

makes history didactics a crucial aspect of all production and dissemination of history. Generally, history didactics could be defined as pertaining to what history we convey, why we convey it and how we convey it within a certain context.⁷⁶ The history didactical perspective does not focus on history primarily, but rather on how history is portrayed, interpreted and used in contemporary society, i.e. what can be called the cultural or sociological aspects of history.⁷⁷ This means that all encounters with history take place in a specific context and this context is essential for how we choose to approach history. For these reasons how we approach and use history becomes essential in history didactics and it also becomes the point of departure for all research that is history didactical in character.⁷⁸

Memory and Remembering

If our preconceptions and prior understanding play an important role in how we choose to approach history, memory could be argued to be a central notion in this.⁷⁹ The view of memory and remembering applied here regards memory not as a passive entity that merely registers what individuals experience, but rather as something active that is constructed by individuals according to the conceptions they have of the world through the act of remembering.⁸⁰ American researcher James E. Young has claimed that “memory is never seamless, but always a montage of collected fragments, recomposed by each person and generation”⁸¹ and with an approach akin to this, memory indeed becomes a practice that is enacted by individuals over and over again. Consequently, it is dependent on the memory constitution or pattern of the experiencing individual: memories are constituted and constructed by the act of remembering. Furthermore, human beings are social beings and our memories are affected by the social environment we grow up in, meaning that we never construct memories in isolation but always within social contexts.⁸²

Thus, memory and remembering can be understood as complex notions. Further, as has been noted in research, individuals are often subjected to and proprietors of many different memories and acts of remembrance since

⁷⁶ See Jeismann, ‘Geschichtsbewußtsein - Theorie’, 42. ⁷⁷

Nordgren, *Vems är historien?*, 14.

⁷⁸ Per Eliasson et al., ‘Inledning’, in *Historia på väg mot framtiden: Historiedidaktiska perspektiv på skola och samhälle*, ed. Per Eliasson et al. (Lund: Lunds universitet, 2010), 9–10.

⁷⁹ See Pierre Nora, ‘Between Memory and History: Les lieux de mémoire’, *Representations*, no. 26 (1989): 7–

24. Although I am sceptical of Nora’s distinction between ‘direct traditional memory’ and ‘indirect modern memory,’ I am sympathetic to his general discussion on the relationship between memory and history.

⁸⁰ See Schechtman, *The Constitution of Selves*, 124–25.

⁸¹ James E. Young, *The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 198.

⁸² See Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 37–40; Mihai Stelian Rusu, ‘History and Collective Memory: The Succeeding Incarnations of an Evolving Relationship’, *Philobiblon XVIII*, no. 2 (2013): 261.

memories are created by individuals, but at the same time these memories are socially, culturally and linguistically contingent, and therefore affected by the context in which they are conceived and disseminated.⁸³ They are always located within a historical culture.

Generally, memory is perceived to be something rather distinct from history: where memory is claimed to be fragmentary, subjective, arbitrary and unreliable, history is characterised by a critical methodological inquiry.⁸⁴ From a history didactical perspective, however, it could be argued that it is difficult to separate memory from history analytically since we always approach history with preconceptions of what it is, i.e. we have memories that affect our perceptions of things. Indeed, these memories can be revised, changed or deleted through a serious study of history, but we nevertheless carry them with us.⁸⁵ This is because we are born into historical cultures – ways of making sense of the past that are culturally embedded in our social environments both implicitly and explicitly.

The Present Perspective on History

French philosopher Roland Barthes once likened the role of historians to that of organisers: instead of merely collecting and compiling historical facts, they purposefully organise them to establish meaning and sense.⁸⁶ Thus, historians are regarded not as passive collectors of historical facts, but rather as active participants in the creation of history. When historians write history they do so with a purpose and they do so within a community of research that affects what is perceived to be legitimate historical inquiries and methods of inquiry.⁸⁷ Furthermore, historians are human beings with passions, interests, memories and preconceptions, and these could be argued to play a central role in the kind of research they choose to engage in. Instead of taking this as an argument as to why historical research should be labelled relativist or subjectivist (and therefore scientifically unappealing), this should be understood as quite the opposite. It is through acknowledging and making explicit the subjective, interpretational and representational practices that go into doing historical research, that historical accounts acquire truth-value.⁸⁸ It is when we are able to assess historical research according to theoretical,

⁸³ See Gregor Feindt et al., 'Entangled Memory: Toward a Third Wave in Memory Studies', *History and Theory* 53, no. 1 (1 February 2014): 31–35.

