FROM THE CHILEAN LABORATORY TO WORLD-COMMUNICATION

ARMAND MATTELART'S INTELLECTUAL JOURNEY

Mariano Zarowsky

Foreword by Peter Simonson

Translated by
William Quinn & Peter Simonson

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Translation of Mariano Zarowsky, *Del Laboratorio chileno a la comunicación-mundo. Un itinerario intelectual de Armand Mattelart* (Editorial Biblos, 2013). The support of the Argentine Republic (through its Programa Sur de Apoyo a las Traducciones) is gratefully acknowledged.

Published by:
mediastudies.press
414 W. Broad St.
Bethlehem, PA 18018, USA

Cover design: Natascha Chtena

Landing page: mediastudies.press/from-the-chilean-laboratory-to-world-communication-armand-mattelarts-intellectual-journey

History of Media Studies series - issn *(online)* 2637-6091 | issn *(print)* 2637-6091

isbn 978-1-951399-50-4 *(print)* | isbn 978-1-951399-47-4 *(pdf)*

isbn 978-1-951399-49-8 *(epub)* | isbn 978-1-951399-48-1 *(html)*

doi 10.64629/3f8575cb.08e7ds72 | lccn 2025943425

Edition 1 published in October 2025

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CHAPTER TWO

The Chilean Laboratory: Configuration of an Intellectual Disposition

From Demography to Communication Studies

In September 1962 Armand Mattelart, a 26-year-old Belgian professor with a doctorate in law from the Catholic University of Louvain and a degree in demography from the University of Paris, arrived in Santiago de Chile to teach demography at the Pontifical Catholic University's School of Sociology. Trained at the Institute for Demographic Studies in Paris, founded by Alfred Sauvy in 1947, Mattelart had been invited to teach a new course on population theories and demographic policies at the School of Sociology, and to get a research program started. The arrival of the expert foreigner trained at the venerable Belgian university and then at the renowned Paris institute needs to be understood in the context of a series of local and international processes in which great hopes were placed on the idea of modernization—to be reached by a variety of possible routes—which served as a sort of horizon that gave meaning and direction to the social sciences, and more specifically to the field of demography and the development of population policies. [1]

[1] With the support of private organizations such as the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, the Population Council had been formed in 1952, and one of its aims was to intervene in the formulation of scientific programs in Latin American countries to foment *development*. Also, in the field of population studies, the Economic Commission for Latin America and

The consolidation and institutionalization of sociology in Chile, as in other Latin American countries, dates back to the 1950s, driven by two convergent processes. On the one hand, efforts at social transformation begun in the previous decades through a process of import substitution led to economic and sociopolitical diversification in the country, which called for "expert knowledge" capable of proposing alternatives to the process underway (Garretón, 2005). Certain conditions and legitimacies had arisen in Chile that favored the institutionalization and creation of an autonomous organizational space for the social sciences that, in that context, were to be seen as a kind of "conscience for sociohistorical projects." In its early years, its main problematic would be the creation of an institutional foundation and a strong emphasis on topics of underdevelopment and structural reforms.[2] The movement consisted of varied but convergent lines of force. As Fernanda Beigel has highlighted with regard to the role played by the Catholic Church in the development of Chilean social sciences, this process gave great importance to the formation of a series of international networks and research centers linked to the Catholic world, more specifically, to the Society of Jesus (Jesuits). In this way, the Society was involved in geopolitical struggles and the reconfiguration of hegemony in the postwar world. In 1957 the Jesuit priest Roger Vekemans, founder of the sociology program at the Pontifical Catholic University of Santiago de Chile, arrived in Chile under the orders of the Society of Jesus; his presence was a key part of this process and "represented the high-water mark of this international strategy" (Beigel, 2011).[3]

With the financial support of the Rockefeller Foundation, Mattelart came to the Catholic University as a visiting professor. The invitation was

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the Caribbean (ECLAC), under the aegis of the United Nations, included a demography section, and under the direct supervision of the United National Population Service, the Latin American Demography Center (CELADE, in its Spanish acronym) had been created in Santiago de Chile in 1958. See Mattelart and Mattelart (1982 [1964]).

[2] The School of Sociology of the Catholic University of Santiago de Chile was created in 1959, in a context characterized by the rapid creation, institutionalization, and professionalization of the discipline. According to Manuel Garretón (2005), this school would struggle through the early '60s with disagreement between "teaching sociologists" and "professional sociologists." While its director, Roger Vekemans, gave priority from the beginning to the development of the Catholic Church's social philosophy and social doctrine, the process soon consolidated around the paradigm of the "professional scientist," in part, Garretón observes, due to the influence of foreign guest professors (Vekemans himself encouraged the invitations) and locals who had studied abroad.

[3] In her research, Fernanda Beigel argues that the Catholic University of Louvain—where Mattelart studied law—was one of the keys that explains the academic and intellectual migrations that took place within the Jesuits' worldwide networks.

made thanks to the mediation of François Houtart (Catholic priest and Marxist sociologist) and at the request of Roger Vekemans, who was anxious to incorporate a demography professor; it was part of a larger process of internationalizing certain networks affiliated with pontifical institutions, which were eager to stake out a differentiated position on issues related to population and family planning. In late 1962, Vekemans assigned Mattelart to participate in the Center for Social Development in Latin America (DESAL, in its Spanish acronym), which he had inaugurated a short time earlier. [4] While engaged in his teaching duties, Mattelart also found time to update demographic research and data collection methods, and in 1964 published the *Manual de análisis demográfico* [*Demographic Analysis Manual*], an instructional text for disseminating knowledge, aimed at Chilean and Latin American researchers, that proposed a general methodology and model for undertaking population studies. At this point, Mattelart—introduced by Vekemans in the book's prologue as an "expert advisor"—identified wholeheartedly with the expectations that had brought him to South America, and he hoped the manual would help "integrate certain demographic elements into the formulation of economic and, above all, social development plans" (Mattelart, 1964: XI). While the project overlapped with the modernization paradigm that was part of the emergence and consolidation of Latin American social sciences, it would be a mistake to recognize just one paradigm for development or a homogeneity among the institutional projects that promoted it. [5] On the contrary, the type of sociology pursued at the Catholic University (in an atmosphere of relative pluralism based on a certain openness in the Latin American Church) was distinctive, blending the humanistic philosophical

[4] The DESAL set out to make a diagnosis of economic and social development in Latin America and formed part of a Catholic network that linked priests and academics (Beigel, 2011).

[5] The most widespread version of this line of thought, which tends to construct a homogenous vision, maintains that starting in the 1950s a reorientation of the social sciences in Latin America began to take root, under the influence of "CEPAL's thinking," with a focus on explaining and overcoming the conditions of so-called "underdevelopment" (Fuentes Navarro, 1992: 72–74). To put it briefly, and therefore somewhat schematically, the "modernization" of science—understood in terms of the parameters of North American empiricism, i.e., guided by the principles of objectivity, verification by observation, evaluative neutrality, and an emphasis on methodology—was considered one of the necessary conditions for development and overcoming the "backwardness" of "traditional societies," which were defined as such by economic theories that sought development as the overriding goal (Blanco, 2006: 204–213). In this sense, the modernizing paradigm assumed a certain definition of science and a certain type of scientist. Garretón (2005) characterized this period as dominated by a "professional scientific" project based on a modernization of the discipline, specialization, the consolidation of the professional role of the sociologist, and the preponderance of the structural-functionalist approach.

tradition with an interest in the modernization of the social sciences. Thus, in a way Mattelart's first "demographic" studies in Chile point to the heterogeneity of matrices that made up this modernization paradigm.

With the change in the social and political conditions in Chile brought about by the victory of the Christian Democrats (DC, in the Spanish acronym)—who won the 1964 elections with a reform agenda summarized by the slogan "Revolution in freedom"—pluralism gave way, within the Catholic world and beyond, to a rise of opposing political doctrines. While this victory to a certain extent dislodged from power the traditional, right-wing oligarchic sectors then represented by Jorge Alesandri, the contradictions and tensions within the reformist program precipitated in 1964 the "political radicalization process" that would reach its peak in the period from 1970 to 1973 (Moulián, 1985: 71). These changes sparked a certain displacement in the orientation of the social sciences (or perhaps we could speak of an intensification of certain tendencies that were already underway). According to Manuel Garretón (2005), starting in 1964 the social sciences in Chile "found room for professional engagement by formulating diagnoses of socioeconomic reform and policy, promoting development among the popular sectors, and reforming education." Or to put it another way, social scientists got directly involved in the debates about modernization and development strategies, by both participating professionally in agencies or programs of the state and reflecting on the implications of their scientific production.

It was in this context, between 1964 and 1967, that Mattelart worked in a variety of institutional settings, which we can define—using the concept proposed by Federico Neiburg and Mariano Plotkin (2004)—as a series of *spaces of multiple intersections*. Aside from teaching at the Catholic University, Mattelart participated in research projects for international foundations, in different state agencies such as the Department of Planning of the National Popular Promotion Council (Mattelart and Garretón, 1965), in the agricultural development plan for the Maule basin (Mattelart, 1965), and, finally, in the Agrarian Reform Training and Research Institute (ICIRA, in the Spanish acronym), where Jacques Chonchol invited him to run the Department of Social Development. At this center, supported by the government and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Mattelart would establish ties with intellectuals of different nationalities and disciplinary and political traditions, ties that would prove to be instrumental in shaping his political perspective and interdisciplinary approach. [6]

[6] At ICIRA Mattelart would meet Andrés Pascal Allende (who would be one of his contacts in the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR in its Spanish acronym), with which he culti-

This network of exchanges and institutional linkages constituted a framework of possibilities for problematizing the policies and concepts of development from the field of demography and the issues of family planning. Mattelart's publications between 1964 and 1967 addressed these matters and reveal an original take on the problems of development and modernization, initially imbued with a certain *humanistic* vision that circulated in Catholic settings—critical of the economistic and technocratic tendencies that drove the process (Mattelart and Mattelart, 1982 [1964]; Mattelart and Garretón, 1965; Mattelart, 1965, 1967)—and later oriented by the debates that took place within different state agencies charged with bringing the reforms proposed by Eduardo Frei's government to fruition. The result was a unique position that, on the one hand, shared some of the general assumptions of social theory at the time, but that on the other, bearing a humanistic stamp, questioned the technocratic options that superseded the spiritual and cultural aspects that, according to Mattelart, should orient the process. While it was not formulated in terms that would later come to be known as *dependentismo* ("dependencism"), this perspective—somewhere between the humanistic critique and the critique of the dominant sociological paradigm—would contribute to shaping a critique of the structural conditions that derailed development plans.[7] In short, Mattelart's early demographic and sociological publications (virtually unread in the field of communication studies) constituted one of the many accounts that, oversimplifications notwithstanding, made up the complex tapestry of conceptions of modernization.

In each of these works Mattelart examined and problematized the proper place of social scientists as experts and echoed, from a *normative* perspective, an insistent call that intellectuals of the time were making to the social sciences.[8] Thus, in the *Manual de análisis demográfico* (1964), Mattelart ex-

vated relations), the US economist Solon Barraclough (director of the center), Brazilian exiles such as Pablo de Tarso and Almino Affonso (former Ministers of Education and Labor in João Goulart's government in Brazil), Paulo Freire (who worked at the center on agrarian reform matters), among others (Beigel, 2011).

[7] For example, in *Integración nacional y marginalidad. Un ensayo de regionalización social en Chile* [*National Integration and Marginalization: An Essay on Social Regionalization in Chile*] (1965), Mattelart and Garretón critically re-elaborated some categories of structural-formalism and the sociology in fashion at the time—such as *integration, marginalization, participation, industrial society*—and using empirical research demonstrated the existence of what they understood to be a series of structural barriers to integration, such as class structure and the gulf between the rural and urban worlds.

[8] Silvia Sigal (1991) points out that between 1950 and 1955, the emergence of sociology in Europe bestowed a new role on intellectuals, who were beginning to be assigned the function of social guides. They were expected to provide options and shed light on the alternatives, not with illusions, Sigal observes, but with specific utopias and simple projects that

pressed a certain unease with the type of professional scientist and the partial technocratic gaze that predominated at the time in academic institutions, calling, from a humanistic perspective, for a synthesis of the epistemological and ontological dimensions and an "integrated conception of the world, society and life" (180). Later he would insist, together with Manuel Garretón, on the "close relation" that should guide the use of concepts and the social reality to which they were applied (Mattelart and Garretón, 1965: 13). In other words, the pursuit of scientificity should be driven, they wrote, by an "existential vibration" and combined with a program of social reform, because the "people" were both the foundation and the target of the developments of science. This task could not be undertaken without questioning the very conditions of production of the social sciences in Latin American countries, that is, the system that tied them to the science developed in the international centers. Along these lines, in a publication devoted to analyzing birth control policies, Mattelart criticized as sterile the promotional strategies recommended by some US sociologists as a mode of "diffusion of modern attitudes," as well as the surveys that used market research models to sway public opinion and sound out the population's attitude toward possible birth control policies (Mattelart, 1967: 152, 187–198).

Mattelart's devotion to birth control policies, rural development, and regional integration led him to consider problems linked to the cultural dimension of modernization. The move toward studying the role of the mass media in this process seemed imminent. The actual trajectory, however, was neither linear nor necessary, insofar as taking the step involved a kind of epistemological shift that, while maintaining lines of continuity with earlier studies, would raise new problematics and ways to address them. This *moment of transition* can be read as occurring around 1968, in two papers he wrote with Michèle Mattelart: "La mujer chilena en una nueva sociedad" ["Chilean Women in a New Society"] (1968) and "Juventud chilena: rebeldía y conformismo" ["Chilean Youth: Rebellion and Conformism"] (1970). We speak of a *moment of transition*[9] toward communication studies and the problems of cultural dependency because in these papers we see the appearance of new terms such as *ideology, myth, alienation* (although they are not yet elaborated as concepts); the authors' first references to Marxist conceptions (albeit in

would address society's day-to-day needs.

[9] Víctor Lenarduzzi (1998: 53) proposes this notion in his study of the journal *Comunicación y Cultura*. There he understands a *moment of transition* to be when a partial redefinition of a certain theoretical framework or problematic field is proposed, on the basis of a questioning that lays the groundwork for a subsequent formulation.

the context of a bibliography for dissemination); the substitution of the call for social scientists to commit to "social reform" with a commitment to the "revolution"; and above all, the formulation of new questions that threw into relief the lack of any theoretical or methodological basis for addressing them:

> What is the cultural content of these two means of communication [image and book]? What are the values conveyed by the literary and cinematic productions that young people say they consume? The format of a single chapter is far too constraining to answer this *fundamental and monstrous question*. We will settle then for simply pointing out this *virgin territory of investigation* and addressing it, for our part, from an *angle of perception of the phenomenon of cultural alienation, which will remain morphological.* (201; italics mine)

While they took the "alienating" content of media messages for granted, they recognized the limitation of the perspective from which they had been working—the combination of qualitative and quantitative surveys—which left the *texts* unexamined. They thus found themselves in the presence of "a fundamental and monstrous question" (the metaphor suggests the disquiet produced by the presence of the unknown and the simultaneous awareness of its relevance) to which they had, as yet, no answer to offer. It is possible then to read a moment of transition toward the specific study of communication phenomena and the so-called "ideological reading" of messages. But the transition was neither linear nor necessary. As we will argue below, Mattelart's participation in the mobilization and reform process that took place at the Chilean university in 1967, on the one hand, and his *disposition* (in the sense of *habitus*) to perceive the political and cultural echoes of May 1968, on the other, would frame his disciplinary, epistemological and political turn.

