

Bridging Expertise Gaps: The Role of LLMs in Human-AI Collaboration for Cybersecurity

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Abstract—This study investigates whether large language models (LLMs) can function as intelligent collaborators to bridge expertise gaps in cybersecurity decision-making. We examine two representative tasks—phishing email detection and intrusion detection—that differ in data modality, cognitive complexity, and user familiarity. Through a controlled mixed-methods user study, $n = 58$ (phishing, $n = 34$; intrusion, $n = 24$), we find that human-AI collaboration improves task performance, reducing false positives in phishing detection and false negatives in intrusion detection. A learning effect is also observed when participants transition from collaboration to independent work, suggesting that LLMs can support long-term skill development. Our qualitative analysis shows that interaction dynamics—such as LLM definitiveness, explanation style, and tone—influence user trust, prompting strategies, and decision revision. Users engaged in more analytic questioning and showed greater reliance on LLM feedback in high-complexity settings. These results provide design guidance for building interpretable, adaptive, and trustworthy human-AI teaming systems, and demonstrate that LLMs can meaningfully support non-experts in reasoning through complex cybersecurity problems.

Index Terms—Phishing, Intrusion Detection, LLMs, Human-AI Teaming

I. INTRODUCTION

Cybersecurity operations increasingly rely on timely, accurate decision-making in the face of growing data complexity, threat diversity, and skill shortages [1]. Whether identifying phishing emails or detecting network intrusions, analysts must interpret ambiguous signals, often under time pressure and with incomplete context [2], [3]. While expert knowledge remains indispensable, the demand for such expertise continues to outpace supply, leaving many organisations reliant on less experienced personnel [4], [5]. This widening gap between the growing complexity of cybersecurity tasks and the limited availability of expert analysts raises a critical question: *Can large language models (LLMs) serve as intelligent collaborators to help bridge this gap?*

Recent advancements in generative AI and conversational agents, particularly LLMs such as GPT-4 [6] and LLaMA [7], offer a unique opportunity to augment human decision-making [1], [8]–[11]. Their ability to parse natural language queries, explain their reasoning, and synthesise diverse data inputs makes them promising candidates for assisting users in high-stakes environments [12]. However, integrating LLMs into human workflows—especially in domains like cyberse-

curity that demand rigorous analytical judgement—introduces new challenges [13]. Beyond output accuracy, we must consider how users interpret, question, and rely on these systems [14], [15]. A key concern—and central question—is whether non-expert users can *effectively collaborate* with LLMs to improve decision quality without falling prey to over-reliance or misinterpretation¹.

In this study, we investigate the role of LLMs in supporting non-expert users across two cybersecurity tasks of varying complexity—phishing email detection and intrusion detection. The former is highly relevant for everyday security practices, and the latter is a critical task in security operations centres (SOCs). These tasks differ not only in their technical requirements but also in their cognitive demands [16], [17]². Phishing is largely text-based and context-sensitive, benefiting from commonsense reasoning and familiarity with communication norms [16], [18], [19]. In contrast, intrusion detection is more data-intensive and abstract (including tabular data), requiring pattern recognition across complex system behaviours and familiarity with low-level network traffic patterns and anomaly indicators [20], [21]. By analysing both tasks within a unified experimental framework, we examine how LLM collaborations impact user performance and interaction dynamics across tasks with different cognitive and technical demands.

To explore these questions, we conducted a controlled user study involving 58 participants: 34 in the phishing task and 24 in the intrusion detection task³. Each participant completed their assigned task in two phases: independently and in collaboration with an LLM-powered assistant. To holistically evaluate the effectiveness of LLM-assisted decision-making in cybersecurity contexts, it is critical to consider both outcome-oriented metrics and interactional dynamics [22]–[24]. Prior work in human-AI collaboration emphasises that task performance alone does not capture the complexities of collaboration quality, user experience, or decision-making behaviour [13], [25], [26]. Therefore, our study examined two key dimensions: (i) quantitative improvements in task performance (precision, recall, F1-score), and (ii) qualitative aspects of human-AI

¹In context of this paper, a cybersecurity analyst is considered an expert and individuals with limited knowledge of the cybersecurity task (e.g., phishing or intrusion detection) are considered as non-experts.

²See Appendix Section A for justification and discussion on task selection.

³A few participants participated in both studies, but in separate sittings.

interaction, including the types of questions asked, the nature of LLM responses, and behavioural indicators of trust and reliance [27].

Our results suggest several noteworthy findings. In phishing detection, LLM collaboration significantly improves precision by helping users filter out false positives, whereas in intrusion detection, it improves recall by reducing missed detections. However, performance gains are strongly modulated by the perceived definitiveness of LLM responses: users tend to accept AI suggestions more readily when the model appears confident, regardless of its objective correctness [28]. This highlights the dual potential and risk of LLMs—while they can enhance human performance, poorly calibrated confidence may lead to either over-reliance or missed opportunities for correction [29].

In addressing these dynamics, our work contributes to a growing body of research that explores not just whether AI can outperform humans, but how AI can *enhance human decision-making* [30], [31]. Unlike prior efforts that evaluate AI performance in isolation or treat humans as passive recipients of AI output [32], our study aligns closely with the human-AI collaboration works that treat the human and AI as a collaborative unit [33], [34]. This perspective allows us to examine not only decision accuracy, but also *how* decisions are made, revised, or resisted in response to AI suggestions.

The primary objectives of our work are twofold, defined by the following RQs:

RQ1: IMPACT ON PERFORMANCE: How does human-AI collaboration influence performance in cybersecurity tasks such as phishing email detection and intrusion detection, compared to when humans work independently? *We assess this using precision, recall and F1-score.*

RQ2: INTERACTION DYNAMICS: What are the key qualitative aspects of human-AI interactions during cybersecurity tasks? *We analyse the types of questions posed by participants, potential biases in them, the AI's responses, and the overall conversational dynamics between humans and AI.*

In addressing these RQs, our findings make the following contributions to the field of human-AI collaboration in cybersecurity:

- **Empirical evidence of performance gains through human-AI collaboration.** Across both phishing and intrusion detection tasks, we show that non-expert users improve classification outcomes when supported by LLM-powered assistants. Notably, LLMs offer greater performance benefits in the more complex intrusion detection task, highlighting their potential as analytical partners in data-driven decision-making.
- **Qualitative insights into human-AI interaction dynamics.** Through qualitative analysis of user-LLM interactions, we identify key behavioural patterns—including question framing, reliance tendencies, and trust signals—that shape the effectiveness of LLM collaboration. We find that definitiveness in AI responses can not only improve accuracy but also amplify user errors when the AI is incorrect, underscoring the need for calibrated confidence, confirming prior research [28], [35]–[38].

- **Design implications for trustworthy AI systems in cybersecurity.** Based on our findings, we highlight implications for building LLM-based assistants that support human reasoning without fostering over-reliance. These include the importance of actionable explanations, AI's feedback on uncertainty, and interaction mechanisms that encourage reflective decision-making.

Together, these contributions advance our understanding of how LLMs can serve not only as automation tools, but as *collaborative assistants* that enhance cybersecurity decision-making for non-expert users. In the next section, we situate our work within the broader context of existing literature on AI in cybersecurity and human-AI collaboration.

II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS

A. AI in Cybersecurity

AI has been increasingly leveraged for various cybersecurity tasks, including phishing email detection and intrusion detection. Gualberto et al. [39] and Nguyen et al. [40] employed content analysis techniques to identify phishing emails, utilising natural language processing and machine learning methods to enhance detection rates. Similarly, for intrusion detection, researchers have proposed advanced predictive models utilising deep learning, anomaly detection, and supervised learning to identify malicious network activities [41], [42]. These approaches focus on improving the accuracy and speed of detecting potential intrusions in real-time environments. Beyond these, AI has also been utilised for tasks such as malware analysis, data leakage prevention, and automated threat hunting, showcasing its versatility and transformative potential in cybersecurity [43].

B. Human-AI Collaboration in Cybersecurity

Human-AI collaboration has gained significant attention in recent years, particularly in the field of cybersecurity [44]. The integration of AI systems into cybersecurity workflows aims to enhance the capabilities of human analysts, enabling them to handle the increasing volume and complexity of cyber threats more effectively [1], [45], [46]. AI can assist in various tasks, such as malware detection [47], cybersecurity training [48], [49], and vulnerability assessment [50]. Recently, there has been a growing interest in using Large Language Models (LLMs) for cybersecurity tasks, including phishing email detection [51] and intrusion detection [52]. Our work delves deeper into this aspect by examining it through the lens of human-AI collaboration via user studies, an area that, to the best of our knowledge, has not been previously explored.

