

**Chemical castration as gender justice:  
How punitive attitudes inform gender policy preferences and  
voting behavior among Brazilian women**

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF INTERDISCIPLINARY  
HONORS IN DEMOCRACY, DEVELOPMENT AND THE RULE OF LAW

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## Abstract

Currently, 19% of the women in the Brazilian Congress are part of Bolsonaro's party, known for its anti-feminist and pro-punishment stances. At first, this fact seems to contradict expectations based on substantive representation. This concept would predict that women share similar interests and therefore would want to advance similar gender policies once in power. I argue that this apparent contradiction can be better explained by exploring how gender, along with punishment attitudes, interacts with voting choices, a current gap in the literature. This project aims to fill this gap. Specifically, it answers the question: "How do attitudes towards punishment impact the gender policy preferences and voting behavior of Brazilian women?". This mixed-methods study works with a novel data set of 39 interviews and 1,194 observations from an online survey experiment. This qualitative data was coded in 2 passes, using deductive, grounded and in vivo codes, with the support of NVivo, followed by analytic memoing. The quantitative data includes results from a conjoint experiment and a survey experiment, which were analyzed, respectively, through average marginal component effect analysis and logistic regressions. The main findings of this thesis indicate that Brazilian women mostly have progressive views on gender issues and there is high demand for gender policy among all women. However, the content of the policies prioritized by them vary when voting, with a particular division of women across issues of gender punishment and abortion, which are mostly defined across partisan lines. This study aims to contribute to the literature on gender and punitive attitudes and substantive representation. Furthermore, through its survey gathering substantive data on policy preferences in Latin America, this project addresses a key challenge to research so far, namely the lack of data on these preferences.

**Keywords:** Gender, policy preferences, voting behavior, punishment, Latin America, Brazil

“I stand  
on the sacrifices  
of a million women before me  
thinking  
what can I do  
to make this mountain taller  
so the women after me  
can see farther  
- legacy”

— Rupi Kaur, the sun and her flowers

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# Chapter 1 | Introduction

“I would not rape you because you are not deserving of it.” - Jair Bolsonaro, former President of Brazil, 2013.

In 2013, the former president of Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro, said the former phrase to a fellow congresswoman inside the Chamber of Deputies, while he was a representative himself (Ramalho, 2016). Almost 10 years later, in 2022, while in his term as president of Brazil, Bolsonaro criticized an 11-year-old girl for getting a legal abortion after being a victim of sexual violence. After his reaction caused outrage in some media vehicles, Bolsonaro tweeted the following to defend himself: “It is because I can see the suffering of the victims and the cowardliness of the rapists that I have always fought for harsher punishment for this crime, including chemical castration (Bolsonaro, 2022).” Although Bolsonaro has been openly sexist in several instances and claims he is anti-feminist, in the past years, he has also strongly emphasized his support for harsher punishment for gender-based crimes, framing this as a concern for women’s issues (Ramalho, 2016). This is, however, not exclusive to Bolsonaro, as it is also observed with the rise of conservative women who claim anti-feminist identities but incorporate a gender lens to their policy proposals as part of an effort from parties to attract the female electorate. These types of proposals, which incorporate gender but not necessarily aim to advance gender equality, have frequently taken the form of punishment policies in Brazil, as illustrated by the former president’s twitter quote above. Observing this context, this thesis explores the question **“How do attitudes towards harsh punishment policies impact the gender policy preferences of Brazilian women? How important are these preferences in defining their voting decisions?”**

Crime is one of the main concerns of Brazilians (Prazeres and Schreiber, 2023), which is reflected in the country's politics. The 2016 Latinobarómetro shows that 41% of Latin Americans worry “almost all of the time” about becoming victims of a serious crime, and the politicians in the region have not failed to adapt their discourse to this concern (Singer et al., 2019). The proposal of *mano dura* policies, harsh punishment policies, is a common trend among popular politicians (Singer et al., 2019).

The political scenario that was created in the past years, particularly when the explicitly anti-feminist Jair Bolsonaro (Ramalho, 2016) gained notoriety, is one in which both criminality and gender issues became some of the most important and debated topics in electoral politics. Rennó shows, for example, that harsh punishment and anti-abortion preferences were some of the central ideological positions of Bolsonaro’s electors (Rennó, 2020). In addition, the first round of the 2018 presidential elections presented a significant gap in vote intentions between men and women. Meanwhile, there was a 52% increase in the number of elected women in Congress in these same elections (Coelho, 2022). Many of these women are part of leftist parties and defend progressive feminist policies, a pattern observed globally (Kittilson, 2016). However, there was also a significant increase in the number of conservative women, culminating in the fact that around 19% of the women elected to Congress in 2022 represent the Partido Liberal (PL), Bolsonaro’s former party (Coelho, 2022).

Perhaps counterintuitively, the women who vote for these conservative congresswomen do not necessarily hold conservative gender attitudes and gender policy preferences (Solano et al., 2022). In a series of interviews of women who voted for Bolsonaro in 2018, Solano et al. showed that interviewees demonstrated views regarding gender policy that appear to be significantly more progressive than those promoted by Bolsonaro, whom they voted for, and by

some of the most prominent conservative female figures in politics. There is an apparent contradiction between these women's views and voting choices. This apparent contradiction, as well as the clear and consistent lack of women in politics and gender policy discussions, weakens democracy.

Crime and gender policy have become increasingly linked together. With the rise of gender-based violence in the past years (Piccirillo and Silvestre, 2022) and an electoral concern about this issue, even parties that have been explicitly anti-feminist in the past are starting to notice the necessity of incorporating a gender perspective in their proposals. This often occurs by incorporating a gender perspective in substantive representation and defending policies that consider a gender perspective. In the case of Brazil, this usually takes the form of incorporating gender into punishment policies. Therefore, these two issues, punishment and gender policy, play an important role in Brazilian politics and are deeply entrenched.

This preoccupation with crime, and particularly with gender-based violence, plays an important role in shaping gender policy preferences in Brazil. **This research therefore aims to understand how attitudes towards punishment - that is, the views on how to address these crimes - shape the support that women have for different types of gender policies –particularly looking at feminist policy and gender punishment policy, and the politicians promoting them.** In particular, it explores women's opinions on gender issues and policy preferences, linking this to their punitive preferences and voting behavior. To do so, this thesis builds on a **mixed-methods approach**, using novel data from 39 in-depth semi-structured interviews with Brazilian women and from a survey with 1,194 female participants, that includes a conjoint and a survey experiment.

Broadly, the main findings of this thesis indicate that Brazilian women mostly have progressive views on gender issues and there is high demand for gender policy among all women. However, the content of the policies prioritized by them vary when voting, with a particular division of women across issues of gender punishment and abortion, which are mostly defined across partisan lines. This therefore results in a reduced ability of accomplishing substantive representation across the issues that are consensus among women.

The next chapters of this thesis cover the following. **Chapter 2** discusses the theories that inform this study, particularly the literature on women's issues and representation, developing particularly on the concepts of substantive and descriptive representation. It also addresses the literature on punitive attitudes and how these impact voting behavior. Lastly, this chapter lays out the theory being proposed and tested in this thesis, specifying the hypotheses being tested. **Chapter 3** provides information background on the political background of Brazil, as well as on the situation of gender inequality and violence in the country, and on factors that influence voting behavior in this context. **Chapter 4** covers the mixed-methods approach of this study, detailing the data collection and analysis of both the quantitative and qualitative data presented here. This chapter also develops on the coding process used to draw meaning and test hypotheses, which were further tested in the survey conducted. The results from these analyses are then presented in the three following chapters. **Chapter 5** provides a panorama of gender and punishment attitudes in Brazil, introducing in detail measures and indexes used throughout the study to measure these attitudes and providing an in-depth understanding of the conceptualization of these through the analysis of qualitative and quantitative data combined. **Chapter 6** discusses the gender policy preferences of Brazilian women, laying out how attitudes and different demographic characteristics impact them. **Chapter 7** analyzes how all of these findings translate into voting

behavior, by observing the results of the conjoint experiment and the survey experiment. Finally, **Chapter 8** develops on how all the presented findings are connected to each other and how they are reflected in electoral politics in Brazil.

## Chapter 2 | Theory

The first section of this literature review focuses on gender and politics. It addresses three branches of this literature. The first conceptualizes and explains the differences between the substantive and descriptive representation of women. The second strand attempts to define women's issues, and it is deeply connected to the literature on substantive representation. Lastly, the third branch focuses on how identity influences voting behavior. Particularly, how different levels of gender identification influence women's views and attitudes.

Secondly, this literature review will engage with the research on punishment and politics. It will first delve into the scholarship of punitive attitudes, explaining what these attitudes are and how they begin to be formed. Then it will explore the impact of attitudes towards punishment in politics and later the gender perspectives that have been incorporated into the punishment literature.

Lastly, I will present a conceptual framework that connects these two branches of the literature and hypothesizes about the connection between them and voting behavior. It is also important to mention that the following chapter will provide background information in Brazilian politics, which will involve a short summary of the literature on Brazilian politics, with a focus on the rise of *Bolsonarismo* and the particularities of the party system of Brazil.

## **Part I: Gender and Politics**

### *Substantive and Descriptive Representation*

Current research on female representation mainly focuses on their descriptive representation - the number of women elected (Wängnerud, 2009) - aiming to understand if women vote for other women out of pure gender identification with the candidates. Descriptive representation seems to have important impacts on female voting behavior in some instances. For example, Burns, Schlozman, and Verba (2001) and Atkeson and Carrillo (2007) suggest that, in the US, women voters in states with women in high political offices tend to be more politically informed and interested than men in the state, opposing the general trend of less female involvement in politics (Kittilson, 2016). In Latin America, Desposato and Norrander (2009) showed that the gender gap in political participation becomes smaller in countries where women are more represented in parliament (Desposato and Norrander, 2009).

A more unexplored subfield inside the literature regarding female representation concerns substantive representation. Pitkin defines substantive representation as “acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them (Pitkin, 1967, p. 209)”. In other words, substantive representation does not concern how many women are in parliaments, but “the extent to which the number of women elected affects women’s interests (Wängnerud, 2009, p. 59).” Celis adds to this definition of substantive representation by establishing three important criteria: “firstly, it is about representative acts as opposed to, for instance, intentions or attitudes. Secondly, the results of these representative acts should be in the interest of the represented. Thirdly, the representatives should be responsive towards the ones they represent (Celis, 2009, p. 97).”

An important theory in this literature is the theory of the politics of presence, conceptualized by Phillips, which suggests that women are better equipped to represent women's interests because they understand the differences in everyday life that the genders encounter (Phillips, 1998). In this way, this theory indicates that there is a link between descriptive and substantive representation. This would happen because, to some extent, female voters and female politicians would share the same experiences and therefore would have similar policy preferences (Wängnerud, 2009). Other stands of empirical research have shown that the politician's identity impacts how they approach policymaking and priorities. This includes race (Broockman, 2013), social class (Carnes, 2012), gender (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004) and learned behavior (Burden, 2007), reflecting how shared experiences affect priorities (Weeks et al., 2022). In this research, I aim to understand if women's views on gender issues and gender policy actually reflect on their voting behavior, as this theory partially suggests.

The results of empirical studies are mixed when it comes to the theory of the politics of presence (Wängnerud, 2009), with most of the research focusing on understanding the behavior of female politicians. For example, there is some evidence that women politicians prioritize the issues prioritized by female voters (Wängnerud, 2009), while other authors, such as D'Ávila indicate that ideology can be a better predictor of which representatives will defend women's interests (D'Ávila, 2018).

Other studies about the substantive representation of women have focused on understanding the trends of women in politics, in order to comprehend how their actions and views differ from men's. The general observed trend was that women in parliaments tend to be more leftist than men, as well as more concerned with environmental protection, more permissive when it comes to social policy and more in favor of affirmative actions such as

introducing gender quotas, as pointed by Heidar and Pedersen (2006). In addition, female politicians, to a larger extent than males, indicated that they viewed “representation of women’s interests (Wängnerud, 2009, p. 62)” as part of their duty (Wängnerud, 2009).

It is, however, important to highlight that these measures of substantive representation that point some of the issues defended by female politicians in common should not be interpreted as if all female politicians are approaching these social problems in the same way. Skjeie analyzes how effects of gender are filtered through party ideology and shows that rightist women tend to support private solutions and leftist women tend to support state intervention (Wängnerud, 2009).

The connection between descriptive and substantive representation described by the theory of the politics of presence becomes more complex nowadays with the rise of conservative women in politics and processes such as strategic descriptive representation used by far-right parties. This process consists of the use of female candidates by far-right parties to attract female voters, exploring the idea of descriptive representation, but often proposing policies that often go against women’s equality advancement (Weeks et al., 2022). That is, they provide the descriptive representation without providing the substantive representation of women. This rise of conservatives is not only seen in Brazil but also in the context of the US, with women voting for Trump, and in Europe, with the rise of far-right female politicians, which makes the questions posed by this thesis on substantive representation relevant on a global scale. In Europe, it is possible to notice that, while Green and New Left Parties maintained the highest share of women throughout time, the Social Democratic and Conservative parties had started attracting women since the 1990s. However, since the mid-2000s, female participation in Radical Right Populist parties, famous for defending men’s interests, has significantly increased, reaching the same

proportion of women MPs as Christian Democratic parties by the end of the 2010s (Weeks et al., 2022). The same trend follows in Brazil, with a different timeline.

Most of the research on descriptive and substantive representation focuses on understanding how these shared preferences are manifested in the parliaments and in the work performed by female politicians, as well as its consequent impacts on female voters. I contribute to the unexplored perspective of this literature, understanding the views and preferences of female voters and how they impact the way they choose their politicians. Particularly, I aim to understand if substantive representation is important to them when voting.

### ***Women's interests***

A significant challenge to the field of substantive representation is defining what are “women’s issues (Wängnerud, 2009, p. 58)”. A significant part of this literature aims to understand what are the shared interests of women and if there is such a thing as *representing women's interests*, as suggested in the previous section. Some complexities of this debate are that there is a tendency to decide what constitutes these interests from the top-down, by looking at the political elites, as well as to overlook the debate about the intersectionality of gender with several other important identities (Wängnerud, 2009).

A first important distinction to be made when it comes to defining women’s issues and preferences is that women’s preferences are not necessarily feminist preferences. For example, several conservative parties have adopted the perspective of “women’s interests” without necessarily incorporating a feminist perspective (Weeks et al., 2022). However, a significant bulk of the previous literature on women’s preferences has conflated women’s policy issues with feminism and therefore failed to explain the behavior of conservative women (Schreiber, 2002).

In this research, I aim to clearly differentiate between these two in order to comprehend whether there are different levels of support for gendered policies compared to feminist policies.

Different authors have conceptualized what women's issues are. Sapiro (1981), for example, stated that the private distribution of labor influences women to have specific interests that are politically 'representable'. Diamond and Hartsock (1981), on the other hand, argue that women's common interests are a consequence of the gendered division of productive labor. Jonasdottir (1988) reconciled these two perspectives and argued that "women's interests take their origins from the gendered reality that mainly coincides with the gendered division of labor (Celis, 2009, p. 98)", and added that the shared interest of women is in fact to be present in the decision-making process and to have control over conditions of choice (Jonasdottir, 1988). Phillips (1995), on the contrary, rejects the idea of universal women's interests, but states that women have specific shared life experiences. Similarly, Iris Marion Young (1997) suggests that representation of women does not involve specific interests and needs, but social perspectives and the way people interpret the world based on their structural social situation. Williams (1998) complements by saying that this similar social position comes from the "cultural and structural obstacles causing the marginalization of women (Celis, 2009. p.99)". Lastly, Wangnerud (2000) argues that substantive representation of women has a feminist 'direction' and that it aims to increase women's autonomy. These definitions of women's issues are essential to understand how to approach measuring views on women's issues and gender policy in this research, considering that it will be first necessary to understand what issues are considered as this priority. Williams' definition is one of particular interest to my research, as I plan to measure women's identification with their gender group through the lenses of shared marginalization (Celis, 2009).

It is also important to look at empirical studies aiming to understand women's interests. These studies usually involve understanding what type of policies change when there are more women in spaces of political decision. Research has shown that female legislators tend to give more attention than their male colleagues to issues such as childcare, family and social policy, women's health, wage protection and preventing violence (Weeks et. al, 2022; Celis, 2006; Childs and Withey, 2004). A more unexplored area of the literature asks the women voters about what type of public policies they would implement to make women's lives better. Solano et al. showed that, among the Brazilian electorate, the public policies that seem to address these women's interests are programs against gender-based violence, policies that support women's careers in companies, investment in education, shelters and punishment of rapists (Solano et al., 2022).

### *Identity and voting behavior*

The third important strand of the literature from which this research is drawing is the field of identity and voting behavior. Identification with a gender group is a subject that has been little explored in the gender and politics literature and that will play an important role in my argument, considering that gender identity has been studied as correlated with sexist beliefs and willingness to take collective actions (Becker and Wagner, 2009). In addition, according to the Social Identity Theory, the level of women's identification with their gender in-group should increase based on their concern with issues of the social category of women and the evaluations and treatment of women (Becker and Wagner, 2009). Gay and Tate also state that individuals who identify with their group may have a sense of interdependence or common fate with other members of their group (Gay and Tate, 1998). Therefore, gender identification is a variable

associated with both previous concerns about gender issues and that may result in a sense of “shared fate” and in a level of willingness to take action collectively.

Becker and Wagner added to the literature on gender identity the idea that gender identity is a dimension that cannot be separated from gender role view when it comes to estimating women’s sexist beliefs and likelihood to engage in collective action (Becker and Wagner, 2009). Through three different studies with German women, they demonstrated that women reject the three types of sexism and are more likely to engage in collective action when they are highly identified with their gender group and have progressive gender role views. Women who are highly identified with traditional gender roles showed a stronger endorsement of sexist attitudes and stronger rejection of collective action compared to the women with a more progressive gender role view. For low identified women, the gender role preference had almost no influence on the endorsement of sexist beliefs and likelihood to participate in collective action (Becker and Wagner, 2009).

This is a very important contribution to the literature because several of the previous studies on gender identification have associated the strength of identification with gender with a feminist identity, ignoring the identity content of it (Becker and Wagner, 2009). This idea of inseparability between level of identification and content proposed by Becker and Wagner is essential in the development of the measure of one of my independent variables, later described.

In addition, an important strand of the literature on gender identity and politics concerns the intersectionality of different identities to see which one impacts voting behavior more significantly. For instance, there is evidence that Black women in the US tend to vote to prioritize their racial interests over their gender interests (Gay and Tate, 1998). This debate is extended to other identities beyond race and ethnicity, such as class, religion, and others. Lastly,

according to Gay and Tate, gender appears to be a less salient category, compared to ethnicity, for example, which means it appears to be harder for women to identify sexism than it is to identify racism (Gay and Tate, 1998), which may lead to less clear gender policy views.

Another important concept in this literature is the idea of gender consciousness, which scholars point as an “important link between gender identity and political action and policy preferences (Schreiber, 2002).” Gender consciousness concerns not only the identification with the group of women but also the “sense of discontentment with women’s social and political status, such as views about gender roles, feelings of relative deprivation, and/or support for the women’s movement (Schreiber, 2002, p. 332).” This may have a significant impact in the likelihood of women to take action.

Lastly, it is important to highlight that this research does not aim to argue that women’s issues and gender policy are the main drivers of the female voting decisions, but rather aims to understand what role these play in these voting decisions. Therefore, it is also important to explore how other factors play a role in the female vote, which is done in the last section of this literature review.

### *Gaps of the gender and politics literature*

Through my research, I will be able to contribute to these three branches of the gender and politics literature. First, I aim to understand what are the most important gender issues for Brazilian women, contributing to the complex literature that tries to systematize how to think about gender issues. Most of the current literature on this topic has approached the definition of gender issues through a top-down approach, that is, observing what types of issues tend to be the focuses of women politicians in comparison to men (Catalano, 2009; Celis, 2006; Childs and Withey, 2004). I will, however, take a bottom-up approach to explore how Brazilian voters see

this substantive representation, understanding what they define as women's issues and priorities. Secondly, I aim to understand the importance that substantive representation plays in women's voting behavior, particularly observing how gender policy takes priority (or not) when women are making voting decisions.

Third, the literature on gender identification has mostly focused on its impact in gender attitudes. Becker and Wagner (2009), for instance, analyzed the impact of gender identification and gender role view on actual behavior, observing the likelihood of women to take collective action. Using a similar framework to theirs, I aim to address one of the main limitations I see in their research. Their focus on collective action does not appear to account for the fact that women are less likely than men to participate in protests and demonstrations, but that they do have higher voting participation than men. This is particularly true in Latin America (Kittilson, 2016). This way, I will be analyzing the effect of identification in individual actions with a collective impact, in this case, voting.