Between Marxism and Semiology, or the Bridges between University Reform and the French May

In early 1967, universities in Chile were shaken by a student movement that took over and occupied academic units, demanding a program that was clearly identified with the traditional banners of university reform.[10] The

[10] Up to this point, the university structure in Chile had not been substantially altered by the reformist principles that rippled through Latin America starting in 1918. For more on student mobilization and Chilean university reform, see Scherz García (1980), San Francisco (2007), and Beigel (2011).

mobilization represented a turning point in the intellectual and academic field of Chile, at the Catholic University in particular and in Mattelart's intellectual and political trajectory. In the Catholic world, it would sharpen the break between the conservative sectors and those who leaned toward Marxism or the different political currents that would later support the Popular Unity (UP, in its Spanish acronym) (Beigel, 2011). In the academic realm, it would give rise to changes in the universities' system of governance and institutional structure. At the Catholic University of Santiago de Chile, new departments and study centers were created—including the Center for Studies of the National Reality (Centro for Estudios de la Realidad Nacional, or CEREN in its Spanish acronym)—that responded to the reformist agenda that called for addressing the demands of the national context and reviewing—in the words of one of its "ideologues," José Joaquín Brunner (1970)—the epistemological underpinnings of the knowledge produced and its usefulness for the process of change. CEREN's creation in 1968 would trigger a process of debate and reformulation of the perspectives for the social sciences: Voices there soon started to argue that it was not enough to promote scientific work if this work did not start by questioning more than just the definition of science's role with respect to society and the political processes of change; more importantly, it needed to question the epistemological assumptions of the dominant scientific tradition. Mattelart's participation in this institutional space was undoubtedly key in shaping his intellectual trajectory, and his profile as a researcher and specialist in matters of communication and culture. Mattelart was, along with Jacques Chonchol, Franz Hinkelammert, and Andrés Pascal Allende, one of CEREN's founders. He soon took on a variety of roles: member of the advisory board; director, researcher, and teacher in the Area of Ideology and Culture; and member of the editorial board of the center's journal, *Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional*. What distinguished CEREN in this first stage was the convergence of specialists from different countries and disciplines, the search for a closer relation between teaching and research, an institutional space devoted to the emerging area of ideology and culture studies, and finally, the search for productive collaboration between social scientists and emerging subjects. All of these elements, which he took an active part in formulating, would come to permeate Mattelart's intellectual stance and perspective, and play a key role in shaping a field of knowledge revolving around communication.

In overall terms, the student mobilization and university reform had a profound impact on a certain climate of ideas in which the field of com-

munication studies emerged and took shape. On the one hand, the systematic opposition of the conservative Chilean newspaper, *El Mercurio*, to the reformist students and their response to it served as a kind of watershed in Chile in terms of sensitivity to the media, especially for a large segment of the university sector.[11] On the other hand, the university reform provided a decisive push for the institutionalization of this field of studies, as it catalyzed pre-existing social demands related to the process of cultural and social modernization that grew out of the changes to the country's economic structure undertaken in previous decades. The reformist platform put at the forefront of its concerns the need to question the relations between "the university and the national agenda" and advocated the creation of new media to "nourish" this link. In this context, as a replacement for the traditional extension departments, new "offices of communications" were created (these would be in charge of managing television channels, with most of them in the hands of universities). Aside from the Area of Ideology and Culture that Mattelart would direct within CEREN, other teaching and research areas were created, such as the Department of Communications of the School of Communication Arts (EAC, in its Spanish acronym) in 1969, also at the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, and the Area of Communication and Ideology of the Institute for Social Sciences and Development at the Catholic University of Valparaíso in 1971.

The repercussions of the confrontation between members of the university community and *El Mercurio* in large measure inspired Mattelart's team to follow the press and develop methodological tools to study mass media messages. We are referring, clearly, to *Los medios de la comunicación de masas: La ideología de la prensa liberal en Chile* [*The Media of Mass Communication: The Ideology of the Liberal Press in Chile*], published as the third issue of CEREN's

[11] During the days the Catholic University was occupied, the traditional newspaper of the Chilean right wing undertook an intense campaign against the reformist movement and became its main detractor. In response to this situation, on August 11, 1967, students and professors took over the university's main campus and unfurled an eloquent banner: "Chileans: *El Mercurio* is lying." The accusation was aimed at a traditional institution of Chilean society and, more importantly, at the horizon of expectations on which the relation between the medium and its audience was based. The intensity of the repercussions emanating from the confrontation can be perceived in a somewhat unusual and highly significant incident: the debate that took place on Saturday, August 19, 1967, on channel 13, not between student movement representatives and university authorities or between students and government representatives, but between Miguel Ángel Solar, leader of the reformist movement at the Catholic University, and René Silva Espejo, director of *El Mercurio* (San Francisco, 2007). A detailed analysis of *El Mercurio*'s coverage of the reformist movement can be found in *Los medios de comunicación de masas. La ideología de la prensa liberal en Chile* (Mattelart, Mattelart, and Piccini, 1970).

journal *Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional* (Mattelart, Mattelart, and Piccini, 1970). We have been arguing that Mattelart's focus on the issue of media and ideology represents both a *shift* and *continuity* with respect to his earlier work, on a trajectory that moved from demographics, population studies, and the sociology of development to communication issues. One element that unquestionably favored the leading role he played in the institutionalization of knowledge about communication was his *disposition*—in the sense of *habitus*—to receive and assimilate the latest developments of a structural semiology that, on the one hand, had an inherent inclination toward formalization that contributed to a preliminary framework of categories in the definition of objects and methods for an emerging field of studies; and that, on the other, helped to generate epistemological and methodological principles for an alternative to the empiricism of North American media sociology. At the end of 1968, during a month-long trip to France that he made for personal reasons, Armand Mattelart would find a sort of key to answer the question he had posed together with Michèle Mattelart in their study of Chilean youth: how to address the cultural content of media? Jacques Chonchol, the director of CEREN, had asked Mattelart to buy books for the center while he was in France, and he came back with a pile of books and journals from François Maspero's now legendary bookstore, La Joie de Lire (Mattelart, 2010: 98): seminal texts of linguistics and semiology (including Saussure, Barthes, Greimas, and Kristeva), some works on ideology and Marxism (Adam Schaf, Althusser, and Gramsci, among others), and the leading journals where, in the context of an intellectual field in upheaval over the events of May, structuralists and Marxists engaged in fierce debate (Beigel, 2011; Mattelart, interview with the author, 2008). [12] Aside from Mattelart's direct role in this "bibliographical importation," it is worth remembering that this reception was only possible and significant given the author's prior concerns and the social demand to account for the media's role in Chile's stormy political process. This took on a specific institutional shape within CEREN, where a prominent place was given to the promotion of interdisciplinarity and debates about the role of culture in the phenomena of underdevelopment and dependency. It could be that Mattelart had the right dispositions to carry out this kind of intellectual transfer, in a political-cultural situation in upheaval, where the space of the possible posi-

[12] We cannot estimate the importance and effects of this bibliographical "importation" on the intellectual field and the social sciences of Chile and Latin America in comparison with the work of other "importers," such as Eliseo Verón in Argentina and Luis Ribeiro in Chile.

tions in the academic field was undergoing change, giving rise to strategies for disciplinary shifts that redefined, as Fernanda Beigel (2011) observes, the specific weight of the kinds of capital in play to favor "activist capital." For a young French-speaking researcher, who could have direct access to the latest developments in semiology and the debates in the leading French journals, and who had been trained in a discipline like demographics that was new and open to integrating a variety of social science disciplines (but was perhaps less susceptible to becoming the "total knowledge" needed for the intellectual intervention that the situation "demanded"), the introduction of semiology allowed him to bring together types of capital from different sources, especially—beyond that which accrued to him on account of his "Frenchness"—the capital that comes from political commitment and from "theoretical modernization." At the same time, it is difficult to conceive of this disciplinary and theoretical-epistemological shift without noting Mattelart's simultaneous turn toward Marxism and political radicalization. The two shifts explain each other, or to be more precise, are part of the same movement.

Even though they had no formal ties, Mattelart's theoretical appropriation of semiology and structuralism was mediated by his reading of the works that Eliseo Verón and his team were producing in Buenos Aires at the Social Research Center of the Instituto Di Tella.[13] In both *Los medios de comunicación de masas* (Mattelart, Mattelart, and Piccini, 1970) and *La ideología de la dominación en una sociedad dependiente* [*The Ideology of Domination in a Dependent Society*] (Mattelart, Castillo, and Castillo, 1980), Mattelart took Verón's works and built a kind of filiation with the Argentinian semiologist.[14] Nevertheless, the theoretical and methodological differences between

[13] In *Lenguaje y comunicación social* [*Language and Social Communication*], Verón (1971 [1969]) proposed an "ideological analysis of messages" and laid out some of his methodological principles, inspired to a great extent by structural semiology.

[14] In the historiography of the field, this filiation has not been addressed; more attention has been paid to the confrontation between Mattelart and Verón as expressed in the controversy between *Lenguajes* and *Comunicación y Cultura.* In *Los medios de comunicación de masas,* however, Mattelart wrote that the methods for latent content analysis used in structural semantics pointed him toward the new territory of discourse structure and went beyond descriptive juxtaposition. He then pointed out that the phenomena in question did not lend themselves to mathematical models, whose properties—and here he quoted Verón—"make it impossible to formalize the structural organization of the meanings contained in the messages" (Mattelart, Mattelart, and Piccini, 1970: 17). A short time later, in *La ideología de la dominación en una sociedad dependiente*, Mattelart proposed a kind of filiation with the works of the Argentinian researcher: "This paper cannot be regarded as an isolated phenomenon," he noted, "it is situated on a heuristic line that for some time has served as an axis for our observations." Mattelart stated that his research belonged to a "current of studies inaugurated in Latin America by Eliseo Verón and his collabora-

the two groups were manifest from the beginning and ran deep (which is why the *filiation* constructed by Mattelart is so noteworthy: Perhaps it was a way to position himself in an emerging field). By 1970 he was proposing a unique appropriation of semiology, based particularly on an attempt to link it to the Marxist tradition, which distinguished it from the framework proposed by Verón. This critical appropriation—expressed here in a highly abridged version—assumed a social conception of the meaning that marked the limits of the immanent analysis of messages, i.e., the need, in his words, to "identify the sender socially" and to understand the *texts* (as opposed to those who emphasized the Saussurean notion of *langue*) as "convergences of social practices." In this sense, Mattelart understood the notion of *intertextuality* (which he took from Julia Kristeva) as an indicator of how a text reads history and is inserted in social space; therefore, he postulated the need to do *diachronic* analysis, i.e., to not just identify the structures that frame and organize messages, but to give an account of their variations. Mattelart's conception of *ideology* (which, following Adam Schaff, he defined as a set of opinions about the issues and objectives of social development that are formed on the basis of interests) placed emphasis on its determination of class and on its political effect. Verón's conception, on the other hand, placed more emphasis on its formal functioning. [15]

The publication of *Los medios de comunicación de masas* as the first special number of *Cuadernos de Realidad Nacional* (no. 3) in March 1970 broadened the circulation of Mattelart's thinking and produced a consecrating effect, after which he started to consolidate his position as a disciplinary reference in an emerging field of studies. In addition, with the circulation of this publication, he found a platform that would project his intellectual profile

tors"; a critical current, he asserted, "and unfortunately still a minority position, which throws the postulates of empiricism into disarray." By making an *ideological reading* of the dominant class's discourse, Mattelart observed, using the term proposed by Verón, this current "refuses to consider said sender's speech or message as capable of being exhausted immediately in a cursory reading." For this reason, he advocated "the need to dispel the objective illusion" "so that hidden structures or secondary meanings can emerge, making it possible to decipher the functional messages of social domination" (Mattelart, Castillo, and Castillo, 1970: 5, 11).

[15] As Barthes might have done, Verón maintained that ideology was not a class of social discourse or a particular type of message, but a system of semantic rules that generated them. The basic mechanism of ideological communication consisted of erasing the tracks of this process of selection and combination (semantization) by which "discourse becomes invisible as such, and the receiver believes s/he is looking at an object." The "ideological reading" of social communication that he proposed thus consisted of discovering the implicit organization of messages to account for their process of production (Verón, 1971 [1969]: 186). For an in-depth analysis of Verón's positions, see Leona (2007) and Zarowsky and Cuesta (2009).

beyond the bounds of academia.[16] The "social resonance" of the publication can also be explained by the fact that in the midst of the election campaigns, the book shone a critical spotlight on *El Mercurio*, that traditional bastion of the so-called "serious press" and mouthpiece of the dominant class in Chile. One example of the breadth of circulation of Mattelart's voice is an issue of the leftist weekly *Punto Final* (with an announced circulation at the time of ten thousand) that dedicated its cover to "The Masters of the Press in Chile" (no. 100, March 17, 1970) and offered a special eight-page supplement whose main source was Mattelart's chapter from *Los medios de comunicación de masas* about the monopoly on communication and the press in Chile. (The book had come out in bookstores just a few days previously.) The publisher of *Punto Final* "translated" the research into more political language, placing emphasis on the call for popular control of the media. What this example highlights is the way academic research, political activism, and cultural journalism came together to construct the figure of Mattelart as a reference figure for communication studies. This legitimized him as a recognized public intellectual: Mattelart recalls having received a call from Salvador Allende himself at the height of the electoral campaign (Beigel, 2011).

In spite of his "founding effects" for studies of communication and culture (and the accounts given in Latin American communicology), Mattelart's work in the domain of *ideological analysis* with a semiological imprint was short-lived. It is true that a few months after publishing *Los medios de comunicación de masas*, he indicated that the developments related to the concept of ideology and how to address it in "no way" represented "a definitive benchmark" and that he regarded the work done so far as an opening act, thus announcing his intention to fine-tune the analysis and "use it in future research" (Mattelart, Castillo, and Castillo, 1970: 6). But his project was soon

[16] We can cite testimonies for all of these interpretations: Jacques Chonchol, the direct of CEREN, presented *Los medios de comunicación de masas* and framed it within the university's transformation process, pointing to the depth of the changes that it expressed. The authors' aim, stated Chonchol (1970), was to "set forth the overall issue of the need to redefine the conditions of 'scientificity' in the process of transforming the university" (3–4). Some months later Franz Hinkelammert (1970: 172), a teacher and researcher at CEREN, wrote a review calling it a "high-level scientific book" that focused on an "underdiscussed topic" in the Chilean academic field, but that at the same time was accessible to the non-specialized reader. Eliseo Verón, having visited Chile in 1971, claimed he had on several occasions heard the story that "Salvador Allende, during the presidential campaign, had made explicit reference to that issue of the CEREN journal during a television show and had even shown a copy before the cameras." For the author, the anecdote revealed "clearly the cultural impact of these studies within the Chilean situation" (Verón, 1974b: 16). Shortly thereafter, the writer Hernán Valdés (1975: 14) identified this work as the point of departure of the cultural controversy over the process of change.

to be modified: The date of the prologue to *La ideología de la dominación en una sociedad dependiente*, where Mattelart expressed these intentions, coincided with the electoral victory of Popular Unity in September 1970. Salvador Allende's inauguration as president would shake up the intellectual field and reorient both the conception of CEREN's research activity and the institutional participation of Mattelart and his team. This shift was not going to mean the abandonment of semiological analysis altogether, but rather its reinterpretation within the framework of new problematics: the conclusions they had reached about the ideological functions of the press and the culture industry would be integrated into debates about the development of cultural policies and alternative forms of popular communication.

