

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN MOROCCO
DURING THE REIGN OF MAWLĀY SULAYMĀN
1792 - 1822

BY

Mohamed EL MANSOUR

T H E S I S

SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN THE SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL AND AFRICAN STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
1981



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For my wife Fatima

A B S T R A C T

Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign (1792-1822) has so far received little attention from students of Moroccan history. The present work is designed to fill this gap in the modern history of Morocco by investigating the social, economic, political and religious aspects of this period of thirty years. It is intended to provide students of the modern history of Morocco with basic factual knowledge about the period.

Initially, the thesis describes the structures of the Moroccan State and of Moroccan society at the turn of the nineteenth century. The economic history of the period is emphasised, particularly Morocco's commercial relations with Europe and the reasons behind the weakening of these relations at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

The thesis then reconstructs the political history of Morocco during Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign. The discussion of political relations with the major European powers is intended to invalidate the long-held view of Morocco's isolation during the period under study.

However, the most important - and the least known - aspect of the period from 1792 to 1822 is made up by Mawlāy Sulaymān's religious ideas and policy. To what extent was he reformist in his ideas? What was the real impact of the Wahhābi doctrine on the religious debate in Morocco, and what made the confrontation between Mawlāy Sulaymān and religious groups inevitable? These are some of the questions the thesis seeks to answer before moving on to discuss the Fès rebellion (1820-1822) which was really the last serious attempt by traditionalist groups to change the course of history to their advantage.

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	----- monetary system at the	

E R R A T A

Page 116, between lines 18 and 19, insert the following:
 "Sulaymān was unable to prevent the continuing slow".

Page 133, line 23:
 change "2,500 kilograms" to "50,000 mithqāl-s worth".

Page 219, line 23:
 add "Nāsiri" to end of line.

Page 284, footnote 142:
 change "al-Turjumān al-mucrib" to "al-Turjumāna al-kubrā".

Page 403, line 1:
 change "Essaouira" to "Safi".

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A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S

My thanks go in the first place to my supervisor, Dr. Michael Brett, for having patiently guided and counselled my research. His generous assistance, even during his private holiday time, calls for special gratitude.

I am also indebted to George Joffé for having read most of the manuscript and suggested improvements covering both matters of form and content. Thanks are due, as well, to Dr. Norman Cigar for his clarifications regarding the Fāsi society during the nineteenth century.

I also received valuable help from Professor M. al-Mannūnī, particularly on the use of Moroccan archives, and from Mr. Abdelouhab Benmansour who allowed me to consult the files of the Direction des Archives Royales. I owe an equal debt to Mr. ˤAbd al-Karīm al-Fīlālī for having opened his private library for me.

Finally, I am grateful to Madame Latifa Harrak for the typing of the Arabic appendices.

A N O T E

ON TRANSLITERATION

Consonants

ء	d	ض	k
ب	ذ	ط	ل
ت	ر	ظ	m
ث	ز	ع	n
ج	س	غ	ه
ح	ش	ف	w
خ	ص	ق	ي

**s -a (in
construct
state:-at)**

Vowels

Short:	<u>'</u>	a	Long:	ɔr	ɔ <u>'</u>
	<u>,</u>	u		,	u <u>'</u>
	<u>i</u>	i		ɔ <u>'</u>	i <u>'</u>

It is almost impossible to devise a unified and homogeneous transliteration system. Names of places and tribes have been rendered according to the conventional French usage (Ouezzane, Tétouan, Beni Hsen, Aït Oumalou etc.). Places for which there were still no French or European names at the beginning of the nineteenth century will be rendered in the simplest Arabic transliteration while respecting their current usage during the period under study (i.e. Dār al-Baydā, ^CArab al-widyān, etc.).

Where a word of Arabic origin is used in the plural form we have preferred to facilitate the task of non-Arabic readers by adding an (s) to the singular form (sharīf-s, muhtasib-s, mawsim-s, etc...). However, there will be instances where the Arabic plural will be used, particularly in cases where the Arabic plural form has gained universal recognition or where the simple adding of an (s) might alter the word's meaning and render it unrecognizable to the Arabic specialist (Cabīd instead of Cabd-s, Cudūl instead of Cadl-s, wujahā instead of wajīh-s, etc..). Sometimes the Arabic word might acquire a slightly different meaning when rendered into its plural form (eg. tagyīd, meaning either note or essay, its plural taqāyīd means usually notes). In such cases, every effort will be made to account for the contextual Arabic meaning.

A glossary of frequently used Arabic words will be found at the end of the thesis to which the English reader might refer in case of difficulty.


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A B B R E V I A T I O N S

A.H.N.	Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid.
B.G.R.	Bibliothèque Générale at Rabat.
B.G.T.	Bibliothèque Générale at Tétouan.
B.N.	Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.
C.C.C.	Correspondance Commerciale et Consulaire (Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
C.O.	Colonial Office (Archives of the Public Record Office, London).
D.A.R.	Direction des Archives Royales at Rabat.
E.I.	Encyclopaedia of Islam (New Edition).
E.J.	Encyclopaedia Judaica.
F.O.	Foreign Office (Archives of the Public Record Office, London).
H.P.M.D.	Hassan II Prize for Manuscripts and Documents.
R.L.	Royal Library, Rabat.
W.O.	War Office (Archives of the Public Record Office, London).

-=-=-

MOROCCO
c. 1800



CHAPTER ONES O U R C E S

The aim of this study is to fill a gap in the modern history of Morocco. The period extending from 1792 to 1822 has remained outside the scope of historical study as far as Moroccan historiography is concerned until now. Those who have chosen to study modern and contemporary history of Morocco have either directed their attention to the beginning of the 'Alawid dynasty (1666-present) or to the period following 1830. Even if some recent attempts have been made to explore the reign of Sīdī Muhammad b. 'Abd Allāh (1757-1790) (1), the history of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries has remained completely ignored.

One of the reasons which has discouraged students of Moroccan history from investigating the period of Mawlāy Sulaymān has been the scarcity of material. Both European and Moroccan archival collections are remarkably poor for the pre-1830 period and the publication of archival collections relating to Moroccan history has overlooked the middle period of the 'Alawid dynasty from 1718 to 1830. The large scale work undertaken by Comte Henri de Castries (d.1927) and the Section d'Histoire du Maroc which was designed to publish European sources relating to Moroccan history did

(1) Ramon Lourido-Díaz, Marruecos en la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII, Madrid, 1978. The two years' reign of Mawlāy al-Yazīd (1790-1792) has been also extensively investigated by Mariano Arribas-Palau; cf. his Cartas Árabes de Marruecos en tiempo de Mawlāy al-Yazīd, Tétouan, 1961.

not extend beyond 1718 (2). On the other hand, El-Ouataiq, the recently created archival publication of the Direction des Archives Royales at Rabat, has been almost exclusively concerned with the publication of official documents concerning the period after 1830.

In fact, Makhzen archival sources are extremely poor for the Mawlāy Sulaymān period (3) as a cursory investigation of the files kept at the Direction des Archives Royales would show. It is no accident that the author of Ithāf aṣ-ṣlām al-nās, who published a considerable amount of official letters belonging to the 'Alawid sultans, was never able to produce an elaborate study of Mawlāy Sulaymān (4).

The problem is worsened by the absence of organization and indexation of Moroccan manuscript sources. Apart from private collections, most of the material deposited at the Bibliothèque Générale in Rabat or the Royal Library is not catalogued or, when it is, is so poorly done that the investigator must take potluck, especially since Arabic traditional titles do not necessarily reflect the contents of the book concerned. Thus, a taqyīd (note) on the Great Plague of 1799 was found in the midst of a biographical work relating to the eleventh century A.H. (15th-16th centuries A.D.) (5). We have also come across

(2) Henri de Castries-Section d'Histoire du Maroc, Sources Inédites de l'Histoire du Maroc, 1905-1961, 26 volumes.

(3) This coincides with G. Ayache's observation about Makhzen archives. See his article "Archives et documentation historique au Maroc" in Les Arabes par leurs archives, CNRS, 1976, p.40.

(4) Cf. biography of Mawlāy Sulaymān in the manuscript volume of Ithāf aṣ-ṣlām al-nās by 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Zaydān, Ms.Z.3986, R.L.

(5) Cf. 'Abd al-Salām b. Sulaymān al-Fishtālī, Taqyīd fī al-wabā' (on the Great Plague of 1799), Ms. D 283, BGR, fol. 125-126.

important fatwā-s (legal opinions) by the ‘ālim-s of Fès concerning the deposition of Mawlāy Sulaymān in 1820 which were indexed under the title of "Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès" (6). Another example is provided by al-‘Arbī al-Mashraffī's commentary on the Shamaqmaqiya (7) in which the author reproduced several letters by Mawlāy Sulaymān as well as an extract from an important khutba (sermon) revealing some of his religious ideas (8).

The student of Moroccan history is further confronted with another difficulty: the nature of the Moroccan material itself. Historical works as such are very limited in number and a historian is often compelled to consult various types of sources in quest of information: biographic dictionaries, hagiographic literature, fahrasa-s (enumeration of one's teachers), religious essays (fatwā-s and jawāb-s) written by the ‘ālim-s on various issues, kunnāsha-s (note books), taqyīd-s (notes), polemic works (munādhharāt), etc.

The last, but not the least, obstacle is the language problem which confronts European scholars in particular. Daring attempts were made during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to translate some fundamental works, such as al-Zayānī's Turjumān and al-Nāṣirī's al-Istiqlāsā which, since their publication, have been intensively used and adopted by successive generations of scholars. In spite of the inestimable value of these two works, they are far from providing a complete and accurate chronology of the ‘Alawid period. The scarcity of studies on the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān has made it

(6) Cf. Ms.D.2795, BGR, pp.393-404.

(7) The Shamaqmaqiya is an eulogistic poem addressed by Ibn al-Wannān (d.1773) to the Sultan Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh.

(8) Cf. Sharh al-Shamaqmaqiya by al-‘Arbī al-Mashraffī, Ms.G.629, BGR, unnumbered pages.

- necessary for this thesis to be based primarily on unpublished sources, both Moroccan and European.

I - Arabic Sources

A-Moroccan Manuscript Sources

(1) Chronologies

The basic chronologies used here come from al-Zayānī, Akansūs, al-Ducayf and the anonymous author of al-Ibtisām.

a) Al-Zayānī (1735-1833)

Al-Zayānī's works have constituted the major Moroccan source of reference to the history of the 'Alawid dynasty. Plagiarized by Akansūs and adopted by al-Nāṣirī, al-Bustān has been for generations an indispensable guide.

The author of al-Bustān is certainly the first historiographer who attempted to write a history of the 'Alawid dynasty. To his talents as a writer he had behind him a long career as a servant of the State. He had visited the Ottoman Empire and the Arab East on several occasions both on official and private business, had had the opportunity to see other political and social systems at work and, at the same time, had learnt a lot about their history, culture and traditions. As ambassador to the Sublime Porte, he met the Ottoman political elite as well as scholars who introduced him to the history of their Empire. In Egypt he met the famous historian, al-Jabartī, among many other intellectual figures (9).

His national pride as a subject of the Western Sultanate did not prevent him from developing a discreet admiration for certain aspects of Ottoman culture, and

(9) 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Zaydān, Ithāf, p.6 of the manuscript volume, Ms. Z 3986, p. 6.

especially the care Ottoman scholars took to record their history and glorify their rulers. Al-Zayānī's chronologies are in fact full of references to the history of the Ottoman Turks. Comparisons with events from the Ottoman history often divert him from his subject and denote not only of his vast knowledge but also of his admiration for the history of this Empire.

Most, if not all, of al-Zayānī's works were written after 1224AH/1809-1810 AD, when he was dismissed by Mawlāy Sulaymān from the royal service. He first produced al-Turjumān, which was presented to Mawlāy Sulaymān in 1228 AH/1813 AD (10). This work represented a universal history in which the history of Morocco, and that of the 'Alawid dynasty in particular, only received a very brief mention. Al-Zayānī, therefore, decided to write a detailed history of the 'Alawid dynasty, a task which no historian had attempted before. Five years later (1233 AH/1817-1818 AD) he completed his basic work, al-Bustān, to which he owes his celebrity as a historian. Al-Bustān was later extended to cover the last years of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign. This revision of al-Bustān, which was given the title of al-Rawḍa al-sulaymāniya, was also perfected by the incorporation into the text of various notes the author had written on the margins of al-Bustān and by annexing to it the laudations that were written by eminent contemporaries in favour of this work. Strangely enough, al-Rawḍa — which will serve as our reference in this study — never gained the popularity of al-Bustān undoubtedly because it was not well-known and easily confused with the latter. For Akansūs and al-Nāṣirī al-Bustān remained the reference to the history of the 'Alawid dynasty and nowhere in their works do we find an allusion to al-Rawḍa. Al-Zayānī himself forgot that he

(10) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa al-sulaymāniya fī mulūk al-dawla al-'alawiya wa man taqaddamahā min al-duwal al-islāmiya, Ms.D.1275, BGR, p.189.

was dealing with a different work when he concluded al-Rawda with the statement that "this is the end of what we could assemble in al-Bustān" (11). For Lévi-Provençal, who did not have the chance to consult a copy of al-Rawda, this work was nothing more than al-Bustān under a different and misleading title (12).

All the chronologies which we are concerned with —al-Turjumān, al-Bustān and al-Rawda— were written during the last twenty-five years of al-Zayānī's long life and were based on a vast amount of material and sources. For the history of Islam and the Ottoman Empire, al-Zayānī has access to works of well-known historians such as Ibn Khallikān, al-Ṭabarī, al-Mas‘ūdī, al-Baladhūrī and Kamāl al-Dīn Pāshā (13). He also had the many notes he had gathered during his travels in the Middle East and the volumes on Islamic history he brought back. As for the history of the 'Alawid dynasty, al-Zayānī acknowledged that he had relied on unclassified notes (taqāyīd) belonging to various families for the reigns of Mawlāy Rashīd (1666-1672) and Mawlāy Ismā‘īl (1672-1727) and had depended on his personal experience for the reigns of Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh and his sons Mawlāy al-Yazīd and Mawlāy Sulaymān (14). We are also told by Akansūs (15) that al-Bustān was written on the basis of notes belonging to a certain Ibn al-Ḥāj al-Miknāsī, about whom we know nothing. Even if this is true, al-Zayānī obviously had recourse to the other sources mentioned above as well as to official documents (income registers, royal letters, etc) and his memory.

(11) Al-Rawda, fol.231.

(12) Lévi-Provençal, Les historiens des chorfas, Paris, 1922, p.183.

(13) Al-Zayānī, al-Turjumāna al-kubrā fī akhbār al-mā'mūr barran wa bahran, Rabat, 1967, pp.53-54, 103-104 and 208.

(14) Ibid., p.546.

(15) Muhammad Akansūs, al-Jaysh al-Aramram al-khumāsī fī dawlat mawlānā Ḫalī al-Sijilmāssī, Ms. D 339, BGR,p.6.

In fact , memory constituted for him a vast source of information for the chronology of the events he witnessed. This was the reason for the brevity of information given to successive years and the numerous mistakes, especially in dating events. However, when we bear in mind that the author did not start writing until he was approaching his eighties, we can easily understand how memory can be so treacherous (16) .

b) Akansūs (1796-1877)

Like al-Zayānī, the author of al-Jaysh al-Caramram was also a kātib and minister of the 'Alawid dynasty. His chronicle can be divided into two parts: the first covering the 'Alawid dynasty before Akansūs was called to serve as kātib for Mawlāy Sulaymān (1235 AH/1819-1820 AD), and the second covering from the last years of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign up to Sīdī Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Rahmān (1859-1873). In the first part, Akansūs did nothing but plagiarize Nuzhat al-Hādī by al-Ifrānī and al-Bustān by al-Zayānī (17). In relating the events of the 'Alawid dynasty up to 1819-1820, al-Jaysh hardly differs from al-Bustān. Only after that date does al-Jaysh become interesting.

(16) Al-Zayānī is very unreliable in dates. Among his errors:

- the year of introduction of the plague into Morocco (al-Zayānī gives 1212 AH instead of 1213);
 - the appointment of al-Salāwī as governor of the northern provinces (he gives 1223 instead of 1222);
 - the arrival of the Wahhābi letter and the pilgrimage of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm (he gives 1227 instead of 1226).
- Between al-Zayānī and al-Du'ayf there can be a chronological gap of two years or more. Cf. for instance the dates concerning the military expedition of Ibn Khadda to the eastern provinces which took place, according to al-Zayānī, in 1211 AH/1796-1797 AD (al-Rawda, fol.180), while al-Du'ayf gives the date of 1213 AH/1798-1799 AD (al-Du'ayf, pp.391-392).

(17) Akansūs avoided, however, al-Zayānī's references to the history of the Ottoman Empire as well as his attacks on Sufi orders, and especially the Tijāniya to which the author of al-Jaysh belonged.

Akansūs who served Mawlāy Sulaymān during the last critical years of his reign (1819-1822) gives us a first hand account which is particularly valuable for, at this point, al-Zayānī's chronologies show signs of exhaustion not only because of their author's remoteness from official business, but also because of his advanced age. Akansūs, however, is to be approached very cautiously because, unlike al-Zayānī who wrote after he had abandoned palace service, the author of al-Jaysh started writing his history when he was less than forty years old and was, therefore, still tempted by dreams of returning to his old post as minister (18). Moreover, the writing of al-Jaysh, the author tells us, was undertaken to satisfy the demand of Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Rahmān. This has considerably diminished the historical importance of this work which is nothing but "un hommage servile aux princes alawites" according to Lévi-Provençal (19).

c) Al-Du‘ayf (1752-1818?)

Here is a totally different chronicle by an author who never served the palace (20).

All the information we have about al-Du‘ayf is drawn from his own work. Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Salām al-Du‘ayf was born in 1752 and apparently spent most of his life as a student travelling from his native town, Rabat, to the major intellectual and spiritual centres of the country such as Fès, Tétouan and Ouezzane, to attend courses by eminent ‘ālim-s of his time. The returns of this studious life were, however, quite meagre for, surprisingly, his chronicle is full of linguistic and grammatical mistakes. The Alfiyya (21) which he studied three times in about twenty years seems to have had little

(18) Akansūs, p.9

(19) Lévi-Provençal, Les historiens des chorfas, p.212.

(20) For his biography cf. Bujandār, al-Ightibāt bi tarājim a‘lām al-Ribāt, Ms. D 1287, BGR, vol. I, pp. 155-156.

(21) The Alfiyya is a treatise in Arabic grammar in verse, composed by the famous Andalusian grammarian Ibn Mālik (d.672 AH/1274 AD). It used to be learnt by heart by every Moroccan student.

effect on him. This linguistic handicap certainly helped to lower his credit in the eyes of his contemporaries and explain, partly at least, why such eminent historians, such as al-Nāṣirī, have not referred to him at all (22).

The historical value of al-Dūcayf's Tārīkh was discovered only recently. Unlike other Moroccan historians, al-Dūcayf made no claim to write a general history of Morocco. The whole manuscript is devoted to the 'Alawid dynasty. The author acknowledged that he relied on Nashr al-mathānī of Muḥammad b. al-Tayyib al-Qādirī (23), and particularly on the private notes of Muḥammad al-Masnāwī Murīnū (d.1207 AH/1792-1793 AD), a native of Rabat, who was in State service during the reign of Mawlāy 'Abd Allāh (1728-1757) (24). These notes were apparently reproduced by al-Dūcayf without the slightest modification, as we find the dedications to Sīdī Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh and his successor Mawlāy al-Yazīd intact (25).

Al-Dūcayf, however, started recording the events of his time long before the death of al-Masnāwī, since he mentions information about his private life going as far back as 1190 AH/1776-1777 AD. We are therefore indebted to al-Dūcayf himself for much of the information covering the last years of Sīdī Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh and the reign of Mawlāy al-Yazīd. As to the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān, there can be no doubt that the author was relying on his direct experience. The record of events

(22) Al-Dūcayf's manuscript was known to al-Nāṣirī's contemporaries. Ibn al-Hāj (d.1899) for instance made reference to it in his history of the 'Alawid dynasty.

(23) Al-Dūcayf, p.76.

(24) Bujandār, al-Ightibāt bi tarājim aṣlām al-Ribāt, Ms.D.1287, BGR, vol.I, p.137.

(25) Such dedications (nāṣarahu Allāh, may God assist him) are only expressed during the lifetime of a sultan.

becomes more abundant, and also more precise, after the death of Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh.

Al-Du‘ayf's Tārīkh is in fact very similar to a diary in which the author noted down national, local and sometimes personal and private events. As a result, the manuscript takes the form of a long list of events which respects no rule but that of chronological sequence. "His writing is, at times, similar to a delirious speech", noted the author of al-Ightibāt (26). Sometimes the information is so abundant that we have a day by day record of happenings. Unlike al-Zayānī who goes very rapidly over the years, al-Du‘ayf might reserve several pages to a single year, covering the events month after month, and very often, day after day. His sense of precision goes even further and he sometimes notes down the hour when an incident occurred (27). There can be no doubt, however, that al-Du‘ayf intended to write a history of the ‘Alawid dynasty as he attempted to entitle his chapters according to the Khaldūnian tradition and referred to himself as "the author of this history" (28). Unfortunately, the chronicle suddenly stops as 1818 with the last sentence of the manuscript unfinished. We can only suppose that the author died shortly after he abandoned his notes. He was most probably carried away by the plague of 1818-1820 for which he must have constituted an easy prey because of his advanced age.

The importance of al-Du‘ayf's work needs hardly to be emphasized. The nature of the work as a record of events as they occurred, the precision of the information given, and the character of its author as an unofficial recorder of events conveying a popular perception of what had occurred, make of this work not only a useful store of

(26) Bujandār, al-Ightibāt, I, p.156.

(27) For instance, the information he gives about al-Salāwī's death: 11 P.M. on the first day of Qa‘da, 1230.

(28) Al-Du‘ayf, p. 172.

information, but also a necessary tool to complement and correct formal chronologies such as those of al-Zayānī.

d) Al-Ibtisām

Al-Ibtisām, written by an anonymous author, was initially intended to cover the reign of Mawlāy 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Hishām (29). The author, however, by way of introduction, devoted a significant part of the book to the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān and produced an original account of events using a narrative style unusual to his Moroccan contemporaries.

The author had travelled three times to the Arab Middle East and had lived in Egypt for many years, at a time when that country was undergoing revolutionary changes under the leadership of Muḥammad 'Alī (1805-1849). He was profoundly impressed by the Egyptian experience as well as by the doctrinal tolerance of the Egyptians and the practicality of their educational system. What is important in his work is not so much the chronology, but the author's impressions and the comparisons he draws between the state of affairs in his own country and that in the Arab East. However, his observations made little impression on his Moroccan contemporaries. The manuscript is unfortunately incomplete with many folios missing from the middle and the end.

(29) Anonymous, al-Ibtisām fi dawlat Ibn Hishām, Ms.Z.1204, R.L. The information we have about the author is drawn from his manuscript. We know that his first name was "Idrīs", that he served as kātib for Mawlāy 'Abd al-Rahmān's minister Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-'Amrāwī (d.1847), and that he resided in Cairo for six years (al-Ibtisām p.58). This author might well be Idrīs b. al-Tayyib b. al-Māhi mentioned by al-Mashraff (Nuzhat al-absār, p.455) as kātib and poet who lived at the time of Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-'Amrāwī.

(2) Biographical Literature (tarājim)

Biographical literature is an essential source for Moroccan history. For traditional writers, the history of persons, whether they were cālim-s, Sufis, saints or temporal figures, was more important than the history of events. This was a concept which harmonized with the religious view of history according to which eternal values and qualities of eminent people were more important than temporal and transient events.

The information given about a person in such biographical dictionaries may vary from a few lines to several pages according both to the material available and the respect the individual enjoyed in the eyes of the author. Usually, such information deals with his dates of birth and death, his nasab (genealogy), his education, his virtues and qualities, sometimes his affiliation to a Sufi order, but very rarely his shortcomings or imperfections. The biographical dictionaries can be devoted to a single person or to a certain category of people (tabaqā), such as the Sufis of a certain religious order; they can also include many categories of Sufis, saints and cālim-s who lived during a particular period.

Mawlāy Sulaymān's period, characterized by intensive intellectual activity, is covered by an abundant literature of biographies (30). Some of these biographies, such

(30) Many of these biographies were written during the second half of the 19th century. Thus we have:

- Ja‘far b. Idrīs al-Kattānī, al-Shurb al-muhtadar min ma‘in ba‘d ahl al-qarn al-thālith ‘ashar, lith., Fès, 1891-1892.
- Ja‘afar b. Idrīs al-Kattānī, Kitāb fī tarājim ba‘d aṣfiyā’ al-qarn al-thālith ‘ashar, Ms.D.2744, BGR.
- Al-‘Arbi al-Mashrafi, Nuzhat al-abṣār li dhawī al-ma‘rifa wa al-istibsār, Ms.K.579, BGR.
- Muḥammad b. Ja‘far al-Kattānī, Salwat al-anfās wa muhādāt al-akyās bi man uqbira min al-‘ulamā’ wa al-ṣulahā’ bi Fās, 3 vol., lith., Fès, 1899.

More recent biographies include:

- ‘Abd al-Kabīr al-Kattānī, Zahrat al-ās fī buyūtāt Fās; Ms.K.1281 BGR.
- Muḥammad b. al-Hasan al-Hajwī, al-Fikr al-sāmī fī al-fiqh al-islāmī, 4 vol., Rabat-Fès, 1921-1926.
- ‘Abd al-Hayy al-Kattānī, Fihris al-fahāris, 2 vol., Fès, 1927-1929.

as al-Rawd al-munīf, dedicated to the sharīf-s of Ouezzane, or al-Fath al-wahbī, devoted to al-‘Arbī b. al-Ma‘ṭī (d.1819), head of the Sharqāwi zāwiya, constitute an important source of information on the history of the zāwiya-s. Al-Rawd al-munīf, for instance, is more than a simple collection of biographies. It often reproduces letters exchanged between the Wazzāni sharīf-s and Mawlāy Sulaymān and helps to elucidate the nature of the complex and obscure relations which existed between the Makhzen and the Wazzāniya religious order during the second decade of the nineteenth century.

At the end of the nineteenth century, Muḥammad b. Ja‘far al-Kattānī produced a major biographical work, Salwat al-anfās (31) which he dedicated to the famous saints and ‘ālim-s buried at Fès. This work served as an incentive for the emergence of a regional biographical literature. His example soon followed by ‘ālim-s from Tétouan, Rabat, Salé, Marrakech and Meknès who compiled biographies of the most eminent people of their towns (32). Rural areas remained outside the scope of this new wave of biographical literature, with the exception of the Sous to which al-Mukhtār al-Sūsī (d.1963) devoted his twenty volume al-Ma‘sūl (33).

(31) Muḥammad b. Ja‘far al-Kattānī, Salwat al-anfās, 3 vol., Lith., Fès, 1899.

(32)-Ahmad al-Ruhūnī, ‘Umdat al-rāwīn fī tārīkh titāwīn, Ms.675, BGT, 9 vol. available only.

-Muhammad Bujandār, al-Ightibāt bi tarājim a‘lām al-Ribāt, D 1287, BGR.

-Al-‘Abbās b. Ibrāhīm, al-‘Iclām bi man halla Murrākush wa Aghmāt min al-a‘lām, 8 vol., Fès, 1936-1939. Vol.VI and VII on microfilm at the BGR (Mic. 167).

-Abd al-Rahmān b. Zaydān, Ithāf a‘lām al-nās bi jamāl akhbār hādirat Maknās, 5 vol., Rabat, 1929-1933; unpublished parts at R.L., Ms.Z.3986.

-Muhammad b. ‘Alī Dīnya, Majālis al-inbisāt fī sharḥ tarājim ‘ulamā’ wa sulahā’ al-Ribāt, 2 vol., Ms.779, R.L.

(33) Al-Mukhtār al-Sūsī, al-Ma‘sūl, 20 vol., Casablanca, 1961.

Biographical works were sometimes devoted to a single family or a single person. The authors of these works usually wanted either to glorify their own family (34) or express gratitude to a respected shaykh (35).

(3) Al-wafayāt

This is another category of traditional literature which is mainly concerned with ascertaining the dates on which eminent people died. However, the author might very well include some information which is related to the person or to his time. Thus we find mention, often very brief, of famous calamities, such as epidemics, famines, locust invasions and droughts. At times, a brief description is given of the person concerned and, in this case, the wafayāt can be useful as a biographical reference (36). Wafayāt works might also expound on a particular event which particularly impressed the author. Thus, the author of Tadhkirat al-muhsinīn, whose father, al-Majdhūb al-Fāsī (d.1844), played an important role in the Fès rebellion of 1820-1822, allotted many pages to relate the developments concerning the rebellion and gave detailed information about its various phases (37).

(34) For instance Muhammad b. Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj (al-Sulāmī), Riyāq al-ward ilā ma intahā ilayhi hādhā al-jawhar al-fard, Ms.K.2313, BGR.

(35) -Mawlāy Sulaymān, Ināyat ülī al-majd li dhikri al-Fāsī ibn al-jadd Fès, 1928.

-Sulaymān al-Hawwāt, al-Rawda al-maqṣūda wa al-hulal al-mamduḍa fī ma'āthir bani Sūda, Ms.K.2351, BGR.

Sulaymān al-Hawwāt also wrote his autobiography entitled: Thamarat unsī fī al-taqrīf bi nafṣī, Ms.K.1264, BGR.

(36) -Abd al-Salām b. Sūda, Ithāf al-muṭāli' bi wafayat a'lām al-qarn al-thālith 'ashar wa al-rābi', typewritten, no. 10,651, R.L.

-Abd al-Kabīr b. al-Majdhūb al-Fāsī, Tadhkirat al-muhsinīn fī wafayāt al-a'yān wa hawādith al-sinīn, Ms.K.270, BGR.

(37) Cf. Tadhkirat al-muhsinīn, pp.347-358.

(4) Fahrasa-s

A fahrasa is a document in which the author enumerates his shaykh-s, the disciplines he studied under each of them, and his ijāza-s (recognition of competence in a certain field). Eminent qālim-s were usually anxious to write such fahrasa-s because of their importance in confirming the sanad (chain of knowledge) which was the only way to validate the knowledge they had acquired however, the authors of such documents rarely limit themselves to the strict definition of a fahrasa. They usually mention all famous qālim-s, Sufis or saints they met or with whom they had any spiritual affiliation. Sometimes they even give details about their lives, their karāmāt (signs of God's favour) and their virtues (38). Thus, al-Zayānī who wrote a fahrasa for Mawlāy Sulaymān mentioned not only his teachers, but all those who constituted his intellectual entourage: qālim-s who attended his religious seminars or helped him correct and review his essays, his kātib-s and those who benefited from his learning. This fahrasa also included the sciences that Mawlāy Sulaymān acquired, the ijāza-s he received from his teachers, his works and his qualities both as a qālim and as a sultan (39).

- (38) - Al-Zayānī, Jawharat al-tījān, Ms.7678, R.L. and K.1220, BGR.
 - 'Abd al-Qādir al-Kūhin, Imdād dhawī al-istiqdād, Ms.D.270, BGR.
 - Al-'Arbī al-Damnātī, Fahrasa, Ms.K.1254, BGR.
 - Ahmad b. Ḥassūn al-Wazzānī, Fahrasa, Mic.829, BGR.
 - Ahmad b. 'Ajība, Fahrasa, Ms.D.1845, BGR.
 - Muḥammad al-Tālib b. Sūda, Tuhfat al-ahbāb bimā lanā min al-ashyākh wa al-ashāb, Mic.828, BGR.
- (39) This fahrasa (Jawharat al-tījān) was abridged by al-Zayānī's pupil, Ibn Rahmūn, under the title of 'al-Durr wa al-Iqyān fī mā qayyadtuhu min Jawharat al-tījān, Ms. D 727, BGR.

(5) Tabaqāt and Manāqib

The tabaqāt (categories) are biographical dictionaries devoted to a specific category of people. They usually provide information about the disciples of a certain Sufi order (40). This branch of literature can easily overlap with the manāqib — works which enumerate the virtues and deeds of a saint — as the authors of such works sometimes tend to mention not only the biography of the saint or the Sufi but also the biographies of his disciples and followers as well. However, biographical information in this kind of literature tends to be very scanty as most of the manāqib works are devoted to the glorification of the individual.

(6) Genealogical literature

The importance of sharifism in Moroccan history and society is capital. Unfortunately, no attempt has been made until now to write a comprehensive history of sharifian families and their impact on the social and political development of the country. All we have at our disposal is a vast amount of genealogical literature giving the nomenclatures of the various holy lineages. The genealogies often include biographical information about eminent sharīf-s and, when written by an outstanding scholar, such as Sulaymān al-Hawwāt, for example, can provide valuable information about the historical evolution of sharifism in Morocco and the Makhzen's policy towards the sharīf-s (41).

- (40) -Ahmad SkIrej, Raf` al-niqāb ba`d kashf al-hijāb qamman talāqā ma`a al-shaykh al-Tijānī min al-ashāb, 3 vol., vol.I and II printed at Tétouan, no date and vol.III printed at Rabat, 1971.
-Muhammad b. Abū Rās al-Mu`askarī, Kanz al-asrār fī manāqib mawlānā al-`Arbi al-Dargāwī wa ba`d ashābihi al-akhyār, Ms.D.2339, BGR.
- (41) Cf. Sulaymān al-Hawwāt, Qurrat al-`uyūn fī al-shurafā`al-qātinīn bi al-`uyūn, Ms.K.1480, BGR (large extracts from this work are reproduced by Ibn Zaydān in al-`Izz wa al-ṣawla fī ma`ālim nughthum al-dawla, 2 vol., Rabat, 1961-1962, pp. 84-90. Al-Zayānī devoted also one of his works to the sharīf-s under the `Alawid dynasty; see Tuhfat al-hāfi al-mutrib fī raf` nasab shurafā` al-maghrib, Ms. 2471, R.L.

(7) Rihla-s

A great number of learned men from Morocco travelled every year to the Hijaz on pilgrimage. Some of them recorded their observations and impressions of the various countries they visited. Important rihla-s, or travel accounts, such as the ones written by Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Salām b. Nāṣir at the end of the eighteenth century (42), include useful information about the difficulties of communication by land, the varying prices from one country to another as well as information about the tribes and territories they travelled through.

Pilgrimage was also an occasion for Moroccan scholars to meet prominent Cālim-s from the Maghrib and the Arab East and engage in theological discussions with adepts of other madhhab-s. Thus, Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Salām b. Nāṣir met Aḥmad al-Tijānī in Algeria in 1782 and became acquainted with his ideas long before their popularization in Morocco (43). Al-Zayānī who spent many years in the Arab East, both on official and private business, produced a voluminous work in which he displayed his historical and geographical knowledge (44).

(8) Kunnāsha-s and Taqāyīd

Some scholars used to keep a kunnāsha, or note-book, in which they wrote down all kinds of information : dates of births and deaths of their contemporaries, noteworthy happenings such as epidemics and other natural calamities

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- (42) Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Salām b. Nāṣir, al-Rihla al-kubrā (1782-83), Ms. D.2651, BGR; al-Rihla al-ṣughrā (1796-97), Ms.121, R.L.
 (43) Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Salām b. Nāṣir, al-Rihla al-kubrā, p.72.
 (44) Al-Zayānī, al-Turjumāna al-kubrā. Other relevant rihla-s include:
 - Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Fāṣī, Extracts from his Rihla (1796-1797) in Ms.G.88, BGR, pp.164-181.
 - Mawlāy ‘Abd al-Salām al-Darīr, Rihla (1773-1774), Ms.Z.1317, R.L.

important political events, reflections on certain issues, quotations of verses composed by themselves or by their contemporaries, practical information about certain remedies, prayers to be said on special occasions, etc... The historical value of such kunnāsha-s depends on the particular interest of their authors. Thus, a kunnāsha by a sultan's kātib, such as al-‘Arbī al-Damnātī (45) contains many of the letters he wrote on behalf of Mawlāy Sulaymān, while another belonging to al-Ma‘dānī (46), also a contemporary of Mawlāy Sulaymān, is totally devoted to his poetry which, with the exception of some verses extolling the benefits of tea, is of little historical importance (47).

Taqāyīd, or notes, served the same purpose of recording miscellaneous information(48). A tagyīd (when used in the singular form) is generally devoted to a certain issue which monopolized the author's attention at a given time and is then , in fact, an essay.

(9) Religious Essays, Fatwā-s and Khutba-s

The period of Mawlāy Sulaymān is extremely rich in controversial issues which involved not only Cālim-s and Sufis, but also the Sultan himself. Mawlāy Sulaymān being a Cālim himself and profoundly attached to Islamic orthodoxy, he not only encouraged religious discussion through his religious seminars and the questions he addressed to the

(45) Al-‘Arbī al-Damnātī, Kunnāsha, Ms.3718, R.L.

(46) Al-Ma‘dānī, Kunnāsha, Ms.5601, R.L.

(47) Other kunnāsha-s include:

- Mawlāy ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. Mawlāy Sulaymān, Ms.4001, R.L.
- Al-‘Arbī al-Mashraffī, Ms.K.204, BGR.
- Abū Bakr al-Manjra, Ms.K.464, BGR.
- A kunnāsha belonging to the Fāsī family, Sbīhī Library at Salé, not catalogued.

(48) Tagyīd when used in the plural form (taqāyīd) applies to notes taken at different times and is, in this case, hardly different from a kunnāsha.

Cālim-s on various issues, but contributed himself to this cultural activity by writing on some of the important problems of his time (49).

Contemporary issues, such as the emergence of the Wahhābi doctrine, Sufi practices or relations with Christians, gave birth to an abundant literature which, on occasions, could become polemical. Political events—such as the Fès rebellion—or natural calamities — such as the plague which twice ravaged the country— were also occasions on which the Cālim-s expressed themselves (50).

(49) Religious essays and khutba-s by Mawlāy Sulaymān include:

- Khutba on the mawsim-s, printed at Fès, no date.
- Al-Samā': mā huwa muttafaqun 'alā hīmatih, Ms.652, Sbīhī Library, Salé.
- Another khutba on Sufi heterodox practices, extracts in Sharh al-shamaqqa by al-Mashrafi, Ms.G.629, BGR.
- Risāla fī al-kasb (written jointly with al-Tayyib b. Kīrān), Ms. D.1838, BGR.

Muhammad al-Ruhūnī (d.1815) also has an important collection of khutba-s : al-Khuṭab al-manbariya, Cairo, 1936.

(50) Works falling under this heading include:

- Al-Tayyib b. Kīrān, radd Calā madhab al-wahhābiya, Ms.K.1325, BGR, pp.21-95.
- Mawlāy Sulaymān, letter addressed to Sa'ūd b. 'Abd al-'Azīz, Ms. 4624, R.L.
- Muhammad al-Ruhūnī, al-Risāla al-wajīza al-muḥarrara fī anna al-tijāra ilā ard al-harb wa ba'th al-māl ilayhā laysa min fi'l al-barara, Ms.D.2438, BGR, pp. 118-127.
- Muhammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī, Fatwā concerning the sale of horses to Spain in return for three presidios in al-Mahdī al-Wazzānī, al-Nawāzil al-jadīda, lith., Fès, 1910, III, pp.35-36.
- Al-Tayyib b. Kīrān, Muhammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī, Muhammad al-Zarwālī and Ahmad b. Sūda, Fatwā-s concerning the immunity of zāwiya-s, in Ms.Z.3772, R.L., unnumbered pages. Ibn Kīrān's reply is printed in al-Wazzānī's al-Nawāzil al-jadīda, III, pp. 80-81.
- Muhammad 'Āshūr, an essay on blameworthy festivities celebrated at Marrakech on the occasion of the 'Āshūrā', written on Mawlāy Sulaymān's order, Ms.Z.3772, R.L., pp.1-35.
- Anonymous, Risāla fī al-radd Calā ahl al-badr wa nahiyyat al-mashriq, Ms.D.2594, BGR.
- Ahmad b. 'Abd al-Salām Bannānī, al-Fuyūqāt al-wahbiya fī al-radd Calā al-tā'ifa al-wahhābiya, Ms.170, Filali Library.
- Muhammad al-Ruhūnī, Jawāb fī al-tā'ün, Ms.D.2251, BGR, pp.1-48.
- Muhammad b. Abī al-Qāsim al-Sijilmāssi, Taqyīd fī al-tā'ün, Ms. D. 2251, pp. 49-79.

(10) Polemical Works (munādhharāt)

The growing importance of the zāwiya-s during the period under study, together with the emergence of an Islamic reformist ideology in the Arab Middle East, gave rise to a dual confrontation both between religious orders and between some of them and the defenders of orthodox Islam, the 'ālim-s. This confrontation escaped from the limited sphere of ideas when some zāwiya-s, particularly those of sharifian origin, joined the rebellion which deposed Mawlāy Sulaymān in 1820.

Two main factors lay behind this polemical literature. Firstly, there was the introduction of a new Sufi order, headed by Ahmad al-Tijānī (1737-1815), into Morocco. It enjoyed the benevolence of the Makhzen, if not its active support. The Shādhili branches of Moroccan Sufism reacted very energetically to this intruder who claimed preeminence over all saints, dead and alive (51). The Tijāni doctrine, on the other hand quickly acquired adepts among the urban aristocracy and the educated society and did not, therefore, lack for ideological support. The second factor was the emergence in the Middle East of the Wahhābi doctrine which had a direct repercussion in the Maghrib. Mawlāy Sulaymān who inherited the Sunni orthodoxy of his father saw in the Wahhābi doctrine not only an attempt to restore the purity

(51) Works in favour of the Tijāniya religious order include:

- Muḥammad Akansūs, al-Jawāb al-muskit, Ms.G.817, BGR.
- ‘Umar b. Sa‘id al-Fawtī, Suyūf al-Sa‘id, Ms.D.2135, BGR.
- Ahmad b. ‘Abd Allāh al-Makkī, Bulūgh al-amānī fī manāqib al-shaykh Ahmad al-Tijānī, Ms.D.2462, BGR.

Works hostile to the Tijāniya order include:

- Ahmad al-Bakkāy, al-Fath al-quddūs fī al-radd ʻalā Abī ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad Akansūs, Ms.K.2455, BGR.
- Fadḍul b. ‘Azzūz, Kashf al-rān ʻan fuḍād mānic al-ziyāra, Ms.K.644, BGR.
- ‘Alī b. Dhāhir al-Watrī, Mā abrazathu al-aqdār fī nuṣrat ahl Allāh Ms.D.1115, BGR.

of Islam, but also a political tool with which to curb the threatening influence of the zāwiya-s.

A word should be said about a particular form of polemical writing, exemplified by al-Husām al-mashraffī (52) which has other qualities as well. The title of this work is a typical example of a misleading title under which the author might incorporate a useful stock of historical evidence. Intended initially as a reply to Akansūs for his defamation of the Darqāwiya religious order, the work also includes two chapters on the history of the 'Alawid dynasty. The reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān is extensively covered and especially the Fès rebellion for which the author provides some important documents (53).

B - Makhzen Letters

Letters, particularly those emanating from the Makhzen, will form an essential source for this thesis. As Germain Ayache pointed out in his study of the Moroccan archives, the Makhzen collection of letters becomes poorer as we go back in time, especially for the period before 1830. (54).

A number of factors account for this. There was, for instance, the meagreness of the Makhzen's administrative apparatus greatly weakened by political instability and plague epidemics. During the short reign of Mawlāy al-

(52) Muhammad al-'Arbī al-Mashraffī, al-Husām al-mashraffī li-qat' lisān al-shāb al-jā'iraffī, Ms.K.2276, BGR and Mic.1207, BGR. Because both of these copies lack many pages we have used both of them as they tend to complement each other.

(53) Being a Darqāwi adept, the author had access to the documents of the zāwiya branch at Fès, some of which he reproduced in al-Husām. The most relevant are:

- Letter from the cālim-s of Fès to Mawlāy Sulaymān asking for the dismissal of the qādī (Ms.K.2276, BGR, pp.328-329)
- Fatwā by the cālim-s of Fès deposing Mawlāy Sulaymān (Mic. 1207, BGR, p. 474 ff.)
- Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès rejecting his illegal dethronement (Mic.1207, pp. 485-487).

(54) G. Ayache, in Les Arabes par leurs archives, p.40.

Yazīd, Makhzen officials who served under Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh were systematically liquidated or purged. The Great Plague of 1799–1800 also carried away a number of competent kātib-s and officials. By the turn of the nineteenth century, Mawlāy Sulaymān was to encounter great difficulty in finding experienced servants to whom he could entrust his foreign affairs. After Ibn ‘Uthmān's death in 1799, the British consul general in Morocco found it extremely difficult to establish communications with the Makhzen because there were hardly any tālib-s around the Sultan who could handle State business. Of the numerous kātib-s who had served Sīdī Muḥammad "none remained, not one!", wrote Matra in 1802 (55). Al-Salāwī who was entrusted with the royal seal in 1799 was only twenty years old and had very rudimentary administrative experience (56). The modesty of the administrative apparatus necessarily led to a decrease in the volume of official correspondence.

Moreover, the administration was not centralized, not only because the Sultan had no fixed capital, but also because of the presence of wazīr al-bahr at Larache where he could be in constant touch with the European consuls at Tangier. Wazīr al-bahr himself was not responsible for foreign affairs only. Al-Salāwī, for instance, was at the same time governor of the northern provinces and we often find him campaigning in the Rif or against the Berber tribes of the Atlas. This has undoubtedly contributed to the dispersal of Makhzen correspondence.

(55) F.O.52/12, 3 May, 1802.

(56) See F.O.52/11, Gibraltar, 6 Aug., 1799. The post of wazīr al-bahr also remained vacant after al-Salāwī's death in 1815. This only confirms the scarcity of qualified administrative personnel during the period under study.

This, however, does not mean that there are no records for the period of Mawlāy Sulaymān. For instance, we know that al-Salāwī used to keep registers of his letters to European consuls (57). The customs houses at the main ports also used to keep registers of exports and imports (58). But, until the Makhzen archives are properly inventoried and catalogued — a process which may take several decades — it will be impossible to ascertain whether such documents still exist or not.

The files of the Direction des Archives Royales for the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān are extremely poor when compared with the abundant correspondence of the post-1830 period. They consist mainly of copies of documents kept at the Rabat Royal Library and include the correspondence of ‘Abd al-Rahmān ‘Ash‘āsh, governor of Tétouan, and Muḥammad Bejja, a wealthy merchant who served as Moroccan consul in Gibraltar from 1815 to 1820.

Besides the collections of the Direction des Archives Royales, the Moroccan Ministry of Culture has acquired during recent years a vast amount of Makhzen letters through an annual exhibition of manuscripts and documents (59). Microfilms of such letters are kept at the Bibliothèque Générale in Rabat. Unfortunately, here again documents relating to the period of Mawlāy Sulaymān are very rare.

Copies of official letters are also to be found in various manuscript works. Many of these letters are reproduced because of their literary or doctrinal value.

(57) F.O.52/15, letter from al-Salāwī to James Green dated 16 Feb., 1810, in which he makes reference to his previous letter dated 11 Dec., 1807.

(58) F.O.52/24, Douglas to Earl Bathurst, 23 June, 1823.

(59) Hassan II Prize for Manuscripts and Documents (H.P.M.D.).

Unfortunately, these copies do not always bear the date of the originals. Many important letters, for instance, occur in the midst of kunnāsha-s (60), hagiographic works or formal chronologies.

Foreign archives have also provided a number of Arabic letters relating to Morocco's relations with Europe. These documents help to undermine the long-held theory of Moroccan isolationism during Mawlāy Sulaymān's period.

II - European Sources

European sources involve reports drawn up by European consuls and their agents, as well as observations made by various European visitors, such as ambassadors, merchants or doctors whose assistance was sometimes solicited by the Moroccan Court.

J.L. Miège, who had worked on the European archives, states that for the period under discussion (1792-1822) there was an unprecedented decline in the amount of material relating to Morocco. This, he believes, reflects a diversion of European interest from Morocco because of the Napoleonic wars (61). They placed Morocco "aux marges du conflit" (62) and the movement of people, goods and information declined as a consequence. We shall argue later on that these wars, far from relegating Morocco to the margin of the conflict, in reality aroused European rivalries and jealousies about the southern shores of the Mediterranean, particularly over Morocco. Here, however, the argument will be limited to countering Miège's suggestion concerning European archives.

(60) A kunnāsha by a Makhzen official such as al-'Arbī al-Dammātī includes many of the letters he wrote on behalf of Mawlāy Sulaymān during the latter part of his reign. Unfortunately, they bear no date.

(61) J.L. Miège, Le Maroc et l'Europe, 1830-1894, Paris, 1961-63, vol. II, pp.19-29.

(62) Ibid., p.19.

The wars in Europe certainly slowed down the movement of people and goods between Morocco and Europe, but the few Europeans who visited Morocco during the early nineteenth century left behind some of the most detailed reports and accounts available. Observations made by travellers like Jackson, Ali Bey (Domingo Badia), John Buffa, Mathieu de Lesseps and others, have long constituted major references on Morocco (63). To these should be added embassy reports drawn up by European envoys, two of which have been published (64).

As far as consular archives are concerned, there is no evidence to suggest that they diminished during the period under study. The amount of British consular letters covering the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān outweighs by far the amount covering his father's reign (65). The same observation applies to the French consular correspondence. The volume of consular archives seems negligible only if compared with that of the post-1830 period.

European archives have long been a target of contempt and suspicion for the current generation of Moroccan

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- (63) J.G. Jackson, An Account of the Empire of Morocco, London, 1814; Ali Bey, Travels of Ali Bey in Morocco, Tripoli, Cyprus, Egypt, Arabia, Syria and Turkey between the years 1803 and 1807, 2 vol., London, 1816; J. Buffa, Travels through the Empire of Morocco, London, 1810; M. de Lesseps, "Notice sur l'Empire de Maroc" in Journal des Voyages, 45° cahier, Juillet 1822 (written in the 1790's).
- (64) J. Caillé, La mission du Capitaine Burel, Rabat, 1953; J. Caillé, Une ambassade autrichienne au Maroc en 1805, Paris, 1957. A third embassy by the Briton William A'Court (1813) remains unpublished; cf. below.
- (65) Sīdī Muḥammad's reign is covered by 9 volumes as compared with 14 volumes for Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign. Cf. State Papers 71, 102 and F.O.52 series at the P.R.O.

historians (66). This attitude is based on the assumption that consular reports were written by foreign agents who not only were motivated by mercantile and colonialist designs, but were also ill-disposed towards the local population and its culture. Their reports could also not be trusted because they lived on the periphery of the country spending most of their time among themselves and taking little interest in the social and political developments of the host country. There is, undoubtedly, an element of truth in all of this. Still, the historical value of these archives cannot be denied. Ill-disposed and scornful of Moroccans as he was, Louis Chénier has left precious reports and a valuable book on the history of Morocco, which still count among the few serious sources on Morocco in the second half of the eighteenth century.

After more than two decades of national independence, European archives are being discovered not to be as useless as was once thought. They can even contribute to national history in fields rarely investigated by Moroccan historians, particularly in economic, social and demographic fields. Recent studies, both of Tunisia and Morocco, have shown the value of European records—whether they be consular, commercial or private—in describing the internal evolution of the Maghrib (67). R. Rosenberger and H. Triki pointed out in 1973 that "foreign sources are usually more useful" for the study of such aspects as plague, epidemics and famines (68). They also underlined

- (66) See Ayache, "La question des archives historiques marocaines," in Hespéris-Tamuda, vol.II, 1961, fasc.2-3; and idem, G. Ayache, "L'utilisation des archives historiques marocaines," in Hespéris-Tamuda, vol.VII, 1966, fasc. unique.
- (67) L. Valensi, Fellahs tunisiens, Paris, 1977; R. Rosenberger, and H. Triki, "Famines et épidémies au Maroc", in Hespéris-Tamuda, vol. XIV, 1973, pp. 109-175 and vol. XV, pp. 5-103.
- (68) R. Rosenberger et H. Triki, "Famines et épidémies", Hespéris-Tamuda, XIV, 1973, p. 111.

that "les commerçants ou les diplomates qui séjournent ou passent au Maroc sont attentifs aux évènements qui peuvent affecter les affaires ou le cours de la politique" (69).

Moroccan traditional literature is strikingly silent about economic and social developments. Nowhere are to be found, for instance, population estimates in Moroccan contemporary works. Al-Zayānī, who travelled more than once to the Orient, described the major cities in Syria and Palestine not omitting to give the exact weight of the Aqsā Mosque dome or the number of prophets buried in Damascus (70) but never even considered giving a population estimate of any country he visited. The plague which swept away at least one third of the Moroccan population between 1799 and 1820, did not receive more than^a few sentences from the same author. Sometimes the reader has the impression that, had not the plague carried away some important prince or minister, it would have never been mentioned (71). Even al-Du‘ayf, whose chronicle is more like a note-book or a diary, never gives a population estimate, not even of his native town. Only Europeans seem to have bothered about statistics of any kind.

European sources can also be very useful in revealing events which are mentioned nowhere in Moroccan sources. They also complement other information and provide the basis for a more accurate chronology for the period under study.

(69) Ibid.

(70) Al-Zayānī, al-Turjumāna al-kubrā, pp.270, 276.

(71) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawda, fol.181.

A - British Archives

The Public Record Office at London contains valuable records relating to Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign. Unlike France or Spain, Great Britain maintained a closer contact with Morocco throughout the Napoleonic wars and succeeded in becoming Morocco's major commercial partner. French designs in the Mediterranean and Moroccan fears of a Franco-Spanish invasion also encouraged Moroccan rapprochement with Great Britain.

(1) Public Record Office

F.O. 52 includes the first series of consular archives covering the period 1760-1837. Fourteen volumes (F.O. 52/10-23) deal with Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign. They consist of consular reports sent by three British consuls who resided at Tangier : J.M. Matra (1787-1805), James Green (1806-1817) and J.S. Douglas (1818-1829).

The first phase of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign is extensively covered by Matra's reports which are of great help in filling in the gaps of Moroccan historiography. James Green also proved to be a well-qualified consul. He was in Morocco during a crucial period when the Napoleonic threat in the Iberian Peninsula encouraged closer cooperation between Great Britain and Morocco. After 1812, however, Green's health deteriorated (72). His reports became less frequent, particularly after the end of the wars in Europe in 1814. J.S. Douglas who was appointed consul in Morocco in 1818 did not reach Tangier until 1821 after the end of the plague.

F.O. 8 - Volumes 5-10 of this series contain instructions from the British government to British consuls in North Africa and cover the period 1801-1836.

(72) F.O. 52/16, 18 Feb., 1812.

F.O. 631 - This series contains the correspondence of the vice-consul at Essaouira. Only the first volume is of interest for the period under study. It covers the years 1813-1816.

F.O. 174 - This series consists of the archives of the British consulate at Tangier, recently transferred to the Public Record Office in London. It mainly includes registers of out-letters sent by the consul general to various authorities in Morocco and Great Britain. It also includes copies of letters sent to other residing European consuls at Tangier. Furthermore, this series contains letters received from the British authorities in London and Gibraltar, or from the vice-consul at Essaouira. It is particularly rich in Arabic letters as it includes the correspondence of Moroccan authorities.

C.O. - During the Napoleonic wars, the Colonial Office (actually responsible for war and colonies) took a particular interest in Morocco. Owing to the strategic position of the Barbary States the diplomatic affairs relating to these countries were transferred in 1804 from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office where they were to remain until 1836. The Colonial Office also followed Moroccan affairs closely because of the importance of provisions drawn from Morocco by the garrison of Gibraltar.

The material relating to Morocco in this series includes:

C.O. 2 - Volumes 3 and 4 contain the papers of William A'Court, British ambassador to the Barbary States in 1813. Volumes 6 and 10 contain documents relating to British and European efforts to suppress piracy in the Western Mediterranean during the years 1816-1818.

C.O. 91 - It contains despatches from the governors of Gibraltar. The period 1792-1822 is covered by volumes 36-80. This series includes valuable information on Anglo-Moroccan cooperation over the blockade of Ceuta (1806-1810), the plague of 1818-1820 (vol.72-76 give detailed statistics on casualties) and the Fès rebellion (R. Sillery's Report in vol.79).

W.O. - Volumes W.O.1/226, 275, 282, and W.O.6/152, 205 contain some information about the question of Ceuta and the Anglo-Moroccan efforts to invest it militarily during the years 1806-1810.

(2) The British Museum

Additional Manuscript 41, 512 includes the papers of William A'Court concerning his mission to North African States in 1813. Among these papers are detailed statistics about the trade of Essaouira in 1812.

The correspondence of Joseph Banks (1744-1820) who took a special interest in the exploration of Africa and was the founder of the African Association. He was instrumental in the nomination of J.M. Matra as consul general in Morocco and maintained a regular correspondence with his protégé. Numerous letters by Matra are found among the correspondence of this famous British botanist, vol.33, 978 and 33, 979.

B - French Archives

The archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Quai d'Orsay) constitute the bulk of French archives covering the period under study. The "Correspondance Consulaire et Commerciale" contains 9 volumes (vol.20-28) covering the period 1790-1824.. They consist essentially of consular reports drawn up by French consuls in Morocco

(du Rocher, Antoine Guillet, Michel-Ange d'Ornano and Sourdeau). They become particularly important after the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1814 when the new royalist regime attempted to make up for the long French absence from the Moroccan scene owing to the British naval supremacy in the Straits zone between 1792 and 1814. France was the only European country to maintain a consul in Morocco during the plague epidemic of 1818-1820 in the hope of taking advantage of the epidemic to regain its lost pre-war commercial position.

At a time when British consular reports become less frequent after the departure of James Green in 1816 and the confinement of the new consul at Gibraltar between 1818 and 1821, the French consul provided useful information about the political events which destabilized the country between 1819 and 1822. This correspondence describes the changes in commercial policy carried out by Mawlāy Sulaymān after 1817 when he was compelled by internal developments to resort to maritime trade as a substitute source of income.

We have also made use of the Archives Nationales which include the valuable journal of M. de Lesseps, chancelier at the French consulate in Morocco during the 1790's (73).

Some French archival material relating to Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign has already been published by Jacques Caillé in his abundant literature (74)

(73) A.F. IV, dossier no. 3. This journal was published in 1822 under the title of "Notice sur l'Empire du Maroc" in Journal des Voyages, 45° cahier, vol. 15, July, 1822.

(74) For example, J. Caillé, La mission du capitaine Burel au Maroc en 1808, Rabat, 1953; "le vice-consul Broussonet et ses 'mémoires' sur le Maroc", in Hespérис-Tamuda, vol. II, fasc. I, 1961, pp. 5-42.

C - Spanish Archives

The most important archival source for the study of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign is the consular archives deposited at the Archivo Historico Nacional at Madrid. As far as Morocco's internal situation is concerned, the Spanish consular correspondence tends to repeat other European archival sources. Our use of the Spanish archives has been, accordingly, very limited.

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CHAPTER II

MOROCCAN STATE AND SOCIETY
 AT THE TURN OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

I - The Land and its People

It is impossible to determine with any certainty the population of Morocco during the period under study. The absence of population censuses and statistics leaves us with only the estimate of foreign travellers. Nor does the abundance of travel accounts during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries help us very much in working out a reliable estimate. Evaluations vary considerably from two million to about fifteen million inhabitants. The following figures given by European authors show clearly the disparity in population estimates:

Table 1 Population Estimates (1771-1825)

1771	2,000,000
1779	6,000,000
1787	5 to 6,000,000
1791	6,000,000
1793	8,000,000
1805	5,336,000
1808	14,886,000
1823	8,500,000
1825	5 to 6,000,000

Sources: Letters from Barbary, France, Spain, Portugal by an English officer who visited the country in 1771, Dublin, no date; D. Noin, La population

The earliest figure with any claims to accuracy goes back to the beginning of the twentieth century and lies somewhere between four and five million inhabitants. As the Moroccan population tended to be stable over time (periodic famines and epidemics erasing the gains of a high birth rate), we can assume that the estimates made at the beginning of this century were valid for most of the nineteenth century (1).

The inhabitants of Morocco formed a relatively homogeneous population. There were two main linguistic groups, Arabs and Berbers, and only two religious communities, Sunni Muslims and Jews. If we exclude the Spanish presidios on the Mediterranean coast, the number of Christians in Morocco was insignificant and consisted exclusively of European residents. By 1806, the European population of Tangier "consisted almost solely of the families of foreign consuls" (2). At Essaouira, the number of Europeans was still less important.

The Moroccan population was predominantly rural. Between 5 and 10% only lived in towns. (3). A sizable proportion of this rural population was concentrated in

... Sources for Table 1 (continued)

rurale du Maroc, vol.I, 1970; Lemprière, Voyage dans l'Empire du Maroc et le Royaume du Fès fait pendant les années 1790 et 1791, 1801; M. de Lesseps, Letter from Taroudant, 20 Oct.n 1793 in Archives Nationales (Paris), AF IV, dossier No.3; J.Caillé Une ambassade autrichienne au Maroc en 1805, 1957; Idem, La mission du capitaine Burel au Maroc en 1808, 1953; J.G. Jackson, An Account of the Empire of Morocco, 1809; F. Charles-Roux and J. Caillé, Missions diplomatiques françaises à Fès, 1955; Graberg de Hemso, Specchio geografico e statistico dell Imperio di Marocco, Genoa, 1834.

(1) D. Noin, La population rurale, I, p.30.

(2) J. Buffa, Travels through the Empire of Morocco, p. 22. In 1816 the French population of Tangier was made up of ten families (CCG, vol.24, fol.187-188).

(3) In 1926 more than 90% of the population continued to live in the countryside; cf. Martin et al, Géographie du Maroc, Paris, 1964, pp. 58, 76.

mountainous areas, particularly in the Rif and the western High Atlas. The Atlantic plains, on the contrary, had a much lower population density. Louis Chénier, the French consul in Morocco under Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh, did not fail to report the emptiness of the coastal plains (4). Similar observations were made by other contemporary witnesses. ‘Abd Allāh b. al-Khayyāt al-Qādirī, father of the author of al-Tuhfa al-qādiriya, reported that towards the middle of the eighteenth century most of the country between Fès and Meknès was uninhabited(5). Lemprière, a British physician who visited the country in 1790 and 1791, observed that on his seven day journey from Salé to Marrakech, he did not see a single habitation (6).

A- The Countryside

(1) The Tribal Reality

For the immense majority of the Moroccan population, the tribe constituted the basic form of social organization. The individual belonged to a tribe and used to be identified on this basis by both other tribesmen and by the Makhzen.

Few tribes really believed that they constituted the descent group of a common ancestor. The name shared by a number of people residing within a limited territory had no consanguineous connotation. The tribe was by no means a closed or permanent structure . It was always ready to receive newcomers who accepted a common destiny with other

(4) D. Noin, La population rurale, I, p.13.

(5) ‘Abd al-Salām b. ‘Abd Allāh al-Qādirī, al-Tuhfa al-qādiriya, Ms. K.2321, BGR, vol.II, p.103.

(6) Lemprière, Voyage, pp.84-85.

tribal members. Tribes or tribal confederations could emerge or vanish, expand or shrink, depending on their internal evolution (co-existence among various segments) or on external action of neighbouring tribes or the Makhzen.

Tribal reality in Morocco was too complex to be accounted for by a single definition. Tribal organization depended on whether the tribe was Arab or Berber, nomadic or sedentary, Jaysh (exempted from taxation in return for military service) or nāyba (paying taxes). If in zones of sedentary life the tribe was reduced to its politico-military aspect, in areas of nomadism or transhumance, on the other hand, it constituted not only a political reference and a defensive structure, but also a basic unit of economic production.

In zones of sedentary life, such as the Rif and the western High Atlas, the tribe maintained itself in spite of a number of factors which, in principle, excluded tribal organization. In these areas the tribe did not constitute a framework for social production since it was the family or the douar (village) which served as the basic economic unit. The tribe also continued to survive despite the development of private property which encouraged the emergence of familial exploitation of land. The nomadic or transhumant tribe, on the contrary, was a much more compact structure, its members being more dependent on each other for physical and economic survival. Unlike the sedentary tribe, it continued to serve not only as a defensive tool against outside danger, but also as an indispensable framework of economic production, the tribe having to move collectively from one pasture to another.

The existence of the tribe seems to have accommodated both the tribesmen and the central government. For the tribesmen, tribal structure offered the only possible

form of social organization, if not for economic reasons at least for defensive ones. In a fluid and insecure society in which the Makhzen never succeeded in establishing a durable presence, the tribe offered the only reassuring structure. The Makhzen on the other hand, could not conceive of another form of political and administrative organization within which the individual could be made accountable for taxes and military service. Far from weakening tribal structure, the Makhzen seems to have always encouraged it, not only for administrative purposes, but for politico-military considerations as well. The tribe constituted for the Makhzen an essential element for the preservation of the internal status quo and it constantly played off one tribe against another. Tribalism was maintained as a means of maintaining the Makhzen's authority over territories it would not have otherwise controlled without a reliable army and an efficient bureaucratic system. Thus the Makhzen enhanced the politico-military aspect of tribal organization which acquired more importance than other economic and social forms.

Another aspect of tribal reality was its mutability. Tribes and confederations were made and unmade for the purpose of self-preservation or in response to pressure exercised by another tribe or by the Makhzen. When during the early nineteenth century the Aït Idrassen was dismantled by the action of its neighbours and that of the Makhzen, its segments (Aït Youssi, Aït Ayache, Aït Ouafella) became autonomous or completely dispersed, becoming segments of yet another structure (7). A tribe usually remained within a confederation only as long as it needed a defensive cover or was forced to do so by a dominant tribe. Makhzen politics were also responsible for the constitution and dislocation of tribal entities.

(7) Cf. 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Fāsī, al-Uqnum, Ms.K.15, BGR, p.525; Lt.de la Chapelle, "Le sultan Moulay Ismaïl et les berbères Sanhaja du Maroc," in Archives Marocaines, XVIII, 1931, p.30.

Jaysh tribes, such as the Cheraga, Oudaya, or the Cherarda, were a pure creation of the central government. The Aït Idrassen largely owed their influence to the 'Alawid sultans who had encouraged some tribes (the Aït Immour and the Mejjate in particular) to join the confederation (8).

Tribes, therefore, were never closed communities or "circles which never cut across each other", to use Gellner's term (9). The rural physiognomy was subject to perpetual change. We have already seen how the Makhzen contributed to the reshaping of the tribal structure, but there were other causes as well. Natural calamities, political crises, inter-tribal and intra-tribal conflicts, the infiltration of populations from the Saharan periphery in a perpetual movement towards the north-western plains, constituted important factors behind the dynamism of the tribal reality.

(2) Tribal Mobility

Tribal mobility was first reflected in the nomadic and transhumant mode of life. North of the Atlas mountains, seasonal tribal mobility was limited to a restricted area. Tribal movements were generally governed by a customary agreement between the various tribes inhabiting a certain region. The Beni Mguild, for instance, spent the summer in the highlands of the Middle Atlas and descended at the beginning of the autumn to the plateaux

(8) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawda, fol.114; al-Nāṣirī, VIII, pp.13,50. If the Mejjate were integrated into the Aït Idrassen, the Aït Immour, on the contrary, always remained autonomous.

(9) E. Gellner, "Tribalism and Social Change in North Africa", in W.H. Lewis, ed., French Speaking Africa, New York, 1965, p.108. The segmentary model proposed by E.Gellner would at best provide a framework for the understanding of the tribal reality in what the author calls "the outer circle". Segmentarity weakens as we draw near to the centers of authority and urban civilization. Actually, universalist elements (Islam, religious orders, Makhzen politics) were always present even among the most remote tribes. Far from providing a dynamic explanation of the North African social reality, the segmentary theory disregards the historical dimension by presenting a static model for tribalism.

of the western Middle Atlas which, during the summer, were occupied by the Zemmour, Guerouane and Beni Mtir (10). These contracted to fill lands situated further to the north or to the west, thus entering into contact with the transhumant Arab tribes of the Beni Hsen and Zaer. The whole process was reversed during the summer season when there was a general retreat towards the more favourable pastures of the highlands.

This seasonal mobility in quest for more favourable grazing lands was but one aspect of a long term tribal movement which concerned the whole area extending between the Ziz and upper Moulouya valleys and the Azghār—the north-western Atlantic plains. Indeed, one of the basic trends of Moroccan history has been the perpetual movement of populations from the desertic fringes to the more inviting lands north of the Atlas mountains. The low altitude of the Middle Atlas and the absence of sedentary populations there facilitated a constant flow of Saharan or pre-Saharan tribes to the other side of the Atlas watershed.

Behind this northward movement there were many factors. The most important was certainly the under-population of the Atlantic plains. The demographic losses occasioned by famines and epidemics created a vacuum which was filled by outsiders. The phenomenon seems to have been acceleratated during the latter part of the Merinid dynasty (1258-1465) as a result of the ravages of the Black Death which carried away nearly two thirds of the Moroccan population (11). This epidemic caused, according to Moroccan sources, the depopulation of the coastal plains and facilitated the Iberian assault on the coastal towns (12). The implantation of the Zenata tribes

(10) W.B.Harris, "The Nomadic Berbers of Central Morocco," in The Geographic Journal, 6, vol.IX, June 1897, p.639.

(11) Brignon et al., Histoire du Maroc, p.153.

(12) Muhammad b. 'Abd Allāh al-Qādirī, al-Tuhfa al-qādiriya, II, pp.415-416.

(Chauouia) in the Atlantic plains dated, according to 'Abd al-Salām b. al-Khayyāt al-Qādirī, from this period (13). During the same period, and most probably as a result of the same epidemic, the Saharan Arabs of the Beni Hsen who used to reside in the Sijilmassa and the Dra valley, made their first appearance in the Tadla (14). From the fifteenth century on, the Beni Hsen pursued their slow progress to the north until they reached the Atlantic coast.

Severe famines led to important changes in the tribal map of the country. The famines of 1661-1662, on which we are well informed owing to 'Abd Allāh al-'Ayyāshī (d.c.1724 AD) (15), led to the northward migration of many Saharan tribes. The Guerouane and Aït Immour made their first crossing to the depopulated Tadla in 1661, while the Aït Haddidou, another Saharan tribe, moved to the Moulouya valley (16). This famine also seems to have greatly weakened the northern part of the country and paved the way for the Alawid takeover of the Azghār.

Another factor which contributed to the emigration of Saharan tribes may have been the progressive desertification of the Saharan fringes. Studies made by A.G.P. Martin on the Saharan oases of the Touat suggest that the volume of subterranean waters declined considerably after the fourteenth century (17). During the eighteenth century alone the taxable volume of water decreased from 200,000 fingers in 1708 to less than 20,000 fingers in 1796 (18). The steady drying up of the Sahara must be therefore, taken into account when considering the migrations by Saharan tribes.

(13) Ibid.

(14) Ibn al- A'raj al-Sulaymānī, Zubdat al-tārikh wa zahrat al-shamārikh, Ms. D 3657, BGR, vol. I, pp. 451-452.

(15) 'Abd Allāh al-'Ayyāshī, al-Iḥyā' wa al-inticāsh, Ms. D.1433, BGR.

(16) Ibid., pp.251-252.

(17) A.G.P. Martin, Quatre siècles d'histoire marocaine, Paris, 1923, p. 107.

(18) Ibid.

Political factors were at least as important as the climatic ones in determining the tribal map of Morocco. Various dynasties proceeded to the transfer of tribes from one place to another for various political reasons. The Almohad Ya^cqūb al-Mansūr (d.1199) transferred a number of Ma^cqil Arab tribes from the Eastern Maghrib to the Atlantic plains. The sparsity of population in the western coastal plains of Morocco allowed easy resettlement of the Sefiane, Khlott and Riyah tribes there (19). The Merinids carried out other tribal transfers. The most important of these was the transfer of Sefiane from the Tamesna to the Gharb (20). They also encouraged the Beni Hsen to leave their Saharan abodes in the Ziz valley when they entrusted them with a peace keeping task among the Atlas Berbers in return for the right to collect taxes over a wide region extending from Sijilmassa to the Tadla (21). The Sa^cadian and Alawid dynasties, both of Saharan origin, relied on the Saharan Arab Ma^cqil to subdue the northern provinces and, subsequently, to build their Jaysh. The Jaysh tribes stationed around Marrakech and Fès were transferred from the Sahara by the Sa^cadian Ahmad al-Mansūr and later on by Mawlāy Ismā^cīl (22).

The Alawid sultans were particularly instrumental in facilitating the descent of the Fazāz Berbers (23) to the lowlands adjacent to the north western slopes of the Middle Atlas. Even if Mawlāy Ismā^cīl succeeded in containing the northward flow of the Fazāz Berbers by building numerous forts around the Atlas mountains, his successors proved to be unable to prevent their irresistible advance. The death of Mawlāy Ismā^cīl and the ensuing political instability led to the breakdown of the status quo in the

(19) Muḥammad al- Ayyāshī, Zahr al-bustān, Ms.D.2152, BGR, p.42.

(20) Ibid., p.20.

(21) Ibn al-A^craj al-Sulaymānī, Zubdat, I, PP.451-452.

(22) Ahmad b. Khālid al-Nāṣirī, al-Istiqsā li akhbār duwal al-Maghrib al-aqṣā, Casablanca, vol. VII, pp. 50-51.

(23) The term "Fazāz" used to be applied to the north-western part of the Middle Atlas or the territory laying south of Meknēs and Fès extending between the upper courses of the Sebou and Oum er-Rbia rivers.

Fazāz and the acceleration of the northward trend of migration. The Guerouane who were residing in the Ziz valley at the end of the seventeenth century (24) made their appearance north of the Atlas mountains only ten years after Mawlāy Ismā‘īl died (25). The Aīt Immour who were maintained by Mawlāy Ismā‘īl in the Moulouya valley burst into the Tadla after they were driven out by the Aīt Oumalou (26). Being unable to control the advance of the Berber tribes into the Azghār, Mawlāy Ismā‘īl's successors increasingly made use of their military potential. Indeed, without the decisive backing of the Aīt Idrassen, Mawlāy ‘Abd Allāh (1729-1757) would have been unable to maintain himself in power(27). Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh continued to rely on the Aīt Idrassen, his father's allies (28). Upon his accession to the throne in 1757 he invited them to settle near Meknès. In 1765 he transferred the Aīt Immour to the Gharb and induced them to join the Aīt Idrassen confederation which he hoped to use as a buffer against the troublesome Aīt Oumalou. During the early 1780's he carried out further tribal adjustments. Thus, he transferred the Tekna, Mejjate and Dou Blal from the Haouz of Marrakech to the vicinity of Fès (29). He also brought back the Guerouane to the Fazaz and a fraction of the Aīt Immour to the Tadla (30).

By the end of the eighteenth century, the lowland Berbers (31) on the northwestern slopes of the Middle Atlas formed an important strategic ally of the Makhzen.

(24) Al-Ñāṣirī, VII, p.87.

(25) Muḥammad b.al-Ṭayyib al-Qādirī, Hawliyāt nashr al-mathānī, N. Cigar, ed., Rabat, 1978, p.46.

(26) Aḥmad b.al-Hāj (al-Salmī), al-Durr al-muntakhab, Ms.Z.1875, R.L. VIII, pp.197-198.

(27) Al-Ñāṣirī, VII, pp.136, 163.

(28) Al-Ñāṣirī, VIII, p.13.

(29) Akansūs, al-Jaysh, Ms.D.339, BGR, p.239; al-Ñāṣirī, VIII, p.50.

(30) Al-Ñāṣirī, VIII, p.50.

(31) Lowland Berbers (barābir lūṭā) included: Aīt Idrassen, Zemmour, Guerouane and Aīt Hakem. In Makhzen terminology, they were also referred to as Barābir al-dawla (State berbers) or Barābir al-tā‘a (loyal Berbers).

"The Beni Mtir, Aït Idrassen, Guerouane, Zemmour, Aït Immour and Aït Hakem", wrote al-Zayānī, "are State Berbers falling under the Makhzen's might. These Berbers have been subjected for a long time to the oppression of the Aït Oumalou. Every year these used to invade their lands during seasonal migrations and progressively drove them away until they occupied almost all their territories" (32).

B- The Urban World

French colonial literature has long upheld the view that there was a complete rupture between the countryside and the towns (33). Towns were seen as isolated fortresses permanently besieged by hostile tribesmen. However, recent studies tend to invalidate this view (34).

Despite the recurrent upheavals by tribesmen, the towns and the countryside never ceased to depend on each other. The prosperity of townspeople was intimately linked to that of the peasant. Towns constituted a permanent market where the peasant sold his agricultural produce and procured all kinds of commodities, whether locally made or imported. In the coastal towns export trade consisted mainly of the produce of the land. Any crop failures in the countryside led not only to a rise of food prices within the towns, but threatened to paralyse all economic activity. Since the peasant was an important customer of the urban artisan and merchant, a fall in his purchasing power was immediately felt by the urban economy.

Towns were also the seat of government. Many provincial qā'ids-s or governors resided in towns from which

(32) Al-Zayānī, al-Turjumāna al-kubrā, Rabat, 1967, p.75.

(33) Cf. for instance E. Michaux-Bellaire in Villes et Tribus du Maroc, II, p.57.

(34) K. Brown, People of Salé, Manchester, 1976; M. Mezzine, Fès and its hinterland from 1549 to 1637, thesis for the Diplôme d'Etudes Supérieures, Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines, Rabat. 1979.

they ran the affairs of the neighbouring tribes. Thus Mawlāy Sulaymān's governor for Rabat and Salé also had under his command the neighbouring tribes of Zaer, Beni Hsen and 'Arab al-Widyān (35). Other examples included the governor of Essaouira who also commanded the neighbouring Chiadma, and the governor of Tétouan whose administrative prerogatives extended to the northern Jbala tribes. From the judicial point of view tribesmen often fell under the jurisdiction of the town's qādī. The legal opinion of urban cālim-s was constantly solicited by tribesmen who contested the verdict of local judicial authorities.

The cultural influence of towns usually extended to areas far beyond the city walls. Fès, Tétouan and Marrakech were the seats of an intensive learning and sheltered an important proportion of rural students (āfāqiyūn). Even minor towns such as Ouezzane, Boujad and Ksar el-Kebir used to serve as important centers of learning whose fruits were reaped mainly by the adjacent countryside. These towns were also the seat of religious orders which recruited their adepts among the rural population. On the other hand, rural zāwiya-s and religious orders (the Darqāwiya, for instance) had many disciples among the urban population and possessed important sites within the city walls.

Town and country were finally bound together by property relationships. Wealthy townsmen owned estates in the neighbouring country and entrusted their exploitation to peasant sharecroppers. Reciprocally, many influential tribal notables owned houses in towns. Mawlāy Sulaymān's qā'id for the Chaouia, al-Ghāzī, possessed important property in Rabat (36), while the qā'id of Beni Hsen, Abū 'Azza al-Qustālī, had a house in Salé (37).

(35) 'Arab al-Widyān included the tribes of the Rabat-Salé hinterland, namely Ṣabbāḥ Arabs, the Dughma, the Sehoul and Hossain.

(36) Al-Dū'ayf, p.514.

(37) Ibid., p.327.

Towns were traditionally distinguished as hadariya (seats of Islamic culture and civilization) and Makhzen towns (seats of government and garrisons). The first category included Fès, Tétouan, Rabat and Salé—towns which contained an important Andalusian colony as a result of the Christian reconquista of Spain. Within their walls they sheltered wealthy and refined merchants and scholars, as well as ingenious craftsmen. Makhzen towns, on the other hand, provided residence for the sultan and his military governors and contained garrisons and storehouses. Sometimes, as used to be the case for some coastal towns (Tangier, Larache and Essaouira), most of the inhabitants were attached to the Makhzen.

The prosperity of a coastal town was intimately linked to the expansion or decline of commerce. The decline of export trade to Europe after 1800 greatly affected the coastal towns. "These ports", noted Jackson in 1809, "had but a limited commerce with foreign nations and were consequently neither very extensive nor populous" (38). They served mainly as garrison towns after Mawlāy Sulaymān closed many ports to trade following the country's pacification in 1798. Some coastal towns, such as Tangier and Larache, were mainly inhabited by soldiers and seamen (39). Others, such as Salé, Rabat and Essaouira, had important 'Abīd garrisons and, with the exception of the latter, maintained negligible trade relations with the outside world.

Some inland towns were also on the decline at the turn of the nineteenth century. Marrakech was particularly affected by the diversion of southern trade to the port of Essaouira during the second half of the eighteenth century. Already in 1790-1791 Lemprière noted

(38) J.G. Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p.29.

(39) J. Buffa, Travels, pp.48-50.

that many of its houses were in ruin (40). Many years later, Jackson gave a similar description, stating that the town was "mostly filled with ruins of houses which had gone to decay" (41). At about the same time, al-Ducayf noted that trade was stagnating and many merchants from Marrakech had become bankrupt (42). The demographic losses of the Great Plague (1799-1800) were partly responsible for this decline. Further to the north, Meknès seems to have shared the fate of Marrakech. To the British ambassador William A'Court "it had the appearance of a heap of ruins rather than of an inhabited city" (43).

Fès and Tétouan, on the other hand, seem to have enjoyed an unprecedented period of economic prosperity. Mathieu de Lesseps reported in 1794 that "Fès was the most populous, industrious, and enlightened as well as the wealthiest and the most civilized city in Morocco" (44). Towards the end of the eighteenth century, Fès was undergoing considerable extension. A letter by Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès makes it clear that by 1797 building activity in the city had spread to hitherto uninhabited zones (45). The Great Plague must have affected this expansion but economic activity seems to have quickly recovered owing to the fiscal advantages granted by Mawlāy Sulaymān (46). According to the author of al-Ibtisām, never were the Fāsi merchants more prosperous than during the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān (47).

(40) W. Lemprière, Voyage, p.85; J. Caillé, Mathieu de Lesseps au Maroc, in Hespéris-Tamuda, vol.II, 1961, p.287.

(41) J.G. Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p.63.

(42) Al-Ducayf, pp.439-440.

(43) C.O.2/4, Meknès, 20 Aug., 1813.

(44) J. Caillé, "Mathieu de Lesseps au Maroc", Hespéris-Tamuda, vol.II, 1961, p.288.

(45) Cf. letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès, dated 16 Hijja 1211/12 June, 1797 in Ms.D.194, BGR, p.56.

(46) Among these advantages were the abolition of non-Quranic taxes, the reduction of import duties for Muslim merchants and the reduction of the military burden of maintaining the rumāt (urban militia)

(47) al-Ibtisām, p.67.

Tétouan had common interests with Fès. It was the latter's outlet to the sea through which passed a major proportion of its trade with Europe. Tétouan had many merchants who maintained commercial relations with European and Mediterranean countries (48). Both Fès and Tétouan seem to have benefited from the decline of the Atlantic trade. Indeed, Fès had become "the greatest emporium of commerce with the interior parts of Africa" (49) and Tétouan tended to serve as the northern outlet for that commerce as well.

C- Social Categories

In broad terms, the Moroccan society was divided into two main categories : the khāssā, or élite, and the ‘āmma, or the common people. The khāssā included the sharīf-s, or those who claim descent form the Prophet, ‘ālim-s, or religious scholars, notables, Makhzen officials and wealthy merchants. The ‘āmma, on the other hand, included the mass of the people: peasants, artisans, shopkeepers, itinerant traders and urban workers— all those whose opinion was never consulted in political matters and who, according to Mawlāy Sulaymān, "should rather count among the dead than among the living" (50).

(1) The Khāssā

Texts of the bay‘a (declaration of allegiance to the newly appointed sultan) generally enumerated the main components of the khāssā, or elite. In such documents, they

(48) A Tétouani merchant, such as ‘Abd al-Karīm b.al-Tālib, maintained commercial relations with the Turkish regencies; cf.CCC,vol.25, 1 Sept.,1817. Other Tétouani merchants who had commercial relations with Europe included ‘Alī al-Bāhy, Muḥammad al-Brūbī and al-‘Attār brothers.

(49) A. Brooks, Sketches in Spain and Morocco, London, 1931, vol.I,p.212.

(50) Cf. extracts from a khutba by Mawlāy Sulaymān in al-Mashraff, Sharḥ al-shamaqmaqiyya, Ms.G 629, BGR, unpaginated.

were referred to as ahl al-hall wa al-'aqd, that is "the people of tying and untying". Their presence and opinion was required every time that the Islamic community was confronted with an important political decision. There is no doubt that the hadariya towns, being the seats of Islamic civilization, harboured a greater proportion of this elite and were, therefore, entitled to play a much more important role in the shaping of the country's destiny.

In a traditional Islamic society, religion played a major role in determining the nature of social differentiation. Sharīf-s claimed prominence over all other segments in society because they belonged to the holy lineage of the Prophet.

Sharīf-s were respected and venerated by virtue of their nobility of blood and their —real or supposed— possession of a particular power of blessing (baraka). They were often called upon by lay people to settle disputes and act as mediators in conflicts. The sultan, although a sharīf himself, did not hesitate to appeal to them for mediation.

The qālim-s also derived their influence from religion since they were considered to be the guardians of the holy law (shari'a) and the spiritual inheritors of the Prophet. The acquisition of the holy sciences (al-'ilm al-sharīf) was a substitute for the holy lineage and ensured for its holder a prominent position in society. The qālim-s were the main referees in all important issues. Among "the people of tying and untying" they held a key position, and no bay'a could ever take place without their participation.

Their social importance was further increased by the exercise of a wide range of judicial, educational and religious functions (judges, notaries, market provosts,

administrators of pious endowments, preachers, prayer leaders, etc). However, Ālim-s did not constitute a social class nor did they represent specific interests. Their loyalty could very well be a function of their sharifian origin or their belonging to a particular religious order.

Religious groups and zāwiya-s represented another socio-religious group the leader of which acquired a considerable influence in society. The importance of these religious orders was based on the moral authority of their shaykh-s (leaders) and the thousands of adepts that were to be found in every part of the country and at every level of the social organization. Their influence was not limited to the religious field. Sufi shaykh-s acted as arbiters in settling conflicts and their zāwiya-s (lodges) served as shelters for the persecuted. They also extended their protection to travellers and trade caravans which otherwise would be exposed to plunder, particularly in zones of weak Makhzen authority. By the turn of the nineteenth century, some religious orders had become so influential that their shaykh-s intervened openly in dynastic conflicts.

Besides religion, hereditary leadership provided an important means of social prominence. Some families, both rural and urban, acquired high social status by virtue of their service to the Makhzen or their military and political prowess within their own group. This often became hereditary. Thus, the Ibn 'Abd al-Sādaq of northern Morocco provided qā'id-s for the Jbala region for many generations under the 'Alawid dynasty. The 'Ash'ash family of Tétouan, though less prestigious than the former, provides another example. In Fès, such a hereditary nobility was mainly monopolized by the Andalusian families which supplied the greatest proportion of military and political leaders there.

The social standing of this nobility (aṣyān) was largely based on its military achievement. A group such as the Fāsi Andalusians was distinguished less by its wealth or learning than by its ability to provide military leadership during periods of political uncertainty. This role was best illustrated in the Fès rebellion of 1820-1822 during which these influential families provided the leadership of the urban militia (rumāt) (51).

Makhzen officials constituted another element of the khāssā. Their social standing depended above all on the power conferred upon them by the sultan. Among them we find the sultan's ministers and kātib-s, governors, qāḍid-s, and army officers. They were not always chosen from among people of wealth or noble descent. They were merely individuals who had proved their proficiency in their field and manifested enough literary skill or administrative know-how to attract the attention of the sultan (52). These individuals were highly influential and were often used as channels to reach the sultan's ear.

Finally, wealth was another means which allowed its holder to figure among the khāssā. However, even if people of wealth counted among the wujahā? (notables), they were not necessarily politically influential. Wealth conferred a high social standing but did not confer power which was the apanage of the Makhzen and its officials. Indeed, recent studies on the social history of Fès (53) show that merchants as a social group never played any outstanding political role in society because political power tended to be concentrated in the elite of the various "natural groupings" (sharīf-s, Bildiyyīn, Andalusians, etc...).

(51) Cf. chapter VII below, pp. 385-390.

(52) Cf. the case of Ahmad al-Qustālī, Mawlāy Sulaymān's secretary, in Bujandār, al-Ightibāt, I, pp. 42-49.

(53) N. Cigar, Socio-economic Structures and the Development of an Urban Bourgeoisie in Pre-colonial Morocco, 1980, typescript, (forthcoming in The Maghreb Review), pp. 9-10.

Two reasons might explain the political insignificance of merchants in Moroccan society prior to 1830. First, there was the predominance of vertical loyalties according to which merchants tended to identify primarily with their ethnic community and only secondarily with their interest groups. Secondly, there was the absence of an effective internal organization among merchants designed to further their commercial and political interests. This induced them to seek individual ways of promotion rather than collective ones. The most common way was to look for Makhzen protection either by accepting governmental responsibilities (amīn-s, customs collectors, qā'id-s), or by entering into commercial association with the sultan and thus, serve as his commercial agents. The most outstanding merchants of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries had all, in one way or another, served the Makhzen (54). Mawlāy Sulaymān himself underlined this reality when he noted that merchants were above all faithful to their commercial interests and would readily accept government responsibility since it allowed them to further these interests (55).

(2) The Sāmma

The Sāmma, or commoners, included all those who did not belong to the elite of the community: peasants, craftsmen, shopkeepers and workers.

In the countryside, the social map was to a large extent simplified by the predominance of the agricultural mode of production. With the exception of a minority of

(54) Among these we find al-Tālib b. Jallūn, 'Abd al-Karīm b.al-Tālib, Muhammad Bejja, Muhammad al-Şaffār and the Ṣfīra brothers of Fès.

(55) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès (1820), in Akansūs, pp.320-322.

of tribal notables, the overwhelming majority of peasants were small landowners, who owned just enough land to sustain their families. Most of the time these peasants found it more, or at least equally, profitable to hire their labour out as khammās (a sharecropper for the fifth of the crop) rather than to cultivate their own parcels of land. In an agriculturally based economy, the peasant endured the main burden of taxation, particularly under the Quranic taxation system adopted by Mawlāy Sulaymān. They also provided armed contingents to fight alongside the Makhzen army. The rural ‘āmma, however, had no place on the political scene and lived on the margin of society.

The urban ‘āmma was more diversified. Some segments of it could also play a more important role. It included petty officials, craftsmen, shopkeepers, peddlers and labourers. The first three categories constituted what can be called the middle rank which separated the khāṣṣa from the lower rank consisting of peddlers and labourers. While the middle strata enjoyed an urban style of life, the rabble on the other hand lived on the margin of urban civilization and represented, by virtue of their predominantly rural origin, an extension of the countryside into the town.

Craftsmen were, numerically, the most important segment of urban society. Artisanry is supposed to have provided the livelihood of more than half of all townspeople (56). Not all crafts were equally valued however.

The other important urban category of the ‘āmma was formed by shopkeepers (ahl al-hawānít) and the itinerant traders (al-suwwāqa). Because of the modest sources of capital at their disposal, the material condition of these

(56) K. Brown, People of Salé, p.129.

merchants did not differ much from that of artisans. Many of them specialized in the sale of artisanal products such as shoes and cloth. Some of them chose to move about the weekly country markets instead of waiting for the peasant customer to visit town.

Of all urban social categories, craftsmen and retail traders were the most inclined towards some form of social organization. The fact that artisans and traders belonging to the same occupation were usually located in the same place induced them to a certain type of corporate organization which was illustrated by the existence of hantā-s (guilds).

The urban ‘āmma of the hadariya towns supplied the main body of the urban militia (rumāt). Together with the city's tubjiya (artillerymen), this militia played an important role in the defence of the town in time of political instability. However, the military leadership of this urban force belonged to the local notables. Prestigious urban families, such as the Fāsi Andalusians, usually provided leaders to officer the military force constituted by the ‘āmma.

(3) The Jewish Community

The Jewish minority constituted in many ways a society apart. Jews enjoyed freedom of worship but were tied down to a special dhimma status. According to this status they were compelled to wear a distinctive costume and pay the capitation tax (al-jizya) which was intended to serve as a constant reminder of their degraded situation as long as they refused to embrace the Islamic religion.

The fact that Jews were forbidden to own land obliged most of them to live in towns where they were employed in artisanry and trade. However, some Jewish rural communities continued to live in the most remote places such as

Wādī Noun, the Dra valley and Tafilelt (57). Their total number was estimated in 1806 at more than 100,000 (58).

If the great majority were employed as artisans, small shopkeepers and itinerant traders, many were big merchants who resided in the ports and conducted large-scale trade with European countries. While they found it difficult to engage in the eastern or southern caravan trade, they could always act as bankers by lending money to Muslim merchants who traded with the Sudan (59). They also engaged in commercial associations with wealthy Muslim merchants and served as commercial agents for the sultan himself.

During the second half of the eighteenth century, Jewish merchants acquired a great importance by virtue of the encouragement given to maritime trade by Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh. Many Jewish families emigrated from all parts of the country to settle in the newly founded port of Essaouira. Sīdī Muḥammad entrusted Jewish merchants with Makhzen monopolies over some products (60) and used them on political missions abroad (61). "The condition of the Jews improved throughout the country" (62).

Under his successor, however, the Jewish community was exposed to the most severe hardships it had experienced for many centuries. Mawlāy al-Yazīd (1790-1792) allowed many Jewish quarters to be plundered and persecuted many of those who had served his father. In fact, the persecution of Jews by Mawlāy al-Yazīd should be seen as a violent reaction against the Jewish ascendancy

(57) R. Caillé, Journal d'un voyage à Timbuctoo et à Jenné dans l'Afrique centrale, Paris, 1965, vol. III, p.88.

(58) J. Buffa, Travels, p.183.

(59) R. Caillé, Journal d'un voyage, III, pp.88-89.

(60) Al-Du‘ayf mentioned that Sīdī Muḥammad entrusted the monopoly of cochineal at Fès to Jewish merchants; cf.p.168.

(61) Encyclopaedia Judaica, XII, art. "Morocco", column 338.

(62) Ibid.

which resulted from Sīdī Muḥammad's commercial policy(63).

The advent of Mawlāy Sulaymān in 1792 came as "a certain delivrance" for the Jewish community (64). He resumed his father's policy by entrusting his commercial transactions to some wealthy Jews of Essaouira such as the Macnin-s and the Guidalla-s. He was even accused of partiality towards his Jewish subjects by European merchants((65)). Indeed, during the early nineteenth century most of the Essaouira trade tended to be concentrated in Jewish hands after many European merchants left the country as a result of the two epidemics of the plague and Mawlāy Sulaymān's restrictions on maritime trade(66).

However, relations between the Muslim and Jewish communities of Morocco at the beginning of the nineteenth century did not always run smoothly. The fact that many Jews travelled to Europe meant that many of them adopted European dress, European names and even European nationalities. Many Gibraltar Jews were in fact Moroccans who changed their nationality while maintaining commercial links with their country of origin. For the Muslim community this represented a violation of the dhimma status and exacerbated tension between the two sides. The rising fears of European intervention in Morocco by the turn of the nineteenth century only worsened the relations between the two communities. In the eyes of the Muslim population the Jews came to represent the agents of European interests and were, therefore, looked upon with much suspicion. Did not they serve as commercial associates of Christians in

(63) Mawlāy al-Yazīd's persecution of the Jews was not an isolated case. In 1792 a certain adventurer in the Sous, Abū Ihlās, was particularly resentful to the Jews whom he killed and burnt in the Sous and Wādi Noun. Cf.al-Samlālī, Nuzhat al-jullās, Ms.46,25, R.L., p.15; al-Mukhtār al-Sūsī, al-Maṣṣūl, 1961, vol.V, pp.142-144. Cf.also F.O. 52/10, 4 Feb.,1792.

(64) Encyclopaedia Judaica, XII, art. "Morocco", column 338.

(65) F.O./174/124 April, 1805; F.O.52/29, Report on the trade of Essaouira, dated 3 June, 1828.

(64) Encyclopaedia Judaica, XII, art. "Morocco", column 338.

(65) F.O.174/12, 4 April, 1805 and F.O.52/29, Report on the Trade of Essaouira, dated 3 June, 1828.

(66) Cf. below chapter III, p. I62.

the ports and as the medium through which European consuls and travellers discovered the hidden weaknesses (*Cawra*) of the Muslim community ? The author of al-Ibtisām did not fail to underline their damaging role during the French occupation of Egypt when they assisted Napoleon in the translation of the Quran and other Islamic works (67).

As a result of the increased resentment against Jews isolated incidents between individuals from the two communities became more frequent. In 1804 the Jews of Essaouira asked Mawlāy Sulaymān to take some measures of protection on their behalf and he ordered the building of the first millāh (Jewish quarter) of the town (68). In 1806 Mawlāy Sulaymān prohibited the wearing of European dress by his Jewish subjects (69) and ordered the 2,000 Jews of Larache to leave the town (70). There was also the pressure exerted upon the Sultan by religious groups which in 1807 made him issue an order to build millāh-s for Rabat, Salé, and Tétouan (71). At the end of 1815 Mawlāy Sulaymān renewed his order to Jews to wear the traditional Moroccan dress and pay the capitation tax. Those who refused under the pretext that they fell under the protection of European countries were asked to leave the country (72). Mawlāy Sulaymān's attitude should not be seen, however, as a manifestation of religious intolerance. Jewish merchants continued to serve as "the king's merchants" (tujjār al-sultān) and customs receivers (73). Mawlāy Sulaymān also proved to be an energetic

(67) Al-Ibtisām, p.27.

(68) D. Corcos, Studies in the History of the Jews of Morocco, Jerusalem, 1976, p.121.

(69) Cf. petition by Jewish merchants of Gibraltar in F.O.174/10, 13 Nov., 1806.

(70) In 1806 Mawlāy Sulaymān ordered the Jews of Larache to leave the town after some Jewish merchants had been involved in the sale of wine to local sailors; cf. J.Buffa, Travels, p.44, and F.O.174/284, letter from al-Salāwī to J.Green, 4 Rajab, 1221/17 Sept., 1806, (appendix 24).

(71) Al-Dū‘ayf, p.448; al-Ibtisām, p.12.

(72) F.O.52/17, 6 Jan., 1816; CCC, vol.24, 1 Feb., 1816.

(73) D. Corcos, Studies, p.117.

defender of the Jewish community. When Fāsi merchants attempted to prevent Jews from selling slippers in the markets of Old Fès he opposed this arbitrary action (74). After the Zaīan defeat, Mawlāy Sulaymān entrusted Jewish merchants with the task of buying arms for his disorganized army (75) and in 1820, when the Oudaya attacked the millāh of Fès, he condemned their action and summoned them to return the Jewish property they had plundered (76). Jewish merchants were still entrusted with Makhzen commercial transactions and in 1822 they were solicited to assist in the reopening of El-Jadida to European trade (77). By confining Jews within special quarters and preventing them from wearing the European dress Mawlāy Sulaymān was just making clear that the Muslim community was not prepared to accept any alteration in the traditional status of the ahl al-dhimma (the protected people).

II - The Moroccan State (Makhzen)

The Moroccan State, known as the Makhzen, was similar in its structure to the great Muslim empires of the Middle East. It was headed by a sultan who was assisted by an army and a bureaucratic apparatus.

The sphere of the sultan's authority expanded or shrank depending on the strength or the weakness of the Makhzen's military forces. Many tribes acknowledged the sultan's authority and agreed to pay taxes. These were usually those contiguous to the urban centers of the western plains and constituted what came to be known as

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- (74) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès, no date, in al-Zayānī, Alfiyat al-sulūk, Ms.K.224, BGR, p.210.
 - (75) CCC, vol.26, 18 July, 1819; and CCC., vol.27, 31 May, 1820.
 - (76) CCC, vol.27, letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès dated 2 Shawāl, 1235/13 July, 1820, asking the Oudaya to return Jewish property.
 - (77) D.A.R., letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Beloniel, 3 Ṣafar, 1238/20 Oct., 1822.

bilād al-makhzen, or the land of government. Others, while still recognizing the religious authority of the sultan, refused to pay taxes when they felt secure enough from the Makhzen's military reprisals. They constituted "the land of dissidence", or bilād al-sība. However, between full-fledged acceptance of Makhzen rule and open dissidence there was a wide range of intermediate relations between the tribes and the sultan. Many distant tribes over which the Makhzen could never hope to establish lasting control kept a regular exchange of letters with the sultan, sent periodic delegations to renew their allegiance and even requested the appointment of Makhzen qā'id-s. Thus, the Touat population in 1800 agreed to pay their legal taxes to the bayt al-māl (treasury) at a time when Mawlāy Sulaymān granted them local autonomy, preferring to entrust the administration of their territory to a local council of notables (78).

A- The Sultan

The sultan's powers extended to almost every aspect of the religious and political life of the country. His religious influence was derived from the fact that he was both the commander of the faithful (amīr al-mūminīn) and a descendant of the Prophet. At the same time, he commanded the army, ran the administrative apparatus, regulated the country's finance and supervised relations with foreign nations. The sultan's prerogatives tended to be even more extensive in Mawlāy Sulaymān's case because of the modesty of the administrative apparatus.

(1) Religious and Temporal Duties

The sultan filled many functions within the Moroccan State. First of all, he was the head of the Islamic community. His main duty in this respect lay in guarding

(78) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Touat, 28 Safar, 1215/21 July, 1800, in El-Ouataiq, I, 1976, pp.446-447.

and enforcing the shari'a, or Islamic law, and the defence of his subjects' faith against heterodox deviations.

This role of the sultan as the guardian of the shari'a is best illustrated by the case of Mawlāy Sulaymān. Indeed, one of his major concerns was the defense of the faith and his constant endeavours to rid the religion from culpable alteration.

The enforcement of the shari'a represented another aspect of the sultan's religious duties. The sultan filled the function of the highest judicial authority by appointing judges (qādi-s) and chief-judges. At the same time, he acted as the supreme court of appeal. His role of guardian of the shari'a was also reflected in his endeavours to ensure its supremacy over customary law (curf). Makhzen attempts to subdue tribal areas of dissidence, particularly in the Berber zones, was partly motivated by the sultan's eagerness to ensure the supremacy of Islamic law over the "law of barbarousness" (al-jāhiliya). Subduing zones of dissidence was regarded by the sultan as a religious duty which differed in no way from the jihād against the enemies of Islam (79).

The defense of Islam against outside threats figured among the most sacred duties of the sultan. This was best illustrated by the necessity to keep alive the tradition of jihād against Christian nations which did not have peace treaties with Morocco. By 1800, this obligation tended to become merely theoretical because of the naval superiority of European countries. Nevertheless, when Mawlāy Sulaymān decided to liquidate the Moroccan navy in 1817, the religious groups did not fail to see in this measure

(79) In 1819, following the Zaian defeat, Mawlāy Sulaymān called on his subjects to take part in a holy war against the rebellious Berbers who were considered to be "more worthy of jihād than the infidel enemy". Cf. letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to 'Abd al-Rahmān 'Ash'āsh, dated 2 Muḥarran, 1235/ 21 Oct., 1819, in D.A.R.

an abandonment by the sultan of one of his essential duties. The sultan refused also to endorse peace treaties the clauses of which were in contradiction with the shari'a. This was particularly made clear by the insistence by sultans upon the fact that the judgement of cases involving Muslim subjects and Christians should always be in conformity with the Islamic law (80).

However, the most important of all sultan's duties was the maintenance of internal peace and security. Internal peace was not only a worldly requirement, but a religious one as well. By ensuring internal security the sultan made it possible for the Muslim community to exercise its religious duties. At the same time, the sultan had to see to it that his subjects were secure both in their lives and their property. In return for this, he was given absolute power. As long as he was able to maintain order the sultan could not be questioned even if he proved to be arbitrary and unjust. Under the terms of the shari'a, as in the Hobbesian concept of the social contract, priority was given to order and security rather than justice. The worst of situations for an Islamic State was not an unjust political system but a situation of sedition (fitna) which rendered the exercise of religious duties impossible.

The sultan was also the head of the army and the Makhzen administration. He supervised the recruitment, the equipment and the training of the army and led all major expeditions in person. He appointed ministers, governors, and qā'id-s and kept a regular correspondence with each of them. In addition to this, he controlled the economic activity by appointing amīn-s (tax collectors) and muhtasib-s, by striking the currency and fixing its value, and finally by regulating the flow of foreign trade. In fact, there was hardly any field that was free from sultanic intervention.

(80) Cf. for instance article VII of the Anglo-Moroccan treaty signed in 1801, in F.O.52/27.

This does not mean that the powers of the sultan were unlimited. The bay'a was already a limitation in itself. Its conditions could be particularly restrictive if the sultan was in a weak position at the time of his investiture. The bay'a of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm b. al-Yazīd in 1820 and that of his brother Mawlāy Sa'īd in 1821, both proclaimed during the Fès rebellion, are evidence of this fact (81). The powers of the sultan were also restricted by the sharī'a and those who represented it, namely the qālim-s. The sultan had to refer to the guardians of the Islamic law especially when he was confronted with important decisions. Mawlāy Sulaymān, being a religious scholar himself, was more inclined than any of his 'Alawid predecessors to abide by the sharī'a. On crucial issues such as the sale of victuals and strategic materials to Christians or the attitude to be adopted towards the Wahhābi doctrine, the opinion of the qālim-s was always sought (82). These could also ask the sultan to implement a legal opinion (fatwā) they had pronounced independently of any request by the sultan. In 1799 for instance, the qālim-s were of opinion that the country was in danger of a European invasion and that the Makhzen had to allow the sale of military equipment to his subjects who were to be put in a state of readiness to defend the land of Islam. Mawlāy Sulaymān could not oppose this fatwā despite the regrettable consequences that such a decision was bound to have on internal order. In practice, therefore, the powers of the sultan were not as absolute and unlimited as they were usually depicted by European observers.

(81) Cf. texts of the two bay'a-s in Dāwūd, III, pp. 250 and 264.

(82) In 1794 Mawlāy Sulaymān requested the religious opinion of al-Tawdī b. Sūda regarding the sale of wheat to the Christians; cf. his letter in Mic. 3/HPMD, Fès , 1978. Later on, he consulted the qālim-s concerning the sale of horses to Spain; cf. al-Mahdī al-Wazzānī, al-Nawāzil al-jadīda, III, pp.35-36. For his consultation on the Wahhābi doctrine cf. chapter V below.

(2) Mawlāy Sulaymān (1766-1822)

The text of the bay'a drafted at Fès in March 1792 depicted the basic traits of Mawlāy Sulaymān's character: nobility, devotion, gentleness and clemency. The bay'a also stressed his piety and his "assiduous study of the noble science" (83). Foreign observers underlined the same features of his character. Matra described him in 1792 as "a respectable young man (...) but timid and unambitious, totally in the hands of the priests (Cālim-s)" (84). Other contemporary European officials were unanimous about his "mild and humane character" (85).

Mawlāy Sulaymān was born in the Tafilelt in 1766. His father Sīdī Muḥammad took a special interest in the religious education of his young sons after he had been disappointed with the behaviour of the elder ones, and particularly Mawlāy al-Yazīd. After he had memorized the Quran in a zāwiya in Ahmar near Safi and studied the Prophet's biography at Ksar el-Kebir (86), Mawlāy Sulaymān was sent to the Tafilelt in 1783, together with two of his brothers. There, each one of them was placed in a separate fortress and given a private tutor. Abū al-Qāsim al-Zayānī, one of the highly trusted servants of Sīdī Muḥammad, was purposely appointed governor of the Tafilelt in order to supervise the education of Mawlāy Sulaymān and his brothers. During his stay in the Tafilelt, Mawlāy Sulaymān had some of the most outstanding Cālim-s of Fès for teachers: 'Abd al-Qādir b. Shaqrūn, Muḥammad a. al-Ṭāhar al-Hawwārī, Muḥammad al-Ṭrūnbāṭī and Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj. Mawlāy Sulaymān only resided in Fès for two years (1790-1792) (87).

(83) Cf. Mawlāy Sulaymān's bay'a in al-Nāṣirī, VIII, pp.87-90.

(84) F.O.52/10, 27 March, 1792.

(85) See observations made by the French vice-consul, L. Mure in CCC, vol.20, 10 April, 1792, the British vice-consul at Tétouan during 1820's, W. Price, reproduced in Brooke, Sketches, I, p.359, and the British consul J.S.Douglas in F.O.52/23, 26 April, 1822.

(86) Al-Zayānī, Alfiyat al-sulūk, pp.166-167.

(87) Al-Nāṣirī, VIII, p.87.

Mawlāy Sulaymān had a bent towards the study of religious sciences and manifested little interest in the country's political affairs before 1792. When Mawlāy al-Yazīd was proclaimed in 1790 he asked him to reside at Marrakech as vice-regent, but after a short time Mawlāy Sulaymān deserted his post and returned to Fès to resume his studies (88). In March 1792 he was very reluctant to accept the throne offered to him by the head of the Aït Idrassen confederation and the people of Fès. According to al-Du'ayf, he accepted only upon the condition that he would not take part in the fighting against his brothers (89).

Indeed, Mawlāy Sulaymān was little prepared to govern a country. He was above all a religious scholar whose education deeply marked his political behaviour. His great respect for the shari'a explains the fact that he sometimes placed God's prescriptions before the interest of the State. His rigid observance of the shari'a, together with his opinionated character, was responsible in part at least, for the inflexibility which characterized his policy, and put him often in collision with groups such as the sharif-s and the religious brotherhoods whose inherited privileges were not always in conformity with the Holy Law.

B- Makhzen Administration

The nature and extent of the administrative system differed widely from one sultan to another. With Mawlāy Sulaymān the administrative apparatus tended to be very modest. Apart from some objective factors which contributed to the weakening of the administrative apparatus left by Sīdī Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh, there was also the authoritarian character of Mawlāy Sulaymān who followed a rigid policy of centralization.

(88) Al-Du'ayf, p.247.

(89) Ibid., p.281.

(1) The Administrative Apparatus

Among the responsibilities of the Moroccan State were the political and administrative posts over which the Makhzen exercised a direct control. Others, on the contrary, were semi-autonomous being mainly religious in character. In traditional Morocco, the so-called "Makhzen service" was basically the palace domestic organization, the administrative hierarchy and the army.

Immediately surrounding the sultan were a number of palace servants who carried out a wide range of daily tasks. They included tent pitchers, water-bringers, the kitchen master, the tea master, the pistol bearer, etc. By 1790, they covered more than twenty different fields (90). These palace servants constituted the permanent company of the sultan and moved with him wherever he went. Although forming part of the Makhzen, the above officers had no stake in the political or administrative affairs of the State. The sultan ran the country through his ministers, kātib-s, qā'id-s and amīn-s, or tax collectors.

At the central level, the Makhzen administration was very rudimentary and in running the affairs of the State the sultan was assisted by a limited number of officials. Louis Chénier, French consul in Morocco from 1767 to 1782, noted that Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh had no real government in which responsibilities were divided among ministers (91). This continued to be the case until the second half of the nineteenth century when Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Rahmān (1859-1873) and Mawlāy al-Ḥasan (1873-1894) attempted to introduce some administrative reforms. The sultan used to be surrounded by men of confidence rather than ministers. The most important individual among these trusted men usually acquired the title of "chief minister" (al-wazīr al-a‘dham). He directed, among other things,

(90) Cf. list of palace officers in 1791 given by the British consul Matra ub Add.Ms.41,512, British Museum.

(91) L. Chénier, Recherches historiques, III, p.164.

foreign affairs, and acted as the intermediary between the sultan and European consuls.

This responsibility of "chief minister" was entrusted between 1800 and 1815 to Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Salām al-Salāwī (d.1815), and afterwards to Ahmad b. M'bārak (d.1819). In practice, government responsibilities were never clearly defined. Al-Salāwī who signed his letters to European consuls as wazīr al-bahr wa shu'ūn al-ajnās (minister of foreign affairs), performed many other duties at the same time. Thus, while still running foreign affairs, he was entrusted on various occasions with the local government of Fès, Salé and the neighbouring tribes, Larache and the northern provinces. He was also entrusted with the leadership of military expeditions not only within territories under his jurisdiction, but also in the Tadla, the Rif and the Fazāz. The scarcity of competent officials must have partly accounted for this concentration of responsibilities in few hands.

Indeed, never was the central administration so reduced as during the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān. Whereas Sīdī Muḥammad used to be surrounded by more than thirty kātib-s at any one time (92), the total number of secretaries who served Mawlāy Sulaymān during his reign did not exceed twenty according to al-Zayānī (93). This fact cannot just be ascribed to Mawlāy Sulaymān's excessive tendency for centralization or to his authoritarian character. Other objective factors account for the modesty of the administrative apparatus at the beginning of the nineteenth century. One of these factors was the persecution undertaken by his predecessor, Mawlāy al-Yazīd, against his father's servants. When he came to the throne in 1790, Mawlāy al-Yazīd resolved that he would not rely on his father's "dogs" as he used to call them (94). Between 1790 and 1792, he launched a systematic search

(92) F.O.52/12, 3 May, 1802.

(93) Al-Zayānī, Jawharat al-tījān, Ms.6778, R.L., pp.67-68.

(94) Al-Du'ayf, p.228.

for all those who had gained the confidence of Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh. Many were executed while others were imprisoned or left the country to save their heads. "As many of the Talbs he could catch were cut to pieces", wrote Matra in 1802, "the same fate attended the old alcaīds or generals..." (95).

There was also the Great Plague of 1799–1800 which was responsible for the death of many competent officials of the old administration. Mawlāy al-Tayyib, the Sultan's brother, and Muḥammad b. ‘Uthmān who were entrusted with foreign affairs, perished in the epidemic. In 1800 Mawlāy Sulaymān found himself compelled to entrust a twenty year old waṣīf (sultan's slave) with the running of foreign affairs (96). In 1801, the Anglo-Moroccan treaty was negotiated on the Moroccan side by ‘Abd al-Rahmān ‘Ashqāsh, "a common muleteer" who could neither read nor write. "The man who negotiated the treaty", wrote Matra in 1802, "was ignorant; the plague had carried off all talbs used to foreign business" (97).

Finally, the conditions of Mawlāy Sulaymān's accession to the throne and the dynastic struggle which opposed him to many of his brothers made him very distrustful of the court princes. The rebellion of his cousin Mawlāy ‘Abd al-Mālik b. Idrīs in 1796 while governor of the Chaouia, and the attempt made by Mawlāy al-Tayyib to get himself proclaimed at Marrakech in 1799 (98) confirmed him in his suspicions. Among all princes, only Mawlāy ‘Abd al-Salām, the Sultan's brother, had some influence in the court of Mawlāy Sulaymān because, "being blind, he was less dangerous" (99). Mawlāy Sulaymān tended to rely above all on black slaves such as al-Salāwī and Ahmād b. M'bārak.

(95) F.O.52/12, 3 May, 1802.

(96) F.O.52/10, 6 Aug., 1799.

(97) F.O.52/12, 12 April, 1802. The same ‘Ashqāsh negotiated the treaty of 1803 between Morocco and Sweden; cf. Muḥammad al-Hajwī, al-‘Alāqiq al-siyāsiya li al-dawla al-‘alawiya, n.p., n.d., p.15.

(98) Al-Du‘ayf, p.394.

(99) F.O.52/12, 3 May, 1802.

Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Salām al-Salāwī represented the most outstanding figure of Mawlāy Sulaymān's Makhzen. He served as chief minister in charge of foreign affairs for about fifteen years (1800-1815). When he was first entrusted with the royal seal in 1799, al-Salāwī had behind him little administrative experience. He was a black slave brought up in the court and had previously served as secretary to Mawlāy al-Tayyib while this one was governor of the northern ports (1794-1797). After the removal of Mawlāy al-Tayyib to Dār al-Bayḍā in 1797 al-Salāwī acted as qā'id of Tangier and had the occasion to deal with European consuls. Following the death of Ibn 'Uthmān in 1799 he was entrusted with the royal seal and from 1800 onwards he directed most of the correspondence with European consuls (100). In 1802 he was appointed governor of Fès, and less than one year later he joined the sultan as kātib. At the beginning of 1804, he was made qā'id of Rabat, Salé and the neighbouring Beni Hsen and 'Arab al-Widyān (101). In May 1805 he was entrusted with the government of Larache and the north-western Jbala tribes (102). Following the destitution of 'Ashāsh in 1807, al-Salāwī's prerogatives were extended to include the governorship of both Tétouan and Tangier. At one time the whole of northern Morocco, including the Rif, came under his authority, in addition to foreign relations which he exercised until his death in 1815. The passing away of al-Salāwī came as a great loss for Mawlāy Sulaymān at a time when the country was entering a difficult period. "When the āmir al-mūminīn learned about his death", wrote al-Zayānī, "he regretted his loss as he was the pillar of his State" (103).

On the local level, the Makhzen exercised its control

(100) F.O.52/11, 6 June, 1797; F.O.52/12, 12 Aug., 1802; al-Du'ayf, p.307.

(101) Al-Du'ayf, p.428.

(102) Ibid., p.442.

(103) Al-Zayānī, Alfiyat al-sulūk, p.182.

over the population through governors and qā'id-s. These were generally chosen on the basis of their administrative competence. A qā'id did not need to be a scholar but had to be an ṣāqil (wise man) with a sense of the practical. Qā'id-s were chosen either from among tribal notables or among Makhzen servants, such as army officers. In the first case the sultan did nothing more than confirm the tribal leader in his position. The effective control of the Makhzen over such qā'id-s depended to a large extent on the strength of the central authority, on the location of the tribe and on its military potential. The most efficient qā'id was the one who succeeded in gaining the trust of both his tribesmen and the sultan. The least efficient, on the other hand, was usually the qā'id appointed by the sultan from outside the tribe and who lacked the necessary coercive power to impose the Makhzen's will. Mawlāy Sulaymān, in particular, tended to disregard the realities of tribal politics and often appointed his own qā'id-s, chosen from among his slaves or from army officers. His attempts at imposing outsiders as qā'id-s on the Berber tribes of the Middle Atlas were constantly rejected and constituted an important factor in the deterioration of Makhzen-Berber relations (104).

Besides ministers, kātib-s and qā'id-s, there were the amīn-s, or tax collectors, who played an important role in the running of the Makhzen administrative machinery. Amīn-s were often described as the bankers of the Makhzen. They ensured the collection of taxes and supervised the farming of State monopolies. They served also as State accountants by keeping Makhzenian funds and executing the sultan's orders relating to the payment of officials and various other expenditures.

Finally, there were public sectors—the judicial system and the administration of pious endowments (ahbās)—which, though autonomous, were not completely free from

(104) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol.183.

Makhzen intervention. Under judicial posts (al-manāṣib al-shar‘iya) we find the muftī, the qādī-s (judges), the ‘udūl (pl. of cadl, or notaries) and the muhtasib-s (market provosts and supervisors of public morality). The judiciary also included the abū al-mawārīth (the master of probate and administrator of government property) and the kāfil al-aytām wa al-ghāibīn (advocate for orphans and missing persons). Posts depending on the ahbās were also semi-autonomous. They included the nādhir (administrator of pious endowments), the mosque imām-s and khatīb-s (prayer leaders) as well as mosque and madrasa teachers.

(2) Mawlāy Sulaymān's Administrative Policy

The meagreness of the administrative apparatus at the beginning of the nineteenth century was not only a result of objective factors such as Mawlāy al-Yazīd's persecution of his father's collaborators and the effects of the Great Plague. It was also a result of Mawlāy Sulaymān's centralizing and authoritarian character. Those who served as his kātib-s, such as al-Zayānī or Akansūs, did not fail to remark on his authoritarian attitude and his obstinacy in running the affairs of the country. Mawlāy Sulaymān's greatest weakness according to al-Zayānī, was "his obstinacy and reliance on inexperienced people" (105). He was so opinionated that he used to draft his own letters before handing them over to his secretaries, without allowing the least alteration to the text. According to al-Ibtisām, Mawlāy Sulaymān forbade his secretaries even to correct grammatical or linguistic errors they might notice in the draft (106). Little chance was given to his entourage to participate in decision making and "no minister was offered opportunity to leave his mark on the country's policy" (107).

His inflexible tendency towards centralization was apparent in more than one aspect of his policy. In ap-

(105) Ibid., fol.186.

(106) Al-Ibtisām, p.5.

(107) Muhammad Gharrīṭ, Fawāṣil al-jumān fī anbā' wuzarā' wa kuttāb al-zamān, Fès, 1921, p. 8.

pointing qā'id-s, for instance, he gave little chance to local notables and religious dignitaries to express their opinion about such appointments. This discontented both traditional notables and local zāwiya-s (108) and led to a continuous friction between the Makhzen and the loci of local power.

We touch here on the heart of Mawlāy Sulaymān's administrative policy. Indeed, Mawlāy Sulaymān showed little respect for traditional and tribal considerations in the appointment of local officials. In the Tadla, the appointment of alien qā'id-s was at the root of persistent tension with the Sharqāwiya religious order. The local government of Fès was often entrusted to outsiders which greatly discontented the Fāsi traditional leadership and partly accounted for the deterioration of relations between Mawlāy Sulaymān and the influential notables of Fès (109). Mawlāy Sulaymān was also prone to disregard tribal antagonisms when extending the authority of a single governor over an explosive combination of tribes. Thus, the governor of the Chaouia, Ibn al-Ghāzī al-Madanī, who commanded a territory extending from the banks of the Bouregreg river to those of the Oum er-Rbia, found his authority contested by the Tadla tribes on many occasions. The Sultan's attempt to impose a single qā'id for both highland and lowland Berbers was, according to al-Zayānī, the reason behind the hostile attitude of the Aīt Oumalou who disliked the governorship of Muḥammad Waṭzīz of the Beni Mtir (110) and later on that of Ibn al-Ghāzī of the Zemmour (111).

Mawlāy Sulaymān wanted above all to entrust government responsibilities to individuals who could be easily controlled by the Makhzen. This explains why he resorted more often to black slaves and non-committed merchants.

(108) Cf. relations between Mawlāy Sulaymān and the zāwiya-s of Ouezzane and Boujad in chapter VI below.

(109) Cf. chapter VI below.

(110) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawda, fol.183.

(111) Al-Zayānī, Tārīkh al-wilāya, Ms.13,009, R.L., p.3.

John Buffa noted in 1806 that many black qāḍid-s "reckoned to be very loyal to the Emperor (were) at the head of the most important provinces and districts" (112). Al-Salāwī and Aḥmad b. M'bārak, the only two ministers that Mawlāy Sulaymān had between 1799 and 1819, were both palace slaves (waṣīf-s). Merchants also enjoyed Mawlāy Sulaymān's favours and were sometimes entrusted with government responsibilities (113).

However, Mawlāy Sulaymān lacked the necessary means to carry out his policy of centralization. He lacked both a reliable army and a flexible tribal policy. Unlike his father who was able to tolerate tribal dissidence as long as it did not threaten his authority, Mawlāy Sulaymān showed a firm determination to extend his control to tribes and territories which the Makhzen had never been able to control since the death of Mawlāy Ismā‘īl. Sīdī Muḥammad avoided open confrontation with inaccessible tribes as much as possible. He preferred to spare his energies in order to tackle more important problems instead of being constantly at the head of his mehalla. Peaceful arrangements with dissident tribes were far more valued than costly and risky military campaigns which, even when successful, had but a limited effect. On the contrary, Mawlāy Sulaymān not only attempted to force the inaccessible mountain Berbers to submit, but also showed a political inflexibility which often made him reject peaceful solutions. The humiliating Zaïan defeat in May 1819 was ascribed by Akansūs to the rejection by Mawlāy Sulaymān of the peace proposals made by the Aīt Oumalou (114). Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh, noted Akansūs, had never rejected the enemy's appeal for forgiveness. He even induced a third party to intercede on behalf of the enemy so as to arrange an honourable outcome for the conflict without risking a humiliating setback (115).

(112) J. Buffa, Travels, pp.108, 184.

(113) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès in Akansūs, pp. 320-322.

(114) Ibid., p.317.

(115) Ibid., pp.317-318.

Mawlāy Sulaymān's religious concept of the imamate might explain his administrative policy and his subsequent difficulties. The Quranic system of taxation adopted by Mawlāy Sulaymān implied a permanent control of the countryside and a direct supervision by the central government of tax collecting. On the other hand, Mawlāy Sulaymān's sense of justice led him to revoke local governors on the least accusation made against them by their subjects. The author of al-Ibtisām reported that on one occasion the governor of Doukkala was arrested because he offered the Sultan a large sum of money, only a short time after his nomination (116). The author of al-Ightibāt mentioned that it was customary for Mawlāy Sulaymān to leave officials in their posts only for a short period of time (117). Muḥammad b. ‘Alī al-Dukkālī also confirmed that by following such a policy the Sultan intended to provide guarantees against the risks of corruption (118). These frequent changes in local government paved the way, however, for the eruption of conflicts among the local notables and considerably weakened the administrative apparatus at a time when Mawlāy Sulaymān had failed to build up a reliable coercive military force.

C- The Army

At the end of the eighteenth century, the Moroccan army consisted of a relatively small corps of professional soldiers of ‘Abīd and Oudaya, both of which had originally been formed by Mawlāy Ismā‘il, and the jaysh tribes which formed a sort of reserve army to be called upon for special expeditions.

(116) Muḥammad al-Hajwī, Ikhtisār al-ibtisām, Ms.H 114, BGR, p.360.

(117) Bujandār, al-Ightibāt, II, pp.122-127.

(118) Muḥammad b. ‘Alī al-Dukkālī, Ithāf ashraf al-malā, Ms.D.11, BGR, p. 101.

يولي ويعزل دوام عصره
وذلك من مصلحة الثضافة
عسى بذوق الناس في امان

Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh had reduced the power of both the ‘Abīd and the Oudaya who had been largely responsible for the civil strife that followed Mawlāy Ismā‘il's death. He reduced the size of the ‘Abīd corps to about 15,000 men and dispersed them among the various sea ports. The Oudaya consisting mainly of cavalry, were reduced to only about 1,000 men and transferred from Fès, where they had been causing a great deal of trouble, to Meknès (119). On the other hand, the reserves furnished by the tribes, both Arab and Berber, became more important. The Arab tribes of the coastal plains alone could contribute, according to al-Zayānī, about 150,000 men (120). The hadariya towns also contributed to the Makhzen's military effort by providing contingents of rumāt (urban militia) and tubjiya (artillerymen) for major expeditions.

The essence of Sīdī Muḥammad's military reform was to curtail the power of the professional army and to rely on the military potential of the tribes with the aim of alleviating the financial burden on the Makhzen. The logical consequence of this policy with regard to the army was to favour the unorganized strength of the tribes over the standing army of the Makhzen. In other words, tribal asabiyya acquired the upper hand over the janissary type of organization sought by Mawlāy Ismā‘il. During his brief reign, Mawlāy al-Yazīd attempted to revive and revitalize the ‘Abīd army by assembling them in the garrison of Meknès (121). The Oudaya were also brought back to Fès after thirty years of absence.

When Mawlāy Sulaymān came to power, the size of the professional army was negligible. Just before Mawlāy al-Yazīd died, it consisted of about 400 Oudaya and less than 2,000 ‘Abīd (122). The political difficulties of Mawlāy al-

(119) Al-Zayānī, Iqd al-jumān, Ms.G.40, BGR, p.15; al-Nāṣirī, VIII, p.115.

(120) Al-Zayānī, Iqd al-jumān, p.15.

(121) Al-Du‘ayf, p.228.

(122) Ibid., p.273.

Yazīd and the dynastic crisis which followed his death led to the dispersal of the professional army as many soldiers deserted Makhzen service under the pressures of survival. In these circumstances, Mawlāy Sulaymān had to rely on the Berber confederation of Aīt Idrassen and the tribe of Beni Mtir in particular, in order to subdue the country and impose his rule. The pacification of the northern provinces of Jbala, the Gharb and Tamesna was essentially an achievement of Aīt Idrassen contingents commanded by Muḥammad Wa‘zīz and Ibn Nāṣir al-Mṭīrī. As for the professional army, it hardly totalled 4,000 men in 1793, according to the estimates of the British consul in Morocco (123).

The task of providing the State with a reliable army was, therefore, one of Mawlāy Sulaymān's most urgent responsibilities. He could not remain for ever dependent on Berber contingents. In 1796 he decided to incorporate among the auxiliary jaysh the tribes of Cheraga and Oulad Jama and equipped at the same time 3,000 men from the Oudaya with horses (124). Mawlāy Sulaymān aimed in the first place at strengthening the Oudaya, greatly weakened by his father, so as to allow them to counter-balance the arrogant power of the ‘Abīd. In 1798 he decided to reinforce the tribal jaysh with the recruitment of the Beni Hsen who were among the most powerful Arab tribes of the Azghār (125). In 1807 the jaysh organization was extended to the Guerouane who, after an unfortunate battle with their Beni Mtir rivals, asked Mawlāy Sulaymān to accept them into his army (126). According to Captain Burel who visited Morocco in 1808, the Guerouane supplied the Makhzen with 2,000 fighters (127). This tribe remained, however, only a short while within the Makhzen army since, in 1811, we find it among the allies of Abū Bakr Amhāwīsh at the Battle of Azrou.

