Concealing IMSI in 5G Network Using Identity Based Encryption

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Abstract. The aspirations for the next generation mobile network (5G) are high. It has a vision of improved security and privacy over the existing LTE network. Subscription privacy of a user has been a historical concern with all the previous generation mobile networks, namely, GSM, UMTS, and LTE. While a little improvement have been achieved in securing the privacy of long-term identity of a subscriber, the so called IMSI catchers are still in existence even in the LTE and advanced LTE networks. There have been proposals published to tackle this problem based on pseudonyms, and different public-key technologies. This report looks into the problem of concealing long-term identity of a subscriber and presents a technique based on Identity Based Encryption to tackle it. A rigorous comparison based on the pros and cons between the different techniques show that identity based encryption is a competitive solution for securing the long-term identity privacy of a user in the 5G network.

1 Introduction

The NGMN Alliance has pointed out the privacy of a user as a requirement of the 5G network under the requirement category of enhanced services [1]. In 3GPP TR 33.899 [2], subscribers' privacy is captured as one of the high level security requirements of the 5G network. However, in the context of diversified devices and the complex business and service model of 5G, it is important to define who is a subscriber and what subscriber privacy means.

According to 3GPP TR 21.905 [4] a subscriber is an entity (associated with one or more users) that is engaged in a subscription with a service provider. A subscription describes the commercial relationship between the subscriber and the service provider, cf. 3GPP TR 21.905 [4]. A subscription identifier is the identifier that uniquely identifies a subscription in the 3GPP system. The identifier is used to access networks based on 3GPP specifications. Subscription privacy refers to the right to protect any information that (a) can be used to identify a subscription to whom such information relates, or (b) is or might be

directly or indirectly linked to a subscription. This definition of privacy suggests to protect any personally identifiable information (PII) from an attacker. While it may be difficult to draw a clear boundary between PII and non-PII, the long-term identifier is surely a PII.

In the case of 2G (GSM), 3G (UMTS) and 4G (LTE) networks, this long-term identifier is known as international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI). An IMSI is usually presented as a 15 digit number but can be shorter. The first 3 digits are the mobile country code (MCC), which are followed by the mobile network code (MNC), either 2 digits or 3 digits. The length of the MNC depends on the value of the MCC. The remaining digits are the mobile subscription identification number (MSIN) within the network's customer base [3].

When a user equipment (UE) tries to connect to a network, the UE has to identify itself using an identifier. Once the UE is identified, an authentication protocol is run in between the UE and the network. If the authentication protocol runs successfully, the network serves the UE with the services the UE is authorized to avail. In all the legacy networks this authentication protocol is a challenge-response based protocol. However, in this report we will restrict our discussion only to the case of identification of a UE where IMSI of the relevant subscriber is used as the identifier. We present solutions to conceal the IMSI during the identification. Nevertheless, the principles used in the solutions we have proposed can be extended to conceal any other PII.

In order to present an easily comprehensible formal discussion, we need to know what are the entities involved in this identification process and what are the communication interfaces between those entities. We also need to know which entities can be entrusted with the IMSI of a subscriber. As the architecture of 5G is yet to be finalized, we present an abstraction of the involved entities and assume that whatever the architecture of 5G will eventually be, it will contain something for each of these entities and something for each of these interfaces. This abstraction is directly extracted from the LTE architecture. Figure 1 shows the abstraction.

The abstraction involves the UE, SN and HN. Both of the SN and HN consist of radio access network (RAN) and core network (CN). The RAN of SN provides the connectivity in between UE and CN of SN. On the other hand, the CN of SN connects itself with the CN of HN. However, we do not present such granularity of SN and HN, because in our discussion it is sufficient to treat the SN and HN as single abstract entities. Note that in a non-roaming situation, the SN and HN are the same network. There are two more entities which are not part of the network but relevant in our discussion, because they attack the network. They are PIC and AIC. The interface UE-SN is a logical interface in between UE and SN. This interface is initially unprotected. The logical interface SN-HN in between SN and HN is protected and the security of this interface is out of the scope of this report. The PICs eavesdrop on the UE-RAN interface when it is unprotected to extract an IMSI. The AICs impersonate a legitimate SN and run a legitimate looking protocol with the UE in order to find out the IMSI. HN and UE both know the IMSI and they are trusted. Both of PIC and AIC

are untrusted. It is in principle possible not to trust SN. However, by other specifications in 3GPP TS 33.106 and TS 33.107, it is required to reveal IMSI to the SN to enable lawful interception (LI) without involving HN.