These findings will also add to the general literature on how identity plays a role in voter behavior. Understanding how women see gender policy and comprehending how they vote can provide valuable insights on how to advance female participation in politics as well as how to advance gender equality, therefore leading to an increase in the quality of democracy in the country. Lastly, I will be contributing to the literature on gender and politics in Latin America, an area that has not been extensively explored inside this topic, that tends to focus on the US and Europe.

## **Part II: Punishment and Politics**

The second literature that this thesis is drawing from is the one on punitive attitudes and punishment policy preferences. As previously mentioned, attitudes can severely impact voting behavior, and the issue of crime and harsher punishment is one of the most relevant to Brazilian voters (Congresso em Foco, 2014). Therefore, to explore how these punitive attitudes relate to gender attitudes and reflect in policy preferences, it is important to explore what has been theorized about punitive attitudes. This section will first explore what are punitive attitudes and what factors explain support for harsher punishment, as well as how these are measured. It will then explore what the literature has said about the intersections between support for punishment and gender. Third, it will explore the implications of punitive attitudes in politics, with special attention to the concept of penal populism. Lastly, I will discuss how my thesis interacts with these three aspects of the literature on punishment.

### *Punitive attitudes: definition and causes*

Punitive attitudes describe one's support for harsher punishment. The idea of harsher punishment varies immensely per country and can refer to state-inflicted punishment or punishment from extrajudicial groups. This way, there are several forms of measuring punitive attitudes. In the context of Latin America, García-Ponce et al., for example, created a policy attitudes index that measures support five different punishment forms - the non-governmental armed groups, the self-defense groups (*autodefensas*), the lynching of criminals, the reinstatement of the death penalty, and the proposal to pay narcotraffickers to stop their participation in violence (García-Ponce et al., 2022). The Latin American Public Opinion Project measures the support for harsher punishment by asking "In your opinion, what should be done to

reduce crime in a country like ours?” There are two response options to be marked depending on the participants’ response, either “implement preventative measures” or “increase the punishment for criminals (Singer et al., 2019).” A third example from Brazil is used in Rennó’s survey, in which participants are asked if they agree with the famous Brazilian saying “*bandido bom é bandido morto*,” translated as “a good criminal is a dead criminal (Rennó, 2022).” These examples serve to illustrate that support for harsher punishment takes different forms in different contexts, but that this type of opinion is what is encompassed by the concept of punitive attitudes.

To fully comprehend the high levels of support for harsher punishment across Latin America, it is important to understand what factors lead to these punitive attitudes. Perhaps the most explored factor in the punishment literature is the fear of crime. This factor is especially relevant in the context of Latin America, a region that became known for its high levels of crime, commonly associated with drug trafficking and militias, increasing since the 1980s (Davis, 2006). As a result of this, fear of crime is extremely high in Latin America, even in relatively safe countries, such as Chile (Dammert and Malone, 2003). The LatinoBarometer survey, for example, indicates that 41% of Latin Americans are worried “almost all of the time” about becoming victims of a serious crime (Singer et al., 2020). This feeling of public insecurity is further reinforced by the media, with exaggerated reports of violent gang activities (Holland, 2013) and extensive coverage of violent crimes. This constant public insecurity, intensified by cultural and economic anxieties, creates a “culture of fear” (Garland, 2002). This collective fear leads to support for “get tough” policies, that is, for harsher punishment policies as a response to the criminal activity that the population is fearing (Bottoms, 1995). There has been an increase in support for harsher punishment policies in Latin American countries (Swanson, 2013) - known

as *mano dura* policies - and these include, for example, “broken windows” policing and longer sentences (Holland, 2013).

Several researchers have also empirically explored the relationship between fear of crime and punitive attitudes and have consistently shown that those who are more fearful of crime are also more punitive (e.g., Hogan et al., 2005; Tufts and Roberts, 2002). It is important to highlight that perceptions of crime and fear of crime are not directly associated with the official crime measure (Schafer et al., 2006). That is, in a city that got safer throughout time, it is possible that citizens still have levels of fear corresponding to a moment in which the city was very unsafe, influenced by the media and this culture of fear, for example. Fear of crime is therefore more impacted by subjective impressions of crime than by objective levels of crime (Schafer et al., 2006).

A second factor that leads to support for harsher punishment are economic anxieties. Singer et al. argues that heightened economic anxieties increase punitiveness both directly and indirectly, in the latter case through the increased fear of crime. In the former case, Singer shows, through extensive analysis of LAPOP data, that the impact that of economic anxieties in punitiveness is mediated by the type of economic anxieties. For those who believe that the national economy is poor, it is possible to observe more punitive attitudes. On the other hand, those who believe their personal economy is poor are less punitive (Singer et al., 2019).

A third cause for punitive attitudes is anger. García-Ponce et al. argue that exposure to violence is correlated with increased anger and leads to support for harsher punishment, including extrajudicial, illegal punishment. They also point out that the perceived innocence of the victim of a crime is what triggers punitiveness and outrage the most among the population, rather than the severity of the crime. Lastly, citizens are welcoming to high levels of violence

when they believe that it is restricted to criminals, and particularly to criminals that committed morally outrageous crimes (García-Ponce et al., 2023).

King and Maruna list as a fourth cause for punitive attitudes the construct of “belief in redeemability,” that is, whether people believe that criminals can be rehabilitated or whether they think that there is no manner of reinserting these people into society, and therefore they should just be punished, with, for example, life imprisonment (King and Maruna, 2009). Lastly, several studies point that factors such as age, race and education also play a role in defining punitiveness. Allen (2002), Hough and Roberts (2002), and Allen and Hough (2007), have shown that older men, citizens with lower levels of education and readers of tabloid newspapers tend to be significantly more supportive of punishment than others. Although not a lot of the literature about demographic divisions of punishment is focused on Latin America, it is possible to presume that a similar demographic relationship exists between these variables and support for punishment.

### *Punitiveness and gender*

Although some studies point out that women are more supportive of rehabilitative policies than men, the relationship between punitiveness and gender does not appear to be clear yet (Applegate et al. 2002). With my research, I aim to explore this gap in the literature and observe Brazilian women’s punishment attitudes. A highly explored portion of the literature that makes the importance of this gap clear is the literature on the gender differences in fear of crime.

It has been widely recognized that women have higher levels of fear of crime than men (Covington & Taylor, 1991; Schafer et al., 2006). Researchers point to several reasons for this heightened fear among women. The main one is that fear of crime among women is overshadowed by the fear of sexual victimization, even when women are prompted with crimes

that do not involve sexual assault (Ferraro, 1995; Fisher & Sloan, 2003). This happens because women face an ever-present fear of sexual victimization, which is a consequence of the fact that they are more likely to be victims of sexual crimes.

This means that the fear of sexual assault serves a “master offense” that impacts the way women perceive any other crime (Ferraro, 1996). For example, while men are afraid of the property that will be stolen in case of a burglary, women are also afraid of being victims of sexual assault in the case of a burglary (Schafer et al., 2006). It is also important to mention that this “master offense” perception may generate greater fear of general victimization because of the immense psychological harm that is associated with sexual crimes (Ferraro, 1996). In their study, Schafer et al. see that the gender differences of fear of crime are also defined by the type of crime. Women and men have similar levels of fear of property victimization, but women are significantly more fearful of personal crime victimization (Schafer et al., 2006). In addition to this, research has shown that women feel less capable of defending themselves (Riger et al., 1978), are more aware of their physical and social vulnerabilities (Burt and Estep, 1981) and also feel responsible for defending their own children (Gilchrist et al., 1998).

These clear gender distinctions in levels of fear of crime, which is an important predictor of punitiveness, as previously established, highlights the importance of approaching punitiveness through a gendered lens. This thesis aims to not only understand how women perceive harsh punishment, but also to understand whether women’s support for punishment varies depending on whether a crime is a gender-based crime or not, considering that their heightened fear seems to be closely associated with gender-based crimes.

### *Impact of punitiveness in politics*

A significant part of the literature on punishment has also focused on the impact that punitiveness has in political decisions and vice versa. An important concept from this literature is the idea of penal populism, which consists in the idea that populist leaders create punitive policies as a manner of addressing the intense fear of crime among the electorate, often implementing policies that are not effective, but that give the population a sense of justice. Roberts et al. (2002) defines it by saying that “penal populists allow the electoral advantage of a policy to take precedence over its penal effectiveness. In short, penal populism consists of the pursuit of a set of penal policies to win votes rather than to reduce crime rates or to promote justice (Roberts et al., 2002, p. 5).”

Penal populism explores prison and incarceration as a central tool, even though a significant body of research has shown that harsher prison sentences only reduces crimes moderately and diverts resources from more effective preventive policies (Roberts et al., 2002). Penal populism also often involves exploiting “misinformed opinion in the pursuit of electoral advantage (Roberts et al., 2002, p.7).” This often means that politicians use oversimplifications of the opinions of the electorate and tend to only hear from specific constituents (Roberts et al., 2002). In this thesis, I am to assess attitudes towards punishment of a significant part of the electorate that is often underrepresented inside political parties, women.

It is also important to highlight the role of the media and of moral indignation in shaping the punitive attitudes of the population and penal populist policies. The media often provides excessive crime reports that create the previously mentioned heightened fear of crime in the population (Roberts et al., 2002). In addition, this widely-spread perception of rising crime leads to a high level of moral indignation, both with violent crimes and with the responses seen as

insufficient (Roberts et al., 2002). This level of moral indignation is also increased by a focus given by the media to criminal cases that were not properly punished, creating a widespread idea that the justice is lenient with criminals, a discourse that is appropriated by penal populists to justify the policies that they are trying to implement (Roberts et al., 2002). Bottoms argues that penal populism uses the “just-deserts model,” which reinvindicates the idea that the punishment someone receives should be proportional to the crime that this person has committed, which can mean abandoning issues of human rights, for example (Bottoms, 1995). Gaio argues that penal populists leverage from this moral indignation and sense of injustice that citizens have to gain electoral advantage. They consider that citizens are no longer interested in politics because politics became irrelevant to solve their problems (Gaio, 2011), so they realize that raising the issue of tougher punishment allows them to gain popularity, especially considering the rise in public support for more punitive policies in Latin America (Swanson, 2013). Gaio points out that, besides the rhetoric of law and order, penal populists also use the following common strategies: demoralize the criminal system, public appearances with the victims to stimulate reactions of revenge, divide the population between the “good citizens” and the “scoundrels”, delegitimize the formal defense process to which defendants have the right, stimulate fear and multiply the chances of victimization of the normal citizen (Gaio, 2011).

Pratt adds to the importance of penal populism by saying that “it represents the largest change in the configuration of penal power in modern society (Pratt, 2007, p.8).” He highlights as an important characteristic of this system the fact that penal populists often direct their discourse to segments of the population that often felt ignored by the government (Pratt, 2007). This makes it fundamental to understand women’s punitive attitude and reactions to penal

populism, considering that this segment of the population has often suffered with high levels of domestic and sexual violence that are often not punished.

In the context of Brazil, Gazoto argued that penal populism has appeared in several of the measures of law and order taken in the period of redemocratization, during the writing of the Constitution of 1988. A main example is the law of heinous crimes, that was repudiated by several criminalists, but still approved by the National Congress and implemented by former President Fernando Collor de Mello (Gazoto, 2010). This way, it is possible to notice that the combat of criminality and implementation of harsher punishment is very present in the rhetoric and in policy proposals of Latin American politicians for at least 30 years now, and it is practically impossible to ignore the impact that this topic has in the political imaginary of the population and how the population makes voting decisions.

It is important to highlight that penal populism does not ignore a gender perspective. Populist politicians have largely exploited the public concern about sexual assault to implement harsher punishment legislation, that usually diverts resources from more effective policies (Roberts et al., 2002). Roberts et al. argues that no form of violence causes more outrage and public condemnation than sexual assault, specially when the victims are children. This type of crime also frequently receives extensive coverage from the media, but the attention brought to this crime has tended to be in cases of sexual assault that happen outside the domestic environment, and, for example, pedophile rings, which are not the most common forms of sexual violence. In fact, most cases of sexual violence are committed by a family member or dating companion (Roberts et al., 2002).

This widespread view of how sexual violence looks like has led to a common view of sex offenders as incurable, increasing the support for severe punishment over rehabilitative

treatments (Simon, 1998). The focus on this type of sexual assault therefore leads to the creation of punitive policies that serve to satisfy a moral indignation caused by such an atrocious crime. Some of these policies include chemical castration - implemented in certain cases of rape of children under 13 years old in California, Florida, Georgia and Louisiana (Miller, 1998) - and death penalty, implemented in Louisiana for aggravated rape when the victim is under the age of 12 (Schaaf, 2000). However, these policies do not really create a safer environment and do not inhibit the most common cases of sexual violence (Roberts et al., 2002). In case of sexual offenders, research shows that the most widely accepted treatment is the cognitive behavioral group therapy, focusing on relapse prevention (Roberts et al., 2002), however, it is uncommon for countries to invest in this type of therapy along with punishment, considering that there is significantly more support for punishment along the population. Hough, Moxon and Lewis (1987), have shown that, in the case in which a stranger assaults an adult woman, 94% of the public in England supports a prison term, the same is also true for Americans (Doble, 1997). There is also an overwhelming majority that supports prison sentences over a community-based sentence for rape (Doble, 1995). However, the public is much more uncertain on how to sentence rapists when they do not fit the image of a stranger or a predator against children and the support for harsher punishment for rapists is much smaller when it comes to a dating companion (Roberts et al., 2002).

It is also important to mention that the population perceives that punishment for rape is much more lenient than it actually is, perhaps because atypical cases with lenient sentences are frequently portrayed in the media. For example, less than 20% of people in England could correctly estimate (within 10% of the right figure) the proportion of convicted rapists that were actually arrested (Hough & Roberts, 1998). Therefore, it is possible to notice that penal populism

and the demand for harsher punishment do not ignore the gendered dimension of crime and demand for justice, instead, they rely significantly on this gender issue.

### *The gap in the punishment literature*

Through my research, I will be able to contribute to three branches of the literature on punishment attitudes. First, I aim to explore the impact that punitive attitudes have in politics through a perspective of voting behavior. A large portion of the literature has focused on how punitive attitudes impact policy preferences, attitudes towards extrajudicial groups and human rights reinforcement. Another significant portion of the literature has looked at the use of these punitive attitudes in political discourse, with a focus on the strategies of penal populism. I will contribute to a more unexplored part of the punitive attitudes' literature, that concerns the impact of these punitive attitudes in voting choice and behavior.

Second, I will focus on the gendered perspective of punitive attitudes, not only looking at the women's perspectives on punishment, but also analyzing how punitive attitudes differ when looking at gender-based crimes and general crimes. Since women are frequently not the most active constituents, considering that fewer women are affiliated to parties and active in politics in this systematic form (Kittilson, 2006), it is relevant to think if these penal populist policies are taking women's voices into consideration or just assuming their preferences. In addition, the literature has extensively focused on sexual violence when looking at punitive attitudes with a gendered perspective, as described in the previous section. It is, however, important to also understand how the punitive attitudes of the population shape their views on punishment for gender-based crimes like domestic violence, that tend to be more normalized and accepted than the media-portrayed cases of sexual violence. This way, my research aims to incorporate both of these main gender-based crimes.

Lastly, the main empirical literature on punitive attitudes has been focused on the United States and Europe, even though Latin American countries present much higher rates of violence and insecurity. Through my research, I want to be able to understand what particular dynamics are seen in Brazilians' punitive attitudes that are not addressed in the American and European literatures.

### ***General contribution to the literature***

As illustrated in the conceptual framework below, this research aims to contribute to the gender, punishment and politics literature in the main following ways:

1. Exploring the idea of substantive representation of women: In the interviews conducted, the participants shared their views on what are women's issues and important policies, which will allow me to construct a view of Brazilian women's shared issues from the bottom-up perspective.
2. Testing whether gender identification and attitudes impact policy preferences and voting behavior: The current literature has mostly looked at the role of gender identification in collective action, and I will be adding to the unexplored field of this impact in the voting behavior of these women
3. Exploring how gender impacts attitudes towards punishment: The current literature explores how gender impacts fear of crime, but not how these gendered differences translate into punitive attitudes and how they vary across gender-based and general crimes
4. Understanding the intersection between punitive attitudes and gender policy preferences
5. Exploring issue-based voting by looking at the impact of gender policy preferences in voting behavior.

## Part III: Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses

The conceptual framework below summarizes the different branches of the literature here explored, as well as how my hypotheses interact with this literature and how I am adding to the previous scholarship.




Figure 1. Conceptual Framework: Factors explaining voting behavior

On the left side of the figure, it is possible to observe a summary of what shapes attitudes towards punishment, as covered in the synthesis of the literature in previous sections. Important factors include fear of crime, a poor national economy, levels of education, and political preferences. This literature has also extensively explored how gender correlates with fear of crime. The right side of the figure portrays the literature on gender and politics. This literature has extensively discussed the roles of substantive and descriptive representation on the political behavior of women, as well as explained how gender identification and gender attitudes play a role in defining collective action among women.

The figure above conceptualizes the main theory being developed in this thesis, which argues that punitive preferences play an important role in shaping what type of gender policy is demanded by women and, therefore, their voting behavior. Women have similar experiences in their daily lives, which are impacted by their race, class and other identities, and, particularly, by gender. These women are also aware of this gender discrimination that they suffer, although to a different extent. Women as a group in general in Brazil are conscious of the experiences that they have only because of being women - which are usually negative and associated with sexism. This awareness is particularly true when it comes to violence. Because they share these similar experiences of sexism (and are aware of it), there is widespread support for gender policies. The specific type of gender policy that Brazilian women support, however, is moderated by their punitive preferences, considering particularly how a significant part of their group identification is tied to their identity as women. This argument can be separated into three main hypotheses, which emerged from observations from 39 interviews and will be tested through the survey conducted with 1,194 Brazilian women:

**Hypothesis 1:** Overall, there is widespread support for ideas of gender equality in Brazil - which in this thesis are measured through gender attitudes. These attitudes towards gender equality do not correlate with traditionally hypothesized characteristics, such as party, religion and socioeconomic status, and it is possible to observe small variation of gender attitudes across groups, with most women presenting progressive views on this issue.

**Hypothesis 2:** There is high demand for gender policy in Brazil, with some variation across the types of policy being supported - in the case of this study, gender punishment policies and feminist policies - although there is significant overlap across women. Therefore, although it is possible to observe some variation based on traditionally hypothesized characteristics, support

for both of these types of gender policies remains very high across the entirety of the sample, including among groups of women that the literature would expect otherwise.

**Hypothesis 3:** Considering the progressive gender attitudes and high demand for feminist policy here being hypothesized, gender policies will play an important role in terms of voting behavior of women. First, there will be preference for policies that incorporate a gender perspective over ones that do not. Second, when observing the two main types of gender policy here conceptualized, gender punishment policies and feminist policies, the first will take preference to women when voting. This is due to the perception of gender identification as correlated with the violence and injustice suffered by women. Although gender punishment policies will be preferred by most women over feminist policies, the difference in the support for these will be particularly higher among women from the right and lower among women from the left.

## **Chapter 3 | Background: The case of Brazil**

In order to explore the voting behavior and policy preferences of Brazilian women, it is important to understand the context of the political system and contemporary politics of Brazil. More than this, it is also essential to understand the current situation of women in the country in order to explain their gender policy preferences. In this chapter, I first provide a general background on the demographics of the country and its political system. The demographics included in this discussion mostly pertain to some characteristics that influence voting behavior. Second, I explore the background of general violence and the situation of gender inequality in the country, to contextualize two central topics of this thesis: punishment and gender. Third, I provide an overview of Brazilian contemporary politics. Later, in the fourth section, I discuss in particular the rise of Bolsonaro and the issues of most importance to the conservative sectors of Brazil, specially around and post the 2018 elections. Lastly, I discuss the particularities of voting behavior and partisanship in Brazil, exploring what the literature has theorized on these topics.

Brazil has a population of 203 million people (IBGE, 2023), being the 5th largest country in territorial size in the world and one of the largest economies, with a GDP of around 1.9 trillion dollars (IBGE, 2023). Like most Latin American countries, Brazil is a very recent democracy. The current democratic era of the country started in 1985 after 21 years of a military coup, and its current constitution was written in 1988, abolishing many of the characteristics of the military regime (Britannica Academic, 2023).

The country is a federal republic, divided into 26 states and the Federal District. The legislative power is exercised by a bicameral National Congress, divided into the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate. The first is composed of 513 representatives, elected every four

years by direct universal suffrage, and the number of representatives is roughly proportional to the population of each state. The Senate is composed of 81 representatives, who serve eight-year terms, but are elected every four years. These elections alternate between voting for one-third and two-thirds of the Senate, and each state has 3 senators. Presidents are also elected by direct universal suffrage and terms last fours years, with the possibility of reelection for one term. Brazil has a highly fragmented multi-party political system, with more than 30 official parties. Lastly, voting is mandatory in Brazil for citizens between the ages of 18 and 60 in the country, but people are always given the option to vote “Null” or “Blank” (Britannica Academic, 2023).