(123) F.O.52/10, 7 May, 1793.

(124) Al-Du‘ayf, pp.318-319.

(125) Ibid., p.387.

(126) Ibid., p.448.

(127) J. Caillé, La mission, p.59.

By the end of the first decade of the nineteenth century Mawlāy Sulaymān realized how modest the result of his organizational efforts really had been. His major failure had been his inability to organize the various jaysh tribes into an efficient army endowed with the necessary discipline and capable of checking the military potential of the tribes. The Cheraga, Oulad Jama and the Beni Hsen tribes never rose to the organizational level of the Oudaya, as Mawlāy Sulaymān had hoped. They constituted nothing more than an auxiliary tribal force to which the Makhzen resorted every time there was a major military confrontation. Even in quantitative terms, Mawlāy Sulaymān was unable to recruit enough troops to balance the military strength of some of the powerful tribal confederations. In 1808 the army was evaluated at 36,000 men (128) at a time when a single tribal confederation, such as the Beni Hsen or the Chaouia, could mobilize as much as 30,000 or 40,000 men (129).

Conscious of these deficiencies, in 1810-1811, Mawlāy Sulaymān attempted a solution along the lines of the janissary model. On the one hand, he ordered the recruitment of the harrātīn (descendants of black slaves) to reinforce the 'Abīd army (130); but this decision was apparently never carried out as a result of the controversy which it raised over the definition of a hartānī (131). On the other hand, Mawlāy Sulaymān decided to recruit 2,000 men of the Beni Hsen—already made into a jaysh tribe—into the regular army (132). These measures, however, were no more successful than the earlier ones. The fall in Makhzen revenue during the second decade of the nineteenth century and growing tribal agitation among the coastal plains after 1811 compromised all efforts designed to strengthen the army. More alarming was the spread of insubordination in the army itself as a result of the Makhzen's inability

(128) Ibid.

(129) Al-Du^cayf, p.388.

(130) Ibid., p.460.

(131) Ibid.

(132) Ibid., p.483.

to curb tribal agitation. In 1815 the 'Abīd army showed signs of dissatisfaction (133) and in 1816 the Oudaya openly defied Mawlāy Sulaymān's orders by refusing to be transferred from Fès to Meknès (134). The plague epidemic of 1818-1820 and the military setback of Zaïan dealt a final blow to the Makhzen army. Disorganized by the plague, routed by the Berber contingents of Abū Bakr Amhāwīsh, the army became more restless and undisciplined than ever.

After the Zaïan defeat, a reorganization of the army became necessary. In 1818-1819 Mawlāy Sulaymān ordered the recruiting of what had been saved from the epidemic and the military defeat (135). He particularly wanted to raise two Arab tribes in the vicinity of Fès, Oulad al-Haj and Himyan, to the jaysh status and incorporate them into the Oudaya (136). However, the political instability which characterized the latter part of his reign, in addition to financial problems experienced by the Makhzen, rendered any efficient reorganization futile.

What was the nature of this army ? The Makhzen army consisted, as mentioned earlier, of two main groups: the standing army of 'Abīd and Oudaya, and the auxiliary force provided by the jaysh tribes. The Oudaya were stationed at Fès while the 'Abīd were garrisoned at Meknès as well as in the various ports. Men in the standing army were provided with accommodation, a fixed monthly salary (one mithqāl), two garments per year, a fixed amount of cereals for the maintenance of their families and horses, in addition to their military equipment. They also received a

(133) F.O.174/20, 6 Sept., 1814.

(134) Al-Du'ayf, p.531.

(135) Cf. letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to 'Ayyād, commander of the Oudaya, ordering him to replace all soldiers who died in the plague epidemic, dated 7 Muḥarram, 1234/ 6 Nov., 1818, in D.A.R. See also another letter to 'Ayyād concerning the reorganization of the army, 1 Shawwāl, 1234/ 13 Aug., 1819 in D.A.R.

(136) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to 'Ayyād, 21 Shawwāl, 1234/ 13 Aug. 1819, concerning the recruitment of Oulad al-Haj and Himyan into the Oudaya, in D.A.R.

rātib (allowance) for every military expedition (137). The jaysh contingents, on the other hand, did not receive a salary as they represented the contribution from tribes which, in return for their military service, were exempted from taxes. For their livelihood, the tribal contingents depended on agriculture but received arms, equipment and clothing from the Makhzen.

While the 'Abīd consisted of infantry and cavalrymen, the Oudaya formed an exclusively mounted force. From both of these Mawlāy Sulaymān appointed 1,400 men to serve as his tabā'a, or royal guard (138). The Makhzen army was particularly deficient in the field of artillery. Indeed, the best artillerymen of the country belonged to the ḥadariya towns such as Tétouan, Salé, Rabat or Fès. They were often called upon to assist the army during its major expeditions.

The structure of the Moroccan army was rudimentary. The troops were officered by qā'id-s and muqaddam-s. Every hundred men were placed under the command of a qā'id, and every twenty five under a muqaddam (139). In their appearance, there was hardly any distinction between a soldier and a common tribesman as far as mount, dress, or military equipment were concerned. Within the army itself, there was only a slight difference in dress between soldiers and officers (140).

Once on the battlefield, Makhzen troops formed nothing but an incoherent multitude lacking both order and discipline. Al-Zayānī ascribed Mawlāy Sulaymān's military defeats to the great number of troops that he led to the

(137) AHN, Estado, Leg.4327, Observations on Lemprière's A Tour from Gibraltar to Tangier, p. 16.

(138) Al-Du'ayf, p.318.

(139) Cf. letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to 'Ayyād concerning the re-organization of the army, dated 1 Shawwāl, 1234/ 13 Aug., 1819, in D.A.R.

(140) Soldiers used to wear a red cap while officers added a white turban around; cf. J. Buffa, Travels, p.108.

battlefield and which became impossible to control. "Every sultan who fights with all his troops", he wrote, "is condemned to ruin, and every prince who entrusts the command of more than one thousand men to a single person is certainly leading his army to defeat" (141). Indeed, Mawlāy Sulaymān's troops at the time of confrontation presented themselves like "a disorganized multitude and reckless hordes lacking order, discipline and restraining officers who should be strictly obeyed by their subordinates" (142). This description of the Moroccan army by a Makhzen official was confirmed by a British surgeon who visited the country in 1820 when he wrote: "A Moorish army is nothing better than a collection of people brought together and possessing neither order nor discipline" (143).

Mawlāy Sulaymān must have been aware of his army's weaknesses for the assistance of Christian renegades was often sought and artillerymen sent for training at Gibraltar. European instructors were also invited to Morocco for training purposes (144). Such attempts were, however, sporadic and isolated. They were intended to meet circumstantial needs rather than longterm programs of training. The Sultan had even proposed to send a group of Moroccan students to London to be trained in the art of gunnery and medicine (145). The British government was willing to receive these students, but the untimely death of al-Salāwī together with the deterioration of the domestic situation in Morocco relegated this project to a secondary plan (146). Turkish and Egyptian military

(141) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawda, fol.184.

(142) The remark was made by Mawlāy 'Abd al-Rahmān's minister, Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-'Amrāwī (d.1847); cf. Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Salām al-Sā'ih, al-Muntakhabat al-'abqariya, Rabat, 1920, p.108.

(143) C.O.91/79, Robert Sillery's Report.

(144) F.O.174/124, letter from al-Salāwī to Matra, dated 21 Ḥijja, 1210/29 June, 1796; F.O.174/285, from al-Salāwī to J. Green, dated 23 Ṣafar, 1227/8 March, 1812; F.O.174/286, from Ahmad b. M'Bārak to J. Green, dated 29 Jumāda I, 1231/28 April, 1816.

(145) Letter from al-Salāwī to W. A'Court, 26 Sha'bān, 1228/24 Aug., 1813. in C.O.2/4 (appendix 67).

(146) Ibid.

reforms were well known in Morocco but did not seem to have made any impression (147). The application of Western-style discipline (qānūn) was simply discarded as being impossible (148).

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- (147) At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Moroccans were well acquainted with Middle Eastern military reforms. The author of al-Ibtisām, for instance, gave a detailed description of Muḥammad ‘Alī's reforms in Egypt. Cf. al-Ibtisām, pp.31-35.
- (148) Al-Ibtisām, p.209.

CHAPTER III

ECONOMY, FINANCE AND TRADE

1792 - 1822

I - Bases of Moroccan Economy

The economic structures of Morocco at the end of the eighteenth century had undergone little or no change for centuries. Agriculture, which provided the overwhelming majority of the population with its livelihood, continued to be practised according to the most rudimentary technological methods. Much the same could be said for crafts and commercial techniques. Moroccans contented themselves with the heritage and ignored the technological changes that were taking place around them. Their proximity to Europe and their uninterrupted contact with Europeans left them indifferent to the growing efficiency of Western civilization. The peasant, the artisan and the merchant continued to provide their goods and services to satisfy the immutable needs of a predominantly rural population. Morocco's acceptance of European trade during the second half of the eighteenth century no doubt placed the population in contact with new products and tended to develop new tastes, particularly among the urban khāssa, but that was just the start of a process the full development of which remained for the distant future.

A- Agriculture

Moroccan traditional agriculture remained heavily dependent on climatic variations and the hazards of natural calamities to which all Mediterranean countries were subject. Drought and locust invasions were the most dreadful enemies against which the peasant could do nothing but lament and pray. When one or the other occurred, economic life was in jeopardy. Yet, in the absence of such calamities, the country produced enough not only to cover the needs of its inhabitants, but to permit exports as well. "The inhabitants", reported the British consul general in 1824, "have an abundance of food, except after long droughts or when the vegetation is destroyed by locusts" (1).

At the beginning of the nineteenth century Morocco still seemed to be an undercultivated country. Many foreign observers were struck by the immensity of the uncultivated lands (2). Despite the fertility of the soil, M. de Lesseps remarked, little land was ploughed (3). Towards the middle of the nineteenth century, Beaumier could still claim that cultivated lands hardly represented one third of the arable territory (4).

The rudimentary state of agricultural techniques did not fail to attract the attention of European travellers. "Despite the beneficent climatic influences", noted Beaumier, "agriculture made no progress for centuries" (5). The wooden plough and the sickle were the only tilling and harvesting instruments adopted by both sedentary and transhumant peasants. "They make use of

(1) F.O. 174/156, 4 Feb., 1824.

(2) Lemprière, Voyage, p. 73, M. de Lesseps, "Notice", p.17, F.O. 174/156, 4 Feb., 1824.

(3) De Lesseps, "Notice", p. 17.

(4) A. Beaumier, Le Maroc, Paris, 1867, p. 54.

(5) Ibid., p. 52.

small harrow and a pair of oxen for turning up the soil, which they instantly sow, and with another harrow of a finer construction they level the mould, and leave the rest of the operations to Nature" (6). Given the availability of fertile land and the relative underpopulation of the coastal plains, such a rudimentary technology seems to have been well suited for the country's requirements. The Moroccan peasant saw no need for a more advanced technology to satisfy his basic wants (7).

However, agricultural techniques and cultures varied greatly from one region to another, depending on the nature of the soil and the degree of sedentarization. In hilly or mountainous country, such as the Rif, the Jbala, the Sous and the western High Atlas where sedentary life predominated, agriculture was based on an intensive utilization of the soil (8). The relative density of the population and the low fertility of the soil led to a fragmentation of family property and the adoption of terraced cultures, particularly in the Sous. In these regions cereal farming acquired a secondary importance as it was intended primarily to cover the needs of the local population. The country between Tétouan and Fès produced large quantities of olives, figs, and citrus fruits. In the Haha and the Sous the same produce could be found, in addition to almonds. "The Sus", wrote J.G. Jackson in 1808, "produces more almonds and olives than all other provinces together" (9). Sugar cane was also planted around Taroudant, but the sugar industry had been on

(6) J. Curtis, A Journal of Travels in Barbary, London, 1803, p.51.

(7) Observations made by A.G.Hopkins about west African pre-colonial societies apply to the Moroccan case as well. "A more advanced technology", wrote Hopkins, "will be used only if it is more profitable than existing methods, or if it is essential to ensure survival". Cf. A.G. Hopkins , An Economic History of West Africa, London, 1973, p.37.

(8) Saugnier, Relations, p. 154.

(9) Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p.20.

the decline for a long time and Morocco depended increasingly on European imports (10). On the other hand, the coastal plains laying between the Jbala and the western High Atlas constituted a land of cereals par excellence. The Gharb appeared to be in 1813 "perhaps the finest cornland in the world" (11). The Chaouia, the Doukkala and the Abda had long been known as the granaries of the Empire. Some industrial cultures were also practiced. Before its prohibition in 1800 by Mawlāy Sulaymān, tobacco used to be planted around Meknès and in the Doukkala. Enough was produced to allow exports to the western Sudan (12). Cotton of "a superior quality" was also cultivated in the environs of Rabat and Salé (13) and was used by the workshops of these towns in the manufacture of a local cotton cloth known as al-kittān al-bildī (14).

In Morocco, as in other pre-colonial societies, agriculture was the matrix of all economic activities. Of all products from the land, cereals were by far the most important. A good harvest of cereals was not only a barrier against famine, but a motor for the whole economic system. With the exception of the famine years of 1817-1818, the period under study witnessed no major agricultural crisis. The early period of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign (1792-1797) was a period of abundance during which agriculture did not suffer from either natural calamities or from the political instability. In fact, Mawlāy Sulaymān avoided as much as possible major military confrontations with the "coastal republics" of Safi, Tīt and Dār al-Baydā ,preferring to consolidate his rule in the

(10) In a letter to the Earl of Liverpool dated 20 Sept., 1797, Jackson mentioned sugar and cotton as produces of the Sous; cf. Liverpool papers, Ms.38,231, British Museum. Cf. also Jackson, An Account of the Empire, pp.18-20.

(11) C.O.2/4, A'Court Mission to Morocco, 20 Aug., 1813.

(12) Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p.16.

(13) Ibid., p.15. Cf. also Ibn 'Alī al-Dukkālī, Ithāf, Ms.Z.13009, R.L., p.16.

(14) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to 'Abd al-Rahmān 'Ash 'āsh, 24 Jumādā II, 1233/1 May, 1818, in D.A.R.

northern provinces. Wheat was so abundant and cheap during these years that it constituted the main item of export from both the northern and southern ports (15).

In 1798 the joint effects of a drought and a locust invasion put an end to this agricultural prosperity. In August 1798 the British consul reported that "the crops in Morocco had entirely failed" (16). The price of wheat became exorbitant reaching 60 mithqāl-s the wisq, or 12 ūqiya-s per mudd (17). The way was paved for the most disastrous plague since the Middle Ages. During the spring of 1799 locusts invaded the country reaching as far north as Tangier and "leaving not the least appearance of verdure on the face of the country" (18). Curiously enough, this locust invasion does not seem to have occasioned any significant damage to the crop of 1799 which, according to both Moroccan and European sources, was abundant (19).

Agricultural activity suffered heavily from the plague of 1799-1800. This was mainly due to the decrease in population and the lack of manpower. "The crop(of 1799) was abundant", noted 'Abd al-Salām b. Sulaymān al-Fishtālī, "but impossible to gather in" (20). European observers who travelled through the coastal plains shortly after the plague ended reported that wheat was left uncut in many places and herds of cattle were wandering in the countryside (21). Labour became so scarce and expensive that husbandmen preferred to abandon their crops, the value of which would be "insufficient to pay the expenses of reaping them" (22). Contrary to what

(15) Al-Du'ayf, pp.324, 334.

(16) F.O.52/11, 15 Aug., 1798.

(17) Al-Fishtālī, fol.125. The wisq makes 5 mudd-s, or 62.5 kilograms.

(18) F.O.52/11, 21 May, 1799.

(19) Al-Fishtālī, fol.125; Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p.105.

(20) Al-Fishtālī, fol.125.

(21) F.O.52/11, 28 Nov., 1799; Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p.175.

(22) Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p.42.

would have been expected, the period immediately after the plague was not one of abundance, but rather of scarcity. The dissemination of the rural population and the heavy rains of the winter of 1799-1800 did not allow the survivors to cultivate the soil (23). Accordingly, little ground was tilled in 1800. At the end of the year the British consul reported that the price of wheat was "three times dearer than it ought to have been at that time" (24). It was precisely this scarcity which induced Mawlāy Sulaymān to impose restrictions on the export of victuals. "The plague made every kind of provision scarce", argued Makhzen officials, "and he (Mawlāy Sulaymān) must consult the interests of his own people" (25).

Once the immediate effects of the Great Plague were over, the country experienced an exceptional agricultural abundance. Neither the demographic losses nor the prohibition imposed on the export of grain seem to have resulted in a drastic fall of cultivated surfaces as alleged by Jackson (26). In fact, all those who visited the country between 1801 and 1813 conveyed a different picture of Moroccan agriculture. James Curtis who travelled to Fès in the spring of 1801 observed that "the country seemed better cultivated than might have been expected from the fatal effects of the plague" (27). While travelling through the Gharb, Curtis also noted that "every part evinced a high state of cultivation" (28).

(23) F.O.52/11, 19 March, 1800.

(24) F.O.52/11, 2 Dec., 1800.

(25) F.O.52/11, 30 Jan., 1801.

(26) Jackson affirmed that after the prohibition of the export of wheat "the soil here (in the Chaouia) and elsewhere has lain fallow" (An Account of the Empire, p.42). In 1818 Jackson affirmed again that "many millions of acres of the finest and most productive land lies fallow for want of a market for its produce" (An Account of Timbuctoo, and Housa territories in the Interior of Africa, London, 1820, p.211). The fact that the southern coastal plains were usually less extensively cultivated than the northern ones might explain the above assertions.

(27) J. Curtis, A Journal, p.32.

(28) Ibid., p.26.

Even "portions of the mountains were cultivated" (29). These observations were confirmed five years later by another British visitor. In 1806 John Buffa noted that the country between Tangier and Meknès was covered with "fine corn fields ... many mountains cultivated to the very summit" (30). In 1813 the British ambassador A'Court was also impressed by the agricultural abundance of the Gharb. "The whole country is one continued plain of perhaps the finest cornland in the world", he wrote (31).

The period extending between 1800 and 1812 was, indeed, one of agricultural prosperity. Cereal prices were extremely low. In 1808, the mudd of wheat cost less than 2 ūqiya-s (32). Famines such as those experienced by Algeria and Tunisia in 1804-1805 were unknown to Morocco (33). At a time when eastern neighbours were having serious agricultural difficulties Morocco could afford to relieve their sufferings by sending cargoes of wheat to Tunis and Tripoli (34). Mawlāy Sulaymān also allowed the free export of 50,000 quintals of cereals "in assistance to the British army fighting the French in Lisbon and Cadiz" (35).

In 1812 locusts invaded the southern provinces causing "considerable damage in corn" (36). Rainfall was also

(29) Ibid., p.53.

(30) J. Buffa, Travels, p.30.

(31) C.O.2/4, Meknès, 20 Aug., 1813.

(32) J. Caillé, La mission, p.107.

(33) L. Valensi, Le Maghreb, p.24.

(34) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawda, fol.182; F.O.52/12, 25 Aug., 1804 and 23 June, 1802.

(35) F.O.52/16, letter from Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Sādaq, governor of Essaouira, to the British government, dated 6 Ṣafar, 1228/8 Feb., 1813. The Spanish junta of Seville was also allowed in 1809 to export 20,000 faneqa-s of wheat (cf. CCC, vol.23, 26 Nov., 1809).

(36) F.O.174/20, 21 April, 1812; F.O.174/153, 9 March, 1812. The crops in the Doukkala and Tamesna were not affected by this locust invasion.

insufficient. Towards the end of 1812 and early 1813 wheat prices in the south suddenly rose to 20 ūqiya-s for the mudd (37). "People have been in a great measure starving", wrote the British vice-consul at Essaouira in May 1813 (38). That was the end of agricultural prosperity and a precursory sign of the economic and political difficulties that lay ahead.

Nevertheless, the 1812 scarcity seems to have been mainly limited to the southern part of the country. Until 1815 Moroccan wheat continued to be illegally drained off to European countries. From 1813 Mawlāy Sulaymān mounted numerous military campaigns against the tribes of the Rif to stop illicit trade of wheat (39). Evidently, the country continued to produce enough to cover the essential needs of the population before the major famine of 1817-1818.

Table 2 Evolution of Wheat Prices 1796-1822

1796	4	<u>ūqiya-s/</u>	<u>the mudd</u>	(12.5 kgs.)
1798-99	12	"	"	"
1808	1.5	"	"	"
1812	20	"	"	" (Essaouira)
1817	26	"	"	" (Rabat)
1818	23	"	"	" (Rabat)
1819	4	"	"	" (Rabat)
1820	4	"	"	" (Rabat)
1821	6	"	"	" (Rabat)
1822	3	"	"	"

Sources: Al-Du'ayf, p.321; al-Fishṭālī, fol.125; J. Caillé, La mission p.107; F.O.531/1; CCC, vol.27-28.

(37) F.O.631/1, 16 May, 1813.

(38) Ibid. In 1813 the Moroccan government found itself in the impossibility of acceding to the request of the British ambassador who demanded, among other things, the authorization to export wheat. Cf. letter from al-Salāwī to W. A'Court, 8 Sha'bān, 1228/6 Aug., 1813 in Add.Ms.41,512, British Museum.

(39) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawda, fol.190; al-Du'ayf, pp.508, 512; F.O.52/16, 7 Aug., 1814.

B - Crafts

The prosperity of the artisan was intimately linked to that of the peasant. Years of drought or bad harvest had direct repercussion on both industry and trade. During such years town dwellers would have to spend more of their income on victuals, and particularly on cereals. Crop failures also reduced the peasant's spendings on town-made products. The urban artisan supplied the tribesman with armament, saddlery, leather articles, part of his clothing and various tools and utensils (40). In the village there were blacksmiths, weavers and potters who satisfied the basic needs of the rural population. Nevertheless, it was in the urban market that the peasant could find more complex articles and a wider choice too.

Craftsmen were mainly concentrated in the hadariya towns such as Fès, Tétouan, Rabat and Salé. In the south, Marrakech and Taroudant tended to play a role similar to that of the hadariya towns in the north. It is impossible to determine exactly the proportion of artisans in the urban population but information about Fès at the beginning of the twentieth century (41) suggests that at least half the population of the major towns gained their living from crafts even in the early nineteenth century. They undoubtedly formed the majority of the urban labour force (42).

Within the urban social body artisans counted rather among the common people. However, the value attached to manual work differed greatly from one craft

(40) For some artisans, such as saddlers and gunsmiths, the tribesman was, undoubtedly, the most important customer. Cf. R. Le Tourneau, La vie quotidienne à Fès en 1900, Paris, 1965, p. 98.

(41) Ibid., p. 99.

(42) Kenneth Brown, People of Salé, p.132.

to another. Between "noble" crafts, such as shoemaking or the work of precious metals, and "dirty" crafts, such as rope making or horseshoeing there was an unbridgeable gap. Crafts of the latter kind tended to be left to outsiders (barrānī-s) while "noble" professions were in general the appanage of "the sons of the town". Very few artisans acquired enough wealth to join the khāṣṣa. Accordingly, they played no significant role in politics, except in times of instability when physical power became more important. Their esprit de corps allowed them to acquire a sudden importance at times when central authority was weak (43).

The list of the various activities involved was vast, but the most important were the leather industry (tanning, shoemaking and saddlery), the weaving of wool and cotton, pottery, the copper industry and the manufacture of light armament. The results of these activities covered not only the local needs but also used to be exported to the western Sudan and the Arab Middle East. Leather goods, woollens and copper utensils were the most well-known articles of Moroccan industry.

While the arrival of Andalusian families from Spain during the fifteenth and early seventeenth centuries gave Moroccan crafts a new impetus through the introduction of new skills, working underwent little change. The basic unit of production remained the workshop which included, in addition to the master worker (m̄alleem), one or a few apprentices. Material conditions for the

(43) In 1873, for instance, the tanners of Fès rebelled against the tax collector (amin) as he attempted to raise the maks on leather, a few weeks only after the proclamation of Mawlāy al-Hasan (1873-1894). Cf. details of the tanners' rising in El-Outaiq, III, 1977, pp.280-296.

(44) A list of traditional Moroccan crafts is given by 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Zaydān, Ms.Z.3986, R.L., p.11.

master worker differed only slightly from that of his journeymen(45). The use of machinery was unknown and even tools were rudimentary.

Outside the workshop the artisans belonging to the same profession were bound by the hanta, or corporation. The hanta was a loose organization with no civil personality and was governed more by curf, or custom, than by a recognized set of rules. In their daily activities artisans manifested no real evidence of organization. It was only on the occasion of certain ceremonies or when a fellow artisan was placed in a difficult situation that mutual action came into play. Artisans of the same corporation usually collected money to make a joint present to the sultan, to the sharif-s or to the shrine of the patron saint of the town. The same happened when an artisan was faced with an unexpected expense, such as funerals or in the case of serious damage to health or property. At the head of every corporation there was an amin (46) who acted as the representative of the profession before the Makhzen authorities and other corporations. In practice, his main task consisted in settling disputes which arose among the members of the corporation. The amin was chosen by artisans under the supervision of the muhtasib (market provost) (47).

Every corporation placed itself under the spiritual protection of a saint. The members of the corporation participated every year in the religious festivities organized in honour of the patron saint and contributed generously to collections for the sharif-s.

(45) K. Brown, People of Salé, p.132.

(46) The amin, head of the corporation, is not to be confused with the makhzen's amin, who is a customs officer or a tax collector.

(47) The muhtasib regulated most economic affairs (fixing of prices, checking weights and measures, repression of industrial fraud) and supervised public morality.

In times of economic hardship artisans usually appealed to the city's patron saint (Mawlāy Idrīs of Fès, Sīdī 'Abd Allāh b. Ḥassūn of Salé and Abū al-'Abbās al-Sabtī of Marrakech) imploring him to intercede in their favour before God (48). Of all the urban groups artisans were the most inclined to join popular tariqa-s such as the 'Aysāwiya, the Hamadsha and the Darqāwiya (49).

Like all other economic sectors crafts suffered heavily from famines and plague epidemics experienced under the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān. The Great Plague of 1799-1800 was the most disastrous of all. The epidemic carried away many artisans in the major towns of the country. Members of the British embassy who were in Fès in 1801 noted the great loss in human lives among artisans(50). Some crafts suffered more than others. Matra reported the perishing of more than seventy stationers and embellishers that were in the city. Mawlāy Sulaymān's ceremonial letter to the king of Great Britain was ornamented by the only apprentice who was spared by the plague (51). The expense of labour rose considerably as a result of the demographic losses (52) and prices of manufactured goods necessarily followed suit. James Curtis noted in 1801 that the prices of locally manufactured articles had considerably increased as a result of the plague (53).

(48) Al-Dufayf mentions, for instance, that in 1804 craftsmen and traders of Marrakech appealed twice to Sīdī Abu al-'Abbās al-Sabtī because of the economic difficulties experienced by the town at that time. Cf. pp.239-240.

(49) In his Enquête sur les corporations, Massignon noted that popular tariqa-s, such as the Hamadsha and the 'Aysāwiya, recruited their adepts mainly among bakers, porters, bath workers, tanners and blacksmiths. Cf. L. Massignon, "Enquête", in Revue du Monde Musulman, LVIII, 1924, p.140.

(50) Curtis, A Journal, pp.83-84; cf. also al-Fishtālī, fol.125.

(51) F.O.52/12, 12 April, 1802.

(52) Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p.175.

(53) Curtis, A Journal, pp.83-84.

However, like other economic sectors, crafts certainly benefited from the agricultural abundance which characterized the middle part of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign. Artisans were also favoured by the fiscal policy adopted by the Sultan. The abolition of non-Quranic taxes (maks) and State monopolies over a number of raw materials (leather, cochineal, raw silk, sulphur) provided unusual advantages for artisanry. The restrictions imposed on the export of wool after the Great Plague made that article abundant (54) and must have constituted a strong incentive for the woollen industry. High tariffs levied on the export of other raw materials, such as goat skins and cow hides, served also as a protection for the local leather industry. The supply of such articles seems to have been so abundant that despite a considerable increase in the volume exported between 1806 and 1812 (55), local markets remained well provided with all kinds of raw materials (56). This certainly allowed the industrial activity to recover from the harmful effects of the Great Plague.

The opening of Morocco to European imports during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries does not seem to have seriously undermined local crafts (57). Although the country received increasing quantities of European manufactured goods (linens, copper utensils, knives, razors, etc) the Moroccan artisan continued to produce not only to cover the needs of the overwhelming majority of consumers, but also to allow for exports to the Sudan and the Arab East. It is true that imported quantities of brass pans, razors and sewing thread, for

(54) F.O.174/13, 30 June , 1802.

(55) Cf. Table 12 below.

(56) J. Buffa, Travels, pp.25, 53.

(57) While Mawlāy Sulaymān attempted to limit exports he made no effort to obstruct imports.

instance, considerably increased between 1804 and 1812 (58), but such imports were to some extent destined for reexportation in the caravan trade and what remained in the country went mainly to an insignificant wealthy minority.

Until the middle of the nineteenth century, Moroccan artisans succeeded in withstanding European competition without much difficulty (59). Many products, particularly leather articles and woollens, continued to find their way to Middle Eastern and west African markets. In Timbuctoo slippers from Fès and ḥāyk-s from Tafilelt could be found side by side with Manchester cloth (60). Indeed, despite a rudimentary technology, the Moroccan artisan produced superior quality articles. The woollen cloth of Tafilelt (al-ḥāyk al-filālī) was "as thin as muslin" (61). A British visitor noticed in 1826 that "some of the woollen manufactures were of superior strength and closeness" even to English woollens (62). Jackson also noted that gold thread manufactured at Fès was "much superior to that which was imported into Barbary from Marseilles" (63) and which was solely used to "make belts sold in the Sudan" (64). In the cutting and polishing of precious stones the Moroccan artisan also displayed an "equal sagacity" (65).

However, by the early nineteenth century the Moroccan artisan was already beginning to lose ground in many fields before the competition of European products. European firearms, for instance, constituted a serious

(58) Between 1804 and 1812 imported brass pans, for instance, increased by as much as 47 times, and razors by more than four times. Cf. Table 15 below.

(59) K. Brown, People of Salé, pp.120-121.

(60) Jackson, An Account of the Empire, pp.289-290; Barth, Travels and discoveries in North and Central Africa, London, 1857, vol.V, pp.32-34.

(61) Jackson, An Account of Timbuctoo, p. 217.

(62) G. Beauclerk, A Journey to Morocco in 1826, London, 1828, p.239.

(63) Jackson, An Account of Timbuctoo, p.126.

(64) Ibid., p.215.

(65) Ibid., p.216.

competitor for the traditional musket. "Locally made firearms", wrote Jacques Caillé in 1827 about the Fāsi industry, "are far from European perfection"(66). By that time the Moroccan gunsmith had not only lost his traditional west African customer but was also threatened on the local market itself. European copper utensils, particularly copper kettles and tea boards, were progressively imposing themselves upon the taste of a wealthy minority for which tea had become by 1800 "a constant beverage at all hours"(67).

Moroccan cotton industry also showed the first signs of inferiority before European imports. According to Muḥammad b. ‘Alī al-Dukkālī, it was during the latter part of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign that European manufacturers began imitating local cloth with the aim of gaining over the Moroccan clientele. "Europeans began to imitate Moroccan cloth", wrote the author of Ithāf ashraf al-malā, "and succeeded in offering a better product at a lower price"(68). Apparently, the cotton industry of Salé and Rabat was the first to suffer. The Makhzen itself preferred European cloth to provide for the needs of the army "because", wrote Mawlāy Sulaymān, "it was of a better quality than the local cotton cloth (al-kittān al-bildī)"(69). Velvet also became an important article in the clothing of the Moroccan army. The artisan's outlets became more and more restricted as Morocco opened its doors to European trade.

(66) J. Caillé, Journal, III, p.115.

(67) Curtis, A Journal, p.16.

(68) Ibn‘Alī al-Dukkālī, Ithāf, p.27.

(69) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to ‘Abd al-Rahmān ‘Ashqāsh, 12 Jumādā II, 1233 / 19 April, 1818, in D.A.R.

C - Trade

In traditional Moroccan economy there was no clear cut distinction between crafts and trade. The artisan was usually the seller of his own produce. The dividing line ran, in fact, not between artisans and merchants, but rather between artisans and small merchants on one hand, and big merchants on the other. The material condition of the shop-keeper or the itinerant trader who moved from one rural market to another hardly differed from that of the artisan who relied on his manual work to earn his living. The tājir, or big merchant, on the contrary, indulged in wholesale trade and had often commercial interests outside the national borders.

Numerically, these tājir-s represented a negligible minority and were concentrated in the hadariya towns such as Fès and Tétouan. Marrakech once considered as the emporium of Saharan trade, was on the decline during the latter part of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (70). The maritime orientation of Moroccan trade by Sīdī Muḥammad b.‘Abd Allāh had diverted trade routes to the Atlantic coast and incited many merchants, particularly Jews, to emigrate from inland towns to the sea ports.

This opening to Europe had far reaching consequences on big trade. It gave rise to a new type of cosmopolitan merchants who, instead of contenting themselves with the role of intermediaries for European interests, now travelled all over Europe. Another important development was the

(70) Lemprière who visited the town in 1790-1791 reported that many houses were in ruin (Voyage, p.85). Jackson made similar remarks noting that "streets are mostly filled with ruins of houses which have gone to decay" (An Account of the Empire, p.63). On the economic difficulties of Marrakech at the beginning of the nineteenth century, cf. al-Du‘ayf, pp.439-440.

adaption of merchants who had specialized in the caravan trade to maritime commerce. This was the case of al-Tālib b. Jallūn (d.1844), the undisputed tājir of Fès who "acquired an immense wealth in the Nigrita trade" and who extended afterwards his activity to maritime commerce(71). He gained "an unlimited number of estates in Fès and its vicinity consisting in orchards, irrigated lands and other properties" (72). The fact that Ibn Jallūn was entrusted with Makhzen money being Mawlāy Sulaymān's amīn (73) did not prevent him from taking part in the Fès rebellion of 1820-1822. However, neither Mawlāy Sulaymān nor his successor reproached him for this involvement. For the Makhzen he represented the appearance of a new class the cooperation of which was necessary to check the influence of the conservative religious forces. Mawlāy 'Abd al-Rahmān, instead of liquidating him— as he did other rebellion leaders (74)— appointed him chief minister when he came to the throne (75).

Another typical example of the cosmopolitan merchant of the early nineteenth century was provided by 'Abd al-Karīm b. al-Tālib. After many years of trade with western Africa, Ibn al-Tālib specialized in the export of wheat. In 1804, he was described by the British consul as "a correct trader ... whose papers are as current as those of any banker of Europe"(76). He spent more than fifteen

(71) F.O.52/29, report on the trade of Essaouira drawn by the British consul in 1828. On the biography of al-Tālib b.Jallūn cf. 'Abd al-Kabīr b. Hāshim al-Kattānī, Zahrat al-ās, pp.546-547.

(72) 'Abd al-Kabīr al-Kattānī, Zahrat al-ās, p.547.

(73) Al-Tālib b. Jallūn supervised, for instance, the construction of great works such as bridges; cf. Anon., Dhikr khilāfat mawlānā Sulaymān b. Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh b. Ismā'īl al-'Alawī, Ms. 1892, fonds arabe, B.N., fol. 67.

(74) Upon his accession to the throne Mawlay 'Abd al-Rahmān ordered the execution of Muḥammad b. Sulaymān and Ibn al-Ghāzī, two notables who had played an important role in the Fès rebellion. Cf.al-Nāṣirī IX, pp.10-11; Muḥammad Gharrīt, Fawāṣil, pp.92-93.

(75) F.O.52/24, 11 Feb., 1823.

(76) F.O.52/12, 21 Oct., 1804

years abroad during which he travelled all over Europe. J.M. Matra reported that he could speak many European languages including English (77). In 1804 he was dispatched by Mawlāy Sulaymān to London, together with 'Abd al-Khālaq 'Ashcāsh to arrange for the purchase of naval armaments (78). Following the British attack on Algiers in 1816 he was dispatched by the Sultan in 1817 on a political mission which led him to Algiers, Tunis and Constantinople (79). During the last years of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign he was appointed by the Regency of Algiers as its consul in Morocco. This allowed him to orient his commercial activities eastward to the Ottoman regencies (80).

Muhammad Bejja (d.1820) was another example of these new enterprising merchants of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. He left his native town, Larache, towards the middle of Sīdī Muhammad's reign to settle in Cadiz. Later on, he moved to Gibraltar where he carried on his business for about twenty years. Bejja succeeded in gaining the confidence of Mawlāy Sulaymān for whom he concluded many commercial transactions abroad (81). In 1815 he was appointed consul of Morocco at Gibraltar where he died five years later, leaving behind him a fortune of 25,000 pounds sterling which Mawlāy Sulaymān found most useful in the midst of the Fès rebellion (82).

(77) Ibid.

(78) Ibid.

(79) CCC, vol.25, 1st Sept., 1817.

(80) Like al-Tālib b. Jallūn, he readily accepted to oppose his signature to the bay'a proclaiming a rebel prince in 1821; cf. text of the bay'a of Mawlāy Sa'īd in Dāwūd, III, p.261.

(81) AHN, Estado, Leg.6232(2), letter from al-Salāwī to the Spanish junta at Cadiz, recommending Muhammad Bejja, dated 12 Rabi^c II, 1228/14 April, 1813.

(82) C.O.91/79, memorial addressed by al-Hāj al-'Arbi Ma'nīnū and al-Hāj Tāhar al-Hayāt to the governor of Gibraltar concerning the property of Muhammad Bejja. This sum was used by Mawlāy Sulaymān for the purchase of military equipment.

There were many other merchants who traded directly with European countries. Among these we find 'Alī Barrāda, al-Ḥāj Idrīs Lahlū, al-Ḥāj Ahmad Ḥardān, 'Abd Allāh al-Salmānī, 'Abd al-Rahmān al-'Aṭṭār, 'Abd al-Karīm al-'Aṭṭār and the Buhlāl brothers whose names have been conserved in the European archives (83). However, few of these merchants travelled abroad to carry^{on} their private business. They were more like commissioners who transacted various affairs either on behalf of the Makhzen or on account of fellow merchants who remained in the country. Thus, Muḥammad Bejja provided a commercial antenna for Tétouani merchants while he resided at Gibraltar. The two sides exchanged commercial information on the availability of articles of trade, on their prices, as well as on the economic situation in general (84). Among themselves, Moroccan merchants created their own commercial circuit in order to avoid resorting to European or Jewish intermediaries as much as possible. This cooperation was made necessary by the modesty of the capital at their disposal. The fact that some of them travelled as far as Hamburg or Amsterdam should not create illusions about the extensiveness of their fortunes. "These merchants", wrote the French consul in 1814, "do not have enough capital to carry this trade with their own means. To their own funds they often add capital belonging to their parents or friends. Sometimes they attend also to money belonging to a widow or an orphan which they fructify according to what they consider as the most advantageous way. After one year or two years of absence ... they return home in order to deliver to everyone the merchandise he ordered or the profit made during the voyage ... contenting themselves with a small

(83) Cf. numerous petitions by Moroccan merchants in F.O.52/14, and CCC, vol.21-22. Some names of prominent contemporary merchants can be found in Beauclerk, A Journey, p.27.

(84) Cf. correspondence of Muḥammad Bejja in D.A.R.

commission" (85). Other obstacles impeded the development of commercial capitalism. Religious scruples prevented Muslim merchants from adopting modern commercial techniques. Banking services remained unknown in Morocco as well as the use of bills of exchange in the negotiation of commercial deals. Commerce was done by barter and when a Moroccan merchant travelled abroad he had to carry with him hard cash consisting generally in Spanish dollars (86). Nor was the Moroccan merchant guaranteed against the risks of piracy, war danger or natural calamities, the taking of an insurance being contrary to religion.

Maritime trade was not the only source of wealth. Caravan trade, in spite of its obvious decline during the period under study, continued to play an important role in the activation of internal exchanges. The eastern pilgrimage caravan was not motivated solely by religious considerations. Besides devout believers who sought to accomplish their religious duties, there were a number of trading pilgrims (al-hujjāj al-mutasabbibūn) who, once in Egypt and the Hijaz, exchanged articles of Moroccan artisanry (leather goods, woollens) or African slaves for Asian spices, Indian muslins and silk. The most prominent pilgrim trader was the head of the caravan (shaykh al-rakb) appointed by the sultan among the wealthiest merchants of Fès (87). The caravan gathered at Fès and remained there for about two months before it departed for Egypt. It was also at Fès that the caravan disbanded upon its return. Its stay at this city for a number of months every year was the occasion for important commercial activity of benefit both to artisans

(85) CCC, vol.24, "Mémoire sur le commerce des européens au Maroc," presented by L. Mure en 1814, fol.120-126.

(86) F.O.52/15, 26 May, 1810.

(87) Some of the prominent merchants of Fès who owed their wealth to pilgrimage caravan trade: the Ṣfīra brothers, Muḥammad Mezwār, al-'Arbī al-Shraybī and 'Abd al-Salām Buhlāl. Mawlāy Sulaymān attempted to appoint as head of the pilgrimage caravan a merchant from another town but met with the opposition of the people of Fès. Cf. al-Du'ayf, pp.384-385, 387.

and merchants of Fès. The cessation of this caravan in 1830 with the French occupation of Algiers constituted a severe blow to the Fāsi economy and necessarily oriented Moroccan trade towards the Atlantic ports.

The commercial ascendancy of Jewish merchants was another important development of the late eighteenth century. This ascendancy was a direct result of Sīdī Muḥammad's interest in the Atlantic. Many Jewish families moved to the Atlantic ports, particularly to Essaouira, where they specialized in the export-import trade. Under the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān they continued to hold the greatest share of the maritime trade. Although affected by Mawlay Sulayman's restrictive commercial policy, they tended to suffer less than their European competitors. Indeed, they seem to have consolidated their position at a time when European merchants found it impossible to maintain themselves in the Moroccan trade. Thus, in 1812 there were six Jewish trading houses in Essaouira as compared to two only in 1805. The number of European trading houses in this port decreased from six to four during the same period (88). European consuls and merchants were constantly complaining about Jewish competition, accusing Mawlāy Sulaymān of partiality towards "Jews who trade with his money" (89).

In fact, Mawlāy Sulaymān chose his tājir-s not only among his Muslim subjects but among Jews as well. While his father decided in 1789 to withdraw his money from Jewish hands and place it in the hands of European merchants, Mawlāy Sulaymān, on the contrary, restored the privileges of his Jewish subjects by entrusting them with

(88) F.O.174/12, 4 April, 1805; Inventory of the trade of Essaouira in Add.Ms.41,512, British Museum.

(89) F.O.174/12, 4 April, 1805; F.O.52/29, Report on the trade of Essaouira drawn in 1828 by the British consul.

his business (90). The most trusted Jewish merchants belonged to the Macnin and Guidalla families of Essaouira, who had commercial interests in England (91). Meir Macnin's business was essentially run with funds borrowed from the Makhzen treasury of Essaouira (92). In 1795 he headed an important firm at Essaouira with agencies at Marseille and London. From 1799 onwards, this agency was entrusted to his nephew, Salomon Sebag, the father of Sir Joseph Sebag Montefiore (93). Meir Macnin himself resided for many years in London where, in addition to running his private business, he negotiated Makhzen transactions and acted as a de facto consul of Morocco in Great Britain (94). On Mawlāy 'Abd al-Rahmān's accession to the throne in 1822, Macnin was granted large export monopolies and dispatched afterwards as ambassador to some European capitals (95).

Despite adverse economic and political conditions of the latter part of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign, the period under study can be considered as a prosperous one as far as domestic trade is concerned. Agriculture, the basis of all economic activities, witnessed no major setback if we except the crop failures of 1798, 1812 and 1817-1818. Politically, the country enjoyed a long period of

(90) Corcos, Studies in the History of the Jews of Morocco, p.117.

(91) F.O.174/29, 1st March, 1811.

(92) Letter from al-Salāwī to Francis Nadler (merchant), 26 Muḥarram, 1217 / 29 May, 1802.

(93) E.J., vol. XI, column 675.

(94) Thus, Meir Macnin negotiated the purchase of military equipment for the Makhzen and intervened on behalf of Moroccan nationals who were met with difficulties while in Great Britain. Cf. letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the governor of Essaouira concerning the purchase by Macnin of a warship in England in F.O.52/14, 28 Ḥijja, 1222 / 22 Dec., 1813; F.O.52/14, letters from Macnin to British authorities concerning some Moroccan nationals.

(95) F.O.52/24, 29 Nov., 1823; E.J., vol. XI, column 675.

peace. Even during the pacification period (1792-1798) economic activity went on unimpaired due to the strategy adopted by Mawlāy Sulaymān and which consisted in avoiding military confrontation as much as possible. It was precisely during this early period that wheat export on a large scale permitted the enrichment of the coastal towns and provinces through the acquisition of large amounts of foreign gold and silver (96).

Mawlāy Sulaymān's fiscal and commercial policy also tended to favour internal trade. By the abolition of the maks the taxation burden of the Moroccan merchant was reduced by more than 75%. Thus, the merchants of Fès who used to pay 22,000 mithqāl-s under the reign of Sīdī Muḥammad b. Abd Allāh paid only 5,000 mithqāl-s during the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān (97). State monopolies over a number of products were also abolished. Moroccan Muslim merchants enjoyed, moreover, a reduced import taxation on sea trade (2.5% against 10% for Christian and Jewish merchants) (98). At one time imports through the eastern borders paid a 1% tax only (99).

Mawlāy Sulaymān's restrictions on exports during the middle part of his reign must have also favoured Moroccan merchants. Limitations on the export of agricultural products led to abundance on the internal market and consequently improved the purchasing power of the population. This benefited both merchants and artisans.

Merchants were also favoured by Mawlāy Sulaymān's administrative policy. Government responsibilities were

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- (96) Al-Duṣayf mentions that the merchants of Rabat accumulated great fortunes from the wheat trade during this period; cf.p.337.
 - (97) Al-Duṣayf, pp.168, 387; al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol.116; al-Nāṣirī, VIII, p.16.
 - (98) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Muḥammad al-Salāwī, no date, concerning port duties for Moroccan merchants, in Alfiyat al-sulūk by al-Zayānī, p.209.
 - (99) F.O.174/13, from Jackson to Matra, 18 May, 1802.

often entrusted to merchants in preference to other social groups. For Mawlāy Sulaymān, wealth meant a minimum of greed and temptation to take over other people's property (100). "The merchant ", he wrote to the people of Fès in 1820, "does not envy others' money and contents himself with his privileged social position in order to fructify his capital" (101). This attitude led him to entrust the local government of Fès to a number of wealthy merchants, such as ^cAbd al-Qādir Ṣfīra, Muḥammad Mezwār and Muḥammad al-Saffār. The same principle led him to favour the Bildiyyīn (102) who were not only people of scholarship but of wealth as well (103).

It was only after 1815 that Moroccan merchants suffered from a series of distressing political and economic developments. During the second decade of the nineteenth century Makhzen authority became increasingly weak. Lacking enough funds and a reliable army Mawlāy down of commercial activity. Merchants, both Muslim and Jewish, were also subject to some restrictive measures in 1815-1816. In 1815 many Jewish merchants left the country after Mawlāy Sulaymān decided to impose on Jews the wearing of Moroccan dress and the payment of the capitation tax. Muslim merchants were also partly affected by the Sultan's decision in 1815 to raise import duties on maritime trade from 2.5% to 10%. Moreover, the travel abroad of

(100) Al-Zayānī, Alfiyat al-sulūk, p.214.

(101) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès (1919) in Akansūs pp.320-322; al-Nāṣirī, VIII, pp.139-141.

(102) The term Bildiyyīn (pl. of Bildi) designates Fāsi converts from Judaism into Islam and their descendants. Since the thirteenth century, when many Jewish families were forced to embrace Islam, the Bildiyyīn formed a distinct social group within the Fāsi society. Despite their indefectible attachment to Islam, their integration was constantly resisted by the other components of the Fāsi society, particularly the sharif-s. This resistance was to a large extent motivated by economic reasons as the Bildiyyīn proved to be unbeatable in the fields of crafts and trade; they also excelled in the field of learning. Cf. Anonymous, Dhikr qissat al-muhājirīn, Ms.D.1115, BGR; N. Cigar, "Conflict and Community in an Urban Milieu under the cAlawis (ca.1666-1830)", in The Maghreb Review, Nov.-Dec., 1978, pp.3-13.

(103) On Mawlāy Sulaymān's relations with the Bildiyyīn cf. chapter VII below.

Moroccan nationals, whether for commercial or other purposes, was subject in 1816 to tight control. More dramatic, however, were the severe famine of 1817-1818 and the dynastic crisis which dominated the last years of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign.

D - A Certain Prosperity

European literature, generally based on impressions formulated by European consuls and merchants, tends to often convey a gloomy picture of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign. Two erroneous concepts contribute to this unrealistic picture. The first one tends to depict this reign as a long chain of civil wars and military confrontations between the Makhzen and Berber tribes. The second concept over-emphasizes the regression of European trade and the adverse effects this had on European interests. The implicit inference behind both these mythical concepts is an unstable reign, a disorganized economy and stifled commerce.

A closer view at the political and economic developments of the period under study shows, on the contrary, that Morocco under Mawlāy Sulaymān enjoyed not only a long period of peace but of prosperity as well. Politically, the country was not exposed to any serious danger of internal destabilization before 1819. During the dynastic crisis of 1792-1798, the country remained divided, but there were no devastating wars. The country continued to produce and export large quantities of agricultural products. During the middle part of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign (1800-1811) the country was economically prosperous and politically peaceful. The second decade of the nineteenth century was undoubtedly disturbed by increasing

tribal agitation but economic activity was not seriously affected until the catastrophic famine of 1817-1818. It was only after the financial means of the Makhzen were greatly reduced as a consequence of this famine that tribal dissidence acquired a threatening character.

Nor was the decline of Moroccan exports to Europe an indication of a degraded internal economy. In fact, Mawlāy Sulaymān's restrictions on the export trade were an important factor behind the prosperity during most of his reign, since it allowed lower prices of agricultural products and sustained the activity of all economic sectors.

The most evident indication of internal prosperity was the low price of victuals. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the price of bread reached its lowest level since the reign of Mawlāy Ismā'īl (104). Towards the end of the eighteenth century, the mudd of Moroccan wheat cost between 2 and 4 ūqiya-s, whereas it cost 16 ūqiya-s in Algeria (105). In 1805 the Austrian ambassador to Morocco wrote that "cereals in this country are of a very low price" (106). Three years later Captain Burel reported that a quintal (118 English pounds) of wheat cost 2.50 francs, viz. 1.5 ūqiya-s the mudd (107). During years of abundance the mudd of wheat which had cost 5 to 6 ūqiya-s under the reign of Sīdī Muḥammad

(104) J. Brignon et al, Histoire du Maroc, p. 273.

(105) Compare wheat prices in Morocco given by al-ṣu'ayf, p.321 with prices in effect in Algeria for the same period given by Ahmad b. Muḥammad al-Fāṣī in his Rihla; cf. extracts of this Rihla Ms.G.88 BGR, p.164.

(106) J. Caillé, Une ambassade, p.108.

(107) Idem., La mission, p.107.

was available at only 2 and 3 ūqiya-s (108). Much the same could be said of meat prices. The Gibraltar authorities noted that Moroccan cattle were far cheaper than either Algerian or Spanish livestock. Even when communications between Gibraltar and Spain were open, the pound of Moroccan meat still cost only one third of the price of its Spanish counterpart (109).

During the last decade of the eighteenth century the political divisions in the country and agricultural abundance made unrestricted export of cereals possible. This gave rise to a class of intermediaries in the Atlantic ports who accumulated enormous wealth. In Rabat and Salé, for instance, some wealthy individuals, such as 'Abd Allāh Bargāsh and his son al-Makki, bought a number of vessels in Europe for mercantile purposes (110). "The people of Rabat", wrote al-Du'ayf, "used to buy ships from Christians. Some of them bought an entire ship, others bought half, one third or one fourth of it. They gained a lot of money and began building houses with arched doors on the Western model" (111). The coastal tribes also benefited from this prosperity. Al-Du'ayf was impressed in 1800 by the affluence of coastal tribesmen, particularly by their admirable horses, their colourful velvet garments, their delicate saddles and golden stirrups (112).

(108) During the reign of Sīdī Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh the mudd of wheat cost between 5 to 6 ūqiya-s in time of abundance (cf. AHN, Estado, Leg. 2327, *Observations sur un livre anglais intitulé A Tour from Gibraltar to Tangier*, by Lemprière p. 44). During the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān the mudd of wheat cost between 2 and 3 ūqiya-s according to the French consul; cf. CCC, vol. 26, 19 Feb., 1818.

(109) F.O.52/21, 21 Nov., 1820.

(110) F.O.52/10, 2 Aug., 1792; AHN, Estado, Leg., 4331(1), copy of a notarial act concerning the purchase of a vessel by 'Abd Allāh Bargāsh, dated 6 Shawwāl, 1207/17 May, 1793.

(111) Al-Du'ayf, p. 337.

(112) Ibid., p. 409.

The most prosperous period of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign was undoubtedly from 1800 to 1815. With the exception of the bad harvest of 1812, this period was free from any serious drought or natural calamity. "The tribes", wrote al-Zayānī, "grew richer and their flocks became more extensive" (113). The plague, by reducing the population, had certainly contributed to the enrichment of those who were left. According to the testimony of Jackson, the period after the plague saw a beneficent "alteration of fortunes" (114). "When the epidemic ended in the Gharb (...), Fès, Meknès and their surroundings", wrote Akansūs, "life became more pleasant and goods more plentiful as a result of the inheritance left by the dead" (115). J. Buffa who travelled through the northern Atlantic plains in 1806 reported that the countryside was prosperous and "covered with immense flocks of sheep and herds of cattle" (116). He also noted the availability in the markets of large quantities of agricultural products (117). Moroccan sources tend to confirm the observations made by European travellers. "During these years", wrote al-Nāṣirī, "the population experienced the utmost tranquillity, peace, low prices and happiness" (118). This was particularly true of the middle period of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign. "We have had the occasion to meet many people who lived during the middle period of his reign", added al-Nāṣirī, "and all are unanimous in their praise of it" (119)

(113) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol. 204.

(114) Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p. 174.

(115) Akansus, p. 288.

(116) J. Buffa, Travels,

(117) Ibid., p. 53.

(118) Al-Nāṣirī, VIII, p. 114.

(119) Ibid., p. 112.

This prosperity also benefited to the urban population. "Trade expanded", wrote the author of al-Ibtisām, "and money became abundant with the abolition of the maks and the extension of security to both the individual and his property" (120). A similar impression is conveyed by al-Zayānī. "During his (Mawlāy Sulaymān's) days", he wrote, "people competed in the building of houses and palaces such as were never seen before" (121). An indication of this urban prosperity was the impressive expansion of Fès towards the end of the eighteenth century. In a letter to the people of this city in 1797, Mawlāy Sulaymān referred to the fact that urbanization had spread to the periphery of the town and to hitherto uninhabited zones (122).

II - Makhzen Finance

A - The Taxation System

The origin of the taxation system in Morocco goes back to the establishment of Islam there. For the Islamic State the sharī'a devised an ingenious system of taxation based on both capital and income. It consists of the cushūr and the zakāt. The first one was a tax of one tenth levied on the produce of the land. In principle,

(120) Al-Ḥajwī, Ikhtīṣār al-Ibtisām, p. 359.

(121) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawda, fol. 202.

(122) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès, 16 Ḥijja, 1211/12 June, 1797 in Ms. D 194, BGR, p. 50.

"...فالعِمارَةُ الْتِي تَهِيَّأَتْ فِي هَذَا الْوَقْتِ السَّعِيدِ مَا نَشَاءُ اللَّهُ بِحَافِرَةِ فَاسِ... فَانْتَمْ تَرُوا النَّاسُ يَعْمَرُونَ أَطْرَافَ الْمَدِينَةِ وَالْبَقْعَ الَّتِي كَانَتْ غَيْرُ مُسْكُونَةِ...".

it was paid at once at the harvest. The zakāt, on the other hand, was a tax of 2.5% paid on precious metals (money included), merchandise, as well as on livestock after one year's uninterrupted possession of a certain minimum (nīṣāb). These Quranic taxes fell mainly on the countryside and their efficient recovery depended therefore on the Makhzen's ability to control the tribes.

Experience proved that these taxes were far below the necessities of the Islamic State. Various dynasties therefore attempted to supplement their revenue by arbitrary taxes, generally known as maghārim (pl. of maghrām) and mukūs (pl. of maks).

The maks, being a non-Quranic tax, is outlawed by the shari‘a. It can be authorized only in extreme cases when the bayt al-māl is suffering an exceptional shortage of funds or when the imām needs urgent assistance to thwart a danger which threatens the Muslim community. Only in such cases can the Cālim-s authorize the imām to levy non-Quranic taxes (123). Sultans were usually able to convince the Cālim-s of their urgent need for funds and only rarely was there any open refusal to a sultan's request (124).

Upon his accession to the throne in 1757, Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh deemed the legal taxes insufficient for the task of the reconstruction of the State after thirty years of devastating civil wars. The opinion of the Cālim-s was solicited and Sīdī Muḥammad was able to obtain a fatwā which, without giving an unqualified approval, limited itself to the reiteration of the legal

(123) ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Fāsī, Taqyīd fī al-mukūs, Ms. D 283, BGR, fol. 27; al-Mahdī al-Wazzānī, al-Nawāzil al-jadīda, I, pp.348-349.

(124) The most famous instance on which a sultan's request to levy non-Quranic taxes was refused is when the qādī of Almeria, Ibn al-Barrā', rejected Yūsuf b. Tāshfīn's (1108-1143) demand for the macūna (assistance). Cf. Akansūs, al-Jaysh, p. 218.

limitations and conditions of the shari'a regarding the maks (125). That was all that Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh needed to start his fiscal plans. After him, Mawlāy al-Yazīd decided to abolish the maks, most probably to satisfy the religious forces which were behind his proclamation (126). Mawlāy Sulaymān chose to rely exclusively on Quranic taxes. In the light of available evidence, it is impossible to determine whether the decision of Mawlāy Sulaymān was motivated by his religious convictions or by the conditions imposed on him by the people of Fès in 1792 (127).

What exactly does the maks cover? For the Cālim-s it includes all arbitrary obligations which are not provided for in the Quran or the Prophet's tradition (128). The maks, known sometimes as "the sultan's tax", covers a wide range of illegal taxes which differ with space and time. These taxes are generally levied on commercial transactions, and include gate duties, and a special tax paid on scales (129). The maks covers also monopolies held by the Makhzen over the exploitation of a number of products such as hides, tobacco, silk, cochineal and sulphur (130). This tax was not collected by the Makhzen but tendered out to a number of merchants who ensured its farming. Thus, Sīdī Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh conceded in 1174/1760-1761 the maks of Fès to Muḥammad al-Ṣaffar for 12,000 mithqāl-s (131).

(125) Al-Nāṣirī, VII, pp.7-9.

(126) Al-Ḏu'ayf, p.226.

(127) Akansūs, p.219. Akansūs wrote in particular: "None of the preceding dynasties since the Almoravids until now respected the the opinion given by Ibn al-Barrā' including this Sharifian 'Alawid dynasty, with the exception of Mawlāy Sulaymān, May God's mercy be upon him. Some people say that the people of Fès insisted upon the abolition of the maks at the time of his bay'a, others say he abolished it by personal motives of virtue and piety. Only God knows better".

(128) ʿAbd al-Rahmān al-Fāṣī, Fī al-mukūs, fol.27.

(129) Al-Ḏu'ayf, p.168.

(130) Ibid.

(131) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol.116.

The maks fell essentially on the urban population and was particularly resented by craftsmen and traders. Its abolition by Mawlāy Sulaymān must have come as a great relief to these social categories. With the abolition of the maks the taxation burden was mainly borne by the peasantry. Under Mawlāy Sulaymān, the zakāt and the Cushūr levied on agriculture provided the greatest share of Makhzen income. The most important implication of this return to the Islamic model of taxation was the increase in the proportion of the bill paid by the countryside. "The tribe which paid ten thousand mithqāl-s by contract in the time of his father", wrote al-Zayānī, "paid (under Mawlāy Sulaymān) twenty or thirty thousand mithqāl-s according to the ratio fixed by the sharī'a" (132). The burden was, therefore, increased twice or threefold. There is no doubt that the agricultural abundance and the absence of severe droughts before 1817 contributed to the prosperity of the tribes the taxable wealth of which consequently increased. Al-Zayānī's statement, however, leaves no doubt that the augmentation of the tribal contribution to the bayt al-māl was intimately linked to the application of the religious ratio of taxation (al-niṣāb al-sharī'i) and that the contract system (muqāṭa'a) adopted by Sīdī Muḥammad imposed a lighter fiscal burden (133).

The contract system applied to taxes on both crops and livestock. Under this system an understanding was reached between the central government and each tribe, or confederation of tribes, over the contribution which

(132) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol. 204.

(133) Ibid. On the muqāṭa'a system al-Zayānī wrote:

"...لأن القبائل في أيامه ت molt و نمت مواشيه و كثرت الخيرات عليها من عدله و حسن سيرته، فصارت القبيلة التي تُعطي عشرة آلاف مثقال مقاطعة أيام والـ... يخرج منها على النصاب الشرعي عشرين و ثلاثين ألفاً..."

should go to bayt al-māl. This amount was fixed by contract most probably after the evaluation of the tribe's agricultural potential, and was not liable to rise and fall from one year to another. Although it used to be called Cushūr, the contribution hardly constituted a Quranic tax since it was not subject to a regular annual revision. The advantages of such a system were numerous. First, it reduced the chances of conflict with the tribes since there was a prior understanding between the two parties and an engagement by the qā'id-s the tribe to secure the amount agreed upon. In other words, the sultan held his qā'id-s responsible for the farming of rural taxes without having to interfere directly with the tribes. Secondly, it considerably alleviated the military burden of the State. The collection of taxes alone necessitated an army under constant mobilization and consumed a sizable share of Makhzen income. By adopting the contract system, Sīdī Muḥammad avoided being constantly on horseback seeking taxes. Thirdly, the muqāṭa'a system guaranteed the Makhzen a regular income which was liable to be affected only if there was an exceptionally long drought, such as the one experienced between 1776 and 1782. The amount agreed upon was certainly below the legal quota, but it had the advantage of being regular and easily recoverable.

This system was abandoned by Mawlāy Sulaymān, together with non-Quranic taxes and State monopolies. In its place he imposed the Quranic Cushūr and zakāt on crops and livestock, relying almost exclusively on these agrarian taxes and thus shifting the burden of the fiscal system to the countryside. By doing so, he increased the chances of confrontation with the tribes. This fiscal choice was partly responsible for Mawlāy Sulaymān's political and military difficulties. A traditional taxation system necessitated not only a reliable army under constant mobilization, but also an efficient administrative apparatus to ensure regular

and adequate collection. John Buffa reported that "detachments of troops were constantly employed in collecting taxes" (134). The Quranic taxation system implied the curbing of tribal dissidence and imposed on Mawlāy Sulaymān the need to be constantly at the head of his mehalla.

The merit of Sīdī Muḥammad's taxation policy was to lessen Makhzen dependence on a countryside the control of which was never guaranteed and to rely on the urban based sectors of the economy (trade, crafts) as an important source of revenue. Mawlāy Sulaymān did just the opposite. By freeing the urban population from the maks, he placed his destiny in the hands of the tribes. His dependence on the countryside was further increased after the fiscal concessions made to the merchants, particularly by the reduction of import duties (135). The bayt al-māl was also deprived of the zakāt on land trade which Mawlāy Sulaymān conceded to the sharīf-s (136). When during the latter part of his reign crops failed and tribes refused to pay taxes, Mawlāy Sumaymān was placed in an untenable situation. It was only then that he realised the disadvantages of the traditional system of taxation and began, progressively, to restore some non-Quranic taxes (137). He also turned his attention to other sources of revenue, particularly the export trade which he attempted to encourage after 1817.

(134) J. Buffa, Travels, p. 185.

(135) Cf. letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to al-Salāwī fixing import duties for Moroccan Muslim merchants, no date, in al-Zayānī, Alfiyat al-sulūk, p. 209.

(136) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès, no date (1821), in al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-nubahā', K 241, pp. 181-185, appendix 88.

(137) Cf. below evolution of Mawlāy Sulaymān's commercial policy.

B- Sources of Income

The zakāt and the Cushūr constituted the most important source of Makhzen revenue under Mawlāy Sulaymān. The fact that these taxes were mainly levied on agricultural produce made this source of revenue most irregular and uncertain.

The zakāt and the Cushūr were essentially levied in kind. Cereals constituted the principal produce which supplied the Makhzen treasury. After its collection by Makhzen officials, the produce was conceded to merchants in return for cash. Sometimes, as had been the case with Mawlāy Sulaymān, the sultan permitted the export of this produce (138). The zakāt levied in towns was generally farmed by merchants. A large portion of these taxes never reached the sultan's treasury as they were used to pay local government officials and garrison troops. Sometimes Makhzen officials were directly entrusted to merchants who paid their salaries (139).

Trade was another source of Makhzen revenue, both directly through the employment of Makhzen money in commercial transactions, and indirectly through the collection of import and export duties. The sultan was himself an important merchant. Makhzen money, drawn from taxation and foreign trade, was handed over to a number of trusted merchants known as tūjjar al-sultān (king's merchants) in order to be fructified in trade. Many of them were Jewish. We have already mentioned the case of Meir Macnin who used the

(138) For instance, Mawlāy Sulaymān allowed in 1802 Portuguese merchants to export wheat collected as zakāt. Cf.F.O.52/12, 2 May, 1802.

(139) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to 'Abd al-Rahmān 'Ash'āsh dated 6 Qa'da, 1233/7 Sept., 1818, in D.A.R.

customs income of Essaouira (140). 'Abd al-Rahmān ^CAsh^Cāsh also used the income of Tétouan's port to carry on commercial transactions on behalf of Mawlāy Sulaymān. ^CAsh^Cāsh invested public money in the eastern caravan trade. He exported wheat, wax, saltpetre, fullers earth and received in return Indian goods which, being sold duty free, could undersell all other imports (141).

If duties on land trade were conceded to the sharīf-s (142), maritime trade duties continued to pass to Mawlāy Sulaymān. On imports from Europe he introduced no innovation. Christian and Jewish merchants continued to pay a uniform tax of 10% ad valorem. For Muslim merchants the import duty was revised in the light of the shari'a and reduced to 2.5% (143). Import duties were often levied in kind, particularly on linen and woollen cloth which was used for the clothing of the army. Export duties, on the contrary, varied considerably and were subject to no rule except the Makhzen's immediate interest (144). After the pacification period during which Mawlāy Sulaymān depended to a large extent on duties drawn from the export of cereals, the Makhzen fixed high tariffs for many articles. The export of many products was also prohibited. Owing to agricultural abundance, Mawlāy Sulaymān disposed of enough income between 1800 and 1815 to be able to dispense with foreign trade as an important source of revenue. It was only after 1815, when the economic and political situation

(140) In 1802, al-Salāwī wrote to a European merchant about Meir Macnin in these words: "Meir Macnin is our Jew and all the funds with which he traded were money belonging to the public treasury of Essaouira". Cf. F.O.52/12, letter dated 26 Muḥarram, 1217/29 May, 1802.

(141) F.O.52/13, 10 March, 1805.

(142) Cf. Mawlāy Sulaymān's letter referenced in note 136 above.

(143) Cf. Mawlāy Sulaymān's letter mentioned in note 135 above. Moroccan Muslim merchants continued to pay 2.5% on imports until 1815.

(144) The only regular export duty was the one levied on the annual contingent of 2,000 head of cattle exported under contract to the British garrison of Gibraltar. This continued at 5 Spanish dollars per head.

deteriorated, that Mawlāy Sulaymān carried out a number of reductions in export duties to procure additional income. There is no doubt that Mawlāy Sulaymān's commercial policy, in addition to the effects of natural calamities, contributed to a decline in the volume of exchanges with the outside world and, as a result, reduced the customs income.

A further source of Makhzen income was provided by the inheritances of people who died without heirs. According to the sharī'a, the bayt al-māl is the heir of all estates and properties to which there is no legal claimant. 'Alawid sultans usually conceded part of this right to sharīf-s or zāwiya-s. Sīdī Muḥammad granted, for instance, the inheritance of Fès (māl irāthat Fās) to the sharīf-s and Mawlāy 'Abd al-Rahmān granted later on a similar privilege to the Wazzāni zāwiya in Touat (145). Mawlāy al-Yazīd and Mawlāy Sulaymān decided, however, to take over all of inheritances of the munqaṭi'ūn, thus depriving the sharīf-s of a privilege bestowed on them by Sīdī Muḥammad. The succession of Mawlāy Sulaymān to the inheritances of heirless people after the end of the Great Plague procured "important revenues" for the Makhzen (146).

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Mawlāy Sulaymān continued to receive two taxes which seemed increasingly anachronistic to those who paid them, namely the capitation tax (al-jizya) levied on Moroccan Jewish subjects and the tribute traditionally paid by some Christian powers. Both of these taxes were originally

(145) Al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-hādī, p. 13; Villes et Tribus du Maroc, vol. IV, p. 247.

(146) F.O.52/12., 4 May, 1803.

justified by the superiority of Islam. The first one was paid by the ahl al-dhimma (Jews) as a symbol of their special status and was intended to serve as a permanent reminder to the Jews of their lowness as long as they remained attached to their religion. With the opening of Morocco to European trade, this dhimma status began to be increasingly challenged, particularly by wealthy Jewish merchants who travelled abroad and sometimes chose to reside on the other side of the Straits. Many of them adopted the European dress, changed their names once in Europe and refused to pay the capitation tax even if they maintained commercial interests in their mother country. In 1815 Mawlāy Sulaymān decided that all Moroccan Jews should pay the capitation tax and wear the customary Moroccan dress. As a result, many Jews chose to leave the country for Europe (147).

The Makhzen continued to receive an annual tribute from some European countries, such as Sweden, Denmark, Holland and the Republic of Venice. This tribute was initially intended as a guarantee against piracy. With Mawlāy Sulaymān, however, Morocco ceased to represent any significant threat for European trading vessels. Some of these States simply ceased to pay their tribute. Holland, for instance, never paid any tribute to Mawlāy Sulaymān. Venice continued to pay its dues until the abolition of the Venetian Republic by Napoleon in 1797. Only Denmark and Sweden maintained their annual contribution of 25,000 and 20,000 Spanish dollars respectively (148).

(147) CCC, vol.24, 1 Feb., 1816; F.O.52/17, 6 June, 1816.

(148) C.O.91/79, Robert Sillery's Report.

Finally, Mawlāy Sulaymān received various types of conventional contributions known as hadiyyas, presents offered by the country's notables and tribes on the occasion of religious feasts, the ma^cūna and sukhra, contributions for revictualling the sultan's troops and emoluments given to Makhzen officials for various services. The shariif-s and the murabitūn were exempt from these contributions.

Undoubtedly, sources of revenue under Mawlāy Sulaymān were less diversified than they used to be under his predecessors. The abolition of non-religious taxes made him too dependent on the countryside at a time when the fiscal burden of the urban sectors of the economy was greatly alleviated. Any crop failure or inability of the Makhzen to control the countryside could have disastrous effects on the Sultan's finance. Urban arbitrary taxes— which during the reign of Sīdī Muḥammad equalled the revenue drawn from legal taxation (149)— could have constituted an important substitute, in times of difficulty, for the uncertain agricultural taxes.

C - The Monetary System

At the end of the eighteenth century the Moroccan monetary system retained the basic characteristics it had acquired during the reign of Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh. The system

(149) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol. 204.

was based on a bi-metallism of silver and bronze, in which the bronze coins possessed an intrinsic value of their own and served as the most current medium of everyday transactions among Moroccans (150). Gold coins became very rare during the latter part of the eighteenth century. The standard coin was the silver mithqāl, weighing 29 grms. In the mithqāl there were 10 silver dirham-s, equalling in value 10 copper ūqiya-s (ounces). The dirham was subdivided into 4 mūzūna-s (or blanquils for Europeans), each being the equivalent of 24 copper fils.

Table 3 The Moroccan Monetary System Under Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh

Silver Coins	Bronze Coins
<u>Mithqāl</u> (29 grams)	
<u>Dirham</u> (1/10 of a <u>mithqāl</u>)	= One <u>ūqiya</u> (96 <u>fils</u>)
<u>Mūzūna</u> (1/4 of a <u>dirham</u>)	= 24 <u>fils</u>

The traditional system based on bimetallism operated properly as long as European influence remained limited. In an isolated Morocco bronze remained a relatively precious alloy, not far behind silver. Its relation to silver was very much like the relation that existed between silver and gold. The whole system began to

(150) G. Ayache, "Aspects de la crise financière au Maroc après l'expédition espagnole de 1860", in Études d'histoire marocaine, Rabat, 1979, pp. 97-138. Although it deals with the late nineteenth century developments, this study remains, nevertheless, the only attempt made until now to explore the mechanisms of a most difficult monetary system and gives useful insights into the situation which prevailed during the early nineteenth century.

crumble under the effect of European penetration. Bronze coins continuously lost value to the advantage of silver. The correlation that existed between copper and silver was disrupted for two main reasons. First, there was a progressive decrease in the volume of coined silver. Both Moroccan purchases abroad and uncontrollable smuggling (151) drained off large quantities of silver. Secondly, the value of Moroccan bronze necessarily decreased under the effect of foreign market prices (152). In order to compensate for the disappearance of silver currency, the Makhzen was induced to put a greater amount of bronze coins into circulation. This inflation in bronze values formed the main feature of the Moroccan monetary system during the nineteenth century.

No doubt, the disappearance of precious metals cannot be solely blamed on European factors. The mining of gold and silver seems to have declined during the second half of the eighteenth century (153). Mines were either abandoned or located in mountainous areas which the Makhzen was not always able to penetrate. Gold arrivals from West Africa also diminished. In 1797 Mawlāy Sulaymān's qā'id in the Tafilelt, the main terminal of Saharan trade, was able to collect 2,500 kilograms of gold dust as part of the zakāt (154). However, gold and silver coins became very rare during the early nineteenth century. The diversion to Tripoli of most of the Sudanic trade after 1795 (155) must have reduced the flow of gold dust into

(151) In 1809-1810 Jewish merchants, in particular, were suspected of exporting foreign specie; cf. F.O.174/17, letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green, 26 Rabi' II, 1224/10 June, 1809, appendix 46.

(152) Ayache, "Aspects de la crise financière," p.125.

(153) Brignon, p.283.

(154) Al-Du'ayf, p.344.

(155) A.A. Boahen, Britain, the Sahara and the Western Sudan 1788-1881, Oxford, 1964, p. 45.

Morocco. Gold and silver mines did exist in the Sous and the Atlas mountains, but, apparently were neither regularly nor adequately worked (156). An indication of the disappearance of silver coins was the conversion by the Makhzen of European silver currencies into Moroccan dirham-s (157). As to the silver mithqāl, it ceased to circulate and became a mere unit of account.

Behind this rarefaction of hard currency there were two possible reasons. First, there was Mawlāy Sulaymān's commercial policy which, by limiting exports and encouraging imports, led to a decline of Moroccan reserves in European specie. Even purchases arriving through Morocco's eastern borders were paid for in Spanish dollars (158). Secondly, there was the uncontestable outflow of precious coins to both Europe and the Middle East. Apart from the smuggling alluded to above, there was the flow of Moroccan coins to the Arab East through the annual pilgrimage caravan. In his study on the economic history of Cairo in the eighteenth century, André Raymond noted that every year Moroccan pilgrims used to sell large quantities of both precious and non-precious coins on the basis of their weight (159).

Copper also became rare. In fact, Mawlāy Sulaymān was the first 'Alawid sultan to have allowed the incorporation of lead into bronze coins and put into

- (156) Jackson reported that Moroccans were unacquainted with "the proper method of refining" precious metals and that, in consequence, mines were often abandoned . Cf. Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p.127.
- (157) F.O.52/12, 3 Feb., 1804.
- (158) Jackson mentioned that in 1802 about 4/5 of Moroccan imports through Algeria (evaluated at one million dollars annually) were paid for in the Spanish hard currency; cf.F.O.174/13, Jackson to Matra, 18 May, 1802.
- (159) A. Raymond, Artisans et commerçants au Caire au XVIII^e siècle, Damascus, 1973-1974, vol. I, pp. 37-38. The author affirmed that among all Arab coins that ended in Egypt, the Moroccan ones were the most abundant.

circulation a lead coin (160).

If daily domestic transactions continued to be negotiated in terms of the bronze currency (ūqiya-s and fils) foreign trade, on the contrary, was essentially carried out through the medium of the Spanish dollar (161). With the disappearance of the silver mīthqāl from circulation, the Spanish dollar, which weighed a little less the mīthqāl (25 grams), became the reference currency for the Moroccan monetary system. Since the chief money of account, the ūqiya, was bronze, the Spanish dollar constantly gained in value while the ūqiya depreciated.

Mawlāy Sulaymān attempted to restore the value of the bronze currency by an arbitrary measure. Upon his accession to the throne in 1792, he decided that the silver mūzūna should equal 4 fils only instead of 24 fils (162). Thus, the dirham (or the ūqiya) now consisted of only 24 fils instead of 96. After this reevaluation of the bronze currency, the fils was worth four times as much as formerly. However, Mawlāy Sulaymān was unable to maintain this situation. Less than two years later, he devalued the bronze currency by one third of its value. The mūzūna became equivalent to 6 fils instead of 4 (163).

The Sultan's attempted reform in 1792 received a further blow at the beginning of the nineteenth century. With the restrictions imposed on exports after 1800 and the decline in the entry of foreign money, people preferred

(160) Brethes, Contribution à l'histoire du Maroc par les recherches numismatiques, pp. 238-239; letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to 'Abd al-Rahmān 'Ash'āsh, dated 11 Hijja, 1227/16 Dec., 1810 in D.A.R. (appendix 64).

(161) The Spanish dollar (piaster) was known in Morocco as al-riyāl al-rūmī.

(162) Ahmad al-Ruhūnī, 'Umdat al-rāwīn, II, p.179; Dāwūd, III, p.198.

(163) "The currency", wrote Matra, "has been debased by 33% during his short reign" (F.O.52/10, 26 June, 1794). When Ali Bey visited Morocco in 1803, the mūzūna was still worth 6 fils; cf. Ali Bey, Travels, I, p.35.

to bury their precious Spanish coins leaving only bronze coins in circulation (164). By 1802, gold and silver coins had become so rare that Mawlāy Sulaymān ordered his customs officers to accept nothing but silver in payment for import duties (165). The bronze currency was further depreciated when Mawlāy Sulaymān decided that the silver dirham should equal 6 mūzūna-s instead of 4 (166). By taking this decision he was, in fact, indirectly undermining the value of the bronze currency. On the basis of this new ratio the dirham (or the ūqiya) could only be exchanged against 36 fils. The monetary system was progressively returning to its former state which prevailed before 1792. The shortage of Moroccan silver coins at the beginning of the nineteenth century was such that Mawlāy Sulaymān was left with the only solution of minting dirham-s from the Spanish dollar (167). By doing so, the Sultan contributed to the increased depreciation of the Moroccan currency since the Spanish silver coin was used to make 13.5 dirham-s. The result was that people buried their old dirham-s, preferring to pay their taxes to the Makhzen in the new debased dirham. Mawlāy Sulaymān soon found himself overloaded with this currency and was, therefore, obliged to order the coining of the Spanish dollar into 10 parts only. Still, the dirham obtained weighed less than the standard dirham (2.5 grams instead of 2.9 grams). In reality, it usually weighed even less than the tenth part of a Spanish dollar because of the loss resulting from clipping. "Money being hammered and not melted", noted the British consul, "the loss would be considerable by clipping" (168). As the Spanish

(164) F.O.52/12, 25 May, 1802.

(165) F.O.52/12, 22 Nov., 1802.

(166) Al-Du'ayf, p. 424. "On the first of Muḥarram, 1218 (23 April, 1803) arrived in Rabat the Sultan's order making the dirham into 6 awjuh (pl. of wajh, lit. face)".

(167) F.O.52/12, 3 Feb., 1804.

(168) Ibid.

dollar which weighed 25 grams replaced the mithqāl (29 grams) as the monetary reference, the way was opened for a rapid devaluation of the Moroccan currency.

Table 4 The Monetary System at the Beginning of the nineteenth century (1803)

Silver Coins	Bronze coins
<u>Mithqāl</u> (10 <u>dirham-s</u>)	= 10 <u>ūqiya-s*</u>
<u>Dirham</u> (6 <u>mūzūna-s</u>)	= 1 <u>ūqiya</u> = 36 <u>fils</u>
<u>Mūzūna</u>	= 6 <u>fils</u>
1/2 <u>mūzūna</u> **	= 3 <u>fils</u>

* The ūqiya, unlike the dirham, did not exist as a coin. As a unit of account it stood at 36 fils.

** The half mūzūna was put into circulation, according to al-Du^cayf, in 1797 (cf.p.348).

If the devaluation of the bronze currency was essentially an internal affair affecting only transactions among Moroccans, the devaluation of the dirham had a direct effect on the value of the Moroccan money in foreign dealings. The relationship between the Moroccan dirham and the European currencies constantly shifted to the disadvantage of the former. From 8.5 ūqiya-s in 1782, the Spanish dollar rose to 12 ūqiya-s around 1800 (169). In 1820, however, it was worth 13.5 ūqiya-s (170). Over a period of twenty years the Moroccan currency suffered only slightly. This was partly due to the decline of commercial contact with Europe during the first two decades of the nineteenth century (171).

(169) F.O.174/6, 23 April, 1800.

(170) Graberg de Hemso, Specchio, p. 163; CCC, vol. 27, 8 Oct., 1820.

(171) From 1792 to 1800 the Spanish dollar changed from 8.5 to 12.5 ūqiya-s and from 1820 it changed from 13.5 to 18 ūqiya-s. The Moroccan mithqāl was worth 3 shillings and 8 pence in 1808. Ten years later (1818), it was worth 3 shillings and 6 pence.

III - Foreign TradeA - Motives and Attitudes(1) Moroccan Ālim-s

The question of trading with non-Muslim countries was an eternal issue of debate for Moroccan Ālim-s ever since the extension of Islam northward to Spain and southward to western Africa. Trade with non-Islamic lands and residence among non-Muslims were either prohibited or subject to a number of restrictions under the sharī'a. This applied not only to Christian countries, but also to the pagan peoples of Africa. A contemporary Ālim of Mawlāy Sulaymān, al-Mukhtār al-Kuntī (d.1811), called upon believers not to visit the western Sudan because its princes were still attached to pagan practices (172). Since the fall of Muslim Spain and the beginning of European expansionism, Moroccan Ālim-s became increasingly preoccupied with the lawfulness of maintaining commercial relations with Christian nations.

Mālikī Ālim-s (173) considered the travel and residence of Muslims among non-believers as a great sin (174). The religious justification is based on the superiority of Islam which might be impaired by the presence of Muslims in non-Islamic lands. Residence among infidels puts the believer in a dangerous position for he is not only subject to non-Islamic jurisdiction, but might also be present at prohibited practices such as the drinking of alcohol and the eating of pork.

(172) Muḥammad b. ‘Uthmān b. Fūdī, Infāq al-maysūr fī tārīkh bilād al-takrūr, Ms K 2384, BGR, p.9.

(173) The school of Mālik b. Anas (d.795 AD) is dominant in the Maghrib and is reputed to be the most formalist madhhab.

(174) Al-Wansharīsī, Al-Mi‘yār in Archives Marocaines, XII, 1908, pp. 196-198.

Believers are supposed to avoid the company of non-Muslims even on board of Christian ships. "Under such conditions", wrote al-Ruhūnī, "travel even to the holiest places with the intention of accomplishing a religious duty is unanimously disapproved of by the ālim-s, let alone travel which is motivated by worldly interests" (175). In a Christian country, a Muslim would be also tempted by non-Islamic practices such as usury or the taking of insurance, both prohibited by the sharī'a. The sending of money to non-Islamic countries is also prohibited under Muslim law (176).

Commercial dealings with Christians are particularly disapproved of when they consist of supplying the enemies of Islam with strategic articles. The selling of every article which is liable to strengthen the military potential of the enemy is prohibited. This applies in particular to horses, metals and military equipment (178). "The imām, may God bless him, assist him and make him victorious", wrote al-Ruhūnī, "is under the obligation of reminding his subjects of these prescriptions and then of punishing whoever transgresses his orders without any leniency in this respect" (179).

(2) Mawlāy Sulaymān and European Trade

Religious considerations were the main motivations of Mawlāy Sulaymān's attitude towards European trade. The restrictions he imposed on travels to Europe by his

(175) Muḥammad al-Ruhūnī, al-Risāla al-mūharrara al-wajīza, p.120.

(176) Ibid.

(177) Cf. fatwā by Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī concerning Mawlāy Sulaymān's proposal for the selling of horses to Spain in return for three Spanish occupied enclaves on the Moroccan Mediterranean coast, in al-Nawāzil al-jadīda, III, pp.35-36 (appendix 47).

(178) Ibid., p.35.

(179) Al-Ruhūnī, al-Risāla, p.127.

Muslim subjects were essentially designed to limit the prejudicial effects on religion (180). The measures taken by Mawlāy Sulaymān to reduce contact with "the land of the enemy" (ard al-harb) were considered by Moroccan Cālim-s as a great achievement of his reign (181). "Merchants who travel to the land of the enemy", he wrote to al-Salāwī, "indulge in business according to the law of the infidels, while this is prohibited by religion" (182).

The danger to which the faith of believers was exposed as a result of their contact with non-Muslims was another factor in Mawlāy Sulaymān's aversion to European trade. The contiguity of Moroccans and Europeans in some coastal towns led to the introduction of many reprehensible practices such as the consumption of alcohol and the use of tobacco. Ali Bey noted in 1803 that the taking of tobacco, despite its prohibition by Mawlāy Sulaymān, was more common among the people of the ports because of their contact with the Europeans (183). The presence of Europeans in the ports also led to the employment of Muslims as servants, a practice particularly injurious to the dignity of the Muslim community as a whole (184). "This very principle", wrote Ali Bey, "is the cause of his being so averse to trade with Christians, as he is afraid that traffic with the infidels should vitiate or impair the true believers' faith" (185).

Fear of scarcity was another argument that was constantly evoked. Experience demonstrated that unlimited

(180) Muhammad b. Ja^cfar al-Kattānī, Salwat al-anfās, I, p.231.

(181) Ibid.

(182) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Muhammad al-Salāwī, no date, fixing import duties for Moroccan Muslim merchants, in al-Zayānī, Alfiyat, p.209 (appendix 91).

(183) Ali Bey, Travels, I, p.173.

(184) F.O.174/20, 6 Dec., 1815.

(185) Ali Bey, Travels, I, p.173; cf. also Brooks, Sketches in Spain and Morocco, I, pp.361-362.

exports usually led to a rise in prices and scarcity of agricultural products on the local market (186). European consuls tried in vain to convince Moroccan authorities of the benefits of liberalized commerce. The opening of the ports to all nations, explained Matra to Ibn 'Uthmān in 1796, would make commodities cheaper and, by giving an impulse to production, would consequently increase the Sultan's revenue (187). Makhzen officials were unable to perceive the benefits of such an approach. The practical effects of free exporting convinced them, on the contrary, that such a policy led only to scarcity and a rise in food prices.

Unrestricted exports also led to the disaffection of the population. Inland regions suffered not only from the consequent rise of food prices, but also from the diversion of economic activity to the coastal towns. In 1793 the people of Fès protested against the export of large quantities of wheat and Mawlāy Sulaymān was "obliged to yield to their clamours" (188). The following year, another violent protest against the ex-

(186) Al-Du'ayf, reported that in 1796, when there were more than 50 ships at Rabat to export wheat and other products, the price of a single bullock reached as much as 30 mithqāl-s (three times the usual price) and dried fruits were not to be found on the occasion of the Āshūrā, cf. pp. 333-334. Al-Du'ayf also noted the effect of unlimited export on the price of wheat: "the price of wheat reached seven ūqiya-s and half, but the Christians still found nothing to export", p. 333.

(187) F.O.174/124, 6 Feb., 1796. Cf. a similar advice by J.S.Douglas, British consul in Morocco (1818-1829) to al-Tālib b. Jallūn, chief minister of Mawlāy 'Abd al-Rahmān, in F.O.52/24, 15 Oct., 1823: "The more of every article is exported the more of that article will be produced in the country (...) the more that is exported, the greater will be the revenue of the State".

(188) F.O.52/10, 30 Sept., 1793.

port of wheat occurred near Tétouan. To show their discontent against the export of 15,000 loaves of bread daily to the Spanish garrison of Ceuta, the Jbala tribesmen attacked the port of Martil, killing a number of Makhzen troops and Spanish seamen and destroying five ships (189). The export of wheat created discontent even among the population of the coastal towns. At Rabat, where the export of wheat during the early period of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign only profited a minority of intermediaries, "most people were opposed to the sale of wheat to the Christians" (190). In 1795 the people of Rabat attacked a European merchant and destroyed his weights (191). It is true that during the pacification period Mawlāy Sulaymān allowed the export of wheat despite popular protests because he urgently needed funds to consolidate his rule; but his attitude changed after 1800 when he had unified the country and disposed of enough resources to dispense with the income from exports.

To insistent European demands for the export of wheat Mawlāy Sulaymān replied that "kings who are entrusted by God with the affairs of their subjects and the defense of their interests must not overlook this duty" (192). The argument was not merely a subterfuge to put off Christian demands. Mawlāy Sulaymān resorted to the same justification when solicited by Yūsuf Karamanlī to allow wheat exports to Tripoli (193).

(189) AHN, Estado, Leg.4331(1), letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Salmon,

(190) dated 3 Sha'bān, 1208/6 March, 1794; F.O.52/10, 5 March, 25 May, 26 June, 1794. This attack was, apparently, made at the instigation of the people of Tétouan (appendix 7).

(190) Al-Du'ayf, p.316.

(191) *Ibid.*

(192) F.O.174/285, letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to J. Green, dated 6 Rabī' II, 1222/13 June, 1807 (appendix 28).

(193) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Yūsuf Pasha Karamanlī, no date, in al-Damnātī, Kunnāshā, Ms.3718, R.L., unnumbered pages, where the Sultan apologizes for the impossibility of allowing wheat exports. It was written during the latter part of the Sulaymāni reign.

Another factor which contributed to Mawlāy Sulaymān's aversion for trade with Europe was the damaging role played by European interests in perpetuating the political division of the country from 1792 to 1798. During this period many European merchants moved to Safi and Tīt where they were offered every encouragement by the rebels. In these ports, European merchants were exempt from any restrictions on exports and customs duties were very low. Without income from trade, the rebellious qā'ids-s of Abda and Doukkala would have been unable to continue their rebellion for so long. "If these people were to remain without income from trade", wrote Ibn 'Uthmān in 1796, "their supporters would soon desert them and their submission would necessarily follow" (194). Immediately after the pacification of the southern coastal provinces, Mawlāy Sulaymān moved to close down European commercial interests there. The ports of Safi, Tīt, Agadir and Dār al-Baydā were closed to commerce and European merchants ordered to move to Essaouira (195). The Venetian Chiappe brothers, who were suspected of involvement in 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Nāṣir's rebellion, were ordered to leave the country in 1800 (196). Nor could Mawlāy Sulaymān easily forget the active role played by Spain in the supporting of the rebellion. After he had secured control of the country, he cancelled all concessions he had made to the Spanish government. He particularly denounced the 1799 treaty which granted Spain important commercial privileges and refused to open Moroccan ports for the export of wheat as had been stipulated in the treaty (197).

(194) AHN, Estado, Leg.4345, letter from Ibn 'Uthmān to the Spanish Prime Minister Godoy, dated 16 Muḥarram, 1211/22 July, 1796 (appendix 13)

(195) CCC, vol.22, letter from al-Salāwī to the French consul dated 2 Rabī' II, 1216/13 July, 1801 informing him of the closure of a number of ports. Cf. also letter from Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj to the French consul Guillet dated 7 Jumādā I, 1214/7 Oct., 1799 in E. Fumey, Choix de correspondances marocaines, Paris, 1903, p. 17.

(196) F.O.52/11, 17 April, 1800.

(197) F.O.52/11, 21 Nov., 1801. Cf. article 30 of the treaty in J.C. Hurewitz, The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics, New Haven and London, 1975, vol. I (European Expansion 1535-1914), p. 139.

Finally, the European political situation convinced Mawlāy Sulaymān that trade with Europe was usually a source of trouble. Moroccan merchants trading with Europe were shown little respect at sea despite Morocco's neutrality during the Napoleonic wars. Vessels and cargoes belonging to Moroccan merchants were frequently seized and confiscated by both warring parties (198). Mawlāy Sulaymān intervened personally on behalf of these merchants, sometimes to no avail. In 1799, after numerous cases of disrespect shown to Moroccan colours at sea, he decided to call home all Moroccan vessels (199). During the first decade of the nineteenth century, he sent two embassies to Napoleon to request the return of Moroccan property, but without success (200). All this, together with a growing suspicion of European designs in the Islamic world and the fear that European hostilities would be extended to Morocco itself, encouraged Mawlāy Sulaymān to prefer an isolationist attitude.

B - The Decline of Caravan Trade

For many centuries Morocco had served as the main outlet for Saharan and west African products. The implantation of European settlements on the west African coast, together with the increasing weakness of the Makhzen, necessarily led to the decline of commercial relations between Morocco and Western Sudan. Since the collapse of the Saadian dynasty (mid-seventeenth century), the Moroccan political presence in the Sahara had become very intermittent. The

(198) Cf. numerous petitions by Moroccan merchants asking for redress in F.O.52/14, and CCC, vol. 21 and 22.

(199) F.O.174/6, 9 Dec., 1799.

(200) On the double embassy of Ḥāj al-Rāmī to France (1803 and 1807) cf. below chapter IV.

'Alawid Mawlāy Ismā'īl was partially successful in restoring Moroccan sovereignty over the western Sahara and the Touat, thus diverting a sizable part of the Sudan trade northward. His efforts were, however, vitiated by the political instability which followed his death. Later sultans were unable to extend their authority beyond the Sous, although the Friday prayer continued to be said in the name of the Moroccan Sovereign over most of the western Sahara. During the second half of the eighteenth century, Sīdī Muḥammad b. ḤAbd Allāh showed complete disinterest in the Saharan provinces, preferring to orient the country towards maritime trade and the north.

Mawlāy Sulaymān succeeded in pacifying the southern Saharan provinces and extended his authority to territories which, since the time of Mawlāy Ismā'īl, had remained virtually independent. In 1796 he pacified the Tafilelt, the main outlet for Saharan trade (201), and in 1800 the people of the Touat recognized his authority and agreed to pay legal taxes (202). By 1801-1802, the Dra valley and trade routes, noted al-Zayānī, were opened to traders "who were able to move freely from one province to another" (203). Two years later, Mawlāy Sulayman's governor, al-Šarīdī, pacified the Saharan routes again and appointed Makhzen qāḍids for the Dra and Ziz valleys (204). Mawlāy Sulaymān even succeeded in extending his rule to Figuig where Makhzen authority had been non-existent for most of the eighteenth century (205). In 1807 he led a southward tour in person which took him

(201) Al-Ḍu'ayf, p.339.

(202) Two letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Touat, dated respectively 23 Ṣafar, 1215/16 July, 1800 and 28 Ṣafar, 1215/21 July, 1800, in El-Ouataiq, I, 1976, pp.444-447.

(203) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol.181.

(204) Ibid.

(205) Ibid., fol.182-183.

as far south as Goulimine, another outlet of Saharan caravans (206). However, these efforts to control Saharan provinces proved to be of no avail. The frequent campaigns that Mawlāy Sulaymān had to undertake showed how fragile the result of these attempts at pacification were.

The land trade consisted of two annual caravans. The first one linked Fès to Timbuctoo and took place between September and April of each year (207). The second caravan departed from Fès for the Arab East on the occasion of the pilgrimage. Both were exposed to the risks of attacks by roving bedouins and were sometimes interrupted because of the insecurity of roads.

Traditional Moroccan exports were largely based on artisan products such as leather articles, woollens, copper utensils, and tobacco. In return, the caravans brought back gold dust, slaves, elephant teeth, ostrich feathers and gum. Pilgrim merchants transported wheat, slaves received from the Sudan, saltpetre and articles of Moroccan artisanry to the Arab East. On their way back to Morocco, these pilgrims carried Indian muslins, silk, spices and perfumes with them. During the second half of the eighteenth century, Morocco's acceptance of European commerce led to the introduction of many European products among the commodities exported southward or eastward. Besides the slippers of Fès and the hāyk-s of the Tafilelt, Moroccan merchants exported linens, muslins, sugar and tea (208).

The volume of caravan trade with western Sudan decreased considerably since the sixteenth century. This was due both to the inability of Moroccan sultans to

(206) Al-Du'ayf, pp.445-446.

(207) Jackson, An Account of Timbuctoo, p.282.

(208) Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p.289.

control the west Saharan tribes and to the political instability that prevailed in the Niger bend area following the fall of the Songhai Empire (209). Moreover, the European settlements on the west African coast became the poles of attraction for an important share of Sudanic trade. By 1793, the whole Saharan trade did not exceed 1 million pounds sterling according to the estimates of the African Association (210). By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Atlantic traffic had already succeeded in gaining the upper hand over the caravan trade (211).

Among all trans-Saharan routes, the one linking Morocco to Timbuctoo seems to have suffered the most. Indeed, the most important share of Sudanic trade was directed to the North African regencies, and particularly to Tripoli. This was mainly due to the political stability enjoyed by Tripoli under the long reign of Yusuf Karamanli who ruled unchallenged from 1795 to 1830. The Pasha of Tripoli succeeded in gaining control of the hinterland tribes and in 1811 conquered the Fezzan. By 1818, more than half the route linking Tripoli to Bornu came under his control (212). Furthermore, Yusuf Karamanli entertained excellent relations with the rulers of Bornu and the Sokoto Empire. In 1825, the Tripoli route to Bornu was described by Laing as "a regular trading route ... along which a child might travel" (213). The security of this route necessarily

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- (209) A.A. Boahen, Britain, the Sahara and the Western Sudan, pp.104-105.
- (210) C.W. Newbury, "North African and Western Saharan Trade in the Nineteenth century : a Reevaluation", Journal of African History, VII, 2 (1966), p.234.
- (211) J.B. Webster and A.A. Boahen, The Growth of African Civilization. The Revolutionary Years. West Africa since 1800, London, 1967, p. 61.
- (212) A.A. Boahen, Britian, the Sahara and the Western Sudan, p.45.
- (213) Ibid., p.107.

diverted the greatest share of Sudanic exports to Tripoli and undermined at the same time Morocco's role as a commercial intermediary between the Arab East and West African peoples.

All indications point to the decline of the caravan trade along the Morocco-Timbuctoo route. By 1788, James Matra reported that "the caravans to the south have decreased considerably for many years. Their decay originated in the great diminution in the number of slaves imported" (214). Indeed, the arrivals of slaves—an important item of Sudanic trade—decreased considerably. Half of the 10,000 exported slaves were directed to Tripoli from which they were reexported to Turkey and the Balkans (215). The number of slaves arriving in Morocco declined as the possibilities of reexport to the eastern regencies were reduced. In 1798 the Timbuctoo caravan returned to Morocco with only 700 slaves (216). By 1817, the flow of black slaves in Morocco had become so scarce that Moroccan merchants sought an attractive source of supply from Algiers (217).

Gold dust arrivals from western Africa seem also to have declined during the early nineteenth century. In 1797 Mawlāy Sulaymān's governor to the Tafilelt returned to Fès with 50,000 mithqāl-s of gold dust only (218) but four years later, the Sultan's governor to the Sous was able to collect "a great deal of gold dust" (219). However, the rarefaction of precious coins after 1800 and the absence

(214) Ibid., p.106.

(215) Webster and Boahen, The Growth of African Civilization, p.67.

(216) Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p.287.

(217) OCC, vol.25, 16 Dec., 1817.

(218) Al-Du‘ayf, p.344.

(219) Anonymous, Dhikr khilāfat, Fonds Arabe, Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris, fol.68. The governor was dispatched to the Sous in 1800; cf. Akansūs, p.288).

of gold dust among Moroccan exports between 1804 and 1812 (220) indicate that arrivals of African gold diminished in the same proportion as other Sudanic products.

Among these let us mention some of the most important. The volumes of ivory, ostrich feathers and gum Senegal that were re-exported from Essaouira diminished steadily during the first decades of the nineteenth century. By 1814 ostrich feathers could not be found at Essaouira. The British vice-consul at that port spent many months trying to procure a small amount to satisfy a personal request(221). He finally wrote to James Green: "I am sorry I have not been able to procure for Madame de Charmilly the remaining feathers which from their present scarcity cannot be procured suitable on any terms"(222).

Table 5 The Export of Sudanic Products from
 Essaouira: Evolution in volume (1804-1812)

	1804	1805	1812
Gum Senegal	! 95,956 lbs.	! 23,509 lbs.	! 16,234 lbs.
Elephant teeth	! 800 "	! 1,709 "	! 35 "
Ostrich feathers	! 555 "	! 1,120 "	! 1,217 "
	!	!	!
	!	!	!

Sources: Jackson, An Account of the Empire, pp.241-251;
Add. Ms.41,512, British Museum.

Another indicator of the decline of the Timbuctoo trade was the number of camels employed in the trans-Saharan traffic. Figures provided by European observers

(220) Cf. Table 5 below.

(221) F.O.631/1, 17 Jan., 1814 and 8 April, 1814.

(222) Ibid., 17 Jan., 1814.

show a steady decline in the size of the Timbuctoo caravan.

Table 6 Size of the Morocco-Timbuctoo Caravan :
Number of camels employed (1798-1827)

1798	2,000 camels
1799	1,700 "
1805	1,800 "
1827	1,400 "

Sources: Jackson, An Account of the Empire, pp. 285, 287; Idem., An Account of Timbuctoo, p. 156; R. Caillé, Journal, II, p. 384.

The other caravan which annually linked Morocco to the Arab East was also seriously undermined during the period under study. The restlessness of Angad Arabs in eastern Morocco and the political instability of western Algeria exposed the eastern caravan to frequent attacks (223). Political events of Egypt and the Hijaz also led to the interruption of the caravan (224). The French invasion of Egypt in 1798 resulted in the suspension of the pilgrimage caravan for several years. The emergence of the Wahhābi-s in the Hijaz also contributed to the disruption of this caravan during the early nineteenth century (225). After pilgrimage was officially resumed in 1811, Mawlāy Sulaymān decided again on its inter-

(223) Anon., Dhikr khilāfat, fol. 68; al-Zayāñī, al-Turjumāna al-kubrā, p. 140. In 1805 an eastern caravan proceeding to Fès was captured and plundered by the Darqāwi rebels in western Algeria (cf. F.O. 52/13, 10 March, 1805).

(224) In 1799 the Moroccan pilgrimage caravan turned back at Tripoli on the news of the French invasion of Egypt (cf. al-Fishtālī, fol. 125). It was not resumed until 1802 (F.O. 52/12, 3 Nov., 1802).

(225) Al-Ibtisām, p. 31.

ruption in 1815 for two years (226).

The development of maritime communications also helped to weaken the pilgrimage caravan by diverting the transport of people and goods from land to sea. Sea transport had the advantage of saving time (30 to 40 days from Morocco to Egypt by sea as compared to 4 to 5 months by land). It also reduced costs and, above all, offered a more secure medium of transport. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, an increasing number of Moroccan pilgrims chose to travel by sea. In 1798 there were nine ships at Essaouira for the transport of pilgrims to Alexandria (227). Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Salām b. Nāṣir described the various dangers to which the traveller by land was exposed and regretted not having chosen sea transport (228). He admitted that travel by land was more arduous, more insecure because of the frequent attacks by highwaymen, and more onerous, the pilgrim having to pay various transit taxes, pay for his food, and ensure the maintenance of his mount at prices which varied from one country to another (229). In 1805 wealthy merchants from Salé were able to arrange for the transport of pilgrims on hired European vessels at only 18 Spanish dollars (21.6 mithqāl-s) per person (230).

By the end of the eighteenth century, the caravan trade seems to have lost its traditional lucrative appeal. Trade with Europe attracted instead an increasing number of merchants, including inland merchants such as the Fāsi-s (231). Some outstanding tājir-s, such as ʿAbd al-Karīm b.

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- (226) A.G.P. Martin, Quatre siècles d'histoire marocaine, p.127. The reasons behind this stoppage of the eastern caravan are not known. By that time Muḥammad ʿAlī of Egypt was involved in a decisive military confrontation with the Wahhābi-s whom he defeated in 1818.
- (227) J. Caillé, Une ambassade, p.111.
- (228) Ibn Nāṣir, al-Rihla al-ṣughrā, p.59.
- (229) Ibid., pp.59, 127.
- (230) Al-DuCayf, p.532.
- (231) In 1798 Mawlāy Sulaymān experienced a great difficulty in overcoming the laxity manifested by Fāsi merchants and their uncooperativeness in setting off the pilgrimage caravan. According to

al-Ṭālib, al-Ṭālib b. Jallūn, and the Buhlāl brothers who made their initial fortunes in land trade, progressively diverted their capital to maritime commerce. A Fāsi merchant, Muḥammad Mezwār who accumulated much of his wealth as shaykh of the eastern caravan, had by 1816 important stakes at sea (232). James Grey Jackson mentions another example, al-Ḥāj Shbānī, who shifted his commercial interests from land to sea (233). Despite unfavourable international circumstances maritime trade was still more profitable, particularly with the advantages conceded by Mawlāy Sulaymān to Moroccan merchants.

C - Maritime Trade : An Era of Uncertainty and Hesitations

The fact that most of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign coincided with the Napoleonic wars determined to a large extent the fate of Morocco's commercial relations with Europe.

Until 1814 sea communications, particularly near the strategic Straits of Gibraltar, became extremely hazardous. The activity of European privateers, the frequent harassment of trading vessels and the seizure of property belonging to the enemy by the contending navies rendered any maritime commercial enterprise very risky. Even a neutral country like Morocco suffered from these damaging war risks and was accused of partiality by both belligerent parties (234).

al-Duṣayf. Mawlāy Sulaymān addressed the merchants of Fès in the following terms: "I appealed to you to go on pilgrimage but you refused(...) preferring to it the land of the Christians. I leave you, therefore, to the land of the Christians until you become Christians yourselves!", p.385.

(232) Ibid., p.532. Cf. note 216 in chapter IV below.

(233) Jackson, An Account of Timbuctoo, pp.V-VII.

(234) On French accusations against Morocco cf. COC, vol.21, fol.54. For Great Britain, cf. F.O.174/3, 24 Dec., 1797 and F.O.52/11, 1st Oct., 1797.

The Napoleonic wars deprived Morocco of some important customers in Europe. The commercial interests of Marseille in Morocco were irremediably damaged by British naval supremacy in the Mediterranean and the Straits zone. The French invasion or annexation of some European countries made them enemies of Great Britain. Their merchant vessels, being exposed to reprisals from the British navy, could no longer venture on the seas, particularly in the Straits zone.

The isolationist orientation of Mawlāy Sulaymān is to be explained by the rising aggressiveness of Europe. Makhzen fears of a European invasion led to frequent stoppages of exports while the war was raging in the Iberian Peninsula (235).

Acute rivalry between France and Great Britain over export privileges also led to the same negative attitude from the Makhzen. When confronted by pressing demands for supplies from contending parties, the most convenient attitude was often a general refusal. "If we accede to your request, or even grant you a proportion of what you are demanding", wrote Mawlāy Sulaymān to James Green in 1811, "they (the French) will certainly renew their application as it cannot be kept secret from them. Therefore, we cannot accede to both" (236). Mawlāy Sulaymān wanted, in fact, to avoid falling into an interminable chain of concessions which would lead to scarcity on the local market.

Nor can we appraise the full extent of the decline of commercial relations with Europe without taking into

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- (235) On Moroccan fears of a European invasion cf. below chapter IV. On stoppages of exports following alarming rumours cf. F.O.52/13, 12 May, 1807 and 18 Jan., 1808; cf. also F.O.52/15, 22 Feb., 1810 and 20 Sept., 1811.
- (236) F.O.52/15, letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to James Green, dated 16 Sha'ban, 1226 / 4 Sept., 1811.

account the natural calamities that Morocco experienced during Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign. The Great Plague of 1799-1800, the famine of 1817-1818, and the plague of 1818-1820 deeply affected the Moroccan economy and contributed to the slow down of commercial exchanges with the outside world. Many European and Jewish merchants left the country to escape the plague and never returned afterwards. Isolation measures taken by European countries whenever epidemics occurred also led to the interruption of normal commercial exchange. From 1818 to 1821, for instance, Great Britain, Morocco's first commercial partner, suspended all contacts with the North African States. Natural calamities also weakened the economic potential of the country, dispersed the population and disrupted traditional economic relations (237).

(1) Nature and Extent of European Trade

Moroccan trade with Europe can be divided into two main categories: an official trade negotiated between the Makhzen and the representatives of the European powers, and a general trade conducted by merchants on a private basis. The first dealt with the export of provisions the returns of which served to cover the costs of government purchases, mainly military equipment. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, this provision trade essentially concerned the British garrison of Gibraltar and the neighbouring Cadiz and Lisbon. General trade, however, tended to be long distance trade and was carried on mainly with the British Isles. This distinction was reflected at the geographic level as well. The northern ports of Tangier and Tétouan specialized in the export of provisions (238), while the southern port of Essaouira

(237) On the departure of European and Jewish merchants from Essaouira following the Great Plague cf. F.O.52/11, 26 Sept., 1799.

(238) "Tout le commerce de Tanger consiste à envoyer des comestibles à Gibraltar et Cadiz", COC, vol.20, fol.179.

where the major trading houses were located, was exclusively restricted to private transactions. Indeed, Mawlāy Sulaymān never allowed provisions to be exported from Essaouira, arguing that "the country roundabout is poor and not cultivated and many times the inhabitants themselves do not find sufficient to eat, much less can they supply others"(239).

The export of provisions included, among other things, livestock, vegetables, poultry and fruits. After the signing of the Anglo-Moroccan treaty of 1801, Mawlāy Sulaymān had allowed a regular annual contingent of 2,000 head of cattle to the British garrison of Gibraltar. This contingent was exported at a low duty of five Spanish dollars instead of the usual 26 dollars per head. Other European nations, such as Spain and Portugal, obtained the same concession when they asked for it, but Great Britain was the only country to benefit regularly. Above this fixed contingent, the Sultan usually granted additional exports when he was in need of funds to finance the purchase of arms and military equipment(240). Being negotiated on a governmental level, this type of trade was not subject to any significant alteration during Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign. The duty on cattle exports was never increased and continued to be in force even after Mawlāy Sulaymān's death.

General trade, on the other hand, was subject to great fluctuations, especially after 1800. Having unified the country under his authority and disposing of enough income to dispense with foreign trade, Mawlāy Sulaymān prohibited the export of many articles while he subjected others to prohibitive tariffs.

(239) F.O.52/13, Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green, 2 Rabi^c I, 1222/9 May, 1807.

(240) C.O.91/79, Robert Siller's Report.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the make up of Morocco's exports and imports had undergone little change. In 1808, Jackson wrote that "nearly the whole of the exports to Morocco consists of manufactured goods and that the returns for these are entirely raw materials" (241). Morocco exported hides, wax, almonds, gum and some African imported commodities, such as ostrich feathers and ivory. In return, the country received a wide range of cloth, glassware (the manufacture of glass being unknown in Morocco), firearms, iron bars, copper sheets, paper and increasing quantities of sugar and green tea (242).

The trade was carried out according to the most rudimentary methods. Bills of exchange were not negotiable and commerce was accordingly carried out by barter, the excess being paid for in Spanish dollars (243). Control on credit facilities were also tightened by Mawlāy Sulaymān and this greatly curtailed the merchants' freedom of action (244).

The volume of the European trade had always been modest. After the open door period (1792-1800), Mawlāy Sulaymān's restrictions on exports, together with the effects of European hostilities and the departure of many European merchants during the 1799-1800 plague, led to a decrease in the volume of trade. Despite the lack

(241) J.G.Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p.256.

(242) The use of tea by Moroccans is quite recent. According to the author of Tadhkirat al-muhsinīn, it was under Sīdī Muhammad b. cAbd Allāh that the consumption of tea became popular. After his death, tradition of tea was firmly established. Both Mawlāy al-Yazīd and Mawlāy Sulaymān had "masters of tea" (mūl atāy) in their courts. In 1802, Ali Bey reported that "there is no Musulman in any tolerable circumstances who has not at all hours of the day tea ready to offer to everyone who may visit him"; cf. his Travels, I, p.22. In reality, this was the case of wealthy townsmen and an insignificant rural minority. Figures of imports at Essaouira show that in 1812 Moroccans still drank more coffee than tea. Cf. table 15 below.

(243) F.O.52/15, 26 May, 1810.

(244) F.O.174/13, Jackson to Matra, 18 May, 1802.

of detailed statistics, the number of trading vessels which called at Essaouira still gives an approximate idea of its size (245).

Table 7 Number of European Vessels at the Port of Essaouira (1798-1822)

1798	60	trading vessels
1804	23	" "
1805	21	" "
1812	24	" "
1822	25	" "

Sources: CCC, vol. 21; F.O.52/13; F.O.52/24;
Add. Ms. 41,512, British Museum.

The same decline is illustrated by the fall in the number of European trading houses at Essaouira.

Table 8 Trading Houses at Essaouira (1790-1828)

1790	12	trading houses
1800	8	" "
1805	6	" "
1812	4	" "
1822	2	" "
1828	1	" "

Sources: Lemprière, *Voyage*, p.66; F.O.52/11, 1st Dec. 1800; F.O.52/13, 4 April, 1805; Add.Ms.41,512, British Museum; F.O.52/23, 23 Nov.,1822; F.O. 52/29.

(245) Unfortunately, there are no trade statistics for the port of Tétouan, the use of which was exclusively limited to Moroccan merchants. Tétouan served as an important outlet for Fāsi merchants trading with Europe.

The port of Tangier which specialized in the export of provisions to Gibraltar, was less affected by the decline of European trade. In 1812, Tangier received 122 vessels from Gibraltar (246). By 1822, the number of vessels employed in the provision trade had only slightly increased to about 156 voyages per year (247).

(2) Trading Interests

The Napoleonic wars brought about a complete change in the commercial roles of Morocco's European partners. British supremacy on the seas led to the interruption of trade with France and her allies, while Great Britain consolidated her position and became Morocco's first commercial partner.

During the reign of Sidi Muhammad b. ^cAbd Allāh, Moroccan trade with Europe was carried with Holland, Hamburg and Genoa. The most important trading partner by far, however, was Marseille. Before the French revolution, Marseille alone controlled more trade than all other competitors put together (248). The war changed the situation . "Depuis le commencement de notre malheureuse révolution", wrote in 1814 the French vice-consul Mure, "notre commerce a dû se ressentir de l'abandon que nos troubles et nos guerres perpetuelles apportaient à toutes nos relations commerciales. La perte totale de notre navigation a laissé ce commerce entre les mains des anglais"(249). At the beginning of 1805 there was a single French commercial establishment at Essaouira (250). After the battle of Trafalgar, French commercial presence in Morocco simply ceased to exist. The little trade with France between 1805 and 1814 that remained was carried by Moroccan merchants,

(246) Cf. list of arrivals and departures of vessels at Tangier in 1812 in Add. Ms. 41,512, British Museum.

(247) F.O.52/23, 26 April, 1822.

(248) De Lesseps, Notice, p.53.

(249) COC, vol.24, "Mémoire sur le commerce des européens au Maroc" (1814), by L. Mure, fol. 120-126.

(250) F.O.52/13, 4 April, 1805.

mainly from Tétouan, who hoped to take advantage of the exemption granted by Great Britain to the subjects of neutral countries in trading with her enemies (251).

Progressively, almost all foreign trade began to be carried on with England and Gibraltar. In fact, it was during the Napoleonic wars that the British commercial supremacy in Morocco was confirmed. Until 1912, the French were unable to regain the privileged position they had acquired during the second half of the eighteenth century. The identity of the trading vessels that visited the port of Essaouira between 1804 and 1822 makes British dominance clear.

Table 9 Trading Vessels at Essaouira According to Nationality (1804-1822)

	Great Britain	Denmark	Portugal	Others	Total
1804	7	6	4	6	23
1805	7	6	-	8	21
1812	17	-	-	3	20
1822	23	-	-	2	25

Sources: F.O.52/13; F.O.52/24; Add.Ms.41,512, British Museum.

Whether British or not, the commercial establishments of Essaouira traded almost exclusively with the British Isles. Almost all European houses belonged to British nationals. In 1812 the four European trading houses which carried out some significant trade with England were all British (252).

Once the war was over, French commercial interests found it extremely difficult to regain the position they had lost to the English. "Le goût que les habitants du

(251) C.O.91/79, Robert Sillery's Report.

(252) Cf. trade statistics for the port of Essaouira in Add.Ms.41,512, British Museum.

Maroc auront contracté depuis plus de vingt ans pour les objets d'Angleterre", wrote Mure in his report, "les empêchera de reprendre celui des marchandises que nous leur fournissions autrefois" (253). So attached had Moroccans become to English products, that after 1814 even French merchants ordered their supplies of cloth at Gibraltar instead of Marseille. By doing so, the French merchants disobeyed an ordinance by the king of France (1815) under which French nationals should only sell French products (254). In Morocco the French consul Sourdeau was unable to enforce this royal decree (255).

The interruption of communications between Morocco and Great Britain during the plague epidemic of 1818-1820 seemed to offer a golden occasion for French traders to penetrate the Moroccan market anew. Sourdeau who was the only European consul to remain in the country during the epidemic, attempted to divert Moroccan trade to Marseille. "Point de doute, Monseigneur", he wrote to Richelieu in 1818, "que le mal qui inflige les maures en ce moment ne tourne au profit de notre commerce" (256). The refusal of British authorities to establish any contact with the Barbary States during the epidemic confirmed Sourdeau's hopes. Since it became impossible to gain admittance to Gibraltar, many British vessels began to load Moroccan products for delivery to Marseille. This revival of French trade was, however, only temporary and was based solely on the momentary absence of British competition. With the end of the epidemic, Sourdeau's hopes proved to be an illusion. In 1822 the port of Essaouira was not visited by a single French vessel, against 18 from England and 5 from Gibraltar (257).

(253) CCC, vol.24, "Mémoire sur le commerce des européens au Maroc," fol.120-126.

(254) CCC, vol.26, 29 Dec., 1819.

(255) Ibid.

(256) CCC, vol.26, 6 Oct., 1818.

(257) F.O.52/24, 23 June, 1823.

Trade with other powers was generally reduced. Spain, being mainly interested in Moroccan wheat, was prevented by Mawlāy Sulaymān from carrying on any extensive trade with Morocco. The treaty of 1799 was never implemented (258). Mawlāy Sulaymān refused to ratify the treaty, maintaining that his minister, Ibn 'Uthmān, had gone beyond his prerogative in granting Spain important concessions, including that of exporting wheat from Dār al-Baydā (259). Having failed to persuade Mawlāy Sulaymān to respect the treaty, in 1805 the Spanish government decided to freeze all its commercial interests in Morocco.

Portugal, Denmark and Holland continued to figure among Morocco's commercial partners until 1806-1807 when the Continental System, the Danish alliance with France and the French invasion of Portugal put a complete stop to their relations with Morocco.

Besides the preponderance of British commercial interests in Morocco, the other major feature of maritime time trade during the period under study was the progressive replacement of departing European merchants by Moroccan Jewish nationals. At the death of Sīdī Muḥammad in 1790, this trade was concentrated in the hands of 12 European houses and about ten Jewish merchants (260). Under Mawlāy Sulaymān, the decline of European presence seems to have benefited Moroccan merchants. Indeed, Mawlāy Sulaymān was often accused by European merchants and consuls of partiality towards his Jewish subjects. In 1805, the British consul affirmed that "the Emperor was determined to have all the commerce in the hands of

(258) Cf. treaty in Hurewitz, The Middle East and North Africa, I, in World Politics, New Haven and London, 1975, vol. I, pp.I34-I40.

(259) C.O.91/79, Robert Sillery's Report.

(260) Lemprière, Voyage, p.86; M.Abitbol, Les Corcos et l'histoire du Maroc contemporain, Jerusalem, 1977, p. 22.

his Jews who trade with his money" (261). The British consul at Essaouira, in a report on trade there in 1828 (262), also noted Mawlāy Sulaymān's abolition of the privileges conceded by his father to the European merchants which meant that Jews could trade with the outside world (263). This policy, noted the report, led to the progressive concentration of foreign trade in the hands of Moroccan Jews at the expense of Europeans.

There is no doubt that the departure of European merchants as a result of the plague and the French revolutionary wars left the way open for a take over by Moroccan Jews of foreign trade. The number of Jewish commercial houses at Essaouira increased in inverse proportion to the decline of their European counterparts. On the other hand, Moroccan Muslim merchants were granted enough fiscal privileges to be able to handle a significant share of the import trade.

Table 10 Evolution of Jewish Trading Interests at Essaouira (1806 - 1828) (264)

	European Trading Houses	Jewish Trading Houses
1805	6	2
1812	4	6
1828	1	9

Sources: F.O.52/13; F.O.52/29 and Add.Ms. 41,512, British Museum.

(261) F.O.174/4, 4 April, 1805.

(262) Report on the trade of Essaouira drawn by the British vice-consul there in 1828, F.O.52/29.

(263) According to the above mentioned report, neither Jewish nor Muslim merchants were allowed to trade with the outside world during the reign of Sidi Muhammad. Only Europeans had this privilege. The author of the report noted that Guidalla was the only exception in this respect.

(264) The Jewish commercial houses of Essaouira were in the hands of: David Macnin, Solomon Macnin, Salem Abitbol, Abraham Cohen, Haim Guidalla and Mordecai Lagury.

(3) Evolution of Mawlāy Sulaymān's Commercial Policy

Under Sīdī Muḥammad b. ḤAbd Allāh, trade with Europe occupied a key position in the global policy of the State. Maritime commerce was encouraged by the Makhzen as an important source of revenue which Sīdī Muḥammad used to fulfil the goals of his internal policy. Commerce with Europe was therefore promoted by all possible means and religious considerations were often overlooked to further this trade. Unlike his father, Mawlāy Sulaymān did not conceive of maritime trade as a tool which might serve his domestic policy. Contact with the Christians was looked upon as "an unavoidable evil" the injurious effects of which should be kept at a minimum. Up to 1817 at least, recourse to trade with Europe was only circumstantial and dictated by contingent difficulties.

a) The Export Trade

Upon his accession to the throne Mawlāy Sulaymān manifested his intention to curtail the export trade, particularly by prohibiting the sale of wheat, wool and oil to Christians (265). However, during the early period of his reign (1792-1798) Mawlāy Sulaymān was in no position to lead a restrictive policy for a number of reasons. In the first place, there was the political division of the country and the need of the Makzen for funds to achieve the pacification of the southern provinces. At a time when many tribes remained independent, the Sultan found in exports a most valuable source of income. Secondly, a restrictive policy at this stage would have only diverted maritime trade to his southern opponents, particularly the rebellious qā'ids of Abda and Doukkala, who were ready to give all encouragement to European traders. This would have necessarily

(265) F.O.52/10, 27 March, 1792; COC, vol.25, 29 Sept., 1817..

strengthened the southern rebels and made their submission even more difficult to achieve. Thirdly, Mawlāy Sulaymān needed to convince Spain, whose role in sustaining the southern rebellion was crucial, that her commercial interests would not be affected in a country united under his authority.

A liberal policy was, therefore, tactically necessary. Mawlāy Sulaymān soon repudiated the promises he had made to the people of Fès in 1792 and allowed wheat to be exported on a large scale. Internal opposition did not prevent him from opening his ports to Christian merchants. "Vessels exported wheat from Tétouan, Tangier, Larache, Rabat, Dār al-Bayḍā and Essaouira with the approval of Mawlāy Sulaymān" (266). On such exports, he received a modest duty of one Spanish dollar, or even eight ūqiya-s per fanega (267). Commercial rivalry between Mawlāy Sulaymān and his southern opponents led to an unprecedented rush for the export of cereals. In 1796 there used to be between 50 and 60 ships at Rabat all loading wheat (268). During the month of January 1796 alone, Essaouira received 24 English vessels —more than the yearly average for the first two decades of the nineteenth century — to load wheat for Europe (269).

Since this open door commercial policy was only tactical, it was doomed to evaporate once the country had been unified. After the independent "coastal republics" of Abda, Doukkala and the Chaouia were subdued in 1797, Mawlāy Sulaymān changed to a completely different attitude.

(266) Al-Ducayf, p.334.

(267) The Spanish fanega is the equivalent of 1.58 bushels or 4 mudd-s. Cf. AHN, Estado, Leg.4331(1), letter from al-Tāhar Fannish to A. Salmon, 20 Jumādā I, 1208/23 Jan., 1794; letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to A. Salmon dated 3 Sha'bān, 1208/6 March, 1794.

(268) Al-Ducayf, p.334.

(269) Cf. above table 7.

Export duties were raised twice or fivefold (270) and the ports of Dār al-Baydā, Ṭīṭ, Safi and Agadir closed to European trade. This tendency towards a restrictive policy was enhanced by the repercussions of the Napoleonic wars. Vessels navigating under Moroccan colours were seized by both belligerent parties. In 1799, Mawlāy Sulaymān decided that, because of "the little respect paid to his subjects and colours on sea", Moroccan vessels were to return home (271). They could no longer sail abroad "on any consideration" unless entrusted with a particular business by the Sultan (272). The plague epidemic of 1799-1800 which greatly reduced contact with the outside world seemed to offer a golden opportunity for the inauguration of a restrictive policy.

There is no doubt that the European political context was not favourable to the development of normal trade relations. The few Moroccan merchants who ventured on sea were often subject to harassment by warring navies and their property confiscated (273).

However, a restrictive policy would not have been possible if the Makhzen had not disposed of enough income to dispense with the revenue from maritime trade. The early years of the nineteenth century witnessed a number of restrictions which complemented those adopted since the end of 1797. In 1801, al-Salāwī notified the European consuls of the Makhzen's decision to close to trade the ports of Mehdia and Asila (274). The export of some traditional articles of trade was prohibited. Wheat, in particular, was no longer regarded as an article of common trade. The export of wool was suspended in 1802 because, argued Mawlāy Sulaymān, "it made clothing too dear for his own people" (275). The duty on cattle was increased threefold, a

(270) F.O.52/11, 20 Dec., 1797.

(271) F.O.174/6, 6 Dec., 1799; F.O.52/11, 15 Dec., 1799.

(272) Ibid.

(273) CCC, vol.21 and 22; F.O.52/14.

(274) CCC, vol.22, letter from al-Salāwī to A. Guillet, 2 Rabi^c I, 1216/13 July, 1801.

(275) F.O.52/12, 22 July, 1802.

decision which persuaded Spain to ban all imports from Morocco (276).

For Mawlāy Sulaymān general trade with Europe was no longer considered a vital source of revenue. Nor did he consider the presence of European merchants in his ports a commercial necessity. "All are welcome to leave the country", he declared in 1801, "as one of my Jews can import whatever commission I order" (277).

The evolution of tariffs between 1801 and 1806 shows clearly Mawlāy Sulaymān's determination to suffocate European trade.

Table 11 Evolution of Export Duties 1801-1806
(in Spanish dollars)

	1801	1806
Figs, almonds, raisins, oil , olives and honey	! 2 per quintal (*)	! 12
Bees wax	! 14 "	! 26
Ivory, copper and gum Arabic	! 5 "	! 15
Goat skins	! 4 "	! 8
Common tanned leather	! 1 "	! 5
Ostrich feathers	! 2 per pound	! 16
Slippers	! 4 per 1,000	! 10
Hāyk-s	! 1 each	! 3

Source: J. Buffa, Travels, pp.89-90.

(*) Moroccan quintal = 118 English lbs.

(276) F.O.52/11, 30 Jan., 1801 and 22 Feb., 1801.

(277) Ibid., 23 Jan. ,1801.

In 1807, Mawlāy Sulaymān added new articles to his list of prohibitions. The export of almonds, raisins, slippers, ḥāyk-s and carpets was banned (278). In 1812 duties on goat skins and calf hides were further increased (279). By 1815, such duties had increased almost four times since 1801. The prohibitive taxes imposed on exports led to the decline of this trade and convinced many European merchants to close down and leave the country (280).