Salvador Allende's Victory: From the Ideological Analysis of Messages to Cultural Policies

On September 4, 1970, Salvador Allende won the presidential election in Chile. Although there had been a high level of mobilization during the campaign, it was primarily after the electoral victory that a significant segment of the Chilean intelligentsia started intensely discussing their specific responsibility in the process of change. While the question of their social function and the call to higher levels of commitment to the political process were nothing new for Chilean academics and intellectuals, the UP's triumph made their decisions more fateful and reshaped the landscape. CEREN instituted a number of institutional and political changes that are key to interpreting Mattelart's journey, specifically the transformation of his intellectual profile and perspective, his participation in the political-cultural process and, above all, certain conditions that spurred the circulation of his writings and his status as a renowned expert in communication studies. We are referring in particular to a certain shift in its initial reformist program.[17] Manuel Garretón, who took Jacques Chonchol's place as director of the center (Chonchol took the position of Minister of Agriculture in the new administration), wrote at the time that reflection on the process of change presupposed the willingness to "bring about the realignment of scientific activity with social praxis" (CESO-CEREN, 1972: 8). Garretón imagined a wholesale redefinition of the social sciences, in terms of both their epistemology and their connection to society. In this sense, it was no longer postulated that the university's *relative*

[17] For more on this see Chonchol (1969), Brunner (1970), Scherz García (1988), Munizaga and Rivera (1983), Diez (mimeograph).

autonomy was a condition for it to carry out its function "as a critical conscience of historical processes" by generating knowledge *about* society—in the words of the reformist platform that had given rise to the center—but, on the contrary, the intention to promote new relations with actors in the social world, that is, new conditions of knowledge production that called for reformulations of theory and epistemology (Garretón, 1971: 7).[18]

The intention to connect scientific production with actors from the social world found its expression in a series of institutional agreements with state agencies, such as the Corporation for Promoting Production (CORFO, in its Spanish acronym), or in the organization of the international symposium "Transition to Socialism and the Chilean Experience" in October 1971 in Santiago de Chile, under the aegis of the Center for Socioeconomic Studies of the University of Chile (CESO, in its Spanish acronym) and CEREN. This event opened a space where high-level political actors (ministers, officials) could exchange ideas with social researchers, while also providing an international setting that convened highly respected leftist intellectuals from around the world to debate the theory and strategy of the transition to socialism. Mattelart would be in charge of one of the few presentations at the symposium that dealt with cultural issues in the socialist transition. It would later be published in *Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional* (Mattelart, 1971d).[19]

[18] This reformulation coexisted at CEREN with the stance of those who saw themselves, with their scientific activity and knowledge *about* society, effectively guiding the process of change. Thus, when they presented their research about unequal development, a group of researchers expressed their intention to "lay the foundation of a strategy for Latin American socialism" (Hinkelammert, Vergara, Perret, and Biedma, 1970: 12). On the other side, the talk was of formulating a "theory of the construction of socialism in Chile" in order to "contribute to creating a rational basis for social praxis," i.e., "to provide operational tools for socialist policy and the execution of its plans" (*Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional,* no. 11, 1972: 274–275). It is fair to ask whether such formulations did not assume a relation of exteriority and hierarchy between scientific knowledge and social demands, where the former was seen as the foundation and guide of political practice.

[19] The symposium's intention was twofold. On the one hand, to take systematic stock of the theoretical contributions being made at the international level regarding the transition to socialism and the meaning and scope of Chile's experience after one year of UP government. At the same time, the symposium, in the words of its organizers, intended to "open up the debate beyond limited academic circles and facilitate a discussion with the country's broadest sectors" by promoting the participation of labor union representatives, neighborhood organizations, political parties, and government representatives (Pizarro and Garretón, 1972: 8; see also Arroyo, 1972). Participants included Pedro Vuskovic, Minister of the Economy; Jacques Chonchol, Minister of Agriculture; Alberto Martínez, Head of the Directorate of Industry and Trade; José Antonio Viera-Gallo, Deputy Minister of Justice; Lelio Basso, former Chairman of the Socialist Proletarian Unity Party of Italy; Paul Sweezy, Kalki Glauser, Marco Aurelio García de Almeida, Vania Bambirra, Rossana Rossanda, Ruy Mauro Marini, Marta Harnecker, André Gunder Frank, Michel Gutelman, Franz Hinkelammert, Antonio Sánchez, Theotonio dos Santos, Manuel Antonio Garretón,

It is in this context that a certain shift in the orientation of Mattelart's work must be read. When he published *La ideología de la dominación en una sociedad dependiente,* he framed his research as what might be called "a cross" between the *ideological analysis* of messages and the description of the ownership structure of the media, but after November 1970 he would declare a shift in the axes of his inquiry with an eye to creating a communication medium identified with the revolutionary context.[20] The seminars and research projects that Mattelart coordinated at CEREN starting in 1971 were framed within the Area of Culture and Ideology that he himself directed. According to statements made when the Area was featured in *Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional*, its intent was to discuss the concept of a "new culture" and to reflect on the evaluative and ideological aspects involved in the process of change, with a prominent place given to the question about the role of mass media. The hope was that the results of its research would lead to a "discussion of the foundations of mass media policies, educational policies, etc.," whereby the aim was to carry out the work with "direct contact" between researchers and the people in charge of implementing policy in the field (*Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional*, no. 9, 1971: 260). The courses taught between the first semester of 1971 and the second semester of 1972 in the Area of Culture and Ideology were for university students, many of them engaged in their own communication experiences.[21] It could be said that a circuit had been

Mattelart himsel. According to dos Santos (1972: 181), Louis Althusser, Ernest Mandel, and Samir Amin were also invited but could not attend due to "last-minute engagements."

[20] In an article published in April 1971, Mattelart (1971c) pointed to the change in objectives by stating that deciphering "the ideology of mass media in the hands of the bourgeoisie" (in reference to his own previous work) had constituted a first stage that needed to "be surpassed or at least understood as merely a rung on the ladder of creating a communication medium identified with the revolutionary context" (173).

[21] In 1971 Armand Mattelart presented the research project "Mass Communication, Culture and Socialist Revolution," which looked at Marxist theory about "base and superstructure," the classic texts on culture and cultural revolution (Lenin, Trotsky, Proletkul, Mao, etc.), and the specific coordinates of the Chilean situation (*Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional*, no. 9, 1971: 261). Within the same area, the project "The Issue of Television in the Chilean Process," run by Mabel Piccini and Michèle Mattelart, set out to produce a synthesis of the topic—with a "practical and theoretical scope," they announced—that they hoped would contribute to "a concrete task of reformulating the mass media." As for teaching, Armand Mattelart would participate, along with other teachers, in the seminars devoted to analyzing the "national reality" (267); he would also teach the courses: a) "Technocratic Culture and Socialist Culture"—about different theoretical conceptions and historical cases of cultural revolution (*Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional*, no. 7, 1971: 208); b) "Mass Culture and the Socialist Revolution"—about base and superstructure theory and the specific coordinates of the Chilean process (*Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional*, no 12, 1972: 285); and c) together with Mabel Piccini and Michèle Mattelart, "Ideology and Mass Media in Chile" (*Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional*, no. 9, 1971: 266). Mabel Piccini

set up at CEREN, a space for discussion and thinking where teaching and research were linked to professional practice and political activism, albeit at an embryonic level. Mattelart brought the debates that took place there into his own thinking, which was published to a large extent in *Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional*, the center's journal. Starting in 1972, as we will see, his experience at the Quimantú National Publishing House would be decisive for his intellectual evolution. [22]

It was clear that social demands were driving an issue that took on its own forms and routes at the universities. Already by the presidential campaign that would propel Salvador Allende to the presidency, the question of the media's role in the process of change was placed squarely on the agenda of political and academic debates. Popular Unity's electoral platform regarded the transformation of mass media as a fundamental factor for creating a "new culture." In this sense, it proposed taking actions both to free communication from its commercial model and to eliminate monopolies, and to make mass media available to social organizations who would give them "an educational orientation" (Programa Unidad Popular, 1969). But shortly after the election results were made known in September 1970, the project's limitations and contradictions rose to the surface. In the agreement protocols between Popular Unity (UP) and the Christian Democrats (DC, in their Spanish acronyms), a series of pacts were signed by which the DC promised Allende parliamentary votes in exchange for UP commitments to respect "freedom of expression," among other things. Or to put it less euphemistically: UP promised to make an exception for the mass media when it came to its program to shift some economic activity to the "social property sec-

and Michèle Mattelart would also offer the seminar "Mass Communication and Ideology," which sought to make a critical analysis of the main theoretical currents related to communication and to design a methodological apparatus for surveying ideology and power structures in the media. As a result, they announced, they hoped to accomplish an "[o]verall evaluation of mass culture and a reframing of the communication medium in a revolutionary process" (*Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional*, no. 12, 1972: 281).

[22] In several of the texts he wrote at the time, Mattelart referred to these spaces of multiple intersection as a condition of possibility for his reflections. For example, he presented one of his articles published in the *Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional* and stated that it was not primarily a "theoretical" text, "but rather the orderly presentation of a set of ideas conceived in the heat of the current issues of the process in Chile, in team discussions and with fellow workers from the media themselves" (1971c: 173). In an article written jointly with Michèle Mattelart (Mattelart and Mattelart, 1972) the two presented the work as an attempt to gather "the fruits of the culture workers' practices," and they stated that the concepts and ideas expressed in the article came out of—referring to his work at Quimantú—"group discussions based on shared practice and confronting it every day with a process," primarily with "the members of the mass communication research and evaluation committee or section" at the publishing house (100).

tor": The media could only be expropriated by way of a special law, with the alternative being their purchase by the government. This scenario would not change substantially in the following years, which meant that Allende would govern with a media structure hegemonized by the commercial model and an antagonistic editorial line: The dominant sectors turned the media into an effective tool for readying their ideological offensive and mobilizing the masses, which in the end would lend legitimacy to the conspiracy and coup d'état. The government, faithful to the commitments it made in the parliamentary agreements and to the "democratic path" to socialism, adhered overall to the principles of "freedom of expression" and refused to make substantial changes to the map of media ownership. Many left-wing activists in the field warned about what they felt was an underestimation of the cultural or communicational front by the popular forces; however, there was no shortage of experiences in which people struggled with the challenges involved in undertaking a transformation of communication with an eye to creating a new culture. In a context where the commercial model predominated in the media and the culture industry was well-developed and skilled in shaping audience expectations, the challenge was huge, not to mention unprecedented with respect to earlier twentieth-century socialist experiences, which formulated their cultural policies within a framework where the culture industry was either absent or inconspicuous. In this scenario, reconstructing Mattelart's participation in the debates over the role of communication in the process of transition to socialism, as well as some of his experiences such as his work at the Quimantú National Publishing House, sheds light on the conditions in which his materialist perspective on cultural analysis emerged. This perspective was developed in a series of *spaces of multiple intersection* (university, cultural world, activism), where politics functioned as an element of articulation and meaning-giving. Providing an account of these hubs of intersection is also useful for highlighting the processes by which Mattelart the *author figure* circulated and was legitimized as a reference in communication studies in the 1970s.

One particularly important nexus between academic activity and practices related to the creation of alternatives in the domain of culture and communication was the participation of a significant number of social scientists or university professors in advising the Allende government's Quimantú National Publishing House. It arose from the Zig-Zag publishing house, at the time one of the largest and most important in Latin America, which had been bought by the state in February 1971 in response to a conflict between workers and the company (Albornoz, 2005; Bergot, 2005). This might have

been one of the most notable experiences that the UP faced on the cultural front, inasmuch as it concentrated in one event a number of the tensions and dilemmas that permeated the cultural field and, in a certain sense and seen from this perspective, the whole *Chilean way* project. When Quimantú was acquired by the state, its directors wasted no time in undertaking an ambitious editorial project that involved modifying certain models and processes for producing its cultural materials; those intended for entertainment, especially comic books, were subjected to intense experimentation in the search for alternatives, within the framework of a broader debate about what Chile's cultural policies should look like. Quimantú faced the challenge of contributing to the creation of a "new culture" within the framework—and with the materials—of a relatively well-developed cultural industry that for years had shaped the tastes and expectations of its consumers through a commercial logic and with a particular vision of the world.[23] Unlike what happened with other media outlets where each party had its own mouthpiece, at Quimantú there were different opinions on cultural policy, because the different forces that made up the UP had been assigned a certain "quota" of the executive posts. It is safe to say that the profiles of Quimantú's sections and publications reflected the different perspectives of the parties that made up the UP. At the risk of oversimplifying, we can see on the one hand a line represented to a large extent by the Communist Party, which advocated "cultural democratization," i.e., greater access for the "people" to certain cultural goods, and, on the other hand, a line represented by the Socialist Party, which sought to promote political education for the purpose of raising awareness and mobilizing the population.[24] It is no exaggeration

[23] While acknowledging the difficulty of gaining access to statistics and documentation, Solène Bergot (2005) estimates that Quimantú edited a total of eleven million books and sold about ten million—this in a country that at the time had 8.8 million inhabitants.

[24] The editorial department run by the writer Joaquín Gutiérrez, from the Communist Party, was divided into two sections: one devoted to publishing works of fiction and the other for "Special Publications," with the latter under the direction of Alejandro Chelén Rojas, from the Socialist Party (Albornoz, 2005). The organizational structure of the publishing house also included sections devoted to children's and educational magazines, as well as informational and journalistic publications. Of the books published, the collection "Quimantú for Everyone" took pride of place; it aimed to broaden access to certain cultural goods by making classic works of literature, especially Latin American literature, available to a wide audience of readers at a low cost. In the political book section, two collections stood out: "Classics of Social Thought," directed by Alejandro Chelén Rojas, which sought to form young political cadres in the classics of Marxist thought, and the "Popular Education Notebooks," directed by Marta Harnecker and Gabriela Uribe, which aimed to "educate workers and raise their awareness" by looking at key aspects of the current political situation from the perspective of the classics of Marxism-Leninism (Harnecker and Uribe, 1971).

to say that the differences in editorial and cultural policies were a kind of translation of the disagreements about political strategy in general, with the advocates of the *democratic path* to socialism facing off against those who urged the *insurrectional* path or *popular power*.[25] It was probably in the field of mass-audience publications—journalistic and children's magazines, comic books—where the divergent criteria for dealing with the tension between "old" and "new" culture were most acutely felt—or, put differently, the contrast between the inherited ways of the old publishing house and the new content they aimed to put out. Mattelart was quick to draw attention to the issue and reflected cogently on it.

What can be "reclaimed" in the different media we work with and what most definitely cannot be asked in April 1971 in *Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional* (1971c), a few months before he joined Quimantú. In this article Mattelart posed a series of questions related to the conditions for creating a communication medium that would accompany the process of change, and wondered—taking comic books and photo comics [*fotonovelas*] as examples—about the possibility and effectiveness of making modifications to the content of the messages while keeping the forms unchanged. In other words, he wondered whether it would be a good idea to insert "new values" in the place of the "mystified" vision of reality that such publications supposedly conveyed. Might the "transition period" have a certain specificity, making it possible and desirable—on the road toward the creation of a "new culture"—to deploy inherited forms while inverting the orientation of their content? "With the form manipulated by the bourgeois medium,"—in Mattelart's words summarizing the question—the idea would be to gradually "slip in new content." The problem was not a simple one, and did not lend itself to easy solutions; Mattelart warned that this possibility could not be accepted without giving thought to its implications and assumptions because, he observed, resorting to "expressive forms created by the old society" and "with connotations stemming from their commercial use" to convey content that denies the values of that system, represented a "contradiction whose different facets and ramifications" called for research.

[25] The internal differences notwithstanding, both Allende and the Communist Party (PC) and other smaller parties agreed on a platform whose strategy did not stray from the framework of the democratic system and that sought to implement, within the possibilities that the accumulation of forces allowed, a process of far-reaching reforms. For their part, sectors of the Socialist Party (which had shifted their position to an "insurrectional path" based on the experience of the Cuban Revolution), together with MIR [Revolutionary Left Movement]—outside of the front—proposed an insurrectional strategy confronting "class against class" and the deployment of "popular power" (Moulián, 1993).

