SURVEY OF AUTOMOTIVE PRIVACY REGULATIONS AND PRIVACY-RELATED ATTACKS

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Agenda

Introduction

Background


Privacy Regulations

Privacy Attacks

Risk Assessment

Conclusion

Introduction



Data Connectivity

- 78 million vehicles as of 2018
- 98% of all new vehicles in US and Europe
 by 2021







Privacy Concerns

- Facebook-Cambridge Analytica incident
- General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)

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
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Who collects what data?





How is data collected?

OBD-II Dongle





Source: Progressive

Source: Vyncs



Source: RTCL, University of Michigan




Threat Model

Alice wants to install Mallory's third-party app from her OEM's app market **App Permissions Mallory** offers third-Speed party app Acc. Pedal Position **Brake Pedal** Position **Mallory** Odometer obtains copy of GPS Steering Wheel requested data Angle for processing Fuel Level from OEM's Telematics data B2B interface App not to OEM server installed Does Alice

authorize the app?

Willingness of sharing vehicle data is high!






Across geographies, willingness to share data and pay for time-saving use-cases is high

Privacy-awareness is also high!



Do you consciously decide to grant certain applications access to your personal data, even if you may have generally disabled this access for other applications?



Customers' awareness of how applications access and share personal data is high as is their willingness to trade data for benefits

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Voluntary guidelines from 2014

ALLIANCE OF AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS, INC. ASSOCIATION OF GLOBAL AUTOMAKERS, INC.

OEMs only have to ask permission for three categories:

- Driving behavior
- Geologation
- Biometrics

"covered information"

US Congress: Driver Privacy Act of 2015

❖ Deals only with EDR data

Consumer Privacy Protection Principles

PRIVACY PRINCIPLES FOR VEHICLE TECHNOLOGIES AND SERVICES

November 12, 2014



114th Congress (2015-2016)

Sponsor: Sen. Hoeven. John (R-ND) (Introduced 03/17/2015)

Committees: Senate - Commerce, Science, and Transportation

Committee Reports: S. Rept. 114-147

Hide Overview **X**

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
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
Driver fingerprinting (selection)


[En16]: Identify 15 drivers using 15 vehicular sensors with 100% accuracy

Enev, M. et al., "Automobile Driver Fingerprinting," Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 1:34-50, 2016.

[Co18]: Uses mobile and vehicular sensors; Less than 81% accuracy with latter

Corbett, Cherita, Alexis Jimmy, and Watkins Lanier, "Who's Driving You?," Consumer Communications & Networking Conference (CCNC), 2018 15th IEEE Annual, 1-4, IEEE, 2018.





Driver fingerprinting (selection)

[Ka17]: Identify 24 drivers with 90% accuracy in 20s only using pre-trip data

Pre-trip Fields	Frequency (Hz)	Range	Driving Fields	Frequency (Hz)	Range
Door status (DO & DC)	10	Boolean	Brake pedal (BP)	10	0-100
Ignition switch status (ISU)	10	Boolean	Accelerator pedal (AP)	50	0-100
Seatbelt status (SF)	10	Boolean	Revolutions per minute (RPM)	10	0-16000
Shifter position (SU)	40	Integer(1-6,13,14,15)	Throttle position (TP)	10	0-100
Parking brake active	100	Boolean	Turn signals (TS)	Event	Boolean
			Vehicle velocity (V)	10	0-255 kmh
			Steering wheel angle (SWA)	100	0-1340°

Kar, Gorkem, Jain Shubham, Gruteser Marco, Chen Jinzhu, Bai Fan, and Govindan Ramesh, "PredriveID: Pre-Trip Driver Identification from In-Vehicle Data," in Proceedings of the Second ACM/IEEE Symposium on Edge Computing, 2, ACM, 2017.

Location Inference (selection)


[De13]: Using speed from tracking unit with 37% accuracy

Dewri, R., Annadata, P., Eltarjaman, W., and Thurimella, R., "Inferring Trip Destinations from Driving Habits Data," in Proceedings of the 12th ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, 267-272, ACM, November 2013).

