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If informing the Japanese public about the movement was Shigenobu's prime motivation for leaving, then, in her own way, she escaped from Mori's dominance of Sekigun as well as Shiomi's emphasis on building an operations base for the group. But was she also following orders from Shiomi? There were reports in the Japanese press that she had been assigned by Shiomi "to unify extremist sub-groups, one of which was the Kyoto University Partisan Corps."³⁷ In any event, she married Okudaira on 2 February 1971. She was now able to obtain a passport using Okudaira's name which allowed her to safely fly out of Japan. Interestingly, a 6 June 1972 *New York Times* story reports that Okudaira (spelled "Ukudaira" in the article) "a student of electrical engineering at Kyoto, 26 years old, had learned Arabic in a previous visit to Lebanon."

Shigenobu's precise route to Beirut remains disputed. One report, for example, states that the Red Army learned that starting in 13–17 February 1971, a "Second International Symposium on Palestine Problems" was to be held in Kuwait. Several top JRA members were reportedly then dispatched to the Middle East including Shigenobu. She reportedly carried two letters. The first was to North Korea's leader Kim Il-sung requesting that the Yodogō hijackers be allowed to come to the Middle East. The second called upon George Habash to allow the Red Army to establish a training center in Lebanon, rather like the one the Yodogō hijackers hoped to create in North Korea.³⁸

Shigenobu reportedly flew to Beirut on 28 February, a few weeks after the Kuwait meeting, flying from Tokyo via Hong Kong, Bangkok, and Mumbai, and arriving in Beirut on 1 March 1971. Okudaira also left around the same time but flew separately and was reportedly already in Beirut when she landed.³⁹ According to Shigenobu, she went to Beirut without having made any pre-arrangements with the PFLP for her arrival.⁴⁰

One unanswered question is the role of George Habash and North Korea. On 7 September 1970, the PFLP leader visited North Korea. It has been reported that Habash met with a leader of the Yodogō hijackers who carried out their hijacking operation on 31 March 1970. The PFLP was also said to have opened a secret office in Tokyo in 1970 as well. Given that the PFLP itself helped inspire the tactic of plane hijacking, it is not impossible that there was some encounter in Pyongyang. What seems more likely, however, is that Shigenobu was put in contact with a PFLP contact in Japan, who may have come to Tokyo in the wake of Habash's trip to recruit volunteers for the Palestinian struggle. The JRA, however, claimed that before Shigenobu and Okudaira's first trip to the Middle East they had links with a Paris contact of the group who knew Habash personally.⁴¹ Other reports state that in 1971 Sekigun contacted a PFLP member named Dijiro who was associated with an Arab "boycott bureau" in Tokyo, and that the PFLP's Leila Khaled later visited Tokyo.⁴²

Shigenobu also may have been influenced by her connection to the film critic Masao Matsuda, part of the radical cinema network tied to filmmakers such as Wakamatsu and Adachi. From 1967 to 1972, Matsuda was part of an extremely important collective that published a journal called *News from the World Revolutionary Movement* (*Sekai kakumei undō jōhō*) and its related *Society of Revolt* (*Reboruto-ha*).⁴³ Besides Matsuda, its editorial collective included avowed anarchists Masakuni Ōta and Kenji Yamaguchi, Shōji Sasaki, the older brother of Norio Sasaki, one of the founders of the terrorist group the East Asian Anti-Japan Armed Front in the early 1970s, as well as the ubiquitous Ryū Ōta, the former Trotskyist leader. The publication glorified Che Guevara and republished works by the

Libya

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Government and Politics



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The conservative elements in Libyan society have been largely discredited by the regime and they are unlikely to regain the influence they formerly enjoyed under the monarchy. Many of the more prominent among them—particularly tribal leaders and members of aristocratic families—are in exile or detention as a result of the initial purges following the 1969 coup. Moreover, for those who have survived these purges, the threat that the regime will dredge up corruption charges against them has curbed their political activity. Much of the opposition, which the regime appears to have quelled, emanated from Cyrenaica, Idris' home region.

Despite the regime's efforts to mobilize enthusiasm for its policies among average citizens, the bulk of the Libyan public remains apathetic toward their revolutionary leaders. Although the government's efforts to administer social benefits and development programs have made some Libyans aware that the regime is concerned about their welfare, most have not developed a national consciousness and have little commitment to any national authority. The Libyan people, many of whom fear Egyptian absorption, have made known their opposition to the regime's plans for a Libyan-Egyptian merger. Their resentment so far has been expressed through discriminatory treatment of the Egyptian community in Libya rather than being directed at the RCC.

public, but the majority of the military strongly supports the RCC and will probably continue to do so as long as they feel their own special status is not threatened by the regime's policies. The Free Officers are the key influence within the military, and they serve as the privileged phalanx insuring their subordinates cooperation with the regime. Very little information has come out about the size and organization of the Free Officers Union, whose members are sometimes referred to as Unionist Officers in keeping with their goal of Arab unity. Fewer than a dozen officers have been positively identified as members of the organization, but the number of Free Officers has probably grown in proportion with the expansion of the regular officers corps. The RCC undoubtedly realizes the difficulty of ensuring the loyalty of new officers if they were denied entry into the organization, and the ranks of those who collaborated in the 1969 coup have probably been augmented by many recently commissioned junior officers. Just how interested the Free Officers are in politics is also difficult to establish. Some apparently have a very deep commitment to Qaddafi personally and have supported him in some disputes within the council. However, the organization probably has no firm leadership and may well encompass a broad spectrum of personal alliances.