⁸⁴ See Stéphane Lévesque, *Thinking Historically: Educating Students for the Twenty-First Century* (Toronto: Buffalo, 2008), 7–9.

⁸⁵ See Rusu, 'History and Collective Memory: The Succeeding Incarnations of an Evolving Relationship', 262–64.

⁸⁶ Roland Barthes, 'The Discourse of History', in *The Postmodern History Reader*, ed. Keith Jenkins (New York: Routledge, 2001), 121.

⁸⁷ See Avner Segall, 'Critical History: Implications for History/Social Studies Education', *Theory & Research in Social Education* 27, no. 3 (1 June 1999): 364.

⁸⁸ See Robert J. Parkes, 'No Outside History: Reconsidering Postmodernism', *Agora (Sungraphô)* 49, no. 3 (2014): 8.

methodological and (if you like) logical standards that we are able to conclude anything about the quality of the historical research we are presented with.⁸⁹ This is also what I believe distinguishes history from memory.

While both memory and history can be said to be contextually contingent according to this logic, we normally have differing criteria for what holds to be valid and true in terms of memories and historical narratives. For a historical narrative to be accepted as true in the historical research community, a basic requirement is that it is guided by a methodological inquiry that is transparent, relevant and logical. Hence it is through its reliance on critical methodological inquiry that history gains its scientific value.⁹⁰ This is also what makes the history didactical perspective crucial when it comes to history and historical research since history didactics stress the cultural and contextual aspects of history. According to history didactics, all history is conceived for a purpose and how we understand history is contingent on who we are and what preconceptions we have of history.⁹¹ In this sense it could be argued that all historical inquiries make use of history for various purposes.

Furthermore, if we apply a hermeneutic approach to history, history must include an assessment of the uses inherent in history, or the representational practices that go into disseminating something historical. Otherwise we run the risk of making arbitrary representations of history that would not meet the basic criteria for historical research stipulated here. Once again, this does not imply that historical knowledge becomes impossible, but rather that historical knowledge requires being specific about context, both that of the historical agent or source, and that of the person doing the interpretation.⁹²

Historical Narratives

If everything we experience has to be put into narrative form, then this also has to apply to history. There are many suggestions for how we should approach historical narratives,⁹³ but the one applied here was developed by German theorist of history Jörn Rüsen. According to Rüsen there are four different types of historical narratives: (i) the *traditional* narrative seeks to uphold tradition and argue continuity or status-quo, (ii) the *exemplary* narrative strives to derive rules of conduct from history in order to guide present action, (iii) the *critical* narrative is used to criticise historical or contemporary phenomena or show alternative ways of acting, and (iv) the *genetic* narrative attempts to show how continuity and change is what characterises

⁸⁹ See Anders Berge, *Att begripa det förflutna: Förklaring, klassificering, kolligation inom historievetenskapen* (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1995), 9–12.

⁹⁰ See Rolf Torstendahl, *Introduktion till historieforskningen: Historia som vetenskap*, 2nd ed. (Stockholm: Natur och kultur, 1971), 56.

⁹¹ See Parkes, *Interrupting History*, 119–20.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 6–15.

⁹³ See Eileen H. Tamura, 'Narrative History and Theory', *History of Education Quarterly* 51, no. 2 (May 2011): 151–52.

history.⁹⁴ Although these four kinds of narratives always intermingle and co-exist they depend on different ways of understanding and approaching history, according to Rüsen. The traditional and exemplary narratives regard history as static: the historical narrative is used to keep things the way they are, or to show why they should stay the way they are. From an epistemic perspective, this could be argued to indicate a view of history that is non-disciplinary and non-contingent. If the historical narrative is used to uphold tradition or argue normative values, it is regarded as something that is static and given, i.e. not a result of interpretation and representation. A critical narrative is different in the sense that it does not try to uphold something but disrupt it. However, cognitively it could be argued to be similar to the previous historical narratives since the historical narrative is used as a kind of conversation stopper: 'You are wrong because this historical example shows that something contrary to your beliefs is actually the case.' Once again, the historical example is treated as something impervious to change and interpretation. The genetic narrative could, however, be perceived to be cognitively different from the others and here the historical example is used not as a conversation stopper, but rather as a conversation opener. History is treated as contingent on interpretation and representation, i.e. it is contextually contingent. Hence, the historical narrative is perceived as dynamic and open to change depending on perspectives applied and questions asked to it. Historical facts, events and categories are not given as final, but rather depend on who you are, what you consider to be historically significant and what questions you ask.⁹⁵ How you view historical knowledge is pertinent to how you perceive and approach history.

