Taint Mechanisms

Advanced topics in Computer Security

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Outline



Introduction


Dynamic Taint Analysis

Forward Symbolic Execution

Conclusions



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Input Analysis



There are two essential questions about the input analysis:

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Input Analysis



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- 1. Is the final value affected by user input?
 - Dynamic Taint Analysis!
 - Tracks information flow between sources and sinks

Input Analysis



There are two essential questions about the input analysis:

- 1. Is the final value affected by user input?
 - Dynamic Taint Analysis!
 - Tracks information flow between sources and sinks
- 2. What input will make execution reach this line of code?
 - Forward Symbolic Execution
 - Allows us to reason about the behavior of a program on many different inputs





```
Tainted
```

$$(x) := get_input(x)$$

$$z := 42$$





$$x := get_input(x)$$
 $z := 42$
 $y := x + z$
 $goto y$
Is y taited?



```
x := get_input()
z := 42
                Js y taited?
goto v
            It depends on the
             selected policy
```


What's a policy?



- ► A taint policy specifies three properties:
 - Taint Introduction
 - ► How is taint introduced into a system?
 - Taint Propagation
 - ▶ How does taint propagate into a system?
 - Taint Checking
 - Is the current operation secure?
- Undertainting vs Overtainting







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▶ Sanitization problem





▶ Sanitization problem

 $b := a \oplus a$





Sanitization problem

b := a ⊕ a

Pure dynamic taint analysis considers data flows...

...but it ignores control-flows

x := get_input(src)

if x == 1 then goto 3 else goto 4

y := 1z := 42





► Sanitization problem

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What about different security policies for different I/O channels?





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What about different security policies for different I/O channels?

→ Static analysis

Forward Symbolic Execution



- We can reason about the behavior of a program using the logic...
- ... and it is conceptually a very simple process

```
x := 2 * get_input(src)
if x - 5 == 14 then goto 3 else goto 4
// line 3: catastrophic failure
// line 4: normal behavior
```

Forward Symbolic Execution



- We can reason about the behavior of a program using the logic...
- ... and it is conceptually a very simple process


```
x := 2 * get_input(src)
if x - 5 == 14 then goto 3 else goto 4
// line 3: catastrophic failure
// line 4: normal behavior
```

- get_input(src) now returns a symbol instead of a concrete value
- But now expressions cannot be fully evaluated to a concrete value

Path Selection and Performance



- For each conditional jump we must decide what path to follow first
 - But some path may never terminate
- ► Exponential blowup due to branches




Path Selection and Performance

- For each conditional jump we must decide what path to follow first
 - But some path may never terminate

while
$$(3^n + 4^n == 5^n) \{n++; \ldots\}$$

► Exponential blowup due to branches



Path Selection and Performance



- For each conditional jump we must decide what path to follow first
 - But some path may never terminate

 while $(3^n + 4^n == 5^n) \{n++; \ldots\}$
- Exponential blowup due to branches
- Solutions
 - Path Selection Heuristics
 - Concolic Testing
 - Depth-First or Random Search
 - More and faster hardware
 - Identify redundancies between formulas
 - Identify independent subformulas

A small comparison




Dynamic Taint Analysis

Forward Symbolic Execution

A small comparison



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Dynamic taint analysis analyzes only feasible paths

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Conclusions



- v Conceptually simple methods of analysis
- v There are a lot of possible use cases
 - Malware detection and analysis
 - Automatic testing
 - Automatic programs understanding

- x Usable with some care
- x The effectiveness depends on the application



Thank you for allowing me to taint your time!

Questions?



SimplL Grammar



```
stmt*
program
stmt \ s ::= var := exp \mid store(exp, exp)
                  goto exp assert exp
                  if exp then goto exp
                    else goto exp
            ::= load(exp) \mid exp \mid \Diamond_b exp \mid \Diamond_u exp
exp e
                  | var | get_input(src) | v
\Diamond_b
            ::= typical binary operators
\Diamond_u
            ::= typical unary operators
value v ::= 32-bit unsigned integer
```

SimplL Operational Semantic



► Each statement rule of the operational semantic is like:

$$\frac{\text{computation}}{<\!\text{current state}>,\,\text{stmt}} \rightarrow <\!\text{end state}>,\,\text{stmt}$$

- ► The state is composed of:
 - Program statements (∑)
 - ullet Current memory state (μ)
 - Current values for variables (Δ)
- Program counter (pc)
- Current statement (i)



Memory Address Problems Forward Symbolic Execution

- What are we supposed to do if a referenced address is derived from user input?
 - LOAD, STORE → Symbolic Memory Address
 - $\bullet \ \ \mathsf{GOTO} \to \textbf{Symbolic Jumps}$
- Solutions
 - Concolic testing
 - SMT (Satisfiability Modulo Theories) solvers
 - ► *NP*-Complete problem!
 - Static and alias analysis