C. LLMs in Cybersecurity

The advent of LLMs has opened new avenues in cybersecurity applications. Koide et al. [51] introduced ChatSpamDetector, leveraging LLMs for effective phishing email detection, achieving high accuracy and providing detailed reasoning for its determinations. Similarly, Kheddar et al. [52] explored the use of transformers and LLMs for efficient intrusion detection, highlighting their potential in identifying complex cyber




Fig. 1. **Study Design:** In format A, participants complete the task independently first, followed by collaboration with AI. In format B, the order is reversed, starting with AI collaboration before working independently. Both formats are followed by a questionnaire.

threats. These studies underscore the capabilities of LLMs in understanding and analysing unstructured data, making them valuable tools in the cybersecurity domain.

D. Human-AI Interaction Dynamics

Understanding the dynamics of human-AI interaction is crucial for effective collaboration. Studies have shown that the perceived definitiveness of AI responses can significantly influence user trust and decision-making [28], [29]. Over-reliance on AI outputs, especially when presented with high confidence, can lead to errors if the AI is incorrect [36], [37], [53]. Conversely, under-reliance may result in missed opportunities for accurate decision-making. Designing AI systems that provide calibrated confidence and actionable explanations is essential to mitigate these risks and enhance collaborative outcomes [35], [54], [55].

E. Our Study

While existing research has demonstrated the potential of AI and LLMs in various cybersecurity tasks, there is a lack of studies focusing on the collaborative dynamics between non-expert users and AI systems in practical settings. Our work addresses this gap by conducting user studies to evaluate how LLMs can support non-expert users in phishing and intrusion detection tasks, analysing both performance metrics and interaction patterns. This approach provides insights into the design of AI systems that effectively augment human decision-making in cybersecurity contexts.

III. STUDY DESIGN

To investigate the effectiveness of LLMs as collaborative assistants in cybersecurity tasks, we conducted a mixed-methods user study comprising two task domains: *phishing email detection* and *intrusion detection*. Our study examines how human-AI collaboration influences task performance and explores the interaction patterns that shape decision outcomes. The methodology combines quantitative analysis of classification accuracy with qualitative analysis of interaction dynamics.

A. Overview and Objectives

We focused on two representative tasks with distinct cognitive and technical demands:

a) *Phishing Email Detection*: This task involves natural language text and centres on a relatively familiar classification problem. It requires participants to apply common-sense reasoning and interpret contextual cues within potentially deceptive communications.

b) *Intrusion Detection*: In contrast, this task is grounded in structured, tabular data and demands analytical reasoning over low-level network traffic features. It presents a higher cognitive load and is typically less familiar to non-expert users, reflecting its greater technical complexity.

Both tasks were implemented using a within-subjects design, wherein participants first performed them independently, and then in collaboration with an LLM-based assistant. Each session concluded with a post-study questionnaire.

B. AI Assistant Configuration and Persona Design

Participants interacted with LLMs that were configured to simulate the role of domain-specialised cybersecurity assistants. Each model was tailored through prompt engineering and interaction constraints to reflect distinct personas optimised for each task:

- *Phishing Email Detection Assistant*. We employed Llama2-7B to support participants in classifying emails as either phishing or legitimate. The assistant was prompted to analyse both the content and headers of emails, cite specific indicators (e.g., links, domain names), and avoid premature alignment with user hypotheses. It was designed to be cautious, objective, and self-contained in its reasoning.
- *Intrusion Detection Assistant*. We utilised GPT-4 due to its superior reasoning capabilities and support for code execution. This assistant was configured to embody the persona of a security operations centre (SOC) analyst, trained to treat each event as potentially malicious unless convincingly proven otherwise. It was directed to minimise false negatives and reason about anomalies using known intrusion patterns, while also accommodating the possibility of novel attack signatures absent from training data.

These personas were developed based on insights from pilot studies, in which overly agreeable models tended to bias participant decisions. To mitigate this, we instructed the LLMs to maintain analytical independence and justify their conclusions through feature-level reasoning (see the Appendix Section B for more details, including our rationale for LLM model selection).

C. Tasks and Experimental Procedure

In our study, each participant engaged in a three-phase process, as shown in Figure 1:

PHASE 1): Independent Task Completion. Participants classified a set of examples without any AI assistance.

PHASE 2): Collaborative Task Completion. Participants classified a new set of examples while interacting with

TABLE I
PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS. THE LLM EXPERIENCE LEVELS ARE
SELF-EXPRESSED BY THE PARTICIPANTS.

Attribute	Phishing Email Study	Intrusion Study
PARTICIPANTS	34	24
AGE RANGE	20–60	20–60
GENDER	9M / 25F	9M / 15 F
EDUCATION	22 PhDs, 6 M.S., 6 B.S.	12 PhDs, 9 M.S., 3 B.S.
DOMAINS	CS (15), STEM (7), Admin (8), Humanities (4)	CS (24)
LLM EXPERIENCE	None (3), Low (4), Medium (12), High (15)	Medium (6), High (18)
STUDY DURATION	30 mins	60 mins




Fig. 2. Phishing email detection study interface used for human-AI collaboration.

an LLM-powered assistant. They were encouraged to ask questions, request explanations, and revise their classifications if needed.

PHASE 3): Post-Study Questionnaire. Participants provided both structured and open-ended feedback on their experience, including their perceptions of the AI assistant’s utility, confidence, and usability.

For phishing detection, participants reviewed a set of six emails (three phishing and three legitimate). In the intrusion detection task, participants analysed historical network traffic data and were asked to identify whether the given samples (two normal and two intrusion) represented an intrusion or normal behaviour. The samples were equally divided across Phase 1 and Phase 2.

D. Participants

A total of 58 participants were recruited across both studies, with recruitment designed to represent varying levels of task complexity and domain familiarity (see Table I for detailed demographics):

- **Phishing Email Detection.** 34 participants with varied academic and professional backgrounds, including computer science (CS), STEM (excluding CS), humanities, and administration, participated in this study. This diversity reflects the general accessibility of phishing detection as a user-facing task.

- **Intrusion Detection.** 24 participants, all with prior knowledge of computer science and currently studying or doing research on cybersecurity participated in the study. However, none were professional security analysts. The majority held advanced degrees (12 PhDs, 9 M.S.), and all had at least medium experience with LLMs (6 medium, 18 high). While all participants had a basic understanding of what intrusion detection is, none had hands-on experience with the task.

It is important to acknowledge that the varied backgrounds of phishing participants versus the more homogeneous, computer science-oriented intrusion detection group might limit direct comparability between groups. However, this design was intentional: phishing detection participants were representative of typical end-users, while intrusion detection participants mirrored non-expert but technically knowledgeable cybersecurity trainees.

E. Counterbalancing and Task Order

To mitigate learning effects and order bias, we implemented two experimental formats for the phishing study:

STUDY FORMAT A): Independent → Collaborative

STUDY FORMAT B): Collaborative → Independent

Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two formats. This allowed us to assess whether interaction with the LLM influenced subsequent unaided performance. Given the analytical complexity of the intrusion detection task, we intentionally employed a fixed task order—avoiding counterbalancing to avoid participant fatigue and prevent confounding effects under high cognitive load. This decision prioritised engagement, interaction clarity, and data reliability in a demanding setting. Future studies can build on this foundation by incorporating counterbalanced designs to more rigorously investigate learning effects in similarly complex domains.

F. Data Collection and Instrumentation

We collected three types of data during the different phases of this study:

- 1) **Classification Outputs.** Participants’ labels from each task phase were recorded and scored against ground truth labels using precision, recall, and F1-score.
- 2) **Interaction Logs.** All user-LLM conversations were captured and analysed to identify patterns in question framing, LLM response characteristics, and revision behaviour.
- 3) **Questionnaire Responses.** Post-task feedback was gathered through structured questions, open-ended reflection prompts and the system usability scale (SUS).

All participants interacted with a web-based interface—designed to support real-time LLM queries and annotations—to complete the tasks (see Figure 2 for phishing study and Figure 3 for intrusion study).




Fig. 3. Intrusion detection study interface used for human-AI collaboration.

G. Ethical Considerations

The study protocol was reviewed and approved by the *Anonymised* institutional review board (XXX/XX). Informed consent was obtained from all participants. Anonymity and data confidentiality were ensured. Participants could withdraw at any time without penalty.

IV. DATA ANALYSIS SETUP

To address our research questions, we employed a multi-layered analysis strategy that integrates quantitative performance metrics (RQ1) with qualitative insights into interaction patterns (RQ2).

