




Memory Safety in Systems Languages

Major Area Exam

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Committee:

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Outline

Motivation

Spatial Safety

- Fat Pointers and Shadow Structures

- Referent Objects

- Dependent Types

Temporal Safety

- Capabilities and Locks

- Effects and Regions

- Linear Types and Ownership

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Infrastructure software upon which applications are built

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Embedded Systems, Compilers, Garbage Collectors, Device Drivers, File Systems

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- Memory errors become **type errors**, management happens at **compile-time**

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Spatial Safety

Always access within object's **bounds**

Spatial Safety


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
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
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
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Some approaches:

- Fat Pointers and Shadow Structures
- Referent Objects
- Dependent Types

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Potential pointer dereference problems:

- Null
- Uninitialized
- Out-of-bounds
- Manufactured

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
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
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
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Fat Pointer Approaches

SafeC¹:

- Safe pointers have value, base, and size
- Complete spatial safety, if transparent storage management and no safe pointer attribute manipulation
- 275% space overhead, 2-6x runtime overhead, 0.35-3x code size overhead
- Some static optimization based on still-valid previous checks

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Cyclone²:

- Annotations for non-array vs array pointers (can specify size)
- Tagged unions and automatic tag injection

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- Separate pointers on usage (SAFE, SEQ, WILD)
- Whole-program inference to find as many SAFE then SEQ pointers as possible
- Reduce WILD pointers⁴ using physical subtyping⁵ for upcasts
- Special pointer RTTI carrying runtime type for downcasts

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Fail-Safe C⁶:

- Combines fat pointers w/ fat integers and virtual structure offsets

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7         assert(p.base != 0 &&
8               0 <= p.cur &&
9               p.cur < p.bound);
10        if (*p.cur == token) break;
11        p.cur = p.cur + (1 * sizeof(int));
12        p.base = p.base;    // optimized out
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2               int *SAFE end,
3               int token)
4 {
5     int *SEQ p = data;
6     while (p.cur < end) {
7         assert(p.base != 0 &&
8               0 <= p.cur &&
9               p.cur < p.bound);
10        if (*p.cur == token) break;
11        p.cur = p.cur + (1 * sizeof(int));
12        p.base = p.base; // optimized out
13        p.bound = p.bound; // " "
14    }
15    ...(repeat lines 7-9)...
16    return (*p.cur == token);
17 }
```

MSCC⁷

⁷Xu, DuVarney, and Sekar, “An Efficient and Backwards-compatible Transformation to Ensure Memory Safety of C Programs”, 2004.

MSCC⁷

- *Split* metadata from pointer, preserving layout
- Every value has linked shadow structure mirroring entire data structure
- Transform every function call to take additional metadata parameters
- Wrappers for external functions; cannot detect memory errors

⁷Xu, DuVarney, and Sekar, “An Efficient and Backwards-compatible Transformation to Ensure Memory Safety of C Programs”, 2004.

Shadow Structures Example

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1 struct ptr_info {
2     void *base;
3     unsigned long bound;
4 };
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6     int *data, ptr_info *data_info,
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8     int token)
9 {
10     int *p = data;
11     ptr_info p_info = *data_info;
12     while (p < end) {
13         CHECK_SPATIAL(p, sizeof(*p), p_info);
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Outline

Motivation

Spatial Safety

Fat Pointers and Shadow Structures

Referent Objects

Dependent Types

Temporal Safety

Capabilities and Locks

Effects and Regions

Linear Types and Ownership

Referent Objects

Objects^{8,9}

- Metadata about **objects**, not pointers

⁸ Jones and Kelly, “Backwards-compatible bounds checking for arrays and pointers in C programs”, 1997.

⁹ Ruwase and Lam, “A Practical Dynamic Buffer Overflow Detector”, 2004.

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- Bounds check on **pointer arithmetic**
- 2-12x overhead

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Advantages:

- Compatible with uninstrumented code

Disadvantages:

- Special mechanisms to handle legal OOB pointers
- Splay-tree object lookup overhead
- Incomplete spatial safety: **sub-object overflows**

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The Sub-Object Problem

