

This research project seeks to position itself in between these positions. The content of history textbooks and popular history magazines is studied as artefacts of a certain historical culture (in the sense that it describes, includes and excludes), and the reception of the content is studied in the context of how it is perceived by history teachers. Thus history textbooks and popular history magazines are studied from the perspective of practical use, both regarding their content and what it portrays, and also how that content is and may be perceived and interpreted by history teachers. Following this logic and inspired by research highlighting interpretive aspects of textbook studies,³⁴ the analyses carried out here rest on the assumption that individuals' preconceptions and cognitive stance towards history affect how they interpret and understand narratives. In that sense, the content of the textbook and popular history magazine narratives can be regarded as subordinated to how individuals interpret their content. Furthermore, these narratives are always situated in a context, and this context also affects how its readers interpret and understand them. This is a perspective that I have striven to include in my analyses of the studied history textbooks and popular history magazines.

History Teachers and History Teaching

The research on history teachers that I have deemed particularly relevant in the context of this study is research that has studied teachers as practitioners in history education and what history teachers think of history as a subject. Research focused on history teachers as practitioners has employed a variety of interviews and classroom observations. Its results aimed to describe and understand a certain teaching practice³⁵ and how to deal with a certain topic or issue in history education,³⁶ as well as describe and define what could be

³⁴ See Ivar Bråten et al., 'The Role of Epistemic Beliefs in the Comprehension of Multiple Expository Texts: Toward an Integrated Model', *Educational Psychologist* 46, no. 1 (January 2011): 48–70; Porat, 'It's Not Written Here, but This Is What Happened'.

³⁵ See Martin Estenberg, *'Ett snäpp högre': En studie av historielärares hanterande av tankeredskap* (Karlstad: Karlstads universitet, 2016); Jessica Jarhall, *En komplex historia: Lärares omformning, undervisningsmönster och strategier i historieundervisning på högstadiet* (Karlstad: Karlstads universitet, 2012);

David Hicks, 'Continuity and Constraint: Case Studies of Becoming a Teacher of History in England and the United States', *International Journal of Social Education* 20, no. 1 (2005): 18–40; Anna-Lena Lilliestam, *Aktör och struktur i historieundervisning: Om utveckling av elevers historiska resonering* (Göteborg: Acta universitatis Gothoburgensis, 2013); Hans Olofsson, *Fatta historia: En explorativ fallstudie om historieundervisning och historiebruk i en högstadielklass* (Karlstad: Fakulteten för samhälls- och livsvetenskaper, Historia, Karlstads universitet, 2011); Joakim Wendell, *'Förklaringar är ju allt på nåt sätt': En undersökning av hur fem lärare använder historiska förklaringar i undervisningen* (Karlstad: Fakulteten för humaniora och samhällsvetenskap, Historia, Karlstads universitet, 2014).

³⁶ Bo Persson, *Mörkets hjärta i klassrummet: Historieundervisning och elevers uppfattningar om förintelsen* (Lund: Lunds universitet, 2011); Ylva Wibaeus, *Att undervisa om det ofattbara: en ämnesdidaktisk studie om kunskapsområdet förintelsen i skolans historieundervisning* (Stockholm: Pedagogiska institutionen, Stockholms universitet, 2010).

perceived as a best practice when teaching history.³⁷ This research has also studied how history teachers perceive their subject and history education from the perspective of the curricular demands history teachers have to deal with in their teaching³⁸ or how history teachers or prospective history teachers perceive their subject.³⁹ Concerning teaching practices, findings have shown that there seems to be a low correspondence between history teachers' formal training in history and their teaching practices.⁴⁰ On the contrary it has been claimed that history teachers' ability to adapt their teaching strategies to their pupils and school as an institution seems more important than profound theoretical knowledge of history. English-American researcher David Hicks argues that the history teacher students he studied should be ready to renegotiate their views of what history is and why it should be taught, in order to avoid disappointment and frustration over pupils' lack of interest in and knowledge of history.⁴¹ While history curricula in large parts of the Western world (including Sweden) portray history teaching as related to furthering disciplinary critical skills,⁴² a number of studies have shown that history teachers and history teacher students still perceive history teaching in a content-related way and that disciplinary aspects of the subject play a subordinate role.⁴³

³⁷ E.g. Ahonen, 'History Education in Post-Conflict Societies'; Lilliestam, *Aktör och struktur i historieundervisning*; Persson, *Mörkets hjärta i klassrummet*.