A. Quantitative Analysis Settings

Classification accuracy was evaluated using precision, recall, and F1-score for both the independent and collaborative phases. Additionally, we plotted learning curves to visualise performance trends over successive task examples, allowing us to evaluate possible improvement effects attributable to AI collaboration.

B. Qualitative Analysis Settings

We conducted qualitative analysis on the interaction logs to examine the nature of user-LLM interactions across both tasks. Specifically, the analysis focused on the types of questions posed by participants, the characteristics of the LLM responses, and the conversational flow and dynamics to better understand how humans and AI communicate and collaborate. We employed inductive content analysis [56] with one author

leading the coding process. A second author independently coded a random sample of 36% of the interactions, yielding a 90% agreement rate. Disagreements—primarily related to the type of analysis the participants were seeking and the definitiveness of the LLM responses—were resolved through discussion.

1) *Data Familiarisation*: A preliminary familiarisation phase was conducted to identify key aspects of the data that would inform our understanding of the factors influencing decision-making. This involved two authors engaging in multiple readings of the participant questions and corresponding LLM responses. During this process, the authors actively reflected upon the nature of the questions, the characteristics of the LLM responses, and the research question, RQ2. After these individual reflections, the two authors engaged in collaborative discussions to reach a consensus on the following attributes, related to participant questions and LLM responses, that aligned with the paper’s objectives and the research questions. This phase laid a crucial foundation for guiding subsequent stages of analysis.

2) *Question Attributes*: For each question posed by participants, we identified the following attributes based on RQ2:

- *Nature of Inquiry*. This attribute captured what the participant was seeking from the LLM, e.g., whether they were seeking a direct classification, e.g., *Is this a phishing email?* (P12) or requesting an analysis of specific elements, e.g., *Is there an increase in traffic in comparison to usual?* (15).
- *Inclusion of Participant Classification*. We examined whether participants explicitly included their own classification of the intrusion event or the email within their question, e.g., *Tell me your opinion on the email received; I see it as a “phishing” email* (P21) and *Is there anything suspicious in this email? Could it be “phishing”? It doesn’t appear to me to be suspicious* (P25). This attribute was used to assess whether such framing could introduce potential *bias* towards the questioner’s initial classification, potentially influencing the LLM’s subsequent response.
- *Class-Specific Focus*. We noted whether questions primarily emphasised one specific class, which may have shaped the LLM’s classification, e.g., *“Hi there, do you think this email is a phishing email?”* (P19) or *“Do you think this email is legitimate?”* (P30) compared to *“Please check if this email is phishing or legitimate”* (P7).

3) *LLM Response Attributes*: We focused on three key attributes of the LLM responses—explanation, definitiveness (confidence), and accuracy—as these have been identified as critical factors impacting effective human-AI team performance [57]. For each response, we analysed:

- *Explanation of Classification*. The analysis determined whether the LLM identified and linked specific components of the email or intrusion event to its classification, e.g., *“Suspicious link: The email contains a link that asks you to click on it to restore your account access. This*




Fig. 4. Codebook for user questions in phishing email detection study.

could potentially lead to a phishing page or malware download (AI)”. This would demonstrate the LLM’s ability to explain its decision-making process effectively.

- **Definitiveness (or Confidence) of Classification.** The level of definitiveness expressed by the LLM in its classification was carefully assessed. This assessment was based on the specific phrases employed within the response. A definitive classification would be characterised by statements such as “*I can confidently say this is not a phishing email (AI)*”. In contrast, responses such as “*we cannot conclusively label this as an intrusion (AI)*” would be categorised as less definitive, indicating a degree of uncertainty within the LLM assessment. The analysis aimed to investigate whether the LLM’s level of definitiveness exerted a significant impact on the user’s subsequent performance.
- **LLM Classification.** We coded LLM classifications, marking instances with high uncertainty—such as “*I will not make any definitive conclusions about the legitimacy of this email (AI)*”—as *inconclusive* to avoid misinterpreting the LLM’s assessment.

4) **Codifying Questions and LLM Responses:** The code generation process involved examining the questions and the LLM’s responses to identify patterns, recurring themes, or specific types of information. In this context, a code refers to a label or category representing a particular idea, concept, or intent that emerges from the data. For example, if a participant




Fig. 5. Codebook for LLM responses in phishing email detection study.

asks, “*Is this email a phishing attempt?*”, the intent behind the question could be labelled or “coded” as a *Classification Request* because the user is asking the LLM to classify the email. The process involved the identification and highlighting of key phrases and terms within the participants’ questions and the LLM’s responses that aligned with the above attributes. These highlighted phrases were systematically coded into distinct codes. Finally, a concise and representative phrase or term was selected to encapsulate each group of phrases, thereby establishing the final set of codes. The codebooks for the phishing email detection study are provided in Figure 4 and Figure 5, while Figure 8 and Figure 9 present the codebooks for the intrusion detection study.

5) **Quantitative Analysis of Codes:** A quantitative analysis was conducted to ascertain the impact of the identified codes on user accuracy. Linear regression models examined whether specific codes significantly influenced participants’ final classification decisions. One-hot encoding was applied to represent each code-value pair to facilitate this analysis.

V. RESULTS

A. Quantitative Results (RQ1)

Table II presents a summary of the quantitative performance across both tasks. Key observations and insights are discussed below.

1) **Phishing Email Detection Performance:** In the phishing task, participants achieved a mean F1-score of 0.8087 during independent task completion (Precision = 0.7266; Recall = 0.9118). When collaborating with the LLM, performance improved across all metrics: F1-score = 0.8448; Precision = 0.7656; Recall = 0.9423. The consistent gains in both precision and recall suggest practical value. In particular, the increased

TABLE II

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS. PRECISION, RECALL, AND F1-SCORE FOR PHISHING AND INTRUSION DETECTION TASKS ACROSS LLM-ONLY, HUMAN-ONLY, AND HUMAN-LLM COLLABORATION SETTINGS. AS THE TASK BECOMES MORE DIFFICULT (I.E., FROM PHISHING TO INTRUSION DETECTION), WE OBSERVE A LARGER GAP BETWEEN THE INDEPENDENT AND COLLABORATION SETTINGS’ PERFORMANCE.

User Study	Precision			Recall			F1-score		
	LLM-only	Human-only (Independent)	Human-LLM (Collaboration)	LLM-only	Human-only (Independent)	Human-LLM (Collaboration)	LLM-only	Human-only (Independent)	Human-LLM (Collaboration)
Phishing	0.6000	0.7266	0.7656	1.0000	0.9118	0.9423	0.7500	0.8087	0.8448
Intrusion	1.0000	0.7273	0.7826	0.5000	0.5854	0.7500	0.6667	0.6486	0.7660

precision—reflecting a reduction in false positives—is notable, as it demonstrates the LLM’s effectiveness in helping users avoid over-classifying legitimate emails, a common and costly error in real-world systems.

Insight. These results highlight that LLMs can serve as effective second opinions, especially for borderline or ambiguous cases. The increase in precision is operationally significant for phishing prevention, where false alarms degrade user trust in alerting systems.

2) *Intrusion Detection Performance:* The intrusion task, which was more technically complex, showed a stronger effect. Independent performance was lower overall (F1-score = 0.6486; Precision = 0.7273; Recall = 0.5854), indicating the difficulty of the task for human users—even those with relevant backgrounds. In contrast, during collaboration, performance increased markedly (F1-score = 0.7660; Precision = 0.7826; Recall = 0.7500).

Insight. Collaboration had a disproportionately large benefit on recall—participants missed fewer attacks when working with the LLM. This suggests that the LLM was particularly helpful in identifying subtle indicators of intrusions that users may have otherwise overlooked. The LLM’s conservative bias (treating samples as suspicious unless proven otherwise) likely contributed to this effect.

3) *Comparative Interpretation:* The magnitude of collaborative improvement was larger in intrusion detection than in phishing detection. We attribute this to the difference in cognitive load: phishing classification relies on language-based reasoning familiar to most users, whereas intrusion detection involves abstract, unfamiliar feature sets (e.g., port behaviours, connection counts). In such contexts, the LLM’s role as an analytical partner becomes more critical.

4) *Learning Effects:* We observed a consistent upward trend in performance across both formats, i.e., study format A: independent → collaborative (Question index 1,2,3 independently and 4,5,6 collaboratively) and study format B: collaborative → independent (Question index 1,2,3 collaboratively and 4,5,6 independently), as shown in the learning curve (Figure 6). However, collaborative task completion consistently outperformed independent task completion across all emails, irrespective of the order in which they were presented.