The conservative elements in Libyan society have been largely discredited by the regime and they are unlikely to regain the influence they formerly enjoyed under the monarchy. Many of the more prominent among them—particularly tribal leaders and members of aristocratic families—are in exile or detention as a result of the initial purges following the 1969 coup. Moreover, for those who have survived these purges, the threat that the regime will dredge up corruption charges against them has curbed their political activity. Much of the opposition, which the regime appears to have quelled, emanated from Cyrenaica, Idris' home region.

a. *The Libyan Arab Socialist Union*

The LASU was established first and foremost to serve the regime and after some fits and starts in its early development it has become a fairly effective civil arm for the RCC. According to Qaddafi's wishes the party is modeled after the Egyptian Arab Socialist Union and its structure reflects Nasir's design for a social and political organization which links leadership with the masses.

Soon after formation of the LASU, Qaddafi made it clear that the new organization would not function as a regular political party, but would serve rather as the major instrument for applying socialist principles to the Libyan situation. The RCC carefully monitored elections of party officials even at the local level where in several instances vote-rigging caused the regime to void the results and reschedule new elections. Finally, after much fanfare the first National Congress was convened in Tripoli in March 1972 and, as expected, Qaddafi was named LASU President.

4. Political parties

Prominent individuals of influential tribes and fanatics have long been in competition for political leadership. Lit political struggle has traditionally taken forms other than that of political party rivalry. Parties have no foundation in the traditional life of the Libyans and have had only a sporadic existence. The Italians banned Libyan political parties during the period of their rule between 1911 and World War II. In 1947 and 1948 the British allowed party activity only as a means for permitting Libyans to air their views on the country's future. However, these parties were banned by King Idris in 1952 following a violent episode in Libya's first elections.

From its earliest days the RCC seemed to be searching for a way to draw important segments of the population into its programs and to inspire enthusiasm for the revolution in the average Libyan. At first the military leaders' suspicion of parties and politicians apparently kept them from establishing a formal organization, and for nearly two years they relied on a series of popular rallies to promote support while maintaining the ban on organized political activity. In 1971, however, Qaddafi announced the formation of the Libyan Arab Socialist Union (LASU), which, despite official denials, is the only legal party in the country. The Ba'th Party, a pan-Arab political movement, still has some members and sympathizers in Libya, but its influence has diminished considerably because of the regime's strict surveillance and occasional harassment of anyone associated with the Ba'th Party.

Theoretically, the National Congress, which consists of around 500 delegates, is the supreme ruling body of the party. Between sessions of the congress, its Central Committee headed by an executive council handles party affairs. There is little information on the actual workings of these party organs, but it appears that a Secretariat General headed by RCC member Hawwadi actually controls the day-to-day business and acts as the regime's controlling arm in the party structure.

Below the national organization are the 10 provincial (or governate) units, most of which are headed by RCC members. These provincial units are divided into district, and finally into basic units. These units, numbering over 2,000, are scattered throughout cities, villages, government agencies, and private enterprises. In some cases, the LASU basic units have merged with labor unions and the distinction between union and party activity has become somewhat blurred. Very little information is available on the size of the party or qualifications for membership, but some reports indicate that there were over 200,000 LASU members in late 1972. Most government employees probably feel that party membership is necessary to protect their jobs, and they most likely account for a substantial but unenthusiastic portion of the rank and file. Moreover, the LASU appears to serve as an umbrella organization which has absorbed labor, student, and other youth groups.

The RCC has tried to impart prestige and responsibility to the LASU and council members seem to take their duties quite seriously. Party activity is generally aimed at selling the regime's policies to the public through the media, popular rallies, and the party structure itself. Qadhafi has taken a particularly active part in many party programs and frequently spends a great deal of time addressing special seminars and meeting with LASU members at the local level. He has also instructed party officials to look after the needs of ordinary citizens and to help them take advantage of public health, education, and housing programs.

In addition to serving as a pipeline to the public, the LASU is an instrument with which the government demonstrates its power and authority. LASU units in the predominantly American-owned petroleum industry have demonstrated their ability to pressure the companies on such issues as Libyanization, increased pay, and general working conditions. Similarly, the orchestrated demonstrations and protests mounted from time to time by the regime depend mainly on LASU manpower, and hundreds of

party members can be turned out in fairly quick order. For example, massive demonstrations in favor of union with Egypt were staged during the unity conference between Presidents Sadat and Qadhafi in August 1972 as part of the regime's pressure campaign to draw their reticent neighbors into the merger scheme.

There has been much fanfare in Libya regarding the LASU with its Egyptian counterpart. Cooperation between the two parties, however, has been limited to the executive level, and very little integration is expected to take place. If the union between the two countries ever assumes real substance, the more vigorous leadership of the Egyptian ASU may well inspire an independent spirit in its Libyan partner, but mutual suspicions will undoubtedly prevent any meaningful consolidation of the two parties even at the highest echelons.

b. The Ba'th Party

The Arab Socialist Resurrection Party, commonly known as the Ba'th Party, represents a pan-Arab socialist reform movement with international headquarters in Damascus, Syria, and regional branches in various other Arab countries. Between 1958 and 1961, when Syria and Egypt were joined in the United Arab Republic, President Nasir attempted to use regional Ba'th parties to achieve his objectives and permitted Ba'thists to operate in Cairo. With the breakup of this union in 1961, Nasir and the Ba'th Party became enemies, and now Nasir's followers work separately to create their own brand of Arab unity.

Syrian Ba'thists in 1956 helped a Libyan, 'Amir al-Tahir al-Dug'bayyis, to form a Ba'thist group among members of the Libyan Students Club in Cairo. Later that year, 'Abdallah Sharaf al-Din, a member of this group, returned to Libya and began forming Ba'th cells in Tripoli and Banghazi. Using the members of the Ba'th group in the Cairo Libyan Students Club as a core, the Ba'th Party expanded its organization in Libya to include secondary school students, minor government officials, and trade union officers. In 1961, however, the Libyan Government imprisoned 87 members of the party, and since then, the Ba'thists have been unable to reorganize themselves successfully.

