



EU MITRE ATT&CK® Community Workshops

Creating Attack Graphs for Adversary Emulation, Simulation and Purple Teaming in Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Environments

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– TLP:WHITE –

Agenda

1. Whoami, Motivation and Background
2. Approach
3. Solution and Graph Design
4. Summary and Future Work



Whoami, Motivation and Background

- Currently: Red Teaming and Penetration Testing
- Previously: Forensics and Incident Response, ...
- 10+ years of experience with infosec for critical infrastructures
- I ❤️ energy – mainly 🔌 on all ⚡ levels
- "🐿️ Rodents [still] cause more power outages than 🐉 hackers"



Disclaimer

This presentation is a result from personal research and interest.
This talk is not related to or explicitly endorsed by my employer.

Motivation




Ukraine Power Outages 2015 & 2016



Petrochemical Plant TRISIS Incident 2017

Research Question

“Is it possible – and if yes to what extent – to algorithmically **generate attack graphs** that can be used for **practical adversary behavior execution** in ICS environments and can the process be supported by a **corresponding application**?”



Attack Tree

(Schneier, Dr. Dobb's Journal, 1999)

Foundation and Existing Work

1. Attack Graphs

(Schneier, Kordy, LeMay, Ekstedt and many more)

- Attacks can be modeled intuitively with graphs/trees
- Focus mainly on assets less on the actions
- Used for modeling defenses and critical paths
- Automated generation has been shown to be possible



ADTree
(Kordy et. al)

2. Ontologies, Kill Chains and MITRE ATT&CK

(Strom, Applebaum, Hutchins, Pols and many more)

- Common language to describe attacks/actions
- Attacks follow common sequences/patterns
- Large repository about information on attacks and behavior (TTP)
- Specific ICS related repositories available

Technique	Platform	Defense Efficacy	Operational Impact	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Compromise and Control
Initial Access	Initial Access	Initial Access	Initial Access	Initial Access	Initial Access	Initial Access	Initial Access
Phishing	Phishing	Phishing	Phishing	Phishing	Phishing	Phishing	Phishing
Malware	Malware	Malware	Malware	Malware	Malware	Malware	Malware
Social Engineering	Social Engineering	Social Engineering	Social Engineering	Social Engineering	Social Engineering	Social Engineering	Social Engineering
Local Privilege Escalation	Local Privilege Escalation	Local Privilege Escalation	Local Privilege Escalation	Local Privilege Escalation	Local Privilege Escalation	Local Privilege Escalation	Local Privilege Escalation
Remote Privilege Escalation	Remote Privilege Escalation	Remote Privilege Escalation	Remote Privilege Escalation	Remote Privilege Escalation	Remote Privilege Escalation	Remote Privilege Escalation	Remote Privilege Escalation
Network Lateral Movement	Network Lateral Movement	Network Lateral Movement	Network Lateral Movement	Network Lateral Movement	Network Lateral Movement	Network Lateral Movement	Network Lateral Movement
Physical Lateral Movement	Physical Lateral Movement	Physical Lateral Movement	Physical Lateral Movement	Physical Lateral Movement	Physical Lateral Movement	Physical Lateral Movement	Physical Lateral Movement
Exfiltration	Exfiltration	Exfiltration	Exfiltration	Exfiltration	Exfiltration	Exfiltration	Exfiltration
Impact	Impact	Impact	Impact	Impact	Impact	Impact	Impact

ATT&CK Framework
(Strom et. al / MITRE)

Approach

Exercises and Adversary Behavior Execution

1. Exercises

- Red and Purple Teaming
- Table-Top Exercises


2. Automated execution

- Simulation
- Machine Learning




Classification of Attack Models

Which **level of detail** required for designing attack graphs for adversary behavior execution?





Use Cases and Input/Output



Solution and Graph Design

System design





1. Graphs

- Set of nodes and edges describing the adversary profile
- Focus on emulation/simulation of attack Techniques
- Sequential along MITRE Tactics (the “what”)


2. Nodes

- Instantiated Techniques as individual hacking steps (the “how”)
- Associated with targets and indicators

3. Edges

- Technique’s results and status

Example Generated Graph



Example Generated Graph





Live Demo?



Just deploy it on your own!



<https://www.pull-the-plug.net/thesis/>

Summary and Future Work

Summary and Future Work

- Conclusion
 - Automated attack graph generation for adversary behavior execution is possible
 - Experts confirm viability of approach and prototype
- Future work
 - Detailed node generation (IOC level) and integration with formal models/languages
 - Machine learning use cases and Bayesian networks
 - Defender profile mapping with threat and defense modeling





Further Reading

Get the full text and source of the application from

 <https://www.pull-the-plug.net/thesis/>

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Creating Attack Graphs for
Adversary Emulation, Simulation and Purple Teaming
in Industrial Control System (ICS) Environments

Master Thesis
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades
M.Sc. Praktische Informatik

der Fakultät
Mathematik und Informatik
der FernUniversität
in Hagen von

Jan Hoff

Thank you

References and Credits

1. Latex beamer template: <https://github.com/matze/mtheme>
2. "Ukraine" power lines: <https://unsplash.com/>
3. Petro Rabigh plant: [https://www.meed.com/petro-rabigh-\[...\] -owners](https://www.meed.com/petro-rabigh-[...] -owners)
4. All other photos: <https://unsplash.com/>
5. Further references and a complete bibliography can be found at:
<https://www.pull-the-plug.net/thesis/>

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