The second axis that, in general terms, ran through Mattelart's proposals regarding mass publications had to do with the idea of promoting "popular workshops," a series of evaluation sessions that aimed not only to find out more about readers' reception but also, more fundamentally, to integrate them gradually into the message production process. Taking the motto "return speech to the people" as his guiding principle, Mattelart argued that the popular workshops would serve to break down the messages' one-way flow and closed, or "canned," nature, in a way that, "launched by their sender to the 'masses' [they would return] to their sender, de-alienated and enriched." This is how he proposed to break down the stratification inside the message production process, so that the group in charge of creating a comic book, for example, would have to discuss "as a team the way to carry out their work with an explicit cultural objective." In his proposal, Mattelart imagined "workshops located in towns, working-class neighborhoods, new agricultural units," with the idea of creating "new community structures" in which to insert communication practice.

In one way or another, the ideas described here guided the first steps taken to modify certain publications at Quimantú. Not long after the questions were posed, the Section for Mass Communication Research and Evaluation was created and Mattelart joined the publishing house to direct the team, which included René Broussain, Abraham Nazal, and Mario Salazar. The section, created formally in August 1971, set out to study Quimantú's periodical publications. In parallel, the Comic Book Coordination and Evaluation Team was formed, a team made up of young sociologists and literature specialists (some of whom had taken part in Mattelart's seminars or Ariel Dorfman's courses) that proposed interacting with scriptwriters, artists, and letterers to formulate changes to the comic books and adapt them to the objectives of the cultural process (Jofré, 1974). The proposed changes ranged from the modification of the forms and content of the magazines inherited from Zig-Zag—which for commercial reasons continued to be published—to the creation of new comic books, with new characters, structures and conflicts that would express new world visions and value judgments. But tensions and difficulties soon arose. Some magazines saw their sales decline edition by edition, which suggested, in part, readers' rejection of the questioning of their reading expectations. Moreover, in response to the reorganization that was undertaken, conflicts emerged within the process of producing the publications. The Comic Book Coordination and Evaluation Team pushed through certain modifications in the workflow as a way to articulate the various production stages and ensure the participation of the different professionals—artists, letterers,

script-writers—in the discussion and conception of the publications. The "advisors" came up against the difficulty of getting the "makers" to accept their proposals and modify contents and forms, not to mention the main challenge: the ways of working. In their eyes, the scriptwriters and artists, most of whom were holdovers from the old publishing house, did not understand the objectives of the new proposals: They defended the "freedom of artistic creation" and refused to attend the new team meetings, arguing that they imposed overtime that was not paid. The advisors saw themselves as a kind of awareness-raising vanguard (Nomez, 1974). For their part, the "makers" felt that the "sociologists" "ideologized" and "politicized" comic books too much, when in their opinion comic books were meant to simply entertain (testimonies in Villafañe Muñoz and Díaz Navarro, 2008). To fill out the map of tensions, mention must be made of the typesetters—who in a way were expected to be the first readers and evaluators of material—who at one point accused the "sociologists" of "dressing" Mizomba (Tarzan) and setting his adventures in the city. This modification, which altered readers' expectations, had been proposed from the advisors' perspective to neutralize the "ideological effect" attributed to this supposedly modern incarnation of the noble savage myth: The conflicts were not between man and nature, but were social (Navarro, 2003). The problem became more acute when the managers or the typesetters themselves concluded that the alteration of the materials was causing the drop in sales and thus jeopardized the company's continuity and their jobs.

What is certain is that as the process advanced, the differences over cultural policy within the left rose to the surface, along with the contradictions and limits of actual communicative practice in the context of a legacy cultural organization. Armand Mattelart would reflect on these points together with Michèle Mattelart in April 1972, in an article in which they reviewed their actions up to that point, especially the experience at Quimantú. They pointed out the need to delimit the focus of cultural interventions, insofar as they perceived that up to that point two different projects had coexisted: one, which tried to defeat the enemy in the cultural market and "permeate" the "uninfected" audience, i.e., the middle-class sectors that the UP was trying to incorporate into the spectrum of its class alliances; the other, which posited "the need to achieve a certain efficiency in class struggle, as it relates to the ideological and cultural field, and more generally in the struggle for power and the advance of socialism." For the Mattelarts, the policy of winning over the middle-class sectors involved costs because it took away from the promotion of communication that, directed specifically at the

proponents of the process of change, would help to promote their organization and mobilization. As for Quimantú, the authors suggested that the publishing house had limited itself to working with the accustomed genres and formats that, as ways of organizing topics and audiences into separate and apparently autonomous spheres, maintained the label of an average audience ("women," "young people," "sports fans") abstracted from its social register. They underscored the need to question audience organization by commercial criteria, that is, the "generic and socially amorphous" concept of "'mass' communication." To change the situation, they proposed a series of modifications that went beyond the forms and content of the publications: They suggested using different criteria to define and delimit the audience segments to target, modifying or substituting some genres, reviewing and transforming the place of specialized content producers, and modifying the distribution system, since it was aimed at the individual, middle-class consumer. Following Antonio Gramsci's instructions regarding the character of a cultural journal, Armand and Michèle Mattelart concluded—and their conclusion served to justify the popular workshops—that creating a new culture required not just coming up with a new world vision but also a new way of organizing it through the participation of a wide range of social actors.

In short, Armand Mattelart's experience at Quimantú—within the framework of the overall political-cultural process and its debates—was key to his formulation of a critique of the abstract notion of "mass communication." By concluding that communication was more than a question of messages and media, he insisted on the need to look at the material organization of the culture in which communication is embedded. It would not be until the late 1970s that he would come up with a more explicit and conceptual version of this conclusion within the framework of his proposal to develop a *class analysis of communication* or, also in his words, a *critique of its political economy.*

The Chilean Route at the Crossroads: Journalism, Culture and Popular Power

After Allende's victory, the expectations to deploy communication on behalf of the process of change, together with concerns over the opposition media's attacks, led some left-wing journalism sectors to deeper discussions, and above all, to identify new challenges in the realm of communication. Four months after the UP assumed power, worries were expressed about the lack of a collective communication policy: While journalists linked to right-wing

sectors launched an ideological assault against Allende, the left was seen as entrenched in a defensive position.[26] In response to this situation, the First National Assembly of Leftist Journalists was organized. Held in April 1971, it brought together 640 journalists and representatives of political parties and different social organizations. After a keynote address by Salvador Allende, they discussed the offensive undertaken by the opposition press and considered a variety of alternatives, ranging from the formation of media cooperatives and legislation that would democratize journalists' access and participation in their workplaces and professional organizations, to different types of control of media workers (in some cases journalists had managed to publish columns expressing opinions opposed to the editorial line of the companies where they worked), including proposals of outright state takeover as a transition toward the socialization of the media.[27]

Mattelart was invited to speak at this assembly through the intermediation of Augusto Olivares, who was a journalist, collaborator at the weekly *Punto Final*, general director of National Television, and advisor to President Allende. Mattelart's intervention, which would later be reproduced in its entirety and published in a special supplement of *Punto Final*, already laid out the main axes of what would be his questions regarding the problems that the transition process entailed in terms of journalism and communication. He laid out the initial difficulty: Mass communication was the domain where Marxist scholars had done the least research, and while some studies of its ideological content did exist, "the most absolute vacuum" could be seen—he insisted—when it came to determining "and meeting the requirements for the revolutionary transformation of the mass media." To address this question, Mattelart (1971a) proposed, first of all, making a diagnosis of the "ideological offensive" undertaken by the press against Allende, and he described some of the elements that he felt characterized the "nature" of the "bourgeoisie's communication activity." Underneath this perspective lay a radical stance that Mattelart would gradually consolidate and develop over the course of

[26] "There is an economic policy. There is agrarian reform activity. There are plans for public works, housing, health programs. What about mass communication?" asked a columnist in the weekly *Punto Final.* He argued that it was also important for journalism companies to pass over to the social property regime ("La sorda voz de la izquierda," *Punto Final*, no. 127, Santiago de Chile, March 30, 1971, p. 12). While announcing the First National Assembly of Leftist Journalists and urging "an ideological offensive," another commentator quoted extensively from a study of *El Mercurio*'s "ideological offensive" that Mattelart had recently finished ("La izquierda debe pasar a la ofensiva ideológica," *Punto Final*, no. 127, Santiago de Chile, March 30, 1971, pp. 26–27).

[27] "Declaración de la Primera Asamblea Nacional de Periodistas de Izquierda," *Punto Final*, no. 129, Santiago de Chile, April 27, 1972, pp. 9–11.

the process: If the intention was to transform communication and place it on the agenda for the construction of the socialist society, the question of the character of communicative practice called first of all for "denaturalizing it," i.e., understanding it as a historically configured practice within the framework of certain social relations. In this sense, he was pointing in his intervention to the rules for constructing "the newsworthy" (governed by a sensationalist principle that served a commercial interest) and, above all, to the way of organizing journalistic practice, which even in the left's conceptions assumed a split between the journalist, assigned the role of agent, and the masses, the subject of the news. From this point of departure, he conceived of the transformations that a short time later he would sum up with the expression "the return of speech to the people."

The intention to make a Marxist-inspired review of culture and communication issues within the conditions peculiar to the Chilean experience would lead, as we will see, to Mattelart's formulation of a unique perspective that was ahead of its time in terms of both politics and cultural analysis. While he did weigh in on points of debate that came from the left, Mattelart found a way to broaden the scope of a discussion that had mostly limited itself to the issues of ownership, media control, and the call for greater commitment on the part of journalists.[28] Although he agreed that one of the objectives of the current stage should be workers' control of the media, Mattelart maintained that this could not "constitute the revolution's sole objective when it came to mass media"; in other words, its transformation could not be approached by imitating the logic by which other companies passed into the realm of social property: What characterized the mass media was the possibility of generating products that were at the same time "power to raise awareness." This specificity made it necessary to pose a different question about the media issue, which could be formulated as follows: How is the strategy of *popular power* reflected in the area of communication? Just as in the matter of cultural policy, Mattelart's proposal for journalism and communication was structured around the principle that the people should gradually become the makers of their own news. The "information cells" and "worker

[28] This line would hold firm throughout the whole process. For example, the Assembly of Communication Workers, held in October 1972 as an alternative to a meeting of the Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) in Santiago, released a statement in favor of a change in the ownership regime, but advocated for the "current moment" the development of a policy of "control" through the formation of journalists' committees at each workplace. Together with a call for the constitution of a federation of communication workers, the assembly expressed the need for left-wing journalists to engage in "self-criticism," and called on them to be more open to "translating" the popular wishes (*Punto Final*, no. 169, Santiago de Chile, October 24, 1972, pp. 30–32).

correspondents" organized in labor unions and activist settings—ideas taken from the Leninist playbook—would be the basis for creating spaces that, after critically analyzing the press and producing their own information, could contribute to the formation of a cultural infrastructure and an alternative way to organize information. Along these lines, while he did point to a role for the political-cultural vanguard in the process of awareness-raising and political mobilization, Mattelart had less of an instrumental focus than some of his colleagues or fellow travelers, and raised questions to pursue from a leftist perspective, matters that included everyday life, leisure, the development of a "new sensibility," and the construction of a new cultural infrastructure. [29]

As the UP consolidated its position in electoral and institutional terms, the dominant classes modified their opposition strategy, shifting from confrontation within the institutional system to the construction of an insurrectional strategy that eventually legitimized the coup d'état in September 1973. This policy demanded intense work of ideological preparation: The press became, in Mattelart's analysis (1974d), a "collective organizer" engaged in creating the dominant classes' "mass line." Although some voices protested the lack of debate about the issue (or its place lower on the agenda than "other priorities"), the truth is the problem was not overlooked among the forces on the left: Fingers were pointed time and again at the shortcomings in communication policy and the insufficient part played by the press in the ideological battle. But repeating the diagnosis did not necessarily translate into agreements to formulate an overall policy. Every time the confrontation grew heated and turned critical, the forces on the left once again pointed out their own limitations. [30] The arguments to explain the situation ranged from

[29] A short time later Mattelart would make a more in-depth systematization of these proposals in an article published in *Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional* (1971c) that then—in a slightly longer version—would be compiled with other articles by Patricio Biedma and Santiago Funes by a publishing house linked to the Socialist Party (Mattelart, Biedma, and Funes, 1971). It is interesting to compare Armand Mattelart's position with Patricio Biedma's (Biedma was an Argentinian sociologist and MIR militant); the latter took a more instrumentalist stance regarding communication's role in taking over the power of the state. Mattelart, on the other hand, while not overlooking the role of the political-cultural vanguards in matters of communication, also insisted on the necessity, in the social transition, of communication policies to address other issues that in his view the process demanded.

[30] The difficulties were noted at the highest levels. In the evaluation after the UP's electoral defeat in the municipal elections in southern Chile in January 1972, Volodia Teitelboim, a senator from the Communist Party and member of its political commission, decried the lack of an overall communication strategy from the government and called left-wing journalists "snipers" (*Punto Final*, no. 150, Santiago de Chile, February 1, 1972, pp. 22, 26). According to *Punto Final's* chronicler, the lack of an overall policy could also be seen in the

"ideological weakness" on the part of journalists to the underestimation of the cultural front on the part of a certain Marxist orthodoxy and the right wing's continued dominance of the media as a result of the government's policy of "freedom of expression" and the existing property regime. Without necessarily denying these points, Mattelart's analysis attempted to shed light on the depth and complexity of the problem and to identify aspects that were not being addressed in the popular field.[31] He was trying to elucidate a "communicative rationality"—a way of organizing the whole array of communication practices that emerged in the framework of a given set of social relations—that having been naturalized, even by the left, stood in the way of its own transformation. When he realized how practices committed to the process of change could reproduce a cultural norm that tended to undercut their own transformative aims, Mattelart began to outline a different way of understanding communication that questioned the abstract notion of "mass communication"; in other words, he conceived of communication as something more than a matter of messages and media: His intention was to situate it in a specific form of material organization of culture, in the framework of specific social relations of production.

At this point it is important to note that Mattelart's proposals came out in parallel with certain communication experiences that took place primarily from 1972 onward, in the context of a polarization of alternatives and a class conflict that escalated with the employers' lockout in October of that year. We are referring to workers' takeover of some opposition dailies, like *La Mañana* in Talca, the emergence of the "industrial belt press," and the takeover and subsequent operation of the University of Chile's Channel 9 Television by its workers between October 1972 and August 1973. All these experiences threw into sharp relief what was at stake in the battle over com-

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Rapporteur Commission of Leftist Journalists which, while praised for bringing together journalists of different leanings, had neglected to come up with a "strategy to commit the entire left wing organically and effectively to the ideological battle." As president of the Unified Workers' Confederation (CUT, in its initials in Spanish), Luis Figueroa, also of the Communist Party, had lodged his criticism of the left-wing press, stating that its pages contained only sensationalism; he warned that the situation could not go on that way (*Punto Final*, no. 175, Santiago de Chile, January 16, 1973, pp. 6, 7).

[31] To a large extent these debates and exercises in self-criticism played out, for a wide audience, on the pages of *Punto Final* and *Chile Hoy.* The latter published, over two subsequent editions, a special dossier on the topic: "La presna de izquierda. Examen sin concesiones" ["The Left-wing Press: Examination without Concessions"] (*Chile Hoy*, no. 4, June 7–13, 1972, and no. 5, June 14–20, 1972). The most salient article of the second installment was an interview with Mattelart and his team at Quimantú: "El periodismo revolucionario está por desarrollarse" ["'Revolutionary Journalism Has Yet to Be Developed': Mattelart and his Team Speak"].

munication and established the conditions for a theoretical formulation of the matter. Inevitably, the scope and development of these initiatives were limited, given the short time they lasted.[32] Not long thereafter, Mattelart, who had experience with some of these phenomena as a researcher (for instance the industrial belt press [Mattelart, 1974e]), did a stocktaking exercise that gave an account of how these experiences shaped the perspective he formulated. He maintained that these initiatives should not be overestimated, but rather seen as an "index" that bore witness to the conclusions that the process in Chile had taught. For one thing, "there are no possibilities of a new communication apparatus except through the creation of new mass organizations that look for or find new forms of communication among themselves or with other sectors in a process of mobilization" (Mattelart, 1974–1975: 32). Aside from what might seem to be an expression of political will, the formulation sums up a whole critique of the abstract concept of "mass communication" and outlines certain principles for a materialist analysis of culture and communication: Counter to any "mediacentric" or content-based perspective, it reaffirms the analysis of its functioning and potential within the logics governing social and cultural dynamics, with a special focus on the shifting relations of force between the classes.

