

Proof Certificates for SMT-based Model Checkers for Infinite-state Systems

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Abstract—We present a dual technique for generating and verifying proof certificates in SMT-based model checkers, focusing on proofs of invariant properties. Certificates for two major model checking algorithms are extracted as k -inductive invariants, minimized and then reduced to a formal proof term with the help of an independent proof-producing SMT solver. SMT-based model checkers typically translate input problems into an internal first-order logic representation. In our approach, the correctness of translation from the model checker’s input to the internal representation is verified in a lightweight manner by proving the observational equivalence between the results of two independent translations. This second proof is done by the model checker itself and generates in turn its own proof certificate. Our experimental evaluation show that, at the price of minimal instrumentation in the model checker, the approach allows one to efficiently generate and verify proof certificates for non-trivial transition systems and invariance queries.

I. INTRODUCTION

Model checkers are perhaps among the most successful formal methods tools in term of industrial use, particularly for the development of safety-critical systems. In addition to traditional applications in hardware design, they are increasingly used in model-based software development to analyze, for instance, models of embedded systems in the aerospace or automotive industry. One clear strength of model checkers, as opposed to proof assistants, say, is their ability to return precise *error traces* witnessing the violation of a given safety property. In addition to being invaluable to help identify and correct bugs, error traces also represent a checkable unsafety certificate. In contrast, most model checkers are currently unable to return any form of corroborating evidence when they declare a safety property to be satisfied by a system under analysis. This is unsatisfactory in general since model checker are complex tools, based on a variety of sophisticated algorithms and search heuristics, and so are not immune to errors.

To mitigate this problem, a possible approach is to use a model checker whose correctness has been formally verified [10]. An alternative is to instrument the model checker so that it is *certifying*, *i.e.* it accompanies its safety claims with a *proof certificate*, an artifact embodying a proof of the claim [16]. The certificate can then be validated by a trusted *certificate checker*. While the former approach may seem better at first, based on the fact that the model checker is verified once and for all, it has a number of disadvantages. To start, the effort is normally enormous since there are no general frameworks for

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verifying modern model checkers. Moreover, any modifications to the originally verified tool requires proofs to be redone. In more extreme cases (*e.g.*, an in-depth modification) one may have to invest the same amount of effort as for the original correctness proof. The main advantage of the second approach is that it requires a much smaller human effort. A disadvantage of course is that every safety claim made by the model checker incurs the cost of generating and then checking the corresponding certificate. This is feasible in general only if such certificates are small and/or simple enough to be checkable by a target certificate checker in a reasonable amount of time (say, with at most an order of magnitude slowdown).

By reducing the trusted core to the certificate checker, certifying model checking facilitates the integration of formal method tools into safety critical processes such as those endorsed by the DO-178C guidelines for avionics software. In the spirit of the *de Bruijn criterion* [4], traditionally applied to theorem provers, it redirects tool qualification requirements from a complex tool, the model checker, to a much simpler one, the proof checker.

We present an approach for generating and verifying proof certificates for SMT-based model checkers. These tools use a variety of model checking techniques and some of them even employ a portfolio approach by running several engines in parallel. Input models are typically represented internally as transition systems encoded in some fragment of first-order logic. Safety properties are expressed as invariant properties and reasoning about invariance is reduced to checking the satisfiability of formulas in certain logical theories such as integer or real linear arithmetic. The latter problem is then delegated to off-the-shelf SMT solvers.

We describe how to generate intermediate certificates that show that a given safety property is satisfied the internal transition system. These certificates are designed to be checkable by an SMT solver. Since SMT solvers themselves are complex artifacts, we also show how to reduce the validity of these certificates to proof objects obtained by a proof-producing SMT solver. This reduction capitalizes specifically on the recent proof production capabilities of the SMT solver CVC4 [5] and the availability of an efficient proof checker for its proofs, which are generated in LFSC format [24]. Most model checkers do allow users to specify system models directly in this relatively low-level logical representation. Instead, they support some pre-existing modeling language (such as Simulink, Lustre, Promela, SMV, or even just C). To account for possible problems in the translation from the input modeling language to the




Figure 1: Process for proof certificates generation and verification in Kind 2.

internal logical representation, we include a second phase which produces an additional proof certificate providing some level of confidence in the correctness of the translation.

While the techniques we have developed are general enough to be applicable to arbitrary SMT-based model checkers, we have implemented them in a specific one: Kind 2 [7], an SMT-based, multi-engine, symbolic model checker that can prove or disprove safety properties of synchronous reactive systems expressed in the Lustre language [11]. As a consequence, we will describe our work in terms of Lustre and Kind 2, but with the assumption that a knowledgeable reader will be able to see how it generalizes to other SMT-based model checkers. In more detailS, this work contains the following specific contributions:

(1) *A technique for generating proof certificates for safety properties of transition systems.* We show how to extract and simplify k -inductive invariants that are sufficient to summarize proofs generated by the different kinds of SMT-based model checking methods (in Section II) and how proofs can be reconstructed (in Section IV).

(2) *An approach to increase trust in the translation from the external modeling language to an internal representation language,* described in Section III. A translation certificate is generated in the form of observational equivalence between two internal representations generated by independently developed front ends. Their equivalence is recast as an invariant property; checking that yields itself a second proof certificate from which a global notion of safety can be derived and incorporated in the LFSC proof. We improve on similar previous approaches [19], [20] by adopting a weaker, property-based notion of observational equivalence, which is enough for our purposes.