[Zh17]: Using speed from OBD-II dongle with 70% accuracy of correct path being in Top 30 of generated candidate paths

Zhou, L., Chen, Q., Luo, Z., Zhu, H., and Chen, C. (June 2017). Speed-Based Location Tracking in Usage-Based Automotive Insurance, in Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS), 2017 IEEE 37th International Conference on, 2252-2257, IEEE.

$\begin{array}{c} { m trip\ length} \\ { m (miles)} \end{array}$	number of candidates	rank of actual destination
1.48	12	1
1.59	12	1
2.60	50	1
3.23	15	1
3.78	11	2
3.85	23	1
3.93	52	1
3.93	49	1
3.95	37	3
5.47	11	2
5.89	18	1
5.84	20	1
7.95	196	2
9.42	26	4
13.15	37	3
14.10	53	1
14.57	68	1
24.10	42	13



Driving Behavior Analysis

Usage-Based Insurance (UBI): Adjust insurance premium based on driving behavior



Company	Mileage	Speed	Acceleration	Hard Braking	Turns
Progressive	~	~		~	
State Farm	~	~	~	~	✓
Allstate	~	~		~	
Esurance		~	~	~	

[Ch15, Li18]: Safe or distracted driving detection

Chen, S.H., Pan, J.S., and Kaixuan, L., "Driving behavior Analysis Based on Vehicle OBD Information and Adaboost Algorithms," in Proceedings of the International MultiConference of Engineers and Computer Scientists, vol. 1, 18-20, 2015.

Li, Z., Bao, S., Kolmanovsky, I.V., and Yin, X., "Visual-Manual Distraction Detection Using Driving Performance Indicators with Naturalistic Driving Data," IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, 2017.

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Risk Assessment

How can we quantify the privacy risk of a vehicular sensor?


Define a 3-tuple

(Driver Fingerprinting, Location Inferencing, Driving Behavior Analysis)

For each of the 20 sensors, assign

- Boolean 1 if sensor contributes to attack category
- ❖ Boolean 0 if not

Example: Current Speed (0,1,0)




Risk Assessment

How can we quantify the privacy risk of a vehicular sensor?

Some attacks are only possible through a combination of multiple sensors

Inspect sensors pairwise in their contribution to attack categories



Risk Matrix – Part 1

	Odometer	NI >	Outside Temperature	GPS	Current Speed	Average Speed	Maximum Speed	Fuel Consumption	Throttle Position	RPM	Steering wheel angle	Airbag status	Seat belt status	Battery level	Tire pressure	Hard braking	Make/Model/Y ear	Fuel level	Check engine light on	Oil level
Odometer	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	1/1/1	0/1/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/1	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/1/0	0/0/0	0/0/1	0/0/0	0/0/1	0/0/1	0/0/0	0/0/1	0/0/0	0/0/0
VIN	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	1/1/1	0/1/1	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/1	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/1/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0
Outside Temperature	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	1/1/1	0/1/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/1/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0
Location (GPS)	1/1/1	1/1/1	1/1/1	1/1/1	1/1/1	1/1/1	1/1/1	1/1/1	1/1/1	1/1/1	1/1/1	1/1/1	1/1/1	1/1/1	1/1/1	1/1/1	1/1/1	1/1/1	1/1/1	1/1/1
Current Speed	0/1/0	0/1/1	0/1/0	1/1/1	0/1/0	0/1/0	0/1/0	1/1/0	0/1/1	0/1/1	0/1/1	0/1/0	0/1/1	0/1/0	0/1/0	0/1/1	0/1/0	0/1/0	0/1/0	0/1/0
Average Speed	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	1/1/1	0/1/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/1/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0
Maximum Speed	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	1/1/1	0/1/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/1/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0
Fuel Consumption	0/0/1	0/0/1	0/0/0	1/1/1	1/1/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/1	0/0/1	0/1/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/1	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0
Throttle Position	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	1/1/1	0/1/1	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/1	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/1/1	0/0/0	0/0/1	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/1	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0
RPM	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	1/1/1	0/1/1	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/1	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/1/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0