This debate about the role of journalism and the media must be situated within a broader debate over the role of culture, intellectuals, and cultural policies during the transition period. Salvador Allende's election had represented a sea change in the self-perception of writers, filmmakers, and journalists, who felt themselves challenged or "called" to rethink their relationship with the political process and their role as intellectuals.[33] While it is fair to say that the process of "the emergence of a new critical awareness among intellectuals and artists" had already begun in Chile in the 1960s (Garretón, 2005), and that the link between intellectuals and politics had traditionally been stronger there than in other Latin American countries, the UP's victory without a doubt helped redefine the actors' understanding of their practice and social function, which were reflected in the proliferation of a variety of intellectual associations. Some of them reflected positions that could be seen as corporatist (like the professional associations of writers and artists that hoped to improve the conditions and possibilities for cultural workers

[32] Unfortunately, we cannot delve deeper into the reconstruction of these experiences. That history has yet to be written.

[33] Various accounts capture an experience that many intellectuals shared: Allende's victory was seen as a "call" to undertake some kind of "mission" as writers, filmmakers, social scientists, etc. (Valdés, 1975; Guzmán, 1981; Dorfman, 1984).

under the new government); others were more committed to the political process in general, and sought to find their place in the tension (which could be felt even within a single grouping, such as Popular Unity's Writers' Workshop) between a Sartrean definition of the *committed intellectual* (writers who express a critical awareness of society in their works but keep a distance from direct, practical political commitments) and the search for a new, more "organic" orientation, such as the one promoted by the Communist Party's National Assembly of Culture Workers. [34]

As for cultural policies, the "Basic Platform" on which Allende ran in Chile's 1970 presidential election aimed for creation of a "new culture" as one of the three pillars of the transition to socialism (along with the creation of the "Social Property Sector" in the economic realm and the legal reform that would give rise to the "Popular State"). Nevertheless, the process was barely underway when the main players in the cultural debate—from a range of political leanings—began to complain of a lack of a policy backed by the government and popular forces that, in the view of some, could channel the masses' participation and promote the creation of the "new culture," and according to others, could achieve consensus in the middle-class sectors that were hostile to the platform of change. Quimantú's publication of a cultural journal called *La Quinta Rueda* [*The Fifth Wheel*] (an ironic reference to the way culture was perceived as secondary in the process of change) points to an assessment common among intellectuals of different stripes. This does not mean, however, that writers, academic and political leaders avoided discussing content and strategy for promoting cultural policies, even when they regarded these topics as marginal compared to other issues. [35] In this sense, in the debates about the fundamentals of cultural policy we can speak, in very general and thus somewhat schematic terms, of positions aligned with three different paradigms: first, *diffusionism* or *cultural democratization* (aimed at making cultural goods available to broad sectors of society); sec-

[34] Aside from the testimonies and the historiographical literature quoted above, for the documentary reconstruction of intellectuals' positions see Valdés (1971), the "Manifesto of the Catholic University's Writers' Workshop" (*Cormorán*, no. 8, Santiago de Chile, December 1970), and the documents of the Communist Party's National Assembly of Culture Workers (AA.VV., 1971).

[35] This somewhat pessimistic perception on the part of the main players (see, for example, Garretón, 1975; Valdés, 1975) could be interpreted in terms of their own expectation of becoming recognized experts or guides of the political process. An assessment of the policies that actually existed under the UP government is an area that historians have only recently begun to research. Unlike the situated perception of the main players, César Albronoz (2005) finds that culture was one of the UP government's top priorities. Along these lines, see also Bowen Silva (2008) and Bergot's work (2005) on Quimantú.

ond, those more inclined toward the so-called *cultural revolution* (aimed at promoting the organization of culture around new forms and contents); and, finally, others who subsumed the specificity of culture practice into general political work: The Communist Party's formula stated that the new culture should emerge "from the practical work of constructing a new society, day after day, for the entire people" (National Assembly of Culture Workers of the Chilean Communist Party, 1971).[36]

From his work in different institutional spaces, Mattelart took an active part in these debates. His proposals were set forth most clearly in his intervention at the International Symposium "Transition to Socialism and the Chilean Experience," later published in its entirety in *Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional,* as well as in different articles that appeared in the same journal. One that sparked the most controversy among one sector of the intellectual field referred to the role that writers should play in promoting a new culture. Mattelart identified the problem of the balance between promoting freedom of creation (which should not be neglected) and educating the masses, the "mass line" that—in alignment with the direction that Cuban cultural policy was taking at the time—should be the measure of any cultural policy. In this sense he drew attention to the need to shift the debate about writers' freedom of creation and broaden its scope, since the idea was to avoid restricting cultural policy to the "merely" cultural, i.e., to a traditional, limited sense of artistic productions. Mattelart reviewed the conceptions behind the separation of culture and politics, and advocated, instead of an intensification of specialized practices, a total "culturalization" of so-called "political practice." He was reading Gramsci's notion of "collective intellectual" (Mattelart, 1971d: 84) and arguing along those lines against the idea of the role of writers "as the epiphenomenal conscience of the nation," highlighting the need to confront their particular voice "with those other custodians of critical conscience: the masses." As we will see, this was one of the formulations that one part of the Latin American intellectual field followed after the shift in Cuban cultural policy and the conclusions of the First Cuban Congress on Education and Culture in 1971. In this regard, despite other profound differences, Mattelart's positions coincided with Carlos Maldonado's (cultural representative of the Communist Party and director of the culture section of *El Siglo*, one of its mass newspapers) when he criticized the Manifesto of the Writers' Workshop because it postulated the intellectual "as the sole critical conscience of society, which implied a vanguard role for this sector in the

[36] For more on the political paradigms of cultural action, see Néstor García Canclini (1987).

cultural process" (Maldonado, 1972). Maldonado was implicitly claiming the vanguard role in the process for the party. Similarly, Mattelart argued that the cultural problem should not be framed in terms of the regimentation of this or that content or the restriction of writers' creative freedom, but as a question of the class that should direct cultural policy, which should correspond to the political party, although he criticized one sector of the left for the "verticality that tends to characterize party activity with the masses." From there the aim was to delineate the location that corresponded to those who up to then had been "the privileged ones in terms of technique and culture in the process of cultural revolution" (1971d). Mattelart's proposal was based on historical analysis of the location of different social sectors in revolutionary processes. It was important to keep the petit bourgeois sectors that favored the revolution, he stated—revisiting Leon Trotsky's debate with the aesthetic vanguards and formalism—from imposing their artistic norm, their particular interest ("freedom of expression," "creation and experimentation") as a general interest, cloaked in the idea of being the "critical conscience of the nation"; the aim, on the contrary, was to "challenge their status as intellectuals, as artists, as exclusive interpreters of the world's meaning." This proposition by no means implied anti-intellectualism for the author. On the contrary, Mattelart was critical of the idea of proletarianizing intellectuals if proletarianization was understood at face value, in his words, as "shovel practice" (Mattelart was referring to one of the many activities in which university-types and intellectuals tended to participate), and he insisted, following Leninist thought, on the fundamental role of theory in the development of the revolutionary movement. What was at stake was not the disappearance of intellectuals but the redefinition of their relationship with the masses, where instead of being "exclusive purveyors of meaning" they should become, Mattelart contended (1971d), "monitors of meaning," by way of a dual movement: "The *proletarianization* of the monopolizers of knowledge and the *intellectualization* of the proletariat" (90-91).

This proposition would be hotly debated by many of the signers of the Manifesto of the Communist Party's Writers' Workshop. Enrique Lihn (1996 [1971]), for example, devoted a long section of his essay "Política y cultura en una etapa de transición al socialism" ["Politics and Culture in a Stage of Transition to Socialism"] to contesting the position Mattelart set forth in *Comunicación masiva y revolución socialista* [*Mass Communication and Socialist Revolution*] (1971). In his arguments, the Chilean writer made comments on the style and type of language that Mattelart used, accusing him of being overly rational—a consequence of coming from Europe, he explained—and

ignorant of "the concrete situation of the country he speaks of." Read in the context of his arguments—where he distinguishes a Latin American style of thinking, more given to "images"—, the accusation against Mattelart was built on pointing to his foreignness as a key factor. The controversy also involved the content of his program, of course, because Mattelart assigned a role to the petite bourgeoisie in the cultural process. The way Lihn saw it, writers were expected to proceed "under Mattelart's orders to die as such." And more categorically, he stated that the "cultural front" that Mattelart proposed was "a kind of suicidal vanguard." In contrast, Lihn drew on the terms of the Manifesto of the Writers' Workshop that envisioned the coexistence of political-ideological work and individual creation, without dismissing the popularization of classic world literature. What was being fought over, as we have said, was the path and the "direction" of this cultural process. Several months later Mattelart would take up the controversy again and clarify that in his view what called for "suicide" was not the writers as such but the *position* of the petit bourgeois class. To put it plainly, this was nothing but a critique of gradualism: The first moment of the revolution needed to be inspired by the last stage, and the "unprejudiced" goal "of the inventive and creative possibilities of the proletariat should inspire the initial moment" (Mattelart and Mattelart, 1972). In other words, the guiding principle of cultural policy should be the "mass line."

The controversy between Lihn and Mattelart sheds light on a dimension of the cultural debate that went beyond specific content: It laid bare, on the one hand, certain tensions in the intellectual field between "writers" and "social scientists" with respect to the places where it was legitimate to intervene as intellectuals (the consolidation of the social sciences and the commitment of their champions to intervene in public affairs on the basis of specialized knowledge undermined the traditional place reserved for writers as intellectuals);[37] on the other, differences over strategy for the *Chilean way* (between the proponents of the *democratic path* and those of *popular power*) and, finally, certain tensions that arose between the political and cultural vanguards over the direction of the process that was underway. This last point cannot be considered in isolation from the commotion produced in the

[37] In terms similar to those of Enrique Lihn, the writer Hernán Valdés (1975) accused Mattelart a few years later of thinking that "petit bourgeois" writers "should commit suicide in order to 'return speech to the people.'" To Valdés's way of thinking, Mattelart had not succeeded in implementing his demand because, "as a *good theorist*, he speaks of an abstract people" and falls "into the idealism of assuming that in Chile the people actually had 'speech' at some point. His formulation," Valdés continued, "completely overlooked the reality in Chile" (17–20; my italics).

Latin American cultural world by the shift that occurred in Cuban cultural policy in the late 1960s. If Cuba had "spectacularized" a traditional issue in the cultural debates of the left, i.e., "the relation between political vanguards and artistic vanguards" (Mangone, 1997: 187–205), in those years the discussions about the island multiplied all over the continent, generating specific ruptures and acts of solidarity: After the "Padilla affair" and Fidel Castro's words at the First National Congress on Education and Culture, a significant portion of the political-cultural debates of the period made reference to what was happening on the island. It was as if the new Cuban context was undergoing a sort of Latin-Americanization (Gilman, 2003: 243). In Chile, where the possibility of a *democratic path* to the socialist transition was under discussion, the debate about the link between culture and politics took on special importance and was tied to specific circumstances. [38]

The conclusions of the Congress on Culture and Education in Cuba, and especially Fidel Castro's closing remarks of May 1, 1971, had a certain impact on Mattelart's positions. In his intervention at the symposium organized by CEREN in October 1971, "About the Transition to Socialism," he gave his evaluation of the Cuban policy change after the congress, calling it "a process of maturation" that had taken shape in Cuban over the previous years (1971d: 95). Given the co-existence of two projects in the revolutionary process, this shift, wrote Mattelart, reflected the policy of "massification of cultural creation" and "the urgency of mobilizing the masses" around this task, i.e., a break with the implicit conception of the intellectual as the "wizard of modern knowledge." Mattelart judged that the line of action that came out of the congress "could be constituted" as the point of departure for an "authentic process of cultural revolution," as the only way to bring about genuine cultural democracy: by generating a new institutionality that would

[38] Until 1968 a certain balance was maintained in the Cuban cultural debate between the positions that favored the autonomy of intellectual and artistic work and those that advocated its subordination to the "needs of the revolution" or, to put it differently, to the direction of the political vanguard. After that, the balance began to tilt toward the latter position. We can mention some Chilean echoes of the Cuban debate. Lisandro Otero, cultural counselor of the Cuban embassy, explained the new cultural orientation of the revolution in June 1971 in the Chilean magazine *Mensaje*; there he criticized—in practically the same words that Fidel Castro spoke at the First Congress on Culture and Education—the existence of "self-chosen castes" that "at the side of the road" assigned themselves the monopoly on the interpretation of collective events, as opposed to those who "sweat and work" (in Lihn, 1996 [1971]: 452). In the same sense, a group of writers signed the "Chilean Declaration" that supported the shift in Cuban cultural policy and spoke against the critics of the Padilla affair. They stated that these were not times for "intermediate stances" (*Ahora*, no. 8, Santiago de Chile, June 1971). On the opposite side of the debate, other Chilean writers signed the *Carta de los 61* [*Letter of the 61*], where the shift in Cuban policy was likened to a "Stalinization" process.

deliver to the people "the power of decision and generation of their culture." In this same tenor a short time later, in early 1972, Armand and Michèle Mattelart ventured that the congress had done a good job of internalizing the "pressing need to redefine science and culture on the basis of the practice of the masses and a new concept of knowledge-wielding man, of deepening the mass line" (Mattelart and Mattelart, 1972: 127). The important thing here is that the Mattelarts' positions on the cultural discussion in Cuba were closely linked to their interpretation of the perspectives on the transition to socialism in Chile: They affirmed that the critique of the Cuban revolutionary process in the name of individual freedom and anti-Stalinism echoed the "false interpretation of the *Chilean way*" that—they wrote—"contains the possibility of capturing and winning over the petite bourgeoisie to the revolutionary cause." At that time, the Mattelarts associated the critiques of the program that came out of the Congress on Education and Culture with the petite bourgeoisie's resistance to surrender their "statute as interpreters or representatives" of cultural phenomena (122).[39]

How to Read Donald Duck*: From the Context in which It Emerged to the History of the Myth*

Having outlined some of the parameters of the debate, we will devote space to the conditions in which Dorfman and Mattelart's famous book emerged. This will enable us, on the one hand, to define more precisely the emergence and character of the issue of communication and culture in the socialist transition and Mattelart's participation in this discussion; on the other hand, to highlight one of the key controversies of this work as it relates to the accounts of Latin American communicology. While Ariel Dorfman and Armand Mattelart's book left a mark on the emergence of communication

[39] Enrique Lihn also understood that the discussion at the heart of the Chilean debate about Cuba revolved around the character of the *Chilean road to socialism*. He wrote in 1971 that the change in Cuba represented a policy of breaking with the "sole front" in cultural matters, a front that until then had allowed certain levels of ideological autonomy and plurality within the framework of a policy of alliances with intellectual sectors that traditionally came from the petite bourgeoisie. Although Lihn's position regarding the island lacked nuances (he took a stance in favor of the Cuban Revolution), he argued that while in the Cuban situation it was explicable and understandable that the army should become the people's ideological vanguard and subordinate intellectual practice and its autonomy, at home it was necessary "to find Chile's road for Chile" (Lihn, 1996 [1971]: 452). In short, if the *Chilean road* involved the unity of the "sole front," in cultural matters it implied the need for the intellectual petite bourgeoisie to take part in a democratic socialist process that would win over the consensus of the middle-class sectors.

studies in Latin America—and perhaps even on the overall cultural history of the continent—as the years passed it also became an extraordinary source of misunderstanding with respect to its meaning and history. The reason is that, aside from a few passing contextualizations within the political-cultural process that followed Salvador Allende's election, the book was read with no consideration of the specific conditions of its emergence that explain its meaning. As a result, *How to Read Donald Duck* [*Para leer al Pato Donald*] would become an icon of a certain time period and of a moment in the field that is either remembered with the nostalgia reserved for good—but naïve—intentions of youth, or else put forward as an emblematic example of "ideologism" or "anti-intellectualism" that—in diminishing the scientificity, research autonomy or reflexivity characteristic of the semiological discipline—supposedly characterized communication studies in the 1970s.[40] What is paradoxical is that a book that set out to *demystify* Disney's most popular comic book became a myth in its own right by being extracted from the context in which it was situated: specifically, from the substance of the political-cultural debate that took place in socialist Chile, and from the series of social spaces of multiple intersections, cultural formations, and institutions, which saw experimentation with novel forms of producing scientific knowledge and intellectual intervention.