(3) *An implementation of these techniques in Kind 2.* The first certificate summarizes the work of its different engines: bounded model checking (BMC), k -induction, IC3, as well as additional invariant generation strategies. The certification of the translation is applied to the Lustre language. The intermediate certificates are SMT-LIB 2 scripts checked by CVC4. CVC4's own proof objects are used to construct an LFSC proof term providing an overall proof of safety.

The full certification process for Kind 2 is depicted in Figure 1. Kind 2 generates two sorts of safety certificates, in the form of SMT-LIB 2 scripts: one certifying the faithfulness of the translation from the Lustre input model to the internal encoding,

```

node add_two (a, b : real) returns (c : real) ;
  var v : real;
  let
  v = a + b ;

  c = 1.0 -> if (pre c) > v then (pre c) else v ;
  --%PROPERTY (a > 0.0 and b > 0.0) => c > 0.0 ;
tel

```

Figure 2: Lustre model of running example.

and one certifying the invariance of the input properties for the internal encoding of the input system. These certificates are checked by CVC4, then turned into LFSC proof objects by collecting CVC4's own proofs and assembling them to form an overall proof that can be efficiently verified by the LFSC proof checker. Our initial experimental evaluation indicates that, at the price of minimal instrumentation in the model checker, this approach allows one to efficiently generate and check proofs for non-trivial transition systems and invariance queries.

To illustrate our different techniques, we will rely on the toy model in Figure 2. In Lustre, reactive components are modeled as *nodes*. The node `add_two` in the figure encodes a component that initially outputs 1.0, in variable `c`, and at each execution step afterwards outputs the maximum between the previous value of `c` and the sum of the current values of input variables `a` and `b`. The model is annotated with an invariance property stating that the output `c` is positive whenever both inputs are.

A. Technical Preliminaries

We define a *transition system* as a tuple $\mathcal{S} = (\mathbf{x}, I, T)$ where \mathbf{x} is a tuple of distinct (typed) variables; I is a formula of typed first-order logic with free variables from \mathbf{x} , which characterizes the initial states of the system; and T is a formula with free variables from \mathbf{x} and a renamed copy \mathbf{x}' of \mathbf{x} , which describes the system's transition relation. If F is a formula with free variables from \mathbf{x} , we write $F[\mathbf{y}]$ to denote the instance of F obtained by replacing its free variables by the corresponding ones in \mathbf{y} . We write $T[\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{y}']$ similarly for T . We adopt the usual notions and notations of first-order logic. In particular, for an interpretation \mathcal{M} and a formula φ , we write $\mathcal{M} \models \varphi$ to mean \mathcal{M} satisfies the formula φ . We also write \models for the logical entailment in a theory (such as integer and real arithmetic) that encodes the data types used in the transition system. A *state* of the system $\mathcal{S} = (\mathbf{x}, I, T)$ is a model that gives an interpretation to the variables of \mathbf{x} . A state \mathcal{M} of a system $\mathcal{S} = (\mathbf{x}, I, T)$ is said to be *reachable* iff there exists an $i \in \mathbb{N}$ such that, $\mathcal{M} \models \exists \mathbf{x}_0 \dots \mathbf{x}_{i-1}. I[\mathbf{x}_0] \wedge T[\mathbf{x}_0, \mathbf{x}_1] \wedge \dots \wedge T[\mathbf{x}_{i-1}, \mathbf{x}_i]$. *State properties* for a system \mathcal{S} are described by first-order formulas whose free variables are from \mathbf{x} . Let P be a state property for $\mathcal{S} = (\mathbf{x}, I, T)$. P holds in, or is an *invariant* of, \mathcal{S} if every reachable state \mathcal{M} of \mathcal{S} is a model of P . Property P is k -inductive for some $k > 0$ if (i) $I[\mathbf{x}_0] \wedge T[\mathbf{x}_0, \mathbf{x}_1] \wedge \dots \wedge T[\mathbf{x}_{i-2}, \mathbf{x}_{i-1}] \models P[\mathbf{x}_{i-1}]$ for all $i = 1, \dots, k$, and (ii) $T[\mathbf{x}_0, \mathbf{x}_1] \wedge \dots \wedge T[\mathbf{x}_{k-1}, \mathbf{x}_k] \wedge P[\mathbf{x}_0] \wedge \dots \wedge P[\mathbf{x}_{k-1}] \models P[\mathbf{x}_k]$. A k -inductive strengthening Q of P is a k -inductive formula $Q[\mathbf{x}]$ such that $Q[\mathbf{x}] \models P[\mathbf{x}]$. One can show that k -inductive

state properties are invariant. It follows that every state property having a k -inductive strengthening is invariant.

II. k -INDUCTIVE SAFETY CERTIFICATES

In this section, we focus on transition systems and present a certificate generation approach general enough to capture the information produced by different SMT-based model checking engines while proving invariance properties of a system $S = (\mathbf{x}, I, T)$. We show that k -inductive strengthenings of original properties are an adequate summary of the reasoning resulting from the combination of these engines. We also show how to combine and simplify them with the aim of generating the most easily verifiable objects.

