

The Legacy of Political Violence across Generations

Supplementary Information

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Table A1. *Location of Crimean Tatars on January 1, 1953 (Soviet sources)*

Territory	Population of Tatars
Kazakhstan	2,511
Uzbekistan	128,348
Tadzhikistan	6,711
Bashkiria	299
Tula Oblast	2,846
Kirov Oblast	8
Mari ASSR	7,652
Kostroma Oblast	2,243
Moscow Oblast	706
Kuibyshev Oblast	663
Kirghizia	366
Kemerovo Oblast	209
Molotov Oblast	8,438
Sverdlovsk Oblast	2,488
Other	1,771
<i>Total</i>	<i>165,259</i>

Source: Pohl (1997).

Table A2. *Survey sample characteristics, by generation*

Variable	First generation	Second generation	Third generation
Male (%)	33.7	50.3	49.5
Urban (%)	22.0	27.8	34.0
Age (average)	80	51	25
Education (%)			
Incomplete primary	43.4	0.8	0.6
Elementary	23.1	1.3	5.2
General middle	15.7	22.8	27.0
Special middle	8.4	38.8	28.1
Professional technical	3.7	17.3	11.9
Incomplete higher	1.7	2.0	9.3
Higher	4.0	16.8	17.9

Table A3. *Descriptive statistics*

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Among 1G					
Victimization	298	1.34	1.06	0	3
Pre-Soviet household wealth	300	0.00	1.00	-3.60	1.82
Dekulakized	282	0.41	0.49	0	1
Soviet opposition	272	2.30	0.82	1	3
Pre-Soviet religiosity	295	2.49	0.62	1	3
In-group attachment	285	0.37	0.53	-1	1
Victimhood	225	0.48	0.50	0	1
Threat perception	283	1.34	1.30	0	3
Among 3G					
In-group attachment	965	0.40	0.50	-1	1
Victimhood	806	0.46	0.50	0	1
Threat perception	959	0.76	1.10	0	3
Support for radical Islam	653	0.02	1.00	-0.57	4.49
Religiosity	996	-0.24	0.73	-0.67	5.25
Support for CT leaders	732	-0.11	1.03	-2.09	1.35
Celebrate CT holiday	955	0.78	0.42	0	1
Support for Chechen rebels	643	0.34	0.47	0	1
Support for annexation	785	0.39	0.49	0	1
Pro-Russia vote choice	972	0.00	1.01	-0.38	3.81
Turnout	982	0.02	1.01	-3.26	0.49
Willingness to participate	732	0.06	0.99	-1.81	0.84

Table A4. *Distribution of intensity of victimization*

Value	Frequency
0	27.9
1	26.5
2	29.2
3	16.4

Table A5. *Relationship between geographic region and ancestor victimization*

Variable	Victimization (first generation only)	Ancestor victimization (full sample)
Southwest (reference group)	-- --	-- --
Southeast	0.124 (0.167)	0.074 (0.153)
Northwest	0.075 (0.188)	-0.026 (0.184)
Northeast	-0.203 (0.158)	-0.341* (0.142)
Observations	298	1,848
Families	298	298
R ²	0.010	0.017

* p<0.05

Notes: Regression estimates with standard errors clustered by family.

Table A6. Endogeneity tests

Variable	Linear regression	Ordered probit
Pre-Soviet household wealth	0.077 (0.068)	0.079 (0.072)
Dekulakized	0.040 (0.152)	0.064 (0.158)
Soviet opposition	0.117 (0.092)	0.116 (0.097)
Pre-Soviet religiosity	0.171 (0.119)	0.159 (0.124)
Pre-deportation region		
Southwest (reference group)	-- --	-- --
Southeast	-0.030 (0.235)	-0.039 (0.248)
Northwest	0.137 (0.248)	0.172 (0.238)
Northeast	0.046 (0.457)	0.038 (0.510)
Deportation republic		
Uzbekistan (reference group)	-- --	-- --
Other Central Asia	-0.269 (0.312)	-0.280 (0.336)
Russia	-0.425 (0.252)	-0.479 (0.285)
Observations	212	212
R ² /Pseudo-R ²	0.041	0.015

* p<0.05

Notes: Estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. Constant term not shown.

Table A7. *Correlates of in-group attachment measure*

Variable	In-group attachment
Consumption of Crimean Tatar television (ATR)	0.059* (0.017)
Crimean Tatar spoken at home	0.087* (0.017)
Oppose mixed marriage	0.114* (0.021)
Observations	1,753
Families	300
R ²	0.08

* p<0.05

Notes: Regression estimates with standard errors clustered by family. Age, gender, generation dummies, and constant term not shown.