Table 12 Evolution in the Volume of some Articles of Export at Essaouira (1804-1812)

	1804	1805	1812
Bitter almonds	362,606 lbs.	488,260 lbs.	73,093 lbs.
Sweet almonds	321,717 "	505,458 "	39,337 "
Pomegranate peel	46,281 "	65,040 "	16,219 "
Bees wax	194,859 "	52,348 "	79,270 "
Wool	97,896 "	29,731 "	prohibited
Olive oil	57,236 "	45,489 "	prohibited
Gum Arabic	335,436 "	492,350 "	12,266 lbs.
Gum Senegal	95,956 "	31,556 "	16,234 "
Cow hides	120,483 "	259,961 "	1,036,562 "
Goat skins	12,726 dōz.	10,037 dōz.	27,999 doz.

Sources: F.O.52/13; Jackson, An Account of the Empire, pp. 236-254; Add.Ms.41,512, British Museum.

The end of the wars in Europe could have led to a reactivation of maritime trade but the high duties imposed

(278) F.O.52/13, 20 Nov., 1807.

(279) F.O.174/153, 3 March, 1812.

(280) However, such high tariffs did not prevent an increase in the exported volumes of some articles such as goat skins and calf hides. Cf. Table 12.

by Mawlāy Sulaymān and the decline of provision sales to the armies of Great Britain and her Peninsular allies as a result of the peace rendered such a prospect illusory. Moreover, Mawlāy Sulaymān adopted a number of measures which gave the impression that the country was heading towards complete isolation. In 1815, he abolished the privilege enjoyed by Moroccan Muslim merchants trading with Europe until then and which consisted in the payment of a reduced duty of 2.5% on imports instead of the 10% paid by Christian and Jewish merchants (281). At the end of the same year, a Makhzen decision imposing the wearing of the traditional Jewish costume on Jews and the payment of the capititation tax by them, led to the departure of many Jewish merchants (282). In 1816, a sultanian decree forbade the travelling of Moroccans to Europe (283). Even pilgrimage to the Holy Places needed special permission from the Sultan (284). For a time, Mawlāy Sulaymān believed that he could dispense with the outside world. "I have no need for trade and would rather not receive a single blanquill from my customs", he declared in 1816 (285).

Never was the outlook for maritime trade so desperate. The French consul expressed his despair in the following terms : "La France ne doit songer à entretenir aucun

(281) CCC, vol.24, 26 Oct., 1815. Contrary to what is asserted by J.L. Miège in Le Maroc et l'Europe, II, pp.21-22, and Brigon et al. in Histoire du Maroc, p.281, Mawlāy Sulaymān did not impose a tax of 50% on imports in 1815. What he did was to raise the contribution paid by Muslim merchants from 2.5% to 10%. In 1819 the import tax was still fixed at 10% (CCC, vol.26, fol.234-235).

(282) F.O.52/17, 6 Jan., 1816; CCC, vol.24, 1st Feb., 1816.

(283) R. Thomassy, Des relations politiques et commerciales de la France avec le Maroc, Paris, 1842, p. 294; al-Ducayf, pp. 531-532.

(284) Cf. an example of this special permission in D.A.R., 15 Shawwāl, 1232/ 28 Aug., 1817. According to A.G.P. Martin (Quatre siècles d'histoire, p. 127) pilgrimage to the Holy Places was suspended between 1815 and 1817.

(285) CCC, vol. 24, 26 March, 1816.

commerce avec cette puissance : droits énormes, prohibitions presque générales, tout s'y oppose" (286). Yet, in February 1817, the whole prohibition system began to crumble.

The decrease in Makhzen revenue following the scarcity of 1816 and the prospects of a disastrous crop for 1817 induced Mawlāy Sulaymān to look for a new source of revenue. Thus in February 1817 he agreed to allow the export of 10,000 quintals of wheat to France despite the scarcity of cereals on the local market. By taking this decision, Mawlāy Sulaymān wanted to respond favourably to the first request made by the new royalist regime in France. Nevertheless, it was clear that the Sultan was desperately looking for sources of income. This was confirmed when during the same month he consented to important reductions in the duties of some basic export articles.

Table 13 Tariff Reductions of February 1817

	Old Duty (in Sp. \$)	New Duty (in Sp. \$)
Wax	14 per ql.	10 per ql.
Gum	5 "	3 "
Sweet almonds	8 "	5 "
Bitter almonds	- -	3 "
Goat skins	15 per 100	10 per 100

Source: CCC, vol.27, fol.100.

The political difficulties of Mawlāy Sulaymān, especially after the unfortunate Battle of Zaian (May 1819) and the subsequent spread of tribal agitation, were further inducements for him to encourage exports. Thus, on the eve of the Fès rebellion, Mawlāy Sulaymān allowed the export of cereals (September 1820) and lifted the prohibition imposed on wool and olive oil (287).. Duties on other products, such as almonds, goat skins, leather

(286) CCC, vol.25, 27 Jan., 1817.

(287) CCC, vol.27, 1 Oct., 1820.

and gum, were subject to further reductions. These measures gave a real hope for a commercial opening.

Table 14 Export Duties Between 1817 and 1820
(in Spanish dollars)

	Before 1817		1817		1820
Sweet almonds	! 8 per ql. !	!	5 per ql. !	2 per ql. !	
Bitter almonds	! - -	!	3 "	! 2 "	
Gum	! 5 "	!	3 "	! 2 "	
Wax	! 14 "	!	10 "	! - -	
Leather	! - -	!	5 "	! 3 "	
Wool	! prohibited	!	prohibited	! 3 "	
Oil	! prohibited	!	prohibited	! 4 "	
Goat skins	! 15 per 100 !	!	10 per 100 !	8 per 100 !	

Source: CCC, vol.27, fol.100.

Indeed, without trade revenues Mawlāy Sulaymān would have been unable to meet the expenses of the war he was engaging against internal dissidents at a time when he lacked the coercive power to collect tribal taxes. Progressively, maritime trade emerged as a useful alternative source of income which allowed the Makhzen to reduce its dependence on the ever uncertain countryside. It enabled Mawlāy Sulaymān to resist effectively the conservative coalition of the zāwiya-s, the sharīf-s and the Berber tribes.

b) The Import Trade

Mawlāy Sulaymān's restrictive policy did not affect imports. He continued to receive a uniform import duty of 10%. He even encouraged traders to bring more goods into the country. Consequently, far from regressing, the volume of many imported articles increased during his reign.

Imports, though they resulted in the draining of valuable specie, were not regarded by the Makhzen as being as impoverishing as exports. On the contrary, they were always welcome in so far as they satisfied the needs of the population. Mawlāy Sulaymān, by principle opposed to the travel of Muslim merchants to Christian countries, took no coercive measures before 1816 to prevent them from trading with Europe (288). Nor did the Makhzen take into consideration the long term effects such imports could have on local industry and crafts.

Mawlāy Sulaymān's encouragement to Moroccan Muslim merchants led to the concentration of a sizable portion of the import trade into the hands of the latter. Indeed, the privileges granted by the Sultan to these merchants made it extremely difficult for European traders to impose themselves on the local market. While Europeans had to pay 10% in kind or ad valorem on all imported goods, Moroccan Muslim merchants paid only the zakāt or 2.5%. According to Jackson, merchandise entering Morocco by land was subject to an even lower duty: 1% ad valorem (289). Thus, goods arriving at Fès from Algiers were far more competitive than those offered by European traders at the sea ports (290). Moroccan merchants were further encouraged in 1803 when they were allowed to travel to Europe and purchase goods within the limits of 2,000 Spanish dollars without having to pay any duty at all(291). European merchants at Essaouira were greatly alarmed by this measure. Matra saw in it a blow to European interests and "a resolution to oblige them to leave the country and confirm his foreign commerce to his own subjects" (292).

(288) Thomassy, Des relations, p. 294.

(289) F.O.174/13, from Jackson to Matra, 18 May, 1802.

(290) Ibid. Jackson affirmed that "the Fez traders are enabled to undersell the European merchants established at this port (Essaouira) and the other ports of the Empire".

(291) F.O.52/12, 31 Jan., 1803.

(292) Ibid., 27 Feb., 1803.

This trade tended to be carried on through the port of Tétouan for which we, unfortunately, do not have any statistics as it was exclusively used by Moroccan merchants. Available figures about the Essaouira trade show a steady increase in the volume of imports during the two first decades of the nineteenth century.

Table 15 Import Trade Through Essaouira 1804 - 1812

	1804		1805		1812
Sugar	! 65,419 lbs.	!	! 32,532 lbs.	!	! 118,131 lbs.
Coffee	! -	!	! 3,600 "	!	! 2,480 "
Tea	! 1,510 "	!	! 1,770 "	!	! 2,031 "
Cloves	! 7,504 "	!	! 13,576 "	!	! 15,850 "
Brass pans	! 550 "	!	! 1,000 "	!	! 26,114 "
Steel	! 2,500 "	!	! 7,000 "	!	! 93,725 "
Razors	! -	!	500 doz.	!	2,400 doz.
Knives	! 13,738 doz.	!	! 12,874 "	!	! 9,893 "
Sewing thread	! 1,000 lbs.	!	! 1,480 lbs.	!	! 2,842 lbs.
Cotton	! 2,400 "	!	! 5,400 "	!	! 21,220 "
Copperas (for dyeing)	! 91,061 "	!	! 147,882 "	!	! 118,317 "
Copper tea kettles	! 119 p.	!	! 255 p.	!	! 150 p.

Sources: Inventories of exports and imports at Essaouira for the years 1804, 1805 and 1812 in F.O.52/13, Jackson, An Account of the Empire, pp.236-254, Add.Ms.41,512, British Museum.

CHAPTER . IV

MAJOR POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1792-1822

At the death of Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh in 1790, Morocco seemed ready for a repeat of the long period of instability it had experienced after the death of Mawlāy Ismā‘īl. The two years-long reign of Mawlāy al-Yazīd (1790-1792) were enough to undo the achievements of thirty years of stability and throw the country back into a state of civil war which endangered all the organizational efforts of his father.

In the official version as presented by al-Zayānī and Akansūs, Mawlāy al-Yazīd appears as an adventurer or an insane fanatic who led the country into disorder and chaos. Yet, in reality, despite his impulsive and adventurous temper, Mawlāy al-Yazīd did reflect the aspirations of large sectors of the population (1). The support he enjoyed from the sharīf-s, the Berber tribes and the army, together with his unanimous proclamation on the morrow of his father's death—despite this latter's public disavowal of his son—showed to what extent the country had become hostile to Sīdī Muḥammad's policies and ready for a change. Mawlāy al-Yazīd's declaration of war on Spain, his persecution of the Jews, expulsion of Christian missionaries, liquidation of his father's

(1) Compare al-Zayānī's attitude with that of al-Du‘ayf who did not conceal his sympathy with Mawlāy al-Yazīd, seen as the hero of the jihād (al-Du‘ayf, p.269).

collaborators and the changes he proposed for the organization of the army and the taxation system (2) constituted a reaction against every aspect of the previous reign. The endorsement given to his candidature for the throne by all the major groups in the country proved that Mawlāy al-Yazīd was more than just an isolated adventurer.

However, the coalition of these groups around Mawlāy al-Yazīd was based on a negative attitude of rejection rather than on a clear and concrete vision of an alternative; his popularity was then bound to evaporate. First of all, the coalition which brought him to power was not homogeneous. The new sultan could not possibly satisfy the army, the Berber tribes, the sharīf-s and the zāwiya-s simultaneously. Secondly, Mawlāy al-Yazīd very quickly succeeded in making enemies. His brutality alienated the administrative apparatus left by his father. By abolishing the maks (non-Quranic taxes) and granting considerable fiscal privileges to the sharīf-s (3), he deprived himself of the revenue necessary to finance his war effort against Spain and ensure the support and fidelity of the army and the tribal contingents.

Indeed, the support of the sharīf-s, the army and the Berbers dissipated as fast as it had emerged. His original supporters—the Idrisiid sharīf-s of northern Morocco—became less enthusiastic for his cause and gave refuge to his brother Mawlāy Maslama who promised to be a less adventurous and more malleable prince. The passionate theme of jihād lost its mobilizing effect when the siege of Ceuta was abandoned at the end of 1791. The Berber contingents became less reliable because of irregularities in pay (4). The 'Abīd army refused to obey Mawlāy al-

(2) On these changes, see al-Du'ayf, pp.226, 232 and 233.

(3) Al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-hādī, Ms.2471, R.L., p.13.

(4) Al-Du'ayf, p.243.

Yazīd's orders for the same reason (5). With these increasing difficulties, the reign of Mawlāy al-Yazīd became one of terror. To obtain the necessary funds to run the country, he had to have recourse to extortion and plunder. Extremely impulsive and authoritarian, he did not hesitate to persecute and physically liquidate important officials and notables on the least suspicion. This created an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty among his entourage and led to the defection of many qā'id-s and members of the royal family (6). Most important of all, however, was the active intervention of Spain in Moroccan internal politics to hasten his downfall.

I - Internal Developments

A - The Struggle for Power (1792-1798)

The evolution of Moroccan internal politics during the early 1790's was greatly influenced by the Spanish hostility to Mawlāy al-Yazīd. To divert his attention from the siege of Ceuta, the Spanish government attempted to encourage rebellion in the southern part of the country by all means available. In the execution of these plāns, the governor of Safi and the Abda, 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Nāṣir al-Mkhīznī, played an important role. Owing to the financial assistance received from Spain (7), Ibn Nāṣir was able to rouse the Abda, the Doukkala and the Haouz tribes against Mawlāy al-Yazīd and, on 10 December 1791, proclaim another son of Sīdī Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh: Mawlāy Hishām. This proclamation occurred at a time when

(5) Ibid., pp.258-259.

(6) Ibid., pp.250-251, 260.

(7) Cf. Arribas-Palau, Cartas Arabes de Marruecos, and idem, Arabic letters about Morocco during the reign of Mawlāy al-Yazīd in Majallat Titwān, 3-4, 1958, pp.109-151. On Spanish assistance to the southern rebels cf. also al-Du'ayf, p.257.

Mawlāy al-Yazīd was the uncontested Sultan of Morocco and can, therefore, only be seen as an attempt by the southern provinces to maintain their independence under the fictive sultanate of Mawlāy Hishām.

When Mawlāy al-Yazīd died at Marrakech on 17 February 1792, the power contest between the sons of Sīdī Muḥammad had already begun. Besides Mawlāy Hishām who ruled over the country extending from Marrakech to the Atlantic coast, there was another prince, Mawlāy ‘Abd al-Rahmān, who succeeded in setting up an independent principality in the Sous. The latter prince, however, had no ambition of claiming the imamate and his position was really the consequence of political vacuum in the extreme south of Morocco. By February 1792, only Mawlāy Hishām and Mawlāy Maslama appeared to be viable candidates for the Moroccan throne.

(1) The Initial Phase of Mawlāy Sulaymān's
Pacification Efforts (1792-1793)

This phase was characterized by the contest between Mawlāy Sulaymān and his brother Mawlāy Maslama for the control of northern Morocco.

Mawlāy Maslama, who had taken refuge in the sanctuary of Mawlāy ‘Abd al-Salām b. Mashīsh in 1791, was proclaimed on 28 February 1792 with the active support of the Rāysūni sharīf-s (8). Within a short time, he succeeded in rallying most of the Jbala tribes as well as the towns of Tétouan, Tangier, Chaouen and Ksar el-Kebir (9). Having secured the northern ports, he moved to Ouezzane where the head of the Wazzāniya religious order, Sīdī ‘Alī b. Ahmad, promised him every assistance. Sīdī ‘Alī b. Ahmad

(8) To cement this alliance with the Rāysūni sharīf-s Mawlāy Maslama married a Rāysūni sharīfa shortly after his proclamation. Cf. al-Du‘ayf, p.277.

(9) Ibid.

whose influence in the country was far more important than that of the Raysūni zāwiya took upon himself Mawlāy Maslama's cause and became his main advisor. He repeated the proclamation at Ouezzane on 23 March 1792 and wrote to his adepts everywhere in the country to secure their backing for Mawlāy Maslama (10).

Owing to the support of the Wazzāni sharīf-s, Mawlāy Maslama rapidly extended his influence over most of the country north of the Sebou river. During his short reign, he chose to reside at Ouezzane where, according to the observation of the British consul, "he depended entirely on the advice and guidance of the sheriff" (11). Sīdī al-Tuhāmī b. al-Hasanī, another Wazzāni sharīf, served as de facto minister for Mawlāy Maslama (12). Never before had the Wazzāniya religious order participated so openly in the political struggle. However, Mawlāy Maslama's chances of success slackened by the middle of March 1792 when an unexpected candidate emerged—Mawlāy Sulaymān.

Mawlāy Maslama and his Wazzāni protectors had underestimated the importance of two major groups, the 'Abīd army and, particularly, the lowland Berbers (barābir lūṭā), whose military intervention in the dynastic contest proved to be decisive. By attempting to physically liquidate Sa'īd b. al-'Ayyāshī, head of the 'Abīd army, and Muḥammad Wa'zīz, leader of the Aīt Idrassen confederation, Mawlāy Maslama alienated both these groups (13). The refusal of the 'Abīd to join Mawlāy Maslama was also motivated by the latter's determination to transfer them back from Meknès to the various coastal garrisons, as used to be the case before the reign of Mawlāy al-Yazīd (14). The

(10) F.O.52/10, 22 April, 1792.

(11) F.O. 52/10, 5 April, 1792.

(12) Al-Du'ayf, p.278.

(13) Ibid., p.277.

(14) D.A.R., letter from Mawlāy Maslama to the Spanish governor of Ceuta dated 21 Sha'bān, 1206 AH/14 April, 1794 (photostatic copy from an original kept at the A.H.N., Madrid).

'Abīd naturally wanted to remain together in a single place, preferably in their traditional residence at Meknès. Mawlāy Maslama's intention to scatter them apparently encouraged their chiefs to seek the alliance of the Aït Idrassen and start looking for their own candidate to the throne. Despite their differences, the 'Abīd and the Aït Idrassen were both determined to avoid falling under the tutelage of the Wazzāni sharīf-s. Neither could they accept the proclamation of Mawlāy Hishām who was equally dependent on the qā'id-s of Abda and Doukkala. Whether they proclaimed Mawlāy Maslama in the north or Mawlāy Hishām in the south, they risked being left with very little say in the country's political affairs.

The fact that the 'Abīd and the Aït Idrassen controlled the middle regions of the country, and particularly Fès, the seat of legitimacy, gave them an undeniable advantage over both their northern and southern adversaries. Indeed, without the qā'īlim-s of Fès, no prince could claim nationwide recognition. A bay'a was binding for the whole Moroccan community only if it received the approval of the principal holders of religious legitimacy—the qā'īlim-s of Fès.

The first move of Muḥammad Wa'zīz and Sa'īd b. al-'Ayyāshī was, therefore, to approach al-Tāwdī b. Sūda (d.1795), the dean of the Fāsi qā'īlim-s (shaykh al-jamā'a). This latter acted not only as a spokesman for the scholarly elite but was also empowered by the people of Fès to decide on the choice of a sultan on their behalf (15).

(15) Cf. notarial act dated 10 Rajab, 1206 AH / 4 March, 1792 AD whereby the people of Fès delegated power to al-Tāwdī b. Sūda to be their spokesman in the choice of a new sultan, in Mic. 2/70, H.P.M.D., Fès, 1978.

Muhammad Wa^czīz and al-Tāwdī b. Sūda agreed not to proclaim any of the contesting princes. Instead, al-Tawdī proposed to the leader of the Aït Idrassen to convene a general congress of "the people of tying and untying" (ahl al-hall wa al-qaqd) to look into the dynastic issue. This congress would include the qālim-s, the army chiefs, the heads of the Wazzāniya and Sharqāwiya religious orders, and the main tribal notables (16). Otherwise, al-Tāwdī b. Sūda insisted, the imamate should go to Mawlāy Hishām because he was proclaimed in the land where the previous imām had died (17). Apparently, this last argument was little appreciated by Muhammad Wa^czīz. Nor did he appreciate the idea of a congress of notables who, by deciding between Mawlāy Maslama and Mawlāy Hishām, would leave the Aït Idrassen out of the power game. He therefore resolved to act quickly and present the qālim-s of Fès with a fait accompli. Together with Sa^cid b. al-‘Ayyāshī and the chiefs of the ‘Abīd army, he proclaimed Mawlāy Sulaymān at Meknès on 10 March 1792. Two days later, the newly proclaimed prince was conducted to Fès in order to receive the formal bay‘a from the qālim-s.

The people of Fès, who had already expressed their opinion through al-Tāwdī b. Sūda, were placed in an embarrassing situation. They could not possibly reject the candidature proposed by the army and the Aït Idrassen without risking aggravating the dynastic crisis. The approval of Mawlāy Sulaymān's candidature by the qālim-s of Fès on 12 March 1792 was actually nothing more than the result of a carefully prepared coup de force. The only consolation of the qālim-s was the fact that the new sultan was a man of learning and devotion and, above all, a prince who promised to be of a mild character.

(16) Al-Du‘ayf, p.277.

(17) Ibid., p.278.

However, the proclamation of Mawlāy Sulaymān at Fès did not succeed in putting an end to the dynastic crisis. On the contrary, it seemed to have complicated it by adding another prince to the list of pretenders. In the north, Sīdī 'Alī b. Ahmad was more determined than ever to defend the candidature of Mawlāy Maslama. He rejected the bay'a of Fès and refused Mawlāy Sulaymān's proposal of submitting the matter to the shari'a (18). To refute the bay'a of Fès, Sīdī 'Alī b. Ahmad brought out an old fatwā going back to the post-Ismā'īli dynastic crisis. According to this fatwā, the imamate is the right of the first proclaimed imām, or, in case of a deadlock, to the most valorous one. Both arguments, were, of course, in favour of Mawlāy Maslama. Moreover, this fatwā gave priority to the prince who was proclaimed by the mujāhidīn and the people of the thughūr (places of confrontation with the enemy), whence the importance of the northern provinces which had always constituted the stronghold of the jihād (19).

It was military force rather than the confrontation of legal opinions which determined the outcome of the succession contest. The support of the army, and particularly that of the powerful Aït Idrassen confederation, was to be decisive. Indeed, in the coalition which brought Mawlāy Sulaymān to power, the 'Abīd tended to be the weaker partner. The 'Abīd chiefs realized very soon that real power belonged to Muḥammad Wa'zīz and his tribesmen. Only a few days after the formal proclamation of Mawlāy Sulaymān at Fès, the 'Abīd attempted to shift the balance to their advantage by seeking an alliance with the Guerouane, the Aït Idrassen's rivals, some of whom had already proclaimed Mawlāy Maslama (20). Relations between Sa'īd b. al-'Ayyāshī and Muḥammad Wa'zīz

(18) Ibid., pp.282, 291.

(19) Cf. text of the bay'a invoked by Sīdī 'Alī b. Ahmad in al-Du'ayf, pp.292-294.

(20) Ibid., pp.281-283.

deteriorated rapidly, reaching a point at which the latter was forced to transfer his family from Meknès to Fès (21). The dissatisfaction of the 'Abīd army became such that in early April 1792, they threatened to join Mawlāy Maslama at Ouezzane (22) and, had they abandoned Mawlāy Sulaymān, Mawlāy Maslama's chances of success would have certainly improved.

However, lacking an organized military force, Mawlāy Maslama depended essentially on disparate tribal contingents whose number and enthusiasm necessarily decreased with time. He also lacked the necessary funds to sustain his military effort. In April 1792 he was so desperately short of money that he wrote to European consuls at Tangier requesting their financial assistance (23). Apparently, Sīdī 'Alī b. Ahmad—whose coffers contained more gold and silver than was to be found in the Makhzen treasury (24)—was not ready to pursue his backing for a cause which had little chance of success after the central regions of Morocco lent their support to Mawlāy Sulaymān. On 22 April, Mawlāy Maslama decided to abandon the struggle momentarily after he suffered two military defeats which ended with the desertion of his two most reliable supporters, the Aīt Immour and the Hayaina tribes (25). In all, his reign lasted a little less than two months. He retreated to the Rif, and later on to Algeria, but never ceased to nourish hopes of taking revenge upon Mawlāy Sulaymān.

(21) *Ibid.*, p.282.

(22) D.A.R., letter from Mawlāy Maslama to the governor of Ceuta, ref. in note 14 above.

(23) F.O. 52/10, 22 April, 1792.

(24) 'Abd Allāh b. al-Tayyib al-Wazzānī, *al-Rawd al-munīf*, II, Ms.K. 2304, BGR, fol.77.

(25) Al-Zayānī, *al-Rawda*, fol.166.

The withdrawal of Mawlāy Maslama from the northern provinces in April 1792 was an important political success for Mawlāy Sulaymān and represented a crucial step in the pacification of the country. Henceforth, Mawlāy Sulaymān became the uncontested ruler of northern Morocco. He appointed governors to the various tribes and towns falling under his control and inaugurated a policy of rapprochement with the Raysūni sharīf-s (26) who assisted him in consolidating his rule over the Jbala. On the other hand, Sīdī 'Alī b. Ahmad ceased his opposition to Mawlāy Sulaymān. To atone for his past support for Mawlāy Maslama, he offered his mediation for bringing about the submission of the southern rebels.

The most recalcitrant zone was the Tamesna where the Chaouia tribes were not completely subdued until 1797. In May 1793, Mawlāy Sulaymān, whose rule was by that time firmly established north of the Bouregreg river, made his first move against the Chaouia. He succeeded in reaching Dār al-Bayḍā without much difficulty but the Chaouia, who had withdrawn their forces southward, inflicted a heavy defeat on the Sultan's troops in June 1793 (27). The royal army, composed of 7,000 men from the 'Abīd, Oudaya and Aït Idrassen, was forced to retreat. The 'Abīd were particularly affected as many of them were killed or captured (28). Deeply upset, Saīd b. al-'Ayyāshī threatened, once again, to abandon Mawlāy Sulaymān (29).

This major military setback in the Chaouia helped to delay Mawlāy Sulaymān's pacification program and gave a respite to Mawlay Hishām and his military backers, 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Nāṣir and Muḥammad b. al-'Arūsī, qā'id-s of

(26) In 1793 Mawlāy Sulaymān granted the Raysūni-s a funduq (caravanserae) in Tétouan where they established a branch of their zāwiya. Cf. letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Sīdī 'Alī b. Raysūn dated early Sha'bān, 1207 AH/ March, 1793 AD in Muḥammad al-Amin al-Raysūni, Haqā'iq tārīkhīya 'an zāwiyat Tażrūt, 1966, p.26.

(27) F.O. 52/10, 1 Aug., 1793.

(28) Ibid.

(29) F.O. 52/10, 19 Oct., 1793.

the Abda and Doukkala tribes respectively. The disobedience of the Chaouia tribes acquired an even more threatening character when, in October 1793, they called on Mawlāy Maslama to serve as their prince (30).

Since he left Ouezzane in April 1792, Mawlāy Maslama had made several attempts to destabilize Mawlāy Sulaymān's government. In September 1792, he attempted, in vain, to rouse the Hayaina tribe north of Fès. After a short stay in Algeria, he returned to the Tafilelt and from there crossed to the Middle Atlas mountains to seek the help of the Amhāwīsh maraboutic family. According to contemporary Jewish sources, Mawlāy Maslama succeeded in rallying to his cause Abū Bakr Amhāwīsh who proclaimed him in the summer of 1793 and provided him with 4,000 men to attack Meknès (31). This attempt also failed and Mawlāy Maslama was desperately looking for assistance in the Tadla when he was invited by the Chaouia to join them (32).

By proclaiming Mawlāy Maslama, the Chaouia were only seeking a cover of legitimacy to maintain their independence. A handful of wealthy notables, among them a cousin of Sīdī 'Alī b. Ahmad (33), were particularly interested in ensuring for themselves the control of wheat exports from Dār al-Baydā. The Chaouia notables made it clear to Mawlāy Maslama that, in return for his services, he was to receive half the export duties (34).

(30) *Ibid.*

(31) G. Vajda, "Recueil de textes historiques judéo-marocains, in *Hespéris*, 36, 1949, p.184."

(32) F.O. 52/10, 10 Oct., 1793.

(33) Al-Du'ayf, p.297.

(34) F.O. 52/10, 19 Oct., 1793.

(2) The Second Phase of Pacification :Mawlāy Sulaymān's New Strategy (1793-1795)

By the end of 1793, the whole of the coast south of Rabat was in the hands of autonomous qā'id-s or princes. Mawlāy Sulaymān lacked the necessary military and financial means to embark upon a large scale confrontation with the rebellious provinces. The unfortunate campaign of May-June 1793 against the Chaouia showed how harmful such military failures could be to the army's morale and discipline.

Moreover, the army was neither well organized nor trustworthy. The 'Abīd officers, in particular, accused Mawlāy Sulaymān of being partial to the Oudaya and the Aït Idrassen Berbers (35). The 'Abīd looked unfavourably upon the Sultan's attempts to strengthen the Oudaya army greatly weakened by Sīdī Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh and which Mawlāy Sulaymān wanted to strengthen to keep the arrogance of the 'Abīd in check (36). In October 1793, when Mawlāy Sulaymān had decided to march against the Chaouia, the 'Abīd troops refused to move and Sa'īd b. al-'Ayyāshī openly threatened to proclaim Mawlāy Maslama (37).

Confronted with these difficulties, Mawlāy Sulaymān adopted a new strategy of pacification based on three principles : a greater recourse to efforts at mediation, the weakening of the rebellious coastal provinces by intercepting their maritime trade, and the courting of Spain in an attempt to bring about a change in her attitude towards the political division of Morocco.

(35) F.O. 52/10, 1 Aug., 1793.

(36) On the strengthening of the Oudaya cf. al-Du'ayf, pp. 318, 335. In 1796 Mawlāy Sulaymān raised the cavalry force of the Oudaya from 400 men that were in 1792 to 3,000 men.

(37) F.O. 52/10, 19 Oct., 1793.

After 1793, Mawlāy Sulaymān resorted increasingly to the good offices of important religious figures, such as Sīdī 'Alī b. Aḥmad and al-'Arbī b. al-Ma'ṭī, heads of the Wazzāniya and Sharqāwiya religious orders respectively. In 1794, he called upon Sīdī 'Alī b. Aḥmad to exert pressure on his cousin Sīdī 'Abd Allāh b. 'Abd al-Qādir to put an end to his commercial activities at Dār al-Bayḍā (38). The Wazzāni sharīf finally left the Chaouia in October 1794 following the repeated intervention of Sīdī 'Alī b. Aḥmad (39). The mediation efforts of the latter as well as those of the 'ālim-s of Fès were also used by Mawlāy Sulaymān in 1795 in an attempt to obtain the submission of 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Nāṣir (40).

Mawlāy Sulayman's strategy also involved avoiding destructive warfare as much as possible directing his efforts instead to a blockade of the rebellious ports. The Sultan had realized that the basis of the whole crisis was commercial. Since the death of Sīdī Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh, coastal tribes had established direct trade relations with European merchants and embarked upon unrestricted export of wheat. In and around the ports of Dār al-Bayḍā, Tīt and Safi, a minority of wealthy intermediaries emerged whose interests depended closely on maritime trade. Mawlāy Sulaymān decided, therefore, to strike at these interests by setting up a naval blockade around these ports.

In October 1793, just after Mawlāy Maslama established himself at Dār al-Bayḍā, Mawlāy Sulaymān intimated to the European consuls his determination to blockade all ports which did not recognize one of the two ruling sultans, himself and Mawlāy Hishām (41). Consequently, European countries were notified that all vessels trading with Dār al-Bayḍā would be seized. Spain, whose merchants

(38) Al-Du'ayf, p.297.

(39) Ibid., p.299.

(40) Ibid., p.311.

(41) F.O. 52/10, 28 Oct., 1793.

had important trading interests at Dār al-Baydā, could not raise any objection to this decision since it had recognized that the country north of the Oum er-Rbia river fell within the dominions of Mawlāy Sulaymān (42). In 1794, some vessels were refitted and ordered to cruise off the Chaouia coast. Many boats loaded with wheat were seized. The naval blockade proved to be so effective that in July 1794 the Chaouia notables asked Mawlāy Maslama to leave their territory (43).

At the beginning of 1795, Mawlāy Sulaymān was presented with an unexpected pretext to extend the naval blockade to Safi and Tīt—the abdication of Mawlāy Hishām at Marrakech. Having realized that he was nothing more than a political tool in the hands of ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. Nāṣir, Mawlāy Hishām abandoned the throne in January 1795 (44). The fact that the tribes of Abda and Doukkala were left without a prince induced Mawlāy Sulaymān to intercept the trade of Tīt and Safi, on the grounds that these ports were refusing allegiance to both courts—Fès and Marrakech—and were, therefore, to be reduced to the obedience of one prince or another (45).

Furthermore, Spain could no longer uphold its argument according to which the territory south of Oum er-Rbia lay outside the sovereignty of Mawlāy Sulaymān. Three important developments undermined this argument. First, there was the proclamation of Mawlāy Sulaymān by Essaouira in April 1794 because of the influence of the important ‘Abīd garrison stationed in that port (46). Secondly,

(42) The Spanish government recognized Mawlāy Sulaymān's right to intercept the trade of Dār al-Baydā but made it clear that it would not allow its trade with Tīt and Safi to be disturbed. Cf.F.O.52/10, 29 Aug., 1794.

(43) Ibid.

(44) F.O. 52/11, 16 Feb., 1795.

(45) F.O. 52/11, in a letter to European consuls dated 29 Sha'bān, 1209 AH/21 March, 1795, Mawlāy Sulaymān expressed his intention to forbid the trade of the Abda and Doukkala following the abdication of Mawlāy Hishām.

(46) Al-Du‘ayf, p.308.

there was the political division of the Doukkala between Muḥammad b. al-‘Arūsī and his brother al-Hāshmī at the end of 1794 and the decision taken by the latter to proclaim Mawlāy Sulaymān (47). Although al-Hāshmī b. al-‘Arūsī threw off his allegiance to Mawlāy Sulaymān in the summer of 1795 (48), the Sultan was nevertheless able to make use of this temporary submission to present himself as the legitimate sultan of the whole country. The third development was the proclamation of Mawlāy Sulaymān in June 1795 by the notables of Marrakech and Rehamna (49).

All these gains, though precarious and temporary, greatly improved Mawlāy Sulaymān's political position vis-à-vis his opponents. The renewed proclamation to Mawlāy Hishām at Marrakech in October 1795 by ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. Nāṣir and al-Hāshmī al-‘Arūsī—by then the uncontested leader of Doukkala—did not prevent Mawlāy Sulaymān from proceeding with the blockade of Safi and Tīt. In June 1796, he had five vessels cruising off the coast of Abda (50) and during the summer of 1796, many ships loaded with wheat were seized and sold at Rabat (51).

Parallel to the blockade of the rebellious ports, Mawlāy Sulaymān attempted to influence Spain's attitude towards the dynastic crisis by granting her important commercial privileges. Indeed, the policy of rapprochement with Spain constituted one of the major principles of Mawlāy Sulaymān's policy during this phase of pacification. The first step in this respect had been the appointment in November 1792 of Muḥammad b. ‘Uthmān, well known to be the man of Spain, as minister for foreign

(47) Ibid., p.306.

(48) Ibid., p.310.

(49) Ibid., p.311; F.O.52/10, 30 July , 1795.

(50) F.O.52/11, 16 June, 1796.

(51) Al-Du‘ayf, p.334.

affairs (52) . . In May 1793, immediately after his first entry to Dār al-Baydā, he notified the Spanish government that it could send its nationals to exercise their trade at that port from which they were allowed to export wheat on the same conditions granted to them by his father (53). A further concession to Spain was made in 1795 when Mawlāy Sulaymān conferred upon her the exclusive right of using the port of Larache (54).

The commercial liberalism which characterized Mawlāy Sulaymān's policy in the 1790's was, to a large extent, motivated by his Spanish policy. By encouraging wheat exports during the pacification phase, he not only sought to strengthen the Makhzen finances, but also anticipated the advantages that were to be expected from a change in Spanish attitudes. Spain, being mainly interested in the purchase of wheat, realized that it could export from the northern ports on almost the same conditions as those offered by the rebels (55). Ultimately, Mawlāy Sulaymān succeeded in convincing Spain that her interests could be better served by a united and peaceful Morocco.

(3) The Third Phase of Pacification:
the Reunification (1796 - 1798)

The abdication of Mawlāy Hishām in January 1795 and the voluntary submission of the Chaouia to Mawlāy Sulaymān two months later gave real hopes for a rapid reunification of the country. The arrival in northern Morocco of a delegation from Marrakech to present its bay'a to Mawlāy Sulaymān in June 1795 confirmed these hopes.

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- (52) AHN, Estado, Leg.4328, letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the European consuls dated 6 Rabi' I, 1207/1st Nov., 1792, notifying them of Ibn 'Uthmān's appointment.
- (53) AHN, Estado, Leg.4330(2), letter from al-Ghāzī b. Salāma to A. Salmon dated 2 Shawwāl, 1207/13 May, 1793, reproduced in appendix 6.
- (54) F.O.52/11, 31 Oct., 1795.
- (55) Cf. Mawlāy Sulaymān's commercial policy in chapter III pp. I63-I64.

The political situation, however, progressively turned against Mawlāy Sulaymān during the second half of the year.

In July 1795, al-Hāshmī b. al-‘Arūsī disavowed his bay‘a and joined ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. Nāṣir. In the Jbala, Mawlāy Maslama threatened to destabilize Mawlāy Sulaymān's control when he laid a siege to Tétouan during most of the summer (56). In October 1795, Mawlāy Hishām was proclaimed again at Marrakech by ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. Nāṣir and al-Hāshmī b. al-‘Arūsī. With the exception of Essaouira, the whole country south of Oum er-Rbia rose again in rebellion. Even Spain, which had suspended her commercial relations with Safi and Tīt on account of Mawlāy Sulaymān's naval blockade of these ports, made it known that after the renewed proclamation of Mawlāy Hishām in October 1795 she had the intention of resuming her normal relations with the qā’id-s of Abda and Doukkala (57). "Cet empire", wrote the French deputy consul, L. Mure, "paraît devoir rester longtemps divisé en deux royaumes" (58).

During the year 1796, no progress could be made to solve the dynastic crisis. For Mawlāy Sulaymān, new difficulties arose. In the Tadla, the head of the Sharqāwiya religious order turned to Mawlāy Hishām after he suspected Mawlāy Sulaymān of ordering the killing of his affine, Abū ‘Azza al-Qustālī, qā’id of the Beni Hsen (59). In the Sous, Mawlāy ‘Abd al-Mālik al-Zayzūn, Mawlāy Sulaymān's nephew and governor of Agadir and Taroudant, became virtually independent. Further to the south, Mawlāy ‘Abd al-Rahmān, another son of Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd

(56) Al-Du‘ayf, pp.312-315. Mawlāy Maslama was compelled to abandon the siege of Tétouan in Oct. 1795 owing to the intervention of Ibn Nāṣir al-Mtīrī. This was his last attempt after which he retreated to Algeria.

(57) AHN, Estado, Leg.4345, letter from Ibn‘Uthmān to the Spanish prime minister Godoy, 16 Muḥarram, 1211/22 July, 1796; cf.appendix 13.

(58) Archives Nationales (Paris), A.F. IV, from L. Mure to the Comité du Salut Public, Salé, 16 Vendémiaire, year IV (7 October, 1795)

(59) Al-Du‘ayf, pp.328-329, 341.

Allāh, set up an independent principality in Wādī Noun. More serious, however, was the renewed rebellion of the Chaouia.

Upon the submission of the Chaouia in March 1795, Mawlāy Sulaymān had appointed his cousin 'Abd al-Mālik b. Idrīs governor for this province. Mawlāy 'Abd al-Mālik took over a large share of the trade returns of Dār al-Baydā and, by November 1796, had succeeded in rallying local notables to his autonomist plan. On 21 January 1797, he was formally proclaimed by the Chaouia tribes. This rebellion took a more threatening character when, in March 1797, 'Abd al-Mālik declared his allegiance to Mawlāy Hishām (60), thus giving the southern prince a pretext whereby he could claim sovereignty over a territory which, until then, had remained an uncontested part of the northern kingdom. Only internal dissensions among the southern rebels allowed Mawlāy Sulaymān to neutralize the serious implications of such a development.


In March 1797, just after Mawlāy 'Abd al-Mālik b. Idrīs proclaimed his allegiance to the court of Marrakech, Mawlāy Hishām abdicated for the second time in protest against the control of all political power by the qā'ids of Abda and Doukkala (61). 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Nāṣir and al-Hāshmī b. al-'Arūsī could not afford a new dynastic vacuum which would impair the legitimacy of their pretensions and give Mawlāy Sulaymān a valuable opportunity to resume his naval blockade against their ports. This second abdication by Mawlāy Hishām was, therefore, immediately followed by the proclamation of his brother Mawlāy al-Ḥusayn on 30 March, 1797 (62). The new sultan was supported by the Abda, Doukkala, Chaouia and the Charrādi zāwiya (63). Marrakech

(60) Ibid., p.348.

(61) Ibid.

(62) Ibid., p.349.

(63) The zāwiya used to be located about one day's journey west of Marrakech. It was founded by Abū al-'Abbās al-Charrādī, disciple of Ahmad al-Khalīfa (d. 1717), second shaykh of the Nāṣiriya religious order. Its influence, however, was limited to the Cherarda tribes including the Zirara, Chébanat, Tekna, Oulad Dlim and Dou Blal. Cf. Drague, Esquisse d'histoire religieuse du Maroc, Paris, 1951, pp. 91-92.



and the adjacent Rehamna, on the other hand, remained attached to Mawlāy Hishām (64) who engaged in a fierce fight with his brother for the control of the southern capital. Finally, Mawlāy al-Ḥusayn entered Marrakech in May, while Mawlāy Hishām took refuge in the mountains.

It was precisely at the moment when the two princes were battling for the control of Marrakech that Mawlāy Sulaymān decided to march against the rebellious Chaouia. Mawlay 'Abd al-Mālik b. Idrīs succeeded in raising 11,000 fighters amongst the Chaouia tribes but Mawlāy Sulaymān had with him 60,000 men the great majority of them belonging to the Aīt Idrassen and other lowland Berbers (65). The rebellious prince was driven back to the Oum er-Rbia river and defeated on 20 May, 1797 (66). The following day, not only the Chaouia but also a number of Doukkala notables submitted to the rule of Mawlāy Sulaymān. The Chaouia, the key to the reduction of the southern provinces, was now definitely pacified and placed under the command of Mawlāy al-Tayyib. The port of Dār al-Baydā was immediately closed to maritime trade and European merchants transferred to Rabat (67). Henceforth, the southern rebels already divided and weakened could no longer hope to maintain their independence.

Mawlāy Sulaymān's victory over the Chaouia in May 1797 and the struggle between Mawlāy Hishām and Mawlāy al-Ḥusayn induced many southern tribes to proclaim Mawlāy Sulaymān. The mawlid (the Prophet's birthday) of 1797 which coincided with 4 September, was the occasion for the Doukkala and Rehamna tribes to present their allegiance to Mawlāy Sulaymān (68). At about the same time, the head of the Wazzāniya religious order was dispatched to Safi in an attempt to obtain the peaceful submission of 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Nāṣir. This latter already abandoned

(64) Al-Du‘ayf, pp. 350, 353.

(65) C.C.C., vol. 21, fol. 117.

(66) Al-Du‘ayf, pp. 358-359.

(67) Al-Zayāni, al-Rawda, fol. 171.

(68) Al-Du‘ayf, p. 366.

by al-Hāshmī b. al-‘Arūsī, could not resist any longer. On 23 September, Sīdī ‘Alī b. Ahmad succeeded in inducing him to recognize Mawlāy Sulaymān as the legitimate and only ruler of the country (69). At Marrakech, the news of the bay‘a of Ibn Nāṣir spread and was immediately followed by the expulsion of Mawlāy al-Ḥusayn and the proclamation of Mawlāy Sulaymān. The reunification of Morocco was formally achieved with the triumphal entry of Mawlāy Sulaymān to Marrakech on 26 November 1797(70).

The Sultan remained at Marrakech for the winter in order to consolidate his rule in the southern provinces. He still had to overcome the desperate resistance offered by Mawlāy al-Ḥusayn and Muḥammad al-Charrādī who refused to hand in the artillery left in his zāwiya by Mawlāy Hishām (71). In December 1797 ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. Nāṣir could no longer conceal his sympathy for al-Charrādī in his conflict with Mawlāy Sulaymān and offered to assist him militarily. He even threatened to proclaim Mawlāy al-Ḥusayn (72). However, the submission of this prince to Mawlāy Sulaymān and his transfer to Rabat at the beginning of 1798 foiled any secessionist attempt. In February 1798, Mawlāy Sulaymān received the allegiance of his nephew ‘Abd al-Mālik al-Zayzūn who ruled independently at Agadir (73), and in March of the same year, a deputation from the Dra populations came to present its bay‘a and request the appointment of a Makhzen governor (74). Thus, on 19 March 1798, Mawlāy Sulaymān celebrated the end of the holy month of Ramaḍān in the presence of delegations from most tribes of Morocco. He was the uncontested ruler of Morocco.

(69) Ibid., p.367; F.O. 52/11, 1 Oct., 1797.

(70) Al-Du‘ayf, p.372.

(71) Ibid., p.373.

(72) Ibid.

(73) Ibid., pp.378-379.

(74) Ibid., p.379.

B - The Great Plague of 1799-1800

No sooner was Mawlāy Sulaymān generally accepted as sultan than the country suffered the first of two major outbreaks of plague. The epidemic which ravaged the country in 1799-1800 had important social and political consequences.

(1) Evolution of the Epidemic

Morocco seems to have been spared the recurrent outbreaks of plague which afflicted North African countries during the second half of the eighteenth century. From 1750 to 1799 the country enjoyed almost half a century without the disease (75). The plague invasions of 1784-1789 witnessed by Tunisia and Algeria did not apparently reach beyond Tlemcen and Mascara (76). Yet, by the end of the century, the country experienced the most devastating epidemic since 1350.

Those who survived the epidemic called it "the big plague" (*al-tā'ūn al-kabīr*) in order to distinguish it from other less important disorders (77). The extent of ravages was far greater than that of the last plague of 1750. A simple indication of its effect is that the number of dead at Fès reached a maximum of 300 per day during the 1750 outbreak whereas in 1799 the number was eight times as much— 2,500 according to Moroccan contemporary estimates (78).

What was the nature of the epidemic? Was it really the plague or another disorder among the frequent calamities which ravaged societies at that time? Contemporary witnesses, both Moroccan and foreign, leave no doubt that the disease in question was the bubonic plague. The

(75) Al-Qādirī, *Hawliyāt*, p.74.

(76) L. Valensi, *Le Maghreb avant la prise d'Alger*, Paris, 1969, p.21.

(77) *Al-Ibtisām*, p.7; 'Abd al-Kabīr b. al-Majdhūb al-Fāsī, *Tadhkīrat al-muhsinīn*, p.343.

(78) *Al-Ibtisām*, p.7; al-Qādirī, *Hawliyāt*, p.74; al-Du'ayf, p.144.

description given by al-Ruhūnī (d.1815), one of the most eminent ālim-s of the Sulaymāni period, was most explicit. It was "a very painful tumor accompanied by high temperature, shivering and vomiting" (79). These symptoms coincide perfectly with the definition of the bubonic plague given by Encyclopaedia Britannica (80). Contemporary Moroccan sources are also specific about the terminology used. We are dealing with tā'ūn and not just wabā' (81).

The plague, already present in Algeria in 1798, penetrated the country from the east. Mawlāy Sulaymān refused to comply with quarantine regulations set by the European consuls at Tangier (82) and considered any preventive measures to be a great sin (83). The bad harvests of 1798 had prepared the way for the epidemic. In August 1798 the British consul general noted that "the crops had entirely failed" (84). The crops in 1799 were more promising but were partly destroyed by locusts. "In the course of twenty four hours", noted Matra, "they left not the least appearance of verdure on the face of the country" (85). It was precisely in the spring of 1799, during the bridging months of the agricultural year, when the individual is at his most vulnerable to epidemics, that the plague took hold on the country.

(79) Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Ruhūnī, Jawāb fī al-tā'ūn, Ms.D.2251, BGR, p.4.

(80) Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1958, pp. 992-996.

(81) Cf. al-Ibtisām, p.7; 'Abd al-Salām b. Sulaymān al-Fishtālī, Taqyid, Ms.D.283, BGR, fol.125. The term wabā' is general and used to cover a wide range of ill-defined diseases (cholera, malignant fever, etc) which attacked populations on a large scale.

(82) European consuls constituted from 1792 a kind of health council to supervise quarantine regulations which, for religious considerations, the Makhzen was never ready to carry out by itself.

(83) F.O.52/11, 26 April, 1799.

(84) F.O.52/11, Tangier, 15 Aug., 1798.

(85) F.O.52/11, Gibraltar, 21 May, 1799.

Before it appeared in the vicinity of Fès, the plague had already been reported in the Rif; but it was at Fès and its surroundings that the epidemic firmly entrenched itself during the month of April 1799 (86). The movement of royal troops under Mawlāy Sulaymān towards Rabat and the southward hastened the spread of the disease. After having completed the pacification of the country, the Sultan decided to visit Safi and Abda in April 1799. He wanted, in particular, to receive the allegiance of 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Nāṣir whose submission still remained uncertain (87). In this southward tour, Mawlāy Sulaymān was accompanied by a large corps of 'Abīd and Oudaya who were already affected by the plague. "Everyday a certain number among the army died from the plague" (88). In this southward expedition Mawlāy Sulaymān "was dragging behind him two armies : the troops and the epidemic", wrote al-Du'ayf (89). The British consul also noted that Mawlāy Sulaymān had carried the disease with him from Fès to Rabat and the coastal plains (90).

There is no doubt that the Sultan's movement across the southern Atlantic plains was responsible for the quick spread of the plague during a season which was particularly favourable to the extension of the malady. "There was no sign of the epidemic in the Doukkala, Abda, Ahmar and elsewhere until the royal army entered these places", added

(86) For both al-Zayānī and the author of al-Ibtisām, the plague made its appearance in 1212 AH/1797-1798 AD. All the evidence drawn from British and French archives as well as from Moroccan contemporary sources proves that the epidemic reached Fès in the spring of 1799. Cf. al-Du'ayf, p.399; 'Abd al-Salām b. Sulaymān al-Fishtālī, Tagyīd, fol.125; al-Zayānī, al-Rawda, fol.181; al-Ibtisām, p.7; F.O.52/11, 15 March, 1799; CCC, vol.22, fol.54-55.

(87) Al-Du'ayf, p.403.

(88) Al-Du'ayf, p.402.

(89) Ibid.

(90) F.O.52/11, 6 Aug., 1799. On the responsibility of the sultanian expedition in carrying the disease southward, cf. also F.O. 52/11, 21 May, 1799.

al-Du‘ayf (91). Commenting on Mawlāy Sulaymān’s untimely expedition, al-Fishtālī noted that "his movement had no reason or justification whatsoever" (92).

The plague made its major ravages between April and July, reaching its apex at Fès and Marrakech during the spring of 1799. According to Moroccan contemporary sources, the number of victims at Fès reached as much as 1,000 per day. "At one time", wrote al-Fishtālī, "people used to bury more than one thousand a day" (93). The author of al-Ibtisām mentioned the figure of 2,500 per day (94). Whatever the exact figure is, it is clear that the losses were considerable. At Marrakech, daily losses reached as much as 1,800 according to French consular sources (95). By September, the British consul general reported that "not one human creature ... is left in Morocco (Marrakech) and the whole face of the country to the summits of the Atlas mountains is covered with dead bodies" (96).

During the months of August and September 1799, the epidemic witnessed a general regression. At the end of the summer, it was even believed to have ended. However, it was "just a temporary calm occasioned by the decrease in population and the heat" (97). By October, the malady reappeared again in the central and southern provinces but the mortality rate was very low.

The northern part of the country was not seriously affected until the spring of 1800. In Tétouan, the plague did not appear before February 1800 (Ramadān 1214 AH) according to local sources (98). In March, the number

(91) Al-Du‘ayf, p.402.

(92) Al-Fishtālī, fol.125.

(93) Ibid.

(94) Al-Ibtisām, p.7.

(95) J. Caillé, "Le vice-consul Broussonet et ses mémoires sur le Maroc", in Hésperis-Tamuda, II, 1961, p.16.

(96) F.O.52/11, 13 Sept., 1799.

(97) F.O.52/11, Safi, 25 Aug., 1799.

(98) Dāwūd, III, p.234.

of victims rose to 20 per day, reaching the record figure of 130-150 per day in April (99). In two months, the town lost, according to contemporary Tétouani sources, 8,000 souls (100). At Tangier where the population was less important, the maximum number of dead does not seem to have exceeded 30 per day (101). The number of victims diminished steadily during the summer of 1800 and, by the end of the year, the country was entirely free from the disease.

(2) Social and Political Consequences

The Great Plague of 1799-1800 had important social, economic and political consequences. The first major consequence was obviously demographic. Between one fourth and one half of the population perished during this epidemic according to British and French consular estimates (102). Moroccan sources, usually silent about such estimations, convey the impression of a sweeping calamity which "almost led to annihilation" (103). Among the indicators of the heavy losses that had been incurred during the plague was the inability of the rural population to ensure the gathering of the 1799 harvest or to attend to agricultural activities in 1800. "The crop was abundant", noted al-Fishtālī in 1799, "but impossible to gather in, so few were the survivors" (104).

(99) F.O.52/11, 29 July, 1800.

(100) Dāwūd, III, p.234.

(101) F.O.52/11, 29 Julay, 1800.

(102) British consular services estimated the loss at half the population (C.O.91/41, Gibraltar, 14 Dec., 1800). Jackson believed the epidemic to have carried away between one third and half the population (*An Account of the Empire*, p. 171). The French vice-consul at Essaouira assessed the losses at one fourth or one third (Thomassy, *Des relations*, p. 262).

(103) Al-Fishtālī, fols.125-126.

(104) Ibid.

Losses among the urban population were generally more important. Towns lost between half and two thirds of their population (105). In Fès, the most populous city of Morocco, many houses were emptied (106). James Curtis who visited the city in 1801 reported that 15,000 people perished in one single street in which only thirty individuals were left (107). Among the victims were thousands of artisans, merchants and men of learning.

However, the demographic losses of the Great Plague seem to have been compensated by a rapid population growth after 1800. The agricultural prosperity which characterized the first decade of the nineteenth century, aided by the absence of epidemics and a high birth rate, tended to attenuate these losses (108).

The Great Plague was also responsible—partly at least—in determining the Makhzen's fate during the early decades of the nineteenth century. Politically, the Great Plague favoured Mawlāy Sulaymān's efforts at pacification by weakening the remaining rebellious tribes of Abda and Doukkala. Heavily depopulated and deprived of their maritime trade after the departure of many European merchants and the interruption of communications imposed by the epidemic, these coastal provinces could no longer hope to maintain their independence (109).

(105) Rabat lost, according to Broussonet, about 20 of its 30,000 inhabitants. Cf. H.P.J. Renaud, "La peste de 1799" - Hespéris, T.1, 1921, p.162. Ksar el-Kebir lost 10 out of its 20,000 inhabitants. Cf. Curtis, A Journal, p.36. Jackson gives the following figures for the main towns: Fès, 65,000; Marrakech, 50,000; Essaouira, 4,500 and Safi, 5,000 (An Account of the Empire, p.174). Tétouan lost in two months only about 8,000 souls according to Tétouani sources quoted by Dāwūd, III, p.234.

(106) Al-Fishtālī, fol.125.

(107) Curtis, A Journal, p.83.

(108) Cf. above chapter III, pp. 98-99.

(109) F.O.52/11, 13 Sept., 1799.

By weakening the southern coastal provinces, it rendered any significant tribal upheaval impossible. The plague also took away most of his former opponents. His two brothers, Mawlāy Hishām and Mawlāy al-Ḥusayn, who, for six years had contested his power south of the Oum er-Rbia river, died in the epidemic. ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. Nāṣir and al-Hāshmī b. al-‘Arūsī, qā’id-s of Abda and Doukkala, also perished from the plague. "Mawlāy Sulaymān is now in perfect control of the country", wrote Matra after the plague ended, "the coastal provinces are so depopulated that no insurrection of consequence is possible" (110).

The Great Plague also helped to solve the Makhzen's immediate financial problems. The succession of Mawlāy Sulaymān to the inheritances of deceased persons (munqati‘ūn) assured him of important revenues and allowed him, according to Jackson, to gain "an incalculable accession to wealth" (111). From the province of Sous alone, the inheritance was so considerable that Makhzen officials were incapable of collecting all of it (112). This unexpected source of revenue allowed Mawlāy Sulaymān to dispense with the returns of maritime trade and encouraged him to put restrictions on commercial relations with Europe.

On the other hand, the plague helped to weaken the Makhzen. The administrative apparatus, in particular, was greatly eroded by the death of many competent officials and princes who had acquired previously an administrative experience under the reign of Sīdī Muḥammad. After the death of Ibn ‘Uthmān and Mawlāy al-Tayyib in 1799, Mawlāy Sulaymān could hardly find a person to take charge of foreign affairs.

(110) F.O. 52/11, 23 Jan., 1801.

(111) Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p.169; under Islamic law the property of persons who die without heirs passes to the bayt al-māl (State treasury).

(112) Al-Zayāni, al-Rawda, fol.181.

Mawlāy Sulaymān also lost in the Great Plague some of his best supporters among the ‘ālim-s. Eminent scholars such as Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Salām al-Fāṣī, ‘Alī b. Awīs al-Huṣaynī, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad Bannīs, Muḥammad b. Maṣ‘ūd al-Trunbāṭī and others who supported his bay‘a in 1792 and had served as his teachers died in the epidemic (113). Al-Du‘ayf, who was a student at Fès in 1799, noted the devastating effects of the plague on the world of learning. "Most ‘ālim-s from Fès and Meknès died" he wrote (114). The passing away of many scholars of the old generation paved the way for important changes among the ‘ālim-s during the first two decades of the nineteenth century (115).

C - A Precarious Truce (1800-1811)

Natural calamities played an important role in furthering tribal instability. This is particularly true of epidemics which, by affecting coastal areas more than Saharan or mountainous regions, created favourable conditions for the movement of tribes (116). Indeed, Saharan and mountainous regions in Morocco always tended to constitute an eternal "réervoir humain" from which the western Atlantic plains were constantly supplied with population reinforcements. For Saharan tribes, the plague was referred to as "al-khayr" (the good), most probably because it allowed them to move to more fertile

(113) Cf. the names of some of these in Ja‘far b. Idrīs al-Kattānī, al-Shurb al-muhtadar, lith., Fès, 1891, part I, pp. 4-6.

(114) Al-Du‘ayf, p. 401.

(115) Cf. evolution of the corps of the ‘ālim-s under Mawlāy Sulaymān in chapter VI below.

(116) J.N. Biraben and Le Goff, "La peste du haut Moyen Age", in Annales Économie Sociétés Civilisations, 6, Nov.-Dec., 1969, p. 1488; B. Rosenberger and H. Triki, "Famines et épidémies", Hespéris-Tamuda, XV, pp. 40-41.

Saharan regions are less affected by plague epidemics because of dry and hot weather which impedes the survival of the flea, the main transmission agent. The plague bacillus itself is not very resistant to heat. The extreme cold and the low degree of humidity in mountainous areas also stop the reproduction of the flea. Moreover, the inhabitants of desertic and mountainous regions are less exposed to contagion because of the relative isolation and inaccessibility of human agglomerations.

lands (117). Jackson reported that after the Great Plague of 1799-1800 many tribes from the Saharan fringes emigrated and "took possession of the country contiguous to the river Draha, as well as many districts in Suse" (118).

Epidemics should be regarded, therefore, as a crucial factor in the perpetuation of nomadic life and the disruption of the tribal status quo. In fact, one of the major aspects of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign was the growing pressure by the mountain Berbers of the Middle Atlas on their lowland neighbours (119).

(1) The End of the Makhzen-Berber Alliance

Under the 'Alawid dynasty, the Makhzen's Berber policy has always been based on a distinction between the unruly mountain Berbers (Barābir al-jabal) and the lowland Berbers (Barābir lūṭā) who tended to serve as strategic allies of the central government.

The predominant group among the mountain Berbers was the powerful Aīt Oumalou confederation. These "people of the shade" included Berber dwellers of the northern slopes of the Middle Atlas as compared to "the people of the sun", such as the Saharan Aīt Atta. Geographically, they covered the territory extending from Azrou to the Assif Melloul river south of Wādī el Abid (120).

(117) Al-Mashrafi, Kunnāsha, p.103; Jackson, An Account of the Empire, p..106.

(118) Jackson, An Account of the Empire, pp. 175-176.

(119) Early in 1800, when the plague was coming to an end in the central and southern regions, "people began talking about Amhāwish who wanted to lead a Berber rising" (al-Du‘ayf, p.407). In May 1800 Mawlāy Sulaymān suffered a major defeat in his first confrontation with the mountain Berbers.

(120) The composition of the Aīt Oumalou, like that of other tribal groupings, has always been subject to change. By the end of the seventeenth century they included the Beni Mguld, Ichkern, Aīt Haddidou, Aīt Isehak and Aīt Lahsen (cf.'Abd al-Rahmān al-Fāsi, al-Uqnūm, p.526). At the beginning of the nineteenth century al-

Owing to the inaccessibility of their territory and their pastoral mode of life which induced them to make incursions on the more inviting grazing lands of the "Makhzen Berbers", relations between the Aït Oumalou and the central government were usually tense. Mountain Berbers often rejected the jurisdiction of Makhzen qā'idas chosen most of the time among lowland Berbers—and proved to be very reluctant in the paying of taxes to the bayt-al-māl.

The weakness of Makhzen authority among mountain Berbers opened the way for the rise of maraboutic figures whose religious charisma ensured them a wide popularity. Since the eighteenth century this role was filled by the Amhāwīsh family from the Aït Sokhman.

The ascendency of this family was initially based on a religious affiliation to the Nāṣiri tariqa. 'Alī U-Hsāyin Amhāwīsh was a disciple of Ahmad al-Khalīfa (d.1717), second shaykh of the Nāṣiriya religious order. His son, Muḥammad Ū-Nāṣir—thus surnamed in glorification of the founder of the tariqa—gained a reputation of sainthood, whence his immense prestige among mountain Berbers(121). Abū Bakr, the elder son of Muḥammad Ū-Nāṣir, inherited the charismatic qualities of the Amhāwīsh and continued to lead Berber opposition to the Makhzen. In 1800, he led mountain Berbers in his first encounter with Mawlāy

... Zayānī mentioned as components of the Aït Oumalou the following groups: Zaian, Ichkern, Beni Mguild, Aït Isehak, Aït Thann and Aït Lahsen (al-Rawda, fol.207). By early twentieth century, the Beni Mguild had broken away from the Aït Oumalou (Drague, Esquisse, pp.147-148, note 15). On the other hand, the Aït Seri and the Aït Sokhman—who according to al-Zayānī belonged to another confederation— seem to have joined the Aït Oumalou during the nineteenth century.

(121) According to al-Zayānī this prestige was based on his prophetic inspiration in which "he might have been assisted by some demon" (al-Rawda, fol.208).

Sulaymān's armies. Despite a two front attack (Tafilelt and Tadla), Abū Bakr Amhāwīsh gained a crushing victory over Makhzen forces. Later military successes (1811 and 1819) added to his prestige and made of him the most irreducible enemy of the 'Alawid dynasty.

To bring mountain Berbers to submission or to keep off their incursions, the Makhzen found it necessary to rely on their lowland consanguineous brothers. Indeed, ever since the death of Mawlāy Ismā'īl in 1727, lowland Berbers had increasingly intervened in the political life of the country. For the 'Alawid sultans who succeeded to Mawlāy Ismā'īl, the Aīt Idrassen, Guerouane and Zemmour represented a useful support which not only balanced the power of an often insubordinate professional army, but also served as an important tool in containing the unruly mountain Berbers. These Berber groupings of the lowlands were also used by the Makhzen to control each other, this tactic being a general principle of Makhzen tribal policy.

Among the lowland Berbers the Aīt Idrassen were by the end of the eighteenth century the most important military force of central Morocco. According to al-Du'ayf, "they owned more money, cattle, horses and equipment than any other tribe, being the most powerful and the most numerous" (122). This enabled them to become the incontestable leaders among the lowland Berbers.

When the succession contest between the various sons of Sīdī Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh began in 1792, the Aīt Idrassen were in a position to play a leading role in this dynastic crisis. The Oudaya army had been greatly

(122) Al-Du'ayf, p. 421. Originally the Aīt Idrassen were located in the upper Moulouya valley. With time, they changed both in their emplacement and their components. At the end of the seventeenth century the confederation included according to 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Fāsī: Aīt Youssi, Beni Mtir, Beni Hammad, Aīt Sadden, Aīt Ouallan and Aīt Ayache (al-Uqnūm, p. 525). At the beginning of the nineteenth century it started to disintegrate. Apart from its nucleus, the Beni Mtir, it included Aīt Ouallan, Aīt Sadden and Mejjate (al-Du'ayf, p. 448).

weakened by Sīdī Muḥammad and the 'Abīd had, to a large extent, disintegrated as a result of Mawlāy al-Yazīd's financial difficulties. At the latter's death, the Oudaya consisted of no more than a few hundred men, while the 'Abīd amounted to less than two thousand men (123). Under these circumstances, the Aīt Idrassen, led by Muḥammad Wa'zīz of the Beni Mtir, served as the main military support of Mawlāy Sulaymān.

We have already seen how instrumental Muḥammad Wa'zīz had been in the bay'a of Mawlāy Sulaymān in March 1792. Later on, when the 'Abīd threatened to join Mawlāy Maslama, the Aīt Idrassen proved to be an essential deterrent force which frustrated destabilization attempts by 'Abīd officers. More important was the role played by the Aīt Idrassen in the pacification of the country from 1792 to 1798. The submission of provinces north of the Oum er-Rbia river was mainly their achievement. During the pacification period, Berber contingents headed by Muḥammad Wa'zīz and Ibn Nāṣir al-Mṭīrī, were to be found among all major military expeditions. Ibn Nāṣir al-Mṭīrī who assumed the leadership of his tribesmen after 1794, was the effective commander-in-chief of Mawlāy Sulaymān's forces whether in the Jbala or in the coastal plains (124). The Sultan himself had a great respect for Ibn Nāṣir al-Mṭīrī and made of him one of his closest advisors. He was not only entrusted with the military operations, but also with the task of reorganizing the army (125). The Berber leader became so essential that he supervised even the appointment of Makhzen qā'id-s (126).

(123) Al-Nāṣirī, VIII, p.15; al-Du'ayf, p.273.

(124) Al-Du'ayf, pp.313,316,333, 338-339. In 1795 Ibn Nāṣir al-Mṭīrī succeeded in ending the siege of Tétouan by Mawlāy Maslama and in May 1797 he participated actively in the military operations against the Chaouia which led to the submission of this province.

(125) In 1796 Ibn Nāṣir al-Mṭīrī supervised the recruitment of Cheraga and Oulad Jama tribes and their incorporation into the Makhzen jaysh (al-Du'ayf, p.319) as well as the purchase of horses for their equipment (al-Du'ayf, p.335).

(126) Al-Du'ayf, p.322.

Ibn Nāṣir al-Mṭīrī succeeded in becoming—to use al-Du‘ayf's terms—"the pillar of Mawlāy Sulaymān's State" (127).

However, with the end of the pacification, a number of factors contributed to undermine the entente which existed between Mawlāy Sulaymān and his Berber allies. First, there was the completion of the pacification itself which lessened the Makhzen dependence on Berber military support. Secondly, Mawlāy Sulaymān succeeded by 1798 in diversifying his military force. During the first six years of his reign he reorganized the ‘Abīd army and, to check its arrogance, reinforced the Oudaya cavalry with new recruits (128). He also strengthened his military potential with the incorporation into his jaysh of new tribes, namely the Cheraga, Oulad Jama and Beni Hsen (129). The extension of military organization to these tribes greatly enhanced the Arab character of Mawlāy Sulaymān's army and, above all, tended to involve him in the tribal antagonism which opposed some of the Arab tribes to lowland Berbers.

Indeed, by 1798 Mawlāy Sulaymān inaugurated a new tribal policy which openly favoured the Beni Hsen. Following his decision to incorporate them into his jaysh, they tended to become the Makhzen's main military support outside the regular army (130). This development was not to be viewed favourably by the Zemmour who were locked up in a long standing struggle with the Beni Hsen over the coastal plains of the Azghār. Mawlāy Sulaymān further contributed to the deterioration of his relations with the lowland Berbers when in September 1798 he incited his new Arab allies to drive away the Zemmour from lands

(127) Ibid., p.316.

(128) Cf. army organization in Chapter II, pp. 85-92.

(129) Al-Du‘ayf, pp.318-319, 387.

(130) Ibid., p.387.

that he considered as belonging to the former (131). By doing so, the Sultan stirred up tribal antagonisms and favoured the crystallization of Arab and Berber loyalties (132). Voluntarily or not, Mawlāy Sulaymān had placed himself in an intricate and delicate situation.

Finally, relations between Mawlāy Sulaymān and the lowland Berbers deteriorated because of internal developments inherent to the Aīt Idrassen themselves. The transfer of Aīt Idrassen leadership to a new generation of young leaders following the death of Ibn Nāṣir al-Mṭīrī (1798-1799) was full of implications for the future of these relations. The fact that the sons of Muḥammad Wa‘zīz and their cousins, the sons of Ibn Nāṣir, competed for the leadership of the confederation greatly weakened the credibility of the traditional leadership of the Beni Mtir among other segments of lowland Berbers. Mawlāy Sulaymān found it increasingly difficult to control the young Aīt Idrassen leadership which was disputed between Muḥammad b. Muḥammad Wa‘zīz and Abū ‘Azza b. Nāṣir (133). Muḥammad Wa‘zīz junior was more inclined to cooperate with the Makhzen while Abū ‘Azza tended to represent a hard line trend within the Beni Mtir (134). These internal cleavages within the Aīt Idrassen after 1800 turned the confederation towards open confrontation with both the Makhzen and its lowland neighbours.

(131) *Ibid.*, p.393.

(132) *Ibid.* Al-Du‘ayf mentioned that in 1798 all Arab tribes of the Azghār sided with the Beni Hsen, while all Berbers manifested their sympathy for the Zemmour.

(133) Muḥammad Wa‘zīz who died in 1794 left three sons among whom Muḥammad who served as Mawlāy Sulaymān's *qā’id* for Fès from 1807 to 1810. For the sake of simplicity, we shall refer to the son as Muḥammad Wa‘zīz. The reader will know that we are dealing with the father for events preceding 1794, and with the son for those after this date.

(134) Mawlāy Sulaymān was on bad terms with Abū‘Azza b. Nāṣir whom he held under surveillance at Fès until he escaped in 1802. Cf. al-Du‘ayf, pp.378-379; F.O.52/12, 15 April, 1802.

The most important consequence of these changes was the rapid disintegration of the lowland Berber front and the increased pressure of the Aït Oumalou on the Makhzen and its traditional allies. This became particularly true after the major defeat suffered by Makhzenian troops in May 1800 in their first encounter with the Aït Oumalou since Mawlāy Sulaymān's accession to the throne. The military incapacity of the Makhzen and the absence of a united lowland Berber front induced some segments of the latter to seek the more reassuring alliance of the mountain Berbers. This was the case of the Aït Youssi who traditionally belonged to the Aït Idrassen confederation and, to a lesser extent, of the Guerouane.

During the first decade of the nineteenth century the military potential of the lowland Berbers was progressively eroded under the joint action of the Makhzen and the Aït Oumalou. In April 1802, Mawlāy Sulaymān inflicted a major defeat on the Beni Mtir and allowed the Guerouane, their rival neighbours, to take possession of their lands (135). In October 1807, the Guerouane were assaulted by both lowland and highland Berbers at the instigation of Mawlāy Sulaymān, after which they were transferred to the country between Meknès and Sefrou (136).

Nevertheless, Mawlāy Sulaymān did not sever all relations with the traditional Berber allies of the Makhzen. Muḥammad Waṣfīz continued to be Makhzen qā'id over his tribesmen and, from 1807 to 1810, he also filled the functions of governor of Fès (137). The Guerouane were also—though for a brief period—incorporated into the Makhzen army after their defeat in 1807.

(135) Al-Du‘ayf, pp.419-421.

(136) Ibid., p.448.

(137) Al-Zayānī, Jamharat man hakama bi Fās, Ms.2348, R.L., p.7.

However, Mawlāy Sulaymān lacked a coherent Berber policy which would have strengthened his lowland allies and guaranteed their support for the Makhzen. His playing off of lowland Berber tribes against each other proved to be harmful to his strategic interests in the long run. By 1810, the Aīt Oumalou renewed their pressure on lowland Berbers and succeeded in rallying the Guerouane and the Aīt Youssi who became the docile allies of Abū Bakr Amhāwish. Relations between Mawlāy Sulaymān and Muḥammad Wa‘zīz further deteriorated in 1810 when this latter was accused of intriguing with mountain Berbers. The Sultan revoked him in April 1810 and shortly afterwards put him in irons (138). When Mawlāy Sulaymān decided to lead a military expedition against the Aīt Oumalou in April 1811, the lowland Berbers had never been so divided in their loyalties.

The Battle of Azrou was hardly a military success for Mawlāy Sulaymān. The Sultan's armies were thrown into confusion during the first day of the battle (28 April, 1811) but the intervention of the Aīt Immour and the Aīt Idrassen the following day saved them from complete destruction (139). Despite their differences with Mawlāy Sulaymān, the Aīt Idrassen were not ready to accept a victory of the Aīt Oumalou. Thereafter, their support to Mawlāy Sulaymān was dictated more by an instinct of preservation than by their sympathy for the Makhzen.

(2) The Pacification of the Peripheral Zones

Despite the steady deterioration of Makhzen-Berber relations during this intermediary period, the country was prosperous and peaceful. The inheritances of the plague victims and agricultural abundance allowed Mawlāy Sulaymān

(138) Al-Du‘ayf, pp.456, 462.

(139) Akansūs, p.296; al-Du‘ayf, p.465; al-Nāṣirī, VIII, p.117.

to easily overcome most of his political difficulties. With the unsubmissive Aīt Oumalou there was no direct military confrontation between 1800 and 1811. The recurrent embroilments with lowland Berbers fitted into the traditional pattern of tribal unrest and were neutralized without much difficulty. Moreover, the restlessness of the lowland Berber zones remained essentially an intra-Berber affair and at no time was the Makhzen directly endangered. Mawlāy Sulaymān therefore directed his efforts to consolidate his rule and extend his authority to peripheral zones which, during the dynastic crisis, had either fallen under foreign rule or simply lost contact with centralized authority and remained autonomous.

In 1798, immediately after the submission of the southern rebel princes, Mawlāy Sulaymān organized a military expedition into the eastern Rif and Oujda on the Algerian border. Since 1792, these territories had been under the control of the Algerian Turks. Upon the proclamation of Mawlāy Sulaymān, the Bey of Mascara who, in 1792, succeeded in liberating Oran from Spanish occupation, crossed into Moroccan territory under the pretext of preparing the siege of Melilla. Later developments proved, however, that the siege of this fortress was but a cover for the territorial ambitions of the Bey of Mascara who withdrew to Algeria as soon as he had appointed his qā'id-s for the eastern provinces (140). Mawlāy Sulaymān's mehalla headed by the Oudaya chief, 'Ayyād, and by Ibn Khadda al-Sharqī, encountered no difficulty in recovering the eastern provinces from the Turks in May 1798 (141).

(140) This eastern expedition was dispatched in Shawwāl, 1212 AH/March-April, 1798 AD and not in 1211 as mentioned by al-Zayānī. Cf.al-Du'ayf, p.380; al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol.180.

(141) Al-Du'ayf, pp.380, 383.

Between 1800 and 1802, Mawlāy Sulaymān directed his attention to the southern and south-eastern provinces. The Touat oases in particular had been completely autonomous since Mawlāy Ismā‘il's death. A military presence in a distant territory such as the Touat was certainly out of the Makhzen's reach. All that Mawlāy Sulaymān could hope to establish there was a relationship of allegiance based on the granting of autonomy to the local populations (142). In 1800, the Sultan resumed contact with the districts of Touat. The populations agreed to pay their legal taxes to the bayt al-māl and obtained in return the right to appoint their own local officials (143). This measure guaranteed the extension of Makhzen authority southward and allowed the Sultan to increase his revenue at the same time.

In 1801-1802, Mawlāy Sulaymān organized two military expeditions with the view of pacifying the southern and south-eastern fringes. The first one was headed by the Sultan's kātib, Ahmad Ashaghrās, and succeeded in pacifying the Dra valley between the Sous and the Tafilelt. Following this tour, noted al-Zayānī, trade routes on the Saharan fringes were again open to caravans (144).

The second expedition was entrusted to the governor of Tafilelt, Muhammad al-Šarīdī, who pacified the Moulouya valley, the Ziz and Gheriss country and the upper Dra valley. Makhzen governors were appointed to all these places (145).

(142) Cf. two letters from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Touat dated 23 Šafar, 1215 AH/ 16 July, 1800 and 28 Šafar, 1215 AH/21 July, 1800 n El-Outaiq, I, 1976, pp.443-449.

(143) Ibid.

(144) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawda, fol.181.

(145) Ibid. For this expedition, al-Rawda gives the date of 1218 AH (1803-1804). Al-Zayānī committed the same error regarding the defeat of the Beni Mtir by Mawlāy Sulaymān and the cession of their lands to Guerouane and which took place in 1802 and not in 1803-1804 as mentioned in al-Rawda. Cf. al-Du‘ayf, p.421, al-Rawda, fol.181.

The political events which took place in Western Algeria in 1805 drew Mawlāy Sulaymān's attention to the necessity of consolidating Makhzen authority and rule on the eastern borders of his kingdom. During that year, an adept of the Darqāwiya religious order, 'Abd al-Qādir b. al-Sharīf, rebelled against the Bey of Oran and called upon the people of Tlemcen to proclaim the Sultan of Morocco. Mawlāy Sulaymān refused the bay'a presented to him by the people of Tlemcen and sent a Makhzen mehalla to assist the Turks in the re-establishment of their authority over the Tlemcen area (146). These events seem to have provided Mawlāy Sulaymān with the opportunity to strengthen his military presence in the eastern marches of the country with the aim of preventing any possible spread of Darqāwi agitation. Taking advantage of Algerian internal difficulties, the Sultan sent in 1806 his qā'id Aba'qīl al-Sūsī to inspect the eastern provinces and recover the oasis of Figuig which, since 1727, had remained virtually independent (147). However, Mawlāy Sulaymān proved his self-restraint when he chose not to aggrandize his eastern provinces at a time when his Turkish neighbours were in no state to oppose any resistance. Indeed, Mawlāy Sulaymān, who personally believed that Morocco extended eastward as far as the Tafna river, did nothing to alter the eastern borders of his kingdom (148).

Having secured his eastern provinces, the Sultan turned his attention to the south-western zones. In 1807, he headed an expedition which led him to Taroudant, Agadir, the zāwiya of Tazeroualt and Goulimine. During this tour

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- (146) F.O.154/284, letter from al-Salāwī to Matra, 13 Jumādā I, 1220 AH/9 Aug., 1805. Mawlāy Sulaymān sent at the same time his brother Mawlāy Mūsā to Oujda to prevent the spread of Darqāwi agitation to Morocco (Ibid.).
- (147) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fols.182-183.
- (148) Muhammd Abū Rās al-Mu'askarī, Fath al-Ilāh wa minnatuh, Ms.K.2332, BGR, p.103. The author reported that, while he was in Morocco, Mawlāy Sulaymān asked him about the eastern limits of Morocco. Abū Rās answered that, according to Ibn Khaldūn and the agreement concluded between the Turks and Mawlāy Ismā'īl, Oujda was Morocco's eastern boundary post. Mawlāy Sulaymān did not agree and remarked that Moroccan territory extended as far as the Tafna river between Oujda and Tlemcen.

in the far Sous, he appointed qā'id-s and qādī-s and arrested the autonomous ruler of Goulimine, 'Abd Allāh U-Sālim who owned a private black army of 1,500 men and commanded Saharan territories as far as al-Saqiya al-Hamra (149). On the same occasion, Mawlāy Sulaymān arrested his brother Mawlāy 'Abd al-Rahmān who, ever since his father's death, had ruled independently over the Wādī Noun (150).

During the following year, Mawlāy Sulaymān led another tour through the Rif and penetrated deep into the mountains where no 'Alawid sultan had ever ventured before. Thus, he reduced the Nāṣiri zāwiya of Beni Touzine and subdued the tribes of Beni Ouriaguel, Beni Saïd and Temsaman (151).

At about the same time, he entered into diplomatic negotiations with Great Britain and Spain with a view to recovering the Spanish holdings on the Moroccan Mediterranean coast. However, the vicissitudes of European politics frustrated Mawlāy Sulaymān's hopes in this respect.

Nevertheless, during the first decade of the nineteenth century, Mawlāy Sulaymān succeeded in extending Makhzen authority to territories which had lost all contact with the central government. By recovering the Touat, Figuig, the far Sous and the Rif, he achieved what had proved to be unrealizable for many of his predecessors. However, these pacification efforts remained without lasting effect. In 1810, Makhzen rule in the Sous was again challenged by the zāwiya of Tazeroualt (152) and the Rif necessitated many other military campaigns. Following the

(149) Al-Du'ayf, p.446.

(150) Ibid., p.447.

(151) Ibid., p.450.

(152) Ibid., p.459.

Battle of Azrou, Mawlāy Sulaymān's efforts were mainly directed to the pacification of the coastal plains which became the principal hotbed of agitation.

D - The Collapse of Makhzen Authority (1811-1822)

(1) The Unrest of the Coastal Plains

One of the consequences of the Battle of Azrou was the spread of tribal agitation to the coastal plains. After the military shortcomings of the Makhzen were unveiled, it became extremely difficult for Mawlāy Sulaymān's governors to impose respect for Makhzen authority.

Attempts by Mawlāy Sulaymān to introduce some administrative adjustments on the morrow of the battle only made things worse. Deeply disappointed by the military performance of his qā'id-s at Azrou (153), Mawlāy Sulaymān proceeded with the replacement of some of them, while he curtailed the administrative prerogatives of the others (154). At the end of 1811, he did the same in the coastal zones where a number of officials were replaced (155). The newly appointed governors, however, were unable to impose respect for order at a time when they lacked the necessary military backing.

(153) Al-Du'ayf reported that following the battle, Mawlāy Sulaymān "lost faith in all his governors" and insulted them publicly at Fès. Cf. p. 446.

(154) The governor for the Chaouia, for instance, was deprived of the governorship of Rabat, Salé and 'Arab al-Widyān. This must have been regarded by his tribesmen as a sultan's condemnation and encouraged therefore latent opposition among the various factions of the Chaouia to well up to the surface. Cf. al-Du'ayf, pp.463-464.

(155) Ibid., p.480.

The economic situation also encouraged the spread of tribal unrest. In 1812 the southern provinces, in particular were seriously affected by a locust invasion and an insufficient rainfall. It was the first agricultural crisis since 1798. In the spring of 1813, wheat prices reached as much as 20 ūqiya-s at Essaouira (156). This not only affected the Makhzen's income based on agricultural revenues, but led also to the dissatisfaction of coastal tribesmen who found it difficult to honour their taxation obligations (157).

The destabilization which affected the Chaouia, the Doukkala and Abda became Mawlāy Sulaymān's main internal preoccupation between 1811 and 1815. The recall in July 1811 of the Chaouia governor, al-Ghāzī, who had been in office since the pacification of the Tamesna in 1797, was followed by an upsurge of tribal feuds which Mawlāy Sulaymān found hard to repress. Al-Ghāzī's successor failed in rallying the notables of the various segments of the Chaouia confederation to him and, in October 1811, the old governor was called back to his office. Owing to the backing of the Makhzen, al-Ghāzī succeeded in quelling tribal agitation in the Chaouia until he was finally recalled in 1815.

Further to the south, the Doukkala attacked their governor 'Umar Abū Sitta in February 1815 and freed all prisoners that were in his jails. The Abda and the

(156) F.O.631/1, 16 May, 1813. In years of abundance, wheat cost between 2 and 3 ūqiya-s for the mudd.

(157) In 1812 Mawlāy Sulaymān acknowledged his financial difficulties which prevented him from ensuring a regular pay to the army. Cf. his letter to 'Abd al-Rahmān Ash'āsh, 2 Jumādā II, 1227/13 June, 1812 in DAR. Cf. also FO 174/20, 19 July, 1815.

neighbouring Chiadma also rebelled in 1815 against their governor, Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Ṣādaq, and forced his resignation (158). "All the tribes of Morocco were in peace with the Sultan", wrote al-Du‘ayf in 1815, "excepting the Chaouia, Doukkala and Abda" (159).

Actually, by that time, insubordination had spread to other parts of the country, and even to the army. In the Rif, tribes engaged in the illicit export of wheat. In the Tafilelt, the Aīt Atta Berbers resumed their expansionist drive in the Ziz valley (160). The ‘Abīd army showed signs of disaffection and the Oudaya refused to obey the Sultan's orders (161).

Towns were no exception to this generalized insubordination. In the summer of 1815 the artisans of Rabat threatened to kill their qā’id ‘Abd al-Rahmān ‘Ashcāsh (162) and in December of the same year the people of Tétouan rejected the nomination of ‘Ashcāsh as governor of their town (163). On the eve of the catastrophic Zaīan defeat, Mawlāy Sulaymān was assailed from all sides.

(2) The Mountain Berber Threat

Between 1811 and 1819, Makhzen-Berber relations were characterized by three main developments. First, there was the accentuated weakening of lowland Berbers and particularly the Aīt Idrassen confederation which was, until the beginning of the nineteenth century, the most powerful component among lowland Berbers.

(158) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawda, fol.190; F.O.631/1, 2 June, 1815; cf. also letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to ‘Umar Abū Sitta dated 23 Rajab, 1230/1st July, 1815 in Mic.4, H.P.M.D., 1978. (appendix 69).

(159) Al-Du‘ayf, p.525.

(160) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawda, fol.70; al-Du‘ayf, p.527.

(161) F.O.174/1, 6 Sept., 1815; al-Du‘ayf, p.531.

(162) Al-Du‘ayf, p.522.

(163) Ibid., p.528.

Secondly, the leadership of lowland Berbers was no longer controlled by Aīt Idrassen after 1814, but passed into the hands of the Zemmour leader, Muḥammad b. al-Ğāzī.

The third development was the implantation of the Darqāwi tariqa among the Fazāz Berbers and its role in widening the gap between these and the Makhzen.

On the morrow of the Battle of Azrou Mawlāy Sulaymān adopted an openly hostile policy to all Berbers whom he held collectively responsible for his military disappointment. The policy he adopted after April 1811 was clearly one of revenge. It was particularly manifested in his political alignment with the Beni Hsen whom he attempted to set up against their Berber neighbours. In October 1813 he renewed his appeal to the Beni Hsen to expel the Zemmour from what he considered as the former's lands(164). At the beginning of 1814 he called again on the Beni Hsen to attack the Zaīan Berbers (165). Such a policy necessarily gave a racial dimension to the Makhzen-Berber conflict and encouraged Fazāz Berbers to make common cause.

Mawlāy Sulaymān's policy during the second decade of the nineteenth century was also based on weakening the lowland Berbers by refusing to assist the traditional allies of the Makhzen in resisting Aīt Oumalou military pressure. The Aīt Idrassen were the first to suffer from this policy of abandonment. Without Makhzen support they proved to be unable to resist the Aīt Oumalou and their Guerouane and Aīt Youssi allies.

The most significant event in this respect was the major confrontation of April 1814 between Abū Bakr Amhāwīsh and Muḥammad Wa'zīz to which official historiography makes

(164) Ibid., pp.501-502.

(165) Ibid., pp.502-503.

no reference. During an attempt to prevent Abū Bakr Amhāwīsh from attacking Meknès, Muḥammad Wa'zīz was overwhelmed by the military might of the Aït Oumalou (166). In this confrontation, the Beni Mtir leader was assisted by Aït Immour and part of the Zemmour whose loyalties were divided between their Idrassen neighbours and the menacing Aït Oumalou (167). The Makhzen, though directly concerned with the outcome of this battle, preferred not to intervene. Muḥammad al-Salāwī, who was then at Meknès, contented himself with dispatching an 'Abīd patrol to follow the developments in the struggle (168). The Zemmour abandoned the battlefield and Aït Idrassen were left on their own. The battle ended with a crushing victory of the Aït Oumalou and the death of Muḥammad Wa'zīz.

The consequences of this decisive battle were far-reaching for Makhzen-Berber relations. With the weakening of the Aït Idrassen, lowland Berbers could no longer resist Aït Oumalou pressure and, consequently, the way was open for a direct confrontation between the Makhzen and the mountain Berbers.

The defeat of the Aït Idrassen had other repercussions on Berber politics. It dangerously upset the balance in favour of the mountain Berbers whose influence among their lowland neighbours became increasingly important at a time when the Makhzen had chosen to abandon its strategic allies.

Relations among lowland Berbers were also upset by this defeat. The Zemmour emerged as the most powerful confederation, a position which they were to hold for the rest of the nineteenth century. Muḥammad b. al-Ghāzī became the

(166) Ibid., p.506.

(167) Ibid., p.507.

(168) Ibid.

uncontested leader of the lowland Berbers. After the death of Muḥammad Wa‘zīz, Ibn al-Ghāzī was appointed qā’id not only for his tribesmen but for all Fazāz Berbers (169). He was to play a leading role in the Fès rebellion of 1820 and even hoped to serve as the main advisor of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm when this one was proclaimed in November 1820 (170). The special treatment reserved by Mawlāy ‘Abd al-Rahmān (1822-1859) upon his accession to the throne for the Zemmour leader attested to Ibn al-Ghāzī's importance among lowland Berbers (171).

However, the importance acquired by the Zemmour during the second decade of the nineteenth century cannot be explained solely in terms of military superiority. The implantation of the Darqāwi tariqa among the Fazāz Berbers (172) was another factor which contributed to Berber politics during this period. The Darqāwi tariqa, which was based on austerity and rejection of all forms of luxury, adapted to the rural mode of life more than any other Sufi doctrine. The new tariqa rapidly succeeded in extending its influence to the countryside and particularly to Berber zones. Muḥammad b. al-Ghāzī was "one of the most intimate adepts of Mawlāy al-‘Arbī al-Darqāwī" (173). Abū Bakr Amhāwīsh, though never formally a member of the tariqa, nevertheless sympathized with the teachings of Mawlāy al-‘Arbī. The sharifdom and ascetism of the Darqāwi shaykh made him highly respectable in the eyes of Amhāwīsh who claimed Idrisid sharifdom himself (174).

(169) Al-Zayānī, Tārīkh al-wilāya, p.3.

(170) Al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-nubahā', pp.194-196. According to Akansūs, Ibn al-Ghāzī was by then "the most influential among Berbers" (al-Jaysh, p.315).

(171) Al-Nāṣirī, IX, p.7.

(172) Cf. below chapter VI, p. 338.

(173) Akansūs, p.330.

(174) Apparently, Abū Bakr Amhāwīsh did not abandon the Nāṣirī tariqa to become a Darqāwi. His successors, however, joined the Darqāwi tariqa cf. Drague, pp. 152-153.

Undoubtedly, the implantation of the Darqāwi religious order among Fazāz Berbers contributed to ease friction between lowland and highland Berbers and paved the way for the crystallization of a united Berber front under the leadership of Abū Bakr Amhāwīsh. This was particularly the case following the Battle of Zaīan (May 1819) which greatly enhanced the prestige of the Amhāwīsh among all Berbers (175). In 1820 Abū Bakr Amhāwīsh joined his efforts to those of religious and traditionalist forces to hasten the downfall of Mawlāy Sulaymān.

II - Foreign Preoccupations

Morocco's relations with the international environment between 1792 and 1822 were largely determined by the tension which characterized the political situation in Europe. Mawlāy Sulaymān acceded to the throne just at a time when the French Revolution was leading Europe towards generalized war. By virtue of its position on the southern shores of the Straits of Gibraltar, Morocco acquired an additional importance during the Napoleonic wars. Throughout the long series of wars, Mawlāy Sulaymān attempted by all means to keep the country out of the European conflict. He progressively dismantled the Moroccan navy to reduce the risks of confrontation with the Christian powers and avoided taking sides in the war which opposed the two European blocks. His endeavours to observe a strict neutrality were, however, made arduous by the fact that Morocco itself was, for a time, threatened by Napoleonic expansionism.

(175) The Battle of Zaian and its consequences will be discussed in chapter VII below.

A- An Impossible Jihād

The peaceful relations Mawlāy Sulaymān entertained with Europe from 1792 to 1822 would not have been possible without the curtailing of the corsair activity on the part of Morocco. Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh had already succeeded in controlling it by making the fleet State property. Mawlāy Sulaymān liquidated the Moroccan navy altogether when it became apparent that the country lacked both the necessary means to match the technological superiority of Christian countries and the concerted expansionism which Europe embarked upon after 1815.

(1) The Technological Gap

Despite efforts made by Sīdī Muḥammad to build up a strong navy during the second half of the eighteenth century, the superiority of European navies remained unchallenged. This had been particularly evident during the siege of Melilla in 1771 when Sīdī Muḥammad declined to fight the Spanish at sea (176). Conscious of the deficiency, he made the navy one of his major preoccupations. Before he died, his naval force consisted of about sixty vessels and 4,000 seamen (177).

His successors were too busy with internal difficulties to pay attention to the maintenance of the navy. The seamen, one fourth of whom were recruited in the Ottoman regencies, were disbanded after 1790 (178) while the vessels were abandoned to the inclemency of weather. During the first two years of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign, noted Matra in 1794, vessels had been exposed to rain and sun without maintenance (179).

(176) Al-Ñāṣirī, VIII, pp.40-41.

(177) Al-Zayānī, Iqd al-jumān, Ms.G.40, BGR, p.15; Lemprière, Voyage, p.210.

(178) Al-Zayānī, al-Turjumāna al-kubrā, p.165.

(179) F.O.52/10, 26 June, 1794.

It was only at the end of 1793 when he realized the importance of the navy in subduing the coastal provinces that Mawlāy Sulaymān directed his efforts to the refitting of his naval vessels. In October 1793 he intimated to the European consuls his intention of blockading the port of Dār al-Baydā and all ports which did not recognize one or other of the two sultans (180).

The interception of vessels dealing with the rebellious port of Dār al-Baydā played a major role in hastening its submission. This decided Mawlāy Sulaymān to extend the naval blockade to Safi and Tīt in 1795. In the summer of 1796 Mawlāy Sulaymān had five cruisers off the coast of Safi (181).

The Moroccan navy remained, nevertheless, very modest. By the end of the eighteenth century it consisted, according to an official of the French legation, of three or four corvettes and a small number of xebecs, galleys and galliots, all very poorly equipped (182). Many of these were lost in February 1800 as a result of a storm which destroyed all vessels that were in the port of Larache (183).

The feeling of insecurity which resulted from Napoleonic expansionism encouraged Mawlāy Sulaymān to pay a greater attention to his fleet. In 1800, he ordered the reactivation of the Rabat-Salé shipyards (184) and in 1804 he decided to buy two war vessels in England (185). The Austrian ambassador, visiting the country in 1805, reported that the Moroccan fleet consisted then of about twenty units but "all of a very bad construction" (186). In 1807-

(180) F.O.52/10, 28 Oct., 1793 and 16 Aug., 1794.

(181) F.O.52/11, 16 June, 1796.

(182) De Lesseps, "Notice", pp. 20-21.

(183) F.O.52/11, 6 March, 1800. Cf. also letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Matra dated 23 Ramadān, 1214 AH/18 Feb., 1800, asking for the replacement of lost ships (same FO series).

(184) Al-Dū'ayf, p.407.

(185) F.O.52/12, 16 Sept., 1804 and 27 Sept., 1804.

(186) J. Caillé, Une ambassade, p.111.

1808 Mawlāy Sulaymān ordered two new war vessels in England and sent two old frigates to be repaired and armed at Gibraltar (187). Other ships were sent to Lisbon to be refitted (188). Captain Burel evaluated the Moroccan fleet in 1808 at about a dozen units manned with about 850 seamen and harboured mainly in Larache and Salé (189).

With the end of the Napoleonic wars, the Moroccan naval force rapidly disintegrated. Many vessels were given as presents to the Deyls of Algiers and Tripoli. By 1816, the Moroccan fleet was reduced to four vessels, among which two only were armed (190). In 1818, the French consul reported that there was only one vessel left at Rabat (191). Two years later, the Moroccan navy ceased to exist when the last vessel was given as present to the Dey of Algiers (192).

Quite apart from its size, the Moroccan navy under Mawlāy Sulaymān hardly deserved the name. It possessed neither the equipment nor the organization enjoyed by contemporary European navies. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the docks of Rabat, Salé and Martil only built small ships which could not venture safely on the high seas outside of the spring and summer seasons. Vessels bought in Europe or received as presents were

(187) F.O.174/17, letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green, Qa‘da, 1222/Jan., 1808; F.O.52/13, 7 Octo., 1808.

(188) F.O.52/13, 7 Oct., 1808.

(189) J. Caillé, La mission, p.105. Local inventories of the naval force at the beginning of the nineteenth century gave the following figures concerning the number of seamen at Salé:-

1804.....400 men

1806.....378 men

1812.....352 men

Cf. Kunnāsha fi‘ umūr al-bahr, Ms.D.1409, BGR, and a list of seamen at Salé, Mic.43, BGR.

(190) CCC, vol.24, 3 Oct., 1816; F.O.52/17, 25 Dec., 1816.

(191) CCC, vol.25, 19 Feb., 1818.

(192) CCC, vol.27, 18 March, 1820.

generally old (193). Once acquired, they were inadequate-ly used and negligently maintained. Moroccan vessels, noted Matra, are "so crowded on the quarter deck and fore-castles that they are rendered useless" (194). Moreover, these vessels were equipped with heavy guns which were suitable only for land use. In 1795, Matra found it hard to convince Moroccan authorities that 14 and 16 pounder guns could not be mounted on vessels. Mawlāy Sulaymān finally realized the mistake over the size of the guns ordered by the Makhzen (195) and Matra could write to Ibn 'Uthmān: "I am very glad the mistake about the size was discovered. I have always thought that the naval system in this country rested on wrong principles. The Moors in my opinion do not sufficiently attend to the navy of their country and the state of their harbours" (196). Other foreign observers, such as de Pouilly, John Buffa and Captain Burel, all under-lined the decayed state of the Moroccan fleet (197). "All is rotten and out of order", noted Burel in 1808 (198).

The same attitude of neglect characterized the recruit-ment of seamen and their organization. Sailors were not full-time professionals. They really constituted a naval reserve force among which the ra'is (commander) of a ship chose his crew when he was sent on a special mission (199). Most often, sailors joined the ra'is on a voluntary basis in the hope of some material gain. The salary allocated to the seamen was very modest and irregular (200). Judging by

(193) In 1800 the governor of Gibraltar proposed to his government the sale to Morocco of two sloops of war requested by the Sultan to be "of the most inferior in H.M.'s arsenals"; cf.C.O.91/40, 18 Dec., 1800.

(194) F.O.52/11, 6 March, 1800.

(195) F.O.174/124,6 Ramadān, 1209 AH/28 March, 1795.

(196) F.O.174/124, 22 April, 1795.

(197) J.Caillé, Une ambassade,p.111; J.Buffa, Travels,p.51; J.Caillé, La mission,p.105. The vessel which was destined to carry back Captain Burel in 1809 broke into two halves as it was leaving the port of Larache. Cf.CCC, vol.23, 26 Nov., 1809; F.O.52/15, 27 Jan.,1810.

(198) J. Caillé, La mission, p.105.

(199) J. Caillé, Une ambassade, p.111.

(200) De Lesseps, "Notice", p.21.

the general state of the navy, de Pouilly estimated in 1805 that five or six European vessels would be more than enough to reduce the Moroccan naval force (201).

(2) The Anachronism of the Jihād at Sea

The technological inferiority of Muslim countries made it increasingly difficult for them to maintain the traditional principles which governed their relations with Christian nations. The jihād at sea became more and more a source of trouble and continuous conflict with Christian nations.

Mawlāy Sulaymān attempted to remove all possible issues of confrontation with European countries. He abolished enslavement of European seamen (202) and ransomed all crews whose ships were wrecked on the Moroccan coast so that they were immediately delivered to their consuls (203). More important was his determination to abandon the jihād at sea.

Mawlāy Sulaymān had realized very early that it had become impossible to enter into a confrontation with European countries without exposing the country to heavy reprisals. The superiority of European navies rendered illusory any hope of maintaining the privateering activities of Moroccan corsairs. Appeals to Muslim solidarity addressed to Mawlāy Sulaymān by the Ottoman Sultan in 1798 following the invasion of Egypt had no chance of being answered (204).

(201) J. Caillé, Une ambassade, p.112.

(202) L. Godard, Description et Histoire du Maroc, Paris, 1860, II, p. 583.

(203) F.O.52/16, 6 April, 1815; CCC, vol.26, 19 April, 1819; Thomassy, Des relations, p.298.

(204) Cf. letter from Selim III to Mawlāy Sulaymān, 3 Rabī‘ I, 1213 AH/15 Aug., 1798, in F.O.174/2 and F.O.174/124, asking for the use of Moroccan fleet against French vessels (appendix 14). Although profoundly concerned about the French invasion of Egypt, Mawlāy Sulaymān was not in a position to intercept French vessels in the Straits zone. "The letter of the Grand Signor", wrote Matra in 1799, "seems to have made no impression on the Emperor's mind" F.O.52/11, 13 Sept., 1799).

All attempts by Mawlāy Sulaymān to reactivate privateering were energetically countered by Christian nations. The major incident in this respect was one with the United States of America at the beginning of the nineteenth century. In 1803, Mawlāy Sulaymān issued orders to the RaṄīs Ibrāhīm Lubarīs to seize vessels belonging to the United States of America, Venice, Holland, the northern German States and all countries which had no peace treaties with Morocco (205). The capture of an American vessel in June 1803 brought about an immediate reaction on the part of the United States of America. Lubarīs and about a hundred sailors from Salé were intercepted before they could reach the coast and made prisoners (206).

The incident created great embarrassment for Mawlāy Sulaymān. The Americans refused to liberate Lubarīs and his crew unless there was a formal engagement by Mawlāy Sulaymān not to harass their vessels in the future. They even threatened to blockade Moroccan ports until such an engagement was obtained (207). Lubarīs and his crew remained in detention for about three months during which negotiations went on between the two sides with the active mediation of British authorities at Tangier and Gibraltar. Finally, in September 1803, Mawlāy Sulaymān arrived in Tangier to sign a peace treaty with the United States of America and to obtain the release of his imprisoned men in return.

The 1803 crisis with the United States showed clearly that the Moroccan navy could not match the superiority of the Christian nations. The American show of force proved to be so successful that many European countries thought of using the same means should a conflict with Morocco occur (208).

(205) Cf. order of Mawlāy Sulaymān in F.O.52/12, no date (1803).

(206) Cf. story in al-Dū'ayf, pp.424-426.

(207) J. Caillé, Une ambassade, p.113.

(208) Ibid. Cf. also F.O.174/285, 23 Ramadān, 1222/24 Nov., 1807 about a similar incident with Sardinia.

Open confrontation being impossible, Mawlāy Sulaymān sought other forms of jihād, particularly the redemption of Muslim captives detained in Europe. Immediately following the incident with the United States, the Sultan requested the British consul, Matra, to assist him in redeeming ten Muslim captives held at Malta (209). In 1806 another initiative was taken by the Makhzen to free Muslim captives at Leghorn (210). Mawlāy Sulaymān's endeavours to recover the Spanish presidios can also be seen as being intended to compensate for the impossibility of carrying on the jihād at sea (211).

The end of the Napoleonic wars inaugurated a new era of relations between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean. If during these wars European countries had not been in a position to adopt a common strategy towards the Barbary corsairs, this was no longer the case after the Congress of Vienna in 1815. European countries began intensive consultations with the aim of uniting their efforts to repress privateering in the Mediterranean (212). Though unable to agree on a common formula, European countries were, nevertheless, determined to put an end to what they regarded as a humiliating and anachronistic practice. In 1816, the Spanish ambassador in London presented a formal protest to the British government against the delivery of military equipment to Morocco despite its non-offensive character (213). The British

(209) F.O.174/284, from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Matra, 23 Sha'bān, 1218/8 Dec. 1803.

(210) F.O.174/284, from al-Salāwī to J. Green, 14 Shawwāl, 1221/25 Dec. 1806.

(211) Cf. El Mansour, "Mawlāy Sulaymān's endeavours to recover Ceuta," in Majallat Kulliyat al-Ādāb, Rabat, No.5-6, 1979, pp.29-44, and idem "Ceuta in Anglo-Moroccan Relations," The Maghreb Review, July-Dec. 1979, pp.129-133.

(212) C.O.2/6, "Projet d'alliance contre les pirateries barbaresques".

(213) The military equipment consisted of gun carriages, gunpowder and cannon balls. Cf. P.G. Rogers, A History of Anglo-Moroccan Relations, London, no date, p. 133.

action was judged by the Spanish government as "displeasing to the powers of Europe and at variance with the efforts actually made by them for reducing those of Barbary to the usages established among civilized nations" (214).

The most worrying incident for Mawlāy Sulaymān was the joint Anglo-Dutch attack on Algiers in August 1816 (215). The destruction of the Algerian fleet on 27 August 1816 by Lord Exmouth had a profound psychological impact on Moroccans (216). Mawlāy Sulaymān who was preparing a punitive expedition against the Aīt Atta delayed his departure preferring to remain in the north until more was known about the outcome of the Anglo-Dutch action. Lord Exmouth did not fail to acquaint the Sultan of Morocco with the motives that lay behind the naval expedition against Algiers.

In his reply, Mawlāy Sulaymān seemed to agree with Lord Exmouth about the erroneous attitude of the Algerian people. "The people of Algiers", he wrote, "were unable to foresee the injurious consequences of their conceptions" (217). In fact, the Algiers expedition was intended as a warning to all those who had not yet been reduced to "the usages of civilized nations". Mawlāy Sulaymān fully understood the lesson to be drawn from it.

To express his solidarity with his suffering Algerian neighbours Mawlāy Sulaymān decided in June 1817 to make a present of three vessels to the Dey of Algiers (218). At

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- (214) FO.52/17, letter of protest from the Spanish ambassador Fernan Minez to Viscount Castlereagh, 21 Sept., 1816.
 - (215) Cf. C.O.2/6, "Lord Exmouth's expedition to the Barbary Powers".
 - (216) Al-Qu‘ayf, p.532. Among those who suffered in Lord Exmouth's attack on Algiers was a Fāsi merchant, Muhammad Mezwār, a former qāṣid of Fès. He lost a vessel in the port of Algiers carrying 100,000 mithqāl-s worth of merchandise.
 - (217) F.O.174/286, letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Lord Exmouth, 26 Shawwāl, 1231/19 Sept., 1816.
 - (218) CCC, vol.25, 4 July, 1817.

the same time, he made it clear that by giving what vessels remained in his ports he intended to avoid being constantly tormented by his own people about the necessity of privateering in the Straits zone (219). By ceding the last vessel he had to the Algerian Regency in 1820, Mawlāy Sulaymān completely abandoned the jihād at sea.

B- Moroccan Fears

Morocco's isolationist tendencies during the period under study were determined, to a large extent, by the menace of European expansionism. During Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign Moroccans, both on the official and popular levels, were constantly obsessed with the spectre of a Christian invasion.

The invasion of Egypt by Napoleon's armies in August 1798 was seen in Morocco as a great calamity for all Muslims (220). Its effects on Moroccans was intensified because Egypt was not only part of dār al-Islām (the land of Islam) but also the bridge leading to the Holy Places of the Hijaz. The image of mounted French soldiers desecrating the Azhar Mosque was humiliating and revolting at the same time (221). If on the official level Mawlāy Sulaymān proved to be unresponsive to appeals from the Sublime Porte for the interception of French vessels in the Straits zone (222), on the popular level, the reaction was immediate and spontaneous. Indeed, the Moroccan colony in Egypt and in the Holy Places, as well as Moroccan pilgrims passing through Egypt, played an active role in organizing resistance to the French occupation of the country (223). In 1800, a Moroccan ascetic, Sīdī al-Jilālī al-Sibācī, who had been residing in Mecca since 1787-1788, raised an army of volunteers and led the jihād

(219) Ibid.

(220) Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Salām b. Nāṣir, al-Rīḥla al-sughrā, P.107.

(221) Al-Ibtisām, p.24.

(222) Cf. letter from Selim III to Mawlāy Sulaymān referenced in note 204 above.

(223) A. al-Jabartī, ‘Ajā’ib al-āthār fī al-tarājim wa al-akhbār, Cairo, 1880, vol. III, p. 94.

against the French invaders (224). He succeeded in assembling many of his compatriots and particularly distinguished himself by opposing the truce concluded with Napoleon and insulting the Egyptian Cālim-s who gave their consent to it (225).

In Morocco itself the invasion of Egypt was seen not as an isolated happening, but as part of a plan which aimed at the subjugation of the whole Islamic world. Sulaymān al-Ḥawwāt warned his Moroccan contemporaries of the Christian danger by drawing a parallel between the loss of Muslim Spain and the conquest of Egypt (226). Al-Ḥawwāt called upon Mawlāy Sulaymān to fortify the ports and put his people in a state of readiness to confront the Christian danger (227). He attacked sceptics who regarded a similar assault on the western part of the Muslim world as impossible because of the alleged invincibility of Moroccan armies. "Did you forget the recent invasion by the infidels of the land of Egypt whose people were so ruthlessly oppressed, plundered and killed that most of them were threatened by apostasy, were it not for God's Mercy and favour ? How can a wise man, therefore, be misled by those who say that the Christians would not dare attack Morocco (al-Gharb) because they know it is well defended and that

(224) Al-Du‘ayf, p.519; al-Jabartī, III, p.94.

(225) Al-Jabartī, III, pp.99-100.

(226) Sulaymān al-Ḥawwāt, As’ila wa ajwiba, Ms.2710, R.L., fol.94.

(227) S. al-Ḥawwāt, Diwān, fol.23. The author addressed Mawlāy Sulaymān in the following verses:

فَسِدْ رَأْيِ سَعِيكَ مُسْتَدِّاً
وَخَضَ الْمُسْلِمِينَ عَلَى جَهَادٍ
وَكَنْ حَذَرَا مِنَ الْكُفَّارِ كَلَّا

وَخَذَ بِالْعَزْمِ فِي سَدِ الْغَورِ
فَقَدْ نَامُوا بِدَرَاقَةِ النَّهَارِ
وَبَعْضًا فِي عَوَاقِبِ الْأَمْوَارِ

He also warned the Sultan against the French danger:

هَذَا الْفَرْنَسِيُّنَ اللَّعِينُ لَقَدْ
وَمَكِيدَةُ الْكُفَّارِ أَخْفَى حِيلَةَ
فَلَتَوَقَّطُنَ النَّاسُ مِنْ غُلَاثَتِهِ
وَأَخْصَصَ لَا تَكُ في السَّوَاحِلِ أَنَّهُمْ
وَأَعْدَ مَا أَسْتَطَعْتُهُ مِنْ قُوَّةِ
دَنَا مَنَا وَنَحْنُ عَنْهُ كَالنَّسَوَامِ
كَمْ زَلَ فِيهَا ثَابِتَ الْأَقْدَامِ
لِصَحْ يَأْغُثُهُمْ عَلَى الْأَقْدَامِ
عَزْمًا لَتَرَهُ بَهَا مِنْ سَافِرِ الْأَقْدَامِ

Islam is always victorious ? This saying can only emanate from those who take their wishes for an object of worship and stop just short of polytheism "(228).

Muhammad al-Ruhūnī, another outstanding cālim of the Sulaymāni period, also called for vigilance, affirming that "the great outrage experienced by Egypt could very well take place anywhere" in the lands of Islam(229).

The evolution of the political situation in neighbouring Spain and the feverish movements of European navies in the Straits zone made the Christian danger a real one. Indeed, after 1795, Spain became the most docile continental ally of Napoleon and a tool for the execution of the latter's ambitions in the Peninsula. The attack made by Spain in 1796 on Portugal, already at war with France, came as clear evidence of this docility. By 1799-1800, rumours were circulating about the existence of a secret arrangement between France and Spain by virtue of which the former would receive the Spanish fortress of Ceuta (230).

The incessant movements of European fleets near the Moroccan coast became a subject of great concern for the populations of the northern ports during the last years of the eighteenth century. In 1799, the cālim-s of the northern ports expressed their worries about the fact "that the sea was full of Christian vessels" at a time when the coastal populations lacked all means of defense as a result of Mawlāy Sulaymān's prohibition of the private carrying of firearms (231). These concerns were brought

(228) Al-Hawwāt, As'ila wa ajwiba, fol.94.

(229) Al-Ruhūnī, al-Khutab al-manbariya, Cairo, 1936, vol. I, p. 11.

(230) C.O.91/40, 8 April, 1799; C.O.91/41, 30 Aug., 1800. The governor of Gibraltar, O'Hara, and the British consul at Tangier, Matra, were in favour of a British take over of Ceuta as early as 1799.

(231) Al-Du'ayf, pp.398-399. According to al-Du'ayf, Mawlāy Sulaymān had limited the carrying of firearms, as well as the purchase of gunpowder, to Makhzen officials.

to the attention of the Sultan who found himself compelled to lift the ban on the sale of firearms and ammunitions despite the injurious consequences that such a decision was to have on internal security (232).

By 1800, Mawlāy Sulaymān became extremely uneasy about rumours of a probable Christian invasion from Ceuta (233). At the same time, his brother Mawlāy Maslama, who met Napoleon in Egypt (234), was reported to be in western Algeria preparing his entry to Morocco (235). By the end of the year, the simple appearance of a British fleet near Tangier created a great panic among the population and the Makhzen officials. Mawlāy Sulaymān immediately issued an order for a general mobilization of the army and requested Sīdī 'Alī b. Ahmad, head of the Wazzāniya religious order, to lead the mujāhidīn to Tangier (236). Nor did assurances given by Spain to Mawlāy Sulaymān in 1801 about the non-existence of a secret treaty ceding Ceuta to the French dissipate his apprehensions (237). The arrival in Cadiz of French troops and armaments was seen as a serious threat to Morocco's security (238).

James Matra reported the general alarm of Moroccan officials about a possible French invasion of their country when he was at Fès to sign the Anglo-Moroccan treaty in 1801. The French danger, he noted, was daily debated in government circles (239). Moroccan officials, he added, did not hide their fears and told the British consul that in case of a French attack, Morocco would look to Great Britain "as the only nation who could protect them from

(232) Ibid., p.400.

(233) Ibid., p.412.

(234) Ibn Zaydān, Ithāf, VI, p.354.

(235) Al-Du'ayf, pp.409, 412-413.

(236) F.O.174/8, 1st Dec., 1800.

(237) F.O.52/11, 1st July, 1801.

(238) F.O.52/11, 1st July, 1801; F.O.174/284, letter from al-Salāwī to Matra dated 8 Sha'bān, 1216/14 Dec., 1801.

(239) F.O.52/11, 16 Sept., 1801.

such a disaster" (240). British authorities played an important role in arousing Moroccan fears. To ensure the flow of supplies to the garrison of Gibraltar, the British government missed no opportunity to stress the gravity of French designs. Matra received instructions from London to "apprize the Emperor of Morocco of the danger to be justly apprehended from these designs ... and to represent to him the treachery and insidious policy of the French in the strongest terms" (241).

In 1801 Matra wrote to Muḥammad al-Salāwī warning him that the Franco-Spanish coalition would direct its armies to Morocco as soon as they had completed the conquest of Portugal (242). The British consul was also ordered to make considerable use of the Egyptian example and the role played by Great Britain in "freeing Egypt and restoring it to its lawful sovereigns" (243). James Green who succeeded Matra in 1806 followed the same policy in order to convince the Makhzen that Napoleon was "the enemy of all crowned heads" (244).

The evacuation of Egypt and the reestablishment of peace in 1802 temporarily thrust aside the danger of a French invasion. However, the Peace of Amiens (1802), by mentioning the Barbary States (245), caused some anxiety to the Makhzen. On reading the translation of the treaty Moroccan officials tended to believe that the settlement reached between the belligerent parties could

(240) *Ibid.*

(241) F.O.8/5, Whitehall, 18 July, 1801, Secret and Confidential.

(242) F.O.174/284, letter from Matra to al-Salāwī, 15 Aug., 1801.

(243) F.O.8/5, 18 July, 1801.

(244) F.O.174/151, letter from Green to his agent at Tétouan, no date.

(245) Cf. article X of the Peace of Amiens in Bulletin des Lois de la République Française, 3^eme série, vol.VI, 1802, pp.336-344.

only lead to the division of the Ottoman Empire and the rest of the Islamic world (246).

The Moroccan government felt much more secure after British naval domination was achieved in the Mediterranean, particularly after the decisive Battle of Trafalgar (October 1805). The destruction of the combined fleets of France and Spain and the emergence of Great Britain as the uncontested master of the seas greatly reduced the risks of an invasion of Morocco. Mawlāy Sulaymān felt secure enough to begin contemplating plans for the recovering of the Spanish fortress of Ceuta and other presidios which his predecessors had been unable to liberate (247).

However, the French danger reappeared again by November 1807 when Portugal was invaded by the Napoleonic armies. Rumours about an eventual occupation of Ceuta by France circulated again (248). The invasion of Portugal was taken by the Moroccan government as a prelude to a French attack on Morocco itself. Mawlāy Sulaymān realised that the best way to thwart the possibility of a Franco-Spanish invasion was to take over Ceuta, the only place from which a major attack could be launched.

Napoleon's invasion of Spain in 1808 and the enthronement of his brother Joseph in the place of the destituted Ferdinand VII was even more alarming. Al-Du'ayf reported that after taking hold of Spain, Napoleon was determined to invade Morocco (249). According to rumour, Napoleon had even succeeded in building a wooden bridge to be used in crossing the Straits and that the only obstacle which

(246) F.O.52/12, 6 June, 1802 and 13 June, 1802.

(247) Cf. note 211 above.

(248) F.O.52/13, 20 Nov., 1807.

(249) Al-Du'ayf, p.446.

prevented him from executing his plan was the British threat to obstruct the return of French forces to the Peninsula (250).

False reports about French landing on the Moroccan coast enhanced popular excitement. In the spring of 1808 imaginary Christian landings were reported near Agadir and even at Rabat and Salé (251). Mawlāy Sulaymān who was by then on a tour in the far Sous hastened his return to the northern provinces and in April 1808 issued a general order for mass mobilization. Governors of the coastal towns were to remain alert and tribes were asked to send contingents to the nearest ports. In May 1808, there were about 40,000 men from the Chaouia and 'Arab al-Widyān ready for any contingency at Rabat (252).

Never in modern times had Morocco's fate been so closely dependent on that of the Iberian Peninsula. The general retreat of French armies in Spain and Portugal during the summer of 1808 and the establishment at Seville of a "Junta Central" to organize resistance against French occupation brought a certain psychological relief to Moroccans who were closely following military developments on the other side of the Straits. The military success of Sir Arthur Wellesley in the Peninsula during the years 1808-1813 reduced Moroccan fears to a large extent and nullified Napoleon's threat to Mawlāy Sulaymān that he intended to invade Morocco with 200,000 French and Spanish soldiers (253). Even the French siege of Cadiz at the beginning of 1810 does not seem to have aroused Moroccan apprehensions after it became clear that Napoleon could never overcome the fierce resistance of the Spanish

(250) Ibid.

(251) Ibid., p.450.

(252) Ibid., p.449. On Moroccan fears of a French invasion in 1808 see also F.O.52/13, 26 April, 1808.

(253) F. Charles-Roux, La France et l'Afrique du Nord avant 1830, Paris, 1932, p. 455.

people who, moreover, enjoyed the military and naval support of Great Britain (254).

The expulsion of French forces from Spain in 1813 came as a great relief to Mawlāy Sulaymān who sent a message congratulating Ferdinand VII for having been saved from the hands of the "arrogant traitor" (255). The restoration of the monarchy in France in 1814 was warmly received by the Moroccan government. "His Majesty", wrote al-Salāwī to Fournet, the French acting consul, "was greatly pleased with this change. I think that at present, your nation can live in peace as well as the whole world" (256) .

C - A Difficult Neutrality

Morocco's relations with Europe during the Napoleonic wars were characterized by two major developments. There was an unprecedented rapprochement with Great Britain as a result of French expansionist policy in the Mediterranean and, by the same token, relations with France and her Spanish ally steadily deteriorated.

(1) The Anglo-Moroccan Rapprochement (1800-1814)

After 1800 Mawlāy Sulaymān and his minister for foreign affairs, Muḥammad al-Salāwī, moved Morocco towards closer cooperation with Great Britain. The death in 1799 of

(254) The news of the French siege of Cadiz was mentioned by al-Du‘ayf in a calm and passive manner. Apparently, there was no sign of panic on the part of the Makhzen or the populations as there had been in 1808. Cf. al-Du‘ayf, p. 456.

(255) AHN, Estado, Leg.4348, letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Ferdinand VII in which the former expressed his satisfaction at the restoration of the monarchy in Spain and the downfall of "the perturbator of world peace"; cf.CCC, vol.25, 17 Feb., 1817.

(256) CCC, vol.24, 3 Jumādā II, 1229/25 May, 1814. Cf. also letter of congratulations from al-Salāwī to the British consul dated 15 Jumādā I, 1229/5 May, 1814 in F.O.174/286.

Muhammad b. 'Uthmān, widely known to be Spain's advocate in the Moroccan Court, the decisive British role in thwarting Napoleon's occupation of Egypt, and the threat of French expansionist designs in the Mediterranean offered a favourable background for a closer cooperation between Morocco and Great Britain.

The resumption in 1800 of Anglo-Moroccan negotiations concerning a British establishment at Ksar el-Seghir, east of Tangier, was in indication of improving relations between the two sides. Ever since 1790, Matra had been striving to obtain from Morocco the exclusive use of this port. As it was nearly opposite to Gibraltar, it would have allowed the British to supply their garrison there without the risk of being intercepted by enemy war vessels (257). Mawlāy al-Yazīd was, apparently, the first to have promised Ksar el-Seghir to Matra, a place, he said, whence the British "might take milk warm from the cow to Gibraltar" (258). Mawlāy al-Tayyib, while governor of Tangier (1794-1797) made the same promise to the British consul (259). In 1800, Matra raised the issue again with the Moroccan authorities who showed their readiness to concede the place to the British but asked Matra to exercise patience until the end of European hostilities (260). In 1802, al-Salāwī promised the British consul the said port or the port of Beliounech, near Ceuta, but his promise never materialized, most probably because such a concession on the southern shore of the Straits was no longer necessary after 1805 when the supremacy of the British fleet in the region became uncontestable (261).

(257) Add.Ms.33,978, British Museum, letter from Matra to J.Banks, 27 Sept., 1801.

(258) F.O.174/12, 27 Feb., 1801.

(259) Ibid.

(260) F.O.174/8, letter from al-Makki al-Ghāzī to Matra, 5 Muḥarram, 1215/29 May, 1800.

(261) The secret negotiations that were going on between Morocco and Great Britain about Ksar el-Seghir were well known to the French and Spanish governments. Cf.AHN, Estado, Leg.4341, 12 July, 1799.

Undoubtedly, the British naval supremacy was in itself an important factor in the preponderance of British influence in Morocco at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Great Britain was, in fact, the only European country which was able to maintain a continuous contact with Morocco and, until the end of the war in 1814, British commercial supremacy in Morocco was unrivalled. France and her European allies were not in a position to ensure the continuity of their interests in Morocco. Following the Battle of Trafalgar, the French consul in Morocco could do nothing but observe, report and formulate vain protests against Mawlāy Sulaymān's "complaisance" with the British (262). In a sense, Morocco was condemned to cooperate with Great Britain which was able to impose her presence in the region.

Yet, Great Britain also depended on Moroccan supplies for her troops in Gibraltar and the Iberian Peninsula. Following the signing of the 1801 treaty between the two countries, Mawlāy Sulaymān consented to allow the export of an annual contingent of 2,000 head of cattle to the garrison of Gibraltar at a reduced rate of duty. Great Britain was also able to obtain additional supplies when the Moroccan government needed to pay for military equipment ordered in Gibraltar or England. Moreover, Mawlāy Sulaymān granted the British government the authorization to export wheat destined for the use of British troops fighting in Spain and Portugal (263).

Military cooperation was another aspect which illustrated the prevalence of British influence in Morocco during this period. Morocco received most of its armament from Great Britain and British authorities also agreed to train

(262) R. Thomassy, Des relations, p. 289.

(263) In 1810-1811 Mawlāy Sulaymān allowed Great Britain to export 75,000 quintals of cereals. F.O.52/16, 29 July, 1812.

Moroccan artillerymen either in Gibraltar or in Morocco itself. This military cooperation reached its apex when both countries joined forces in 1807 over the possible siege of Ceuta. During that year, the Moroccan government allowed the British army to use the islet of Tāwra and proposed the landing of British troops on the Moroccan mainland to organize the siege of Ceuta (264). The end of European hostilities reduced the importance of Morocco for Great Britain, but preponderence of British influence in Morocco was firmly established for the rest of the nineteenth century.

(2) Franco-Moroccan Tensions (1800-1814)

Relations with France and her allies deteriorated continuously during the same period. Napoleon not only never thought of renewing the Franco-Moroccan treaty of 1767, but showed little courtesy to the Sultan of Morocco. In 1803 Mawlāy Sulaymān was deeply offended by the behavior of the French government towards his ambassador, Hāj Idrīs al-Rāmī. The Moroccan envoy who was dispatched to claim property belonging to Moroccan merchants whose ships or cargoes were confiscated by the French navy , was shown little consideration and returned empty-handed (265). On the return of al-Rāmī, the French commissioner in Morocco notified al-Salāwī that all correspondence with the French government was to be conveyed through him and that "failing to this formality, such correspondence would receive no consideration"(266). In 1804, when Napoleon was proclaimed Emperor, Mawlāy Sulaymān refused to congratulate him. In reply to Fournet, the French consul in Morocco, the Sultan made it clear that it had

(264) Cf. letters from al-Salāwī to British authorities concerning Anglo-Moroccan efforts at blockading Ceuta in appendices 33,35, 37,38, 39, 40 and 48.

(265) COC, vol.22, fol.100, letter from al-Rāmī to the French government, no date, concerning the property of Moroccan merchants.

(266) COC, vol.22, from the French commissioner to al-Salāwī, 14 Nivose, year XII of the Revolution calendar (4 Jan., 1804).

never been customary for a Muslim Sultan to be first in addressing a Christian ruler and that Bonaparte had not until then sent any letter or present to the sultan of Morocco. Fournet was reminded that he himself needed a letter of accreditation (267).

Mawlāy Sulaymān refused also to accept the French conquest of Italy. In 1806 he prevented the French consul in Morocco from hoisting the Italian flag affirming that he would only permit the colours that were hoisted during his father's lifetime (268), and by 1807 d'Ornano was to acknowledge his failure in inducing the Moroccan government to recognize French conquests in Italy. Moreover, Mawlāy Sulaymān refused to comply with Napoleon's Continental System and continued to allow traditional exports to Gibraltar (269).

In 1807, Mawlāy Sulaymān decided to send al-Rāmī on a second embassy to France in an attempt to obtain redress for the Moroccan merchants. This mission to the Napoleonic court was no more successful than the first one. Al-Rāmī's demands for compensation received no attention. Napoleon's letter of reply to Mawlāy Sulaymān made no mention of the issue al-Rāmī was sent to resolve (270).

- (267) CCC, vol.22, letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Fournet, 14 Hijja, 1219/ 16 March, 1805.
- (268) F.O.52/13, 10 Dec., 1806.
- (269) J. Caillé, "Le consul de l'Empereur au Maroc," Revue de l'Institut Napoléon, 93, Octobre 1964, p.175.
- (270) CCC, vol.23, two letters from al-Rāmī to the French minister for foreign affairs, the first bearing no date, and the second dated 27 Oct. , 1807. Cf. also Napoleon's reply dated 11 Nov., 1807 in J. Caillé, "Deux lettres de Napoléon 1er au Sultan du Maroc", in Revue de l'Institut Napoléon, 90, January 1964, pp.13-14.

