```
PMSI, P_{new}, \kappa, \mathcal{K}, SQN
                                                                          S = \{s = \langle i, \mathcal{K}, SQN, \boldsymbol{\kappa}, \boldsymbol{p}, \boldsymbol{p'} \rangle | \forall i \in I\}
  SIM
                                                            SN
                                                                                                                HN
                      IMSI inquiry
update PMSI \leftarrow P_{new}
             IMSI Inquiry response (PMSI)
                                                                           AV Request (PMSI)
                                        i, \mathcal{K}, SQN, \kappa, p, p' \leftarrow s \in S \text{ where } s_p = PMSI \lor s_{p'} = PMSI
                                                        if s_{n'} = PMSI then
                                                                     update s_p \leftarrow s_{p'}
                                                                     update s_{p'} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{34} \notin \{s_p, s_{p'} | \forall s \in S\}
                                                         RAND \leftarrow E_{\kappa} \left( u = (p', SQN) \right)
                                          MAC \leftarrow f_1(\mathcal{K}, SQN, AMF, RAND)
                                                                                                                 BOX A
                                         XRES \leftarrow f_2\left(\mathcal{K}, RAND\right)
                                         CK \leftarrow f_3(\mathcal{K}, RAND)
                                         IK \leftarrow f_4\left(\mathcal{K}, RAND\right)
                                         AK \leftarrow f_5 (\mathcal{K}, RAND)
                                         AUTN \leftarrow \langle SQN \oplus AK, AMF, MAC \rangle
                                         update s_{SQN} \leftarrow SQN + 1
      authentication request (RAND, AUTN)
                                                                   RAND, AUTN, XRES, CK, IK
 AK \leftarrow f_5 (\mathcal{K}, RAND)
                                                                BOX B
 XSQN \leftarrow AK \oplus AUTN_{SQN \oplus AK}
 XMAC \leftarrow f_1(\mathcal{K}, XSQN, AUTN_{AMF}, RAND)
           verify XMAC = AUTN_{MAC}
           verify SQN \leq XSQN \leq (SQN + range)
  update SQN \leftarrow SQN + 1
  SRES \leftarrow f_2(\mathcal{K}, RAND)
  CK \leftarrow f_3(\mathcal{K}, RAND)
  IK \leftarrow f_4(\mathcal{K}, RAND)
 u \leftarrow E_{\kappa}^{-1}(RAND)
    verify XSQN = u_{SQN}
 update P_{new} \leftarrow u_{p'}
           authentication response (SRES)
                                              verify SRES = XRES
                    encrypted with CK
              authenticity protected with IK
```