Soon after the RCC established firm control following the 1969 coup, several prominent members of the Ba'th Party made bids for positions in the new government. However, Qadhafi's vehement anti-Ba'thist sentiments quickly dashed their hopes and many members of the party either left the country or

severely curtailed their political activities. Qadhafi views the Ba'thist movement as a corrosive, atheistic influence and a serious threat to his Nasirite principles. In 1971, he expelled some 70 Palestinian Ba'thists for alleged subversion, and he has kept a close security watch on Libyan sympathizers who have remained in the country.

5. Elections

Elections are alien to Libyan traditions and the people have had little opportunity to become familiar with modern electoral practices. Under the monarchy, the only elections ever held were for deputies to the House of Representatives, and the government blatantly controlled every stage of the election process. The RCC has abolished even the facade of democratic institutions and the only elections held since 1969 have involved Libyan participation in the Confederation of Arab Republics (CAR), and the establishment of the LASU official structure.

Although the military regime has conducted elections with a minimum of direct interference, the RCC views the electoral process as a means for drumming up public enthusiasm and it has used various methods to ensure the results it wants. For example, to guarantee support for Libyan participation in the CAR, the referendum on the federation charter was conducted on 1 September 1971, the anniversary of the Libyan revolution and a day charged with emotional spirit for Arab causes. Moreover, black boxes were used as receptacles for negative votes, a ploy which played upon the strong Muslim superstition that black is evil and dangerous. Not surprisingly, the referendum was overwhelmingly accepted by a record turnout of voters.

Elections for LASU officials and for deputies to the CAR Assembly have been carried out in routine fashion. Suffrage has been extended to both males and females, but there is no information available on the age requirements for participation in either election. All candidates for LASU offices and for deputy representatives to the CAR must be registered members of the LASU, and all LASU members are required to vote. The RCC has carefully monitored each stage of these elections and has intervened on several occasions to prevent vote-rigging and to insure that all candidates meet nomination requirements. The regime has also criticized those campaign practices which play on tribal ties and family influence.

D. National policies (C)

1. Domestic

In attempting to reform Libyan society, Qadhafi is trying to cast off the psychological fetters of centuries of foreign domination and to instill a sense of national identity and pride in Libyans. He views these steps as essential in revitalizing and uniting the Arab world.

Under the RCC's direction the last vestiges of the pro-Western Libyan monarchy have been eliminated; in its place the full panoply of the early regime of Egypt's Nasir—except for the People's Assembly—has been reproduced. Qadhafi's goal is to harmonize the political and economic structures of Libya and Egypt in preparation for a complete merger of the two states.


Qadhafi is aiming at a classless society marked by social justice, equal opportunity, and a more equitable distribution of income. Many schools, hospitals, child care centers and roads have been built and the welfare services expanded to a reasonable level. The corruption and patronage in the government that flourished under the monarchy has been largely ended, as has the tribally based administration; local chiefs must now take competitive exams. The government has provided subsidies for housing and education, but no money handouts in the Saudi Arabian fashion. A major problem has been in getting the welfare programs to nonurban Libyans and in helping the rural dwellers to take advantage of the services available.

To reduce foreign influence in Libya and reinstate the primacy of the Arabic language and culture, the government has Arabized schools, social institutions, and many private concerns and established a legal code based almost exclusively on strict Islamic law. English street names have been replaced with Arabic, and all travellers to Libya must carry Arabic-language passports. Although Qadhafi has made exceptions to this rule when it serves Libya's own economic and political interests, the regulation has been enforced against all nationalities, causing considerable disruption.

The government has also moved against foreigners resident in Libya. Thousands of lifelong resident Italians have been evicted and the United States and United Kingdom have evacuated their bases, at Libya's request. To be sure many Italians have returned, but they are Italians untainted by the colonial connection. All these antiforeign moves have struck a responsive chord in the average Libyan,

Aleksandr Rutskoi, vice-king?

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In spring 1991, during the Third Russian Congress, one conservative deputy threw the leadership of the Communist Party into a state of shock. On behalf of 179 members of a new faction called "Communists for Democracy," he announced full support for the Supreme Soviet of Russia and its chairman, condemned the mass media for defaming Boris Yeltsin, and strongly supported establishing the post of president of the republic. After walking off the platform, he added: "Are there any sensible people at this Congress with party membership cards by their hearts? There are such people, and many of them."

This man was Aleksandr Rutskoi, a 50-year-old colonel, and a hero in the Afghanistan war. A pilot, he was shot down twice over the country to which the Soviet Union was offering active "national assistance." Just a year before switching to Yeltsin's side, Rutskoi, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Russia, had denounced Andrei Sakharov and the democrats in general while praising the avowed fascists of the Pamyat organization.

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The attitudes taken by the Arab nationalist against the non-Arab ‘Agam’ played a prominent role in the reluctance of the Shi’ites from engaging in political action and opposition, as well as in taking a hostile position towards the nationalist movement, which was one of the most important movements at that time. These hostile attitudes of the ANM towards the Shi’ites helped to promote sectarian and ethnic divisions in the society. The anti-position taken by the ANM Kuwait Branch towards the Iranian

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immigration to Kuwait and the Arabian Gulf region did not distinguish between Kuwaitis of Iranian origin who had contributed to the progress, modernization and building of Kuwait, and the new Iranian immigrants. It mobilized the

Kuwaiti people on the basis that there was a joint plot between British colonialism, the ruling family, and Iran to erase the Arab identity from the Gulf. The movement’s struggle against the British presence was associated with a similar struggle against the Iranian presence by all means and at all levels. The movement felt that the growing Iranian community was a threat to Arabism; they thought:²⁹

- making a foreign majority in Kuwait and the rest of the Arabian Gulf region to be a pressing force against its Arab population
- the use of some of its figures to oppose the Arab progressive forces that threatened the colonial privileges in the region
- getting rid of hungry mouths that make a threat to the Shah regime
- achieving the dream of the Iranian empire to expand in the Arabian Gulf region.