The Franco-Moroccan tension reached its height in 1807 when Mawlāy Sulaymān allowed British forces to occupy the islet of Tāwra so as to blockade Ceuta. D'Ornano protested vehemently against this occupation and requested al-Salāwī to expel British troops from the islet, to which the latter replied that the Moroccan government had not experienced any injury from the British presence in Tāwra and did not, therefore, deem it necessary to take any action against them (271).

Napoleon took this event so seriously that he decided to dispatch a special envoy to Mawlāy Sulaymān in 1808. Captain Burel was chosen for this embassy and was entrusted with a double mission. On one hand, he was to protest against Mawlāy Sulaymān's "complicity" with the English, and on the other, to draw a reconnaissance of the country's defenses in view of an eventual invasion (272). Napoleon's letter delivered by Burel to Mawlāy Sulaymān was by no means friendly. The French Emperor summoned Mawlāy Sulaymān to stop supplies to the British garrison of Gibraltar and demanded the immediate withdrawal of British troops from the Tāwra islet. He also warned against any eventual landing of British troops on the Moroccan mainland which would threaten Ceuta. "If you favour their (the British) views against us, we will be under the obligation of considering you among our enemies", wrote Napoleon, "because we cannot tolerate for ever a situation in which we are neither enemies nor friends ... The Spanish forces are now united to those of France and, relying on these, we will be able to check any offense and avenge any injury done to us either openly or under the cover of a treacherous neutrality" (273).

Mawlāy Sulaymān was greatly offended by this letter. Captain Burel had no hope of success in the mission he was

(271) CCC, vol.23, from al-Salāwī to d'Ornano, 9 Rabī' I, 1223/6 May, 1808.

(272) J. Caillé, La mission, p. 28.

(273) Letter from Napoleon to Mawlāy Sulaymān, 16 May, 1808 in CCC, vol. 23.

entrusted with, especially since he only delivered the letter in August 1808, at a time when the news of the French débâcle at Baylen in Spain and the emergence of a junta government at Seville had turned the situation completely to the disadvantage of Napoleon. The difficulties of the French army in Spain after 1808 had rendered Burel's mission to Morocco useless.

Between 1808 and 1814, d'Ornano lacked all means of exerting any significant pressure on Moroccan authorities. In 1808 Mawlāy Sulaymān accepted the accreditation of a consul sent by the Seville Junta against which the French consul protested energetically. Al-Salāwī explained to d'Ornano that European quarrels did not concern Morocco and that if King Joseph Napoleon sent his consul he would be received with the same honours (274). In 1809, d'Ornano protested again, but in vain, against the arrival in Morocco of Count de Tilly as ambassador of the Seville Junta. "We are neutral", answered al-Salāwī, "and we are free to receive whoever comes to us" (275). D'Ornano also protested against the authorization granted to the Spanish junta government to export cattle and wheat (276). "You Frenchmen are always complaining about the fact that we do nothing for you", replied al-Salāwī, "but you never ask for anything. Request something and you will be served in the same way as others" (277).

The end of hostilities in 1814 came as a relief not only to Europe but also to the Moroccan government. The post-war period was characterized by a clear European disinterest in Morocco, particularly on the part of Great Britain whose dependence on Moroccan provisions was

(274) J. Caillé, La mission, p.54.

(275) CCC, vol.23, from al-Salāwī to d'Ornano, 8 Muḥarram, 1224/23 Feb., 1809.

(276) CCC, vol.23, 26 Nov., 1809.

(277) Ibid.

greatly reduced. Only France attempted to restore her commercial interests almost completely destroyed by the British naval supremacy in the Mediterranean (278).

(278) Cf. evolution of Morocco's commercial relations with Europe after 1814 in chapter III .

CHAPTER VMAWLĀY SULAYMĀN AND RELIGIOUS REFORMISM
AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

One of the most obscure aspects of the period under study is constituted by the religious ideas of Mawlāy Sulaymān and the impact on Morocco of the contemporary Wahhābi reformist doctrine. Indeed, this period is characterized on one hand by the ascendance of religious forces and their open intervention in the political sphere, and on the other, by the insistent appeal of Mawlāy Sulaymān for a return to the sources of Islam and his obstinate militancy to eradicate detestable religious innovations. The Wahhābi doctrine, which appeared in the Arab East at the turn of the nineteenth century, seems to have gained the sympathy of Mawlāy Sulaymān and contributed to worsen his relations with the Sufi orders and the sharīf-s. Although differing with the Wahhābi-s on some important ideological issues, Mawlāy Sulaymān appreciated, nevertheless, the reformist character of the doctrine. Only the quasi-unanimous hostility of the Moroccan religious forces to Wahhābism can explain why Mawlāy Sulaymān refrained from openly adopting the doctrine. Religious forces, however, were not unconscious of his hidden sympathies and did not fail to accuse him of Wahhābism. To what extent, then, was Mawlāy Sulaymān reformist in his religious ideas and what was his real attitude towards the Wahhābi doctrine?

I- The Reformist Tradition in Morocco

In the Islamic world, reformism was always identified with an attempt to restore the primitive purity of Islam. It did not mean the rejection of the old and its replacement by the new. Reformism was intimately linked to the Islamic conception according to which the best of times was the time of the Prophet and his immediate successors. The more remote we are from the pious ancestors (al-salaf al-sālih) the more corrupt we become. The ideal, therefore, is behind and not ahead and no modern reformist movement ever attempted to challenge this truism.

If in the Arab East the profusion of religious doctrines was at the origin of numerous reformist theories, the monopoly of the Mālikī rite in Morocco seems to have crippled, to a certain extent, the religious speculative activity. Indeed, the salient feature of Maghribi Islam has been the predominance of one school of jurisprudence — Mālikism — and the absence of all others. Since the ninth century, Malikism progressively imposed itself as the undisputed madhab (rite) all over North Africa, mainly as a result of the work of the highly esteemed scholar of Kairouan, ‘Abd al-Salām b. Sa‘īd Saḥnūn (d. 854 A.D.). His Mudawwana became the fundamental reference for legislation (1).

The only Moroccan dynasty which ever attempted to challenge Mālikism was that of the Almohads (1130-1276). During this period attempts were made to introduce the doctrine of Abū al-Hasan al-Ash‘arī (2) through the works of his disciple Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālī (1058-1112) who happened to be the teacher of the dynasty's founder,

- (1) Later on an Egyptian ‘ālim, Khalīl b. Ishaq (d.1374) produced an abridgement (mukhtaṣar) which acquired the character of a code for Mālikī rite and used to be memorized by every Moroccan student who had passed elementary education.
- (2) The Ash‘ari school was founded by Abū al-Hasan al-Ash‘arī (d.935 AD) who tried to use rational arguments to defend orthodox Islam. This school became identified with the theory of al-kasb according to

Ibn Tumart (d.1128). The hostility of the Almohads to Mālikism was best illustrated by their burning of Saḥnūn's Mudawwana, while al-Ghazzālī's Iḥyā' was widely distributed.

The Almohad ideological rebellion against Mālikism produced, however, no lasting effect. Mālikism proved to be deeply rooted in the country. Almohad Ash'ari ideas had no alternative but to cohabit with the doctrine of Mālik b. Anas. After the Almohads, Mālikism was restored as the official madhab but Moroccan cālim-s could no longer dispense with the Ash'ari dogma. Mālikī jurisprudence and Ash'ari dogma became two indissoluble aspects of the Moroccan religious tradition (3).

The early Alawid sultans were concerned more with the military and political consolidation of their power than with ideological problems. Sīdī Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh was the first Alawid sultan to deal with such doctrinal issues.

Sīdī Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh was a great admirer of the Sa'ādian Aḥmad al-Manṣūr not so much for his religious ideas as for the pompous etiquette of his court. Indeed, Sīdī Muḥammad attempted to copy many of al-Manṣūr's political military and even religious institutions. Following the example of this illustrious predecessor, Sīdī Muḥammad made hadīth reading and commentary an established

...which man creates his deeds in conformity with God's will. Cf. E.I., 1960, vol. I, pp.694-696.

- (3) The best illustration of this successful symbiosis is the urjūza (poem) of 'Abd al-Wāhid b. 'Āshir (d.1631) in which the author brings together the fiqh (jurisprudence) of Mālik, the dogma of al-Ash'arī and the sufism of al-Junayd (d.910 AD). This urjūza summarized the basic tenets of religion and used to be memorized by every Moroccan student. It was abundantly commented during Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign, particularly by al-Tayyib b. Kifrān (d.1812), Badr al-Dīn al-Hammūmī (d.1849) and Muḥammad al-Murābit al-Samlālī (d.1806).

custom of his court (4). He brought in from the Arab East many hadīth collections, particularly the musnad-s of al-Shāfi‘ī, Abū Hanīfa and Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, which he was the first to introduce to Morocco (5). The study by Sīdī Muḥammad of these three musnad-s led him to adopt a more conciliatory and open attitude towards the madhhab-s of their authors. In his seminars Sīdī Muḥammad gave equal importance to the hadīth collections of the four imām-s whom he considered to be equal in orthodoxy (6).

However, Sīdī Muḥammad was attracted above all by Ḥanbalism (7) because of the simplicity of its dogmatic views which he judged as "most conformable to the belief of the four imām-s and the pious ancestors" (8). In fact Sīdī Muḥammad was no man of erudition. He abhorred complex speculative controversy and for this reason found the Ḥanbali madhhab suitable to his simple thinking. Along the lines of Ibn Ḥanbal's doctrine, Sīdī Muḥammad advocated reliance on the self-evident meaning of the Quran and the hadīth, rather than complex theological interpretations. Dogmatic theology (‘ilm al-kalām) and philosophical

(4) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol.125-126; al-Nāṣirī, V, p.153, VIII, p.67. Al-Zayānī mentioned that upon his accession to the throne, Sīdī Muḥammad abandoned the reading of history and literature books and devoted all his time to the reading of hadīth to which he appointed fixed hours in imitation of Aḥmad al-Mansūr. Sīdī Muḥammad never missed the occasion to declare that "al-Mansūr is our teacher and example". Cf. al-Rawḍa, fol.125-126.

(5) Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh, al-Futūhāt al-ilāhiya fī ahādīth khayr al-bariya, Rabat, 1980, p. 1.

(6) Ibid., p.459.

(7) Ḥanbalism is the doctrine founded by the celebrated theologian, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (780-855) which claimed to restore the Quran, the Prophet's tradition and the consulta (fatwā) of the rightly guided ancestors as the main sources of Islamic jurisprudence. Ibn Ḥanbal advocated a strict adherence to the text of the Quran and the Sunna without any allegorical exegesis. In case of disagreement, reliance on the Quran was preferred to personal effort of opinion; cf. "Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal" in E.I., vol. I, 1960, pp. 272-277.

(8) Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh, al-Futūhāt, p.458.

speculation were unknown to the Prophet and his companions and were therefore considered as "detestable innovations" (9).

For this reason the teachings of al-Ash'arī and al-Ghazzālī were discarded because both engaged in the refutation of erroneous ideas, thus preserving these injurious concepts in their books (10). As far as ideological attacks against Islamic orthodoxy were concerned, the best approach consisted, according to Sīdī Muḥammad, in abstaining from all debate about dogma (11).

Dogmatic inflexibility was, indeed, the main grievance Sīdī Muḥammad had against the Mālikī cālim-s of Morocco. For him, the search for truth should not be confined to one single madhab, since all the four imām-s — al-Shāfi'i, Abū Ḥanīfa, Mālik and Ibn Ḥanbal — were worthy of respect and glorification (12). Everyone who adheres to one of the four doctrines", he wrote, "is sure to be on the right path, because they all relied on God's Book and his Prophet's tradition" (13). To show his independence vis-à-vis all doctrines, Sīdī Muḥammad declared to his contemporaries that he was Mālikī in rite but Ḥanbali in dogma (14).

Sīdī Muḥammad's open challenge to the Mālikī-Ash'arī tradition led him to adopt some original ideas on the teaching of religious disciplines. For him, the Islamic religion

(9) Sīdī Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh, Ta'līf fī iḥyā 'ūlūm al-dīn, Ms.9593, R.L., pp.130-131; al-Nāṣirī, VIII, p.68.

(10) Ibid., pp.112-113.

(11) Sīdī Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh, al-Futūḥāt, p.457; Cf. also his Ta'līf, p.129.

(12) Sīdī Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh, al-Futūḥāt, p.459.

(13) Ibid.

(14) Ibid., pp.457-458. Sīdī Muḥammad often repeated this statement. Cf. notice entitled "On the clarification of my saying 'Mālikī in rite and Ḥanbali in dogma' "in al-Futūḥāt, pp.457-458.

was very simple and was to be sought in its primary sources. He advocated, therefore, the return to the source of the shari'a, the Quran and the Prophet's tradition, and the abandonment of fossilized manuals, such as the Mukhtaṣar of Khalīl b. Ishaq (15), which, by their complexity, often hid the simplicity of the religion. These abstracts, argues Sidi Muhammad, often conceal the true nature of Islam and complicate what, in fact, is clear and intelligible (16). During his reign the study of Khalīl's Mukhtaṣar was to be largely abandoned by many cālim-s who did not want to antagonize the Sultan (17).

Sidi Muhammad's reformist attempts were obstinately resisted by the Moroccan cālim-s. Those who complied with his instructions regarding the teaching of certain Mālikī manuals did so more from fear than from conviction (18). After his death, his Hanbali ideas were completely forgotten.

Mawlāy Sulaymān was a fervent adept of the Mālikī school. Owing to his religious education, however, he remained faithful to the reformist spirit of his father. His loyalty to the Mālikī-Ash'ari school did not prevent him from advocating the return to the sources of Islam in order to restore the original purity of the religion.

(15) Cf. note 1 above.

(16) Sidi Muhammad b. 'Abd Allāh, al-Futūhāt, cf. introduction by Muhammed Rashid Mulīn, p. ۲; al-Nāṣiri, VIII, p. 67.

(17) Al-Du'ayf, p. 235.

(18) Cf. case of Muhammed b. Abū al-Qāsim al-Sijilmāsī who resumed the teaching of Khalīl's Mukhtaṣar and its commentaries immediately after the death of Sidi Muhammad b. 'Abd Allāh, in al-Du'ayf, p. 235. Moroccan cālim-s remained unanimously hostile to the Hanbalist tendencies of Sidi Muhammad. They expressed their attachment to the Mukhtaṣar in the following terms:

"نَحْنُ خَلِيلِيُونَ، إِنْ ضَلَّنَا وَإِنْ اهْتَدَنَا"

Cf. al-Futūhāt, introduction, p. ۵.

II - The Religious Reformism of Mawlāy Sulaymān

It would be impossible to appraise in its full extent the nature of the conflict which opposed the Makhzen to the religious forces within Morocco at the beginning of the nineteenth century without, first, shedding some light on the religious ideas of Mawlāy Sulaymān.

A- His Education and Religious Scholarship

Mawlāy Sulaymān was deeply influenced by his religious education. This education was mainly accomplished outside the big centres of learning. His father, being eager to isolate his young sons from the political turmoil of the major urban centres, preferred to send Mawlāy Sulaymān first to a small zāwiya near Safi. When he memorized the Quran, he pursued his religious education at Ksar El-Kebir. In 1783, Sīdī Muḥammad sent him to Tafilelt at the age of seventeen (19). It was in the latter place that he acquired his basic education and was introduced to the main religious sciences, such as the hadīth, the exegesis of the Quran and Sufism. It was also in the Tafilelt that he was acquainted with the fundamental work of al-Ghazzālī, Iḥyā' ʻūlūm al-dīn, the study of which he encouraged later on, as well as some works of the Ḥanbali theologian Ibn Taymiyya (20). His stay in Fès was apparently very brief but allowed him, nevertheless, to meet some of the most prominent cālim-s of his time, namely al-Tawdī b. Sūda, his son Əḥmad b. Sūda, al-Ṭayyib b. Kīrān, ʻAbd al-Qādir b. Shaqrūn and Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj (21).

(19) Al-Zayānī, Alfiyat al-sulūk, Ms.K.224, BGR, pp.166-168.

(20) ʻAbd al-Karīm al-Filālī, al-Tārīkh al-muftarā ʻlayh fī al-Maghrib, Rabat, I969, pp. II9-II0.

(21) Al-Zayānī, Alfiyat, p.168.

Until he assumed the responsibility of the sultanate in 1792 Mawlāy Sulaymān gave himself completely to the acquisition of the religious sciences showing little interest in worldly attractions (22). Nor did he have any political motivation. During the short reign of Mawlāy al-Yazīd he refused the post of vice-regent for Marrakech and preferred, instead, to devote himself to learning (23). According to the author of Tadhkirat al-muhsinīn, Mawlāy Sulaymān "was never a candidate to the throne, nor did he have any such ambition. His interest was so oriented towards religious studies that people used to believe he could not even ride a horse" (24). Indeed, when sultan, Mawlāy Sulaymān governed more like a cālim than a statesman, referring constantly to the shari'a and the cālim-s before taking any important decision. "He never concluded any business which related to his kingdom without first consulting them (the cālim-s)", wrote Muḥammad b. al-Ḥāj, "nor did he accept from them anything but an explicit reference to the text (of the Quran and the Sunna)" (25). The abolition of non-religious taxes or the prohibition of tobacco plantation —which both used to secure important revenues for the treasury — are typical examples of the supremacy of faith over State interest.

Nothing illustrates the religious orientation of Mawlāy Sulaymān better than his cultural activity and his numerous writings. His court used to be a meeting place for the outstanding cālim-s of his time, particularly during the holy month of Ramadān. He supervised religious seminars in person and recommended the study of some works, such as

(22) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol. 157.

(23) Al-Zayānī, Alfiyat, p.159; al-Du‘ayf, p.247.

(24) ‘Abd al-Kabīr b. al-Majdhūb al-Fāṣī, Tadhkirat al-Muhsinīn, Ms.K.270 BGR, p.342.

(25) Muḥammad al-Tālib b. Ḥamdūn b. a-Ḥāj, al-Ishrāf cālā bacd man bi Fās min al-ashrāf, Ms. D 653, BGR, p. 80.

the Iḥyā³ of al-Ghazzālī or the Musnad of Ibn Ḥanbal (26). His political responsibilities never prevented him from contributing actively to the theological debate of his time. In this respect he wrote numerous works which bear the marks of a distinguished scholarly talent (27). Mawlāy Sulaymān was also known to be an active promoter of religious learning. He provided for students who memorized the Mukhtaṣar of Khalīl and attended lectures given by the ‘ālim-s at the Qarawiyin in person (28).

B- His Religious Ideas

Mawlāy Sulaymān inherited his father's religious reformism but without its Ḥanbalist orientation. Like his father, Mawlāy Sulaymān was in favour of a return to the tradition of the Prophet and his companions by extricating all "detestable innovations" and restoring the primitive purity of Islam. This, however, he wanted to achieve within the well-established tradition of the Mālikī-Ash‘ari school.

- (26) Al-Zayānī, Jawharat, Ms.6778, R.L., p.84; al-Qu‘ayf, p.390; Sulaymān al-Hawwāt, al-Rawḍa al-maqṣūda, Ms.K.2351, BGR, p.43; al-Hawwāt's Dīwān, Ms.D.753, BGR, pp.17-20; Ḥamdūn b. al-Hāj, Dīwān, Ms.222, R.L., p.39.; Muḥammad al-Hajwī, Ikhtisār al-ibtiṣām, Ms. H.114, BGR, p.359.
- (27) The works of Mawlāy Sulaymān include in particular:-
 - Commentary of Khalīl's Mukhtaṣar, the first volume is available at the Royal Library, No. 1323;
 - Commentary of the Muwaṭṭa' of Mālik b. Anas;
 - Ināyat’ūlī al-majd li dhikr al-Fāsī ibn al-jadd, written in gratitude to his shaykh (teacher) Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Salām al-Fāsī, printed at Fès in 1928;
 - Annotations (ḥāshiya) on al-Zarqānī's commentary of al-Mawāhib al-ludniya;
 - Essay on pilgrimage, Ms.K.963, BGR, pp.237-264;
 - Essay on the kasb (Jawāb fī mas’alat al-kasb) Ms.D.1838, BGR, pp. 253-270. This essay was revised by al-Tayyib b. Kirān;
 - Two essays on the use of music by Sufi brotherhoods:
 • al-Samā‘: mā huwa muttafaqun ‘alā ḥirmatiḥ, Ms.652, Sbīḥī library (Salé), pp. 1-59.
 • Imtā‘ al asmā‘ bi tahrīr ma iltabasa min ḥukm al samā‘, mentioned by Ḥamdūn b. al-Hāj in his Dīwān, p.241;
 - Risāla fī al-radd ‘alā man qāla bi afḍaliyyat banī isrā‘il ‘alā al-‘arab, Ms.D.2600, BGR, pp.34-42;

His essay on the acquisition of human actions (al-kasb) (29) sheds some light on his dogmatic convictions. Mawlāy Sulaymān adopted the basic principles of the Ash‘ari school, particularly with regard to man's freedom of action and the problem of al-takfīr (excommunication). Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī had devised the notion of kasb in order to avoid the extremism of two theological schools, the Qadariya and the Mu‘tazila which maintained that man is totally free and capable of inventing his actions, and the Jabriya for which man is nothing but a tool in the execution of the divine will (30). According to the theory of al-kasb, which characterized the Ash‘ari school, man has the power to create his actions but in conformity with God's will. This interpretation was adopted by the Moroccan ‘ālim-s (31) and by Mawlāy Sulaymān to avoid the abuses of both the Qādariya and the Jabriya, and also because it fits perfectly well the position of Mālik b. Anas on this particular issue (32).

The second point of convergence between Mawlāy Sulaymān and the Ash‘ari school relates to the problem of al-takfīr. For Ash‘ari theologians such as al-Ghazzālī, a grave sin (kabīra) does not justify

- Taqyīd fī al-tabkhīr zaman al-ṣawm, Ms.653, Sbīḥī Library, 9 pages;
- Numerous khutba-s attacking popular detestable innovations relating to the cult of saints. Cf. in particular his khutba on the mawsim-s printed at Fès, without date; cf. also extracts from other khutba-s in al-Mashrafi, Sharḥ al-shamaqmaqīyya, Ms. G.629, BGR, unpaginated; and al-Nāṣirī, VIII, p. 123.

- (28) Al-Du‘ayf, pp.364-391.
- (29) Jawāb fī mas‘alat al-kasb, Ms. D 1838, BGR, pp. 253-270.
- (30) Ibid., p.254.
- (31) Cf. al-Tayyib b. Kīrān, Sharḥ tawḥīd al-murshid al-mu‘īn, lith. 1889, p.6.
- (32) Ibid.

excommunication as long as its author does not contest the oneness of God and accepts his Prophet's message . A person does not incur infidelity as long as he recognizes some basic tenets of the religion (darūriyat, pl. of darūra). Both Abū al-Hasan al-Ash‘arī and al-Ghazzālī called for the greatest prudence in excommunicating "the people of the qibla" (Muslims). Mawlāy Sulaymān defended the same principle. "Excommunication", he wrote, "should be pronounced only against an infidel about whom there can be no ambiguity because it means the condemnation of a Muslim to perpetual hell when the Day of the last judgement comes" (33). It was on this particular point that Mawlāy Sulaymān expressed his greatest reticence on the Wahhābi doctrine which was highly predisposed to excommunicate ideological opponents.

The mere fact of participating in such dogmatic debate would have been considered inadmissible by Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh. Mawlāy Sulaymān, on the contrary, did not share his father's Ḥanbali convictions as far as speculative theology was concerned. His reign was characterized, in fact, by the restoration of Mālikī supremacy and the return to Ash‘ari dogmatics. Mawlāy Sulaymān rehabilitated the Mukhtaṣar of Khalīl and encouraged the study of al-Ghazzālī's works. He remained, however, deeply convinced of the necessity to restore the original purity of Islam.

The reformist ideas of Mawlāy Sulaymān reflected a deep personal conviction and were not dictated solely by political considerations. They also reflected his pious character and his natural hostility to heterodox practices.

(33) Mawlāy Sulaymān and al-Ṭayyib b. Kīrān, Jawāb fī mas’alat al-kashb, p. 264.

Mawlāy Sulaymān wrote numerous essays to discredit popular customs which are contrary to the sharī'a (34). He incited at the same time the cālim-s to imitate his efforts. Thus, on Mawlāy Sulaymān's demand, the qādī of Rabat, Muḥammad b. Ḩāfiẓ (d.1844-45) wrote a pamphlet reproving some festive amusements celebrated at Marrakech on the occasion of the Āshūrā (tenth day of Muḥarram) (35). Another cālim, Ḥabib al-Salām Ḥarakāt of Salé criticized, in an essay written by order of the Sultan, twenty five "detestable popular practices" (36).

Mawlāy Sulaymān hardly missed an occasion to reaffirm his reprobation of such practices. Religious fairs (mawsim-s) were declared illegal not only because they constituted blameworthy innovations in themselves but also because of their allowing a number of indecent practices, such as chanting, dancing, the mingling of men and women, extravagant celebrations and illegal spendings (37).

Another manifestation of Mawlāy Sulaymān's salafism (38) was his hostility to the ornamentation of holy places and the erection of sumptuous buildings over tombs and shrines. In 1805, for example, he ordered the removal of a dome built on his father's shrine and placed it instead on a mosque (39). Four years later he removed the tombstone (naqīr) placed on his father's tomb because

(34) Cf. works of Mawlāy Sulaymān above, footnote 27.

(35) Muḥammad Ḩāfiẓ (known as al-Rashshāy), essay reproving festive amusements celebrated at Marrakech on the occasion of Āshūrā, in Ms.Z.3772, R.L., pp.1-35. Cf. also Bujandār, al-Ightibāt bi tarājīm a'clām al-Ribāt, Ms.D.1287, BGR, vol.I, pp.196-197.

(36) Muḥammad b. 'Alī al-Dukkālī, Ithāf, Ms.D.11, BGR, p.75.

(37) Mawlāy Sulaymān, Khutba on the mawsim-s, pp.5-6.

(38) Salafism advocates the return to the pious men of old (al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ), that is the Prophet's companions, as a means to restore the original purity of the religion.

(39) Al-Du'ayf, p.442.

he argued, it was a bid'a contrary to the Sunna (40). Among the 'Alawid sultans Mawlāy Sulaymān was in fact the one who devoted the least effort to the building and restoration of shrines (41).

C- Mawlāy Sulaymān and Sufism

Those who approached Mawlāy Sulaymān, whether Moroccan or foreign contemporaries, were impressed by his piety and ascetism. He disdained luxury and contented himself with the strict minimum. "His court", wrote Ali Bey, "had no splendor and his dress was very simple, not to say plain" (42). A Moroccan contemporary, quoted by al-Nāṣirī, was reported to have seen the Sultan wearing patched trousers and in possession of a watch on a cord of wool (43).

His austere nature, his ascetism and his religious education made him very inclined to contemplative life. Mawlāy Sulaymān was not hostile to Sufism as it is often assumed. His hostility was not directed against Sufism as such but against Sufism as it came to be practised by common people and certain zāwiya-s. After all, Mawlāy Sulaymān himself was an adept of the Nāṣiriya religious order (44).

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- (40) Al-Du'ayf, pp.441-445. The word bid'a (detestable innovation) is used to mean any alteration or addition to the religion which contradicts the tradition of the Prophet and his companions.
- (41) Among the architectural achievements of Mawlāy Sulaymān al-Zayāñī mentioned 16 mosques but only 2 shrines. One of these shrines was renovated because the Sultan wanted to erect a separation wall between men and women visitors. Cf. al-Rawda, fol.204; al-Nāṣirī, VIII, pp.172-173; al-Du'ayf, p.173.
- (42) Ali Bey, Travels, I, pp.51, 173.
- (43) Al-Nāṣirī, VIII, p.171. Another mark of Mawlāy Sulaymān's ascetism was his refusal to use articles which contained gold. In 1803 he declined an umbrella presented to him by the French consul because it was decorated with gold threads. Such articles were usually sold and their value distributed to ālim-s and sharif-s. Cf. letter from al-Salāwī to A. Guillet, 10 Rajab 1218/23 Oct. 1803 in Eugène Fumey, Choix de correspondances marocaines, p.19.
- (44) Abd al-Rahmān b. Zaydān, Ithāf, II, p.21; Abd al-Hayy al-Kattāñī, Fihris al-fahāris, II, p.331. Cf. also text of an ijāza delivered

The most outstanding feature of Moroccan Sufism has always been its popular orientation. This popular dimension is to be seen in both its historical and social context. Since the fifteenth century, indeed, the local zāwiya-s have played a determinant role in the military resistance against frequent attempts of Iberian expansionism and needed for this purpose a constant popular mobilization. Being essentially a rural movement operating within an overwhelmingly illiterate population, the simplification of Sufi principles became a necessity. This was also made imperative by the missionary function of the zāwiya in a milieu where Islamization remained rudimentary and superficial. The popular success of the zāwiya-s in the countryside was, in a sense, the result of the spiritual vacuum which in the town was filled by cālim-s.

This popularization of Sufism led to the emergence of numerous heterodox practices which tainted the true nature of Islam. Among these practices there were the gathering of adepts in exciting dhikr sessions, the cult of saints and the annual celebration of mawsim-s. Another by-product of this popularization was the degradation of Sufism as a science. Moroccan Sufis tended, according to Sulaymān al-Hawwāt, to neglect the original works on Sufism and concentrate instead on a number of popularizing books and stereotyped formulas such as the maxims of Ibn 'Atā' Allāh(45)

... by Mawlāy Sulaymān to Ahmad b. al-Nādī al-Hamdūnī, dated 1 Shawwāl 1236/2 July, 1821 in D.A.R., year 1236 AH.

(45) Ibn 'Atā' Allāh (d.1308 AD) belonged to the mystic school founded by Abū al-Hasan al-Shādhili (d.1258 AD). His most important work, al-Hikam al-'atā'iya, was abundantly commented by Moroccan mystics. E.I., III, 1971, pp.722-723. On the degraded state of Moroccan Sufism at the beginning of the 19th century Sulaymān al-Hawwāt wrote in al-Rawda al-maqṣūda, p.43:

"إلا أنَّ هم أهل المغرب تقاعست عن التعلق بموضوعاته سوى ما كان من مسائل اقتطعها ابن عطاء الله من الكتاب والسنة وكلام القوم ونسخها في قوالب الحكم وعدت من جملة كتب الفن، وإن كانت إنما هي كلمات ملقطة بلا ترتيب ولا تبويب... ولم تبرح هذه الحكم تتناولها الأيدي وتتلعثم بها الألسن من طلبة المدرسين في الوقت ويلهج بحفظها المستظہرون بالانحياز للقوم... أما الكتب المتضمنة لموضوع الفن على سنن أهله وفق مصطلحهم فقد طارت به عنتاً مغرب في جميع أقطار المغرب..."

For similar Sufi works Mawlāy Sulaymān had little sympathy. He even remonstrated against their being read(46).

The ambition of Mawlāy Sulaymān was, according to al-Hawwāt, to renovate mysticism by going back to the sources of Sufism, and particularly to the doctrine of al-Ghazzālī (47). Mawlāy Sulaymān had clearly a great admiration for al-Ghazzālī. Upon his accession to the throne he prescribed the teaching of his Iḥyā' and recommended its reading for his own sons (48). He also supervised its discussion within the religious seminars that he held frequently and which included the most eminent ‘ālim-s of the country (49).

Al-Iḥyā' is al-Ghazzālī's greatest work in size and in importance. It is a comprehensive guide for the devout Muslim covering almost every aspect of religious life : worship, conduct in the daily life, purification of the heart and advance along the mystic way (50). Al-Ghazzālī had the advantage of being an outstanding theologian and a great mystic at the same time. Without departing from Sunnism or orthodox Islam, his Iḥyā' provided an answer to all mystic preoccupations of the devout believer.

(46) A. al-Filālī, al-Tārīkh, pp. I22-I24.

(47) Al-Hawwāt, Diwan, pp.17-20; al-Rawḍa al-maqṣūda, p.43.

(48) Al-Ibtisām, p.6. Cf. also letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to his son Mawlāy Ibrāhīm recommending the reading of al-Iḥyā', no date, in al-Mashrafi's Sharḥ al-shamaqāqiyya, unnumbered pages.

(49) Sulaymān al-Hawwāt, al-Rawḍa al-maqṣūda, p.43; cf. also his Diwan, pp.17-20. Al-Hawwāt praised Mawlāy Sulaymān's efforts to revive the "science of Sufism by encouraging the study of al-Ghazzālī's Iḥyā'". In this respect he wrote in al-Rawḍa ..., p.43:

"لما أطّلَ اللَّهُ عَلَى الْمَغْرِبِ شَمْسُ خَلَافَتِهِ فِي أَنْقَاعِ الْعِلْمِ وَالْعَدْلِ . . . أَمْ صَرَفَ هَمْتَهُ لِحَيَاةِ هَذَا الدِّينِ بِأَحْيَاهُ كِتَابَ الْإِحْيَاِ لِلْغَزَّالِيِّ، فَصَارَ يُقْرَأُ عَلَى مَرَّ الْأَيَامِ وَاللَّيَالِيِّ، وَذَلِكَ بَعْدَ مَا تَعْهَدَهُ بِالْقِرَاءَةِ فِي بَسَاطَةِ السَّعِيدِ، وَتَطَوَّلَ لَهُ بِالْمَبَاحَثَةِ فِي تَفَاصِيلِ مَشْكُلَهُ بِالنَّظَرِ السَّدِيدِ".

(50) Cf. E.I., 1965, II, pp.1038-1041.

Mawlāy Sulaymān's preference for the mysticism of al-Ghazzālī was in fact a preference for a "Sunni mysticism" or a "mysticism of the legalists" (taṣawwuf al-fuqahā) as defined by a fifteenth century Maghribi mystic, Ahmad Zarrūq (d.1493 AD) (51). The objective of Sunni mysticism is to place the believer on the mystic way and provide him with the necessary tools to ensure his salvation without the need for a spiritual intermediary. In other words, it is a mysticism in which the shaykh, or spiritual guide, occupies a secondary role (52).

This kind of mysticism is elitist by definition and therefore less open to popular deviations. Mawlāy Sulaymān advocated a mysticism for the enlightened few to the exclusion of the cāmma, or common people, "this group of people which", in his own terms, "should count rather among the dead than among the living" (53). This is because the common people were unable to lead a contemplative life in conformity with the tradition of the Prophet and his companions. Orthodox mysticism presupposed the ability to recite the Quran and invoke God in a discreet manner, instead of resorting to ecstatic dhikr sessions as was the case with some popular religious orders (54).

Mawlāy Sulaymān was fully conscious that the replacement of popular mysticism as advocated by the zāwiya-s

(51) S. Trimingham, The Sufi Orders in Islam, Oxford, 1971, p. 242.

(52) The adoption of a shaykh was essential to all Sufi orders and particularly to the Shādhiliṭariqa-s. "He who pretends to be able to dispense with the shaykh", wrote Mawlāy al-'Arbi al-Darqāwī, "has missed the gate and faced the wall. Had we remained faithful to the Prophet's message we would have certainly been able to content ourselves with God and the Prophet without the need for a shaykh; but after all the alterations we have introduced to the religion, until our hearts and senses have become soiled, how can we do without a shaykh?". Cf. Mawlāy al-'Arbi al-Darqāwī, Rasā'il, Ms.K.3095, BGR, p.30; personal translation.

(53) Al-'Arbi al-Mashrafi, Sharḥ al-shamaqmaqiyya, unpaginated.

(54) Mawlāy Sulaymān, Khuṭba on the mawsim-s, pp.5-6.

with a "Sunni mysticism" according to the doctrine of al-Ghazzālī, would only be achieved if the prevailing Sufi practices were discredited and eradicated. He applied himself therefore to the task of combatting innovations with an untiring perseverance. His essays and khutba-s were mainly directed against popular religious brotherhoods which recruited heavily among the lower strata of the Cāmma, such as the 'Aysāwiya and the Ḥamadsha orders. They were also directed against the new Darqāwiya order which succeeded within a relatively short time in becoming the most popular religious order in the country and whose practices —such as the dhikr sessions and the wearing of patched garments— were often repugnant to orthodox cālim-s.

Among the unorthodox practices of the zāwiya-s, the samāc (the use of musical instruments for worship purposes) was an eternal subject of controversy between the cālim-s and the Sufis. In two essays devoted to this question, Mawlāy Sulaymān elucidated religious attitudes with this respect (55). To cut short the controversy on the samāc he proposed to go back to "the mother of sources" —the Quran and the Prophet's tradition. He also supported his arguments condemning the samāc by extensive quotations from the works of famous Mālikī theologians. Mawlāy Sulaymān wanted to prove in particular that:-

1. the worship of God is incompatible with any form of amusement;
2. Sufism as practiced by the Cāmma is a fallacy and an innovation which does more harm to their belief than any other sin they might commit;
3. the adepts of Sufi tariqa-s are superfluous and an unproductive element in society. By their retreat from active life they necessarily constitute a burden for the rest of the social body from which

(55) Cf. note 27 above.

they should be discarded (56).

Mawlāy Sulaymān's attack on Sufi heterodox practices found its expression also in his numerous khutba-s (57) in which he denounced the celebration of mawsim-s. These annual gatherings of adepts and sympathizers of a religious order gave rise to a number of illegal practices. The mawsim-s, argued Mawlāy Sulaymān, constituted an innovation because they were unknown to the pious ancestors (58). Moreover, these annual fairs were usually the occasion for the immolation of animals and their dedication to dead saints in order to implore their power of intercession. This practice, Mawlāy Sulaymān claimed, could be perilous for the belief of the common people who, by imploring the saints, often tended to ascribe to them divine attributions (59). Mawlāy Sulaymān decided, therefore, to ban these annual celebrations and maintained this interdiction even during the most critical periods of his reign (60).

By discrediting these practices Mawlāy Sulaymān was in fact launching a direct attack on the zāwiya-s for whom the mawsim-s represented not only an important religious manifestation but also a vital source of income (61). The decision to prohibit such fairs affected directly the moral and material privileges of both the zāwiya-s and the sharif-s. No wonder that these forces adopted an openly hostile attitude towards Mawlāy Sulaymān and accused him of Wahhābism.

(56) This is a clear attack on the Dargāwi-s who preached al-khumūl, or the neglect of means of livelihood. Cf. Mawlāy Sulaymān, al-Samā', pp.44-46.

(57) Cf. Note 27 above.

(58) Mawlāy Sulaymān, Khutba on the mawsim-s, p.5.

(59) Al-'Arbi al-Mashraffi, Sharḥ al-shamaqmaqiyā, unpaginated.

(60) In 1235 AH/1819-1820 AD, on the morrow of the Zaīān defeat and in the midst of a critical political crisis, Mawlāy Sulaymān still maintained a firm position on religious fairs and opposed the celebration by the 'Aysāwa of their mawsim. Cf. Ibn Zaydān, Ithāf, I, p.351 and al-Mashraffi's Sharḥ..., unpaginated.

(61) The mawsim-s took place usually during the summer or the autumn seasons after the end of harvests. The adepts of the Wazzāniya

II - The Winds of Eastern Reformism : the Moroccan Response to Wahhābism

The Wahhābi doctrine was almost unanimously rejected by the Islamic world. In the Ottoman Empire hostility to Wahhābism was motivated, to a large extent, by political reasons since the movement represented not only a religious but also a political threat. This was not the case in Morocco whose Sultan was one of the rare rulers if not the only one, who not only refrained from attacking the doctrine, but sympathized with many of its ideas. However, the conservatism of the religious forces and the predominance of the Sufi-sharifian ideology in Morocco made impossible its implantation in this country.

A- The Wahhābi Doctrine

Wahhābism is a modern form of Ḥanbalism. The founder of the doctrine, Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (1703-1792), received a religious education in conformity with the Ḥanbalist rite and was particularly impressed with the ideas of Ibn Taymiyya (d.1328 AD) who was one of the most eminent theologians of the Ḥanbali school (62). In 1744 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb concluded an alliance with the prince of Najd in the Hijāz, Muḥammad b. Sa‘ūd, for whom the new ideas of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb presented a precious occasion to shake off the Ottoman rule. Thereafter, the movement acquired a political character, gained new followers and extended progressively to most of the Hijaz. In 1805-1806 the Wahhābis took over the Holy Places of Mecca and Medina. It was indeed under the reign of Sa‘ūd b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz (1803-1814) that the movement reached its culmination.

... religious order , for instance, brought all kinds of offerings to Sīdī ‘Alī b. Aḥmad: agricultural products, slaves, gold and silver. Cf. A. al-Wazzānī, al-Rawd al-munīf, II, pp. 76-77.

(62) On Ibn Taymiyya, cf. E.I., III, 1971, pp. 951-955.

Being unable to stop the progress of the Wahhābi threat the Ottoman sultan, Mahmūd II, called on the Pasha of Egypt, Muḥammad ‘Alī, to check the spread of this politico-religious danger. The successor of Sa‘ūd, ‘Abd Allāh, suffered a decisive defeat in 1815 and was finally taken prisoner and executed at Istanbul in 1818.

As a doctrine, Wahhābism attempts, along the lines drawn by Ibn Ḥanbal and Ibn Taymiyya, to restore the original purity and simplicity of the religion by combatting all suspect innovations. The Wahhābi doctrine is based on a strict adherence to the unicity of God (al-tawḥīd). The cult of saints is energetically opposed as well as the visitation of shrines and tombs of saints, considered to be forms of idolatry. Even the ritual visitation of the Prophet's tomb was placed under heavy restrictions and prohibited to the common people in order to prevent idolatrous practices, such as asking for the Prophet's intercession. Books of prayers dedicated to the Prophet, such as the Dalā'il al-khayrāt by the renovator of Maghribi Sufism, Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Jazūlī (d. 1460), were forbidden (63). Prayers, argued the Wahhābi theologians, should be directed to God alone to the exclusion of all creatures, be they prophets or saints, alive or dead (64). All those who did not conform to this view were considered as idolatrous (mushrikūn, pl. of mushrik) and therefore liable for jihād as infidels.

The Wahhābi fight against innovations and idolatrous practices also manifested itself in intransigent opposition to all deviations which had corrupted religion. Among these there were the ornamentation of tombs of saints and mosques, the consecration of sacrifices to the awliyā'

(63) Al-Ibtisām, p.28.

(64) ‘Abd Allāh b. Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, An Account of the Tenets of the Wahhabis of Arabia, Ms.Or.6631, British Museum, fol.20.

(pl. of wali, or saint) and all forms of saint cult. Upon their entering Mecca and Medina, the Wahhābi-s destroyed the domes erected on the tombs of the Prophet and his companions and all ornamental edifices they considered as detestable innovations. In so doing, their aim was to restore the primitive purity and simplicity of Islam as lived under the Prophet and the Right-guided califs.

The Wahhābi-s distinguished themselves in particular by their hostility to Sufism and the Sufi tariqa-s. Although they were not opposed to mysticism in principle, the Wahhābi-s were, nevertheless, suspicious of Sufi practices which they condemned as being contrary to religion (65). This attitude provoked the hostility of most of the Islamic world because of the spread of Sufi ideology, particularly among the common people. The condemnation of Sufi heterodox practices by the Wahhābi-s was accompanied by a very austere and ascetic way of life. They forbade the use of tobacco, the wearing of silk and abstained from all forms of luxury (66). Their attachment to the primitive purity of Islam and the tradition of the Prophet's companions also reflected itself in their stress on equality among all believers. They abolished distinctive titles and forbade prostration before princes or other dignitaries. "They addressed their prince by his name", noted the author of al-Ibtisām, "and greeted him in the same way they used to greet each other" (67).

B- The Moroccan Response

A number of factors militated against the success of the Wahhābi reformist doctrine in Morocco. If, on one hand the popular attitude was mainly motivated by the

(65) Ibid., pp.7-8.

(66) Al-Ibtisām, p.28; al-Naṣirī, VIII, p.120.

(67) Al-Ibtisām, p.28; Anon. Histoire des Wahhabis depuis leur origine jusqu'à la fin de 1809, Paris, 1810, p. 21.

predominance of the Sufi-sharifian ideology, that of the ṣālim-s, on the other hand, is to be explained by the deep-seated Mālikī-Ash'ari tradition which proved to be incompatible with Ḥanbali dogma. However, Mawlāy Sulaymān while remaining faithful to Ash'ari dogma, did not make secret his sympathy with the reformist character of Wahhābism.

(1) The Popular Response

The Ḥanbali doctrine was well known in Morocco but remained confined to the speculative field since Mālikism had always been the official and undisputed rite, and Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal was respected more for his contribution to the study of the hadīth than for his theological ideas (68). It was only during the second half of the eighteenth century that Ḥanbali ideas were openly adopted by the ruling sultan, Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh. This coincided with the emergence of Wahhābism in the Arabian peninsula, but there is nothing to show that Sīdī Muḥammad's sympathy with Ḥanbalism was a result of foreign influence. The existence of the Wahhābi movement passed apparently unnoticed until the beginning of the nineteenth century when it had spread to the Holy Places. Moroccan travel accounts (riḥla-s) written by returning pilgrims during the latter part of the eighteenth century make, in fact, no reference to this emerging religious movement. Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Salām b. Nāṣir who went twice on pilgrimage—in 1782 (1196 AH) and 1797 (1211 AH)—wrote two detailed riḥla-s neither of which mentioned the Wahhābi-s (69). Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Fāṣī who accompanied him during the second pilgrimage did not refer either to the Wahhābi movement in his riḥla (70).

(68) E. Micheaux-Bellaire, Le Wahhabisme, Casablanca, 1928, p.9.

(69) Cf. Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Salām b. Nāṣir, al-Riḥla al-kubrā, Ms.D. 2651, BGR, and al-Riḥla al-ṣughrā, Ms.121, R.L.

(70) Cf. extracts from his riḥla in Ms.G.88, BGR, pp.164-181.

The first reference to the Wahhābi movement by al-Du‘ayf goes back to 1803 (71). The information provided by Aḥmad b. ‘Abd al-Salām Bannānī (d.1819) also confirms that it was at the beginning of the nineteenth century that Moroccans became acquainted with the existence of Wahhābism (72). Bannānī affirmed that before 1803 there had never been any mention of the Wahhābi-s in Morocco (73). This was no doubt due to the interruption of contact with the Arab East for a number of years. From 1798 to 1802 the Moroccan pilgrimage caravan was suspended because of the French invasion of Egypt (74). This suspension, apparently, left Moroccans unacquainted with the events that were taking place in the Arabian peninsula. Moreover, the attention of the Islamic world was directed to the Christian threat which hung over Egypt, until the evacuation of French troops in 1802.

Aḥmad b. ‘Abd al-Salām Bannānī was among the pilgrims who left the city of Fès in October 1802. "We had never heard of the Wahhābi or his followers", he wrote (75). It was only upon their arrival in Egypt in February 1803 that Moroccan pilgrims became acquainted with the existence of the Wahhābi movement (76).

(71) Al-Du‘ayf, p.423.

(72) Aḥmad b. ‘Abd al-Salām Bannānī, al-Fuyūdāt al-wahbiya fī al-radd ‘alā al-ṭā’ifa al-wahbiya, Ms.170, private library of ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Filālī.

(73) Ibid., pp.10-11.

(74) The Moroccan pilgrimage caravan was temporarily interrupted following the French invasion of Egypt. It was in 1802 that Mawlāy Sulaymān authorized this caravan upon the assurances given to him by the British consul on the security of the land routes through Egypt. Cf. FO.52/12, 3 November, 1802.

(75) Bannānī, al-Fuyūdāt, pp.10-11:

".. خرجتُ مع الركب النبوي من محروسة فاس منها الله تعالى من كل بأس في أول يوم من العشر الاواخر من جمادى الثانية عام سبعة عشر بمودة و ماتين و ألف، و الجفر من ألم الفراق و كثرة الشوق في نشر و لف، و ليس في أذهاناً ولا أسماعنا ذكر للوهبي و لا أشياعه (. . .) الى أن وصلنا الى قاهرة مصر المحروسة اواخر شوال من العام المذكور فوجدنا وجوه أهلها من أجله قمعطيرة عبوسة و ألقينا خبره فيها شائعاً وعلى لسان كل غاد و راجع مستفيضاً ذاتياً".
(76) Ibid., p.11.

The news about the existence of the Wahhābi-s in the Hijaz and the prohibition they imposed on the visitation of the Prophet's tomb spread fear and confusion among Moroccan pilgrims, but the pilgrimage caravan succeeded in reaching Medina without being disturbed. After the pilgrims had fulfilled their religious duties there, however, they were attacked by the followers of Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhāb. Some of them were plundered and some even lost their lives (77).

The returning pilgrims were the first to popularize the news about the Wahhābi movement. The information conveyed by these pilgrims, many of whom had suffered or witnessed Wahhābi brutality, was in general biased, inaccurate and distorted. In Morocco, the Wahhābi doctrine was thus judged on the basis of false rumours or in terms of excesses committed by Wahhābi followers. For the common people, the doctrine came to be identified with the desecration of the Holy Places, the hostility to the visitation of saints, and the prohibition of the Dalā'il al-khayrāt (78), a highly venerated book of prayers in Morocco. Al-Du'ayf , who reflected popular opinion better than any other contemporary author, claimed that "the Wahhābi" was seeking to found a new religion (79).

The attitude of the Moroccan people to this eastern reformist doctrine was overwhelmingly hostile. The predominance of the Sufi-sharifian ideology represented the main obstacle to the spread of Wahhābism in Morocco.

(77) Ibid., pp.16 and 19.

(78) Al-Du'ayf, pp.424 and 500; al-Zayānī, al-Turjumāna, p.389; al-Ibtisām, p.28.

(79) Al-Du'ayf, p.500.

The Wahhābi doctrine is in its essence opposed to the cult of saints which is the very basis of Moroccan popular religion. It is also hostile to the adoption of spiritual intermediaries between the believer and God. This was in open contradiction with the whole sufi ideology according to which mystic shaykh-s, or spiritual guides are supposed to lead the believer on the path of God. The Shādhili school of Sufism, from which derived most of the Maghribi tariqa-s, maintained in fact that it was impossible to restore the original purity of Islam as lived under the Prophet and his companions because of the corruption of the age, whence the necessity for spiritual guidance for the devout Muslim (80). The adoption of a "spiritual way" (tariqa) becomes, therefore, a necessity. The Wahhābi doctrine upheld, on the contrary, that religion was accessible by its sources to all believers without distinction.

The Wahhābi doctrine could not just antagonize Sufi brotherhoods without, at the same time, coming into collision with sharifism. Indeed, Moroccan Sufism had been interwoven with sharifism ever since the revival of the Shādhili mystic school in the fifteenth century under the influence of the celebrated Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Jazūlī. The worship of saints, the veneration of the Prophet and his descendants and the advocation of social and religious differentiation which places the awliyā, and the sharif-s at the top of the socio-religious pyramid, were as dear to the sharif-s as they were to the Sufi shaykh-s. The Wahhābi doctrine, however, rejected the intercession of saints and the necessity of intermediaries between man and God, thus attacking the foundation of both popular Sufism and sharifism at the same time.

(80) Mawlāy al-‘Arbī al-Darqāwī, Rasā'il, Ms K 3095, BGR, p. 30; ‘Abd al-Hafidh al-Fāsī, al-Turjumān al-mu‘rib ‘an ashhar furū‘ al-shādhiliya bi al-Maghrib, Mic. I4, HPMD, Rabat, 1976, no pagination.

Anti-Wahhābi propaganda found in Morocco most favourable ground. The common people readily adopted a hostile attitude to this reformist movement. Many thousands of Moroccans volunteered to fight the Wahhābi-s under the banner of Muḥammad ‘Alī (81). The spirit of the jihād remained by no means confined to the common people. As eminent an cālim as Ahmād b. ‘Abd al-Salām Bannānī thought in fact that it was also the duty of amīr al-mūminīn to send the mujāhidīn, money and military equipment to suppress the Wahhābi threat (82).

(2) The Official Response: Ālim-s and Makhzen

Apparently, the Wahhābi leaders never attempted to recruit the Moroccan sultan or the Moroccan cālim-s to their religious cause. Their preaching effort remained confined to the Ottoman Empire, most probably for political reasons, as they needed to overcome first of all resistance within the Empire itself. There is, in fact, no evidence of any direct correspondence from the Wahhābi-s to the Moroccan cālim-s or to Mawlāy Sulaymān. Indeed, among the written documents through which Moroccans became acquainted with the Wahhābi doctrine there is none addressed to them directly.

Contrary to what is asserted by al-Zayānī and al-Nāṣirī, Moroccan cālim-s did not first come into contact with the Wahhābi doctrine in 1811-1812 (83) when they received a copy of the letter addressed by Sa‘ūd b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz to the Tunisian cālim-s. The information provided by the author of al-Fuyūdāt al-wahbiya leaves no doubt that the introduction into the country of the first Wahhābi documents goes back to 1803.

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- (81) Al-Du‘ayf mentioned that Muḥammad ‘Alī had with him a Maghribi contingent of 8,000 men. Cf. al-Du‘ayf, pp.477, 500. The Egyptian historian al-Jabartī noted the existence of Maghribi fighters among the Egyptian army; cf. ‘Ajā’ib al-āthār fī al-tarājīm wa al-akhbār, Cairo, 1880, vol.IV, p.305.
- (82) A. Bannānī, al-Fuyūdāt, p.151.
- (83) Cf. al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol.185; al-Nāṣirī, VIII, pp.117-120.

Indeed, Ahmad Bannānī affirmed that upon his return from the Hijaz he brought with him two letters exposing the tenets of the Wahhābi doctrine (84). The first letter was a long one, while the second which fell into the author's hands at Constantine during the return journey amounted to a few pages only (85). After having circulated among the ‘Ālim-s of Fès, these two documents finally reached Mawlāy Sulaymān.

This version of events is confirmed by al-Tayyib b. Kīrān. In his essay in the refutation of Wahhābism, Ibn Kīrān affirmed that he was entrusted by Mawlāy Sulaymān with the examination of two letters which "fell into his hands" (86). They consisted in a long one of about forty pages, and a short one of four pages, neither of which, he claimed, was addressed to the Moroccan ‘Ālim-s or to Mawlāy Sulaymān (87).

(84) A. Bannānī, *al-Fuyudāt*, p. 176.

(85) *Ibid.* Bannānī wrote in particular:

"وذلك ان رسالة الوهبي المذكور أتت بها معي من بلاد المشرق مع رسالة أخرى صفرى الفيت لها بعدينة قسطنطينية. ثم لما وصلنا الى مدينة فاس منها الله تعالى من كل باس وقعتا معا بيد مولانا الإمام الأوحد، عالم السلاطين و سلطان العلماء، النقد أمير المؤمنين سيدنا سليمان بن محمد أبقاء الله ذابباً عن دينه و ملذا لأهل الحق في حينه فأمر نصره الله شيخنا المذكور (الطيب بن كيران) أن يمعن النظر فيما انتهاه صاحب الرسائلتين و اعتمد و حمل عليه العامة و تقلده".

(86) Al-Tayyib b. Kīrān, *Radd ‘alā madhab al-wahhābiya*, Ms. K 1325, BGR, p. 21.

"ووقع من ذلك في يد مولانا الإمام (. . .) رساّلان منسوبان لسعود بن عبد العزيز أحدهما صفرى نحو ورقيتين والأخرى نحو كُرّاسة، أمرني أن أمعن النظر فيما انتهاه و اعتمد"

(87) *Ibid.*

The ideological content of the two documents seemed so important that Mawlāy Sulaymān deemed it necessary to submit the issue to the ‘ālim-s for examination. Ibn Kīrān, being the shaykh al-jamā‘a, was more qualified than any other to draft an answer. The need for the formulation of a reply was dictated essentially by the necessity of ideological clarification.

In his response, which extended to about fifty pages (88), al-Tayyib b. Kīrān took it upon himself to refute the main theological arguments of the Wahhābi doctrine. He relied on both logic and the sayings of famous theologians to define the nature of belief and heresy and to clarify the attitude of Islam towards the veneration of saints and recourse to their power of intercession. The veneration due to the Prophet and the awliyā’, argued Ibn Kīrān, is conformable with the precepts of religion and should in no way be considered as idolatrous worship. Ibn Kīrān recognized, however, that some people among the ‘āmma did in fact exaggerate their reverence towards the awliyā’ but in such cases, he maintained, we should be very cautious in deciding whether this veneration had reached the point of becoming a heresy or not. The punishment of heretical practices, underlined Ibn Kīrān, must remain limited to their specific authors and should in no way be generalized to a whole community (89).

On the Makhzen's side, there was no reaction until 1811. Between 1803 and 1811 Mawlāy Sulaymān refrained from either condemning the Wahhābi doctrine or expressing openly his sympathy with its principles. Was it the hostility of the ‘ālim-s to this doctrine which prevented

(88) Ibid. Ibn Kīrān's personal attitude towards the Wahhābi doctrine is reflected in his essay (Ms.K.1325, BGR). It should not be confused with the letter that he wrote to Sa‘ūd b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz on behalf of Mawlāy Sulaymān (Ms.4624, R.L.) and which reflects the Sultan's views. Cf. appendix 55.

(89) Ibid., p.75.

him from manifesting his favourable disposition ? Some indications allow us to conclude that Mawlāy Sulaymān's hostility to innovations and heterodox practices was enhanced during this period. In 1804, al-Du^cayf reported that the Sultan's governor, Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Salām al-Salāwī, prevented the ‘Arab al-Widyān tribes from celebrating the mawsim of Sīdī Yahya b. Mansūr (90). The next year Mawlāy Sulaymān removed the dome off his father's shrine in Rabat (91). In 1806, the Sultan wrote an important essay in which he attacked Sufi heterodox practices (92). Three years later, in 1809, he ordered the removal of the tombstone placed on his father's tomb claiming that "it was against the Sunna" (93).

Meanwhile, the regular movement of Moroccan pilgrims to the Hijaz was hindered by the alleged insecurity of the holy places (94). The arrival in Fès of a third Wahhābi document in 1811 raised the problem again and made an official reply inevitable. The new document consisted in a letter addressed by Sa‘ūd b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz to the ‘ālim-s of Tunis. A copy of this letter had then been dispatched to Fès (95). Mawlāy Sulaymān thought that the time had come for the resumption of the pilgrimage to Mecca and the despatch of an official delegation which would both transmit the Moroccan position vis-à-vis the Wahhābi doctrine and also sound out the real intentions and motives of the Wahhābi leaders.

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- (90) Al-Du^cayf, p.411. For al-Du^cayf the event seemed so important that he wrote: "From the day of Mawlāy Sulaymān's proclamation to the day in which he removed the tombstone there had elapsed 17 years and 11 months less than 7 days".
- (91) Ibid., p.442.
- (92) Mawlāy Sulaymān, al-Samā‘, Ms. 652, Sbīhī library, pp. 1-59.
- (93) Al-Du^cayf, p.454.
- (94) Propaganda by conservative forces played an important role in diverting devout believers from fulfilling their religious duties. Cf. the case of an Idrisiid sharīf, al-Fadil al-‘Amrānī, who dissuaded many Moroccan pilgrims from proceeding to the Hijaz on the pretence that Wahhābi-s had forbidden the visitation of the Holy Places. Cf. al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-nubahā, p.20. Later on, this ascetic sharīf played an active role in the Fès rebellion against Mawlāy Sulaymān.
- (95) Cf. copy of the letter in al-Zayānī, al-Turjumāna al-kubrā, pp.394-396.

Mawlāy Sulaymān found no difficulty in convincing the ‘ālim-s that it was necessary to issue a fatwā authorizing the resumption of pilgrimage. The question addressed to the ‘ālim-s was formulated in such a way that they were left with little freedom of manoeuvre. "Our Lord", wrote the ‘ālim-s, "has already answered the query and left little room for contestation". Relying on the information communicated to them in two royal letters about the security of the Holy Places, the ‘ālim-s wrote that "the people of the Maghrib were subject, in the same way as other Muslims, to the obligation of pilgrimage, especially after it became clear that they were not exposed during their journey to any threat from ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (sic). Nobody who travelled through the Wahhābi State of the Hijaz ever claimed that he had been invited to adopt Wahhābi views or had been endangered in his life or property, or prevented from accomplishing his wishes. On the contrary, he ('Abd al-Wahhāb) was the agent of security and tranquillity in every part of the Hijaz, and might very well be a support for this Religion" (96).

Never were the Moroccan ‘ālim-s more unanimous in praising the action of the Wahhābi-s. Mawlāy Sulaymān seemed to have achieved a preliminary success in overcoming the resistance of the religious scholars. He was so encouraged that he decided to send an official reply to Sa‘ūd b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz. The task of formulating such a reply was entrusted to three ‘ālim-s: al-Ṭayyib b. Kīrān (d. 1812), author of the essay referenced above, Sulaymān al-Ḥawwāt (d. 1816), the naqīb (dean) of the sharīf-s, and Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj, the uncontested poet of the Sulaymāni Court (97).

(96) Cf. fatwā by the ‘ālim-s authorizing Mawlāy Sulaymān to dispatch the pilgrimage caravan in 1811 after he had received favourable reports on the security of the Hijaz, in Ms.D.2753, BGR, pp. 95–98. The signatories of the fatwā were: Aḥmad b. Sūda, Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī, Muḥammad al-Zarwālī, Idrīs al-‘Irāqī, Muḥammad b. Mansūr, Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj, al-Ṭayyib b. Kīrān and ‘Abd al-Salām al-Azamī. Cf. appendix 53.

(97) Cf. Ibn Kīrān's letter to Sa‘ūd b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz in the name of Mawlāy Sulaymān in Ms.4624, R.L.; al-Ḥawwāt's letter in Ms.2710, R.L., fol.82–86; Ḥamdūn's versified reply in his Dīwān, Ms.K.963, pp.202–215.

Ibn Kīrān had already made clear his rejection of the Wahhābi doctrine. Like Mawlāy Sulaymān, he remained profoundly attached to Mālikī-Ash'ari theological thought. He was highly respectful of the sharīf-s to whom he devoted two of his major works (98) and was by no means hostile to the zāwiya-s. Among his works there figure, in particular, a commentary on the maxims of Ibn 'Atā' Allāh (99) and another on the Mashīshi prayer (al-ṣalāt al-mashīhiya by the Sufi Pole Mawlāy 'Abd al-Salām b. Mashīsh). He was not, therefore, disposed to offer a welcome to Wahhābi ideas.

Nor was Sulaymān al-Hawwāt--whose consultation by the Sultan on this issue seemed rather to be a measure of courtesy towards the spokesman of the sharīf-s--any more receptive to Wahhābi views. Although well grounded in the religious sciences, al-Hawwāt did not count among the senior ‘ālim-s whose opinion was sought on important doctrinal issues (100). He distinguished himself not so much by his religious scholarship as by his talents as the genealogist of the sharifian families of Morocco (101). He was also profoundly imbued with Sufi ideas. His sympathy with the sufi brotherhoods manifested itself especially in his condemnation of the persecution to which the Darqāwi-s were exposed in the years 1794-1795 (102). Towards Wahhābism al-Hawwāt adopted an openly hostile attitude (103). In spite of this, he maintained good relations with the Sultan to whom he devoted many of his eulogistic poems (104).

(98) They consisted in two poems devoted to the exhalation of the Qādiri and Wazzāni sharīf-s. Cf. Hāshiyat Muhammad b. Qāsim al-Qādirī on Ibn Kīrān's commentary on Ibn 'Ashir's tawhīd, lith. Fès, no date, vol. I, part I, pp. 4-5.

(99) Cf. footnote 45 above.

(100) His name does not figure, for instance, among the ‘ālim-s who were consulted in 1811 on the resumption of pilgrimage to the Holy Places. Cf. footnote 96 above.

(101) Cf. al-'Arbī al-Mashraffī, Nuzhat al-absār, p. 451.

(102) Ibid.

(103) Al-Hawwāt, Dīwān, Ms. 2941, R.L., p. 57.

(104) Cf. his Dīwān in the eulogy of Mawlāy Sulaymān, Ms. D.753, BGR; cf. also collection of his poems in Ms. Z.3091, R.L.

The third ‘ālim, Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj, was both a religious scholar and an unrivalled poet. The excellent relations he maintained with the court made of him a typical "palace ‘ālim". During Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj was often called upon to fill governmental posts. He served in particular as Muhtasib of Fès and governor of the Gharb province. His strict adherence to the shari‘a made him, sometimes, very unpopular, especially with the Wazzāniya religious order whose influence extended to the Gharb (105). His dispute with Sīdī ‘Alī b. Aḥmad in 1804 (106) was most probably the reason why he abandoned the Wazzāni tariqa (107). Aḥmad al-Tijānī attempted later on to attract him to his tariqa but without success (108). Undoubtedly, Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj was the most enthusiastic ‘ālim for the Wahhābi reformist ideas. Al-Zayānī went so far as to claim that Ḥamdūn confessed his Wahhābism to his son before he died (109).

Among the three answers drafted at Mawlāy Sulaymān's demand, only Ḥamdūn's qaṣīda is mentioned by Moroccan historiographers. There is no trace in the works of al-Zayānī or Akansūs of Ibn Kīrān's reply which constituted, nevertheless, the basic document carried by the official delegation to the Wahhābi leaders. Both al-Zayānī and Akansūs mentioned Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj as the only ‘ālim entrusted with the drafting of the Moroccan reply (110). Ḥamdūn's qaṣīda certainly reflected Mawlāy Sulaymān's attitude, but was rather intended as an eulogistic supplement to Ibn Kīrān's solidly argued letter. The fact that not only Ibn Kīrān's letter and Ḥamdūn's qaṣīda

(105) Al-Du‘ayf, p.436; al-Kattānī, Salwat, III, pp.4-5; al-Mashraffī, Nuzhat al-absār, pp.431-433.

(106) Al-Du‘ayf, p.436.

(107) Skiredj, Raf‘ al-hijāb, II, p.143.

(108) Cf. Tijānī Letters, Ms.K.644, BGR, letter from Aḥmad al-Tijānī to Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj, pp.158-159.

(109) Al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-nubahā’, p.271.

(110) Al-Zayānī, al-Turjumāna, p.396; al-Rawda, fol.185; Akansūs, pp. 298-299.

but also a third document by Sulaymān al-Ḥawwāt (111) are now available enables us to have a clearer idea about the whole issue.

The examination of the three documents shows, indeed, that they all express the same convictions and rely on same arguments. The instructions of Mawlāy Sulaymān to the three 'ālim-s were faithfully respected. Contrary to what is claimed by al-Zayānī, therefore, Ḥamdūn's qasīda did not reflect the convictions of its author alone (112). Ḥamdūn b.al-Ḥāj had done no more than to render in verse the ideas developed in prose by Ibn Kīrān and Sulaymān al-Ḥawwāt.

Both Ibn Kīrān and al-Ḥawwāt had the opportunity to express their personal opinion about the Wahhābi doctrine (113). They both were unequivocally hostile to the said doctrine. In his essay on the refutation of the Wahhābi ideas, Ibn Kīrān attacked "the Wahhābi" as a "blameworthy innovator" who "perturbed the belief of the common Muslims" (114). Al-Ḥawwāt, on the other hand, qualified the Wahhābi-s as "rebels" who threatened with the sword all those who did not adopt their views (115). An examination of Mawlāy Sulaymān's message to Sa'ūd b.'Abd al-'Azīz makes the great difference between these 'ālim-s personal

(111) Al-Ḥawwāt drafted a letter to Ibn Sa'ūd on behalf of Mawlāy Sulaymān but this latter preferred Ibn Kīrān's project which was more solidly argued. Cf. al-Ḥawwāt's letter in Ms.Z.2710, R.L., fol.82-86 (appendix 56). Cf. Ibn Kīrān's draft in Ms.4624,R.L. (appendix 55).

(112) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawda, fol.185.

(113) Cf. Ms.K.1325, BGR, for Ibn Kīrān's personal opinion and Ms.2941, R.L. for al-Ḥawwāt's personal views.

(114) Ibn Kīrān, Radd 'alā madhab al-wahhābiya, pp. 21, 46.

(115) Al-Ḥawwāt, Dīwān, pp.32,57.

On the return of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm from the Hijaz in 1812 al-Ḥawwāt wrote :
 لا سِيَّا و سَعُود يَمْنَع أَرْضَه * بِالسِيفِ مَنْ كَانْ لَا يَتَوَهَّب
 وَهُوَ الْأَمِيرُ عَلَى الْحِجَازِ وَغَيْرِهِ * وَالثَّائِرُ الْمُتَمَرِّدُ الْمُتَفَلِّب

This accusation is completely contradictory to the eulogistic statements made in the letter he was asked to draft to Sa'ūd b. 'Abd al-'Azīz and in which he praised in particular the pacification of the Hijaz by the Wahhābi-s ; cf. Ms.Z.2710, R.L., fol.85.

views and the position of the Sultan quite evident (116).

(3) Mawlāy Sulaymān and the Wahhābi Doctrine

The fact that Mawlāy Sulaymān decided to send an official delegation in 1811 to deliver his reply to the Wahhābi leaders shows the importance he attached to the issue. This delegation was headed by his elder son and heir presumptive, Mawlāy Ibrāhīm, as well as the qādī of Marrakech, Muhammad al-Zaddāghī, and a distinguished ‘ālim from Fès, al-‘Abbās b. Kīrān (117).

Mawlāy Sulaymān took the initiative of sending an official reply in order to express his good disposition towards the Wahhābi ideas. "The aim of this letter", he wrote to Sa‘ūd b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, "is to dissipate any possible suspicion on your part according to which we would be opposed to your ideas" (118). In spite of some criticism, Mawlāy Sulaymān remained, on the whole, favourable to the reformist spirit of the Wahhābi doctrine. He exalted the asceticism of the Wahhābi-s, their hostility to all forms of luxury and their endeavours to purify the religion from all sorts of detestable innovations. "We were pleased", Mawlāy Sulaymān wrote, "to hear about your conduct, your qualities, your ascetism, your revivification of the tenets of religion according to the path traced by the pious ancestors (al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ), your care about a sincere unitarian worship of God and your eradication of innovations and deviations which are usually at the origin of doctrinal errors and heresies. What we learned about you is in perfect harmony with the books of the

(116) Since al-Hawwāt's letter was never sent to Sa‘ūd, it will be, therefore, disregarded in our analysis of Mawlāy Sulaymān's attitude vis-à-vis the Wahhābi doctrine.

(117) Akansūs, p.299.

(118) Cf. letter drafted by Ibn Kīrān, Ms.4624, R.L., fol.5.

"ālim-s and the doctrines instituted by the salaf and the Prophet's companions" (119). Mawlāy Sulaymān also praised the action of the Wahhābi-s in pacifying the Hijaz and ensuring the protection of pilgrims (120).

He had, nevertheless, some reservations about the Wahhābi doctrine regarding, in particular, the doctrinal problem of al-takfīr (excommunication) and the recourse to the intercession of prophets and saints.

The major issue of theological disagreement between the Wahhābi-s and their opponents was, undoubtedly, the question of excommunication. The doctrine of Wahhābism was initially founded on the basis of a strict adherence to the unicity of God. The followers of Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhāb were, indeed, so attached to the principle of God's unicity that they preferred to call themselves al-muwahhidūn, or unitarians (121). Their zeal about this principle made them very prone to consider the popular veneration given to the Prophet and the awliyā’as as a form of idolatrous worship which contradicted the basis foundation of faith. Ideological intolerance, which usually characterizes every new movement, led them to abuse of the use of excommunication against their opponents. These were thus declared to be mushrikūn (pl. of mushrik) or heretics and whose blood may be let under the terms of the shari‘a.

(119) Letter to Sa‘ūd, Ibid., fol.1 (personal translation). The letter read: "وبعد فإننا نحمد الله الذي هداكم و هدى بكم. فلقد سرنا ما بلغنا عنكم من سيرتكم و شيمكم وأحوالكم في الزهد في الدنيا وإحياء رسم الدين، والحضور على طريق السلف الصالح و سُنن المهتدين، و الحمل على إخلاص التوحيد لرب العالمين وقطع البدع والضلالات التي هي منشأ زيف العقائد وكثر العجبات. وما برحنا نسمع عنكم ما قد أصيتم فيه كل الإصابة و واقتنم فيه كتب العلما، ومذاهب السلف الصحابة...".

(120) Ibid., fol.5.

(121) The appellation of "Wahhābis-s" was applied to them by their enemies.

Given his strong attachment to the Mālikī-Ash'ari school (122), Mawlāy Sulaymān rejected the Wahhābi view on this particular issue. He maintained that the exaggerated veneration of saints and their entreatment are to be considered at most as bid'a or as a serious sin (kabīra) which should in no way result in excluding from the Muslim community persons who still believed in God and his Prophet (123). We have already referred to Mawlāy Sulaymān's doctrinal position on the takfir issue. "Excommunication", he wrote in his essay on al-kasb, "is a most alarming issue, since it implies the condemnation of a person to perpetual hell when the day of the Last Judgement comes. The takfir can only be pronounced against an infidel about whom there can be no ambiguity" (124). According to Mawlāy Sulaymān, the dividing line between a believer and an infidel is the profession of faith, or the shahāda, which is enough in itself to ensure the individual against perpetual hell. "It is far safer to spare the lives of a thousand infidels", Mawlāy Sulaymān wrote to Sa'ūd b. 'Abd al-'Azīz, "than to shed unjustly the blood of a single believer" (125).

The second objection made by Mawlāy Sulaymān to the Wahhābi doctrine related to the place occupied by saints in Islam. The Wahhābi-s did not deny sainthood or the saints' miracles (karāmat). They maintained, nevertheless, that only God was worthy of worship and rejected

(122) His Ash'ari convictions are clearly expressed in an essay on al-kasb written initially by Mawlāy Sulaymān but completed by Ibn Kirān. Cf. Ms.D.1838, BGR, pp.253-270.

(123) Mawlāy Sulaymān and Ibn Kirān, Jawāb fī mas'alat al-kasb, Ms.D. 1838, BGR, p.269.

(124) Ibid.

(125) Mawlāy Sulaymān, letter to Sa'ūd, fol.2.

therefore all forms of saint cult. They particularly disapproved the visitation of the saints' tombs by the common people. The supplication of saints, whether dead or alive, was considered as a form of heresy (shirk) since only God can fulfill man's wishes (126).

For Mawlāy Sulaymān, a distinction had to be made between a person who resorted to the intercession of saints being aware that only God could fulfill his demand and a person who addressed himself to a saint believing that the saint alone could ensure him good or evil. In other words, all depended on the real intention of the individual, something which only God knows.

Mawlāy Sulaymān's letter quoted numerous hadīth-s and verses of the Quran which supported the ability of prophets and saints to act as intermediaries between man and his Creator. The recourse to the intercession of saints, argued Mawlāy Sulaymān, could not be therefore considered as a form of heresy. The visitation of the Prophet's tomb and the request of his shafā'a (intercession) was even recommended by the sharī'a and remained perfectly advisable as long as the prescribed rules of visitation were respected (127).

Mawlāy Sulaymān recognized, however, that these rules were usually unknown to the Cāmma who resorted to numerous

(126) On this particular issue the Wahhābi-s are most ambiguous. The supplication of saints and the recourse to their power of intercession is considered indiscriminately both as shirk and as bid'a. Cf. letter of Sa'ūd to the Cālim-s of Tunis in al-Zayānī's Turjumāna al-kubrā, pp.394-395 and Ibn'Abd al-Wahhāb, An Account, fol. 4.

(127) Mawlāy Sulaymān to Sa'ūd, fol.4.

detestable innovations, such as the embracing of the saints' tombs and the circumambulation of their shrines. He agreed, therefore, with the attitude adopted by the Wahhābi-s of preventing the common people from visiting the tombs of saints. "The visitation by the common people of the tombs of saints is usually the occasion for unsuitable sayings and heresies", he wrote. "It is perfectly legitimate to prevent them from such visits until they are fully aware of what they say"(128). This position is in harmony with Mawlāy Sulaymān's ideas on the visitation of saints (129) and the celebration of the mawsim-s which he prohibited for his people on more than one occasion, as we have seen earlier.

Between Mawlāy Sulaymān and the Wahhābi-s there was another point of accord: it concerned the ornamentation of tombs and the erection around them of sumptuous buildings. Mawlāy Sulaymān always abhorred extravagant practices which run contrary to the Sunna. The building usually raised over a tomb, argued Mawlāy Sulaymān in his letter to Sa‘ūd, should be kept to a minimum "whether the dead is a proprietor, a ṣālim, a sharīf or a sultan"(130). Slight constructions could be tolerated for the purpose of distinction and preservation but should exclude any engravings or excessive ornamentation. He also condemned other similar heterodox practices such as the burning of candles or the sacrifice of animals on the saints' tombs (131).

Mawlāy Sulaymān's adherence to the Ash‘ari theory of al-kasb was certainly a major obstacle which prevented

(128) Mawlāy Sulaymān believed that the visitation of saints should be allowed only to those who are acquainted with the rules prescribed by the shari‘a in this respect. Cf. Ibn Murīda, al-kawākib al-sayyāra fī al-bahth wa al-hath ‘alā al-ziyāra, Ms. K 479, BGR, p.113.

(129) Mawlāy Sulaymān to Sa‘ūd, Ms 4624, RL, fol. 4.

(130) Ibid.

(131) Ibid.

him from adopting the Wahhābi doctrine. However, the disagreement on the issue of excommunication was only partial since, in principle at least, the Wahhābi-s did not consider the author of a grave sin (*kabīra*) to be an infidel (*kāfir*) but merely a sinner (132). The discord point between Mawlāy Sulaymān and the Wahhābi-s was not constituted by the latter's doctrinal tenets but by their proneness to excommunicate without allowing for enough prudence to discern the real *kāfir* from the false one. Mawlāy Sulaymān's criticism of the Wahhābi-s was rather directed against their practical abuses. In his message to Sa'ūd he called on the Wahhābi-s to adopt a more lenient attitude in dealing with theological differences. He recalled the rules of debate as formulated by al-Ghazzālī and practiced by Ahmad b. Ḥanbal, warning against the dangers of ideological obstinacy and intolerance (133). Indeed, the confrontation of ideas between the *‘Ālim*-s members of the Moroccan delegation to the Hijaz and Sa'ūd b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz showed an identity of views on major theological issues (134).

Mawlāy Ibrāhīm and the members of the delegation were given a warm welcome by Sa'ūd b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz and were allowed to visit all Holy Places, including the Prophet's tomb (135). According to Akansūs, the Moroccans were impressed by the ascetism of the Wahhābi prince whose "state did not differ from that of any of his subjects" (136). Contrary to what they expected, they observed no-

(132) ‘Abd Allāh b. Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, *An Account*, p. 16.

(133) Mawlāy Sulaymān to Sa'ūd, fol.3.

(134) Akansūs, pp.299-300. During the audience accorded to Mawlāy Ibrāhīm by Sa'ūd, it was made clear to the Moroccan delegation that the Wahhābi-s upheld the Mālikī interpretation of God's metaphorical "sitting on the throne" (*al-istiwā'*). Sa'ūd explained that the visitation of the Prophet's tomb was only prohibited for ordinary people who were unacquainted with the prescribed rules of visitation.

(135) Al-Jabartī reported that the Moroccan pilgrimage caravan was given an unusual welcome and allowed to travel freely in the Hijaz. Cf. al-Jabartī, *‘Aja’ib al-āthār*, IV, p.143.

(136) Akansūs, p.299.

thing from him or from his followers which contradicted the shari'a. During the audience accorded to the Moroccan delegation, the opportunity was given to the qādī of Marrakech, Muḥammad al-Zaddāghī, and to al-‘Abbās b. Kīrān to seek more clarification of the Wahhābi doctrine, particularly on the question of intercession of the Prophet and the awliyā', and the visitation of tombs and shrines(137). Sa‘ūd b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz explained to the Moroccan ‘ālim-s that the Wahhābi-s were not opposed by principle to the visitation of the Prophet's tomb, nor did they deny the sainthood of the awliyā'. This visitation, however, had to be performed according to certain rules, well established by the shari'a, and which were usually ignored by the common people. It was in order to prevent the visitation of venerated persons from becoming a cult in itself, he explained, that the Wahhābi-s prohibited ordinary people from entering the Prophet's sanctuary (138).

Upon their return in September 1812 the members of the delegation reported their impressions and expounded the doctrine of Wahhābism. Akansūs, who conferred with many of them, affirmed that none had seen or heard from the Wahhābi-s anything contrary to the shari'a (139). The return of the delegation gave birth, nevertheless, to an acute controversy about Wahhābism. The opponents of the doctrine, such as al-Zayānī and Sulaymān al-Hawwāt, claimed that the Holy Places in the Hijaz were as insecure as ever and, were it not for the presence of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm among the Moroccan delegation, pilgrims would have never been allowed to perform their religious duties (140).

(137) Ibid., pp.299-300.

(138) Ibid.

(139) Ibid., p.300.

(140) Following the return of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm from the Hijaz, al-Hawwāt wrote:-

وَلَوْلَا لَمْ تَأْمُنْ لَهُمْ سِبْلَ الْهُدَىْ × وَلَا أَتَمْعَا نَحْنُ الْحَجَازَ وَأَنْجَدْنَا
وَلَكُنْ بَعْدَ حَلَّوْا مَقَامَ سَمِيَّهِ × وَحَجَوْا وَزَارُوا وَالْزِيَارَةَ تَحْمَدْ

Cf. his Dīwān, Ms.2941, R.L., P.57.

Another point of discord concerned the eulogistic qaṣīda of Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj. Al-Zayānī claimed that it reflected in no way the ideas of Mawlāy Sulaymān and that it was composed on the private initiative of Ḥamdūn (141). "How is it possible", al-Zayānī wrote, "to praise this erring innovator who should be, in fact, repudiated especially after he had spread insecurity in the Holy Places, prohibited the visitation and the intercession of prophets and saints, and banned the reading of Dalā'il al-khayrāt and the invocation of saints?" (142).

On the other hand, Akansūs who counted among the Tijāni adepts, affirmed that Ḥamdūn composed his poem "by order of the Sultan and in his name" (143) to be delivered officially by his son to the head of the Wahhābi State.

Ḥamdūn's qaṣīda was generally attacked by Mawlāy Sulaymān's contemporaries who, instead of attacking openly the Sultan's sympathy with Wahhābism, blamed its author as the sole person responsible (144). In this respect, Ahmad b. ‘Abd al-Salām Bannānī was more outspoken in his criticism of Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj and, indirectly, of Mawlāy

(141) Al-Zayānī was strongly opposed to the Wahhābi movement. This hostility is to be explained, in part at least, by his sympathy with the Ottomans. Like al-Ḥawwāt, he maintained that without the presence of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm the Moroccan pilgrims would have been unable to fulfill their religious duties. Cf. al-Rawḍa, fol. 187.

(142) Al-Zayānī, al-Turjumān al-mu‘rib, p. 389 (personal translation). "فكيف يُدح المبتدع الفال ويشكر؟ بل يهجر؟ أم كيف يتغرب الى من يخيف أهل الحرمين ويبع زياراة الأنبياء والتسلل بهم الى رب السماوات وينهى عن قراءة دلائل الخيرات والدعاء بمقامات الأولياء أهل الكرامات؟"

(143) Akansūs, p. 299.

(144) This is the case of an anonymous essay refuting the Wahhābi doctrine, entitled: Risāla fī al-radd ‘alā mutbadi‘at ahl al-badr wa nāhiyat al-mashriq, Ms.D.2594, BGR, pp. 251-264. The author of this essay attacked those who praise the Wahhābi-s in the following terms:

"وما دروا أن أهل الحق من الأمة السعيدية لا يألون في طلب الحق جهد هم، وأن مدحه وإن أطرب فيه مادح له ولغو عندهم. وأن مثل مولانا المنصور بالله (...) لا يتبع في مدح مادحه هواهم ولا يبيع أعزه الله آخرته بدنياهم، فليس لمولانا أعزه الله مع رسخه في العلوم من يستفزه أحد بقوله... ."

Sulaymān . Bannānī argued that Ḥamdūn's eulogy was worthy only of legally proclaimed princes, which was not the case with the Wahhābi leader (145). Instead of praising Sa‘ūd, Ḥamdūn "should have appealed to Moroccans, and particularly to the amīr al-mūminīn may God glorify him in order to organize the jihād against this usurpator and in order to free the Holy Places from his grasp and assist the mujāhidīn by supplying them with military equipment such as gunpowder, guns, artillery and other material. As to this kind of speech, it will only encourage him in his tyranny" (146).

Contrary to what Mawlāy Sulaymān had hoped, the sending of the official reply to the Wahhābi leaders, instead of easing the internal resistance of religious forces in Morocco, had only exacerbated their hostility. Mawlāy Sulaymān's initiative succeeded neither in convincing the ‘ālim-s of the religious soundness of the Wahhābi doctrine nor in dissipating the malevolent propaganda of conservative groups about the alleged insecurity of the Holy Places. This initiative had, in reality, only served to unchain their hostility.

(145) Bannānī, al-Fuyūqāt, pp.124-125.

(146) Ibid., p.151.

CHAPTER VI

THE ASCENDANCE OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS:
THE RELIGIOUS POLICY OF MAWLĀY SULAYMĀN

During the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān religious groups acquired an unprecedented importance in the political affairs of the country. This was due, no doubt, to the weakness of the Makhzen, but also to the growing prestige of these groups, especially the sharīf-s. Indeed, among the three religious groups, the cālim-s, the zāwiya-s and the sharīf-s, these last were, by virtue of their cāṣabiyya, the most active social element which succeeded in extending its hegemony over all others.

I - The cālim-s

A- Role and Function in Society

In an Islamic society, religious nobility could be attained either through sharifian descent or through the acquisition of the "holy knowledge" (al-ilm al-sharīf). For those who lacked a sharifian lineage (sharaf al-nasab) religious scholarship offered the alternative for a privileged position in society.

The importance of the cālim-s, or religious scholars, in an Islamic society needs hardly to be underlined. They did not only constitute the guardians of the religious

sciences, but also represented the only body which could interpret religious law (al-sharī'a) and therefore, the only force which could act as a check on the sultan's powers. After all, the ālim-s are the successors of the Prophet, the guardians of the sharī'a and consequently the source of all religious and political legitimacy.

This importance was underlined every time the Muslim community was confronted with an important decision, and especially when it was faced with the choice of a new sultan. Among all the components of the ahl al-hall wa al-aqd, the ālim-s represented the crucial element in any bay'a procedure. Once "elected", the sultan was not responsible to the ālim-s, but often felt obliged to consult them and justify his decisions to them. Sometimes, the ālim-s took the initiative of issuing a judicial opinion without a request from the sultan and expected its implementation by the Makhzen (1).

Behind this important role was the relative independence enjoyed by the ālim-s vis-à-vis the Makhzen on which they depended neither organizationally nor financially. On the organizational level, the ālim-s never had a clear code to define obligations and internal rules of mobility. This ambiguity worked against any attempt by the Makhzen to domesticate them. The sultan could appoint ālim-s to judicial posts, but was unable to control control the internal mobility of ālim-s from one grade to another. Only the ālim-s themselves had the overriding say in the distribution of religious scholars

(1) In 1799, for instance, following the French invasion of Egypt and the unusual movement of European fleets near the Moroccan coast, the ālim-s of Tétouan wrote to the ālim-s of Fès in order to obtain a fatwā which would allow the inhabitants of the thughūr (ports) to buy and carry arms. The desired fatwā was issued and Mawlāy Sulaymān had no alternative but to lift the ban of the private use of arms, despite the gravity of such a decision. Cf. al-Du'ayf, pp.398-400.

among the various categories of learning (ṭabaqāt, pl. of ṭabaqa) (2). The appointment of the chief Ūlī al-ḥiqāṣid (shaykh al-jamā'a) also remained beyond the sultan's control. This was usually decided by the corps of Ūlī al-ḥiqāṣid-s according to a well established tradition which took into consideration the Ūlī al-ḥiqāṣid's competence, age and experience.

The Ūlī al-ḥiqāṣid-s had also a relative financial autonomy. Whether he was to fill a judicial or an educational post the Ūlī al-ḥiqāṣid would not be dependent on the Makhzen for his emoluments, for these he received from the ahbās. Even the qādī, who was appointed by royal decree, was not considered a Makhzen official. The distinction between a Makhzenian post (mansib makhzanī) and a legal post (mansib shar'i) left no room for confusion. The Ūlī al-ḥiqāṣid-s did receive occasional presents from the sultan but this manifestation of sultanian generosity had no significant effect on the Ūlī al-ḥiqāṣid's freedom of thought. A Ūlī al-ḥiqāṣid could be even more independent and feared by the Makhzen if he refused the sultan's favours and declined public responsibilities. Nothing irritated Sidi Muhammed b. Abd Allah more than the refusal of a Ūlī al-ḥiqāṣid, such as Ahmad al-Warzīzī, to accept his donation (3). Such a negative attitude on the Ūlī al-ḥiqāṣid's part was also a cause for respect by his fellow Ūlī al-ḥiqāṣid-s. The greatest eulogy that could be reserved for a Ūlī al-ḥiqāṣid was to mention that he never stained his honour with the acceptance of a Makhzenian post (4).

The Ūlī al-ḥiqāṣid-s filled a number of important functions in society, in at least three fields: religious observance, teaching and judicature. The first evident function of religious scholars was to provide places of worship—mosques, sanctuaries and zāwiya-s—with imām-s and khatīb-s (preachers) to lead the five daily prayers as

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- (2) Under Mawlāy Sulaymān the Ūlī al-ḥiqāṣid-s were classified into three categories. Cf. Ibn Zaydān, al-Ṭizz wa al-sawla, pp. 167-175.
 (3) Al-Dūayf, p. 170. Cf. also Ibid., pp. 194 and 198.
 (4) Cf. introduction to al-Hawwāt's al-Sirr al-dhāhir, lith., Fès, 1932, pp. 3-4; cf. also Muhammed b. Ja'far al-Kattānī, Salwat, III, p. 118.

well as the Friday prayer. Jointly with his duties as prayer leader, the imām assumed a teaching task. It was at the mosque, in fact, that the learning process began, first by the memorization of the Quran, then by the acquisition of the basic disciplines.

Higher education could be acquired in the countryside especially in rural areas with an old sedentary tradition, such as the Jbala and the Sous; but it was mainly in the hadariya towns that the student had the opportunity to meet the most eminent Cālim-s of the country. After the acquisition of the preliminary education, the tālib, or student, moved to the town where he could deepen his knowledge and learn new disciplines. Fès was the uncontested centre of higher education, not only because of the number of outstanding Cālim-s it embraced within its walls, but also by the numerous schools (madrasa-s) in the city. Students repaired to Fès from all over the country, including from other hadariya towns, to perfect their learning.

Curriculum and teaching methods underwent little or no change through centuries. Fiqh (jurisprudence) was at the basis of all learning and continued to be considered as "the king of sciences". Other disciplines included the exegesis of the Quran (al-tafsīr), the hadīth, or the Prophet's traditions, the uṣūl, or sources of jurisprudence, theological dogma (Cilm al-kalām), logic (al-mantiq), mysticism (al-tasawwuf) in addition to grammar, Arabic linguistics and some scientific subjects such as arithmetic, algebra, and astronomy(5). The emphasis on the study of certain disciplines could vary with time. Thus, the study of Khalīl's Mukhtaṣar was almost abandoned under the reign of Sīdī Muḥammad because of this latter's hostility to abridged works as a method

(5) Cf. al-Hawwāt, al-Rawḍa al-maqṣūda, pp.34-57 for a complete list of disciplines taught at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

of teaching. Sīdī Muḥammad also reproved the study of theological dogma (6). Mawlāy Sulaymān, on the contrary, allocated special prizes for those who memorized Khalīl's Mukhtaṣar and did not refrain from venturing into dogmatic discussions himself.

Education was mainly based on learning by rote and the use of archaic manuals. Many of these were rendered in verse in order to facilitate their acquisition. The most common teaching method consisted in reading and explaining the text to the students. In practice, the teacher never limited himself to the text. He attempted most of the time to expound on the subject by referring to the opinions of the famous theologians. The study of a single manual, such as the Mukhtaṣar for example, could last as much as ten years and even longer (7). For the qālim, the length of his course was a sign of his scholarly competence. Attempts by Sīdī Muḥammad to introduce some reforms to the educational system, namely by repressing the use of secondary manuals, ended in failure. Moroccan qālim-s were not disposed to relinquish their centuries-old teaching traditions. Different educational methods witnessed by Moroccan qālim-s in the Arab East, such as Egypt, where the acquisition of the Mukhtaṣar took no more than two years and where "the student became capable of teaching in three years" (8) seem to have had no effect on teaching methods at the Qarawiyyīn (9).

The other function of the qālim-s was judicial. From among the qālim-s were recruited the muftī, the qādī and the qudūl, or notaries. At the top of the judicial system there was the sultan himself who appointed the qādī-s and acted as the highest court of appeal. He appointed the

(6) Cf. chapter V above. pp. 247-248.

(7) A.al-Tāzī, Jāmi' al-Qarawiyyīn, Beirut, 1972, vol. II, p. 727.

(8) Al-Ibtisām, pp. 58-59.

(9) It was only in 1845 that Mawlāy 'Abd al-Rahmān attempted to introduce some reforms to the educational system of the Qarawiyyīn; cf. al-Tāzī, Jāmi' al-Qarawiyyīn, III, pp. 727-728.

chief judge (qādī al-quḍāt) and the judges of the different towns and tribes. In theory, the chief judge, who acted at the same time as the qādī of Fès, was entitled to appoint and supervise all other judges of the country (10). In practice, however, his prerogatives were much more limited, since the judges were appointed by royal decree and grievances against them were generally addressed directly to the sultan. Moreover, there were a number of regional chief judges at the major towns such as Tétouan, Marrakech and Taroudant, who used to supervise the qādī-s of their immediate regions. Thus, the qādī of Ouezzane was usually entrusted with the supervision of the rural qādī-s of the Jbala (11).

The main duty of a qādī was to render justice according to the sharī'a. His prerogatives also extended to many judicial, religious and educational fields. Thus, he appointed or dismissed the Cudūl and supervised the functions of the nādhir, the muhtasib, as well as those of the mosque imām-s and the teachers at the various mosques and madrasa-s(12). Owing to these prerogatives, the qādī held a privileged position not only within the body of learned men, but in society as a whole. His effective power depended, nevertheless, on both the official backing of the sultan and the respect he enjoyed from his fellow Cālim-s. This respect was generally based on both the qādī's scholarship and his age.

Beside the qādī, there was the muftī who acted as a court of appeal. The muftī (the person who issues a fatwā) was a regular function of every Cālim whose scholarly competence was widely recognized. This function enabled the citizen to by-pass the qādī, if necessary, when a

(10) Al-Zayānī, Takmīl quḍāt Fās Calā mā fī Jadhwat al-iqtibās, Ms. 4792, RL, p. 2.

(11) Letter from Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh to Sīdī ‘Alī b. Ahmad, Muḥarram, 1200/Nov.-Dec., 1785, in al-Dū‘ayf, pp.198-199.

(12) Al-Zayānī, Takmīl quḍāt Fās, p.2.

fatwā was requested independently of a prior consultation of the latter (13). The muftī acted more often as a court of appeal when a contender, being dissatisfied with the qādī's judgement, brought his case before him. Unlike the qādī, however, the muftī lacked the necessary authority to enforce his sentence and, in case of irreconcilable contradiction between the qādī's judgement and the muftī's opinion, the contending parties were left with the only ultimate alternative of appealing to the sultan.

As an institutionalized function, it was not established in Morocco before the sixteenth century. While the same institution was in force in the Eastern Maghrib ever since the fourteenth century, in Morocco it was apparently introduced for the first time by the Sa'adian Muḥammad al-Shaykh (d. 1557) in imitation of the Ottoman Turks (14). Nevertheless, the post of muftī in Morocco was never as important as it was in the Ottoman Empire. This institution was in fact so fragile that it simply vanished when the qādī al-qudāt enjoyed enough moral authority and respectability to impose himself as the uncontested judicial reference. This was the case of al-Tāwdī b. Sūda under Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh. Other sultans, such as Mawlāy Sulaymān and his successor Mawlāy ‘Abd al-Rahmān, were even convinced that the existence of qādī and muftī side by side created more problems than it solved (15). Among these problems was the traditional professional rivalry which opposed qādī and muftī and which led during the last years of Mawlāy Sulaymān's rule to the most distressing consequences.

(13) According to al-Zayānī, the post of muftī comes third in the administrative hierarchy of the Islamic State after the sultan and the wazīr-s (ministers). Cf. Takmīl qudāt Fās, p.1.

(14) A. Benabdallah, al-Qādī al-maghribī, paper presented to the Fès Seminar on Mālik b. Anas (1980), p.6. On the origin of the institution in the Eastern Maghrib, cf. R. Brunschwig, La Berbérie orientale sous les Hafsidés des origines à la fin du XVe siècle, Paris, 1940, vol. II, p. 139.

(15) In 1820 following the different between the qādī and the muftī of Fès, Mawlāy Sulaymān abolished the institution of muftī (al-Zayānī, Takmīl qudāt Fās, p.12)

B- The Corps of ^Cālim-s Under Mawlāy Sulaymān.

The Cālim-s did not constitute an effective group with a clear structure and recognized rules of accession. All those who established themselves in the religious sciences and gained the reputation of belonging to the learned elite of the country were Cālim-s. It was only on the occasion of important events, such as the proclamation of a sultan, the holding of a consultation on an important political or religious issue, or the distribution of a Makhzen donation, that the question of "who is Cālim?" imposed itself.

Under Mawlāy Sulaymān, the Cālim-s were classified into three categories (tabaqāt) according to their competence and scholarly reputation (16). The first and second tabaqā-s included senior Cālim-s whose "learning piety and insight" enabled them to act as "the people of tying and untying" as far as important matters of religion were concerned. The third category, on the other hand, was made up of tālib-s , or students who, after having acquired the basic religious science, took up a number of low clerical offices : imām-s, khatīb-s, teachers at the Quranic schools, notaries, etc.

At the top of the learned pyramid there was the shaykh at-jamā'a who, by virtue of his scholarship, piety and age, acted as the spokesman for his fellow Cālim-s. He was consulted by the sultan on important matters and served as an intermediary between him and the rest of the Cālim-s. Shaykh al-jamā'a acted sometimes as the spokesman for the whole Fāsi society as was the case in 1792 when al-Tāwdī b. Sūda was delegated to act on

(16) Cf. Mawlāy Sulaymān's dhahir giving the list of Cālim-s in Fès according to their category, issued around 1233/1817-1818, in Ibn Zaydān, al-^CIzz wa al-ṣawla, II, pp.167-175. The number of Cālim-s under Mawlāy Sulaymān was 428(in 1818) compared to 266 in 1906. Compare dhahir of Mawlāy Abd al-^CAzīz (1894-1908) in Ibn Zaydān, al-^CIzz wa al-ṣawla, II, pp.167-188.

behalf of the population of Fès in the choice of a new sultan (17). The moral authority enjoyed by the shaykh al-jamā'a enabled him to play a role of arbiter and give the corps of qālim-s a certain appearance of unity and homogeneity by keeping in the shade internal cleavages.

Mawlāy Sulaymān's relations with the qālim-s can be divided into two periods. During the first two decades of his reign Mawlāy Sulaymān maintained privileged relations with the qālim-s. This was partly due to the presence of scholars with whom he had built up close ties of cooperation. It is also to be explained by the existence until 1812 of a shaykh al-jamā'a in the person of al-Tayyib b. Kīrān whose moral authority among the religious scholars served as a safeguard against possible inter-qālim-s dissensions. The uncontested judicial authority of Ahmad b. Sūda and the abolition of the institution of muftī during his term also helped to avoid the traditional qādī-muftī opposition (18). However, the passing away of many qālim-s of the old generation opened the way after 1812 for the emergence of a new generation of scholars with whom Mawlāy Sulaymān had little contact. Moreover, the re-establishment of the post of muftī after 1816, together with the appointment of a young qādī from the Ibn Sūda family, contributed to the deterioration of Makhzen-qālim-s relations.

The fact that Mawlāy Sulaymān was himself a qālim taking an active part in the religious and cultural life greatly improved his image among the scholarly elite of the country. His doctrinal views also contributed to ease his relations with this religious group. His attachment to the Mālikī-Ash'ari tradition as manifested in the re-

(17) Cf. notarial act established on 10 Rajab, 1206/ 4 March, 1792, Mic. 2/70, HPMF, Fès, 1978.

(18) These dissensions were best illustrated by the animosity which opposed al-'Abbās b. Sūda and Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī after 1816. Cf. below.

establishment of the teaching of Khalīl's Mukhtasar and al-Ghazzālī's Iḥyā, was well received by Moroccan cālim-s.

Mawlāy Sulaymān had for teachers the most outstanding cālim-s of the late eighteenth century. Some of these, such as al-Tāwdī b. Sūda, Aḥmad b. Sūda, Muḥammad al-Hawwārī and ‘Abd al-Qādir b. Shaqrūn, had been called by Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh to assume judicial responsibilities and look after the education of his sons. For these cālim-s, who dominated the scholarly elite at the death of Sīdī Muḥammad, Mawlāy Sulaymān had a great respect. He regularly consulted them on important religious and political issues and continued to attend their lectures even after he assumed power. A close contact with Mawlāy Sulaymān's shaykh-s was maintained through the Sultan's learned council which served as a seminar for the debate of religious questions.

Some of Mawlāy Sulaymān's most respected teachers were of Bildi origin. Moroccan historiographers did not fail to point out that in 1804, Mawlāy Sulaymān attended Ibn Shaqrūn's funeral in person to mark his great affection for his shaykh (19). He then ordered the burial of Ibn Shaqrūn within the walls of the holy shrine of Mawlāy Idrīs, despite the opposition of the sharīf-s (20). Al-Ṭayyib b. Kīrān, another Bildi cālim, and shaykh al-jamāca after al-Tāwdī b. Sūda, also enjoyed Mawlāy Sulaymān's admiration. Even while sultan, Mawlāy Sulaymān continued to attend Ibn Kīrān's lectures at the Qarawiyīn preferring to sit among the students as a sign of respect for his teacher (21). He also constantly referred to him

(19) Ja‘far b. Idrīs al-Kattānī, al-Shurb, part I, p. 7; Muḥammad b. Ja‘far al-Kattānī, Salwat, I, pp. 95-96. "The Sultan attended his funeral and mourned him", noted al-Du‘ayf, p. 441.

(20) A. Ibn al-Muwāz, al-Maqāla al-murdiya fī al-dawla al-‘Alawiya, Ms. 493, RL, p. 21; M. Balmūnū, Taqyīd fī ba‘d asrār al-tarīqa al-tijāniya, Ms. K 461, BGR, pp. 144-145.

(21) Al-Du‘ayf, p. 364.

in the clarification of religious and doctrinal issues. This sympathy for Bildi Ūalim-s was often interpreted by contemporaries as a sign of Mawlāy Sulaymān's preference of the Bildiyīn to other social groups and was particularly resented by sharīf-s (22).

Mawlāy Sulaymān had also a great esteem for the Ibn Sūda family which produced many outstanding Ūalim-s. Al-Tāwdī b. Sūda served as his teacher as well as his shaykh from whom he received the Nāṣiri wird. His advice on important issues was regularly solicited by Mawlāy Sulaymān. Ahmad b. Sūda and his son al-‘Abbās were entrusted with the qadirat of Fès during most of his reign (23).

However, the good understanding which existed between Mawlāy Sulaymān and the Ūalim-s was seriously compromised during the latter part of his reign. This was essentially due to the internal changes undergone by the Ūalim-s between 1792 and 1822. During this period most Ūalim-s who served as Mawlāy Sulaymān's teachers and closest advisors progressively passed away to be replaced by a younger generation of Ūalim-s. The most important loss for Mawlāy Sulaymān consisted in the death of al-Tayyib b. Kīrān in 1812 and the disability of Ahmad b. Sūda in 1816. The result was the absence among the Ūalim-s of a moral authority able to fill the vacant post of shaykh al-jamā'a or to exercise effectively the duties of chief judge. Under such conditions latent inter-Ūalim-s rivalries were bound to emerge to the surface.

The list of Ūalim-s established by Mawlāy Sulaymān around 1817 shows a complete renewal of the scholarly elite (24). The examination of the fatwā-s and the bay'a which brought Mawlāy Ibrāhīm b. al-Yazīd to power in 1820 also confirmed this change. By comparing the

(22) al-Dūcayf, p.364.

(23) On Mawlāy Sulaymān's relations with the Ibn Sūda family, cf. chapter VII below.

(24) Cf. dhahir referenced in note 16 above.

list of ālim-s who proclaimed Mawlāy Sulaymān in 1792 to that of ālim-s who dethroned him in 1820 (25) we notice that among the fifteen scholars who signed the 1792 bay^Ca only one was still alive twenty nine years later — Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī. Consequently, most of the ālim-s who took part in the Fès rebellion belonged to the younger generation of scholars, or "ahdāth al-^Culamā'", as referred to by al-Zayānī (26).

A further observation should be made here. At a time when the sharīf-s enhanced their presence among the scholarly elite, the Bildiyyīn who traditionally provided "a disproportionate number of scholars" (27) seem to have lost their privileged position. No Bildi name figured in fact in the bay^Ca proclaiming Mawlāy Ibrāhīm (28).

List "A" - The ālim-s who proclaimed Mawlāy Sulaymān in 1792

Muḥammad al-Tāwdī b. Sūda (d.1795)
 Ahmād b. al-Tāwdī b. Sūda (d.1820)
 Muḥammad b. ^CAbd al-Salām al-Fāsī (d.1799)
^CAbd al-Qādir b. Shaqrūn (d.1804)
 Muḥammad Bannīs (d.1799)
 Muḥammad b. ^CAbd al-Majīd al-Fāsī (d.1799)
 Yaḥyā b. al-Mahdī al-Shafashāwnī (d.1813)
^CAli b. Awīs (d.1799)
 Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī (d.1826)

(25) Compare lists "A" and "B" below.

(26) al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-nubahā', Ms.6180, R.L., p.12.

(27) N. Cigar, "Conflict and Community in an Urban Milieu Under the 'Alawi-s (1660-1830)", The Maghreb Review, Nov.-Dec., 1978, p.9.

(28) Cf. text of the bay^Ca in Dāwūd, III, pp.250-257.

Muhammad b. Mas'ud al-Trunbati (d.1799)
 Muhammad al-Hadi b. Ziyan al-Iraqi (d.1799)
 Sulayman al-Fishtali (d.1794)
 Muhammad al-Tuhami Taha -
 Abd al-Malik b. al-Hasan al-Fadili
 Idris b. Hashim al-Juti

List "B" - The ^Cālim-s who supported the dethronement of Mawlay Sulayman in 1821

Muhammad b. Ibrahim al-Dukkali
 Abd al-Salam al-Azami (d.1826)
 Abu Bakr al-Manjra (d.1824-1825)
 Muhammad b. Abi Bakr al-Yazghi (d.1823-1824)
 Abd al-Malik al-Murri
 Abu Bakr al-Idrisi
 Badr al-Din al-Hammumi (d.1849-1850)
 Al-Arb al-Zarhuni
 Majdhub al-Fasi
 Muhammad b. Sulayman
 Abd al-Salam al-Masnawi
 Muhammad b. Abd al-Rahman al-Dilawi

During the second decade of the nineteenth century relations between Mawlay Sulayman and the ^Cālim-s became increasingly tense, essentially because of the Sultan's intransigence and refusal to recognize the changes that had occurred within the learned elite of the country. His decision in 1816 to appoint a new qadi from the Ibn Suda family was bound to create friction between the newly named official and Muhammad b. Ibrahim al-Dukkali, the mufti, not only because this latter belonged to a prestigious family which produced many ^Cālim-s in the past, but also because he considered himself, by virtue of his scholarship and his

age, as the most qualified person for the office of chief judge (29). The young age of the new *qādī*, al-^cAbbās b. Sūda, his inexperience and his inability to impose himself to his fellow scholars further aggravated inter-^c*ālim* rivalries.

II - The Sharīf-s

The *sharīf-s* constituted a kind of "blood nobility" within the Moroccan society. To be a *sharīf* one had to be able to trace one's descent back to the Prophet through his daughter Fātima. The Idrisids, whose ancestor Idrīs b. ^cAbd Allāh founded in Morocco the first Islamic dynasty (788-1016 AD), are the most venerated and the most widespread. Between the fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries, other sharifian families arrived in Morocco. Among these were the ^cAlawids, the Qādiri-s, the Siqilli-s, the ^cIrāqi-s and the Manjriyyīn. Many of these families resided at Fès, the cradle of the Idrisid dynasty, but the Idrisid *sharīf-s* were to be found everywhere, particularly in the northern part of the country. The ^cAlawids who belong to a different branch of *sharīf-s* remained in the Tafilelt until the middle of the seventeenth century when they founded their own dynasty.

(29) al-Zayānī, Takmīl quḍāt Fās, p.12

وعزم المفتى ومن له تبع من فهم الوقت وفي القضا طمع

The fact that the *muftī*, Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī, had ambitions for the post of *qādī* shows that al-Zayānī's classification placing the office of *muftī* above that of chief judge (cf. note 13 above) did not always reflect the reality, especially under Mawlāy Sulaymān who insisted on curtailing the powers of the *muftī*.

Sharifdom is based on the possession of the baraka, a kind of "beneficent effluvium" or supernatural power inherited from the Prophet. Not all sharifian groups possessed the same amount of this baraka. The Idrisids were considered to be the most prestigious by far, and among the Idrisids themselves, some families claimed pre-eminence over others. Thus, the Kattāniyyīn considered themselves to be the purest and the most authentic of all (30).

The Idrisid sharīf-s lived in concealment for many centuries after the fall of their dynasty (10th century AD) in order to avoid persecution. With the encouragement of the Merinid dynasty (1258-1465), however, they began to emerge to the surface. The Merinids hoped to exploit the religious prestige of the sharīf-s to their advantage to counter the influence of the zāwiya-s. This hope was enhanced by the concentration of the sharīf-s at Fès, which seemed to offer greater possibilities for Makhzen control. The benevolent Merinid policy towards the sharīf-s encouraged many sharifian families to return to Fès (31). It was during the Merinid period that, by a mysterious coincidence, the relics of Mawlāy Idrīs II were discovered in Fès (32).

The spread of Sufism was another factor which favoured the resurgence of sharifism. The emphasis placed by the Shādhili school on the veneration of the Prophet and his descendants contributed to the consolidation of sharifism as a fundamental principle of both religious and political legitimacy. The prestige of the sharīf-s further increased after the fifteenth century because of their active role in the military resistance to Spanish and

(30) ^CAbd al-Hayy al-Kattānī, Kitāb fī al-^{C-3}a'ilat al-Kattāniya, Ms.K. 3249, BGR, p.120.

(31) Al-Nāṣirī, VII, p.6; Ibn Zaydān, al-^CIzz wa la-ṣawla, II, pp.85,108; Ibn al-Hāj, al-Durr al-muntakhab, IX, pp.292-293; ^CAbd al-Salām b. al-Tayyib al-Qādirī, al-Durr al-saniy, lith., Fès, 1891, pp.17,38.

(32) G. Dague, Esquisse, p.47.

Portuguese attacks on Morocco (33).

Being a sharīf in the Moroccan society entitled one not only to the respect and veneration due to the descent of the Prophet but also to a number of material privileges. A sharīf was, first of all, exempt from military service, from non-religious taxes and from all arbitrary Makhzen impositions (al-wadhā'if pl. of wadhīf). Thus, the sharīf-s were freed from participating in the presents offered to the sultan on the occasion of religious celebrations (hadiyya), as well as from the contributions paid to Makhzen officials on various occasions (34). They were also guaranteed justice by their peers and placed under the authority of a sharīf shaykh to whom they delivered their taxes (35).

In many ways, the sharīf-s constituted a State within the State. They were immune from a number of contributions, enjoyed a private jurisdiction and were not subject to any lay authority. Between them and the sultan, the naqīb of the sharīf-s (the dean) acted as an intermediary. The naqīb was appointed by the sultan to look after the moral interests of the sharīf-s. His main duty resided in ascertaining sharifian genealogies and preventing false pretenders from staining the Prophet's posterity. He kept an inventory of all births and deaths among the sharīf-s and saw to it that no misalliances took place between sharīf-s and non-sharīf-s. The naqīb also attempted to divert the sharīf-s from the exercise of degrading professions which were incompatible with the dignity of the holy lineage (36). The donations they received from the sultan were

(33) In 1578 the Idrisid sharīf-s of northern Morocco participated actively in the battle of Wād al-Makhāzin. To reward them, Ahmad al-Mansūr declared inviolable the shrine of Mawlāy 'Abd al-Salām b. Mashīsh and allowed them a share in the income of the sanctuary of Mawlāy Idrīs.

(34) Al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-hāfi, p. 12.

(35) Ibid.

(36) Ibn Zaydān, al-IZZ wa al-sawla, II, pp.74, 79.

intended essentially to guarantee a decent livelihood to the sharīf-s without which they would necessarily resort to such professions. The naqīb acted, finally, as an arbitrator in intra-sharifian conflicts so as to avoid any outside interference from laymen.

The privileges enjoyed by sharīf-s naturally encouraged many people to falsify their genealogies and claim descent from the Prophet. Such forgeries could very well pass unnoticed, particularly during long intervals of civil strife, such as the chaotic period which followed the death of Mawlāy Ismā'īl. Sultans attempted therefore at different times to ascertain sharifian genealogies and establish inventories of authentic sharīf-s.

The first attempt in this respect was made by the Sa'adian Ahmād al-Maṇṣūr (d.1603). His inventory (dīwān al-ashrāf) served later on as a basis for Mawlāy Ismā'īl to produce his own register (kunnāsh al-ashrāf) (37). When Sīdī Muḥammad b. Abd Allāh acceded to the Moroccan throne in 1757, the number of false sharīf-s (al-mutasharrifūn, pl. of mutasharrif) had considerably increased. To quell the clamours of the powerful sharifian families (ahl al-ṣaṣabiyya), Sīdī Muḥammad decided to limit sharifdom to twelve distinguished branches, or sixteen families (38). As a measure of solicitude towards the sharīf-s he granted these branches the privilege of dividing among themselves the inheritance fund of Fès (39). This measure created a great deal of discontent among the rest of the sharīf-s, or the "common sharīf-s" (ṣāmmat al-ashrāf), who did not belong to the twelve influential branches but still remained fully convinced of their sharifdom. Their insistent complaints persuaded Sīdī Muḥammad to abrogate in 1201 AH(1786-1787) the concessions he had made to the

(37) Ibid., p.108.

(38) Cf. list of the twelve branches in Taqyid al-ashrāf, Z.3122, R.L.

(39) The inheritance fund of Fès (māl irāthat Fās) included all properties left by heirless persons who died in the city.

twelve branches and declare that the inheritance fund of Fès should be equally divided among all sharifian families with the exception of the Idrisids who monopolized the revenue of the sanctuary of Mawlāy Idrīs instead (40).

The short and unstable reign of Mawlāy al-Yazīd was another occasion for false sharīf-s to forge genealogies. Mawlāy al-Yazīd, we are told by al-Zayānī, granted dhabīr-s of sharifdom to all pretenders without the least check on the authenticity of their claims (41). Nevertheless, he followed a pro-sharifian policy motivated to a large extent by the support he received from the sharīf-s of northern Morocco before and after his proclamation. This policy was largely responsible for the growing interference by the sharīf-s and the zāwiya-s in the political life of the country, especially during the dynastic crisis which followed his death in 1792.

Mawlāy Sulaymān's relations with the sharīf-s were governed by two considerations: first, there was his centralizing temperament which made him hostile to all forms of particularism; secondly, there were his personal religious convictions which placed the sharī'a^c above particular interests. These considerations led Mawlāy Sulaymān to progressively curtail the privileges enjoyed by the sharīf-s and embittered relations between the two sides.

The sharīf-s' material privileges were particularly affected. Mawlāy Sulaymān, like his father, failed to solve the traditional dilemma of "who was sharīf?"

(40) Al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-hādī, p.13; Ibn Zaydān, al-^CIzz wa al-sawla, II,p.86.

(41) Al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-hādī, p.13; ^CAbd al-Salām al-Qādirī, Taqyīd fī al-dawla al-calawiya, Ms.248, R.L., p.20.

During the early disturbed years of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign, the Makhzen was too busy pacifying the country to devote any attention to this thorny problem. When it finally did, it found that the number of false pretenders to sharifian status reached such proportions that it was impossible to discern an authentic from a false sharīf. Mawlāy Sulaymān decided, therefore, to place sharīf-s and non-sharīf-s on the same footing to cut short all polemic on the issue. He wrote to his governors ordering them to collect taxes (zakāt) and Cushūr) from all his subjects, without distinction (42). By this measure, he undermined the administrative autonomy of the sharīf-s.

Sharifian families upon whom Sīdī Muḥammad had conferred the right to divide among themselves the inheritance fund of Fès (43) were deprived from this privilege by Mawlāy Sulaymān (44). To compensate them he decided to grant them a regular allowance (sila) taken from bayt al-māl. In order to satisfy other categories of sharīf-s who felt especially injured, Mawlāy Sulaymān decided in 1795 to extend this allowance to forty-four new families who, though not belonging to ahl al-Caṣabiyya (prestigious sharifian families), possessed nevertheless sufficient written evidence of the authenticity of their lineages. In addition to these two categories of sharīf-s—ahl al-Caṣabiyya and those who had written evidence—Mawlāy Sulaymān identified a third category which included thirty families whose sharifdom was disputed by prestigious sharīf-s, but against whom there was no decisive evidence. To these thirty families, Mawlāy

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- (42) Al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-hādī, p.13 : "He wrote to the governors ordering them not to consider any of his dhahir-s and to collect their zakāt and Cushūr without distinction between sharīf and mutasharrif".
- (43) Ibn Zaydān, al-CIzz wa al-ṣawla, II, p.86. The list of the sixteen families (or twelve branches—a branch, shuṣba, being more general than "a family", Cāṣila) is given in Ms.Z.3122, R.L.
- (44) Al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-hādī, p.13.

Sulaymān decided to grant one fifth of the allowance given to the two categories above (45) until such time as they produced substantial proof of their sharifdom. By 1801, only three out of these thirty contested families were unable to produce Ismā'īli dhahīr-s authenticating their sharifian lineages. To the great grief of ahl al-^casabiyya, the corps of sharīf-s was expanded once more to include twenty seven additional families (46).

These measures which were intended to quell the clamours of dissatisfied sharīf-s only discontented all categories. They failed to satisfy the prestigious families who did not want to be placed on the same footing with those whom they considered doubtful sharīf-s. Ahl al-^casabiyya were also affected in their material interests because the number of beneficiaries from the royal concessions had increased considerably. Instead of the sixteen families chosen by Sīdī Muḥammad b. ^cAbd Allāh there were now eighty-seven to compete for the inheritance fund of Fès. The "common sharīf-s" (^cāmmat al-ashrāf) were not satisfied either. Mawlāy Sulaymān's measures did not succeed in completely abolishing the discrimination they were subjected to by powerful sharīf-s. On the occasion of the distribution of a sultanian sila, reported al-Zayānī, it used to be said "this is for the sharīf-s and this is for the mutasharrifūn" (47).

Mawlāy Sulaymān devised another measure intended to compensate sharīf-s for the Makhzen's take over of the inheritance fund of Fès. It consisted of granting the sharīf-s the zakāt levied on overland trade (48)—2.5%

(45) Dhahīr of Mawlāy Sulaymān to the sharīf-s, dated 7 Rabīc I, 1210/21 Sept., 1795 in Ibn Zaydān, al-^cIzz wa al-ṣawla, II, pp.111-113.

(46) Cf. Sulaymāni dhahīr dated Jumādā II, 1216/Oct.-Nov., 1801, D.A.R.

(47) al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-ḥādī, p. 14.

(48) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the sharīf-s of Fès, no date, in al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-nubahā?, pp.181-185 (appendix 88).

tax on capital, paid by merchants returning from the Arab East or from Timbuctoo. This decision, however, disadvantaged the sharīf-s of northern Morocco since a large part of the zakāt exacted on the caravan trade would go to the 'Alawid sharīf-s of Tafilelt. The northern sharīf-s were left with the zakāt of the eastern pilgrimage caravan only. The frequent interruption of this caravan during the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān must have certainly affected the interests of the sharīf-s of Fès and the northern part of the country.

The sharīf-s were not only affected materially. Their social and moral status was at stake as well. On the judicial level, Mawlāy Sulaymān decreed that the sharīf^ca should stand supreme. A sharīf was no longer to be immune from punishment by Makhzen officials, although traditionally the naqīb or the shaykh of the sharīf-s looked into offences committed by the descendants of the Prophet, and a layman could never punish a sharīf. All he could do was to persuade him in the same way "a slave would persuade his master's son" (49) because his sins were the concern of "a prior Divine Providence" (50).

Mawlāy Sulaymān's most daring action against the sharīf-s was his abolition of the immunity traditionally enjoyed by the venerated descendants of the Prophet and the murabitūn (zāwiya members). To give his action a solid legal foundation, Mawlāy Sulaymān asked the ālim-s to issue a fatwā concerning the immunity of zāwiya-s in which some governors had deposited illegally acquired funds. In their reply to the Sultan's query, the ālim-s

(49) Al-Tijānī, Nuṣrat al-shurafā fī al radd 'alā ahl al-jafā, Ms K I574, BGR, pp. 551-552.

(50) Ibid., p. 552.

were unanimous in authorizing the Makhzen to invest such zāwiya-s and recover funds which legally belonged to bayt al-māl (51). In other words, the zāwiya-s and other venerated places could not serve as a refuge from the judgement of the sharī'a.

Mawlāy Sulaymān pursued convicted sharīf-s even inside such traditionally inviolable places as the shrine of Mawlāy Idrīs in Fès. For the Sultan, there could be no sanctity above that of the sharī'a. Al-Du'ayf reported an incident according to which an Idrisid sharīf was taken out of the shrine of "his ancestor" on the Sultan's order and administered five hundred strokes (52). Makhzen qā'id-s did not hesitate either to invest holy shrines to expel offenders even if these happened to be sharīf-s. In 1796, the qā'id of the Gharb, Ibn al-Jilānī, ordered his men to invade the shrine of Mawlāy Bushtā al-Khammār in order to arrest a sharīf who was then taken to Mawlāy Sulayman and maimed in application of the precepts of the sharī'a (53). The sheltering of offenders and political dissidents was clearly the major issue between Mawlāy Sulaymān and the Wazzāni and Sharqāwi zāwiya-s. In Fès, some of Mawlāy Sulaymān's governors, such as Muḥammad Wa'zīz (1807-1810) and Aḥmad al-Qustālī (1817-1818), were most unpopular among the sharīf-s (54). This

(51) Cf. text of the fatwā by Ibn Kīrān, al-Dukkālī, Muḥammad al-Zarwālī and Aḥmad b. Sūda in al-Mahdī al-Wazzānī, al-Nawāzil al-kubrā, lith., Fès, 1901, vol.III, pp.80-81. The same fatwā can be consulted in Ms.K.1072, BGR, pp.100-115.

(52) Al-Du'ayf, p.319, "On Tuesday, 15 Rajab, 1210 (25 Jan.,1796) the Sultan arrested the sharīf Mawlāy al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad b. al-Faḍīl al-Idrīsī after he was taken out of the shrine of his ancestor. When he reached the Sultan he was undressed and administered about five hundred strokes ... He was liberated afterwards on the intervention of al-faqīh al-Ḥāj Muḥammad Bannīs and given a compensation of one hundred mithqāl-s, but the sharīf refused to take it". The fact that a sharīf was liberated on the intervention of a Bildī is significant enough. Cf. another case of punishment inflicted on a sharīf, p.333.

(53) Ibid., p.329.

(54) Al-Zayānī, Alfiyat al-sulūk, pp.213-214; and idem, Jamharat man hakama bi Fās, p. 7.

latter, in particular, came to be known as mu³addib al-ashrāf (the person who punishes the sharīf-s) (55).

In his attitude towards the sharīf-s Mawlāy Sulaymān was certainly motivated by a deep sense of justice refusing to allow people of his own blood to transgress the shari'a merely because they were the Prophet's descendants. It is reported that he once beat his son to death for having unjustly killed a slave (56). This does not, however, completely explain his policy towards the sharīf-s. What he sought in the first place was a curb on the power of a social group upon which tradition and society had conferred too much consideration. In this respect, his confrontation with the sharīf-s cannot be detached from his struggle against the growing power of religious groups in general. Mawlāy Sulaymān attempted by various means to diminish the influence of the sharīf-s. His privileged relations with the Cālim-s which contrasted with his avoidance of the sharīf-s, were intended, according to Sulaymān al-Ḥawwāt, as a check on the arrogance of the latter (57). Even a foreign traveller, such as John Buffa, who was on a short visit to the country, observed that "the princes of blood and Xeriff-s were not allowed to interfere in any political or public business, and were never consulted in State affairs" (58).

The conflict with the sharīf-s had also an ideological dimension. The sharīf-s, whose interests were intimately linked with those of the zāwiya-s, could not but be

(55) Ibid.

(56) Al-Ḥajwī, Ikhtisār al-Ibtisām, p.359. The British consul also reported in 1802 that Mawlāy Sulaymān beat to death a prince of the ruling family for having arbitrarily killed a Berber notable; cf.F.O.52/12, 12 Aug., 1802.

(57) Sulaymān al-Ḥawwāt wrote: "After Mawlāy al-Yazīd, Mawlāy Sulaymān followed a wise policy which favoured the people of learning and religiousness and discarded the rest, elevating some and discrediting others with the hope of checking their abuses and reducing their power"; quoted in Ibn Zaydān, al-CIzz, II,pp.86-87.

(58) John Buffa, Travels, p. 184.

concerned over Mawlāy Sulaymān's reformist ideas. His sympathy with the Wahhābi doctrine and his public and repeated attacks on popular religious practices irritated the sharīf-s and the zāwiya-s. Mawlāy Sulaymān's prohibition of the mawsim-s held annually by the zāwiya-s and the sharīf-s constituted not only an injury for the material interests of these groups, but also an unpardonable outrage against their religious traditions. The sharīf-s were to play an important role in the Fès rebellion during which they openly accused Mawlāy Sulaymān of Wahhābism.

III - Religious Orders

The proliferation of religious brotherhoods has certainly been the salient feature of Moroccan history during the last four centuries. Sufi ideas, which were introduced into the Maghrib in the eleventh century received vigorous encouragement by the doctrines of Abū al-Hasan al-Shādhili (1175-1258 AD) and Muḥammad b. ^cAbd al-Rahmān al-Jazūlī (d.1465). These two mystics did not found any particular order or zāwiya of their own, but served nevertheless as the spiritual reference for most tariqa-s of the Maghrib.

The Shādhili-Jazūli school was based on an intensive veneration of the Prophet which was quickly extended to the latter's descendants. Thus, Moroccan Sufism progressively fell under the influence of the sharīf-s. Al-Jazūlī from whom most tariqa-s claim spiritual descent, was a sharīf himself and manifested a great pride in declaring that he had the privilege of possessing, at the same time, the nobility of belief and that of blood (āl-sharaf al-dīnī wa al-sharaf al-tīnī) (59). "Man's power", he wrote, "springs not from the esteem he enjoys or the tribe to which he belongs, but from the nobility

(59) Muḥammad al-Mahdī al-Fāṣī, Mumti^c al-asmā^c fī dhikr al-Jazūlī wa al-Tabbā^c wa mā lahumā min al-ashbāb, lith., Fès, 1895, p.3.

of his origin. I am a sharīf, my origin is noble, my ancestor is the Prophet of God (may peace be upon him) to whom I am closer than any other creature" (60). In fact, al-Jazūlī did nothing more than underline the sharifian orientation of Moroccan Sufism whose Poles (61), Abū al-Ḥasan al-Shādhilī and his shaykh Mawlāy ^CAbd al-Salām b. Mashīsh, were themselves descendants of the Prophet (62).

After al-Jazūlī, most ṭariqa-s in Morocco came under the control of sharifian lineages. With the exception of the Qādiriya and the Tijāniya, all claim spiritual attachment to the Shādhili-Jazūli tradition. By the early nineteenth century, the most influential zāwiya-s (Wazzāniya, and Darqāwiya) were led by sharīf-s. Indeed, sharifian opposition to Mawlāy Sulaymān was usually associated to that of the zāwiya-s. The distinction made here between zāwiya-s and sharīf-s is purely dictated by methodological considerations. In practice, these two groups often represented the same reality.

Before reviewing the main ṭariqa-s which dominated the religious life at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the difference between ṭariqa, tā'ifa and zāwiya must be clarified. A ṭariqa is a religious path which is supposed to lead the murīd (aspirant) towards a more intimate knowledge of God and, through an intensive religious life, put him closer to the Divine presence.

(60) Ibid., p.5.

(61) A Pole (qutb) means in Sufi terminology the highest spiritual authority among the saints during a given period of time. Ahmad al-Tijānī, the founder of the Tijāni ṭariqa, claimed that he was the Pole of his time.

