

Social Interactions with Endogeneous Group Formation

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Model

- Classical linear-in-means model

$$y_i = \sum_{j=1}^n w_{ij} y_j \gamma_1 + \sum_{j=1}^n w_{ij} x'_j \gamma_2 + x'_i \gamma_3 + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

- workhorse in the literature on peer effects
- w : exogenous or endogenous
- w : group structure observed or unobserved

This paper

Groups **observed** and **endogenously** formed via two-sided many-to-one matching without transfers

- **COMMENT**: groups do not interact, $w_{ij} = 0$ if $g_i \neq g_j$
how restrictive? network formation with block structure?
- **COMMENT**: individuals join only one group (restrictive?)

Group formation

Two-sided many-to-one matching w/o transfers (Azevedo and Leshno (2016))

$$u_{ig} = z'_i \delta_g^u + \xi_{ig} \quad \text{and} \quad v_{gi} = z'_i \delta_g^v + \eta_{gi} \quad (2)$$

COMMENT: No peer effects in group formation

EQUILIBRIUM: Group cutoffs $p = (p_1, \dots, p_G)$

$$\mathbf{1}\{g_i = g\} = \underbrace{\mathbf{1}\{\eta_{gi} \geq p_g - z'_i \delta_g^v\}}_{i \text{ qualifies for } g} \prod_{h \neq g} \underbrace{\mathbf{1}\{\xi_{ih} - \xi_{ig} < z'_i (\delta_g^u - \delta_h^u)\}}_{i \text{ prefers } g \text{ to } h} \quad \text{OR} \quad \underbrace{\mathbf{1}\{\eta_{hi} < p_h - z'_i \delta_h^v\}}_{i \text{ doesn't qualify for } h}$$

Essentially a multinomial choice problem with endogenous choice set

Equilibrium p clears demand and supply

Selection Bias

We assume a completely nonparametric distribution $f(\epsilon_i, \xi_i, \eta_i)$

$$\mathbb{E}[\epsilon_i | x, z, g(z, \xi, \eta; p(z, \xi, \eta))] \neq 0 \quad (3)$$

- ① Because ϵ_i is allowed to be correlated with unobservables ξ_i and η_i
- ② Because ϵ_i is correlated with ξ and η since $p(z, \xi, \eta)$

This is a very high-dimensional object

Approximation

The equilibrium cutoffs for a fixed n are

$$p_n = (p_{n,1}, \dots, p_{n,G}) \quad (4)$$

Azevedo and Leshno (2016) show that as $n \rightarrow \infty$

$$p_n \rightarrow p^* = (p_1^*, \dots, p_G^*) \quad (5)$$

Note: p^* is **unique** and **deterministic**

By continuous mapping we get

$$\mathbb{E}[\epsilon_i | \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{z}, \mathbf{g}(\mathbf{z}, \boldsymbol{\xi}, \boldsymbol{\eta}; p_n)] \rightarrow \mathbb{E}[\epsilon_i | x_i, z_i, g_i(z_i, \xi_i, \eta_i; p^*)] \quad (6)$$

which is now lower dimension

Selection function

There exist a selection function (a la Heckman)

$$\mathbb{E}[\epsilon_i | x_i, z_i, g_i = g] = \lambda_g(\tau_i) \quad (7)$$

where $\tau_i = (z_i' \delta_1^u, \dots, z_i' \delta_G^u, z_i' \delta_1^v, \dots, z_i' \delta_G^v)$

Note: The bias correction function $\lambda_g(\tau_i)$ is **group-specific**

$$y_i = \textcolor{blue}{w_i y} \gamma_1 + \textcolor{red}{w_i x} \gamma_2 + \textcolor{black}{x_i'} \gamma_3 + \textcolor{brown}{\lambda_{g_i}(\tau_i)} + \nu_i \quad (8)$$

Identification problem?: if $w_{ij} = 1/n_{g_i}$,

$$\textcolor{blue}{w_i y} = \sum_{j=1}^n w_{ij} y_j \quad \text{and} \quad \textcolor{red}{w_i x} = \sum_{j=1}^n w_{ij} x_j \quad (9)$$

are also **group-specific** averages

Exchangeability

So assume **fixed effect** in the preferences

$$u_{ig} = \alpha_g + z'_i \delta_g^u + \xi_{ig} \quad \text{and} \quad v_{gi} = z'_i \delta_g^v + \eta_{gi} \quad (10)$$

and define extended indices $\tau_{ig}^e = (\alpha_g + z'_i \delta_g^u, p_g - z'_i \delta_g^v)$.