Table A8. *Effects of first-generation victimization on third-generation attitudes and behaviors*

Dependent variable	Victimization effect	SE	Obs.	Families	R²
Political identities					
In-group attachment	0.058*	0.022	957	298	0.015
Victimhood	0.080*	0.023	801	286	0.028
Threat perception	0.970*	0.047	951	298	0.009
Radicalism					
Support for radical Islam	0.009	0.058	645	267	0.000
Religiosity	0.049	0.031	988	298	0.005
Crimean Tatar issues					
Support for CT leaders	0.178*	0.050	724	285	0.032
Celebrate CT holiday	0.038*	0.019	947	297	0.009
Attitudes toward Russia					
Support for Chechen rebels	0.101*	0.021	639	270	0.046
Support for annexation	-0.074*	0.026	778	285	0.025
Pro-Russia vote choice	-0.089*	0.044	964	296	0.008
Political engagement					
Turnout	0.094*	0.042	974	298	0.010
Willingness to participate	0.120*	0.044	727	287	0.015
[Past participation]	0.080*	0.040	996	298	0.007

* p<0.05

Notes: Linear regression estimates with standard errors clustered by family. Constant terms not shown.

Table A9. *Effects of first-generation victimization on third-generation identities, attitudes, and behaviors, with pre-deportation controls*

Dependent variable	Victimization effect	SE	Obs.	Families	R²
Political identities					
In-group attachment	0.052*	0.026	699	214	0.058
Victimhood	0.074*	0.026	605	210	0.120
Threat perception	0.163*	0.053	687	214	0.033
Radicalism					
Support for radical Islam	-0.002	0.066	467	191	0.059
Religiosity	0.033	0.037	715	214	0.033
Crimean Tatar issues					
Support for CT leaders	0.187*	0.061	528	207	0.057
Celebrate CT holiday	0.039	0.024	686	214	0.064
Attitudes toward Russia					
Support for Chechen rebels	0.101*	0.024	469	195	0.087
Support for annexation	-0.064*	0.028	569	205	0.107
Pro-Russia vote choice	-0.087	0.055	707	213	0.051
Political engagement					
Turnout	0.096	0.050	706	214	0.054
Willingness to participate	0.096	0.050	534	207	0.031

* p<0.05

Notes: Linear regression estimates with standard errors clustered by family. Constant terms and pre-deportation control variables (pre-Soviet household wealth, dekulakized, Soviet opposition, pre-Soviet religiosity, pre-deportation region, and deportation republic) not shown.

Table A10. *Effects of first-generation victimization on third-generation identities, attitudes, and behaviors, with third-generation demographic controls*

Dependent variable	Victimization effect	SE	Obs.	Families	R²
Political identities					
In-group attachment	0.054*	0.022	940	298	0.030
Victimhood	0.072*	0.024	788	285	0.045
Threat perception	0.095*	0.047	934	298	0.017
Radicalism					
Support for radical Islam	0.016	0.057	635	267	0.017
Religiosity	0.054	0.031	970	298	0.028
Crimean Tatar issues					
Support for CT leaders	0.164*	0.050	710	285	0.045
Celebrate CT holiday	0.037	0.019	927	297	0.018
Attitudes toward Russia					
Support for Chechen rebels	0.102*	0.021	628	269	0.058
Support for annexation	-0.071*	0.026	765	285	0.038
Pro-Russia vote choice	-0.091*	0.043	944	296	0.024
Political engagement					
Turnout	0.096*	0.041	956	298	0.028
Willingness to participate	0.126*	0.042	709	286	0.065

* p<0.05

Notes: Linear regression estimates with standard errors clustered by family. Constant terms and demographic control variables (wealth index, education, age, gender, and marital status) not shown.

Table A11. *Effects of first-generation victimization on third-generation identities, attitudes, and behaviors – probit models*

Dependent variable	Victimization effect	SE	Obs.	Families	Pseudo-R²
Political identities					
In-group attachment	0.141*	0.055	957	298	0.010
Victimhood	0.205*	0.061	801	286	0.020
Threat perception	0.109*	0.052	951	298	0.004
Crimean Tatar issues					
Celebrate CT holiday	0.130*	0.067	947	297	0.009
Attitudes toward Russia					
Support for Chechen rebels	0.285*	0.062	639	270	0.037
Support for annexation	-0.191*	0.069	778	285	0.018
Pro-Russia vote choice	-0.153*	0.066	964	296	0.010
Political engagement					
Turnout	0.138*	0.056	974	298	0.008
Willingness to participate	0.147*	0.053	727	287	0.006

* p<0.05

Notes: Probit or ordered probit estimates with standard errors clustered by family. Constant terms not shown.