³⁸ See Mikael Berg, *Historielärares ämnesförståelse: Centrala begrepp i historielärares förståelse av skolämnet historia*, Studier i de samhällsvetenskapliga ämnernas didaktik 22 (Karlstad: Karlstads universitet, 2014); Ismail Hakkı Demircioglu, 'Using Controversial Issues In History Lessons: Views Of Turkish History Teachers', *Kastamonu Eğitim Dergisi* 24, no. 1 (January 2016): 147–62; Ložic, *I historiekanoons skugga*; Thomas Nygren, 'Erfarna lärares historiedidaktiska insikter och undervisningsstrategier', 2009.

³⁹ See Bruce VanSledright and Kimberly Reddy, 'Changing Epistemic Beliefs? An Exploratory Study of Cognition among Prospective History Teacher', *Tempo E Argumento* 6, no. 11 (27 May 2014): 28–68; Wansink et al., 'Epistemological Tensions in Prospective Dutch History Teachers' Beliefs about the Objectives of Secondary Education'; Paul Zanzanian and Sabrina Moisan, 'Harmonizing Two of History Teaching's Main Social Functions: Franco-Québécois History Teachers and Their Predispositions to Catering to Narrative Diversity', *Education Sciences* 2, no. 4 (10 December 2012): 255–75.

⁴⁰ Barton and Levstik, *Teaching History for the Common Good*, 251–52; Johan Hansson, *Historieintresse och historieundervisning: Elevers och lärares uppfattning om historieämnet* (Umeå: Umeå universitet, 2010), 149–50.

⁴¹ Hicks, 'Continuity and Constraint'.

⁴² Ahonen, 'History Education in Post-Conflict Societies', 76.

⁴³ See Orhan Akinoglu, 'Functions of History Education: History Teacher Trainees' Perspective', *Education* 129, no. 3 (Spring 2009): 464–65; Berg, *Historielärares ämnesförståelse*, 186–87; Hansson, *Historieintresse och historieundervisning*, 73–74; Richard Harris and Katharine Burn, 'English History Teachers' Views on What Substantive Content Young People Should Be Taught', *Journal of Curriculum Studies* 48, no. 4 (3 July 2016): 537–38; Jarhall, *En komplex historia*, 170–71; Anna-Lena Lilliestam, 'Nyblivna lärarstudenters syn på historia och historieundervisning', *Nordidactica: Journal of Humanities and Social Science Education*, no. 2015:4 (2015): 42; Ložic, *I historiekanoons skugga*, 217–19; David Ludvigsson, 'Lärarstudenters relation till

historieämnet', *Nordidactica: Journal of Humanities and Social Science Education*, no. 1 (2011): 48; Nygren, 'Erfarna lärares historiedidaktiska insikter och undervisningsstrategier', 81;

Rantala, 'How Finnish Adolescents Understand History'; Damira Umetbaeva, 'Paradoxes of Hegemonic Discourse in Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan: History Textbooks' and History Teachers' Attitudes toward the Soviet Past', *Central Asian Affairs* 2, no. 3 (29 May 2015): 300–301. Regarding how current research presents history teachers' perception of history as a subject, there are a number of interesting results. One is that teachers' conceptions of history may not be congruent with that of their pupils, and this is something history teachers have to be aware of since it affects how their pupils will perceive the subjects taught and their learning. This renders history education a rather complex enterprise since it forces teachers to take many different perspectives into account.⁴⁴ Canadian researcher Paul Zanazanian studied how French-speaking history teachers in Québec narrated the history of Québec and what role the English-speaking minority of the province played in it.⁴⁵ Thus, his research was oriented towards how history teachers understand or regard history as a subject, and what role their personal views of it played. He found that the teachers he studied displayed a tension between how they talked about the history of their own ethnic group and the more disciplinary aspects of history stressed in the history curricula of Québec. The teachers expressed concerns that the heritage of the French-Canadian population was neglected in the history curricula. According to Zanazanian this causes a tension since these teachers display an unwillingness to negotiate their own historical perspective, something he argues that a procedural approach to history requires.⁴⁶ Similar tensions have been noted in other research on teachers as well.⁴⁷