Assume **exchangeability** for unobservables ξ_i and η_i

$$f(\epsilon_i, \xi_{i1}, \dots, \xi_{iG}, \eta_{1i}, \dots, \eta_{Gi}) = f(\epsilon_i, \xi_{ik_1}, \dots, \xi_{ik_G}, \eta_{k_1i}, \dots, \eta_{k_Gi}) \quad (11)$$

for any permutation (k_1, \dots, k_G) of the groups.

Then the selection bias is **group-invariant**

$$\mathbb{E}[\epsilon_i | x_i, z_i, g_i = g] = \lambda^e(\tau_{ig}^e, \tau_{i,-g}^e) \quad (12)$$

IDENTIFICATION p^*

He et al 2022 show how to identify the parameters δ

To identify p^* (and α) compute conditional probabilities

$$\sigma_{h|g}(p_g - z'_i \delta_g^v) = P(g_i = h | p_g - z'_i \delta_g^v) = P(g_i = h | z'_i \delta_g^v) \quad (13)$$

$$\sigma_{h|1}(p_1 - z'_j \delta_1^v) = P(g_j = h | p_1 - z'_j \delta_1^v) = P(g_j = h | z'_j \delta_1^v) \quad (14)$$

because of **exchangeability**

$$\sigma_{h|g}(\cdot) = \sigma_{h|1}(\cdot) = \sigma_h(\cdot) \quad (15)$$

Assuming $\sigma_h(\cdot)$ **strictly monotone**, if you can find i and j such that

$$\sigma_{h|g}(p_g - z'_i \delta_g^v) = \sigma_{h|1}(p_1 - z'_j \delta_1^v) \Rightarrow p_g - z'_i \delta_g^v = p_1 - z'_j \delta_1^v \quad (16)$$

Then identification of p_g follow from **normalization** $p_1 = 0$.

IDENTIFICATION γ

$$y_i = \textcolor{red}{w_i} \textcolor{red}{y} \gamma_1 + \textcolor{blue}{w_i} \textcolor{blue}{x} \gamma_2 + \textcolor{green}{x'_i} \gamma_3 + \lambda^e(\tau_{ig}^e, \tau_{i,-g}^e) + \nu_i \quad (17)$$

Take $\mathbb{E}(\cdot | \tau_{ig}^e, \tau_{i,-g}^e)$ and subtract to obtain

$$y_i = \widetilde{w_i} \textcolor{red}{y} \gamma_1 + \widetilde{w_i} \textcolor{blue}{x} \gamma_2 + \widetilde{x'_i} \gamma_3 + \lambda^e(\tau_{ig}^e, \tau_{i,-g}^e) + \nu_i \quad (18)$$

IDEA: Use z_i as instrument for $w_i y$

$$X_i = (\textcolor{red}{w_i} \textcolor{red}{y}, \textcolor{blue}{w_i} \textcolor{blue}{x}, \textcolor{green}{x'_i}) \quad \text{and} \quad Z_i = (z_i, \textcolor{blue}{w_i} \textcolor{blue}{x}, \textcolor{green}{x'_i}) \quad (19)$$

and you can build moment like this

$$\mathbb{E} \left[Z_i \left(\widetilde{y}_i - \widetilde{X'_i} \gamma \right) \right] = 0 \quad (20)$$

So identification follows from rank conditions on $\mathbb{E}[Z_i Z'_i]$ and $\mathbb{E}[Z_i \widetilde{X'_i}]$

Summary

- Great paper
- Some clever tricks and methodology
- Needs a killer application to become **memorable**