How to Read Donald Duck was published by Ediciones Universitarias of the Catholic University of Valparaíso in December 1971. In its prologue, Dorfman and Mattelart laid out their intention to address audiences broader than just academics, and to include science as one of the terms to be analyzed in their work—not with an eye to denying its rationality or its specific being, they insisted, but to reformulate its conditions. It aimed "to make communication more effective" with readers insofar as critical work also encompassed "self-criticism about the way the results are to be communicated." The language they used was trying to "break down the false solemnity in which science usually shrouds its own work." This intention—with echoes of the orientations given by Fidel Castro in early 1971 at the First Cuban Congress on Education and Culture—converged with the proposal of the workshops developed at Quimantú, and it was generally consistent, as we

[40] The critical bibliography on *How to Read Donald Duck* in Argentina is extensive. For a semiotic perspective, one can consult Wajsman (1974), Verón (1974b), and the latest works of Berone (2010). From the perspective of cultural history, Vázquez (2010). As we have pointed out in Chapter 1, a recent review of Mattelart's role in the continent's intellectual history, more specifically in the debate about the relation between intellectuals and mass media, sees *How to Read Donald Duck* and Mattelart's intellectual profile to be a clear expression of "anti-intellectualist positions" (Varela, 2010: 780).

have seen, with the reformulations that had been worked out at the publishing house.[41] But the book was also enmeshed in a very specific political-cultural dispute. The state's expropriation of the Zig-Zag publishing house in early 1971 had sounded the alarm in the editorial mouthpieces of the dominant classes. Concerned about the potential impact of Quimantú's publications on children and young people, they proceeded to question first the state's takeover of the publisher and then its editorial policies. In this sense, it is noteworthy how little the book's critics and commentators have considered the *intertextual techniques*—more in line with an avant-garde novel than a scientific treatise—with which *How to Read Donald Duck* integrated its adversaries' journalistic discourse and defined its interlocutors. Not only in the section "Instructions for getting kicked out of the Disneyland Club" do the authors anticipate the opposition press's potential criticisms of the book, but also even more throughout the body of the text they incorporate and refute fragments of journalistic articles in which the liberal press tried to delegitimize Quimantú's editorial policies. As is evident, these articles (several of which explicitly attacked many of the intellectuals and social scientists who worked at Quimantú) had been published before the book appeared. The right-wing press was thus one of their chief debate partners in the search for legitimacy for Quimantú's initiatives.[42]

[41] With the caution necessary in approaching any retrospective account by the actors involved, it is worth noting Mattelart's version of the genesis of *How to Read Donald Duck*: "At the time, the [Quimantú] workers came to see us, saying: it's funny, we keep printing magazines that slap us in the face; we'd like to know what's behind all of that. And we started to work with them. We had begun to run workshops—and not just about Walt Disney—that tried to spark reflection about these products that absolutely were against them […] Our first concern was not to write a book but to have a discussion with them in workshops regarding the many questions they were asking about this kind of cultural product" (Mattelart, 1996).

[42] Dorfman and Mattelart (2002 [1972]) quoted fragments from the newspaper *La Segunda* (July 20, 1971), which on the appearance of Quimantú's first children's magazine ironically predicted that "Walt Disney would be banned in Chile" and that "the *consciousnesss-raising experts* had come to the conclusion that Chilean children could not think, or feel, or love, or suffer through animals" (12). They likewise quoted a long fragment from an opinion piece in *El Mercurio* (August 13, 1971) that, under the title "Voice of Alert to Parents" directed their attention to the dangerous objectives pursued by the Popular Unity government, which intended "to create a new mentality in the younger generations." The article directly slammed Quimantú's projects and the "pseudosociologists" who, with their "convoluted language," collaborated as "foreign personnel" at the service of a state-run company that sought, by means of "Marxist procedures," the ideological indoctrination of children and young people through children's magazines (80). Finally, the authors quoted fragments from another *El Mercurio* article that in September 1971 denounced the appearance of a young-adult magazine at Quimantú, warning that "[u]nfortunately, immorality is cultivated in information media that belong to the government" (159).

But upon its release, *How to Read Donald Duck* also unleashed controversy in the heart of the left wing, underscoring the tensions that ran through it. The objections to the book from certain progressive sectors were situated within the debate about the role of culture and everyday life in the process of change and, more specifically, about Quimantú's editorial policies. Carlos Maldonado (1972), a respected cultural expert from the Chilean Communist Party, published an article in *Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional* where he objected, in converse to a tendency to underestimate the cultural factor (which he also criticized), to a "highly paralyzing" element, which was the "despair into which not insignificant sectors of the left fall… moaning about the lack of a cultural policy." These intellectual sectors—wrote Maldonado—"do harm to the cultural process" even as they "present themselves as its staunchest defenders," because they envision "the cultural revolution as an *act of will*, seeing the world of the conscience only in terms of its autonomy"; consequently, they tried to "endow semantic factors, advertising slogans, and characters in comic books or soap operas with a power they did not (and never will) have." Maldonado then highlighted the "close" ties between "base" and "superstructure" in order to emphasize the heteronomy of the cultural realm, and he concluded that it was futile to "conceive of the appearance of features that announce a new culture unless they were rooted in the appearance of a new kind of social relations." As we can see, Maldonado's reference to some of Quimantú's experiences, and especially to Dorfman and Mattelart's book, *How to Read Donald Duck*, was straightforward. In the same tenor, the communist writer Bernardo Subercaseaux (1972) wrote a long article in the cultural supplement of *El Siglo* (the Communist Party's newspaper for the masses) in which he criticized the authors. While he did acknowledge some positive aspects—they "made a compelling argument" that the world of Disney "is not an innocent world"—Subercaseaux observed that Dorfman and Mattelart made the mistake of supposing that Donald Duck was responsible for the victory or defeat of the revolution in Chile; he accused them of "idealism," of conceiving of the class struggle exclusively as an ideological struggle and of being detached from both the working class and the reality in Chile. Subercaseaux framed his differences in terms of the strategy of ideological and cultural combat that he attributed to the authors and, in part, to Quimantú. He thus questioned some of the state publisher's output, such as the magazines *Onda*, *Cabrochico,* and *Mayoría*. Instead of doing an ideological reading of the magazines or telling parents not to read their children's comic books, he asked why not promote volunteer work or parents' participation in resolving educational problems. It was ultimately

about a cultural strategy where ideological combat should be framed "within a concrete historical situation alongside political and economic combat."[43]

Mattelart's replies to these objections point to the uniqueness of his theoretical stance. In general terms, he emphasized the need to take up the question of everyday life and its relation to mass culture as an issue for the socialist perspective.[44] Thus, in a 1972 article, Armand and Michèle Mattelart defended what Quimantú had done to that point, suggesting that it had addressed issues neglected by left-wing culture in novel ways. In response to the critiques, they maintained that the questioning and experimentation with genres proposed in their editorial policy represented one of the most interesting attempts—and one of the only attempts in regimes transitioning to socialism—at dealing with the complexity of the mechanisms of mass culture. This was the only way, they insisted, to ensure that in a moment of transition "leisure is not put on hold for a long time," because if the intention was to suppress people's desires for entertainment by decree, the pressure to satisfy them would eventually come back all the stronger. The left should adopt the problem of everyday culture as its own, they argued, and this problem was not solved "with solutions dictated in manuals," but by working on a new sensibility. If this problem was not addressed, they warned that a key battlefield in the struggle would be left in the hands of a culture industry that, the Mattelarts pointed out (1972: 109, 115), at this stage of the game had politicized and mobilized their "popular fronts" against Allende's government with the help of an everyday culture that the same culture industry had long since consolidated in its images.

In theoretical terms, it could be argued that the crux of the cultural debate could be grasped by comparing the way the antagonists understood the relation between those well-traveled concepts of Marxist theory, "base" and "superstructure." In this sense it is illuminating to compare the analysis made by Héctor Schmucler—who participated in the debate by editing and writing the prologue for the Argentinian edition of *How to Read Donald Duck* published by Siglo XXI—with those of Maldonado and Subercaseaux. While there was alignment in their thinking about the relation of "structure-superstructure"

[43] These discrepancies with the Communist Party's cultural policy most likely explain why *How to Read Donald Duck* could never find broad support to be published by the state-run publishing house, where Mattelart says he and Dorfman first offered their manuscript (Beigel, 2011).

[44] It is interesting to observe the significance that Mattelart retrospectively gives to his familiarity with the edition of Leon Trotsky's book *El nuevo curso. Problemas de la vida cotidiana* [*The New Course: Problems from Everyday Life*], published in *Cuadernos Pasado y Presente* in 1971 (Beigel, 2011; Mattelart, interview given to the author, 2007).

as a totality, Schmucler's conclusions diverged from Maldonado's concerning the need to undertake an ideological critique of the messages of mass culture. In the Chilean process, he wrote,

> it was proven once again that the structure-superstructure relation is much tighter than we are led to believe by a type of thinking that purports to be revolutionary but simply repeats the commonplaces of a rigorously mechanistic positivism. The so-called structure actually encompasses all social relations. There is therefore just one moment of change […] Ideology, then, cannot be seen as an epiphenomenal field where a battle can 'also' (but later) be waged, as the thick-headed and bloodless left claims. The revolution must be conceived as a total project even though the ownership of a company may change hands suddenly and the collective imaginary requires a long process of transformation. If, from the first act, power is not postulated as ideological change, any good intentions of carrying out the revolution will inevitably end up as a farce. (Schmucler, 2002 [1972]: 3–5)

The "correct" interpretation of the link between "base" and "superstructure" would seem to hold the keys to resolving the cultural dilemma. And while all the disputants seemed to agree on criticizing so-called "mechanicism," differences surfaced in the emphasis they placed on one of the relation's two poles and, above all, in the interpretation of the political work that followed from their understanding. That was how Mattelart (1971d) understood it when he observed that while everyone seemed to belittle mechanicism and acknowledge the complexity of the mechanisms that articulated the relation between "base" and "superstructure," problems surfaced when someone tried to specify the significance and practical orientations implied by the characterization of that interrelation. He discerned mechanistic positions that he attributed to the cultural line of the Communist Party, as expressed by Carlos Maldonado, among others. In this debate, Mattelart, following the premises of structuralist theories and certain Marxist writings, was one of the few authors who went beyond the oft-cited "dialectical interrelation" to argue that the "superstructure" could have some autonomy from the "base" and, in this sense, either lay the groundwork for changes or put a brake on their development. This idea, already set forth in *La ideología de la dominación en una sociedad dependiente* (1970), had important practical consequences, putting in play the possibility that communicative or cultural practice would precede the process of change and prepare the way for changes "in the base." Be that as it may, Mattelart made it clear that the different emphases

that drove the theoretical debate about the "base"-"superstructure" relation owed a great deal to discussions of political strategy and the nature of the *Chilean way*. He contended that these discussions were bound to find their concrete landing point in the act of mobilizing the masses and the tempo required for this process of direct participation. Thus, some time later, in the 1973 prologue to *La comunicación masiva en el proceso de liberación* [*Mass Communication in the Process of Liberation*], he situated this discussion within the debate about popular power and the *Chilean way*. He wrote:

> Muzzling and postponing the question of ideological struggle, for the sake of giving priority to the construction of material power, means in reality relegating to a secondary place the role of the organized masses to consolidate power in their daily practice of class struggle. (Mattelart, 1998 [1973]: 13)

To conclude, only by analyzing *How to Read Donald Duck* in the conditions in which it emerged and circulated can one fully grasp its implication and significance. As the book itself states in several passages, Dorfman and Mattelart's concerns had less to do with methodological reflection on how to analyze mass discourse or study its effects on audiences, and more with the process of formulating cultural policies and discussing their function and legitimacy. The dispute was enmeshed in an intense battle of ideas against the dominant sectors for control of an entertainment industry that covered the country virtually in its entirety, and, simultaneously, in a debate within the left—with the experience of the Quimantú publishing house as one of its points of reference—about the mandate and content of cultural policies in a process of democratic transition to socialism. Inevitably, the international circulation of *How to Read Donald Duck* meant that it was read "out of context," i.e., with no consideration given to the field of production it came out of nor, to put it differently, to the controversy in which it was enmeshed and took on very specific meaning.[45] And this applies both to the readings made of the bookin other parts of the world (that of Eliseo Verón and his group at the journal *Lenguajes* in Argentina) and to the assessments made in later years, when the temporal distance had the same decontextualizing effect as its international circulation.

[45] In his work on the social conditions for the circulation of ideas, Pierre Bourdieu (1999 [1990]) states that the fact that receivers of a text reinterpret it every time based on the structure of the field of reception is a "driver of tremendous misunderstandings."