Historical Knowledge and Understanding

If we proceed with a Gadamerian perspective of sense-making, we come to a particular notion of how historical knowledge and understanding are made possible. The key aspect here is the extent to which the individual engages with the historicity, not only of the historical accounts they are confronted with, but also of their own preconceptions and prejudices.⁹⁶ According to this view, understanding and knowledge is always formed in the relationship between past and present horizons, and it is through an awareness and acknowledgement of the interplay and relationship between these two horizons that historical knowledge is obtained. Accordingly, it is essential that we understand how important the historical agent's temporal and spatial context was for their understanding of the world, and how important our own temporal and spatial context is for our approach to and understanding of

⁹⁴ Jörn Rüsen, 'Tradition: A Principle of Historical Sense-Generation and Its Logic and Effect in Historical Culture', *History and Theory* 51, no. 4 (2012): 52.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 52–55.

⁹⁶ See Retz, 'A Moderate Hermeneutical Approach to Empathy in History Education', 224.

history, i.e. that history is characterised by both genetic *and* genealogical perspectives and thus always contemporary and contextually contingent.⁹⁷

According to this view, the level of contextualisation that an individual can apply to history is pertinent to their epistemic attitudes towards knowledge, i.e. their attitudes to the character and nature of historical accounts. In other words, the level of contextualisation is relevant to their historical understanding. Individuals that display no awareness of the representational practices of history have no means of treating contradictory accounts of history other than rejecting them or accepting them, since they lack a method for analysing historical narratives from the historically relevant perspectives.⁹⁸ With an understanding of the contextually contingent character of history, a *historiographic gaze*, to borrow Australian historian Robert Parkes' term, that engages with the contingency and historicity of all perspectives (including your own one),⁹⁹ it becomes possible for an individual to assess and analyse different accounts of history in a complex manner, and we also have a method for ascertaining the value of the historical piece of information at hand. Few historians would use sources that have no provenance regarding their origin, i.e. knowledge about the context of the source, and few historians would accept historical narratives that do not comply with the theoretical and methodological requirements that the discipline enforces.¹⁰⁰ As soon as we apply historical methodology to claims of historical knowledge that do not incorporate a contextual analysis, they become examples of mythology or fantasy rather than knowledge.¹⁰¹ This stresses the need for an awareness of the *cultural* aspects of historical research and history, i.e. that all history is culturally contingent – it belongs to a historical culture.

Historical Culture

Historical culture is a concept that deals with the relationship to history that individuals, groups of people, institutions and societies may have. It deals with how history is disseminated and how knowledge, attitudes and values

⁹⁷ See Per Eliasson, 'Kan ett historiemedvetande fördjupas?', in *Historien är nu: En introduktion till historiedidaktiken*, ed. Klas-Göran Karlsson and Ulf Zander (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2009), 317, 325; Sam Wineburg, *Historical Thinking and Other Unnatural Acts: Charting the Future of Teaching the Past* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001), 18–24.

⁹⁸ See VanSledright and Reddy, 'Changing Epistemic Beliefs?', 32–36.

⁹⁹ See Parkes, *Interrupting History*, 120.

¹⁰⁰ Cecilia Axelsson, 'Att hantera källor - på gymnasienivå.', in *Kritiska perspektiv på historiedidaktiken*, ed. David Ludvigsson, *Aktuellt om historia*, 2013:2 (Eksjö: Historielärarnas förening, 2013), 72; Bråten et al.,

'The Role of Epistemic Beliefs in the Comprehension of Multiple Expository Texts', 54–55; Peter Lee and Rosalynn Ashby, 'Progression in Historical Understanding among Students Ages 7-14', in *Knowing, Teaching, and Learning History: National and International Perspectives*, ed. Peter N. Stearns, Peter Seixas and Sam Wineburg (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 204–12.