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Soviet Jews Arriving in Israel: The Humanitarian Needs: a Staff Report, Vol. 4

By United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs

The parliamentary representatives of the ANM Bloc in the National Assembly launched a severe campaign against the Kuwaitis of Iranian origin and demanded the formation of a commission to investigate into their files. They also suggested granting Kuwaiti nationality to Arabs only, and the withdrawal

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of the Kuwaiti nationality from people who were of Iranian origin. They also demanded that the Arabic language as a criterion in granting Kuwaiti nationality.³⁰ The attitudes of the ANM in Kuwait, which were announced in the Parliament or through its literature, created a violent reaction among the Kuwaiti Shi'ites of Iranian or Arab origin alike, especially when extremist figures of the Shi'ites of Iranian origin, members in Jam'iyyat al-Thakafah al-Ijtima'yah (the Social Culture Society (SCS)) succeeded in escalating this division between the Sunnis and Shi'ites of Arab origin. They announced that the action is not intended against immigration organized by the Government of the Shah, but it also meant the Kuwaiti Shi'ites of Iranian origin. At the same time, they encouraged Kuwaiti Shi'ites of Arab origin to live in areas dominated by a sectarian nature. The Society played a role in promoting that the Shah was the protector of the Shi'ites in Kuwait.

The Kuwaiti National Movement was affected negatively due to the positions taken by the ANM towards the Kuwaitis from Iranian origin on the grounds that they are a group of invaders and that there is a historical conflict between Arabs and Persians. These attitudes served the Kuwaiti regime, which succeeded in exploiting the Shi'ites to take positions against the Kuwaiti National Movement.³¹

MEMORANDUM OF TRANSMITTAL

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U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, DC, February 5, 1992.

To: Senator EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs.

From: JERRY TINKER, staff director; MICHAEL MYERS, counsel; NANCY SODERBERG, foreign policy advisor to Senator Kennedy.

At your request, we traveled to Israel from December 3–9, 1991, to evaluate the needs of the hundreds of thousands of Soviet Jews who have arrived in Israel in recent years. The following report, "Soviet Jews Arriving in Israel: The Humanitarian Needs" contains our findings from that trip.

During our visit, we met with officials of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, the Israeli Finance Ministry, the Israeli Housing Ministry, the Jewish Agency, the U.S. Embassy and Consulate, the American Jewish Committee as well as with Soviet and Ethiopian immigrants. We are grateful for the generous hospitality extended to us during our visit and for the assistance, time and energy so many graciously devoted to our trip.

Expressions of anti-Semitism in the former Soviet Union continue. Such activities include the painting of swastikas on Jewish homes in Moscow, desecration of Jewish cemeteries, verbal and written insults, and the threat of pogroms. Pamyat and other groups promote an explicitly anti-Semitic agenda and have undertaken anti-Semitic campaigns that include threats, beatings, and killings. These groups are primarily based in Russia and promote a hard-line nationalistic agenda. While the top leadership of the former Soviet Union took steps to denounce anti-Semitism, neither the past nor the current leadership has succeeded in stopping the activities of the anti-Semitic organizations. Local authorities, which are gaining in power, have done little to oppose anti-Semitism.

On November 7, 1991, an anti-Semitic demonstration took place in St. Petersburg without interference by the authorities. In addition, on January 5, 1992, during the Russian Orthodox Christmas in Odessa, a Jewish cemetery and monument were desecrated and a group of Jewish children were harassed and taunted by local thugs. As recently as January 17, 1992, the Moscow authorities permitted an anti-Semitic rally in front of the Kremlin organized by right-wing pro-Communist elements which bitterly denounced Jews and Freemasons. An American journalist was attacked by the crowd when he revealed he was Jewish.

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Dr. Karmit Zysman of Action for Soviet Jewry in Massachusetts recently found after a trip in April, 1991, to the Soviet Union, that Soviet Jews:

Continue to be the objects of persecution, that is, serious violations of their human rights, including threats to their lives and freedom. For example, at least ten Jewish political prisoners remain incarcerated, ostensibly for engaging in illegal private business ventures with foreigners. Their non-Jewish colleagues frequently are not even detained * * *

The authorities are unwilling or unable to control Jewish persecution by anti-Semitic individuals and organizations such as Pamyat. With the dissolution of the Soviet

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government, the actions of local officials take on greater significance. * * * We continue to receive many reports that Jews who complain about anti-Semitic expression, harassment and even physical attacks are met with official indifference, if not hostility.

The anti-Semitism throughout the former Soviet Union over many centuries is well known and has been well documented. That it continues is disturbing but hardly surprising. This fact has been recognized most recently in our immigration laws through the passage of the Lautenberg amendment, enacted November 21, 1989.¹ The amendment identified Soviet Jews as "targets of persecution" and established procedures for the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service for their admission into the United States as refugees. This provision remains in force today.

Unfortunately, anti-Semitism in the former Soviet Union is likely to continue for some time, until the governments of the new Republics begin to actively combat the problem.

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Meanwhile, phone lines between Beirut and Damascus were extremely busy – between the gendarmerie and army commands on both sides of the border, and, more significantly, between the office of the Lebanese prime minister and the Syrian Presidency. No one was ever to know exactly what Riad el-Solh said to Husni al-Za‘im, but he may have threatened him. According to Hanna Ghusn, owner of *al-Diyar* – a paper which often reflected the government’s views – Riad el-Solh told Za‘im that Lebanon would attack Syria, with military assistance from both Iraq and Turkey, unless Za‘im withdrew his backing for the PPS.²⁷ Others said that Riad ‘bought’ Antun Sa‘ada from the notoriously greedy Za‘im for a large sum of money. Za‘im’s Prime Minister Muhsin al-Barazi – who was known to detest

²⁶ *Le Jour*, 7 July 1949.