```
1 struct node {char str[3]; void (*func)(); };  
2 struct node *n = (struct node *) malloc(sizeof(node));  
3 char *s = n.str;  
4 strcpy(s, "bad!");
```

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```

- `n` and `s` have the same address \Rightarrow map to same object in global database
- `strcpy` will see `s`'s size as that of `n`

Referent Objects Approaches

SafeCode¹⁰

- Use automatic pool allocation (APA)¹¹
- Use separate, **smaller** data structures to store bounds metadata for **each partition**
- 1.2x overhead

¹⁰Dhurjati and Adve, “Backwards-compatible Array Bounds Checking for C with Very Low Overhead”, 2006.

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Baggy Bounds Checking (BBC)¹²

- Compact bounds representation and efficient way to look up object bounds
- Align base addresses to be multiple of padded size
- Replace splay tree with small lookup table
- 0.6x overhead

¹⁰Dhurjati and Adve, “Backwards-compatible Array Bounds Checking for C with Very Low Overhead”, 2006.

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Softbound¹³

- Base and bound metadata for each pointer, stored in disjoint metadata table

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- 67% overhead

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Dependent Types

Dependent types are *typed-valued functions*¹⁴

¹⁴Pierce, *Advanced topics in types and programming languages*, 2005.

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$$\text{Vector} : \text{Nat} \rightarrow \text{Type} \rightarrow \text{Type}$$

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- Based on type theory work by Martin-Löf¹⁵
- **Undecidability** of type checking: arbitrary computation to check type equality
- Work on defining equality and restricting forms of index terms

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Early Uses of Dependent Types

Dependent ML¹⁶ and Cayenne¹⁷

- Reduce static array bound checking to constraint satisfiability
- DML uses *indexed types*: limit indices to linear integer and boolean expressions; compile-time decidable
- Cayenne has *no restrictions* on types: undecidability of arbitrary expression equivalence and thus type checking

Xanadu¹⁸

- Imperative environment
- Restrict index expressions in types to integer constraint domain

¹⁶Xi and Pfenning, “Eliminating Array Bound Checking Through Dependent Types”, 1998.

¹⁷Augustsson, “Cayenne—a Language with Dependent Types”, 1998.

¹⁸Xi, “Imperative programming with dependent types”, 2000.

Dependent Types in Imperative Languages

SafeDrive¹⁹ and Deputy^{20, 21}

- User-added annotations relating pointers to bounds

¹⁹Zhou et al., “SafeDrive”, 2006.

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 1. Automatic addition of bounds annotations for pointer types

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Deputy Example for Spatial Safety

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1  int find_token(int *data,  
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3                int token)  
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Abstract Syntax, For Your Consideration

$x, y \in \text{Variables}$ $\text{op} \in \text{Binary ops}$ $n \in \text{Integers}$ $\text{comp} \in \text{Comparison Ops}$

Ctors $C ::= \text{int} \mid \text{ref} \mid \text{array}$

Types $\tau ::= C \mid \tau_1 \tau_2 \mid \tau e$

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Exprs $e ::= n \mid l \mid e_1 \text{ op } e_2$

Cmds $c ::= l := e \mid \text{assert}(\gamma) \mid c_1; c_2 \mid \dots$

Preds $\gamma ::= e_1 \text{ comp } e_2 \mid \text{true} \mid \gamma_1 \wedge \gamma_2$

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$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash e : \text{array } \tau \quad e_{len} \Rightarrow \gamma_e}{\Gamma \vdash *e; \tau \Rightarrow \gamma_e \wedge (0 < e_{len})} \text{ (ARRAY Deref)}$$

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Týr²³

- Augments LLVM IR with dependent pointer types
- Uses programmer annotations insert run-time bounds checks
- LLVM optimizations remove always-true checks; error if always-false

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- Extend C with two *checked pointer types*: `_Ptr<T>` and `_Array_ptr<T>`
- Associated bounds expressions indicating where bounds are stored
- Isolate (un)safe code with *checked code regions*

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Low*²⁵

- DSL for verified, efficient low-level programming in F*
- Write F* syntax against library modelling lower-level view of C memory

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Quick Spatial Recap

Spatial Safety

- Arrays and pointers

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Outline

Motivation

Spatial Safety

Fat Pointers and Shadow Structures

Referent Objects

Dependent Types

Temporal Safety

Capabilities and Locks

Effects and Regions

Linear Types and Ownership

Prevent accessing object that has been **previously deallocated**

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- Capabilities and locks
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1  int attach(struct sock *sk) {
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3          free(sk); return 1;
4      }
5      return 0;
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7  void mq_notify(sigevent *n) {
8      struct sock_t *sock;
9      while (n->try) {
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- Dangling pointers

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A Real Bug

- Linux Kernel in `ipc/mqueue.c`
- July 2017
- https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1470659

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2      if (sk->bad) {
3          free(sk); return 1;
4      }
5      return 0;
6  }
7  void mq_notify(sigevent *n) {
8      struct sock_t *sock;
9      while (n->try) {
10         sock = malloc_sock(n->info);
11         if (attach(sock)){
12             //sock = NULL;
13             break;
14         }
15     }
16     if (sock) free(sock);
17 }
```

