A DoS Attack by Exploiting a Weakness of Solutions to Defeat IMSI-Catchers

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Abstract—**Pseudonym based solutions to defeat IMSI-catchers have been published in the recent years. The idea of these solutions have been on the table of the 3GPP community for a couple of years. For some technical reasons, none of the pseudonym based solutions has yet been accepted as a 3GPP standard, even though there has not been any known fatal weaknesses in these solutions. However, we have found a vulnerability of the pseudonym based solutions. This vulnerability has also been reported in another publication (cite?) in the last month, July, 2017. Using this vulnerability, we show that a novel DDoS attack can be mounted against an entire mobile network. We analytically estimate the expected success rate of the DDoS attack. According to our analysis, we can send 50 percent of the subscribers of a mobile network out of service using a reasonably large (maybe mention the size?) botnet. We run a simulation of the attack and show that our analytical estimation is fairly accurate. We present a fix of the existing solution by using the location update message sent by the SN to the HN. By doing so, we obtain a modified AKA protocol as our solution. We present a detail analysis of our solution using a relevant state machine of the protocol. The state machine is constructed using the relevant variables involved in the protocol. We exhaustively look into all the possible states of the user equipment and home network, and show that, in our solution protocol, there does not remain any vulnerability that could lead to a DoS attack of the kind we have presented in this paper.**

I. Introduction

Kimmo will write it

II. Pseudonym Based Solutions

Mohsin will write the summary of all the proposed pseudonym based solutions

III. Vulnerability/attack of the Solutions

All the solutions mentioned in the previous section have the same vulnerability

IV. Simulation and analytical esimation of the succes rate of the attack

V. Solution

A. State Diagram at the UE side

- II = IMSI Inquiry

- IAV = Invalid Authentication Vector

- VAV_p = Valid Authentication Vector that has pseudonym p embedded in it


Fig. 2.   A Pseudonym Based Solution cite

if $\exists s$ such that $PMSI_i = s'_p$ then s'_p, s''_p
if $\exists s$ such that $PMSI_i = s''_p$ then s''_p, s'''_p
The user s's state in the UE: s_p, s'_p

Fig. 4.   State Diagram of UE

Fig. 1.   A Pseudonym Based Solution cite

$PMSI, P_{new}, SQN, \kappa, \mathcal{K}$

SIM

Serving network

$S = \{s \mid \forall i \in I\}$ where $s = \langle i, \mathcal{K}, SQN, \kappa, p, p' \rangle$

Home network

identity request

update $PMSI \leftarrow P_{new}$

identity response $(PMSI)$

$PMSI$

$\mathcal{K}, SQN, k, p, p' \leftarrow s \in S$ where $s_p = PMSI \vee s_{p'} = PMSI$

if $s_{p'} = PMSI$ **then**

        update $s_p \leftarrow s_{p'}$

        update $s_{p'} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{34} \notin \{s_p, s_{p'} | \forall s \in S\}$

$m \leftarrow M_\kappa(p', SQN)$

$RAND \leftarrow E_\kappa(u = \langle p', SQN, m \rangle)$

$XRES \leftarrow A_3(\mathcal{K}, RAND)$

$CK \leftarrow A_8(\mathcal{K}, RAND)$

update $s_{SQN} \leftarrow SQN + 1$

$RAND, XRES, CK$

authentication request $(RAND)$

$u \leftarrow E_\kappa^{-1}(RAND)$

$m \leftarrow M_\kappa(u_{p'}, u_{SQN})$

verify $m = u_m$

verify $SQN \leq u_{SQN}$

update $SQN \leftarrow u_{SQN} + 1$

update $P_{new} \leftarrow u_{p'}$

$SRES \leftarrow A_3(\mathcal{K}, RAND)$

$CK \leftarrow A_8(\mathcal{K}, RAND)$

authentication response $(SRES)$

verify $SRES = XRES$

encrypted using CK

Fig. 3.   Simulation result

Success rate of the DoS attack
IMSI Length: 10 digits

No of affected users (percentage)

Number of guessed pseudonyms

Fig. 5.   State Diagram of HN

1: i, null, null, 0, null, null   LU: i / no-AV

AV-req: i / AV_p

2: i, p, null, 0, 0, null   AV-req: i,p / AV_p

LU: i/ no-AV

LU: p / no-AV

3: i, p, null, 1, 0, null   LU: i / no-AV

LU: p / no-AV

4: i, p, null, 1, 1, null   LU: i,p / no-AV

AV-req: i, p / AV_p'

AV-req: i,p / AV_p'

6: i, p, p', 1, 1, 0   LU: i,p / no-AV   AV-req: i,p / AV_p'

AV-req: p' / AV_p''

LU: p / no-AV   temp1: i, p', p'', 1, 0, 0

LU: p' / no-AV

null/p=p',p'=p''

null/p=p',p'=p''   5: i, p, p', 1, 0, 0   LU: i / no-AV   AV-req: i,p,p' / AV_p'

LU: p' / no-AV

7: i, p, p', 1, 1, 1   LU: i,p,p' / 0   AV-req: i,p / 4

AV-req: p' / AV_p''

temp2: i, p', p'', 1, 1, 0

3

B. Post-war period

VI. CONCLUSION

The conclusion goes here.

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REFERENCES

[1] H. Kopka and P. W. Daly, *A Guide to LATEX*, 3rd ed. Harlow, England: Addison-Wesley, 1999.