Table A12. *Effects of first-generation victimization on third-generation identities, attitudes, and behaviors, excluding families deported to Russia*

Dependent variable	Victimization effect	SE	Obs.	Families	R²
Political identities					
In-group attachment	0.049*	0.023	859	267	0.010
Victimhood	0.065*	0.025	727	258	0.017
Threat perception	0.099*	0.050	854	267	0.009
Radicalism					
Support for radical Islam	-0.008	0.063	572	236	0.000
Religiosity	0.043	0.035	886	267	0.004
Crimean Tatar issues					
Support for CT leaders	0.166*	0.054	657	256	0.026
Celebrate CT holiday	0.043*	0.022	851	266	0.011
Attitudes toward Russia					
Support for Chechen rebels	0.099*	0.023	574	241	0.044
Support for annexation	-0.053*	0.028	697	255	0.012
Pro-Russia vote choice	-0.079	0.048	864	265	0.007
Political engagement					
Turnout	0.076	0.045	874	267	0.006
Willingness to participate	0.097*	0.047	657	257	0.010

* p<0.05

Notes: Linear regression estimates with standard errors clustered by family. Constant terms not shown.

Table A13. *Effects of first-generation victimization on third-generation identities, attitudes, and behaviors, excluding 3G born before Soviet Union collapse*

Dependent variable	Victimization effect	SE	Obs.	Families	R²
Political identities					
In-group attachment	0.057*	0.025	611	256	0.014
Victimhood	0.071*	0.029	521	236	0.021
Threat perception	0.091	0.055	605	251	0.007
Radicalism					
Support for radical Islam	0.005	0.071	440	221	0.000
Religiosity	0.058	0.042	628	255	0.007
Crimean Tatar issues					
Support for CT leaders	0.184*	0.056	496	241	0.035
Celebrate CT holiday	0.039	0.024	604	251	0.010
Attitudes toward Russia					
Support for Chechen rebels	0.094*	0.025	426	219	0.042
Support for annexation	-0.062*	0.029	504	234	0.019
Pro-Russia vote choice	-0.096	0.057	610	253	0.008
Political engagement					
Turnout	0.115*	0.053	618	254	0.012
Willingness to participate	0.114*	0.054	495	233	0.014

* p<0.05

Notes: Linear regression estimates with standard errors clustered by family. Constant terms not shown.

Table A14. *Effects of first-generation victimization on third-generation identities, attitudes, and behaviors, excluding 1G less than six years old in 1944*

Dependent variable	Victimization effect	SE	Obs.	Families	R ²
Political identities					
In-group attachment	0.065*	0.024	811	249	0.018
Victimhood	0.085*	0.026	682	239	0.031
Threat perception	0.075	0.051	807	249	0.005
Radicalism					
Support for radical Islam	0.024	0.061	570	228	0.001
Religiosity	0.052	0.036	838	249	0.006
Crimean Tatar issues					
Support for CT leaders	0.151*	0.053	628	240	0.023
Celebrate CT holiday	0.040	0.037	807	248	0.010
Attitudes toward Russia					
Support for Chechen rebels	0.097*	0.023	558	229	0.041
Support for annexation	-0.066*	0.029	672	239	0.020
Pro-Russia vote choice	-0.084	0.049	814	247	0.008
Political engagement					
Turnout	0.089*	0.046	831	249	0.009
Willingness to participate	0.129*	0.048	615	239	0.018

* p<0.05

Notes: Linear regression estimates with standard errors clustered by family. Constant terms not shown.

Table A15. *Effects of first-generation victimization on third-generation identities, attitudes, and behaviors, among families living in different settlements*

Dependent variable	Victimization effect	SE	Obs.	Families	R²
Political identities					
In-group attachment	0.092*	0.032	329	179	0.033
Victimhood	0.102*	0.033	276	151	0.040
Threat perception	0.187*	0.064	328	176	0.031
Radicalism					
Support for radical Islam	0.030	0.080	236	146	0.001
Religiosity	0.064	0.041	342	181	0.009
Crimean Tatar issues					
Support for CT leaders	0.310*	0.078	264	154	0.085
Celebrate CT holiday	0.035	0.030	324	177	0.008
Attitudes toward Russia					
Support for Chechen rebels	0.104*	0.035	254	148	0.046
Support for annexation	-0.094*	0.037	274	159	0.038
Pro-Russia vote choice	-0.216*	0.079	335	176	0.034
Political engagement					
Turnout	0.221*	0.073	337	178	0.037
Willingness to participate	0.150*	0.068	268	159	0.022

* p<0.05

Notes: Linear regression estimates with standard errors clustered by family. Constant terms not shown.

