TLA+ specification of Lamport's distributed mutual-exclusion algorithm that appeared as an example in L. Lamport: Time, Clocks and the Ordering of Events in a Distributed System. $CACM\ 21(7):558-565,\ 1978.$

EXTENDS Naturals, Sequences

The parameter N represents the number of processes. The parameter maxClock is used only for model checking in order to keep the state space finite.

Constant N, maxClock

Assume $NType \triangleq N \in Nat$ Assume $maxClockType \triangleq maxClock \in Nat$

$$\begin{array}{ccc} Proc & \triangleq & 1 \dots N \\ Clock & \triangleq & Nat \setminus \{0\} \end{array}$$

For model checking, add ClockConstraint as a state constraint to ensure a finite state space and override the definition of Clock by $1 \dots maxClock+1$ so that TLC can evaluate the definition of Message.

VARIABLES

clock, local clock of each process

req, requests received from processes (clock transmitted with request)

ack, acknowledgements received from processes

network, messages sent but not yet received crit set of processes in critical section

Messages used in the algorithm.

```
\begin{array}{ll} ReqMessage(c) \ \triangleq \ [type \mapsto \text{``req''}, \ clock \mapsto c] \\ AckMessage \ \triangleq \ [type \mapsto \text{``ack''}, \ clock \mapsto 0] \\ RelMessage \ \triangleq \ [type \mapsto \text{``rel''}, \ clock \ \mapsto 0] \end{array}
```

 $Message \triangleq \{AckMessage, RelMessage\} \cup \{ReqMessage(c) : c \in Clock\}$

The type correctness predicate.

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TupeOK \triangleq
```

```
clock[p] is the local clock of process p
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 $\land \ clock \in [\mathit{Proc} \to \overline{\mathit{Clock}}]$

req[p][q] stores the clock associated with request from q received by p, 0 if none

 $\land req \in [Proc \rightarrow [Proc \rightarrow Nat]]$

ack[p] stores the processes that have ack'ed p's request

 $\land \ ack \in [Proc \rightarrow \text{SUBSET} \ Proc]$

network[p][q]: queue of messages from p to q – pairwise FIFO communication

 $\land network \in [Proc \rightarrow [Proc \rightarrow Seq(Message)]]$

set of processes in critical section: should be empty or singleton

 $\land crit \in \text{SUBSET } Proc$

The initial state predicate.

```
 \begin{array}{ll} Init & \triangleq \\ & \land \ clock = [p \in Proc \mapsto 1] \\ & \land \ req \ = [p \in Proc \mapsto [q \in Proc \mapsto 0]] \\ & \land \ ack = [p \in Proc \mapsto \{\}] \\ & \land \ network = [p \in Proc \mapsto [q \in Proc \mapsto \langle \rangle]] \\ & \land \ crit = \{\} \end{array}
```

beats(p, q) is true if process p believes that its request has higher priority than q's request. This is true if either p has not received a request from q or p's request has a smaller clock value than q's. If there is a tie, the numerical process ID decides.

```
\begin{array}{l} beats(p,\ q) \ \stackrel{\triangle}{=} \\ \lor \ req[p][q] = 0 \\ \lor \ req[p][p] < req[p][q] \\ \lor \ req[p][p] = req[p][q] \land p < q \end{array}
```

Broadcast a message: send it to all processes except the sender.

```
Broadcast(s, m) \triangleq [r \in Proc \mapsto \text{if } s = r \text{ Then } network[s][r] \text{ else } Append(network[s][r], m)]
```

Process p requests access to critical section.

```
 \begin{aligned} &Request(p) \stackrel{\triangle}{=} \\ & \wedge req[p][p] = 0 \\ & \wedge req' = [req \ \text{EXCEPT} \ ![p][p] = clock[p]] \\ & \wedge network' = [network \ \text{EXCEPT} \ ![p] = Broadcast(p, \ ReqMessage(clock[p]))] \\ & \wedge ack' = [ack \ \text{EXCEPT} \ ![p] = \{p\}] \\ & \wedge \ \text{UNCHANGED} \ \langle clock, \ crit \rangle \end{aligned}
```