## **Part I: The population of Brazil**

Understanding voting behavior goes far beyond understanding political preferences, it requires, among other factors, understanding who the electorate is. This section will explore three demographic characteristics that have been argued to play important roles in voting behavior in Brazil: race, income and religion.

Brazil is a predominantly Black country, with 55.03% of its population declaring themselves as Black (Censo, 2010). It is important to understand, however, that racial categories are unique in the Brazilian context and differ significantly from other Latin American countries and from the United States. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to elaborate on these categories in detail, but for the purpose of the study being conducted, it is important to say that the category of “Black” as understood in the United States is actually composed of two different racial categories in Brazil. The umbrella term of Black in the country encompasses both people who classify as “pretos” (translated literally as Black) and people who classify as “pardos” (Moragas,

2023), which could be broadly understood as lighter-skinned Black people<sup>1</sup>. In addition, 47.51% of Brazilians declare themselves as White, 1.1% as Asian and 0.43% as indigenous (Censo, 2010). It is also important to notice that there is a lot of variation on racial composition of the population across different regions of the country. For example, in the North region of the country 78.4% of the population is Black, against only 26.3% in the South (Azevedo, 2022).

It is also important to notice that Brazil has a long history of oppression against the Black population, and it was the last country in the Americas to abolish slavery, only in 1888 (Behtel, 1970). This results in extreme racial inequalities observed until today. For example, the average monthly income of the Black population is R\$1,608 (approximately \$321), while the average income of the White population is R\$2,796 (approximately \$560) (IBGE, 2018). In addition, 76.9% of victims of homicide in the country and 68.2% of the people arrested are Black (Jornal Nacional, 2022). These markers illustrate the rooted racism of the country and the importance of understanding its racial diversity in order to comprehend how different racial groups may have different political demands, a topic that will be further explored in the chapter when looking at voting behavior specifically.

Another important marker of the Brazilian population, that has a significant impact in politics, is class, and particularly income inequality. With a Gini Index of 52.9, Brazil has consistently been ranked among the 10 most unequal countries in the world in terms of wealth inequality. In 2021, the 10% richest in the country earned almost 59% of the country's national income, while the poorest 50% own just 0.4% of Brazilian wealth (Fernandes, 2021). Although the country's GDP per capita is relatively high, the income of most of the population is

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<sup>1</sup> Throughout this thesis, people who identify as “Pretos” will be referred and Black and I will use the term “Pardo” in Portuguese to refer to the women who identify with this category, considering that I did not find the common translations to this category appropriate considering its complex original meaning.

considerably low. 70% of Brazilians earn up to 2 minimum wages (in 2019, this consisted of around \$375 per month) and 90% of the population earns up to \$700 per month (Mota, 2021).

The last important demographic marker to be mentioned is religion. Brazil, colonized by the Portuguese, is historically a Catholic country, like most of its neighbors. However, in the past decades, the country has seen a significant rise in the number of Evangelicals, who play a very important role in politics, which will be further discussed in this chapter. 50% of the population is Catholic, against 31% of evangelicals. The remaining 19% is divided into the following categories: 10% say they have no religion, 3% are Spiritist, 2% follow Afro-Brazilian religions, 1% are atheist, 0.3% is Jewish and the remaining 2% follow other religions (G1, 2020).

## **Part II: Violence and Gender**

In this thesis, I am investigating both the effect of punishment attitudes and gender policy preferences on voting behavior in Brazil. To explain why these are important issues to the politics of the country, this section will explore the current situation of general violence in the country, the situation of women and the situation of violence against women.

Brazil has the largest absolute number of homicides in the world. In 2014, the country accounted for 13% of all the homicides that happened in the world, according to the World Health Organization (G1, 2014). In 2022, 47.398 people were victims of homicide in Brazil, which corresponds to a rate of 23.3 per 100,000 inhabitants. As previously mentioned, most of the victims of these homicides are young Black men - 76.9% are Black, 50.2% are between 12 and 29 years old and 91.4% are men (G1, 2014). Although a significant portion of these murders comes from criminal activity, Brazil also has extreme rates of police violence and homicide, that again mostly impacts the Black population. For comparison, the Brazilian National Public

Security Forum Report of 2014 indicated that, in 5 years, the Brazilian police killed as many people as the police in the United States killed in 30 years (Ganem, 2015). In addition, Brazil also has extremely high rates of incarceration, with 322 people arrested for each 100,000 inhabitants. This leads to Brazil having the third largest incarcerated population in the world, of around 680,000 people, behind only China and the United States (Medeiros, 2020).

When it comes to gender-based violence, the situation in Brazil is equally (if not more) concerning. The National Survey of Violence against Women estimates that 30% of women in the country have suffered some type of domestic violence, which corresponds to 25.4 million women. Out of those, 76% report that the violence suffered was physical (Mesiano, 2023). In 2021, 1,319 women were victims of femicide, with one woman being killed every 7 hours in the country. In the same year, 56,098 cases of rape were reported, which corresponds to one girl or woman being raped every ten minutes (G1 DF, 2022). This just accounts for the number of cases of sexual violence that were actually reported, but the estimate is that most of these cases never get to the police or health authorities.

There is also a widespread perception of impunity among women, with 62% stating that they believe women do not report cases of violence to the police due to the perception of impunity. In addition, 73% say that fearing the aggressor also leads to not reporting and 61% think that financial dependence also plays an important role (Mesiano, 2023). With these high levels of general violence and gender-based violence, combined with the perception of impunity, it is no surprise that security is one of the main concerns of the Brazilian population and therefore is an issue that receives significant attention from politicians. The role this topic played in the 2018 and 2022 elections will be further explained in this chapter, and it is central to this thesis.

Besides gender-based violence, women in Brazil still face several other types of gender discrimination and inequality. Two are particularly relevant to the context of this thesis: political and work inequality. When it comes to female representativeness in the legislative power, Brazil occupies the position 143 of a ranking of 188 countries, and it is the second country with the lowest rate of female representativeness in Latin America (Haje, 2020). As of 2023, only 16% of people in the Brazilian Congress are women and, among governors, only 1 out of 27 is a woman. This gender discrimination in politics is also seen at the level of candidacies: while 52.5% of the Brazilian electorate is composed by women, only 33.3% of the municipal candidacies were of women and only 10% of the candidacies for mayor (Bittar, 2020). In addition, 81% of the female politicians in Brazil have reported to have suffered some type of political violence (Congresso em Foco, 2021).

When it comes to the work sphere, women are still paid 77.7% of what men are paid. The average income of women is around \$397 per month, while it is of \$511 per month for men (Tribunal Superior do Trabalho, 2023). They are also more affected by unemployment, with 13.9% of women being unemployed, compared to 9.6% of men (Alvarenga, 2022). Lastly, the burden of domestic work falls heavily on these women: they perform an average of 21.4 hours a week of domestic work, compared to 11h a week for men (IBGE, 2020). All of these show that women still face very different challenges than men, particularly when it comes to gender-based violence, political and economic inequality. This means that women's political preferences may differ from men's in several aspects, as it was discussed in the previous chapter. In the further sections, the impact of these gender differences in particular Brazilian elections will be greater discussed.

## **Part III: Contemporary Brazilian Politics**

To properly contextualize the contemporary Brazilian politics, it is necessary to first introduce some of the most important political actors in the federal level in the past 20 years. Throughout this thesis, I refer to president Lula and former president Jair Bolsonaro, therefore, I will first give a brief introduction on whom these political figures are, although the rest of this background will further elaborate on their platforms and impacts in Brazilian politics.

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, popularly known as Lula, was president of Brazil from 2003 to 2011, for two consecutive terms. He is one of the founding members of the Worker's Party (Britannica Academic, 2023), the largest leftist party in Brazil, and is greatly known for the immense reduction of poverty that Brazil experienced during his term (Pereira, 2015). He is also the current president of the country, elected in 2022 for a term from 2023 to 2026 (Britannica Academic, 2023).

Jair Bolsonaro is the former president of Brazil, having served from 2019 to 2023. He has served as an army captain as well as a former federal deputy, representing the state of Rio de Janeiro in the National Congress for around 27 years (Britannica Academic, 2023). Bolsonaro is a right-wing nationalist, law-and-order advocate and has extensively defended the “traditional values” and the “traditional family”, having been pointed as misogynist, homophobe, and racist due to several of his speeches (Britannica Academic, 2023). Since 2021, Bolsonaro is a part of the Liberal Party, a right-wing party, but this is the 9th party that Bolsonaro has been a part of. When elected to the presidency in 2018, he was part of the Social Liberal Party, also a right-wing party (Gomes, 2021).

### *Corruption in contemporary Brazilian politics*

It is impossible to provide a narrative of current Brazilian politics without looking at corruption in the country, as this is one of the main challenges Brazil faces (Transparency International, 2017), and one of the main concerns of the electorate. In the Transparency International's 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index, Brazil scores 35 out of 100 - on a 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (highly clean) scale - ranking 105 out of 180 in terms of corruption (Transparency International, 2017). There is also a perception of increase of corruption in the country from the electorate. According to the 2017 Global Corruption Barometer, 78% of respondents believed that the level of corruption in the country had increased (Transparency International, 2017).

The widespread grand corruption in the country, extensively covered by the media, resulted in distrust in the institutions and in democracy itself. In 2018, Brazilian institutions reached a low point of distrust, according to the 2018 Social Trust Index, which pointed that public trust scored 48 points out of 100. The most distrusted institutions were the presidency (13 points), political parties (16) and the congress (18) (Transparency International, 2017). This low point of distrust was reached after more than a decade of grand corruption scandals. Research by Ibope pointed that corruption was seen as the second most relevant problem by Brazilians in 2017, with 55% of the participants listing it as the main issue of the country, only behind unemployment (Transparency International, 2017).

Two important events, the Mensalão and the Car Wash Operation, played a significant role in the public sentiment towards parties, particularly the Workers' Party, and were central in defining the 2018 elections in the country (Rennó, 2020). The Mensalão scandal revealed that the Workers' Party made monthly payments to minor parties to buy their support in Congress from

illicit money (Watts, 2017). Similarly, in 2014, the Car Wash Operation revealed that the Workers Party had accepted bribes in exchange for over-priced contracts involving the largest state-owned company in the country, Petrobras. Lula himself had offered executive posts in Petrobras to his political allies, as a way of building support in the Congress (Watts, 2017).

These corruption scandals involved every major party in Brazil, including PT's main opponent, PSDB (Brazilian Social Democracy Party), and MDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement). Nevertheless, as the party in government, the Workers' Party, however, was taken by the media as the main precursor of corruption, and the public's fury was mainly directed towards the party. Although the Workers' Party was indeed also involved in these scandals, among many other parties, it is also important to say that judicial reforms enabled by the party were fundamental for the Car Wash Operation to be conducted, such as naming an independent attorney general in 2013 (Watts, 2017).

### ***Anti-Workers' Party Sentiment (Antipetismo)***

During the fallout of these corruption scandals, in 2016, former president Dilma Rousseff was impeached. She was the first (and only) female president of Brazil, and successor of former President Lula, also from the Workers' Party, elected for the first time in 2010 and re-elected in 2014 (Britannica Academic, 2023). She was impeached under the accusation of false accounting, which consists of shifting funds between government accounts to make finances look better. It is important to mention that previous administrations had also done this, but were never punished by it (Watts, 2017). Dilma's impeachment was closely connected to the intense association between corruption and the Workers' Party, which was reflected in a wave of anti-corruption and anti-Workers' Party protests, in which 91% of protesters declaring that the Workers' Party caused great harm to the country and 82% of them rating the party as 0 out of 10.

In addition, 31% thought that the best for the country was for Dilma to renounce, 27% thought it was for her to be impeached and 14% thought it was a military intervention (Telles, 97). Besides the public discontentment, Dilma also refused to call off the Car Wash investigation, which led to great discontentment among many politicians in Congress who were being targeted by the operation, including Eduardo Cunha -later condemned for corruption - then speaker of the lower house, who accepted the one of the many impeachment requests to oust Dilma Rousseff (Watts, 2017).

Another extremely important event of contemporary Brazilian politics, which is again tied to corruption scandals, was the imprisonment of former president Lula. In April 2018, six months before the presidential elections, Lula was arrested, condemned for passive corruption and money laundering (Coalizão Comprova, 2023). Lula remained in jail from April 2018 to November 2019. However, in 2021, the Supreme Court canceled all condemnations against Lula, under the argument that Lula did not have his rights respected in the judgment of the case and that the judge of the case had been partial (Coalizão Comprova, 2023).

With the great association of the Workers' Party with corruption, Dilma's impeachment and Lula's prison, the anti-Workers' Party sentiment (*antipetismo*) in Brazil reached its peak and influenced several elections in the 2010s and 2020s. According to Samuels and Zucco (2018), *antipetismo* is the main predictor of voting behavior of around 40% of the population, to whom electing the Workers' Party is an inadmissible idea (Samuels and Zucco, 2018). The roots of this *antipetismo* have been explored by several authors and are associated not only to the successive corruption scandals (Ribeiro, Carreirão and Borba 2016), but also to the evaluation of the economy as bad during the Workers' Party governments (Paiva, Krause and Lameirão, 2016), and to the resentment of the middle class in response to the redistributive politics of the party,

that mostly targeted the poor. However, it is important to say that the *antipetismo* is a phenomenon that happened before the party got to the presidency as well (Samuels e Zucco, 2018), which indicates that the factors pointed above do not explain the whole extent of this rejection (Araújo, 2022).

Araújo points out that the Pentecostal evangelical population represented a significant part of the rejection of the Workers' Party in the presidential elections. He shows that, between 2002 and 2018, Pentecostal evangelical voters were the least likely to vote for the Workers' Party, reaching a peak rejection in 2018, when the probability that a Pentecostal evangelical voted for the Workers' Party was 55% lower in comparison to other religious groups (Araújo, 2022). This is also true to Evangelical voters that are beneficiaries of the Bolsa Família program - a cash transfer program greatly expanded by the Workers' Party, that had striking results in poverty reduction in the country (Pereira, 2015). Unlike other religious beneficiaries of the program, the beneficiaries who are Pentecostal Evangelical tend to not electorally reward the party for the program (Araújo, 2022).

## **Part IV: Conservative issues and post-2018 elections**

### *The 2018 elections*

The 2018 elections were a consolidation of the immense changes happening in Brazilian politics in the past decade, with a shift from 14 years of a leftist government to the election of right-wing military candidate, Jair Bolsonaro. Running against several other candidates, Jair Bolsonaro and Fernando Haddad were the two most voted presidential candidates and competed in the runoff of these elections. In the runoff elections, in October 2018, Bolsonaro won with 55% of the votes (Britannica Academic, 2023).

A peculiarity of the 2018 election is that it was the most divisive on the basis of gender: surveys pointed out that only 18% of eligible women intended to vote for Bolsonaro, compared to 36% of men (Veja, 2023). Still, it is estimated that in the runoff, Bolsonaro received 46% of the female vote (Pimentel, 2018). Analyzing the Latin American Public Opinion Project and voting behavior in 2018, Araújo showed that the 2018 election is the first one in which being a woman led to higher likelihood of voting for the Workers' Party. In addition, women led the largest women's protest in the history of Brazil, reuniting hundreds of thousands of participants in around 114 cities, both in and outside the country (Araújo, 2022). This was also one of the largest protests against a single candidate. These protests were called #EleNão (#NotHim) and stemmed from social media mobilization, particularly from the Facebook group Women United Against Bolsonaro, that reunited 3.88 million people. They, although more inclined to the left of the political spectrum, reunited thousands of women from all political ideologies, including groups such as evangelical people and "police officers against fascism." (Rossi et al., 2018) These women were reunited to denounce the misogyny of Bolsonaro, whose polemic statements have included saying that women should be paid less than men (Lima, 2015) and saying to a federal deputy that he would not rape her because "she was not deserving it" (Sabóia, 2022).

In addition to the gender-based divisions of voting in the 2018 presidential election, there were also clear age and income influences, with older and richer people being more inclined to vote for Bolsonaro. Furthermore, this election was also significantly divisive in racial terms. 42% of White people declared that they would vote for Bolsonaro, against 15% for Haddad. Meanwhile, 30% of Black people declared they would vote for Haddad and 18% for Bolsonaro. Indigenous peoples also favored Lula, with 37% declaring they would vote for them against 22% for Bolsonaro. It is important to note, however, that the trend was different among *pardos*

(light-skinned Black people), with 30% of this population declaring that they would vote for Bolsonaro and 23% for Lula (Folha de São Paulo, 2022). The lower support among these populations may be associated with several racist statements from Bolsonaro. Some of them included saying that his sons would never date a Black woman or be gay because they “were raised right” (O Globo, 2011) and that “certainly, the Indian has changed. It's evolving. Increasingly, the Indian is a human being like us (Folha de São Paulo, 2022).” In addition, Bolsonaro also opposed affirmative action policies, like racial quotas in public universities (Silva and Larkins, 2019).

It was also possible to observe overwhelming support for Bolsonaro among the evangelical population, with 40% of evangelicals saying they were going to vote for Bolsonaro, against 15% for Haddad. Among Catholics, 29% supported Bolsonaro and 25% supported Haddad (Folha de São Paulo, 2022). In several of his communications with the evangelical population, Bolsonaro has brought a discourse about the traditional values of the family, particularly expressing homophobic and transphobic ideas. In one of these meetings with Evangelicals, Bolsonaro has said, for example, that “what we want is for Joãozinho to be Joãozinho [typical Portuguese name for men] all his life. May Mariazinha be Maria [typical Portuguese name for women] all her life, may they form a family, may their character not be distorted in the classroom (Folha de São Paulo, 2022).”

Lastly, to understand the context of the elections of 2018, it is important to observe the amount of abstentions, null and blank votes. In the runoff of the elections, many voters felt trapped between choosing the “lesser of two evils”. This is because many of this electorate had the anti-Workers’ Party sentiment guiding their choices, but at the same were resistant in voting for Bolsonaro due to his far-right violent rhetoric. This led to the largest rate of null votes since

1989 in the runoff of the 2018 presidential election. Accounting for null and blank votes, as well as abstentions, 30% of the Brazilian electorate did not choose a candidate (Grandin et al., 2018).

### *Bolsonarismo: The conservative ethos of Brazil*

The previous sections have explored some of the rhetoric and political trajectory of Bolsonaro. This upcoming one aims to highlight the important issues covered by Bolsonaro's ideology, as well as provide some insight on his voters' preferences, in order to shed light on how he became such a prominent figure in the country.

An important study to understand current voting behavior in the country, and particularly the phenomenon of Bolsonarismo, was conducted by Rennó. This research was able to show that the 2018 elections marked an extensive alignment of voters with right-wing positions, particularly Bolsonaro's voters, constituting an “issue voting for an allegedly populist politician (Rennó, 2020, p. 2),” that is, Bolsonaro's voters policy preferences were aligned with his political platform in several ways. This analysis of issue-positioning of Bolsonaro's supporters contradicts the common idea that Bolsonaro was mostly elected because of the widespread *antipetismo* (resentment against the PT, Workers' Party) of the population (Rennó, 2020) and the relevance that anti-corruption sentiment has in Latin American elections (Rennó, 2007).

This was definitely an important factor in the past presidential elections, as discussed above, but it was not the only defining one. Although the fact that there was issue-based voting in Bolsonaro's election is particularly important, since this election completely changed the landscape of Brazilian democracy, this was not the first time that Brazilians voted based on issues. Ames et al. (2008), Rennó and Ames (2014) and Baker and Greene (2015) have pointed out that several other elections in Brazil and Latin America have been decided with issue-based

voting. Some of the important issues in the past have been, for example, abortion (Rennó and Ames, 2014) and privatization (Ames et al., 2008).

Rennó points out that a cornerstone of Bolsonaro's platform that was extremely aligned with his voters' political preferences was the demand for harsher punishment, which included lowering the age of legal maturity, favoring the death penalty, opposing the legalization of drugs, and relaxing gun control, for example (Rennó, 2020). This demand for harsher punishment resonated both with the poor population, which is frequently exposed to high levels of violence in Brazil, and to the elites, often exposed to the fear of crime reported in the television (Rennó, 2020). Bolsonaro also represented a cultural backlash in Brazil and presented a rhetoric that was deeply critical of the left and defended traditional family values. He became known with his anti-LGBTQ and anti-feminist rhetoric (Rennó, 2020) and Rennó (2020) points out that some of these issues are shared among his voters, who oppose abortion more than the median Brazilian voter, as well as are more in favor of incarcerating women who get abortions (Rennó, 2020).

In terms of the anti-feminist rhetoric, Solano et al. (2022), on the other hand, has shown that Bolsonaro's female electors presented significantly more progressive views on gender than Bolsonaro (Solano et al. 2022), based on interviews conducted with some of these women. She shows that, for example, the majority of women think there should be quotas of 50% for women in Congress and 77% think there should be more women in politics (Solano et al. 2022).