A. Extracting and Verifying Certificates

Kind 2 converts internally input models and properties, expressed in Lustre, to a transition system that captures the same input/output behavior. The translation is relatively straightforward for single-node models, and is based on having state variables corresponding to the node's input and output variables as well as any terms of the form $\text{pre } t$.¹ For multi-node models, the transition systems for the individual nodes are combined according to Lustre's synchronous parallel composition semantics.

Certificate extraction. In Kind 2, an input property P can be proved invariant by one of two main model checking methods: k -induction [22] and IC3 [6], each implemented in an independent engine. The job of either engine is facilitated by a number of auxiliary invariant generation engines, which discover and pass along auxiliary invariants that might be helpful in proving the main property. Often these are local invariants, for instance specific to a sub-component of the input system. All of these engines, which run concurrently, generate *safety certificates* of the form (k, ϕ) where k is a positive number and ϕ is a k -inductive strengthening of some state property. The content of the certificate depends on the engine:

- The k -induction engine tries to prove that the input property P is invariant by proving that it is k -inductive for some $k > 0$. When this succeeds, P is its own k -inductive strengthening and a possible certificate is the pair (k, P) .
- The IC3 engine also tries to prove that an input property P is invariant. It succeeds when it is able to construct a conjunction ϕ of formulas such that $\phi \wedge P$ is 1-inductive. In this case, a possible certificate is $(1, \phi \wedge P)$.
- The invariant generation engines are based on variations of the previous techniques. Every auxiliary invariant used in the proof of an input property P is provided with its own certificate, also of the form (k, ϕ) .

Certificate combination. Kind 2 accepts as input multiple properties for a given model, and attempts to verify them individually. This means that it normally produces individual certificates for a collection of user-specified and internally

¹For each non-initial execution step, $\text{pre } t$ denotes the value of t in the previous step.

generated properties. These safety certificates are combined together thanks to the following easily provable result.

Proposition 1. *If (k_i, ϕ_i) is a k_i -inductive strengthening of property $P_i[\mathbf{x}]$ for $i = 1, 2$, then $(k, \phi_1 \wedge \phi_2)$ with $k = \max(k_1, k_2)$ is a k -inductive strengthening of $P_1[\mathbf{x}] \wedge P_2[\mathbf{x}]$.*

Verifying Certificates. Checking a (combined) certificate (k, ϕ) for a (conjunctive) property P reduces to verifying that ϕ is indeed a k -inductive strengthening of P . This can be done using any tool that can prove the following entailments:

$$\begin{aligned} I[\mathbf{x}_0] \wedge T[\mathbf{x}_0, \mathbf{x}_1] \wedge \dots \wedge T[\mathbf{x}_{i-2}, \mathbf{x}_{i-1}] \models \phi[\mathbf{x}_{i-1}] \text{ for } i \in [1, k] \quad (\text{base}_k) \\ T[\mathbf{x}_0, \mathbf{x}_1] \wedge \dots \wedge T[\mathbf{x}_{k-1}, \mathbf{x}_k] \wedge \phi[\mathbf{x}_0] \wedge \dots \wedge \phi[\mathbf{x}_{k-1}] \models \phi[\mathbf{x}_k] \quad (\text{step}_k) \\ \phi[\mathbf{x}] \models P[\mathbf{x}] \quad (\text{implication}) \end{aligned}$$

Using an SMT solver to prove (base_k) , (step_k) , and (implication) , effectively moves the burden of trust from the model checker to the solver. As we describe in Section IV, the latter can in turn be removed from the trusted core if it can provide an LFSC proof of the three entailments.

B. Simplifying Certificates

Good certificates need to be simple and easily checkable by an independent tool or method. In particular, there is an expectation that checking a certificate should not take more time than proving the original property. A common approach in the certificate production literature is to simplify and/or reduce the certificate *a posteriori* [2], [8], [25]. This extra effort at construction time can pay large dividends at checking time. In our case, a safety certificate (k, ϕ) can be simplified by reducing the value of k or the size/complexity of ϕ , or both. Currently, Kind 2 tries to reduce k before simplifying ϕ . Empirical evaluation, discussed in Section V, suggests that this sort of post-processing is always worth the overhead.

Reducing k . Referring back to the entailments (base_k) and (step_k) from the previous section, because of the k checks in (base_k) , checking a certificate (k, ϕ) requires a number of sub-checks proportional to k . Each of sub-checks in turn take time proportional to k , making the whole process quadratic in k . Due to the concurrent nature of Kind 2, proofs obtained by its k -induction engines are not guaranteed to have a minimal k . Consequently, lowering k can often be the most effective way of simplifying a certificate. To do that, after it constructs an initial combined certificate (k, ϕ) , Kind 2 will replay the inductive step (step_k) for ϕ for values k' smaller than k , following one of three different strategies, chosen heuristically:

- *forward enumeration:* progressively try all values of k' from 1 to k and stop at the first where k' -inductiveness holds;
- *backward enumeration:* try values of k' from k down to 1, stopping as soon as k' -inductiveness is lost;
- *binary search:* partition $[1, k]$ into subintervals $[1, k']$ and $[k' + 1, k]$ of similar size and recursively consider the first or the second interval depending on whether φ is k' -inductive or not.

