

# CIS 447/544: Computer and Network Security

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# Law and Ethics

- Don't be evil
  - Respect privacy and property of others
  - Violations in code of conduct will result in **failure of the course**
- Respect the law (federal/state)
  - Computer intrusion and wiretapping are illegal
  - You can go to jail
- Respect university policies
  - Do not tamper with campus systems
  - You can be expelled
- Ask TA or instructor when in doubt

# Introduction

# What is Security

- Normal users care about program correctness
  - Workaround buggy software
  - Never see all bugs
- Adversaries seek out undesirable behavior
  - Your adversary is not a typical user
  - Exercise corner cases to produce undesirable behavior
- Security is about achieving some goal in the presence of an adversary
  - Prevent undesirable behavior in a program

# The Security Problem


# Buggy Software

- Released software contains a lot of defects
  - Agile development is inherently a buggy process (feature = bug)
  - Time to market creates aggressive schedules
  - Some bugs too expensive to fix (bad design choices early on in project)
- Developers and validation engineers are not normal users
  - Rely on lab modes to gain full access to system details
  - Normal users don't use the system this way
  - Leaves lots of corner cases to be exploited


# Social Engineering

- Social engineering is effective
  - Trick people into breaking standard security practices
    - Baiting
      - malware infected device (USB drive) user will find and install
    - Phishing
      - fraudulent communications (email, impersonating trusted source) to steal personal, financial, or business information
    - Tailgating
      - Unauthorized individual follows authorized users into restricted and secure locations where they can launch attack


# How Companies Lose Data




# Types of Data Stolen



# Distribution of Attacks Across the World




≈ 300,000 users/month worldwide



A worldwide problem

# Cost of Not Fixing Vulnerabilities



# Marketplace for Vulnerabilities

- Marketplace for finding and exploiting vulnerabilities
  - bug bounty programs
    - Google Vulnerability Reward Program: up to \$31,337
    - Microsoft Bounty Program: up to \$100K
    - Apple Bug Bounty program: up to \$200K (secure boot firmware)
    - Pwn2Own competition: \$15K
- Zero day initiative (ZDI), iDefense (accenture): up to \$25K
- Zerodium: \$1.5M for iOS10, \$200K for Android 7 (Sep. 2016)

# Vulnerability Disclosures

	Product Name	Vendor Name	Product Type	Number of Vulnerabilities
1	<a href="#">Mac Os X</a>	<a href="#">Apple</a>	OS	<a href="#">385</a>
2	<a href="#">Iphone Os</a>	<a href="#">Apple</a>	OS	<a href="#">376</a>
3	<a href="#">Flash Player</a>	<a href="#">Adobe</a>	Application	<a href="#">313</a>
4	<a href="#">Air Sdk</a>	<a href="#">Adobe</a>	Application	<a href="#">246</a>
5	<a href="#">AIR</a>	<a href="#">Adobe</a>	Application	<a href="#">246</a>
6	<a href="#">Air Sdk &amp; Compiler</a>	<a href="#">Adobe</a>	Application	<a href="#">246</a>
7	<a href="#">Internet Explorer</a>	<a href="#">Microsoft</a>	Application	<a href="#">231</a>
8	<a href="#">Chrome</a>	<a href="#">Google</a>	Application	<a href="#">187</a>
9	<a href="#">Firefox</a>	<a href="#">Mozilla</a>	Application	<a href="#">178</a>
10	<a href="#">Windows Server 2012</a>	<a href="#">Microsoft</a>	OS	<a href="#">155</a>
11	<a href="#">Ubuntu Linux</a>	<a href="#">Canonical</a>	OS	<a href="#">152</a>
12	<a href="#">Windows 8.1</a>	<a href="#">Microsoft</a>	OS	<a href="#">151</a>

# How to Think about Security

# Components of Security

- Policy: the goal you want to achieve, e.g. only Alice should read file F
  - Confidentiality: info users wish to hide must not be revealed, e.g. corporate secrets
  - Integrity: Information or functionality must not be modified, e.g. disallow deleting files or changing data in flight
  - Availability: System must remain available at all time, e.g. site must withstand denial of service attacks