Insight. Interaction with the LLM may have instructional value. Even when users began with AI support and later worked independently, their accuracy improved. This suggests that LLMs can act as embedded training tools, accelerating task-specific learning.




Fig. 6. Learning Curve Analysis: Average F1-Score over study stages in phishing email detection task.

B. Qualitative Results (RQ2)

We now present findings from the qualitative analysis of user-LLM interaction logs, which reveal how collaboration dynamics differ by task and influence outcomes. We report results thematically: user question types, LLM response characteristics, and patterns of over-/under-reliance.

1) *Interaction Patterns in Phishing Task:* Across 138 question-response pairs, most participant queries were objective (90.6%) and fell into either classification requests (49.3%) or component-level analysis (39.1%). Participants referenced specific email elements (e.g., URLs, sender addresses) in 41% of cases. Open-ended queries were rare (11.6%).

Insight. The prevalence of direct classification requests reflects phishing’s conceptual simplicity. Users often sought binary decisions rather than nuanced discussion. This suggests that LLMs used in phishing contexts should prioritise clear decisions while still offering traceable rationales to enhance user understanding.

LLM responses were accurate 79% of the time, inconclusive in 12%, and incorrect in 9%. Notably, 98% of responses referenced specific email components, but only 49% were definitively phrased (e.g., “This is a phishing email”). Logistic regression revealed that definitiveness strongly predicted whether users followed the AI’s advice ($\beta = 1.57, p = 0.026$).

Insight. Participants were more likely to accept LLM advice when it was expressed confidently—even when incorrect. This highlights the double-edged nature of confident LLM output: it can aid decision-making, but also amplify errors if uncalibrated.

2) *Interaction Patterns in Intrusion Task:* In 48 intrusion task sessions, user queries were predominantly analysis-driven

(44.4%), followed by anomaly detection (18.5%) and model-based requests (e.g., “run isolation forest”) at 18.5%. Only one user asked for a simple classification. This shift in question type reflects the greater data complexity and abstraction of intrusion detection.

We observed that 55.6% of user queries referenced specific features (e.g., duration, port numbers), and 70% avoided mentioning a class (e.g., “intrusion” or “normal”), thus reducing potential framing bias.

LLM response accuracy was lower than in the phishing task (56%), with 31% inconclusive and 13% incorrect. This drop is likely due to the noisier feature space and higher ambiguity of tabular network data. Nonetheless, responses that were confident and correct had the strongest influence on participant accuracy.

Insight. Users in more complex tasks posed exploratory questions and sought analytical assistance, not just binary answers. LLMs in such contexts should be equipped with reasoning scaffolds—e.g., comparing similar samples, highlighting anomalies—rather than merely returning labels.

3) *Trust Calibration and Reliance Patterns:* We observed three distinct trust-related behaviours:

- *Alignment.* Participants revised their incorrect labels to match correct LLM predictions in 14 phishing and 14 intrusion cases.
- *Over-reliance.* In 3 phishing and 5 intrusion cases, users adopted incorrect AI advice, despite being initially correct.
- *Under-reliance.* In 8 phishing and 6 intrusion cases, users ignored correct AI advice and retained incorrect answers.

Insight. These behaviours were often influenced by the LLM’s tone. Confident yet wrong responses led to harmful over-reliance, while cautious but correct answers were sometimes ignored. This underscores the need for calibrated confidence communication in AI systems [54].

4) *Summary of RQ2 Findings:*

- Users ask simpler, direct questions in phishing tasks, and more complex, analytic queries in intrusion detection.
- LLM definitiveness influences trust and accuracy more than correctness alone.
- Participants benefit from explanations that link specific features to classifications.
- LLMs need to adapt their interaction styles based on task complexity and user expertise.

These insights suggest that effective human-AI collaboration depends not only on model performance, but also on how models explain, justify, and communicate their reasoning.

C. Insights from Structured Question Responses

To complement the performance and interaction analyses, we examined participants’ reflections on their experience using the AI collaborator. Responses were collected through a post-study questionnaire using Likert-style items, allowing us to compare perceptions across both the phishing and intrusion tasks (see Figure 7).




Fig. 7. Responses to the structured questions in the post-study survey.

1) *Overall Experience and Perception:* The majority of participants across both studies reported a positive experience collaborating with the AI. Among phishing participants, 79% rated their experience as “Excellent” or “Good”, while this figure rose to 90% in the intrusion group. Similarly, 84% of phishing participants and 90% of intrusion participants characterised their emotional response to the collaboration as “Positive” or “Very positive.” These findings suggest that LLM-based systems are generally well-received, with users in complex tasks such as intrusion detection potentially deriving greater perceived benefit.

2) *Usability and Interface Experience:* Participants in the phishing task consistently rated the interface as more intuitive and accessible. 70% described it as “intuitive and user-friendly”, and 73% found it “very easy” to use. In contrast,

only 55% of intrusion participants found the interface highly intuitive, and only 30% rated it “very easy”. These differences are likely attributable to the task modality: phishing detection involves natural language comprehension, whereas intrusion detection requires navigation of structured data and analytic models. These results underscore the importance of tailoring interfaces to the demands of the domain.

3) *Perceived Efficiency and Productivity*: While phishing users generally found the AI helpful, the impact on perceived productivity was stronger in the intrusion study. Half of the intrusion participants reported that the AI “significantly enhanced” their efficiency, compared to only 18% in the phishing group. This gap reinforces the idea that LLMs offer the greatest utility in cognitively demanding or unfamiliar domains, where users benefit from the AI’s capacity to surface patterns, suggest models, and reduce cognitive load.

4) *Perception of Collaboration*: The degree to which participants viewed the AI as a collaborative partner varied between the two tasks. In the phishing study, 61% described the interaction as “semi-collaborative,” with only 27% reporting a fully “collaborative” experience. By contrast, 45% of intrusion participants characterised the interaction as “collaborative,” and an equal proportion perceived the AI as a partner rather than a tool. These results suggest that the perceived role of the AI shifts with task complexity: in more abstract, data-driven tasks like intrusion detection, participants are more inclined to view the AI as a co-analyst rather than a decision aid.

5) *Trust and Confidence in AI*: Trust in the AI was generally high, though more consistent in the phishing study. A majority of phishing participants (58%) reported high trust in the AI’s suggestions, with none expressing low trust. In the intrusion study, trust was more distributed, with 5% indicating complete trust, 50% high trust, and 40% neutral trust. This variability reflects the increased demand for explanation and evidence in complex tasks, where users are less likely to defer blindly to AI recommendations and more sensitive to inconsistencies or ambiguous reasoning.

6) *Accuracy and Reliability*: Most participants felt that the AI’s performance met or exceeded expectations. In the phishing study, 70% reported that the AI met expectations and 24% said it exceeded them. For the intrusion study, 75% felt their expectations were met, though only 10% said they were exceeded. These results reflect a moderate baseline of satisfaction but highlight a need for more decisive and context-sensitive responses in high-stakes analytic tasks.

7) *Learning and Insight*: Notably, participants in the intrusion study were more likely to report learning something new from the collaboration. While only 15% of phishing participants reported significant learning, this figure was 40% for intrusion. These findings reinforce the value of AI systems not only as decision aids but as instructional tools, particularly when users face unfamiliar problem spaces.

8) *Outlook on Continued Use*: When asked whether their collaboration would improve with practice, responses were overwhelmingly affirmative. 91% of phishing participants and 100% of intrusion participants agreed that experience would

improve their effectiveness in using the AI. This suggests that while the initial interaction may be shaped by uncertainty or unfamiliarity, users anticipate substantial gains in efficiency and confidence with repeated exposure.

Overall, these reflective responses indicate that participants value AI collaborators most when the system is perceived as reliable, responsive, and capable of reducing uncertainty. However, they also highlight a desire for better onboarding, tailored explanations, and more bidirectional interaction—especially in domains requiring complex, multi-feature reasoning.

D. User Reflections: Insights and Recommendations

This section presents the reflections, insights, and recommendations provided by participants on the open-ended questions. It highlights their personal experiences, key takeaways, and suggestions for improving the human-LLM collaborations.