Table A16. *Effects of first-generation victimization on third-generation identities, attitudes, and behaviors, among families interviewed on the same day*

Dependent variable	Victimization effect	SE	Obs.	Families	R²
Political identities					
In-group attachment	0.006	0.027	496	248	0.000
Victimhood	0.074*	0.027	416	226	0.024
Threat perception	0.085	0.067	493	251	0.006
Radicalism					
Support for radical Islam	0.040	0.078	340	209	0.006
Religiosity	0.021	0.046	511	254	0.001
Crimean Tatar issues					
Support for CT leaders	0.152*	0.066	364	215	0.023
Celebrate CT holiday	0.034	0.020	482	251	0.008
Attitudes toward Russia					
Support for Chechen rebels	0.130*	0.028	339	209	0.075
Support for annexation	-0.072	0.031	394	222	0.024
Pro-Russia vote choice	-0.099	0.057	492	249	0.010
Political engagement					
Turnout	0.095	0.054	501	253	0.010
Willingness to participate	0.090	0.059	373	215	0.009

* p<0.05

Notes: Linear regression estimates with standard errors clustered by family. Constant terms not shown.

Table A17. *Effects of first-generation victimization on third-generation identities, attitudes, and behaviors, among families interviewed within one day of each other*

Dependent variable	Victimization effect	SE	Obs.	Families	R²
Political identities					
In-group attachment	0.034	0.025	708	266	0.005
Victimhood	0.088*	0.024	607	249	0.034
Threat perception	0.101	0.055	699	270	0.009
Radicalism					
Support for radical Islam	0.046	0.068	480	235	0.002
Religiosity	0.042	0.037	727	270	0.003
Crimean Tatar issues					
Support for CT leaders	0.154*	0.057	531	242	0.023
Celebrate CT holiday	0.028	0.020	695	269	0.006
Attitudes toward Russia					
Support for Chechen rebels	0.120*	0.023	490	235	0.063
Support for annexation	-0.072*	0.029	589	245	0.023
Pro-Russia vote choice	-0.103	0.054	708	267	0.010
Political engagement					
Turnout	0.103*	0.051	719	270	0.010
Willingness to participate	0.092	0.050	533	240	0.009

* p<0.05

Notes: Linear regression estimates with standard errors clustered by family. Constant terms not shown.

Table A18. *Effects of first-generation victimization on third-generation identities, attitudes, and behaviors, among families interviewed within two days of each other*

Dependent variable	Victimization effect	SE	Obs.	Families	R²
Political identities					
In-group attachment	0.038*	0.024	781	275	0.006
Victimhood	0.089*	0.023	673	258	0.035
Threat perception	0.113*	0.051	775	276	0.012
Radicalism					
Support for radical Islam	0.026	0.066	538	240	0.001
Religiosity	0.041	0.034	804	276	0.003
Crimean Tatar issues					
Support for CT leaders	0.177*	0.056	598	251	0.030
Celebrate CT holiday	0.034	0.019	770	275	0.008
Attitudes toward Russia					
Support for Chechen rebels	0.118*	0.023	543	242	0.060
Support for annexation	-0.079*	0.028	651	251	0.028
Pro-Russia vote choice	-0.109*	0.052	783	273	0.011
Political engagement					
Turnout	0.105*	0.049	794	276	0.011
Willingness to participate	0.120*	0.048	598	250	0.016

* p<0.05

Notes: Linear regression estimates with standard errors clustered by family. Constant terms not shown.

Table A19. *Association between identities and reports of other violence, among first generation*

Dependent variable	Victimization coefficient	SE	Obs	R²
Arrested				
In-group attachment	-0.055	0.084	277	0.002
Victimhood	0.125	0.086	219	0.010
Threat perception	0.073	0.200	274	0.000
Executed or disappeared				
In-group attachment	-0.112	0.073	277	0.008
Victimhood	0.128	0.083	221	0.010
Threat perception	0.436*	0.183	274	0.019

* p<0.05

Notes: Regression estimates with robust standard errors. Constant terms not shown.

Table A20. *Effects of victimization on attitudes among first generation*

Dependent variable	Victimization effect	SE	Obs	R²
In-group attachment	0.081 [*]	0.028	283	0.027
Victimhood	0.077 [*]	0.031	224	0.027
Threat perception	0.156 [*]	0.073	281	0.016

^{*} p<0.05

Notes: Regression estimates with robust standard errors. Constant terms not shown.