However, there is still a significant gap of the literature on explaining the behavior of the women who have voted for Bolsonaro. In my research, I aim to address this gap by exploring the attitudes and the policy preferences of Brazilian women (including the ones who voted for Bolsonaro) about both gender and punishment issues. Another important gap of this literature is that issue positions concerning feminism and gender equality tend to focus solely on abortion

policy. However, abortion is an extremely polarizing topic in a highly religious country like Brazil (Solano et al., 2022) and cannot be used a sole indicator of support for feminist policies. Therefore, in my research, I also intend to address this gap by analyzing preferences in other gender issues and policies, as well as by measuring through an experiment the impact that abortion policy has in defining issue-based voting.

### ***Security and punishment***

As previously mentioned, security is a very relevant issue to Brazilian voters, and it is also one of the main issues in Bolsonaro's platform. This appears both through his extreme support for harsher punishment, and his defense for relaxation of gun control, for the self-defense of citizens (Campanha Bolsonaro, 2018). Bolsonaro as a federal deputy was part of the cross-party caucus in the Chamber of Deputies known as the *Bancada da Bala* (the Bullet caucus), which is composed by former police officers, firearms industry lobbyists and tough-on-crime advocates (Macaulay, 2019). Not only were these great supporters of Bolsonaro in the presidential elections, Bolsonaro's success also brought with him more people to this caucus. Out of the 52 federal deputies from the Social Liberal Party, Bolsonaro's former party, elected in 2018, 40% had a police or military background. Indeed, if the members of this caucus were a party, they would be second largest in the Congress (Macaulay, 2019). According to Macaulay, this caucus shares "a nostalgia for an era of social hierarchy, and a society that is divided into the deserving and undeserving, in which the 'good people' are collectively protected from the 'bad people', through what the hard-line law-and-order lobby calls 'social defense'. The lobby's slogan is 'the only good criminal is a dead one' is hardly new. It has underpinned the executions of criminal suspects by police, death squads and militias all through the twentieth century to the current day (Macaulay, 2019, p. 11)."

Part of Bolsonaro's discourse regarding violence and security involves praising the military dictatorship of Brazil as a period of order and law in the country (Macaulay, 2019). In Bolsonaro's government itself, the military presence was clear, with 8 of his appointed ministers coming from the armed forces (Macaulay, 2019). As it can be observed through this description and Bolsonaro's discourses, the former president used a lot of the characteristics of penal populism in his favor.

Roberts et al. defines the concept of penal populism by saying that "penal populists allow the electoral advantage of a policy to take precedence over its penal effectiveness (Roberts, 2002, p. 5)". In short, penal populism consists of the pursuit of a set of penal policies to win votes rather than to reduce crime rates or to promote justice. In his 2018 government plan, Bolsonaro stated that there will be "ZERO tolerance with crime, corruption and privileges (Campanha Bolsonaro, 2018, 10)." He also associates the high rates of violence in Brazil to the rigid gun regulation in the country. The document also indicates that

"The United States, Austria, Germany, Norway, Finland, Israel, Switzerland, Canada, etc, are countries in which there is a gun in the majority of households. Coincidentally, the rate of homicides committed with a gun is much smaller than it is in Brazil. In Canada, there are 600 homicides per year! In Israel 100 and in Switzerland 40! [...] A statistical treatment will indicate an inverse correlation between guns in the household and homicides! (Campanha Bolsonaro, 2018, p. 25)"

This type of discourse is closely associated with the general rhetoric of penal populism because it not only proposes "easy" solutions to complicated issues, it also provides misguiding information, such as pointing out that guns reduce violence, when several studies have proved the opposite (Roberts, 2002). It also is framed in a misleading form to the population, citing absolute number of homicides of much smaller countries and contrasting to Brazil's numbers,

instead of making a comparison of rates. Lastly, this government plan provides no citations to indicate where this information is coming from.

In terms of actual policies proposed by Bolsonaro to reduce violence and crime, the government plan focuses on harsher punishment, using an aggressive rhetoric. It states, for example, that they will “Arrest people and leave them in prison! Put an end to the progression of sentences and temporary releases! (Campanha Bolsonaro, 2018, p. 32)” and “Reduce the penal majority to 16 years old! (Campanha Bolsonaro, 2018, p. 32)”. There is also great emphasis on the protection and investment in the police, stating that there should be more investment in equipment and technology of police forces, as well as that:

“police officers need to be sure that, in the exercise of their professional activity, they will be protected by legal protection. Guaranteed by the State, through the exclusion of illegality. We Brazilians need to guarantee and recognize that the life of a police officer is worth a lot and his work will be remembered by all of us! For the Brazilian Nation! (Campanha Bolsonaro, 2018, p. 32)”.

Again, there is great emphasis on the importance of relaxation of gun control, with the proposal to “Reformulate the Disarmament Statute to guarantee the citizen's right to LEGITIMATE DEFENSE of themselves, their family members, their property and that of third parties! (Campanha Bolsonaro, 2018, p. 32)”. Another significant aspect about Bolsonaro’s discourse on punishment is the aversion to the concept of human rights, saying that human rights policies will be redirected to the victims and not the criminal (Campanha Bolsonaro, 2018). During the 2018 campaign, International Amnesty declared their concern with Bolsonaro’s proposed punishment policies as a threat to human rights and, a few months after, released a statement informing that several human rights violations were already being solidified in Bolsonaro’s government (Amnesty International, 2018).

### *Gender and punishment*

Another topic growing in importance in Brazilian politics and that was of particular relevance to Bolsonaro's campaign is gender. Not only does a significant part of his ideology rely on a cultural backlash, that involves anti-feminist discourse, as pointed by Rennó (2020), Bolsonaro also faced a huge rate of rejection among women (Veja, 2023) and had to adapt his plans and discourses to attract the female electorate.

Although women are only mentioned in Bolsonaro's government plan once, and he has publicly stood against several measures that would promote gender equality, Bolsonaro strategically touched on an issue that appeals to the female electorate immensely: gender-based violence. The only mention of women in Bolsonaro's government plan was to discuss the high rates of rape against children (Campanha Bolsonaro, 2018). With the relevance of this issue in mind, it is possible to observe that Bolsonaro is very intentional in including women in his discourse about punishment and violence.

In several events, the former president has defended that the relaxation of guns could greatly benefit women, who would then be able to defend themselves from sexual violence in the streets (Sanches, 2022). In one of his speeches at a women's event, Bolsonaro said, "When you're changing your tires on the street alone and someone comes in your direction, would you rather have the Maria da Penha law [main law for protection against domestic violence in Brazil] or a gun? (Sanches, 2022)" Again, it is possible to observe Bolsonaro's use of penal populism rhetoric. Not only there is a defense of the simple solution to gender-based violence, to arm women, which is not based on any scientific evidence, but also in the use of a distorted view of what gender-based violence looks like. The use of discourse about gender-based violence, particularly sexual violence, has been common inside the penal populist approaches in different

countries. These penal populists discuss the issue of sexual violence, framing the aggressor as an unknown person, who commits the violence on a dark alley and who is basically sick and cannot be rehabilitated (Pratt, 2006). This ignores the fact that most of the cases of sexual violence are committed by people that the victim knows, and a lot of them are in the domestic environment (Mesiano, 2023). Therefore, these types of solutions do not apply to the setting in which these violences typically occur.

Another example of this approach is that, as a federal deputy, Bolsonaro also proposed a law project that would implement chemical castration as part of the punishment of people condemned for rape (Bolsonaro, 2013). During his campaign, he reinforced this discourse several times. During Bolsonaro's government, however, there was a 94% decrease in the budget of resources to combat violence against women (Martello, 2022). Therefore, even though Bolsonaro opposed the implementation of several policies that promote gender equality, he did use a gendered approach to his discourse on punishment policies, however, these were never translated into government actions.

### *2022 Elections*

On October 20th, 2022, Bolsonaro and Lula competed in the runoff of the presidential elections and Lula won, very narrowly, with 51% of the vote, with just over 49% of the votes for Bolsonaro. Bolsonaro was then the first incumbent in Brazilian elections to not get reelected in more than 30 years (Britannica Academic, 2023). He was initially silent about the election results and never conceded defeat explicitly, but eventually indicated that he would cooperate with the transition of power. Supporters of Bolsonaro, however, organized protests after the elections across the country, questioning the results of the elections. These supporters would camp outside military buildings, ask the military to interfere and clog the traffic. They reached a peak around a

week after Lula's inauguration, on January 8th, 2023, when thousands of Bolsonaro's supporters invaded the Brazilian Congress and Supreme Court, promoting destruction inside these buildings (Britannica Academic, 2023).

Although extremely turbulent, the transition of power happened. On June 30th, 2023, Bolsonaro was declared ineligible for 8 years by the Supreme Electoral Court. This decision was based on the judgement that Bolsonaro abused his political power and improperly used communication means during a meeting conducted with foreign ambassadors in the presidential palace in 2022. In this meeting, Bolsonaro questioned the trustworthiness of the electronic ballots without any proof. Therefore, Bolsonaro cannot run for any political office for the following 8 years, and it is still being investigated for many other possible crimes (Britannica Academic, 2023).

## **Part V: Voting Behavior in Brazil**

### *Factors influencing voting decisions*

Extensive research has been conducted aiming to explain what factors into voting decisions. Some of the literature points out to extensive impact of clientelism and populist discourses. Other parts of the literature discuss individual-level factors that impact the manner that people vote. This strand of the literature points to factors such as: income (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004), education (Evans and Andersen, 2006), gender (Karp and Banducci, 2008), age (Dalton, 2008), personality traits (Gerber et al., 2011), emotional intelligence (Mayer and Salovey, 1990), climate change concerns (Anderson and McGregor, 2018), and healthcare experiences (Haselswerdt, 2018) (Kulachai et al., 2023). This is not an exhaustive list of everything that factors into a voting decision and, considering the complexity of this issue, this

research will mostly rely on the literature on the impact of gender and gender attitudes, and punitive attitudes in voting behavior.

Dammert (2012) points that studies of public opinion in Latin American countries show that the population of these countries lists combatting criminality as either the first or second most important public issue. In the case of Brazil, a survey conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics showed that 39% of Brazilians think that crime and public security is the biggest problem that Brazil faces nowadays and 33% think that the biggest problem are drugs, which is also associated to the theme of criminality (Congresso em Foco, 2014).

The impact of punitive attitudes in voting behavior has been particularly important in Brazil with a shift to conservatism across Latin America (Scoones et al., 2017) and with the rise of far-right Jair Bolsonaro (Londono and Andreoni, 2018). Paes-Machado and Vilar Noronha (2002) point out that Bolsonaro emphasizes the importance of punitive measures against “urban criminals.” They argue that “while the majority of Brazilian citizens may be in favor of protecting human rights, societal level political shifts and increased fears of violence by marginal others may be responsible for the appearance of punitiveness.” (Singer et al., 2020)

### *Voting behavior and the party system*

Lastly, to analyze voting behavior in Brazil, it is fundamental to go beyond the general literature on voting behavior and the literature on the contemporary politics of Brazil. It is also important to analyze what are some of the particularities of the political system of the country that impact voting behavior. The particular focus of this section is exploring the literature of the party system in Brazil, which led me to decide to focus on ideology and specific election’s decision rather than party identification in my research.

Brazil's party system has some of the highest degrees of fragmentation in the world (Clark et al., 2006), having more than 30 parties. This fragmentation makes it difficult for voters to understand what parties are more aligned with their ideology. This is reinforced by the fact that a lot of these parties have converged towards a more centrist view and formed different coalitions (Lucas and Samuels, 2010). Because of this, the majority of the literature defends that party identification is not rooted in Brazilian society and ends up mattering more to a minority of voters, who have higher levels of education and political involvement (Carreirão and Kinzo, 2004). Carreirão and Kinzo (2004), for example, show that less than half of the voters exhibits some type of party identification. Besides, less than 10% of voters are affiliated to a party (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, 2021) and more than 84% do not trust political parties (World Values Survey, 2020).

Braga and Pimental (2011), however, showed that, since 2006, sympathy towards two parties was growing and beginning to define voter behavior in Brazil. These parties were PT (*Partido dos Trabalhadores*, translated as Workers' Party), a left-leaning party, and PSDB (*Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira*, translated as Brazilian Social Democracy Party), a right-leaning party. This happened because the voters became more familiar with these two parties after they were present in the second round of presidential elections several times (Braga and Pimental, 2011).

Researchers have also pointed out that this approximation with these two parties was mediated by socioeconomic variables. They argue that social policies promoted by President Lula's government (the most important representative of PT), with an emphasis in policies to combat hunger, led to an alignment of the poorer electorate with PT and of the middle class with PSDB (Braga and Pimental, 2011). However, this typical dispute between PT and PSDB began

to change with the rise of Jair Bolsonaro, in 2018. The PSDB lost significant space to the extreme right, mostly represented by PL (the Liberal Party, whose main representative is Bolsonaro) now (Braga and Pimental, 2011). It is also important to note that Jair Bolsonaro changed parties during his presidential mandate, which exemplifies the greater attachment to ideology than to party identification.

It is also important to note that positions on inequality are important when defining voter choice in Brazil, particularly considering that the country has one of the highest income inequality rates in the world. Luna and Rovira Kaltwasser (2014) argue that right-wing positions in Latin America usually excuse the state from reducing inequality through social policies. Being a beneficiary of Bolsa Família (a conditional cash transfer program) then is defining to vote choice in several elections in Brazil, but it was more ambivalent in the case of the 2018 elections, considering that Bolsonaro maintained himself ambivalent to Bolsa Família, considering the electoral importance of this program (Aragão, 2018).

As previously mentioned, this research does not plan to explain everything that factors into the voting behavior of women and this section made it clear how complex the literature is when it comes to voting choice, with several disagreements between authors. It is important to highlight, however, that part of the research has shown that issues and policy preferences have played an important role in the 2018 election. Even though there is evidence of issue-based voting, most of the literature has focused on how sociodemographic aspects and party identification dictate voting behavior. Through this research, I therefore aim to contribute to the literature of attitude-based and issue-based voting, particularly looking at gender and punishment.

### *Voting behavior and identity*

In the previous chapter, I have developed on the theories about how identity, particularly gender, informs voting behavior. To conclude this chapter, I will briefly explore the impact that several identity factors have in voting behavior in the specific context of Brazil. According to Guedes-Neto (2021), the concept of social sorting - that is, alignment with specific parties based on social identity - is not as clear in Brazil as it is in the United States. This is possibly greatly associated with the lack of partisan sentiment and the fact that Brazil does not have a bipartisan system. However, also as previously mentioned, the increased polarization in the country has led to some level of social sorting in the 2018 and 2022 elections, with, for example, men and white citizens being more likely to vote for Bolsonaro. Besides the categories of identity that are usually looked at in American literature when observing voting behavior - namely race and gender-the Brazilian literature on voting behavior has greatly emphasized the impact of class, geography and religion in voting behavior (Guedes-Neto, 2021).

A significant portion of the literature looks at social class as the main determinant of voting in Brazilian politics (Singer, 2009). This analysis was particularly relevant in the 20 years before 2018, in which most of the elections were decided between the Workers' Party and the Brazilian Social Democrat Party, with the working class composing most of the electors of the firsts and the higher-income classes composing the electorate of the second (Guedes-Neto, 2021).

Reis e Castro (1992) have also pointed to the relevance of the place of residency of the voters, that is, the relation center-periphery, in determining voting preferences. Throughout time, this regionality has been consolidated, specially with the great support for the Workers' Party in the Northeast of the country (Veiga, 2011). It is important, however, to highlight that social class

continues to play a role in these regional discrepancies, considering that significant economic inequalities are seen across different regions of Brazil.

Lastly, religion has been an important predictor of voting preference in Brazil far before the rise of Bolsonaro. Peixoto and Rennó (2011) show that evangelicals have been less likely to vote for the Workers' Party, for example. In addition, Smith (2016) showed that religious groups promote extensive mobilization of the practitioners of that religion to raise support for specific politicians. Boas and Smith (2019) have also shown that this type of descriptive representation matters (Guedes-Neto, 2021).

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has provided an overview of the context of contemporary politics in Brazil and the turbulent periods being faced in the country in the 2010s and 2020s. In particular for this thesis, it is necessary to understand the current situation of voting choice, greatly influenced by the polarization and the *antipetismo*, as this plays a fundamental role in any conversation about political behavior in the country at the moment. Furthermore, understanding what factors influence voting behavior in the country is fundamental background to understand the design of the study conducted in this thesis and the variables chosen at different moments of the research. Lastly, comprehending the relevance of the topics of gender and security in the current context of the country highlights the relevance of the research being conducted.

## **Chapter 4 | Methodology: Mixed-methods research**

### *Study Methodology Rationale: Mixed-methods research*

This research uses a mixed-methods approach to explore how punishment attitudes influence Brazilian women's gender policy preferences and how these preferences impact voting behavior. To do so, I am employing both in-depth semi-structured interviews and a 57-item online survey that includes a conjoint and a survey experiment. To explain the rationale behind using a mixed methodology, I will first elaborate on why qualitative methods are appropriate to this setting and, later on, why quantitative methods are a good addition to this thesis.

As previously mentioned in my literature review, the topic of gender policy preferences and substantive representation among women has not been very explored in general, particularly in Latin America (Wängnerud, 2009). Miles et al. (2019) argue that qualitative research is a powerful tool “as a strategy for discovery, for exploring new ideas, and for developing hypotheses (Miles et al. 2019, 8).” Therefore, qualitative research fits this setting of hypothesis exploration very appropriately. In addition, the qualitative approach I am taking is also inspired by the grounded theory methodology, which proposes that researchers “abstract conceptual relationships from data rather than deduce testable hypotheses from existing theory (Deterding and Waters, 2021, 711).” This allowed me to take an inductive and iterative approach to my qualitative work, which was not formally hypothesis-driven. It is important to mention that I went to the field with some assumptions of important variables to measure, which were reflected in my interview protocol. However, many issues that were context-specific and not covered in previous research emerged consistently throughout the qualitative data collection, strengthening the power of my analysis. A significant portion of my current research question, in fact, emerged

from observations from interviews during my data collection process. Previous to this fieldwork, punishment attitudes were not a main part of my investigation. Still, it was a recurring topic throughout almost all interviews. It led me to build a conceptual framework with it in mind, which can illustrate the power of qualitative methodology in shaping hypothesis generation.

Qualitative research also fits this research design well due to its iterative nature, which has allowed me to employ insights from data collection from interviews to develop my survey instrument and experiments. This iterative process means that data collection and analysis proceeded concurrently, and it led to the elaboration of a survey instrument that is informed by interview analysis that happened throughout the data collection process. Therefore, both instruments were being developed concurrently, with the interview protocol being improved based on important points that emerged from the data. The importance of interviews in survey development has been explored by Wackerbarth et al. (2002) and supported by survey methodologists like deVaus (1986) and Sheatsley (1983).

On the other hand, the quantitative portion of the research will be used to test the hypotheses generated by the qualitative portion. In addition, the quantitative methods used are more generalizable than the qualitative approach since I was able to collect opinions and attitudes from a larger variety of people, although with less conceptual depth. Through a conjoint experiment in the online survey, I will also be able to test complex causal claims, which would be very challenging using interviews due to the limited number of participants.

In conclusion, as Miles et al. (2019) argue, “qualitative data can help the quantitative side of a study during design by aiding in conceptual framework development, methodological choice(s), research question design, and instrumentation (Miles et al., 2019, 35)” and this

combination is adequate for this research because it will strengthen the analytic findings of a field that has not been very explored yet.

## **Part I: Qualitative Data**

### *Positionality statement*

Research is inherently affected by the identities and world views of the person conducting it. Due to the nature of qualitative research, it has become increasingly important for researchers to recognize what identities and views may shape the way they conduct research through a positionality statement. These may include social, political, religious, racial identities, previous experiences, etc. (Holmes, 2020, 1; Hein, 2023).

In the context of this research, it is important to disclose my identity as an insider and an outsider to the context that I am studying. The first is because I was born and raised in Brazil and lived in São Paulo for around ten years. In addition, I identify as a woman, speak Portuguese as my native language, and have extensive cultural and historical knowledge of the country. This facilitated my field access, as well as my ability to gain trust from interviewees, who, to some extent, could identify all of these characteristics we had in common. On the other hand, I can be seen as an outsider due to the fact that I am entering fieldwork as a researcher from Stanford, located in the United States. It is also fundamental to mention that, due to my undergraduate studies, I have received Western training in Political Science, which has had an impact throughout this research.

In addition, in the context of the central topic of this research, gender policy, I find it important to disclose that I identify as a feminist and have been engaged in the feminist movement for years, through local feminist collectives and through protests, although I am not

affiliated to any political party or institution. Lastly, it is important to mention that I have had summer internships in the government two times in the past. From June to August 2020, I interned at the Secretariat of Education of the State of São Paulo, in Brazil. From June to August 2022, I interned at the National Women's Institute of the Federal Government of Mexico. Lastly, I am part of the Poverty, Governance and Violence Lab, directed by Prof. Beatriz Magaloni, at Stanford University.