(62) Muhammad al-Mahdī al-Fāṣī, Mu'mtac al-asmāc, p.8.

Each tariqa is distinguished by its particular wird (initiation prayer) and dhikr (litany) which is recited either individually or preferably in collective dhikr sessions. The adepts of a tariqa form a religious order (ṭā'ifa) which is headed by a shaykh. Within this religious association, the murīd is directed towards salvation by following the tariqa prescriptions. The zāwiya finally, is a kind of a convent or meeting house where the adepts of a particular religious order assemble to lead an intensive religious life. Zāwiya-s, therefore, belong most of the time to a large religious order.

A local zāwiya, however, could very well develop its own tariqa and evolve into a wider religious order extending over vast regions and sometimes over many countries. The great religious orders of Morocco, the Nāṣiriya, the Sharqāwiya and the Wazzāniya, all started as local zāwiya-s. Indeed, in the Moroccan context, this evolution was rather the rule. With time, the term "zāwiya" imposed itself as a substitute for "religious order".

A - The Nāṣiriya

The zāwiya of Tamegrout was founded in 783 AH (1575-1576) by ^cUmar b. Ahmad al-Anṣārī (d.1602). It was only after his death that the zāwiya, under the leadership of Muhammad b. Nāṣir, began to evolve as a brotherhood with its own Sufi path (63). Muhammad b. Nāṣir, who assumed the responsibility of the zāwiya in 1630, was in fact the spiritual founder of the Nāṣiriya religious order. His scrupulous observance of Islamic orthodoxy profoundly marked the evolution of the zāwiya.

The Nāṣiri tariqa had no distinctive doctrine. "The path of the Nāṣiriya", wrote Ahmad b. Khālid al-Nāṣirī, "is actually nothing but the path of the Prophet of God

(63) M. Ḥajjī, al-Ḥaraka al-fikriya bi al-Maghrib fī īahd al-sa'diyīn, Rabat, 1976, vol. II, p. 55I.

and his Sunna ... The shaykh Muḥammad b. Nāṣir simply gave it a new life and served as the agent who strived for its triumph" (64). Muḥammad b. Nāṣir who was an outstanding qālim and Sufi at the same time, reduced the litanies (wird-s) of the Shādhiliya to a single litany leaving more room for the recitation of the Quran (65). Heterodox Sufi practices, such as the use of musical instruments or the recourse to liturgic dances, were severely condemned and discarded as detestable innovations (66). The Nāṣiri-s also considered as innovations the immolation of animals on the shrine of saints, the use of tobacco and, indeed, all practices which find no justification in the Quran or in the Prophet's traditions. This orthodox orientation attracted many qālim-s to the order. Al-Tāwdī b. Sūda (d.1795) adhered to the Nāṣiri tariqa and his son Aḥmad (d.1820) was entrusted with the leadership of the Fāsi branch of the zāwiya (67). Mawlāy Sulaymān, following his father's example, also adhered to the Nāṣiri tariqa whose rigorous orthodoxy was closest to his reformist ideals.

Owing to its geographical location, the Nāṣiri zāwiya played an important role in the cultural and social life of the Dra valley. Tamegrout constituted, indeed, an active centre for the propagation of the Arabo-Islamic culture on the fringes of the Sahara. Nothing illustrates this fact better than the famous library of the zāwiya which still contains many thousands of manuscripts. The weakness of central authority in such a distant region furthermore impelled the zāwiya to serve as mediator in tribal conflicts and extend its beneficent protection to local economic activity. This social role made Tamegrout into an important staging point for the caravan trade and allowed the zāwiya to acquire considerable wealth.

(64) G. Drague, Esquisse, p.203.

(65) al-Ruhūnī, Umdat al-rāwīn, VII, pp.603-604.

(66) Muḥammad b. Abd al-Salām b. Nāṣir, al-Mazāyā fī mā ḥadatha min al-bida' bi ummi al-zawāyā, Ms Z 3099, RL, pp. 47-49.

(67) Al-Ḥawwāt, al-Rawḍa al-maqṣūda, p. 322.

The distant location of the zāwiya on the outskirts of the Sahara was never an incentive for the Nāṣiri shaykh-s to develop political ambitions. These always manifested great self-restraint in this respect, even refusing to take part in the jihād efforts in order to avoid being suspected of political designs (68). As a result, their relations with the Makhzen were generally peaceful and cordial. The refusal of the Nāṣiri-s to mention the sultan's name in the Friday prayer created a certain tension between the zāwiya and Mawlāy Rashīd, but the 'Alawid sultans were soon convinced that this omission was not a sign of hostility to the ruling dynasty. According to the argument put forward by the Nāṣiri shaykh-s, it was a measure dictated by a strict observance of the Sunna (69). To show his good will towards the zāwiya, Mawlay Ismā'īl allowed Ahmad b. Nāṣir to extend his influence to the northern provinces of the country, apparently with the aim of exercising a closer control over the activities of the zāwiya.

During the first half of the eighteenth century, the zāwiya succeeded in gaining numerous adepts all over the country. Its implantation was particularly important amongst Atlas Berbers. The adoption of the Nāṣiri tariqa by the Amhāwish and Aḥānsāl families was at the basis of their politico-religious leadership in the Atlas during most of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

This northward expansion imposed on the zāwiya the adoption of a policy of cooperation with the Makhzen. The fifth shaykh of the zāwiya, Ja'far b. Mūsā, entertained cordial relations with Sīdī Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh (70).

(68) G. Dague, Esquisse, p.208, note 28.

(69) Ibid., p.189. Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Salām b. Nāṣir gave a different interpretation to this practice of the early Nāṣiri-s. Sīdī Muḥammad b. Nāṣir, argued the author of al-Mazāyā, lived at a time when the dynastic struggle between the 'Alawids and the Dilā'i-s was not yet settled. To avoid any complications, he chose therefore not to mention any name in the Friday khutba; cf., al-Mazāyā, p.69.

(70) G. Dague, Esquisse, p.191.

As a result, the Nāṣiri-s implanted branches of their zāwiya everywhere and succeeded in becoming one of the most influential religious orders in the country. However, under the sixth shaykh, ^cAlī b. Yūsuf (term from 1783 to 1818-1819), relations deteriorated and Sīdī Muḥammad b. ^cAbd Allāh not only destroyed a branch of the zāwiya in the Rif (71) but threatened to invest Tamegrout itself (72).

During the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān, the Nāṣiri-s entertained excellent relations with the Makhzen. Indeed, Mawlāy Sulaymān succeeded in dissipating the tension which had reigned on the eve of Sīdī Muḥammad's death replacing it by cooperation and good understanding. Many factors contributed towards this improvement. During the term of ^cAlī b. Yūsuf the zāwiya progressively lost its influence among the Fazāz Berbers whose sympathies went instead to the new Darqāwi religious order. This development reduced the chances of confrontation between the Makhzen and the Nāṣiri zāwiya whose Amhāwīsh and Ahānsāl adepts had been at the origin of numerous conflicts with the 'Alawid dynasty (73). At the beginning of the nineteenth century Abū Bakr Amhāwīsh maintained very distant relations with his Nāṣiri shaykh-s. He seemed to have more admiration for the shaykh of the Darqāwi tariqa whose ascetic character and sharifian origin were particularly appealing to his austere nature and sharifian pretensions (74). The Nāṣiri-s, on the other hand, were not very enthusiastic about the belligerent attitude of the Aīt Oumalou towards their neighbours (75).

(71) Al-Du‘ayf, p. 203.

(72) Ibid., pp. 210-211.

(73) The Hānsāli zāwiya followed the Nāṣiri doctrine and intervened actively in the troubles which followed the death of Mawlāy Ismā‘il in 1727. Cf. Magali Morsy, Les Ahansala, Paris-The Hague, 1972. Under the reign of Sīdī Muḥammad the Amhāwīsh maraboutic family gave refuge to Mawlāy al-Yazīd in 1770, after this one rebelled against his father. Cf. al-Zayānī, al-Rawda, fol.163-164.

(74) G. Draguet, pp. 141-143.

(75) Ibn Nāṣir, al-Rīḥla al-ṣughrā, p. 215.

Another factor which contributed to the rapprochement between the Nāṣiriya and the Makhzen during the period under study was the need for the zāwiya of Tamegrout to resist the expansionism of the Aït Atta Berbers. The southward expansionist drive of the Aït Atta constituted a serious threat for the Arab tribes of the Dra valley. By the end of the eighteenth century, according to Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Salām b. Nāṣir (76), the Aït Atta had occupied most of the country stretching between the Tafilelt and the Dra river. This expansion compelled the Nāṣiri-s to seek the support of the Makhzen (77).

The orthodoxy of the Nāṣiri ṭarīqa and its well-known disapproval of blamable innovations must certainly have favoured a better understanding between the two sides. The doctrine of the Nāṣiriya, which is "actually nothing but the path of God's Prophet" (78), matched perfectly Mawlāy Sulaymān's hostility to heterodox practices. Mawlāy Sulaymān was himself an adept of the Nāṣiri ṭarīqa, the wird of which he received from his father, as well as from the shaykh-s of the zāwiya (79). This adherence to the Nāṣiri ṭarīqa he also shared with his respected teachers, al-Tāwdī b. Sūda and Ahmād b. Sūda (80).

The Nāṣiri shaykh-s themselves had great esteem for Mawlāy Sulaymān's orthodoxy and religiousness. Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Salām b. Nāṣir who met Mawlāy Sulaymān in 1796

(76) Ibn Nāṣir, al-Rihla al-Kubrā, p. 23.

(77) G. Dague, p. 213.

(78) Ahmād b. Khālid al-Nāṣirī, Tal‘at al-mushtārī, quoted by G. Dague, p. 203.

(79) Ibn Rahmūn, al-Durr wa al-Ciqyān, D 724, p. 45; A. al-Kattānī, Fihris al-fahāris, II, p. 329.; al-Du‘ayf, p. 394.

(80) S. al-Hawwāt, al-Rawda, pp. 316, 322. Ahmād b. Sūda received the Nāṣiri wird from his father and from ‘Alī b. Yūsuf who entrusted him with the leadership of the Fāsi branch of the zāwiya.

was impressed with the latter's scholarship and respect for the Cālim-s (81). Moreover, he maintained excellent relations with Mawlāy Sulaymān's court and called upon the shaykh of the zāwiya, ‘Alī b. Yūsuf, to mention the Sultan's name in the Friday khutba, thus advocating the break with an old tradition whereby the Nāṣiri-s omitted the prince's name in their Friday prayers (82). ‘Alī b. Yūsuf himself paid frequent visits to the royal court and enjoyed Mawlāy Sulaymān's respect (83). Indeed, never before had relations between the Nāṣiri shaykh-s and the ‘Alawid sultans been so intimate.

B - The Sharqāwiya

The Sharqāwi zāwiya is an offshoot of the Nāṣiri tarīqa. Its founder, Muḥammad al-Sharqī (d. 1601) claimed descent from the Prophet's companion Cūmar b. al-Khattāb (84). Muḥammad al-Sharqī was a disciple of al-Jazūlī through his pupil ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Tabbā‘. Around 1660, the grandson of the founder, Muḥammad al-Ma‘ṭī joined the Nāṣiri tarīqa. However, the shaykh-s of the Sharqāwiya religious order did not always manifest the same degree of orthodoxy as the Nāṣiri-s. Liturgic dances, for instance, were perfectly acceptable to Mawlāy Sulaymān's contemporary, al-‘Arbī b. al-Ma‘ṭī (85).

The Sharqāwiya never succeeded in extending its influence to distant regions as did the Nāṣiriya or the Wazzāniya. The Sharqāwi-s had neither the missionary drive of the Nāṣiri-s nor the advantage of sharifdom enjoyed by the Wazzāni-s. The influence of the zāwiya remained therefore limited to the Tadla and the central plains of Morocco.

(81) Ibn Nāṣir, al-Rihla al-ṣughrā, p. 29.

(82) Ibn Nāṣir, al-Mazāyā, p. 69.

(83) Al-Du‘ayf, pp. 381, 394. The respect Mawlāy Sulaymān had for the Nāṣiri-s did not prevent him from launching a punitive attack on the zāwiya's branch of Beni Touzine (Rif) in 1808. Cf. al-Du‘ayf, p. 450.

(84) ‘Abd al-Salām al-Qādiri refuted this claim. Cf. his al-Tuhfa al-qādiriya, II, p. 8.

(85) al-Du‘ayf, p. 387.

The geographical location of the zāwiya at Boujad, at the foot of the Atlas mountains, determined to a large extent, the nature of its relations with the Makhzen. By virtue of its position, it served as a buffer zone between the dissident Berber tribes and the lowland Makhzen country. The 'Alawid sultans had, therefore, a particular interest in strengthening the zāwiya. The Sharqāwi-s were granted large concessions over the Tadla and neighbouring tribes in the form of 'azīb-s (86). The farming of agricultural taxes in these territories, together with the regular ziyāra-s (offerings) by the faithful ('87), ensured a considerable revenue for the zāwiya.

The destruction of the zāwiya of Dilā³ by Mawlāy Rashīd in 1668 certainly contributed to the emergence of the Sharqāwiya order as the uncontested religious power of central Morocco (88). The long period of political instability witnessed between 1727 and 1757 served also to consolidate the prestige of the zāwiya, by virtue of its role as mediator in local conflicts. During the second half of the eighteenth century, the politico-religious influence of the zāwiya reached such proportion that Sīdī Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh found it necessary to direct a military attack against Boujad and evacuate its inhabitants (88).

Apparently, Sīdī Muḥammad's repressive action against the zāwiya of Boujad caused little harm to the prestige and influence of the Sharqāwi-s. The political instability

(86) A 'azīb is a territory the inhabitants of which pay their legal taxes to a zāwiya by virtue of a concession from the Makhzen. Wazzāni sharīf-s were granted control not only over taxation but over land and its occupants as well.

(87) The Sharqāwi zāwiya received two annual ziyāra-s, one during the spring and the other after the end of harvests. They consisted of both money and agricultural produce (Information communicated to the author of this thesis by Muḥammad al-Sharqāwī).

(88) al-Nāṣirī, VII, p.53.

(89) Al-Dūcayf, p.197. Al-Zayānī dated this campaign in 1119AH/1784-1785 (al-Rawḍa, fol.144). The date given by al-Dūcayf, being more precise (Feb., 1786), seems more probable.

after his death allowed the zāwiya to regain its strength and enhance its autonomy by assuming a more pronounced role in the 1790's dynastic crisis.

The attitude of the Sharqāwi zāwiya in the political contest between Mawlāy Sulaymān to his brothers from 1792 to 1797 was by no means neutral. Al-^CArbī b. al-Ma^Cṭī lent his support to Mawlāy Hishām with whom he had a deep and intimate friendship (90). Until 1794 the name of Mawlāy Hishām was still mentioned in the mosques of Boujad during Friday prayers (91). Despite al-^CArbī's loyalty to Mawlāy Hishām, some influential members of the Sharqāwi family, such as Qaddūr b. ^CAlī b. al-Ma^Cṭī, had close relations with Mawlāy Sulaymān and were in favour of his being proclaimed. Towards the end of 1794, al-^CArbī b. al-Ma^Cṭī had become so embarrassed by the growing sympathy of his own family for Mawlāy Sulaymān that he sought refuge in the mountains (92). Soon afterwards, however, the head of the Sharqāwiya realized that the moment of truth had come and that he could no longer ignore the consensus which was building up around Mawlāy Sulaymān. He was even willing to offer his good offices in 1796 to bring about the submission of the rebellious Chaouia (93).

A fortuitous incident in 1796 compromised this new and fragile reconciliation. Abū ^CAzza al-Qusṭālī, qāḍid of the Beni Hsen and affine of al-^CArbī b. al-Ma^Cṭī, was assassinated in obscure circumstances, most probably at Mawlāy Sulaymān's instigation (94). This incident "deeply afflicted" al-^CArbī b. al-Ma^Cṭī (95) and reduced his enthusiasm for Mawlāy Sulaymān's cause at a time when the southern provinces were still in rebellion. Once again,

(90) Al-^CArbī Bendāwūd, al-Fath al-wahbī fī manāqib al-shaykh abi al-mawāhib mawlānā al-^CArbī, Ms K 23I2, BGR, p. 529.

(91) Al-DuCayf, p.300.

(92) Ibid.

(93) Ibid., p.317.

(94) Ibid., pp.327-328.

(95) Ibid., p.328.

al-^cArbī b. al-Ma^cṭī turned to Mawlāy Hishām (96). It was only after the mediation of Fāsi ^cālim-s that the shaykh of the Sharqāwi zāwiya agreed to meet Mawlāy Sulaymān in 1797 (97). The rupture between the two sides had lasted for about a year.

With the submission of the last strongholds of rebellion in 1798 Mawlāy Sulaymān directed his attention to the consolidation of his rule in the Tadla where Makhzen authority had been almost nonexistent since the death of Sīdī Muḥammad b. ^cAbd Allāh. Attempts by Mawlāy Sulaymān to impose qāḍid-s over the Tadla were constantly thwarted by al-^cArbī b. al-Ma^cṭī. Despite a certain Makhzen tradition there, Mawlāy Sulaymān appointed neither a local man as qāḍid nor did he take the opinion of the zāwiya over this appointment into consideration. None of the numerous qāḍid-s appointed after 1798 met with the approval of the Tadla tribes. At the end of 1799 these rose in rebellion against al-Ghāzī b. al-Madanī, qāḍid of the Chaouia and whose prerogatives were extended to include the Tadla as well (98). In 1801, al-Zayānī, who was appointed governor of this province, met the same fate (99).

To gain over al-^cArbī b. al-Ma^cṭī and neutralize the opposition of the Tadla tribes, Mawlāy Sulaymān nominated members of his own family as governors for this province: his brothers Mawlāy al-Tayyib and Mawlāy Mūsā, his son Muḥammad and his son-in-law al-Habīb al-Balghītī (100).

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- (96) According to al-Du^cayf, the Friday prayer at Boujad was still said in the name of Mawlāy Hishām at the end of 1796, cf.p.341.
- (97) The delegation sent by Mawlāy Sulaymān to al-^cArbī b. al-Ma^cṭī in 1797 included al-Tayyib b. Kīrān, ‘Abd al-Qādir b. Shaqrūn, Muḥammad Bannīs, in addition to Mawlāy Ibrāhīm, the Sultan's son who was ordered to stay at Boujad in order to acquire the religious sciences there; cf. al-Du^cayf, pp.356-358, 363.
- (98) Ibid., p.405. From February 1799 to November 1799, the governorship of the Tadla had been assumed by Mawlāy al-Tayyib (d.Nov.1799).
- (99) Ibid., p.413.
- (100) Ibid., pp.399, 404, 405, 429, 434, 435; see also letter of rebuke from Mawlāy Sulaymān to al-^cArbī b. al-Ma^cṭī, no date, in Ms.K.1264, BGR, pp.361-365 (appendix 54).

This did not prevent the Beni Mousa and Ourdigha tribes from attacking and plundering Makhzen troops at Boujad in 1801 (101). In 1804 the governorship of the Tadla was entrusted to Sulaymān Ludiyyī (of the Oudaya) and in 1805 to Muḥammad al-Jilālī al-Sarghīnī, both strangers to the area and devoted servants of the Makhzen (102). Both of these qāṣid-s were particularly unpopular in the Tadla and, according to the literature of the zāwiya (103), were at the origin of all the misunderstanding and the tension that existed between Mawlāy Sulaymān and the Sharqāwi zāwiya.

In 1808 the tribes of the Tadla, namely Ouardigha and Smala, rose again in rebellion against al-Ghāzī b. al-Madanī. This latter succeeded apparently in convincing Mawlāy Sulaymān of the fact that al-^cArbī b. al-Ma^cṭī was the instigator of this rebellion (104). The Sultan decided thereafter to put an end, once and for all, to the arrogance of the Sharqāwi zāwiya which he considered as responsible for the persistent agitation among the Tadla tribes (105). On 26 November 1808, a summons by the Sultan was read at the great mosque of Boujad : anybody who remained at Boujad after a lapse of fifteen days would face capital punishment (106). Al-^cArbī b. al-Ma^cṭī was placed under surveillance at Fès (107) and the zāwiya threatened with punishment similar to the one suffered by the Dilāpi-s in 1668 (108). At the same time the Sultan organized a punitive expedition against the Tadla tribes and against the mountain Berbers of Aït Seri (109).

(101) Ibid., pp.417-418.

(102) A. Bendāwūd, al-Fath al-wahbī, .530; al-Du^cayf, pp.435, 440.

(103) A. Bendāwūd, al-Fath al-wahbī, pp.528-530.

(104) Al-Du^cayf, pp.451-452.

(105) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to al-^cArbī b. al-Ma^cṭī, referenced in note 100 above.

(106) Al-Du^cayf, p.451.

(107) Al-^cArbī b. al-Ma^cṭī remained in exile from December 1808 to Aug. 1809; cf.al-Du^cayf, pp.452-453.

(108) Cf. letter mentioned in notes 100 and 105 above.

(109) Al-Du^cayf, pp.452-453.

The Berber policy of Mawlāy Sulaymān was, in fact, an important area of disagreement with the Sharqawi zāwiya. Traditionally, the zāwiya extended its spiritual influence over the mountain Berbers, thus drawing into its orbit refractory tribes which the military power of the Makhzen was incapable of subduing (110). The shaykh-s of the zāwiya preferred to see these tribes remain outside Makhzen authority. The extension of Makhzen rule to mountainous areas would not only compromise the position of the zāwiya as a useful buffer between Makhzen regions and areas of dissidence, but would also deprive the Sharqāwi-s of a possible refuge in case of conflict with the Makhzen (111). It was to conserve this rearguard that the Sharqāwi-s used to discourage the Makhzen from taking any action against the Atlas Berbers. Al-^CArbī b. al-Ma^Cṭī often dissuaded Mawlāy Sulaymān from risking a perilous military confrontation with "these monkeys" as long as they remained entrenched in their mountains and were not endangering his communication routes through the coastal plains (112). Mawlāy Sulaymān's qā'id-s in the Tadla saw the advice as nothing more than a cover for the Sharqāwi-s to maintain their influence in the Atlas which they intended to use as a refuge for offenders from the Tadla (113).

Following Mawlāy Sulaymān's action against the zāwiya in 1808-1808 and the eight months exile of al-^CArbī b. al-Ma^Cṭī (114), the Sharqāwi-s began to avoid involvement in

(110) The Sharqāwi-s had, for instance, khādim-s (servants) in the Aīt Attab tribe; cf. Bendāwūd, al-Fath al-wahbī, p.570.

(111) In 1794, for instance, al-^CArbī b.al-Ma^Cṭī took refuge in the mountains after he refused to proclaim Mawlāy Sulaymān; cf. al-Du^Cayf, p.300.

(112) A. Bendāwūd, al-Fath al-wahbī, p.530.

"ما لك حاجة في قتال قرود على قنال الرجال لم يجعلهم الله في طريق الرباط، ولا في طريق طنجة، ولا تطوان، فلا تلعب القمار معهم بالملائكة"

(113) Ibid.

(114) Al-^CArbī b.al-Ma^Cṭī was allowed by Mawlāy Sulaymān to return to Boujad in Aug. 1809; cf.al-Du^Cayf, p.453. On 22 Jumādā II, 1224/4 Aug., 1809, according to al-Du^Cayf, al-^CArbī b. al-Ma^Cṭī left Fès where he was kept "like a prisoner" and was given 81 mules by the Sultan to carry the numerous presents he received.

Makhzen affairs. The head of the zāwiya disassociated himself from the insubordination of the Tadla tribes and spent the last years of his life exhorting his followers to respect Makhzen authority (115). The punitive military campaign had certainly neutralized the power of the Sharqāwi zāwiya, but the weakening of its position as a buffer between the Makhzen and the dissident Berber tribes exposed the former to even greater dangers. The "final pacification" of the Tadla in 1808-1809 opened the way for a direct confrontation with the mountain Berbers. It was only after a humiliating defeat in 1819 that Mawlāy Sulaymān realized how sound al-^cArbī b.al-Ma^cṭī's advice had been.

C - The Wazzāniya

Between the Sharqāwi and Wazzāni zāwiya-s there were two important similarities. First, both zāwiya-s occupied the foothills of a mountainous area which was often in dissidence. This fact bestowed on these zāwiya-s an important strategic value which the Makhzen attempted to use in order to further its political interests in the inaccessible Atlas and Jbala mountains. Secondly, over time, the two zāwiya-s acquired, with Makhzen encouragement, considerable landed property around the seat of the mother zāwiya. This led to a high degree of centralization which gave them the appearance of landed theocracies (116).

The Wazzāni zāwiya was founded by an Idrisid sharīf, Mawlāy ^cAbd Allāh b. Ibrāhīm (d.1678) who was an adept of the Shādhili-Jazūli school. On the doctrinal level, there is hardly any difference between the Wazzāni-s and the other Shādhili tariqa-s. "Our tariqa", wrote Mawlāy ^cAbd

(115) A. Bendāwūd, al-Fath al-wahbi, p.576.

(116) Ali Bey reported in 1803 that the saints of Boujad and Ouezzane had extensive domains the inhabitants of which paid no taxes to the Makhzen. According to the same author, these lands were ruled by the saints without the interference of the sultan. Cf. his Travels, I, p.151.

Allāh, "is based on three principles: the respect of God's ordinances, the avoidance of evil-doers, and the devotion to our Lord the Prophet" (117).

If Mawlāy ^CAbd Allāh consecrated his life to worship and contemplation, his successors and heirs of his baraka directed their efforts to the consolidation of the influence of the zāwiya, both inside and outside national boundaries. Towards the middle of the eighteenth century, Mawlāy al-Tayyib, the fourth shaykh of the zāwiya, had already adepts and estates in every part of the country (118). At the same time, the zāwiya extended its spiritual influence to the Touat and western Algeria (119). When Sīdī ^CAlī b. Ahmad took over the affairs of the zāwiya in 1782 the order was about to enter what Abdallah Laroui calls "the third stage" of the zāwiya's life during which economic and political preoccupations overshadow all others (120).

Sīdī ^CAlī b. Ahmad devoted most of his energies to the consolidation of the worldly interests of the zāwiya. He invited the Jews to settle in Ouezzane with the intention of activating trade and crafts. On the other hand, he directed his efforts to provide the zāwiya with a military force. He persuaded his followers to acquire armaments and learn the necessary military skills (121). According to the author of al-Rawd al-munīf, Sīdī ^CAlī b. Ahmad developed a personal interest in the acquisition of military equipment "until he accumulated more armament than is usually found in the arsenals of kings" (122).

(117) Ḥamdün al-Tāhirī, Tuhfat, p.272; A. al-Ruhūnī, Cumdat al-rāwīn, VII, pp.714-715.

(118) Muḥammad b. al-Tayyib al-Qādirī, Nashr al-Mathānī li ahl al-qarn al-hādī 'ashar wa al-thānī, Ms K 2253, BGR, vol. II, p.132.

(119) G. Drague, Esquisse, p. 23I.

(120) A. Laroui, Les origines sociales et culturelles du nationalisme marocain 1830-1912, Paris, 1977, pp. I37-I38.

(121) ^CAbd Allāh b.al-Tayyib al-Wazzānī, al-Rawd al-munīf, II, fol.78.

(122) Ibid.; al-Miknāsī, al-Kawkab al-ascad, lith., Fès, 1906, p.122.

The economic potential of the zāwiya of Ouezzane was considerable. In addition to the large estates it owned in the Gharb and elsewhere, the shaykh-s received each year a considerable amount of offerings from their adepts. Ouezzane used to be a destination for pilgrims from all over the country. Sīdī ^CAlī b. Ahmad spent most of his time, apparently, receiving ziyāra-s from his visitors (123). The income drawn from these offerings "surpassed that of any king of Morocco" (124). Mawlāy al-^CArbī (d. 1850) who succeeded Sīdī ^CAlī b. Ahmad, multiplied the landed interests of the zāwiya (125) and lived in a splendour unknown to the founders of the zāwiya (126).

Before the death of Sīdī Muḥammad b. ^CAbd Allāh in 1790 the shaykh-s of the zāwiya maintained good relations with the 'Alawid sultans. In general, they abstained from any action which would irritate the Makhzen and expose their easily accessible domains to its vengeance. On the other hand, the 'Alawid sultans saw in the zāwiya an important tool in the control, or at least the containment, of the turbulent Jbala tribes. Moreover, the spread of the Wazzāni tariqa to distant places, such as the Touat and western Algeria, gave it additional importance. To reward the traditional loyalty of the zāwiya, Sīdī Muḥammad decided in 1786 to grant the sharīf-s of Ouezzane large administrative concessions (127) at a time when he seemed determined to curb the growing power of the Sharqāwi and Nāṣiri zāwiya-s (128). Following the death of Sīdī

(123) A. al-Wazzāni, al-Rawd al-munīf, fol.77.

(124) Ibid.

(125) Ibn Ḥassūn, Fahrasa, Mic. 829, BGR.

(126) Michaux-Bellaire, "La maison d'Ouezzane" in Revue du Monde Musulman, vol.V, 1908, p.45; Villes et Tribus du Maroc, IV, pp.246-247.

(127) These concessions consisted in the right of the Wazzāni shaykh-s to (1) administer the sharīf-s without interference from the Makhzen (2) appoint the qādī for Ouezzane to whom the qādī-s of the Jbala would be responsible (3) exercise a control over Makhzen qā'id-s at Ouezzane and the Gharb (4) administer local ahbās. Cf. al-Duṣayf, pp.198-199.

(128) Cf. al-Duṣayf, pp.197 and 210 about the action of Sīdī Muḥammad against the Sharqāwi and Nāṣiri zāwiya-s.

Muhammad, however, the shaykh-s of the Wazzāni zāwiya departed from their traditional neutrality in political affairs and played an active role in the dynastic crisis which destabilized the country during the early years of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign. This interference, together with Mawlāy Sulaymān's repudiation of his father's concessions to the zāwiya-s, led to the deterioration of relations between the two sides.

Sīdī ^CAlī b. Ahmad was the first Wazzāni shaykh to involve himself openly in the country's political affairs by actively taking part in the 1790 dynastic crisis (129). After the collapse of Mawlāy Maslama's rule in Ouezzane in April 1792, the head of the zāwiya attempted by all available means to improve his relations with Mawlāy Sulaymān, particularly by offering his mediation efforts in bringing about the submission of the rebellious coastal provinces. Mawlāy Sulaymān was, however, determined not to allow any concessions over Makhzen sovereignty. He first of all wanted to curtail the administrative autonomy of the zāwiya by appointing his own officials at Ouezzane. This constituted a clear violation of the understanding reached in 1786 between Sīdī Muhammad and the shaykh of the zāwiya (130). In 1795 Mawlāy Sulaymān nominated an eminent ^Cālim from Fès—Muhammad al-Zarwālī—to be qādī for Ouezzane. A few days later, this nomination was revoked and al-Zarwālī was replaced by Ahmad al-Dar^Cāwī al-Wazzāni, most probably on Sīdī ^CAlī's intervention (131). The following year, the Sultan extended the authority of his qādī in the Gharb, al-Jilānī b. al-Mufaddal, to include Ouezzane and the tribe of Masmouda, as well as other neighbouring territories considered by the sharif-s of Ouezzane as falling within their sphere of influence (132).

(129) Cf. chapter IV above, pp. 176-181.

(130) Cf. note 66 above.

(131) Al-Dūcayf, p.301.

(132) Ibid., p.325.

For Ouezzane, al-Jilānī delegated a Makhzen official to reside in the town itself.

Sīdī ^CAlī b. Ahmad was deeply irritated by Mawlāy Sulaymān's attempts to abolish the administrative privileges of the zāwiya. He energetically resisted these attempts and sought every means of preventing Makhzen qā'id-s from exercising their duties. On this issue Mawlāy Sulaymān was not ready to compromise. "Ouezzane being part of the Moroccan territory", he wrote to Sīdī ^CAlī b. Ahmad, "any official who is appointed there should feel at home ... The person appointed by our uncle must govern in conformity with the sharī'a and will therefore remain as long as he respects it and observes our directives" (133). Mawlāy Sulaymān succeeded, no doubt, in installing his qā'id-s but relations between the Makhzen and the sharīf-s of Ouezzane were often disturbed by similar incidents over the appointment and the administrative prerogatives of Makhzen qā'id-s (134).

The other issue on which Mawlāy Sulaymān refused to compromise related to the function of the zāwiya as a refuge for dissidents and common law offenders. "A zāwiya, he wrote to Sīdī ^CAlī b. Ahmad, "is supposed to be a shelter for the oppressed and not for the oppressor" (135). The zāwiya, he argued, can in no way enjoy more respectability than Mecca and Medina because, even these holiest of places are not empowered by the sharī'a to shelter offenders (136). In other words, Mawlāy Sulaymān affirmed his determination

(133) Al-Jilānī was referred to as "our uncle" by Mawlāy Sulaymān because he belonged to the Macqil Arabs from which had come the Sultan's mother. Cf letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Sīdī ^CAlī b. Ahmad in al-Ducayf, p. 326 (appendix 12).

(134) Another example of this tension between the Wazzāni zāwiya and the Makhzen is the case of the governorship of Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj over the Gharb province. After repeated complaints by the sharīf-s of Ouezzane, Ḥamdūn was finally revoked. Cf. al-Ducayf, p. 436; Ḥamdūn's Dīwān, pp. 178-179.

(135) Letter referenced in note 133 above.

(136) Ibid.

not to allow the zāwiya to become a cover for subversive action. Many precedents induced him to adopt such an attitude. During 1795 and 1796 alone, the zāwiya gave refuge to at least three former qā'id-s whose extradition was demanded by the Makhzen (137).

Until 1811, when Sīdī ^cAlī b. Ahmad died, Mawlāy Sulaymān followed a policy of cautious cooperation with the Wazzāni zāwiya while using the good offices of the sharīf-s of Ouezzane to obtain the submission of political dissidents (138). The death of Sīdī ^cAlī marked a turning point in Mawlāy Sulaymān's relations with this zāwiya. The contest over the succession between Sīdī ^cAlī's sons offered the Makhzen a golden opportunity to reduce the power of a religious group whose open interference in the political arena twenty years before had threatened the 'Alawid dynasty itself.

Sīdī ^cAlī b. Ahmad left two candidates for his succession, Sīdī al-Tuhāmī (d.1825) and Sīdī al-^cArbī (d. 1850). During their father's lifetime they assumed different roles within the zāwiya. The eldest, Sīdī al-Tuhāmī, had developed strong ties with the urban notables, the cālim-s, and the Sultan's entourage. Sīdī al-^cArbī, on the other hand, was used by his father to settle disputes among tribes and enjoyed, consequently, the sympathy of the rural notables and of the far distant regions on Morocco's eastern and south-eastern borders (139). In the succession dispute, Mawlāy Sulaymān openly sided with Sīdī al-Tuhāmī. He wrote to the notables of the country urging them to recognize Sīdī al-Tuhāmī as the legitimate heir of

(137) Among these were: al-Ghāzī b.Salāma who escaped the prison of Mehdia , Sulaymān b.al-Qurshī, and Ibn Khadda al-Shargī; cf.al-Ducayf, pp.313,316-317, 340.

(138) In 1797, Sīdī ^cAlī b. Ahmad succeeded in a joint mission with some cālim-s of Fès, in bringing about the submission of ^cAbd al-Rahmān b. Nāṣir; cf.al-Ducayf, pp.367-368.

(139) A.al-Wazzānī, al-Rawd al-munīf,II,p.66; Ibn Ḥamza al-Miknāsī, al-Kawkab al-ascad, pp.185-187.

his father's baraka (140). Eminent ^Cālim-s, such as Ḥamdūn b.al-Ḥāj and Sulaymān al-Ḥawwāt, also supported al-Tuhāmī's candidature (141). The sympathy of common people, however, as well as that of the adepts of the zāwiya in general, went primarily to Sīdī al-^CArbī (142).

The history of the Wazzāniya religious order during the second decade of the nineteenth century was characterized by acute rivalry between the two sons of Sīdī ^CAlī over the leadership of the zāwiya. On more than one occasion Mawlāy Sulaymān was asked to mediate between Sīdī al-Tuhāmī and Sīdī al-^CArbī. Replying to a complaint by the former, Mawlāy Sulaymān confirmed once more his partiality in the conflict. He asserted that Sīdī ^CAlī b. Ahmad had chosen Sīdī al-Tuhāmī as his successor and demanded that Sīdī al-^CArbī should not interfere anymore in the affairs of the zāwiya (143). However, Mawlāy Sulaymān saw no way of preventing Sīdī al-^CArbī from receiving visitors and ziyāra-s. "Had Sīdī ^CAlī left one thousand sons", wrote Mawlāy Sulaymān, "all would receive their share of the ziyāra-s without causing any harm to each other" (144).

(140) A.al-Wazzānī, al-Rawd al-munīf, II,p.66; see also letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Sīdī al-Tuhāmī supporting his candidature in Ms.K.1264, pp.361-365 (appendix 51).

(141) Al-Miknāsī, al-Kawkab al-asqad, pp.191-218; A.al-Wazzānī, al-Rawd al-munīf, II,p.48.

(142) A. Bannānī, Tahliyat al- ādhān wa al-masāmi^C, Ms K 650, BGR, p. 131.

لله قُوَّةُ الظُّهُور بالحُكْم التَّصْرِيعي الذي لا يَنْبَال بالتصوُّر ولا بالحَدْق في الأمور وإنما يَخْصُّهُ من شَاءُ العُلَم بخَفْيَاتِ الأمور وخفَايا الصُّدُور . . .

(143) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Sīdī al-Tuhāmī, no date, in al-Rawd al-munīf, II,p.48, in which Mawlāy Sulaymān confirmed the legitimacy of his succession to the leadership of the zāwiya (appendix 52):

"...وَأَمَّا التَّعْرُضُ مِنْهُ (سَيِّدِي الْعَرَبِيِّ) لِلمُقْدَمِينَ وَالْكَاتِبَةِ لِلْأَفَاقِ وَ الدُّخُولِ فِي أُمُورِ الزَّاوِيَةِ فَهُوَ ظَالِمٌ أَشْهَدُ بِاللَّهِ أَنَّ أَبَاكَ قَدْمَكَ وَقَوْضَكَ فِي حَيْلَتِهِ وَأَنْتَ كَتَتْ حَاكِمًا عَلَيْهِ فِي حَيَاةِ الدُّرْدَةِ . . . وَأَمَّا كُونَ النَّاسِ بَذَ هَبُونَ لَهُ بِالْوِزَارَةِ فَلَا عَلَيْكَ، وَلَوْ تُرَكَ سَيِّدِي عَلَيْهِ الْفَلَكِ كُلَّهَا تَزَارُ لَا ضَرَرَ وَلَا ضَرَارٌ، وَأَمْرُ الزَّاوِيَةِ شَيْءٌ وَهَذَا شَيْءٌ . . ."

(144) Ibid.

At one time coexistence between the two brothers became impossible. Sīdī al-^cArbī was finally obliged to abandon the mother zāwiya to his brother and settle at Tétouan (145). After the death of Sīdī al-Tuhāmī in 1825 the leadership of the zāwiya was assumed by his son al-Tāhar. It was only in 1840, when Sīdī al-Tāhar died, that the zāwiya was again united under the leadership of Sīdī al-^cArbī.

Ultimately, Mawlāy Sulaymān failed to weaken the Wazzāni zāwiya by supporting one brother against the other. His policy towards the zāwiya during the second decade of the nineteenth century served only to antagonize Sīdī al-^cArbī and the rural groups that were supporting him. In fact, Sīdī al-^cArbī could never forgive Mawlāy Sulaymān's interference in the internal affairs of the zāwiya (146). He was to play a leading role in the Fès rebellion of 1820-1822.

D - The Darqāwiya

With the foundation of this new tariqa during the second half of the eighteenth century, Mawlāy al-^cArbī al-Darqāwī (1737-1823) intended to breathe a new life into the Shādhili doctrine, at a time when existing religious orders became almost exclusively preoccupied with worldly

(145) Al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-nubahā?, p.169.

(146) This interference in the internal affairs of the zāwiya extended also to marriage alliances. In 1802, Mawlāy Sulaymān married one of his sons to a Wazzāni sharīfa in spite of the opposition manifested by the sharīf-s of Ouezzane (al-Du^cayf, p.422). In 1815, Mawlāy Sulaymān also obliged Sīdī al-^cArbī to ally with the maraboutic family of Awlād al-Majdhūb of Masmouda, traditionally held in contempt by the sharīf-s of Ouezzane (al-Rawd al-munīf, II, pp.40-42).

interests. Favoured by the sharifdom of its founder, the Darqāwiya succeeded, within a few decades, in becoming one of the most important Sufi orders of the Maghrib.

In fact, it was the shaykh of Mawlāy al-^CArbī, ^CAlī al-Jamal (d.1779), who paved the way for the emergence of this new tariqa. In his works, we find the basic ideas advocated later on by his disciple. Mawlāy al-^CArbī's contribution resided in the popularization of his master's principles (147).

The doctrine of the Darqāwi tariqa is based on the curbing of human passions and self humiliation as a means of rising above worldly attractions. The murīd should detach himself from the material world in order to concentrate on the path of God. This detachment (al-tajrīd) (148) which involves both body and mind, should lead man to a state of fanā^C, or complete dissolution in God. In order to defeat man's temptations, the tariqa advocated "the breaking of the custom" (kharq al-^Cāda), whereby its adepts were to wear patched garments (al-muraqqā^Ca), practice mendicancy and lead an unconventional life (149). "The curbing of temptations", wrote Mawlāy al-^CArbī, "leads man to an authentic knowledge of God, dissipates his doubts and puts him nearer to the Divine presence" (150).

The Darqāwi tariqa accorded great importance to dhikr sessions and the practice of the samā^C as a means of achieving ecstasy. Orthodox ^Cālim-s condemned these practices and Mawlāy Sulaymān sought to attack such detestable innovations at every opportunity.

(147) Compare al-Yawāqīt al-hisān by ^CAlī al-Jamal (Ms.D.1741,BGR) to Mawlāy al-^CArbī al-Darqāwi's Rasā'il (lith., Fès,1901) and his al-Mudhākara al-qalbiya (Ms.D.1736, BGR).

(148) The tajrīd means detachment from both sensual and moral preoccupations in order to concentrate on God. A complete detachment supposes the abandonment to all means of livelihood and the wearing of al-muraqqāa; cf.al-Tayyib b. Kīrān, Sharḥ al-hikam al-catā'iya p.6.

(149) Mawlāy al-^CArbī al-Darqāwi, Rasā'il, Ms K 3095, BGR, p. 79.

(150) Ibid., p.68.

The opposition of orthodox ālim-s did not, however, prevent the Darqāwi tariqa from spreading rapidly, particularly among the rural populations and the lower urban classes. The sharifdom of the founder facilitated this rapid expansion. During the latter part of the eighteenth century and the early nineteenth century, the Darqāwi tariqa rapidly replaced the Nāṣiriya order among the Sanhaja Berbers of the Fazāz. Ibn al-Ghāzī, leader of the Zemmour confederation, was a devout disciple of the Mawlāy al-^CArbī and his successors adhered to the Darqawi order. In Algeria, the zāwiya became so powerful at the beginning of the nineteenth century that it posed a serious political threat to the Turkish rulers there.

Despite this success, Mawlāy al-^CArbī felt uneasy about the resistance of the ālim-s and the upper classes to his teachings. The unorthodoxy of some practices by the Darqāwi-s and the advocacy of pauperism discouraged many ālim-s and wealthy townsmen from joining the new order (151). When the zāwiya was subjected to Makhzen repression during the early years of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign, the ālim-s usually sided with the Makhzen (152). To overcome these difficulties, Mawlāy al-^CArbī eventually deemed it necessary to adopt a different approach towards the khāssā, particularly by providing more flexible criteria for recruitment.

These concessions were best illustrated by the case of Muḥammad al-Harrāq (d.1845), an eminent ālim and preacher at the great mosque of Tétouan, who was accepted into the order without being required to wear the muraqqa^Ca or practice mendicancy (153).

- (151) The author of Tārīkh Titwān affirmed that among the Darqāwi adepts in Tétouan, there were no scholars "which shows that the ālim-s of Tétouan and its faqīh-s during that period were not in favour of Sufism and ascetic life"; cf. Dāwūd, al-Nūr al-barrāq fī tarjamat al-shaykh Muḥammad al-Harrāq, Tétouan, 1968, p. 31.
- (152) Muḥammad al-Makūdī, al-Irshād wa al-tibyān, pp.199-223; Dāwūd, III, pp.206-223.
- (153) Dāwūd, al-Nūr al-barrāq, p.21.

For Mawlāy al-^CArbī, the presence of an eminent ^Cālim within the order became even more important after the death of his two lieutenants, Ahmad b. ^CAjība (d.1809) and Muḥammad al-Buzīdī (d.1813). An ^Cālim such as Muḥammad al-Ḥarrāq would, according to Mawlāy al-^CArbī, defend the ṭarīqa against its ideological detractors and improve its image in the eyes of the intellectual circles (154). Muḥammad al-Ḥarrāq seemed to fulfill all the necessary requirements. He was at the same time ^Cālim, sharīf, a respected townsman, and he maintained good relations with Makhzen officials.

Al-Ḥarrāq engaged the ṭarīqa upon a new direction. He repudiated the Darqāwi principles of humility and pauperism and maintained cordial contacts with the Makhzen. This new orientation allowed the Darqāwi order to consolidate its position within the urban upper society and helped, at the same time, to put an end to the persecution of Darqāwi-s by the Makhzen. Experience had convinced the founder of the ṭarīqa that his order could not develop while subjected to attacks from the ^Cālim-s and repression by the Makhzen.

On the accession of Mawlāy Sulaymān to the throne in 1792, the Darqāwi zāwiya was hardly significant as a religious group. Unlike the Wazzāni and Sharqāwi zāwiya-s it did not take any part in the dynastic crisis of 1790's. Nevertheless, in a relatively short period of time, Mawlāy al-^CArbī al-Darqāwī succeeded in spreading the word of his ṭarīqa even beyond the national borders. This rapid expansion, particularly in the countryside, is usually ascribed to the simplicity of its teachings and its exaltation of poverty, which made its message similar to the way of life of the mass of people.

(154) Ibid., p.26.

It was precisely this popular appeal of the tarīqa which raised the apprehensions of the Makhzen. When Darqāwi teachings first made their appearance in northern Morocco during the 1790's, Makhzen authorities were clearly determined to stamp out this subversive order. Mawlāy Sulaymān's governor at Tétouan, al-Šarīdī, launched a campaign against adepts of the tarīqa in 1795 and put Ahmād b. ^CAjība —an eminent disciple of Mawlāy al-^CArbī al-Darqāwī— in prison (155). Ibn ^CAjība and his imprisoned companions were accused by the authorities of heterodox Sufi practices, mingling with women, unconventional dress and ecstatic dances (156). Ahmād b. ^CAjība was ordered by the governor of Tétouan to abandon his muraqqā^Ca and return to his normal teaching activities, but his Sufi convictions remained unshakable. Mawlāy Sulaymān himself was informed of Ibn ^CAjība's case. His order to the governor was categoric : "if he does not return to his former state, put him in chains and send him to me" (157).

While in prison, Ibn ^CAjība was visited by a delegation of Darqāwi-s who came from other parts of the country. They were also arrested and imprisoned and asked to abandon their Sufi practices (158). At the same time, the branch of the zāwiya at Tétouan was closed. In the face of this

(155) Ahmād b. ^CAjība was a cālim before he was converted to the Darqāwi tarīqa around 1793. After he completed his religious education at Fès, he returned to Tétouan in order to devote himself to the teaching of religious sciences. He produced numerous works dealing mainly with Sufism. His conversion to the Darqāwi tarīqa was a great shock to Tétouani society. He liquidated all his property and turned into a wandering mystic wearing the muraqqā^Ca, walking barefooted and sleeping in the street. Cf. his Fahrasa, Ms.D.1845, BGR; M.al-MuCaskarī, Kanz al-asrār, Ms.K.2841, BGR; Dāwūd, III, pp.206-233; J.L.Michon, L'autobiographie (fahrasa) du soufi marocain Ahmad Ibn Ajība (1747-1809), Leiden, 1969.

(156) Al-Makūdī, pp.206, 210, 233-234; Dāwūd, III, p.219.

(157) J.L.Michon, p.115; Dāwūd, III, p.210.

(158) Among the imprisoned visitors figured Muḥammad al-Makūdī, author of al-Irshād wa al-tibyān, which relates the suffering of the Darqāwi-s at Tétouan.

fierce repression, Mawlāy al-^cArbī could do nothing but exhort his adepts in Tétouan to remain faithful to their principles and wait for the end of the storm (159).

For the Makhzen the Darqāwi-s threatened not only public tranquility but also the moral values of the khāssā. In Tétouan, they met with the opposition of all categories of the urban elite: notables, cālim-s and sharīf-s (160). There is no doubt that the hostility of the upper urban society to the ascetic principles of the tariqa was a major obstacle to its success in the urban milieu and deprived it, consequently, of any solid support in its moment of adversity.

The immediate result of this repressive campaign was the adoption of new tactics by Mawlāy al-^cArbī al-Darqāwī. The new plan consisted in withdrawing his disciples from towns where they attracted the attention of Makhzen authorities too easily, to concentrate on the countryside and neighbouring Algerian territory. Thus, the head of the northern branch of the zāwiya, Muḥammad al-Buzīdī, was ordered to take refuge at Tlemcen where he was joined by a al-Hāshmī b.^cAjība, brother of Aḥmad b.^cAjība. After he was freed in 1795-1796, Aḥmad b.^cAjiba refused to resume his teaching activities and preferred, instead, to follow the advice of his shaykh and settle in his native tribe of Anjra (161). This new tactic bore fruits within a short period of time. In less than ten years, the Darqāwi-s became so powerful in western Algeria that they destabilized Turkish rule in that area. Realizing his inability to stop the spread of the Darqāwiya order, Mawlāy Sulaymān then tried not to antagonize it.

(159) Cf. letters from Mawlāy al-^cArbī to his followers in Tétouan in Ms.D.1856, BGR, pp.254-270.

(160) Dāwūd, III, p.213. On the hostility of the Wazzāni-s, cf. Ibn ^cAjība's Fahrasa, p.38. The Raysūni sharīf-s of Tétouan were also hostile to the Darqāwi-s and approved Makhzen repression. Sulaymān al-Hawwāt was among the few to raise his voice against the persecution of the Darqāwi-s. Cf. al-Mashraffī, al-Husām, p.451.

(161) Dāwūd, III, p.210.

The unexpectedly rapid success of the Darqāwiya called forth a more conciliatory attitude on the Makhzen's part. The spread of the ṭarīqa into some of the most uncontrollable regions (the Jbala and eastern provinces) which were also considered as thughūr (points of confrontation with the enemy) induced Mawlāy Sulaymān to improve his relations with Mawlāy al-^cArbī and seek his cooperation. By 1797, two years after the repressive campaign of Tétouan, there were indications that relations between the two sides were beginning to improve. During that year, Mawlāy al-^cArbī was able to intercede before Mawlāy Sulaymān and obtain the release of an imprisoned gā'īd (162). In return, Mawlāy Sulaymān requested the good offices of the Darqāwi shaykh in his differences with Mawlāy Maslama. Mawlāy al-^cArbī was asked in October 1797 to proceed to Algeria and arrange for Mawlāy Sulaymān's brother to return to Morocco (163).

In 1805, the prospects of cooperation between the two sides appeared so encouraging that Mawlāy al-^cArbī thought of using his spiritual influence in western Algeria to bring about the annexation of Tlemcen to Morocco. Following the repression of Darqāwi adepts by the Bey of Oran, a disciple of Mawlāy al-^cArbī, ^cAbd al-Qādir b.al-Sharīf, decided to lead a rebellion against the ruling Turks in the summer of 1805. Weakened by a severe famine and an unstable internal situation, the Algerian government proved to be incapable of putting the rebellion down. Ibn al-Sharīf succeeded in besieging Oran from all sides, except from the sea through which the town received its supplies (164). The Algerian Turks were so helpless that the Dey decided to call upon Mawlāy Sulaymān for assistance. Ibn al-Sharīf's rebellion, the Dey stated in a letter to Mawlāy

(162) Al-Ducayf, p.364.

(163) Cf. letter from Mawlāy ^cAbd al-Salām, the Sultan's brother, to Mawlāy al-^cArbī al-Darqāwī, dated 22 Rabī' II, 1212/14 Oct., 1797 in al-Fāṣī al-Fihri, Qabīlat Bani Zarwāl, Rabat, 1962, p. 45.

(164) Cf. story of Ibn al-Sharīf's rebellion in al-Zayāñī, al-Rawda, fol. 181-182; Ibn al-Araj al-Sulaymānī, Zubdat al-tārīkh, vol.III, pp. 124-127; an anonymous Taqyīd on the Darqāwi uprising in Western Algeria, Ms. D I492, BGR.

Sulaymān, was nothing more than the tail of a snake whose head lay in Morocco. To prove his good disposition, Mawlāy Sulaymān sent Mawlāy al-^CArbī al-Darqāwī on a mission to Tlemcen with the aim of re-establishing peace between Ibn al-Sharīf and the Bey of Oran (165).

To Mawlāy Sulaymān's great surprise, the Darqāwi shaykh returned from Tlemcen with a written bay^Ca from Ibn al-Sharīf and a delegation of notables to present their allegiance to the Sultan of Morocco (166). Mawlāy Sulaymān was by no means ready to involve himself in an adventure the outcome of which was still not clear. "The people of Tlemcen were well received", wrote al-Salāwī to the British consul who asked for clarification, "but were ordered by His Majesty to return to their country and their rulers, because he said, it is illegal for us to set one Muslim against another" (167). On the other hand, Mawlāy Sulaymān did not want to hurt Mawlāy al-^CArbī's feelings. He praised his salutary efforts and promised him that as soon as the winter was over, he would go in person to Tlemcen in order to receive the allegiance of Ibn al-Sharīf and his followers (168). At the same time, he sent his brother Mawlāy Mūsā with a contingent to Oujda so as to prevent his subjects from getting involved in Algerian affairs (169) and dispatched the qā'id of the Oudaya army to Tlemcen in order to come between Ibn al-Sharīf's followers and the Turks. ^CAyyād Ludiyyī was instructed to remain in Algeria until the Bey had taken firm control of the region (170). The promises given by the Sultan to Mawlāy al-^CArbī were, apparently, nothing more than a manoeuvre intended to put off

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- (165) Cf. letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Mawlāy al-^CArbī dated 16 Jumādā II, 1220 in al-Fāṣī al-Fihrī, Qabilat, pp.44-45. Cf.also F.O.52/13, 10 March, 1805.
- (166) This bay^Ca was met with joy and festivities in Morocco; cf.al-Dūcayf, p.444; Sulaymān al-Hawwāt, Dīwān, pp.156-157.
- (167) F.O.174/284, letter from al-Salāwī to Matra, dated 13 Jumādā I, 1220/9 Aug., 1805.
- (168) Cf.two letters from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Mawlāy al-^CArbī al-Darqāwī in al-Fāṣī al-Fihrī, Qabilat, pp.44-45.
- (169) F.O.174/284, letter mentioned in note 167 above.
- (170) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawda, fol.182.

the head of the Darqāwiya order.

One of the reasons behind Mawlāy Sulaymān's refusal to accede to the wishes of Mawlāy al-^CArbī was certainly his reluctance to bring under his control a turbulent region from which subversion could easily spread to other parts of his kingdom. Even the existence of an independent Darqāwi republic on his eastern borders would have constituted a serious threat to the eastern provinces which had only been recovered from the Algerian Turks in 1798 (171). The annexation of Tlemcen, besides the difficulties it would have raised with the Dey of Algiers, would certainly have placed Mawlāy Sulaymān in debt to the shaykh of the Darqāwiya order and would have increased the power of this most uncontrollable religious group. Other considerations resulting from the European wars, weighed in favour of a cautious decision on Mawlāy Sulaymān's part. Moroccan fears of a European invasion increased with the break^Cdown of the Peace of Amiens and the resumption of hostilities in 1804. Any military adventure on the eastern borders would have been most undesirable at a time when the Makhzen was paying particular attention to the fortification of the northern ports and even cherishing the hope of recovering the fortress of Ceuta from Spanish control (172).

Mawlāy al-^CArbī's deception over the bay^Ca of Tlemcen was followed by a certain coolness in relations between the zāwiya and Mawlāy Sulaymān. This tendency was reinforced by Mawlāy Sulaymān's attacks on heterodox Sufi practices and his sympathy with Wahhābi reformist ideas (173). Contact between the two sides, however, was not completely lost. In 1812, Mawlāy Sulaymān agreed to grant refuge to ^CAbd al-Qādir b. al-Sharīf and promised to receive him as hospitably as he had received al-Tijānī in

(171) Al-Ducayf, p.380.

(172) Cf. M. El Mansour, "Mawlāy Sulaymān's Endeavours to Recover Ceuta" (in Arabic), Majallat Kulliyat al-Ādāb, Rabat, V-VI (1979), pp. 29-44.

(173) Mawlāy Sulaymān's essay on the samāc was written in 1806, and was designed to discredit such practices which concerned the Darqāwi-s in the first place.

1799 (174). The following year, the people of Tlemcen and Oran sent again a delegation to Meknes in order to renew their bay^ca to Mawlāy Sulaymān (175). Despite the popular enthusiasm for this event (176), Mawlāy Sulaymān seemed as determined as ever not to compromise himself in any such adventure. Was this refusal motivated by similar considerations to those behind the rejection of the preferred bay^ca in 1805, or was it motivated by the increasing difficulties which faced the Makhzen during the last decade of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign ?

Whatever the answer, relations between Mawlāy Sulaymān and the Darqāwi zāwiya deteriorated steadily during the second decade of the nineteenth century. This deterioration was intimately linked to the progress of the Darqāwiya among the Sanhaja Berbers of the Zemmour and the Middle Atlas. Ibn al-Ghāzī, leader of the Zemmour and a devoted adept of the Darqāwi tariqa, "never acted except on the advice of his shaykh" (177). Abū Bakr Amhāwish also maintained cordial relations with Mawlāy al-^cArbī and sympathized with his teachings. This implantation of the Darqāwi tariqa among the troublesome Berber tribes led to greater involvement of Mawlāy al-^cArbī in the political affairs of the country. In 1820, the Darqāwi shaykh, for whom contempt for temporal power and worldly attractions constituted a basic principle, figured among the most militant elements in the Fès rebellion.

Meanwhile, however, the emergence after 1818 of the new tendency within the tariqa, represented by al-Harrāq, inaugurated a new era in the relations between the Makhzen and the Darqāwi zāwiya. Owing to his urban origin

(174) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the governor of Fès dated 16 Jumādā I, 1227/28 May, 1812, in Mic.12/67, HPMD, Fès, 1978.

(175) CCC, vol. 24, 26 May, 1813; al-Duṣayf, p.499.

(176) *Ibid.* Public rejoicing rejoicing was reported at Tangier and Rabat.

(177) Al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-nubahā', p.195.

al-Ḥarrāq maintained excellent relations with the Makhzen and succeeded in gaining over disciples from among government officials such as Mawlāy ‘Abd al-Rahmān's minister, Muḥammad al-^CAmrāwī, and this latter's kātib, the author of al-Ibtisām (178). This new tendency manifested its independence during the Fès rebellion when al-Ḥarrāq refused to sign the bay^Ca proclaiming Mawlāy Ibrāhīm despite the imprisonment of his shaykh by Mawlāy Sulaymān during the whole period of the rebellion (179).

E - The Tijāniya

One of the characteristics of Moroccan Sufism since the fifteenth century had been its national orientation under the influence of al-Jazūlī's teachings. Eastern Sufi schools, such as the Qādiriya, were progressively replaced by Jazūli oriented tariqa-s. The introduction into Morocco of a new tariqa by Aḥmad al-Tijānī (d.1815) was bound to provoke reactions from the local zāwiya-s against this intruder who claimed pre-eminence over all other Sufi Poles (qutb-s).

Before he founded his tariqa at Aīn Madi (Algeria) in 1782, Aḥmad al-Tijānī had been a disciple of many tariqa-s including the Wazzāniya, the Darqāwiya and the Nāṣiriya. None of these tariqa-s had satisfied his aspirations, however. "We have had several shaykh-s", he wrote, "but none was of any help to us. Our teacher and spiritual reference for this tariqa is our Lord Muḥammad himself" (180).

(178) Dāwūd, al-Nūr al-barrāq, pp.66-68; al-Ḥajwī, Ikhtiṣār al-Ibtisām, p.355.

(179) Al-Tuhāmī al-Wazzānī, al-Zāwiya, Tétouan, 1942, pp. 199, 201.

(180) M. b.al-Mushrī, Rawḍ al-muhibb al-fānī fī mā talaqqaynāhu min Abī al-‘Abbās al-Tijānī, Ms D 2028, BGR, p. 236.

Al-Tijānī claimed that it was from the Prophet that he received the order to found his own tariqa which he preferred to call "Muhammadiya". The litanies he prescribed to his adepts were supposed to be dictated by the Prophet Muhammad with whom al-Tijānī was able to communicate while awake (181). Al-Tijānī ascribed to his order special privileges. Not only he claimed to be the "seal of saints" (khātim al-awliyā'), but also the "Pole of Poles" (qutb al-aqtāb), the highest spiritual power of his time (182). Moreover, al-Tijānī guaranteed to his followers a position superior to that of the greatest saints and which could normally be attained only by the Prophet's companions (183).

The claim that the tariqa's teachings were received directly from the Prophet led al-Tijānī to impose special restrictions on his adepts. A disciple of al-Tijānī could not attach himself to a second tariqa "because true love cannot be divided" (184), nor could he give up this path and turn to an alternative, since this would mean turning away from the Messenger of God himself (185). The Tijāni-s were consequently forbidden to visit other saints, whether dead or alive (186).

Unlike the Darqāwiya, the Tijāni tariqa did not advocate privation, pauperism and the curbing of man's passions. Ahmad al-Tijānī, we are told by his adepts, lived in luxury "wearing the best of clothes and riding the best of mounts" (187). The Prophet is supposed to have ordered al-Tijānī to adhere to this tariqa "without any need for retreat or isolation" (188). Al-Tijānī in fact had

(181) Abun Nasr, The Tijaniyya, London, 1965, p. 38.

(182) Muhammād Gannūn, Raf' al-Citāb 'an-nān taraka al-ziyāra min al-ashāb, Ms K 2028, BGR, p. 342, Abun Nasr, The Tijaniyya, p. 28.

(183) Tijāni Letters, p. 169.

(184) Muhammād Gannūn, Raf' al-citāb, p. 345.

(185) Ibid., p. 338.

(186) Tijāni Letters, p. 169; cUmar al-Fawtī, Suyūf al-Sacīd, p. 21.

(187) Muhammād Balmīnū, Taqyīd, p. 117.

(188) cUmar al-Fawtī, Suyūf al-Sacīd, p. 76.

the reputation of being able to ensure wealth for his adepts in this world and salvation in the life to come (189). This incited many wealthy people to join the tariqa and thus contributed to the development of the order into an aristocratic congregation.

The spread of the Tijāni tariqa was hindered by a number of factors. The non-sharīf origin of Ahmad al-Tijānī constituted a handicap in a country where sharifdom had become a vital criterion of legitimacy. Ahmad al-Tijānī attempted to forge a sharifian lineage for himself but without success (190). The repudiation of the Shādhili doctrine was another obstacle which faced the Tijāni order. This latter represented in fact an attack on the very principle of popular Moroccan Islam which was based on the cult of saints. Finally, the opposition of existing zāwiya-s must have slowed down the spread of the Tijāni order. Ahmad al-Tijānī's ideas inevitably antagonized these zāwiya-s when he affirmed that the Tijāniya was derived directly from the Prophet and that it was not only superior to all tariqa-s, but also the seal which abrogated all other Sufi paths (191).

The Tijāni order recruited its adepts from among the non-sharīf urban khāṣṣa: Makhzen officials, merchants and influential families. "Most of his adepts", wrote al-^CArbi al-Mashrafi, "are merchants and people of wealth" (192). This tariqa counted also many of adepts from among the Bildiyyīn of Fès who happened to control a sizable share of Fāsi economic power, particularly in the commercial field. There

(189) Abun Nasr, The Tijaniyya, p.47.

(190) Al-Tijānī's alleged sharifdom is based on a supposed personal confirmation by the Prophet but rests on no objective evidence; cf. Ibn al-Mushri, Rawd al-muhibb, p.313. Al-Tijānī attempted by all means to gain over the sharīf-s, or at least temporize their hostility. He even wrote an essay in the defence of the holy lineage entitled "Nusrat al-shurafā fi al-radd ʻalā ahl al-jafā", Ms.K. 1574, BGR, pp.517-556.

(191) Muhammad Gannūn, al-Durr al-mandhūm, Ms D 2135, BGR, p. 276.

(192) Al-CArbi al-Mashrafi, Nuzhat al-abṣār, p.431.

is no doubt that the benevolent attitude manifested by Mawlāy Sulaymān towards Ahmad al-Tijānī encouraged many people from Makhzen circles to join this religious order. For the Makhzen this brotherhood seemed to offer a valuable opportunity to counter-balance the preponderant influence of popularly based zāwiya-s which were far less easy to control than a zāwiya based among the urban elite.

When Ahmad al-Tijānī fled the persecution of the Algerian Turks in 1798 he chose to reside in Fès where he was offered a most hospitable reception by Mawlāy Sulaymān. He was given a magnificent house which cost, according to al-Zayānī, 20,000 mithqāl-s (193) and a regular allowance which largely covered his needs. Later on, he was assisted with the building of his zāwiya and offered protection against the people of Fès who attempted to obstruct construction (194).

Mawlāy Sulaymān seems to have been so impressed with the piety of al-Tijānī, his ascetism and his scholarship that he invited him to join his learned council which included the most eminent cālim-s of the country (195). This benevolence does not, however, mean that Mawlāy Sulaymān shared the ideological tenets of the Tijāniya. Refuge and hospitality were traditionally granted by Moroccan sultans to all those who fled political or religious persecution (196). The hostility of al-Tijānī to the cult of saints and the celebration of mawsim-s (197) was certainly appreciated by Mawlāy Sulaymān whose opposition to heterodox practices has been already underlined. However, contrary to claims by Tijāni sources, Mawlāy Sulaymān never considered

(193) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawda, fol.172.

(194) Abun Nasr, The Tijaniyya, p.20.

(195) Ibid., p.21.

(196) In 1812 Mawlāy Sulaymān manifested his readiness to receive Ibn al-Sharīf, the Darqāwi leader in Algeria, persecuted by the Turks.

(197) Balmīnū, Tagyīd, p.147.

joining the Tijāni tariqa (198). Ahmād al-Tijānī did, in fact, propose to him the Tijāni wird, alleging that he had received a special message from the Prophet for "his son Sulaymān" (199). Apparently, Mawlāy Sulaymān remained insensitive to this appeal. His joining of the Tijāniya would have been incompatible with his obedience to the Nāṣiri tariqa whose strict observance of the Sunna coincided more with his orthodox tendencies. Shortly before his death, Mawlāy Sulaymān still acknowledged his loyalty to the Nāṣiri tariqa (200). Nonetheless, the Sultan must have thought about using this new tariqa to counteract the power of the Shādhili-sharifian zāwiya-s.

The Cālim-s manifested a different attitude towards the founder of the Tijāni tariqa. Ibn Kīrān, the shaykh al-jamā'a, is reported to have attacked him publicly in the meetings of the learned council (201). Another contemporary Cālim, Ahmād b. ^CAbd al-Salām Bannānī, considered the allegation by the Tijāni-s according to which the Prophet attended their dhikr sessions in person as evidence of "their absurdity, imbecility and ignorance" (202). Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj, on the contrary, maintained good relations with Ahmād al-Tijānī (203). An attempt was made by this latter to recruit him into his order, but without success (204).

The sharīf-s and the zāwiya-s could only adopt a hostile attitude, the Tijāniya being a rebellion against both sharifian ideology and the Shādhili Sufi school from

(198) Abū Nasr, The Tijāniyya, p.20.

(199) Letter from Ahmād al-Tijānī to Mawlāy Sulaymān inviting him to join his order, no date, in Tijāni Letters, pp.159-160.

(200) Cf. Ijāza by Mawlāy Sulaymān to Ahmād b. al-Nādī, 15 Shawwāl, 1236/16 July, 1821, authorizing him to recite the Nāṣiri wird, in D.A.R. Cf. also A.al-Kattānī, Fihris, II, p.331.

(201) Abū Nasr, The Tijāniyya, p.21.

(202) A. Bannānī, Tahliyat al-ādhān, p.186.

(203) al-Ḥafnāwī, Taqrīf al-khalāf bi rijāl al-salaf, Algiers, 1906, p. 37.

(204) A letter from Ahmād al-Tijānī to Ḥamdūn b. al-Ḥāj, no date, in al-Tijānī, Tijāni Letters, Ms K 2815, BGR, pp. I58-I59.

which almost all Maghribi tariqa-s derived. Indeed, al-Tijānī condemned the cult of saints, the visitation of their shrines and the celebration of mawsim-s, all fundamental traditions of Moroccan Islam. This explains the little success encountered by his order in Fès where the visitation of the shrine of Mawlāy Idrīs could not be dispensed with. So attached were the Fāsi-s to this saint that al-Tijānī was obliged to compromise on this particular issue (205).

Nor did the Shādhili zāwiya-s accept the allegation by al-Tijānī about the supremacy of his tariqa. Al-Tijānī claimed, in fact, that his tariqa automatically abrogated all previous ones, in the same way Islam superseded all previous religions (206). He also affirmed that his adepts held before God a position higher than that of the most eminent saints (207). This placed him in direct confrontation with the traditional tariqa-s the wird-s of which he had adopted and abandoned.

At one time the Fāsi milieu had become so inimical that Ahmad al-Tijānī considered emigrating to the Arab East (208). Only the protection of the Makhzen enabled him to overcome his difficulties. The friendliness of the Sultan induced, no doubt, many members of the Makhzen to join the Tijāniya. One of Mawlāy Sulaymān's sons, Mawlāy ^CAbd al-Salām, adopted this tariqa (209), as well as Akansūs who was counted among the closest collaborators of Mawlāy Sulaymān. Numerically, however, the Tijāniya was still insignificant when its founder died in 1815. Its importance, until then, resided more in the ideological challenge it posed for Moroccan religious groups than in its intrinsic power.

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- (205) In order to attract new recruits al-Tijānī allowed sometimes his followers to visit this shrine; cf. al-Ruhūnī, CUmdat al-rāwin, X, pp. 147-148.
- (206) Muhammad Gannūn, al-Durr al-mandhūm, p. 276.
- (207) Letter from Ahmad al-Tijānī to ?, in Tijāni Letters, p. 169.
- (208) Abun Nasr, The Tijāniyya, p. 21.
- (209) Al-Fadīlī, al-Durar al-bahiya, lith., Fès, 1895, vol. I, p. 177. Another son of Mawlāy Sulaymān, Mawlāy ^CAli, openly attacked the Tijāni tariqa and the allegations made by its founder according to which he was the seal of sainthood. Cf. Muhammad b. ^CAzzūz, Kashf al-rān, Ms K 644, BGR, p. 233.

CHAPTER VII

THE FÈS REBELLION (1820-1822): THE TRADITIONALISTS' REVENGE

The Fès rebellion of 1820-1822 represents the culmination of the socio-political crisis - latent for many years before - of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign. This political uprising which led to the proclamation of a rival prince, was the outcome of Mawlāy Sulaymān's growing isolation as well as a result of adverse factors over which he had no control. By virtue of his tribal and religious policies, Mawlāy Sulaymān had deprived himself of reliable allies and made too many enemies. The Sultan's lack of a flexible and coherent tribal policy deprived him of important strategic allies and his religious ideas also alienated the religious groups. Lacking enough funds and a reliable army, Mawlāy Sulaymān could not possibly withstand the joint effects of desolating natural calamities and a humiliating military setback.

I - Gathering Storms

The Battle of Azrou (April 1811) is generally considered as a turning point in the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān and the onset of a steady decline of his authority. However, the difficulties encountered by the Makhzen during the second decade of the nineteenth century were not solely the result of military failures. Experience proved that when the Makhzen disposed of enough income, a major military setback — such as the one suffered in 1800— could easily be overcome. What made the situation increasingly untenable for Mawlāy Sulaymān after 1811 were the financial difficulties that resulted from the fall

of maritime trade returns. The end of the Napoleonic wars in the Iberian Peninsula resulted in a decline of provision exports which, before 1814, went to the British, Spanish and Portuguese armies (1). To compensate for the consequent fall in Makhzen revenue, Mawlāy Sulaymān decided in 1815 to raise import duties for Moroccan Muslim merchants from 2.5% to 10% and, in February 1817, consented to major tariff reductions on some basic exports, thus inaugurating a new commercial policy. More important, however, were the natural calamities (famine of 1817-1818, plague of 1818-1820) which greatly affected Makhzen finances. These calamities also contributed to the deterioration of relations between the Makhzen and the tribes, as the latter were unable to honour their tax obligations, thus creating propitious conditions for the disruption of internal peace.

A - The Famine of 1817-1818

The crop failure of 1812 marked the end of agricultural abundance which characterized the middle era of Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign. Nonetheless, it was followed by three years of relatively good harvests which allowed peasants to reconstitute their reserves. The country was again exposed to scarcity in 1816 as a result of a locust invasion (2).

It was during the early months of 1817 that the spectre of famine became certain. "The continuation of a desolating drought of which there are few examples in this country had thrown into consternation the African monarch and all his subjects", wrote de Lesseps in March 1817 (3). "... The inhabitants of every sex, age and religion live in lamentations, fasting and prayers. The recent ~~experience~~ of a scarcity which emptied the silos adds to their alarm" (4).

(1) Cf. above chapter III, pp. I67-I68.

(2) CCC, vol.25, fol.29-33.

(3) CCC, vol.25, 24 March, 1817.

(4) Ibid.

The rise in cereal prices was enhanced during the spring of 1817 by Mawlāy Sulaymān's unfortunate decision to allow wheat exports to France. One month after the arrival in Rabat of French officials who were to supervise these exports, wheat prices rose by at least 50%, reaching as much as 22 ūqiya-s for the mudd, as compared with 2-4 ūqiya-s in time of abundance (5).

By September 1817 the mudd of wheat cost about 26 ūqiya-s (6). At that price, few people could afford to buy cereals. By the end of the year the Makhzen took the initiative, for the first time, of distributing free meals made up of herbs, roots and rice to indigent people (7). To relieve the sufferings of a starving population, European consuls also decided to import maize from Gibraltar to assist the needy inhabitants of Tangier (8). "Never Morocco offered a more distressing picture", wrote Sourdeau (9).

The drought continued in 1818. In February the mudd of wheat cost 22 ūqiya-s at Rabat (10). "More than half the population lived on herbs", wrote Sourdeau, "as they could not afford the price of cereals" (11).

For the common people, the rise in cereal prices was intimately linked to the export concession made by the Sultan to the Christians. Mawlāy Sulaymān's decision was most unpopular among the urban population and in the inland provinces. Despite all precautions by the Makhzen to give the least publicity to the exportation of wheat, the news led to a general rise of prices, especially at Fès and Marrakech (12). Even wheat that

(5) Ibid., 12 April, 1817. Cf. chapter III above, pp. 99-100.

(6) Ibid., 29 Sept., 1817.

(7) CCC, vol.25, 13 Dec., 1817.

(8) CCC, vol.26, 19 Feb., 1818.

(9) Ibid.

(10) Ibid.

(11) Ibid.

(12) CCC, vol.25, letter from Ahmad b. M'bārak to Sourdeau, 9 Qa'da, 1232 / 20 Sept., 1817.

was loaded from Safi to Tangier for the relief of the northern provinces was taken by the common people to be part of the deal concluded with France (13). In Rabat "a population alarmed about its own existence" attacked the boats that came to load wheat (14). In September 1817, the people of Fès remonstrated against the export of cereals and reminded Mawlāy Sulaymān of the promise he made in 1792 not to allow the sale of cereals, oil and wool to the Christians (15). The Sultan found himself compelled to order an immediate stoppage of exports, but could he dispense with his customs revenue at a time when the agriculture-based taxation system was in no position to provide the necessary funds (16)?

B - The Scourge of God : The Plague Epidemic of
1818 - 1820.

The two year famine had already paved the way for the subsequent epidemic. This time, the plague attacked the country through the northern ports after the arrival of a number of returning pilgrims in May-June 1818. The outbreak of the malady was preceded by the arrival in Tangier of a British three masted ship from Alexandria. It was among the 430 pilgrims she had brought back that the first casualties occurred by the middle of June (17).

This second epidemic was less violent in its nature and less devastating than the previous one in 1799-1800, although it lasted a little longer. Average daily estimates represented between one third and two thirds of those recorded in 1799-1800. This was partly due to the fact that the population afflicted in 1818 was less numerous. The previous eighteen years had hardly been sufficient for the reconstitution of the population.

(13) *Ibid.*

(14) CCC, vol.25, 12 April, 1817.

(15) *Ibid.*, 29 Sept., 1817.

(16) On the Sultan's commercial policy after 1817 cf. pp. I69-I70 above.

(17) CCC, vol.26, 18 June, 1818.

During the year 1818 the plague remained confined to northern and eastern Morocco. Tangier lost 2,000 souls during the first six months of the epidemic (18). At Tétouan, death rates in 1818 remained moderate : 10 to 20 per day as a maximum. It was in the spring of 1819 that the epidemic reached its apex there, at a time when the south still remained free from the malady. In March, the number of deaths at Fès reached several hundreds per day. The British Health Agent reported that in Fès "people are employed from sunrise to sunset in burying the dead" (19). In April, their number was supposed to have reached 400 per day (20). At Tétouan, the number of victims daily fluctuated between 70 and 100 (21).

The middle of 1819 constituted a turning point for the epidemic. In the north, it was everywhere on the decline. In some places, such as Tangier, Larache, Fès and Meknès, it had ceased entirely by September (22). At this point the plague spread to the Tamesna and the southern provinces where it reached its apex in the spring of 1820. In February 1820, there were about 200 deaths per day at Marrakech. In March, the record figure of 900 per day was reached (23). In April, this number fell to 600 and continued to decline until the disease disappeared almost completely in July (24). With the end of the summer, the epidemic seemed to exhaust itself everywhere. By October, it still persisted at Agadir but that was to be the last sign of it (25).

(18) CCC, vol.26, 28 Dec., 1818. Moroccan sources mention that Tangier lost 1/5 of its population during the whole epidemic (cf. 'Abd al-Salām b. Sūda, Iḥṭāf al-muṭāli', events of the year 1233 AH).

(19) C.O.91/74, 8 April, 1819.

(20) Ibid., 10 May, 1819.

(21) Tétouani contemporary sources quoted by Dāwūd estimated the losses at the apex of the plague at 80 per day; cf. Dāwūd, III, p.249.

(22) C.O.91/74, 7 Oct., 1819.

(23) C.O.91/76, 24 March, 1820.

(24) Ibid., 28 July, 1820.

(25) Ibid., 6 Oct., 1820.

The losses during the second plague of 1818-1820 were much smaller than those of the Great Plague of 1799-1800 as local estimates for the cities of Fès and Tétouan during the first and second epidemics show. In 1799-1800, the number of casualties at the height of the epidemic reached 2,500 per day according to the author of al-Ibtisām (26). In 1818-1820, the maximum at Fès never exceeded 300 per day according to the same source (27). Contemporary Tétouani sources affirm that the maximum daily losses in 1818-1820 represented a little more than half of the 1799-1800 maximum (80 deaths against 150) (28).

The Makhzen was greatly affected by the plague of 1818-1820. Propitious conditions for social unrest resulting from the drought of 1817 were further enhanced. Contrary to the situation that prevailed during and after the Great Plague of 1799-1800 (firm control of the country by Mawlāy Sulaymān after the pacification was achieved, death of major political opponents, agricultural abundance after 1800), this second epidemic only aggravated the problems facing the Makhzen. The decrease in Makhzen revenues as a result of the drought which continued in 1818 undermined its means of intervention and made it very difficult for Mawlāy Sulaymān to benefit from the inheritance of the plague victims as in 1800.

Makhzen income was also reduced by the interruption of commercial relations with most European countries. Between 1818 and 1821 Great Britain withdrew its consul general and suspended almost all contact with Morocco. Even provisions for Gibraltar ceased to be drawn from Morocco (29). Spain also refused to receive in her ports ships arriving from Morocco (30). Only France attempted

(26) Al-Ibtisām, p.7.

(27) Ibid.

(28) Dāwūd, III, pp.234, 249.

(29) F.O.52/24, 23 Feb., 1823.

(30) CCC, vol.26, 2 and 6 October, 1818.

to encourage commercial exchange with Morocco during the 1818-1820 epidemic with the aim of restoring French presence in Morocco. On the whole, commercial contact with Europe was greatly reduced during these three years.

The army suffered equally from the plague. In 1819 Mawlāy Sulaymān's military potential, at the time he confronted the Aīt Oumalou, was greatly weakened by the epidemic. The army consisted then of a large number of new recruits. The losses from the disease were so significant in 1818 that Mawlāy Sulaymān deemed it necessary to replace soldiers who perished in the plague by their adult sons (31). In 1819, the joint effects of the Zaïan defeat and the plague imposed further reorganization measures. The Oudaya were reinforced in August of the same year by the incorporation of two Arab tribes from the country adjacent to Fès (32). At the same time Mawlāy Sulaymān decided to reorganize what remained of the army on the basis of an old system adopted by his father (33). Owing to the lack of the necessary financial means, however, Mawlāy Sulaymān proved incapable of ensuring an adequate reorganization of the army.

Plague when it coincides with the breakdown of order, as in 1819-1820, creates a certain psychological climate in which the image and authority of the ruling prince is seriously undermined (34). Epidemics were

- (31) D.A.R., letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the qā'id of the Oudaya dated 7 Muḥarram, 1234/6 Nov., 1818, concerning the replacement of the deceased soldiers.
- (32) D.A.R., letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the qā'id of the Oudaya dated 21 Shawwāl, 1234/13 Aug., 1819, concerning the incorporation of Himyane and Oulad el-Haj into the Oudaya army.
- (33) D.A.R., letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the qā'id of the Oudaya dated 21 Shawwāl, 1234/13 Aug., 1819, concerning the reorganization of the army after the end of the plague in the northern provinces.
- (34) Biraben and Le Goff, "La peste du haut Moyen Age," p.1498.

commonly regarded as God's punishment for man's increasing insubordination and an illustration of the divine anger (35). For the popular masses, however, the scapegoat for their bitterness tended to be the temporal power itself. The authorization granted by Mawlāy Sulaymān to France in 1817 to export wheat in the midst of a severe drought while "the population was alarmed about its own existence" (36), and his determination to dismantle the Moroccan navy during the same year, thus abandoning the *jihād*, could only be perceived as manifestations of a benevolent policy towards the enemies of Islam and the cause for God's anger. In the summer of 1817 the French consul reported that "the saints, or individuals who have a great influence on the people of towns and countryside, invoke God in their prayers to give them another king" (37). In 1819, while the plague was raging, Mawlāy Sulaymān confirmed, once again, his hostility to the heterodox practices of the *zāwiya-s* by prohibiting the celebration of *mawsim-s*, or religious fairs (38). Conservative religious groups did not fail to point out what they considered as religious deviation on Mawlāy Sulaymān's part and accused him of Wahhābism in 1820 (39).

The conjunction of natural calamities and the *imām*'s failure in his duties served to enhance the all-pervading pessimism and led people to draw a parallel between these calamities and the shortcomings of the temporal power (40). The general feeling of despair and helplessness

(35) *Ibid.*

(36) *CCC*, vol.25, 12 April, 1817.

(37) *Ibid.*, 20 Aug., 1817.

(38) Cf. extracts from Mawlāy Sulaymān's *khutba* (1819) in al-‘Arbī al-Mashrafi, *Sharḥ al-shamaqmaqiyya*, unnumbered pages.

(39) Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-‘Amrāwī, *Nafhat al-araj*, Ms.Z.3866, R.L., p.50.

(40) On such a parallel cf. reflections by Muḥammad b. Ḥamza al-Miknāsī quoted in ‘Abd Allāh b. al-Tayyib al-Wazzānī, *al-Rawḍ al-munīf*, Ms.K.2304, BGR, II, fol.157-158:

وَأَمَا زَمَانُنَا الَّذِي نَحْنُ فِيهِ وَهُوَ الْقَرْنُ التَّالِيْثُعَشَرُ الَّذِي كَتَبَ فِيهِ الْفَقْرُ وَقَلَ فِيهِ الْحَيَاةُ،
الْإِيمَانُ وَسَادَ أَهْلُ الظُّلْمِ وَالْطُّفَيْلَانُ وَفَشَا فِيهِ الْفَسَادُ وَالْعَصَابُ مِنْ عَمَّرْ مَنْكَرُ وَلَا تَاهِي
وَلَا تَمْرُ وَلَا مُنْتَهِي، سِيَّما بَعْدَ الطَّاعُونَ الَّذِي عَمَّ أَفْصَى بِلَادَ الْمَغْرِبِ وَأَدْنَى...
(written in 1821-1822).

ness facilitated the emergence of mahdi-s (pretenders) in whom the common people hoped to find an alternative for a temporal power condemned by the divine providence. It was for the triumph of Islam that a charismatic figure such as Abū Bakr Amhāwīsh led his men against the troops of the Makhzen in the midst of the 1818-1820 plague (41).

Natural calamities tend also to favour popular religion and enhance the prestige of religious groups such as the sharīf-s and the zāwiya-s. The fact that opposition to Mawlāy Sulaymān acquired a more accentuated religious character after 1818 was not merely a fortuitous coincidence.

C- The Zaïan Defeat (May, 1819)

The undecisive character of the Battle of Azrou had left the mountain Berbers of the Middle Atlas virtually outside Makhzen rule. Being unable to submit them militarily, Mawlāy Sulaymān spared no effort since 1811 to tighten the economic blockade against the Aït Oumalou. He believed that the denial of lowlands cereals to the dissidents would easily bring down Abū Bakr Amhāwīsh and the Aït Oumalou leaders. In 1813 the Zaer, the Zemmour and the Ourdigha tribes were forced to pay heavy fines for selling cereals to mountain Berbers (42). At the end of 1818, in the midst of a devastating famine, Mawlāy Sulaymān renewed his determination to stifle the Aït Oumalou. He ordered the lowland qā'id-s to prevent wheat sales to the Aït Oumalou and declared that every tribe which did not respect his orders could be plundered by its neighbours (43).

(41) Jeannine Drouin, Un cycle oral hagiographique dans le Moyen Atlas marocain, Paris, 1975, p. III.

(42) Al-Duṣayf, p.498.

(43) Letters from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the qā'id of Agourai (near Meknès) dated 3 Hijja, 1233/4 Oct., 1818 and 11 Hijja, 1233/12 Oct., 1818, in D.A.R.

In the spring of 1819 Mawlāy Sulaymān decided to lead a major expedition against the mountain Berbers. The decision was apparently taken upon the advice of Muḥammad b. al-Ghāzī, leader of the Zemmour and Mawlāy Sulaymān's newly appointed qāḍī for the Berber regions (44). Ibn al-Ghāzī's plan, according to al-Zayānī, provided for a major offensive which would assail the Aït Oumalou from the south. The Haouz tribes, under the leadership of Mawlāy Sulaymān, and the northern army commanded by Mawlāy Ibrāhīm and including the Zemmour, the Arab tribes of the Azghār, the Oudaya and the 'Abīd were to meet at the Tadla and from there would invest the Adekhsān (upper Oum er-Rbia valley), considered to be the breadbasket of the Aït Oumalou.

The military expedition coincided with the height of the plague epidemic in the northern provinces (45). "People were in great distress", wrote al-Zayānī, "and were in no state to take part in this military campaign" (46). Mawlāy Sulaymān, who was then at Marrakech, seems to have been unaware of the devastating effects of the plague epidemic in the northern provinces. Indeed, al-Zayānī blames Mawlāy Ibrāhīm, son and vice-regent of Mawlāy Sulaymān at Fès, for not having informed his father of the real extent of the epidemic and the great suffering it had caused to the population (47).

The number of Makhzen troops assembled in the Tadla amounted to about 60,000 men (48). In May 1819 Mawlāy Sulaymān headed to the Adekhsān where he ordered the destruction of cereal plantations belonging to the Aït

(44) Al-Zayānī, Tārīkh al-wilāya, p. 3.

(45) Cf. evolution of the second plague epidemic above.

(46) Al-Zayānī, al-Rawḍa, fol.191.

(47) Ibid., fol.23.

(48) Al-Nāṣirf, VIII, p.134.

Oumalou. Military confrontation between the Makhzen and Abū Bakr Amhāwīsh could have been avoided when the Aīt Oumalou came to the Sultan's son, Mawlāy Ibrāhīm, asking for forgiveness and manifesting at the same time their readiness to pay the indemnity demanded and provide the necessary hostages as a guarantee for their good behaviour (49). However, Mawlāy Ibrāhīm, "an extremely hot-headed prince" not only persuaded his father to reject this offer but massacred a number of women and children among the peace delegation which came to him (50). According to al-Zayānī, the Sultan refused the peace offer on the advice of Ibn al-Ghāzī who was at the origin of the whole plan of the battle (51).

During the first day of the battle, casualties were mainly limited to Makhzen contingents from the Arab tribes. According to a "trustworthy" witness of the battle quoted by al-Nāṣirī, Ibn al-Ghāzī, commander of the lowland Berbers, had previously agreed with the Aīt Oumalou to spare each other by using only gunpowder in the firing (52). Having suspected the malevolence of Ibn al-Ghāzī, Mawlāy Sulaymān ordered on the second day of the battle the withdrawal of Berber contingents from the fighting to test, he argued, the military competence of his Arab troops. As soon as the fighting resumed, Ibn al-Ghāzī decided to abandon the Sultan and join the Aīt Oumalou. Caught between mountain and lowland Berbers, Makhzen troops were completely overwhelmed and demoralized. As a result, all tribal contingents deserted Mawlāy Sulaymān who was left with the 'Abīd and the Oudaya (53).

(49) Al-Zayānī, Tārīkh al-wilāya, p. 4.

(50) E. Mercier, Histoire de l'Afrique septentrionale (Berbérie) depuis les temps les plus reculés jusqu'à la conquête française (1830), Paris, 1888, vol. III, p. 513.

(51) Al-Zayānī, Tārīkh al-wilāya, p.4.

(52) Akansūs and al-Nāṣirī ascribe the defeat of Makhzen troops to the betrayal of Ibn al-Ghāzī who decided to join the Aīt Oumalou at the last minute (al-Jaysh, p.315; al-Nāṣirī, VIII, pp.134-135). Al-Zayānī's version is that Ibn al-Ghāzī's tribesmen and other lowland Berbers just deserted in front of the heavy fire of the Aīt Oumalou (al-Rawḍa, fol.191 and Tārīkh, p.4). Akansūs's allegation reflects most probably the official justification of the defeat.

(53) Al-Nāṣirī, VIII, p.135.

By the end of the second day, the Makhzen armies were completely routed. Mawlāy Ibrāhīm was mortally wounded and Mawlāy Sulaymān himself made prisoner. At no time, however, was he ill-treated by his enemies. On the contrary, once identified he was shown every respect as a sharīf. His tent was torn into pieces and distributed among the Aït Oumalou Berbers as an invocation of his baraka (54). After three days of captivity he was accompanied to the outskirts of his capital, Meknès, and set free.

After the battle, rumours about the defeat of Mawlāy Sulaymān circulated for many days (55). The tidings of this defeat quickly spread to the whole country, generating confusion and restlessness both among the army and the tribes. Communications between Fès, Meknès and their surroundings became unsafe after the Berber rebels spread into the surrounding plains. The populations of the Azghār, already suffering from the plague, had to bear the consequences.

Mawlāy Sulaymān took the shock of his captivity and the death of his elder son and heir presumptive badly. For months he remained secluded in his Meknès palace. His ability to act was also greatly reduced after many officials and army qā'id-s had died in the battle (56). Ahmad b. M'bārak, who had replaced Muhammad al-Salāwī as chief minister, was the only official of importance who remained and through whom Mawlāy Sulaymān transmitted his orders (57). "His Majesty", wrote the French consul, "is in an awkward position vis-à-vis his own people who, after making him prisoner, escorted him to his palace. His only safeguard", added Sourdeau, "resides in the veneration due to him as a sharīf" (58).

(54) CCC, vol.26, 10 June, 1819.

(55) Ibid.

(56) Abd al-Kabīr b. al-Majdhūb al-Fāsī, Tadhkirat, p.347.

(57) CCC, vol.26, 18 July, 1819.

(58) Ibid., 30 June, 1819.

The disintegration of the army under the joint effects of the plague and the Zaïan defeat prevented Mawlāy Sulaymān from taking any concrete action to restore the Makhzen's credibility among his subjects. The army needed reorganization, as well as clothing and equipment. The incapacity of the army was such that it even proved unable to convey military equipment safely from the ports to the besieged capital (59).

Mawlāy Sulaymān's handling of the after-effects of the defeat only helped to perpetuate the political crisis. In the summer of 1819 he imprisoned a delegation of six hundred Berber notables from the Aït Idrassen who came to Meknès asking for his forgiveness. After they were hospitably received, the palace gates were secured and the notables put into irons. Mawlāy Sulaymān apparently intended to keep them as hostages for future good behaviour. However, his actions only added fuel to the flames of Berber dissidence. Infuriated by what they regarded as a betrayal on the Sultan's part, the Berber tribes united under the leadership of Abū Bakr Amhāwīsh and laid siege to Meknès. "This (action) led to the deterioration of the situation and set fire to all parts of the Maghrib", wrote Akansūs. "The Berbers united in a common front and solicited the coming of the imposter" (60). For a time, the traditional antagonism between lowland and mountain Berbers was set aside and the Makhzen was no longer able to play on it to contain the dissidence of the Aït Oumalou. In September, 1819 the siege around Meknès was tightened after Amhāwīsh himself took command of the Berber contingents. All attempts by Mawlāy Sulaymān to bring some Berber tribes over to his side failed "after concord was realised among them and differences forgotten" (61).

(59) Ibid., 30 Sept., 1819.

(60) Akansūs, p. 318.

(61) Ibid.

Mawlāy Sulaymān was more isolated than ever. Not one provincial qā'id was able to raise an army and come to his assistance at Meknès. Left without pay, some contingents of the army refused to carry out their duties (62). In the capital itself, insubordination spread to the 'Abīd who, in November, 1819, massacred Ahmad b. M'bārak, their commander and the Sultan's chief minister (63).

The liberation of the Berber hostages at the beginning of 1820 after the marabout 'Abd Allāh b. Ḥamza al-'Ayyāshī interceded on their behalf, failed to end the siege of Meknès (64). Mawlāy Sulaymān had not been able to leave his capital since his liberation by the Aīt Oumalou in May 1819. On the verge of despair, he declared that he placed his confidence in God alone who makes and unmakes kings (65).

II - Prelude to an Urban Rebellion

Fès, with its industry and commerce, was deeply affected by the famine of 1817-1818 and its consequences. Its people were particularly upset by Mawlāy Sulaymān's decision to allow wheat exports to France in 1817. The French official who was supervising the export of wheat at Rabat wrote in September 1817 that Fès was "most discontented because every outlet of its commerce and industry was closed" (66). The news of the Zaïan defeat and the ensuing increase of banditry in the Saïs plain rendered all commercial relations with the outside world very risky. The repercussions from the economic

(62) CCC, vol. 26, 30 June, 1819.

(63) Ibid., 3 Dec., 1819.

(64) Akansūs, p.319. Many of these hostages (100 according to the French consul) had died in prison because of the insalubrious conditions there. Cf. CCC, vol. 26, 20 Sept., 1819.

(65) CCC, vol. 27, 22 Jan., 1820.

(66) CCC, vol. 25, 29 Sept., 1819.

difficulties and the political uncertainty which had prevailed since May 1819 soon found their way to Fāsi politics.

The persistence of tribal agitation in the Saïs plain and the absence of effective Makhzen authority within Fès itself were bound to disturb the precarious coexistence between the various components of Fāsi society. Fès had always had three qā'ids, one for each of the three sections of the city ('Adwa, Andalus and Lamṭiyīn) and Sīdī Muhammad b. 'Abd Allāh respected this tradition (67). Mawlāy Sulaymān, however, succeeded in imposing a single qā'id, an arrangement which was accepted by the Fāsi-s only so long as the Makhzen proved powerful enough to ensure peace and tranquility in their city. This, however, was no longer possible after the Zaīan setback.

Mawlāy Sulaymān had spent more than eight months confined in his capital when, in February 1820, he received the first alarming news from Fès. At the beginning of 1820 the 'Adwa section of Fès objected to the governorship of Muḥammad al-Ṣaffār, who was Andalusian, and sought to have him recalled (68). Group loyalties welled up to the surface and inevitably led to violence. Mawlāy Sulaymān, who was besieged in Meknès, wrote a letter to the people of Fès in which he satisfied neither his governor nor those who objected to him (69). He particularly blamed the notables, who, he claimed, instead of assisting the Sultan in suppressing disobedience, preferred to spend their time in their villas and gardens.

(67) Al-Du'ayf, p.167.

(68) Sources at our disposal make no reference to the nature of grievances: the people of Fès, and the 'Adwa in particular, had against al-Ṣaffār. However, Mawlāy Sulaymān in his letter to the people of Fès (al-Nāṣirī, VIII, pp.139-141) accused the governor of Fès of avarice and compared him to a dog who was attacked by other dogs for having refused to share his food with them.

(69) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès in Akansūs, pp. 320-322 and al-Nāṣirī, VIII, pp.139-141.

In the same letter he expounded on the principles that governed his policy towards the city of Fès. " I entrust your government to outsiders (barrānī-s) because they are less likely to arouse your jealousy ... and to merchants because they do not covet others' wealth and content themselves with their prestigious position on order to fructify their capital" (70).

The letter produced no effect on the Fāsi-s, for the gravity of the situation required action rather than words. Mawlāy Sulaymān was not totally unaware of this, yet he hoped he would be able to appease tensions in Fès while he was besieged by Berber tribes in Meknès. The release of the Berber hostages had no discernible effect on the tribal agitation around the capital, so Mawlāy Sulaymān finally resolved to leave Meknès and head for Fès despite the grave risks involved. During its night-time journey to Fès, the Sultan's convoy was assailed by Berber insurgents from all sides and the protection of the marabout Muḥammad b. Ḥamza al-‘Ayyāshī, who accompanied Mawlāy Sulaymān, proved to be of no avail (71).

Immediately after his arrival on Fès, Mawlāy Sulaymān ordered that all Berbers in the city should be destituted. Great excesses were committed and the generalised conflict between Mawlāy Sulaymān and the Berbers acquired a tinge of racial antagonism between Arabs and Berbers (72). Nevertheless, Mawlāy Sulaymān did succeed in restoring tranquillity within the city itself. Muḥammad al-Ṣaffār was recalled and replaced by a waṣīf, Qāsim b. Sākin, who was an officer of the

(70) Ibid.

(71) Akansūs, p. 319.

(72) Ibid., cf. also al-Majdhūb al-Fāsi, Tadhkirat, p. 348.

‘Abīd army (73). This measure temporarily quelled the unrest within the city and allowed Mawlāy Sulaymān to direct his attention to the pacification of the coastal regions of the Gharb where the authority of the qāḍid-s had been greatly weakened after the Zaīan defeat (74).

In his journey through the Gharb the Sultan was accompanied by the ‘Abīd and Oudaya armies who agreed to leave their families in Fès and Meknès only after having been promised that they would not have to go beyond Rabat. He also had contingents from the Haouz tribes who were among the few remaining supporters of the Makhzen. Once in Rabat, Ibn al-Jilālī, qāḍid of the Rehamna and companion of Mawlāy Sulaymān in his captivity amongst the Zaīan, proposed that the Sultan change his residence temporarily to Marrakech where he was more likely to enjoy the support of the neighbouring tribes (75). The Oudaya and the ‘Abīd, however, were quite unwilling to abandon their families to the insecurity which reigned around Fès and Meknès and, therefore, refused to proceed to Marrakech as requested by the Sultan. The notables of the Haouz, on the other hand, warned Mawlāy Sulaymān that if he returned to Meknès he might lose the chance of reaching their country for ever (76). Mawlāy Sulaymān was thus presented with an embarrassing choice: if he satisfied the Haouz notables he risked alienating his army, but if he chose to return to Meknès he risked his throne. Finally, he resolved to head southward even if his army refused to follow.

When he left Rabat in June 1820, Mawlāy Sulaymān was not even sure he would reach Marrakech safely because of the insecurity of roads. He decided, therefore,

(73) Al-Zayānī, Jamharat man hakama bi Fās, p.9; Akansūs, p.319.

(74) Akansūs, p.323.

(75) Ibid.; al-Majdhūb al-Fāsī, Tadhkirat, p.348.

(76) Al-Majdhūb al-Fāsī, Tadhkirat, p.348.

to travel in disguise among the Seraghna, who on their way to Marrakech, spread rumours that the Sultan was still at Rabat. For several days, people in the northern part of the country were unable to ascertain where the Sultan was in fact. The Oudaya and the 'Abīd who returned to Fès and Meknès created the greatest confusion. The Sultan, they reported, had abandoned the Azghār and fled to the south (77). In addition to spreading injurious rumours, the 'Abīd and the Oudaya began to plunder Jewish quarters in both Fès and Meknès (78) thus inaugurating a cycle of violence which was impossible to control.

III - The Power Vacuum and the Fāsi Response

The hasty and ill-timed departure of Mawlāy Sulaymān to Marrakech had a disastrous effect on the course of events in the north. The Sultan had delegated authority to his two sons, Mawlāy al-Husayn in Meknès and Mawlāy 'Alī in Fès. The two princes, however, were effectively incapable of making their voice heard, even among the army. Immediately after the departure of Mawlāy Sulaymān towards the middle of June 1820, the Oudaya plundered the Jewish quarter of Fès for three days. This attack on the millāh affected the interests of the Muslim population as well since many Fāsi merchants used to entrust their merchandise and financial capital to Jewish associates. "This incited the people of Fès to rebellion", wrote al-Zayānī, "because they lost considerable sums of money" (79). What alarmed the people of Fès was the declared intention of the Oudaya to extend their plundering to Old Fès itself. "After the small

(77) Ibid.

(78) Ibid.

(79) Al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-nubahā?, K 241, p. 226.

millāh", said the Oudaya, "we will plunder the big one" (80). The people of Fès were exposed to external violence for the first time since the unstable reign of Mawlāy ‘Abd Allāh (1729-1757).

The Sultan's prolonged residence at Marrakech during the summer of 1820 made the Makhzen's administrative presence in the north less and less perceptible. The appeal addressed by Mawlāy Sulaymān to the Oudaya to return what they had plundered in the millāh to its legitimate owners remained a dead letter (81). The Oudaya even escalated their aggression by blockading Old Fès. They looted every caravan that entered or left the city and plundered livestock belonging to Fāsi-s. Inside Old Fès itself, crafts and trade were paralyzed as a result of the blockade. In order to deal with the growing insecurity which they faced, the Fasi-s decided to fill the power vacuum by appointing their own qāḍī-s. Each of the three sections of the city appointed its own qāḍī, thus resuming a tradition which had disappeared with Mawlāy Sulaymān. The qāḍī-s who had to ensure security within their sections and organize resistance to the Oudaya were ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. Fāris, Qaddūr al-Mqarfi and Ahmad al-Hārthī.

Another conflict emerged along with the power vacuum: the contest between the muftī and the qāḍī. The rivalry between the muftī, Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī and the qāḍī, al-‘Abbās b. Sūda cannot be fully appraised unless seen in the light of the privileged relations that existed between Mawlāy Sulaymān and the Ibn Sūda family. Since the second half of the eighteenth century, this family had enjoyed the favours of the ‘Alawid sultans more than

(80) Ibid.

(81) Cf. Mawlāy Sulaymān's letter to the people of Fès exhorting them to return Jewish property, dated 2 Shawwāl, 1235/13 July, 1820, in CCC, vol.27, fol.68-69.

any other learned family of the country. This was largely due to the reputation gained by al-Tāwdī b. Sūda as the uncontested authority during the second half of the eighteenth century. According to Muḥammad al-Ruhūnī, al-Tāwdī had served as teacher of all qālim-s of his time, excepting one only—Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim al-Sijilmāssī (82). Al-Tāwdī was not only respected by sultans and his fellow qālim-s, but also by sharīf-s. Nothing illustrates better this esteem than the unanimous decision taken in 1792 by the qālim-s, sharīf-s and notables of Fès to give him a free hand in the choice of a new sultan for the country (83).

His son Ahmad was appointed qādī of Fès by Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh and, after having been discarded by Mawlāy al-Yazīd, was re-established in his office in 1792 by Mawlāy Sulaymān (84). In addition to the exercise of justice in the city of Fès he was invested by Mawlāy Sulaymān with the power to supervise all judges of Morocco (qādī al-qudāt) (85). Aḥmad b. Sūda held this post for the period extending from 1792 to 1816 with a short interruption in 1801 (86). The competence of Aḥmad b. Sūda was such that Mawlāy Sulaymān decided to dispense with the post of muftī (87).

For Mawlāy Sulaymān the Ibn Sūda-s were not only teachers, but spiritual guides as well. Indeed, it was through al-Tāwdī b. Sūda that he received the Nāṣiri wird (88). This explains the great esteem in which he held his shaykh-s. During the early years of his reign, Mawlāy

- (82) Muḥammad al-Ruhūnī, Awḍah al-masālik wa ashāl al-marāqī ilā sabki ibrīz al-shaykh ‘Abd al-Bāqī, Cairo, 1888-1889, vol.I, p.13.
- (83) Cf. chapter IV above, pp. I78-I79.
- (84) Cf. Sulaymān's dhahīr appointing Aḥmad b. Sūda as qādī of Fès in al-Hawwāt, al-Rawḍa al-maqṣūda, p.320 (appendix 3). Cf. also al-Du‘ayf, p.414.
- (85) Al-Hawwāt, al-Rawḍa al-maqṣūda, pp.320-321; al-Zayānī, Takmīl, p.9.
- (86) Al-Du‘ayf, p.414.
- (87) Al-Hawwāt, al-Rawḍa al-maqṣūda, p.323.
- (88) ‘Abd al-Hayy al-Kattānī, Fihris, II, p.329; al-Hawwāt, al-Rawḍa, p.322; Muḥammad b. Ja‘far al-Kattānī, Salwat, I, p.116.

Sulaymān kept al-Tāwdī b. Sūda informed of the political developments in the country and sought his advice on the important issues of his time (89). The Sultan continued to observe the same attitude towards Ahmād b. al-Tāwdī b. Sūda. Even when he was on bad terms with the people of Fès, he continued to write to the qādī acquainting him with major political events (90). This attitude towards the Ibn Sūda-s who monopolized the royal privileges for several decades, caused a great embitterment on the part of other learned families of Fès as well as the sharīf-s (91).

When Ahmād b. Sūda lost his sight in 1816, the post of qādī was conferred upon his youngest son, al-‘Abbās who was by that time twenty-nine years old. On the other hand, Ibn Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī, a senior and aged ‘ālim, was nominated muftī. Al-Dukkālī was disappointed with Mawlāy Sulaymān's choice for a young ‘ālim from the Ibn Sūda family to serve as qādī of Fès, considering himself as better qualified for this most prestigious judicial post in the kingdom (92). In addition, al-‘Abbās proved to be uncooperative and manifested a firm determination to render justice without the services of a muftī (93). In the conflict which opposed the two judicial authorities at Fès, Mawlāy Sulaymān sided with the qādī every time he was asked to intervene. In 1817, he restricted the judicial prerogatives of the muftī and, at the beginning of 1820, abolished the post of muftī altogether after an argument

(89) Cf. for instance letter of Mawlāy Sulaymān to al-Tāwdī b. Sūda, no date, Mic.3, HPM, Fès, 1978, in which the Sultan informs him about the submission of the Chaouia and asks for his legal opinion concerning the export of wheat to the Christian nations.

(90) Al-Du‘ayf mentions that in 1797 Mawlāy Sulaymān wrote a letter to Ahmād b. Sūda informing him of the political situation in the Chaouia. The letter was read publically to the people of Fès (p.361).

(91) Ibn Zaydān, al-‘Izz wa al-sawla, II, p.90.

(92) Al-Zayānī, Takmīl quḍāt Fās, p.12.

(93) Ibid.

between the two judicial authorities over a case involving two sharīf-s of Fès (94).

The qādī-muftī antagonism acquired a new dimension when on June 11, 1820, al-Dukkālī and another senior qālim, ‘Abd al-Salām al-Azamī (the only two remaining qālim-s who had signed Mawlāy Sulaymān's bay‘a) wrote a letter to the Sultan asking for the recall of al-‘Abbās b. Sūda. The two signatories denounced Ibn Sūda's incapacity and injustice and pointed to his youth, his inexperience and his contempt for the muftī's opinion (95). Mawlāy Sulaymān received the letter at Rabat while considering whether to proceed to Marrakech or return to his capital. Apparently, he underestimated the gravity of the case over which the muftī and the qādī were quarreling, assuming that the conflict was nothing more than normal professional rivalry (96). He did not deem it necessary to send a reply.

After the plunder of the millāh by the Oudaya at the end of June and the consequent appointment of sectional qā’id-s by the Fāsi-s, al-‘Abbās found himself in an increasingly untenable situation as he lacked the necessary means to enforce his sentences. During the summer of 1820, he was attacked by a sharīf, Sīdī al-Tāhar al-Kattānī, who fired at him while he was holding a public audience (97). The consequent arrest of al-Kattānī by Makhzen officials, already overshadowed by the locally appointed qā’id-s, provoked a general reaction

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- (94) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Muhammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī restricting his judicial prerogatives, dated 5 Ramadān, 1232/19 July, 1817, in DAR, (appendix 74). The circumstances of his dismissal are not clear. Akansūs mentioned that the muftī was revoked following a confrontation between Ibn Sūda and al-Dukkālī over a case involving two sharīf-s from Fès, but gave no details about it. Al-Nāṣirī who relied on Akansūs reproduced the same story, adding that the case was "well known" (al-Nāṣirī, VIII, p.146). In the material we have consulted we have found no trace of this case.
- (95) Letter from al-Dukkālī and al-Azamī to Mawlāy Sulaymān, dated 29 Sha‘bān, 1235/11 June, 1820 in al-Mashrafi, al-Husām, pp.328-329; cf. also al-Nāṣirī, VIII, pp.146-147.
- (96) Akansūs, p.326.
- (97) Ibid.

of solidarity with the Kattānī sharīf. Ultimately, the Andalusian notable, Ibn al-Rāziq, intervened and forced his liberation (98). Terrorized by the attempt made on his life, Ibn Sūda could no longer leave his home. The Kattānī case proved, furthermore, that it was no longer possible for the qādī to adequately fulfil his judicial functions. The rebels simply dismissed him and appointed a new qādī, Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Dilā’ī. This dealt the final blow to what remained of Makhzen authority in Fès.

Nonetheless, the people of Fès in no way disputed Mawlāy Sulaymān's legitimacy. By appointing their own qādīs and nominating a new judge they did not intend to overthrow the local representatives of the Makhzen; they simply made up for a deficient administration which proved to be powerless in the face of the events that were taking place. The people of Fès still looked forward to the return of Mawlāy Sulaymān to his seat of government and for the normalization of the country's political situation. In the summer of 1820, al-Dukkālī wrote to Mawlāy Sulaymān, on behalf of the Fāsi-s, asking for his prompt return to the Azghār (99). The Sultan, however, did not respond to this request. On 22 August, he answered the people of Fès with a most ambiguous and enigmatic letter which only served to inflame the situation (100). In it, Mawlāy Sulaymān ascribed the political crisis to the weakness of the army and its

(98) Cf. letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès, no date, in al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-nubahā', pp.181-185 (appendix 89).

(99) Al-Majdhūb al-Fāsī, Tadhkirat, p.349.

(100) Cf. letter in Ms.D.2795, BGR, p.393. The letter dated 13 Qa‘da, 1235/22 Aug., 1820, must have arrived in Fès much later than the date given by Akansūs (Shawwāl 1235/July-Aug., 1820); cf. Akansūs, p.326. According to the author of Tadhkirat, p.349, Mawlāy Sulaymān's reply was written on the back of the letter sent to him by Ibn Ibrāhīm and al-Azamī. This letter is reproduced in appendix 82).

inability to ensure the collection of taxes. He, implicitly, admitted his impotence and advised the Fāsi-s to take the responsibility for their own security upon themselves by seeking the alliance of Berber tribes, as used to be the case during the chaotic reign of his grandfather, Mawlāy ‘Abd Allāh. This alliance, he said, would allow them to thwart the Oudaya attacks while he was away. The most confusing statement in the letter was the allusion he made to abdication when he wrote: "May God reserve a happy ending to what remains (of my life) and ensure my replacement among the Muslims ... I am not the first to abandon this matter; those who are more virtuous than myself, such as al-Husayn, the noblest among the sons of Fātima al-Zahrā, already did" (101).

The Sultan's enigmatic letter reached Fès during the second week of September 1820. It was addressed to Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī, Siḍī Muḥammad b.al-Tāhar al-‘Alawī and al-Tālib b. Jallūn. Ibn Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī who was the first to read the letter, made a copy of it before he handed over the original to Mawlāy ‘Alī, the Sultan's son and vice-regent in the city (102). Some Cālim-s also had an opportunity to see the original. Upon the reception of the royal message, Mawlāy ‘Alī convened the notables in a mosque adjacent to his residence and read it to them in the presence of a large crowd (103). A great turmoil resulted among the audience, but the prince, who did not appreciate his father's attitude, refused to hand it over and, after shutting himself up in his house, burnt it. As a result, suspicion about the Sultan's real intentions increased.

(101) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès in Ms.D.2795,BGR, p.393.

(102) Al-Majdhūb al-Fāsī, Tadhkirat, p.349.

(103) Akansūs,p.326.

What was the real intention of Mawlāy Sulaymān in addressing the people of Fès in such vague terms as those used in his letter? Apologists for the 'Alawid dynasty, such as al-Zayānī and Akansūs, refuse to see any explicit mention of abdication on the Sultan's part in the letter. Al-Zayānī refuses categorically any idea of abdication, even accusing al-Dukkālī of having falsified the letter (104). Akansūs, on the other hand, rejects the accusation by al-Zayānī against al-Dukkālī and recognizes the equivocal character of the letter (105). Nevertheless, as usual, Akansūs finds an excuse for Mawlāy Sulaymān. His intention was not to abdicate, argues the author of al-Jaysh, but to arouse the people of Fès and incite them to manifest a greater attachment to his person (106). 'Abd al-Kabīr b. al-Majdhūb al-Fāsī, whose father was involved in the rebellion, offers a different interpretation. According to the author of Tadhkirat al-Muhsinīn, Mawlāy Sulaymān was genuine in his proposal of abdication (107). Even an objective chronicler such as the anonymous author of al-Ibtisām tends to support the latter explanation, claiming that Mawlāy Sulaymān chose to abdicate in order to avoid further bloodshed and social disorder (108).

Indeed, a careful examination of Mawlāy Sulaymān's letter leaves no doubt about his intention to abandon his responsibilities as head of the Muslim community. His reference to the case of al-Husayn, son of 'Alī b. Abī Tālib, could only be interpreted as a determination to abdicate. Moreover, it was not the first time that Mawlāy Sulaymān had expressed his will to relinquish power. Since the Zaīan military setback he had become increasingly pessimistic about the future of his reign, particularly after the death of his elder son Mawlāy

(104) Al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-nubahā', pp.178-179. Al-Zayānī produced a slightly different version of the letter which, he claimed, was al-Dukkālī's copy freed from all additions and alterations.

(105) Akansūs, p.327.

(106) Ibid.

(107) Al-Majdhūb al-Fāsī, Tadhkirat, p.349.

(108) Al-Ibtisām, p.65.

Ibrāhīm, the assassination of his only minister, Ahmād b. M'bārak, and the collapse of his army. During the summer of 1820, while at Marrakech, he told Rehamna notables that he had been tempted more than once by the idea of abandoning the political scene to dedicate the rest of his life to the worship of God (109). Whatever his real intention, his letter offered the Fāsi-s an unexpected occasion to rid themselves of a sultan who had effectively ceased to rule since May, 1819.

IV - The Proclamation of a New Sultan

Thoughts of dethroning Mawlāy Sulaymān went back at least to the summer of 1817 when, in the midst of a catastrophic famine he allowed wheat to be exported to Christians and also decided to end the jihād at sea by disarming the Moroccan navy. The French consul general noted then that "the saints, or individuals who have a great influence over towns and countryside, implore God in their prayers to give them another king" (110). By then the name of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm, son of the late Mawlāy al-Yazīd, was mentioned as a possible candidate (111).

The deposition of a sultan, however, is not made easy by the sharī'a. The imām cannot be deposed unless officially declared incapable of meeting the ultimate goals prescribed for the imamate, namely the guarantee of public tranquility which is an essential condition for the exercise of religious and worldly duties. He can also be replaced by another imām if he admits his incapacity to govern (112). The most perplexing issue which faced the leaders of the rebellion since the arrival of Mawlāy

(109) Akansūs, p.327.

(110) CCC, vol.25, 20 July, 1817.

(111) Ibid., 29 Sept., 1817.

(112) On the imamate in Islam cf. 'Abd al-Qādir al-Fāsi, Risāla fī al-imāma al-Cudhīma wa shurūt man yataqalladuhā, Ms D 1861, BGR, pp. 368-388; Ahmad al-Ruhūnī, Nuṣḥ amīr al-mūminīn, Ms D 2160, BGR.

Sulaymān's letter of abdication was the question of how to find a legal justification for the deposition of the Sultan.

At the request of the rebellion leaders, who overwhelmingly belonged to the Andalusian notability (113), al-Dukkālī and other ‘ālim-s spent more than two months trying to build up a legal basis for the destitution of Mawlāy Sulaymān. The most important document on which they could rely was obviously what they considered to be the abdication letter, but the original copy had been lost and the people of Fès were only left with an unauthenticated copy. To authenticate this duplicate, the ‘ālim-s and tālib-s who had the chance of reading the original copy, were convened and asked to testify that the copy made by Ibn Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī conformed to the original. Three scholars only were able to provide such a testimony (114).

Now that the authenticity of the letter in question was legally established, the ‘ālim-s could issue a fatwā authorizing the deposition of Mawlāy Sulaymān. In fact, two fatwā-s were issued on the basis of the Sultan's letter. They were signed respectively by Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī and Muḥammad al-Yāzghī. These fatwā-s were supported by a number of ‘ālim-s who agreed that the letter was a clear abdication on Mawlāy Sulaymān's part and an explicit recognition of political impotence. "The Muslims are called to appoint an imām", wrote Ibn Ibrāhīm, "otherwise, two parties would have sinned: the people of tying and untying (ahl al-hall wa al-caqd) and the candidate who fulfills the conditions of the imamate" (115).

(113) Al-Zayānī, Tuhfat, pp.155-156. The main Andalusian leaders of the rebellion were: Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Rāziq, Muḥammad b. Sulaymān, Qaddūr ‘Amir and ‘Allāl al-‘Afīya. Cf. also Akansūs, p.328.

(114) Cf. certified copy of Mawlāy Sulaymān's letter in Ms.D.2795, BGR, p. 393, appendix 82.

(115) Cf. fatwā by al-Dukkālī in Ms. D 2795, p.393 (appendix 83).

In principle, this well-grounded fatwā could have in itself offered sufficient justification for the dethronement of Mawlāy Sulaymān. However, many Cālim-s were reluctant to support the fatwā. The authenticity of the letter, which had served as the basis of the fatwā, was still contested by a number of influential persons who refused to join al-Dukkālī and his party. Furthermore, the letter appeared to be vague and enigmatic. Nowhere was there a clear statement of abdication. For many Cālim-s the dethronement of the imām was too important a question to be grounded on such a meagre evidence. Accordingly, the fatwā issued by al-Dukkālī and his party failed to rally enough support for the rebels. The Oudaya and the 'Abīd, in particular, refused to join the movement.

To overcome the hesitations of many reluctant Cālim-s the leaders of the rebellion resorted to a second device. Apart from the question of voluntary abdication of the imām, the Muslim community is empowered by the sharī'a to depose him if his incapacity to govern and ensure internal peace is proved. The leaders of the rebellion, therefore, established a notarial act to prove that since the unfortunate Zaīan battle, the country had been virtually without government (116). This notarial act was produced at the beginning of November, 1820, less than two weeks before the proclamation of the new prince. On the basis of this notarial act the Cālim-s were asked to issue a second fatwā authorizing the Muslim community to appoint another ruler.

The second fatwā (*) relied on the following arguments:

1. the manifest disintegration of the Sultan's authority,
2. his inability to ensure the respect for law and order,
3. the break up of unanimity around him, and
4. the rejection of his authority by the army and by the centre of legitimacy, i.e. Fès.

(116) Cf. notarial act dated beginning Safar, 1236/ Nov., 1820 in Ms D 2795, pp. 397-398 (appendix 84).

(*) Cf. appendix 85.

"This act", wrote 'Abd al-Salām al-Azamī, "is sufficient in itself for the proclamation of a new imām, even if the first one maintains himself" (117). The proclamation of a new prince became, according to Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī, not only desirable, but a most urgent obligation of the Muslim community (118). Mawlāy Sulaymān was, therefore, to be deposed on the basis of two fatwā-s, relying on both his letter and the notarial act establishing his powerlessness. The number of cālim-s who lent their support to the second fatwā had considerably increased since the promulgation of the first fatwā, six weeks before (119).

The legal ground having been cleared, the people of Fès proceeded on 16 November, 1820 to the election of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm b. al-Yazīd as the new sultan. The proclamation ceremony was attended by Sīdī al-‘Arbī al-Wazzānī, Mawlāy al-‘Arbī al-Darqāwī, Abū Bakr Amhāwīsh, Muḥammad b. al-Ghāzī and Muḥammad b. Ḥammū Wa‘zīz. The Fāsi rebellion ceased, therefore, to be a purely urban uprising and stretched beyond the walls of Fès to acquire the dimension of a dynastic crisis. The rebels failed, however, to gain either the Oudaya or the ‘Abīd armies. Most Arab tribes of the Azghār also refused to back the rebels' cause.

The Idrisiid sharīf-s and the adepts of the two shari-fian zāwiya-s seemed at first in favour of a complete dynastic change. Ibn al-Ghāzī, head of the Zemmour and devout disciple of Mawlāy al-‘Arbī al-Darqāwī, proposed the proclamation of an Idrisiid candidate (120). The Andalusian notables, on the contrary, fearing a drastic swing in favour of the sharīf-s, expressed their opposition to this idea and called for the proclamation of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm who, they argued, was more likely to rally the sympathy of the army (121).

(117) Fatwā by al-Azamī in Ms.D.2795, p.399, appendix 85.

(118) Fatwā by al-Dukkālī in Ms.D.2795, p.398.

(119) 19 cālim-s signed the second document, while the first fatwā was approved by 9 cālim-s only.

(120) Al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-nubahā, p.194.

(121) Ibid., pp.194-195.

Mawlāy Ibrāhīm did not have any political ambitions. He even refused the sultanate at the beginning and accepted only reluctantly under the threat of an Idrisid prince being chosen. For the popular masses, however, he symbolized the myth of his father, the hero of the jihād, and was capable therefore of rallying the sympathy of the northern provinces which, thirty years before, were the first to proclaim Mawlāy al-Yazīd.

V - The Word Spreads

The creation of a political alliance between the people of Fès and the Berber tribes of the Fazāz determined the army and most of the Arab tribes to stand aloof from the movement. The Berber contingents, therefore, remained the main military force upon which the new regime depended to enforce its authority beyond the walls of Fès.

After drafting the bay‘a, the rebels started a campaign to secure its acceptance by the northern provinces. These not only constituted the stronghold of the Idrisid sharīf-s, but offered material and political advantages for the regime as well. Through the northern ports, they could both control maritime trade and develop contacts with the representatives of the European countries from which they could obtain political recognition and military equipment.

Mawlāy Ibrāhīm left Fès for the north at the end of January 1821 (122). He was accompanied by his chief advisor, Sīdī al-‘Arbī al-Wazzānī. The Wazzānī sharīf appealed to his followers everywhere to recognize the newly proclaimed sultan (123). As he approached each village or town he proclaimed that "Mawlāy Sulaymān's star

(122) F.O. 174/26, 19 Feb., 1821.

(123) Al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-nubahā, Ms K 241, p. 171.

is set and Mawlāy Ibrāhīm is the Sultan to be obeyed" (124). The religious prestige of both the Wazzāni and the Raysūni sharīf-s was used to gain support for the new sultan, particularly in the countryside (125). In the Gharb, the Sefiane under the leadership of Muḥammad al-Lūshī, provided reliable support (126). In the Jbala, the religious influence of the sharīf-s of Ouezzane was of great help to the rebels. However, the coastal towns of Tangier and Larache refused to join the new regime because of the important 'Abīd garrisons stationed in them. Of all the northern towns, only Tétouan agreed to open its doors to Mawlāy Ibrahīm.

Indeed, Tétouan's situation was in many respects similar to that of Fès. As an industrial and commercial centre, Tétouan had been exposed ever since the summer of 1819 to continuous siege by the neighbouring tribes. In July 1820, following the plunder of the Jewish quarter of Fès by the Oudaya, the Jbala tribes attempted the same against the millāh of Tétouan (127). The blockade enforced around the town affected not only the commercial interests of the Tétouani artisans and traders, but even prevented a normal food supply. In the summer of 1820, the inhabitants found themselves obliged to import wheat from Gibraltar (128). For the people of Tétouan, therefore, as for the people of Fès, the rebellion promised an end to a distressing situation.

It was only after the insurgents left Fès that Mawlāy Sulaymān decided to act. The news of their heading to the northern ports made him very uneasy about the future. The control of the ports would offer his enemies the necessary

(124) C.O.91/79, Robert Sillery's Report.

(125) Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-'Amrāwī, Nafḥat al-araj, Ms Z 3866, RL, p. 68.

(126) CCC, vol.27, 1 March, 1821.

(127) CCC, vol.27, fol.57-58. The attack was put off by the qā'id of Tétouan, 'Abd al-Rahmān 'Ash'āsh, with the assistance of the population who—it was remarked on this occasion—"volunteered to act in defence of the Jews and evinced an extraordinary determination to protect them" (C.O.91/76, 15 June, 1820).

(128) CCC, vol.27, 24 July, 1820.

funds to consolidate their rule and allow them to acquire arms from Europe, thus making their defeat extremely difficult. The 'Abīd and the Oudaya were also pressing for the return of Mawlāy Sulaymān to the Azghār.

In fact, Mawlāy Sulaymān's situation had significantly improved since the proclamation of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm in November, 1820. The major development was the refusal of the Oudaya and the 'Abīd to join the rebels. Several tribes also refused to proclaim the new sultan more from hostility to the Fāsi-Berber alliance than from fidelity to Mawlāy Sulaymān. These groups which were indifferent or hostile to the rebels soon felt the need for an alternative and turned back, therefore, to Mawlāy Sulaymān. Tribes which before the proclamation of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm had refused to take sides, were placed in an embarrassing situation after the rebellion. Ultimately, it became impossible for them to stand idly by. Tribal antagonisms played an important role in polarizing support around one prince or another (129). The 'Abīd and the Oudaya, who a few months before had abandoned Mawlāy Sulaymān, not only refused to join the rebels, but went to Marrakech to ask for his forgiveness and request his return to his capital (130). In a sense, the proclamation of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm offered Mawlāy Sulaymān a real chance to re-establish his authority over the country.

When Mawlāy Sulaymān returned to the Azghār in March 1821, accompanied by contingents from the army and the Haouz tribes, he had for the first time since 1819 a military force with which to assert his authority. The pacification of the northern tribes did not pose any major difficulty. The situation, however, was differ-

(129) Thus, the Beni Hsen, traditionally opposed to the Sefiane and the Zemmour, refused to join the rebels because of the outstanding role played by the leaders these two confederations in the rebellion.

(130) Al-Majdhūb al-Fāsī, Tadhkirat, p.352.

ent in the case of Fès and Tétouan, which the rebels had already entered, and where they entrenched themselves. The reduction of these two cities necessitated a long siege.