Simplifying ϕ . Because of how combined certificates (k, ϕ) are generated, the invariant ϕ , which is a conjunction $\psi_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \psi_n$

Algorithm 1. Two-phase simplification of invariants

Input: $R = \{\psi_1, \dots, \psi_n\}$: invariant set to be reduced,
 P : input property set, T : Transition relation

```

Function trim( $R, P$ )
  if  $R(0..k - 1) \wedge P(0..k - 1) \wedge$ 
     $T(0..k) \models P(k)$  then
    // P is k-inductive wrt R
     $U = \text{get-unsat-core}();$ 
     $R' = \{\psi \in R \mid \psi \text{ occurs in } U\};$ 
    if  $R'(0..k - 1) \wedge P(0..k - 1) \wedge$ 
       $T(0..k) \models R'(k) \wedge P(k)$  then
      // R' \wedge P is k-inductive
      return  $R' \cup P$ 
    else // R' is not strong enough
      trim( $R \setminus R'$ ,  $R' \cup P$ )
    else error “Not k-inductive”;
  cherry-pick( trim( $\{\psi_1, \dots, \psi_n\}, P$ ),  $P$  );

```

```

Function cherry-pick( $R, P$ )
  if  $P(0..k - 1) \wedge T(0..k) \models P(k)$ 
    then
    // P is k-inductive
    return  $P$ 
  else
    // Find cex to induction
     $M = \text{get-cex}();$ 
    // ... and a blocking invariant
     $\psi = \text{choose}(\{\psi \in R \mid M \not\models \psi\});$ 
    cherry-pick( $R \setminus \{\psi\}$ ,  $P \cup \{\psi\}$ )

```

of formulas, can contain unnecessary information (redundancy, useless auxiliary invariants, etc.). We tighten ϕ with a process based on two fixpoint computations applied in sequence and described in Algorithm 1. There, we use the notation $\varphi(i)$, $\varphi(0..i)$ and $T(0..i)$ as an abbreviation, respectively, of $\varphi[\mathbf{x}_i]$, $\varphi[\mathbf{x}_0] \wedge \dots \wedge f[\mathbf{x}_i]$ and $T[\mathbf{x}_0, \mathbf{x}_1] \wedge \dots \wedge T[\mathbf{x}_{i-1}, \mathbf{x}_i]$. Also, we treat finite sets of formulas as the conjunction of their elements. For entailment checks, we assume the availability of a function `get-unsat-core` that returns an unsatisfiable core of the premises and the negated conclusion of the entailment when the entailment holds, and a function `get-cex` that returns a counterexample when the entailment does not hold. Both of these functionalities are provided by most SMT solvers.

Algorithm 1 uses two functions, `trim` and `cherry-pick`, both of which take a set P of properties and a set R of auxiliary invariants for P . Function `trim` aims at identifying and removing from R invariants that are not needed to prove P k -inductive. It relies on unsat cores to progressively reduce the set R as long as $R \cup P$ remains k -inductive. Function `cherry-pick` recursively checks that P is k -inductive and, if it is not, adds to it any of the auxiliary invariants from R that eliminate the k -induction counter-example found by the SMT solver. One can prove that each function, and so the whole process, is terminating—the main point being that the input set R is finite and gets strictly smaller with each recursive call. The process is also sound in the sense that its returned formula is a k -inductive strengthening of P whenever the input $\phi = \psi_1 \wedge \dots \wedge \psi_n \wedge P$ is. However, it is not guaranteed to yield the smallest k -inductive strengthening of P contained. This is intentional, for practical efficiency.

Practical considerations. In principle, applying `trim` is computationally expensive because of the cost of its entailment checks. In practice, it terminates after a very small number of iterations—generally less than three on our benchmarks. Moreover, it is very effective at removing large unnecessary parts of the certificate. Considering that certificates with hundreds of conjuncts are common, the cost of running `cherry-pick` on the original certificate can become prohibitive.

In our experiments, it was always beneficial to apply the coarse reduction performed by `trim` before calling `cherry-pick`.

We observe that the effect of `trim` is similar to one of the reduction steps proposed by Irvii *et al.* [14] for invariants produced by SAT-based IC3-like model checkers. While potentially increasing precision, many of their other steps require a number of satisfiability checks linear in the size of ϕ , which is already prohibitive for the SMT case.

It could be useful to try to reduce k and simplify ϕ at the same time in the hope of getting closer to a minimal k than we do currently with our algorithm. This, however, would be more expensive, so further empirical evidences would be needed to assess the practical effectiveness of more sophisticated approaches in practice.

III. FRONT END CERTIFICATION

The certificates discussed in the previous section are produced for Kind 2’s internal FOL representation of the input system and properties. Although the translation to this internal representation from the Lustre input is fairly direct, Kind 2’s front end also applies a number of optimizations and simplifications to the input, such as slicing, constant propagation, and so on. This raises the question of whether the front end can be trusted to be correct. We rule out the option of formally proving its correctness for the reason we gave in Section I. In alternative, we have the translation phase generate certificates of its own.