Fig. 1. High-level security architecture

One approach of protecting IMSI privacy is to use a temporary identifier instead of the actual IMSI and keep changing the temporary identifier at a feasible frequency. Note that the temporary identifier has to be assigned over a confidentiality protected channel and different entities of the network may assign different temporary identifiers to the UE. In the LTE network, the temporary identifier assigned by serving network (SN) is called globally unique temporary identity (GUTI) and the home network (HN) does not assign any temporary identifier to the UE. However, during the initial attachment of a UE to the SN, the UE has neither a GUTI nor a security context with the SN that can assign it with a GUTI. Besides, GUTI can be lost by either one or both of the UE and the SN. This would force the UE to reveal its IMSI to the SN to keep itself from permanently locked out of the network. This problem gives an opportunity to an active IMSI catcher (AIC) who impersonates a legitimate SN and forces the UE to run the initial attachment protocol. This also gives an opportunity to a passive IMSI catcher (PIC) to eavesdrop the IMSI sent in clear text. Solutions [6, 5] have been proposed by using temporary IMSI known as pseudonym assigned by the HN. While these solutions solve the cases of lost and unsynchronised GUTI, they still have the problem of lost or unsynchronised pseudonyms and also initial attachment.

In this paper we discuss different solutions based on pseudonyms and public-key encryption to prevent the PIC and AIC. We also propose a solution based on identity based encryption (IBE) that prevents both PIC and AIC. We extend our solution to a mutual authentication protocol in between SN and UE without the involvement of the HN every time the authentication runs.

Apart from preventing AIC and PIC, there are other 5G requirements which a solution should also meet. Reduced signalling overhead, improved control plane latency are two such requirements. Concealing all the parts of IMSI, namely, MCC, MNC and MSIN has been identified as another requirement. Also, in the case of public-key, the complexity involved in setting a PKI and revocation of a public-key need to be considered with high importance. In some cases the public key of an entity is pre-provisioned to all the potential senders in the system. If this public key is revoked and a new public-private key pair is generated by the entity from which the public key was revoked, then the new public key needs to be re-provisioned to all those entities that were pre-provisioned with the old public key. Considering all these requirements, we evaluate our solutions based on the following criteria:

1. Concealed from PIC, AIC, SN
2. Parts of the IMSI concealed
3. Signalling overhead
4. Latency
5. PKI complexity
6. Public-key revocation and re-provisioning

the above list needs to be modified further
We also want to see if any of these solutions would work in a heterogeneous situation where one or more of the entities involved would come from the legacy networks. Apparently, none of the legacy networks use public-key encryption. Consequently, all of the solutions that lso want to see use public-key encryption will not work in such a heterogeneous situation. A variant of pseudonym based approach might be possible to devise that work in some heterogeneous situation. While the choice of the solution is dependent on how much we want to achieve, our solution based on IBE becomes a competitive one by meeting most of the important requirements.

In Section **??** we discuss the solutions based on pseudonyms and different kinds of public-key encryption. In section **??**, we present a solution based IBE that is not only identification but also works as mutual authentication. In Section 3, we present an evaluation of the discussed presented solution along with our proposed solution based on the aforementioned evaluation criteria. Finally we conclude the paper in Section 4.

2   Solution based on IBE

As already mentioned in Section **??**, in IBE the public and private key of a receiver is computed from the identity of the receiver in conjunction with the

public and private key of a trusted third party respectively. As the private key of the trusted third party is required to compute the private key of the receiver, the private key of the receiver has to be provisioned to the receiver by the trusted third party. Even though an extra one-time burden of private key provisioning is required, a sender does not need to authenticate the public key of a receiver each time the sender and the receiver agree on a security context. The sender does not need to authenticate the public-key, because if the public key is not authentic, the receiver will not have the private key. If the receiver does not have the private key, any message encrypted by the public key will never be decrypted by the receiver. On the other hand the private key of the receiver would be provisioned to the receiver only if the receiver can authenticate itself to the trusted third party. In other words, the authenticity of the public key in IBE is guaranteed by the trusted third party. Usually in IBE, the trusted third party is known as the private key generator (PKG). While in the certificate based and root-key based cases it is possible to revoke the public key of a receiver, it is impossible to revoke the public key in IBE unless the identity itself is revoked. Please note that, a PKG knows the private keys of all the receivers whose public keys were generated using the PKG's public key. As a result a PKG can decrypt any message sent by any sender to any receiver. This assumes a very high level of trust in the PKG. In Figure 2, we show how IBE works pictorially.