Risk Matrix – Part 2

	Odometer	NIN	Outside Temperature	GPS	Current Speed	Average Speed	Maximum Speed	Fuel Consumption	Throttle Position	RPM	Steering wheel angle	Airbag status	Seat belt status	Battery level	Tire pressure	Hard braking	Make/Model/Y ear	Fuel level	Check engine light on	Oil level
Steering wheel angle	0/1/0	0/1/0	0/1/0	1/1/1	0/1/1	0/1/0	0/1/0	0/1/0	0/1/1	0/1/0	0/1/0	0/1/0	0/1/0	0/1/0	0/1/0	0/1/1	0/1/0	0/1/0	0/1/0	0/1/0
Airbag status	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	1/1/1	0/1/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/1/0	0/0/0	0/0/1	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/1	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0
Seat belt status	0/0/1	0/0/0	0/0/0	1/1/1	0/1/1	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/1	0/0/0	0/1/0	0/0/1	0/0/1	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/1	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0
Battery level	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	1/1/1	0/1/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/1/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0
Tire pressure	0/0/1	0/0/0	0/0/0	1/1/1	0/1/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/1/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0
Hard braking	0/0/1	0/0/0	0/0/0	1/1/1	0/1/1	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/1	0/0/0	0/1/1	0/0/1	0/0/1	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0
Make/Model/Year	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	1/1/1	0/1/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/1	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/1/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0
Fuel level	0/0/1	0/0/0	0/0/0	1/1/1	0/1/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/1/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/1	0/0/0	0/0/0
Check engine light on	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	1/1/1	0/1/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/1/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0
Oil level	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	1/1/1	0/1/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/1/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0


Risk Matrix (selection)

GPS is a very sensitive sensor, it contributes to all attack categories in combination with any sensor

	Odometer	Z >	Outside Temperature	GPS	Current Speed
Odometer	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	1/1/1	0/1/0
VIN	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	1/1/1	0/1/1
Outside Temperature	0/0/0	0/0/0	0/0/0	1/1/1	0/1/0
Location (GPS)	1/1/1	1/1/1	1/1/1	1/1/1	1/1/1
Current Speed	0/ 1 /0	0/ 1 /1	0/ 1 /0	1/1/1	0/1/0

Current Speed contributes to location inference in any combination

Risk Assessment



Privacy Score

Metric defining privacy risk of sensor *k*:

$$PS_{k} = \frac{\sum_{i} \sum_{j} w_{i} c_{k,j}^{i}}{N \sum_{i} w_{i}}$$

- **❖** Evaluated for *N*=20 sensors
- ❖ i is attack category
- **❖** *c* is 3-tuple entry in the matrix
- **❖** Weights w are optional (for evaluation assigned to 1)

Normalized Privacy Score (NPS) to arrange values in interval [0,1]:

$$NPS_k = \frac{PS_k - \min(PS)}{\max(PS) - \min(PS)}$$

Privacy Score

Vehicular Sensor	Privacy Score (PS)	Normalized Privacy Score (NPS)
Location	1.00	1.00
Current Speed	0.48	0.43
Steering wheel angle	0.42	0.37
Fuel Consumption	0.18	0.11
Hard braking	0.18	0.11
Odometer	0.17	0.10
Seat belt status	0.17	0.10
Throttle Position	0.15	0.08
RPM	0.15	0.08
VIN	0.12	0.04
Airbag status	0.12	0.04
Fuel level	0.12	0.04
Tire pressure	0.10	0.02
Make/model/year	0.10	0.02
Outside Temperature	0.08	0.00
Average Speed	0.08	0.00
Maximum Speed	0.08	0.00
Battery level	0.08	0.00
Check engine light on	0.08	0.00
Oil level	0.08	0.00

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Conclusion

- ❖ Pervasiveness of vehicular data collection
- **❖** Lax privacy regulation in automotive domain

Increased privacy risk

- Surveyed and categorized existing attacks
- ❖ Defined risk matrix to assess the risk of 20 sensors contributing to attack categories
- Quantified each sensor's risk using Privacy Score (PS)
- Privacy Score can be used as design parameter of future automotive privacy-protection schemes

THANK YOU

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