Vincent Boutonnet, another Canadian researcher, studied the historical media history teachers in the Québec province of Canada use to teach historical thinking skills and how they view these media. Boutonnet found that the teachers perceive textbooks to play a central role in how they teach and plan history, and that they use the textbooks as reference sources when teaching.⁴⁸ He further found that the teachers in his study tend not to use historical media critically when teaching, but rather tend to use these narratives as a way of confirming the historical narrative presented in class by the teacher.⁴⁹ In the teaching observed, Boutonnet found that the teachers relied on historical media in a similar manner. Textbooks and other media were studied as sources of information and were only critically scrutinised on rare

⁴⁴ See Hansson, *Historieintresse och historieundervisning*, 126; Lilliestam, *Aktör och struktur i historieundervisning*, 210–12; Olofsson, *Fatta historia*, 215.

⁴⁵ Paul Zanazanian, 'Historical Consciousness and the Structuring of Group Boundaries: A Look at Two Francophone School History Teachers Regarding Québec's Anglophone Minority', *Curriculum Inquiry* 42, no. 2 (1 March 2012): 222.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 234–35.

⁴⁷ Zvi Bekerman and Michalinos Zembylas, 'Fearful Symmetry: Palestinian and Jewish Teachers Confront Contested Narratives in Integrated Bilingual Education', *Teaching and Teacher Education* 26, no. 3 (April 2010): 507–15; Umetbaeva, 'Paradoxes of Hegemonic Discourse in Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan'.

⁴⁸ Vincent Boutonnet, *Les ressources didactiques: Typologie d'usages en lien avec la méthode historique et l'intervention éducative d'enseignants d'histoire au secondaire* (Montréal: Université de Montréal, 2013), 155–57.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 166.

occasions.⁵⁰ Interestingly, this relates to what is perceived to be the dominant historical culture in Québec regarding history teaching. According to Boutonnet, in the public debate about history in schools in Québec, there is a strong voice that is critical towards a history education oriented towards skills, and instead favours teaching focused on a certain historical content.⁵¹ Thus, Zanazanian's and Boutonnet's results show that a broader societal historical culture may impact how history teachers perceive and approach history and how they teach it in school. Together with the perspective of how teachers need to negotiate their teaching objectives with the conceptions of history of their pupils, this research highlights the complex and contextually contingent character of history education that stresses teachers' conceptions of history and history education as central to how they view history and implement it in a teaching situation.

The present research project uses an approach similar to the ones described, but I have explicitly tried to relate history teaching to the broader notion of historical culture. I have analysed how lower secondary school history teachers' uses of history are constituted when they interpret a textbook quotation relating the outbreak of the Cold War, talk of their personal experience of growing up during the Cold War, and teach it to their pupils. With this analysis, I have tried to study how teachers relate to history in contexts that are relevant to history education both concerning the history they choose to disseminate and also how they choose to disseminate this history.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 178–79.

⁵¹ Ibid., 174–75.

Theoretical Framework

Ontological and Epistemological Assumptions

The ontological approach in this study applies as a basic assumption that anything we can know of the world has to be communicated through language, i.e. the world can only be known through our conceptualisation and communication of it.⁵² In empirical research this means that the distinction between ontology and epistemology collapses since what we are engaging with is not the world as such, but rather our conceptions of the world. Thus, the purely ontological question of what the world is can be argued to be of less importance than the purely epistemological question of what can we know the world to be and how can we assert that knowledge. Indeed, as has been argued by Karl Popper and others, truth and the world in itself is a rather uninteresting matter in scientific research (the world is what it is, so to speak). The crucial question is how, in scientific research, we can come to approximate the world in our representations of it.⁵³ In other words, what I perceive distinguishes science from other knowledge practices is that it engages with methodological inquiry in a scientific context. It is not our postulations about matters in the world that are central *per se*, but rather how we went about reaching these postulations, and this directs us towards epistemological problems rather than ontological ones.

For these reasons, what will be outlined below does not relate to the world as such in the strictly ontological sense, but to our perception, interpretation, knowledge and communication of it. The emphasis in the presentation below is placed on representational and interpretational aspects of how we come to know the world. This section has been divided into two sub-sections. ‘Representation’ tries to specify the basic theoretical assumptions about the world, and our experiences and knowledge thereof, which underlie the present study. Secondly, the sub-section called ‘Interpretation’ seeks to clarify how I consider that we may come to know something of the world.