### **Interviews: Population Sample and Selection**

#### *Research Setting and Population Sample*

This research was conducted in the city of São Paulo, in Brazil. With around 22 million inhabitants (G1, 2021), this city was chosen because of its political, racial, and class diversity. In the 2022 presidential elections, Lula received a total of 53.54% of the votes, while Bolsonaro received 46.46%, which presents a fairly equal divide in the population politically (Arruda, 2022).

The population that I initially set to interview for this research were Brazilian women aged 23 to 61, who are residents of São Paulo. This initial age bracket was defined to limit interviews to only women who have had to vote in the 2018 and 2022 elections, that I explore in my interview protocol. Voting is mandatory in Brazil between the ages of 18 and 60, so this initial sample design considered people who were between these ages in 2018. It is optional for people between 16 and 18 years old and for people over 60. However, throughout the time conducting the interviews, I noticed that the youth were also very involved in the political discussions during the period and I wanted to analyze whether they had decided to vote (even if it was optional for them at the time) and contrast their attitudes with the rest of the sample. With this, I decided to expand my sample to Brazilian women over 18 in general.

Although qualitative research tends to use purposive sampling instead of random sampling (Miles et al., 2019), I began my recruitment process using a random sample and, after a few interviews, applied a more purposive sampling, which was also theory-driven. This initial random sampling allowed me to analyze the effectiveness of my recruiting strategies, as well as conduct some concurrent analysis to inform how my purposeful sampling should look like. Building off the concept of theoretical sampling (Miles et al., 2019), I used both interview observations and previous theories of voting behavior to establish some important criteria for my sampling moving forward.

I aimed at a diverse sample mostly in terms of age, race, income and religion, since these are all factors that significantly impact voting behavior (Rennó, 2020). I aimed for a relative balance between White and Black people, who compose most of the Brazilian population, as well as diversity of income with a focus on low-income women (up to 2 minimum salaries), since the majority of the country fits this category (Mota, 2021). I also put particular effort in recruiting evangelical women, considering that there have been several studies (Araújo, 2022) about how evangelicals have had a huge impact on politics in Brazil in the past decades.

**Table 1. Interview Participant Demographics (*n* = 39)**

		<b>Frequency in the survey</b>
<b>Age</b>	18-29	9
	30-44	14
	45-60	16
<b>Race</b>	White	15
	<i>Pardo</i>	20
	Black	4
<b>Income</b>	Less than 2 monthly minimum wages	15
	Between 2 and 5 monthly minimum wages	12

	Between 5 and 10 monthly minimum wages	8
	More than 10 monthly minimum wages	4
<b>Religion</b>		
	Catholic	14
	Evangelical	17
	Umbanda/Candomblé (Afro-Brazilian religions)	1
	More than one	2
	None	5
<b>Education</b>		
	Some or complete middle school	2
	Some or complete high school	14
	Some or complete college	15
<b>Number of children</b>		
	0	7
	1 - 2	23
	3+	9
<b>Work Status</b>		
	Unemployed	10
	Self-employed	15
	Employed by others	12
	Retired	1
	Other	1
<b>Vote in 2018 elections</b>		
<b>(2nd round)</b>		
	Haddad	16
	Bolsonaro	9
	Null	7
	Did not vote	5
	Did not answer	2
<b>Vote in 2022 elections</b>		
<b>(2nd round)</b>		
	Lula	19
	Bolsonaro	8
	Null	8
	Did not vote	2
	Did not answer	2

### *Participant Recruitment*

Participants were recruited through two main strategies: Facebook advertisements and contact with community leaders of two neighborhoods. The initial random sampling was done through the publication of Facebook ads. It is important to mention that 87.2% of the population above 10 years old has access to the internet in the country, corresponding to 91.5% of the households (Vieceli, 2023). Brazil is also the third country that most uses social media in the world, with 127.4 million unique users in social media (Vieceli, 2023). The tool for Facebook advertisement sends ads to both Facebook and Instagram, which allowed me to target, respectively, older and younger populations. The description of the ad (translated from Portuguese) can be found in the Appendix 3.

A Qualtrics form was attached to the ad asking for people's phone numbers (with no identifying information) and I contacted them through WhatsApp. Several of the people interested also contacted me directly through WhatsApp. Fifteen dollars were spent on Facebook ads, which resulted in 297 responses in the form and around 50 people contacting me over WhatsApp. After interviewing the first 5 participants that contacted me, I began to take a purposeful approach to sampling, asking potential participants their age and neighborhood. This allowed me to estimate important demographic information for my research (such as race and income), without having to directly ask for this type of more sensitive information.

The second recruitment strategy mentioned was the direct contact with community leaders of two neighborhoods, Comunidade Esperança and Comunidade Sapé. To contact these community leaders, I used my personal connections who perform volunteer work in these neighborhoods, who then reached out to the leaderships and asked them to divulge this opportunity to their community, which they did through oral invitations and WhatsApp group

chats. The choice of these two communities was based both in the limits of field access and on special characteristics of these communities. Both of these are *favelas* (slums) and therefore are low-income areas, which served the purpose of high representation of low-income women in my study. *Comunidade Esperança* started as an occupation of unused land and consists of a collaborative community, which includes, for example, a shared kitchen, joint efforts to build houses etc (Pina, 2016). Therefore, interviewing people from these areas could provide me a very particular perspective in the context of São Paulo, a large city with few communities with such close networks. In addition, due to this dynamic, I also assumed the possibility that people from this community are more politically active at the local level, which would also provide me a different perspective from the average citizen of São Paulo (Pina, 2016). Lastly, I decided to conduct recruitment at the *Comunidade Sapé* as well due to the fact that the community leadership I was able to reach there was an important figure at one of the evangelical churches in the region, which allowed me to also focus my recruitment in this parcel of the population that I wanted to understand better. Approval for this study was granted by the Institutional Review Board at Stanford University's Research Compliance Office (Protocol 69301).

### **Interviews: Data collection**

Data collection happened between June and October 2023 and during this period I was situated in Brazil. 39 in-depth interviews were conducted, on a one-on-one basis, in Portuguese. All interviews were audio recorded using a digital recorder. 32 of these participants were recruited via Facebook ads and were interviewed online (2 of them via Zoom call and 30 of them via WhatsApp video call). 3 of these interviews were conducted in the living room of the house of one of the community leaders in *Comunidade Esperança*, who offered me to use the space in

privacy for around 3 hours. The remaining 4 interviews were conducted in the kitchen of one of the evangelical churches of *Comunidade Sapé*, arranged by the community leader.

In terms of compensation, it is necessary to mention that the Brazilian Law of Research Ethics only allows for payment of costs of participation, such as transportation and food costs. Participants received R\$50 (approximately \$9.6 at the time of the data collection) for these transportation costs, via the widely-used transfer method PIX. They still received this same payment when doing online interviews to account for participants that may need to leave their houses and conduct the online interview somewhere else to guarantee their privacy, in cases where they do not have a private space at home and are based too far from where I could conduct an in-person interview or in dangerous areas.

At the beginning of all interviews, I informed participants of the purpose of the interview, their rights and compensation. I then sent them a Qualtrics link that contained the informed consent agreement, that they virtually signed, also granting authorization to be audio recorded. For the interviews in person, the procedure was the same, with a physical signature.

The interviews were semi-structured and the protocol included demographic questions, questions about gender identification, gender attitudes, gender policy preferences and political preferences (see interview protocol in Appendix 1). The questions that asked explicitly about politics were intentionally left at the end of the interview, in order to first build trust with the participants before asking questions that could be seen as more sensitive at this moment of extreme polarization in the country. The shortest interview lasted around 15 minutes and the longest 1h40min.

## **Interviews: Data Organization and Analysis**

The recordings of the interviews were transcribed verbatim using the software Cockatoo and each of these transcripts was reviewed and edited manually to guarantee accuracy, with the support of three transcribers hired to do so, who first had to sign a privacy agreement to guarantee the confidentiality of the data. This data was then organized into an index that included the following information: Anonymized identification, demographic information that I wanted to keep track of for purposeful sampling (age, race, vote in 2018 and 2022 elections, religion, employment status, income), current status of the interview (if it was recorded, transcribed, coded etc), collection data and length.

Analytic memos were written throughout the process of interviewing people and transcribing the data. These memos noted patterns and possible inductive codes that emerged from the data (Saldaña, 2013, p. 41). I also included propositions in the memos. Miles et al. (2019) defines a proposition as “a statement that puts forth a conditional event—an if-then or why-because proposal that gets closer to prediction or theory” (Miles et al., 2019, p. 92) Including these propositions is important not only to start formally noting relationships between variables in the data, but also to maintain biases explicit to the researchers themselves. Writing these propositions throughout the whole research process allows researchers to distance themselves from confirmation bias, for example. The writing of memos and propositions was also employed throughout the whole process of data coding, that will be described next.

The definition of a code, according to Saldaña (2013) is “a word or short phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attribute for a portion of language-based or visual data (Saldaña, 2013, p.3).” Therefore, coding interviews is a manner of organizing this extensive type of data into categories and analyzing relationships

between these categories. The first codebook I used was developed based on my interview questionnaire, in the analysis noted through analytic memos during data collection, and in existing theoretical concepts that relate to my topic (Hein, 2023). To test this first codebook (See sample of codebook in Appendix 5), I coded four interviews, from participants with different voting preferences, race and income. The improved codebook resulted from this activity, containing 41 codes, their definition, type, one example from data coded with this code and frequency. The software NVivo 2020 was utilized to support the data coding and analysis stages.

The coding method I used consisted in a two-pass coding, applied to the entirety of my data. In the first pass of coding, my main goal was to organize the data into themes covered in the interviews. Therefore, the codes used emerged from the interview questionnaire and were mostly categorical and deductive codes. 6 of these codes were equivalent to these macro categories of interview questions and 9 other codes consisted in categorizing the answers of the interviewees in a simplified form (i.e. support vs. not support). Some of these codes were hypothesis codes and some emerged from the literature. Hypothesis coding is defined as “the application of a researcher-generated, predetermined list of codes onto qualitative data specifically to assess a researcher-generated hypothesis. The codes are developed from a theory/prediction about what will be found in the data before they have been collected or analyzed (Miles et al., 2019, p. 70).” These hypothesis codes were based both in my predictions before collecting data and in the analysis that happened concurrent to the data collection process. In terms of theory-based codes, those mainly referred to general concepts of theory related to my topic, one example is “gender consciousness”, based on the theory developed by (Schreiber, 2002). Several values codes (Miles et al. 2019, 67) were used when analyzing participants answers about gender attitudes and several evaluation codes (Miles et al. 2019, 67) were used

when participants shared their opinions about gender policy, two of the main topics of the interviews.

In the second pass of coding, I intended to get a more granular understanding of the data, so I used descriptive codes - both inductive and deductive - applied to more discrete chunks of data. Miles et al. say that “a descriptive code assigns labels to data that summarize in a word or short phrase—most often as a noun—the basic topic of a passage of qualitative data (Miles et al. 2019, 64).” Therefore, these codes served to zoom out of a view of the previously mentioned macro categories as separated and to observe what are some themes that come across the entire interview, not only inside each macro-category. Lastly, in the second pass of coding, I also used interpretative codes that allow me to draw larger conceptual themes from the data. These included extensive use of in-vivo codes, which “uses words or short phrases from the participant’s own language in the data record as codes” and “honors the participant’s voice (Miles et al. 2019, 65).” It also included the use of concept codes, that “assign meso- or macrolevels of meaning to data or to data analytic work in progress (Miles et al. 2019, 66).”

At the end of these two rounds of coding, I also included attribute coding to all of the transcripts. This simply consists in the “notation of basic descriptive information such as the field work setting, participant characteristics or demographics, data format, and other variables of interest (Miles et al. 2019, 71).” These were only included in the transcripts when finishing the coding to make sure that this information would not lead to confirmation bias. Besides the continuing writing of memos throughout the coding process, I also created data displays between each pass of coding of the data, a process that facilitated exploring relationships among the data and drawing conclusions (Miles et al. 2019, 31). For example, a code frequency table was created after the first round of coding to analyze general trends in progressiveness/regressiveness

in gender attitudes. To add to the reliability of my conclusions, I also used several means of confirmation. The main one is triangulating interviews with surveys (Johnson, 2017). Lastly, interviews were analyzed in Portuguese to avoid loss of meaning, but all codes (except *in vivo* codes) were written in English. Coding and analysis was conducted from October 2023 to April 2024.

## **Part II: Quantitative Data**

### **Survey: Population Sample and Selection**

This survey was responded by 2,037 women over the age of 18, from all regions of Brazil, which results in 1,194 valid answers after several filters were applied, such as attention checks. It was administered via Qualtrics and recruitment happened via Meta Ads. Participants answered in a completely anonymous and confidential manner. Before the implementation of the final survey, a pilot survey was conducted with 327 valid responses, in order to test the understanding of the survey questionnaire and the validity of the measures being employed.

Initially, random sampling was employed in the survey recruitment, but due to the disbalance of some important variables (namely, state and political position), purposeful sampling was employed to provide some balance to the sample. The table below highlights some of the important demographic characteristics of the survey respondents:

**Table 2: Survey Participant Demographics ( $n = 1,194$ )**

		Frequency in the survey	Approximate proportion in the population
<b>Age</b>	18-30	32.9% (n = 394)	16%
	31-40	24.5% (n = 293)	15.5%
	41-50	23.1% (n = 277)	14.6%
	51-60	14.4% (n = 173)	12%
	60+	4.7% (n = 57)	15.8%
<b>Race</b>	White	47.4% (n = 566)	43.5%
	<i>Pardo</i>	36% (n = 431)	45.3%
	Black	13.4% (n = 161)	10.2%
	Asian	2% (n = 25)	0.4%
	Indigenous	0.05% (n = 7)	0.6%
	Prefer not to answer	0.03% (n = 4)	-
<b>Income</b>	Less than 2 monthly minimum wages	45.7% (n = 546)	58.75%
	Between 2 and 5 monthly minimum wages	35.1% (n = 420)	21.05%
	Between 5 and 10 monthly minimum wages	11.3% (n = 135)	5.65%
	More than 10 monthly minimum wages	7.2% (n = 87)	2.57%
<b>Religion</b>	Catholic	29.4% (n = 352)	50%
	Evangelical	28.3% (n = 339)	31%
	Afro-Brazilian Religions	7.4% (n = 89)	2%

	Atheist/Agnostic	9.1% (n = 69)	11%
	Other	25.4% (n = 304)	2.3%
<b>Education</b>	Some or complete middle school	2.3% (n = 28)	35.8%
	Some or complete high school	39.6% (n = 473)	34.9%
	Some or complete college	54.4% (n = 650)	23.3%
	Some or complete masters or doctorate program	3.6% (n = 43)	-
<b>Number of children</b>	0	33.8% (n = 404)	31%
	1 - 2	48% (n = 574)	43.2%
	3+	18% (n = 216)	25.8%
<b>Political preference</b>	Left	35.7% (n = 427)	21%
	Center-left	11.1% (n = 133)	
	Center	21.5% (n = 257)	9%
	Center-right	5.6% (n = 68)	11%
	Right	23.4% (n = 280)	
<b>Region</b>	South	17.9% (n = 211)	14.7%
	Southeast	63.2% (n = 744)	41.8%
	Midwest	3.4% (40%)	8.02%
	Northeast	10.8% (n = 128)	26.9%
	North	4.5% (n = 53)	8.5%

Selection of participants in the survey was conducted through Facebook and Instagram, using Meta Ads. The importance and predominance of social media, and particularly Facebook, in Brazil was explained earlier in this chapter and these tools have been used by several researchers in the country for the purposes of study recruitment (Kuhne and Zindel, 2020). Fifteen campaigns were used for recruitment for this ad, with a combination of traffic and conversion campaigns and different types of target populations. In this recruitment, I opted for inserting smaller amounts of money into each campaign and making them have a shorter duration to be able to access the conversions of each campaign closely and to strive for relative balance in the population being reached, with several ads targeting regions of the country with a predominance of right-wing voting or targeting older women, who were not the main respondents of the survey initially. Appendix 3 details the recruitment campaigns.

In addition, snowballing recruitment was used. I sent around 30 WhatsApp messages to personal contacts who live in different regions of São Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Fortaleza, Recife and Manaus and asked them to forward the recruitment material for the survey in WhatsApp group chats. It is also possible to observe that participants who found out about the survey on Facebook/Instagram also invited their personal friends to participate in the study. The recruitment using Meta Ads, however, was significantly more effective, as shown below:




Figure 2. Survey Recruitment Strategy

Compensation of participants for surveys is not allowed according to the Boards of Research Ethics in Brazil, so there was no direct payment for participation. The respondents could, however, join a raffle to win 1 out of 7 gift cards of \$60 for the store of their choice. Respondents interested in participating in the raffle would fill out a second survey at the end of the main one, where they added their phone number. This was done to avoid that any identifiable or contact information that could be linked to the answers of the survey. In addition, any person could enter the raffle, independently of answering the study, per instructions of the Stanford IRB. In appendix 6, detailed recruitment materials for the survey can be found.

It is possible to notice from the participant sample that there is a predominance of leftist women, as well as a vast majority of women coming from the Southeast region of the country. This might happen due to the portion of the respondents coming from WhatsApp, where women would send the survey to friends and other groups, which may have led to a predominance of left-wing networks. Lastly, it is important to take into consideration how self-selection might have played a role in attracting women interested in women's issues to answer the survey, which

again may be associated with a predominance of leftist individuals. In the analysis of the survey, these imbalances in the sample can be easily controlled and the number of individuals for other regions and who identify outside the left spectrum is sufficient to generate several statistically significant results.

## **Survey: Data Collection**

Survey data collection happened between the dates of January 30th and February 15th, when the raffle was conducted and the seven winners were contacted via WhatsApp. As previously mentioned, all women in Brazil over the age of 18 were eligible to participate in the survey. However, to guarantee the quality of responses, three measures were taken: (1) Prevention of duplicate answers, (2) Bot detection through reCAPTCHA scores, and (3) Attention Checks.

The first two measures were easily implemented through Qualtrics tools designed specifically for this. With these tools activated in the survey, during the analysis of the data, it was possible to simply filter for answers with high reCAPTCHA scores, to guarantee that no bots' responses were accounted for. In addition, three attention checks were inserted throughout the survey, and they were embedded in matrix questions. An example of an attention check says "Answer 'a little' in this line" and is inserted (in a random order) into a matrix of other questions, and answers range from "a little" to "a lot." The survey included two experiments and questions about demographics and other variables of interest. The full survey questionnaire can be found on appendix 2. The experiments involved a two-task conjoint experiment, designed to measure voting behavior, and a survey experiment, designed to measure the effect of abortion preferences on voting choice. All of these will be further elaborated in the next sections.

## **Survey: Data Analysis**

Analysis of this quantitative data took place from February to April 2024, with the use of the software RStudio. This section will first cover how the general data collected by the survey was grouped into indexes and analyzed. Second, it will discuss the choice of a conjoint experiment for the purposes of this study, its format and analysis method. Lastly, it will cover the use of a survey experiment, its format and analysis.

### *Variables of interest*

Some variables measured in this study include: gender identification, gender and punitive attitudes, levels of fear, gender punishment policy preferences, and feminist policy preferences. These were measured through several statements in which participants had to answer how much they agree/support something, ranging from “a little” to “a lot”, options that were later converted into a scale of 1-4. The answers to these questions were then grouped to generate indexes that allow for a more comprehensive understanding of the measured variables. To test the viability of using these indexes, I measured the Cronbach’s alpha of each of them. This alpha is a measure of internal consistency of scales and ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating higher internal consistency (Tavakol and Dennick, 2011). Further explanations of the theory informing these indexes, as well as previous measures that informed them, are covered in Chapter 5.

The table below describes each of these indexes, the questions used to compose them, and their Cronbach’s alpha.