¹⁰¹ See Knut Kjeldstadli, *Det förflutna är inte vad det en gång var* (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1998), 44–55; Quentin Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas', *History and Theory* 8, no. 1 (1 January 1969): 6–7.

about history provide individuals with meaning.¹⁰² Hence it is a concept that can be applied at both a general, or collective, level and a less general individual level. It is within a historical culture that individuals' encounters with history occur and where the conditions for these encounters are established.¹⁰³ In this sense, a historical culture can be argued to affect the relations individuals, groups of people and institutions have to history firstly, since it is already present when a certain individual enters a social environment and secondly, since most history, per definition, cannot be experienced first hand by individuals, it is rather experienced through historical accounts that are disseminated in speech, writing or through customs and cultural habits. Thus it could be argued that individuals never encounter history nakedly but always through a cultural or social environment. We are affected by what families, friends, schools, the media and governments (et cetera) say about history.¹⁰⁴ A historical culture can, in this way, be perceived as a genre¹⁰⁵ or coherence system that renders certain things historically significant and meaningful and others meaningless and irrelevant.¹⁰⁶

Furthermore, it is important to stress that historical culture is rarely, if ever, monolithic. Although certain perceptions of history may be dominant in a given social environment, there can be varying, sometimes opposing, historical cultures in a society. This can be due to social, economic, professional, political, ethnical, religious or other reasons. Therefore, historical cultures are dynamic and can change over time; they can be seen as both structure and process at the same time.¹⁰⁷

Moreover, we are not determined by the historical culture that surrounds us: through our relationship to history we can change a historical culture. We can choose to assert a certain historical culture, or we can choose to criticise it. Why we do so depends on how we regard history substantively and epistemically. This means that we may have an opposing view of what history contains and what should count as historically significant (this is what I mean with substantively). Alternatively, we could have an epistemic view of historical narratives as contextually contingent and for this reason be more cautious in asserting a certain historical culture as the only legitimate or possible one (this is what I mean with epistemically).¹⁰⁸ From this viewpoint, there is a kind of doubleness regarding historical culture in the sense that it

¹⁰² See Erik Sjöberg, *Battlefields of Memory: The Macedonian Conflict and Greek Historical Culture*, Umeå Studies in History and Education 6 (Umeå: Umeå universitet, 2011), 8.

¹⁰³ See Karlsson, *Europeiska möten med historien*, 76.

¹⁰⁴ See Jukka Rantala, 'Children as Consumers of Historical Culture in Finland', *Journal of Curriculum Studies* 43, no. 4 (August 2011): 494–95.

¹⁰⁵ See Charles L. Briggs and Richard Bauman, 'Genre, Intertextuality, and Social Power', *Journal of Linguistic Anthropology* 2, no. 2 (1992): 143.

¹⁰⁶ See Peter Aronsson, *Historiebruk: Att använda det förflutna* (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2004), 86–87. ¹⁰⁷ See Sjöberg, *Battlefields of Memory: The Macedonian Conflict and Greek Historical Culture*, 9–10. ¹⁰⁸ See Rüsen, 'Tradition', 57–58.

enables us an access to history (and thus limits what we can experience, think, or know about it) while we can also uphold and change historical culture through how we interact with it, through how we make use of history.

Uses of History

History can be used in different ways in different societies at different times and we manifest our historical consciousnesses and historical cultures through our uses of history.¹⁰⁹ The notion of uses of history is generally defined as a use where conceptions of the past that emanate from a historical culture in different ways are used to create meaning, orientate in the present and influence the future.¹¹⁰ Given the theoretical approach taken here, I have chosen to specify this use as narrative enactments of the past. Thus uses of history can be defined as narrative enactments of the past that are applied to create meaning, orientate in the present and influence the future.

