

## The Nature of Moral Value

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- **J. L. Mackie** (a moral anti-realist) believes that there are **no universal moral values** based on **relativistic arguments**.
- **Mackie** argues for what he calls **moral skepticism**, which is the view that **there are no objective values**.
  - This is distinguished from **moral objectivism** which involves the view that **there are objective values**.
- Before his arguments, he makes a couple of distinctions first:
  1. He distinguishes moral skepticism from the following views:
    - (a) Our current system of values needs to be replaced with a better system of values.
    - (b) No existing system of moral values is adequate.
  2. He distinguishes second-order moral questions from first-order moral question.
    - (a) First-order moral questions are concerned with moral values.
    - (b) Second-order moral questions are concerned with the possible existence of objective moral values, independently of any system of values.
  3. He distinguishes moral skepticism from simple subjectivism.
  4. He distinguishes the thesis that **there are objective moral values** from the thesis that **there are inner-subjective values**.

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### Thomas Nagel

- **Thomas Nagel** (a moral realist) admits that there is **at least one very general value** that is **objective**.
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