Table A21. *Intergenerational persistence of victimization effects*

Variable	Coefficient	SE	Obs.	Families	R²
1G-2G Transmission					
In-group attachment	0.224*	0.046	577	298	0.071
Victimhood	0.468*	0.045	473	266	0.212
Threat perception	0.358*	0.043	570	297	0.149
2G-3G Transmission					
In-group attachment	0.326*	0.037	965	591	0.130
Victimhood	0.364*	0.037	806	517	0.133
Threat perception	0.311*	0.035	959	588	0.117
1G-3G Transmission					
In-group attachment	0.216*	0.041	965	300	0.066
Victimhood	0.337*	0.044	806	288	0.112
Threat perception	0.251*	0.038	959	300	0.089

* p<0.05

Notes: Regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by family. Constant terms not shown.

Table A22. *Effects of first-generation victimization on third-generation identities, attitudes, and behaviors, conditioned by family discussion*

Dependent variable	Victimization	Discussion	Interaction	Obs.	Families	R²
Political identities						
In-group attachment	0.050 (0.053)	-0.070 (0.037)	-0.002 (0.022)	938	297	0.027
Victimhood	-0.004 (0.055)	-0.143* (0.036)	0.031 (0.023)	788	285	0.056
Threat perception	0.010 (0.116)	-0.156* (0.069)	0.037 (0.047)	933	297	0.017
Radicalism						
Support for radical Islam	0.071 (0.131)	0.084 (0.094)	-0.025 (0.055)	639	266	0.002
Religiosity	-0.015 (0.095)	-0.132* (0.046)	0.025 (0.032)	968	297	0.018
Crimean Tatar issues						
Support for CT leaders	-0.066 (0.123)	-0.271* (0.089)	0.102 (0.053)	715	285	0.048
Celebrate CT holiday	-0.035 (0.037)	-0.123* (0.029)	0.030 (0.017)	927	296	0.040
Attitudes toward Russia						
Support for Chechen rebels	0.020 (0.054)	-0.065 (0.035)	0.036 (0.022)	630	269	0.051
Support for annexation	0.046 (0.065)	0.110* (0.045)	-0.051 (0.026)	766	284	0.034
Pro-Russia vote choice	0.178 (0.114)	0.243* (0.091)	-0.116* (0.052)	944	295	0.022
Political engagement						
Turnout	-0.107 (0.108)	-0.175* (0.088)	0.088 (0.047)	955	297	0.017
Willingness to participate	0.006 (0.102)	-0.259* (0.080)	0.038 (0.049)	714	285	0.046

* p<0.05

Notes: Linear regression estimates with standard errors clustered by family. Constant terms not shown.

Table A23. Implicit mediation analysis

Variable	Radicalism		Crimean Tatar issues		Attitudes toward Russia			Political participation	
	Support for radical Islam	Religiosity	Support for CT leaders	Celebrate CT holiday	Support for Chechen rebels	Support for annexation	Pro-Russia vote choice	Turnout	Willingness to participate
In-group attachment	-0.027 (0.092)	-0.098 (0.055)	0.399* (0.098)	0.151* (0.042)	0.044 (0.043)	-0.158* (0.036)	-0.229* (0.082)	0.256* (0.082)	0.181* (0.088)
Victimhood	-0.036 (0.093)	0.126* (0.058)	0.260* (0.097)	-0.036 (0.044)	-0.097* (0.044)	-0.331* (0.042)	-0.474* (0.086)	0.484* (0.082)	0.008 (0.083)
Threat perception	0.061 (0.044)	0.129* (0.029)	0.254* (0.042)	0.017 (0.015)	0.113* (0.020)	-0.164* (0.016)	-0.198* (0.028)	0.130* (0.033)	0.180* (0.035)
First-generation victimization	-0.022 (0.059)	0.033 (0.028)	0.320 (0.166)	0.081 (0.066)	0.243* (0.065)	-0.113 (0.066)	-0.048 (0.154)	0.031 (0.047)	0.092* (0.046)
Observations	501	743	547	707	488	622	723	738	564
Families	235	281	254	280	243	257	275	281	258
R ²	0.005	0.062	0.177	0.039	0.120	0.365	0.118	0.105	0.070

* p<0.05

Notes: Regression estimates with standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by family. Constant terms not shown.