In 1874 German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche published a text in which he criticised what he perceived to be the contemporary obsession with history. He saw a danger in the heavy reliance on history and argued that we need a mixture of both past and present, memory and oblivion. According to Nietzsche there was a great risk in studying history for the sake of history: if we do so we might lose ourselves in the historical maze, and, more importantly, history will become meaningless to us. It will just become an exercise in facts and figures that has no practical use in everyday life. What Nietzsche proposed instead was that history needs to have a practical use (a use of history) in order to be meaningful to us.¹¹¹ Nietzsche discerned three ways of using history, all of them with benefits and drawbacks. The *monumental* use of history is positive because it will remind us of past heroes and great deeds and can thus be a good guidance for us in life. On the other hand, he argued, history never repeats itself and if we rely too heavily on the monumental use of history we will fail to realise that history, society and people change.¹¹² The *antiquarian* use of history is valuable since it helps us keep traditions alive, but it can also make us overly nostalgic, backward and appreciative of past times.¹¹³ The *critical* use of history is useful since everything in history needs to be assessed, according to Nietzsche, but a single-handedly critical orientation can be adverse since people adhering to it could fail to realise that we are all part of a tradition we cannot dissociate ourselves from, no matter how

¹⁰⁹ See Karlsson, 'Historia, historiedidaktik och historiekultur - teori och perspektiv', 72.

¹¹⁰ See Per Eliasson et al., "Det är smart att använda historia i nya händelser..." Historiebruk i skola och samhälle', in *Historiedidaktik i Norden 9*, ed. Per Eliasson et al. (Malmö; Halmstad: Malmö högskola; Högs-kolan i Halmstad, 2012), 262.

¹¹¹ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Om historiens nytta och skada: En otidsenlig betraktelse* (Stockholm: Rabén Prisma, 1998), 38–39.

¹¹² Ibid., 42–50.

¹¹³ Ibid., 51–56.

painful or unfashionable it may be. We always need to relate to it.¹¹⁴ Furthermore, historical research is not the place to look for answers since it cannot show why history matters to us or should matter to us; that can only be answered by what practical use history has in our contemporary lives.¹¹⁵

In a Swedish context the concept of uses of history has become central during the last couple of decades, both in history didactical research and in Swedish history curricula. Swedish historian Klas-Göran Karlsson was the first to introduce the concept in research in Sweden. When studying how history was used in Russia after the collapse of communism, he found that history indeed played an integral part not only regarding how people came to understand their society, but also themselves and people around them. This is because history plays a crucial role in our lives.¹¹⁶ Through using history people seek to orientate themselves in the world and create meaning in both their personal lives and the world around them. Klas-Göran Karlsson has attempted to typify different kinds of uses of history that we employ when we approach the past. All these uses of history stem from a certain need or interest among individuals or institutions to make sense of the past or present and influence the future. Put another way, whenever we feel a certain need or interest we use history to satisfy that need or interest – history is used with a certain goal or agenda in mind. According to the latest version of Karlsson's typology, history can be used to satisfy needs in the following ways:

- Scientifically – to obtain and construct new knowledge through an analytical and methodological approach;
- Politico-pedagogically – to illustrate, make public, and create debate;
- Morally – to rediscover and show historical wrong-doings and shortcomings;
- Ideologically – to justify and/or argue something, to make sense of the past;
- Existentially – to remember, create meaning in life, and build identities;
- A non-use – to cover up, conceal, or try to make some historical events, persons or periods fall into public neglect.¹¹⁷

Similar to Nietzsche, one aim of Karlsson's typology is to show that history can be used for a number of reasons and that the scientific use of history

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 57–59.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 92–98.

¹¹⁶ Klas-Göran Karlsson, *Historia som vapen: Historiebruk och Sovjetunionens upplösning 1985–1995*

(Stockholm: Natur och kultur, 1999), 50–53.

¹¹⁷ Karlsson, 'Historia, Historiedidaktik och historiekultur - teori och perspektiv', 73–78.

(that is supposedly regarded as the only legitimate one by the historical research community¹¹⁸) is merely one of many. In that sense one could say that Karlsson's typology tries to argue a broader conception of what are legitimate uses of history: history is used by many kinds of agents and for many kinds of reasons, and history is always used to satisfy a need or interest, both among individuals and institutions. Thus, Karlsson's typology shows that people (and institutions) may use history for a number of reasons, that these uses relate to how we perceive history at a rather fundamental level, and that these uses stem from a personal need to find direction or meaning using the historical example. I have chosen to call the perspective that Nietzsche and Karlsson apply on uses of history a teleological one since it seeks to illustrate the needs to which a certain use of history corresponds.

