

Bonus Question:
How Does Incentive Pay Affect Wage Rigidity?

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Motivation

- ▶ **Wage rigidity** is central to macro and labor (Keynes 1936)
 - ▶ Wage rigidity = sluggishly adjusting or fixed wages
 - ▶ Affects unemployment dynamics (Hall 2005, Gertler & Trigari 2009)
 - ▶ Affects inflation dynamics (Christiano et al 2005, 2016)

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- ▶ Recent evidence: estimates of wage rigidity depend on measure (Grigsby, Hurst & Yildirmaz 2021)
 - ▶ Base wages are rigid in nominal and real terms (2.5% of workers receive annual nominal base cut)
 - ... But **bonuses** are flexible (17.5% of workers receive annual base + bonus cut)

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... But **bonuses** are flexible (17.5% of workers receive annual base + bonus cut)
- ▶ *What is the **relevant notion** of wage rigidity when there is flexible bonus pay?*
- ▶ **This paper:** models bonuses as **incentive pay**
 - ▶ 30-50% of US workers get incentive pay (Lemieux, McLeod and Parent, 2009; Makridis & Gittelman 2021)
 - ▶ Including 25-30% of low wage workers
 - ▶ Incentive pay = piece-rates, bonuses, commissions, stock options or profit sharing
 - ▶ Longer term incentives (e.g. promotions) are also common

Wage Flexibility from Incentives is Irrelevant for Unemployment Dynamics

This paper: embeds dynamic model of **incentive pay** into standard macro models

- ▶ Incentive pay = contract with moral hazard (Holmstrom 1979; Sannikov 2008)
- ▶ Unemployment = standard labor search model (Mortensen & Pissarides 1994)

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- ▶ Unemployment = standard labor search model (Mortensen & Pissarides 1994)
- ▶ Allows **flexible incentive pay** consistent with microdata + **long term contracts** (Barro 1977)
- ... But contracts are **complex**

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Unemployment dynamics: **first order equivalent** in two economies (“DICE Theorem”)

1. Economy #1: labor search model with flexible incentive pay
2. Economy #2: labor search model with rigid wages as in Hall (2005)

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Intuition: **incentive effects** matter

1. **Direct productivity effect:** negative shock to value added in Economies #1 and #2
2. **Marginal cost effect:** fall in wages in Economy #1 dampens fall in profits
3. **Incentive effect:** fall in effort in Economy #1 amplifies fall in profits

Optimal contract: **incentives** offset **marginal cost** changes

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Extension: introduce **bargaining** into incentive pay model

- ▶ **Analytical result:** **bargaining** wage flexibility allocative for unemployment dynamics
 - But **incentive** wage flexibility irrelevant
- ▶ **Calibration w/ micro moments:** separately measure **bargaining vs. incentive** wage flexibility
- ▶ **Numerical result:** large unemployment fluctuations even if wages are flexible
 - Similar unemployment dynamics to Hall (2005) rigid wage model
 - XX%-XX% of wage flexibility in the data is due to **incentives**

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Takeaways:

- ▶ Wage flexibility due to **complex** and **flexible** incentive pay is *irrelevant* for unemployment dynamics
- ▶ Unemployment dynamics behave as if a **simple** model with **wage rigidity**
- ▶ Empirical work should measure *allocative* wage flexibility **due to bargaining not incentives**

Outline

1. **Static labor search model + static incentive contract**

- ▶ Intuition for DICE and role of incentive effects

2. **DMP model + general dynamic incentive contract**

- ▶ Derive DICE theorem for **wide class of contracts** (e.g. unrestricted utility function, persistent shocks)
- ▶ Due to **envelope and aggregation theorems** we develop

3. **Wage Bargaining**

- ▶ Result: wage flexibility from bargaining is allocative, flexibility from incentives irrelevant
- ▶ Calibrate model: disentangle wage flexibility from bargaining vs. incentives

4. **Extension to inflation dynamics: DICE for Phillips Curve**