²⁷ A statement made by Hanna Ghosn at a private party given at Bayt Meri, on 9 July 1949, by Alexandre Riachi, president of the Lebanese Press Syndicate, on the occasion of the Riachi daughter’s birthday. Among the guests were Husni al-Barazi, Camille Chamoun, Alfred Thabit, Sa‘di Munla and several journalists; Fonds Beyrouth (Amb.), série 199A4, carton 20, 11 July 1949.

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Sa‘ada – was believed to have helped persuade the colonel to hand him over to the Lebanese. Za‘im also received calls from Cairo and Riyadh, urging him to cooperate with the Lebanese authorities. For his part, Riad el-Solh later told Houstoun-Boswall, the British minister in Beirut, that Za‘im had financed and armed the PPS. But when he realised that his behaviour might drive the Lebanese government into the arms of the Hashemites, he had quickly abandoned the party and handed over its leader, although well aware that Sa‘ada would be executed.²⁸

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Meanwhile, in Damascus, the duplicitous Za‘im invited Sa‘ada to the presidential palace, where, after being courteously received, he was overpowered and taken under guard, in the night of 6–7 July, to the Lebanese border, where he was handed over to the Emir Farid Chehab, director-general of Lebanon’s *Sûreté Générale* – on ‘condition’ that he be killed on the journey to Beirut. These were Za‘im’s specific terms. Sa‘ada was to be shot, while ‘attempting escape’,²⁹ no doubt to protect the colonel from the charge of betrayal, and to conceal the detailed secrets of Za‘im’s actual dealings with him.

President Bishara al-Khoury relates in his memoirs that he was woken that night by a phone call at 2.30 in the morning. It was Riad el-Solh, informing him of Antun Sa‘ada’s extradition from Syria and his arrest by the Lebanese authorities. The president was amazed because, like most people, he assumed that Za‘im would use Sa‘ada for an attack on Lebanon, and would not give him up quite so lightly. Bishara al-Khoury dressed hurriedly and went to collect Riad on the way to the

²⁸ British Commonwealth Relations Office, Outward Telegram, 25 July 1949 (FO 371/75320).

²⁹ Beirut to Foreign Office, 7 July 1949 (FO 371/75320).

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office. It was only then that Riad el-Soh told him that the Emir Farid Chehab had phoned to convey Za‘im’s terms – namely to kill Sa‘ada en route. Riad told the president that he had instructed Chehab to ignore these instructions, and to bring the PPS leader to Beirut instead, and lock him up in a military barracks.

The president and the prime minister then sat down to discuss what should be done. The army commander, the Emir Fu‘ad Chehab, was called in to give his views. Bishara al-Khoury was concerned that the unstable Za‘im might react violently once he learned that Sa‘ada had not, after all, been killed in the manner that he had demanded. So, at 5 a.m., Shaykh Bishara rang the presidential palace in Damascus to explain. But there was no answer. Finally, at 6 a.m., Husni al-Za‘im himself picked up the phone. After thanking him for his support for Lebanon, Bishara al-Khoury told him that Sa‘ada would shortly be put on trial before a military court for treason, in accordance with the country’s law. ‘That’s fine,’ Za‘im said abruptly, ending the conversation – to the astonishment and relief of the Lebanese officials.³⁰

Mehwish-Task 32

p. 687:

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At 8 p.m. on 7 July, the military court sentenced Sa'ada to death in accordance with Article 79 of the Military Code of Justice. The file was passed to the Amnesty Commission, which confirmed the sentence. After hearing the defence of the condemned man, and before taking the decision on Sa'ada's fate, the president called a meeting attended by Riad el-Solh and the Emir Farid Chehab, as well as by Habib Abi Chahla and Gabriel al-Murr, notables of Sa'ada's own Greek Orthodox community. According to a note by the Emir Farid Chehab, Riad el-Solh expressed the opinion that he disliked executions. President Khoury said nothing. But the two Greek Orthodox notables were adamant that Sa'ada should be executed. No doubt they considered him a dangerous upstart, who posed a threat to their dominant position in their community. This aspect of the circumstances of Sa'ada's execution remained unknown for more than half a century, and was only revealed on the publication of the Emir Farid Chehab's reports in 2006.³¹

President Bishara al-Khoury then signed the decree authorising the sentence to be carried out. At 3 a.m. on 8 July, a Greek Orthodox priest spent some moments alone with Sa'ada, who asked for a cup of coffee and a cigarette, while he drew up his will and testament. At 3.30 a.m. he was taken by soldiers to the place of execution in the barracks. His eyes were bound and his hands tied behind his back. In accordance with army regulations, he was made to kneel and was tied to a stake. At 3.40 a.m., an officer gave the order to fire. Less than twenty-four hours had passed between Sa'ada's arrest and his execution.³²

³¹ Ahmad Asfahani (ed.), *Antun Sa'ada wa'l hizb al-suri al-ijtima'i: fi 'auraq al-'amir Farid Chehab, al-mudir al-'amm lil 'amm al-'amm al-lubnani*, Beirut 2006.

³² Beirut to Foreign Office, 8 July 1949 (FO 371/75320).

On 17 July, and only a day after the trial, Riad el-Solh was received in Damascus with full honours by Husni al-Za'im, who had by this time promoted himself to the rank of marshal! A week before Riad's visit, on 8 July, Syria and Lebanon signed a financial and trade agreement.³³ The long-running quarrel between the two countries was patched up. On returning to Beirut, Riad el-Solh confided to Bishara al-Khoury that he had had to hold back his tears on entering the now much-degraded and alien presidential palace, where his dear friend and ardent fellow nationalist Shukri al-Quwatli had only recently presided.³⁴

At the same time, the Lebanese government made a move at rounding up members of the *Phalanges libanaises*. There were thirteen arrests – out of a membership which some said was over 20,000. The movement was dissolved, its offices closed and its weapons confiscated.