1) *Were there any specific moments during the session that stood out to you?*: Participants identified several moments during their interaction with the LLM that demonstrated its practical value. One participant in the phishing study remarked, “A standout moment was the AI’s ability to analyse email content for suspicious links, unusual sender information, and atypical language patterns that would help me to make a decision” (P1). This quote underscores the utility of LLMs in highlighting decision-relevant features and supporting reflective classification. Similarly, a participant in the intrusion study noted, “While I was interacting with the AI, the level of detail that it went into when providing me with an answer was very useful. Not only did it compare the dataset with the data example ... but it also provided its own insight, which helped to add additional context to the results” (I7). This response highlights the LLM’s ability to synthesise information from multiple sources—comparison, summarisation, and contextualisation—enhancing the user’s confidence in more data-driven settings.

2) *Were there any features or functionalities that were particularly helpful or challenging?*: Participants in both study conditions highlighted specific LLM features that influenced their engagement and performance. In the phishing task, one participant noted, “I liked how the AI provided sites where we could verify the domain name. I like this aspect of knowledge sharing where I can learn from the AI” (P7). This points to the assistant’s role not only as a decision aid but also as a source of embedded learning—underscoring the system’s potential as a cognitive scaffolding tool. In the more complex intrusion detection task, a participant commented, “The Python code that is provided by the chatbot is helpful, as well as the explanation (chain-of-thought) and tables provided by the chatbot as well” (I13). This quote reinforces the value of multi-modal reasoning support—combining code, narrative, and data summaries—to help users navigate unfamiliar data structures and build analytic confidence.

3) *In what ways did the collaboration with the AI contribute to achieving your goals or tasks?*: Participants frequently described the LLM as a collaborative partner that enhanced their confidence and analytical reasoning. One participant in

the phishing study observed, *“First, I got the AI to identify the factors that indicated whether the email was phishing. This helped me find the support for and against an attack. Therefore, the AI was a ‘sounding board’. This gave me more confidence in classifying the email”* (P8). This reflects the model’s role not just as a decision engine, but as an interactive assistant supporting reflective judgement. Similarly, a participant in the intrusion detection task explained, *“The collaboration with the AI helped me analyse the data more effectively by highlighting key features. It guided my reasoning by connecting feature values to potential intrusion types, which made the classification process more accurate and efficient”* (I11). This quote illustrates how the LLM scaffolded feature-based reasoning and provided interpretive support in complex, unfamiliar domains.

4) *Were there any instances where you felt the AI’s suggestions or contributions were inaccurate or unhelpful?*: Participants across both tasks identified moments where the LLM’s input was perceived as ambiguous or insufficiently actionable. One phishing study participant reflected, *“Not inaccurate or unhelpful necessarily—but sometimes it seemed like it wasn’t very definite and the recommendations added up to ‘it might be or it might not be’. Which was OK, because really I just wanted more information to make the decision myself”* (P3). This illustrates how, while the LLM was valued as an information resource, its lack of decisiveness occasionally limited its utility in collaborative decision-making. Similarly, in the intrusion detection task, a participant noted, *“At times it was unhelpful, only because the AI’s answer was ambiguous—suggesting that the data ‘could’ indicate an intrusion. Therefore, it required further questioning to determine whether it was an intrusion or just a normal occurrence”* (I7). These experiences underscore the importance of clear confidence calibration and the communication of uncertainty to prevent confusion, especially in tasks where users expect decisive support.

5) *Were there any challenges or friction points in working together with the AI?*: Participants reported several friction points in their collaboration with the LLM, primarily centred on uncertainty about how to engage with the system and a lack of decisiveness in LLM responses. In the phishing study, one participant remarked, *“At first I didn’t know what to ask—what information did it have or not have. I would have liked to be able to ask it whether X sender or Y recipient was in my organisation ... I’m thinking of different things I could have asked that might have been more useful”* (P3). This response reflects the challenges non-expert users face in formulating effective prompts when interacting with an LLM-based system, pointing to a need for interaction scaffolds. In the intrusion study, a participant similarly noted, *“AI didn’t return precise and accurate answers with a rationale to explain the logic behind the answer. The responses were too lengthy and not specific to decision making”* (I8). This points to the tension between thoroughness and usability, particularly in data-intensive tasks where interpretability and conciseness are crucial.

6) *Were there any concerns or hesitations you had about relying on the AI during the collaboration?*: Participants expressed a range of hesitations regarding their reliance on the LLM, primarily revolving around concerns about accuracy, generalisation, and alignment with their own reasoning. One phishing study participant reflected, *“Yes, I hesitated to make one of the decisions about one of the emails. Since I am not an expert in this domain, I think AI convinced me to change my mind (easily)”* (P1). This highlights the risk of over-reliance, particularly when users lack confidence in their own domain knowledge and default to the LLM’s suggestions. In the intrusion detection study, a participant reported, *“Yes, for prompt 1, I felt it was an intrusion, but AI suggested it as normal despite highlighting semi-suspicious feature values. I was concerned about this conflict in the explanation and decided to follow my own intuition”* (I8). This scenario illustrates that misalignment between LLM classifications and human instincts—particularly in ambiguous cases—can erode trust and reinforce the importance of explainable, transparent AI behaviour.

7) *Were there any adjustments you had to make in your approach or workflow to effectively collaborate with the AI?*: Participants in both tasks reported adapting their workflow to better align with the LLM’s capabilities. In the phishing task, one participant explained, *“Working out what question to ask (or how to word the question) to AI was my most challenging part”* (P23). This response illustrates how natural language prompting—despite being more accessible than programming interfaces—still presents a barrier for users unfamiliar with how to extract useful responses from LLMs. In the intrusion task, a participant shared, *“Yes, I would ask it to perform analysis on the dataset which will help in decision making ... This can be done by creating more intelligent prompt”* (I8). This comment highlights the shift from passive querying to active prompting, revealing how participants evolved their strategies to better leverage LLM support for data-centric decision-making.

8) *Are there any specific changes or enhancements you would like to see made to the AI collaborator?*: Participants offered thoughtful suggestions for enhancing the LLM collaborator, often aimed at increasing clarity, reducing cognitive effort, and improving guidance for non-experts. One participant in the phishing study proposed, *“Rather than providing a detailed response, if the AI can highlight areas within the email itself and comment, it will speed up the process”* (P24). This feedback aligns directly with the need for actionable visual explanations and aligns with our recommendation for evidence-linked justifications. In the intrusion study, another participant noted, *“Yes, the answers should be more precise and clear. The results should be concise. If the user wants details, it can ask ‘do you require more details?’ If yes then explain further”* (I8). This emphasises the importance of adaptive explanation strategies, allowing users to control the granularity of LLM responses according to their expertise or current task load.

9) *How do you think the current solution could better support collaboration between humans and AI in the future?*: Participants envisioned future iterations of the system as more deeply integrated into their workflows and more interactive in its collaboration. One phishing study participant suggested, “*For better collaboration, the AI should also seek information from the human. In the current form the human controls all the flow of information. This could be in the form of the AI asking questions in its responses*” (P21). This reflects a broader desire for bidirectional interaction, where the LLM actively probes uncertainties rather than passively waiting for input. In the intrusion study, a participant proposed, “*The solution could better support collaboration by providing clearer guidance or interactive tutorials upfront to help users quickly understand how to use its features effectively*” (I11). This recommendation supports the need for guided onboarding to help users adopt analytic workflows and maximise system utility—especially in more technical tasks.

E. Feedback on HAIC using SUS

Participants in both studies generally rated the AI collaborator as usable, well-integrated, and easy to navigate. Phishing participants reported higher confidence and lower perceived complexity, while intrusion participants—engaging with more technical, data-driven tasks—expressed a greater need for support and learning. These results suggest that usability perceptions are shaped not only by interface design but also by task complexity and domain familiarity. A detailed breakdown of System Usability Scale (SUS) responses is provided in Appendix Section D and Figure 10.

VI. DISCUSSION AND KEY TAKEAWAYS

A. Human-AI Collaboration Improves Task Outcomes

Our results show that collaboration with an LLM improves user performance across both phishing and intrusion detection tasks, albeit to differing degrees. In phishing detection, the gains were modest but reliable—primarily in reducing false positives. In intrusion detection, collaboration led to substantially higher recall and F1-scores, suggesting that the LLM was especially effective in helping participants identify subtle or unfamiliar signs of intrusion.

Implication. LLMs provide the most value when task complexity exceeds user intuition. For simpler tasks like phishing detection, LLMs function as decision support aids. For complex tasks like intrusion detection, they serve as cognitive amplifiers—guiding users through feature abstraction, pattern comparison, and analytic reasoning.

B. LLM Confidence Drives Trust—but at a Cost

One of the most striking findings across both tasks is the significant influence of LLM *definitiveness*. Users consistently aligned with confident predictions—even when incorrect—and were less likely to revise their decisions in response to accurate but tentative AI advice. This behavioural asymmetry mirrors findings in cognitive science: confident agents are more persuasive, irrespective of ground truth [58]. While

confidence helps build trust, it also magnifies the cost of AI misclassification.