VI - The Collapse of the Rebellion

The unexpected death of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm on 15 March, 1821 seemed to offer a solution to the dynastic crisis which had resulted from the Fès rebellion. The news of his death was received with a great joy by Mawlāy Sulaymān who was preparing the siege of Tétouan. The insurgents, however, manifested a firm resolution to persist in their rebellion, for immediately after the death of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm they proclaimed his brother, Mawlāy Sa‘īd under the same conditions originally proposed in the bay‘a of 16 November, 1820 (131). The bay‘a of Tétouan, drawn up by ‘Abd al-Mālik al-Murri, a Fāsi sharīf who played a significant role in the rebellion, reiterated these conditions according to which the sharīf-s and all those who enjoyed "a noble genealogy" were to assume a prominent role in the public affairs of the country (132). The bay‘a of Mawlāy Sa‘īd also reflected a certain ascendancy of the Wazzāni sharīf-s who were the most militant agitators in a region considered to be the stronghold of the Idrisiid sharīf-s outside Fès.

From March 1821 to April 1822 Mawlāy Sulaymān's attention was mainly taken up with the siege of Fès and Tétouan. Mawlāy ‘Alī, the Sultan's son, was entrusted with the military operations in the north, while Mawlāy Sulaymān took residence in New Fès to direct in person the siege of the neighbouring town. Mawlāy ‘Alī succeeded in subduing the northern tribes, but the Tétouani-s offered a fierce resistance to the 15,000 strong army sent by the Makhzen. Tétouan was in a better position to resist Mawlāy Sulaymān for two main reasons. First, the city

(131) Cf. bay‘a of Mawlāy Sa‘īd in Dāwūd, III, pp. 259-264.

(132) Ibid.

had a larger rumāt (urban militia) force than Fès. In 1795 Tétouan was still able to mobilize 2,000 militia men (133). It had also many competent artillerymen (tubjiya) some of whom had been sent to assist the people of Fès (134). Secondly, Tétouan, being a maritime town, had larger stores of military equipment. Moreover, the people of Tétouan managed to control the port of Martil until January 1822. Martil served not only as a maritime outlet, but also as an important depot of military equipment (135).

The siege of Fès and Tétouan lasted for about a year. During this period events began progressively to favour Mawlāy Sulaymān. In the spring of 1821, the rebels suffered a major defeat at the hands of the Oudaya when Mawlāy Sa‘īd attempted to enter Fès after having been proclaimed at Tétouan. In June, 1821 the Beni Mguild submitted to Mawlāy Sulaymān (136) and in July, Sulaymāni troops inflicted heavy losses on the Aīt Oumalou after Abū Bakr Amhāwish attempted to relieve Fès (137). This military success was mainly due to the artillery received by the Makhzen from Tangier (138). It encouraged other tribes to submit to Mawlāy Sulaymān, particularly the Guerouane and Oulad al-Haj (139).

Following these military successes, Mawlāy Sulaymān headed north at the end of October, 1821 to inspect the forces besieging Tétouan. He spent most of the winter at Tangier from which he directed military operations.

(133) Al-Du‘ayf, p.315.

(134) Akansüs, p.336.

(135) C.O.91/79, Robert Sillery's Report.

(136) Letter from Abd al-Qādir al-Turkī, chief bombardier of Mawlāy Sulaymān, to Khālid al-‘Umari, qādi of Tangier, dated 17 Ramadān, 1236/18 June, 1821 in CCC, vol.27.

(137) Letter from Fès dated 6 Qa‘da, 1236/6 Aug., 1821, in CCC, vol.27.

(138) Ibid.

(139) Ibid.

Despite a reinforcement of 3,000 men who were mobilized by his nephew, Mawlāy ‘Abd al-Rahmān from the Doukkala, Abda and Chiadma, Mawlāy Sulaymān failed to break the Tétouani resistance. In January 1822, Makhzen troops gained control of the Martil fortress, but were unable to subdue Tétouan itself. In February 1822, after the besiegers suffered heavy losses, Mawlāy Suaymān decided to abandon the siege and return to Fès (140).

In February-March 1822, Mawlāy Sulaymān led a pacification tour through the country north and east of Fès. By subduing the Ghiatta, and particularly the Hayaina, he succeeded in depriving the Fāsi-s of their most important source of cereals. Henceforth, Fès was unable to maintain effective contact with Tétouan or with the surrounding tribes. Tired with the long siege, the people of Fès opened the gates to Mawlāy Sulaymān who entered the city on 20 April, 1822. The submission of Tétouan automatically followed on 3 May, 1822 (141).

Strangely enough, it was the rebellion of Fès which saved the country from the political impasse it had reached after the Zaīan defeat. It was only after the proclamation of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm in November, 1820 that a certain consensus began to take shape around Mawlāy Sulaymān. Instead of overthrowing Mawlāy Sulaymān, the Fès rebellion did in fact contribute to the restoration of his authority.

The major factor which contributed to improve Mawlāy Sulaymān's situation was the refusal of the army to rally the rebels' cause. The war which broke out in October, 1820 between the Oudaya and the Fāsi-s (142) was decisive in this respect. The Fāsi-s who had forgotten all about warfare "because of the long period of peace", were

(140) C.O.91/79, Robert Sillery's Report.

(141) Ibid.

(142) Al-Majdhūb al-Fāsi, Tadhkirat, p.351.

completely overpowered by the Oudaya cavalry (143). The people of Fès had no other alternative but to appeal to the Berber tribes for assistance. Ultimately, this Berber intervention on behalf of the Fāsi-s made any reconciliation between these and the Oudaya impossible and persuaded the latter to treat the rebellious regime with hostility.

The nature of the coalition behind Mawlāy Ibrāhīm (sharīf-s, Fāsi-s and Berbers) persuaded most of the Arab tribes of the Azghār to rally to Mawlāy Sulaymān's cause. Tribal antagonisms to a large extent determined the outcome of the rebellion. Thus, the Beni Hsen declared their allegiance to Mawlāy Sulaymān immediately after their traditional opponents, the Zemmour and the Sefiane, rallied to the party of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm (144). Traditional tribal animosities were also responsible for the disintegration of the united Berber front. The first major defection occurred within the Aīt Oumalou themselves. In June 1821, the submission of the Beni Mguild (145) was followed by that of other Berber tribes such as the Aīt Morghad and the Aīt Izdeg who, together with the Beni Mguild, were able to provide Mawlāy Sulaymān with one thousand cavalrymen (146). With the assistance of these tribes, Mawlāy Sulaymān won a major victory over Abū Bakr Amhāwīsh on 29 July, 1821 (147). This military success led to the defection of the Guerouane, thus undermining the fragile Berber coalition led by Amhāwīsh (148). Thereafter, the Berber alliance ceased to be of any use to the people of Fès.

(143) Ibid.

(144) CCC, vol.27, bulletin covering the period from 4 to 19 March, 1821.

(145) Cf. letter mentioned in note 136 above.

(146) Cf. note 137 above.

(147) Ibid.

(148) Ibid.

The rebels were also weakened by the fortuitous arrest of the head of the Darqāwiya religious order. Mawlay al-‘Arbī al-Darqāwī was taken into custody by the Oudaya after he failed to persuade them to join Mawlāy Ibrāhīm's party. Ibn al-Ghāzī was greatly concerned about the future of his shaykh and manifested, therefore, great moderation while the latter remained in Mawlāy Sulaymān's hands.

The role of the Darqāwi-s in the rebellion was also tempered by the political ascendance of the Wazzāniya religious order, particularly after the movement extended to the northern provinces. Contrary to Darqāwi hopes, the new sultan did not confer any leading role in his government upon Ibn al-Ghāzī (149). The real leadership of the whole movement was taken instead by the Wazzāni sharīf-s. The political dominance of the Wazzāni-s necessarily moderated Darqāwi enthusiasm for the cause of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm and his brother, Mawlāy Sa‘īd.

Mawlāy Sulaymān's success was also made possible by the financial difficulties of the rebels. When they had proclaimed the new sultan, the rebellion leaders had anticipated that they would gain a rapid control of the northern ports from which they could establish commercial contact with the outside world. Their failure to subdue these places considerably diminished their chances of success. Nor were Fès and Tétouan able to establish any durable contacts with their hinterland. The financial resources of the rebels ran out very quickly. Makhzen funds left by Mawlāy Sulaymān in the treasuries of Fès and Tétouan were soon consumed. Other public funds such as the ahbās and the inheritance of the munqaṭi‘ūn were also used up (150). Fāsi and Tétouani merchants who had staked their support on a lightning victory were the next victims of the financial difficulties that faced the rebels. After the exhaustion of public funds, the rebels turned to them

(149) Al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-nubahā, K 241, p.196.

(150) Al-Ibtisām, p. 67; al-Majdhub al-Fāsi, Tadhkirat, p. 353.

so that their resources were also consumed by the expenses of the war.

Moreover, lamentable living conditions within the besieged cities of Fès and Tétouan greatly undermined the population's morale. "During these days", wrote the author of al-Ibtisām, "the people of Fès were in a great distress because of the rise in food prices and the interruption of communications" (151). The shelling of residential quarters by Makhzen artillery made even worse the living conditions of the Fasi-s and the Tétouani-s. Food stores inside Fès were hit and eye witnesses reported scenes of streets running with oil, honey and butter (152). The economic blockade of Fès became unbearable after Mawlāy Sulaymān's military successes over the Berber coalition under Abū Bakr Amhāwīsh in the summer of 1821 and the submission of the neighbouring Hayaina in February 1822.

Mawlāy Sulaymān's victory was also made easier by his military superiority. The failure of the rebels to control the ports deprived them not only of an important source of revenue, but also prevented them from receiving sophisticated military equipment from abroad. Mawlāy Sulaymān, on the contrary, benefited from the regular flow of heavy arms which he received from Europe. In 1820, he received fifty canons from France, Great Britain and Sweden (153). The following year, he was supplied with twenty mountain guns from Gibraltar (154). The use of artillery proved to be decisive in the defeat of Abū Bakr Amhāwīsh in July 1821 as well as in the siege of both Fès and Tétouan.

(151) Al-Ibtisām, p.67. Cf. similar observations by al-Majdhūb al-Fāsī, Tadhkirat, pp.353-354.

(152) A letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān's chief bombardier at Fès to the qādī of Tangier dated 17 Ramadān, 1236/18 June, 1821 reported that shelling continued even during the holy month of Ramadān. Cf. CCC, vol.27, fol.218.

(153) CCC, vol.27, 25 May, 1820.

(154) F.O.52/22, 17 March, 1821.

Finally, Mawlāy Sulaymān's success was partly due to the benevolent attitude of the European countries. During this political crisis, European nations were unanimous in their support of him. The conservative nature of the rebel regime and the religious groups that were behind it had raised the apprehensions of the European consuls. "The European powers", wrote Sourdeau, the French consul, in 1820, "are determined to use every possible means in order to keep the present Emperor, with his peaceful policy, on the throne" (155). The fact that the new regime was easily identified with the short-lived reign of Mawlāy al-Yazīd and that he depended on the same intransigent groups excited the fears of European nations. "Soon we will see the Moroccan navy, at present annihilated, privateering in the Straits and disturbing trade in every possible way" wrote Sourdeau in 1820 (156). The European consuls refused to recognize or assist the rebels and provided Mawlāy Sulaymān with every possible assistance. Not only did they comply with his appeal to boycott the port of Martil, the only window the rebels had on the outside world, but also provided him with the necessary artillery to ensure a military superiority over his opponents. Not less important was the military assistance received from Spain through the fortress of Ceuta and which was used in the siege of Tétouan (157). Great Britain assisted him financially, facilitated the transfer of Muḥammad Bejja's inheritance (158), and granted him a loan of 50,000 Spanish dollars in 1821 (159). During the same year, Denmark

(155) CCC, vol.27, 20 May, 1820.

(156) Ibid.

(157) CCC, vol. 29, 4 Jan., 1822.

(158) C.O. 91/79, Order by the Governor of Gibraltar concerning Bejja's property, dated, 11 Aug., 1821. Cf. note 82 in chapter IV above.

(159) F.O.52/22, 16 April, 1821.

agreed to pay its arrears of tribute amounting to 100,000 Spanish dollars (160) without making any juridical protest over the existence of two rival princes (161). This financial assistance proved to be highly valuable at a time when Mawlāy Sulaymān's income was greatly reduced by the political and economic situation.

VII - The Nature of the Rebellion

Some European authors have seen the Fès rebellion as the creation of trading interests and a reaction by the merchant class against the restrictive commercial policy of Mawlāy Sulaymān (162). A more careful examination of facts leaves no doubt, however, about the conservative character of the movement. While the rebellion did allow the merchant class to play a more active role in the country's political affairs after 1822, it was by no means carried out by merchants.

Indeed, a glance at the bay'a issued by the rebels to Mawlāy Ibrāhīm on 16 November, 1820 tends to invalidate Lazarev's claim that the Fāsi upheaval against Mawlāy Sulaymān constituted a "bourgeois revolution" (163). The authors of the bay'a called upon the new sultan to remove merchants from government and to rely instead on the sharif-s and the traditional notability. "The interests of the Muslim community should not be placed in the hands of merchants and wealthy people", underlined the text of the bay'a, "but in the hands of individuals whose noble

(160) F.O.52/22, 17 March, 1821.

(161) In 1794 Denmark had refused to pay its tribute on the pretext that Mawlāy Sulaymān was not in complete control of the country; cf.F.O. 52/10, 21 Sept., 1794.

(162) Cf. in particular Thomassy, Des relations politiques et commerciales de la France avec le Maroc, 1842, et G.Lazarev, "Aspects du capitalisme agraire au Maroc avant le Protectorat", in Annuaire de l'Afrique du nord, CNRS, 1975, pp.57-90.

(163) Lazarev wrote about the rebellion: "Il semble qu'elle ait été plus qu'une révolte, mais une révolution qui porta la bourgeoisie commerçante au pouvoir dans la cité de Fès"; cf.his "Aspects du capitalisme", p.59.

ancestry stands out as the surest guarantee against deviation and treachery" (164). The conditional bayca also called upon Mawlāy Ibrāhīm to respect and honour those of noble ancestry, "without overlooking the distinction that exists between sharīf-s and non-sharīf-s" (165). Makhzen responsibilities, demanded the bayca, should be entrusted to families whose loyalty to the Ḳalawid dynasty had been proved during the reign of Mawlāy Ismā'īl — in other words, to the prestigious traditional families (166). The composition of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm's government brings a further proof of the conservative nature of the rebellion. Muḥammad b. Sulaymān, an Andalusian, was appointed chief minister, while Sīdī al-Ḳarbālī, head of the Wazzāniya religious order, assumed the role of advisor to the new sultan (167).

The examination of the Fāsi signatories of the bayca also makes the predominance of the Andalusian and sharifian elements clear. The Qālim-s and merchants, on the other hand, seem to have played a secondary role in the rebellion. While the traditional Fāsi notables and the Idrisiid sharīf-s remained convinced enemies of Mawlāy Sulaymān throughout the rebellion, the support of the Qālim-s and the merchants slackened very quickly.

A - Rumāt and Notables

Since the breakdown of Makhzen authority after the Zaīan defeat, the Andalusian notables, particularly those belonging to families traditionally known to have provided the politico-military leadership in Fès,

(164) Cf. text of the bayca in Dāwūd, III, p.256 (extracts in appendix 86).

(165) Ibid.

(166) This is a clear reference to Mawlāy Ismā'īl's reliance on Andalusian notables in the government of Fès. Andalusian families such as al-Rūsī and al-Gharnāṭī provided governors and army officers during his reign. The Bildiyyīn, on the contrary, seem to have been held in disgrace by Mawlāy Ismā'īl. Cf. N. Cigar, "Une lettre inédite de Mūly Ismā'īl aux gens de Fès," in Hespéris-Tamuda vol., XV, 1974, pp.105-118.

(167) CCC, vol.27, 1 March, 1821.

reacquired an importance they had lost under Mawlāy Sulaymān. In view of the growing insecurity caused by Oudaya attacks, the people of Fès were forced to turn to these notables to whom they entrusted the defence of their lives and property. However, the importance of the rumāt leadership tended to decline as the rebellion broadened to become more than a purely Fāsi movement.

The rumāt (pl. of rāmī) formed the urban militia of some hađariya towns, such as Fès, Tétouan and Salé. They were initially armed with crossbows, but adopted firearms later on (168). It is not possible to ascertain when and how the institution originated, but the rumāt were, apparently, first used by the Makhzen during the reign of the Saçadian sultan Ahmād al-Mansūr (1578-1603) (169). They were financed on a local basis and their main duty was the defence of the town against tribal attacks and the guarantee of tranquillity within the town itself in times of political instability.

Under the 'Alawid dynasty, the city of Fès was usually requested to contribute to the Makhzen's military needs by sending a contingent of rumāt to fight alongside the army. The size of this contingent varied greatly from one reign to another. Under Mawlāy Ismā'īl, Fès used to support a military force of 3,000 men (170). Following his death, the military contribution of Fès was reduced to only 500 men. This did not prevent the rumāt leaders from playing a significant role in Fāsi politics during the chaotic reign of Mawlāy 'Abd Allāh. The Andalusian family of al-Lirīnī, for instance, provided both rumāt commanders and

(168) Ibn ‘Alī al-Dukkālī, *Ithāf*, 13,009, R.L., p. 16.

"وكان فيها [سلا] الرّماة بالنّبال" أنسى مقام خارج البلدة حمل
فسل سلام عن حوت من كمله

(169) Al-*Nāṣirī*, V, p. 163.

(170) Al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-nubahā, K241, p. 192.

Makhzen governors during this period (171). The military contribution of Fès was subject to a further reduction with the accession of Sīdī Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh to power in 1757. During his reign the people of Fès supported a modest force of only 50 men (172). His successor, Mawlāy al-Yazīd, brought back the Fès quota of rumāt to 500 men (173). After 1792, Mawlāy Sulaymān reduced the military contribution of Fès to a symbolic figure of eighteen men, one for each quarter. In his military campaigns he was often satisfied with ten men only (174). Despite their modest size, the rumāt of Fès took part in the pacification of the Chaouia in 1797 (175) and in 1800 in the Makhzen expedition against the Aït Oumalou (176).

It is clear that the importance of the rumāt as a military force was considerably reduced during the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān. The reduction of their number by the Makhzen, in addition to the long period of peace enjoyed by Fès during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, were the main factors behind this decline. When hostilities erupted between the Oudaya and the Fāsi-s in October 1820, the latter realised that they had completely forgotten military practice. As a result, they were helpless before the Oudaya "because they had no longer any experience in fighting", wrote the author of Tadhkirat al-Muhsinīn, "after the long period of peace (...). It was the first fighting witnessed by the people (of Fès)" (177)

Akansūs, who witnessed the early phases of the rebellion, affirmed that the most active group was not

(171) Al-Dū‘ayf, p. 148; Abīmad Ibn al-Hāj, al-Durr al-muntakhab, Ms. Z 1875, R.L., p.289; al-Nāṣirī, VII, p.35.

(172) Al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-nubahā, p.193.

(173) Al-Dū‘ayf, p.242; al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-nubahā, p.193.

(174) Al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-nubahā, p.193.

(175) Al-Dū‘ayf, pp.344-345.

(176) Ibid., p.410.

(177) Al-Majdhūb al-Fāsī, Tadhkirat; p.351.

made up of merchants and wealthy people— as Mawlāy Sulaymān had assumed while he was still at Marrakech—but of "individuals who make their appearance in time of trouble only, called al-rumāt" (178). The mere fact that Akansūs had to explain what was meant by the term rumāt already shows how unacquainted his contemporaries were with this institution. The rumāt who led the Fès rebellion were certainly not from the lower ranks of the urban militia since the institution had almost ceased to exist as a military force by 1820. Moreover, the lower ranks of the rumāt were usually temporary recruits, drawn essentially from the "rabble" and, therefore, unable to perpetuate rumāt traditions during a long and peaceful reign such as that of Mawlāy Sulaymān. Only the prestigious families which had traditionally monopolized the military and administrative leadership on the city were capable of playing such a significant role in the rebellion.

Al-Zayānī, who also was a witness of the rebellion, made no reference at all to the rumāt. Instead, the leading role he attributed to the Andalusian notables. Mawlāy Sulaymān himself, in a letter to the people of Fès during the rebellion (179), vehemently attacked the Andalusians accusing them of being "at the root of the evil". The 'Adwa and the Lamtiyīn, on the other hand, maintained Mawlāy Sulaymān, were only misled by the Andalusians. In fact, the rumāt referred to by Akansūs and the Andalusians mentioned both by al-Zayānī and Mawlāy Sulaymān were one and the same. We find the same names of families who traditionally supplied the leadership of the rumāt (180). They also provided local governors during the reigns of Mawlāy Ismā'īl and Mawlāy 'Abd Allāh.

(178) Akansūs, p.328.

(179) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès (1821), in al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-nubahā', pp.185-188, appendix 89.

(180) Among these names we find: al-Lirīnī, al-Gharnāṭī, al-Jazūlī, al-Khatīb, 'Adīl and others. Cf. list of Fāsi notables who deposed Mawlāy Sulaymān and proclaimed his nephew in the text of the bay'a of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm, Dāwūd, III, p.254.

The primordial role attributed by Akansūs to the rumāt leaders, who were predominantly Andalusians, appears to be contradicted by the insignificant size of the rumāt force by 1820. Their importance, however, resided not in their number, but in their ability to officer the rabble and organize the defence of the city. Moreover, their weight within Fāsi society was not merely due to their sense of military organization and mobilization. It was also due to their political leadership for, under the 'Alawid dynasty, they provided not only rumāt commanders but also Makhzen qā'ids. Sometimes, the same individuals happened to be rumāt commanders and local qā'ids at the same time (181). Owing to their importance within Fāsi society, the rumāt leaders were counted among the aṣyān, or notables, and were, therefore, consulted on important matters, particularly when it came to the designation of a new sultan.

As a socio-military force, the rumāt became particularly powerful in times of political uncertainty when their military experience was sought by the other social groups. They even acquired the upper hand during periods of weak central authority. "Once they make their appearance", wrote Akansūs, "wealthy people fall under their might and mercy" (182). The fact that their military importance had declined during the reign of Mawlāy Sulaymān did not mean that they had ceased to exist in 1820. Even if the lower ranks could easily disband and disappear over time, the traditional leadership was more likely to survive as it was closely associated with the Fāsi notability.

Mawlāy Sulaymān was aware of their existence within the Fāsi social structure, but he never gave them any

(181) N. Cigar, An Edition and Translation of the Chronicles from Muhammad al-Qādirī's Nashr al-Mathānī, Ph.D. Thesis, 1976, Oxford University, p. I4.

(182) Akansūs, p.333.

"أَهْلُ فَاسِ وَأَهْلُ الْعَصْبَةِ مِنْهُمْ قَوْمٌ يَقَالُ لَهُمُ الرَّمَاءُ لَا يَظْهَرُونَ بِالْأَفْئَةِ، وَمَا فِي وَقْتِ الْأَحْكَامِ فَانْتَهُمْ خَادِمُونَ لَا يَأْلَمُ لَهُمْ فَلَذَّا كَانُوا وَقْتَ ظَهُورِهِمْ كَانُوا أَهْلَ الْأَمْوَالِ وَالْأَصْوَلِ تَحْتَ ذِمْتِهِمْ وَتَصْرِفُهُمْ يَغْلِبُونَ فِيهِمْ مَا أَرَادُوا."

importance. His centralizing administrative policy led him to erode the power of this private military force by reducing its numbers and removing its leaders from local Makhzen responsibilities. "Between Mawlāy Sulaymān and these rumāt leaders", noted Akansūs, "there was a deeply rooted hatred" (183). He never solicited their aid or advice because he preferred "people of decency and religiousness" to them (184). Apparently, Mawlāy Sulaymān had little desire to depend on individuals who derived their influence from "street power". Moreover, their strong sense of Casabiyya (esprit de corps) made them uncontrollable and unreliable for Makhzen purposes. In running the affairs of Fès, Mawlāy Sulaymān preferred people who had no particular attachments to this traditional politico-military elite. The government of the city was always entrusted to outsiders (barrānī-s), palace slaves (wasīf-s) or to merchants "who were solely interested in the fructification of their capital" and whose loyalty to the Makhzen was, therefore, more likely to be assured.

Governors of Fès, 1792-1822

1792-1802	Ahmad al-Yammūrī	Makhzen <u>qā'id</u> from the Aît Immour
1802	āl-Habīb b. 'Abd al-Hādī Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Šādaq Ahmad al-Yammūrī	Sultan's affine <u>wasīf</u>
1802-1803	Muhammad al-Salāwī	<u>wasīf</u>
1803-1807	Aba ^c qīl al-Sūsī	Makhzen <u>qā'id</u>
1807-1810	Muhammad Wa ^c zīz	leader and <u>qā'id</u> of the Aît Idrassen
1810-1811	Umar Abū Sitta Muhammad b. Sīrāt al-Shārgī	Makhzen <u>qā'id</u> Makhzen <u>qā'id</u>

(183) Akansūs, p.328.

(184) *Ibid.* Akansūs wrote about Mawlāy Sulaymān's relation with the rumāt leaders:

"وَكَانَ السُّلْطَانُ لَا يَسْأَلُ بِهِمْ لَأَنَّهُ يَعْلَمُ ظُلْمَهُمْ وَفَسَادَهُمْ لَمَرْءَةٌ لَهُمْ، فَهُوَ يَغْضُبُهُمْ غَايَةً، كَانُوا مُصْرِينَ عَلَى بَخْسَهٖ ذَلِكَ".

1811-1812	‘Abd al-Qādir Ṣfīra	merchant
	‘Abd al-Rahmān Ṣfīra	merchant
1813-1815	Muhammad al-Salāwī	
	Muhammad al-Ṣarīdī	<u>waṣīf</u>
	Muhammad Mezwār	merchant
	‘Alī Majjūt	Makhzen <u>qā’id</u> from the Aīt Immour
1815-1817	Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Ṣādaq	
1817-1818	Aḥmad al-Qustālī	<u>kātib</u>
1818-1820	Muhammad al-Ṣaffār	merchant
1820	Qāsim b. Sākin	<u>waṣīf</u>
	(‘Abd al-Rahmān b. Fāris)	Fāsi notables
	()	chosen during the
1820-1822	(Qaddūr al-Mqarfi)	rebellion
	(Ahmad al-Hārthī)	
1822		
(April-Nov)	Mawlāy ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. Hishām	

Sources: Al-Zayānī, Takmīl qudāt Fās; Idem, Jamharat man hakama bi Fās; Al-Du‘ayf; Akansūs, al-Jaysh.

Mawlāy Sulaymān's administrative policy and his dislike for the rumāt leaders greatly disturbed the traditional Fāsi notability. The break down of Mawlāy Sulayman's authority after 1819 offered them a chance to openly express their hostility and make common cause with the sharīf-s, in so far as the traditional privileges of both groups were threatened. An examination of the conditions imposed on Mawlāy Ibrāhīm in the bay‘a of 1820 makes the identity of interest of the traditional notables and the sharīf-s clear. However, the extension of the rebellion beyond the walls of Fès greatly reduced the importance of the rumāt leaders in the movement and opened the way for the sharīf-s to dominate it.

B - The Sharīf-s

The use of military power by the rumāt leaders in 1820 undoubtedly brought them to the front of the political scene but it did not confer the leadership of the rebellion upon

them. In fact, the political leadership of the movement remained the prerogative of the sharīf-s whose influence was further increased with the involvement of the sharifian zāwiya-s and the extension of the rebellion into the countryside.

The sharīf-s never forgave Mawlāy Sulaymān for having attempted to erode their privileges by every means available (185). The sharīf-s of Fès viewed Mawlāy Sulaymān's policy of favouring people of scholarship and wealth at the expense of those who belonged to the Prophet's holy lineage with indignation. His learned council mainly involved ‘ālim-s belonging to the Bildiyyīn or the ‘āmma, to whom he referred for advice on important matters. Nothing could be more shocking to the sharīf-s of Fès than the decision taken by Mawlāy Sulaymān in 1804 to bury his Bildi shaykh, ‘Abd al-Qādir b. Shaqrūn, within the walls of the holy shrine of Mawlāy Idrīs (186).

Of all the Fāsi social groups the sharīf-s were the most resentful of Mawlāy Sulaymān's sympathy with the Bildiyyīn. The long period of peace that the city had enjoyed primarily favoured a group such as the Bildiyyīn whose main strength was based on wealth and learning (187). The outstanding achievements of the Bildiyyīn in the fields of scholarship and trade during this period tended to exacerbate friction with groups whose privileges were inherited (sharīf-s and traditional notables) and, on the other hand, groups whose achievements in the fields of learning and trade represented the only means of improving

(185) Cf. chapter VI. above, pp. 303-309.

(186) Ibn al-Muwāz, al-Maqāla al-murdiyya, Ms.493, R.L., p.21. The only other Bildi ‘ālim to have been buried in the shrine of Mawlāy Idrīs is ‘Abd al-Salām Gassūs (d.1709). By ordering his burial within the walls of the holy shrine, Mawlāy Ismā‘īl apparently sought to expiate his killing of the famous ‘ālim of Fès. Cf. al-Nāṣirī, VII, pp.94-95.

(187) N. Cigar, "Conflict and Community in an Urban Milieu under the 'Alawi-s," The Maghreb Review, Nov.-Dec., 1978, p.5.

their social status ('āmma and Bildiyyīn). Mawlāy Sulaymān's neglect of the sharīf-s can only be explained by his eagerness to avoid being tied to a group whose aṣabiyya and particularist tendencies were likely to compromise his efforts at centralization. His reliance on people of wealth and learning did not involve such a risk. Mawlāy Sulaymān was openly criticized by his contemporaries for his partiality towards the Bildiyyīn. "The Sultan", wrote al-Du'ayf, "respected their views and had a great affection for them. He preferred them to the rest of the people of Fès and entrusted them with his money and trade from which they gained considerable fortunes" (188).

During most of the rebellion, the Idrisid sharīf-s, in particular, proved to be the most ardent enemies of Mawlāy Sulaymān's regime. The attempt made by al-Kattānī in the summer of 1820 on the life of the qādī, al-‘Abbās b. Sūda, presaged the downfall of Mawlāy Sulaymān's authority in the city. When Makhzen officials arrested him, sharifian aṣabiyya began to work and al-Kattānī was immediately freed by his fellow sharīf-s (189). Another sharīf, al-Faḍīl al-‘Imrānī, who already distinguished

(188) A contemporary of Mawlāy Sulaymān expressed his criticism of the Sultan's sympathy with the Bildiyyīn in the following verses:

بَنْوَ فِرِيقَةَ قَدْ نَالُوا مَرَادَهُمْ
لَا عَيْبَ فِيهِ سُوَى تَفْضِيلِهِ لَهُمْ
مِنَ الْأَمِيرِ وَحَازُوا غَایَةَ الْأَرْبَعَةِ
عَلَى بَنْيِ الْمُطْفَى وَ جَمَّلَةَ الْعَرَبِ

The old controversial issue of the alleged preference of the Israelite race by the Quran was raised again during the early years of the nineteenth century (al-Zayānī, al-Turjumāna al-kubrā, p.357). The issue used to be raised everytime the friction between the Bildiyyīn and the other Fāsi groups reached an explosive stage. Ahmad b. ‘Abd al-Salām Bannānī (d.1818) devoted a long work to the issue (Tahliyat al-āthān wa al-masāmi‘, Ms.K.650, BGR). Mawlāy Sulaymān , we are told by Bannānī, did not approve of the campaign that was launched against the Bildi ‘ālim-s. Cf. Bannānī, Tahliyat, p.16.

(189) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès (1821) in al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-nubahā, pp.181-185.

himself by his militancy against the Wahhābi reformist movement, took an active part in the rebellion by inciting the Fāsi-s to violence (190). Ālim-s of sharīf origin played a critical role in clearing the legal ground for the dethronement of Mawlāy Sulaymān. Sharifian Ālim-s were heavily represented among the signatories of the fatwā-s which authorized the deposition of Mawlāy Sulaymān (191). This also applied to the bay'a which brought Mawlāy Ibrāhīm to the throne in November 1820 (192).

The sharīf leadership of the rebellion was, above all, determined by the involvement of two important sharifian zāwiya-s, the Wazzāniya and the Darqāwiya. Sīdī al-‘Arbī al-Wazzānī found in the rebellion a means to avenge himself on a sultan who, since the death of Sīdī ‘Alī b. Ahmad in 1811, had constantly sided against him in the succession contest in the zāwiya (193). Owing to the wide influence he had amongst the tribes, his role became decisive once the newly proclaimed sultan needed to extend his rule to the northern provinces. Indeed, without the crucial support of the Wazzāni sharīf-s, the extension of the rebellion to the countryside would not have been possible. When the movement reached the northern provinces, a Wazzāni sharīf of Tétouan, Sīdī ‘Abd al-Karīm b. ‘Abd Allāh, became the main agent of rebel

(190) *Ibid.*, p.174.

(191) Cf. fatwā-s in Ms.D.2795, BGR, pp.393-404.

(192) Cf. signatories of the bay'a in Dāwūd, III, pp.253-254. The sharīf-s represented 1/3 of the signatories and there was not a single Bildī cālim among the proclaimers of the new sultan.

(193) Cf. chapter VI. In a long poem (*urjūza*) al-Zayānī pointed out the leading role of the sharīf-s in the Fès rebellion:

أَذْسِقُونِي لِلسُّمِّي فِي الشَّقَاقِ
صَالُوا وَبَاضُوا بِعِشْنَانِ الشَّقَاقِ
هُمْ نَدَمَا وَحْجَابُ الرِّوَاقيِ
يَقْتُلُونَ الْوَفَدَ مَعَ الرِّفَاقِ

وَغَاظُنِي قُلْعَلِ بْنِي أَبِيكَ
وَمِنْ بَقَائِمِهِمْ مَنْ شَعَّ عَلَيَّ
وَصَلَحَائِهِمْ أَهْلَلَ لِلْمَرَانِيِ
وَشُرُفَا الْعَلَمِ وَالْجَنْدِيِ

propaganda in the northern Jbala (194). His devotion to the new regime and his religious influence led him to be appointed vice-regent for Tétouan and its surroundings. His zeal for the rebellion was such that, even after the surrender of Fès and Tétouan in the spring of 1822, he still refused to abandon the struggle (195).

The Darqāwiya religious order whose founder was an Idrisid sharīf himself, also took an active part in the rebellion, particularly during its early stages. Mawlāy al-‘Arbī al-Darqāwī attended the proclamation of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm and used his religious influence in an attempt to gain over the Oudaya to the cause of the rebels. His disciple, Muḥammad b. al-Ghāzī, leader of the Zemmour confederation, took a prominent part in mobilizing Berber support for the new regime. According to al-Zayānī, he was in favour of a complete dynastic change, as he proposed the designation of an Idrisid prince (196). The importance of the Darqāwiya religious order tended, however, to diminish after the arrest of the Darqāwi shaykh by the Oudaya and the emergence of the Wazzānī sharīf-s as the uncontested leaders of the rebellion.

C - The ‘Ālim-s

It is not easy to evaluate the nature of the ‘Ālim-s' involvement in the rebellion as they did not represent a distinct social group or a particular set of group interests. Their loyalty was often a function of the social connection they had with existing groups (sharīf-s, Bildiyyīn, Cāmma) or their membership of a particular religious order.

(194) Al-Wazzānī, al-Zāwiya, p.200; Dāwūd, III, pp.260-261.

(195) Al-Wazzānī, al-Zāwiya, p.200; al-Ruhūnī, ‘Umdat al-rāwīn, II, p.192.

(196) Al-Zayānī, Tubfat al-nubahā, p.169.

There is no doubt that the changes which occurred within the corps of Cālim-s during the second decade of the nineteenth century (197) had a significant impact upon the political loyalties of the scholarly elite during the rebellion. During this decade worsening internal difficulties tended to monopolize Mawlāy Sulaymān's attention and, consequently, made his relations with the Cālim-s very distant. The meetings of his learned council became very rare. The institution itself tended to disintegrate after the death of its most prominent members : al-Tayyib b. Kīrān (d.1812), Yahyā al-Shafashāwnī (d.1813), Ḥamdūn b.al-Hāj (1817) and Ahmad b. Sūda (d.1820). The corps of Cālim-s fell progressively under the influence of the sharīf-s. Indeed, the Cālim-s of sharifian origin such as 'Abd al-Salām al-Azamī, 'Abd al-Mālik al-Murrī and Abū Bakr al-Manjra, played a leading role in the legitimization of the rebellion.

Despite this, the proportion of Cālim-s who lent their support to the rebellion remained insignificant (198). It should also be borne in mind that many Cālim-s whose names appeared at the bottom of the fatwā drafted in November 1820 were, a few days before the proclamation of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm, subject to pressure and threat (199). Thus, we find among the signatories of this fatwā the deposed qādī, al-'Abbās b. Sūda and other members of his family who were exposed to great sufferings during the rebellion (200).

(197) Cf. chapter VI.

(198) 12 Cālim-s signed the bay'a on 16 November, 1820 out of a total of 90 Cālim-s belonging to the first and second categories — those who were liable to appear at the formal act of proclamation. Cf. bay'a of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm in Dāwūd III, pp.253-254; list of Cālim-s established by Mawlāy Sulaymān around 1818 in Ibn Zaydān, al-Izz wa al-sawla, II, pp.168-169.

(199) Al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-nubahā', p.158.

(200) Cf. fatwā issued at the beginning of Ṣafar, 1236/early Nov., 1820 in Ms.D.2795, pp.398-404; cf. also Għarrīt, Fawāṣil al-jumān, p.92 on the persecution of the Ibn Sūda family during the rebellion.

The sympathy of the Ūalim-s for the rebellion slackened very quickly after the new regime failed to gain enough support in the country at large. Some Ūalim-s such as Muhammad al-Yāzghī, the author of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm's bay'a and one of the most fervent militants of the early phase of the rebellion, rallied to Mawlāy Sulaymān's party later on and, consequently, suffered imprisonment and torture by the rebels (201). When Mawlāy Ibrāhīm died four months after his proclamation, very few Ūalim-s were ready to approve the bay'a of his brother, Mawlāy Sa'īd (202).

D - Merchants

In his study on precolonial social structures in Morocco (203), G. Lazarev blames the Fès rebellion on a commercial bourgeoisie in search for a greater share in public affairs. A similar interpretation was formulated by R. Thomassy when he claimed that Mawlāy Sulaymān's commercial policy was the main reason behind the political agitation experienced during the latter part of his reign (204). The examination of Moroccan sources, however, allows us to draw a different conclusion .

During Mawlāy Sulaymān's reign, Fès, as an industrial and a commercial city, enjoyed not only a long period of peace, but also a period of prosperity to which a number of fiscal privileges contributed. Mawlāy Sulaymān, who believed at the beginning of the rebellion that merchants and people of wealth were the ring-leaders of the movement, could not understand why the Fāsi-s should be so ungrateful to him after all the privileges he had granted them (205). In a letter to them following the proclama-

(201) Al-'Amrāwī, Nafhat al-araj, p.45.

(202) 10 Ūalim-s only from Fès and Tétouan approved the bay'a of Mawlāy Sa'īd, proclaimed on 17 March, 1821. Cf. text of the bay'a in Dāwūd, III, pp.259-264.

(203) G. Lazarev, "Aspects du capitalisme agraire", pp.58-60.

(204) R. Thomassy, Des relations, p. 3I6.

(205) Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès, in al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-nubahā, pp.181-185 (appendix 88).

tion of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm, he reminded the merchants of his past endeavours to promote their interests (206). He mentioned in particular the abolition of the maks, the reduction of port duties for Moroccan Muslim merchants from 10 to 2.5% and the alleviation of the city's military burden. Indeed by reducing the rumāt contingent from 500 men to a symbolic force of only 18 men, he considerably alleviated the financial burden on the Fāsi merchants since they used to make the largest contribution to the equipping and maintenance of this urban militia. People of wealth could not hope for more favourable conditions : a peaceful reign, light taxation and an insignificant contribution to the military effort. "Fāsi merchants ... were firmly attached to Abī al-Rabīc (Mawlāy Sulaymān) because it was during his times that they attained prosperity", wrote the author of al-Ibtisām, "but they were overpowered" (207).

The fiscal privileges enjoyed by Moroccan merchants remained unimpaired until 1815 when Mawlāy Sulaymān's financial difficulties induced him to operate some changes in his commercial policy. However, neither the increase of import duties for Muslim merchants (1815) nor the limitation on the travel abroad of Moroccan nationals (1816) seem to have seriously affected the interests of Fāsi and Tétouani merchants. Despite these measures, the big merchants of these two towns continued to have commercial relations with Europe and the Arab East (208). The liberalization of the export trade after 1817 (209) was not either disadvantageous to the Moroccan merchants. These complained above all about the decline of contact with

(206) Ibid.

(207) Al-Ibtisām, p.67. On merchants under Mawlāy Sulaymān cf. chapter III above, pp. I08-II7.

(208) Cf. private correspondence of Muhammad Bejja in D.A.R., years 1232-1234 A.H. Among these merchants we find Ibn al-Tālib, Muhammad Mezwār, al-'Abbās Buhlāl, Muhammad al-Sarrūkh, al-Tāhar Baddū and Muhammad al-Brūbī.

(209) Cf. chapter III above, pp. I69-I70.

the outside world and the harmful effects of the drought (210).

The involvement of Fāsi merchants in the rebellion was thus essentially motivated by circumstantial considerations. The breakdown of Makhzen authority after 1819 led to the spread of insecurity in the northern provinces, and consequently threatened the commercial interests of Fès. Moreover, natural calamities disturbed the country's economy and worked against the immediate interests of the merchant class. The prospect of a political change was, therefore, tempting for merchants who were seeking a more stable and a more efficient regime. Their hopes were soon frustrated, especially when they realized they had to pay the bill for the rebellion (211).

The text of the bay'a which brought this latter to the throne dispels any illusion about the bourgeois character of the rebellion. The bay'a called upon the new sultan to rely on the sharīf-s and the traditional notables and "to avoid placing the affairs of Muslims in the hands of merchants and the wealthy because it is the cause of ruin" (212). The fact that merchants tended to play a more prominent role in Makhzen affairs after 1822 should not mislead us in assessing the significance of their participation in the rebellion. The ascendance of the merchant class after 1822 was largely due to the encouragement of the Makhzen for whom this class represented the only counterweight capable of upsetting the influence of conservative groups.

(210) Letter from Muḥammad al-Brūbī to Bejja, Jumādā II, 1234/March-April, 1819.

(211) Al-Ibtisām, p.67; al-Majdhūb al-Fāṣī, Tadhkirat, p.353.

(212) Cf. bay'a of Mawlāy Ibrāhīm in Dāwūd, III, p.256.

CHAPTER EIGHTC O N C L U S I O N

Although Mawlāy Sulaymān did eventually succeed in crushing the rebellion led by traditionalist groups, his prestige had been damaged beyond measure. Other misfortunes were to confront him during the last months of his reign, particularly the humiliating military defeat in July 1822 at the hands of the Charrādi zāwiya near Marrakech (1).

After having completed the pacification of northern Morocco, Mawlāy Sulaymān proceeded to the south, where tribal antagonism between the Cherarda and the Rehamna tribes threatened to develop into a violent confrontation. The confrontation between these two tribal groups had originated from rivalry over land in the Nfis valley (2). However, the leadership of al-Mahdī al-Charrādī among his tribesmen and the intervention of Mawlāy Sulaymān on the side of the Rehamna led to a direct confrontation between the Charrādi zāwiya and the Makhzen. In July 1822, the Makhzen troops were defeated and Mawlāy Sulaymān was himself held prisoner for several days (3).

In the autumn of the same year the Sultan suffered a final blow from the Cherarda tribes. Together with some of the Chiadma, the Cherarda attacked a Makhzen convoy which was carrying taxes collected from the Essaouira

(1) Cf. Drague, Esquisse, pp.91-92.

(2) P. Pascon, Le Haouz de Marrakech, Rabat, 1917, I, p.197.

(3) Akansūs, pp.344-345. Mawlāy 'Abd al-Rahmān avenged this humiliation when in 1828 he razed the zāwiya to the ground and transferred the Cherarda to the Gharb. Cf. al-Nāṣirī, IX, pp.17-20.

trade and they plundered it (4). Considerable amounts of money and goods were lost at a time when the Makhzen was still trying to enforce its authority over the country. Mawlāy Sulaymān was deeply affected by the incident which caused his health to deteriorate until he died on 28 November 1822.

The encounter with the Charrādi zāwiya was, in one way, a further attempt against Mawlāy Sulaymān by traditionalist groups. However, neither the Fès rebellion nor the Charrādi encounter succeeded, and they only served to confirm the Makhzen in its new post-1817 policies. In fact, by then Mawlāy Sulaymān had realised that commercial contact with Europe was the only way he could reduce his financial dependence on the uncertain countryside and, at the same time, effectively resist traditionalist groups. The commercial opening to Europe which began in early 1817 with the granting of important reductions in tariffs was continued during the following years, particularly during the period of the Fès rebellion. Indeed, without export income, which was mainly used to pay for military equipment, the defeat of the rebellion would have been impossible.

Thus, to overcome opposition, Mawlāy Sulaymān had to return to the liberal commercial policy he had adopted during the 1790s. However, this time he was apparently determined not to abandon trade with Europe as an important potential source of revenue for the Makhzen. In fact, Mawlāy Sulaymān was confronted with a much more fundamental choice. Instead of the unsatisfactory system of taxing

(4) Akansūs, p.346.

the tribes and relieving the fiscal burden of urban-based economic activity, the Makhzen was obliged to rely on trade and merchants as part of a permanent strategy. Unlike the commercial policy adopted by Mawlāy Sulaymān after 1798 when he had pacified the country, the end of the Fès rebellion was not accompanied by any restrictive measures on exports to Europe. Indeed, several decisions seemed to confirm that he had broken with his past experience once and for all. By agreeing to establish diplomatic relations with Sardinia in September 1822 (5) and by deciding to reopen the port of El-Jadida to European trade one month before he died (6), Mawlāy Sulaymān showed that the time had come to end Morocco's isolationist tendencies.

His choice of his nephew, Mawlāy 'Abd al-Rahmān, as his successor was partly dictated by his concern to ensure continuity for the policies of his later years. Indeed, as governor of Essaouira from 1821 to 1822, Mawlāy 'Abd al-Rahmān not only proved himself to be a competent administrator, but he had also turned out to be an enthusiastic encourager of trade as well. During his residence there he had developed personal ties with Jewish and European merchants (7). In a way, his career resembled that of Sīdī Muḥammad b. 'Abd Allāh who, prior to his assumption of power in 1757, had also been governor

(5) F.O. 52/13, letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the King of Sardinia, 29 Sept., 1822.

(6) F.O. 174/28, 2 Nov., 1822. Cf. also F.O. 52/23, 23 Nov. 1822 and a letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Beloniel (Jewish merchant) requesting his assistance in the reopening of the port of El-Jadida in D.A.R. (year 1238 AH).

(7) F.O. 174/155, 24 Jan., 1823 and 31 Dec., 1823.

at Essaouira. As soon as he acceded to the throne, Mawlāy Abd al-Rahmān called upon the wealthy Fāsi merchant al-Ṭālib b. Jallūn to serve as his chief minister (8) and immediately thereafter granted Meir Macnin large monopolies over the export trade.

MERCHANTS, of all social categories, seemed to be the only group whose alliance was of strategic value to the Makhzen. There is no doubt that the merchant class, particularly in Fès and Tétouan, was greatly weakened after 1817 as a result of natural calamities and the political instability which followed the Sultan's defeat at the hands of the Zaian. It was weakened even more by the Fès rebellion during which Mawlāy Ibrāhīm and his brother Mawlāy Sa‘īd extorted large sums of money from both Fāsi and Tétouani merchants. Nevertheless, weakened as it was in 1822, the urban mercantile bourgeoisie emerged from the rebellion as the only victorious group on which the Makhzen could rely to keep the traditionalist groups in check.

As a practical statesman, however, Mawlāy Abd al-Rahmān was anxious not to antagonize these groups, particularly at a time when the embryonic merchant class was not yet powerful enough to provide solid support to the Makhzen. As a result, to temper any potential opposition they might have demonstrated, he granted them a number of concessions. He had inaugurated his reign by a gesture of goodwill towards the Idrisid sharīf-s when he ordered the enlargement of the shrine of Mawlāy Idrīs (9). The Wazzāni sharīf-s were

(8) F.O. 52/24, 11 Feb. 1823.

(9) Al-Nāṣirī, IX, p.8.

allowed to take control of the inheritances of people who died without heirs in the Touat. Traditional notables of both urban and rural origins were also given a share in the government of the country. Al-Tayyib al-Biyyāz, one of the leaders of the Fès rebellion, was entrusted with control of the customs of Tangier and, later on, appointed qā'id of Fès itself (10). Muḥammad Ū-Mimūn, leader of the Guerouane, was appointed qā'id of Tangier and Muḥammad b. al-Ghāzī, of the Zemmour, became one of the closest advisors to Mawlāy Sulaymān's successor for a time. This policy of rapprochement with the traditionalist elements within Moroccan society was, in fact, nothing more than a tactical policy designed to neutralize their hostility. After 1822 these groups progressively lost ground to the mercantile bourgeoisie which took an increasingly active role in running the Makhzen bureaucracy. Indeed, the history of Morocco during the rest of the nineteenth century was dominated by the ascendance of this merchant class whose development went hand in hand with the country's commercial opening to Europe.

(10) ibid.

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G L O S S A R Y

^C Adl	(pl. ^C udūl), notary.
Aḥbās	Pious endowments.
Ahl al-dhimma	The protected people, particularly Jews living under the protection of the Muslim community.
Ahl al-hall wa al- ^C aqd	People responsible for tying and untying matters of religion. They include the <u>^Cālim-s, sharīf-s</u> , notables and army chiefs.
^C Ālim	A religious scholar.
Amīn	Tax collector; superintendant; head of a professional corporation.
^C Āmma	Common people.
^C Asābiyya	Group cohesion, " <u>esprit de corps</u> ".
^C Āshūrā'	Tenth day of Muḥarram, first month of the Hijra year.
A ^C yan	Notables, people of distinction.
^C Azīb	Territory the inhabitants of which pay their taxes to a <u>zāwiya</u> instead of the Makhzen.
Baraka	Supernatural power owned by saints and <u>sharīf-s</u> .
Bay ^C a	Vow of allegiance.
Bayt al-māl	State treasury.
Bid ^C a	A blameworthy innovation.
Dhikr	Incessant repetition of certain words or phrases in praise and remembrance of God.
Dīwān	A collection of poems, register.
Fanega	Spanish measure equivalent to 1.58 bushels (or 4 Moroccan <u>mudd-s</u>).
Faqīh	Jurisconsult, learned man.
Fatwā	Formal judicial opinion issued by the <u>muftī</u> (or by a prominent <u>^Cālim</u>).

Ḩadariya (towns)	Seats of urban civilization (Fès, Tétouan, Rabat and Salé).
Ḩadīth	Tradition going back to the Prophet.
Hadiyya	Present, gift.
Ḩanta	Professional association of artisans or traders.
Ḩartānī	(pl. ḥarrātīn), descendant of a black slave.
‘Ilm	Knowledge, science of divine things.
‘Ilm al-kalām	Dogmatic theology.
Imām	"Leader" in public worship, the spiritual and temporal leader of the Muslim community.
Ijāza	Recognition of authority in a field (or fields) of learning.
Jaysh	Army; tribe providing troops in return for exemption from taxes.
Kabīra	Major sin.
Karāma	Saint's miracle, sign of God's favour.
Kasb	Acquisition, personal initiative.
Kātib	Secretary.
Khādim	Servant, adept of a particular <u>zāwiya</u> or religious order.
Khāṣṣa	Elite, people of distinction
Khuṭba	A homily delivered at the Friday prayer.
Madrasa	A higher religious school.
Madhab	Juridical school, rite.
Makhzen	Storehouse or treasury. By extention, used in Morocco to mean the State.
Maks	Artibrary (non-religious) taxes. They include gate taxes, market dues and the State monopolies.
Manāqib	Virtues of saints, works of merit.
Mawlāy	My Lord, title of distinction given to <u>sharīf-s</u> (used interchangeably with <u>Sīdī</u>).
Mawsim	Religious fair.

Mehalla	Army detachment on expedition.
Millāh	Jewish quarter.
Mudd	Measure for cereals and other agricultural produce. At the beginning of the XIXth century, it equaled 12.5 kilograms for wheat and 10 kilograms for barley. The Rabat <u>mudd</u> was three times the standard (Fāsi) <u>mudd</u> .
Muhtasib	Market provost and supervisor of public morality.
Mujāhid	(pl. mujāhidūn), fighter in a holy war.
Munqati ^C	(pl. munqati ^C ūn), a person who dies without leaving heirs.
Murābit	A man who devotes his life to worship in a retreat, a popularly acclaimed saint.
Muraqqa ^C a	Patched garment worn by the adepts of some religious orders, particularly by the Darqāwi-s.
Murid	Aspirant, disciple.
Mushrik	Heretic, polytheist
Mutasharrif	False <u>sharīf</u> .
Nādhir	Administrator of pious endowments.
Qā'id	Chief; governor.
Qaṣīda	Poem.
Qintār	Moroccan quintal, equivalent to 118 English pounds. As a monetary measure it equaled 1,000 <u>mithqāl</u> -s.
Rātib	Salary.
Rihla	Travel, travel account.
Rumāt	Urban militia of some major towns, such as Fès and Tétouan.
al-Salaf al-Šāliḥ	Pious ancestors.
Samā ^C	Use of musical instruments for cult purposes.
Sanad	Chain of transmission of knowledge.
Shafā ^C a	Intercession of a saint or a prophet between the believer and God.

Shahāda	Profession of faith.
Sharī'a	Islamic law.
Sharīf	A descendant of the Prophet Muḥammad.
Shaykh	Spiritual leader; teacher; head of a religious order.
Shirk	Polytheism.
Sīla	A voluntary allowance; a regular gift from the sultan.
Silsila	The line of succession in a religious order traced to some religious authority.
Sunna	Prophet's traditions.
Tabā'a	Sultan's personal guard.
Tabaqā	Category (of <u>Cālim-s</u> or saints).
Takfir	Excommunication from the Muslim community.
Tālib	Student; learned man; secretary.
Tariqa	Sufi path.
Tubjiya (Turkish)	Artillerymen.
Urjūza	A poem according to a particular metre called <u>rajaz</u> .
Ūqiya	The basic monetary unit in pre-colonial Morocco, based on bronze. In 1818 it cost 3 shillings and 6 pence or 40 French centimes.
Ushūr	Quranic tax of one tenth on agricultural produce.
Wali	(pl. awliyā), God's friend, saint.
Waṣīf	Sultan's slave.
Wazīr	Minister.
Wird	Litany; initiation formula communicated by a <u>shaykh</u> to a <u>murid</u> .
Zakāt	Tax of 2.5% paid on precious metals, merchandise and livestock after one year's uninterrupted possession of a certain minimum (<u>nīsāb</u>).
ziyāra	Offering made to a saint or a <u>sharīf</u> .
Zāwiya	A convent or a retreat. In North Africa also used to designate a religious order.

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN MOROCCO
DURING THE REIGN OF MAWLĀY SULAYMĀN
1792 - 1822

by

Mohamed EL MANSOUR

T H E S I S

SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN THE SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL AND AFRICAN STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
1981



A P P E N D I C E S

Almost all the documents contained therein are being published for the first time here. By reproducing these documents we aim at:-

1. Providing those who seek a deeper knowledge of the period with first hand information for a more intimate acquaintance with the issues discussed in the thesis.
2. Assembling as much documents as possible about a reign which is not only under-studied but which is also strikingly poor in documents.

Thus, we would have contributed to clear a major obstacle which has prevented until now the study of the period.

The documents are organized chronologically. Documents which bear no date and which we were unable to situate in time will come last.

Appendix 1 : Letter of rebuke from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Sīdī ‘Alī b. Ahmad concerning the latter's support for Mawlāy Maslama.

Date : not mentioned (1792)

Source: Ms.K.1264, BGR, p.365.

من عبد ربه سليمان بن محمد إلى علي بن أحمد ،

بلغنا كتابك المشتمل على السفطة والجدل المبهر بالتعريض وقد كنا نكتب إليك على نيتنا ونخاطبك بالخطابة والبرهان حتى وقفتا على هذا الكتاب فعلمنا أنك تخطي خطيب عشوى ، وأن لا حسب لك إلا اتباع الهوى ، وقولك لي فسأل عنك ، فأنا أعرف الناس بك كما أنت أعرف الناس بي . أنت رجل مسلم ترتكب الصالح والطالع ، إن قابلتك الله بعدله عذبك ، وإن قابلتك بحمله غفر لك ، لأنك تأكل أموال الناس بالباطل ، وكل من أكل أموال الناس بوصف وهو ليس فيه فهو أكل له بالباطل ، كما هو منصوص عند العلماء وليس لك والحمد لله طريق تدلّ بها على الله إلا ولنا يد .

أطول من يدرك من حفظ القرآن والتفقه في الدين وطهارة النسب ، وهذا من باب التحدث بالنعم . فاعلم أنك دخلت أمراً ما راعى من هو خير " مني من هو خير " منك فيه حرمة ولم يدخل فيه هذا الدخول ، وما عرضت به نفسك للهلاك قد وصل لفاس من غير إذننا على وجه السعي في الأرض بالفساد . والآن إن قدمت علينا فالثائب من الذنب كمن لا ذنب له ، وإلا جازيناك بما أنت به مجنى في الكتاب بححـول الله وقوته .

Appendix 2 : Letter from Mawlāy Hishām to the king of Spain asking for money and military equipment.

Date : 29 Jumādā II, 1206 / 23 Feb., 1792.

Source : A.H.N., Estado, Legajo 4328.

إلى السلطان الصبنيول الري كرسوس الرابع

السلام على من اتبع الهدى . أما بعد فاعلم أنى قد قدمت لك كتاباً تاريخه سبعة وعشرين من جمادى الثانية سنة ستة و ماتين وألف وعليلتك منه بجميع الأخبار الواقع عندنا بالغرب وما زاد وما نقص وإن نريدك المال الذى تزيد توجهه لحضرتنا العالية بالله مع الات الحرب من المدافع والبارود والمكاحل والسكاكن وجهاً منه لطيط الجديدة على يد خادمنا القائد الحاج الهاشمي بن العروسي الدكالي ، فلن مرستها سهلة وطيبة ونحب عمارتها أكثر من غيرها والبعض من ذلك وجهه لشفر آسفي . وعلى هذا يكون العمل إن شاء الله والسلام .
وفي التاسع والعشرين من جمادى الثاني عام 1206 .

Appendix 3: Dhahîr by Mawlây Sulaymân appointing Ahmâd b. Sûda qâdî of Fès.

Date : 21 Rajab, 1206 / 15 March, 1792.

Source: Sulaymân al-Hawwât, al-Rawâdâ al-maqşûda, Ms. K.2351, pp.320-321.

الحمد لله وحده وصلى الله على سيدنا ومولانا محمد وآل وصحبه

عن الأمير المولوي الهاشمي العلوي الذى تجددت بسعادته مفاخر أسلافه
وعاد العقد بحول الله وقوته إلى حسن انتظامه واتلافه وجع الله به شمل
هذا الإقليم المغربي بعد اندفاعه وهد أركانه والله تبارك وتعالى أعلم حيث
 يجعل رسالته سيدنا ومولانا أمير المؤمنين وناصر شريعة سيدنا ومولانا محمد
الصادق الأمين

عبد ربه سليمان بن محمد ابن عبد الله
كان الله له (توقيع مولاي سليمان)

أمد الله بالتأييد والفتح المبين ونصر به عساكر المسلمين ، يستقر هذا الظهير
الأسمى المبارك الأنحر الأحمى بيد الفقيه الأجل العالم العلامة الأفضل النزيه
الوجيه الأسعد أبي العباس السيد أحمد بن الشيخ الإمام علم الأعلام وبركة
شيخوخ الإسلام سيد محمد التاودي بن سودة أبقى الله مصباح فضله تستضا به
هذه الأمة ويعرف منه بحول الله وقوته وشامل ينه وبركته أتنا ولیناه خطبة
المنصب الشرعي بمحروسة حضرة فاس الإدريسية صانها الله وكلها ومن كل
ما يضرها وقاها وقد انتخباه وتخيرناه لهذا المنصب الشريف وطوقناه إيماء
لما نعلم من علمه ودينه . إن المسلمين لا يصيّبهم معه إن شاء الله ضيق
ولا تحريف ويكون عنده في مقطع الحق سواه القوى والضعف والشريف والمشروف
أمدنا الله وإيماء بالهداية والتوفيق وسلك بنا وآله أفق طريق حتى يكون

إن شاء الله ثالث القضاة ، ومحلى في العلم والعمل بالخلل المرتضاة ، وقد
بسطنا له يد التصرف في أمر الشهود على النهج القديم المعهود ، فمن
ثبتت عدالته فليقره على حاله ، ومن تطرق إلى الألسن بسوء أو كانت
فيه ريبة تخدش في مرؤته فليذهب لحال سبيله كائناً من كان ، ومن كان حاله
على هذين الوضعين وأبقاء منصوباً للشهادة أو قبلشهادته فإئتم ما يترتب
في ذلك على رقبته وعهده عليه ، ونحن برأنا من ذلك دنيا وأخرى والله
تبارك وتعالى يتولى هداية الجميع ويوفقنا لما يرضي به عنا سيدنا ونبينا
ومولانا محمد صاحب القدر الرفيع والسلام . صدر الأمر بهذا في الحادي
والعشرين من رجب الفرد عام ستة مائتين وألف .

Appendix 4 : Letter from Mawlāy Maslama to the European consuls at Tangier concerning his different with Mawlāy Sulaymān.

Date : 21 Sha'bān, 1206 / 14 April, 1792.

Source: A.H.N., Estado, Legajo 4328.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ رَحْمَةً وَرَحْمَةً وَلَا حُوْلَّ وَلَا قُوَّةَ إِلَّا بِاللَّهِ
 ليعلم النعراني فراشيشكو الجنويز وكافة القوسمات بشفر طنجة أن أخانا
 مولاي سليمان حين بايده الشلح محمد وعزيز شرط على نفسه أنه على الفرقة
 مع جميع أجناس النصارى ولاصلح لهم بهم حيث علم أننا معكم على المهادنة
 والصلح . وها وصفاتنا عبيد سيد البخاري تخاصموا معه ونصرتنا ونحن أعلمكم
 بهذا الخبر الذى ورد علينا لتكونوا محققين بخبره . انتهى
 وفي 21 شعبان عام 1206 .

Appendix 5 : Letter from Juan Manuel Salmon, Spanish consul general to Mawlāy Sulaymān concerning the official Spanish attitude towards the dynastic crisis in Morocco.

Date : End of Shawwāl, 1206 / June , 1792.

Source : A.H.N., Estado, Legajo 4327.

رسالة من دون خوان سالمون إلى سليمان

أيها الأمير المعظم وصاحب المقام المفخم سيدى مولاي سليمان
آدام الله عزه .

حين تشرفت بورود عزيز كتابكم فقد قبلته بكل اعتبار وإكراام واحترام
ولأنني أرسلتكم إلى حضرة مولاي الملك سلطان إسبانيا لكي يقف على فحواه
فاتاني الأمر أن أوضح لديكم أنه قد انسنَ وانحط جداً ومدح حسن
ميلكم وموافقتكم على الصلح والمسالمة مع دولة إسبانيا ورغبتكم برجوع رهبان
طائفتنا الفرা�ييلية إلى محروسة مكتasse وخلاف قناصرنا إلى مساكنهم
المعينة وبالطلاق مراكبنا إلى أساطيل دولة مراكش العاشرة كما كان في
حياة صاحب الذكر المؤيد والدكم سلطان محمد وأنه سيوفيكم بفعيل
الجميل كلما يتوقف له عما أبديتتموه له من إيمارات الحب والوداد والصدقة
الثانية ، ولكن يُضيف بالقول حضرة مولاي الملك أنه لا تمكنه الآن الموافقة
على ما أشرتموه حيث مثل هذه الإشارات الظاهرة تعلن إقراره ورضاه
بتقدمكم وتوليتكم الثانية على مملكة مراكش العلية مع وجود أمير آخر وهو
أخوكم الذي يطلب هذه الحقوق عينها لذاته ويجد على الوصول إليهما .
إذاً قد تحسن عنده هذا الرأي المصيب إلا يدخل ويعارض حقوق أحد
ولا يقدم ولا يآخر الواحد على الآخر من الإخوان بالإعلان والإقرار أن هذا
هو السلطان ، وذلك قد اعتمد الآن على حفظ المسالمة —————

سيادتكم الشريفة ومع الأمير أخيم بحال الاعتدال النام وأنه سيجعلها
 إن شاء الله على ثبات بعد العهود مع من يستوتب أمره وتنقّل
 سلطانته على الدولة الإساعلية ورعاياها، غير أن مولاي الملك
 يرغب بنوع المحبة والأناسة إن حضرت سعادتكم والأمير الآخر أخاكم
 تنفقان في حقوقهما . وإنني بلغت سعادتكم جواب مولاي ملك
 إسبانيا أؤكد له ديني أرجو مجدًا حفظ المسالمة بين هذه الدولة
 وسعادتكم السامية ، وأطلب من الله دوام حياتكم سنين عديدة وأيام
 مخلدة والسلام . حرر في أواخر شوال سنة 1206 من الهجرة .

الداعي إلى مقامكم السامي
 دون خوان كرزالر سلسون

Appendix 6 : Letter from al-Ghāzī b. Salāma (Mawlāy Sulaymān's qā'id) to the Spanish consul general, J.M. Salmon, concerning the concession of Dar al-Bayda to the Spanish.

Date : 2 Shawwāl, 1207 / 13 May, 1793.

Source : A.H.N., Estado, Legajo 4330 (2).

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

من خديم العقام العالى بالله القائد الغازي بن سلامه إلى القونصوا
ملوين سلمون الصبنيولى سلام على من اتبع الهدى، أما بعد بلغنى كتابك
وما ذكرت فيه عرفته وعلمت بأنك تحب الإصلاح وتجري في ما يبلغ إليه بين
مولانا ومن ينعته أولاً نَا أمير الْمُلْكَ المحمدية مولانا سليمان نصره الله
النصر البدين ونصر عساكره وأيده بالفتح المعين وبين أميركم وذاك الذي
يجلب لك الرضى ومن يفعل هذا ينبغي له أن يلحظ وتقصى جميع أمره
لأنه لا يجري في مثل هذا إلأى أنه عقل ومرؤة وما ذكرته لي بأنك تكلمت مع
سلطانكم وأنه أمر لراكب تجاركم تخرج لمراسينا بقصد التجارة فإنه بنفس ما دخل
يدي وقرأتـه صرت به لحضرـة مولانا السـلطـان نـصرـهـ اللهـ وـقـرـأـهـ عـلـيـهـ فـلـماـ سـمعـ
ذلك آيـدـهـ اللهـ كـتـبـ فيـ الجـيـنـ لـجـمـيعـ مـرـاسـيـهـ يـوـصـيـهـ بـعـراـكـ بـمـاـ يـفـرـحـهـ
بـهـمـ وـيـوـسـقـواـ لـهـمـ وـإـنـ كـانـتـ مـرـاكـبـ التـرـصـانـ يـخـرـجـواـ لـهـ الفـريـشـكـ عـلـىـ عـادـةـ
سـيـدـنـاـ وـمـوـلـانـاـ الـكـبـيرـ رـحـمـهـ اللهـ وـأـنـ يـزـيدـ وـأـنـ يـفـرـجـهـ لـهـ مـاـ يـعـدـ
يـعـهـدـ وـأـعـطـاـكـمـ سـيـدـنـاـ أـطـالـ اللهـ عـرـهـ مـرـسـيـ الدـارـ الـبـيـضاـ كـمـ كـانـتـ بـأـيـدـيـكـ
فيـ حـيـاةـ سـيـدـنـاـ وـالـدـهـ قـدـسـ اللهـ روـحـهـ وـأـمـرـكـ انـ قـدـمـتـ الدـارـ الـبـيـضاـ
أـنـ تـحـوـزـوـ الدـارـ الـتـيـ عـنـدـكـ بـهـاـ وـجـمـيعـ الـمـخـازـنـ وـيـحـوزـ مـفـاتـيـعـ الـجـمـيعـ لـكـ
قـونـصـوـ الـفـرـانـصـيـصـ الـذـيـ بـرـيـاطـ الـفـتـعـ لـأـنـيـ عـلـمـتـ يـحـبـكـ وـهـوـ الـذـيـ قـالـ لـيـ تـكـلـمـ
لـكـ مـعـ مـوـلـانـاـ السـلـطـانـ فـيـ شـأـنـ مـرـسـيـ الدـارـ الـبـيـضاـ وـحـوزـ دـارـكـ وـالـمـخـازـنـ الـتـيـ

بها ففعلت ذلك وكلمت سيدنا ومولانا سليمان خلد الله ملكه وقد أعطاها لك
افعل بها ما أردت وسيدنا ومولانا الطيب أخو مولانا السلطان أيده الله تراه
نازلاً بل قاطنا في الدار البيضا بمحال كثيرة عنده بتامسنه وما ذكرته بأن أحدا
كتب لك من طنجة يريد أن يخسر ما بينا وبينك فلا تسمع بذلك ولا تنصل إلى إيه
لأننا لا نقبل ذلك لما نعلمه من حال مولانا السلطان أداءه الله وأنه لا يسمع بذلك
ولا يقبله في جنس الصبنيول لأمور منها أنكم جيراننا الأقرباء ولما كان من المواصلة
بين سيدنا الكبير رحمه الله وبين الري كارلوس وكذلك يحب سيدنا ومولانا
سليمان نصره الله يكون مع ولد الري كارلوس أو أكثر من ذلك لما يصلح الله به
بين الفريقين وقد وصفنا حالك وخدمتك لمولانا الإمام لما نعلمه من وقوفك في
الإصلاح بين المسلمين والصبنيول وأنت عنده في منزلة كبيرة وان كتابك الذي
بعثت لي أولاً وصلني وмолاي محمد الذي كان بالدار البيضا قائماً قبضه مولانا الإمام
وهو مسجونا عندك وقونصوا الفرانسيص الذي بالرياط يحبك كثيراً ويحب لك الغير ،
والسلام على من اتبع الهدى ، وفي 2 شوال عام 1207 .

Appendix 7 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Antonio Gonzales Salmon, Spanish vice-consul, apologizing for the attack made by Jbāla tribesmen on Spanish vessels and seamen at Martil and showing readiness to receive Spanish friars in Morocco.

Date : 3 Sha'bān, 1208 / 6 March, 1794.

Source : A.H.N., Estado, Legajo 4331 (1).

الحمد لله وحده ولا حول ولا قوة إلا به

(الباب)

خد بنا انطوني صالحون نائب قونصوا الاصبنيول بشفر طنجة حرسه الله
امين السلام على من اتبع الهدى أما بعد فقد ورد على شريف مقاما من
عندك أربعة كتب أولها زمام هديتك وهدية أخيك الواعظ وقد بلفت على ما
هي عليه في زمامك فعافاك وعافا أخيك المذكور فإنكما لنا وقد حدثت محبتكم
وخدمتكم لجانبنا حرسه الله ول يكن عملك فيما جئت به من الخمسة والعشرين
الف ريال ان توسر واجبها وتتمل ما بقي لك بعد قطع الحساب حتى لا يبقى
لك منها ولو موزونة على الواجب الأول وهو ثمان وأولي لكل فنية فلنـك
متاعنا ولانعامك إلا بما يليق بك ويفرح به أخوك وزعماه جنسك . وما وقع
بعرتيل عرف جنسكم بحقيقة أمره وانه إنما وقع من الزمتطوط ومثل ذلك يقع في كل
جنس وفي كل دولة ولا يضر ولا يؤثر في جانب السلطنة ومع ذلك فإنه لا يضر
من دمائكم ولا من أموالكم شيء إن شاء الله وستسمعون ما يقع بأولادك الشياطين
 أصحاب ذلك الفعل من العقوبة إلى أن يبلغ خبرها لجميع بلاد صباية والله
على ذلك قدير و مسئلة لفرنسيص وما ذكرت عنهم قد تحققته وأشهر لکریم علمـنا
وما دامـوا معکم على غير اتفاق فلا حاجة لنا بهم ولا بما يأتي من عندهم وما
أمرنا لجميع خدامـنا أهل مراسينا الجهادية عمرها الله وحرسها بأن لا يتركوا أحدا
من جنس لفرنصيـس يرسـى عندـهم ولا يدخلـ اليـهم ولا ينفعـونـه ولو بشـرة ماـ

ولذا ورد عليهم قرضاً من جنسكم أنتم يفرحوا به ويعطوه ما أراد كما أمرناهم
 قبل وقدمنا لهم وخداماً لفريالية ها نحن جددنا لهم على ما بآيديهم بعد
 وقوتنا على ظهائيرهم ورد ها إليهم وعلى ما كانوا عليه من الملاحظة والاعتبار
 يبقون، وبتاريخ ثالث شعبان من عام ١٢٠٨.

Appendix 8 : Letter from Mawlāy Maslama to the Governor of Ceuta asking for ammunitions while he was entrenched in the shrine of Mawlāy^c Abd al-Salām b. Mashīsh (1795).

Date : 8 Ṣafar, 1210 / 24 August, 1795.

Source : D.A.R.

الحمد لله وحده وصلى الله على سيدنا محمد وآله

(الطابع)

إلى حاكم سبتة والسلام على من اتبع الهدى . أما بعد
 فنأمرك أن تبعث لنا قنطران بارود وقنطران خفيف لأنكم عندى أفضـلـ
 الجنون ونعرفكم حينئذ تحبـ جـانـبـنـاـ العـالـيـ بالـلـهـ ؛ ونجازـكـمـ
 إن شاء الله بأحسن الجزاء ولا بد ولابد وابعث لنا ما ذكرنا . 8 صفر
 عام 1210 .

Appendix 9 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Sīdī ‘Alī b. Ahmad following the normalization of relations with the Wazzāni zāwiya.

Date : 1795.

Source: al-Dū‘ayf, p.308.

من عبد ربه سليمان بن محمد أمير المؤمنين لطف الله به آمين
إلى الشريف البركة سيدى علي بن احمد ، سلام عليكم ورحمة الله
وبركاته ،

وبعد فأننا وأياكم على عهد الله وأخوته، ولا نحب (ان) يقع
منكم الا الخير العام كما هي عادتكم وعادة أسلافكم، وتحققنا
(ان) قد ويك لفاس انما (كان) فرارا بنفسك ودينك، وقد جعل
الله فيك خيراً كثيراً ولا نسمع في جانبك كلام أحد لم نعتقد فيه
من الدين والاستقامة والنصح . وهذا الأمر الذي أولانا الله
تعالى والله ما طلبناه ولا سمعنا فيه، وحيث كلفنا الله به
وجب علينا القيام به والرضا والتسليم إذ نحن عبيد الله نرضي
بما قدره علينا وقضاءه، غير أننا نحب من أشالكم أن يكونوا
لنا أعونا " وتعاونوا على البر والتقوى ولا تعاونوا على الإثم
والعدوان "، والله في عيون العبد ما دام العبد في عيون أخيه ،
وليس تحت أديم السماء من يعرف قدركم ويجل لكم مثلنا بحول
الله وقوته، ونطلب منكم صالح الدعاء والسلام .

Appendix 10 : Letter from Mawlāy Hishām to Carlos IV, king of Spain, introducing his ambassador.

Date : 1 Sha'bān, 1210 / 10 Feb., 1796.

Source: A.H.N., Estado, Legajo 4331.

الحمد لله وحده ولا حول ولا قوة إلا بالله العلي العظيم

إلى الرَّئِيْس كارلوس الرابع سلطان سيسيلياس ارْغُور سيسيلياس وغيرهم من
نواحي صبانية السلام على من أتَىَ بِهِ الْهُدَىَ آمَّا بَعْدَ فَلِيْكُنْ فِي عِلْمَهُ
أَنَّ اللَّهَ تَعَالَى تَوَلَّ أَمْرَنَا بِغَشْلِهِ وَوَفَقَ قَوْنَا لِلخَيْرِ بِرَشْدِهِ وَطَولِهِ وَاحْلَنَا
دارَ الْمُلْكَةِ بِلَحْسَانِهِ وَبِجَدِهِ وَوَلَانَا سُبْحَانَهُ الْأَمْرُ السُّلْطَانِيَّ بِجَدِهِ
وَسِيَاسَةِ عِبَادِهِ وَجَنُودِهِ وَاهْلَنَا لِنَصْبِ الْوَيْتَهُ عَلَى رُوسَنَا وَبَنُودَهُ بِمَرَاكِيشِ
وَلَيَالِتَهُ وَنَوَاحِيهِ وَارْجَاهُ حَاضِرَتِهِ وَذَوَاهِيهِ بِدارِ مُلْكَةِ الدَّنَا وَاسْلَافِهِ
رَحْمَهُمُ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى وَوَجَبَ عَلَيْنَا إِعْلَامُكَ بِذَلِكَ وَقَدْ وَجَهْنَاكَ كِتابَنَا المَحْفُوظَ
بِاللَّهِ مَعَ خَدِيْكُمْ سَلَمُونَ لِيَقُوْنَ فِي عِلْمِكَ مَا نَحْنُ عَلَيْهِ مِنْ نِيَّةٍ
الْخَيْرِ عَازِمُونَ وَلَنْعَلِمْكُمْ بِمَا مَنَّ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى عَلَيْنَا بِهِ مِنَ التَّصْرِ وَالْتَّمْكِينِ وَالْعَافِيَّةِ وَالْتَّسْكِينِ
وَلِتَجْدِيدِ الصلحِ وَالْمَهَادِنَةِ الَّتِي كَانَ مَعَكُمْ عَلَيْهَا وَالدَّنَا المَرْحُومُ بِاللَّهِ وَلَا تَرُوا
مَا أَنْ شَاءَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى إِلَّا خَيْرٌ وَدَوْمَ الْعَافِيَّةِ وَالَّذِي يَصْلُحُ وَلَيْقَ بِرَعِيَّتِهِ
وَرَعِيَّتِكُمْ هُوَ الَّذِي يَكُونُ إِنْ شَاءَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى وَقَدْ بَعْثَتَا لَكَ كِتابًا أَخْرَى مَعَ
صَاحْبِنَا الْفَقِيهِ الشَّرِيفِ مُولَّا يَعْبُدَ اللَّهَ بْنَ الْحَاجِ لَأَنَّا وَجَهْنَا إِلَيْسِ
الْسُّلْطَانَةِ مَرِيَّتَهُ وَمَنْ عَنْهَا يَقْدِمُ إِلَى عَنْكَ بِأَمْرَنَا الشَّرِيفِ
انتَهَى، وَفِي فَاتِحِ شَعْبَانَ الْمُبارَكِ مِنْ سَنَةِ عَشْرَةِ وَمَائِتَيْنِ وَأَلْفِ .

Appendix 11 : Letter from 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Nāsir to the Spanish consul general J.G. Salmon concerning an embassy sent by Mawlāy Hishām to the Spanish Court.

Date : 1 Sha'bān, 1210 / 10 Feb., 1796.

Source: A.H.N., Estado, Legajo 4331.

الحمد لله وحده

ولا يسدون إلا ملائكة

إلى التووصوا دُجنبلاجوان تمُصلس سَلْمُون السَّلَامُ على من اتبَعَ
الهُدَى أَمَا بَعْدَ فَقَدْ كَتَبْتُ لَكَ هَذَا الْكِتَابَ لِنُخْبِرُكَ فِيهِ وَأَنَا مَعْكَ عَلَى
الْعَهْدِ الْقَدِيمِ الَّذِي كَانَ بَيْنَكُمْ وَبَيْنَ مَوْلَانَا الْمَرْحُومِ بَاللَّهِ وَعْدَ وَفَانَهُ رَحْمَةُ
اللَّهِ كَمَا جَدَدْنَا مَعْكَ وَكَتَبْتُ أَنْتَ الْوَاسِطَةَ فِي ذَلِكَ بَيْنَنَا وَبَيْنَ سُلْطَانَكَ
وَنُخْبِرُكَ أَيْضًا وَأَنَّ السُّلْطَانَ سَيِّدَنَا وَمَوْلَانَا هِشَامَ نَصْرَهُ اللَّهُ بِحَمْرَاءِ مَرَاكِشَ
صَانَهُ اللَّهُ مُؤْيَداً مُنْصُوراً وَالْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ عَلَى ذَالِكَ وَهَا كِتَابُهُ الشَّرِيفُ لِسُلْطَانَكَ
يَصِلُّ عَلَى يَدِ خَدِيكَ زُزَافَ اكْرُوزَ وَفِي خَدِيكَ الْمَذْكُورِ كَفَايَةُ الْخَيْرِ وَنَحْنُ عَلَى
مَعْرِفَتِكَ كَمَا تَعْلَمُ مَنْا ذَالِكَ، وَأَكْثَرُ وَنَذْكُرُكَ فِي قَوْلِكَ الْفَاتَ وَهُوَ أَنْكُمْ قَلْتُمْ أَوْلَادَ
سَيِّدَنَا وَمَوْلَانَا أَمِيرَ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ رَحْمَهُ اللَّهُ كَلِمَهُ وَاحِدٌ عَنْكُمْ فِي الْمُعْرِفَةِ وَالْإِحْسَانِ
وَفِيمَا يَجِبُ لِلْمُلُوكِ عَلَى الْمُلُوكِ وَنُخْبِرُكَ خَبْرَ الْحَقِّ الْيَقِينِ الَّذِي لَا يَتَحَوَّلُ
إِنْ شَاءَ اللَّهُ هُوَ سَيِّدُنَا وَمَوْلَانَا هِشَامَ نَصْرَهُ اللَّهُ نَصْرًا عَزِيزًا وَهَذَا مَا نُخْبِرُكَ بِهِ
لَأَنَّكَ تُحِبُّنَا وَالْوَاجِبُ أَنْ لَا نَغْيَبَ عَنْكَ خَبْرَهُ وَنَعْلَمُ بِأَنَّهُ يَصِلُّ إِلَى سُلْطَانَكَ
كِتَابًا خَارِغًا بَغْرِيْرُ هَذَا الْوَارِدِ بِيْدِكَ مَعَ الْفَقِيهِ الشَّرِيفِ مَوْلَايِي عَبْدِ اللَّهِ لَأَنَّ سَيِّدَنَا
وَمَوْلَانَا هِشَامَ نَصْرَهُ اللَّهُ أَمْرَهُ أَنْ يَرْكِبَ الْبَحْرَ بِأَمْرِهِ الشَّرِيفِ لِسُلْطَانَةِ الْبَرْدَقَيْزِ
وَمَنْهَا يَقْدِمُ إِلَى سُلْطَانَ صَبَانِيَّةِ بَكِتَابِهِ الشَّرِيفِ وَنَعْلَمُ بِأَنَّ سُلْطَانَنَا مَعَ تَوْفِيرِ
جُنُودِهِ وَكَثْرَةِ جِيَوشِهِ وَبَنْوَهُ لَا يَخْرُجُ مِنْ بَلْدَهُ صَائِلاً عَلَى أَحَدٍ مَّنْ لِيْسَ
فِي إِيَالَتِهِ لَأَنَّ إِذَا زَادَهُ اللَّهُ مِنْ فَضْلِهِ عَلَى مَا أَعْطَاهُ مِنْ الْقَبَائِلِ فَلَا يَبْأَسُ

بِذِلِكَ كُلِّ ذَلِكَ مِنْ نَصْرِهِ اللَّهِ لِحَفْظِ الْأَعْرَاضِ وَحَقْنِ الدَّمَاءِ وَلِنَفْسِي
الْأَغْرَاضِ وَتَقييدِ النَّعْمَاءِ وَاظْهارًا لِلشُّكْرِ الْوَاجِبِ لِلرَّبِّ عَلَى عَبْدِهِ فِي سَرْرَةِ
وَجَهْرِهِ، انتهى؛ وَفِي فَاتِحِ شَعْبَانَ الْمَبارَكِ مِنْ سَنَةِ عَشْرَةِ وَمَا تَتَّبِعُهُ مِنْ أَلْفٍ .

خديم المقام العالي بالله

عبد الرحمن بن ناصر المخيزني أمنه الله

Appendix 12 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Sīdī ‘Alī b. Ahmad concerning the appointment of Makhzenian qā’id-s in Ouezzane and the neighbouring region.

Date : Hijja, 1210 / June-July, 1796.

Source : al-Dū‘ayf, p.326.

الحمد لله وحده وصلى الله على من لا نبي بعده

من سليمان بن محمد لطف الله به إلى العالم البركة سيدى علي بن أحمد الحسنى ، وبعد اعلم أنى إنما أردت من يكون بزاوية وزان واقف على الشرع المطاع ويكون كالشهاب بجميعها من الشياطين لأنها بلاد بالمغرب ، ومن كان بها كأنما يكون بيته وأنت بمعزز عن القوم الذين يريدون مجرد الجاه الدنبوى و يجعلون أمتتهم خيراً من مكة والمدينة لجهلهم ، لأنهما لا يجيئان عاصيأ ، وي تعرضون إلى لعنة الله ورسوله والملائكة والناس أجمعين والخراب ولو بعد حين بطيؤاهم المحدثين . وحقيقة الزاوية أن يلجا إليها كل من هرب إلى الله من ظالم وليس مهربات للظالمين ، وذلك الرجل الذي جعله خالنا الجيلاني بن المفضل يكون واقفاً على الشرع ومتبعاً لكل ما هذا فلن هو اتبعه فيبقى ، ولن أتبعه هواء وضرره فلا يبقى معنا ولا مع الله ، وأنا معتصم به وعليه الانتكال والسلام . في ذي الحجة 1210 .

Appendix 13 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān's minister Muḥammad Ibn ‘Uthmān to the Spanish Prime Minister Godoy concerning the rebellion of the southern coastal provinces.

Date : 16 Muḥarram, 1211 / 22 July, 1796.

Source : A.H.N., Estado, Legajo 4345.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

أيها السيد الذى سما مجدہ وفخاره وملات الأسماع آثاره وزير الدولة
الاصنیولية البرنسپی ، اي أمیر الصلح ، أما بعد اعرفکم أنـه ورد
 علينا من عند منویل سلمون كتاب كتبه لسيدنا أمیر المؤمنین بأمر دولتكـ
 يذكر فيه أن ملك اصباـنية عزم على إعطاء الاذن لراكب رعيته في التوجـه
 لمرستي آسفـي وطيط بسبـب قدوـم من قدم عليه من تلك الناحـية يطلب ذلك
 مـحتاجـاً بما صدر من الملك المـذكور من أنه لا يـمـيل لأحد من أولاد أمـير
 المؤمنـين سـيدـي مـحمدـ رـحـمـهـ اللـهـ إـلاـ بـالـخـيـرـ وـذـكـرـ أـنـهـ كـتـبـ بـذـكـرـ لـسـيـدـنـاـ
 الملك عام 1792 من تاريخ المسيح وأنـ سـيـدـهـ كـبـ بعد ذلك يستدعـيـ
 تجارـكم وراكـبـكم للقدـوم علىـ أـيـالـةـ سـيـدـنـاـ إـلـىـ هـذـهـ النـاحـيـةـ وتـلـكـ ، وـبـقـيـ
 الـأـمـرـ علىـ ذـلـكـ إـلـىـ عـامـ 1209 من تاريخـناـ حيثـ ظـهـرـ منـ قـبـيـاتـيـ دـكـالـةـ
 وـعـبـدـهـ ماـ ظـهـرـ منـ نـبـذـ أمرـ مـوـلـايـ هـشـامـ وـخـروـجـ عنـهـ ، وـبـقـيـتـ مـرسـ طـيطـ
 وـآـسـفـيـ بـيـدـ الثـوـارـ الـفـائـيـنـ فـرـجـعـ حـيـنـئـذـ مـلـكـ اـصـبـانـيـةـ عـنـ مـعـاـلـتـهـ وـمـخـالـطـتـهـ
 بـسـبـبـ خـرـوـجـهـ عـنـ الـأـحـكـامـ الـواـجـبـةـ . وـعـرـفـ سـيـدـنـاـ أمـيرـ المؤـمـنـينـ جـمـيعـ
 الـقـنـوـلـاتـ الـذـيـنـ بـبـلـدـهـ وـأـعـلـمـهـ بـأـنـ لـاـ يـتـوـجـهـ أـحـدـ إـلـىـ تـلـكـ النـاحـيـةـ ، فـعـمـلـ
 عـلـىـ ذـلـكـ مـلـكـ اـسـبـانـيـةـ إـلـىـ أـنـ وـرـدـ هـذـاـ الرـجـلـ عـلـيـهـ آـخـرـ بـمـكـاتـبـ مـوـلـايـ
 هـشـامـ يـخـبـرـهـ فـيـهـ بـأـنـ مـسـمـوـعـ الـكـلـمـةـ مـطـاعـ فـيـ تـلـكـ النـاحـيـةـ وـأـنـ مـرسـ
 آـسـفـيـ وـطـيطـ ، نـعـنـ أـسـكـالـةـ ، تـحـتـ حـكـمـهـ وـطـلـبـ مـنـ الـمـلـكـ إـتـيـانـ مـرـاكـبـ جـنـسـهـ
 لـلـتـجـارـةـ هـنـالـكـ ، وـلـذـكـ أـمـرـ الـمـلـكـ الـقـونـصـوـ مـنـوـيـلـ سـلـمـونـ بـالـكـتـبـ لـسـيـدـنـاـ

أمير المؤمنين ليامر مراكبـه بعدم التعرض لراكب جنسه قائلـاً أن ذلك لا ضرر فيه ، وذكر منويل المذكور أن الملك سـاـءـه هذا التفرق وتنـسـى جـمـعـ الكلمة لـسـيـدـنـاـ أـمـيرـ المؤـمـنـينـ . فأعلـمـتـ سـيـدـنـاـ بـجـمـعـ ما ذـكـرـ وأـمـرـيـ أـنـ نـجـيـبـ القـونـصـواـ منـوـيلـ وـأـنـ نـكـاتـ حـضـرـتـكـمـ .

فأقول أولاً أـمـاـ استـدـعـاـ سـيـدـنـاـ أـيـدـهـ اللهـ جـنـسـ الـاصـبـنـيـوـلـ للـقـدـوـمـ عـلـىـ أـيـالـنـسـ لـاشـتـرـاكـ الرـعـاـيـاـ فـيـ التـجـارـةـ وـسـائـرـ الـمـعـاـمـلـاتـ وـلـوـكـانـ عـلـىـ ذـكـ الـوـجـهـ مـنـ التـرـدـ إـلـىـ هـذـهـ النـاحـيـةـ وـتـلـكـ فـالـحـاـمـلـ عـلـيـهـ هـوـ الـمـحـافـظـةـ عـلـىـ مـاـ كـانـ عـلـيـهـ وـالـدـهـ سـيـدـنـاـ مـحـمـدـ رـحـمـهـ اللـهـ مـعـكـ وـإـزـالـةـ مـاـ حـدـثـ مـنـ الـوـحـشـةـ بـعـدـ وـفـانـهـ لـتـعـودـ الـحـالـ كـمـاـ كـانـ مـرـاعـاتـ لـحـقـ الـجـوـارـ الـوـاجـبـ .

وـأـمـاـ اـعـلـامـهـ ثـانـيـاـ بـأـنـ لـاـ يـتـوجـهـ أـحـدـ لـتـلـكـ النـاحـيـةـ وـذـكـ عـاـمـ 1209 لـأـنـ مـنـ بـهـاـ لـيـسـ مـتـقـلـداـ حـكـماـ وـلـاـ طـاعـةـ كـمـاـ بـلـغـ ذـكـ مـلـكـ اـسـبـانـيـاـ فـهـوـ كـذـكـ وـلـاـ زـالـوـاـ عـلـىـ هـذـهـ الـحـالـةـ إـلـىـ الـآنـ ، فـأـوـلـاـئـكـ الـذـيـنـ ظـهـرـ لـمـلـكـ اـسـبـانـيـاـ الـاتـخـالـطـهـ رـعـيـتـهـ هـمـ الـمـوـجـودـوـنـ الـآنـ وـمـعـهـ الـكـلـامـ ، وـأـمـاـ مـوـلـاـيـ هـشـامـ فـلـيـسـوـعـنـدـ أـمـرـهـ وـلـاـ يـنـصـتوـنـ لـرـأـيـهـ وـلـاـ يـذـكـرـوـنـهـ عـنـ لـرـادـتـهـمـ قـضاـهـ غـرـضـ مـثـلـ هـذـاـ لـيـتـوـصـلـوـاـ إـلـىـ مـرـادـهـمـ مـنـ الـفـسـادـ الـذـيـ هـمـ عـلـيـهـ وـفـرـارـاـ مـنـ الـأـحـكـامـ . وـأـمـاـ قـولـهـ أـنـ مـرـسـ آـسـفـ وـطـبـيـطـ وـعـشـيرـةـ دـكـالـةـ وـعـبـدـهـ عـنـدـ حـكـمـهـ فـهـذـاـ كـلـامـ بـالـلـسـانـ وـلـاـ وـجـودـ لـهـ فـيـ الـعـيـانـ وـالـحـقـ أـقـولـ إـنـاـ أـوـلـاـئـكـ الـقـومـ مـتـلـاـعـبـوـنـ يـسـعـونـ فـيـ الـفـسـادـ وـيـرـيدـوـنـ الـإـعـانـةـ عـلـيـهـ بـإـقـامـةـ الـمـتـجـرـعـنـدـهـمـ لـيـتـوـصـلـوـاـ بـذـكـ لـاـسـتـمـارـ حـالـهـمـ الـذـيـمـ حـيـثـ تـيـقـنـوـ بـتـفـرـقـ مـنـ مـعـهـ لـأـنـ لـمـ يـجـدـوـ مـاـ يـعـطـوـنـهـمـ ، فـهـذـهـ حـقـيـقـةـ الـأـمـرـ وـغـيـرـ هـذـاـ كـلـهـ بـاطـلـ ، وـذـكـرـ القـونـصـواـ المـذـكـورـ فـيـ كـتـابـهـ أـنـ سـيـدـنـاـ أـمـيرـ الـمـؤ~مـنـينـ وـاقـقـ عـلـىـ إـتـيـانـ مـرـاكـبـمـ لـتـلـكـ النـاحـيـةـ قـبـلـ هـذـاـ وـرـضـيـ بـهـ فـلـاجـحةـ فـيـ لـأـنـهـ ظـهـرـ مـنـ الـفـسـادـ وـإـعـانـةـ أـهـلـهـ عـلـيـهـ بـإـقـامـةـ الـمـتـجـرـعـهـمـ مـاـ هـوـ مشـهـورـ وـهـوـ السـبـبـ فـيـ دـوـامـ التـفـرـقـ فـلـاـ يـتـعـيـنـ الـوقـوفـ مـعـ الـفـسـادـ لـأـنـ لـوـ بـقـيـ أـوـلـاـئـكـ الـقـومـ مـنـ غـيـرـ أـنـ يـحـصـلـ لـهـمـ مـدـدـ مـنـ الـتـجـارـةـ لـتـفـرـقـ عـلـيـهـمـ مـنـ يـقـصـبـوـنـ بـهـ وـيـذـعـنـوـنـ ضـرـورةـ وـرـبـاـ يـسـلـمـهـمـ مـنـ مـعـهـ بـالـبـدـ . وـذـكـرـ القـونـصـواـ الـذـكـورـ فـيـ كـتـابـهـ الـمـكـتـوبـ بـأـمـرـ الـدـوـلـةـ الصـبـانـيـوـلـيـةـ أـنـ مـلـكـ اـسـبـانـيـاـ سـاـءـهـ هـذـاـ التـفـرـقـ وـيـتـمـنـ جـمـعـ الـكـلـمـةـ لـسـيـدـنـاـ أـمـيرـ الـمـؤ~م~ن~ ، فـهـذـاـ هـوـ الـمـظـنـوـنـ بـهـ وـلـاـ نـشـكـ فـيـ مـيـلـهـ الـطـبـيـعـيـ إـلـىـ الـخـيـرـ ، غـيـرـ أـنـ الـمـلـكـ بـحـسـبـ الـظـاهـرـ لـأـعـلـمـ لـهـ بـحـقـيـقـةـ الـأـمـرـ فـأـمـرـ عـلـىـ نـحـوـمـ سـمعـ . فـأـعـلـمـ لـتـعـلـمـهـ أـنـ تـوـجـهـ مـرـاكـبـ

التجار لتلك الناحية هو السبب في إبقاء أهل الفساد على فسادهم ولو بقوا مهجورين غير مخالفين لاذعنوا . وأما كونهم متقلدين طاعة أو حكما فـلا يتوجهونه الملك . وذكر القونصوا في كتابه من أن سيدنا يوصي رؤساً مراكبه بعدم التعرض لمراكب جنسكم ورعايتكم فهو قد فعل ذلك من قبل من غير طلب وذلك واجب ، وما صدر من ذلك الرئيس الأحمق لمركبكم قريباً فقد ساتوا وأمر سيدنا بقتله وعقابه وزجه في البحر . وأما جمع كلمة المغرب على سيدنا أمير المؤمنين فهي مجموعة والحمد لله فأي نسبة لقبيلتين دكالة وعبدة من قبائل المغرب وعشائره؟ فجميع من وراءهم مغاربة إلى الصحراء كلهم متقلدون طاعة سيدنا وجميع من أمامهم شرقاً إلى ما وراء تافلات فذلك ، فالحكم للأكثر لا للأقل ما عدا أولئك رؤوس الشياطين يستميلون أمثالهم بما يتحصل في يدهم من المدد بوجود التجارة عند هم فاقتضى الحال أن بينا لكم الأمر كما هو الحق والواقع ليلاً يعتقد الملك أن توجه مراكب التجارة لتلك الناحية فيه صلاح لجمهور المسلمين ، ما فيه إلا إعانته تلك الشرذمة الخارجة عن الجماعة .

وأما حال سيدنا أمير المؤمنين معكم فهو على ما كان عليه من البرور، والاكرام
لجميع جنس الاصنیعول ويقضى لكم كل ما يمكن قضاؤه، حرر في سادس عشر
من المحرم فاتح عام 1211 بحضورة فاس، كتبه محبكم الداعي لكم بالبقاء
وحسن المال محمد ابن عثمان لطف الله به.

جميع ما رسم بأمر مولانا السلطان
ليعلمه جنابكم ويخبر الملك
بالحق الذي لا غبار عليه.

Appendix 14 : Letter from the Ottoman Sultan, Selīm III, to Mawlāy Sulaymān requesting his help to defeat French designs in Egypt.

Date : 3 Rabi' I, 1213 / 15 August, 1798.

Source : F.O. 174/124.

...

The French nation having risen into rebellion and renounced all belief in the One and Omnipotent God, as well as in the Apostles and Prophets, and being intent on subverting all religious institutions, have destroyed churches (sic) and banished every worship. They deny Universal Resurrection and Judgement and having devoted themselves to tenets contradictory of immortal life are become followers of the odious doctrine of metempsychosis.

They having thus united in an attack against all Christian nations in order to bring them over to the vile principles and new invented laws which they have introduced into their own country, have at last by dint of war and pillage forced the greatest part of the French to embrace their stupid system. In a word their national character being constructed on principles of rebellion, treachery and tyranny, they are become a vile race, seeking only to spread anarchy on all sides. Thus, owing to a spirit of deceit and arrogance, and without advice being given to the Sublime Porte by their republic relative to a rupture or having made any declaration of war, as practiced by all regular governments, a wretch named Bonaparte lately came at the head of a great number of troops to a province—which is under Ottoman jurisdiction—there threw off the mask by the attack of Alexandria and Rosetta...

Their visible end in thus breaking treaties, violating the peace and in perpetrating the above stated aggression is to extend their attacks against all in the faith of Islam. For as it has been ascertained from sundry intercepted dispatches, their plan is to assail the three holy cities of Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem, it becomes a religious duty incumbent upon all true believers whether in the East or West, in Persia or in Arabia, to develop all their power and force at the cost of their lives and properties to repell and defeat that nation unto total extirpation.

When all this, therefore, be known to the Sultan of Morocco, it is the hope and desire of the Sublime Porte that—the favour of God being first implored and the fullest confidence put in his help—the most sollicitous measures be adopted for the purpose of intercepting the ships which may be sent to the succour of the French invaders of Egypt, and thus cutting off their communications as a means of adding to the Mooselmen strength while theirs be curtailed: In a word that nothing be left undone to stop their ships carrying dispatches and to intercept and weaken the above nation, by falling upon them from all sides to the honor and defense of Islam.

3 Rabeah Ewell, 1213

(15 August, 1798)

Certified (signed) Spencer Smith,
H.B.M. Minister Plenipotentiary
at the Ottoman Porte.

Appendix 15 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the French Directoire concerning the seizure by French cruisers of property belonging to Moroccan merchants.

Date: 22 Rabī‘ I, 1213 / 3 Sept., 1798.

Source: A.F. III, 74, Archives Nationales (Paris).

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وَلَا حُوْلَ وَلَا قُوَّةَ إِلَّا بِاللَّهِ الْعَلِيِّ الْعَظِيمِ
مِنْ عَبْدِ رَبِّهِ أَمِيرِ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ سُلْطَانِ مَرَاكِشْ وَفَاسْ وَمَكْتَاسَةِ وَتَافِيلَاتْ
وَدَرْعَةِ وَسُوسْ وَالْبَاقِي سَلِيمَانُ بْنُ مُحَمَّدٍ كَانَ اللَّهُ لَهُ.
(الطبع السليماني)

إِلَى أَعْظَمِ دِيَوَانِ فِي الْمَلَأِ النَّصَارَى الشَّهِيرِ الذَّكْرُ الْجَمِيعُ الْقَائِمِ
بِالدُّولَةِ الْفَرْنَسَوِيَّةِ.

أَمَّا بَعْدُ، فَانَّهُ غَيْرُ خَافٍ عَنْكُمْ مَا كَانَ عَلَيْهِ سَلْفًا مَعَ دُولَتِكُمْ مِنْ
الرَّعْيِ الْجَمِيلِ وَالْإِحْسَانِ الْجَزِيلِ مِنَ الْجَانِبَيْنِ وَلِمَا أَقْرَى اللَّهُ
تَعَالَى أَمْرَ الْبَنَى سَلَكْتُمْ مِنْ قَبْلِنَا فِي الْمَحَافَظَةِ عَلَى الْعَهْدِ
الْقَدِيمِ وَالرَّعْيِ الصَّمِيمِ نَلَاحِظُ رِعَايَاكُمْ مُثْلَ مَا نَلَاحِظُ رِعَايَانَا. ثُمَّ
إِنَّ بَعْضَ مَرَاكِبِكُمْ لَمْ تَحْفَظْ عَلَى مَا أَتَسْهَى السَّلْفُ وَبَنَى عَلَيْهِ
الخَلْفُ فَصَارُوا يَتَعَرَّضُونَ لِرِعْيَتِنَا فِي الْبَحْرِ وَيَأْخُذُونَ أَمْوَالَهُمْ
مِنْ غَيْرِ حَقٍّ وَلَا مُوجِبٍ، وَقَدْ طَالَ مَا تَكَلَّمُ فِي نَازِلَتِهِمْ قَوْنُصُوكُمْ
الَّذِي عَنْدَنَا بِطْنَجَةُ، وَكَرَرَ الْكِتَابُ فِي أَمْرِهِمْ فَلَمْ يَسْمَعْ كَلَامَهُ،
وَلِمَا طَالَ بِأَصْحَابِ الْمَالِ الْأَمْدِ وَهُمْ يَنْتَظِرُونَ مَا يَرِدُ عَلَى
الْقَوْنُصِيِّ فِي شَانِهِمْ فَلَمْ يَظْهُرْ لَهُمْ شَيْءٌ طَلَبُوا مِنْنَا الْكِتَابَ إِلَيْكُمْ لِتَأْمِرُوا
عَاجِلًا بِرُدُّ مَتَاعِهِمْ عَلَيْهِمْ، وَأَصْحَابُ الدُّعْوَى حَمَلُوا هَذَا الْكِتَابَ
إِلَيْكُمُ الْفَقِيهُ السَّيِّدُ الْحَاجُ عَبْدُ السَّلَامِ زَكُورُ نَائِبِ ولَدِهِ عَبْدِ الرَّحْمَانِ
بْنِ زَكُورِ الْفَاسِيِّ وَرَفيقِهِ الْحَاجُ بْنِ صَالِحٍ مِنْ أَهْلِ آسَفِيِّ فِي
دُعْوَى مَالِهِمُ الْمُأْخُوذُ أَيْضًا مِنْ غَيْرِ مُوجِبٍ. وَنَحْنُ فِي انتِظَارِ قَدْوِهِمْ

عليها من عندكم مجبوري الخاطر برد متعاهتم مع
اعطائكم الأمر لرؤساء مراكبكم البحريه بأن يتحافظوا على
العهود التي بيننا وبينكم كما تقتضيه الصحبة، ونحن
على عهدهم والسلام.

في ثاني وعشرين من ربيع الأول عام 1213.

Appendix 16 : Letter from 'Abd Allah b. 'Abd al-Mālik,
governor of Tangier, to the British consul general J.M.
Matra, asking for the purchase of two war vessels in
England.

Date : 6 Shawwāl, 1214 / 3 March, 1800.

Source: F.O. 174/284.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

صَاحِبُ الْأَعْزَمِ فَنْصُورُ الْمَكَانِيْجِ حَمِيرِ مِيرِيْهِ مَحْرُوكِ اَمَّا بَحْرِ بِلَادِيْهِ دَابِلِ
عَنْدِيْهِ غَدَيِيْهِ وَعَنْقُرِ الدَّكَ وَنَفْرَحِ حَيْثِ نَسْمَحُكَ حَيْثِ اَنْتَ وَقَدْ مَيْتَكَ وَاعْلَمُ
وَانْدَيْرَتَ اِيْكَ اللَّهِ اَوْنَيْهِ بِالْكَلَامِ مَهْكَ جَمْسَلَيْهِ وَهَوْشَنَهِ اَدَنْدَاهَا وَكَبِ
فِرْسَاهِ الدَّرِيْبِ يَلِيْغُونِيْهِ بِاَفَامْتَهِرِهِ وَمَرَاجِعِهِ وَيَكِيُونُونِ عَلَىْ فَرِرِهِ وَخَولِهِ
لَوَادِ الدَّرِيْبِ اَيْشَرِهِ اَكْرِمِيْهِ اِيْرِنَاهِيْهِ بِذِالْجَمَغَلِيْهِ وَهَلَاجِرِهِ قَلْكَاهِتِهِ مَعْ تَلِيْبِهِ
بِرِرِهِلَامِ وَيَنْتَهِ لَهُ وَجْهِ الْعَمَلِ وَكَبِيْهِ يَكِيُونِيْهِ اَنْتَرِادِهِ وَنَجِيْهِ وَاوْنِيْهِ
بِيْرِنِيْهِ اِيْنِيْهِ اَنْتَهِ وَكَدَنِيْهِ اَذَالِكَ اوْكِرِمَزِ مُورِعْنِرِيْرِنِ وَبِسِيْهِ تَنْزَادِهِ
عَنْدِرِهِيْرِنِيْهِ اَجِيْهِ وَنَضَهِرِهِيْهِ اَكِيْرِهِ كَيِهِ اَذَادِيْرِنِ وَاجْرِيْهِ
مَنْجِيْفِقِهِ مَنْجِيْنِيْهِ كَيِهِ وَمَنْجِيْنِيْهِ دَعِهِ جَمِيعِ اَهْمَلِيْرِهِ اَكْزِرِهِ وَعِيْرِهِ كَمِرِهِ
بِيْشِيْهِ كَيِهِ اِذَذَكِيْيِهِ غِيْمِهِ كَمِرِهِ يَفْضَادِهِ ذَالْجَمِ وَفَرِارِهِيْرِنِيْهِ اِلَيْهِ
الَّهِ بِعِجَيْبِهِ حَسِيْجِهِ حَسِيْجِهِ اَسَهِ بِعِرَاجِيْهِ اَيْشَرِهِ وَرِدَاطِهِ وَكَنْجِيْهِ وَنَجْهُولِهِ بَخْرَمَةِ
اَكْرِمِيْبِ وَضَنْدَهِمِ لَلَّكِرِمِرِاَرِدِهِ اَمُوكِلَسِهِ طَلَوِهِ كَرِمِرِاَنِرِهِ يَاتِيْوِهِ مَوْجِيْرِهِ
بِاَفَامْتَهِرِهِ زِيلِدِهِ عَلَىْ مَلَانْضَهِهِتِهِ بِعِرَاجِيْهِ وَجِيْبِهِ اَمْجَوَابِهِ
عَزِيْزِ الدَّبِيْسِيْهِ دِيْرِيْهِ وَانِكَلَاهِ اَعْدَاهِ مَلَانِيْهِيْهِ عَنْ فَنَابِهِ
لَلَّا يَضِبِ اَمَاقِبِهِ بِعِصَدِيْلِكِهِ وَهِيْسِيْهِ عَنْهِ اَمِلَاهِدِيْقِفِرِهِ وَكَافِيْهِ
حَفِيْجِهِ وَجِيْسِيْهِ وَنِيْتِهِ وَجِيْهِلَانِيْهِ دِيْرِيْهِ لَلَّاصِمِ اِيْكَ اللَّهِ وَلَوْهِ شَهْرِهِ
وَعَلَىْ عَصَدِهِمِ وَالْمَشَلَامِ بِعِرَاجِيْهِ كَفِشَرَالِ عَدْعَهِ ٤١٦٢

خَرِيجِ اَمْفَلَامِ اَلْحَلِيْهِ بِالْمَهْدِ
عَبِرِ اللَّهِ بِرِعِيْرِهِ اَهْلَكِزِزِيْهِ بِسِيْهِ

Appendix 17 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J.M. Matra expressing Moroccan satisfaction at the expulsion of the French from Egypt and inquiring about the situation in the Mediterranean.

Date : 8 Sha'bān, 1216/14 December, 1801.

Source: F.O. 174/ 286.

ا شریعت و محدث

مکاہر کافیۃ اللہ

Appendix . 18 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J.M.Matra
 dealing with various issues among which the Moroccan
 promise to allow a British establishment at Ksar el
 Seghir or Beliounech.

Date : 27 Rabī' II, 1217/27 August, 1802.

Source: F.O. 174/284.

وَلَا مُرْدِ وَلَا فَتَأْ إِنْ أَبَالَهُ أَكَلَ الْعَظِيمَ

الْجَوَاهِرُ وَهَذِهِ

إِنَّ الْفَرْنَصَرَا چِمِرْ سِرْ دِلَاحِرْ إِلَامِ بِهِ دِيْطَلَهِ مِشْهُورَ لَكَلَهِ نَعِيدَ
 تَلَقَّتْ لَهَا مِنْهُ عَلَى رِبَعَةِ أَشْفَقِي بِجَبَلِ كَلَارِي أَرَادَتْهُمْ لَنْعِيَسِي وَلَابِكَ
 وَكَلَامِي لَازِمِيَّا ذَبِيجَ الْفَرْنَصَرَا هَلَحِبَلَهِ كَلَارِي لَمْ نَتَهِلَّا / / / لَذَانِتَهِ الرَّجِيَّةِ
 يَبِيرِي بِكَلَاتِنْهِيَّهِ عَنْهُ اَعْنَهِ هَمُورِ اَمِرِ الْمُرْسِتِيَّهِ لَهَلَهُمْتِيَّهِ بِنِيُولَهِرِ الْفَرْنَصَرَا
 اَوْ ضَعِيمِ دِلَاحِرِمِيَّهِ بِبَالِهِ رَابِكَهِ مِنْ فَضَّلَهِمْ عَلَى اِيدِينِي اَهَشَادَ السَّهِ وَمَارِيَّهِ
 صَلَمَبَ الْمَعَابِجِي وَسَفَهُمْ اَعْلَمَنِي بِهِ يَسِيرَ السَّهِ اَسَرَلَهِ عَلَى اِيدِينِي اَهَشَادَ
 السَّهِ وَكَنَدَ الْمَرْجِدَهِ عَلَيَّهِ مِنْ كَتَهِ حَلَيَّهِ اَرْمَاهُو اَمِصِيَّهِ مِنْهُ
 اَهَهَنْهِشِي اَهَسِمِنْهِ وَرَجَهِ لَهَا زِمَّهِ وَلَاجِبِ اَجْمِيعِ وَالْمَسَّهِ لَلَّهِ

بِ 29 رِبَعَهِ التَّانِي عَلَى 12/7 قَرْبَهِ السَّهِ
 وَاعْنَنِ عَلَمَلَنَلَهِ عَنْهُ مِنْ هَبِيرِ عَنِيلِ الْقَسْلَهِ
 اَغْبَلِرِ الْجَمِعِ عَزِمَا وَلَابِرِ
 اَسَكَلَهِ وَلَفِنَهِ

Appendix 19 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to J.M.Matra concerning the redemption of ten Muslim captives held at Malta.

Date : 23 Sha'bān, 1218/8 December, 1803.

Source: F.O. 174/284.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم ولا حول ولا قوة إلا بالله

(التابع السليماني)

إلى القونصو مري ماطرا أما بعد فقد بلغنا أن عشرة من المسلمين أسرى بالحطة فأردنا استخلاصهم من الأسر ولم يظهر لنا من نكلفوه بأمرهم وفادائهم إلا أنت فنامرك بوصول أمرنا إليك تبعث لمن يشتريهم ويخلص ثمن شرائهم وبيبعث إليك لتوجههم لمقامنا العالى بالله ، ونامرك بقبض الشين . فقف في هذه المسئلة فلينك تعال خاطرنا بقضائهما والعزم بها . صدر الأمر به في 23 شعبان المبارك عام 1218 .

Appendix 20 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to J.M.Matra
concerning preventive measures against epidemics.

Date : 11 Rajab, 1219 / 22 May, 1804.

Source: F.O. 174/284.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم و لا حول ولا قوة الا بالله

(التابع السليماني)

الى جيمس ما طرا قونصر النجليز، اما بعد وصلنا كتابك و ذكرت لنا فيه ان الوباء
 عندكم بجبل طارق وفي بلاد اصبيلول والباروكات اذا كانوا يتربّدون من
 تطوان لجبل طارق فانت لهم تعرفون كيف تتعاملون مع اهل الوباء في بياعنك
 و مشتراتكم و تجعلون الدرارهم في الخلل و تتحفظون منه كل التحفظ
 والمسلمون لا يعرفون ذلك ولا يتحفظون مثل تحفظكم منه و ذلك
 فيه ضرر على المسلمين وعلى قونصوات التماري الذين بطنجة، ففي
 11 رجب عام 1219.

Appendix 21 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J.M. Matra giving clarifications about the Darqāwi rebellion in Western Algeria.

Date : 13 Jumādā I, 1220/9 August, 1805.

Source: F.O. 174/284.

وَمَا مُولَكَ الْأَبَدُ لِلَّهِ الْعَلِيِّ الْعَظِيمِ

الشَّهَادَةُ وَحْدَهُ

اللَّهُ أَكْفَنْ صَوْصَاهُ مِنْ مَلَكٍ! إِنَّمَا يَعْلَمُ بِالْمُكَانَاتِ وَصَلَوةِ الْمَغْرِبِ لِلْمُسْلِمِيِّ
 إِنَّمَا إِلَّا اللَّهُ وَلَا يَحِلُّ لِغَایِبٍ هُوَ فَلَالِ الْمَاعِدِ كَعْلُهُ فَوْجِيَّهُ وَأَعْلَمَتْهُ إِنَّمَا إِلَّا اللَّهُ بِفَطْحِ
 الْعَرْبِ بِتَمَكُّعِهِ عَنْ مَرَاكِبِ الْفَرْصَانِيَّهِ بِرَجْمِهِ لِكَتَابِهِ التَّمَيُّعِ لِلْفَلَامِ بِرَجْمِهِ لِمَاعِنْ شَعَالِشِ
 وَجَهَتْهُ لِهِ بِلَامِرَهِ إِبْرَاهِيمَ بِلَامِرَهِ بِلَامِرَهِ بِلَامِرَهِ بِلَامِرَهِ بِلَامِرَهِ بِلَامِرَهِ بِلَامِرَهِ
 طَبَّهُهُ اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ بِجَهَلِتِهِ لَا فَتَارِيجَ كَلِّ الْأَصْوَرِ بِكَانِلَاتِ لَوْمَهِ لِلْجَنَابِ الشَّرِيفِ—
 سِرِّ الْجَلَهِ وَفَدَ لِتَانَالْلَّهُمَّ أَتَيْتُ فِي حَلَى مِنْ عَنْدِكَ لِمَ اِنْتَ اَعْلَمُ بِهِ بِجَلِيلِ الْمَلَكِيَّهِ وَكَلِيلِ
 الْعِيمِ بِيَشِيكِ الْمَصَراَتِ عَلَى الْمَدَنَهِ بِلَامِرَهِ بِلَامِرَهِ بِلَامِرَهِ بِلَامِرَهِ بِلَامِرَهِ بِلَامِرَهِ
 مِنْ أَعْيُمِهِ لِلْفَلَامِ بِعِيدِ الْمُؤْمِنِهِ عَشْفَانِشِمِهِ لِأَكْرَامِ اِلْجَنَسِ الْمُجَلِّهِ وَالْعِيرِيَشِيكِ بِلَاقِهِ
 مِنْ كَنْجَهِتِهِ يَا خَنْدِيَّهُ مَا هُوَ الْمَقْتَدِي درَاعِيَّهُ خَبِيرِ فَتَكِهِ بِلَاقِهِتِهِ اِبْرَاهِيمَ بِلَامِرَهِ تَبَقَّتْ عَنْهُ فَأَوْجَعَهُمْ
 سَكَانِهِ غَيْرِهِ وَفَتَلُوا الْيَهُودَ الْذِيَرَهِ بِلَامِرَهِ بِلَامِرَهِ عَلَيْهِمْ وَالْفَلَامِ بِلَامِرَهِ فَلَامِرَهِ
 وَتَلَهُمْ لِيَمِرَهِ الْدَّرِعَاهِ بِلَامِرَهِ الْدَّرِعَاهِ لِمَ تَقْرِئُهُمْ فَلَامِرَهِ وَصَرِبَ الْجَبَلِ الْمُهِيَّدِ اوْهَمَهُمْ
 إِلَهُهُمْ بِلَامِرَهِ ذَاهِمِهِ عَبِيدِ الْفَلَادِ بِلَامِرَهِ التَّمَيُّعِ بِلَامِرَهِ فَرِفَادِهِ وَرَجَمِهِ لِهِ السَّلَاحِ، اِبْرَاهِيمَ
 شَيْخِهِ اِبْرَاهِيمَ بِلَامِرَهِ اِلْجَنَسِ الْمُرَفَّدِ وَالْمَلَاجِيِّ اِلْجَنَسِ بِلَامِرَهِ بِلَامِرَهِ بِلَامِرَهِ بِلَامِرَهِ
 اِبْرَاهِيمَ وَاهْلِهِ مَسَانِ اِقْتَوَاهُمْ بِلَامِرَهِ اِبْرَاهِيمَ بِلَامِرَهِ بِلَامِرَهِ بِلَامِرَهِ بِلَامِرَهِ
 وَفَلَالِهِمْ اِرْجَعُوا الْمَلَحَانِهِمْ بِلَامِرَهِ اِشْتَهَلَهُمْ بِلَامِرَهِ تَارِيَخِهِ بِلَامِرَهِ پِسِّ اِلْمُسْلِمِيِّينِ وَرَجَبِهِ
 اِبْرَاهِيمَ اِنَّهَا مُوكَرَهُ مَوْسِيَهُ مَحْلَنَهُ تَشَرِّلَهُ بِوَجْهِهِ لِتَفْعِيلِهِ عَيْنَهُ مِنَ الْاخْوَلِ بِالْبَعْضِ
 وَهَذَا لَهُو خَبَرُ الْتَّقْفِيَّهِ اِلَهُ تَهْتَمَمُهُ عَلَيْهِ وَكَتَبَهُ اِبْرَاهِيمَ بِلَامِرَهِ اِلْجَنَدِيِّ اِلَّا اَوْلُو عَلَى 122هـ

مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ إِبْرَاهِيمَ
 الْمَسْلِمِيُّ
 وَعَفَفَهُ ...

Appendix. 22 : Letter from al-Salāwī to the British consul general J. Green, asking for a British naval pass to convey a quantity of wheat to the Regency of Tunis.

Date : 18 Jumādā I, 1221/3 August, 1806.

Source: F.O. 174/284.

الى المؤمن صواعق سر الخبيث النجلين اما بعد عذبة قدر طبا كتابك وعمره اتيانك
فونصوص المخاتمة سبز كنطر لا اله ملهم حبابك وكل من يلمس معندها السلاح فخرج
معونته سبز كنطر لا اله مقبول صحته وحيث سا ناعنك ومحنةك بعذتك بعزمك
لذا المغلبه لن تكون واسطة الخبر بين الدارتين ونفعي بجلب الامرانت تزيينك
بعجيبة بيتهن خضر تزيينك اكتشافها انت انت شلة الله
واعلم انه مركب متاع الدوبار لبريله العتيق كل ما حمله البصر الزرع اعطها سبز
كنطر الله اهلة توسم وحيث رفع لهم مغنم ما وقع من القبر او وجد ما احشى
وسرا الزرع وبغير مدخل اداري ناكتم تهلكونه فطاير يكر ليلا يتفضل له احمدك
عنناكم حيث هو حامل الزرع سبز كنطر الله وحال اسم ام امير امس امك بيطك
وغير نهضتك حجا وابك بذا الابياتين ركتبه اليكم ٢٤٨ جمادى الاولى على ١٢٢

فَهُمْ بِعِنْدِ الْمَسْلَى
الْمَلْوَى
رَفِيْهِ

Appendix 23 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to J. Green asking redress in favour of Moroccan jew merchants whose property, loaded on three vessels, was seized by British cruizers.

Date : 20 Jumādā II, 1221/ 4 September, 1806.

Source: F.O.174/284.

الخواص
لـ مـ حـ زـ وـ رـ اـ فـ رـ (ـ طـ بـ الـ لـ دـ)



نَحْنُ أَنَا خَدْمَتْ أَنْتَ بِعَهْ قَرِيبٌ فَوْنَحْ جَفْرٌ (لَا فَجْلَيْنِي بِخَنْيَةِ الْكَلْبَةِ
خَوْسَهَا لِلَّهِ دَامِيْنِي امَا بَعْرَنَامِيْنِي تَكْتُبُ لِكُوزِيْخِيْنِي لَا فَجْلَيْنِي بِخَوْسَهَا
مَرَاكِبَ ذَهَبِيْخِرْتَهْ مَرَدِيْوَخْ وَقَرْشَائِيْوَخْ اَنْدَ فَتَخَيْ لِدَفَرِيْجِيْهِي
ذَرْجِلِيْنِي بِعَنْهِمْ سَرَكِيْبِ اَسْمَهُ دَهُورِتَشْ هَلَانَا وَسَغْدَرِ بَكْهُورِزْمُوا وَسَفَرْمَى بِلَدَنَا^{مِلْهَارِ}
لَهَاهَمْبُورَى وَرَلَاخَ اَسْمَهُ كُوْرَمِيرِسِيْ وَالْتَّاثِ اَسْمَهُمْ حَرَانِيْ بِبِلَكَارِ وَرَغْدَهْ وَرَحْدَوَا
لَهُ مِنِ اَمْهِنْتَرِ خَاصَ بِالسِّلَاحِ لِلْمَسْوَرِيْهِ خَوْسَهَا اللَّهِ وَلَأَخْبِيْهِ اَنْدَ مَهِيْ بِوْسَعَا يَا كَفِيرَهِ
وَكَلِمَ عِيسَمِ الْبَنَاسِبُورِيَّهِ مَتَعْنَالَانِهِمْ اَنْجَمِيْتِيْ خَدْمَتْ اَوْتَخَتْ كَلِيلَنَارِ مِنْ
اَيْلَاتِنَا وَعَثَتْ خَرْمَتْسَاوِلَاسِلِ الْأَصْرِيْ (جَنَانِيْ لَشَحَوِيْ اَلْزِبَعِيْخِ مَعَمَ عَلَى
اَنْهَلَمْهَنَهِ وَلَشَلَمْ عَلِيْمَهِ) وَلَا يَكُوفُ بِعَادِهِمْ وَلَا بَفْنِبُورِهِ مَتَلَعَمَهِ وَعَلَى
هَذَا بَكِيرِيْ عَمَلَهِ دَلَيَا خَدْجَهِتِرِيْهِ وَلَا اَهْمَالْتَعِيْمَتْ لَا تَحْبِيْحَ لَهَهَا شَهِهِ مَقْنَهِعَهِ
عَلَى اَنْغَافِرِيْ الْمَغْسُودِ بِهَنَنَا وَبِهَنَمْ وَبِهَنَرِ اَصْرَرَ اَمْرَنَا لَتَنِيْيَفِ اَبِرِهِ اللَّهِ بَهَهِهِ
مَسْجَدَهِيْ (الْلَّذِنْ عَلَيْهِمَا)

Appendix 24 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green regarding the liberation of Muslim captives held at Lisbon and the evacuation of the Jewish community in Larache.

Date : 4 Rajab, 1221 / 17 Sept., 1806.

Source: F.O. 174/284.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ كُلَّا مَا فَوْزٌ لِّلْأَنْتَارِ بِاللَّهِ أَكْبَرُ الْعَالَمُونَ

الله العون صوا حمسان في ما يجيء بالعلم ان بعض الاماري من الجزائر بلا اجبرة
 طلبوا من سيرنا نصر الله بذاته لهم بلذاكنت تفديهم على اني انهم بنى بمع
 لك جميع مساجد بالخمر التي تغدو فيها مرسالهم اي شرط عاليه مفروض في ذلك
 بلا اسلامي وعدها ما ملأنا ذ به منهم راعلم انه لم يبي بالمعاذ ينشر حتى يهدى
 بما مر سيرنا نصر الله وافت تركت شلوم بدرهم حتى يذهب غرضكم وهم يبي
 فضاله رب هذه البقبة اليكم اي تقيي بعلام اهلها لنعلم سيرنا بل انه لم يبي
 حتى يهدى بها ثم هلا منه اي كله الله رجوعنا لا يبيكم انه وافق على
 امركم بالمعاذ ينشر راعلمنا بالخمر لا بركت به اليكم ثم بغير الشمل السلوى
 ورفعه الله بـ 4 رجب العدد الخوار على 1221

Appendix 25 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green concerning the redemption of Muslim captives held at Leghorn.

Date : 14 Shawwāl, 1221 / 25 Dec., 1806.

Source: F.O. 174/284.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم ولا حول ولا قوة إلا بالله العلي العظيم

إلى القونصو والذرين لنجلزي أبا عبد ،

فقد وصلنا كتابك وعرفت منه أنك وجهت على الكرديال ، فذلك الظن بك ، وأعلم أن بعض الأسرى من المسلمين بالجُرنة وأمرني سيدى نصره الله نكتب لك تعلمني هل تجد سبيلا إليهم وأمرني سيدى نكتب لك تكتسم هذا الأمر ببني وبينك لا يطلع عليه أحد لأنك إذا حصلته لسيدنا نصره الله كل ما تزيد فيه من أموركم تقضى لكم وما خصكم به سيدنا نصره الله دون جميع القونصوات إلا لتحققه أいで الله بمحبتكم في جانبه أいで الله وتعملون جهداكم في ذلك غاية واعلمني بالذي كان عزما ، وكتبه إليكم في 14 شوال المبارك عام 1221 .

محمد بن عبد السلام السلوى وفقه الله

Appendix 26 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to J. Green
 declining a British demand for the permission to export
 provisions from Essaouira.

Date : 2 Rabī‘ I, 1222 / 10 May, 1807.

Source: F.O. 174/285.



الحمد لله رب العالمين

جيمس كريغ فوز صو الجيليز و طر كلنذر هنزا و غير قبلا مصنه و مدة
 ذكره تند على تشريح ما يحيط به من حبر فاصيتكم من الغنم والبغال والرماد و
 سرقة مفتعلهم رب شعر النسوة المحرونة اللذ جاعلها انتقامه الذي ذكر
 في نهاية الفضية عرسلانه و ننانه العماره بذلك ارجوكم عاليه الا وفات
 بغير اصله المحمر والمحض باللكلية وبخلاف ارجوكم ما يزيد على بضم غيمه
 ولامه وفتحه وتنكون واء
 سواهم في نهاية العماره او الحصب و المحمر لا يغير دهن رئيسيه ، مثلا
 يحيط جلد في اصيتكه و في اصيتكه عنيه كه و هنزا اعنيه تعلمه انت
 وغيمه كه مركبة لالندره و اسلامه بعيلاني ربيع الاو اعلان ١٢٢٢

Appendix 27 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green requesting a pass for a Moroccan vessel carrying a present to Napoleon.

Date : 2 Rabi' I, 1222 / 10 May, 1807.