Comparing independent translations. Our goal is to keep the whole certification process lightweight and entirely automatic. As a consequence, instead of proving a semantic preservation between the input Lustre model and its internal representation as a transition system, we prove the *observational equivalence* of two internal representations obtained *independently* from the same input. This technique for certifying translations has already been employed in the SAT based toolchain of Prover Technologies [20] and in the Systerel Smart Solver [19]. In our case, instead of developing another front end for Kind 2 we can rely on a pre-existing third-party tool: JKind, a Lustre model checker inspired by Kind but developed independently at Rockwell Collins [21]. JKind too converts input models to an FOL representation. It is a good candidate because it is sufficiently different from Kind 2: it has a completely different code base (it is written in Java whereas Kind 2 is written in OCaml) and was developed independently by a different team. While our approach does not actually guarantee the correctness of the Kind 2 translation, it provides some formal evidence of its trustworthiness.

Our certificate encodes the claim that the transition relations constructed by the two independent front ends are behaviorally equivalent over a set of *relevant* state variables. In essence, the certificate consists of a transition system that observes the internal states of the two systems generated by each front end. This *observer* system feeds its two subsystems the same inputs and verifies that their externally visible behavior is the same.

For $i = 1, 2$, let $\mathcal{S}_i = (\mathbf{x}_i, I_i[\mathbf{x}_i], T_i[\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{x}'_i])$ be the internal transition system, and P_i the property, respectively generated

by JKind and Kind 2, with \mathbf{x}_1 and \mathbf{x}_2 sharing no components. We construct an observer system S_{obs} and a safety property $P_{\text{obs}} = (S_1, P_1) \sim (S_2, P_2)$ expressing a suitable notion of observational equivalence (\sim) between the two systems. Then we check the correctness of this observer in the same way as we would check the correctness of S_2 with respect to the original safety property. This process is illustrated as part of Figure 1, where Obs Eq is the observer described below and the module **Kind 2 Core** is the core part of Kind 2, which works directly with the internal FOL representation of a transition system.

Observational equivalence. A standard definition of observational equivalence would require the two systems S_1 and S_2 to produce the same outputs when given the same inputs at each step. This is, however, is unnecessarily stringent for our purposes and, depending on how different the two translations are, it might not even be the case. A better notion of equivalence is *property-based*: we consider S_1 and S_2 equivalent if, for the same input, they agree at each step on the truth value they assign to their respective version of the original input property in the Lustre model. For $j = 1, 2$, let \mathbf{i}_j be the subtuple of \mathbf{x}_j that corresponds to the input variables of the Lustre model. Then P_{obs} and $S_{\text{obs}} = (\mathbf{x}_{\text{obs}}, I_{\text{obs}}, T_{\text{obs}})$ are defined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} P_{\text{obs}} &= (P_1[\mathbf{x}_1] \Leftrightarrow P_2[\mathbf{x}_2]) & I_{\text{obs}} &= \mathbf{i}_1 \approx \mathbf{i}_2 \wedge I_1[\mathbf{x}_1] \wedge I_2[\mathbf{x}_2] \\ \mathbf{x}_{\text{obs}} &= \mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{x}_2 & T_{\text{obs}} &= \mathbf{i}'_1 \approx \mathbf{i}'_2 \wedge T_1[\mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{x}'_1] \wedge T_2[\mathbf{x}_2, \mathbf{x}'_2] \end{aligned}$$

where, for two tuples $\mathbf{a} = (a_1, \dots, a_n)$ and $\mathbf{b} = (b_1, \dots, b_n)$, the expression $\mathbf{a} \approx \mathbf{b}$ denotes the formula $\bigwedge_{i=1, \dots, n} a_i = b_i$. The set of state variables of the observer system S_{obs} is the (disjoint) union of the variables of S_1 and S_2 . The system itself is effectively the parallel composition of S_1 and S_2 after their corresponding input variables have been pairwise identified.

Front end certificates. To recap, the equivalence observer S_{obs} and the associated property P_{obs} constitute an intermediate certificate of Kind 2's translation from the input Lustre model and properties to Kind 2's internal representation. Checking it consists in proving that the property P_{obs} is invariant for S_{obs} . Since S_{obs} and P_{obs} are generated in a format that corresponds directly to Kind 2's internal representation of transition systems and properties, this invariance proof can be done by Kind 2 itself without relying on its front end. Moreover, the proof is provided with its own safety certificate, which we call a *front end certificate*, of the sort discussed in Section II.

One possible problem with this approach is the small likelihood that the property P_{obs} is k -inductive for S_{obs} , and for a small k , so as to be easily provable by Kind 2. We mitigate this by identifying pairs of corresponding state variables from \mathbf{x}_1 and \mathbf{x}_2 and suggesting their equality as a *candidate auxiliary invariant* for Kind 2 to try. Some of these equalities may indeed be proven invariant and so they can potentially help in the proof of P_{obs} . Note that while this harks back to the stronger notion of observational equivalence we mentioned earlier, it is not the same since the equivalence between certain non-input variables is only suggested, not required.