Local and International Intellectual Networks

The last point we wish to develop in this chapter is a reconstruction of how in the Chilean laboratory Mattelart participated in an interlinked, local, and international network of intellectual sociability that significantly contributed to shaping his horizon of production and his heterogeneous, cosmopolitan intellectual profile. The existence and dynamics of these networks also partly explain the processes of Mattelart's legitimization and recognition throughout Latin America as a reference figure in communication studies. We are referring to the academic ties and networks created in Santiago de Chile in the 1960s and early 1970s, which enabled Mattelart to establish relations with a number of groups, including the MIR (Revolutionary Left Movement), a group of Argentinian "Gramscians" (one of the leading members, Schmucler, would later co-found the journal *Comunicación y Cultura* with Mattelart), Cuban cultural institutions such as the Cuban Institute of Cinematic Art and Industry (ICAIC, in its Spanish acronym), and international academic networks where the North American "pioneers" of the so-called *political economy of communication*, among others, worked. [46]

If, as we have seen, Mattelart's inquiries into the cultural problem in the transition to socialism revolved around the question of how to express the theses of *popular power* in communicative and cultural practices, then we need to complete the genealogy of his engagement in spaces of multiple intersection, referenced to now only in a brief mention of his political-intellectual ties with the MIR. Mattelart maintained a dialogue and close collaboration with this movement, which aside from leaving certain marks on his political

[46] We have already referred to the successful process of the institutionalization of the social sciences that took place in Chile starting in the 1950s. The political stability that the country afforded for many exiled Latin American academics, the international recognition of its universities and social science departments (which looked to international exchange as a way to institutionalize and "modernize" themselves), and the geopolitical appeal that Chile offered for the establishment of foundations and research centers funded from abroad, all served to bestow international recognition on its remarkably heterogenous academic field (Garretón, 2005; Beigel, 2006a, 2011). The configuration of networks of intellectual and academic circulation in Santiago de Chile opened up a productive space that enabled exchanges between a variety of intellectual traditions and led to original theoretical and disciplinary developments. Then the victory of Popular Unity sparked interest among intellectuals and activists around the world in what was seen as a unique road to socialism, which encouraged more trips, pilgrimages, and intellectual exchanges. We do not have the space here to give a full account of this presence of writers, filmmakers, journalists, sociologists, etc., who spent time in Chile to witness the Chilean experience first-hand and show their solidarity with it, but we do wish to highlight, for reasons we will develop in the next chapter, that the people's Chile exerted a particular pull on the French intellectual and political world.

stances, in a way also contributed to delineating and enhancing his intellectual and research project in communication and culture. [47]

The testimonies agree in describing the existence within the MIR of the Unit for the Analysis of Content, or of "open sources," which depended on its Intelligence Area and monitored the radio, press, and television for the purpose of writing up regular reports on the conjuncture for the organization's political commission. They also agree in pointing out that Mattelart was not organically linked to the Area, but that he did maintain a relation of exchange and cooperation with it. Pascal Allende states that Mattelart had a decisive impact on the creation and orientation of the group that monitored the media (with the participation of Patricio Biedma, Manuela Gumucio, and Carmen Castillo, among others), perhaps on the methodology, perhaps because some of them had been "formed" by him. [48] Other testimonies (from María Luz Lagarrigue, former member of the MIR and wife of Patricio Biedma) indicate that the relation went both ways: The team kept a daily log that often reached Mattelart's hands, while Mattelart's analyses served as materials for the Analysis unit's work (Lagarrigue Castillo, interview with the author, 2008). In a seminar he ran in Lima in 1981, Mattelart recalled the Chilean experience and referred autobiographically to the existence of a group—about which he gave few details—that tried to identify the inter-

[47] Mattelart met Andrés Pascal Allende, one of the founders and future secretary general of the MIR, at the Catholic University's School of Sociology, where he was Mattelart's student. They met up again years later through Carmen Castillo (at the time Pascal Allende's wife), with whom Mattelart in 1970 wrote *La ideología de la dominación en una sociedad dependiente.* Together they participated in the creation of CEREN, taking advantage of the "direct line" that Pascal Allende had with the rector of the Catholic University, Fernando Velasco Castillo, his father-in-law at the time (Garretón, interview with the author, 2008; Pascal Allende, interview with the author, 2008). Mattelart's friendship with Pascal Allende enabled him to engage in dialogue with other leading figures of the organization, such as Miguel Enríquez, Bautista von Schowen, Edgardo Enríquez (Beigel, 2011; Mattelart, interview with the author, 2011). According to Pascal Allende, they would get together informally to discuss politics and the "national reality." Mattelart, Pascal Allende states, was an "intellectual interlocutor" and a "practical helper" for the MIR (Pascal Allende, interview with the author, 2008). For his part, in a recent retrospective assessment, Mattelart highlights the intellectual dialogue he maintained at the time with leading figures from the MIR (Mattelart, 2010: 111). For an introductory historiographic look at the history of the MIR and its participation in the political debate of the Chilean and Latin American left, see Pinto (2005). For a partisan perspective, see Pascal Allende (2003). The documents cited in Löwy (2007) also provide information.

[48] This orientation coincides with the reading that Mattelart made at the time of Lenin's instruction, as he remembered it, to decipher the press in order to learn the different strategies and divisions of the dominant classes, since bourgeois newspapers were the best at denouncing their "adversaries" (Mattelart, 1971c: 186).

play of class alliances and changing power relations by making a systematic reading of the press (Mattelart, 1981b: 87).

We are interested in pointing out this area of exchange between Mattelart's thinking about communication and his political activism, because this monitoring played a key role in the development of one of his lines of work: inquiring, within the overall correlations of power, into the role of the media in the destabilization of the government and the different forms the dominant classes' "ideological offensive" took against the process that started with Allende's election. It is a key question because, on the basis of that work, Mattelart would construct his materialist perspective on communication and modify his conception of the functioning of ideology and the so-called "ideological analysis" of mass media messages. Mattelart saw how, over the course of the popular process, the media changed their own practices and conceptions of communication: The opposition media stopped addressing an undifferentiated audience—the "average man," "public opinion"—and passive receivers with the intention of meeting their information or entertainment needs, and began making political appeals to their target segments, identifying them by sector—"professionals," "women," "businesspeople"—for the purpose of producing an active mobilization against the UP government. The socially amorphous notion of "public opinion" turned into "popular opinion." To put it another way, the dominant classes were wrestling with the popular forces over the meaning of the word *people* and the possibilities of representing it. Mattelart concluded provocatively that the bourgeoisie "had gone to Lenin's school": It had manufactured its "mass lines," and the press had assumed the role of its "collective organizer" (Mattelart, 1998 [1973]: 213–221; 1974d). In short, as opposed to the abstract and ahistorical notion of "mass communication" reproduced by functionalist theorists and communicators themselves (on the right and on the left), Mattelart formulated a materialist perspective of communication based on the analysis of a social process that had taken on exceptional characteristics: He confirmed that the ways of organizing communication, the genres that structured the messages, and the ways of relating to the target audience, far from being universal characteristic properties of all mediated communication or the natural consequence of the underlying technologies, were in part the modifiable product of the state of power relations and the conflictive interaction between the classes.[49] Together with the conclusions from the

[49] In this sense, Mattelart (1981b) wrote autobiographically some years later: "The first 'disturbing' fact that laid bare the Chilean process was that the way communication is produced in time of social peace is eminently reversible" (85). Mattelart was referring to

Quimantú experience and from the overall debate about strategies of cultural transformation (as we saw, Mattelart's invitation to review and denaturalize the whole functional mode of the circuit of production, circulation, and consumption of messages, i.e., the material infrastructure of culture), this monitoring would be key, as we will argue, to Mattelart's formulation, years later, of the concept of "mode of communication production" and his "class analysis." Based on this monitoring of the press, Mattelart and his team also confirmed the theses—along the lines already sketched out in *La ideología de la dominación en una sociedad dependiente*—of the *elasticity of the sign*, and they were moving from a structural reading of the messages toward a diachronic and dynamic analysis of the contestation of meaning. They no longer defined the ideological dimension as an internal property of textual forms—as assumed in the version of ideological analysis that Eliseo Verón promoted in the late 1960s; they defined it by its concrete effects on the struggle to impose certain meanings over others. [50] As we saw, in a more general frame of reference and political influence, Mattelart's theses in the debate about cultural and communication policies cannot be understood without understanding the shared framework and points of commonality and difference they had with the MIR's political positions and its strategy for creating popular power. [51]

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the construction of a "mass line for the bourgeoisie," the shift from mass communication medium to class medium engaged in collective organization. He then emphasized that that was the novelty that the Chilean process had taught him, and which led him to a critical theory of communication based on reflection about the behavior of the dominant classes (91).

[50] In an interview in 1974, already in exile, Mattelart left a record of his theoretical shift away from his first appropriation of semiological theories. In the dynamic of class confrontation in Chile, he affirmed, "very concrete problems were identified" in relation to the analysis of ideologies. Semiology had represented a step forward from functionalism, he pointed out, but it risked rationalization of the internal operations of texts. And what the process had taught him was that "an ideology is ideology only insofar as it produces political effects." Ideological functioning had nothing static about it, which meant that analysis had to account for the "effect produced by the dominant ideology on the dominated and the responses that the latter formulated in their struggle" (Mattelart and Mattelart, 1977: 35).

[51] Mattelart referred retrospectively to this environment of dialogue. He recalls "having spoken with Miguel [Enríquez], who in the end was not well versed in these issues, and most of all with Andrés Pascal, about the contradictions in the left's policies, especially after the article we wrote with Michèle about rupture and continuity [he is referring to "Cultura y continuidad en la comunicación" ["Culture and Continuity in Communication"], 1972]. He had read it carefully and I remember having spoken a great deal with him. There was an openness, and I believe it was the only place where these things could be discussed to see where the problems were" (Mattelart, interview with the author, January 2011).

On another front, Mattelart's role as a founding member and co-director of the journal *Comunicación y Cultura* represents a watershed movement in the development of his intellectual perspective and his international renown. While the journal was produced by an international team, the first two issues were firmly anchored in the Chilean experience; i.e., Mattelart and his closest circle made the key decisions.[52] In their inaugural editorial, the editors situated the journal project within a tradition: The one Antonio Gramsci referred to when he spoke of the "broad denomination of cultural journal." This *Gramscian imprint* (more a "structure of feeling" than systematic work with the ideas of the Italian Marxist),[53] which was explicitly acknowledged in these inaugural pages, left its impact on two central questions: on the one hand, the intention to constitute a specific space from which to intervene politically in culture, i.e., from the specificity of intellectual practice; on the other, and the idea that oriented the initial steps of this intervention: the attempt to disrupt both the social mode of knowledge production and cultural activity as a whole, as part of the configuration of a new hegemony. It was no coincidence that the journal's first theoretical reference was to the author of *The Prison Notebooks*. "Gramsci warned," they wrote in the editorial, "that if a journal of this type is not linked to a 'disciplined base movement,' it inevitably tends to become the expression of a coterie of 'unarmed prophets'" (*Comunicación y Cultura*, 1973: 3–4). The journal did not set out to create that movement but to "accompany it," since the function it proposed to fulfill was "that of establishing itself as a clearinghouse and mouthpiece of the diverse experiences" that were emerging in the field of mass communication, those that fostered processes of "liberation of the dependent societies" of Latin America. Based on "this norm of political priority," the journal stated that it would select its topics, areas of interest, readers, and collaborators. This was a project to link up different experiences (those that emerged from workers in culture, communication, and education, but also from researchers "driven by a desire to merge theory with action"), so that "the seeds of a new theory and a new practice of communication" would emerge. At the time,

[52] At the urging of Mario Kaplún, a meeting was organized in Montevideo at the end of 1971 with the participation of Kaplún himself, Roque Faraone from Uruguay, Hugo Assman, Héctor Schmucler, and Michèle and Armand Mattelart. This meeting gave rise to the plan to publish *Comunicación y Cultura*. With funding provided by Hugo Assman, the first number was edited in Santiago de Chile and appeared in newsstands in July 1973, with an editorial board made up of Mattelart, Assman, and Schmucler, and a team of Latin American writers. See Lenarduzzi (1998).

[53] For more on the *Gramscian influence* of *Comunicación y Cultura*, see the retrospective assessment by Schmucler (1998: 154; 1994: 6).

these new practices and theories did not aim to promote or consolidate an emerging discipline. On the contrary, the intention was for them to blend *in* and *with* "a new total way of producing life, down to the most intimate aspects of people's day-to-day lives." Along these lines, the editorial published in the journal's second issue called for strengthening already existing ties among groups and emphasizing experiences of popular participation with the media, "as a point of departure for elaborating new forms of culture that will consolidate social relations transformed by the people." The appearance of *Comunicación y Cultura* could thus be seen as part of an underlying debate with CEREN at the Catholic University of Santiago de Chile (for the last editions of *Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional,* Mattelart no longer belonged to the editorial council) about the way to conceive of intellectual work and, in this sense, intellectuals' participation in the political process. While Mattelart conducted a sort of research-action with the workers who were actually experimenting with a journalism of the base (the press of the industrial belts of Santiago de Chile), and while *Comunicación y Cultura* tried to link itself "to a disciplined base movement," at the *Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional*, on the other hand, the stated intention was for CEREN to be an institutional space where the "theory of the transition to socialism" would be formulated or a theory would be produced to "guide planning." The center's ties with key players of the process of change took the form, as we saw, of institutional relations, especially with state agencies.

The fact that, for its first two editions before the coup d'état, Santiago de Chile was the seat of *Comunicación y Cultura* shows that its center of gravity at the time revolved around Mattelart's group and the dynamics of the Chilean process, which explains why a good number of the articles were devoted to discussing cultural and communicational aspects of this effort to transition to socialism. While the second issue hit the streets after the coup d'état of September 1973 and billed itself as a "witness" and "homage" to the road taken by the popular movement in Chile, the fact is that most of the articles were written before the coup, with the intention of assessing the experiences and intervening in the debates about the conjuncture. And they were produced, as we have seen, through their authors' concrete participation in research and teaching institutions or spaces of political and cultural activism. [54]

[54] *Comunicación y Cultura* initial issue was first printed in July 1973 in Santiago de Chile, the city identified as the location of the first editorial signed by its editors. Mattelart, aside from being the director and editor, appeared on the masthead as "responsible representative." After the coup the first number was reprinted in September 1973 by Galerna

Now, how do we explain the formation of this international space that had its epicenter in Chile? And how did the journal manage to take a certain *Gramscian imprint*–Gramsci's ideas were not yet nearly as widely known on the continent as they would be in the 1980s—and make it an element of affinity and commonality? To answer these questions, we have to go back to the formation of a new left in Argentina—for the most part with a Gramscian bent—and its dissemination throughout the continent by way of its proponents' cultural praxis and the intellectual networks they forged. In this sense, it is worth noting Mattelart's account of learning about the journal *Pasado y Presente* and its namesake pamphlets from his dealings with several Argentinian academics who had been exiled or moved to Chile—Cordoban "friends" or sympathizers of the group of "Argentinian Gramscians" led by José Aricó, such as Mabel Piccini and Carlos Sempat Assadourian. According to Mattelart, this pair of Cordobans played the role of "smugglers" of texts—Antonio Gramsci, Rosa Luxemburg, Leon Trotsky, Alexandra Kollontai, some of which were published in *Cuadernos Pasado y Presente*—which were regarded as a "an essential source of criticism of orthodox Marxism during all of those years" (Mattelart, interview with the author, 2007). According to the historian Diego García (2011), Carlos Sempat Assadourian also used his good standing with the editors to have Mattelart, Carmen, and Leonardo Castillo's *La ideología de la dominación en una sociedade dependiente* [*The Ideology of Domination in a Dependent Society*] (1970) published at Signos, an editorial house in Buenos Aires run by José Aricó, Santiago Funes, and Héctor Schmucler.[55] From this first connection they probably suggested other projects. Soon after Salvador Allende's government took

publishers. Mattelart wrote about *Sesame Street* ("Imperialism in Pursuit of a Cultural Counterrevolution"), and yet the table of contents of this first issue reveals that most of the articles looked at different aspects of the Chilean "cultural battle": Patricio Biedma ("The Ideological Struggle for the Press in Chile"), Guillermo Labarca ("Examining the Exam: Secondary School in Chile"), Rody Oñate Z., ("The *Surazo* in Three Dimensions: Analysis of an Experience"). In the second issue, which came out in 1974, Naim Nomez ("The Comic Book in the Process of Social Change") analyzed the challenges that had been identified in the field of comic book production at Quimantú, Armand Mattelart ("Press and Ideological Struggle in the Industrial Belts of Santiago: Testimonies") and Michèle Mattelart and Mabel Piccini ("Television and the Popular Sectors") discussed in their research different aspects of the problem of popular communication in the Chilean process.