Source: F.O. 174/285.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وَلَا هُوَ مِنَ الظَّالِمِينَ الْعَلِيُّ الْعَظِيمُ

الله الرحمن الرحيم اللهم إني نسألك ما تعلمت من القرآن الكريم كل مطلب من حيزك نعم الله
شراً، عذاباً من العذاب وعذاباً لهم من عذابنا ثم أهـ سبـرـكـ نـصـرـ اللهـ اـسـنـكـثـرـهـ الـأـلـلـهـ
وـذـالـلـهـمـاـيـرـ اللهـ هـنـاكـ دـكـنـيـرـواـيـ كـلـاـ العـدـدـ لـلـهـ لـلـمـاـيـرـهـ نـهـلـيـهـ أـكـمـ
عـنـتـيـ، بـعـوجـمـ لـهـمـاـيـرـ اللهـ أـمـدـعـ عـشـرـ مـنـ الـغـيلـ عـبـضـ أـهـلـ فـلـاسـ بـلـذـ الـأـمـرـ دـكـنـيـ
وـفـرـ الـجـدـلـ بـإـعـدـاـ، بـسـبـرـ كـهـ مـعـنـدـ الـرـاثـ الـعـاصـ اـفـالـهـ لـيـكـبـوـاـ بـمـركـبـ
الـمـرـكـلـاـ الـسـقـمـ الـطـاشـنـ بـارـيـرـهـ وـاسـمـ الـأـيـمـ الـتـخـزـنـ بـلـيـلـ زـنـجـلـ الـمـهـرـدـ وـهـلـانـهـ
الـخـدـمـةـ بـأـنـهـ الـكـبـيـرـ وـبـأـنـهـ وـابـطـ وـفـدـ وـطـنـ كـنـلـ بـأـعـلـ الـأـمـرـ الـنـدـ، اـنـلـكـ مـعـنـدـ الـأـرـكـبـلـ
بـعـداـ اـنـأـعـلـمـ النـاسـ بـخـاـلـ الـبـلـاـيـكـونـ ذـ الـأـدـ، شـلـاـ، اللـهـ وـهـلـادـ الـمـسـعـلـةـ التـيـ كـلـوـىـ
بـعـدـ سـبـرـكـ نـصـرـ اللهـ ثـابـدـ لـكـ مـرـ الـوـفـوـفـ پـهـاـ وـكـبـهـ الـيـكـمـ غـمـ بـعـدـ الشـلـلـ الـشـلـرـ

Appendix 28 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green giving the reasons behind the limitation of exports.

Date : 6 Rabī‘ II, 1222/ 13 June, 1807.

Source: F.O. 174/285.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم ولا حول ولا قوّة إلا بالله العلي العظيم

الى القونصوا جيمس اثرين لتجليني وبعد فاعلم ان كاتب الذي وجهت لحضره مولانا العالية بالله وصل وتعرف سيدى بكل ما ذكرته وأمرني أبده الله ان نجحيك عنه بأمره العلي بالله، وما ذكرته أنك تعلم سلطانك دائمًا يسعى فيما يجلب خاطر سيدنا نصره الله وما يرضاه وتطول به دائمًا المهادنة والمحبة فلا شك عند سيدنا نصره الله في ذلك، كما انكم عارفون أنتم وتحققون بما لكم عند سيدنا نصره الله من المحبة والمكانة التي ظهرت لكم بمنع جميع النصارى من الوست الا جنسكم ميزه سيدنا نصره الله بحمل ما يحتاج لجبل طارق من وسق الشيران بأقل مما يعطى فيه على قدر محبتكم في جانب سيدنا نصره الله، غير أنكم تعلمون أن الملوك الذين استرعاهم الله أمر رعيته وأوجب عليهم النظر في أمور صالحهم لا بد لهم من ذلك ، وسيدنا نصره الله يخشى في رعيته لأنه أبده الله كان منع تجـار أهـل الذـمـة وغـيرـهـمـ يـتـشـرونـ فـيـ ذـلـكـ الـاـكـارـ وـيـضـرـونـ بـالـرـعـيـةـ غـاـيـةـ الضـرـرـ، وـهـذـهـ الـعـمـارـةـ طـالـتـ وـكـثـيرـ مـاـ يـخـرـجـ فـيـهـ وـتـسـعـونـ أـمـرـ هـذـهـ السـنـينـ وـمـاـ يـقـعـ فـيـهـ، أـيـ الغـرـبـ، مـنـ الفـلـاـ وـأـيـنـ بـلـفـتـ قـيـمةـ السـمـنـ وـلـوـ لـأـنـ اللهـ تـعـالـىـ سـبـانـهـ تـدارـكـاـ آـخـرـ السـنـةـ لـبـلـغـ الغـرـبـ إـلـىـ الضـرـرـ الـفـادـحـ، وـأـنـتـ بـهـ وـلـيـسـ مـنـ رـءـاـ كـمـنـ سـمعـ، وـأـمـاـ جـنـسـكـ بـعـيـدـ وـلـاـ يـعـرـفـ حـقـيقـةـ الـأـمـرـ كـمـاـ تـعـرـفـونـ، وـلـمـنـزـلـتـكـ عـنـدـ سـيـدـنـاـ نـصـرـهـ اللـهـ وـمـكـانـتـكـ لـأـبـدـ انـ يـتـرـكـ لـكـ بـاقـيـةـ لـاـ ضـرـرـ فـيـهـ لـاـكـنـ عـلـىـ شـرـطـ أـمـرـ يـحـصـلـ فـيـهـ بـعـضـ النـفـعـ لـلـمـسـلـيـنـ يـهـوـنـ مـعـهـ مـاـ يـحـصـلـ مـنـ الضـرـرـ، وـكـلـامـكـ فـيـ ذـلـكـ مـعـ الـكـاتـبـ السـيـدـ مـحـمـدـ بـنـ عـبـدـ السـلـامـ السـلـيـ، فـكـلـ مـاـ يـفـعـلـ مـعـكـ فـيـ ذـلـكـ أـمـضـيـنـاـ وـنـحـنـ فـعـلـنـاـ فـيـ حـدـ ذـالـكـ وـمـاـ يـدـفعـ عـنـهـ وـالـسـلـامـ، هـذـاـ نـصـ جـوابـ سـيـدـنـاـ نـصـرـهـ اللـهـ يـكـمـ وـكـتـبـهـ فـيـ 27ـ رـبـيعـ النـبـيـ .

وَالآن وَالْحَمْدُ لِلَّهِ الَّذِي يَسِّرَ اللَّهُ لَكُمْ هَذَا الْأَمْرَ عَلَى هَذَا الْوِجْهِ، وَالآن
 أَعْلَمُ أَنْ سَيِّدَنَا نَصْرَهُ اللَّهُ مَا كَانَ أَمْرًا أَوْلَى الْأَمْرِ بِوَسْطِ الشَّيْرَانِ إِلَّا بِالْبَارُودِ
 فَأَتَوْا بِهِ الْيَهُودُ أَوْلًا ثُمَّ قَطَعُوهُ، وَقَدْ اسْتَكْفَى سَيِّدُنَا نَصْرَهُ اللَّهُ وَلَا
 يَحْلُّ لِهِ أَيْدِيهِ اللَّهُ أَعْطَاهُ الشَّيْرَانِ إِلَّا بِمَا يَحْصُلُ بِهِ بَعْضُ النَّفَعِ
 لِلْمُسْلِمِينَ، وَنَحْنُ الْيَوْمَ مُتَوَقِّفُونَ عَلَى بَعْضِ اقْتَامَةِ الْبَحْرِ وَالْأَبْرَاجِ، فَإِذَا
 كَتَمْتُمْ تَاتُونَ بِهَا فَإِنَّ الْوَسْقَ يَسِّرُّ قَدْرًا مَعْلُومًا إِلَى أَجْلِ مَعْهُودٍ،
 لَا كُنْ بَعْدَ الْإِتْفَاقِ عَلَى الْقِيمَةِ وَالصَّاكِةِ وَاعْطَاهُ خَطْبَدَكَ بِمَجْسِيٍّ
 الْإِقْامَةِ فِي أَجْلِ مَعْهُودٍ عَلَى أَنْ ذَالِكَ لَا يَكُونُ عَلَى يَدِ الْيَهُودِ وَتَخْتَارُونَ
 أَنْتُمْ مِنْ يَشْتَرِي لَكُمْ عَلَى أَيْدِيكُمْ فَهُوَ أَرْفَقُ لَكُمْ وَأَنْفَعُ وَلَا يَدْخُلُ فِي أَمْرِكُمْ
 أَحَدٌ إِلَّا مَنْ تَرِيدُونَهُ أَنْتُمْ فَيُسْهِلُ عَلَيْكُمْ وَعَلَى الرَّعِيَّةِ ذَالِكُ، وَلَوْ جَدَ
 سَيِّدِي أَيْدِيهِ اللَّهُ فَسْحَةً فِي دِينِهِ تُحَلِّلُ لَهُ تَسْرِيعُ الشَّيْرَانِ مَا طَلَبَ
 مِنْكُمْ هَذِهِ الْإِقْامَةِ وَلَا غَيْرَهَا، غَيْرَ أَنَّهُ لَمْ يَجِدْ فَسْحَةً فِي دِينِهِ إِلَّا بِمَا فِيهِ
 نَفْعٌ لِلْمُسْلِمِينَ وَهَذِهِ الْإِقْامَةُ عِلْمٌ سَيِّدِنَا أَيْدِيهِ اللَّهُ وَتَحْقِيقُ أَنْكُمْ لَا تَعْجِزُونَ
 فِيهَا وَلَا ضَيْقٌ عَلَيْكُمْ فِيهَا حَتَّى تَاتُوا فِي مَقَابِلَتِهَا بِالْإِقْامَةِ تَوْسِقُونَ
 الْيَوْمَ وَلَوْمًا مُحْبِتَكُمْ فِي جَانِبِهِ الْعُلِيِّ بِاللَّهِ مَا نَظَرَ لَكُمْ، وَالآن وَجَهَ لَنَا
 مِنْ تَعْتِمَدُ عَلَيْهِ فِي ابْرَامِ الْكَلَامِ مَعَهُ وَامْضَائِهِ وَحْدَهُ لَأَنَّ الْكِتَابَةَ لَا تَفْيِي
 بِالْمَقصُودِ وَلَا بَدْنَدَ مِنْ تَرْدَادِ الْكَلَامِ مَعَهُ ذَالِكُ، وَكَتَبَهُ إِلَيْكُمْ مُحَمَّدُ بْنُ
 عَبْدِ السَّلَامِ السَّلَّيِي وَفَقِهُ اللَّهُ فِي ٦ رَبِيعِ الثَّانِي عَام ١٢٢٢هـ.

Appendix 29 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green
inquiring about the rupture between Great Britain and
the Sublime Porte and requesting a pass for a Tripoli-
tan vessel to proceed from Larache to Tripoli.

Date : 11 Rabi' II, 1222 / 18 June, 1807.

Source: F.O. 174/285.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وَعَوْصِيَّةِ رَبِّكُمُ الْوَكِيلِ

اللَّهُ أَعْلَمُ صَرَايْحُ الْجَنَانِ لِنَجْلِيزُ أَمَّا بَعْدُ بِمَا عَلِمْتُ أَنَّ هَذَا الْقَيْمَرُ سَعَادَهُ
بِنَكُمْ وَبِسَلَطَتِ الْمُلْكَةِ الْعَظِيمَةِ لَمْ تَعْلَمْنَا بِهَا لَمْ تَخْفَفُوهُ وَهِيَ
وَجْهُ الْأَمْرِ عَنْهُ نَا مَرْكَبٌ مُتَنَعِّثٌ أَكْمَلَ بَلْسَرْبَنْتَكُرْ زَرْجُ مَرْكَبٌ يَوْمَ مَرْسَى
عَلَيْهِ مِنَ الْمَجْبُورَةِ وَهِيَ شَعْرٌ هَذَا الْقَيْمَرُ كَمَا مَعْرُوفٌ مَا يَضْعُفُ إِلَّا يُجْبَكُ
تَعْلَمُنَا بِلَامِفِيَّةِ هَذَا الْقَيْمَرُ وَفَلَتْ مَفِيَّةِ الْأَوْزَادِ وَفَلَتْ هَلْ
تَفَدَّرُ عَلَى اخْرَاجِ الْبَصَرِ كَهْلَارَلَا النَّاسُ أَهْلَكُهُ بَلْسَرْبَنْتَكُرْ هَذَا
الَّذِي هُنَّا بِالْأَعْزَمِ لِلْمَجْبُورَةِ رَبِّيَّرْ جَهَوَهُ لِبَلْدَمِ سَلَمِيَّرْ لَمْ تَفَدَّرُ عَلَى
ذَلِكَ وَلَا بِمَا عَلِمْنَا بِمَا يَقُولُ عَلَيْهِ بِأَمْرِهِمْ أَشْلَهَ السَّمَرْ كَتَبَهُ
الْبَكَمْ ۲۱۰ رَبِّيَّعُ الْثَّالِثِ عَلَى ۱۲۲۲ مُعَرِّبِيَّرْ السَّمَلِيَّ

وَبَنْبَرْ
لَكَشَلَوَهُ

Appendix 30 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green advising him on how to approach Mawlāy Sulaymān to get more supplies for British naval forces.

Date : 10 Jumādā I, 1222 / 16 July , 1807.

Source: F.O. 174/285.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ كَلَامُ وَكَافِرَةٌ إِنَّا بِاللَّهِ أَعْلَمُ الْعَزِيزُ

Appendix 31 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green concerning the handling of exports by Jewish merchants.

Date : 20 Jumādā I, 1222 / 26 July, 1807.

Source: F.O. 174/285.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وَلَا حُولَّ وَلَا قُوَّةَ إِلَّا بِاللَّهِ الْعَلِيِّ الْعَظِيمِ

إِلَى الْقُوْنُصُوِّ الْأَكْرِينَ لِنْجِلِيزِي أَمَا بَعْدَ فَقَدْ وَصَلَنِي كِتَابُكَ وَعْرَفْتُ كُلَّ
مَا ذَكَرْتُهُ وَكُلَّهُ حَقِيقَةٌ وَهَا كِتَابُ سَيِّدِنَا نَصْرَهُ اللَّهُ يَصْلِكُ تَرْكِبَ مَنْ أَرَدْتُ وَاعْلَمْ
أَنَّ الْيَهُودَ هُمُ الَّذِينَ يَضْرُونَكُمْ بِتَسْوِيقِهِمْ لَكُمُ التَّيْرَانِ فَلَوْتَسْوَقْتُمْ مُثْلَ مَا
يَتَسْوِقُ الْبَرْطَقِيزُ لَظَاهِرٍ لَكُمْ فَعَلَ الْيَهُودُ مِنْ جُودَةِ التَّيْرَانِ وَرِخَاَهُ الثَّنَانِ،
وَهِيَ كِتَابُ مُحَمَّدٍ بْنِ عَبْدِ السَّلَامِ السَّلْوَيِّ وَفَقَهُ اللَّهُ فِي ٢٠ جُمَادَى الْأُولَى

عَام ١٢٢٢ .

Appendix 32 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green
regarding the redemption of Muslim captives in Sardinia.
Date : 23 Ramadān, 1222 / 24 Nov., 1807.
Source: F.O. 174/285.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وَمَا حَوْلَ وَمَا فُوْلَ إِلَّا بِاللَّهِ الْعَلِيِّ لِعَلِيهِ

الى الفرصة الـ ٣٧ لغليون ما بعد بـ ٥٠ كـ اميرنا عنكم هو توقف على هذا
في مخضية هذه المسلمين الـ ٣٧ في فرضهم اهل سرداينه كيف خلاصه
مرادي بهم لاننا نعمت انهم اصحابكم وسینز نعم الله لم يعدهم بذلك
وكان بعد عشرة اشهر الام معهم الابغى امر من سینز نعم الله وزاد الرحمـت تكتب لهم
زنتهم بهـذا الامر واذا اتوا بال المسلمين بهـم على ما كانوا عليهـم فـديـا من الاصـلـ
ومـا اخذـلـهم عـشرـة اشهر لـرـشـكـراـبـهـ لـسـيـنـزـ بـحدـ اـسـلـرـذـلـ عـلـيـهـمـ وـهـمـ لـمـ يـكـلـمـ لـهـمـ
اـحـدـ يـتـكـلـمـ عـلـيـهـمـ وـاـرـادـ اـرـاءـ وـاـيـوـكـلـونـكـ اوـغـيرـكـ عـلـيـهـمـ وـيـقـعـ الـعـصـالـ اـشـأـ اللـهـ
يـاعـنـ بـذـ الـأـرـابـيـ بـذـ اـنـهـمـ عـلـمـ عـلـىـ الـسـلـمـ الـعـمـيـيـ وـغـرـكـلـسـ فـيـضـنـاـ الـاحـسـنـاـ
اـلـيـهـ وـلـمـ يـهـلـوـ اـعـلـيـهـ حـمـيـدـ بـذـ الـنـصـارـيـ هـمـ بـذـ وـنـاـ بـذـ نـعـنـ بـذـ اـسـيـرـ وـالـمـركـبـ يـعـلـيـهـ
هـوـ الـفـوـفـ بـهـذاـ الـاـمـرـ وـلـاـ بـرـجـيـهـ تـنـكـلـ مـاـنـزـ بـذـ اـشـأـ اللـهـ وـاـمـاـ الـكـلـلـ الـذـيـ كـتـبـ
لـيـهـ مـعـ طـوـرـيـ وـكـبـرـ كـمـيـسـ مـرـذـالـ بـذـ الـاـمـرـ عـنـهـ بـذـ الـدـبـلـ الـخـلـبـهـ مـرـذـمـزـيـ حـنـيـ التـفـ
بـذـ اـشـأـ اللـهـ وـبـرـجـيـهـ الـيـكـرـمـ خـمـرـ عـبـرـ اـشـأـ اللـهـ وـفـقـهـ اللـهـ ٢٣٢ـ رـضـاـ الـعـلـمـ

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Appendix 33 : Pledge by Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Salām al-Salāwī to the British government regarding the fortress of Ceuta.

Date : 10 Shawwāl, 1222 / 11 Dec., 1807.

Source: F.O. 52/13.

Blessed be the only God and faith in him, witnesses that I, Sidi Mohamed ben Abdeslam Slawi, servant of the Almighty God and subject of His Imperial Majesty Mulay Sliman, whom God preserve, minister of marine and foreign affairs, being vested with due authority by His Imperial Majesty, to bind myself to the English nation, thus, if the English nation will take possession of Ceuta from the enemies now residing there and restore it to the Moors, a free exportation of oxen, sheep, fowls, eggs, and vegetables shall be allowed paying for the same as in the time of my master Sidi Mohamed ben Abdallah, whom God rest his soul; and I further pledge myself to allow the exportation of gums, wax, hides, and other articles of trade paying the same duty as in the time of the aforementioned Sidi Mohamed ben Abdallah, but these privileges shall only be granted to English Christian merchants.

To the above conditions His Imperial Majesty and myself severally bind ourselves, according to His Imperial Majesty's authority vested in me, as witnesses my hand and seal at Tetouan, this tenth day of Shawwal, 1222.


Appendix 34 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Sādaq concerning the purchase of a war vessel in England by Meir Macnin.

Date : 28 Hijja, 1222 / 26 Feb., 1808.

Source: F.O. 52/14.

وَنَمَرْ قَدْ فَرَةٌ بَدْ بِاللَّهِ لَعْنَهُ أَنْعَمْ

الحمد لله



خرفينا ورسيعينا الخلاج اهمن عنده الطير راغعا في الله وسلام عليهندا ورحمه الله وجزاكاته
وبغدو مفرغ تعلقنا بزمكنا بما يوصي الرزق والنعمان اي النزاوى يوصي بشرعيه اتفقيه
على ابو جبير ويزيد بن ابي ذئب للتابعه يوصي بشرعيه قوله له يفعى ويجتازه من شر لتنا
بزمكنا بزمكنا فرطنا اذ اكتفى بحسب ما وجدناه بزم النزاوى والنعام للتعليم اذ كان ما يكتب بالروايات
والذوقين وعمليه يكرر من المراكب انجزها جنهر لتعليم بزم الشاعر و فيه بزم المذاق
اثنا عشر من بعد الاذاعين من النعام اذ قال العز و مغيره غيره من المذاق الشعرا اشتيا اذ اصر عثم شفيرا
لبيانه مرا الاد قلبي بعنده فرله ان كل مرسو و ما ذكرناه و كفيته لا يتعدى ما اذ اشتيا على خطأه مرا
الغفران شفاء الله بوزير الدولة لتعليم فيه قال الحق بيه انه يفعى و حامشة بيه يفعى و حامشة بيه
يشترى ذلة موسي عليه الشواذ شفاء ميفده عاجلا ما يد ناظرا و اشتيا اهنة بزم اذ عذر فلما
و دعير راغد بزم تلبيه و ما يفتح اليه بوجهه اذ حضرها المتعير اذ لم يجز العذر اذ قسم له اذ
بعد المدعى اذ اخربها رانى بزم العصر و لم يوجه شيئا علمنا انه بلا ذرفوا له بجهزه شفاعة
و رجزه من انتقامه و عدم فتحه و اسلامه و انتقامه و مرضه الجهة الارحام معلم ٢٩٢

Appendix 35 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green on Anglo-Moroccan preparations for the siege of Ceuta.

Date : 11 Safar, 1223 / 8 April, 1808.

Source: F.O. 174/17.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وَكَانَ مُوْلَى رَبِّ الْفَلَقِ إِلَٰهُ الْعَالَمِينَ

إِنَّ الْفَنَصِيرَةَ الْكَبِيرَ لِتَخْلِيَّزَ إِمَادَةً طَبْقَيْدَ سَهْلَتْ أَنْكُمْ عَلَيْتُمْ لِمَدَافِعِ جِبَلِ خَلْدَرَةِ
 كَارِيَّةِ الْمَهَاجِرِ وَمَلَكَاهُ عَنْكُمْ كَمْ مِنْ كَارِيَّةِ الْمَهَاجِرِ أَنْلَا عَمَلْتُمْهُمْ بِالْعَازِرِ بِلَذِ الْأَعْزَمِ
 أَهْوَمَهُنَّا لَكُمْ تَبَقْتُ لَنْ أَعْلَمُ مَا يَبْلُغُهُ كُلُّ يَدَهُ مِنْ حِصْنَةِ ثَلَاثَيْنِيَّةِ
 عَشْرِ رَضْبَعَهُ كَمْ مِنْ حِصْنَةِ أَرْبَاعَتِهِ وَعَشْرِ بَرِّ لَابِيَّهُ أَبْقَتُ لَنْ أَعْلَمُهُمْ بِرَادِمَهُتِ
 بِلَذِ اسْمَرَتْ مِنْ يَنْزِلَ عَلَى حَزَرِيَّهِ لَنَّا وَلَأَبْنَاهُ لَكَ أَوْلَ الْمَعْلَمَاتِ التِّسْتَوَاعِعَاتِ
 يَهُوَمَهُ نَجَّوْهُهَا هَنَالِكَ بِلَاهِيَهُونَكَ دَالَدَالَامَسْلَمَةَ نَجَّبَهُمْ تَمْنَاهُمْ
 سَنَنَزُولَ لِلَّهِرِ الْمَعَالِمَةَ مَعَ الْعَيْنَةِ وَكُلُّ مَا يَخْصُّهُمْ يَا تَوْنَى عَلَيْهِ لَهَنْتَرَ
 هَذَا فَبِلِ الشَّرْدَعِ بِلَهِمْ وَإِذَا شَعْتُمْ بِالْمَهْبَبِ بِلَاهِيَخْصَكُهُشِ دَاهَشَهُ اللَّهُ
 وَبِهِ كَنْبَهُ الْيَكِمْ مُخْبَرُ السَّلَلِ الْمَشْلُوِيِّ وَقَبْرُ السَّهِيِّ وَالصَّمِيرُ الْجَيْرُ عَلَى 223

Appendix 36 : Letter from J. Green to Mawlāy Sulaymān giving assurances about the British landing on the Moroccan islet of Tawra .

Date : 16 Ṣafar, 1223 / 13 April, 1808.

Source: F.O. 174/17.

أما بعد أنهى لكريم علم سيدنا آيده الله وأنه في شهر شوال كت أخبرت جانب مولانا العلي بالله بالسائل التي قالها لنا كاتب سيدنا محمد السلوبي طالبا من جنسنا أخذ سبتة من يد أعداء سيدنا الذين هم بها ، فأجابنا سيدنا نصره الله في كتابه العزيز بأنه كل ما عملنا مع كاتب سيدنا المذكور هو ماض ، ومن ذلك الوقت آيد الله نصر سيدنا ، واني مشتغل بالمكاتبة على ذلک لوزير دولتنا حتى أتاني آخر جوابه أنه قد خرج الأمر بمحاصرة سبتة في البحر، ولأجل أن يكون أمرنا على عهد كتب لنا حاكم جبل طارق بأن نطلب لوزير سيدنا نصره الله السيد محمد السلوبي إذنه بنزولنا الجزيرة المسماة " تورة " فذكرت جميع هذا كله للسيد محمد المذكور وقاولني بأنه يتطلب لنا ذلك من جانب مولانا العلي بالله حين تكونوا موجودين لذلك ، ولما رأينا عدونا ، آيد الله نصر سيدنا ، كل يوم ياتيهـ المدد والميرة ويجهدون أنفسهم ما أمكنـا ، بارك الله في عمر سيدنا ، إلاـ أن أسرعنا لنزول هذه الجزيرة ، وهي فارغة ولا شيء من العمارة بها وأنزلنا بها مائعة من الجيش وبعض الخدامـين وستة من المدافـع وبعـض قراصـينـا بقصد الحصار على سبتة قائمـينـ في ذلك على ساقـ جـدـ ولوـلاـ نـزـولـناـ ، بـارـكـ اللـهـ فـيـ عمرـ سـيـدـناـ ، بـهـذـهـ الـجـزـيرـةـ لـكـانـ عـدوـنـاـ كـلـ يـوـمـ يـزـدـادـ مـدـداـ فـيـصـبـرـونـ بـذـلـكـ مـاـ نـعـيـنـ مـنـ أـخـذـهـاـ . فـلـذـاـ لـمـ نـنـزـلـ بـهـذـهـ الـجـزـيرـةـ لـاـ يـسـتـقـيمـ لـنـاـ حـصـارـ ، فـلـأـجـلـ يـكـونـ سـيـدـناـ الـمـنـصـورـ بـالـلـهـ مـطـمـنـ الـبـالـ فـلـمـهـ لـاـ غـرـضـ لـنـاـ فـيـ هـذـهـ الـجـزـيرـةـ لـاـ نـفـعـ إـلـاـ حـصـارـ عـلـىـ أـعـدـاءـ سـيـدـناـ وـلـأـخـرـاجـهـمـ بـعـونـ اللـهـ مـنـ سـبـتـةـ . هـذـاـ وـقـدـ سـمـعـنـاـ أـعـدـاءـنـاـ كـتـبـواـ لـجـابـ سـيـدـناـ نـصـرـهـ اللـهـ بـخـلـافـ مـاـ ذـكـرـنـاـ . فـحـاشـ اللـهـ أـنـ يـكـونـ عـنـدـنـاـ جـابـ سـيـدـناـ الـمـقـدـسـ بـهـذـهـ الـمـكـانـةـ مـعـ أـنـاـ ، آيدـ اللـهـ نـصـرـ سـيـدـناـ ، مـاـ نـزـلـنـاـ

بها إلا لمنفعة سيدنا والقيام بالحصار على سبتة فلا بد من هذه الجزيرة وإن أمر سيدنا بالخروج عنها فخرجوا منها وندفعوها ل الخليفة سيدنا يعمرها بن شاء وما نحن إلا عند الأمر والنهي ومن جملة خدام سيدنا وجيشه كذلك نعلم جانب مولانا العلي بالله بأن الإقامة الجهادية للأبراج التي كان أمرنا سيدنا بالإثبات بها هاهي اليوم ساعة الكتب تنزل بالمرسى وبعد فراغ المركب من نزولها أيد الله نصر سيدنا يرجع لجبل طارق للإثبات بإقامة المراكب نفع الله سيدنا ومولانا بأجر ذلك .

Appendix. 37 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green
 concerning the British landing on the Islet of Tawra.
Date : 18 Ṣafar 1223 / 15 April, 1808.
Source: F.O. 174/2.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ كُلَّا هُوَ إِلَّا فَتْرَأْ لِرَابِّ الْعَالَمِينَ

اللَّهُمَّ أَغْنِنَا إِذْ رَجَبْتَنَا بِمَا يَعْلَمُ بِفَدَى رَصْنَتِنَا كَذَلِكَ بِأَعْرَفَنَا وَإِنَّا مَا شَكِّيْتَ وَبِفَعْلِيْكَ
 الْحَالَ بِعَذَابِكَ فَلَا يَكُونُ عَذَابُكَ بِأَسْرَارِكَ شَاءَ اللَّهُ رَفَدَ وَطَالَ النَّعَمَ إِلَيْكَ الْمُرْسَلُ شَبَّاكَةَ
 وَأَخْبَرَنَا بِالْمُرْسَلِ إِذْ أَعْلَمَ عَمَّا فِي الْعِجَاجِ وَفَدَ وَجَهَهَا إِلَيْكَ سَيِّدُنَا حَمْزَةُ اللَّهِ يُبَشِّرُكَ
 لِهِ أَمْرُهُ وَيُطْكِيْكَ إِذْ تَذَلَّبُ إِذْ لَانْتَ بِهِ إِلَيْكَ مُعْنَى لِمَعْ خَلْيَادَ الْأَعْرَابِ بِرَأْبَعَتْهُ لَنَدَا
 وَأَعْلَمَكَ تَبَتَّلَ لِلْمُرْسَلِ تَصِيرُ وَالْمُصْبِيْلُ أَنْتُمْ أَعْلَمُ بِتَبَتَّلِكَ سَيِّدُنَا حَمْزَةُ اللَّهِ يُبَشِّرُكَ
 مَا عَلِمْتُمْ بِهِ يَعْلَمُهُ بِجَيْشِهِ وَيَعْلَمُكُمْ شَرَافُ امْتَكُمْ وَفَلَتْ لَهُمْ لَذَّةٌ مُتَوَجِّهٌ إِلَيْهِ
 نَتَمْهِلُ بِجَيْشِنَا ، شَاءَ اللَّهُ بِكَذَّ الْأَنْتَ شَتَّى عَمَّنْدَ الْفَوْنَصَوَاتِ أَنْتُمْ أَرْدَنْتُمُ الْخَرْوَجَ
 مُنْطَلَّا رَتَّلَيْمَهُ الْمُسْلِمِيْرُ لِتَرْسِلُوا عَلَيْرِيْ دَسَّانَتْسِيْرِيْ فَيَعْلَمَ سَيِّدُنَا حَمْزَةُ اللَّهِ كَوْلِيْنَيَةَ
 الْجَبَرِيَّا يَا تَيْمَهُ بِهِلَّهُمْ بِرَاهِنَ شَاءَ اللَّهُ بِالْعِلْمِ عَلَى مَا يَلِيْنَاهُ إِلَيْكَ مُعْنَى نَارَاعِنَ بِالْبَلَادِ
 مِنَ الْأَفَلَامَةِ رَلَابِدَرِيَّا لِلْأَسْمَاعِ بِرَكِبِ عَزَّزَادَ بِفَدَى تَوْجِهِ بِالسَّلَامَةِ وَبِهِ كَتَبَ إِلَيْكَ
 غَمْ بِعِبَرِ الْمُسْلِلِ وَالْمُشَلِّيِّ وَتَقْبِرِ اللَّهِ 182 أَصْبَعُ الْجَبَرِيَّا عَلَى حَقْرَلَهُ أَوْ وَهَبَ لَنَا كَلَارِكَنَزَ
 الْبَغَازِمَ دَارِكَ وَوَجَدَنَا عَلَى خَسِينَ كَلَارِكَهَ نَلَذَّعَ لِلْأَفَلَامَةِ لِكَبِ سَيِّدَنَا
 سَيِّدُنَا اللَّهُ وَلَابِدُوكَ وَلَكَمَا يَلِيْكَ لَذَا وَحْيَنَ نَاسِيْلَهُ مَانِكَهُوَهُ لَاتَّنَهُ وَلَابِرَمَ

Appendix 38 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green on the Ceuta question and the British landing on the islet of Tawra.

Date : 27 Safar, 1223 / 24 April, 1808.

Source: F.O. 174/17.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ
وَلَا هُوَ كَفُورٌ أَنْ يَأْتِيَ اللَّهُ بِالنُّفُوضِ

إِلَيْنَا لِنَعْصُوا إِكْرَارِ لِنْجِيلِيرِ أَمَا جَدَّابِيَا، جَوَابِ مَكْحُولِيَا، حَمْوَالِيَا وَطَنِيَ عَلَى سَبَبِ
تَأْوِيلِهِ وَاعْجَبِ سَيْرِ اسْتِحْمَامِ اللَّهِ نَزْوَلِكُمْ بِهِ الْبَظْرَمِ، غَيْرِ كُمْ وَلَوْ كَلِبْتُمُ النَّزْرَ وَعَنِيَّتُهُ نَازِ
بِهِنْجَةِ أَوْ الْفَصْرِ الصَّغِيرِ لِفَلَنْدَكُمْ طَالِعِ، إِذَا كَتَمْتُ تَفْهُرَوْنَ عَلَى نَزْوَلِ رَالَّذِي الْمَرْبَ—
عَلَى مَعْلَةِ مَعْنَيَّتِكُمْ بِسِرِّ الْمَطَارِ سَبَبَةِ اعْتِيَّنِي فَهَذِي يَدُوكِ بِهِ الْتَّشْفِلُوَانْغُرِ بِهِلَنْدَا
مَعْشَرِ سَبَبِرِ وَلَوْ نَظِيْبُوَهُ وَأَكْتَمْتُهُنْدَا الْأَمْرِ عَرَكِلِ أَمْدَرِ رَابِغِيَّهِ بَيْنِ وَبَيْنِكِ لَا يَجْلِمُ
عَلَيْهِ أَمْدَرِ رَاعِيَّيَّهِ فَهَذِي يَدُوكِ بِالْجَمِيرِ لَا إِنْكُمْ بِهِ لَاعِلُونَ جَمِيْرِ الْجَنِيْرِ مَنْوَكِ الْمَبِنْدَكِ بِهِلَدَا
تَخْجُوهُ عَنِيَّتِهِ وَكُلُّ مَا يَنْحِصُ عَمَكْرَكُمْ مِنْ الْكَمَانِيَّةِ وَالْجَمِيرِ وَغَيْرِهِ لَكُمْ مَعْنَيَّهُ نَازِتُهُنْيَّهِنْدَا
خَلَاجِيَّكِ بِسَبَبَةِ تَوْلُهُنْهَا إِسْتِرِنْجِ حَمْوَالِيَا اللَّهِ رَأَيْتَ بِكِ بِإِكْثَرِ مَرْهُنْدَا مِنْ غَيْرِ
مَنْجِيَّهِ لَا كُنْتُ نَرِيْجِيَّنَهُمْ بِبَيْنِ عَمَلِيَّتِهِنْيَّهِنْدَا إِسْتِرِنْجِ حَمْوَالِيَا اللَّهِ وَكُلُّ مَاتَنْخِنَهُ مِنْ الْأَمْرِ
فَظَاهِرِيَا اللَّهِ وَيَقِنِيَا لَكُمْ مَعْنَيَّهُنْيَّهِنْدَا إِسْتِرِنْجِ حَمْوَالِيَا بِقَوْيِيَّتِهِنْيَّهِنْدَا بِهِيَّهِنْيَّهِنْدَا
إِذَا تَلَذِّغَلِيَّهُلِهِ سَبَبَةِ أَيْلِيَا مِنْ مَرْكَشِيَّيِّهِنْيَّهِنْدَا خَرْجِ إِسْتِرِنْجِ حَمْوَالِيَا اللَّهِ مِنْ مَرْكَشِيَّهِنْيَّهِنْدَا
لَنَلَادِهِنْيَّهِنْدَا لِسِيْمُونَهُنْيَّهِنْدَا لَنَلَادِهِنْيَّهِنْدَا لَنَلَادِهِنْيَّهِنْدَا لَنَلَادِهِنْيَّهِنْدَا وَالْعَدِيقَةِ
إِذَا شَأَرَهُنْيَّهِنْدَا لِسِيْمُونَهُنْيَّهِنْدَا لَنَلَادِهِنْيَّهِنْدَا لَنَلَادِهِنْيَّهِنْدَا لَنَلَادِهِنْيَّهِنْدَا وَالْعَدِيقَةِ
لَنَعِيَّهُنْيَّهِنْدَا لِسِيْمُونَهُنْيَّهِنْدَا لَنَلَادِهِنْيَّهِنْدَا لَنَلَادِهِنْيَّهِنْدَا لَنَلَادِهِنْيَّهِنْدَا وَالْعَدِيقَةِ
وَالْعَدِيقَةِ لَنَلَادِهِنْيَّهِنْدَا كَعْبِ الْبَيْكِمْ بَعْدِ بَعْرِيَّهِنْيَّهِنْدَا الشَّلَادِيِّ وَقَبَّهِيَا اللَّهِ بِ223 صَبَرِيَّهِنْيَّهِنْدَا

Appendix 39 : Letter from al-Salāwī to James Green concerning a joint British-Moroccan blockade of Ceuta.

Date : 28 Safar 1223 / 25 April, 1808.

Source: F.O. 174/17.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وَسَلَامٌ وَكَافُورٌ لِلأَبْلَاهِ الْعُلَيِّ الْمُتَطَهِّرِ

اللَّهُمَّ إِنَّا نَسْأَلُكُكَ الْغُلَمَانِ مَا يَعْلَمُ بِفُضْلِكَ وَصَلَاتِكَ كَثِيرًا بِمَا فَرَقْتَ مَا فَرَقْتَ بِأَعْلَمِ رَأْنَةٍ
إِنَّمَا الْكِتَابَ لِلَّهِ الْعَزِيزِ كَذَلِكَ يَكُونُ فِيلَهُنَّا وَمَبْهَثُ الْخَلْقَةِ بِسَبِيلِهِ
بِرَحْمَةِ رَبِّ الْأَوَّلِ وَالْآخِرِ وَبِرَحْمَةِ الْمَلِكِ الْمُجَاهِدِ رَاجِحِ الْمَرْجَنِ الْمُجْعَلِ
بِجَاهِ الْمُرَاسِمَةِ وَالْمُتَّسِدِرِ بِلَا خَدِيَّةِ فِي ذَلِكَ الْأَبْلَاهِ الْمُجَاهِدِ الْمُجْعَلِ
تَخْرُجُ لِهَا عَصَابَةٌ مِنْ سَبِيلِهِ فِي لِلْأَنْتَقِبِ بِمَهْلَكِهِنَّا الْمَازِدَةِ بِعَدْسَةِ سَبِيلِهِ
وَنَتَارَةِ الْمَاءِ كَذَلِكَ لِهَا الْعَدِيدَةُ ذَهِبَتْ كَذَلِكَ لِلْأَمْرِ مِنْهُمْ عَلَى عَدِيْدٍ وَكَمْ وَعَدَنَا
وَلَا هُنْ مَا يَبْغُونَ الْجَبَشَ وَنَجْمَعُ عَلَيْنَا فَلَمَّا تَشَكَّلَ غَيْرُ مَطْرَكِمْ رَأَى عَلَيْهِ
إِذَا هُنْ مِنْكُمُ الْخَصَارِيَّةِ الْبَهْرِيَّةِ بَلَى، مَعْلَمَتْنَا تَصْبِعُ رَابِطَتِهِ بِالْبَهْرِيِّ وَخَلَرِيِّ وَرَادِ الْأَرْدَنِ
نَزَولِ مَعْلَمَتِهِنَّا فِي هُوْسِ جَمْلَةِ عَلَيْتَكَ رَادِ الْأَمْرِ تَفَعِّلُهُ وَالْأَعْلَمُ حِرَبُ الْمُسْبِرِ
بِشَرْكَعَوْكُمْ بِجَوْلِ اللَّهِ حِرَبُ الْبَهْرِيِّ وَرَادِ الْمَرْيَقَعِ عَلَيْهِنَّا الْخَطَرُ الْيَوْمُ الْمُرْبِيُّ
هُمْ مُشَاهِرُنُونَ مَعَ الْبَهْرِيِّ صِصِّيْرُ بِمَقْوِيْفَعِ دَهِيشَتِهِنَّا لَمْ تَكُنْ عِنْدَكُمْ سَرَائِكَتِ
كَبِيرَةِ رَكَيْثَةِ لِبِالْبَغَازِ يَسْفُو عِنْدَ مُشَاهِرِنَّا بِلَا بَحْجَةِ خَلَافٍ عَلَيْهِنَّا يَنْتَهِرُونَ كَمِهْلَكِ
مِنْ سَرَرِ رَادِ الْأَخْنَهِ مِنْ كُمِ الْيَوْمِ الْعَزِيزِ وَالْمَجِيدِ بِلَا زَصِحُ بِالْجَلَةِ بِكَشْبَهِ
وَرَجَمُ تَشَتَّلُونَ بِالْبَهْرِيِّ نَزَلَ عَلَى سَبِيلِهِنَّا رَهِنَّا الْأَمْرِ مَا يَبْغُونَ فِيهِ تَرَاثُهُ وَلَا بَغْنَى
پَيْهُ لَا أَعْجَبُهُ وَمَجِيئُ الْأَمْرِ الْأَتِيَّ هُوَ لَكُمْ عِنْدَكُمْ 2 الْيَوْمُ الْمُبِيْسُ لَهُ وَلَا يَدْعُنَكُمْ أَمْلَأَهُ كُمْ
وَالْأَكْلَانَهُ وَالْأَعْلَهُ وَالْأَعْلَمُ لِلْأَمْرِ الْأَيْشِرِ وَرَيْحَنِ بَهَا وَنَسَحِ لَهُ الْبَهْرِسِيِّ وَالْبَهْلَانِيِّ پَيْهُ
كُلَّ مَا يَبْغُونَ بِلَا فَدَامَةَ لِلْأَيْشِرِ وَرَيْحَنِ بَهَا وَنَسَحِ لَهُ الْبَهْرِسِيِّ وَالْبَهْلَانِيِّ
يَنْهَيْهُ رَابِرُو بِهَتَبِ الْيَكِيرِ مُحَمَّدِ الْسَّلَادِ الْمُسْلُوِيِّ وَفِيْرِ الْمَدِ 28 صَعِيرِ الْيَمِ 1223 لـ

Appendix 40 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green on the Ceuta question.

Date : 1 Rabī‘ I, 1223 / 27 April, 1808.

Source: F.O. 174/17.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وَكَافِرُوا لَا يَأْدُلُهُمُ الْعَلَى الْعِلْمِ

اللَّهُ أَنْتَ صَوْدَاكَمْ لِيَعْلَمَ إِمَامُهُ وَفَقِيرُهُ وَلَمْ يَنْتَهِ عَلَى رَأْيِي إِلَّا لَانْشَأَ
بِالْقُلُوبِ مَا بِالْكُتُبِ إِنَّمَا هُوَ لِلْمُلْكِ وَالْمُلْكُ لِلْعِلْمِ وَإِعْلَمُهُ لِهُمْ وَالْكُتُبُ
لِهُمْ سُخْنَةٌ مِّنَ الْكُتُبِ الْأُخْرَى وَجَهْتُ لِي وَاعْلَمُهُمْ لَهُمْ زَمِيعٌ مَا حَلَبْتُ مِنْ هَذَا إِنَّمَا
فَلَدَعْتُ عَلَيْكُمْ بِيَوْمِ الدِّينِ أَنْ شَاءَ اللَّهُ وَيُنْضِلُكُمْ كُلَّ مَلَكَرْبَيْدَ وَجَوَهْ مَلَكَرْبَيْ
غَيْرَ أَنَّهُ أَنْلَقْتُ مَمْعَلَتِي فَكَأَ، ابْعَادَنِي مِنْ رَأْيِكُمُ الْكَبَارِ وَزَرَانِيَّكُمْ بِالْعَصَارِ
عَلَى سَبِيلِهِ بِأَعْلَمِي مَا يَسِّبِبُ ذَلِكُو الْكَبِيرُ إِذَا النَّفَرَتِيَّهُ بِلَهْجَتِي دَاهْ وَجَهْتُ الْكَبِيرُ
بِلَهْ بَهْ مَعْهُ وَيَهْ كَتَبَ إِلَيْكُمْ غَيْرَ عَنْ إِلَشْنِي السُّلْطَانِيَّ وَقَنْتَهُ السُّبْعَ أَوْلَ رَبِيعِ النَّبُوَى
عَلَى 223

Appendix 41 : Letter from the governor of Essaouira to the British Chancellor of the Exchequer concerning the purchase of a war vessel in England.

Date : 16 Rabī‘ I, 1223 / 12 May, 1808.

Source: F.O. 52/14.

الحمد لله

من حمد ربنا تعلم وخدیع المعلم العلی بالله فلادی مرسن
 للصویر وفاکھر جیشها الشعید الحاج امحمد بن عبیح الخادم
 کا، اللہ الدلّه الریک پر جنسہ و خلیقہ من لکم کم و وزیر الدّولہ
 النیجیلیزیہ و ریسٹھا و فہرمانہا الامّہ کبڑو سلاسلہ طبع
 الوزیر الرفیع اپنے بال مفتریز سیال خبیث کے کثیر اور تکوہ بغیر
 و حمل الخیر و تضییر میں نہ کر جل ملیخ لدن سمع علینیک الـ
 الشیر و لکھو المحسوب علینیک بیش معنیک عمل منیہ سیدنا
 المنصور بالله مولانا سلیمان راد ان اللہ وجہہ دام امیرو بخدا
 بلازیتیکہ نائحہ اللہ امر شدیہ الزمہ ایو مفینیں الحرمیں داز قشتری
 لہ مرکبہ افرطانہ مرا مرا کما الجدیدۃ اللہ احمد شفوقہ بے هذہ
 السالیکہ بخیبک ارتقیع معد بکلیتھ و تکریز بیحونہ حقی
 بیشتریکہ عمل الکیعیۃ اللہ امر بغا سیدنا ابیدہ اللہ عزّما و یکون
 عمل ختم المراء و ارتقیع مهدیۃ الوفیو بے دلک کما هرما المکنون
 پیک و ائک لآ تصریح مسئلہ جانبی سیدنا ابیدہ عزیز زخم منک
 و صحتیکہ بی جانبی الشریعہ کھنھرہ و ثبتیک اعلانہ اللہ و ائک بی عمل التزمع
 لـ الشیعہ و امیریکہ امر بیع النبو و الافر علام 1223

Appendix 42: Letter from al-Salāwī to Admiral Collingwood proposing the supply of Spain with horses in return for the fortress of Ceuta.

Date: 20 Jumādā, 1223/ 14 July, 1808.

Source: British Museum, Add. Ms. 40,098.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ رَبِّ الْعَالَمِينَ

المرانث المعلم المقى كي فتح طلب كل امور الامر والكلف بل مروره بمركته
أشر المفيم على فالمر اما بخطابه، كتابه الله، وجفت لبيته ابيها الله ونهره
وطلحضرت العلی بالله وتعزف ماحلبت در من جانب العلی بالله بأعجده ایمه
استغافلكم في بحر محبتكم متوجه دعا غيركم يلهمكم تقوه لهم بحفظ امسرة
ونواك ع ليلا صدى الحبطة منكم في جانب الشرييف رامنة ایمه الله
انني سمعت عن المباعلم ان هذا الامر صفت نسبته لا على سير ائمه الله كان المسلمين
طاهرون و ما يقبلون ولا الا اذا كانوا منبعثة تعارضه انه هرما في حين لا يقبل
لذا بعلده الا اذا اكله، ماذكرنا الاول لاحرمة اليم ما صفت على سير ائمه الله بجانب
محبتكم واعلموا من شئكم في هذه الباب الشرييف ما يحيي نقصكم امركم
ونسبت مظاهرها على بعده، ملائكةهم للمجد پمير طلبنا الاول و ما يقربونه على ماتلائئتهم
به بخلاف الميسرين تليهم اليهم و ملائكة فربية من غير تهليل و امشقة بخلاف ذلك
والكل ما ذكرت پيه مع الفونصوا الرازير حبر يكتب لهم بما يقربونه منبعثة طلبتهم
حيث انهم الكل فيه و فدعا عز عليهم طلبها لذا المسئلة التي هي من نوعه
عليكم بالعلم ولو كانت غير ممنوعة ما رمت طلبتهما لذا و اوقف لغيرهم لذا
بل انه ينضوا شئ الله وبه كتب من حرم و سنه هوان بعدها اولى

وزیر البر والملک بالاموال الاجنبی



1223

$$20 \text{ Jun 2018} \\ = 14 \text{ days}$$

Appendix 43 : An example of a Sulaymāni passport.

Date : middle of Jumādā II, 1223 / August, 1808.

Source: F.O. 174/17.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم ولا حول ولا قوة إلا بالله العلي العظيم
 (بعد الطابع الشريف)

يستقر هذا المرسوم الشريف والظاهر المنيف أسماء الله
 بيد الخديم الرايس ابراهيم ومهه تسعه وخمسون من البحريه من أي جنس
 أراد يسافر بسنجرقان النصور بالله في المركب المسى "تطوان" تحمل عشرة
 آلاف قنطار وفيها ستة عشر مدعا ، يسافر آمنا حيث شاء من بلاد المسلمين
 وببلاد النصارى الذين هم بالمهادنة والصلح معنا ، فعليه نعرف أجناس
 النصارى المصاحين مع جانينا العلي بالله بذلك ليقدروا حرمته ويراعوا حقه
 كما هو المقرر في قوانين الصلح وقواعد ، وقدر مدة عمل الظاهر الشريف عشر
 سنين . صدر الأمر به تمام الرسم فافت الأمر والحكم في أواسط
 جمادى الثانية عام 1223 .

Appendix 44 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green
asking for a maritime pass to secure the return to
France of Captain Burel.

Date : 24 Rabī' I, 1224 / 9 May, 1809.

Source: F.O. 174/17.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ سَامِولْ وَلَفْوُلْ إِبْرَاهِيمْ

إِلَى الْغُونْصُوْ وَالْقُشْرِ لِتَلِيْزِ إِمَادِيْجِيْ وَظَلِيلِيْسِ بَيْنِ وَعَاقِبَةِ وَرَطْلَا
مَهْدِ كَتَابِيْا وَعَرْقَتِ هَمِيْجِيْ بَلْهَنْ مَهْدِ وَفَوْجَيْ وَأَعْتَنَّا، الْحَاكِمِ بَيْنِ مَهْدِ وَلِيْسِ
هَمِيْجِيْ، أَيْنَ إِنَّ اللَّهَ إِلَّا يَعْلَمُ عَنْكُمْ مَعْ جَانِبِهِ الْعَلَى بِاللَّهِ
وَكَنْيَةِ الْمَاعِرِبِتْ بِجَوَابِ الْكَمَدَلَرِيِّ الْيَكَاعِلِيِّ مَعْبِيْنَةِ الْمَهْيَنْ بِإِعْلَمِ اِنْتَدَ
كَلَّا وَكَلَّا وَأَمَادِيَا زَيْنَهُنْيَهُ كَرَانْهَرِيْمِ الْمَوْفَوْ وَالْأَعْتَنَّا
بِجَنَاحَةِ لَهِيْزِ تَحْرِمَ اللَّهِ وَاعْلَمُوا نَهْ بِعَوْ اِنْتَدِ الْمَالِ النَّصَرِيِّ إِبْرَاهِيمْ أَنْصِيْصِ رَسُولِ
وَرَجَعَ مَمْضِيًّا مَوْلَانَ تَحْرِمَ اللَّهِ بِهِيْرِ مَالِلِكِيَانِ طَلِيَ مَنْهُ وَرَفْنَصَوْهُمْ
الْمَهْيَهُ عَلِيِّ تَرْجِيْهِ وَالْمَالِ سَوْ جَفَلَتْ لَهُنْ تَلِيْزِ مَنْكَثَتْ تَهْمِيْتَهُ
بِجَانِبِ لَهِيْزِ تَحْرِمَ اللَّهِ وَصَعِيْفَهُ مَنْتَهَيَةِ الْأَخْلَيْهِ كَلَّا غَيْرِ بَطْلِيهِ
لَنْ كَانْ بَحْرِيَّهُ مَدِيْطَنِيْهِ عَلِيِّهِ (عَلِيِّهِ) بِجَانِبِ لَهِيْزِ تَحْرِمَ اللَّهِ
وَالْيَوْ وَكَلِبِ مَنْتَهَيَهِ التَّوْصِيْهِ بِمَرْكِبِ إِبْرَاهِيْلِيِّ الْمَتَوْجِيْمِ لَهِيْزِيْهِ
وَرَفْتَلِمِ مَعْهُ وَنَدِ الْمَسِيْحِ وَالْمَبْوَلِ يَلْتَهِمْ مَهْدِ دَارِدَتْ تَهْمِرِ وَخَبَهْنَا
مَهْتَهْتَهْيَهِ كَلَّا غَيْرِ الْأَنَّيِ، بِيَلِمِ بِهِ وَكَانْهَرِيْلَيْرِ وَرَادِيْعِ ذَالْمَالِيْرِ لَهِيْقَرِ وَلَادِيْهِ
وَلَهِ كَيْمِيْمِ بِرَعْمَلِ الْمَشَلَلِ الْمَلَوِيِّ وَفَقَهِ الْنَّدَبِ 242 رَبِيعُ النَّبُوَى
الآنِرِ عَلَوْ 1224

Appendix 45 : Letter of rebuke from Mawlāy Sulaymān to al-‘Arbī b. al-Ma‘ṭī, head of the Sharqāwi zāwiya . Date : not mentioned in the text, but letter written during al-‘Arbī b. al-Ma‘ṭī's exile in Fès (Dec., 1808-Aug., 1809).

Source: Ms. K.1264, BGR, pp.361-365.

الحمد لله وحده

إلى القبيه السيد العزيز بن المعطي الذى لاتزال فراستا فيه تصيب ولا تخطي . جعلنا الله ولدكم من لم يتخذ إلا هـ سواه . سلام عليكم ورحمة الله . أما بعد أيمها السائر على غير طريق من الليالي المـلهمـة طال ما أردتم أن تطفئوا نور الله بأفواهكم ويأبى الله إلا أن يـتمـه . أما للعاقل في قول ناج الدين ما يكفيه ، ما ترك من الجهل شيئا ، من أراد أن يظهر في الوقت عندما أظهره الله فيه ، خرجت أولـأـعنـ الجمـاعـةـ ، ثم خـدـعـنـاـ فيـ اللهـ بـلـسانـ الـضـرـاعـةـ ، فـسـتـرـنـاـ عـورـتـكـ ، وـأـقـلـنـاـ عـشـرـتـكـ ، وـقـابـلـنـاـ إـسـمـاـتـكـ بـالـإـحـسـانـ ، الـذـيـ لـيـسـ لـكـ بـشـكـرـهـ يـدـانـ وـلـاـ لـسـانـ ، وـقـلـنـاـ لـلـنـفـسـ قـولـ منـ لـيـسـ عـنـ رـبـهـ بـلـاهـ ، وـلـانـ يـرـيدـواـ أـنـ يـخـدـعـوكـ فـلـمـ حـسـبـكـ اللـهـ فـاذـكـرـواـ نـعـمـةـ اللـهـ عـلـيـكـ إـذـ كـنـتـ أـعـدـاءـ إـلـيـ فـانـقـذـكـ مـنـهـ " هلـ الـبـيـعـةـ الـتـيـ كـانـتـ فـيـ رـقـبـتـكـ إـلـاـ بـالـسـمـعـ وـالـطـاعـةـ وـلـزـومـ السـنـةـ وـالـجـمـاعـةـ ، وـإـسـحـاضـ النـصـيـحةـ جـهـدـ الـاسـطـاعـةـ ، فـهـذـاـ النـبـيـ صـلـىـ اللـهـ عـلـيـهـ وـسـلـمـ قـالـ " الـدـيـنـ النـصـيـحةـ لـلـهـ وـلـرـسـوـلـهـ وـلـأـئـمـةـ الـسـلـمـيـنـ " . وـقـالـ " أـسـمـعـوـاـ وـأـطـيـعـوـاـ وـلـانـ اـسـتـعـمـلـ عـلـيـكـ عـبـدـ حـبـشـيـ كـانـ رـأـسـ زـيـبـيـةـ " . وـقـالـ " السـمـعـ وـالـطـاعـةـ عـلـىـ الـسـرـ " المـسـلـمـ فـيـاـ أـحـبـ وـكـرـهـ مـاـ لـمـ يـوـمـرـ بـمـعـصـيـةـ وـمـنـ خـرـجـ عـنـ الـجـمـاعـةـ قـدـ شـبـرـ فـقـدـ خـلـعـ رـبـقـةـ الـإـسـلـامـ مـنـ عـنـهـ إـلـاـ أـنـ يـرـجـعـ ، فـلـاتـكـ فـيـ سـكـرـةـ الـخـواـطـرـ الـكـاذـبـةـ ، لـمـ عـلـيـكـ لـلـسـلـطـانـ مـنـ الـحـقـوقـ الـواـجـبـةـ . لـقـدـ جـثـتـ شـيـئـاـ قـرـيـاـ ، وـنـبـذـتـ عـهـدـ اللـهـ وـرـاءـ ظـهـرـيـاـ . أـينـ الـعـهـدـ وـالـمـيـثـاقـ

منكم ما فيه عند الله نجاتكم ، وهو في الحقيقة لأنفسكم الميتة حياتكم ، من
 الخرق معنى من أحوال العامة ، التي لا يعمرها من له المسوقة
 الناتمة ، أو الخرق حتى إلى مدينة فاس ، واحتفالكم بالله وبدينكم
 القويم عن الناس ، فما قدرتم عن التقصي عن العامة ، ولا رجعتم عن
 مكاتبنة الحكم والخوض في الفتنة الطامة ، وكتم طلبتم الذهاب لنفاذ
 زرعكم وضرعكم ، ونقل أولادكم إن أذن لكم ، على أنه خرج بسببيكم
 من تعلمون ، وأنتم ما وقع لهم في رقبة من تظلون ، فذهبتم وقررتم
 لكم القرار ، وبعد ما وعدتم أن ترجعون في أيام قصار ، وبعد أن خرج
 الإخوان والأخوات وأبناء الأعمام والعمات ، ومن له هنا لكم شأن من الفهماء
 الأعيان ومن ليس بخروجه سبب ، ولا كان لنا في انتقالكم أرب ،
 واغتنموها فرصة بإقامتكم ، وقد خرج من كانت عليكم منهم غمة ،
 وأظهرتم التهاون بكلام من وجبت عليكم طاعته ، وصحتكم في الزمان
 الطویل عنایته ، إن كتم تعتقدون ذلك وما أنا لكم من سلك تلك المسالك ،
 وصرتم إلى ما كان يظن بغيركم من المخالف ، وهل تدخل الأوئد المزاجة ،
 ما عذركم في الجلوس بجعیدان بعدما خرج من هو أضعف منكم بالأهل
 والولدان ، وإنما طولبتم بالخروج بأنفسكم فغسرت صفة الظنومن من نظركم ،
 أوردها سعد وسعد مشتمل * ما هاكذا ياسعد تورد الإبل !
 فاتق الله وارض بقضائه ، ولا تعاند القدر فتصاب ببلائه ، واصبر كما صبر
 الذين خرجوا من ديارهم قهراً ، لما علموا أن الله عوضهم عنده خيراً ،
 فانظروا لما وقع للقاضي عياض وهو مفوض لله من غير سخط ، ولا اعتراض ،
 وأزعج إلى الرحيل أبو إسحاق بن الحاج ، فقطع من الأندلس البحر للجاج
 متبوءاً منها مراكش الحمرا على عهد السلطان يوسف بن الناصر الموحدى ،
 وانظروا لحال القطب أبي مدين وأين دفن ، وبعد أن صلب على كبر السن ،
 وكذلك الشيخ الغزواني أخرجه الواسطي من زاويةبني زكار ، وأشخص إلى
 مراكش فكانت له دار قرار ، وغيرهم من أخرجوا من أرضهم ، فلم يثقل
 كان لك لسوة حسنة في بعضهم ، على أنهم لم يكونوا لمثل ما تفعل
 فاعلين ، ولا للرفاع السفلة مجالسين ، ولشن قلت قول من لعبت به بيد
 الهوا ، أنك أجل أن تفتدي بهولاً ، فارفع نفسك إلى الصحابة الكرام
 الذين هم كالنجوم في الاهتداء للأنام . فهذا أبوذر الغفارى وكان من

أكابر الصحابة أسلم رابعاً أو خامساً استقدمه عثمان من الشام لشكوى
 معاوية به وأسكنه الربدة بعد أن أخرجه من المدينة لما كثر عليه الناس،
 لماراً في ذلك من المصلحة ليس معها التباس لما في تعدد الرؤساء من
 الفاسد، التي يجب درءها في النائب والشاهد على أن الصحابة عدول،
 وكل واحد منهم مجتهد فيما يفعل أو يقول، فلم يتآخر أبوذر ولم يسترجع
 امتناعاً لقول النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم اسمع واطع، وأين أنت أيها المتဂاهل
 من هؤلاء السادات الأفاضل؟ هيهات هيهات! ليس الماضي كـالات،
 بل أين أنت من الشيخ الحسن اليوسي نقله مولانا الجد أبوالنصر اسماعيل
 إلى مدينة فاس، وأمره أن يتخد بها له ولبنيه خير كياس، ولم
 يغنه من الاعتذار ما نظر ونشر، مما يجب منه الرضى بالقضاء والتسليم
 للقدر. وكان قصده من إخراجه من بلاده جيلاً، ليقيم به على علماء
 الحضرة من العلم والعمل دليلاً، لاسيما وكان له المقر في أقيع بلاد
 لا يامن عليه الاعتذار، بما ليس له عليه من أثر العامة انتدار. فإذا كان
 هذا في الزمن السلف ومن اتفق آثارهم من خيار الخلف، فما بالك بهذه
 الأزماء التي لا يجتمع أهلها على علم أو عرفان، فلم يبق عنهم إلا العزلة
 في الحين، لكل من تمسك بحبل العقل والدين، وأحمد الله أن جعل
 خصمك عاقلاً، متتحقق بحب الخير لعباد الله مغضولاً وفاضلاً،
 لا يريد أن يجري الله على يده شرّاً، بل يريد أن يكون مظهراً
 لرحمة الله في خلقه نهياً وأمراً، ولا يفسد ملكه بهضم أمثالك،
 وإنما بريء من يلقى نفسه في المهالك. ولو لمكان الشفعة عليك،
 ومحبة الخير كلها إليك، لتركك ترعى هملاً، وتنهي في كل واد مع
 الأخرين عملاً. ذرهم يخوضوا ويلعبوا حتى يلاقوا يومهم الذي
 يعودون، "وزر الذين اتخذوا دينهم لعباً ولهم وغرتهم الحياة الدنيا".
 ولكن الدين النصيحة، ولا يكون المؤمن موئلاً حتى يحب لأخيه المؤمن كما
 يحب لنفسه. والمؤمن للؤمن كالبنيان المرصوص يشد بعضه ببعضًا ومن وجد
 أخاه على شفا فليأخذ بيده، ولإلى الآن فتفذ أمرنا الذي لا معقب لحكمه
 بنصر أو قيام. إننا نأمركم ولا نعدل عن أمرنا بالسكن بمدينة فاس، ولا تخرجوا
 منها إلى أبي الجعد أصلاً. ولا ترتبوا بعد القطع عنها وصلة،
 ومن يشق عليكم رحيله من ضفة الذرية والبنات والبنين انزلكوهم من

جملة من بقى بها من المستضعفين ، وبادروا بالإجابة والامتثال والإنابة قبل أن تعظم الحووة ، فتُسد باب التوبة ، فلا تجدون سبيلاً للسلوك على الصراط المستقيم ، ولتحذر الذين يخالفون عن أمره أن تصيّبهم فتنة أو يصيّبهم عذاب أليم ، ولا تلقوها بأيديكم إلى التهلكة بكثرة الأعذار ، وقد سجل الحكم عليكم بعد تعدد الأعذار والإندار ، على أن عذركم كله كسراب بقيمة ، ومحضونه البنية على الباطل غير منيعة ، فلن اطرح العذر خير من العذر ، فلن امثلكم نجوت ، وإن أبيتم خذلتم . فلا عهد لكم ولا طاعة ، وكتنم من فارق السنة والجماعة ، وسيعلم الذين ظلموا أي منقلب ينقلبون ، كلام سوف تعلمون ثم كلام سوف تعلمون ، وحسي الله ونعم الوكيل ، ومن يعتص بالله فقد هدي إلى صراط مستقيم .

Appendix 46 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green concerning the draining of foreign specie from Morocco by Jewish merchants.

Date : 26 Rabi^c II, 1224 / 10 June, 1809.

Source: F.O. 174/17.

الحمد لله رب العالمين
وَمَا حَوْلَ وَمَا فُرِّجَ إِلَّا بِاللَّهِ

قتلوا المسئلة امرها في پـ و بلاها كـل عنـرـ و لم يعـطـلـشـ و بلـماـهـوـرـجـلـةـ (ـ)ـ تـمـ هـونـهـ
منـهمـ بـهـ ماـتـفـيـهـ خـونـهـ وـاـنـقـبـلـصـنـكـ غـيـرـاـبـهـ غـيـرـاـبـهـ وـاـبـثـوـلـهـ عـنـاـ وـاـبـهـ وـاـبـجـهـ
وـهـ كـتـبـ غـيـرـعـمـ اـسـقـعـ الصـلـوـىـ وـقـبـرـالـسـرـ 262 رـبـيعـالـتـلـزـ عـلـىـ 1224
ـهـ جـمـيعـاـلـاـفـلـلـ

١ـ الـتـ سـرـتـكـ وـصـرـتـ عـمـيـعـ فـلـلـ الـمـنـخـلـبـ الـأـمـاـ بـهـلـمـاـذـ الـمـاـرـظـلـرـ مـتـرـهـوـدـ
اـلـلـذـيـاـ كـلـاـكـاتـ دـاـمـاـلـدـكـرـتـ عـلـىـ الـمـسـلـهـ بـلـعـلـمـ دـاـهـ الـيـهـودـ اـشـغـلـوـلـاـ يـاـقـوـنـ
بـهـ بـسـعـ وـيـشـمـدـ اـلـضـبـلـوـنـ وـاـمـ يـاـلـ بـلـدـوـيـ مـنـهـ وـيـقـلـوـنـهـ مـنـ الـمـغـرـبـ وـ71، سـبـلـهـ
بـلـانـ الـبـقـوـغـيـرـيـلـ بـعـشـلـاـفـ اـلـافـ رـيـالـ اـذـالـتـيـصـهـ بـالـفـ بـسـيـلـهـ بـلـلـيـلـهـ وـاـلـكـلـهـ
دـيـاـ حـمـيـزـ اـلـافـ اوـسـنـهـ اـلـافـ كـلـهـ بـسـيـلـهـ بـلـلـفـيـلـدـ الـأـمـاـلـاـ هـلـاـنـافـلـاـ عـلـيـكـمـ
اـشـأـ الـهـ وـاـذـاـكـاـنـ هـلـوـرـيـلـ مـلـاـنـتـبـهـ غـيـرـهـ لـذـ الـهـرـلـزـرـ دـلـهـ مـاـخـنـ وـامـنـهـ
وـلـذـ اـكـلـيـ بـلـذـبـهـ مـعـ غـيـرـهـ مـرـلـضـبـلـوـهـ وـاـمـ يـاـلـ كـعـ الـلـاـنـزـ دـالـهـ وـاـذـاـكـاـنـ بـلـذـبـهـ
فـبـلـ وـصـدـهـ وـمـطـلـهـلـذـهـ الـمـرـاـجـيـصـ هـوـرـجـلـةـ الـلـاـمـ وـلـاغـرـمـلـلـفـهـ وـلـاـفـةـ
لـعـمـلـشـ وـبـلـماـهـمـ مـاـمـوـرـوـنـ بـلـلـوـمـتـ عـلـيـعـمـ وـسـيـنـ (ـ)ـ تـمـ هـونـهـ (ـ)ـ عـشـرـهـ
وـلـانـغـرـضـهـ اـمـيـاـسـبـعـ فـلـعـهـ وـعـدـ اـتـيـانـهـ دـاـمـاـلـدـكـرـتـهـ عـلـىـ بـصـرـهـ رـفـاعـمـ الـبـرـانـصـيـ
قتـلـاـ المسـئـلـةـ اـمـرـهـاـ فـيـپـ وـبـلـهاـ كـلـ عنـرـ وـلمـ يـعـطـلـشـ وـبلـماـهـوـرـجـلـةـ (ـ)ـ تـمـ هـونـهـ
منـهمـ بـهـ ماـتـفـيـهـ خـونـهـ وـاـنـقـبـلـصـنـكـ غـيـرـاـبـهـ غـيـرـاـبـهـ وـاـبـثـوـلـهـ عـنـاـ وـاـبـهـ وـاـبـجـهـ
وـهـ كـتـبـ غـيـرـعـمـ اـسـقـعـ الصـلـوـىـ وـقـبـرـالـسـرـ 262 رـبـيعـالـتـلـزـ عـلـىـ 1224

Appendix 47 : Fatwā by the cālim-s of Fès concerning the sale of horses to Spain in return for the restitution of three presidios on the Mediterranean coast.

Date : 1809-1810.

Source: al-Mahdī al-Wazzānī, al-Nawāzil al-jadīda al-kubrā, Lith., Fès, 1910, vol.III, pp.35-36.

لما أمر سيدنا أمير المؤمنين المعتنی بلقامة شعائر الدين أبوالربیع مولانا سلیمان العلوی أبغى الله برکته للمسلمین أن یقید له ما یتضمن الحكم فيما سأله عنه بعض فرق النصاری من الذين بیننا وبينهم الہدنة أن يتخلوا له عن ثلاثة شغور ما بأيديهم في عدوتنا على أن يأخذن لهم في شراء عدد من الخيال من المسلمين لاحتياجهم إليها في قتال من يريد التغلب عليهم من جنسهم دمهم الله تعالى ، هل یفتخر ذلك في جنب استخلاص تلك الشغور من أيديهم ليعمروا المسلمين وياموا أن يانیهم العدو من قبلها . قیدنا في ذلك بموافقة بعض أصحابنا ما نصه : إن الواجب في المسألة الاحتياط وتخیي الصلحية الراجحة إذ أصل المسألة لولا اغتنام استخلاص تلك الشغور المنع الشدید ، ومنهم من عبر فيها بالکراهة زمن الہدنة . قال في المدئنة : "لا يباع من الحربيين "الـ الحـربـ من سلاح وکراع وسرور وغیرها مما یتقون به في الحرب من نحـاس وخرـشـ وغـيرـهـ " . قال أبوالحسن في التقيید ، محمد بن یونس ، قال ابن حبیب كانوا في هدنة أو غیرها ، وأما الطعام فيجوز بيعه منهم في الہدنة ، فاما في غير الہدنة فلا . وقال ابن الماجشون وغیره ، فینظر الإمام في ذلك وینذر أن من فعله منهم نقض العهد ويتقدم إلى المسلمين في بيعه منهم ويفتش عليهم في انصرافهم ، وكذلك جرى أمر أهل الدين . قال سخنون : من أهدى للمشرکین سلاحاً فقد أشرك في دماء المسلمين ، وكذلك في بيته ذلك منهم ، قال الحسن من حمل إليهم الطعام فهو فاسق ومن بائع منهم السلاح فليس بمومن . والخرش بالثاء الخباء وما عون السفر ، عیاض :

الكراع الخمي خاصة ، وقيل الدواب كلها هـ . وفي القوانين إذا قدم أهل الحرب إلى بلادنا جاز الشراء منهم والبيع إلا أنه لا يباع لهم ما يستعينون به على الحرب ، ويرهبون به المسلمين كالخيل والسلاح والألوية والحرير والنحاس ولا يباع منهم من الكسوة إلا ما يغطي الحر والبرد لا ما يتزينون به في الحرب وفي التئاس . ووقع في جواب لشيخنا أبي حفص الفاسي رحمه الله حمل الكراهة في كلامها (أى المقدمات) على ظاهرها من الشريعة ، وحاول رد ما في المدونة إليها ولفظه " ولما ذكر في الواضحة في البيع الصرف عن مطرف وابن الماجشون أنه يكره قال ما نصه : " وإذا كانت الهدنة بيننا وبين المشركين فلابأس أن يباع منهم الطعام ويكره أن يباع منهم الكراع والسلاح والحديد " ثم قال مالك " كل ما هو قوة على أهل الإسلام مما يتغذون به على حربهم من كراع وسلاح وخرق وغيره مما يعلم أنه قوة في الحرب فإنهم لا يباعون ذلك " هـ . قال وليس فيه تصریح بالكراهة ولا بالتحريم فلن حملت على الكراهة كانت وفاما الواضحة والكراهة التنزيهية تتضمن الجواز الأعم ، وإذا كان البيع المحرر جائزًا فيما بالك بالواقع في مسألتنا ، وإن حمل على التحرير فيكتفي التمسك بكلام الواضحة عند الحاجة إلى هذه المسألة .

Appendix 48 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green about the Ceuta question.

Date : 15 Rabī‘ II, 1225 / 20 May, 1810.

Source: F.O. 174/21.

بِسْرَ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وَبِحَمْدِهِ وَكَفَلَهُ بِالْمُؤْمِنِينَ

الى المؤمنين والقبر لشئ ما يزداد بالايم ويرث ثلاثة مسلسلة
وكمابداً تغليروا واما ملأ منهن وتقدير ناحيتها بما يهمي به فلوبندي امر مستبد واعملوا ما يسيروننا
بحرا الله لذا سمعكم نزولتكم بحسبة مرتاد الارواح عجيبة وفال اذا الالات في بيـنـ العـلـيـنـ كـانـهاـ
في ايـنـ يـنـاـوـاـ بـاـرـىـ بـاـمـاـسـ ايـنـ يـنـاـ وـمـلـعـنـاـ كـانـهـ عـنـنـ يـاـشـ اـنـهـ اـشـ منـهـ
انـزـلـتـمـ بـعـدـ الـعـامـ الـعـمـكـ دـلـيـلـ مـاـ يـفـهـمـ اـنـكـمـ عـكـنـتـمـ مـنـهـ كـانـعـكـمـ عـربـاـ، دـالـكـ
انـكـمـ مـلـازـلـتـمـ تـلـلـمـفـكـرـوـ الصـبـيـوـنـ وـتـبـشـرـنـعـمـ دـلـمـ تـرـيـدـ وـأـنـلـخـنـ وـنـهـاـمـنـلـجـبـرـ المـلـفـمـ
حيـثـ انـكـمـ تـلـيـنـوـنـعـمـ وـتـمـسـ وـنـعـمـ دـلـمـ تـرـيـدـ وـأـيـنـسـبـرـ دـلـمـ اـخـارـشـ الـبـرـانـصـيـرـ اـذـاـنـيـ
يـقـيـنـ اـهـمـ اـرـغـلـ عـلـيـهـ يـلـهـنـدـ اـمـعـنـدـ اـوـ كـانـشـ اـهـمـ دـلـاـلـمـ دـلـمـ اـلـتـمـ عـمـ اـلـتـمـ عـمـ النـاسـ
وـوـجـدـ عـهـدـكـمـ كـلـمـ خـالـقـمـ كـلـمـ كـلـمـ الـلـاعـبـينـ يـهـ ضـرـسـ مـسـلـلـةـ اـذـاـيـفـتـ بـيـنـ
وـبـيـنـ الصـبـيـوـنـ هـلـذـاـ الـاـمـاـلـاتـ مـتـبـيـعـتـ اـهـمـ اـرـيـخـيـمـ عـرـفـنـدـ لـبـيـتـ زـيـفـنـ وـجـوـ
اـلـيـ بـيـلـعـلـ عـلـيـ الصـبـيـرـ بـيـعـرـتـلـاـخـرـهـ رـكـهـ كـانـهـ كـوـنـاـنـكـمـ نـزـلـتـمـ بـكـلـمـ خـضـنـدـ اـنـكـ
مـلـكـتـمـوـهـ ماـ اـنـمـ نـالـمـرـهـ الـرـاـبـعـ بـالـرـجـمـ اـلـذـ بـيـرـ، الصـبـيـرـ بـالـخـيـرـ اوـ بـالـشـرـ
جـدـ وـجـبـتـ بـجـدـ لـهـ اـشـلـهـ اـلـدـلـلـهـ اـلـسـلـعـةـ اـلـتـهـ اـنـدـ شـرـ بـيـعـكـمـ الـصـبـيـرـ دـلـمـ بـيـسـنـوـلـ
عـلـيـهـ اـلـهـ وـهـمـ دـلـيـلـ وـبـلـدـ نـاـبـكـلـ مـنـ تـلـزـعـنـدـ عـلـيـهـ اـخـارـ بـسـوـلـ وـنـقـلـ دـلـمـ وـلـمـ نـكـلـ
مـلـهـ مـاـ اـفـارـنـاـ اللـهـ عـلـيـهـ رـاـلـ، الـكـلـ، اـخـفـ وـثـلـاثـ مـسـاـبـكـ اـذـاـتـمـ مـلـكـتـمـ
الـبـلـدـ وـصـارـتـتـ فـهـمـ دـلـيـلـكـمـ وـغـلـيـتـكـمـ بـلـنـقـلـوـامـ بـعـاسـ الصـبـيـرـ بـيـتـوـهـ كـامـعـانـهـ
بـلـدـ وـنـكـرـهـ الـبـلـدـ اـلـكـمـ خـالـقـهـ وـمـاعـنـدـكـمـ كـانـهـ عـنـدـ كـيـزـ بـيـزـ بـيـزـ بـيـزـ
اـذـاـرـفـ لـشـعـرـ الـصـبـيـرـ دـلـمـ تـرـيـدـ وـاـمـدـاـشـ عـبـ مـدـعـمـ دـلـمـ دـخـلـوـاـ وـالـخـيـرـ بـيـنـاـ
وـبـيـنـهـ بـيـزـ جـوـهـ مـنـهـ وـبـيـكـنـوـهـ الـصـبـيـرـ اـنـجـهـ اـلـهـ وـكـلـ مـاـ يـرـ بـيـدـ وـنـهـ مـاـ لـكـرـكـاتـ
كـمـ اـعـانـتـ بـلـدـ هـرـشـ اـلـنـعـ وـاـلـشـعـرـ وـالـغـرـ وـالـقـشـ وـالـوـجـاجـ وـكـلـ مـاـ هـرـبـاـ بـيـلـهـ نـصـرـاـ
نـصـرـاـ اللـهـ نـعـطـوـلـهـ لـهـ كـيـفـ بـيـرـ بـيـدـ وـهـ وـرـكـيـفـ وـرـقـعـنـدـ لـهـمـ صـنـعـةـ خـصـيـةـ تـجـبـرـ بـلـدـ وـلـفـمـ
وـرـيـطـهـ اـلـهـ بـلـدـ اـجـسـهـ اـمـسـ مـرـمـاـتـ دـلـيـلـ دـلـيـلـ اـذـاـمـ تـفـذـرـ وـاـعـلـىـ اـخـضـولـ ؟ـ كـنـزـاـ
اـلـعـدـ رـاـلـ اـهـلـكـ هـرـثـمـ زـسـلـهـمـ وـاـلـمـرـاـلـثـاـلـ اـذـاـمـ تـفـذـرـ وـاـعـلـىـ اـخـضـولـ ؟ـ كـنـزـاـ
اـلـاـمـ اـلـمـ بـيـلـعـلـهـ كـمـ بـيـدـ بـاـرـ هـلـزـاـعـ بـيـتـهـ دـاـنـزـ كـرـنـاـخـ وـهـمـ بـلـاـجـهـ لـهـمـ وـنـدـ اـفـضـلـ
مـهـمـ ؟ـ اـبـلـيـتـ اـلـبـعـ كـامـدـ وـاـمـاـلـاتـ مـضـتـ وـبـلـتـ وـبـانـقـوـيـنـدـ رـبـيـنـعـمـ اـلـمـ بـ
عـلـيـهـ اـلـبـعـ اـبـلـيـلـ مـرـفـتـ غـيـرـهـ اـخـتـيـرـ كـمـ اـلـهـ بـيـنـلـدـ بـيـنـهـمـ بـيـلـهـ وـهـ خـيـرـ
اـخـلـاـعـيـرـ وـبـهـ كـتـ الـبـكـرـ مـرـعـبـ الـسـلـمـ اـلـسـلـمـ وـقـبـرـ اـلـسـلـمـ بـمـصـصـ رـبـيـعـ اـلـتـزـعـلـ 1225

Appendix 49 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green about the seizure by British cruizers of merchandize belonging to two Fāsi merchants.

Date : 25 Shawwāl, 1225 / 23 Nov., 1810.

Source: F.O. 174/21.

الحمد لله ولا حول ولا قوة إلا بالله العلي العظيم

إلى القوموا اقررين لنجلزي ، أما بعد فلن ناجرين من أهل فاس أحد هما السيد محمد التازى والثانى اسم الحاج الطاهر القباج ركبا من الجزائر ناجرين فلقيهما أحد مراكبكم فأخذهما بمالهما ومتاعهما ، فالملوكد به عليكم بوصول الكتاب إليكم تكتب عليهم للمرانت والحاكم يُسرحانهما بما لهم كما هي عادتكم المعتادة في كل من هو من إيداله مولانا ورعايته ، ونريد لكم أن لا يصحبكم تراثي في هذا الأمر عزماً ولا بد ، وبه كتب إليكم محمد بن عبد السلام السلوى وفقه الله في 25 شوال الميلاد

عام 1225 .

Appendix 50 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green asking for the restitution of a vessel belonging to 'Abd al-Karīm b. al-Ṭālib, captured by the British navy at Malta.

Date : 14 Rabī' I, 1226 / 8 April, 1811.

Source: F.O. 174/21.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وَكَلِمَاتُهُ أَمْرٌ بِالْمُحْكَمِ

إِلَى الْفَرْنَصُوَا اَفْرِيْلِيْزَ اَمْ بَعْدَ فِرْدُ عَلَيْهِ عَبْدُ وَهَذِيْمُ سَيِّدُ نَجْوَةِ اللَّهِ
 الْحَاجِ عَبْلِ الْكَرِيمِ بْنِ الْقَالِبِ عَلَيْهِ شَلَّا مَرْكِبَهُ الَّتِي اَخْنَدَهُ لِهِ النَّجَلِينَ كَالْمَهْرَبِ
 مِنْ غَيْرِ مُوْجِبٍ بِالْأَنْدَاعِ بِهِ وَرَعْ وَ اَمْرُهُ اَكْلَهُ اَمْبِيْرَهُ عَلَى الْفَوَاعِدِ
 وَكَلَّا وَجَهَ اَخْنَادَهُ بِلَذِ الْأَنْزِيْدِ كَانَ تَكْتُبُ لَهُ عَلَيْهِ لِمَ اَنْشَ وَرَفَعَ مَاهِهِ
 بِرَدَّا بِمَتَاعِهِ كَلَدَ وَلَا نَغْبَلَ مَنْهُ عَنْ رَأِيهِ وَلِهِ كَتَبَ الْكَيْمُ غَيْرُ عَبْلِ السَّلَسِ
 السَّلَسُوِيِّ وَفِيْهِ التَّدَرَّجُوْنِ بِعِدَارِبِعِنْ النَّبَرِيِّ الْأَنْوَرِ عَلَى ١٢٢٦

Appendix 51 : Letter of congratulation from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Sīdī al-Tuhāmī upon his accession to the leadership of the Wazzāni zāwiya in 1811.

Date : 17 Rabi^c II, 1226 / 11 May, 1811.

Source: Ms.K. 1264, BGR, pp.361-365.

الحمد لله وحده وصلى الله على سيدنا ومولانا محمد وآل وصحبه وسلم

يneathي السيادة اذ جلوت صباحها * ومدت من نهر الهدى او ضاحها
وعقدت عهدهك في الوفاء وعهدها * ووصلت راحك بالعلاء وراحها
ووفرت من حظ البرائة حظها * فحميت جانبها ورشت جناحها

الولد الذي اختاره الله لبابه ، الحافظ الواقي والعالم السعي المراتب
والعربي ، والحلبي المقلد فوق الترائب والترافق ، والكنز المؤمل والدخر
الباقي ، ذو الخلق السمي والخلق السنوي ، والمجد العلي ، أبو محمد سيدى
التهامى ابن محينا فى الله سيدى على حجب الله عين السوء عن عين
كمالك ، وصیر الفلك الدوار مطية آمالك ، وجعل اتفاق اليمن مقرضا
بسمينك ، وانتظام الشمال معقودا بشمالك ، ولا برح ثوب سعادتكم سابقا
وقبر سعادتكم كلما أفلت الأقمار بازغا ، أسلم باتم السلام عليكم ،
وقلوبنا شيقه إليكم ، من حضرتنا العلية بالله حرسها الله ، عن ذكر لكم
يتضوئ طيه ، وود لكم لا يذوي وإن طال الزمان طيبه ،

وبعد ، فإنني أحمد لكم الله الذى لا إله إلا هو وأصلى على خاتم
أنبيائه ، وأنهى إليكم أنه وصلنا السادة الإخوة والعشيرة الحائزه
قصب السبق في حلبة المرأة ، وكتابكم ، وانتهى إلينا جوابكم وخطابكم ،
وما ذكرتم في شأن كتابنا المتضمن إلخاء الحافظ ،
المشتمل على سنن الفوائد والمواعظ . وغير خاف عليكم أن والدكم

سَهَّاهُ اللَّهُ صَوْبَ الرَّحْمَةِ أَغْدَقَهُ، وَأَسْدَى لِلَّرْوَحِ الْكَرِيمَةِ مِنْ نَسِيْمِ
الْمَغْفِرَةِ أَعْبَقَهُ، كَانَ لَنَا فِي هَذَا الْأَمْرِ الَّذِي تَحْمِلُنَا أُمْرَهُ، وَتَسْوُغُشَا
مَرْءَهُ، أَعْذَبَ مَعِينَ وَأَفْضَلَ نَاصِرَ وَمُعِينَ، حَازَ رَحْمَهُ اللَّهُ مِنْ مَكَارِمِ
الْأَخْلَاقِ مَا لَوْ مَرْجَنَ بِهِ الْبَحْرُ لَنَفِ مَلْوَحْتَهُ، وَصَفَنَ كَدْرَوْتَهُ، أَخْلَاقُ جَمِيعِ
الْمَرْوَةِ أَطْرَافُهَا، وَحَرَسَتِ النَّقْ أَكَافِهَا، إِلَى أَنْ قَبْضَهُ اللَّهُ إِلَيْهِ
وَاخْتَارَهُ لَمَّا لَدِيهِ، وَنَحْنُ فِي خَلَالِ هَذَا نَتَّأْمِلُ أَحْوَالَكَ وَنَسْتَبِرُهَا،
وَنَتَّبِعُ شَيْكَ مِنْ بَيْنِ إِخْوَتِكَ وَنَسْتَقْرِيْهَا، حَتَّى اتَّضَحَتْ لَنَا فِيْكَ
الْمَخَايِلُ، وَأَعْرَيْتَ عَنْ فَضْلِكَ قَوَاطِعَ الدَّلَائِلِ، فَرَسَحَنَاكَ لِهَذَا الْأَمْرِ فِي
قَائِمِ حَيَاتِهِ، وَقَلَّدَنَاكَ سَنِيْ مَوْسِحَاتِهِ، وَرَجَوْنَا بِحُولِ اللَّهِ أَنْ تَكُونَونَ
الْخَلِيفَةَ مِنْ بَعْدِهِ، وَسَادَّاً ثَلَمَةَ فَقْدِهِ، إِذْ تَلُوحُ مَخَايِلُ الْلَّيْثِ فِي شَبَلِهِ
وَيَكُونُ النَّجِيبُ فَرْعَاً تَابِعاً لِأَصْلِهِ، حَقَّ اللَّهُ رِجَامِنَا فِيْكَ، وَخَوْلَكَ مِنْ خَيْرِ
الْدَّارِيْنِ مَا يَشْفِيكَ، وَجَعَلَ الْحَكْمَةَ صَادِرَةَ أَبْدَا عَنْ فِيْكَ، حَتَّى يَكُونَ مِنْ
خَلْفِكَ فِي حُكْمِ الْخَالِدِ وَإِنْ أَصْبَعَ فَانِيَا، وَالْمَقِيمَ بِأَهْلِهِ وَإِنْ أَمْسَى بِالْعَرَاءِ
ثَاوِيَا، وَإِنْكَ وَإِنْ جَمَعْتَ بِحَمْدِ اللَّهِ إِلَى شَرْفِ الْأَعْرَاقِ شَرْفَ الْأَخْلَاقِ،
فَلَا تَقْفَ عِنْدَمَا بَنْتَهُ الْأَوَّلَيْلَ، وَتَكْسُلُ عَنِ الْاسْتِكْثَارِ مِنْ حَسْنِ الْفَوَاضِلِ
وَالْفَضَائِلِ، وَانْظُرْ إِلَى قَوْلِ الْقَافِلِ : إِذَا أَعْجَبْتَكَ خَصَالَ امْرِيْ، فَكَتْهَا يَكْنِيْ
مَا يَعْجِبُكَ، فَلَيْسَ عَلَى الْمَجْدِ وَالْمَكْرَمَاتِ إِذَا جَسَّهَا حَاجِبٌ يَحْجِبُكَ، وَإِلَى
قُولَّهُ :

لَسْنَا وَإِنْ كَرِمْتَ أَحْسَابَنَا يَسُوْ * مَا عَلَى الْأَحْسَابِ نَتَّكِيلُ
نَبْنِي كَمَا كَانَتْ أَوَانِلَنَا * تَبْنِي وَنَفْعِلُ أَقْبَحُ فَعْلَ
وَفَرَقَ بَيْنَ مَنْ تَنَاهَى فِي الْفَضْلِ أُمْرَهُ، وَعَلِمَ بِالْمَرْضِرَةِ مَجْدَهُ وَخَيْرِهُ، وَبَيْنَ
ذِي الْبَدَائِيَاتِ، وَمَنْ يَرُومُ حَصْولَ النَّهَايَاتِ، وَحَفَظَ فَانِكَ الْيَوْمَ ذُو الْمَقَامِ
الْمَعْلُومِ، وَآسِيَ الْكَلُومِ، تَحْمَلَتْ أَمْرَا، وَأَرْهَقَتْ فِيمَا تَعَيَّنَتْ لَهُ عَسْرَا فَاسْتَعْنَ
عَلَى ذَلِكَ بِقَوْلِ خَيْرِ الْقَافِلَيْنِ : " وَإِذْ قَالَ مُوسَى لِقَوْمِهِ اسْتَعِينُوا بِاللَّهِ
وَاصْبِرُوا لِنَ الْأَرْضَ لِلَّهِ يَوْرَثُهَا مِنْ يَشَاءُ مِنْ عَبَادِهِ وَالْعَقْبَةُ لِلْمُتَقَيِّنِ "،
وَبِالشَّكْرِ فَلَانِهِ تَرْجِمَانُ السَّنِيَّةِ وَلِسَانُ الطَّوْيَةِ، وَشَاهِدُ الْإِخْلَاصِ، وَعَنْوَانُ
الْإِخْتِصَاصِ، وَلَلَا خَوَانَ عَدَّةَ تَشَدَّدَهُمْ وَتَقْوِيَّهُمْ وَنُورًا يَسْعَى بَيْنَ أَيْدِيهِمْ،
وَبِالْحَلْمِ عَلَى الْعَشِيرَةِ وَالْأَخْوَانِ، وَقَابِلَهُمْ وَلَوْ أَسْأَمُوا بِجَمِيلِ الْبُرُورِ وَالْإِحْسَانِ،
وَلَلَّهِ دَرْمَنْ قَالَ :

إذا أدمت قوارضهم فـؤادي * كظمت على أذاهم وانطويت
 ورحـة عليهم طـقـ الحـيـا * كـائـى ما سـمعـت ولا رـأـيـت
 وبـكـ حـالـ فـلـنـ تـكـ أـيـدـيـناـ بـالـأـمـسـ أـمـسـكـتـ عـلـىـ القـلـوبـ خـوفـ اـنـصـاعـهـاـ
 وـانـزـعـاجـهـاـ ،ـ فـقـدـ سـحـبـتـ بـكـ الـيـوـمـ عـلـىـ الصـدـورـ عـنـدـ اـسـتـرـاحـتـهـاـ وـانـفـرـاجـهـاـ
 وـلـئـنـ عـظـمـتـ الـبـلـوـيـ بـمـصـرـعـهـ ،ـ فـقـدـ سـدـهـاـ اللـهـ مـنـكـ بـأـعـظـمـ خـلـفـ ،ـ وـلـلـهـ دـرـ
 منـ قـالـ فـأـنـصـفـ :

لـثـنـ فـبـعـ الأـحـشـاءـ مـنـ أـبـقـدـهـ * فـماـ فـاتـهـ مـنـ أـنـتـ تـعـقـبـهـ خـيـرـ
 وـلـمـ فـقـدـتـهـ الـخـلـقـ شـيـخـ هـدـاـيـةـ * فـقـدـ طـالـ مـاـ أـضـعـتـ وـأـنـتـ لـهـ دـخـرـ
 جـلاـ وـجـهـكـ الـلـيـلـ الـبـهـيـمـ لـقـدـهـ * كـذـاكـ غـرـوـبـ الشـمـسـ يـعـقـبـهـ الـبـدرـ
 وـالـلـهـ أـسـأـلـ أـنـ يـحـقـ فـيـكـ الرـجـاـءـ وـيـعـطـرـ مـنـ نـشـرـكـ الـأـرـجـاـءـ ،ـ وـيـقـيـ
 مـجـدـكـ يـانـعـةـ بـالـفـضـلـ أـدـوـاـحـهـ ،ـ مـؤـيـدـةـ بـرـوحـ اللـهـ أـرـواـحـهـ ،ـ وـمـشـيـ بالـسـعـدـ
 صـبـاحـهـ وـنـسـيمـ سـنـاـهـ شـهـرـاـ غـدوـةـ وـشـهـرـاـ رـواـحـهـ ،ـ أـمـيـنـ .

Appendix 52 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Sīdī al-Tuhāmī supporting him in his conflict with Sīdī al-‘Arbī over the leadership of the Wazzāni zāwiya.

Date : not mentioned. Written following the death of Sīdī ‘Alī b. Ahmad (April 1811).

Source: al-Rawd al-munīf, II, Ms. K.2304, BGR, fol. 48-49.

من سليمان بن محمد لطف الله به إلى أخيها في الله الشريف الحسني
العلمي سيدي التهامي بن سيدى على ،

السلام عليكم ورحمة الله ،
وبعد فهذا داء عضال تلقاه بالصبر والاعراض عنه وتصفية الباطن ،
والجأ إلى الله ، والزهد يذهب جناه ، وأما ما ينفع الناس يمكته ، ومن
يدعى ما ليس فيه فضحة الله . أما التعرض منه للمقدمين والتابعة
للآفاق والدخول في أمور الزاوية فهو ظالم أشهد بالله أن أباك قدْمك
وقوض لك في حياته وأنت كنت حاكماً عليه في حياة والده ، وأما كون الناس
يذهبون له بالزيارة فلا عليك فيه ولو ترك سيدى على ألف ولد كلها تُزار
لا ضرر ولا ضرار ، وامر الزاوية شيء وهذا شيء ، وفي الجبل في كل زمان
أكثر من مائة زاوية كلها تزار ولا ضيق في طريق الله ، وإن لم يزره هو يزار
غيره كأولاد التلبي وصاحب صرصر وغيره ، فلما كان صادقاً فلخوانه
أسعد الناس بصلاحه ، وإن كان كاذباً يفضحه الله ، ونامر الفقيه
الرهوني وابن عتنا سيدى محمد بن الصادق أن يقول له مضمون كلامنا
يكف عن التعرض لأمر الزاوية والمقدمين في النواحي ، و من أتاه يزوره
على الخصوص لا علينا فيه ، ولو أراد أن يكتب لأحد في البلدان يطلب
أو يطبع فيه لا علينا ، فلما شرقوا كلهم يأكلون بسيدي احمد الشرقي
وكذا أهل وزان بمولانا عبد الله الشريف ، لكن التلبيس والبهتان لا ،

أو يرحل من وزان ويتخذ زاوية على الاستقلال في بلد بالجبال
أو الوطى فلن أولاد بن ناصر لهم زوايا ، وإن أبا الا تمادي على
المصياف فالله ينتقم منه على القرب إن شاء الله والسلام .

Appendix 53 : Fatwā by the Ālim-s authorizing the resumption of pilgrimage to the Holy Places in the Hijāz after its take over by the Wahhābī-s.

Date : not mentioned (1811)

Source: Ms.D.2753, BGR, pp.95-98.

الحمد لله وحده وصلى الله على سيدنا محمد وآله ومحبته وسلم تسليماً

أما بعد ، فقد أتانا كتاباً مولانا المنصور بالله ، الأول والثاني ، وقرأناهما
قراءة الثالثي ، وأطربانا بمبانيهما البارعة ، ومعانيهما الرائعة ولا طرب
ذى المثالث والمثاني ، وقد أفصح مولانا عن جواب مسئلته بحيث لم يدع
مقالاً لقائل ، وقال من حضر من النبهاء والفضلاء ما المسؤول عنها بأعلم من
السائل . وأجمعوا على أن أهل الغرب كغيرهم في وجوب الحج على كل قبيل
من استطاع منهم السبيل ، و إلا ضرر يلحقهم في إيمان وذهاب ، من جهة عبد
الوهاب ، إذ لم يدع أحد من مرت بالهجاز في دوته أنه دعا إلى قوله
أو خاف منه على نفسه أو ماله أو عاقه شيء في بلوغ آماله ، بل وقع به الأمان

والطمأنينة حقيقة في كل مجاز من دروب الحجاز . ولعله من الذين يُؤيَّد بهم هذا الدين . والناس فيما علمنا من تجار وذوي حرف لطلاع الركب متشرفون ولكمال أمر سيدنا متشوقون ، وكماله بأمر رؤسائه البلدان من قاص ودان أن يختوا على الحج من استطاع منهم ولا ينفلوا عنهم ترغيباً وترهيباً ، وتسهيلأ وتقريباً ، غير جاعلين ذلك حبالة لأخذ المال ظلماً . عالمين بأن الله قد أحاط بكل شيء علماً . وفي قول مولانا جلَّ وعزَّ ، — إن الإيجاز طريق القرآن ونهجه . ولله على الناس حج البيت من استطاع إليه سبيلاً ” دون ” . ولله على من استطاع إلى البيت سبيلاً حجَّه ” أو ” . ولله حج البيت على من استطاع إليه سبيلاً ” . وغير ذلك من التقادير الموجزة التي ييديها من كان نبيلاً ، إشارة وتنبيه لكل نبيه على أن الحج واجب أو كالواجب على الناس عامتهم ، ولو بحثهم المستطيع وإقامتهم ، سبيلاً من أمير عامة صاحب كلمة تامة ، ومن مفتٍ ومدرس وخطيب ، ومرغب بما به النفس تطيب حتى لا تعوق العوادي والأعادى ، ويهون الخطب ولو سحبها على الوجنات ، وقد عُد ما صدر من القاضي في تلك الأبيات من الهينات ، ولم يرد في غير الحج من الأركان ما ورد في تركه مع الإمكان ، وكفى قول الله ” ومن كفر فإن الله غني عن العالمين ” . وتقول رسوله ثانية ” فلا عليه أن يموت يهودياً أو نصراً ” . وتقوله : ” لا ضرورة في الإسلام ” أي سنة الدين أن لا يبقى أحدٌ من المسلمين يستطيع أن يحج ولا يحج حتى لا يكون ضرورة في الإسلام أصلاً .

واما ما أشار إليه مولانا من تعين التجار فذلك من وظيفة مولانا وهو بهم أدرى من الفير ، وربما يغنى الله عن ذلك بمن ينتدب منهم من أهل الخير ، وقد أهلت خيبة أولاد أبي هلال وفي ذلك براعة استهلال أن يكمل بدر أمر مولانا الطالع السعيد المطالع بجاه خاتم النبيين والمرسلين ، وقاد الفر المحبّلين عليه وعلى فرعه سلالة النفس الزكية أزكي تحية تعنى نفحاتها الزكية هـ .

— الحمد لله ، بعد إهداء سلام كريم طيب بر عمير مولانا أمير المؤمنين ومن به تقام السنة والدين ، بما سطر أعلاه يقول عبد الله بن أحمد التاودي بن سودة كان الله له .

- وعبد ربه محمد بن محمد بن ابراهيم لطف الله به ،

- الحمد لله على ما في المسطور أعلاه يوافق عبد الله محمد بن عمرو الزروالسي
أملح الله حاله بمنه ، آمين ،

- وعبد ربه ادريس بن زيان العراقي ونفعه الله بمنه ،

- وعبد ربه محمد بن منصور وفقه الله ،

- وعبد ربه حمدون بن الحاج سلك الله به أقوم المحاج ،

- الحمد لله ، في الخطاب والمعيار في بحث الاستطاعة ما ينبغي لسيدنا الإمام مراجعته ، ثم يبحث عن حال الطريق فإنه أقرب إلى معرفته على التحقيق ، ثم لا يكره أحد ولا يأمر بـإكراهه ، وإنما يندب الناس لـجملاً ويأمر بتذكيرهم ، ولينظر قول الرسالة وغيرها ، ومن ترك الحج مستطیعاً فالله حسبه ، وما سطر عرضه حسن وكتب عبد ربه الطيب بن عبد المجيد بن كيران ،

- الحمد لله ، المقيد عرضه وأعلاه صحيح والسلام ، وكتب عبد ربه وأسير ذنبه عبد السلام الأزمي الحسني لطف الله به «آمين» .

الحمد لله

من سليمان بن محمد لطف الله به ،
سادتنا الأئمة الأعلام ، وفتكم الله والسلام عليكم ورحمة الله تعالى وبركاته .
فعلامة التيسير أن شرح الله صدركم لاحياء هذه الدعيمة ولست من يُجبر
ولا يوصف بشدة شكيمة ، ولما لم يمكنني الذهاب بنفسي ها أنا وهبته
للمسلمين ولدي في مكاني ، وعلى الله تأم العزيمة . انتهى .

Appendix 54 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the qā'id of the Oudaya on the eve of the battle of Azrou about the tactic to be adopted vis-à-vis the Fazaz Berbers.

Date : not mentioned (1811)

Source: Mic.1207, BGR, pp.465-467.

سلام الله عليك وتوايشه ،

وبعد تعلم أنا لولم يوفقنا الله للخرج مسرعا وأظهرنا الله للقبائل اظهار رحمة و هنا لله الحمد ، لفدت كل قبيلة على عاملها حتى لا ينفعنا أحد ولا يصلنا لمكاسبة لودام ذلك الهرج .
اذ العامل الغاش المنافق تلك شهوته الخوض و يعتذر بالفساد . و أما المحب الناصح فلم تكن له قدرة على الوصول اليانا كما نريده ، و من أتى بجميل مرغوبا لا ينفع . و عليه فلا يفتر الانسان بهذه السكينة التي من الله بها مع المدارات و جريان العادة على خاطرها . فليفتتم الانسان غفلة العادة و يبرم أمره ، و يجعل لها في غفلتها أنشوطه و سلسلة في عنقها لا يمكنها منها الجموع . فقد جرئت و أيقظتها هذه النبأة ، فما أمن مولانا اسماعيل غائلا العادة حتى لم يُيقِّ لها فرسا ولا سلاحا و تركها كالأنعام السائمة منقادة لراعيها بعد جور العمال والسيبي و القتل الفادح ، وقد كان علي وشو ولد بركا والباشا غازى وغانم الحاجى ، وأخراهم سنة الله التي قد خلت في عباده ، فان قال العادة ليس عمال اليوم كأولائك ، قلنا لهم لستم أنتم كتلك الرعية ، وقتل لهم ما رأينا يقوم على العامل الا الأكابر الذين منعوا من التصرف من شهواتهم . و أما الضعيف فلا قدرة له ، و ما رأينا أحدا يشتكي بعامل لقلة دينه او لعدم صلاته و صيامه ، وزناه مثلا ، وشرب الخمر ، و ائنا يشتكي بما لا يسمعه الشرع منه من كون العامل ليس أخي ، و ما درى أنه أمر بالطاعة ولو لعبد حبشي ، و قال له صلى الله عليه وسلم "آد الذي عليك واطلب من الله الذي لك" ، و لم يقل "انتصر لنفسك" . فاحتفظ بهذا الكتاب فان فيه

حكماً وسياسة ويقرأه عليك من يفهمه لك، واحفظه عندك فما الناس
 أظهر الله سياسته كمولانا الجد اسماعيل فقد كان البرير كلهم
 لهم عامل واحد، وأما ولد بركا وفلان وفلان في اقلين، أو كان
 جاعلاً لكل قبيلة أشياخا، لكن الفساد هو الذي جرأهم علينا، وبالقهر
 استثروا أمره، فعليه اذا نزلنا ان شاء الله تادلا، فعند ذلك ان شاء
 الله شد روحك مع ايٍت يوسي ورد المظالم كلها واقبض أهل الفساد
 وانزل بعين السمّار بمن بقي من الأوداية وحلّتها كلها لا تبعد
 عن زرعها، وقل لهم ان أصلحتم أنفسكم أنا ضامن لكم خاطر السلطان
 والا فانه يأتيكم من بعثت على أزرو على ثيثنو، ونحن من هنا، وتكون
 ان شاء الله محلة بن ناصر عن يمينك، والسيد محمد السلاوي بالدارج
 حتى تصلح ان شاء الله تلك القبائل كلها التي دُب فيها الفساد
 وترد المظالم، وهذا الكتاب عند نزولنا ان شاء الله تادلا وجهه
 مع طالبك حتى يقرأه على السيد محمد الشاهد، أما اليوم اكتتب
 وسر بما أنت سائر به من الاحسان و لطافة العامة على شهواتها،
 والانسان يفسر امام عدوه اذا كان على غير اهبة ثم يكرر السلام.

Appendix 55 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Sa‘ūd b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz expounding the Sultan's position regarding the Wahhābi doctrine.

Date : not mentioned (1811).

Source: Ms.4629, R.L., fol.1-5.

” من ملکه الله أرْزَةُ الْعَرَبِ وَقِيَادُهَا ، فَاحسِنْ سِيَاسَتَهَا وَأَصْلِحْ سِيرَتَهَا
وَمَهْدِ بِلَادِهَا ، وَبَشِّرْ عَلَى يَدِيهِ حَسَنَةً أَمِنَ السَّابِلَةَ مِنَ الْقَطَّاعِ
وَالنَّهَابِ ، وَتَيسِّرْ وَصُولَ الحَجَاجِ وَالْعَمَارِ وَالْزُوَارِ إِلَى نَيلِ الْأَوْطَارِ وَالْأَرَابِ ،
فَأَنْصِبْ وَقَدْ أَحْرَزَ بِذَلِكِ التَّثَابَ وَالثَّوَابَ وَحَصَلَ بِهِ فِي الدَّارِينِ أَفْضَلَ جَزَاءٍ
وَحَسَنَ مَثَابٌ ،

أَخْوَانَا فِي اللَّهِ فَلَانْ حَفْظَكُمُ اللَّهُ مِنْ جَمِيعِ الْأَسْوَاءِ وَأَدَمْ عَلَيْكُمْ سَبُوغُ
النَّعَاءِ ، سَلَامٌ عَلَيْكُمْ وَرَحْمَةٌ مِنَ اللَّهِ نَامِيَةٌ وَبَرَكَاتٌ مُتَزاِدَةٌ ، وَأَيَادٍ
صَافِيَةٌ ، وَمَنْ مُتَرَادُ فَتَةٌ وَعَافِيَةٌ غَيْرُ عَافِيَةٌ ،

وَبَعْدَ فَإِنَّا نَحْمَدُ إِلَيْكُمُ اللَّهَ الَّذِي هَدَاكُمْ وَهَدَى بَكُمْ فَلَقَدْ سَرَّنَا مَا
بَلَغْنَا عَنْكُمْ مِنْ سِيرَتِكُمْ وَشَيْكِكُمْ وَأَحْوَالِكُمْ مِنَ الزَّهْدِ فِي الدُّنْيَا وَإِحْيَا
رُسُومِ الدِّينِ وَالْحُضُورِ عَلَى طَرِيقِ السَّلْفِ الصَّالِحِ وَسُنُنِ الْمُهَتَّدِينَ وَالْحَمْلِ
عَلَى إِخْلَاصِ التَّوْحِيدِ لِرَبِّ الْعَالَمِينَ وَقْطَعَ الْبَدْعَ وَالْفَلَالَاتِ الَّتِي هِيَ
مُنْشَا زَيْغُ الْعَقَائِدِ وَكَثْرَةُ الْجَهَالَاتِ ، وَمَا يَرْحَنُّا نَسْعَ عنْكُمْ مَا قَدْ أَصْبَنَّ
فِيهِ كُلُّ الْإِصَابَةِ وَوَاقْتَمَ فِيهِ كُبُّ الْعِلْمِ ، وَمَذَاهِبُ السَّلْفِ وَالصَّحَابَةِ كَمَا
لَا يَخْفَى عَلَى مَنْ مَارَسَ مَوْطَأَ الْإِمَامِ مَالِكَ ، وَمَا فِي الصَّحِيحَيْنِ وَطَالِعَ مَسْنَدِ
الْإِمَامِ الْأَوَّلِ الْزَاهِدِ أَحْمَدَ بْنَ حَنْبَلَ أَمِيرِ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ فِي الْحَدِيثِ بِلَا مِيَنَ .
وَمَذَهِبُنَا مُعْشَرُ الْمَالِكِيَّةِ مُبْنَىٰ عَلَى مَا أَنْتُمْ عَلَيْهِ مِنْ سَدِ الذَّرَاعِ وَلِيُطَالِ
الْبَدْعُ وَالْمَحْدَثَاتُ ، وَلَا نَكْفُرُ مَعَ ذَلِكَ أَحَدًا بِذَنْبِ مَنْ أَهْلَ الْقَبْلَةِ وَلَا مَنْ
أَهْلَ الْأَهْوَاءِ فِي الْمُعْتَقَدَاتِ إِلَّا مَنْ خَرَجَ بِيَدِعْتَهُ عَمَّا عَلِمْ مِنَ الدِّينِ

ضرورة كُنكري علم الله تعالى بالجزئيات ، وعلى هذا إمام أهل السنة أبي الحسن الأشعري والأئمة الأربعـة وهو المريد بالقطعيات ، أخـرج الطبراني عن أنس قال خرج علينا رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم فقال: إن بني إسرائيل افتقروا على إحدى وسبعين فرقـة وستفترق هذه الأمة على اثنـيـن وسبعين فرقـة كلـها على الضلالـة إلا السواد الأعظم ، قالوا من السواد الأعظم ؟ قال من كان على ما أنا عليه ، وأصحابـي من لم يـسـارـ في دين الله ، ولم يـتـقـرـ أحدـاـ من أهـلـ التـوـحـيدـ بـذـنـبـ غـفـرـلـةـ ، وروى البيهـقـيـ بـسـنـدـ صـحـيـحـ أنـ جـابـرـ بنـ عـبـدـ اللهـ سـئـلـ هلـ كـنـتمـ تـسـمـونـ شـيـناـ مـنـ الذـنـوبـ كـفـرـاـ أوـ شـرـكـاـ أوـ نـفـاقـاـ ، قالـ مـمـازـ اللهـ ولاـكـاـ نـقـولـ مـوـنـسـونـ مـذـنـبـوـنـ ، فالـفـاسـقـ إـذـاـ مـاتـ بـلـاتـوـبـةـ فـيـ الـشـيـئـةـ لـاـيـةـةـ ، وـيـغـفـرـ مـاـ دـوـنـ ذـلـكـ لـمـ يـشـأـ وـهـيـ مـخـصـصـةـ لـعـمـومـاتـ الـعـقـابـ فـلـنـ عـقـبـ لـمـ يـخـلـدـ بـلـ نـقـطـعـ بـخـرـوـجـهـ وـدـخـولـهـ الـجـنـةـ كـمـاـ صـحـ فـيـ أـحـادـيـثـ الشـفـاعـةـ الـمـوـاثـرـةـ ، وـفـيـ رـوـاهـ الـبـزـارـ وـالـطـبـرـانـيـ بـلـسـنـادـ صـحـيـحـ " منـ قـالـ لـاـلـهـ لـاـلـهـ نـفـعـتـهـ يـوـمـ يـوـمـ " مـنـ دـهـرـهـ يـصـيـهـ قـبـلـ ذـلـكـ مـاـ أـصـابـهـ " فـارـكـابـ الـكـبـيرـةـ لـاـيـزـيلـ اـسـمـ الـإـيمـانـ يـخـلـفـاـ لـلـمـعـتـلـةـ فـيـ أـنـ مـرـتـكـبـهـاـ غـيـرـ مـوـمـ وـلـاـ كـافـرـ فـيـخـلـدـ فـيـ نـارـ دـوـنـ نـارـ الـكـفـارـ وـخـلـفـاـ لـقـوـلـ الـخـوـاجـ أـنـهـ كـافـرـ ، وـلـاـنـكـفـرـ نـافـيـ الـرـايـةـ وـخـلـقـ اللهـ تـعـالـىـ لـأـفـعـالـ الـعـبـادـ وـاـخـتـلـفـ فـيـمـ يـقـولـ بـخـلـقـ الـقـرـآنـ فـأـطـلـقـ قـوـمـ أـنـهـ كـافـرـ ، وـثـبـتـ مـنـ الشـافـعـيـ ، وـقـالـ آخـرـوـنـ مـبـدـعـ لـاـكـافـرـ وـتـأـوـلـ الـبـيـهـقـيـ قـوـلـ الشـافـعـيـ عـلـىـ كـفـرـانـ النـعـمـ دـوـنـ الـخـرـقـ عـلـىـ الـمـلـةـ وـرـدـ بـأـنـ الشـافـعـيـ أـفـتـيـ بـضـرـبـ عـنـ حـفـصـ الـقـرـدـ لـقـوـلـهـ بـذـلـكـ . وـلـعـلـ مـاـ يـنـقـلـ عـنـكـمـ مـنـ تـكـفـيرـ جـفـةـ الـأـعـرـابـ إـنـمـاـ هـوـ فـيـمـ استـحـقـ ذـلـكـ مـنـهـمـ باـعـتـقـادـ مـاـ يـخـالـفـ مـاـ عـلـمـ مـنـ الـدـيـنـ ضـرـورـةـ ، إـذـ الـظـنـ بـكـمـ التـثـبـتـ فـيـ الـأـمـرـ لـاـسـيـماـ فـيـ هـذـاـ المـقـامـ الصـعـبـ فـلـاـ يـخـفـيـ عـلـيـكـمـ مـاـ وـرـدـ فـيـ تـكـفـيرـ عـوـامـ الـمـسـلـمـيـنـ مـنـ التـشـدـيـدـ وـغـاـيـةـ الـعـيـدـ الشـدـيـدـ لـحـدـيـثـ مـسـلـمـ وـجـامـعـ التـرـمـيـدـيـ عـنـ اـبـنـ عـمـرـ مـرـفـوعـاـ " أـيـمـاـ اـمـرـىـ " قـالـ لـأـخـيـهـ كـافـرـ ، فـقـدـ بـاـ " بـهـاـ أـحـدـهـاـ لـمـ كـانـ كـمـاـ قـالـ وـلـاـ رـجـعـتـ عـلـيـهـ " . وـلـأـبـيـ دـاـوـودـ عـنـ أـبـيـ هـرـيـةـ رـفـعـةـ " أـيـمـاـ رـجـلـ كـفـرـ رـجـلاـ مـسـلـمـاـ " فـلـنـ كـانـ كـافـرـاـ وـلـاـ كـانـ هـوـ الـكـافـرـ " وـهـذـهـ مـبـالـغـةـ أـوـ وـعـيـدـ بـأـنـ لـاـ يـخـتـمـ لـهـ بـالـإـيمـانـ " عـصـمـنـاـ اللـهـ وـلـيـاـكـمـ ، وـلـلـبـخـارـيـ عـنـهـ وـلـهـ وـلـإـمـامـ أـحـمـدـ عـنـ اـبـنـ عـمـرـ رـفـعـاءـ : " إـذـاـ قـالـ رـجـلـ لـأـخـيـهـ يـاـ كـافـرـ فـقـدـ بـاـ " بـهـاـ أـحـدـهـمـاـ " .

والأحاديث في هذا أكثر من أن تحصى ، وانظر قوله تعالى " يا أئمها الذين آمنوا إذا ضربتم في سبيل الله " إلى قوله " بما تعلمون خيراً " وفي الصحيح أن المصطفى قال لأسامة : " أقتلته بعد ما قال لا إله إلا الله فكيف تصنع بلا إله إلا الله إذا جئت يوم القيمة ؟ " ولما اعتذر بأنه قالها خوفاً من السلاح قال : " هلا شفقت عن قلبه ؟ ". وانظر ما تواتر من قوله صلى الله عليه وسلم " أمرت أن أقاتل الناس حتى يقولوا لا إله إلا الله فإذا قالوها عصموا فيهادهم وأموالهم لا بحقها وحسابهم على الله " فاكتفي من جغة الأعراب بالشهادة حتى يثبت موجب انتفاء العصمة . وما اشتهر بين علماء الأمة وذكره غير واحد كالتقى السبكي والبيضاوى أن الغلط يستر ألف كافر أهون من الغلط بسفك مجدة دم أمري مسلم . وكيف يتوهם أن يلتبس على أمثالكم الفرق بين الشرك الذي يسجد للصنم وهو يرى أنه يجلب ويدفع ويendum من الأسواء ، وأنه لا ترد شفاعته بل تعتبر لا محالة من غير احتياج إلى إذن - قال تعالى معرضآ لهم " من ذا الذي يشفع عنده إلا بإذنه " ولا تنفع الشفاعة عنده إلا من أذن له " ، يومئذ لا تنفع الشفاعة إلا من أذن له الرحمن ورضي له قوله " ، وقيل لهم أين ما كتم تعبدون من دون الله هل ينصروكم أو ينتصرون " ثم قال " قالوا هم فيها يختصون بالله إن كنا لفي ضلال مبين إذ نسيكم برب العالمين " أي في استحقاق العبادة والنفع والضر ، وقال " ومن الناس من يتخذ من دون الله أنداداً يحبونهم كحب الله " . قال في النهاية الأنداد جمع نِدَّ بالكسر ، وهو مثل الشيء الذي يُضاده في أموره ويناديه أي يخالفه هو . وفي المصباح لا يكون الند إلا مخالفاً - وبين السلم المستفيث بنبي أولسي مع اعتقاد أن الله هو المعطي المانع الضار النافع وأن يستغث به ويرغب إليه على وجهه أن يشفع له عند الله استصحاباً للإذن العام في الشفاعة للMuslimين وقضاء حوائجهم أو إسناداً لما يحدث له من إلهام أو كيفية يعلمها الله . وظن قبول شفاعته بمكان خصوصيته ولا يمنع من ذلك كونه ميتاً فإن الأرواح بعد مفارقة الأجساد دراكه عالم بأحوال الأحياء غالباً كما تواترت به الآثار المتکاثرة المفيدة للبيقين . قال تعالى " كل نفس ذائقه الموت " والذائق لابد أن ييقن بعد المذوق . وقال " إذا بلغت التراقي " إلى قوله " المساق " والمساق

الا رواح ، " لا تحسن الذين قُتلوا في سبيل الله أمواناً بل أحياء " إلى آخره . وأحاديث نعيمها وتعذيبها وأن أهل القبور يسمعون سلام الزائر ويردون ويعلمون أحوال أهل الدنيا وأن الأرواح تتلاقى وتتزاور كثيرة جداً . قالوا ولكل روح بجسدها اتصال معنوي . أما الأنبياء فـ " حيَا هم حقيقة على ما للحافظ الأسيوطى في تأليف سماه " أنباء الأذكياء " بحياة الأنبياء " وبالجملة ليس لنا أن نُكفر إلا بإنكار من علم من الدين ضرورة ، وكل ما لا يخالف إجماعاً ولا نصاً صريحاً قطعاً فترجعه إلى نوع اجتهاد . فليكن رد العلماء فيه بعضهم على بعض برقق مع الجزم بأن المصيب في العقليات واحد وهو من صادق الواقع كقولنا بأن الباري سبحانه يرى في الآخرة وأنه الحالـى لـأعمال العباد ، وأن صفات المعانـى قائمة بالذات العلـى ، وأنه تـالـى أن يكون في ملكه ما لا يـريـد أو لا يـكـون ما يـريـد . أما الأحكـام الفقهـية فقد اخـتـلـف هل كل مجـتـهد فيها مـصـيب أو المصـيبـ فيها واحدـ عليهـ الأـكـثر . فالـآنـةـ القـولـ فيهاـ معـ الخـصـومـ أـجـدرـ ، وقدـ أـفـادـ الفـزـالـيـ فيـ الإـحـيـاءـ فيـ الـبـابـ الـرـابـعـ منـ كتابـ الـعـلـمـ شـرـوـطـ الـمـنـاظـرـ وـالـجـدـلـ وـافـاتـهـماـ ، فـلـيـنـظـرـ، ولـيـحـذـرـ الـعـالـمـ منـ التشـعـيبـ وـقـلـةـ الـانـصـافـ لـلـحـقـ بـعـدـ ظـهـورـهـ وـلـلـجـاجـ فـيـهـ ، وـانـظـرـ كـيـفـ كانتـ منـاظـرـ الـإـمـامـ أـحـمـدـ رـضـيـ اللـهـ عـنـهـ معـ خـصـومـهـ فـيـ الـمـعـقـدـاتـ وـغـيـرـهـ بـلـيـضـاحـ الـحـقـ بـأـدـلـةـ وـمـظـاهـرـهـ وـالـاحـتـيـالـ فـيـ لـيـصالـهـ إـلـىـ الـأـفـهـامـ حـتـىـ بـزـولـ الـالـتبـاسـ وـالـاشـتـباـهـ ، وـفـيـ هـدـمـ الـبـاطـلـ بـحـلـ الشـبـهـ بـلـ تـعـنيـتـ وـلـاـ تـشـفـيـبـ وـقـدـ كـانـ الـبـدـعـ وـالـأـهـوـاءـ طـافـحةـ فـيـ وـقـتـهـ فـكـانـ يـتـعـطـفـ فـيـ رـدـهـ وـإـيـطالـهـ وـهـذـاـ كـلـهـ مـاـ سـيـقـ إـلـيـهـ الـكـلـامـ وـلـيـسـ بـخـافـ عـلـىـ أـمـثالـكـ مـنـ هـوـ بـصـدـدـ تـحـقـيقـ الـحـقـ وـإـقـامـةـ الـأـحـكـامـ . وـأـكـثـرـ مـاـ تـنـكـرـهـ عـلـىـ مـرـتـكـبـهـ وـهـوـ عـنـنـاـ عـشـرـ الـمـالـكـيـةـ مـحـرـمـ أـوـ مـكـرـوـهـ أـوـ مـخـتـلـفـ فـيـهـ ، فـقـدـ قـالـ عـلـمـاؤـنـاـ يـكـرـهـ الـبـنـاءـ عـلـىـ الـقـبـورـ أـوـ التـحـوـيزـ ، وـسـوـاـ كـانـ الـبـيـتـ مـالـكـاـ أـوـ عـالـمـاـ أـوـ شـرـيفـاـ أـوـ سـلـطـانـاـ أـوـ غـيـرـ ذـلـكـ " وـلـانـ بوـهـيـ بـهـ حـرـمـ " ، وـجـازـ الـبـنـاءـ الـخـفـيفـ لـلـتـسـيـزـ بـحـجـرـ أـوـ خـشـبـةـ بـلـ نـقـشـ وـخـدـ . صـحـ الـحـاـكـمـ فـيـ الـمـسـتـدـرـكـ أـحـادـيـثـ النـهـيـ عـنـ الـبـنـاءـ وـالـكـتـابـ عـلـىـ الـقـبـورـ ثـمـ اـسـتـخـفـ الـكـتـابـ فـقـطـ بـأـنـ أـئـمـةـ الـمـسـلـمـينـ شـرـقاـ وـغـربـاـ مـكـتـوبـ عـلـىـ قـبـورـهـ ، وـيـسـطـ الـمـسـئـلـةـ وـالـخـلـافـ فـيـهـ يـطـولـ ، وـذـكـرـ عـلـمـاؤـنـاـ أـيـضاـ أـنـ الـوقـودـ عـلـىـ قـبـرـ الـوـلـيـ وـوـضـعـ الـسـتـورـ عـلـيـهـ لـيـسـ بـقـرـبةـ بـلـ هـوـ مـكـرـوـهـ وـمـنـ نـذـرـ مـاـ لـذـكـ أـوـ نـذـرـهـ بـعـيـنـهـ لـمـ يـلـزـمـهـ لـاـكـنـ مـنـ وـضـعـ يـدـهـ بـمـالـ

نذر لذلك وجب عليه جعله بمنزلة شرط الواقع المكره فلأنه يتبع ، وقد بسط صاحب المدخل الكلام في هذا وغيره من كلامه ولا بأس بذكر مسئلة الصالحين والعلماء والأولياء ما لم يكن منقوشا على القبر أو على جدار أو في ورقة ملصقة هناك ، وإذا كان هذا متنوعاً فما بالك بالشمع الكبير الفليظ الذي ليست به حاجة للوقود ولو كان سائفاً فلم يبق إلا أن يكون إضاعة مال ، وكذلك يمنع ما يفعله بعضهم من تعليق قنديل على قبر من كان مشهوراً بالخير والناس يعتقدونه ليأتي الناس إلى مكان الضوء ليزوروا فلينظر تماهه . ومن المُختلف فيه زيارة قبور الصالحين فذكر ابن أويوب في اختصار الرسالة العلمية للقشيري أن ذلك ليس من طريق القوم أي الموصولة وذكر ابن العربي من فقهه المالكي أن لا يزار قبر لينتفع به غير قبر نبينا صلى الله عليه وسلم . وقال الشارمساوي "قصد الانتفاع بالبيت بدعة" ، قيل وهذا ينظر إلى سد الذرائع وحسم مادة البدع الحرجمة المتطرقة في ذلك وجعلها الفزالي من العبادة واعتمده صاحب المدخل ، وعمل عليه الجماهير الذين لا يحصون وحظ على ذلك الشيخ ابراهيم النازمي في قصيدة المشهورة التي تلقاها العلامة بالقبول وأولها :

زيارة أرباب التقى مرهم يسدي * ومنتاج أبواب العارة والخير ٠٠٠
إلى أن قال :

عليك بها فالقوم باحروا بسرها * وأوصوا بها ياصاح في السروالجهر ٠٠٠
ثم قال :

ولا فرق في أحكامها بين سالك * مُرِبٌّ ومجدوب وحيٌّ وذي قبر
وقال مالك في رواية ابن وهب "إذا سلم زائر القبر الشريف على المصطفى يقف للدعا مستقبلاً القبر الشريف لا القبلة" وقد سأله الخليفة المنصور أيهما يستقبل ؟ فقال "لم تصرف وجهك عنه وهو وسيلة أبيك آدم إلى الله عز وجل" . وقال مالك في المبسوط : "لا أرى أن يقف يدعوا ، لكن يسلم ويضي" وجمع الشيخ بين قوله بأن مثل المنصور يعلم ما يدعوه به و"اداب الدعا" بين يديه صلى الله عليه وسلم فآمن عليه سوء الأدب فأفاته بذلك وأفتن العامة أن يسلموا وينصرفوا ليلاً يواجهوه بالتسل به إلى الله أو يدعوا بما يحرم أو يكره ، أو يلتفوا جهلاً منهم . وقد حذر الشيخ مما يفعله بعض الجهلة من الطواف بالقبر الشريف والتتسع بالبناء أو إلقاء المناديل

والثياب عليه - وقد تقرب بعض العامة فأكل الأوز في الروضة الشريفة -
 وإلقاء شعورهم في القناديل وكل ذلك من المنيكرات وإذا كره مالك دعاء
 العوام عند القبر الشريف فما بالك بغيره من قبور الصالحين ، فلن زيارة العوام
 لقبور الصالحين لا يخلو غالباً من سوء مقالات وظهور جهالات ، فمنعهم منها
 حتى يعلموا ما يقولون سداداً قياساً على ما في آية " لا تقربوا الصلاة .. الآية "
 وحديث مالك " فعلمه يذهب يستغفر فيسب نفسه " بجامع الخوف من التكلم
 بالجهل وما لا يليق بجناب الباري سبحانه ، ومن المختلف فيه أيضاً تقبيل
 كل معظم شرعاً وقد أخذ بعضهم الجواز من مشروعية تقبيل الحجر وقد ورد
 في وفدي عبد القيس أنهم أكبوا يقبلون يدي المصطفى ورجليه وكذا تعرية الوجه
 في الأماكن الشريفة ، قالوا ومذهب كثير من العلماء وخصوصاً المالكية الكراهة
 في غير ما ثبت في الشرع تقبيل الحجر ، وقد نهى مالك عن تعرية الوجه
 على الحجر وكان يفعله إذا خلا به هذا . وفي المدونة وهي أصل كتاب
المالكية " ولو قال علي جزوراً أو ان انحر جزوراً فلينحرها في مووضعه ولو نسوى
 موضاً أو سأه فلا يخرجها إليه كانت العزور بعينها أو بغير عينها وكذلك
 إن نذرها لمساكين بلده وهو بغيرها فلينحرها بموضعه يتصدق بها على
 مساكين من عنده وسوق البدنة إلى غير مكة من الضلال " وهذا كله من سد
 الذرائع وكرامة الأولياء لا تتذرونها فيما بلغنا عنكم كيف وإنما أنكرتها المعتزلة
 وأثبتتها جميع أهل السنة وقال جمهورهم ما جاز أن يكون معجزة لنبي جاز
 أن يكون كرامة لولي لا فرق بينهما إلا التحرى وعدمه ، وهي متوازرة معنى ،
 فلا حاجة للتطويل وهذا القدر كاف في هذه الرسالة المبنية على الاختصار
 دفعنا بها أن تظنوا بنا أنها من نحو منحى الاعتراض عليكم والإنكار . ولما
 أتضح لدينا قصدكم وخلوص طويتكم في الدب عن الدين ولحقنا احتياطكم
 وحياطكم لل المسلمين ، ومنكم الجار وإن جار فكان بكم من اللاذين
 وحافظتكم على الشيم العربية والمكارم الشرعية مقتتعين بذلك منكم متباهين
 وإنكم لا ت تعرضون للمغاربة الحجاج والعمار والزائرين ، لم يبق وجه نسي

احتباشم عن أداء الفريضة والسنة ، وجهنام وأحلانا ولدنا وسطهم في هذه
 السنة ملتحفين أجر تلك الخطأ ، وأن يحط بها عنا الوزر والخطا ، وان تكون من
 ندب إلى الطاعة وكان عليها من المسعدين ، وإنك لخليق أن تسلك بهذه
 الأمة أحسن المسالك ، وأن تكون عليها من المشفقين ، فأحسن جوارها
 أحسن الله إليك ، إن الله يحب المحسنين ، ولا تُصْنَعْ إلى واش يخادع الله
 وهو خادعه ، ولا يحيق مكر السوء إلا به " والله خير الماكرين " ، عصمنا
 الله وإياكم من كيد الشيطان وجعلنا من اضطه إلى استئذنهم بقوله
 " إلا عبادك منهم المخلصين " وصلى الله على سيدنا ومولانا محمد سيد
 الأولين والآخرين ، وعلى الله وأصحابه أجمعين وآخر دعوانا أن الحمد لله
 رب العالمين هـ .