**Table 3. Description of Indexes**

Index Name	Description	<b>Questions that compose the index</b> <i>How much do you agree with the following statements/ support the following policies?</i> <i>(Scale of 1 - 4)</i>	Cronbach's Alpha
Gender Identification Score	Measures how much participants identify with being a woman, relate to other women in the country and think that women's policies impact them personally. Higher values indicate higher levels of identification	1. I think that being a woman impacts my daily experiences 2. I have similar experiences to other women 3. Public policies and projects about women approved in Brazil impact my life 4. Women could benefit from collaborating with each other 5. I feel solidarity with other women in Brazil	0.72
Gender Attitudes Score	Measures how progressive/conservative are participants' opinions and attitudes towards gender issues, ranging from opinions about inclusion in the workplace and politics to views on gender violence. Higher values indicate having more progressive views on gender issues	1. Women should not be surprised if they are harassed at a party when they are using promiscuous clothes 2. If a woman doesn't physically fight back, it's not rape 3. Physical violence between members of a couple is a private matter and others should not interfere 4. Women should be provided with more opportunities to conduct paid work 5. Women should have more responsibility than men when it comes to taking care of children and the household 6. Women have more obstacles than men when entering the job market 7. Women should be paid less than men because they often need to take a maternity leave 8. There should be more women in politics	0.62
General Punishment Attitudes Score	Measures how much people favor general punitive measures, which do not include any specific measures for gender-based crimes. Higher values indicate more punitive preferences	1. Lynching a criminal rather than releasing him on a technicality 2. Instating the death penalty 3. Use of electronic ankle bracelet for 10 years after release for people convicted of violent robbery 4. Life sentence for people convicted of homicide	0.76

Feminist Policy Score	<p>Measures how much people support a range of policies that aim to advance gender equality, related to maternity rights, protection against gender-based violence and increased participation in politics and workforce. Higher values indicate more support for these policies</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Creation of a national campaign of awareness about sexual and domestic violence against women in schools</li> <li>2. Increase the number of “Casas da Mulher Brasileira”, a 24-hour government center that combines different services for women victims of domestic violence, such as shelter homes, delegacia da mulher, children’s shelter and re-inclusion in the labor market</li> <li>3. Promote sex education in schools</li> <li>4. Implementing 50% quotas for female candidates in Congress, guaranteeing that half of the representatives are women</li> <li>5. Mandatory training of employees that are likely to have to deal with women in situation of sexual violence (in hospital, polices, but also clubs)</li> <li>6. Women who take care of their household and children should receive a stipend for this domestic work</li> <li>7. Establish that all companies and institutions should have a minimum maternity leave of 6 months</li> <li>8. The government should increase fines for companies who pay women and men differently</li> <li>9. The government should provide access to contraceptive methods and promote awareness about the use of it</li> </ol>	0.82
Gender Punishment Policy Score	<p>Measures how much people support a range of policies that aim to increase punishment for gender-based violence. Higher values indicate more support for these policies</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Increasing the number of years of prison for people convicted of rape</li> <li>2. Use of electronic ankle bracelet for 10 years after release for people convicted of domestic violence</li> <li>3. Relaxation of gun control so that women can defend themselves</li> <li>4. Chemical castration as punishment for convicted rapists</li> <li>5. Life sentence for people convicted of femicide</li> <li>6. Increasing the number of years of prison for people convicted of domestic violence</li> </ol>	0.8
Gender Injustice Score	<p>Measures the perception of injustice in the processing and judgement of gender-based crimes. Higher values indicate higher</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Frequently, judges do not take claims of domestic violence seriously</li> <li>2. Frequently, judges do not take claims of rape seriously</li> <li>3. Frequently, judges do not take claims of</li> </ol>	0.95

	perception of injustice	sexual harassment seriously	
Safety Score	Measures how afraid people feel in general. Higher values indicate higher levels of fear	<p>1. How safe do you feel at night?</p> <p>2. How safe do you feel walking alone?</p> <p>3. How frequently do you not do things you would like to do in your city because you are afraid of being a victim of a crime?</p> <p>4. How frequently do you feel afraid of being robbed in your city?</p> <p>5. How frequently do you feel afraid of being a victim of a violent robbery in your city?</p> <p>5. How frequently do you feel afraid of being a victim of a murder in your city?</p>	0.86

The analysis of these indexes took two main forms, using t-statistics and linear regressions. The first set of analyses conducted assessed the impact of demographic characteristics in each of these indexes to flag any significant differences. The second set of analyses took Gender Punishment Policy Preferences and Feminist Policy Preferences as dependent variables and tested the impact of each of the indexes in policy preferences. The results of these analyses can be found in Chapter 5.

### Conjoint experiment

This study also contained a conjoint experiment, presented to the respondents at the beginning of the survey, immediately after questions about demographic information. In this conjoint experiment, respondents received two options of candidates, each of them with six randomized attributes, and were asked to vote for one of them as their federal representative. This was done twice, so there are a total of 2,388 conjoint choices made in this study. The options that each of these attributes could take - automatically randomized by Qualtrics - can be found below:

**Table 4. List of possible attributes in the conjoint experiment***One random attribute per level is displayed for each candidate*

Name (To indicate the gender of the candidate)	1. André 2. João 3. Eduardo 4. Maria 5. Júlia 6. Luísa
Age	1. 33 2. 36 3. 41 4. 42
Race	1. White 2. Black 3. Light-skin black ( <i>pardo</i> )
Educational level	1. Complete college 2. Complete master's degree
Previous experience in the government	1. Has previous experience working in the state government 2. This would be their first time working in the government
<i>Feminist Policy</i>	
1. Establish 6 months as the minimum time that companies have to offer of maternity leave	
2. Increase the number of “Casas da Mulher Brasileira”, a 24-hour government center that combines different services for women victims of domestic violence, such as shelter homes, <i>delegacia da mulher</i> , children’s shelter and re-inclusion in the labor market	
<i>Gendered punishment policy</i>	
3. Chemical castration for convicted rapists	
4. Life sentence for people convicted of femicide	
<i>General punishment policy</i>	
5. Use of electronic ankle bracelet for 10 years after release for people convicted of violent robbery	
6. Life sentence for people convicted of homicide	
<i>General justice policy</i>	
7. Expansion of areas under government environmental protection, which impedes, for example, deforestation in these regions	
8. Increase satellite monitoring in areas with high concentration of illegal mining, in order to reduce these occurrences	

In the Qualtrics survey itself, the candidate choice looked like the following:

Imagine que você tem que votar em um candidato a deputado federal no seu estado e essa é a informação que você recebe sobre os dois candidatos disponíveis.

**Candidato(a) A**

**Nome:** João

**Idade:** 41

**Raça:** Branco(a)

**Nível educacional:** Mestrado completo

**Experiência prévia no governo:** Essa seria sua primeira vez trabalhando no governo

**Um dos projetos defendidos:** Prisão perpétua para pessoas condenadas de homicídio

**Candidato(a) B**

**Nome:** Eduardo

**Idade:** 33

**Raça:** Pardo(a)

**Nível educacional:** Mestrado completo

**Experiência prévia no governo:** Essa seria sua primeira vez trabalhando no governo

**Um dos projetos defendidos:** Uso obrigatório tornozeleira eletrônica por 10 anos depois da liberação de pessoas condenadas por roubo violento.

Em qual dos dois candidatos você votaria para deputado federal?

Candidato A

Candidato B

Figure 3: Conjoint Experiment Choice on Qualtrics

Conjoint experiments are useful to measure multidimensional preferences and estimate the causal effect of several attributes on hypothetical choices, which allows for the analysis of more complex causal questions (Bansak et al., 2018). Fully randomized conjoint experiments are also effective in reducing social desirability bias, since sensitive attributes can be presented together with an array of other attributes (Bansak et al., 2018). This is important in the context of this study because topics of gender and attitudes towards punishment can generally be seen as

sensitive. Lastly, tabular conjoint experiments, such as the one being implemented here, also tend to have higher engagement from respondents than vignette experiments, since the latter increases fatigue among respondents (Bansak et al., 2018).

The analysis of this experiment takes the form of an average marginal component effect analysis (AMCE), in order to account for causal effects in a context of multidimensional analysis. Due to the random assignment of the attributes' levels, AMCE can be estimated through a simple linear regression (Bansak et al., 2018). This AMCE represents "the effect of a particular attribute value of interest against another value of the same attribute while holding equal the joint distribution of the other attributes in the design, averaged over this distribution as well as the sampling distribution from the population (Bansak et al., 2018, p. 29)." The next step of the conjoint analysis involves conducting a conditional AMCE analysis, looking at the particular subgroups of interest in the analysis (Bansak et al. 33). That is, this type of conditional AMCE allows for the analysis of voting behavior in the conjoint experiment among different groups, such as only right-wing women or only among women with high gender identification.

### **Survey experiment: abortion treatment**

This experiment appears in the survey immediately after the conjoint experiment. It aims to measure how stances on abortion policy impact the support for feminist candidates, considering that abortion is only legal under the three conditions in Brazil and tends to be an extremely controversial and divisive topic (Rennó, 2020). This experiment aims to particularly assess participants' support for feminist versus gender punishment policies, and how this support changes when the variable of abortion is added to it. It consists of a survey experiment, using complete randomization of the treatment. Participants are asked to choose between two

candidates to vote for as their state representative, and below are the options offered for participants in control and in treatment:

Table 5: Abortion Experiment Design	
Control	
Candidate A	Candidate B
<b>Age:</b> 32 years old <b>Education:</b> Has a bachelor's degree <b>Some policies:</b> Wants to increase the number of programs to combat sexual violence, increase the gender quotas in Congress and create incentives for companies to hire single mothers, thinks the current abortion law is sufficient	<b>Age:</b> 35 years old <b>Education:</b> Has a bachelor's degree <b>Some policies:</b> Wants to increase the penalty for rapists, thinks that there should be a relaxation of gun control in order for women to be able to defend themselves, and thinks that the current abortion law is sufficient
Treatment	
Candidate A	Candidate B
<b>Age:</b> 32 years old <b>Education:</b> Has a bachelor's degree <b>Some policies:</b> Wants to increase the number of programs to combat sexual violence, increase the gender quotas in Congress and create incentives for companies to hire single mothers, supports the legalization of abortion until 3 months of pregnancy	<b>Age:</b> 35 years old <b>Education:</b> Has a bachelor's degree <b>Some policies:</b> Wants to increase the penalty for rapists, thinks that there should be a relaxation of gun control in order for women to be able to defend themselves, and thinks that the current abortion law is sufficient

To analyze this experiment's results, first a balance check is conducted, to ensure a relatively equal distribution of participants between the control and treatment groups when it comes to the other covariates being measured. Then, the main analysis consists of a logistic regression estimating the impact of treatment in the voting outcomes, which will be interacted with other variables of interest, as described in the results' discussion, in Chapter 5.

## **Part III: Validity**

### *Interpretative validity*

The use of inductive and in vivo codes adds to the interpretative validity of my research, as it allows concepts to emerge from the data itself, honoring participants' insights and words. In addition, reflective listening, with clarifying questions, was used to ensure clear understanding of participants ideas. Furthermore, conducting the interviews in my native language and having experienced the cultural and political background of Brazil was extremely important to capture the entire meaning of the ideas expressed by the participants, who often used references and slangs that an outsider might not have knowledge about. Lastly, as I mentioned in my positionality statement, my identity as a feminist has played an important role in my life. Therefore, I paid particular attention to the elaboration of the interview protocol, adding many forms to measure conservative views in regard to gender, with the support of my advisors, in order to avoid a biased interpretation of participants' ideas.

### *Theoretical validity*

Ideas emerging from the data were discussed with advisors to develop "intersubjective consensus (Miles et al. 2019, 32)." Additionally, writing prepositions and analytic memos during data collection and analysis allowed me to observe and control for my biases throughout the process. This confirmation bias was also avoided by only adding attribute coding at the end of the analysis, to not let participants' characteristics influence my coding process. Lastly, the use of coding tools allowed me to systematically check the conclusions I was having at each step of the analysis process.

### *Descriptive validity*

To add to the descriptive validity of my research, all interviews were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim, to ensure the highest fidelity to the data possible.

# **Chapter 5 | What does it mean to be a woman in Brazil?: Conceptualization of gender identification and attitudes of Brazilian women**

This chapter explores the hypothesis that there is widespread support for ideas of gender equality in Brazil - which in this thesis are measured through gender attitudes. These attitudes towards gender equality do not correlate with traditionally hypothesized characteristics, such as party, religion and socioeconomic status, and it is possible to observe small variation of gender attitudes across groups, with most women presenting progressive views on this issue. To do so, it provides a panorama of what gender attitudes look like across the survey sample, as well as qualitative evidence of women's understanding of gender issues, which supports the argument of stability of gender attitudes. Besides understanding the content of their views through gender attitudes, this chapter also elaborates on the variable of gender identification. Both of these variables have been pointed by the literature as an important indication of women's political behavior (Becker and Wagner, 2009; Gay and Tate, 1998), as previously presented through the conceptual framework of this work (refer to chapter 2). Therefore, when approaching the qualitative data collection, questions to understand these two measures were included and the themes that emerged from these were used to inform the survey design.

Besides the observation of these variables previously hypothesized in the literature, other relevant themes emerged from the interviews and led to the inductive generation of other three variables discussed in this chapter: perceptions of gender injustice, general punitive preferences and perceptions of safety. These are particularly important to the understanding of gender punishment policy preferences, and the indexes here presented were highly informed by observations from interviews, therefore, this chapter will also present what these measures

consist of and cover why they are essential to the later understanding of gender policy preferences.

To cover these topics, this chapter will begin with an overview of both gender identification and gender attitudes, drawing from both the relevant quantitative and qualitative data. Secondly, it will cover the emergence of the theme of punishment from the interviews and how this informed the creation of measurements of perceptions of gender injustice, general punitive preferences and perceptions of safety. Thirdly, I will show how these five important variables look like across different demographic variables and, lastly, how the variables correlate among each other.

## **Gender Identification**

Gender identification is an important variable when it comes to understanding policy preferences and voting behavior because it supports our understanding of how much women identify with each other as a group. Gay and Tate argue that individuals who identify with a specific group have a sense of interdependence and common fate with other members (Gay and Tate, 1998). It is important to mention, however, that gender identification does not provide information on whether the identification with the group of women has a feminist lens to it or a view of traditional gender roles (Becker and Wagner, 2009). That is, a woman with high gender identification may observe this gender identification as either progressive or conservative. For this reason, it was also important to implement the measure of *gender attitudes* in the interviews and survey conducted. In addition, thinking about gender identification provides valuable insight into the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation. It contributes to our

understanding of whether female voters feel that there are issues in common with the large group of women that they identify (or not) with, as well as whether having a woman in power means that these issues will already be represented. Lastly, it is important to mention that previous literature has pointed out that group identification in situations of minority groups often relates to understanding the similar oppressions suffered (Gay and Tate, 1998), so understanding women's concepts of sexism will also be important in this section.

Although in the survey questionnaire most questions on this topic pertain to identification with the general group of women and sense of a shared fate, the interviews provided a more comprehensive overview of women's perceptions of what shapes their experiences as women in society, a nuanced panorama that can only be covered through in-depth interviews. A first important theme that emerged from this qualitative data and that will be further described in this section was women's resistance to say that being a woman impacted their daily lives, while simultaneously pointing to daily experiences of perceived discrimination due to their gender. Secondly, interview data supports the argument that women have high consciousness about the sexism they face. When asked about having experienced sexism in their lives or observed other women around them suffering sexism, their descriptions were frequently associated sexism to domestic violence and enforcement of traditional gender role views, with some women also mentioning discrimination in a more public sphere. Lastly, this section presents how the data from the interviews provides a rich panorama from the bottom-up of what are issues that women share in common, particularly through interviewees' reflections on what makes them similar to other women and how they think that women-targeted policies impact them.

The measure of gender identification used in the survey was based on some measures used in previous literature (Becker and Wagner, 2009), as well as tested and improved during the

conduction of interviews. The scale used varied from 1 (Not at all) to 4 (A lot), therefore higher scores indicate higher gender identification. The table below shows the statements used to constitute this measure, as well as the distribution of participants across these variables and the mean score.

Table 6: Summary of Gender Identification Score

<b>Gender Identification Score</b>	<b>1 (in %)</b>	<b>2 (in %)</b>	<b>3 (in %)</b>	<b>4 (in %)</b>	<b>Mean (out of 4)</b>
I think that being a woman impacts my daily experiences	23.8	26.8	21.8	27.3	2.53
I have similar experiences to other women	6.03	42.6	31.6	19.6	2.65
Public policies and projects about women approved in Brazil impact my life	10.7	27.8	29.4	31.9	2.83
Women could benefit from collaborating with each other	1.76	10.8	36.5	50.7	3.36
I feel solidarity with other women in Brazil	3.68	18.0	36.0	42.2	3.17
Identification Score	-	-	-	-	2.90

Throughout this thesis, several measures on a scale of 1 to 4 will be used and 2.5 will be the threshold mostly used to define whether most of the respondents have a high or low score. Here, therefore, it is possible to observe an overall high identification score, although some statements approach a low score, such as “I think that being a woman impacts my daily experiences.”

When improving and drawing meaning from this measure, the interviews conducted were extremely valuable. Like in the survey, the statement “I think that being a woman impacts my daily experiences” was contradictory. It was viewed mostly in a negative manner by women, as if it asked them if the intrinsic fact of them being a woman leads to not being capable of doing things, not necessarily as a question about whether discrimination against women stopped them from doing things. This was seen in several examples in which interview respondents would say that being a woman does not impact their life because they are “strong” or “warriors”, but later proceed to describing that they perceive that being a woman has led to some types of discrimination that negatively impacted their personal lives. This is evidenced by the following responses when respondents were asked whether they agreed with the referred statement:

“No, it does not impact my life, no. But we are always symbolized as the fragile gender. But I don’t consider myself fragile. I am even strong, I have to be a fortress, specially so that I can transmit this strength to my children. But we know that in society we are seen as the fragile gender, also because of the danger that the city offers, the danger that the world currently offers. So, whether we want it or not, there is this fragility because of the wrong things in the world, because of the sexism, actually because of the humans. Because otherwise we would all be equal<sup>2</sup>” - 43-year-old woman

“It doesn’t impact. It has impacted in the past because of [...] besides the discrimination, the sexism in itself, to me, it does not impact my life at all, because I have my voice. I feel that I have my voice and that I can decide my things, the decisions, even inside the house. So, to me, it does not impact nowadays” - 43-year-old woman

Therefore, this question was often received by women as related to their personal efforts of overcoming discrimination and not letting their identity as women impact their lives. In terms of group identification, when asked about the statement “I have similar experiences to other women,” the main topics noted by women as shared in common were: childcare, domestic labor and experiences of gender discrimination, often of sexual harassment or employment

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<sup>2</sup> All the quotes used in this thesis were translated by me from the transcripts of the interviews conducted in Portuguese.

discrimination. A 52-year-old interviewee, for example, said: "It is hard being a woman, because women have several positions. In the house, on the job, facing the daily experiences of taking buses, trains, the workload, the household responsibilities. Housewives, with no salary."

Although most of the women stated that they do share similar experiences with other women - which is also observed in the survey, with the mean score of this statement being 2.65 out of 4 -, some of them pointed that they do not think they are similar to the group of women. The main reasons they presented for this were: perceptions of individuality as more relevant than similarities, and perceptions of other women as superficial. As an instance of the first case, a 52-year-old interviewee answered: "Similar experience? Ah, I think that each person has their own way of being. Sometimes, we can even be similar, but we are never identical, it is never equal. There are people who like to work outside the house, there are people who don't like to do anything inside the house, and there are people who do everything." In the second predominant reason, viewing women as superficial, an example is seen in the interview with a 55-year-old woman: "Look, it depends, because there are women who don't like to work and only like to put on make up, take care of their skin, go to expensive clinics, and take care of the family, of course. But I mean, it's too much luxury, right?"

As previously mentioned, in the interviews women were also directly asked about whether they perceive sexism around them and what forms it takes, in order to inform the understanding about how much gender identification is connected to perceptions of shared experiences of sexism. Although the majority of women say that they have observed sexism around them, some of them pointed out that they have never personally experienced it. This seemed to be associated with the fact that a lot of women associated sexism with domestic violence and would mention that they see a lot of cases of domestic violence on the television, as

well as with explicit imposition of gender roles by men. However, they would later describe, for example, cases of sexism they personally experienced in the work force, without flagging that as sexism necessarily. This perception of sexism as mostly domestic violence is exemplified in the following responses to the question, “Have you or anyone you know ever experienced sexism?”

It is also important to mention that both of these respondents, who initially claimed that they did not experience sexism in their lives, later in the interview mentioned cases of discrimination that they faced:

“Respondent: No, I have only seen it on the television. TV, internet, but I have never experienced it around me.

Interviewer: What type of thing do you see the most on the television or the internet? What type of sexism?

Respondent: A lot of violence, right? Men killing women because of jealousy”

“Respondent: Well, not in my family, thank God, and I have also never experienced it

Interviewer: What would you consider to be sexism?

Respondent: Ah, violence or a man... not only physical violence, but verbal too, right? The way that the man speaks, not letting the woman do something. There are a lot of men who say that women have to stay in the house, taking care of the house and the children. That is also sexist, it does not have to be violence, right?”

This strong association between sexism and domestic violence is also reflected in interviewees' answers about whether public policy targeted towards women impacts them. Although there is a high perception that policy impacts them - in the survey, the score of this question was of 2.83 out of 4 -, the interviewees that said these policies do not impact them referred to two main reasons: they associated gender policy with policy for domestic violence and mentioned that they were not impacted by it, or in general they thought that the creation of policy does not impact them. The first reason can be observed in the following statement, by a 49-year-old interviewee:

“Not directly. I don’t see a big impact in my life or in the lives of people that I know in relation to any law that was created specifically… For example, the Maria da Penha law<sup>3</sup>, right? Thank God I do not have contact, I don’t know anyone who lives this type of situation of domestic violence, I don’t know anyone who suffered a femicide. So, in my life and in the lives of people close to me, I don’t see any impact.”