³³ MAE, Fonds Beyrouth (Amb.), série B, carton 48, translated from the Arabic by the Information Department of the Légation de France, Beirut, 11 July 1949.

³⁴ 'Abbas 'Abd al-Ra'uf Hammad, Sunni Palestinian; Muhammad Ibrahim Shalabi, Sunni Palestinian; Muhammad Ahmad al-Zu'bi, Sunni Syrian; 'Abd al-Hafiz 'Alami, Lebanese Shi'a; Ma'ruf Muhammad Muwaffaq, Lebanese Druze; and Adib Sam'an Jada', Greek Catholic Palestinian.

³⁵ *The Times*, London, 18 July 1949.

³⁶ Al-Khoury, *Haqa'iq lubnaniyya*, p. 218.

The Muslim paramilitary movement, *al-Najjada*, was also dissolved. As a result of these measures, the *Phalanges* and the *Najjada* both took the significant, far-reaching decision to transform themselves into political parties.

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Camille Chamoun – by now a bitter opponent of Bishara al-Khoury, who aspired to win the presidency for himself – was concerned to show that Sa‘ada had been executed for far baser motives than these. He told a private gathering of politicians and journalists on

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9 July³⁷ – the day after Sa‘ada’s execution – that the PPS leader had been tried in camera and executed immediately, in order to conceal his connection with Salim and Khalil al-Khoury, the corrupt brother and son of President Bishara al-Khoury. Sa‘ada had been seen at Salim’s table and at the house of Khalil, Chamoun claimed. At the 1947 elections, Salim had relied on PPS support in order to win a seat he could not have

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hoped for otherwise. The famous printing works at Jummayza had been bought by Salim al-Khoury for the PPS, and now served to print his own newspaper, *Nida‘ al-Watan*. As for the economic agreement with Syria, Chamoun said that it had been signed immediately after Sa‘ada’s execution, mainly to protect the economic interests of Fu‘ad al-Khoury, another of the president’s brothers, who was known as the ‘cement king’ of Lebanon. It was not clear, however, whether any of Chamoun’s bald accusations were founded on anything other than political hostility.

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first provided direct assistance to the university. To ensure that the AUB could remain open, the Office of War Information financed grants for scholarships, equipment, and visiting professorships to fill vacancies at the university with the understanding that Washington would continue to respect the institution's autonomy (Penrose, 1941; Ninkovich, 1981).² The Army also worked with the university to train technicians for anti-malaria efforts (Dodge, 1958).

These efforts were rewarded in the years immediately following WWII. At the founding conference of the United Nations in San Francisco more AUB alumni were represented than any other college or university in the world (Bickers, 1967). Influential Lebanese figures affiliated with AUB such as Charles Malik and Constantine Zurayk became ambassadors to the United States and distinguished themselves as some of the region's most pro-American senior officials (Attié, 2004; Thomas, 2016; Rabah, 2007).

World War II and its aftermath socialized policymakers to the university's potential as a strategic instrument in the Cold War. In his study of AUB, John Munro identifies several reasons why the U.S. government came to view the university as a strategic asset. AUB was based in a newly independent Arab state near Russia's southern borders. University administrators had developed close ties to regional governments with oil reserves. AUB alumni were well-represented in prominent positions throughout the greater Middle East. The university, through its "disinterested commitment" to regional development and its support for Arab nationalism, had earned the respect of regional governments and populaces alike. Finally, U.S. support for the university, and for Lebanon more generally, made Washington appear more neutral in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Munro, 1977, pp. 100–111).

As part of its strategy to keep newly independent Middle Eastern states from falling into the Soviet sphere, the United States launched its assistance program to Lebanon in 1951 (Anderson, 2011). Soon thereafter, the Foreign Service set up a field school for Arabic language training in close proximity to AUB (Kaplan, 1995). By 1956, Lebanon received some \$38 million in technical and economist assistance (Qubain, 1961). Initially through the Point Four Program and then through the International Cooperation Administration and USAID, the U.S. government financed the university's hospital building and agricultural college, as well as regional programs in public health, public administration, and economics. Large increases in research grants and faculty salaries amounted, in the words of the AUB Trustees' 1949–50 *Annual Report*, to a major "program of stabilization and development" (Munro, 1977, p. 103).

With the dawn of the Cold War, a new generation of American academics and policymakers flocked to AUB. Their interest and expertise in the Middle East stemmed less from the religious or humanitarian concerns of their

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predecessors, but more through the area studies programs in elite American universities that the government and private foundations were financing as part of the Cold War (Cleveland et al., 1960; Thomas, 2016). When AUB launched an Arab Studies Program with aid from the Rockefeller Foundation, the largest number of students that enrolled were Americans who either had already joined the Foreign Service or who were planning to become diplomats. When the program began sponsoring a special summer course on Middle Eastern history for State Department employees, rumors abounded in the local press that the Arab Studies Program was an arm of U.S. intelligence services (Munro, 1977).