Fig. 2. IBC mechanism

Fig. 3. Privacy protected UE identification using IBE

Description In this approach, a UE is considered as the sender. The SN a UE is trying to connect with, is considered as the receiver. The UE's HN acts as the PKG. The HN is trusted as the PKG because the UE is a subscriber of the HN and the UE trusts the HN with the IMSI in all the legacy networks. In all the legacy networks, the HN can technically mount both of the PIC and AIC attacks against its subscribers. Still it is trusted that the HN would not mount an IMSI catcher attack. On the other hand, choosing the HN as PKG gives the HN the ability to decrypt any encrypted IMSI sent by a UE to an SN. As a result an HN gets the ability to become a PIC or an AIC. Consequently, choosing the HN as PKG does not increase level of trust required in an HN comparing with the approaches used in all the legacy networks. Please note that an SN may serve many UEs coming from different HNs. Hence, an SN can have different public-private key pairs associated with different HNs.

The solution is pictorially presented in Figure 3. It has three different phases. In provisioning phase, the HN generates a public-private key pair e_{hnid}, d_{hnid} in step 1. In step 2 of this phase, the HN provisions the UE with the public key e_{hnid}. During roaming agreement phase, the SN sends the $snid$ in step 1. In step 2 the HN chooses a suitable expiry time $expirytime$ for the private key of the SN. The expiry time is appended with $snid$ and the private key d_{snid} is computed considering $snid\|expirytime$ as the identity of the SN. The reason for using a expiry time as part of the identity of the SN will be discussed later when we discuss the revocation of the public key of an SN. In step 3, the HN sends d_{snid} to the SN along with $expirytime$ and e_{hnid}. In step 4, the SN stores these information in its key-table. In the identification phase, in step 1, the SN broadcasts the $snid$. In step 2, the UE sends back the $hnid$ to the SN. In step 3 the SN extracts the $expirytime$ given by the HN from the key-table. In step 4, SN sends $expirytime$ to the UE. In step 5 the UE computes the public key of the SN e_{snid} as mentioned in the figure. In step 6 the UE encrypts the IMSI using e_{snid} and sends the encrypted IMSI to the SN along with e_{hnid}. Like the other approaches, a random $salt$ of agreed length is concatenated with IMSI before the encryption to avoid having the same encrypted IMSI all the time. At this point the identification ends in a normal situation. However, the SN might need to consult further with the HN in a special case as mentioned in Figure 3. We will discuss that later in this subsection when we discuss the issue of changing the public-private key pair of the HN.

Revocation of Public Keys SNs As the public key in IBE can not be revoked, we use the concept of expiry time as the part of the identity of an entity. The expiry time is a time stamp in the future. Based on the level of trust the HN has in the SN, the HN chooses an expiry time for the SN before computing the private key of the SN. The same expiry time is sent to the UE by the SN. The UE checks if the expiry time is expired or not. If the expiry time is not expired, the UE uses this expiry time to compute the public key of the SN. At some suitable point of time before the expiry time, the SN asks the HN to provide with a new expiry time further in the future. If the SN is not trusted any more, the HN does

not compute the private key for the SN and the old public key given to the SN expires when the expiry time comes. If the private key of the SN is compromised but the SN is still trusted by the HN, the HN computes a new private key using a new expiry time when the SN asks for a private key. Thus a compromised private key can be used by an attacker to mount an attack only until the expiry time used to compute the compromised private key. If the expiry time is chosen as a time stamp far in the future, then the revocation will take long time. If the expiry time is chosen as a time stamp quite near in the future, then the revocation will be quick. In such short expiry time, the signalling overhead in between the HN and SNs will increase. Nevertheless, this signalling overhead does not depend on the number of UEs connecting to the SN and this signalling overhead is a not in the radio network. Hence this overhead might not be very critical. In case longer expiry time is used, a list of revoked $snid||expirytime$ can be maintained by the HN. Whenever there is a change in the list and a UE is attached to a legitimate SN, the HN can send the change to the UE with both authenticity and integrity protection. The list of revoked public key will not grow over time because after the expiry time, a public key is automatically revoked. In this way, AIC and PIC will be able to attack if the they know the private key of the SN and the breach of SN's private key is undetected by the SN. An AIC will be able to mount an attack when the AIC knows the private key of the SN and the expiry time involved in the identity of the SN is not yet expired and the UE is not yet updated with the list of the revoked public keys.

Revocation of the Public Key of the HN Consider the situation when the private key of the HN is compromised but the subscription details of the subscribers' are still secure for some reason. Such a partial security breach of the HN is possible if e.g. the private key is kept in a different server than the one where the subscription details are stored. In such situation, the entity having access to the private key of the HN can mount attacks both as a PIC and AIC. The HN can recover from this situation by changing the public-private key pair. If the HN changes its public-private key pair, the private key of all the SNs have to be recomputed and be sent to the SNs. All the UEs have to be re-provisioned with the new public key of the HN. There are three possible cases of synchronisation.