Potential pointer dereference problems:

- Double frees
- Dangling pointers

A Real Bug

- Linux Kernel in `ipc/mqueue.c`
- July 2017
- https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1470659

Goals:

- Good: Detecting use-after-free
- Better: Eliminating free entirely

A Comment on Garbage Collection

Garbage collection

²⁶Boehm and Weiser, "Garbage Collection in an Uncooperative Environment", 1988.

A Comment on Garbage Collection

Garbage collection

- Relinquish control of object location and layout to runtime

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A Comment on Garbage Collection

Garbage collection

- Relinquish control of object location and layout to runtime
- Complete temporal safety, but...
 - Non-zero overhead
 - Drag
 - Loss of real-time guarantees/predictability
 - Reduced reference locality, increased page fault/cache miss rates
- Some spatial approaches (e.g. Fail-Safe C, CCured) use Boehm-Demers-Weister²⁶

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Outline

Motivation

Spatial Safety

Fat Pointers and Shadow Structures

Referent Objects

Dependent Types

Temporal Safety

Capabilities and Locks

Effects and Regions

Linear Types and Ownership

Capabilities and Locks

²⁷Nagarakatte, Zhao, Milo M.K. Martin, et al., “CETS”, 2010.

²⁸Nagarakatte, M. M. K. Martin, and Zdancewic, “Everything You Want to Know About Pointer-Based Checking”, 2015.

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Capabilities and Locks

- SafeC, MSCC
 - Unique capability associated with each memory block
 - Stored in capability store, marked invalid on free
 - Check if pointer's capability copy is still valid on dereference

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- Memsafe²⁹
 - Set bounds of deallocated pointer to invalid value

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2      key_t sk_key,
3      lock_t *sk_lock_addr) {
4      if (sk_key != *sk_lock_addr)
5          abort();
6      if (sk->bad) {
7          if (Freeable_ptrs_map.lookup(sk_key) != sk)
8              abort();
9          free(sk);
10         *sk_lock_addr = INVALID_KEY;
11         deallocate_lock(sk_lock_addr);
12         return 1;
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14     return 0;
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5      while (n->try) {
6          sock = malloc_sock(n->info);
7          sock_key = Next_key++;
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Effect types describe the *effects* of the computation leading to a value³⁰

- Opening a file
- Modifying an object

³⁰Pierce, *Advanced topics in types and programming languages*, 2005.