To oversee its ties with the U.S. government, the trustees appointed Penrose as president in 1948. The first without family ties to the university, Penrose would play the role not only of an educational administrator but also, as Munro characterized it, "something in the nature of a U.S. Ambassador without portfolio" (Munro, 1977, p. 100). A former Office of Strategic Services operative in Cairo, chief of secret intelligence in Washington and Europe during WWII, and

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special assistant to Secretary of Defense Forrestal, Penrose was the first AUB president with a background officially working in the U.S. government. Across the Arab world, AUB's selection of Penrose as president underscored the institution's growing proximity to U.S. foreign policy interests (Munro, 1977). Penrose was an enthusiastic advocate of federal funding for the university, believing that federal support would allow AUB to expand its reach without compromising its core values (Munro, 1977). To underscore the U.S. interest in the university, Penrose wrote confidential memos to the State Department warning of Soviet-backed communist infiltration that aimed to "upset the effective operation of the institution" (Penrose, 1951, para. 2). Penrose also recruited American administrators and faculty members who were politically ambitious and well-connected in Washington. Harold Hoskins, as an example, the United States' first envoy to Saudi Arabia, joined AUB's board of trustees and served until his death in 1977 (Hollinger, 2017). Penrose's reforms left a favorable impression in the U.S. policy community. In a January 1957 report on the university prepared for the Senate's Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, *Foreign Affairs* editor Hamilton Armstrong assessed that due

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In a series of editorials reflecting the SSNP's position published in early March, *Sada Lubnan* proprietor and editor Muhammad Ba'albaki firmly rejected the doctrine of "positive neutrality." He derided "positive neutrality" as bereft of any meaning and found the idea the four participants had agreed on a common course of action laughable, characterizing it as an attempt to "blackmail" other countries in the region.² In his first editorial, Ba'albaki rhetorically asked whom they [i. e., the signatories] were trying to deceive and what political victory they thought their announcement had achieved.³ In his two subsequent pieces, he demanded to know what Egypt and Syria wanted from Lebanon and Iraq, their calls for neutralism merely a euphemism for adopting policies that were more favorable to the Soviets than the Americans.⁴ While criticizing the doctrine, Ba'albaki praised Chamoun's anti-communist stand and argued America's fight against communism and an offer of aid could only benefit Arab countries.⁵

Chamoun's government believed securing American economic and military aid was vital for strengthening the country and helping Lebanon resist Syrian and Egyptian political pressure and, accordingly, announced its formal acceptance of the doctrine on 16 March.⁶ The Lebanese government's official endorsement of America's policy, which went further than any other pro-American Arab government, was a divisive decision that "further polarized the divided loyalties of the [Lebanese] population and worsened already strained relations with [Egypt's] Nasser."⁷ Indeed, Chamoun's overt declaration in support of American regional policy and newly enacted domestic policies that limited the freedom of expression and expanded the scope of the government's censorship of the press only served to galvanize opposition to his government further and resulted in the dissolution of the Lebanese parliament. Among the opposition, support for Nasser, predominately among Sunnis who viewed Chamoun's acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine as a slight towards their community and a violation of the National Pact of 1943, was particularly strong. However, the Lebanese opposition was divided between those opposed to Chamoun's foreign and domestic policy and those solely opposed to his domestic policy. The former formed a Sunni-led, pro-Nasser opposition coalition known as the National Front under the leadership of 'Abdallah al-Yafi and Saeb Salam. At the same time, the latter coalesced around Kamal Jumblatt's Progressive Socialist Party and Beshara al-Khuri's Constitutional Union Party (CUP).⁸ Meanwhile, as internal opposition to Chamoun organized, an infuriated Nasser ordered the intensification of Egypt's propaganda attacks and subversive activities to destabilize Chamoun and his government.⁹

Tensions and hostility between Beirut and the Cairo-Damascus alliance only intensified over the following months as summer parliamentary elections approached. The SSNP continued to denounce growing communist infiltration and influence in Syria through its mouthpiece *Sada Lubnan* and remained concerned about the Syrian Deuxième Bureau's activities in Lebanon designed to counter its activities and undermine Chamoun.¹⁰ While the party had enjoyed the Lebanese government's protection, it grew concerned that Lt. Colonel

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Antun Sa'ad, the head of Lebanon's Deuxième Bureau, was working closely with his Syrian counterparts, providing them with important information on the party's activities in Lebanon.¹¹ To be sure, Sa'ad and Sarraj did not have the best of relations, but whatever tensions may have existed between them and their respective intelligence bureaus would not necessarily preclude cooperation on matters in which both had a vested interest. The party also worked to thwart Syrian and Egyptian efforts to subvert Jordan, whose policy orientation had shifted towards the West and its anti-communist views became more pronounced. The Syrian military's limited participation in an attempted putsch to overthrow King Hussein in early April heightened already strained tensions between Amman and Damascus and hardened Jordan's anti-Nasserist and anti-communist stance. It also led Jordan to intensify its subversive campaign against Syria, which included making overtures to the Syrian opposition. In this context, King Hussein invited Asad al-Ashqar and Salah al-Shishakli to his palace to discuss Syria and forge a cooperative relationship of some sort. According to British reports, the SSNP offered to assist Jordanian security services during the Saudi monarch's planned visit to thwart any Syrian effort to cause trouble or harm to King Sa'ud.¹²

At the end of May, as parliamentary elections neared, the opposition accused the Lebanese government of interfering in the elections and demanded a "neutral" government oversee the elections were free and fair, calling for a general strike should its demands not be met. The Lebanese government denied the accusations and prohibited public demonstrations of any sort. Ignoring the order, opposition leaders Salam and Yafi "called for a general strike and peaceful demonstration to mobilize popular support on behalf of [the opposition's] demands," but "the peaceful demonstration degenerated into a violent scuffle between the opposition and security forces."¹³ Adib Qadurra, the head of the SSNP's Higher Council and a candidate in the coming elections, called on all involved to avoid sowing discord, denouncing the influence of sectarianism and communism, and the SSNP issued a statement supporting free elections and the preservation of Lebanon as a bastion of thought and freedom.¹⁴ While Lebanese elections were generally free, the opposition's claims of interference were not entirely unfounded as foreign meddling had already manifested itself in the parliamentary contest. The United States, through the CIA, was providing funds to Chamoun that were used to support pro-Western candidates, particularly those supportive of the Eisenhower Doctrine,¹⁵ while the British, determined to maintain Lebanon's pro-Western orientation, were supportive of efforts to strengthen Chamoun and his allies. On the other hand, Egypt and Syria, possibly with Soviet backing, financially supported opposition candidates, and Syrian intelligence smuggled weapons to opposition forces in-country.¹⁶ Notably, however, "while Syrian and Egyptian assistance was blatant, that of the Western powers was far subtler

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Umran, Mohammad**(1922-1972)**

Mohammad Umran studied at the Homs Military Academy and joined the Baath Party of Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Bitar in 1947. In 1953, he helped overthrow the military government of General Adib al-Shishakli, which had previously outlawed the Baath and sent its leadership into exile.