Example 1. Consider again the Lustre model and property of Figure 2. The systems S_1 and S_2 respectively generated by

JKind 2.1² and Kind 2 from that model are the following, in abstract syntax and modulo variable renaming:

S_1	S_2
$\mathbf{x}_1 = \{a_1, b_1, c_1, v_1\}$	$\mathbf{x}_2 = \{i, a_2, b_2, c_2, v_2\}$
$I_1 = R[\top, \mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{x}'_1]$	$I_2 = (i \wedge v_2 = a_2 + b_2 \wedge c_2 = 1)$
$T_1 = R[\perp, \mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{x}'_1]$	$T_2 = (\neg i' \wedge v'_2 = a'_2 + b'_2 \wedge c'_2 = ite(c_2 > v'_1, c_2, v'_2))$
$R[g, \mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{x}'_1] = (v'_1 = a'_1 + b'_1 \wedge c'_1 = ite(g, \frac{10}{10}, ite(c_1 > v'_1, c_1, v'_1)))$	$P_2 = a_2 > 0 \wedge b_2 > 0 \Rightarrow c_2 > 0$
$P_1 = a_1 > \frac{0}{10} \wedge b_1 > \frac{0}{10} \Rightarrow c_1 > \frac{0}{10}$	

The equivalence observer S_{obs} is defined by

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{x}_{\text{obs}} &= \mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{x}_2 & I_{\text{obs}} &= (a_1 = a_2 \wedge b_1 = b_2 \wedge I_1 \wedge I_2) \\ P_{\text{obs}} &= (P_1 \Leftrightarrow P_2) & T_{\text{obs}} &= (a'_1 = a'_2 \wedge b'_1 = b'_2 \wedge T_1 \wedge T_2) \end{aligned}$$

Suggested auxiliary invariants in this case will be the equalities $a_1 = a_2$, $b_1 = b_2$, $c_1 = c_2$, and $v_1 = v_2$ between corresponding state variables in the two systems. \square

IV. FROM CERTIFICATES TO LFSC PROOFS

The last step of our approach, once the various safety certificates have been produced and checked, is to gather the proofs of the various entailment checks performed by the SMT solver and assemble them into a self-contained overall proof of safety for the original system.

LFSC proofs. The entailment proofs are obtained specifically from CVC4 as proof terms in LFSC, an extension of the Edinburgh Logical Framework (LF) [12] with side conditions [25]. In LFSC, which is in essence a dependently typed λ -calculus, proof systems are encoded as type systems. Proof checking then reduces to type checking, performed by a highly optimized checker developed by Stump *et al.* [24]. This particular LFSC checker takes as input a type system S and a term t in that system, and checks whether t is well typed in S . The efficiency of this framework for proof checking lies in the use of side-conditions, defined as small functional programs, which can be pre-compiled by the checker. Using proof rules with side conditions generally leads to both smaller proof sizes and faster proof checking times.

A proof system is formally defined in LFSC through *signatures*, which contain a definition of the system's language together with axioms and proof rules. The proof system used by CVC4 is defined over a number of signatures, which are included in its source code distribution. Those relevant to this work include signatures for propositional logic and resolution (`sat.plf`); first-order terms and formulas, with rules for CNF conversion and abstraction to propositional logic (`smt.plf`); equality over uninterpreted functions (`th_base.plf`); and real and integer linear arithmetic (`th_int.plf` and `th_real.plf`).

Extending CVC4's proof system. We have extended CVC4's proof system with an additional signature (`kind.plf`) for k -inductive reasoning, invariance and safety.³ This signature also specifies the encoding for state variables, initial states, transition

²We produce S_1 by having JKind 2.1 write a dump file from which we can extract its internal representation.

³The LFSC checker with all the necessary signatures are distributed with Kind 2 and publicly available.

$$\begin{array}{c}
\frac{\text{K-IND } k \in \mathbb{N} \quad \text{SMT } \frac{\vdots}{B_k \models \perp} \quad \text{SMT } \frac{\vdots}{S_k \models \perp}}{\text{INVIMPL } \frac{\text{invariant}(I, T, \phi)}{\text{invariant}(I, T, P)}} \quad \text{SMT } \frac{\vdots}{\phi \models P} \\
\text{INV+OBS } \frac{}{\text{invariant}(I, T, P)} \quad \text{OBSEQ } \frac{\text{K-IND } \frac{\vdots}{\text{invariant}(I_o, T_o, \phi_o)} \quad \text{SMT } \frac{\vdots}{\phi_o \models P_o}}{\frac{\text{invariant}(I_o, T_o, P_o)}{\text{woe}(I, T, P, I', T', P')}} \\
\hline
\text{safe}(I, T, P)
\end{array}$$

Figure 3: Sketch of derivation tree for LFSC proofs of safety produced by Kind 2

$ \begin{array}{c} \text{INVIMPL } \frac{\forall k \in \mathbb{N}. P_1(k) \models P_2(k) \quad \text{invariant}(I, T, P_1)}{\text{invariant}(I, T, P_2)} \\ \text{K-IND } \frac{k \in \mathbb{N} \quad B_k \models \perp \quad S_k \models \perp}{\text{invariant}(I, T, P)} \left[\begin{array}{l} B_k = \text{base}(I, T, P, k) \\ S_k = \text{step}(T, P, k) \end{array} \right] \\ \text{unroll}(T, P, k) = \text{match } k \text{ with} \\ 0 \mapsto P(0) \\ 1 \mapsto P(0) \wedge T(0, 1) \\ _ \mapsto \text{unroll}(T, P, k - 1) \wedge P(k - 1) \wedge T(k - 1, k) \\ \text{step}(T, P, k) = \text{unroll}(T, P, k) \wedge \neg P(k) \end{array} \right] \end{array} $
--