Fluent Languages,³¹ MFX³²

- Mix functional and imperative languages

³¹David K. Gifford and John M. Lucassen, "Integrating functional and imperative programming", 1986.

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
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
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Effects

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E.g.

- `update` is Procedure
- `nth` is Observer
- `arrayCreate` is Function
- `length` is Pure

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Type and Effect Systems³³

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Region-Based Memory Management

Regions³⁴

- Divide heap into stack of sub-heaps (i.e. regions)

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- Unreasonable object lifetimes due to LIFO ordering of region lifetimes

³⁴Tofte and Talpin, “Region-Based Memory Management”, 1997.

Early Use of Regions

Capability Calculus³⁵

- Arbitrarily-ordered region allocation/deallocation, via capability tracking
- Capability: set of regions presently valid to access

³⁵Crary, Walker, and Morrisett, “Typed Memory Management in a Calculus of Capabilities”, 1999.

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Also see:

- RC³⁶
- Reaps³⁷
- Control-C³⁸ and Type Homogeneity³⁹

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Regions in Cyclone

Cyclone,⁴⁰ again!

- Three region types:

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 - single **heap** region

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 - **stack** regions

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 - single **heap** region
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 - single **heap** region
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- Lifetime subtyping: region A $<:$ region B \Leftrightarrow region A **outlives** region B

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- Three region types:
 - single **heap** region
 - **stack** regions
 - **dynamic** regions
- Lifetime subtyping: region A $<:$ region B \Leftrightarrow region A **outlives** region B
- Sane defaults by inferring region annotations on pointer types

⁴⁰Grossman et al., “Region-based Memory Management in Cyclone”, 2002.

Regions in Cyclone

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```
1 struct Set< $\alpha$ ,  $\rho$ ,  $\epsilon$ >
2 {
3     list_t< $\alpha$ ,  $\rho$ > elts;
4     int (*cmp)( $\alpha$ ,  $\alpha$ ;  $\epsilon$ );
5 }
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1 struct Set< $\alpha$ ,  $\rho$ >
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3     list_t< $\alpha$ ,  $\rho$ > elts;
4     int (*cmp)( $\alpha$ ,  $\alpha$ ; regions_of( $\alpha$ ));
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```

Some Cyclone Abstract Syntax

kinds	κ	$::= T \mid R$
type and region vars	α, ρ	
region sets	ϵ	$::= \emptyset \mid \alpha \mid \epsilon_1 \cup \epsilon_2$
region constraints	γ	$::= \emptyset \mid \gamma, \epsilon <: \rho$
constructors	τ	$::= \alpha \mid \text{int} \mid \tau_1 \xrightarrow{\epsilon} \tau_2 \mid \tau @ \rho \mid \text{handle}(\rho) \mid \forall \alpha : \kappa \triangleright \gamma. \tau \mid \dots$
expressions	e	$::= x_\rho \mid v \mid e \langle \tau \rangle \mid * e \mid \text{new}(e_1)e_2 \mid e_1(e_2) \mid \&e \mid \dots$
functions	f	$::= \rho : (\tau_1 \ x_\rho) \xrightarrow{\epsilon} \tau_2 = \{s\} \mid \Lambda \alpha : \kappa \triangleright \gamma. f$
statements	s	$::= e \mid s_1; s_2 \mid \text{if } (e) \ s_1 \ \text{else } s_2 \mid \rho : \{ \tau \ x_\rho = e; \ s \} \mid \text{region} \langle \rho \rangle \ x_\rho \ s \mid \dots$
		...