To analyse cognitive or epistemic aspects of how individuals use history, I have chosen to apply Jörn Rüsen's typology of historical narratives as presented above. The idea here is that when individuals use history to satisfy certain needs (i.e. when they use history teleologically) they can do so in different ways depending on how they perceive history. A narrative that uses history *traditionally* (i.e. a constructivist narrative that presents history in a factual way) could be regarded as indicative of a view of history as something unaffected by the context in which it was conceived or received. A narrative that uses history *critically* (i.e. a narrative that seeks to question or criticise) could be regarded as an indication of a view of history that acknowledges history as contextually contingent, but excludes the subjective position from this analysis. Finally, a narrative that uses history *genetically* (i.e. a narrative that engages with the dynamic and contingent character of history) can be seen as an indication of a view of history that incorporates both the historiographic gaze and the personal subjective position in the analyses of the contextual contingency of history. I have chosen to call these uses of history narratological since they illustrate the narratological properties that uses of history may have. Taken together, these two dimensions of uses of history may be applied to analyse why we use history the way we do, and also how we do it, and thus they can be used to shed light on how our manifestations of history relate to how we perceive it. A concept that deals explicitly with the more intricate and complex question of how we perceive history is historical consciousness.

Historical Consciousness

In a sense, an individual's use of history can be regarded as an indicator of their historical consciousness since it stems from how individuals perceive

¹¹⁸ Klas-Göran Karlsson, 'Historiedidaktik: Begrepp, teori och analys', in *Historien är nu: En introduktion till historiedidaktiken*, ed. Ulf Zander and Klas-Göran Karlsson (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2009), 58.

and understand history.¹¹⁹ Hans-Georg Gadamer has claimed that historical consciousness is the epistemological condition of modern man and that it is one of the most important developments in the last 500 years. In Gadamer's view, historical consciousness is the awareness that everything around us is historical and relative to this fact, this historicity.¹²⁰ When we appreciate the historicity of everything around us and of all of our views, i.e. that everything is contingent on historical factors (even history itself), we come to understand that we must engage critically with everything we experience, perceive and believe. Hence, our interpretations of the world around us and of history are contextually contingent, as are the various categories we use to discern matters about the world and history. The historical consciousness of modern humanity enables us to critically assess and interpret the world around us, and it becomes the only way we can reach knowledge, according to Gadamer.¹²¹ Thus, historical consciousness can be understood as a hermeneutically inspired concept that deals with the totality of history and historical understanding since it takes a meta-perspective on history and individuals' conceptions of history. The emergence of this modern historical consciousness is argued to date back to the late 17th and early 18th centuries, and was the result of a new method of reading the classical histories of Ancient Greece.¹²² Instead of doing only textual analyses of the classical texts, French Enlightenment philosopher Bodin argued that it was equally important to take into account the historical context in which the texts were conceived.¹²³

Historical consciousness became a key concept in history didactics in West Germany in the 1960's in the debate about whether positivist knowledge of history is possible. Left-wing oriented West German philosophers, historians and sociologists criticised the dominant positivist historical tradition.¹²⁴ According to this group, history should be taught and used emancipatorically in society. Through studies of the historical realities that lie behind the structures in society, individuals would realise the historicity and contextual contingencies of the traditions and structures that permeate society, and thus be able to break free from the limitations placed on them by society.¹²⁵ The concept was then introduced to Sweden from West Germany

¹¹⁹ See Jensen, 'Historiemedvetande - begreppsanalys, samhällsteori, didaktik', 44–46.

¹²⁰ Hans-Georg Gadamer, 'The Problem of Historical Consciousness', ed. Erick Raphael Jimenez et al.,

Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 5, no. 1 (1975): 8.

¹²¹ Ibid., 47–48.

¹²² John Lukacs, *Historical Consciousness: The Remembered Past* (Transaction Publishers, 1985), 10–16; Yves Charles Zarka, 'The Construction of Historical Consciousness', *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 12, no. 3 (2004): 416.

¹²³ Zarka, 'The Construction of Historical Consciousness', 416.

¹²⁴ Georg G. Iggers, *New Directions in European Historiography* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan U.P., 1984), 116–18.

¹²⁵ See Ammert, *Det osamtidas samtidighet*, 41; Klas-Göran Karlsson, 'Historiedidaktiken och historievetenskapen - ett spänningsfyllt förhållande', in *Historiedidaktik*, ed. Christer Karlegård and Klas-Göran Karlsson (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1997), 24–25.