# Components of Security

- Threat model: assumptions about what adversary would do
  - e.g. assume adversary can guess passwords
  - Be conservative with assumptions
- Mechanism: knobs your system provides to enforce the policy, e.g. user accounts, passwords, access controls, encryption, etc.
- End goal: adversary must not be able to compromise the policy while within the threat model

# Case Studies

# Issues with Policies

- Account recovery questions are widely used for resetting passwords
  - List of questions that only account owner knows
  - Email link to reset password
  - What if dealing with email provider?
- Yahoo weakened the policy by providing a path to accessing the account through questions
- Some adversary guessed Sarah Palin's high school, birthday, etc.
  - All info was on wikipedia

The logo for Yahoo!, featuring the word "YAHOO!" in its signature blue and purple gradient font.

# Issues with Policies

- Interaction between multiple accounts (Amazon, Apple, Google, etc.)
- All accounts had strong policies individually
  - Weakness when combined together
- Digital life of Mat Honan from [wired.com](#) dissolved within an hour
  - Google account taken over then deleted
  - Twitter account compromised and used as platform for broadcasting info
  - AppleID broken into (erased data on iPhone, iPad, and MacBook)





Mat Honan

# Issues with Policies




# Issues with Policies




How to get last 4 CC?

# Issues with Policies



# Issues with Policies




# Issues with Threat Model

- Issues with threat model sometimes involves computational assumptions changing over time
- MIT's Kerberos system used 56-bit DES keys
  - In 1980's adversary couldn't check all  $2^{56}$  keys
  - Student project at MIT showed that key could be obtained in a day
- DARPA wanted to build secure operating system
  - Got red team to break into the OS
  - The OS was secure, however source code of OS was stored on machine kept in someone's office
  - Red team broke into the server and inserted backdoor
  - OS was compromised when developers built a new OS



# Issues with Mechanism

- Most issues tend to be with mechanism due to complicated software, hardware, and different system-level interactions
- Apple iCloud provides many services including storage, locating device, etc



# Issues with Mechanism

- Human passwords are relatively easy to crack using GPUs ( <1day)
- Mechanism should only allow limited number of incorrect attempts and implement some exponential backoff
- Find iPhone interface forgot a check on the number of incorrect login attempts allowing adversary to make unlimited guesses of password
- Many accounts were compromised as a result

# Other Case Studies

# Stuxnet

- First worm known to attack supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems that control wide range of machinery
  - Cyberweapon used to target Iran's centrifuges at nuclear facilities
- Typically spread via USB flash drive
  - Installs kernel mode rootkits using digitally signed certificates stolen from Realtek and Jmicron
- Worm then propagates itself across a private network and scans for Siemens Step 7 software (used for programming PLCs)




Centrifuge

# Stuxnet


- Once software is connected to PLC device, Stuxnet infects the PLC
- Malicious code injected into PLC ramps up and down the velocity of centrifuges (used for uranium enrichment) in an attempt to destroy them
  - Maintaining rotor speed of centrifuges is critical
  - Stuxnet had the ability to report false feedback to the monitoring system
- 984 centrifuges were destroyed during this process

# Heartbleed


- SSL/TLS was extended to implement a heartbeat
- Heartbeat used to test and keep alive a secure communication link without the need to renegotiate the connection every time
- Bug allowed attacker to send a maliciously crafted packet that would prompt the server to return more data (buffer over-read)
- Server blindly copied memory (up to 64KB) according to the payload size specified by the user which typically contains usernames, passwords, and keys




# Heartbleed



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

# WannaCry

- Ransomware attack that targets systems running the Windows operating system, encrypts data files, and demands \$300 in bitcoins within 3 days (or \$600 in 7 days)
- Ransomware affected more than 230K systems across the world including the UK's National Health Service (NHS) prompting them to run services on an emergency-only basis
- Propagates itself using EternalBlue, a Windows exploit associated with Server Message Block (SMB) which is used for file and printer sharing
  - Attackers could send a crafted packet to allow code execution on target




# WannaCry

Client



S\_pub


Server



S\_priv

# WannaCry


Client




Server



# WannaCry




# WannaCry



Encrypt AES key with asymmetric client's public key

$C_{\text{pub}}\{K_{\text{AES}}\}$

# WannaCry



Encrypt client's private key with server's public key and send to server

$$S_{\text{pub}}\{C_{\text{priv}}\}$$