

# HW/SW CO-DESIGN OF AN AUTOMOTIVE EMBEDDED FIREWALL

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# Agenda

Introduction

Concept


Implementation

Results

Outlook


# Introduction

## Automotive cybersecurity is an emerging field



## Definition of countermeasures

- based on a holistic security concept for vehicles



## **Holistic network security concept consisting of four barriers**

- Access control to network
- Secure on-board communication
- Data usage policies
- Anomaly detection and defense

## **Holistic network security concept consisting of four barriers**

- **Access control to network → Firewall**
- Secure on-board communication
- Data usage policies
- Anomaly detection and defense

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
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
Outlook

## E/E Architecture: Next-Generation Domain Architecture





## Abstract system model



## Evaluation of firewall performance based on automotive requirements

- E2E latency
- Jitter
- Throughput
- Memory/RAM consumption
- CPU utilization

Network Working Group  
Request for Comments: 3511  
Category: Informational

INFORMATIONAL

B. Hickman  
Spirent Communications  
D. Newman  
Network Test  
S. Tadjudin  
Spirent Communications  
T. Martin  
GVNW Consulting Inc  
April 2003

### Benchmarking Methodology for Firewall Performance

Status of this Memo


This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does

## Latency and throughput requirements in in-vehicle networks

Traffic Type	Throughput	Max. End-to-End Delay [ms]
Control Data	1.6 - 16 kbit/s	$\leq 10$
Driver Assistance Camera Data	25.1 Mbit/s	$\leq 45$
Multimedia Audio Data	1.4 Mbit/s	$\leq 150$
Multimedia Video Data	11.8 Mbit/s	$\leq 150$
Bulk Traffic	1.12 Mbit/s - 11.2 Mbit/s	None


Source: Y. Lee and K. Park. Meeting the real-time constraints with standard Ethernet in an in-vehicle network

## Experimental setup



## Firewall features

- Successive analysis stages on MCU



## Definition of assessment matrix based on requirements

- (N)PF: (No) Packet Filter
- SIF: Stateful Inspection Firewall

	CPU load (% MCU)	RAM consumption (% MCU)	E2E latency Worst Case ( $\mu$ s)
MCU NPF			
MCU PF			
MCU PF+SIF			
FPGA PF			
MCU+FPGA combined			

## Adversary model

### Network Control



Install or corrupt a device on the network to control the operation of other devices

### Denial of Service



Deny access to network resources to other devices on the network

### Snooping or Information Theft



Snoop the content of traffic on the network to extract information

Source: Broadcom

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
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# Implementation



**Infineon AURIX  
TriCore TC297-TF**



**Altera Cyclone V SoC  
Development Kit**

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

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
## E2E latency MCU




**500 rules: 2.3 ms  $\rightarrow$  2.2 ms overhead**

# Results

## E2E latency FPGA




## RAM consumption MCU



**500 rules: 107 kB → 33 kB overhead**

## CPU utilization



# Results

## Assessment matrix

- TCP traffic

	CPU load (% MCU)	RAM consumption (% MCU)	E2E latency Worst Case ( $\mu$ s)
MCU NPF	8.8	9.7	132
MCU PF	8.835	9.9	210
MCU PF+SIF	8.83	10	147
FPGA PF	n/a	n/a	3
MCU+FPGA combined	8.83	9.8	150

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Conclusion and Outlook



**Distributed approach: HW firewall in GW, SW firewall on DCs**

**Trade-off SW ↔ HW regarding latency and RAM**

## **Future Work**

- Content-addressable memory (CAM)
- Application Layer filtering (DoIP, SOME/IP)
- Deep Packet Inspection in HW
- Consideration of external traffic model

# Contact

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