Figure 4: A sample of LFSC rules for k -induction proofs

relations, and property predicates. State variables are encoded as functions from natural numbers to values. This way, the unrolling of the transition relation done in (base_k) and (step_k) does not need the creation of several copies of the state variable tuple \mathbf{x} . For example, for the state vector $\mathbf{x} = (y, z)$ with y of type real and z of type integer, the LFSC encoding will make y and z functions from naturals to reals and integers, respectively. So we will use the tuples $(y(0), z(0)), (y(1), z(1)), \dots$ instead of $(y_0, z_0), (y_1, z_1), \dots$ where $y_0, y_1, \dots, z_0, z_1, \dots$ are (distinct) variables. Correspondingly, our LFSC encoding of a transition relation formula $T[\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}']$ is parametrized by two natural variables, the index of the pre-state and that of the post-state, instead of two tuples of state variables. Similarly, I , P and ϕ are parametrized by a single natural variable.

The signature defines several derivability judgments, including one for proofs of invariance, which has the following type:

$\text{invariant} : \Pi I : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \text{formula}. \Pi T : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \text{formula}.$

$\Pi P : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \text{formula}. \text{Type}$

It also contains rules to build proofs of invariance by k -induction, as illustrated in Figure 4 in abstract syntax. There, proof rule INVIMPL states that weakenings of invariants are invariants. Rule K-IND encodes the k -induction principle as presented in Section II. It has two side-conditions that compute formulas for the subgoals of k -induction. As an example, we provide the definition of step, which uses an auxiliary function to compute unrollings of the transition relation.

This signature also specifies how to encapsulate proofs for the front-end certificates by providing a additional judgment, $\text{safe}(I, T, P, I', T', P')$, which can be derived only when $\text{invariant}(I, T, P)$ is derivable and the observational equivalence

between (I, T, P) and (I', T', P') is provable (judgment woe). Self contained proofs of safety follow the sketch depicted in Figure 3, where SMT stands for an unsatisfiability rule whose proof tree is obtained, with minor changes, from a proof produced by CVC4.

In practice, running Kind 2 in proof production mode on a Lustre model generates an LFSC proof (in a text file) that can be then fed together with the various signature files (`{sat,smt,th_int,th_real,kind}.plf`) to the LFSC proof checker.

V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION

We evaluated our certificate generation and checking techniques on a set of academic benchmarks and a smaller set of industrial-grade benchmarks.⁴ They come from different sources (academic and industrial users, published case studies, etc.) and are of various nature (memory coherence protocols, reactive controllers from railway and aerospace industry, counter systems, simulation of systems, ...). We selected only benchmark problems consisting of a Lustre model with properties that Kind 2 could prove with a 5 minutes timeout.

We first focus on the effect of minimization on intermediate certificate checking by the SMT solver CVC4 and then evaluate our complete certification chain, including front end certification and LFSC proof checking.

We ran our tests on a Linux machine with two 12-core 64-bits AMD Opteron processors and 32GB of memory. We used a certifying version of Kind 2 based on Kind 2 v0.8. The CVC4 binary was from version 1.5-prerelease (git proofs 7ba546df). Tools were given a timeout of 5 minutes.

Certificate simplification. The plot in Figure 5 focuses on the effects of the certificate simplification techniques presented in Section II. It shows how many problems a particular configuration can cumulatively process within a certain amount of time. We compare various measures: S measures the time needed by Kind 2 to solve the model checking problem and generate an initial safety certificate, i.e., before simplification;⁵ mE measure the time to reduce the safety certificate using the *easy* simplification technique (i.e., only `trim` in Algorithm 1); m is the time to do the full simplification (i.e. both `trim` and `cherry-pick`); finally, $cvc4$ measures the time necessary for CVC4 to check the safety certificate—we exclude front end certificates in this analysis. We can see from the plot that

⁴Kind 2 is available at <https://kind.cs.uiowa.edu> and benchmarks are available at <https://github.com/Kind2-MC/Kind2-Benchmarks/tree/fmcad16>.

⁵We do not show the time to just solve the problem because its difference with S is negligible.




Figure 5: Overhead and improvements of minimization.

without any simplification ($S+cvc4$) we can check a lot less certificates and take much more time than with simplification. We can also see that, even if the full simplification process is more expensive ($S+m$ vs. $S+mE$), it yields a larger number of checked certificates within the time limit ($S+m+cvc4$ vs. $S+m+E+cvc4$). The superiority of full simplification is confirmed by an analysis of the full results. It reduces the size of the invariants on average by 74% (removing on average 19 invariants per certificate) for 42% of the benchmarks. For one benchmark, it removes 236 invariants out of 243. The value of k is reduced in 11% of the benchmarks, by 10 on average, the maximum being a reduction from 36 down to 2. The bump at 428 is due to the simplification overhead for a single benchmark, which is larger than the solving time. However, even with this outlier, the cumulative benefit of full simplification on certificates is clear.

Checking full certificates. The plot in Figure 6 refers to the complete proof certification chain. The measurements show the time necessary up to produce the proofs ($S+m+cvc4$) (which involve an intermediate checking phase, $cvc4$, with CVC4) and to check them with the LFSC proof checker (p). The second and third curves are for the invariance property while the last two also include the overhead for the front end proof ($I+F$). The latter includes the time to: prove the input property; fully minimize its safety certificate and generate the corresponding proof; construct the equivalence observer, including the time to call JKind and extract its transition system; model check the observer with Kind 2; minimize and produce the proof for the front end certificate; and finally check the combined resulting proof with LFSC.