Table A24. *Effects of first-generation victimization on third-generation identities, attitudes, and behaviors – with dichotomous measure of victimization*

Dependent variable	Victimization effect	SE	Obs.	Families	R²
Political identities					
In-group attachment	0.059	0.051	957	298	0.003
Victimhood	0.170*	0.052	801	286	0.023
Threat perception	0.214*	0.103	951	298	0.008
Radicalism					
Support for radical Islam	-0.028	0.117	645	267	0.000
Religiosity	0.192*	0.052	988	298	0.014
Crimean Tatar issues					
Support for CT leaders	0.412*	0.113	724	285	0.031
Celebrate CT holiday	0.066	0.048	947	297	0.005
Attitudes toward Russia					
Support for Chechen rebels	0.195*	0.047	639	270	0.032
Support for annexation	-0.256*	0.058	778	285	0.053
Pro-Russia vote choice	-0.250*	0.114	964	296	0.012
Political engagement					
Turnout	0.255*	0.107	974	298	0.013
Willingness to participate	0.269*	0.108	727	287	0.015

* p<0.05

Notes: Linear regression estimates with standard errors clustered by family. Constant terms not shown.

Table A25. *Effects of first-generation victimization on third-generation identities, attitudes, and behaviors – with dummy variables for levels of victimization*

Dependent variable	Victimization effect			Obs.	Families	R ²
	1	2-3	4+			
Political identities						
In-group attachment	-0.038 (0.060)	0.096 (0.061)	0.153* (0.070)	957	298	0.021
Victimhood	0.115 (0.063)	0.192* (0.061)	0.229* (0.080)	801	286	0.029
Threat perception	0.163 (0.120)	0.212 (0.126)	0.301 (0.159)	951	298	0.009
Radicalism						
Support for radical Islam	-0.037 (0.143)	-0.072 (0.127)	0.077 (0.208)	645	267	0.003
Religiosity	0.246 (0.065)	0.151 (0.063)	0.180 (0.116)	988	298	0.016
Crimean Tatar issues						
Support for CT leaders	0.257 (0.135)	0.562* (0.137)	0.401* (0.161)	724	285	0.044
Celebrate CT holiday	0.012 (0.057)	0.099 (0.055)	0.091 (0.063)	947	297	0.012
Attitudes toward Russia						
Support for Chechen rebels	0.111 (0.058)	0.238* (0.057)	0.276* (0.070)	639	270	0.048
Support for annexation	-0.230* (0.070)	-0.337* (0.062)	-0.140 (0.087)	778	285	0.072
Pro-Russia vote choice	-0.215 (0.131)	-0.293* (0.127)	-0.225 (0.140)	964	296	0.013

Political engagement						
Turnout	0.183 (0.129)	0.350* (0.118)	0.195 (0.133)	974	298	0.017
Willingness to participate	0.269* (0.125)	0.167 (0.134)	0.476* (0.134)	727	287	0.024

* p<0.05

Notes: Linear regression estimates with standard errors clustered by family. Standard errors in parentheses. Constant terms not shown. Base category of victimization is zero family members died.

Survey Methodology

We calculated how Crimean Tatars are distributed across Crimea's 14 *raions* (provinces) and 11 cities using settlement-level population statistics from 2012 provided to us by the Crimean Tatar popular assembly, the Mejlis. Each province and city was then assigned the number of first-generation respondents proportionate to the size of the Crimean Tatar population residing within that administrative unit. Villages were selected randomly from within each province/city after settlements of fewer than 200 inhabitants and those with fewer than 10% Crimean Tatars (based on statistics from the 2001 Ukrainian census) were excluded from the sample. We omitted these settlements because of the difficulties accessing small, remote villages and locating older respondents in villages where Crimean Tatars are a small minority.

Interviewers randomly sampled households until they found a Crimean Tatar respondent over 73 years old, meaning they were at least three years old at the time of the deportation. After interviewing each first-generation respondent, we followed the family chain down to the second and third generations. Within each family, two second-generation respondents were randomly selected, and subsequently two children of every second-generation respondent were also randomly selected. We located second- and third-generation respondents at their places of residence and made multiple revisits when necessary. Our final sample consists of 300 first-generation respondents, 600 second-generation respondents, and 1,004 third-generation respondents living in 23 towns and 191 villages across Crimea.

Not every second-generation respondent had two adult children and third-generation individuals were somewhat more likely to decline participation. The response rate was 94% and 93% among first- and second-generation respondents, respectively, and 71% among third-generation interviewees. For both these reasons, it was not always possible to interview four grandchildren in every family.

What is missing from this sample is the set of Crimean Tatar families whose deportation survivors have since died. We could have sampled their descendants and relied on their reports of their ancestors' victimization during deportation, but we expected such reports to be far less reliable. Moreover, we see no reason to think that the legacy of political violence among these families is different from that among those with a living deportation survivor.