Example Cyclone Judgments

$$\Delta; \Gamma; \gamma; \epsilon; \tau \vdash_{stmt} S$$
$$\Delta; \Gamma; \gamma; \epsilon \vdash e : \tau$$
$$\Gamma \vdash \epsilon \Rightarrow \rho$$

Example Cyclone Judgments

$\Delta; \Gamma; \gamma; \epsilon; \tau \vdash_{stmt} S$

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Δ : in-scope type/region vars

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Soundness Theorem⁴¹:

- The program cannot get stuck from type errors or dangling-pointer dereferences.
- The terminating program deallocates all regions it allocates

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Benchmarks

- 86 lines of region annotation-related changes across 18,000 lines (6%)
- Eliminate heap allocation entirely for web-server
- Near-zero overhead (from garbage collection and bounds checking)

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Outline

Motivation

Spatial Safety

Fat Pointers and Shadow Structures

Referent Objects

Dependent Types

Temporal Safety

Capabilities and Locks

Effects and Regions

Linear Types and Ownership

Linear types^{42,43} ensure that every variable is used exactly *once*.

- The **world** is a non-duplicatable resource

⁴²Girard, “Linear logic”, 1987.

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- Efficiency: safe to destructively update an array
- **Memory management: can immediately collect used values**

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Clay⁴⁴

- Type-theoretic basis for giving type-safe code more control over memory
- Singleton types to type check loads, coercion functions to modify values' type safely

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PACLANG⁴⁵

- Program network processors for handling packets
- Unique ownership property: each packet in heap is referenced by exactly one thread
- Allow mutable aliasing within the same thread
- Operations for a functions to 1) take ownership or 2) create local aliases

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COGENT^{46, 47}

- Pure, polymorphic language with linear types for writing low-level systems code

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
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
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- Reason with **interactive theorem prover**
- Missing functionality can be implemented in C, manually verified
- No trusted compiler, runtime, or garbage collector needed

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Person-Months of Work

- Proof Framework: 33.5
- Compiler: 10
- Proofs: 18

Lines (kLOC)

- Isabelle theorems: 17
- Compiler: 9.5
- ext2 Filesystem: 6.5 (Isabelle/HOL: 76.7)

Other Linear Types

Quasi-linear types⁴⁸

- Distinguish consumed values from those that may be returned
- Use κ to control how often a variable of type τ^κ is used (many times locally)

⁴⁸Kobayashi, “Quasi-linear Types”, 1999.

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- Keys associate static capabilities with run-time resources
- Annotate functions with effect clause (pre- and post-conditions on held-key set)
- Windows 2000 locking errors, IRP ownership model

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Ordered types for memory layout⁵⁰

- Variables must be used in order \Rightarrow memory locations
- *Orderly lambda calculus* for size-preserving memory operations

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Ownership

Types can represent **ownership** and prevent *aliasing* and *mutation* on the same location.

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LCL⁵¹

- owned annotation to denote reference with obligation to release storage
- dependent annotation for sharing; user ensures lifetimes contained properly

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- Object's definition includes **unique** object context that owns it

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Singularity⁵³

- Type system tracks resources, passes ownership of arguments to callee

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1 let (snd, rcv) = channel();
2 join(move || {
3     let mut v = Vec::new();
4     v.push(0);
5     snd.send(v);
6     v.push(1);
7 },
8 move || {
9     let v = rcv.recv().unwrap();
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- Ownership and lifetimes
- Type system enforces that objects have unique **owners**
- Objects may be borrowed for no longer than owner
- Object automatically **deallocated** when owner leaves scope
- Unsafe sections for mutating raw pointers and aliased state
- Regions \approx lifetimes (region capabilities \approx lifetime tokens)

```
1 let (snd, rcv) = channel();
2 join(move || {
3     let mut v = Vec::new();
4     v.push(0);
5     snd.send(v);
6     v.push(1);
7 },
8 move || {
9     let v = rcv.recv().unwrap();
10    println!("Received: ␣{:?}", v);
11 });
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Quick Temporal Recap

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- Effects and regions

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- Effects and regions
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- Memory errors \equiv *type errors*

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- Be reasonable and optimistic

Thanks!