


Università degli Studi di Padova

DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICS

MASTER DEGREE IN COMPUTER SCIENCE



**All You Ever Wanted to Know About  
Dynamic Taint Analysis and Forward  
Symbolic Execution**

(but might have been afraid to ask)

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# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Static and Dynamic Analysis

Dynamic analysis is the analysis of the properties of a running program. In contrast to static analysis, which examines a program's text to derive properties that hold for all executions, dynamic analysis derives properties that hold for one or more executions by examination of the running program. While dynamic analysis cannot prove that a program satisfies a particular property, it can detect violations of properties as well as provide useful information to programmers about the behavior of their programs. Although dynamic analysis provides a powerful mechanism for relating program inputs, this dependence from the inputs makes it incomplete. Viewed in this light, dynamic and static analysis might be better termed "input-centric" and "program-centric" analysis respectively. [1]

Dynamic analysis is attractive because it allows us to reason about actual executions, and thus can perform precise security analysis based upon run-time information. Further, dynamic analysis is simple: we need only consider facts about a single execution at a time.

## 1.2 Questions about user input

The two analyses can be used in conjunction to build formulas representing only the parts of an execution that depend upon tainted values.

### 1.2.1 Is the final value affected by user input? $\Rightarrow$ Dynamic Taint Analysis

Dynamic taint analysis runs a program and observes which computations are affected by predefined taint sources such as user input. . Any program value whose computation depends on data derived from a taint source is considered *tainted*. Any other value is considered *untainted*.

### 1.2.2 What input will make execution reach this line of code? $\Rightarrow$ Forward Symbolic Execution

Dynamic forward symbolic execution automatically builds a logical formula describing a program execution path, which reduces the problem of reasoning about the execution to the domain of logic.

## 1.3 Applications

The number of security applications utilizing these two techniques is enormous. Example security research areas employing either dynamic taint analysis, forward symbolic execution, or a mix of the two, are the following:

- **Unknown Vulnerability Detection:** Dynamic taint analysis can look for misuses of user input during an execution. For example, dynamic taint analysis can be used to prevent code injection attacks by monitoring whether user input is executed;
- **Automatic Input Filter Generation:** Forward symbolic execution can be used to automatically generate input filters that detect and remove exploits from the input stream. Filters generated in response to actual executions are attractive because they provide strong accuracy guarantees;
- **Malware Analysis:** Taint analysis and forward symbolic execution are used to analyze how information flows through a malware binary, explore trigger-based behavior and detect emulators;
- **Test Case Generation:** Taint analysis and forward symbolic execution are used to automatically generate inputs to test programs, and can generate inputs that cause two implementations of the same protocol to behave differently.

## 2 SimpIL: The language

### 2.1 The basics

A precise definition of dynamic taint analysis or forward symbolic execution must target a specific language: we use SIMPIL, a Simple Intermediate Language. Although the language is simple, it is powerful enough to express typical languages as varied as Java and assembly code. Indeed, the language is representative of internal representations used by compilers for a variety of programming languages. A program in this language consists of a sequence of numbered statements. Statements in our language consist of assignments, assertions, jumps, and conditional jumps.

Expressions are side-effect free, and we use  $\Diamond b$  to represent typical binary operators, e.g., addition, subtraction, etc. Similarly,  $\Diamond u$  represents unary operators such as logical negation. The statement `get_input(src)` returns input from source `src`. We use a dot (`.`) to denote an argument that is ignored, e.g., we will write `get_input(.)` when the exact input source is not relevant. For simplicity, we consider only expressions (constants, variables, etc.) that evaluate to 32-bit integer values.

Because dynamic program analyses are defined in terms of actual program executions, operational semantics also provide a natural way to define a dynamic analysis. Each statement rule is of the form:

$$\frac{\text{computation}}{\langle \text{current state} \rangle, \text{stmt} \rightarrow \langle \text{end state} \rangle, \text{stmt}'}$$

Rules are deterministic and read bottom to top, left to right. Given a statement, we pattern-match the statement to find the applicable rule.

### 2.2 Discussion

## Bibliography

- [1] Thomas Ball. “The concept of dynamic analysis”. In: *Software Engineering—ESEC/FSE’99*. Springer. 1999, p. 216 (cit. on p. 2).