We are able to generate and check the proof of invariance for around 80% of benchmarks that Kind 2 succeeds in verifying; we produce and check a complete proof including the front end for 60% of them. Most of the cases where we fail to generate the proof are due to CVC4's current limitations in its proof producing capabilities. The biggest bottlenecks are the model checking of the equivalence observer and the simplification of certificates. Despite that, the time cost of the full certification chain is overall within one order of magnitude of the cost of just proving the input property. We find the overall level of performance, which we think we could improve further, already rather good, especially considering that a lot of the benchmarks we used are non-trivial.




Figure 6: Evaluation of proof certification chain.

VI. RELATED WORK

Formally verified model checkers. A natural approach to the certification of verification tools consists in proving the program (here the model checker) correct once and for all. This is possible to a large extent for programs written in programming languages with (largely automated) verification toolsets such as ESC Java 2, Frama-C, VCC, F^{*} etc. Proving full functional correctness of a model checker, however, is currently a very challenging job because these tools are often rather complex and tend to evolve quickly with the ongoing advances in the field. When feasible, one great advantage of this approach of course is that the performances of the model checker is minimally impacted by the verification process. One example of this kind of certification effort is the modern SAT solver versat which was developed and verified using the programming language GURU [17]. We are, however, not aware of similar results for model checkers.

Another possibility is to prove the underlying algorithms of a model checker correct in a descriptive language of interactive proof assistants such as Coq or Isabelle, and obtain an executable program from these tools through a refinement process or code extraction mechanism. Although the first formal verification of a model checker in Coq for the modal μ -calculus [23] goes back to 1998, only recently have *certified verification tools* started to emerge. Amjad [1] shows how to embed BDD-based symbolic model checking algorithms in the HOL theorem prover so that results are returned as theorems. This approach relies on the correctness of the backend BDD implementation. Esparza *et al.* [10] have fully verified an automata-based model checker for finite state systems with the Isabelle theorem prover. Using successive refinements, they built a correct by construction model checker from high level specifications down to functional (SML) code.

A recent approach for the certification of SAT and SMT solvers [2] consists in having the solver produce a detailed certificate in which each rule is read and verified by a combination of several small certified checkers, written and proved correct in Coq. This approach also allows one to import inside Coq proof terms from these solvers [3].

Certifying model checkers. A number of techniques have been proposed to produce certifying model checkers. Earlier solutions (e.g., [15], [16], [18]) were limited to finite-state systems. The first certifying model checker for infinite-state

systems was perhaps the C model checker BLAST [13], which produced certificates for a control flow automaton internally generated from an input C program. BLAST provided proof certificates in the Edinburgh Logical Framework (LF) [12], which limits the scalability of certificate checking when proofs involve reasoning modulo the theory of C’s data types.

A more recent certifying model checker is SLAB [9], which produces certificates in the form of inductive verification diagrams to be checked by SMT solvers. We go one step further by relying on SMT solvers that are in turn proof producing. Also, we address the issue of certifying the translation from the input model to the internal representation.

For model checking of parameterized systems, the model checker Cubicle generates certificates as Why3 files that can be independently checked by several SMT solvers and automated theorem provers [8], where trust is claimed through the redundant use of multiple solvers.

VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

We have presented a dual technique for generating and checking proof certificates for SMT-based model checkers, and applied it to the model checker Kind 2. Given a Lustre model and one or more invariance properties for it, Kind 2 generates LFSC proofs for the properties it can verify. These proofs have two parts. The first attests that the model and the properties are encoded correctly in Kind 2’s internal representation format. It does that by proving the observational equivalence, with respect to the properties, between the internal system and another one produced from the same Lustre input by an independent, third-party tool. The second part attests that the encoded properties are invariants of the internal transition system encoding the Lustre model. Initial certificates, which we call safety certificates, are generated as (possibly combined) k -inductive invariants, and simplified before being verified by the CVC4 SMT solver. The eventual proof certificates, in LFSC format, are assembled from the proofs generated by CVC4 after verifying these safety certificates.

The trusted core of our approach consists in:

- 1) The LFSC checker (5300 lines of C++ code).
- 2) The LFSC signatures comprising the overall proof system in LFSC (CVC4’s `sat.plf`, `smt.plf`, `th_base.plf`, `th_int.plf`, `th_real.plf` and our own `kind.plf`, for k -induction and safety), for a total of 444 lines of LFSC code.
- 3) The assumption that Kind 2 and JKind do not have identical defects that could escape the observational equivalence check.

A current but temporary limitation of our certificate generation process is that LFSC proofs may contain an unsound proof rule, `trust_f`, which derives any formula. This rule is used by the current version of CVC4 to fill in present gaps in its proof generation code. However, it will be progressively phased out as the instrumentation of CVC4 to produce full proofs is completed.

Kind 2 has the ability to do compositional and modular analyses of Lustre models extended with assume-guarantee-style contracts. A possible line of future research is to extend the

work described here to apply to such analyses by incorporating their underlying abstraction mechanisms.

Kind 2’s proof certificate generation is being leveraged in an ongoing project funded by NASA and the FAA as an innovative way to reduce the cost of tool qualification with respect to DO-178C requirements.

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