[55] For a historical reconstruction of the role of the "Argentinian Gramscians" through their journal and their editorial work in the dissemination, debate and updating of leftist culture and thinking throughout Latin America, see the work of Raúl Burgos (2004). From the perspective of one of the leading players, see Aricó (2005 [1988]). Burgos considers both the project of Signos and that of Siglo XXI as part of the editorial and political-cultural project of the group led by Aricó. Diego García (2011), who relativized this idea, contends that Signos grew out of a convergence of groups and interests.

power, Santiago Funes (who in 1971 would publish *Comunicación masiva y revolución socialista* together with Patricio Biedma and Mattelart) traveled to Chile in his capacity as editorial secretary of the journal *Los Libros* to make a proposal to its director, Héctor Schmucler, to put together a special edition about the Chilean process (Schmucler, interview with the author, 2007). As he recalled, his first direct contact with Mattelart was in the context of preparing this special edition (Lenarduzzi, 1998: 146).[56]

These links clearly formed part of a larger movement, a formal and informal network of editorial, intellectual, and academic exchange that operated on both sides of the Andes. In essence, it was a process that combined attraction to the burgeoning modernization and institutionalization of the social sciences in Chile—whose universities and research centers had taken in many Latin American exiles—and fascination with the country's political scene. The existence of a special issue of *Los Libros* invites us to consider not only the networks of exchange among cultural formations but also the influences—which were clearly fundamental—in the intellectual realm; *Los Libros* also revealed the emergence of new circulation networks of authors and texts and, therefore, of legitimization opportunities for the Latin American intellectual field. This space of circulation and legitimization was also produced through political activism, which, as José Aricó (2005 [1988]: 39) asserts in assessing the experience of *Pasado y Presente*, regarded editorial activity as a useful platform for intervening politically through cultural practice. Piecing together this mosaic of relations is key to understanding Mattelart's consolidation as a recognized figure, as well as his intellectual profile and perspective. Mattelart's ties to this cultural formation, especially surrounding Héctor Schmucler, indexes his participation in the processes of renewing leftist thinking in Latin America, while

[56] The editorial of issue no. 15–16 of *Los Libros*, dated February 1971, stated that Chile since November 1970 occupied "a privileged place in the interest of contemporary history," which justified the preparation of a special monographic edition (*Los Libros*, 15–16, 1971). It also mentioned that Mattelart's collaboration—he also published an article, "Los medios de comunicación de masas" ["Mass Communication Media"] (1971b)— along with Santiago Funes's, had been essential for bringing together the collaborations of his Chilean colleagues. Raúl Burgos (2004) argues that the *Los Libros* project should be regarded "as part of the broader editorial experience" of the "*Pasado y Presente* group" (158). While we understand that this statement needs to be placed in its context, the genealogy should not be overlooked. *Los Libros* represented an articulation between the academic world, cultural critique in the journalistic tradition, and political activism, a project that aimed for cultural modernization and "theoretical updating." Unlike other limited-circulation Argentinian cultural journals, like *Contorno* and *Pasado y Presente*—whose mantle it was taking up, in a certain sense—it ventured into a new and broader market of journals and audiences that encompassed all of Latin America. For more on *Los Libros*, see Fontdevilla and Pulleiro (2004–2005), de Diego (2007 [2003]: 87–106), Cousido (2008), among others.

also explaining conditions for the circulation and legitimization of his work across the continent, especially after Schmucler promoted the re-editing of *How to Read Donald Duck* in 1972 at Siglo XXI in Argentina (the first edition, as we saw, was published by the University Press in Valparaíso). This project would mark the beginning of Mattelart's connections with Siglo XXI (at the time Schmucler was its editorial manager; Aricó, production manager), which would also publish *Agresión desde el espacio. Cultura y napalm en la era de los satélites* [*Aggression from Space: Culture and Napalm in the Satellite Age*] in 1972, and in 1973 *La comunicación de masas en el proceso de liberación*, a book that drew together a number of articles, including some of the texts Mattelart published in *Cuadernos de la Realidad Nacional* in the heat of the political-cultural debate. It was the materiality of this network of circulation and intellectual sociability that enabled Mattelart and Schmucler to establish, as Jorge Rivera (1987: 76) put it, a common area around their political positions and perspectives regarding the study of communication processes, but also—and above all—the shared experience, in Schmucler's words (1998), of living "the political dimension almost as an articulator of intellectual work" (146).

Finally, it is important to comment on the idea of the *Gramscian imprint* that left its mark on the early numbers of *Comunicación y Cultura*. This influence took the form not so much of a conceptual, systematic analysis of Antonio Gramsci's thinking as an orientation based on the idea of a cultural journal and the somewhat imprecise but still productive notion of "organic intellectual." The questioning of the place of the traditional scientist and researcher was situated within a conception positing that new forms of communication needed to be developed in the framework of new relations between media, cultural producers, and popular organizations; but this same reconfiguration was seen, especially in Mattelart's positions, as redefining the field of knowledge production itself. This "mass line" that Mattelart advocated in his interventions in the debate over cultural policy emerged, in a way, from his different work experiences with "the bases." The main players saw it as an approach that, rather than "populist," involved the creation of new relations that would articulate "the old knowledge—which can be transmitted but must be transformed—with a new practice and a new class" (Mattelart and Mattelart, 1977: 37–38). Perhaps now it is easier to fully understand the meaning of Schmucler's response in *Comunicación y Cultura* to Verón and the journal *Lenguajes*, where he affirmed, as we have seen, the idea that political practice was a condition of truth for the social sciences. Far from being simply a statement of more or less abstract prin-

ciples or a program to be carried out in the future, his position assumed the experience, with Mattelart at the center, that advocated redefining the ways of producing knowledge, communication, and culture within the framework of the Chilean political process. Schmucler (1975) wrote that, among other things that sparked his reflection, he should mention "a direct or indirect social practice (*that is, carried out by others and assumed by me*) that gradually modified conceptions we entertained some years ago about the role of the mass media […] [i.e.] the political process that has shaken Latin America in recent years and that has generated new conditions for thinking, while also verifying or dismissing the truth of some of the hypotheses wielded up to now" (4; my italics).

In that article, Schmucler would anticipate many of the topics that constituted the agenda of communication studies in the 1980s. What we wish to highlight here, in contrast to the position that saw the politicization and new forms of intellectual work deployed in the Chilean laboratory as a kind of "epistemological obstacle" to knowledge production, is that they, and the reflexive capacity that their proponents fostered, yielded fundamental contributions about the way people think about communication and culture, for example, considerations about the activity of reception, about the elasticity of the ideological sign or the impossibility of understanding communication processes outside the material (historical-social) organization of the culture and the conflicts it entails.[57]

Another relevant place to observe the configuration of this network of international connections that Mattelart established in Chile pertains to the ties he established with two "pioneering" researchers of what then was an incipient *political economy of communication*. The US researcher Herbert Schiller (University of California San Diego) and the Canadian Dallas Smythe (Simon Fraser University) had traveled to Santiago de Chile in 1971, one year after Allende took power, to learn about the experience in matters related to communication and to express their solidarity with the political developments (Schiller and Smythe, 1972). Through them, Mattelart learned about one of the first and most classic books about media and imperialism,

[57] A prime example is the continuity that can be drawn between the article on television reception and popular reception that Michèle Mattelart and Mabel Piccini published in issue no. 2 of *Comunicación y Cultura* (Mattelart and Piccini, 1974) and the "pioneering" research program that Schmucler (1975) suggested with regard to this topic in his article. For an assessment of the contributions of these articles as they relate to later developments in the field, especially the question of reception, see Grimson and Varela (1999) and Saintout (1998). For a contextualization of Piccini and Mattelart's article in the political-cultural debate in Chile, allow me to cite Zarowsky (2007).

Mass Communications and American Empire, by Herbert Schiller (1969), and more importantly, he forged a series of ties linking him with North American research groups and spaces devoted to studying internationalization processes and the connections between communication, technologies, and economic and military power. These encounters advanced the building of an informal international core of researchers who in the 1970s critically addressed the debate about communication policies and the new order of information and communication. More institutionally, Herbert Schiller and Dallas Smythe, among others, proposed to Mattelart the formation of a section of the International Association of Mass Communication Research (IAMCR) devoted to the political economy of communication and the internationalization of cultural industries. These ties led to a trip to the United States, which would provide Mattelart with access to indispensable sources for his research. [58]

These international connections would frame one line of research that Mattelart began to develop in 1971, in which he defined his object around processes of commercialization and internationalization of communication and culture. The influence of Schiller's work, especially *Mass Communication and American Empire,* was evident in Mattelart's writing during this period. Schiller proposed a series of considerations for analyzing the geopolitical reordering of the world in the postwar years and the way the US developed supremacy by means of innovative relations among communicational, military, and industrial power. Mattelart was already raising the same issues by pursuing questions opened by developments in Chile: He wanted to understand the role—unprecedented in cases of destabilization at the hands of the military in other countries—that transnational corporations

[58] Through George Gerbner, professor at the University of Pennsylvania's Annenberg School of Communications (as it was then called) and editor of the *Journal of Communication,* Mattelart would receive an invitation to travel to the International Symposium on Communications: Technology, Impact and Politics, held in March 1972 at the Annenberg School in Philadelphia. At this conference (his first trip to the United States), Mattelart presented his analysis of the communication experiences in Chile (Mattelart, 1973c). There he took part in debates with Elihu Katz, James Halloran, Kaarle Nordestreng, Herbert Schiller, and Dallas Smythe. It was not just academics who attended the conference. Researchers from major corporations, such as ITT, and from state agencies, like NASA, presented papers on topics ranging from the Chinese Cultural Revolution and new television technologies to the worldwide imbalance in telecommunications and the role of security in the formulation of public policy. See Mattelart (1973 [1972]: 17). In New York he met researchers from the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), a news agency organized by a group of journalism students linked to the "New Left" on university campuses. These ties would become relevant for his access to certain sources related to strategies deployed by the US military and the transnational networks it mobilized in Chile and Latin America.

like International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT), press and public relations agencies, and organizations like the Inter American Press Association (IAPA) were playing in the attempt to overthrow Allende's government as well as the political meaning of what he concluded were new ways of wielding transnational power. Once again, the analysis of the role of communication and culture was embedded in the challenges set in motion by the *Chilean way*.[59] Mattelart clearly specified his objectives and interlocutors within the Chilean context, stating that he chose "the particular viewpoint of communication to lay bare a power structure" (1973 [1972]: 10). Along these lines, in *La cultura como empresa multinacional* [*Culture as a Multinational Corporation*] (finished in Santiago de Chile a few months before the coup, in April 1973, and published in 1974 in Buenos Aires by Galerna publishers), he proposed redefining the debate about *mass culture* outside of the "culturalist sphere," and returning "to the material bases of culture"; more specifically, "reconnecting products that are called cultural with the system that provides their manufacturers with 'inspiration' and enables their manufacture" (1974: 11). While we will return to this question later, we would like to emphasize here that, in its early formulations, the emergence of this type of cultural materialism to address the international dimension of culture occurred in the context of discussion about the process of change and an analysis of the strategies of the Chilean bourgeoisie and their external allies. The shift proposed by Armand Mattelart in the definition of the object to be addressed had to do with his political will, which came out of his experience in the cultural debate, to move the struggle away from the fronts defined by the left itself on the basis of naturalized and universalized assumptions. In other words, if the problem of the "ideological battle" was not limited to the transformation of mass media genres and content, then it implied the total reorganization of a cultural infrastructure; in the same way, the problem of power could not be reduced to a merely military matter or to a question of state apparatus, as if these issues had no relation to the cultural context. The strategies of what was called "cultural imperialism" for Chile and the helplessness of the popular forces only highlighted the gravity of the matter.[60]

[59] It was framed, to be sure, in the theoretical space that had been opened in Chile around the phenomena of internationalization and dependence, and that was deployed to a great extent by Latin American exiles who had come to the country. We are referring to the ties that Mattelart's team at CEREN maintained with certain "dependentists" such as Franz Hinkelammert, André Gunder Frank, Theotonio dos Santos, and Ruy Mauro Marini, among others, which framed and enabled his own question about the transnational and dependent nature of cultural and ideological phenomena (Beigel, 2011; Mattelart, 2010).

[60] His words hint at a debate with sectors of the left that downplayed the issue. He wrote:

Finally, it is worth mentioning here another relationship that came out of the "Santiago Connection," the one Mattelart forged with some Cuban cultural institutions and personalities. The relation dates back to the moment when Salvador Allende was inaugurated president in November 1970. Alfredo Guevara, president of the ICAIC, headed the Cuban delegation of filmmakers that had traveled to Santiago de Chile to film the ceremony. Interested in the study that Michèle and Armand Mattelart had done together with Mabel Piccini about the ideology of the liberal press in Chile, Guevara proposed a meeting with them to exchange ideas, and he invited them to visit the island. The result was a profuse exchange: In June 1971 Mattelart published an article in the heterodox journal *Pensamiento Crítico* (Mattelart, 1971e), in the very last number before it was controversially shut down by the Cuban authorities under Soviet pressure (Löwy, 2007: 52). In January 1972, Michèle and Armand Mattelart were invited through Alfredo Guevara's good offices to form part of the official delegation of Chilean filmmakers in Havana, where they toured the island and took a close look at the audiovisual initiatives undertaken by the ICAIC. That same year Mattelart ran a two-week seminar at the University of Havana. The dedication of the Chilean edition of *How to Read Donald Duck* (December 1971), which included Alfredo Guevara alongside the authors' children, bears witness to Guevara's relevance and to the impact the ICAIC experience had on Mattelart. Mattelart also took part in putting together the edition that the then-prestigious *Casa de las Américas*[61] devoted to "imperialism and the mass media," where he published a long article (Mattelart, 1973b). The thanks that the editors expressed to Mattelart show that he collaborated, along with Michèle Mattelart and Héctor Schmucler (from Argentina), in sending most of the texts published in that special edition (*Casa de las Américas*, no. 77, March 1973: 174). Some of them cited Mattelart extensively as a voice of authority, for example, in the introductory piece by the Cuban Leonardo Acosta, who used as a source versions of Mattelart's articles reproduced and edited by

"And don't let them find fault with us for choosing the particular viewpoint of communication to lay bare a power structure. All power structures are total, and it is precisely that totality that shows how bound together economic infrastructure and superstructural factors are. One more proof that communication is none other than a political problem" (Mattelart, 1973: 10).

[61] *Casa de las Américas* is a journal that managed to become one of the intellectual reference points and legitimizing markers in the Latin American intellectual field, and its opinion held great weight when it came to consecrating figures. For a specific overview of the journal, see Fornet (1999).

Cuban institutions, such as Ediciones ICAIC and the journal *Referencias*, of the University of Havana (Acosta, 1973, 9, 13).

These references are sufficient to demonstrate a level of Mattelart's circulation as an intellectual figure at the Latin American scale, which, at the same time, would be amplified by his relation with the cultural institutions of the island, which at that point still served as a point of reference and source of legitimacy for the Latin American intellectual field (Gilman, 2003). These intellectual exchanges and networks thus explain long-lasting political and intellectual influences (I have analyzed the allusions to Cuban cultural policy in Mattelart's positions in the Chilean debate), but they also enable us to reconstruct the underpinnings of the circulation and legitimation of his intellectual figure. The appeal to a reader and a continent-wide *popular we*, as expressed in the journal *Comunicación y Cultura*, points to the maturation of these political, editorial, and institutional exchange networks that sustained the publication and circulation of his works. This all served to configure a space of prestige and a reputation as an author figure. [62] As we will argue starting in the next chapter, Mattelart's participation in these international intellectual networks is key to understanding both his political-professional trajectory after his exile in France in 1973 and the formation—which condenses all of his experience in the *Chilean laboratory*—of a unique intellectual disposition that would mark his cosmopolitan profile, his experience of the political as articulating his intellectual work, and his inexhaustible energy for trying to understand society on the basis of a materialist critique of communication and culture.

A few days after the coup d'état launched by Augusto Pinochet, Mattelart was expelled from Chile along with his family. From that point onward, his experience of the *Chilean laboratory* would be reworked under the influence of different political, cultural, and intellectual coordinates; of new theoretical appropriations; and from renewed positions—marked by his experience of *exile*—within the intellectual field and the cultural world of the French left.

[62] In this sense, the presentation of *La cultura como empresa multinacional* (published in Santiago de Chile in April 1973) takes on added meaning: Mattelart stated that his new lines of research "had matured" "in step with the liberation processes" in Latin America. Thus, he affirmed, he set out to inquire into "the role of culture in the domination of *our* peoples" (Mattelart, 1973: 11).