1. None of UE and SN are updated with the change in HN
2. SN is updated but UE is not
3. UE is updated but SN is not

In the first case, the entity having access to the private key of the HN will be able to attack as AIC and PIC until the expiry time of SN comes. When the expiry time comes, the SN gets a new private key from the HN along with the new public key of the HN. This leads to the second case above. In such case the protocol continues from step 7 of Figure 3. In step 7, the SN finds that the UE is still using the old public key of the HN. In step 8, the SN asks the HN to compute a private key for the SN using the old private key (the one for which

the UE has the public key) of HN and the current expiry time of the SN. In step 9, the HN checks if the public key sent by the SN is a public key used by the HN previously. If so, this indicates that there is a UE which is not yet updated with the new public key of the HN. The HN computes the private key accordingly and send it to the SN in step 10. The SN uses this private key to decrypt the IMSI. Once UE is attached to a legitimate SN, the HN can send the new public key to the UE with both authenticity and integrity protection. In the third case also, when the UE is updated but the SN is not, the steps through 7 to 10 is used in the similar manner. In step 10, the HN indicates if the e_{hnid} is the latest public key of the HN. If it is the latest, then the SN updates its key-table accordingly.

Pros and Cons This approach can not conceal *hnid*. It conceals MSIN from AIC, PIC. The IMSI is entirely revealed to the SN. It does not need to transfer and verify the certificate each time the protocol is run. This approach reduces the signalling and computational overhead compared to the certificate-based approach. However, the problem of heavier computation for public-key encryption and large ciphertext expansion remains as downsides of this solution. Nevertheless, once a UE is identified by the network, the network assigns a GUTI to the UE. It is a question for further research to evaluate the effect of these downsides in signalling overhead and increased latency. This solution is not backward compatible with LTE, UMTS and GSM. It does not require to establish any new trusted authorities, so there is no PKI complexity involved. Revocation of public keys is possible and easy.

3 Evaluation

We have discussed the the pros and cons of different solutions in their respective subsections in Section **??**. All the solutions conceal the MSIN from both AIC and PIC and reveals the entire IMSI to SN. That is why we do not mention the concealment of IMSI as a comparing criterion. Table 1 shows a quick comparison. Note that this is a local comparison, not a global one. For an example, when we say the signalling overhead is low, we mean that it is low comparing with other solutions presented in this report.

All the solutions are based on public-key encryption. As a result all of them requires expensive computation of public-key encryption. Another downside of public-key encryption is the size of the ciphertext is comparatively large. These two downsides will affect the latency and signalling overhead. Once a UE is identified and authenticated by the SN, the SN assigns a GUTI to the UE. In the consecutive identification and authentication, this GUTI can be used. However, when the GUTI is not synchronised in between the SN and the UE, or the UE tries to connect to a new SN, the GUTI does not work. In that situation, the solutions we have proposed can be used. Hence, solutions of public-key encryption based solution is not required to run each time there is a need of identification of a UE. By using a temporary identifier assigned to the UE by the HN, we can reduce the need of running the public-key encryption based solution. The

Solutions	Signalling Overhead	Latency	PKI Effort	Key revocation and re-provisioning
Certificate based	high	high	high	possible and complex
Certificate based and short chain	medium	medium	low	possible and easy
Certificate based short chain and pre-provisioned public keys of SNs	low	low	low	possible and easy
Root-key based	low	low	low	possible and easy
IBE based	low	low	low	possible and easy

Table 1. Comparative evaluation of the solutions

temporary identifier assigned by the HN is called pseudonym. Solutions based on pseudonyms have been proposed in [6, 5]. By using the public-key encryption based solution in conjunction with GUTI and pseudonym, the need for running the public-key encryption based solution becomes very infrequent. Besides, the need of low latency is mostly for making the tactile internet successful. As a result, it is the data plane where the low latency is critical, not the control plane. However, it is still a matter of further research to quantify the impact of public-key encryption on signalling overhead and latency.

4   Conclusion

In this report we have discussed different solutions based on public-key encryption to protect the privacy of the long-term identifier known as IMSI. We have come up with a categorisation of public-key encryption and presented one solution using each of the subcategories. The comparative analysis among the techniques from different categories of public-key encryption shows that pre-provisioned public keys of the SNs, root-key and IBE based solutions are promising approaches to protect the IMSI privacy. Interestingly, none of the solutions need a new entity to build the PKI. However, as all the solutions are based on public-key encryption, the expensive computation and longer ciphertext are the inherent downsides of all the solutions. These downsides affect the latency and signalling overhead. In conjunction with GUTI and pseudonym the impact on latency and signalling overhead can be reduced to large extent. However, quantification of the latency and signalling overhead remains open to further research.

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