Appendix 56 : Draft of a letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Sa‘ūd b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz on the Wahhābi doctrine written by Sulaymān al-Hawwāt.

Date : not mentioned (1811)

Source: Z.2710, R.L., fol. 82-86.

الحمد لله

أخونا في الله السلطان الذي أصلح الله به ما فسد من أمر الدنيا
والدين، واقامة حجة بالغة على أهل الشكوك في بيان التوحيد
على طريق اليقين الحامي بسيفه دار الاسلام، والداعي الى القيام
بالقسط بين الانام، أمير العرب الذي لا يدرك شاؤه في المجد
والحسب، مالك الحرمين أبو النجا سعود المطاع أمره في الاغوار
والنجود، يسّر الله لكم دوام القيام بمصالح المسلمين، وأمن
بكم طريق الحجّاج والمعتمرین، ثم عليكم السلام ورحمة الله ما
خرّت لكم الأذقان والجباء،

اما بعد، فقد أنهى الى حضرتنا العلية بالله من لم يقع له فيما
يبلّغه غلط واشتباه من حسن سيرتكم وصدق سيرتكم ما يسودن
بأنك من المجددين الذين يجدد الله بهم لهذه الأمة معالى
الدين، ونرجوا أن تكون من الذين قال فيهم نبيك عليه السلام
”لا تزال طائفة من أمتي ظاهرين على الحق لا يضرّهم من خالفهم
حتى يأتي أمر الله“، كيف وقد أخذت بحظ وافر منخلق العظيم
الذي أنتي الله به على أشرف رسله في الكتاب الكريم كالزهد
في الدنيا الذي لا تكون يد صاحبه الا العليا. روى الإمام أحمد
بن حنبل رضي الله عنه في مسنده عن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم
”الزهد في الدنيا يريح القلب والبدن والرغبة في الدنيا تطييل
الهم والحزن“، وكالحلم فإنه يسمى بالحلم في المقام العظيم
أخرج الخطيب في التاريخ عن أبي هريرة رضي الله عنه أن النبي
صقال: الحليم سيد في الدنيا وسيد في الآخرة، وكالمغفور هو

أدعى إلى الدخول في الطاعة إلى قيام الساعة. وقد أرسل الله تعالى إليه نبيه في غير ما آية، قوله تعالى "خذ العفو وامر بالعرف واعرض عن الجاهلين" ، وأخرج الرافع عن علي بن أبي طالب رضي الله عنه أن رسول الله (ص) قال "غفو الملوك أبقى للملك" . وكالرحمة فانها تبعث على اسباغ النعمة قال تعالى في حق نبيه عليه السلام "فيما رحمة من الله لينت لهم، ولو كثت فضا غليظ القلب لانفروا من حولك" ، وقال "وكان بالمؤمنين رحيمًا" . وأخرج أبو داود و الترمذى عن عبد الله بن عمرو بن العاص رضي الله عنه عن النبي (ص) : "الراحمون يرحمهم الرحمن ، ارحموا من في الأرض يرحمكم من في السماء" . وأخرج أبو الشيخ عن أبي هريرة رضي الله عنه عن النبي عليه الصلاة والسلام قال "الرحمة تنزل على الامام ثم على من عن بيته الأول فالاول" ، إلى غير هذا من أوصاف الحسان التي لا يفي بها اللسان، مع الأخذ بالسنة وطرح البدعة، وفي الحديث الكريم "من أخذ بستني فهو مني، ومن رغب عن سنتي فليس مني" ، وناهيك بما قدّمه بين يدي نجواك من الأمر بأخلاص التوحيد لله بما لا يتوجه منه اشراك فلا يسأل غيره ولا يرجى الا خيره . قيل لأبي الحسن الشاذلي "هذا جدك عليه السلام يقول : جبت القلوب على حب من أحسن إليها" ، فقال رضي الله عنه : لا نرى محسنا الا الله" ، وهذا هو توحيد أهل اليمان المتمكّين بالشهود في العرفان، وبذلك ثبتت كلمة الله عندك وقت في حماية الملة والذب عنها جهودك فعم سلطانك الحرميin و الحجاز بأسره و اليمن عموماً مستوي الطرفين فاستزيدوا نعم الله عليكم بشكركم لأنّه القائل " ولئن شكرتم لازيد تكـمـنـ" و من الشرك على هذه النعم ، وهو لبيت دوامها كالركن الأعظم ، الزيادة في حسن الخلق مع الخلق الذين هم عيال الله الملك الحق فان حسن الخلق خلق الله الأعظم . ولك فيه أفضل اسوة بالنبي (ص)، وأخرج الدليمي في سنن الفردوس عن أنس رضي الله أن النبي

عليه السلام قال "حسن الخلق نصف الدين" ، وأخرج ابن عدي في الكامل عن ابن عباس رضي الله عنهما عنه عليه السلام "حسن الخلق يذيب الخطايا كما تذيب الشمس الجليد" ، ومن ذلك الزيادة في تعظيم حرمات الله فهو خير له عند ربّه ، ومن تعظيمها احترام العلماء الذين هم حملة الشريعة الفرّاء، ففي الحديث الصحيح "ان الملائكة لنضع أجنحتها لطالب العلم ، وان العالم ليستغفر له من في السموات والأرض والسماء في جوف الماء" ، وان فضل العالم على العابد كفضل القمر ليلة البدر على سائر الكواكب، وان العلماء ورثة الأنبياء، وان الأنبياء لم يورثوا دينارا ولا درهما ولكن ورثوا العلم، فمن أخذَ أخذَ بحظ وافر" ، أخرجه أبو داود والترمذى عن أبي الورد رضي الله عنه عن النبي عليه الصلاة والسلام . وفي حكم العلماء العاملين حكم أولياء الله الصالحين ان لم يكن العلماء أولياء الله فليس لله من ولسي و اذا انتفى اعتقاد التأثير لهم في شيء عن القلوب فزيارةتهم أحباباً وأموات من الأمر المحبوب، على هذا بناء العقائد السنّية في أن لا تأثير لغير القدرة الالهية، به أخذ أئمة المذاهب الأربعة أحمد بن حنبل، ومالك بن أنس، و محمد بن ادريس الشافعى، و أبو حنيفة رضي الله عنهم، واستمرّ عليه عمل الناس في جميع الأقطار من البيهقي والقزوين والأمسكار، وحديث "لا تشدّ الرجال إلا لثلاث" محمول على خصوص الصلاة . فزيارة الصالحين أمر محمود في حق من حصل في سلامة العقيدة على المقصود، ونية الزائر في زيارته، وربما أنصح به في عبارته، إنما هو التبرك والاعتبار والدعاء، والتشفع بهم لله الواحد التبار، فان بركة الصالحين جارية بعد مماتهم أكثر مما كانت في حياتهم لأنهم على بساط الحق كما قال الشيخ ابن عقبة الحضرمي، والدعاء عندهم مستجاب لأن الله تعالى قد اجتباهم وشرفهم وكرّهم، فلما نفع بهم في الدنيا في الآخرة أكثر، "قل إنما أدعورّتي ولا أشرك به أحداً" ، على أن العلماء المجتهدين وإن اختلفوا فاختلافهم رحمة

خَصَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى بِهَا هَذِهِ الْأُمَّةِ وَكُلُّهُمْ عَلَى هُدًى مِنْ رَبِّهِمْ، وَإِنْ قَالُوا
 مَعَ عَدْمِ النَّصِيرَةِ إِيمَانَهُمْ وَمَا كَانُ بَعْضُهُمْ يُؤْتِيهِمْ بَعْضًا وَلَا يَرُونَ لِقَوْاعِدِ
 مَذَهْبِهِ نَقْضاً، وَلَكُلِّ مِنْهُمْ أَتَيَّاعٌ مَقْلُدٌ وَنَوْلَانًا عَلَى آثَارِهِمْ مُقْتَدُونَ، وَكَانَ
 أَمَامُ مَذَهْبِهِمْ أَبُو عِبْدِ اللَّهِ أَحْمَدُ بْنُ حَنْبَلَ رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُ أَقْرَبُ النَّاسِ
 إِلَى الْحَقِّ وَأَبْعَدُهُمْ مِنِ الْبَاطِلِ، وَكَانَ فِي زَمِنٍ كَثُرَ فِيهِ الْبَطَلُونَ
 وَقَدْ قَلَّ فِيهِ الْمُنْصَفُونَ، لَا كُنَّهُ كَانَ يَسْوَقُهُمْ بِزَمَانِ السَّكِينَةِ وَالْوَقَارِ، بَعْدَ
 اظْهَارِ الْحَجَّةِ كَانَهَا عَلِمَ فِي رَأْسِهِ نَارٌ، وَكَذَلِكَ لَمْ يَقُلْ هُوَ وَلَا غَيْرُهُ
 مِنْ هُؤُلَاءِ الائِمَّةِ الَّذِينَ انْحَصَرُتْ فِيهِمُ الْمَذَاهِبُ الْأَرْبَعَةُ لِهَذِهِ الْأُمَّةِ
 بِتَكْفِيرِ أَحَدٍ مِنْ أَهْلِ الْإِسْلَامِ إِذَا اقْتَرَفَ شَيْئًا مِنِ الْمُعَاصِي الْعَظِيمَ
 إِذَا لَا يَكْفُرُ أَحَدٌ بِذَنْبِهِ مِنْ أَهْلِ الْقِبْلَةِ وَلَا بِذَنْبِهِ مِنْ الْإِسْلَامِ عَوْرَةٌ كُلُّهُ
 لِقَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى "إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يَغْفِرُ إِنْ شَرَكَ بِهِ وَيَغْفِرُ مَا دُونَ ذَلِكَ لِمَنْ
 يَشَاءُ". وَأَخْرَجَ الْبَخَارِيُّ وَمُسْلِمُ وَالْتَّرمِذِيُّ عَنْ أَبِي ذِرَّ الْفَهَارِيِّ
 رَضِيَ اللَّهُ عَنْهُ أَنَّ النَّبِيَّ (ص) قَالَ "أَتَانِي جَبَرِيلٌ فَبَشَّرَنِي أَنَّهُ مِنْ مَاتَ
 مِنْ أَمْتَكَ لَا يَشَرِّكُ بِاللَّهِ شَيْئًا دَخَلَ الْجَنَّةَ، قَلْتُ وَلَمْ زَنا وَلَمْ سُرِقَ؟
 قَالَ : وَلَمْ زَنا وَلَمْ سُرِقَ! قَلْتُ: وَلَمْ زَنا وَلَمْ سُرِقَ؟ قَالَ: وَلَمْ زَنا
 وَلَمْ سُرِقَ! ثُمَّ قَالَ فِي الرَّابِعَةِ عَلَى رَغْمِ أَنَّهُ أَبِي ذِرَّ فَلَا يَحْكُمُ حِينَشَدُ
 بِالْكُفُّارِ عَلَى مَنْ لَمْ يَحْكُمْ عَلَيْهِ بِهِ الْقُرْآنُ، لَأَنَّ الْحُكْمَ عَلَى أَحَدٍ بِالْخَلُودِ
 فِي النَّارِ أَنَّمَا مَرْجِعُهُ إِلَى الرَّحْمَنِ فِي هَذِهِ الدَّارِ، وَقَدْ أَكْمَلَ اللَّهُ
 الَّذِينَ عَلَى لِسَانِ رَسُولِهِ الصَّادِقِ الْأَمِينِ: "وَمَا أَنَّا كُمْ الرَّسُولُ فَخَذُوهُ
 وَمَا نَهَاكُمْ عَنْهُ فَانْتَهُوا" وَمِنْ أَحَدُهُتِ فِي أَمْرِنَا هَذَا مَا لَيْسَ فِيهِ فَهْ—
 مَرْدُودٌ عَلَيْهِ، سَلَكَ اللَّهُ بَنَا وَبِكُمْ سَبِيلُ الطَّاعَةِ أَمَاتَنَا عَلَى السُّنْنَةِ
 وَالْجَمَاعَةِ، أَبْشِرْ رَعَاكَ اللَّهُ أَنَّ كَانَتِ النَّتَّةُ لَكَ عَلَى مُلْكِ الْإِسْلَامِ بِتَأْمِينِ
 الْحَجَّاجِ الْوَافِدِينَ عَلَى بَيْتِ اللَّهِ الْحَرَامِ، فَلَا يَسْتَطِعُ الْيَوْمَ حِيَّ—
 الْأَعْرَابُ أَنْ يَمْدُّ لَهُمْ يَدَ القَتْلِ وَالْإِنْتَهَاءِ، وَالْجَزَاءُ عَلَى ذَلِكَ عِنْدَ
 اللَّهِ لَا يَعْدُهُ حَجَّ وَلَا عُمْرَةٌ، وَأَنَّمَا يَهْبِهِ تَعَالَى لِمَنْ بَذَلَ فِي نِصْرَةِ
 الَّذِينَ عَمِّرُوا، لَأَنَّ الْحَجَّاجَ وَفَدُ اللَّهِ، وَهُوَ تَعَالَى يَتَوَلَّ مِنْ تَسْوِلَاهُ

فيحجون في أمان ويزورون في أمان، وزيارة قبر النبي عليه السلام مَا
يبيح به القلب والشوق والغرام، ومن فاته العبر اكتفى بالأثر وقضى
لفرط ما به بعض الوطر، وهي من أعظم القراءات وأفضل ما يناب عليه
من المستحبات، بشر فيها الحديث بالقبول لأن شمسه عليه السلام ليس
لها في الحقيقة أقول. أخرج ابن عدي في الكامل والبيهقي في الشعب
عن ابن عامر رضي الله عنه عن النبي (ص) قال "من زارني في قبري وجابت
له شفاعتي" ، وأخرج الطبراني في الكبير والبيهقي في السنن عن ابن
عمر رضي الله عنهما عن النبي عليه السلام قال "من حج فزار قبري بعد
وفاتي كان كمن زارني في حياتي" ، وأخرج البيهقي في الشعب عن
أنس رضي الله عنه أنه عليه الصلاة والسلام قال "من زارني بالمدينة
محتسباًكت له شهيداً وشفيعاً يوم القيمة" ، ولا عجب أن كانت بكلم
رکاب الحاج تؤمن فوجوهاً بحسنكم تزيد ؟ أخرج الطبراني في الكبير
عن ابن عمر رضي الله عنهما أن رسول الله (ص) قال "زين الحاج أهل
اليمين" قد واليك رفعت للخير، وسعدتك بتوفّر خصال الحمد كلها لدبك
ولانا نحن أعزك الله لما نشر في بساطنا طي ما لكم من المحسن
وشهر في ليالتنا ما سنى الله لكم في الفتوحات في تلك الأماكن
أذنا في الناس بالحج في أقطار المغرب لزوال ما كان يختلج في
الخاطر من الوهم المرهبة، فأجابوا الداعي آتين من كل فتح عبيقة
سالكين بعون الله أيمان وأمن طريق، اذ لم يبق لهم عذر في
التخلف عن هذا الفرض، وأنتم بحمد الله قد مكن لكم في الأرض
متخلقين بالأخلاق العربية، ومتسبحين بالأحكام الشرعية، وهذا
ولدنا أصلحة الله وجهناه فيهم يتمنى أجر خطاه لأداء حجته
وعمرته والسلام على جده عليه الصلاة والسلام في حجرته حتى يتربّ
إن شاء الله وسعيه مشكور، وذنبه بفضل الله وكرمه مغفور. شكر الله
سعينا وسعيكم، وغفر بمنته ذنبنا وذنبكم أمين والسلام.

Appendix 57 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to J. Green requesting a British vessel to bring back his son Mawlāy Ibrāhīm from Alexandria.

Date : Beginning of Jumādā I, 1226 / May, 1811.

Source: F.O. 174/21.

لِبِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وَصَاحِلِ رَفَرْوَاهُ مَلِي بِاللَّهِ الْعَلِيِّ الْعَظِيمِ



الرَّحْمَنِ يَعْلَمُ مَا فِي الْأَفْوَاتِ فَلَمَّا تَلَقَّى مَالِي بِالْمَلِكِ بِالْمَشْرِقِ
لَمْ يَجِدْ إِلَيْهِ حِلًّا إِلَّا نَامَرَكَ أَنْ تَكْتُبْ عَلَيْهِ زَرْنَالِ السَّلَاحَاءِ جَرْجِيَّا مَرْ
بِسَعِينَةِ مَرْفِيلَرِ سَعِينَةِ تَهْيَّلَرِ وَتَرْجِهِ بِعِشْرُونَ مَائِيَّةِ السَّنَةِ الْأَخِلَّةِ
أَنْ شَكَرَ اللَّهَ تَلْفِي وَلِمَانَدَابَا لَا سَكَنَيَّ رِيدَ تَخْلِهِ وَأَهَابَهُ الرَّمْسِيُّ كَنْبَتَةِ
بِعَوْلَ مَالِمَ وَكَاتِدَخْلَبِهِ مَتْوَلَمَسِيُّ كَامِسِ الْمَاسِ أَنَّهُ يَبْلُكَ الْمَسَاهِيَّ
وَكَالْمَسَاهِيَّ أَنَّهُ يَبْلُكَ الْمَسَاهِيَّ وَأَعْلَمَتَهُ بِهَذِهِ التَّكْبِ الْمَيْرِ وَيَلِيَّتِيَّ مَرَابِ
مَعْنَى السَّلَاحَاءِ جَرْجِيَّا أَنَّهُ هَيْكَلَهُ إِلَى الْمَكَبِ وَيَسِّرْهُ لِتَلْهِمِهِ اِنْفِسَنَدَ
بِدَالْمَوْرَهَلَذَهُ مَرْأَهُمُ الْأَمْرِ أَنَّهُ تَلَاقَنَّ بِهَا بِالْجَيْعَ وَالْعَنْزَ وَالْقَنْ وَكَابِدَهُ وَجَهَ
كَبَ الْيَمِيَّمِيَّ وَأَوَابِلَهُمَادِيَّ الْأَلَى وَلَيَ عَلَى 1226

Appendix 58 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green concerning the payment to Mawlāy Maslama of an allowance by the British consul at Alexandria.

Date : 15 Jumādā I, 1226 / 7 june, 1811.

Source: F.O. 174/21.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وَكَلَّا هُوَ كَاذِبٌ إِنَّمَا بِاللَّهِ أَعْلَى الْعِظَمَ

الآن الفونصوا اقر بالتفصي ما يجيء باعلام رايه سيرزا خوا الله مكتبه
 امر فونصوا الخيليز اللى، بلا اسكندرية پها مضوي دفع لاخفيه
 سيرزا موكل اى سكلامته اللى، بمحض مایة ريال بـ كل شهر ويفتش
 خواكم من تعيقهم عليه ورثي دفع الايهنا لك ورقا امر ز مركان خوا الله
 نتميل عدك العطاب بـ ذالما وتفتح للاملا دبلتكم له من واجب
 طاركة الائمه ثور صناعت السننة والآيات ونرايد ان كل رعنفوك العصابة
 ابعثه لنا وان لم يترعنفوك تعنى بالكتب للفونصوا اللى، بلا اسكندرية
 وتنسلمه وان لم يكربي دفع له شيك دفوسلا يديفع له ذالامس دين
 وظله امر سيرزا خوا الله واعنى دين الا وابدا وسلامه دار به كتب اليؤم
 تخر بغير السين المثلوى وفهر الله بـ حمد الله الاموال على 1226

Appendix 59 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to J. Green
apologizing for the impossibility of allowing the export
of wheat.

Date : 9 Qa`da, 1226 / 25 Nov., 1811.

Source: F.O. 174/21.

الحمد لله وحده
وصل اس وسلام على سيدنا محمد والى



فُتُّحَ الْجَلِيلُ أَقْرَبَنَا مَا نَخَرَ أَمْرَنَا أَعْنَيَهُ أَسِيرُ خَيْرَ بَرِّ سَبَدِ الْأَسْلَامِ أَرِسَحْ
لَكُمُ التَّيَّارَانِ لِمَا الْكَرِيمُ جَاءَ بِنَا مَا كَلَمَتَكُمْ مَعَهُ فَبِلٌ وَلِرَبِيعَتِ الْمَالِ مَا سَرَحَتْ
تَرَزِّعَ بِعَزَّتِهِ نَهَى مَبَارِقَنَا بِرَا حَسِيَّتِنَا وَنَهَرَ الْبَرِّ أَمَا إِلَزَرِزَعَ نَسَلَ اللَّهُ أَمَّا يَسِّ عَلَيْنَا
بِدِيْهِمُ الْيَمِّعَ بِإِلَادَنَا كَمَادَ بِحَمَارَكَ سَفَوَهَ بِعَاسَ سِيَارَفَدَ تَأْذِرَ الْهَرَائِي
مِزَارَ الْأَنَابِيَّ وَأَمَا فَغَرَّ بَحْبَعَ أَعَانَتَكَ عَلَى مَا يَئِرَضِي اللَّهُ تَعَالَى أَمَّا السَّاعِدَاءَ وَ
وَأَمِيسَ وَالشَّلَاءَ عَلَى مِرَاثِبِ الْمَنَزِيَّ وَالشَّلَاءَ وَبِهِ وَرَدَ الْفَعَرَةَ الْمَرَاءَ عَلَى
كَهْدَءَ اَوْفَدَ وَصَلَادَرَجَهَتَهُ مِنَ الْهَمَّ يَدِيْهِ كَمَادَ كَرِزَهُ بِكَتَابَكَ كَنْزَهُ اللَّهُ
خَبِيرَكَمْعَ بِتَارِيَحِهِ

Appendix 60 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green asking for a British vessel to bring back the prince Mawlāy Ibrāhīm from Alexandria and requesting verification of rumours according to which Moroccan pilgrims would have been prevented from visiting the Holy Places.

Date : 15 Safar, 1227 / 29 Feb., 1812.

Source: F.O. 174/285.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وَلَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا بِاللَّهِ دُلَلَ الْعَذَابُ

الى الفوضى والافلام الجميلة اما بهذه وفند وصلنه هنا بل اعتبرت ما اتعجل
عليه جميع الفوتوغرافات بامر اركب الذي بلغ ايا شرقي كلا مركب
ثانية بالصوب (هانجى نعلم سعيد) بامرهم باشرب الماء حكم به عليه
الحملان شاه السيفي لكنه من ذكر الماء اعلم انه كل انتاك فهل بذلك
كتاب سريرنا حكم المعلم اسقينة التي تتوجه لاسكندرية
نلاذ بالمجلاح مع ولد سيريل تحركوا الله ان تقتصر عليهم املاعه الاهبروك
بنابر وكلام سيريل اتجاه يلاذ قلوب المعلماء صداع التجليل على المركب
انه يلاذه والبعض يسمعن اذهم لم يجتو اهل هذه المصنفة بل اذ اسان (ايز) نلاذ
الله بما علم (بلا تعييه) وادا اتت العوشاهه بما لها تناهها الكمال فيه
التي تكفيه (عنده) زبابا علمنا كيد يكتبون بذ الماء (ابو ربه كتب اليكم)
غير غير المتن العالى الشارى رب فخر الله في واصح الغير على ٦٢٦

Appendix 61 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green
about the training of Moroccan artillerymen at
Gibraltar.

Date : 23 Safar, 1227 / 8 March, 1812.

Source: F.O. 174/285.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وَلَا هُوَ كَا فَوْذٌ لِّلْمَالِ الْعَالِيِّ اَتَقْرِيبُ

إِلَى الْفَنَصَرِ الْأَقْرَبِ لِلْجَلِيلِ إِمَامَ الْجَمَاعَةِ عَلَيْهَا أَرْبَعَةُ مِنَ الْبَنِيَّةِ مِنْ شَفَعَ
الصَّدِيقِ لِيَا مَرْكَسِيَّةِ نَسِيَّةِ اللَّهِ تَبَارَكَتْهُمْ بِجَلَدِ كَارِبِيَّهُمْ بِهِ عَنْ كُوكُوكِيَّتِي
يَتَعَلَّمُونَ الْأَشْأَرَ الْمَدِيَّ بِالْمَرْكَادِ بِهِ عَلَيْكَ أَنْ تُوَضِّعَ عَلَيْهِمْ بِالرَّفُوفِ مَهْرُولَ الْأَغْنَمَ
بِأَمْرِهِمْ حَتَّى يَاتِوْبَعَهُمْ سَرَادِيَّةِ نَسِيَّةِ اللَّهِ وَهَاهُمْ يَطْرُدُونَ الْجَبَّةَ كَاتِبِيَّةِ نَسِيَّةِ
السِّيرِ عَرَبِيَّةِ هُنَّ رَمَانِيَّتَنَّ فَلَتْ لَمَاعِلَ الْأَشْيَرِ مِنْ عَلَيْهِ الَّذِي يَنْتَهِيَّهُنَّ يَاتِوْبَعُهُ بِرَلَدِ
نَسِيَّةِ نَسِيَّةِ اللَّهِ بِالنَّزَكِ لِكَمْبِيَّ دَالَلَادِ مِنْ جَمِيَّهُ تَكَبِّيَّ بِنَدَادِيَّ وَالْأَبَالَدِيَّ يَنْظِمُ
لَهُمْ وَبِهِ كَتَبِيَّهُمْ غَمْرِيَّ عَلِيِّ السَّلَلِ السَّلَلِيِّ وَفِيَّهُ اللَّهِ ٢٣٤ صَبْرِيَّ عَلِيَّ ١٢٢٧

Appendix 62 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green inquiring about the war between Muḥammad ‘Alī of Egypt and the Wahhābī-s of the Ḥijāz.

Date : 1 Rabī‘ I, 1227 / 15 March, 1812.

Source: F.O. 174/285.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وَلَا حُولَّ وَلَا قُوَّةَ إِلَّا بِاللَّهِ أَعْلَمُ

إِلَى الْفَرْنَصِرِ الْقَيْرَلِيِّ زَرِّا مَا يَعْدُ بِطْلَهُ هَذَا الرَّجُلُ التَّكَلَّارُنَ يَأْمُرُكُ دِيَنَنْجَاهُ اللَّهِ
تَبَعَّثَنَدَ لِلَّاهِ كُمْ جَيْلَ طَلَرِيِّ يَبَلَّشَدَ بِمَرْكَبِ (الْمَاسِكَنَهُ) رِبِّهِ وَلَادِدَ كَلَابِعَنْمَابِصَوَلَ
الْكَلَابِ الْيَدِيِّ وَلَانْفِيَعَنَادَمَاهِنْمَعَنَدَكُمْ مِنْ خَبَرِ بَاشِمَصَرِ وَمَا بَعْلَمَعَ الْوَهَبِيَّ
إِذْنِ بِالْجَهَازِ دَاهِرِ وَبِرَكَتِ الْبَكَمِ تَمَرِ عَنْمَ السَّرِّيِّ زَبَغَهُ اللَّهِ بِمَهَدِ
رِبِّ الْمَبُورِ عَلَى ٢٢٦

Appendix 63 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to 'Abd al-Rahmān 'Ash'āsh concerning the salary and equipment of Makhzenian troops.

Date : 2 Jumādā II, 1227 / 13 June, 1812.

Source: D.A.R.

الحمد لله وحده وصلى الله على سيدنا ونبينا محمد وآله
 خدينا الحاج عبد الرحمن عشماش ، سلام عليك ورحمة الله وبعد
 وصلنا كتابك وعرفنا ما تضمنه بمشاهرة القائدين اقطعهما ومشاهرة العسكر
 اقطعهما مُعترضاً لهم بقلة الداخل ، والخياطة يدفع لهم ثمنها من ذئبيرة
 السيد ابراهيم التي تحت يد السوسي ، كل واحد في يده وكل واحد
 يزيدما أحباب ، وفرق الكسان والملف الصدرية والبدعية وما يخصكم
 من الملف يصلكم من الصورة إن شاء الله ، ولا ضرر علينا فيه ، والله يرضي
 عنك والسلام ، في 2 من جمادى الأولى عام 1227 .

Appendix 64 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to 'Abd al-Rahmān ḤAshāḥ concerning the striking of copper coins to which a proportion of lead is to be added.

Date : 11 Hijja, 1227 / 16 Dec., 1812.

Source: D.A.R.

الحمد لله وحده صلى الله على سيدنا و مولانا محمد و واله و صحبه وسلم
 (طابع : سليمان بن محمد غفر الله له بمنه)

خدينا الأمين الحاج عبد الرحمن أشعاش أعاشرك الله وسلام عليك ورحمة الله تعالى وبركاته وبعد بلغنا كتابك مع المثالين من سكة الفلوس وقد أعجبنا ذلك الصنيع ، أصلحت الله ، وهذا الرقيق أفضل وعليه العمل إن شاء الله ، وأوقيستان من الرصاص في كل رطل من النحاس تكفي ليلاً تسوّد الفلوس وتُفسّر بالرصاص حتى تكون منه والله يعينك والسلام .
 وفي 11 من ذي الحجة الحرام عام 1227 .

Appendix 65 :Letter from the governor of Essaouira to the British government about allegations made against James Green, British consul at Tangier, who would have sold to his own account Moroccan cereals allowed initially as an assistance to the British army in the Peninsula.

Date : 6 Safar, 1228 / 8 Feb., 1813.

Source: F.O. 52/16.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
ولا حول ولا قوة إلا بالله العلي العظيم

من عبد ربه سبحانه خديم المقام العالى بالله قائد شفر السورة وناظر جيشه
السميد محمد بن عبد الصادق كان الله له مامين إلى صاحبنا الوزير الشهير
مدبر أمر الدولة الانجليزية وقهرمانها الأعظم أما بعد فنحب أن تكون على
خير وستزيد منه لأنك رجل ملبع تحبنا وتجد الخدمة في جانب أميرنا
سيدنا ومولانا سليمان أاعاننا الله وإياك عليها مامين ثم اعلم أنه نصره الله
كان أمرني أولاً أن نسرح لتصوكم القاطن بطنجة وسق ثلاثين ألف قطار من
الزرع ثلثتها قمحاً وثلثها شعيراً من غير صاكة إعانته لجيش الانجليز المقابل
للأفرنجيين بالإجبيوة وبمقابل فوجه من ناب عنه في وسقها وهو الذي
أراك ماسرايل فوسقها ثم إيه أيده الله أمرني ثانيةً أن نسرح له
وسق عشرين ألف قطار أخرى منها عشرة قمحاً وخمسة شعيراً أو خمسة قطنية
إعانته لجيشه المذكور وأيضاً من غير صاكة فسرحتها له ووسقها كما أمرني سيدني
خلد الله ملكه وحتى الآن سمعت أن القنصل المذكور طلب ذلك من مولانا
نصرة الله على السننكم من غير شعور منكم ولا أذن له في ذلك ولما أطه
لإيه لوجهكم ووجه سلطانكم وآكام لجيشكم واعانته لهم على ما هم بصدده
باعه بالإجبيوة وغيرها وحازريه لنفسه ولم شرك معه فيه من اليهود ولم
يُعن به جيشكم كما طلبه من مولانا عليه فنحب منك أن تعلينا بحقيقة ذلك
هل كان بمشورتكم أو إذنكم أو من عندية نفسه كما سمعنا وياتينا كتابتك إن

شأن الله ببيان ذلك مع من يأتيك بكتابنا هازا وهو الذي أخ التاجر
 مير بن مقين مطبوعاً عليه بطبعكم المعهود ليزول الإشكال وتبلى
 الحقيقة ويرتفع الجاز وعلى عهدهم والسلام ، في سادس صفر
 الغبر عام 1228 .

Appendix 66 : Letter from al-Salāwī to the British ambassador W. A'Court allowing additional export of provisions for the British army in the Peninsula.

Date : 8 Sha'bān, 1228 / 6 Aug., 1813.

Source: British Museum, Add. Ms. 41,512.

لبراءة الرحمن الرحيم وسلام وکافر لآئمماً بالأنها عليه التقى

إلى البشاد و راجعهم ويلو إركاماً به باه نسيك ايذ الله و نسرا
بمح بى و فبلوك و امر بارك املاً و تغفيراً ميث اتبث من عنده الملاكا جمع الله
يحيى الله و ينفعه

وفناسخ لعلتك در فاصينكم التي بلغا اللهو اربعة و الاو من ذكور
البغ في ملائكة العذامير الغابليان ثم الله العلو في كل سنة ٢٠٠٠
وفداء من هم ببطأه خمسة عشر رامايا الكيل راس ١٥

وامر ايده الله لكم بتقم بع اربعين بية بغلة من شعر السرير بعشر آريان للبغله
وفد علمنا اما التجاري كلبو، الشيران، بار بغير ريلا الكيل راس
ويطلبوا البغال بستين ريلا للبغله

وكذا ميزا ابيه الله سمعت نعمته الربية بـ الاجندر الغيل على محبتها
ولا غنتها وجدته و مع هذه الاصطاكدة التي يطلبون التجار بحاله يعظهم
ميزة الله شيئاً انه ينفع للضرر اذا يعطيه من ذداوله ملكان
الضرر ماعز عليه شه و بجانبكم

وان الفوز صرا اغمبر عنده ميزا الله في مكلنته انت كلها بعافل
وزيادة اوكا يسمع فيه كل ما امير في وثوى بحصنه و امانته و ان خدمته
طيبة للجنايني كل سعنوا بالمخير في جميع احواله

واما الزرع بلا ينبع عليكم طنال الزب و علا و جباله من بعد الزرع
هذا المائة ستة اما خصبة رخ زينة كلها بارغه بلا يفطر في حرج منه ش، البتة
واما الميل ولا يصاله ااسپك ارجفة البير وبالبلدان عنده ايده الله
واما المدار و مصالحه ااسپك اما عزها ينبع وبكتاب اليم عم اليس

اللهم اربق بيتنا الله في ذكرك ثانية المبارك على عرشك ١٢٦٦

Appendix 67 : Letter from al-Salāwī to the British ambassador William A'Court inquiring about the possibility of sending Moroccan students to London.

Date : 26 Sha'ban, 1228 / 24 Aug., 1813.

Source: C.O. 2/4.

To the Ambassador William A'Court.

I am directed by His Imperial Majesty to write to you respecting some young men H.I.M. intends sending to England to learn the art of medicine, and the science of gunnery; they are to remain until perfect in both. H.I.M. requests you will make known his wishes upon this subject to H.R.H. Prince George, if he accedes to them, he requests the Minister be directed to acquaint him that H.I.M. may send the young men to London. We beg you will not neglect writing upon this subject as we shall anxiously wait for an answer, and peace.

(S E A L)

Appendix 68 : Letter from al-Salāwī to J. Green expressing satisfaction of Moroccan authorities after the surrender of Napoleon.

Date : 15 Jumādā I, 1229 / 5 May, 1814.

Source: F.O.174/286.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وَكَانَ حُولُ وَلَيْلٌ لَا يَدْلِسُ النَّعْلَى

الى المنور صرا اقربي لخليز امد بده جفه وطننا كذا يك
ونجز بنا صنه حكت الا خبار التي سرت اهل الدنيا كلهم
دخلوا في عمه والذني بازكيه وصلب الله له ملوكه اليه لم
يعدل فيه وملاذ معاذ الله في خلفه في البلفي والخلف
وكاشك اذكر انتي اشتئ الناس وفروبا في هذه الامر
واعتنى به بملا فرض تم وما ملتم هنقي انتقم الله منه ويعنى
جعيلكم على كل فيز الا خبر من ومن له خبر له ما اندفع بيدهم
ويكشفه وكما تغيرت هنا ما يغيرها بل هي انت شفاء الله وربه كتب
المريم ثم بعدها السمع المسمى وفقيه الله في ٥٤ احمد بن ابراهيم

١٢٢٩

Appendix 69 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to ʻUmar Abū Sitta appointing him governor on the ʻAbda tribes after they rebelled against Muḥammad b. ʻAbd al-Sādaq.

Date : 23 Rajab, 1230 / 1 July, 1815.

Source: Mic.4, H.P.M.D., Rabat, 1978, BGR.

سلیمان بن محمد لطف الله به

خدینا القائد عمر بستة اعانک الله

سلام عليك ورحمة الله وبركاته . وبعد فنامك أن تقول لعبدة لست بناقض
عهد والدنا وأسلافنا رحمهم الله فيكم ، وخدمتهم ومحبة أسلافهم وإن ضيعوا ،
وما رأيت والدي رحمه الله قط أكل عبدة ولا أباهم ولا جدي ولا أبوه رحمه
الله ، وإنما رأيتم مع عدم حضوري وأهل الغرب ، واردت أن أجعل لهم
ما يرتدعون به سفهاؤهم وما قط أكلت قبيلة بلا حضور سلطان حتى شرائكة
أخوال والدنا رحمه الله ما أمر بأكلهم حتى حضر فليحذروا سخط الله ولينظروا
كيف لم يراعي والدنا رحمه الله أخواله لما خرجوا عن الطريق لقول الله تعالى
"لاتجدوا قوماً يومئون بالله واليوم الآخر يوادون من حاد الله ورسوله ولو كانوا
ءاباء هم أو أبناء هم أو إخوانهم أو عشيرتهم " . وهب أن ابن عبد الصادق
ظلمهم فالشرع بين ومن لم يرضاه كافر ، ومن ظلم لا يظلم ومن جار عليه
عامله لا يحل له أن يحارب ولا أن ينتصر من العامل لقوله صلى الله عليه وسلم
"أدوا الذي عليكم واطلبوا الله الذي لكم " وقوله صلى الله عليه وسلم
"إن ضررك فاصبر وإن أخذمالك فاصبر وإن شتمك فاصبر" وإن قمعهم
بالحجنة الشرعية وعرفهم أنهم استوجبوا الهلاك لو لا عفو الله لضييعهم . وهذه
مدة وانهم والناس أجمعين ما شاع عند أحد ولا ذاع ضرر ابن عبد الصادق لهم
ولا قامت القبيلة كلها لضرر عام فاشر وإنما سفيه جمع سفهاء كلهم مباحثون المال
والدور وصار يدور على صلحاء القبيلة وذوي الأعراض والثروة ويجررونهم على

القيام للناساد . هذا مبدء أمرهم . واجعل معهم الحساب كم قبض منهم ابن عبد الصادق من المال في غير حق وكم قتل من نفس بغير حق لتكون لنا الحجة على العمال في عزلهم ، وأما ابن كان كل عامل أراد تنفيذ الأحكام الشرعية وجريان العدود الذاتية على من وجبه عليه يقوم سفيه محارب باغ عليه ويجبر القبيلة على الفساد ما بقيت ولا ية ثابتة لأحد يراقب الله ويريد الحق وما بقيت أحكام الشرع تجري على أحد وصار العزل والولاية بيـد الفـاسـاقـ لـأـبـيـدـ السـلـطـانـ فـتحـاـمـمـ الـحـكـامـ وـفـسـدـ الـدـيـنـ ، وـاقـطـعـمـ الـحـجـةـ حتى يـعـرـفـواـ ، وـقـلـ لـهـمـ لـاـ يـقـولـواـ هـذـاـ مـدـينـيـ لـاـ قـدـرـةـ لـهـ عـلـىـ تـنـفـيـذـ حـقـ فـيـ ظـالـمـ لـذـلـكـ أـرـدـنـاهـ ، وـلـأـنـ فـعـلـ بـفـسـاقـنـاـ شـيـئـاـ وـجـبـ عـلـيـهـمـ قـمـناـ عـلـيـهـ كـمـ قـمـناـ عـلـىـ اـبـنـ عـبـدـ الصـادـقـ ، بـلـ هـوـ أـهـونـ . قـلـ لـهـمـ جـمـيعـ الـأـيمـانـ تـلـزـمـنـيـ إـنـ لـمـ أـحـكـمـ فـيـكـمـ بـمـاـ أـنـزـلـ اللـهـ حـتـىـ أـخـرـجـ مـنـ وـسـطـكـمـ وـلـمـ أـرـدـ وـلـأـيـنـكـمـ لـشـبـعـ بـطـنـيـ وـنـيـلـ شـهـوـتـيـ مـنـ الدـنـيـاـ بـلـ قـبـلـتـهاـ لـأـكـونـ رـحـمـةـ لـلـضـعـفـاءـ أـصـرـفـعـنـهـمـ الـعـذـابـ الـعـامـ بـحـولـ اللـهـ ، وـسـوـطـ عـذـابـ عـلـىـ الـظـالـمـينـ أـنـزـلـ بـهـمـ مـاـ يـسـتـحقـونـ بـحـولـ اللـهـ فـلـمـ قـبـلـتـمـ وـإـلاـ اـنـصـرـفـ عـنـكـمـ وـالـسـلـامـ . فـيـ 23 رـجـبـ الـفـرـدـ الـحـرـامـ عـامـ 1230 .

Appendix 70 : Letter from Ahmad b. Muhammad to J. Green asking for a British bombardier to train Moroccan artillerymen.

Date : 29 Jumādā I, 1231 / 27 April, 1816.

Source: F.O. 174/286.

لِيَعْلَمَ اللَّهُ أَكْبَرُ وَلَا يُؤْمِنُ بِاللَّهِ الْعَلِيِّ لِمَنْ يُفْسِدُ

الى تلبيس فومه ورد بغير عشيبته الفتن ضمرا قُثري جلنار الاغلبين
بلتفد راصه ملتر يبر حبيب الرزينة طول المهر والتعلاع على حفظ انتقام الاهلى
اولاً بعد علعلم ان مولانا امير المؤمنين نفع المهاجرينا من هنا بفتحة المسلمين
ان نبعث الى جبل طارق لقيادة الجند المتفوق العرايش معلم ماهر ورمي
المهاجرين والرجال لبعض مع اولادنا بالاشارة به كل يوم سيف
ورانت الباب النبئ خل عليه به هنا قبر بدوى بمحجوبه جانب
مولانا نفعه (رس ونفعه) لك الجبل ان تفتت باقامه المسير يقتصر
الى جبل طارق لقيادة المعلم عز ملوك لا يبرغ خذ ركبنا لاقاير المهد
الستعم بهنها وفهرواس هكته پنه اوپنك والسلطان ٢٩٢

جعفری، عاصم ۱۲

لـلـهـ مـلـكـ الـحـالـ

Appendix . 71 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Lord Exmouth commenting the English raid on the port of Algiers.

Date : 26 Shawwāl, 1231 / 19 Sept., 1816.

Source: F.O. 174/284.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وَلَا حُوْلَ وَلَا قُوَّةَ إِلَّا بِاللَّهِ الْعَلِيِّ الْمُظْمِنِ
 (الطَّابِعُ السَّلِيمَانِ)

المحب الصادق والرئيس المقدم الكبير سيف الدولة النجليزية وزعيمها
 وطالع سعدها ويسار يمنها الورد إكسيموث ادمال ، بلغنا كتابكم تُخْبِرُنَا
 بما وقع بينكم وبين أهل الجزائر وذلك علامة المحبة والصدقة الكبيرة ، ولقد
 كنا متشوشين لذلك ومتطلعين له ، ونسئل الله اللطاف لجميع المخلوقين ، وأن
 يجري أحوالهم على النهج القويم والصراط المستقيم " ولو لا دفاع الله الناس
 بعضهم ببعض لفسدت الأرض ولكن الله ذو فضل على العلمين " . وأهل
 الجزائر لم ينظروا لأنفسهم ولا لما يحصل من الأضرار والوهن الناشئ عن
 آرائهم ، ولينصرنَ الله من ينصره ، ولو حفظوا الله حفظهم ولو لم يخرجوا
 عن أمره لاعانهم ، " وما أصابكم من مصيبة بما كسبت أيديكم ويعفو عن كثير " .
 نسئل الله الكريم أن لا يوقعنا فيما يخطئه عنا وأن يلطف بعباده ويونقهم
 لما يرضاه من مراده " أَمَّا بَنِي إِنَّمَا حَكَمَ طَنْجَةً أَنْ يَتَلَقَّ مَا كَبَرَ
 وَمَنْ يَرِدُ مِنْ قَبْلِكُمْ بِمَا يَسْرُكُمْ وَأَنْ لَا يَنْعِمْ مَا فِيهِ مَعْرُوفٌ وَلِإِحْسَانٍ وَيَدْلِيلٍ عَلَى
 كَمَالِ الْمَرْوَةِ وَالصَّحْبَةِ إِنْ شَاءَ اللَّهُ وَفِي 26 مِنْ شَوَّالِ الْأَبْرَكِ عَامَ 1231 . "


Appendix 72 : Letter from Ahmad b. M'bārak to the British vice consul at Tangier concerning the punishment of a British citizen according to Muslim law.

Date : 1 Muḥarram, 1232 / 21 Nov., 1816.

Source: F.O.174/286.

الحمد لله

الرئيْس فونصو البليز اثريبي اما بعد فن وطل
لعن خاتم موكلنا امنه وربانه كتاب الفونصو
وكتبته كتابه وش احقرت وجمعته للفايد المعمد
المعين بذاله واما ناديه الفاير لرجل بلا يخوه الـ
من الجما فيبر وال المسلمين جميع بلاه التصارى تمر عليهـ
اعکام ورايتقا ولو سمحنا ان فايد جيل صارق فتلـ
مسلمـاً استويـب القـل او آءـه لفـلـنا يـلـستـواـنهـيـ
بعـلـعـرـمـ لـصـرامـ عـامـ 1232ـ



Appendix 73 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Louis XVIII authorizing the export of Moroccan wheat.

Date : 1 Rabi' II, 1232 / 18 Feb., 1817.

Source: C.C.C., vol.25.

اما بعد ، بلغنا كتابك ، ونحن لا يعز علينا شيء لجانبكم ولو لا ما يسراء
تونصوكم من الغلا هذه السنين ، نسأل الله الرحمة لعباده أجمعين ،
ما انقطع الوسق أبداً من بلادنا لبلادكم من الزرع وغيره ، ولأجل وجهك هما
نحن نقاسوكم الرخاء والشدة ، فإذا كان يونيه إن شاء الله يسر لكم
ما تطلبون على قدر الوقت والسعر كما تطلبون ، ولكن يكون الوسق من الرباط
وتكون دار القونصو فيه كما كان ، وأما غيرها لاتسع ذلك ، والرباط متعددة
ويأتي الزرع إليها من تامستة لأنها محله ، ولا يقع ضرر على المسلمين إن شاء
الله . أما تعين الصاكفة فلو كان للصاكفة ما سرحناه بشيء من الدنيا
وإنما نسرح مانسرحه لراعيتكم إن شاء الله لأجلكم لا غير والسلام .

Appendix 74 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Dukkālī restricting his prerogatives as muftī.

Date : 5 Ramadān, 1232 / 19 July, 1817.

Source: D.A.R.

الحمد لله وحده

(سليمان بن محمد غفر الله له بمنه)

الفقيه السيد محمد بن ابراهيم السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبعد ، لا تعتد
تفتي بنقض أحكام القضاة إلا إذا كان الحكم مخالفًا للشرع من أصله
وأما من الإعذار أو الإنذار فلا لأن القاضي إذا تحقق عنده لذاته الغصّ
ولم يحكم له الإعذار أو الإنذار فله أن يحكم ولا يُرد عليه حكمه لعدم الإعذار
لكونه أعرف من غيره في ذلك ، وحكم العاشر مرجع الخلاف فيما قضى
البادية كالذي أفتتكم له بنقض الحكم لعدم الإعذار كيف يخفى عليه عدم
العلم بمخارجة أبناءه عنه في الأصل الذي اشتري منهم بعضه ثم سلمه للشريك
وكيف يخفى على القاضي الحق في هذه الدعوة في تلك البقعة الصغيرة
التي لا يخفى على كافة أهلها ما لبعضهم على بعض ، وبالكتوى بنقض
الحكم في تلك المعنى تفتح علينا أبواباً من الدعاوى وكثرة الخصماء ،
والسلام في 5 رمضان المعظم عام 1232 .

Appendix. 75 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Muḥammad b. al-Rādī, qāḍī of Agouraī, ordering him to enforce the economic blockade of the Aīt Oumalou.

Date : 3 Ḥijja, 1233 / 4 Oct., 1818.

Source: D.A.R.

الحمد لله وحده وصلى الله على سيدنا ومولانا محمد وآل وصحبه وسلم تسلیما
 (الطابع السليماني)

وصيفنا القائد محمد بن الراضي العلوج سلام عليك ورحمة الله تعالى
 وصيف والذى يراد منك هو اجرى في العداوة بين آيات أمالو وبين قبائلنا المطيري
 والذى والجرواري والزموري صالح بين قبائلنا وقطع الكيل عن آيات أمالو من عند
 والجبر بسر الطاعة وكل فرقة أدخلت قافلة من آيات أمالوا تعرض لهم بخيلك
 برس وانهاهم وكل من أتى معهم . وقسم لهم من قبيلتهم بالتحريض والطمع
 وانها من يضر بهم ، او ان قدم بها بني مطير حرثش عليهم جروان والعكس
 من يضر بهم او ان عدم بها بني مطير حرثش عليهم جروان والعكس .
 ونادي في السوق كل قبيلة اكتال منها آيات أمال فهي ملعونة والسلام .
 في 3 من ذي الحجة الحرام عام 1233 .

Appendix 76 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to ‘Ayyād, qā’id of the Oudaya, ordering him to reorganize the troops that were spared by the plague of 1818.

Date : 21 Shawwāl, 1234 / 13 August, 1819.

Source : D.A.R.

الحمد لله وحده وصلى الله على سيدنا ومولانا محمد وصحبه
وسلم تسلينا

(التابع) (التلویع)

خالنا القائد عياد سلام عليك ورحمة الله تعالى وبركاته وبعد
نأمرك أن تجمع أخواننا الأوداية وسردهم لما عافاهم الله
والحمد لله من هذا الوباء واجعلهم مائة مائة وخمسة
وعشرين وخمسة وعشرين واجعل لكل قائد مائة قائد ولكل خمسة
وعشرين مقدم حتى لا يكون قائد عنده أقل من مائة ولا مقدم
عند़ه أقل من خمسة وعشرين وزتم لكل مقدم أصحابه باسمهم
ولكل قائد مائة أصحابه أيضاً واجعل ذلك في دفتر كما جعله
والدُّنْيَا رحمة الله على يد القائد قذور والسيد بلقاسم
يعينك فإنه منكم والسلام
في 21 شوال الأبرك عام 1234.

Appendix 77 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to ‘Ayyād ordering him to incorporate the tribes of Himyan and Oulad al-Haj into the army.

Date : 21 Shawwāl, 1234 / 13 August, 1819.

Source: D.A.R.

الحمد لله وحده وصلن الله على سيدنا وموانا محمد وآله وصحبه وسلم تسليماً
 (الطابع)

خالنا القائد عياد سلام عليك ورحمة الله تعالى وبعد ولينا بحول الله
 أمر احبيان وأولاد الحاج وجعلناهم من جملة جيش أخواننا الأوداية
 وزكي وتهم وأعشارهم هذه السنة فقط أنعمنا عليهم بها يجعلونها في
 السلاح وصرد هم والسلام في 21 من شوال الأبرك عام 1234.

Appendix . 78 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to 'Abd al-Rahmān 'Ash'āsh calling for the mobilization of the Jbala tribes for the jihād against the dissident Berbers.

Date : 2 Muḥarram, 1235 / 21 Oct., 1819.

Source: D.A.R.

الحمد لله وحده . . . وصلى الله على سيدنا و مولانا محمد وآله وصحبه وسلم
 (الطبع السليمانى)

خدينا الأئم الائمه العادل عبد الرحمن أشعاشر سلام عليه، ورحمة الله تعالى وبركاته وبعد قد بلغكم فعل هؤلاء الخوارج من البربر من شق العصا وخروجهم على جماعة المسلمين ونهبهم أموال الناس وقطع الطرقات، و هتك المحارم وسفك الدماء ، ولا يخفاكم ما أعد الله للمجاهدين في سبيل الله وجهاد هؤلاء الخوارج أولى و مقدم على جهاد العدو الكافر، فالله الله قف وقف جد و حزم كما هو المعتقد فيك من غيرتك على كلمة الله العليا، وأذن في قبائل الجبل بالجهاد وناديهم يا عباد الله أعينوا إخوانكم المسلمين، الجهاد للجهاد في سبيل الله واجتهد كل الاجتهاد في جمع العدد الكبير من المجاهدين عشرة ألف راجل أو عشرين ألفاً أو ما أمكنك ، وكل من جاء مجاهداً أو جات به غمرة الإسلام أعطيته وأكرمه وكانت له اليد عندها وله عند الله الدرجة العليا. قال تعالى: لا يستوي القاعدون من المؤمنين... الآية ، وقال تعالى: "فضل الله المجاهدين على القاعدين أجرأ عظيماً درجات منه و مغفرة و رحمة ". والله يوفقكم ويعينكم والسلام . في 2 من محرم الحرام فاتح 1235 .

Appendix 79 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the French consul Sourdeau concerning this latter's grievance against a deranged Baqqālī sharīf.

Date : 12 Jumādā II, 1235 / 27 March, 1820.

Source: C.C.C. vol. 27

فونص جنس الفرنسيص مورد أما بعد فانت ضيفنا وفي جوارنا وقونص جنس
كبير في بلا دنا فلا نحب لك إلا الرفعه الكبيرة والمكانة الخطيره وتعلم
أنه لا يمكن أن يهلك ذله ولو من أعز أولادنا وأمر الله قدر أ McDوراً ولا نرمي
آن يقع ذله بآدمي الناس أو البهائم ولا نسترك له حقه إن شاء الله وانت
النصارى أرق أندية وأصبر على أذى لأنه هذا أنت به رسولكم عليه السلام
عيسى بن مريم ويأمركم في الكتاب الذي أتاكتم به من عند الله من لطرك على
هذا الخد فاعطه الخد الآخر، وما انتصر لنفسه صلى الله عليه حين أنت
لقتله اليهود حتى رفعه الله وفي كتابنا على لسان نبينا : " ولتجدن أقربهم
مودة للذين آمنوا الذين قالوا إنا نصارى ذلك بأن منهم قسيسين ورهبانا
وانهم لا يستكبرون " وقال لنا نبينا رفع القلم عن ثلاث الجنون حتى يغسل
والصبي والنائم " . وهذا الجنون ليس له عقل ، ومع هذا فقد حكمناك في جنائيته
إن عفوت فعلت فعل أهل الإحسان أثابك الرحمن وإن أردت أن تأخذ
حقك في الدنيا فلك ذلك ولا يخش أحد في إياتنا ظلماً ولا هضما بحح حول
الله انتهى في 12 من جمادى الثانية 1235 م

Appendix 80 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to Sourdeau, the French consul general, asking for military equipment on the morrow of the Zaian defeat (May 1819).

Date : 9 Sha'bān, 1235 / 22 May, 1820.

Source : C.C.C., vol. 27.

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وَلَا حُوْلَّ وَلَا قُوَّةَ إِلَّا بِاللَّهِ الْعَلِيِّ الْعَظِيمِ

تونص جنس الزنصيص صورد، أما بعد لا بد اكتب لمحبنا سلطانكم
وفقه الله وللوزير على مدافع عشرين صفار تحمل المدفعية
بلغة يعطوها لنا من الموحد في خزانتكم وفي مراكبكم، وكل
ما يناسب في مقابلتها من هدية أو أمر فيه منفعة جيشكم
اعلمنا به توجهه لأننا نعلم محبتكم، ولا نعز شيئاً في
جنسكم، وأنتم كذلك، والمكاحل نريد لها تخرج بالرباط ان
شاء الله.

انتهى في 9 شعبان الأبرك عام 1235.

Appendix . 81 : Letter from Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm and
‘Abd al-Salām al-Azamī to Mawlāy Sulaymān asking for
the revocation of the qādī al-‘Abbās b. Sūda.
Date : 29 Sha‘bān, 1235 / 11 June, 1820.
Source: K.2276, BGR, pp.328-329.

الحضره التي رضيها الله لکفالة الحق و ایالة الخلق ، و آتیتها
 من قوة العزائم و حدة الصوارم و الفصل في افاضة النعم
 والعدل ما ظهرت به مزيّنة السبق و تبینت به فضيلة الغرب
 على الشرق أداًم الله أیامها بعزيز داد ، و نصر مکین يتصل
 به من السماء الامداد ،

حضره مولانا الامام المُؤيد البهـام ، أمير المؤمنين سیدنا
 سليمان أیـد الله نصره بازکـى السلام ، فـان من الواجبات
 المؤکـد أمرها و التکـاليف المعظم في الشـرع قـطـرـهـا و قـدرـهـا
 النصـحة للـله و لـرسـولـه و لـائـمةـ السـلـمـين و عـامـتـهم ، و من اکـاد
 النـصـائـح و اکـملـهـا تـغـيـيرـ المـنـكـر و الدـبـ عنـ السـلـمـين و اعـراضـهـم
 و قد اـفـصـحتـ النـصـوصـ بـتـغـيـيرـهـ ، و بـالـوعـيدـ عـلـىـ كـتمـهـ . قال تعالـى
 " كانوا لا يـتـنـاهـونـ عـنـ مـنـكـرـ فعلـوهـ " ، و قال جـلـ منـ قـائلـ " وـلـاذـ
 قـالـتـ أـمـةـ مـنـهـ لـمـ تـعـظـونـ قـوـماـ اللـهـ مـهـلكـهـمـ اوـ مـعـذـبـهـمـ عـذـابـاـ
 شـدـيدـاـ " ، و شـهـيرـ جـلـيـ ماـ هوـ مـنـ شـيمـ مـولـانـاـ أـدـامـ اللـهـ تـأـيـدـهـ
 و ما جـبـلتـ عـلـيـهـ طـبـيـعـتـهـ الـعـلـوـيـةـ مـنـ النـصـرـةـ لـدـيـنـ اللـهـ تـعـالـىـ
 و رـعـایـةـ وـدـادـهـ وـ الدـبـ عـنـ حـقـوقـ عـبـادـهـ ، وـ قـمـعـ مـنـ يـلـحظـهـ بـعـيـنـ
 الـاعـدـاءـ ، وـ الشـفـ بـحـبـةـ الـعـلـمـ وـ التـلـهـفـ عـلـىـ بـشـهـ فـيـ الـآـفـاقـ
 وـ نـشـرـهـ ، وـ كـبـتـ الـمـعـتـدـيـنـ وـ الـمـلـحـدـيـنـ ذـوـيـ الـجـرـأـةـ وـ الـعـنـادـ وـ خـصـوصـاـ
 مـاـ يـرـجـعـ لـلـجـورـ وـ تـضـيـعـ حـقـوقـ عـبـادـهـ ، فـهـوـ أـيـدـهـ اللـهـ دـائـمـاـ يـجـهـدـ
 نـفـسـهـ فـيـ ذـلـكـ بـالـبـحـثـعـنـ مـتـعـلـقـاتـهـ وـ الـاحـتـيـاطـ فـيـ التـبـعـ لـلـأـحـکـامـ

الشرعية . وكيف لا وحفظ الحقوق أحد الكلمات الخمس التي تواطأ على حفظها جميع الأنبياء و الرسل ، ولم تستفهم في شريعة من شرائع الامم قط ، وقد ارتكب قاضي البلدة الفاسدة الحكم بالأمور الفضيحة ، و التلبيسات والتعديمات التي لا صفاء لها ولا وجاهة استقامة بجهوم حولها ولا شيء فيها يجري على قاعدة من قواعد شريعتها ، وكيف لا وقد جمع بها الطم و الجهل وأخذ الرشى و التحرف عن العدل ، يشهد بذلك من له أدنى ملابسة بالاحكام و فروعها من فقهها هذه البلدة و غيرها ، فمن يوم عدم أبوه التبست عليه الحقائق فانتبذ ما أصله أهل العلم و أرباب الوثائق ، و خرق الاجماع و السنة و الكتاب ، فلتنتظر هذه الأمور التي لم تقع في غير هذا القطر المغربي من بين سائر الاقطارات ولم يتصف بها أهل عصر ما سلف من الاعصار ، فكيف لا تتنهض همة ذي نفس زاكية لجسمها وسد الطرق دونها . فنبتهل إلى الله تعالى بأن يولي مولانا أمير المؤمنين كشف بلواها ورفع شكوكها ، فقد ضاقت نفس الخاصة و العامة بها درعا ، وما استطاعوا لها نكرا ولا سمعا ، فلمثلها يود أن لا يكون المؤمن موجودا و كيف لا وقد نبذ الشريعة ورفضها وراء الظهر ، و سلك صورة شنيعة تبقى ضحكة أمد الدهر ، معاذ الله أن يقع هذا و أمير المؤمنين موجود ، و العلما و العلم و الحمد لله حارس على الدين

تعود ، و اللهم يديم الحضرة العالية و يديم سعودها
و يجعل القدر الساوية جنودها و السلام . وفي ناسع
و عشرين شعبان عام ١٢٣٥ .

Appendix 82 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fes acknowledging his incapacity to guarantee their security and advising them to seek the protection of Berber tribes. This letter was interpreted as an abdication on the Sultan's part.

Date : 13 Qa'da, 1235 / 22 Aug., 1820.

Source : Ms. D 2795, B.G.R., p. 393.

الحمد لله

ابن عمنا الشيرفي سيدی محمد بن الطاهر والفقیہ سیدی محمد بن ابراهیم والطالب بن جلؤن، احفظووا هذه الوصیة واحذر وامثل من مثل هذا، ولیقُسْ ما لم یقل: الجند مع السلطان كمثل موسى مع قومه. ان تصبھم حسنة يقولوا هذا من عند الله وان تصبھم سیئة يقولوا هذا من عندك. ”وان دعاهم الس کریمة قالوا اذهب وریک فقاتلا إنا ها هنا قاعد ون“ . وآخر الدولة إذا ضعف الجند ولم یقدر على قبض الواجب من القبائل وجمع بيت المال نصبوا سلطاناً غرّاً حدثاً جاهلاً، وربما كان فاسقاً، فالذین التصیحة، اللهم اشهد. فان أردت سلاماً امن أنفسکم يا أهل فاس فادخلوا في حلف البرير فان لهم قوانین ومرزوقة تنعمون من الظلم ويتغبون بالکفاف ومن له عصبية كبيرة تقرئ كل أحد وترده عن الظلم، أسئل الله ان يتسم ما بقی بخیر وان يخلفی في المسلمين بخیر، وبما اراد الله امراً هیا اسبابه وان بقیت بهذه الدولة بقیة نصرها الله بفضلہ وألهمنا العدل والنصر، ومن قال انى بھی هذه الله بعد موتها اماته الله شائعاً في قدرته، وان أخرجت هذا الامر عن نفسي فقد خرج من هو خیر مني كالحسن ابن علي سید اولاد فاطمة الزهراء رضی الله عنها واغنیم اجمعین، في 13 من ذی القعدة الحرام عام 1235.

Appendix 83: Fatwā by the ‘ālim-s of Fès in favour of the dethronement of Mawlāy Sulaymān. This fatwā was issued on the basis of Mawlāy Sulaymān's letter of abdication (Cf. appendix 82 above).

Date : Hijja, 1235 / Sept., 1820.

Source: Ms.D.2795 , BGR, pp.393-397.

- يشهد الواقع شكله عقبه بأن ما تضمنه الرسم يسرته قد عاين جلـه في
برأة سيدنا نصره الله سليمان المتنسخ منها هذا الرسم «معانية تامة من
غير شك ولاريب وبذلك قيد شهادته في السابع عشر من ذي الحجة الحرام
عام 1235 عبد ربه علي التسولي لطف الله به آمين .

الحمد لله الواضع شكله إثر تاريخه يشهد بأنه وقف على أصل الرسالة
السلطانية المنتسخ منها الأسطر الثمانية أعلاه المكحولة بخط الفقيه العلامة
الأشهر سيدي محمد بن ابراهيم وعاينها بيد الفقيه المذكور ، وما ذكر في
الأسطر المشار لها كلها مثبتة في الأصل المذكور من غير شك ولاريب وبـ
تيد شهادته مسؤولة منه في التاريخ أعلاه عبد الوهاب بن العابد القادري
الحسين لطف الله به .

— الحمد لله ومن يشهد بِعْنَانِي الأصل المنقول منه ما سطر أعلاه يسأله
أبو بكر بن زيان الإدريسي لطف الله به آمين .

- ليس النصر المسطر أعلاه من معانٍ الرسوم بل من معانٍ الرسائل والفرق بينهما معلوم لأن الرسائل جلّها أخبار والرسوم جلّها إنشاءات والخبر والإنساء متبادران حقيقة كما ذكره القرافي في الفروق، وإذا ثبت بينهما التباين الحقيقي ففي العوارض واللوازم أظهر وأصر؛ سلمنا طريق الجدل

أنها من ذلك ، فإن المسألة الخلافية أفقى بلفادتها الشيخ أبوالحسن وأبوعبد الله الهواري وأبوالعباس التقرى ولاريب في ترجيح هذه الطريقة على طريقة ابن عرفة في مثل هذه النازلة دفعةً لما حصل من مفاسد الإسلام ، وما يتربّح حصوله أن يبقى الناس بلا إمام على أن المقطوع به عندنا في النازلة خروجهما عن نطاق الخلاف لأن موضوعه الرسوم التي طرقهما الأحاديث المقوى بالعدالة ومسئلتنا مضمونه الذي وقع الشهادة بمعاينته من العجز ، والخروج بلغ حد الاشتهار والتحق بالشهرة بوسط النهار ، وصار تواتره كالعيان ، الذي لا يختلف فيه اثنان . فعلى تقدير ان لولم يات من عنده كتاب ، ألم تُغلق على المسلمين الأبواب ؟ ألم تختلف على السلطان كلمة الناس ؟ ألم يهدمو من ركن طاعة الأساس حتى استقصى الأماكن التي يطلق له فيها الانتصار ، ويطلع له منها نجوم الاقتدار ، فلم يحصل له من ذلك إيناس وإنما وقع من ذلك الباس . لا يقال الشهادة بالمعارضة من قبيل النقل وشرطها الإذن وأين الإذن في النازلة التي أهواها إن بقي الناس فوضى نازلة ؟ لأننا نقول فائدة الإذن هنا ضروري الانتهاء بالتواتر والشهدود المذكورين على أن بعثه الكتاب وأمره بقراءته على الناس في أعلى مراتب الإذن بلا احتمال ، وقد ذكر الفقهاء في الوصية بخط اليد أنها تُقيد إذا أخرجها الموصي من يده وأعطها للغير لأن ذلك يرفع احتمال أنه ردّها ورجع عنها . رَدَّنَا اللَّهُ إِلَى التَّحْقِيقِ وَجَعَانَا مِنْ سَلْكِ أَحْسَنِ الْطَّرِيقِ ، حتى نامن النفاق ونخرج عن دائرة الشفاق ، فلا يدخل في وعيه قول النبي المختار " من كسر علمًا أجهمه بليجام من النار " . قال ذلك وكتبه عبد ربه المفوض الأمير إلى ربه ، محمد بن بوبكر الياغبي لطف الله به .

- الحمد لله ، لا يخفى على ذي بصيرة أن المسطر أعلاه صحيح .
وكتب عبد ربه عبد الملك بن الكبير المُسرِّي .

- لاختفاء أن صدر ما نقل من الرسالة أعلاه هو اعتراف من اعتراف السلطان بضعف الجندي والعسكر وبعدم امتثال أمره فيما يأمرهم به من القيام بأمر

ال المسلمين . وآخره وهو صريح أو كالتصريح في تأخره وخروجه لأجل ذلك
فيما لها من مصيبة ما أعظمها ! فعلى المسلمين أن ينهاوا إماماً جامعاً
لشروط الإمامة يقوم بذلك ، فما لم يتعلوا حرج وأثمن فريقان :
أحدهما أهل الحل والعقد والثاني من اجتمع فيهم شروط الخلافة
ولم يطلبها . قاله أئتنا رضوان الله عليهم . والله أعلم . وكتب العبد
القديس محمد بن إبراهيم لطف الله به .

- الحمد لله ، لا مزيد على ما ستره عالم الأنام ومفتى الإسلام ، والله
أعلم . وكتب محمد العربي بن الهاشمي الزرهوني لطف الله به .

- الحمد لله ، حيث دل أول الرسالة أعلاه وآخرها أن السلطان خرج عن
القيام بأمور الإسلام فواجب على المسلمين نصب الإمام لأن به انتظام الدين
وقيام حقوق المسلمين ، وإلا أثمن الفريقان المذكوران في الرسم الثاني عليه
ال الصادر عن عين التحقيق المبني أساسه على سواه الطريق . قال المؤسس
سعد الدين في التفاصي وشرحها : " ينحل عقد الإمامة بما يزول منه
المقصود منها ، وكذا يخلعه نفسه لعجزه عن القيام بصالح أمور المسلمين"
وأن لم يجعل العجز ظاهرا فقد استشعره من نفسه وعليه يخرج قضية
الحسن رضي الله عنه . وفي حديث البيهقي عن أنس رضي الله عنه
" إذا مررت ببلدة ليس بها سلطان فلا تقربها ، إنما السلطان ظل الله
ورحمه " وقال صلى الله عليه وسلم : " من مات وليس في عنقه بيعة مات
موته جاهلية " اللهم بحق النبي الكريم البر الرحيم الذي به ختمت الرسالة
وجعلت حجتها قامعة كل ضلاله سُكِّن الروعات وأنظم الجماعات ويسّر
للخلق أسبابه ، وارفع بفضلك العدل وركابه . وكتب عبد ربه محمد بن
بوبكر البازغي لطف الله به .

- الحمد لله ما صدر به المفتياً أعلاه من كون الرسالة المصدر بها صريح
في العزل أو كالتصريح صحيح . وكتبه عبد ربه محمد بن يحيى السوسي
الجزائري .

– الحمد لله ما مدر به المفتيان أعلاه صحيح عبد رب محمد بن المذوب
السباعي لطف الله به .

— الحمد لله ما أعلم صحيحاً . عبد ربه مالك بن قدور المغري العقيلي
لطف الله به أمين .

— لاشك أن ما في الكتاب أعلاه هو كالعجز الصريح ، وما كتبه الأئمة
الأعلام من النصوص واضح في ذلك صحيح . وكتب عبد ربه عبد الملك بن
الكبير المُرئي الحسني لطف الله به آمين .

- الحمد لله ، وبمثل ما سطر به الأعلام أعلاه يقول عبد ربه محمد بن حمدون بن الحاج سلك الله به أقسام الحاج .

Appendix 84 : Notarial act established by the people of Fès to serve as a legal basis for the dethronement of Mawlāy Sulaymān.

Date : Early Šafar, 1236 / Nov. 1820.

Source: Ms.D.2795, BGR, pp.397-398.

الحمد لله

الواضعون أشكالهم عقبه يعرفون مارمت به هذه الأزمان من
انسداد باب المعاش والأمان المعرفة الكافية عن الدلائل السامية
ومعها يشهدون بأنّه منذ وقعت الطامة الكبرى على مولانا سليمان
في قبيلة بنى مكثيلد وزيان، و الفتنة قاتمة وعيون
الأحوال غير نائمة، و ان الناس بقوا بعد ذلك عاماً و نصفاً فوضى
تoward عليهم الأحوال التي لا ترضي من قطع الطرق و نهب
البضائع و سفك النعوس و انهدام القواعد و الأسوس و انفلاق أبواب
وانفتاح أنىاب، و ان هذا الأمر العايل و الخطب النازل عزم
المغرب رسمي وحده من مراكش الى وجدة حتى أصاب هذه الفاسدة
ذات الحasan الفاشية، ما أطار المقام عن الأ杰فان و جرد السيوف
الأ杰فان من ترداد الصواعق المدببة و الحوادث المسمرة، فمن
علم ذلك بالمعاينة في فاس و أحوازها وبالسماع الفاشي البالغ حد
التوتر في غيرها، قيده به شاهدا في أوائل صفر الأبرك من عام
1236.

عبد السلام بن الهاشمي البوعناني

عبد العزيز بن بوجيدة عديل

عبد الوهاب بن العابد القادري

عمر بن عبد السلام الداودي

محمد بن التهامي المري

محمد بن محمد الحلو

عبد السلام بن محمد البكري الدلائي

محمد بن محمد بن عبد الرحمن الدلائي .

Appendix 85 : Fatwā by the ālim-s of Fès authorizing the Muslim community to elect a new sultan.

Date : Early Ṣafar, 1236 / Nov., 1820.

Source: Ms. D.2795, BGR, pp. 398-400.

نص السؤال :

الحمد لله ، ساداتنا القادة الكواكب المقادرة ، جوابكم الكافي ونحكم الشافي عما أحكم بناء في الرسم المسطر أعلاه هل يُبيح ذلك للMuslimين نصب إمام آخر يتقيم لهم أو دهم وينصر عددهم ، ويدفع بسبب عدله هذه الفتنة التي أظلم يومها وعم شومها . بينما لنا ما عندكم في النازلة التي أهواها لازالت نازلة ، فلا زلت ملائلاً ، ولا بس بابكم معاداً والسلام .

نص الجواب :

- الحمد لله وحده وصلى الله على سيدنا محمد وآله . الجواب والله الموفق للصواب بعثته أن ما شهد به الشهود بالرسم حيث أشير يوجب على المسلمين نصب إمام آخر ، إذ مما يشترط في الإمام ابتداءً ودوانـاـ كما لغير واحد من الأئمة حتى الشيخ السنوسي في شرح القصيدة كونـه قادرـاً على تنفيذ الأحكام وانتصار المظلوم من الظالم وتجهيز الجيوش والذبـ عن بيضة الإسلام ، إذ ذلك هو المقصد والحكمة في نصب الإمام فإذا تغـدر وجب على الأمة نصب غيره من يقدر على القيام بأمور المسلمين وتدبـير مصالحـهم العامة ، والله تعالى أعلم .

وكتب عبد ربه تعالى محمد بن محمد بن ابراهيم لطف الله به آمين.

الحمد لله والله المونق للصواب . إن ما ثبت أعلاه يبيح للمسامرين إقامة إمام يقوم بصالحهم ويدفعون به يد الظالم عن المظلوم وتنحل به بيعة الأول لقد المقصود من الإمامة من حاله ، وهذا مما لا يمترى فيه بين الأئمة . قال في الواقف مانصه : " وللأمة خلع الإمام وعزله لسبب يوجبه ، مثل أن يوجد منه ما يوجب اختلال أحوال المسلمين وانتكاس أمور الدين كما لهم نصبه وإقامته لانتظامها وإعلانها " المراد منه ونحوه في شرحه آية وفي شرح المقاصد من الأسباب المتفق على حل عقد الإمامة بها ما يزول به مقصود الإمامة . ولا خفاء أن ما قيد في الشهادة أعلاه صريح في ذلك . قال في الاستذكار في شرح قوله صلى الله عليه وسلم " وإن تنازع الأمر أهله ، أهله هم أهل العلم والإحسان والفضل والدين مع القوة على القيام بذلك " . السردار منه . فالشهادة المقيدة أعلاه السؤال ببيحة للMuslimين إقامة إمام يذب عنهم ويقوم بصالحهم ويدفعون به يد الظالم عن المظلوم لأن ظل الله ورممه في أرضه ياوي إليه القوى والضعف ويطعن به الظالم عن المظلوم . وهذه الشهادة كافية في إقامة شأن مع بقاء الأول سبباً ما اشتهر وثبت بخط يده أنه عازل نفسه لعجزه وعدم قيامه بأمور المسلمين ، وهذا كاف في الجواب عن النازلة والله أعلم . وكتب عبد السلام بن بوزيد الأزدي الحسني لطف الله به .

الحمد لله ، المسطر أعلاه طالع على التحقيق مبناء ، وكيف لا وهو من الفتايا المشهورات الملحة بالضروريات ، والنقول واردة على نسخه وقدره محكمة لرسمه وحده . قال الطيبي في حديث " ألا وكلكم مسؤول عن رعيته " إشارة إلى أن المقصود من الإمام الأعظم الحياة والذب ، وحيث انتفأ ذلك في الأول بشهادة الأخبار المتواترة والفنون المتکاثرة المفني توازها عن تسجيل الشهود في الغيب والشهود ، فلا تخرب الناس عن دائرة الأئمـاـم إلا بخلعه ونصب إمام آخر للإسلام ، لأن بنصبه تحفظ الكلمات الخمس التي بحفلتها بقاء هذا الجنس . لا يقال سلب الإمامة بمجرد سلب الاقتدار منقوص بحقيقة مولانا عثمان يوم الحصار ، لأننا نقول : أجاب

عن النضر المذكور سيف الدين الأدمي وارتفاعه الأبي بـأن عثمان رضي الله عنه لم يكن في تلك الحالة عاجزاً عن تنفيذ الأحكام بل كان مطاعماً في النضر والإبرام ، وإنما منعه من الذب والتقياـم والأمر بذلك للخاص والعام سد أبواب المحن والأحوال وكف أسباب الفتـن والأحوال ، بخلاف المشهود في عجزه فـلـانـه اخـتـلـفـ عـلـيـهـ كـلـمـةـ النـاسـ وـهـدـمـواـ مـنـ رـكـنـ طـاغـتـهـ الأـسـاسـ حـتـىـ صـارـ مـنـقـطـعاـ عـنـ الـأـجـنـادـ وـالـأـتـبـاعـ لـيـسـ لـهـ مـنـ الـقـدـرـةـ قـلـامـةـ فـضـلـاـ عـنـ الـبـاعـ كـمـ أـفـصـحـ بـذـلـكـ كـتـابـهـ وـأـعـلـنـ بـهـ خـطـابـهـ خـرـوـجاـ عـنـ عـهـدـةـ الدـمـاءـ السـفـوكـةـ وـالـأـعـراـضـ الـمـهـتوـكـةـ وـالـأـمـوـالـ الـمـنـهـوبـةـ وـالـأـحـوـالـ الـمـسـلـوـةـ وـهـبـهـ بـقـطـرـ أـخـسـرـ نـافـذـ الـأـمـرـ مـحـكـمـاـ فـيـ زـيـدـ وـعـمـروـ فـلـنـ ذـلـكـ لـاـ يـجـدـيـ وـلـيـسـ إـلـىـ كـلـامـ يـهـدـيـ ، لـقـصـورـ فـائـدـتـهـ عـلـىـ قـطـرـهـ وـأـبـنـاءـ مـصـرـهـ ، وـهـذـاـ فـيـ نـازـلـتـنـاـ أـخـرىـ وـهـوـبـهاـ أـحـلـ وـأـجـلـ .ـ فـيـجـبـ عـلـىـ النـاسـ نـصـبـ غـيـرـهـ لـلـاستـفـادـةـ بـبـدـرـهـ ، ذـكـرـهـ الـإـمـامـ بـنـ عـرـفـةـ وـغـيـرـهـ مـنـ اعـتـقـدـ الـحـقـ وـعـرـفـهـ جـبـرـ اللـهـ كـسـرـ إـلـاسـلـامـ بـجـاهـ النـبـيـ عـلـيـهـ السـلـامـ .ـ قـالـ ذـلـكـ وـكـبـهـ مـحـدـ بـنـ أـبـيـ بـكـرـ بـنـ عـبـدـ الـكـرـيمـ الـيـازـعـيـ لـطـفـ اللـهـ بـهـ .ـ

ـ الحـمـدـ لـلـهـ ، مـاـ ذـكـرـ الـأـئـمـةـ أـعـلـاهـ جـوـابـاـ وـتـصـحـيـحاـ إـشـارـةـ وـتـلـويـحـاـ صـحـيـحـ .ـ كـيـفـ لـاـ يـجـبـ عـلـىـ الـسـلـمـينـ نـصـبـ إـمـامـ لـمـاـ نـزـلـ بـهـمـ مـنـ هـذـهـ الـخـطـبـ وـالـعـظـامـ وـمـاـ نـقـلـهـ الـجـهـاـذـةـ النـقـادـ فـيـ النـازـلـةـ كـافـيـ يـجـبـ عـلـيـهـ الـاعـتـمـادـ لـأـنـ عـلـيـهـمـ الـمـعـوـلـ فـيـمـاـ قـالـوهـ وـنـقـلـوهـ وـرـقـمـوـهـ وـحـمـلـوهـ .ـ وـقـدـ ذـكـرـ سـيـدـيـ الـعـرـبـ الـفـاسـيـ فـيـ تـأـلـيـفـ لـهـ فـيـ الـمـسـأـلـةـ مـاـ فـيـهـ الـكـثـيـرـ وـإـلـيـهـ الـغـاـيـةـ وـاستـيـفـاءـ الـكـلـامـ عـلـىـ النـازـلـةـ يـطـوـلـ ، وـفـيـمـاـ ذـكـرـ الـحـاـصـلـ وـالـسـحـوـلـ .ـ وـكـبـهـ عـبـدـ الـمـلـكـ بـنـ الـكـبـيرـ الـمـرـيـ الـحـسـنـيـ وـهـذـاـ شـكـلـهـ .ـ

ـ السـطـرـ أـعـلـاهـ جـوـابـاـ وـتـصـحـيـحاـ صـحـيـحـ مـاـ هـوـ مـعـلـومـ وـمـقـرـرـ فـيـ دـوـاـبـيـنـ الـأـئـمـةـ مـبـيـنـ وـمـحرـرـ ، لـأـنـ الـمـقصـودـ الـأـعـظـمـ مـنـ الـإـمـامـ الـكـبـرـيـ صـيـانـةـ الـدـيـنـ وـحـيـاطـةـ الـسـلـمـينـ وـالـقـيـامـ بـمـصالـحـهـمـ وـدـفـعـ مـضـارـهـمـ وـكـفـ كـلـ يـدـ عـادـيـةـ غـنـمـ اوـمـنـ غـيـرـهـ ، وـأـنـ نـسـبـةـ الـإـمـامـ إـلـىـ الـمـصالـحـ الـفـرـوـرـيـةـ تـكـسـبـ رـكـنـ الـمـاهـيـةـ إـلـىـ الـمـاهـيـةـ لـاـ مـرـيـةـ فـيـ انـدـعـاـمـهـ بـاـنـدـعـاـمـ رـكـنـ مـنـ أـرـكـانـهـ ، وـحـيـثـ اـخـتـلـ رـكـنـ الـإـمـامـ وـمـرـجـ حـالـ الـمـغـرـبـ وـمـاجـ أـهـلـهـ ، فـنـ مـشـرـقـ وـمـنـ مـغـربـ

لعجز أميرهم عن الدفاع ، وبقي أمره غير مطاع منذ زمان ولم يحصل لهم على أنفسهم وأموالهم أمان ليبيـن بهذه النقاـمـ العظيم والخطب المهاـيلـ الجسيـمـ انحلـلـ عند الخلافـةـ عنـهـ المقـصـودـ منهـ ، إذ كلـ ماـ يـزـولـ بهـ المقـصـودـ منـ الإـمامـةـ يـعـزلـ بهـ صـاحـبـهاـ . قالـ الأـمـدـيـ : " الـثـامـنـ منـ شـروـطـ الإـمامـةـ المـتـفـقـ عـلـيـهاـ أـنـ يـكـونـ نـافـذـ الحـكـمـ مـطـاعـاـ قادرـاـ عـلـىـ منـ خـرـجـ عنـ طـاعـتـهـ فـلـمـ قـيلـ يـلـزـمـ أـنـ يـكـونـ عـنـمـانـ رـضـيـ اللـهـ عـنـهـ قـدـ خـرـجـ عنـ الـأـمـرـ حـينـ حـسـرـ فـيـ دـارـهـ لـأـنـ لـمـ يـكـنـ قـادـرـاـ عـلـىـ الزـجـرـ ، أـجـيبـ بـأـنـ كـانـ نـافـذـ الحـكـمـ شـرقـاـ وـغـربـاـ وـلـاكـهـ هـاشـ عـلـيـهـ أـوـبـاشـ مـنـ النـاسـ وـقـصـدـ تـسـكـينـ الفـتـنـةـ وـأـخـذـ الـأـمـرـ بـالـلـيـبـنـ ، وـلـمـ يـعـلـمـ مـاـ يـؤـولـ إـلـيـهـ هـ . " وـالـشـرـطـ يـلـزـمـ مـنـ عـدـمـ الـشـرـوـطـ ، وـفـيـ الـمـوـاقـعـ لـعـضـ الدـيـنـ وـشـرـحـهـ لـلـسـيـدـ الـجـرجـانـيـ : " وـلـلـأـمـةـ خـلـعـ الـإـمـامـ وـعـزـلـهـ لـسـبـبـ يـوـجـبـهـ ، مـثـلـ أـنـ يـوـجـدـ مـنـهـ مـاـ يـوـجـبـ اـخـتـالـ أـحـوالـ الـمـسـلـمـينـ وـأـنـتـكـاسـ أـمـرـ الدـيـنـ " لـاـ سـيـماـ مـعـ خـلـعـهـ نـفـسـهـ كـمـاـ فـيـ كـتـابـهـ جـزـاءـ اللـهـ عـنـ الـمـسـلـمـينـ خـيـرـاـ وـمـنـحـهـ مـثـوبـةـ وـأـجـراـ . فـيـ الـمـقـاصـدـ وـشـرـحـهـ لـلـمـوـلـسـ سـعـدـ الدـيـنـ مـاـ نـصـهـ : " يـنـحـلـ عـنـ الـإـمـامـ بـمـاـ يـزـولـ بـهـ مـقـصـودـ الـإـمامـةـ كـصـيرـوـتـهـ أـسـيـرـاـ لـأـمـيرـ لـاـ يـرـجـىـ خـلاـصـهـ وـكـذـاـ مـرـضـ الـذـيـ يـنـسـيـهـ الـعـلـومـ وـكـذـاـ بـخـلـعـهـ نـفـسـهـ لـعـجزـهـ عـنـ الـقـيـامـ بـمـصـالـحـ الـمـسـلـمـينـ وـلـمـ لـمـ يـكـنـ ظـاهـرـاـ بـلـ اـسـتـشـعـرـهـ مـنـ نـفـسـهـ وـعـلـيـهـ مـحـمـلـ خـلـعـ الـحـسـنـ هـ . " وـقـالـ الـبـكـريـ : " لـاـ يـجـزـوـ خـلـعـ الـإـمـامـ بـلـ سـبـبـ وـالـسـبـبـ المـتـفـقـ عـلـيـهـ كـلـ مـاـ يـخـتـلـ بـهـ مـقـصـودـ الـإـمامـةـ ، وـلـمـ عـزـلـ نـفـسـهـ بـنـفـسـهـ فـلـمـ كـانـ لـعـجزـهـ عـنـ الـقـيـامـ بـالـأـمـرـ اـنـعـزلـ وـلـافـلاـ ؟ـ عـلـىـ أـنـ السـلـطـانـ إـذـاـ كـانـ قـادـرـاـ عـلـىـ التـنـفـيـذـ وـكـانـ بـعـرـ الـبـلـادـ لـاـ يـصـلـ إـلـيـهـ حـكـمـ وـاضـطـرـواـ إـلـىـ الـإـمـامـ يـدـبـرـ أـمـرـهـ فـنـقـلـ الـمـازـرـيـ عـنـ بـعـضـ الـأـصـولـيـينـ جـواـزـ نـصـبـ إـمـامـ يـقـومـ بـأـمـرـهـ ، وـقـالـ اـبـنـ عـرـفـةـ : " شـرـطـ اـتـخـاذـ الـإـمـامـ إـنـاـ هـوـ مـعـ الـإـمـانـ فـلـوـ بـعـدـ مـوـضـعـ الـإـمـامـ حـتـىـ لـاـ يـنـفـذـ حـكـمـهـ بـبـعـضـ الـأـقـطـارـ الـبـعـيـدةـ جـازـ نـصـبـ غـيـرـهـ بـذـلـكـ الـقـطـرـ هـ . " كـيفـ لـاـ وـالـنـاسـ بـقـواـ فـوـضـيـ وـنـزـلـ بـهـذـا الـمـغـرـبـ فـيـ دـيـنـ اللـهـ وـرـسـوـلـهـ مـاـلـاـ يـرـضـيـ ، وـقـدـ قـالـ الشـيـخـ زـرـوقـ فـيـ قـوـاعـدـهـ " قـاعـدـةـ حـفـظـ الـنـظـامـ وـاجـبـ وـمـرـاعـةـ الـمـصـالـحـ الـعـامـةـ لـازـمـ هـ . " فـيـجـبـ نـصـبـ إـمـامـ يـسـوسـ أـمـرـهـ وـيـسـدـ ثـغـورـهـ وـيـجـهزـ جـيـوشـهـ وـيـقـهرـ مـتـغلـبـهـ وـالـمـحـارـبـيـنـ وـالـمـتـلـصـصـيـنـ وـقـطـعـةـ الـطـرـيقـ لـاجـمـاعـ الصـحـابـةـ رـضـيـ اللـهـ عـنـهـ عـلـىـ ذـلـكـ وـبـيـادـ رـتـبـهـ إـلـيـهـ . وـقـدـ قـالـ أـبـوـيـكـرـ رـضـيـ اللـهـ عـنـهـ فـيـ خـطـبـتـهـ الـمـشـهـورـةـ أـنـ مـحـمـداـ

قد مات ولابد لهذا الأمر من يقوم به فبادر الجميع إلى تصديةه وقبول قوله ، ولم يخالف في ذلك أحد وتعجبهم على ذلك التابعون ، ومن بعد هم إلى هلم جرا . قال الجزوئي : " الإمامة الكبرى فرض كفاية فإن تواطئوا على تركها فهم عاصون لأن الإمامة ما تصلح به هذه الأمة هـ . " فإذا لم يقْسِ بها أحد حرج أي أُفِيسَ بتركه فريقان ، أحدهما أهل الحل والعقد ، والثاني كل من يصلح للإمامنة فقد . وقال ابن العربي : " لا يقاتل إلا مع إمام يقدمه أهل الحل والعقد لأنفسهم هـ . " وقال أبو الحسن الصفير : " لا يقاتـلـ الله عزـوجـلـ بـحقـ الـمـسـلـمـينـ إـلاـ بـالـجـتـمـاعـ وـالتـولـيـةـ عـلـىـ أـنـفـسـهـمـ وـيـقـعـ بـالـحـقـ هـ . " والله أعلم . وكتب عبد الله أبو بكر بن ادريس بن عبد الرحمن المنجرة الحسني غفر الله له .

- الحمد لله ، جميع ما سطر أعلاه جواباً وتصحيحاً صحيحٌ غنيًّا لو ضوحته لمزيد تصحيح ، إذ لاختفاء أن المقصود من الإمامة هو حماية بيضة الإسلام وحياة المسلمين والذب عن الخاص منهم والعام ، وإن عقد الإمامة ينحل بزوال المقصود منها الذي هو القدرة على تنفيذ الأحكام وحفظ التضليل وانتصار المظلوم من الظالم وتجهيز الجيوش كما قاله أمتنا رضوان الله عليهم والله أعلم . وكتب محمد العربي الهاشمي الزرهوني (تف مدحه الله برحمته) .

- الحمد لله ما أجاب به الأئمة أعلاه صحيح والله الموفق ، وبه كتب العباس ابن محمد بن كيران كان الله له لـه .

- الحمد لله ، ما قيد أعلاه جواباً وتصحيحاً كلـهـ صـحـيـحـ ،ـ وـفـقـهـ جـلـيـ صـرـيحـ لاـيـحـاجـ لـمـزـيدـ عـلـيـهـ ،ـ وـالـاسـتـدـلـالـ عـلـيـهـ يـشـبـهـ الـاسـتـدـلـالـ عـلـىـ النـهـارـ وـالـلـكـ أـعـلـمـ .ـ وـكـبـهـ عـبـدـ رـبـهـ تـعـلـىـ عـلـىـ التـسـوـلـيـ .ـ

- الحمد لله ، لاشك أن ما أوجبه الله تعالى على أهل الإسلام ، الإذعان والانقياد والاستسلام مع السمع والطاعة بقدر الجهد والاستطاعة للأمراء والملوك ومن تبع طريقة المسلوك مشروط بالقدرة على تنفيذ الأحكـام

الشرعية ورد المظالم إلى أهلها والذب عن (الحقوق) المرعية . والشرط
منتفي بانتفاء الشروط بل وغير ذلك من الشروط التي بانتفاءها ينتفهي
الشروط . وحيث رمى هذا الزمان بهذه رفع الأمان ، وتعيين على
أهل الحل والعقد والرد أن ينصبوا إماماً لشروط الكمال جاماً ، ولضرورة
الوسائل رافعاً ، وما نقله الأئمة مصابيح الأمة يجب عليه الاعتماد ورفع
بسبيبه العناد ، وذلك غني عن زيادة البيان ، وليس الخبر كالبيان .
قاله وكتبه محمد بن حمدون بن الحاج سلك الله به أتون الحاج .

- الحمد لله ، ما سطر أعلاه جواباً وتصحیحاً صحيحاً غنی عن المزید والتصحیح ،
وكتبه عبد ربه علي بن الصدیق التوزانی لطف الله به .

– الحمد لله ، ما سطر أعلاه يمتثله جواباً وتصححاً صحيحاً وله كتاب أحمد
بن محمد المتنبي لطف الله به .

– الحمد لله ما سطر أعلاه جواباً وتم حججاً صحيحاً ، وبه كتب محمد الشهير
بالسنوسي الحسني لطف الله به .

الحمد لله ، ما سطر أعلاه يلتصق ، جواباً وتصححاً صحيح غني عن التصحيح والله أعلم ، وكتب عبد ربه سبحانة محمد بن الطاهر العلوي الحسني لطف الله به «امين» .

– الحمد لله ، ما سطر أعلاه صحيح ، وكتب عبد ربه العباس بن أحمد بن سودة تسلواه الله .

- من المعلوم المقرر الذي هو كالشمس او اشهر ان ما سطره الائمة اعلامه كلـه في غاية الوضوح والله تعالى اعلم . وكتب عبد الله تعالى محمد بن الطالب بن سودة الله ولـيـه .

- الحمد لله ، ما سطر أعلاه صحيح . عبد الواحد بن أحمد بن سودة .

- الحمد لله ما افتتح به أعلاه ويسره أهل الإفادة متعمق وليس عليه من زيادة . وكتب عبد ربه تعالى أبو بكر بن زيـان الـادرـيـسي لـطفـالـلـهـبـه .

- الحمد لله ، ما سطـرـهـ الأـئـمـةـ أـعـلـاهـ مـاـ لـيـنـكـرـأـوـيـجـهـلـ حـلـاهـ ،
وـلـيـسـ يـصـحـ فـيـ الـأـذـهـانـ شـيـءـ * إـذـاـ اـحـتـاجـ النـهـارـ إـلـىـ دـلـيلـ
وـكـبـ عـبـدـ رـبـهـ تـعـالـىـ مـحـمـدـ التـهـامـيـ بـنـ الـحـمـادـيـ لـطـفـ اللـهـ بـهـ ؛ـأـمـيـنـ .

الحمد لله ، أعلم باستقلال الرسوم أعلاه بالملتصقين عبد ربه سبحانه وتعالى
محمد بن محمد بن عبد الرحمن الدلائـي لـطفـالـلـهـبـهـ ؛ـأـمـيـنـ . هـ .

Appendix 86 : Extracts from the bay'a proclaiming Mawlāy Ibrāhīm.

Date : 9 Ṣafar, 1236 / 16 Nov., 1820.

Source: Ms.Z.3772, R.L., unpaginated; reproduced in Dāwūd, Tārīkh Tiṭwān, III, pp.250-257.

"... وبايعه الجميع بيعة طلت في دائرة الاسعاد ، وكمل بها للمسلمين
المواسم والأعياد ، على السمع والطاعة ، بقدر الاستطاعة ، لما توفر فيه من الشروط
الشرعية ، والأحوال المرعية ، بقلوب عاقدة الاعتقاد ، خالصة من الاعتراض والانتقاد ،
مطابقة للسنة التي أعلنت بنصره ، وتشرفت بيته وذكره ، ملتزمة للعقود التي
احكتها الشريعة المطهرة ، والتوانين المعتبرة ، التزموها طوعا ، وأحکموها شرعا
وأعطوا على ذلك المواثيق التي لا يغتصب عقدها ، ولا يفل حدها ، وقبل أيديه الله
بيعتهم ، وأجاب دعوتهم ، والتزم أن يبذل الاجتهاد في صالح العباد ، فعليهم
أن يقتلونا أمره سرا وجهرا ، وأن يمحضوه النصيحة فعلا وذكرا ، وأن يقفوا عند
حد المحدود ، بالشرع المطاع ، الموافق لما عليه الكتاب والسنة والاجماع
وأن يقاتلوا دونه ما أقام الدين ، وأشاع شعار المهددين ، لاتأخذهم في ذلك
لومة لام ، ولا صولة قائم ، وعليه أعز الله أنصاره ، وأدام على الطغاة اقتداره
أن يرفع منارهم ، وأن يحمي ذمارهم ، وأن يعاملهم بالرفق في الأمور ، وأن يحملهم
على جادة الشرع المشهور ، وأن يسير فيهم بالسيرة المحمدة عاقبها ، الأمونة
منالبها ، وأن يسد ثغورهم ، ويحمي ظهورهم ، ولا يُهمل فيهم التمييز بين
الشرف والشرف ، على مقتضى الشرع والقانون المأثور ، وأن ينزل الناس
منازلهم ، لا يحررهم نائلهم ، وينحرهم الأرزاق والجبائيات ، على حسب المناصب
والكافيات ، وأن يختار العمال لفصل الشكایات ، وأن تراعي نفسه الزكي
المتطهرين بأحسن الرعایات ، وأن يرفع أقدار الشرفاء والعلماء ، وينحرهم ما
يستحقونه من التعظيم والاكتفاء ، وأن يقدم أهل الرأي والتسديد ، لحضور

مجلسه السعيد ، وأن لا يأنف من مشورة أهل العلم في الأمور بل يشاورهم في الإيriad والصدور ، وأن يرفع التواعد والأسوس برفق المغارم والمكوس ، وأن لا يحكم في المناصب الغرض والتغريب ، بل يجريها على حسب الاستحقاق والنصيب ، وأن يضرب صفا على يد من شهد العلماء ينبذ حكمه ، ووجوب الاعتراض عنه في حده ورسمه ، وأن يُرسل عنان الفتوى ، ويتجنب أهل الجهل والدعوى ، وأن لا يمكن العدو الكافر من سوق الوسق ، وأن يسوى بين الجيش والقبائل عند الحركة في الرزق ، وليجعل الأوامر والمناصب المخزنية ، في البيوت التي لها في خلافة مولانا اسماعيل أصدق ثبات ونية ، وأن لا يجعل أمـور المسلمين في أيدي التجار والمتربفين ، لأن ذلك سبب التدمير ، واستيـلاه الفساد والنـكير ، قال تعالى " وادأ أرـدنا أـن نـهـلـكـ قـرـيـةـ أـمـرـنـاـ مـتـرـفـيـهـ فـقـسـقـاـ فـيـهـاـ فـحـقـ عـلـيـهـ القـوـلـ فـدـمـنـاـهـاـ تـدـمـيرـاـ " ، وأن لا يعدل عن ظهر حـسـبـ ، وتنـاسـقـ نـسـبـهـ لـأـنـ ذـلـكـ أـبـقـ لـلـمـنـاصـبـ ، وـأـشـعـ لـهـ مـنـ الـمـصـائـبـ ، كـتـبـ عمرـ بنـ عبدـ العـزـيزـ إـلـىـ الـحـسـنـ الـبـصـرـيـ أـنـ أـشـرـ عـلـيـ بـأـقـوـامـ أـوـلـيـهـ ، فـكـتـبـ إـلـيـهـ ، أـمـاـ أـهـلـ الـخـيـرـ فـلـاـ يـرـيدـونـكـ ، وـأـهـلـ الشـرـلـاتـرـيـدـهـمـ ، فـعـلـيـكـ بـذـوـيـ الـأـحـسـابـ ، فـانـهـمـ لـاـ يـدـنـسـونـ أـحـسـابـهـمـ بـالـخـيـانـاتـ ، وـعـلـىـ الـجـمـيعـ بـالـتـقـوـىـ ، وـمـرـاقـبـةـ الـلـهـ فـيـ السـرـ وـالـنـجـوـىـ ، فـانـهـاـ الـمـقصـودـةـ مـنـ الـخـلـقـ الـذـيـ كـرـمـهـ اللـهـ تـكـرـيـماـ ، وـزـادـهـ بـالـخـلـافـةـ الـبـنـيـةـ عـلـىـ أـرـكـانـهـاـ تـعـظـيـمـاـ . . . " .

Appendix 87 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès following their repudiation of his bay'a.

Date : not mentioned (1820-1821)

Source: Al-‘Arbī al-Mashrafī, al-Husām, Mic. 1207, BGR, pp. 485-487.

الحمد لله،

كافأة أهل فاس سلام عليكم ورحمة الله تعالى وبركاته ۹

وبعد فأنشدكم الله بسم استحللت نقض بيعتنا أو الجرءة على طاعتنا التي أوجبها الله عليكم بالكتاب والسنّة والاجماع، قال تعالى : "يَا يَاهَا الَّذِينَ آتَيْنَا أُطْعِمُوا اللَّهُ . . . " وقال (ص) "اَسْمَعُوا وَأَطِيعُوا وَانْ وَلِي عَلَيْكُمْ عَبْدُ حَبْشَيْ رَأْسَ زَيْبَةَ" ، وقال "كُلُّ أَنْتِي يَدْخُلُونَ الْجَنَّةَ إِلَّا مِنْ أَبْنَى ، قَالُوا يَا رَسُولَ اللَّهِ وَمَنْ يَأْبَى ؟ قَالَ مَنْ أَطَاعَنِي دَخَلَ الْجَنَّةَ وَمَنْ عَصَانِي فَقَدْ أَبْنَى ، وَمَنْ أَطَاعَ أَمْرِي فَقَدْ أَطَاعَنِي وَمَنْ عَصَ أَمْرِي فَقَدْ عَصَانِي" ، وقال "مَنْ فَارَقَ الْجَمَاعَةَ قَيْدَ شَبَرْ مَاتَ مِيتَةً جَاهِلِيَّةً" ، وقال "مَنْ أَهَانَ الْخَلَافَةَ وَاسْتَدَلَّ الْإِسْمَارَةَ لَقِيَ اللَّهَ وَلَا وَجَهَ لَهُ عِنْدَهُ" ، وقال "ثَلَاثَةٌ لَا يَنْظُرُ اللَّهُ إِلَيْهِمْ وَلَا يَزَّكِيهِمْ وَلَهُمْ عَذَابٌ أَلِيمٌ" : رجل بايع سلطانا على أن يعطيه شيئا فان أعطى وفي له بيعته وإلا نقضها" ، وقد بايعتُونا بيعة شرعية وأعطيتم عليها صفة أيمانكم. قال تعالى "وَأَوْفُوا بِالْعَهْدِ إِنَّ الْعَهْدَ كَانَ مَسْؤُلًا" ، وقال "وَالْمَوْفُونَ بِعَهْدِهِمْ إِذَا عَاهَدُوا" . وأما من جهة الشرع فلا سبيل الى ذلك لأن الله تعالى أحل ما أحل وحرم ما حرّم وكتاب الله بين أظهرنا وسنة نبيه قائمة بيننا ، وفي مختصر خليل : "الباغية... ، وأما من جهة الكبriاء والفلوطة والمعظمة فإن الله غالب على أمره . وفي الحديث القديسي : "الكبriاء ردامي والمعظمة إزاربي ، فمن نازعني فيها قصمنته" . فارجعوا على أنفسكم فقد خلل لكم الشيطان وسُول لكم وألق لكم ، وغرّكم الامهال ، والظلم يمهل ولا يهمل ، وفي الحديث "مَنْ اللَّهُ يُمْهِلُ عَلَى الظَّالِمِ حَتَّى يَأْخُذَهُ ، فَإِذَا أَخْذَهُ لَمْ يُفْلِتَهُ" . وكان الأنسب لكم لو كانت لكم أعلم

وبصائر أَن تعلموا أَن الْأَمْرُ لِهَا أَوْآخِرُ كَمَا لَهَا أَوَّلُ وَتَذَكَّرُوا مَا
أَسْدِينَا لَكُمْ نَحْنُ وَأَسْلَافُنَا مِنْ جَزِيلِ الْإِحْسَانِ وَعَظِيمِ الْامْتَانِ وَشَتَّانِ
مَا بَيْنَ مِنْ سَبْقَتِهِ السَّعَادَةُ الْعَظِيمُ وَمِنْ كِتَابِ اللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ الشَّقَاءُ حَتَّى
وَمَنْ كَانَ فِي هَذِهِ أَعْمَسٌ فَهُوَ فِي الْآخِرَةِ أَعْمَسٌ، فَقَدْ أَعْلَمْتُ بِالشَّقَاءِ
وَتَبَرَّزَتِ لِسُونَ الْأَخْلَاقِ، وَأَسْتَوْى فِي ذَلِكَ كَبِيرُكُمْ وَصَفِيرُكُمْ وَأَمِيرُكُمْ
وَمَامُورُكُمْ، وَظَنَنتُمْ أَنْ بِيَدِكُمْ زِمامُ الْأَقْدَارِ وَلَكُمْ عَلَى مَا شَتَّمِ الْقَدْرَةُ
وَالْأَقْدَارُ. كَلَّا، لَقَدْ أَخْطَاطَ بِمَرَادِكُمُ الْفَائِلُ، وَمَا تَتَمَضَّبُونَ بِهِ فَانِه
طَائِلٌ زَائِلٌ، أَرْشَدَنَاكُمْ وَحَذَرَنَاكُمْ وَبِسْطَوَةِ اللَّهِ وَقَهْرِيَّتِهِ خَوْفَنَاكُمْ
”أَنَّمَا تَوَعَّدُونَ . . . الْآيَةُ“، ”وَمَا أَنْتُمْ بِمَعْجَزِينَ فَلِيَحْذِرُ الَّذِينَ
يَخَالُفُونَ عَنْ أَمْرِهِ أَنْ تُصَيِّبُوهُمْ فَتْنَةً أَوْ يُصَيِّبُوهُمْ عَذَابًا أَلِيمًا“ . . . وَقَدْ
كَبَّنَا إِلَيْكُمْ كُمْ مِنْ كِتَابٍ فَلَمْ يَظْهُرْ لَنَا مِنْ قَبْلِكُمْ جَوَابٌ، فَلَمْ نَتَدَرَّجْ أَيْقَعْ
ذَلِكَ بِيَدِ شَيَاطِينِكُمْ وَيَكْتُمُونَهُ عَنْكُمْ أَمْ تَسْمَعُونَهُ ثُمَّ تَبْذُونَهُ وَرَاهُ ظَهُورُكُمْ
عِنَادًا وَاسْتَكْبَارًا . . . وَالآنَ إِنْ أَرَدْتُمُ السَّلَامَ لِنَفْوَسِكُمْ فَاقْطُعُوهُمْ عَنْ
غَيْكُمْ وَارْجِعُوهُمْ عَنْ بَغْيِكُمْ فَإِنَّ التَّوْبَةَ تَمْحِيُ مَا قَبْلَهَا، وَالتَّائِبُ مِنْ
كُمْ لَا ذَنْبٌ لَهُ، ”وَإِنَّ اللَّهَ تَعَالَى لِيُفْرِحَ بِتَوْبَةِ الْعَبْدِ الْمُاصِيِّ . . .
الْحَدِيثُ“، وَالْأَنْ فَأَنْتُمْ مِنْ عَقَابِ اللَّهِ بِمَدْرَجَةِ حِيلَةٍ وَدَرَكَ لِيَلَةٍ . اللَّهُمَّ
إِنَّا بِلُغْنَا الْمَجْهُودِ وَالسَّلامُ .

Appendix 88 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the sharīf-s of Fès during the Fès rebellion.

Date : not mentioned (1821)

Source: Al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-nubahā?, Ms.K.241, BGR, pp.181-185.

”الحمد لله ، إلى كافة أبناء عتنا من الأشراف العلويين والأدارسة الحسينيين والعرقيين والطاهريين الصقليين والمسفريين الحسينيين وعامة أهل فاس ، سلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته وبعد ، فإنني كتبت والله أعلم - محسناً إليكم منذ قلدين الله أمركم ، وأسير فيكم بسيرة العدل والعفاف ، ولا أعاملكم بالجور وعدم الإنصاف وأسقطت عنكم ما كان وظفه عليكم أخونا اليزيد من الخمسة رامياً مع ما كان عليكم من وظيف المكس وأسقطت عن تجاركم ما كانوا يعطون في المراسي من العُشر ، وجعلناه زكاة شرعية رب العشر ، وما يأتوا به في البر وهبنا عشره على الأشراف ، وكتت إواسي ضعفاً كـ ويتاماكم وطلبتكم من بيت المال زيادة على مارتبنا لهم من الوقف الكبير ومن المارستان وكتت أحبيكم ووائلاً لكم ، ومعتمداً على اصطنانكم حتى جعلت أولادي في وسطكم ركونا إليكم ليكونوا بعدها في أمن وأمان ، وتراعوا لهم ما أسلافنا إليكم من الإحسان . وأقل يكونون من جملة أشرافكم موقرين محترمين وإن رماهم أحد من يأتي بعدها بمكره شدأفعون عنهم بل تقاتلون عليهم وتحموهم لأنهم بين أظهركم وفي جواركم فما شعرنا حتى سمعنا أن دارنا تنهب ومن فيها يسلب ، ومن ينسب إلينا بين محبوس وشريد ، ولم تكتفوا بذلك إلى أن جعلتم ولدنا على في الحديد ، ورميتم ديارنا بالبنبـ والكور ، ولم تخشوا عاقبة الأمور ، وأنكرتم الصنيع وسويستم بين الرفيق والوضيع ، ولو لا الثقة بكم والميل إليكم ما أنت عندكم المدافع والمهارز التي أعددتها لأعدائكم فصرتم ترمون داري بها ، فمارأيـت أصفق من وجوهكم . فأناشدكم الله ما نقتضوه منا حتى فعلتم فعلتكم التي

خلعتم بها رقة الإسلام وحللت بمعتنا التي لا يجوز حلها ولا يقول به أحد من العاملين الأعلام واعتمدت على سُفهائكم المستدعين المضلعين وخدعوك بالزور والبهتان وصرت خلفهم مدللين . فأين عقلاكم وذروا أسناتكم وكبراً بيتوتكم الذين حنكتم التجارب ويختبئون عاقب الأمور ويختافون الوقوع في السحر، وروشادوا ما حل بالمخالفين المعاندين المحاربين بين الويل والثبور ، وإن ماتوا فقد سمع أولادهم ما حل بهم من سالف الدهور . فأين الحكيم والعسرى والخطيب وسامي ، وأين الحارثي وابن عمير وشاذان ، والشاوى ، وأين الفردوس والجزولي وعنون ، والفرناتي والمنج والمنقاد وأهل زرهون ؟ وأين قدماء الأشراف الإدريسيين والعرaciين الذين حضروا الواقع وشاهدوا رمي المهاز والمدافع؟ وإن أعن الله أبصاركم وبصائركم وفعلتم فعلتكم وجنتكم جناتكم ، فما موجب رمي البسب على النساء ونهب الديار وقبض ولدنا وتضييع الجوار ؟ وإن زعتم أنه حمل لكم منه ضرر أو رماكم بشريراً فأخرجوه على الباب يذهب لدار أبيه ، على أنه عاقل نبيه ، ولا تقولوا أن ابن عمّه هو الذي قبضه ونهب الدور فلولاكم ما قبض ولا سجن ولا نهب بل هو معذور ، ولو كان فيكم الخير ولم تتركوا الصنيع ودافعتم عنه الوضيع والرعن وضعنتموه كما يضع من الثدي الرضيع ، كيف وقد منتم الفاسق المارق الثاني الوضيع وأزلتموه من يد خُداً مما في الله من صُنع بشيع ! وحتى الآن هذا كابنـا ينطق عليكم بالحق ، فيوافيكم بالنصيحة والصدق إن لم تسرعوا ولدنا لسداره أو لدار والده بفاس الجديد وتزيلوا عنه ما عليه من الحديد ، وإن تجعلوا خطابنا لكم عيناً ، أو تحددوا به حدناً فقد تسببت في خراب بلادكم وقتل رجالكم وسي أولادكم وبناتكم ونسائهم ، وحملهم في المنشآت الجوار لبلاد الترك يُباعون كما يباع بنـي الكفار . وما كتبت لكم هذا إلا إعذاراً وإنذاراً لمن معكم من الغرباء والمستضعفـين ليخرجوا من هذه الدار ليلاً يعتمرـون البواره فقد أفتى علماء المغرب العاملون والأخيار منهم الصالحـون ، لا كفتوى سُفهائكم المضلون بلياحة دمائكم وأموالكم لخروجكم على مأامـكم وشقـكم عصـى المسلمين لعمـياتكم ، فحمدـنا الله على ما صرتم إليه من الذل والهـوان وتضييع الأموال والأبدان وعدتم رعاياـ البريرـ الأجلـافـ يـعاملـونـكمـ بـقلـةـ الإنـصـافـ بعدـ معـاملـتـناـ لكمـ والـحـمدـ للـلهـ بـالـعـدـلـ وـالـعـفـافـ وـلـمـ يـكـفـكمـ مـالـ الدـوـلـةـ الذيـ نـهـيـتـ وـلـمـ الـوقـفـ الذـيـ أـتـلـفـتـ وـلـاـ مـالـ الـأـيـتـامـ الذـيـ ضـيـعـتـ وـلـاـ مـالـ

التجار الذي أسلفتم ، وقد بذرتم في هذه المدة القليلة أزيد من الألفين
 قنطرة على السفهاء ، والبرير والغجار ، فكيف لا تحبون من يوافئكم على الظلم والغصب
 وتقاسمونه مال الشهباء ، ولابد أن يجازيكم الله على الإساءة للجار ويرسل عليكم
 شواطئ من نار ومواعق مدبرة تخرب عليكم الديار وتسرع بكم إلى دار
 الخزي والبوار ، فإن سرحتم ولدنا رجونا أن ينقذكم الله من هذه البلوى
 ويعفو عنكم فلن العفو أقرب للتفوى ، ” وإن الله لا يغير ما بقوم حتى يغيروا
 ما بأنفسهم ” والسلام .

Appendix 89 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the sharīf-s of Fes.

Date : not mentioned (1821)

Source: al-Zayānī, Tuhfat al-nubahā, K. 241, BGR, pp. 185-188.

الحمد لله وحده

فيه اصطناع ولا إحسان ولا بد أن يلحق بأصحابه فلن الله لا يهم أمره
 فأخبروني أين علاوكم وأين بيوتكم ؟ أليس منكم رجل رشيد يرشدكم
 لما فيه صلاح دينكم ودنياكم وبيوتكم من سنة الفنلة ويدركم عاقب الأمور،
 فأين الحارثي والفردوس وشاذان وابن عمير والجزولي وأمثالهم ؟ فلو كان
 فيكم خير ما قبض ولدنا في وسطكم وفي جواركم ، ولا نهبت دار ولدنا ابراهيم
 رحمة الله في جواركم وبين أظهركم ، ولا تقولوا إن ابن عمته نهب أو قبض ،
 بل تجرأتم لما في ذلك لكم من الغرر ، فلو كانت لكم همة عالية أو نفس
 أبية لقاتلتم دونه وإنكم أكثر منهم رجالاً وسلاحاً وجندنا معكم . وحيث
 وافتتحوهم وطروا بأرجلهم على رقابكم وجروه من وسطكم . وعلى فرض أنه
 لحقكم منه ما تكرهون أخرجوه على الباب ليتوجه لدار أبيه . فانظروا ما
 فعله ابن عبد الرزاق في قضية الثاني فلمنه ليس بابن سلطان ولا ذي وجاهة
 بعد أن قبضه خداناً أزاله لهم وأجاره ولم يبال بأحد لاعتماده على المفسدين
 الذين وراءه لأن الأندلسين مُفرغون في قالب واحد وما فيهم إلا رجال عاقلان
 مفهوران مغلوبان ، وأنتم فيكم فاسد واحد غلبكم وقادكم بلا رسن إلس ان
 يوقعكم فيما تكرهون . ولا تقولوا أني كتبت لكم هذا عن ضعف أو وهن أو أعجز في
 جمعكم وجلدهم مع الجواليت الخواج وتعززكم بهم . إنما قدمت لكم هذه
 إنذاراً وإنذاراً خوفاً من الواقع في المحذور حتى لا يبقى على ملام منكم
 ولا من الأشراف والضعفاء والأيتام والأيام ، فإن رجعتم إلى الطريقة
 المثلى فقد تجملتم على رو وسمك وعلى من معكم من المستخففين ، وتخرجوا
 ولدنا على من السجن لداره أو تخرجوه على الباب لدار والده ، وإن بقيتكم
 على عيالكم فلن الله ياخذكم أخذوا وبيلا ، لأن الرحمة تخص والنعمة
 تعم ، " وإن الله يغير ما يشاء حتى يغيروا ما بأنفسهم " . فقد كتمت في
 راحة ونعمة شاملة فلم تؤدوا شكرها وكرفوها فأزالها الله عنكم وإلى الآن لم
 تبلغ منهاها . لو كتمت تعتبرون لعرفتم ما أنتم فيه من الذل والهوان ونهب
 الأموال والكساد وإمارة الأوغاد وغلاء الأسعار واستطالة الجار زادكم الله
 صغاراً على صغار وأخلي منكم هذه الدار ، فعن قريب إن شاء الله يرسل
 عليكم شواطئ من نار ، وصواعق مدمرة تخرب عليكم الديار حتى لا يبقى لها
 إشار إزلا تصلحون لا على الجور من وص في الأخبار ، فالجزء من جنس العمل
 إن شاء الله والعقول فعلم أقرب للقوى والسلام .

Appendix 90 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to the people of Fès contradicting the Fāsi merchants' decision to prevent Jewish shoemakers from selling their produce in the markets of Old Fès.

Date : not mentioned .

Source: al-Zayānī, Alfiyat al-sulūk, Ms.K.224, BGR, p. 210.

السلام عليكم ورحمة الله ،

من المعلوم أن رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم قبضه الله وذرعه مرهونة عند يهودي في سوق المدينة في طعام ، وعمر رضي الله عنه قبض منهم العشر في سوقها وكل مصر فتح فأهل ذمته هم أهل صناعته ولازال ذلك إلى الآن بصر الشام وال العراق وخراسان ولاد الترك كلها ، فكيف يمنع أهل الذمة من بيع السبات في أسواق المسلمين ، أو يمنعون من صنعه للخش ودفع ضرر عام ، وإنما قصده جلب ضرر عام وهو غلاء السبات وجلب نفعه ليبنيع هو كيف شاء بما شاء . على أن الفش اليوم صار عادة المسلمين في الصنائع كلها أخرى اليهود ولا يمكن التحذير منه في زتنا بل هو مدخل عليه ، فلا يمنعون إلا إذا منع الشارع فيما لم أطلع عليه من كلام الأئمة ، وإن كان عندكم نعر بالمنع من غير كلام أهل السبات وجهوه لنا والسلام .

Appendix 91 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to al-Salāwī fixing import duties for Moroccan Muslim merchants.

Date : not mentioned.

Source : al-Zayānī, Alfiyat al-sulūk, Ms. K 224, B.G.R., p. 209.

كاتبنا السيد محمد الملاوي، سلام عليك ورحمة الله وبركاته،

وبعد، فما ذكرت من قبض العُشر من التجار الواردِين من المشرق
فلا نقبض منهم إلا ربع العُشر الذي هو زكاة أموالهم المشروع،
ونص عليه العلماء وقررَه أئمَّة المذهب في غير ما موضع
وعليه عملَك في المراسيم كلها، فان تبيَّنَتْ أغراض الناس وقمنا
في المحذور، لأن التجارة في أرض الحرب حرام سيما في هذا
الزمن الذي قُلَّتْ فيه الأمانة في أهلها ولا يميزون بين الحلال
والحرام، ويتجهُون لأرض الحرب ويتعاملون معاملة الكُفار
وهي حرام، ويأتُون بأموال الكُفار وهي حرام، حتى صارت أموالهم
كلها سحت وما يقبض منها سحت فلا تدنسها بقبض العُشر،
ولا تقبض إلا ربعها المشروع، وإن كان على غير وجهه، ولو
كفوا لكيفنا، ولو اكتفوا بالتجارة في بلاد المسلمين
كمصر والشام والججاز وببلاد الترك لكيفنا عن قبض
الجميع والسلام.

Appendix 92 : Letter from Mawlāy Sulaymān to one of his qā'ids (al-Ghāzī) concerning the maintenance of Makhzenian prisons.

Date : not mentioned.

Source: Ms. K.1264, BGR, pp.357-358; al-Mashrafī, al-Husām, Mic.1207, BGR, pp. 362-464.

"محبنا الفقيه السيد الغازى أمانك الله وسلام عليك ورحمة الله .
وبعد فلا يقلقك مناتردد النصح والإفصاح عن خبايا النغير الأمارة بالسوء ،
فما ذلك إلا لمحبتنا فيك وما أهمتناك كفيرك ، ولو نظرت ما بلفتنا قضيّة إلا
عادت عليك بالمنفعة العامة فيها وفي غيرها ، وإذا رفعنا إليك أمرًا فلا تبحث
عن قائله ، ولكن ابحث فيه فإن كان كذلك فإنه يذهب جفا ، أو حقا فاحمد الله
لأنني لست بسلطان تخشى بادرة سوء حتى يخرج من القول إليه . وإنما
عندنا صدر يقبل الحق والذنب ، ولا أنتقم ولو للحق إلا أن يحكم الله ، وهو أنسا
أمثل لك ذلك بمسئلة وتأملها وانظر إيلاغها إلينا خير لك لما نشأ عنها من
النصح أم كونها طويت عنها . هب أنه بلغنا فرار بنى زمور من السجن فإننا نعلم
أن الأمر لله وقد فسر المساجين من سجن كسرى وقيصر والحجاج ، وسجون
مولانا اسماعيل والدنا رحمة الله من عند العجيدى ، ومن هو أعظم منه حزماً ،
والأمر لله ، ولو قدر شيء لكان ثم أعطف عليك فأنبئك من حيث لا تدرى ولا تشعر
فأقول : أعلم أنك ذو خلافة كبيرة وذو لمرة متعدة يجب عليك أن يكون لسك
سجن متسع من مائتي شبر تربيعه من ناحية السقف ومن ناحية بيوت متعددة ،
ومن ناحية ميظات وبشر ، وفي ناحية أخرى مسجد وبشر وإمام راتب ، وعند ذلك
من تخلف عن الملاة ضرب إذ لا ذنب مسجون منه أحد أعظم من تركه ،
كيف لا نامره ولأنه ولعليها يقتل كفراً تاركها ، وانظر إلى سجنك حين قام بأمر
الله كم قبضنا فيه من المال على يدك ، فكيف لا نصيّر فيه عشرة آلاف وعشرين
نفدي بها رقابنا من النار ، وكيف لا ينجيهم الله من النار ويجعل لهم مخرجاً

وَرْجَأً ، وَلَمْ يَمْفُ ، لَنَا أَحَد سِجْنَاهُ ، لَكِنْ هَذَا سِجْنُ الْعِمَالِ كُلُّهُمْ فَأَنْسَتَ
أَشْفَقَنَا عَلَيْهَا ، مِنْ دُونِهِمْ ، فَإِنْ قُلْتَ فِي جُوَابِكَ كُلُّ الْعِمَالِ هَكُذا ، فَأَقُولُ لَكَ
وَمَا ضَرَكَ إِنْ أَحْسَنْتَ لِنَفْسِكَ وَأَسَاءَ لِغَيْرِكَ ؟ أَيْنَقْصُ غَيْرِكَ مِنْ عَذَابِكَ وَهُلْ فِي
الْمَعَاصِي قَالَ اللَّهُ " وَفِي ذَلِكَ فَلِيَتَافِسِ الْمُتَنَافِسُونَ " ؟ لَا بُلْ فِي جَوَارِ اللَّهِ
فِي أَعْلَى عَلَيْنَا ، أَيْ فِي أَفْعَالِ الْبَرِّ . فَمَا لَنَا وَلِلتَّنَافِسِ فِي الْهَلَالِكَ ؟ فَإِنْ قُلْتَ
مِنْ مَا تَمَاتَ فَقَدْ بَلَغَ أَجْلَهُ فَأَقُولُ لَكَ إِنْ أَتَاكَ رَجُلٌ وَقَالَ لَكَ إِنْ هَذَا الرَّجُلُ قَتَلَ أَخِي
مَا تَقُولُ لَهُ ؟ فَإِنْ قُلْتَ بَلَغَ أَجْلَهُ تَخْرُجُ عَنِ الْإِسْلَامِ ، وَتُكَذِّبُ بِالْقُرْآنِ ، وَفِيهِ
" دَلَكُمْ فِي الْقَمَاصِ حَيَاةٌ يَا أَوْلَى الْأَلْبَابِ " وَحَدِيثُ عَنِ النَّبِيِّ (ص) " الْمَسْرَةُ
مَقْتُولٌ بِمَا قُتِلَ بِهِ " كَمَا أَنْ ذَلِكَ الرَّجُلُ قُتِلَ بِسَيِّفِهِ قُتِلَتْ أَنْتَ بِسِجْنِكَ وَغَمِّكَ . أَمَا
تَحْذِيرُ أَنْ يَقْتُلَكَ اللَّهُ مِثْلَهَا ، وَكَتَتْ أَخْبَرْتَنَا بِلِسَانِكَ أَنْ طَائِفَةً مِنْ أَهْلِ نَادِلَا
مَاتُوا بِسِجْنِكَ . أَنْشَدَكَ اللَّهُ هَلْ تَحْقِقْتَ أَنْ بَعْضُهُمْ أَوْ جَلَّهُمْ مَاتَ مِنْ غَمِّ السِّجْنِ
وَعَدْمِ الْاعْتِسَامِ بِهِ ؟ وَإِذَا كَانَ كَذَلِكَ فَلَمْ تَنْظُرْ لَنَا وَلَا لِنَفْسِكَ ؟ اللَّهُ مَا هَذَا !
وَقَنْتَا اللَّهُ لِمَرْضَاتِهِ أَمْسِينَ .