Representation

Following the approach outlined, questions of what the world is should be understood as related to questions of our representations of what the world is in the context of this study. British philosopher Michael Dummett has stated that “what we cannot think we cannot think, and what we cannot think we cannot say”⁵⁴ meaning that our representations of the world are contingent on our perceptions of it. This could also be interpreted as saying

⁵² See Michael Dummett, *Thought and Reality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 2–3, 14.

⁵³ Karl R. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge*, 3. ed., (rev.). (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1989), 222–26.

⁵⁴ Dummett, *Thought and Reality*, 24.

that our perceptions of the world are contingent on our preconceptions of it: to make sense of something (which could be argued to be a basic requirement for making intelligible representations of that something) it has to fit our basic views of what the world is and how it functions.

Thus, what we have at the most basic level are various phenomena that appear to us, and that we experience. These phenomena are then represented by us through our use of language, both when making sense of something to ourselves and to others. From an ontological perspective this means that our experiences of the world and representations of it are always mediated through language, and thus contingent on our use of language. This does not mean that knowledge of the world becomes impossible, but rather that this is the only means by which we can access the world and talk about it.

Interpretation

If we proceed along this line of reasoning, interpretation could be argued to become a fundamental practice when doing science: we experience phenomena, we represent them, we interpret their meaning, and then we represent that meaning to ourselves and to others.⁵⁵ Since our experiences and representations of the world have been argued to be contingent on our preconceptions of the world, a scientific interpretive practice has to deal with these contingencies by making them explicit and engaging with their relevance for how we represent and know the world. Thus, a hermeneutic practice becomes essential for gaining access to and knowledge of the world. German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer stated that the aim of hermeneutics is to clarify the wonder of understanding not as a secretive communication, but as a co-operation in mutual meaning-making between individuals. Interpretation should seek to acknowledge and engage with the influence of the contemporary world and prejudices of the interpreting subject in order to gain validity.⁵⁶ This could be understood as arguing for the importance of the *practice of interpretation*, rather than the interpretation itself. When doing science we endeavour to make our theoretical and methodological approaches (i.e. our interpretative practices) seem valid and relevant.⁵⁷ It matters little how original or thought-provoking our interpretations are if they do not rest on a solid transparent methodological foundation.

From this viewpoint, knowledge and understanding become holistic endeavours: we need to take the full context of what we study and how we study it into account. Furthermore, it is in the hermeneutic and dialectical

⁵⁵ It should be noted that I view representation as both a conscious and unconscious activity (we have to represent things in order to experience them), whereas interpretation is regarded as an active process in which we engage with our and others' representations.

⁵⁶ Hans-Georg Gadamer, 'Om förståelsens cirkel', in *Filosofiska strömningar efter 1950*, ed. Konrad Marc-Wogau, *Filosofin genom tiderna* 5 (Stockholm: Albert Bonniers bokförlag, 1981), 327–28.

⁵⁷ See Tyson Retz, 'A Moderate Hermeneutical Approach to Empathy in History Education', *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 47, no. 3 (23 February 2015): 218–20.

engagement with what we study that we can reach a scientifically valid interpretation, not by applying a certain methodology or theory in analysis. This means that we need to argue the relevance and soundness of the theoretical and methodological approaches we use when doing science.⁵⁸ Ideally, we should strive towards a kind of hermeneutical openness using the dialectic method in text analysis.⁵⁹ Gadamer claimed that when we interpret we project our preconceptions and understanding onto what we are interpreting. This means that the interpreter should always try to make their presumptions or prejudices explicit when studying texts, and then strive to engage with these presumptions in order to take the full context of the text into account.⁶⁰ An interpreter that does not engage in this kind of dialectic method runs the risk of letting their arbitrary prejudices affect the meaning, knowledge and understanding that is derived from a certain account.⁶¹ Hence, the context in which knowledge is derived becomes an important aspect of scientific research since all postulations of the world are contextually contingent. This line of argumentation also has repercussions for how we approach and understand the notions of truth and knowledge.