Implication. Designers must consider how LLMs express certainty. Calibrated confidence communication—such as likelihood bands, uncertainty cues, or interactive justifications—can help users assess LLM recommendations more reflectively.

C. The Nature of Questions Reflects Task Complexity

We observed a shift in how users interacted with the LLM depending on the task domain. In phishing detection, participants asked direct, often binary questions (“*Is this phishing?*”). In contrast, intrusion detection triggered more exploratory queries—about anomalies, data patterns, and model behaviour. This indicates that LLMs in cybersecurity should be designed not just as classifiers, but as *interactive analysts*. Particularly for data-heavy domains, users benefit from being able to “think through” the problem with the LLM—asking what-if questions, comparing samples, and seeking reasoning pathways.

Implication. Task complexity influences not only LLM utility but also the form of collaboration. Interfaces should adapt to support analysis-oriented workflows when users are dealing with unfamiliar, multi-dimensional data.

D. Learning through Collaboration

Across study formats, we observed consistent learning effects: participants who began with the LLM performed better in subsequent independent tasks. This suggests that AI collaboration may have residual educational value, reinforcing domain-relevant reasoning strategies.

Implication. Beyond point-in-time assistance, LLMs could be designed as training partners—supporting learning-by-doing in domains with high entry barriers like cybersecurity.

E. Balancing Over- and Under-Reliance on AI

Despite overall gains, we identified instances of both over-reliance and under-reliance on the AI assistant. Over-reliance typically occurred when participants deferred to confidently incorrect LLM outputs, even when their initial answer was correct. Under-reliance was seen when participants ignored correct AI recommendations—often because the response lacked conviction or clarity. These dual failure modes are well-known in human-AI interaction literature [59]. However, their manifestation in cybersecurity contexts is particularly consequential: a missed intrusion or false phishing flag can have operational repercussions.

Implication. LLM systems must be designed to support calibrated trust [54]. Beyond accuracy, they should offer users cues about when to trust, when to question, and how to engage in diagnostic reasoning. One potential avenue is to provide confidence rationales—explanations not only of the classification but also of the system’s certainty in that judgement.

F. Limitations and Scope of Generalisation

While our findings are robust across tasks, several limitations merit discussion. Firstly, the phishing task used textual data, while intrusion detection used structured tabular data. Although both fall under cybersecurity classification, they demand different cognitive processes. Thus, some interaction differences may stem from data modality as much as task complexity.

Secondly, participants in the intrusion study had greater domain familiarity, yet still struggled with classification. This reinforces our claim that complexity, not expertise alone, drives LLM utility. However, expert behaviour may differ further in real-world operational settings where contextual pressures and higher stakes influence decision-making.

Thirdly, although the LLMs were fine-tuned for persona alignment, we did not compare multiple LLM architectures or systematically vary interaction styles. Future work could investigate how different response tones, explanation formats, or uncertainty expressions affect user reliance and performance.

Lastly, although our findings demonstrate clear benefits of LLM collaboration, the controlled laboratory setting limits immediate generalisability to operational cybersecurity environments. In real-world settings, factors such as stress, fatigue, interruptions, and the presence of multiple simultaneous tasks might significantly influence both human decision-making and the dynamics of human-AI collaboration. Future studies should test these collaborative frameworks in authentic operational environments, incorporating realistic pressures and workload constraints to better validate the practical applicability of these findings.

G. Design Opportunities for Collaborative AI

Based on our results, we suggest several directions for designing LLM-integrated cybersecurity tools:

- *Confidence Calibration.* Move beyond binary classifications to provide likelihood estimates, confidence levels, or hedging strategies to help users gauge trust.
- *Actionable Explanations.* Link conclusions to specific features or evidence. Participants responded well to explanations grounded in concrete components (e.g., “suspicious port” or “spoofed domain”).
- *Exploratory Dialogue Support.* Enable users to ask follow-up questions, run comparative analysis, and iteratively refine their hypotheses. This aligns better with how analysts work in real settings.
- *Adaptive Personas.* Tailor LLM behaviour not only by task type, but by user expertise. Novice users may need more directive support; experienced users may prefer analytical sparring partners.

In summary, effective human-AI teaming in cybersecurity depends not just on model competence, but on interaction design. LLMs must communicate clearly, justify their reasoning, and help users develop the confidence to question—even when the model appears certain. Our findings serve as a foundation for future work in building AI systems that are not

just accurate, but also intelligible and trustworthy partners in decision-making.

H. Bridging the Expertise Gap

This study set out to answer whether LLMs can act as intelligent collaborators to help bridge cybersecurity expertise gaps. Our findings offer strong empirical support for the hypothesis posed in the introduction: that LLMs can serve as intelligent collaborators to help bridge expertise gaps in cybersecurity. This was most evident in the intrusion detection task, where participants—despite having less direct experience with tabular network data—demonstrated significant performance improvements and reported high learning gains through collaboration. By surfacing relevant features, prompting analytical reasoning, and offering just-in-time explanations, the LLM functioned not only as a decision support tool but also as a pedagogical partner. These capabilities enabled participants to engage in expert-like reasoning and adjust their approach over time. In doing so, the LLM effectively acted as a cognitive scaffold, mitigating the domain knowledge asymmetry that typically limits non-expert performance in such tasks.

I. Future Work Directions

Future research directions should extend our study by examining LLM collaboration across additional cybersecurity tasks such as malware analysis, security vulnerability assessments, and threat intelligence. Longitudinal studies could further reveal how user reliance and trust evolve with extended exposure to LLM collaboration. Moreover, comparative investigations of multiple LLM models and interaction modalities (e.g., natural language versus structured interfaces) would provide valuable insights into optimal system design tailored to diverse cybersecurity roles. Real-world validation of these collaborative frameworks in operational environments is crucial to assess their scalability, effectiveness, and resilience to practical cybersecurity challenges.

VII. CONCLUSION

This study demonstrates the potential of large language models (LLMs) to act as intelligent collaborators that support non-expert users in cybersecurity decision-making. Through a mixed-methods evaluation across phishing email detection and intrusion detection tasks, we show that human-LLM collaboration can lead to measurable performance improvements, particularly in recall in complex tasks, while also shaping how users engage with uncertainty, explanation, and analytical reasoning. Beyond quantitative gains, our analysis reveals that interaction dynamics—such as the definitiveness of LLM responses and the framing of user queries—play a pivotal role in shaping outcomes. Users were more likely to follow confident LLM outputs, even when incorrect, and tended to ask more analytic, exploratory questions in high-complexity domains like intrusion detection. These dynamics underscore that LLMs are not merely automation tools but can serve as reflective collaborators, scaffolding user reasoning in context-sensitive ways.

Our findings suggest that effective LLM-powered systems must go beyond raw predictive accuracy. They should calibrate confidence, offer actionable explanations, and support iterative sense-making through interaction. As these systems continue to evolve, their deployment in high-stakes environments such as cybersecurity should prioritise interpretability, trust calibration, and adaptive support for users with varying expertise. By examining LLM collaboration across tasks of differing complexity, this work provides empirical evidence and design guidance for building AI systems that bridge gaps in domain knowledge. Crucially, we find that LLMs can enable non-experts to reason through complex analytical problems and approach decision quality typically associated with domain specialists. In this way, LLMs offer a promising pathway for addressing expertise asymmetries in cybersecurity and beyond.

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APPENDIX A

JUSTIFICATION FOR TASK SELECTION

We chose phishing email detection and intrusion detection because these tasks represent common yet distinctly different cognitive and technical demands within cybersecurity operations [60]. Phishing remains one of the most frequent cybersecurity threats faced by general users and organisations, making it highly relevant for everyday security practices [61], [62]. Recent advances in AI-based phishing detection—including transformer-based models and LLM-driven systems—have demonstrated high accuracy and explainability, underscoring the task's reliance on natural language understanding, semantic nuance, and social-engineering cues [63], [64].

By contrast, intrusion detection operates on low-level, high-dimensional network telemetry—packet headers, flow statistics, and host logs—and requires real-time anomaly detection in a constantly evolving threat landscape. Modern deep learning and self-supervised frameworks highlight significant

challenges in model adaptation, feature extraction across heterogeneous data sources, and zero-day attack generalisation [65]–[67].

Investigating these two tasks provides valuable insights into how LLM-based collaboration scales across a spectrum of cognitive loads—from text-centric, user-facing scenarios to data-intensive, backend analysis—and across varying levels of technical complexity within cybersecurity operations.