An instance of the disillusionment with the ability of impact of public policy and politics, on the other hand, is observed in this interview with a 27-year-old woman:

“To be honest, I have never seen laws and things like that impacting [my life]. In my life, it always continues the same thing, you know? I don’t know if it is because I am poor [laughs], this can be a reason.”

As previously mentioned, however, most of the women interviewed stated that they have either experienced sexism or know someone who has. The main situations that interviewees mentioned as sexist involved: hearing from their husbands or parents the reinforcement of gender roles, sexual harassment in public spaces, discrimination in the workforce (specially among mothers when looking for jobs) and sexual violence. In addition, there were also several women who described their own experiences of personal victimization of domestic violence. These will be further covered in the next chapter.

Therefore, there are high levels of gender identification among the participants in the interviews and the survey, but there is a lot of nuance in the comprehension of this identification. The qualitative portion of this study supported the exploration of this nuance behind answers. An important consideration when interpreting this measure is whether women with high levels of gender identification identify more with a progressive view of gender issues or more conservative, which will be covered in the following section about gender attitudes.

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<sup>3</sup> This law is frequently referred to throughout the thesis, and it is the law that concerns a series of measures against domestic violence

## **Gender Attitudes**

The Gender Attitudes Score measures how progressive or conservative are the views of people on several gender issues, such as opinions about traditional gender roles, gender violence, sexuality, etc. It uses statements from several existing surveys, such as the LAPOP and the World Values Survey, as well as questions developed based on the most pressing gender issues in Brazil and tested in the interviews. The questions that measure gender attitudes ask “How much do you agree with the following statements?” and the scale used varied from 1 (“Not at all”) to 4 (“A lot”), where 4 is the most progressive and 1 the most conservative answer. This process of differential coding had to happen because in some cases “Not at all” indicated progressive views (e.g. “Physical violence between members of a couple is a private matter and others should not intervene”), while in others it indicated conservative views in terms of achieving gender equality(e.g., “There should be more women in politics”).

Table 7: Summary of Gender Attitudes Score

<b>Gender Attitudes Score</b>	<b>1 (in %)</b>	<b>2 (in %)</b>	<b>3 (in %)</b>	<b>4 (in %)</b>	<b>Mean (out of 4)</b>
Women should not be surprised if they are harassed at a party when they are using promiscuous clothes	9.97	6.53	9.05	74.4	3.48
If a woman doesn't physically fight back, it's not rape	6.21	3.94	4.70	85.1	3.69
Physical violence between members of a couple is a private matter and others should not interfere	3.51	4.02	5.86	86.5	3.76
Women should be provided with more opportunities to conduct paid work	1.73	2.93	21.0	74.8	3.70
Women should have more responsibility than men when it comes to taking care of children and the household	3.76	2.34	10.3	83.5	3.74
Women have more obstacles than men when entering the job market	1.92	12.2	29.5	56.2	3.40
Women should be paid less than men because they often need to take a maternity leave	0.83	0.83	1.59	96.7	3.94
There should be more women in politics	1.50	6.28	25.2	66.9	3.58
Attitudes Score	-	-	-	-	3.65

From the survey analysis, it is possible to observe that most women have very progressive gender attitudes, including women who we would expect to be more conservative (ex, older women from the right, evangelical). This will be shown in the last section of this chapter, which presents the validity of these measures and looks at the correlation of important demographic variables and important independent variables.

Therefore, this is evidence to support the hypothesis, earlier posed, which states that most women have progressive gender attitudes and there is little variation among them. In the last section of this chapter, it will be possible to observe that this trend is maintained across different demographics and not just a particularity of this sample.

### *Conservative gender attitudes*

When it comes to conservative gender attitudes, the qualitative data collected allowed for the identification of three trends of conservative behavior related to the statements being used: (1) victim-blaming, (2) reluctance about interfering in domestic violence, and (3) support for traditional gender roles. Views that revealed victim-blaming behavior emerged when women were asked about sexual harassment and rape (first two statements in the table above). The type of statements that were identified as conservative because of their nature of victim blaming are exemplified by the following:

“I think women also have to value themselves. Because it is very easy to say ‘oh the man did that and that’, but then the woman is almost naked, you know? In my opinion, the schools should not let girls use such short skirts, or shirts that let you see a lot. Because the men are made of flesh, we are all made of flesh [expression referring to the fact that they cannot control themselves]. Nobody is 100%” - 55-year-old interviewee

“I believe that, depending on the places where you go, depending on the clothes, you are instigating the desire of that person, that man. For example, at work, I see that a lot of girls go to work with a certain type of clothes right? But in this case that I was telling you about, the lady was going to work, it was 8 am. And it was a place, like, a little empty, you know? And she had these clothes... Nothing justifies it, right? I am not in favor of these things. [...] But I believe that if she has been, like, more dressed, maybe this would not have happened” - 43-year-old interviewee

It was also possible to observe some reluctance from the interviewees when asked about intervening in a couple’s fight. In the interview, they were asked if they agreed with the statement “*Em briga de marido e mulher não se mete a colher.*” This Brazilian saying basically means that one should not interfere in a couple’s fight, and it is frequently used to imply that

others should not interfere in domestic violence, since it is seen as a private matter. A lot of them mentioned personal experiences of interfering in fights and the couple going back together and framing them as the “villain” in these situations. A 43-year-old interviewee, for example, stated that when a couple goes back after a fight in which you interfered, you become the “guilty one.” She also perceives that some people even die when trying to intervene: “a lot of people have died because they tried to defend someone. They try to stop the fight, get the child, get the person, you know? And at the end, the person ends up dead.” This view of receiving the blame after trying to defend someone and the perception of danger of directly interfering in these situations is widespread among the respondents. Some also mentioned some level of hopelessness with their intervention. A 27-year-old interviewee, for example, said:

“The husband of one of my sisters hits her and even with us interfering very often, asking her to leave him, she says she is going to break up, but she ends up going back together with him. And this is recurring. Then, in this case, since we have already given advice, we did everything we could and the person is insisting in the same error, in this case I think that there is no hope. Because he beats her, he is a terrible person, there are a lot of men in Brazil, right? A lot. And the person is insisting in the same error, so because of these things, I agree [with the fact that people should not interfere in couples’ fights]”

This opinion is shared by many other respondents who had similar experiences with close relatives or friends. Most interviewees, however, say that they would interfere in case of physical violence, generally by calling the police. Nevertheless, they also express distrust in the police, saying that they often do not take claims of domestic violence seriously and do not visit the houses where the violence is happening.

Lastly, conservative gender attitudes also took the form of support for traditional gender roles in the interviews, particularly among people with high religiosity. When asked about what they thought was the role of women in society, interviewees would mention that “women take care of the household, of the children, of the men and the men work to support the family.” More

commonly, the women with conservative views on this topic mentioned religious reasons for these roles, saying, for instance: “According to the Bible, this was supposed to be God’s plan. The woman should stay in the house taking care of the house, the children, the husband and the man only has to provide.”

In the results of the survey shown above, it is also possible to observe that the lowest scores (although still very high) refer to the statements “Women should not be surprised if they are harassed at a party when they are using promiscuous clothes” and “Women have more obstacles than men when entering the job market,” which are respectively 3.48 and 3.40. The first is consistent with the observation of conservative attitudes being related to victim blaming from the interviews. When it comes to the second, it was possible to observe through the qualitative data that, although women can perceive sexism in the workforce, they also perceive significant improvement on this compared to previous years:

“Interviewer: Do you think it is harder for women to get and keep jobs than it is for men, or not?

Respondent: Not like in the past, it improved like 80%, the problem that women have is that they get pregnant. She has children. And this really gets in the way. The company wants growth. So the company is very concerned about this. But it is a lot better. Now there are a lot more opportunities for women.”

Therefore, these are the three main trends of conservative attitudes observed among the participants. However, as the results of the survey show, women mostly have progressive gender attitudes, aiming to increase gender equality and criticizing sexist structures. From the interviews’ observations, it is possible to see that they can recognize discrimination and sexist structures even when they do not describe them in these terms. In this qualitative data collection, questions about gender attitudes aimed at measuring not only the opinions of women about several gender issues, but also to comprehend their level of consciousness about gender

discrimination and how this gender consciousness related to their reaction to the attitudes questions.

### *Progressive gender attitudes*

Besides the progressive gender attitudes that can be observed in table 7, with detailed results of the survey's responses, in the qualitative data it was possible to observe four important trends of progressive views among most women: (1) there was a widespread perception of the lack of women in politics as a structural problem, (2) there was also a widespread perception of difficulties related to employment as sexism, (3) there was a very negative reaction to statements that included victim blaming, and (4) there was a widespread perception of women being overloaded with household and childcare duties, as well as the opinion that these tasks should be more properly divided.

First, when it comes to the structural problem of gender-based political inequality, women are very aware of the significantly lower proportion of women in political positions in Brazil and mostly attribute it to the sexism inside institutional politics. For instance, a 43-year-old interviewee mentioned: "There are more men because there is still a lot of sexism in politics. They [the men in politics] think that they are the smartest, they think they are the best, they think they still rule the country, they think that they rule our opinions and us, they think that we are submissive." There is also a perception among several women that the voters themselves are sexist and tend to vote less for women, exemplified in the response by the 56-year-old respondent: "It is the lack of voters that trust [women]. Because women even run for office, but there are a lot of men, and even a lot of women, who think that they [the women running for office] will not be able to make it."

Second, most of the interviewees pointed out that they think it is harder for women to get and to keep jobs, and they see this work discrimination as sexism, since they often associate it to maternity. Some mention this as a perception, as illustrated by the following:

"Interviewer: And do you think this [equal pay] happens in Brazil nowadays?

Respondent: No, it does not

Interviewer: Why do you think that is the case?

Respondent: The sexism, right? [...] The woman entered the job market a short period of time ago, right? A lot of men think that we have to stay in the house taking care of the children"

"I think it is a little more difficult for younger women who get pregnant. Because no one will want to give a promotion to a woman knowing that she has just gotten married and that she will soon have children. I think that in this criterion yes" - 49-year-old woman

Other women share their own experiences with employment discrimination when pointing out the sexism faced in the hiring process. A 25-year-old interviewee, for instance, said: "I have been to job interviews, for example, that the exclusion criteria was like: 'do you want to get pregnant? If yes, when? Do you use some type of contraception? Are you in a relationship? Are you married? Who do you live with?'"

The third pattern observed among women with progressive gender attitudes was the negative reaction had by many of them when asked about whether they agreed with statements that blamed the victim of a sexual harassment, such as "Women should not be surprised if they are harassed at a party when they are using promiscuous clothes" or "If a woman doesn't physically fight back, it is not rape." Common responses included "the clothes are mine and the body is mine, nobody has the right to touch me" or "This does not make any sense, because I like to dress like that, you know? And this is not an invitation for anyone to come touch me." In the statements related to rape, respondents also often mentioned that a lot of women would not have the strength to fight back and "after the moment she says no, it is a rape if he continues trying." Some also mentioned that women who are drugged or drunk do not have the ability to consent.

Lastly, the interviews also revealed a strong discontent of women with the burden of household responsibilities and childcare often falling over them and the consciousness that this needs to change and men need to take more responsibility:

“When you talk about a house, you talk about union. Union is about two sides. The two have to share [responsibilities]. If they both work, they both have to help in the house. Arriving home, the husband has to help too, washing dishes, taking care of the children.”  
- 52-year-old interviewee

“The man also has to have his role and function [...] Let’s talk about, for example, the issue of children. It was not the mother who made the children by herself. If the dad is also there, he also needs to be present in the education, health, well-being, everything”  
- 41-year-old interviewee

In later sections of this chapter, it will be possible to understand how demographic variables impact the Gender Attitudes Score, but overall it is possible to observe very progressive and stable gender attitudes among most women, with no significant variation based on previously hypothesized demographics.

## **Gender Injustice, General Punishment Preferences, and Safety Score**

While the decision to measure gender identification and gender attitudes to understand policy preferences came from the previous literature on the topic, these three other measures - gender injustice, general punishment preferences, and safety score - emerged from the interviews’ discoveries, in which women would frequently mention gender injustice and presented a strong support for punishment. The topic of punishment for gender-based crimes gained such relevance in most of the interviews that it became necessary to incorporate it to the framework for understanding gender policy preferences. Based on this incorporation of punishment as a central aspect of the study, the three variables mentioned above were measured in the survey.

### *The relevance of punishment in gender policy preferences*

This relevance of punishment in gender policy frequently appeared in the qualitative data through the question about support for chemical castration for convicted rapists. When including this question into the interview questionnaire, the initial assumption was that only very conservative women, and particularly Bolsonaro supporters, would be in favor of this policy. This is because this policy has been proposed by Bolsonaro and mostly supported by his party. However, the interviews observed that only 8 out of 39 women did not support or did not know if they supported it, and that their political positions and gender attitudes did not predict support for this policy. For instance, a 43-year-old interviewee, who views herself as from the left, is an avid Lula supporter and declares herself a feminist, answered the following when she was asked about whether she supported chemical castration:

“You will have to excuse me, but there really should be castration, right? They will leave there [the prison] and then continue doing the same thing. And then the woman will become pregnant by a rapist [...] I think, yes, it should [be implemented]. Yes, it should. He has to be punished somehow. Thinking that we are their property, and then they go and make a woman pregnant.”

Another 52-year-old interviewee with progressive gender views and who supports the leftist president Lula answered the following:

“That would be wonderful, it would be very good. Can I sign this project 100, 1 million times? I would sign it as many times as possible. Wow, that would be amazing. [...] If that happened, man, we wouldn't have this problem anymore. It's the same as the death penalty, which I'm super in favor of. If someone stole once, cut off their arm. If they stole the second time, cut off their other arm. The third, kill them. I'm sorry to say this, but it would solve these problems”

As predicted, this project is also highly supported by politically conservative women. One of the interviewees, who voted for Bolsonaro, stated, “I think it is about time this happens. This should have been happening a long time ago.”

When developing the variables that would support understanding punitive attitudes and their relation to gender policy preferences, two main themes were identified from the qualitative data: (1) the sense that there was a lack of justice for gender-based crimes and that even the mechanisms in place for punishing these crimes did not properly work and (2) the sense that violence against women is getting worse, while other areas of gender issues are improving.

When it comes to the first theme, there are several levels defining this perception of injustice. First, there is the idea that the current laws in the country are not harsh enough to punish gender-based crimes:

"I think that the laws in Brazil are too weak, you know? [...] I don't think we should castrate [rapists], I think we should kill them. [Laughs] Yes, I think so, because while there is no respect for the law, the humans will only respect the law when it hits their pocket [referring to the fact that people only respect the law when they know there will be financial harm for not doing so]. Now, in other countries it is not like this. The law is not respected just because it will financially impact you, it is respected because people are afraid or going to jail or receiving a death sentence, then it works. Here in Brazil, it is embarrassing" - 55-year-old interviewee

Second, there is the perception that laws are not properly enforced even when they exist, particularly in terms of domestic violence protection:

"There is the Maria da Penha Law, the man is called to the police station, you know? And then he is arrested for one or two days and is then released. And then he goes, leaves and kills the woman" - 52-year-old interviewee

"Interviewer: Do you think it would be important to have more women's police stations that are open 24 hours a day?

Respondent: There are stations everywhere, right? I don't even think this is the issue. What I really want are fair laws. Yes, but there is no justice. There is no point in going and filling a criminal claim, I have done this already, but there are no severe laws. So the man does not know that there will be severe consequences applied to him" - 52-year-old interviewee

A second theme identified in the qualitative data, as mentioned, is the perception of the increase in gender-based violence, while at the same time there is a perception of improvements

of other areas of gender discrimination. This will be more developed in the next chapter, but here it is important to note that the perception of the increase in violence is followed by high levels of fear, which were often manifested by interviewees along with strong support for harsher punishment, as illustrated below, in the response given by a 52-year-old interviewee when asked about her opinions on chemical castration for rapists:

“We should actually kill them [the rapists]. [Laughs] To me, if there was a paper where I could sign to legalize life sentence for these people, I would sign it, I would also sign for death penalty [...] The others would not do it again if they knew they would die. It is because of this [lack of punishment] that there is a lot [of rapes]. Nothing happens. And then the women just feel lost, afraid [...] I am tired.”

These recurrent and relevant appearances therefore showed the importance of measuring these three other independent variables - gender injustice, general punishment preferences and safety score - in order to understand how they relate to gender policy preferences and voting behavior.

### ***General Punishment Attitudes***

This variable measures attitudes towards punishment. It is measured on a scale of 1 to 4, in which 4 indicates higher support. The statements used here were mostly based on widely used measures for punitive attitudes (such as the ones used in the LAPOP) and general political proposals observed in the media. The simple average of the results of each statement presented leads to a General Punishment Attitudes Score.

Table 8: Summary of General Punishment Attitudes Score

<b>General Punishment Attitudes Score</b>	<b>1 (in %)</b>	<b>2 (in %)</b>	<b>3 (in %)</b>	<b>4 (in %)</b>	<b>Mean (out of 4)</b>
Lynching a criminal rather than releasing him on a technicality	59.0	21.2	7.21	12.5	1.73
Instituting the death penalty	33.9	21.2	13.6	31.1	2.42
Use of electronic ankle bracelet for 10 years after release for people convicted of violent robbery	9.73	20.8	24.07	45.3	3.05
Life sentence for people convicted of homicide	8.88	19.9	20.5	50.6	3.13
General Punishment Attitudes Score	-	-	-	-	2.58

It is possible to observe that there is moderate to high support for harsher punishment overall, with “Life sentence for people convicted of homicide” being the most supported measure and “Lynching a criminal rather than releasing him on a technicality” being the least supported. It is important to note that this variable intentionally fails to mention types of gender-based crimes, since the support for punishment for gender-based crimes will be evaluated when observing gender policy preferences in the next chapter. The General Punishment Attitudes variable is greatly correlated to political preferences and other factors, as will be shown in the next section, so we observe more variability in it than in previous variables observed.

### ***Gender Injustice***

This variable aims to measure how much women perceive injustice when judging gender-based crimes. It also varies on a scale of 1 - 4, and higher scores indicate a higher perception of injustice. The Gender Injustice Score is also generated by a simple average of the

statements below. It is important to mention that each of the respondents only answered two of the statements.

Table 9: Summary of Gender Injustice Score

Gender Injustice Score	1 (in %)	2 (in %)	3 (in %)	4 (in %)	Mean (out of 4)
Frequently, judges do not take claims of domestic violence seriously	5.67	18.9	30.9	44.5	3.14
Frequently, judges do not take claims of rape seriously	5.66	19.33	34.1	40.83	3.10
Frequently, judges do not take claims of sexual harassment seriously	3.84	18.10	33.05	45.01	3.19
Gender Injustice Score	-	-	-	-	3.14

The survey indicates that women have a perception that gender-based crimes tend to often go unpunished, with a very high average score of 3.14 out of 4. This issue had already appeared in the interviews, as it was previously mentioned. It is important to note that this perception of injustice, although mostly measure in terms of the formal justice system in the survey, is observed in all steps of law enforcement by women in the interviews. This includes viewing the laws as not tough enough, observing that police officers do not take claims of gender-based violence seriously, and the perceptions that even when condemned by a judge, laws are usually not properly enforced over people convicted of gender-based violence.

### *Safety Score*

The observations from the interview about the importance of the fear women face to inform their views on punishment are complemented by the previous literature, which indicates

that women face higher levels of fear than men (Covington & Taylor, 1991; Schafer et al., 2006). This variable measures how safe women feel, with higher values indicating feeling safer. This means that some of the statements went through a reverse coding of values to indicate a standardized scale of 1 - 4, in which 4 always indicates feeling safer. The Safety Score was developed with the averages of the statements.

Table 10: Summary of Safety Score

<b>Safety Score</b>	<b>1 (in %)</b>	<b>2 (in %)</b>	<b>3 (in %)</b>	<b>4 (in %)</b>	<b>Mean (out of 4)</b>
How safe do you feel walking alone?	64.9	21.4	12.1	1.50	1.50
How safe do you feel at night?	60.9	20.6	14.5	3.76	1.61
How frequently do you not do things you would like to do in your city because you are afraid of being a victim of a crime?	14.7	34.0	43.7	7.53	2.44
How frequently do you feel afraid of being robbed in your city?	36.8	29.0	31.6	2.42	2.00
How frequently do you feel afraid of being a victim of a violent robbery in your city?	34.8	26.9	32.9	5.27	2.09
How frequently do you feel afraid of being a victim of a murder in your city?	28.7	20.1	37.8	13.3	2.36
Safety Score	-	-	-	-	2.00

This variable, therefore, points out that women feel very unsafe on average. In addition, 90% of the survey respondents indicated that they think women feel unsafer in their city than men.