We hired and trained ethnic Crimean Tatar enumerators, and we offered respondents a choice of Russian or Crimean Tatar survey instruments. Only 28% of our respondents chose to take the survey in Crimean Tatar. Unsurprisingly, that proportion was higher among first-generation respondents (50%) and lower among third-generation respondents (16%). Crimean Tatars are overall fairly secular and few display outward appearances of piety. The Muslim headscarf, for instance, is worn by few women; none of our interviewers wore one. We are therefore not concerned about interviewer effects when it comes to our measures of religiosity.

Survey Question Wording

The survey was introduced to every respondent as follows:

Hello! My name is [...] I am assisting with a research project about the transmission of cultural, religious, and linguistic traditions from older to younger generations in Crimean Tatar families. Our aim is to establish how to preserve Crimean Tatar traditions and to find out why some of them disappear over time. This project does not pursue any political goals. Nor does it have any connection to the ongoing census of Crimea. All information that you share with us will be kept in strictest confidence, and we will not record your family name. Generalized results, collected from some 2,000 interviews, will be printed in scientific journals and we will share our overall findings with Crimean Tatar civic organizations. [Contact information and consent statement follow.]

Pre-deportation measures

Pre-Soviet household wealth: “Prior to deportation, some families were wealthy; others poor. What type of property from the list below did your close relatives own? (a) House, (b) Some agricultural land, (c) A lot of agricultural land, (d) An orchard, (e) Some pasture animals, (f) A lot of pasture animals, (g) A horse drawn carriage, (h) Other substantial property, e.g. tobacco fields, a smithery, a winery.” (0) No; (1) Yes. Factored index.¹

Dekulakized: “Were your close relatives subject to dekulakization?” (0) No; (1) Yes.

Soviet opposition: “Prior to deportation, did your close relatives privately support or oppose Soviet authorities, not in public but within the family circle?” (1) They supported Soviet authorities; (2) They were indifferent towards them, (3) They opposed Soviet authorities.

Pre-Soviet religiosity: “How important was it for your family to follow Islamic customs and traditions?” (1) Not important; (2) Somewhat important; (3) Very important.

Victimization

Violent victimization: “Did any family members die during the train journey to the deportation destination or shortly afterwards?” (0) No, no family members died; (1) Yes, one family member died; (2) Yes, 2 or 3 family members died; (3) Yes, 4 or more family members died.

Political identities

In-group attachment: “Some people say that all Crimean Tatars can be trusted; others disagree. Do you trust all Crimean Tatars / Russians, most, only some, or none?” (0) Trust none; (1) Trust only some; (2) Trust majority; (3) Trust all. Our variable takes the difference between trust in Crimean Tatars and trust in Russians.

¹ Eigenvalue = 1.43, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.32. In constructing this index (as well as the third-generation wealth index), we follow a common practice in household surveys of using the first principal component as an index of asset wealth (see Filmer and Pritchett 2001).

Victimhood: “Do you consider yourself or your relatives to be victims of the Russian political system today?” (0) No; (1) Yes.

Fear of persecution: “Some Crimean Tatars started to fear concerning their future after the March referendum. Did you start to feel fear?” (0) No. “What do you most fear today?” (1) Conflicts between ethnicities; (2) Limitations in rights; (3) Deportation or mass arrests.

Radicalism and religiosity

Support for radical Islam: “Imagine that in 10 years there is an independent Crimean Tatar state. Should it be a secular state or one run under Sharia law?” (0) Secular state; (1) Under Sharia law. “What is your attitude toward Hizb ut-Tahrir?” (1) Positive; (0) Neither; (-1) Negative. “What is your attitude toward the Wahhabi movement in Islam?” (1) Positive; (0) Neither; (-1) Negative. Factored index.²

Religiosity: I will now name some religious customs. Please tell me how frequently you observe these customs, if you observe them: Daily prayer, Fast at Ramadan, Watch religious programs on TV or DVDs, Read the Quran, Read other religious literature. (1) Never; (2) Sometimes; (3) Often; (4) Always. Factored index.³

Crimean Tatar issues

Support for CT leaders: “Could you please tell me how much you personally support the following politicians: (a) Mustafa Dzhemilev, (b) Refat Chubarov, (c) Remi Il’iasov?” (1) Do not support at all; (2) Do not support; (3) Support; (4) Support completely. Factored index.⁴

Celebrate CT holiday: “Do you observe the following commemorative dates? Day of the Crimean Tatar flag (26 June)? (0) No; (1) Yes.