While working undercover against Shishakli, Umran became a student of the Baath Party leader Akram al-Hawrani and was highly influenced by his views. Umran also became a fervent supporter of Egypt in the second half of the 1950s and rallied in support of President Gamal Abd al-Nasser. Umran advocated Syria's merger with Egypt to form the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958 and allied himself with other Baath officers who shared his pro-Nasser views. In 1960, Umran and the other officers founded the Military Committee of the Baath Party, a secret coalition determined to preserve the UAR and uphold Nasser's views of Arab nationalism. The ages of the coalition members ranged from twenty-eight to thirty-eight, and Umran was the oldest. He was appointed president of the committee and held this post until the Baath came to power in 1963.

In September 1961, a coup dissolved the UAR and the leaders of the new government dismissed most of the officers from Syrian Army. The Military Committee vowed to oppose the post-Nasser government of President Nazim al-Qudsi. The young party members were influenced by the coup that took place in Iraq on February 8, 1963, and which led to the killing of General Abd al-Karim Qasim. The Iraqi coup was carried out by a group of Baath Party officers, and Umran hoped that he and his comrades could do the same thing in Syria.

On March 8, 1963, the Baath officers came to power in Damascus, overthrowing Qudsi and promising to restore the UAR. Umran toppled General Abd al-Karim al-Abid and took over command of the 70th Armoured Brigade at Kisweh, south of Damascus. Back in military uniform after once being fired by Qudsi, Umran was now commander of one of the most strategically placed military units in Syria. The country's new leaders distributed government and military posts to senior party members, and Umran became a deputy to Prime

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Threatened with expulsion by his former comrades, Umran publicly shifted into Aflaq's orbit and offered his allegiance to the civilian wing of the Baath Party. In retaliation, the officers stripped him of his military title, expelled him from the Military Committee, and made him ambassador to Spain, the traditional exile for political dissidents.

Aflaq responded to Umran's maltreatment by calling eighty of his followers into conference and passing a law making the Regional Command, dominated by officers, subject to the authority of the civilian National Command, a body under Aflaq's chairmanship. Michel Aflaq added that an officer could not be transferred from his post or dismissed from office without authorization from the civilian leadership. Aflaq was then replaced by Dr Munif al-Razzaz, another civilian Baathist, who created a new pro-Aflaq leadership for Syria. Bitar was reappointed prime minister. Amin al-Hafez was kept as president. Umran became minister of defense. And Mansur al-Atrash, a veteran member of the Baath, was appointed president of a Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) that excluded members of the Military Committee.

Salah Jadid, Umran's chief military rival, rebelled against these orders and arrested a number of Umran's allies in the armed forces. Umran assumed his new duties on February 21, 1966, and carried out his revenge by transferring three of Jadid's best men to remote districts and dismissing a handful of others. He transferred the powerful Ahmad Suwaydani, a powerful Jadid loyalist, from Military Intelligence to a ceremonial post at Officers Administration.

The military wing struck back with a final blow, toppling President Amin al-Hafez, along with the two Baath leaders Aflaq and Bitar, and arresting Mohammad Umran on February 23, 1966. Umran was discharged from the Syrian Army and expelled from the Baath Party. Jadid jailed him in the Mezze prison in Damascus where he remained until the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 broke out. To unite Syria in the face of Israeli arms, Jadid ordered the release of all political prisoners. Umran went to Lebanon and supported the coup that ousted Jadid in November 1970 and brought Hafez al-Assad to power.

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There was a somewhat bizarre footnote to this entire affair, when Steve, quoting Khalil, passed on warm regards to us from ‘Mister Lotz’, and in the same breath told us that the Egyptians had known the true identity of this so-called ‘German’ all along, but that they had played along in order not to create new tensions during our negotiations.⁴

Finally, after talking to Mahmoud Khalil once again, Steve told us that he understood our position but could not set a date for a further meeting at that point, since such a meeting required highly detailed preparations. Our interpretation of this was that Khalil needed Nasser’s backing, and that only if the ‘*Ra’iss*’ deigned to give him the go-ahead would he be willing to meet us once again. In the end it was decided that Mahmoud Khalil would look into the possibility of meeting us two to three weeks later, when he was due

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After a two-hour discussion, in the course of which Khalil asked for Israeli help in securing the loan, the Egyptian officer asked the Mossad representative for ‘something in writing’. Initially he requested that the letter be prepared for him by that same evening, but the Mossad agent explained that the issue was a very weighty one, and had to be referred back to Israel for approval. Khalil then requested that the letter be sent to him to Egypt. In the end, however, they agreed to meet elsewhere in Europe at the beginning of October 1965, at which time it was agreed Khalil would be given the letter. Toward the end of the conversation, Khalil mentioned Lotz once again (this time ‘from the horse’s mouth’, as it were), remarking that the Egyptians could have sentenced the Israeli spy to death and executed him, but had decided not to.

Mahmoud was not reassured, and reiterated his fear that it would be a ‘disaster’ if the existence of these meetings were ever leaked. He talked at

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Intelligence for Peace

length about Nasser’s suspicious nature, claiming that following any Israeli statement (such as a recent one by Golda Me’ir) regarding Israel’s desire for peace, the President immediately expected some act of aggression. It was my impression that these fundamental feelings of suspicion were indeed deeply embedded, and perhaps even had some basis in reality.