Process p receives a request from q and acknowledges it.

```
Receive Request(p, q) \stackrel{\triangle}{=} \\ \land network[q][p] \neq \langle \rangle \\ \land \text{ Let } m \stackrel{\triangle}{=} Head(network[q][p]) \\ c \stackrel{\triangle}{=} m.clock \\ \text{IN} \qquad \land m.type = \text{"req"} \\ \land req' = [req \text{ except } ![p][q] = c] \\ \land clock' = [clock \text{ except } ![p] = \text{ if } c > clock[p] \text{ then } c+1 \text{ else } @+1] \\ \land network' = [network \text{ except } ![q][p] = Tail(@), \\ ![p][q] = Append(@, AckMessage)] \\ \land \text{ UNCHANGED } \langle ack, crit \rangle
```

Process p receives an acknowledgement from q.

```
 \begin{aligned} &ReceiveAck(p, \ q) \ \stackrel{\triangle}{=} \\ & \land \ network[q][p] \neq \langle \rangle \\ & \land \ \text{LET} \ m \ \stackrel{\triangle}{=} \ Head(network[q][p]) \\ & \text{IN} \quad \land \ m.type = \text{``ack''} \end{aligned}
```

Process p enters the critical section.

Process p exits the critical section and notifies other processes.

```
Exit(p) \triangleq \\ \land p \in crit \\ \land crit' = crit \setminus \{p\} \\ \land network' = [network \ \text{EXCEPT} \ ![p] = Broadcast(p, RelMessage)] \\ \land req' = [req \ \text{EXCEPT} \ ![p][p] = 0] \\ \land ack' = [ack \ \text{EXCEPT} \ ![p] = \{\}] \\ \land \text{UNCHANGED} \ clock
```

Process p receives a release notification from q.

```
\begin{aligned} &Receive Release(p, \ q) \ \stackrel{\triangle}{=} \\ & \land network[q][p] \neq \langle \rangle \\ & \land \text{LET} \ m \ \stackrel{\triangle}{=} \ Head(network[q][p]) \\ &\text{IN} \quad \land m.type = \text{"rel"} \\ & \land req' = [req \ \text{EXCEPT} \ ![p][q] = 0] \\ & \land network' = [network \ \text{EXCEPT} \ ![q][p] = Tail(@)] \\ & \land \text{UNCHANGED} \ \langle clock, \ ack, \ crit \rangle \end{aligned}
```

Next-state relation.

```
 \begin{split} Next & \triangleq \\ & \vee \exists \ p \in Proc : Request(p) \vee Enter(p) \vee Exit(p) \\ & \vee \exists \ p \in Proc : \exists \ q \in Proc \setminus \{p\} : \\ & ReceiveRequest(p, \ q) \vee ReceiveAck(p, \ q) \vee ReceiveRelease(p, \ q) \\ vars & \triangleq \langle req, \ network, \ clock, \ ack, \ crit \rangle \\ Spec & \triangleq Init \wedge \Box [Next]_{vars} \end{split}
```

A state constraint that is useful for validating the specification using finite-state model checking. $ClockConstraint \ \stackrel{\triangle}{=} \ \forall \ p \in Proc : clock[p] \leq maxClock$

No channel ever contains more than three messages. In fact, no channel ever contains more than one message of the same type, as proved below.

 $\textit{BoundedNetwork} \ \stackrel{\triangle}{=} \ \forall \, p, \ q \in \textit{Proc} : \textit{Len}(\textit{network}[p][q]) \leq 3$

The main safety property of mutual exclusion.

$$Mutex \triangleq \forall p, q \in crit : p = q$$

$$\mathit{Live} \ \triangleq \ \forall \ p \in \mathit{Proc} : \Diamond (p \ \in \mathit{crit})$$

- * Modification History * Last modified Sun Oct 07 00:34:02 EDT 2018 by mehuljain * Created Sun Sep 30 20:38:42 EDT 2018 by mehuljain