Attitudes toward Russia

Support Chechen rebels: “Some people say that Chechens and Dagestanis who are fighting against Russia are radicals; others say that these people are freedom fighters. Do you think Chechens and Dagestanis who are fighting against Russia are radicals or freedom fighters?” (0) Radicals; (1) Freedom fighters.

Support annexation: “Do you support Russia’s annexation of Crimea in principle?” (0) No; (1) Yes.

² Eigenvalue = 1.79, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.66. The factor loadings are Sharia = 0.53, Hizb = 0.87, Wahhabi = 0.86.

³ Eigenvalue = 2.73, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.79. The factor loadings are Daily prayer = 0.75, Fast at Ramadan = 0.78, Watch religious programs = 0.74, Read the Quran = 0.69, Read other religious literature = 0.73.

⁴ Eigenvalue = 2.04; Cronbach’s alpha = 0.76. The factor loadings are Dzhemilev = 0.90, Chubarov = 0.93, Il’iasov = 0.60.

Pro-Russia vote choice: “As you know, on 16 March 2014, Crimea held a referendum on secession from Ukraine. Did you participate in the referendum? How did you vote? Remember that all your answers are completely confidential.” (0) In favor of autonomy within Ukraine, spoiled ballot; (1) In favor of unification with Russia. “Which political party did you vote for?” (0) Fair Russia, Liberal Democrats, Communists, or blank/spoiled ballot; (1) United Russia. Factored index.⁵

Political participation

Turnout: “As you know, on 16 March 2014, Crimea held a referendum on secession from Ukraine. Did you participate in the referendum?” (0) No; (1) Yes. “In September of this year, local elections took place in Crimea in accordance with Russian rules. Did you participate in that election?” (0) No; (1) Yes. Factored index.⁶

Willingness to participate: “People participate in politics in different ways. Now I’m going to read out some forms of political action that people can take. Please tell me whether you might do it or would never do it: (a) Signing petitions, (b) Attending peaceful demonstrations, (c) Joining strikes.” (0) Would never do this; (1) Might do this. Factored index.⁷

Past participation: “Please look at the list below. Did you engage in any civic activities over the past 12 months? (1) Discussed political issues with family and friends, (b) Participated in an event commemorating the Crimean-Tatar deportation (18 May), (c) Participated in other protests or demonstrations (other than 18 May).” (0) No; (1) Yes. Factored index.⁸

Other measures

Consumption of Crimean Tatar television: “How frequently do you watch the ATR television channel?” (1) Never; (2) Several times a month; (3) Several times a week; (4) Every day.

Crimean Tatar spoken at home: “Which language do you speak at home?” (1) Exclusively Russian; (2) Mostly Russian, but sometimes Crimean Tatar; (3) Both Russian and Crimean Tatar; (4) Mostly Crimean Tatar, but sometimes Russian; (5) Exclusively Crimean Tatar.

Oppose mixed marriages: “Some Crimean Tatar families are completely opposed to mixed marriages, whereas others support them. How would you react to your child wanting to marry someone who is not an ethnic Crimean Tatar?” (0) Supportive; (1) Indifferent; (2) Opposed.

Family discussion: “When you were growing up, how often did your close relatives discuss the deportation with you?” (1) Never; (2) Sometimes; (3) Often; (4) Very often.

⁵ Eigenvalue = 1.46, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.60. The factor loadings are 0.85.

⁶ Eigenvalue = 1.39, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.52. The factor loadings are 0.83.

⁷ Eigenvalue = 2.08, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.78. The factor loadings are petitions = 0.81, demonstrations = 0.88, strikes = 0.81.

⁸ Eigenvalue = 1.32, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.33. The factor loadings are discussion = 0.58, May 18 commemoration = 0.72, other demonstration = 0.68.

Third-generation demographics

Wealth: “Please tell me if you have the following items in your household: (a) Refrigerator, (b) Freezer, (c) Car, (d) Microwave, (e) Bicycle, (f) Motorcycle/moped, (g) Computer, (h) Internet, (i) Flat screen TV.” (0) No; (1) Yes. Factored index.⁹

Education: “What is your education level?” (1) Incomplete primary, (2) Elementary, unfinished middle, (3) General middle (school or technical school), (4) Special middle (technical institute, “college”), (5) Professional technical, (6) Incomplete higher, (7) Higher.

Married: “What is your marital status?” (1) Married, (0) Divorced/Separated/Widowed, (0) Cohabit, but not officially married, (0) Never been married.

⁹ Eigenvalue = 1.78, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.50.

References:

Filmer, Deon and Lant H. Pritchett. 2001. "Estimating Wealth Effect Without Expenditure Data or Tears: An Application to Educational Enrollments in States of India." *Demography* 38(1): 15-32.