Truth and Knowledge

If one holds context to be an important aspect in how we come to know the world, any epistemological theory of truth and knowledge has to take this into account. Such a view is afforded by the theoretical position called epistemological contextualism. According to this position the truth-value of all postulations is contingent on the context in which they are derived or stated,

i.e. in normal conversation we have certain standards for what qualifies as a true statement and in science we apply other more strict standards as to what counts as a true statement.⁶² As an example, in most Swedish history textbooks you will find a statement saying something to the effect of “Gustav Vasa was the king of Sweden between 1523 and 1560” and most people in Sweden would hold that statement to be true. If the same statement would, however, be said at a seminar on early Modern Swedish history it could be considered to be problematic. For instance, Sweden as we know it today did not exist in 1523. Sweden was in a royal union with Denmark at the time and legally the Danish king was still the head of state in Sweden for some years

⁵⁸ See Dagfinn Føllesdal, Lars Wallöe and Jon Elster, *Argumentasjonsteori, språk og vitenskapsfilosofi*, 5th ed. (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1992), 97–100; Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 2nd ed. (New York: Continuum, 2006), 271.

⁵⁹ Per-Johan Ödman, *Tolkning, förståelse, vetande: Hermeneutik i teori och praktik* (Stockholm: Norstedts akademiska förlag, 2007), 25–30.

⁶⁰ Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 266–67.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 269.

⁶² See Michael Blome-Tillmann, *Knowledge and Presuppositions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014),

11; Alexander Dinges, ‘Epistemic Contextualism Can Be Stated Properly’, *Synthese* 191, no. 15 (29 April 2014): 3541–56.

after 1523. What this example shows is that one statement can be considered as true in one context and not in another. What happens is not that the statement changes, but rather the contexts in which it is made. Differing standards result in different ways of interpreting the *meaning* of the statement and, thus, its truth-value.⁶³ This means that we need to pay close attention to context and use when analysing meaning and truth in empirical sources, such as historical narratives in textbooks, popular history magazines and narratives elicited from interviews. It is within the context of the practices that these accounts acquire meaning. Furthermore, as a researcher it is important to acknowledge and engage with how you approach a study and strive to make your theoretical and methodological assumptions explicit since they will be relevant to how your research can be understood and assessed.

This line of reasoning points towards a position resembling what can be called inter-subjective verifiability or criticisability; a position arguing that scientific knowledge should be able to be criticised and reproduced by others.⁶⁴ From this viewpoint, due to contextual constraints within the research community, researchers need to explain how they went about getting the knowledge they possess, i.e. to explain the theoretical assumptions and/or methodologies they have used in order to render their research inter-subjectively acceptable. If a researcher fails to do this we are likely to disregard the results of his or her research no matter what they are. In order to enhance inter-subjective verifiability or criticisability it is important to strive for clarity in the theoretical approach and concepts we use and the results we get from using this approach. If we use concepts that are not specified in detail in our research (or elsewhere) it may be difficult to assess what we mean by what we say, and the results of our studies (i.e. our knowledge) cannot be assessed.⁶⁵ In this sense there is a social aspect to knowledge and its production: what is knowledge is determined by the context in which it is perceived or conceived, and what is acceptable knowledge production (or science) is also contextually contingent. This does not mean that anything goes, but rather that we have to pay close attention to the context in which pieces of knowledge were created to determine the value of them, since that is where these pieces of knowledge acquire meaning and truth-value, according to the view presented here.⁶⁶

⁶³ See Lars Bergström, 'Relativism', *Filosofisk tidskrift*, no. 1 (1998): 16–37.

⁶⁴ See Björn Badersten, *Normativ metod: Att studera det önskvärda* (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2006), 74–79; Lars Bergström, *Objektivitet: En undersökning av Innebörden, möjligheten och önskvärdheten av objektivitet i samhällsvetenskapen*, 2nd ed. (Stockholm: Thales, 1987), 60–65.

⁶⁵ See Sven Ove Hansson, *Verktygslära för filosofer* (Stockholm: Thales, 2010), 124–25.

⁶⁶ See Sievers, 'Toward a Direct Realist Account of Observation'.

Experience and Cognition

If we regard context and contingency as key to understanding and knowledge, then how we can understand how humans experience and come to know the world becomes crucial. In the following sub-section I aim to specify how I understand the basic notions of consciousness, narrative and narration to be related to this in the context of this study.