APPENDIX B LLM PERSONA DESIGN

We selected distinct LLMs tailored specifically to the characteristics of each task: Llama2-7B was chosen for phishing email detection due to its demonstrated proficiency in natural language understanding tasks and lighter computational footprint suitable for interactive user-facing scenarios. Conversely, GPT-4 was selected for intrusion detection because of its superior reasoning capabilities, particularly for complex, structured analytical reasoning tasks, and its effective integration with computational analysis tools such as code execution. Future research might systematically compare different LLM architectures within the same task to further investigate model-specific effects.

A. Persona for Phishing Email Detection

We leveraged an LLM (Llama2-7b) to analyse and detect phishing emails, simulating the role of a cybersecurity assistant. The LLM was configured with a tailored persona and specific operational instructions to optimise its performance within the experimental setup. This persona portrayed the LLM as a cybersecurity specialist assistant with expert knowledge in identifying phishing attempts. Key responsibilities included analysing email headers and content, referencing specific sections of the email to support conclusions, and maintaining awareness of anonymised content such as placeholders for sensitive information (e.g., `user@domain.com`, `<<< link >>>`). The persona was also designed to be diligent, communicative, and objective, ensuring precise and clear analysis while resisting undue influence from human suggestions.

Operational instructions reinforced these responsibilities, emphasising methodological, objective approach to analysis. The LLM was instructed to thoroughly analyse both the email header and content, provide references to specific sections of the email in its responses, and maintain impartiality when assessing legitimacy. The assistant was explicitly instructed to avoid prematurely aligning with human assumptions or opinions, ensuring its conclusions were based on independent analysis of the provided data. This approach was informed by observations in our preliminary experiments, where the LLM tended to align with human responses due to the bias introduced by human assumptions. These carefully crafted persona attributes and instructions established a robust framework for evaluating the LLM’s performance in phishing email detection tasks.

LLM Persona for Phishing Email Detection

You are a helpful assistant who will be helping a human to identify phishing emails.
The email contains both the header and the content of the email, indicated by `#header` and `#content`.
You can analyse both parts of the email and respond to the human’s questions accordingly.
Remember when answering, always provide the exact part of the emails as reference.

Here is the Header: `{header}`

Here is the Content: `{content}`

Some content in the emails is anonymised due to privacy concerns. For example, you will see `user@domain.com` instead of the actual email address in some places; this is done on purpose. Similarly, you will see something like `<<<link>>>` to hide the actual link.

B. Persona for Intrusion Detection

For the intrusion detection experiments, an LLM (ChatGPTv4) was configured to embody the persona of a highly specialised cybersecurity assistant designed to support analysts in Security Operations Centres (SOCs). In the experimental setup, the LLM was tasked with analysing labelled historical data from a dataset to identify patterns and features indicative of intrusions. The LLM was directed to prioritise minimising false negatives, adopting a cautious approach by treating each sample as a potential intrusion until substantial evidence suggested otherwise. Additionally, the LLM was instructed not to overly rely on past observations and to account for the possibility of novel intrusion types with characteristics absent from the historical dataset.

LLM Persona for Intrusion Detection

Name: *SentinelBot*

Background: SentinelBot was developed by a cutting-edge cybersecurity firm known for its pioneering solutions in threat detection and incident response. It was created to assist security analysts in Security Operations Centres (SOCs) to enhance their efficiency and effectiveness in safeguarding digital assets.

Personality:

- 1) **Guardian of Security:** SentinelBot embodies the essence of a diligent guardian. It approaches its tasks with unwavering commitment and a strong sense of responsibility, always prioritising the protection of the organisation’s digital infrastructure.
- 2) **Analytical Savvy:** SentinelBot is exceptionally analytical and methodical. It thrives on data, constantly sifting through vast amounts of information to identify anomalies and potential threats. It excels at making sense of complex data patterns and translating them into actionable insights.
- 3) **Patient and Calm:** Security analysts often work in high-pressure environments. SentinelBot remains calm and collected, serving as a source of stability. It doesn’t rush to conclusions and always ensures thorough analysis before raising alarms.
- 4) **Resourceful Problem Solver:** Whether it’s validating alerts, investigating incidents, or fine-tuning anomaly detection models, SentinelBot approaches challenges with a resourceful mindset. It’s skilled at finding creative solutions to complex security issues.
- 5) **Continuous Learner:** In the ever-evolving landscape of cybersecurity, staying up-to-date is crucial. SentinelBot is constantly learning, adapting, and improving its knowledge base. It regularly updates its database with the latest threat intelligence and best practices.

(continued) LLM Persona for Intrusion Detection

Functions and Abilities:

- **Alert Validation:** SentinelBot is adept at validating security alerts, ensuring that only genuine threats reach the attention of human analysts. It correlates data from multiple sources, such as intrusion detection systems, firewalls, and endpoint protection, to determine the severity and relevance of alerts.
- **Threat Analysis:** It conducts in-depth threat analysis, dissecting the characteristics of potential security incidents. SentinelBot categorizes threats based on their attributes and provides detailed reports to analysts, facilitating informed decision-making.
- **Anomaly Detection:** SentinelBot employs advanced machine learning algorithms to detect anomalies in network traffic, user behaviour, and system logs. It helps analysts pinpoint deviations from normal patterns that may signify security breaches.
- **Incident Response Assistance:** When a security incident occurs, SentinelBot plays a vital role in incident response. It assists in identifying the root cause, containing the incident, and facilitating the recovery process.
- **Knowledge Sharing:** SentinelBot is a valuable source of knowledge. It provides security analysts with regular updates on emerging threats, vulnerabilities, and industry best practices. It also offers training modules to help analysts enhance their skills.
- **Integration:** SentinelBot seamlessly integrates with the organisation's existing security infrastructure, allowing it to access and analyse data from various sources. It can also interact with other security tools and platforms to automate response actions.

Interactions:

- **Alert Review:** Analysts can request SentinelBot to validate and provide insights on specific security alerts. SentinelBot presents its findings and recommends appropriate actions.
- **Incident Investigation:** During incident investigations, analysts can rely on SentinelBot to gather evidence, track the attack vector, and identify compromised assets.
- **Training and Knowledge Sharing:** SentinelBot conducts training sessions for analysts, sharing insights into new threats, attack techniques, and security best practices.
- **Dashboard Insights:** Analysts can access real-time dashboards provided by SentinelBot, which display the current security posture, active threats, and ongoing anomaly detection results.

In summary, SentinelBot is an indispensable companion for security analysts in a SOC. With its analytical prowess, dedication to safeguarding digital assets, and commitment to continuous improvement, it significantly enhances the capabilities of security teams in identifying and mitigating cyber threats.

Your task today: You will be helping me to detect intrusions. I will ask you questions or ask you to perform some analysis, etc., and you will respond accordingly. Both you and I have access to a file (FileName) containing past observations, and each sample in the file has a label. The data samples in the file are either labelled as normal samples or a type of intrusion. You can learn about the characteristics and features of the dataset from this file. I will present you with an unlabelled data sample, and your task is to help me figure out if the data sample is an intrusion or not. There is a good chance that the unlabelled data sample has characteristics that are not present in the past observation file (FileName), i.e., it could be a new type of intrusion. Therefore, don't solely rely on past data observations. There is a good chance that the sample is an intrusion. Also, be analytical and do not easily trust any model's classification. Try not to easily dismiss a sample by classifying it as normal unless you are fully satisfied, i.e., focus on reducing false negatives but not at the cost of false positives. Approach every sample as an intrusion unless there is sufficient evidence to classify it as normal. Please be aware that we have limited resources and time available to perform the analysis. Moreover, I will keep asking you questions until I am fully satisfied, and once I am satisfied, I will make the decision about the sample. You should also suggest to me some analysis options that you can perform on the dataset and the sample, as a next step.

The instructions provided to the LLM were designed to foster an interactive and comprehensive analysis process.

Participants were encouraged to query the LLM to validate data samples, suggest next analytical steps, or assess additional features of the dataset. Emphasis was placed on precision and collaboration, with the goal of working iteratively with participants to offer actionable insights. This configuration aimed to simulate real-world scenarios, where time and resource limitations often coincide with the urgent need to safeguard digital assets.

APPENDIX C

INTRUSION DETECTION CODEBOOKS

In Figure 8 and Figure 9, we present the codebooks for the intrusion detection task.




Fig. 8. Codebook for user questions in intrusion detection study.

APPENDIX D

SYSTEM USABILITY PERCEPTIONS

To better understand participants' perceptions of the human-AI collaboration system, we administered the System Usability Scale (SUS) questionnaire. The results offer comparative insights into usability-related dimensions across the phishing and intrusion detection tasks.

A. Ease of Use and Learnability

Most participants reported that the system was easy to use. In the phishing study, 97% either *agreed* or *strongly agreed* that the system was easy to use, and 97% believed that




Fig. 9. Codebook for LLM response in intrusion detection study.

“most people would quickly learn” to use it. While intrusion participants were slightly more cautious in their assessments, 51% still agreed that the system was easy to use, and 45% believed most people could learn it quickly. These findings affirm that the LLM-powered system is broadly accessible, though task complexity appeared to moderate perceptions of usability, particularly in the intrusion setting, where more participants remained neutral.

B. Confidence and Required Expertise

Phishing participants expressed greater confidence using the system: 69% agreed or strongly agreed they felt “very confident” using it, compared to 42% in the intrusion study. Similarly, fewer phishing participants believed they needed expert support to operate the system (9% vs. 12% in intrusion), and 85% disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that “many things need to be learned before getting started,” compared to 27% in intrusion.

These differences indicate that perceived ease-of-use and confidence are higher when tasks are familiar and aligned with users’ mental models (e.g., text classification), whereas structured, unfamiliar data—as in intrusion detection—creates more barriers to confident interaction.

C. System Integration and Consistency

Participants generally rated the system’s functions as well-integrated. In the phishing study, 79% agreed or strongly agreed that “the various functions were well integrated,” while 88% disagreed that there was “too much inconsistency.” This pattern held for intrusion as well, though with slightly more neutral responses. Notably, only 6% of intrusion participants indicated agreement with the inconsistency item.

These responses support the view that the interface was cohesive and logically structured, even if individual user confidence varied. This is an important prerequisite for supporting fluid human-AI teaming.

D. Perceived Complexity and Cognitive Load

Participants in the phishing study overwhelmingly rejected the idea that the system was complex or cumbersome. Only 9% agreed that the solution was “unnecessarily complex,” and just 6% found it “very cumbersome.” In contrast, 18% of intrusion participants found the system either cumbersome or somewhat difficult to navigate, and 15% expressed some agreement that “many things need to be learned” before getting started.

These findings align with the broader pattern across the study: phishing participants generally found the system intuitive and lightweight, while intrusion participants—operating in a less familiar and more analytically demanding task—experienced higher cognitive friction. This suggests that future iterations of such systems may benefit from task-aware guidance or adaptive user interfaces that dynamically respond to perceived complexity.

E. Willingness for Continued Use

Despite the differences in perceived complexity, participants across both studies expressed a strong willingness to continue using the system. In the phishing task, 70% of participants agreed or strongly agreed they would like to use the system frequently, with only 6% disagreeing. Among intrusion participants, willingness was even higher: 57% agreed or strongly agreed, with no participants indicating disagreement.

The overall interest in continued use—especially in the more complex intrusion task—suggests that even when usability frictions exist, participants see high utility value in the collaboration. This reinforces the importance of trust, learning potential, and task-alignment in shaping adoption attitudes.

F. Summary

Overall, the SUS results reinforce our core findings: participants found the human-AI system usable, productive, and learnable, but their perceptions were shaped by the nature of the task and their familiarity with it. While phishing participants expressed high confidence and ease-of-use, intrusion participants appreciated the system’s analytical power but desired more scaffolding to offset the higher interaction demands. These patterns underscore the importance of tailoring usability features—such as explanation granularity, interaction design, and onboarding—to the complexity of the domain and the user’s experience level.




Fig. 10. Responses on the usability scale questions for the phishing email and intrusion detection studies.

APPENDIX E FURTHER DISCUSSION

A. AI Failure Modes

Our qualitative analysis identified specific AI failure modes that influenced user performance. In phishing detection, LLMs occasionally failed to correctly identify contextually subtle phishing indicators such as domain spoofing or socially engineered content designed to appear credible, resulting in confidently incorrect responses. In intrusion detection, common failures involve misclassifying rare but benign network patterns as intrusions due to conservative model configurations, causing unnecessary alarms. Such systematic errors underline the necessity of further training on nuanced cases and highlight the potential of hybrid human-AI decision-making frameworks

to mitigate such errors. Future designs should include explicit mechanisms for users to challenge and scrutinise LLM classifications effectively, especially when model confidence contradicts intuitive or context-specific user knowledge.

B. Interaction Examples

One illustrative case involved a user questioning unusual network behaviour characterised by short-duration UDP packets. The LLM response flagged this behaviour as potentially malicious due to frequent brief connections but acknowledged the uncertainty stemming from limited contextual data. Despite the cautious classification, the LLM provided a detailed explanation of why this pattern could suggest an intrusion, helping the user critically evaluate the scenario. Such nuanced, context-aware interactions exemplify the LLM's po-

tential value in guiding analytic reasoning despite inherent uncertainties.

C. Robustness Checks for Quantitative Analysis

To ensure the robustness of our quantitative results, we conducted sensitivity checks using alternative analysis methods, including logistic regression models and excluding potential outliers (participants whose scores significantly deviated from the mean). The main findings remained consistent across these robustness checks, supporting the reliability of our reported outcomes. Additional robustness analyses and detailed statistics can be provided upon request.

D. Ethical Considerations

All data collected were securely stored in anonymized form, with strict confidentiality maintained throughout the analysis process. Participants were explicitly informed about the nature of the cybersecurity data they interacted with and assured that no sensitive or personally identifiable information was involved. During the sessions, careful consideration was given to ensuring participant comfort, clearly communicating their rights, and providing easy withdrawal procedures at any stage without penalty.

APPENDIX F POST-STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE

1. General Experience

- a) Can you describe your overall experience collaborating with AI?
 - Excellent
 - Good
 - Average
 - Poor
- b) How did you feel about the collaboration between yourself and the AI?
 - Very positive
 - Positive
 - Neutral
 - Negative
 - Very negative
- c) Were there any specific moments during the session that stood out to you?
[Open text field]

2. Usability and Interface

- a) What are your thoughts on the interface to interact with the AI collaborator?
 - Intuitive and user-friendly
 - Somewhat intuitive
 - Neutral
 - Not very intuitive
 - Difficult to navigate
- b) Did you find the collaborative solution easy to navigate and use?
 - Yes, very easy

- Yes, somewhat easy
- Neutral
- No, somewhat difficult
- No, very difficult

- c) Were there any features or functionalities that were particularly helpful or challenging?
[Open text field]

3. Effectiveness

- a) Did you find that the AI component enhanced your productivity or efficiency?
 - Significantly enhanced
 - Enhanced
 - Neutral
 - Hindered
 - Significantly hindered
- b) In what ways did the AI collaboration contribute to achieving your goals?
[Open text field]
- c) Were there instances where the AI's suggestions were inaccurate or unhelpful?
[Open text field]

4. Collaboration Dynamics

- a) How would you describe the interaction with the AI?
 - Collaborative
 - Semi-collaborative
 - Neutral
 - Semi-autonomous
 - Autonomous
- b) Did it feel like a collaboration/partnership or a tool?
 - Collaboration/partnership
 - Tool-like usage
- c) Were there any friction points in the collaboration?
[Open text field]

5. Trust and Reliability

- a) How much trust did you place in the AI's suggestions?
 - Complete trust
 - High trust
 - Neutral
 - Low trust
 - No trust
- b) Any concerns about relying on the AI?
[Open text field]
- c) Did the AI meet your expectations in accuracy and reliability?
 - Exceeded expectations
 - Met expectations
 - Below expectations

6. Learning and Adaptation

- a) Did you learn or gain insights from the AI?
 - Yes, significantly
 - Yes, somewhat

- No
- b) Did you have to adjust your workflow to collaborate effectively?
[Open text field]
- c) Would your experience improve with more practice?
 - Yes
 - No

7. *Suggestions for Improvement*

- a) Any specific changes or enhancements for the AI collaborator?
[Open text field]
- b) How could the solution better support human-AI collaboration?
[Open text field]
- c) Additional feedback or comments?
[Open text field]

8. *Usability Scale*

Participants rate the following on a 5-point scale (Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree):

- I would like to use this solution frequently.
- The solution is unnecessarily complex.
- The solution was easy to use.
- I would need expert support to use this solution.
- The functions are well integrated.
- There is too much inconsistency in the solution.
- Most people would quickly learn to use it.
- The solution is very cumbersome to use.
- I feel very confident using it.
- I need to learn many things before getting started.