Fundamentally, consciousness plays a crucial role in how human beings experience the world: some kind of awareness seems to be a pre-requisite for us to experience matters. Nonetheless, consciousness is primarily of interest as a function in an individual presently, i.e. consciousness should not be reduced to mere sensory loci or parts of the brain. Through our consciousness we become aware of phenomena, and consequently, the sensory loci or the phenomena that appear in our consciousnesses are subordinate to this function of our consciousness, and without this function there would be nothing of which to speak, there would be no experiences.⁶⁷ Consciousness should thus primarily be understood as a function and not a physiological or mental entity. However, according to the view presented here, in order for us to experience something we need to be able to conceptualise it, and this is done when we apply linguistic notions and concepts and narrate what we perceive.

There are many propositions for how the notion *narrative* should be understood: it could be understood as any kind of utterance without any specific order,⁶⁸ as requiring emplotment (as opposed to chronicles, annals and stories)⁶⁹ and as containing normative elements,⁷⁰ to name a few. In the present study I am mostly interested in narratives from a communicative perspective. When we try to make sense of our experiences to ourselves, and when we try to disseminate these same experiences to other people, we do that by narrating them or putting them into the narrative form. This does not mean that I claim that narratives constitute reality, but rather that they constitute our perception of reality; human reality is essentially a linguistic reality.⁷¹ Hence, my focus is on the function of narratives, rather than their linguistic properties. Thus, in order to cover as many means of dissemination as possible, I use the notion of narrative in a very broad or loose sense: it can take any form and its forms can vary indefinitely. The key aspect here is that narration should be perceived as the foundation of how we can intelligibly

⁶⁷ Ran Lahav, 'What Neuropsychology Tells Us About Consciousness', *Philosophy of Science* 60, no. 1 (1993): 79.

⁶⁸ E.g. Marya Schechtman, *The Constitution of Selves* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2007), 95–99.

⁶⁹ E.g. Barbara Czarniawska, *Narratives in Social Science Research*, 1 edition (SAGE Publications Ltd, 2004), 17–24.

⁷⁰ E.g. Charlotte Linde, *Life Stories: The Creation of Coherence* (Oxford University Press, 1993), 84–85.

⁷¹ Ödman, *Tolkning, Förståelse, Vetande*, 47.

experience and understand the world, i.e. it is central to human epistemology.⁷²

It is also important to underline that emplotment or normative evaluation in narratives can occur at different levels since speech units or text units that do not have emplotment at what may be called a ‘micro-level’ (e.g. on the surface of the text), can be emplotted at a more abstract level or ‘macro-level’ (e.g. regarding the context of the text). We can, for instance, ascribe narratives emplotment or normative qualities at a macro-level, in order to render them meaningful. Another important aspect of narratives is that they can be ascribed different qualities depending on the context in which they are analysed. Additionally, a narrative that seems to have no emplotment in one context could be regarded as having that in another. Thus, qualities we ascribe to narratives are contextually contingent. This contextual contingency is another reason why I have chosen to approach the notion of narrative in a broad or loose sense. Furthermore, the notion of narrative could be argued to play a significant role in history: in order for history to be disseminated, it has to be put into narrative form. This may not necessarily mean that all history should be perceived as narrative and plot-driven as has been implied by some⁷³, but rather that history has to be narrated in order to be communicated.⁷⁴

History Didactical Assumptions

History Didactics

The preceding section argued that history has to be put into narrative form in order for it to be disseminated. Furthermore, and taking the lead of Gadamer, whenever we interpret or represent anything we project our preconceptions and prior understanding onto that something that we are trying to make sense of. This line of reasoning stresses what has been called the importance of the genealogical perspective in history: whenever we approach history we do so from our contemporary point of view.⁷⁵ Accordingly, all historical sources, pieces of information or accounts have to be experienced and interpreted in order to make sense. This act of experience and interpretation always takes place within an individual that has a certain understanding of themselves and the world, irrespective of whether they are an academic historian or a casual student of history. This is also the perspective that

⁷² See Robert Thorp, *Historical Consciousness, Historical Media, and History Education*, Licentiate Theses from the Historical Media Postgraduate School 5 (Umeå: Umeå universitet, 2014), 10–11.

⁷³ E.g. Hayden White, *The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation* (JHU Press, 2009).

⁷⁴ See David Carr, *Time, Narrative, and History*, Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology & Existential Philosophy, 0550-0060 (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1986), 25–29.

⁷⁵ Klas-Göran Karlsson, *Europeiska möten med historien. Historiekulturella perspektiv på andra världskriget, förintelsen och den kommunistiska terrorn.*, 1st ed. (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2010), 27–30.