## **Impact of demographics on the independent variables of interest**

This section will explore how important demographics correlate to the five independent variables covered in this chapter: gender identification, gender attitudes, general punishment preferences, gender injustice, and safety score. This will provide us with a deeper understanding of these variables and serve as validity checks that will point to whether the variables are correctly measured and reproduce some of the expected patterns based on the literature. This section will cover, respectively, the impact of religion and religiosity, age, race, income, education, number of children, and political preferences on the variables of interest of this chapter. Lastly, the next section of the chapter will develop on how these variables relate to each other.

### ***Religion and religiosity***

In the next tables, the categorical level in the first line is the reference being used to compare means across the different variables and run t-tests. They allow us to understand how these variables look across different demographic groups and to understand whether these differences are statistically significant. The reference level established here to run t-tests was the group of Catholics, so the estimates of statistical significance shown below are in comparison to this group.

Table 11: T-test of difference in means of IVs per religion

	Identification Score (1)	Attitudes Score (2)	General Punishment Score (3)	Gender Injustice Score (4)	Safety Score (5)
Catholic	2.788	3.622	2.720	3.024	2.051
Evangelical	2.837	3.577	2.765	3.116	1.911**
Atheist/Agnostic	3.295***	3.860***	2.155***	3.236**	2.091
Afro-Brazilian Religions	3.071***	3.751**	2.528	3.37***	2.001
Other	2.930**	3.692	2.390***	3.221**	1.999

*Note:* \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$

It is interesting to observe that Atheists and Agnostics have significantly higher scores of gender identification, as well as more progressive gender attitudes, than Catholics and all the other religious groups. This might be related to the fact that several conservative views in terms of women's roles are justified with religious values, as shown in the interview observations about conservative gender attitudes. This is, therefore, also correlated with Gender Injustice Score, considering how Gender Identification and Gender Attitudes play a role in how people perceive gender injustices (this idea will be further elaborated in the next section of this chapter). It is also fascinating to observe that Atheists and Agnostics have a significantly lower General Punishment Score than Catholics, both when controlling or not for demographic covariates.

A second important observation from the table is that there are no statistically significant differences between Catholics and Evangelicals regarding these variables in the sample, except for the Safety Score. This observation is particularly interesting because a large part of the literature focuses on the rise of conservatism associated with Evangelical religions in Brazil (Peixoto and Rennó, 2018), but it is possible to see that, in terms of attitudes toward gender and punishment, Evangelicals do not appear to be more or less conservative than Catholics in the country. In addition, when controlling for all demographics and covariates, the correlation between being Evangelical and Safety Score stops being statistically significant. One relevant variable that continues to be significant is race. Black and *Parda* women tend to feel unsafer than the general population, and here this may reflect on evangelical women feeling unsafer, as most evangelical women are Black or Parda (Balloussier, 2020).

Lastly, women who follow Afro-Brazilian religions tend to identify more with being a woman, have more progressive gender attitudes, and a greater perception of gender injustice. This goes along with the literature on race and identification, which points out that women who

are highly identified with their race may also be more aware of their oppressions (Gay and Tate, 1998). Considering that the public reclaiming of Afro-Brazilian religions is closely associated with the Black movement, it is possible to infer that these women follow this pattern explained in the literature, in which their high identification with being Black might be correlated with them also having a higher identification with their gender. Among the group of Afro-Brazilian religions, there is also less support for general punishment, but this is not a significant when inserting other controls.

Table 12: T-test of difference in means of IVs per religiosity level

	Identification Score (1)	Attitudes Score (2)	General Punishment Score (3)	Gender Injustice Score (4)	Safety Score (5)
Low	2.945	3.702	2.491	3.149	2.001
Moderate	2.873	3.661	2.543	3.165	2.106
High	2.868*	3.604***	2.709***	3.133	1.961

Note: \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$

When observing the relationship between level of religiosity and the variables of interest, the level of reference used for the analysis was that of low religiosity (people who attend religious events once a year or less). It is interesting to observe that people with high religiosity levels (who attend religious events once a week or more) have lower identification scores and are more conservative in terms of gender attitudes, as it would be expected from the previous literature about conservativeness and religion (Rennó and Peixoto, 2018). There is also a significant direct correlation between higher religiosity and general punishment preferences. This is aligned with the fact that, in Brazilian politics, extremely religious figures defend harsher punishment. It is important to say, however, that these figures tend to also be in parties on the right, so it is important to observe the interaction between religiosity and politics. In this survey, when this interaction is considered, it is possible to observe that the main correlation with a

higher General Punishment Score comes from being in the center or right, and not from having higher religiosity.

When observing the main hypothesis of this chapter, which refers to the stability of progressive gender attitudes across variables and to the fact that most women, even women who we would expect to have conservative attitudes (such as very religious women), present progressive views on gender equality issues. In this section, it was possible to observe this stability across religion and religiosity levels, with even Evangelical women, who tend to be associated with conservative views of gender (Rennó, 2020), having a score of over 3.5 on a scale of 4 in terms of gender attitudes. In terms of religiosity, even the participants in the category of high religiosity have a Gender Attitudes Score of over 3.6.

### *Age*

The t-tests displayed below were generated using the group of women aged 18 to 30 as a reference level.

Table 13: T-test of difference in means of IVs per age group

	Identification Score (1)	Attitudes Score (2)	General Punishment Score (3)	Gender Injustice Score (4)	Safety Score (5)
18-30	3.069	3.762	2.586	3.329	1.853
31-40	2.919**	3.653***	2.757**	3.116**	1.986**
41-50	2.786***	3.581***	2.543	3.075***	2.060***
51-60	2.766***	3.600***	2.372**	2.930***	2.184***
60+	2.726***	3.524***	2.508	3.017*	2.210***

*Note:* \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$

From this table, it is possible to observe that older women tend to have lower identification scores and more conservative gender attitudes compared to the reference level of ages 18-30. Interestingly, there is a continuous decrease in these scores for each of the age

groups. Even among the most conservative age group, however, the gender attitudes score is above 3.5. The same happens with Gender Injustice Scores (since these three measures are associated, as it will be further explained). This might be related to the fact that feminist movements have gained force in the last decades and women's rights have advanced, which may be associated with the fact that younger women are more used to and expect gender equality. It is also possible to observe that the older that women are, the safer they feel. This might be a reflection that most cases of sexual violence and harassment happen with younger women (Gomes, 2023).

### *Race*

For the following analysis, the group of White respondents is used as the reference level:

Table 14: T-test of difference in means of IVs per race

	Identification Score (1)	Attitudes Score (2)	General Punishment Score (3)	Gender Injustice Score (4)	Safety Score (5)
White	2.928	3.671	2.506	3.158	2.098
Black	2.945	3.675	2.647	3.155	1.906***
Pardo	2.872	3.640	2.662*	3.124	1.907***
Other	2.816	3.620	2.576	3.152	1.939

*Note:* \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$

There are no statistically significant differences in identification and gender attitudes scores across any of the races. It is also possible to observe that the general punishment score is higher for *Pardo* and Black people compared to White people. This is a surprising finding because Black and *Pardo* people are the main ones affected by police violence and unfair trials (Jornal Nacional, 2022). This might be related, therefore, to the socioeconomic status of *Pardo* and Black people, which tends to be lower than that of White people, meaning that they might

live in more dangerous areas and have more exposure to violence, which can lead to higher support for punishment.

In addition, Black and *Pardo* women report lower Safety Scores than white women. This might be associated to the fact that Black people are more susceptible to violence in Brazil than white people, both for general and gender-based crimes (Mugnatto, 2021).

### ***Income***

When observing the impact of income on the variables of interest, the group of respondents used as a reference level are those who earn less than 2 minimum wages monthly.

Table 15: T-test of difference in means of IVs per income (in number of minimum wages)

	Identification Score (1)	Attitudes Score (2)	General Punishment Score (3)	Gender Injustice Score (4)	Safety Score (5)
Less than 2	2.812	3.600	2.788	3.121	1.958
2 - 5	2.938**	3.691***	2.505***	3.173	2.022
5 - 10	3.044***	3.725***	2.348***	3.104	2.023
More than 10	3.103***	3.754***	2.109***	3.220	2.103

*Note:* \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$

Higher salaries are directly related to higher identification scores, as well as higher attitude scores. In addition, general punishment score is inversely correlated to income. This might happen because these women live in safer neighborhoods and, therefore, experience less violence, which may impact their views on punishment.

## ***Education***

When analyzing the impact of education on the variable of interest, the reference level used is of the group of women who have either complete or incomplete middle school education.

Table 16: T-test of difference in means of IVs per educational level

	Identification Score (1)	Attitudes Score (2)	General Punishment Score (3)	Gender Injustice Score (4)	Safety Score (5)
Middle School	2.571	3.379	2.669	2.964	2.005
High School	2.767	3.594*	2.831	3.084	1.971
College	3.002**	3.704***	2.433	3.184	2.022
Master's or PhD	3.218***	3.857***	2.07**	3.337	1.953

*Note:* \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$

Compared to women who have only completed middle school, women who have completed college or women who have a master's or PhD have significantly higher identification scores. There is no statistically significant difference in the identification score of women with middle and high school education. In the case of gender attitudes, education is directly correlated with a progressive increase in the score when there is an increase in the level of education.

In the case of general punishment score, there is only a statistically significant educational decrease of this score at the highest education bracket. Lastly, there are no statistically significant differences in gender injustice and safety scores.

## ***Number of children***

Here, the reference level being used is the group of women who do not have children:

Table 17: T-test of difference in means of IVs per number of children

	Identification Score (1)	Attitudes Score (2)	General Punishment Score (3)	Gender Injustice Score (4)	Safety Score (5)
0	3.050	.751	2.419	3.305	1.963
1 or 2	2.821***	3.751	2.643***	3.057***	2.006
3 or more	2.863***	3.618***	2.732***	3.078***	2.047

Note: \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$

It is possible to observe that women who are mothers and women with no children behave differently regarding the measured variables, but the number of children does not make a significant difference in general. Compared to women with no children, women with children have lower identification scores. Regarding Attitudes Scores, women with children tend to be more conservative than women without children. In addition, the number of children women have is also directly associated with the General Punishment Score. Lastly, Gender Injustice Scores drop among women with children. There are no statistically significant differences among groups when it comes to safety scores.

### *Political Preferences*

The last covariate to be analyzed in this chapter is political preferences. In this t-test table, the reference level is the group of respondents in the political left. It is also important to mention that the groups “Left” and “Right” also include respondents who identified, respectively, as center-left and center-right.

Table 18: T-test of difference in means of IVs per political ideology

	Identification Score (1)	Attitudes Score (2)	General Punishment Score (3)	Gender Injustice Score (4)	Safety Score (5)
Left	3.118	3.772	2.313	3.232	2.010
Center	2.775***	3.614***	2.886***	3.150	1.881**
Right	2.962***	3.518***	2.805***	3.020***	2.060

Note: \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$

Here, it is possible to observe that the behavior of women from the center is significantly closer to the women from the right regarding identification, gender attitudes and punishment preferences than it is to women from the left. Women from the left have much greater gender identification than women from the center. The same trend is seen in terms of gender attitudes, with leftist women having significantly higher Gender Attitudes Scores, indicating that they are more progressive in terms of gender attitudes, as it would be expected based on the fact that in Brazil the topic of women's rights and the feminist movement has been historically associated to the left. Meanwhile, rightist women have lower gender attitudes score than women from the center. It is important to mention that this is still a very high score (3.518), which supports the argument that gender attitudes are overall progressive among all women.

Regarding support for punishment, women from the left are significantly less punitive than women from the center. In this topic, there are no statistically significant differences between women from the center and the right. When it comes to perception of gender injustice, women from the center and from the left show similar levels of perceiving high gender injustice, while women from the right have a significantly lower score of Gender Injustice. It is important to mention that this is still a very high Gender Injustice Score (3.02), which means that women

from all the political spectrum are still aware of gender injustice. Lastly, women from the center perceive to be less safe than women from both the right and the left.

## **Correlation between independent variables**

To conclude this descriptive exploration of the data, it is essential to understand how these variables of interest relate to each other. The image below presents a correlation table between these variables:

Table 19: Correlation matrix of the independent variables

	Identification Score	Attitudes Score	General Punishment	Gender Injustice	Safety Score
Identification Score	1.00	0.42	-0.08	0.27	-0.20
Attitudes Score	0.42	1.00	-0.14	0.23	-0.12
General Punishment Score	-0.08	-0.14	1.00	0.09	-0.20
Gender Injustice	0.27	0.23	0.09	1.00	-0.21
Safety Score	-0.20	-0.12	-0.20	-0.21	1.00

Based on these values, it is possible to understand a few mechanisms of how these variables correlate to each other, testing a few hypotheses presented when constructing the conceptual framework. First, it is possible to observe that identification score and attitudes have a high positive correlation (0.42), since someone who identifies more with their gender and women around them may be more perceptive of gender discrimination (Becker and Wagner, 2009). Both identification score and gender attitudes positively and moderately correlate with gender injustice (0.27 and 0.23). One possible explanation for this is that someone who is more progressive in terms of gender and aware about what is happening to women around them is likely to also be more perceptive of gender injustices.

Lastly, the only variables with a moderate correlation with general punishment should be safety score, since it is possible to assume that women who feel more unsafe will also be more

likely to support harsher punishment. In the table, it is possible to note that they have a moderate inverse correlation (-0.21), which means that higher Gender Punishment Scores are correlated with feeling less safe, which is an observation aligned with the literature (Hogan et al., 2005).

## **Conclusion: main takeaways**

As final takeaways of the descriptive data analysis presented in this chapter, it is first fundamental to highlight the confirmation of hypothesis 1, which stated that gender attitudes are progressive among most women. Not only the breakdown analysis of the Gender Attitudes Score variable and the distribution proved this claim, but it was also supported when observing the impact of covariates in this score. Even among women who would be expected to be more conservative in these terms (e.g. very religious or rightist women), the Gender Attitudes Score remained very high.

Secondly, it is important to highlight that Gender Identification is positively correlated with more progressive Gender Attitudes. Both are positively correlated with Gender Injustice perception. This indicates that women with higher Gender Attitudes Scores also tend to have higher identification with the group of women and vice versa. Women with higher scores for these two variables also tend to be more perceptive of gender-based injustices.

Thirdly, safety is negatively correlated with general support for punishment, which indicated that in this sample the more unsafe someone feels, the more they tend to support harsher punishment as well. Lastly, a fundamental takeaway from these observations is that women from the center and the right behave very similarly to each other, with significant differences from leftist women, in most of the variables covered in this chapter.

## **Chapter 6 | Punitivism or Feminism?: Gender Policy Preferences of Brazilian women**

This chapter will provide a panorama of the gender policy preferences of Brazilian women, exploring not only what policies are the most and least supported but also analyzing how different demographic characteristics impact these preferences and how they interact with the independent variables covered in the previous chapter. Understanding these policy preferences is foundational to understanding Brazilian women's voting behavior, which will be covered in the next chapter.

The next sections of this chapter will particularly address hypothesis 2, which states that there is high demand for gender policy in Brazil, with some variation across the types of policy being supported - in the case of this study, gender punishment policies and feminist policies - although there is significant overlap across women. Therefore, although it is possible to observe some variation based on traditionally hypothesized characteristics, support for both of these types of gender policies remains very high across the entirety of the sample, including among groups of women that the literature would expect otherwise. This hypothesis is supported by the findings from this chapter, which show that both feminist policies and gender punishment policies present very high support across respondents. This is also consistent with the findings from the previous chapter, which show that most women have progressive views on gender issues and awareness about how sexism impact their daily lives and society. Based on this, it is intuitive to expect that women who support equality ideals and perceive that the situation of women in the country needs to be improved would be supportive of policies that address gender issues. These policies, however, take several formats - here divided in feminist and gender punishment policies - and understanding how the support looks like for each of them,

particularly across important demographics and political preferences, will be important when understanding how this demand shapes different voting behaviors.

To test this hypothesis, this chapter will initially provide descriptive statistics on both feminist and gender punishment policy preferences. These will involve exploring how these preferences look across different demographic groups. Then it will explore the themes regarding policy preferences that emerged from the qualitative data, aiming to provide a panorama of what substantive representation on the basis of gender looks like for Brazilian women - that is, what policies do they consider as the most relevant for the group of women. Lastly, it will explore the relationship between the independent variables of interest - Gender Identification Score, Gender Attitudes Score, Gender Injustice, General Punishment Attitudes and Safety Score - and each of the policy preferences, aiming to explain specific mechanisms of operation of the proposed conceptual framework (refer to chapter 2).

## **Feminist Policy Preferences**

The Feminist Policy Score referred to here measures the support of respondents to policies that are designed to advance gender equality and leverage women's empowerment, as well as treat structural problems of sexism. They were chosen based on policies that have been extensively researched and proposed in different countries. Respondents were asked how much they supported these policies and could answer on a 4-point scale, ranging from "Not at all" to "A lot". The average of all the statements listed below generated a Feminist Policy Score.

Table 20: Summary of Feminist Policy Score

Feminist Policy Preferences Score	1 (in %)	2 (in %)	3 (in %)	4 (in %)	Mean (out of 4)
Creation of a national campaign of awareness about sexual and domestic violence against women in schools	0.75	4.44	19.1	75.6	3.70
Increase the number of “Casas da Mulher Brasileira”, a 24-hour government center that combines different services for women victims of domestic violence, such as shelter homes, delegacia da mulher, children’s shelter and re-inclusion in the labor market	0.58	3.09	16.9	79.3	3.75
Promote sex education in schools	8.63	13.16	20.6	57.58	3.27
Implementing 50 percent quotas for female candidates in Congress, guaranteeing that half of the representatives are women	6.54	17.7	28.35	47.3	3.16
Mandatory training of employees that are likely to have to deal with women in situation of sexual violence (in hospital, polices, but also clubs)	0.41	2.01	18.4	79.1	3.76
Women who take care of their household and children should receive a stipend for this domestic work	5.53	12.9	19.7	61.7	3.38
Establish that all companies and institutions should have a minimum maternity leave of 6 months	1.75	5.52	21.1	71.5	3.62
The government should increase fines for companies who pay women and men differently	3.01	7.37	19.7	69.8	3.56
The government should provide access to contraceptive methods and promote awareness about the use of it	1.00	4.18	17.92	76.8	3.71
Feminist Policy Score	-	-	-	-	3.54

It is possible to observe that support for feminist policies is very high, with the average feminist policy score being of 3.54 out of 4. Therefore, there is widespread support for feminist policies, including among participants that would otherwise be expected to be more conservative in terms of gender issues, such as women from the right or very religious women, as it will be shown in next sections.

## **Gender Punishment Policy Preferences**

The gender punishment policy score measures participants' support for a series of policies of harsher punishment for gender-based crimes. The score is generated through the average of the scores of all statement listed below.

Table 21: Summary of Gender Punishment Policy Score

Gender Punishment Policy Score	1 (in %)	2 (in %)	3 (in %)	4 (in %)	Mean (out of 4)
Increasing the number of years of prison for people convicted of rape	0.41	3.35	15.7	80.4	3.76
Use of electronic ankle bracelet for 10 years after release for people convicted of domestic violence	6.53	15.5	25.3	52.6	3.24
Relaxation of gun control so that women can defend themselves	32.7	28.2	16.1	22.7	2.29
Chemical castration as punishment for convicted rapists	10.7	12.8	16.5	59.8	3.26
Life sentence for people convicted of femicide	6.28	9.71	21.6	62.3	3.40
Increasing the number of years of prison for people convicted of domestic violence	0.75	6.70	25.4	67.0	3.59
Gender Punishment Policy Score	-	-	-	-	3.25

As indicated in the table above, there is high and stable support for Gender Punishment Policy, although slightly lower than the feminist policies (score of 3.25 compared to 3.54). Most of the scores are very stable, but a particularly low score was the one for the policy proposing relaxation of gun control. It is also important to note that this variable exhibits more variation across different demographics, when compared to the Feminist Policy Score, but even the demographics that one would expect to be less supportive of gender punishment policies (for example, leftist women) still exhibit overall a high score for this variable. This is consistent with what was predicted on hypothesis 2, which predicted that the overall support for both types of policies is high.

## **Policy preferences across demographics**

After establishing how these policy preferences are being measured and how the general support for them looks like, this section will elaborate on the impact of different demographic variables in the measured policy preferences. The table below shows results of linear regressions that use demographics as independent variables and policy preferences as dependent variables.

Table 22: Impact of demographic variables in policy preferences

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Feminist Policy Score (1)	Gender Punishment Policy Score (2)
<b>Political Preferences</b>		
Center	-0.142*** (0.032)	0.347*** (0.044)
Right	-0.308*** (0.029)	0.418*** (0.040)
Constant	3.673*** (0.018)	3.058*** (0.025)
<b>Race</b>		
Black	0.002 (0.041)	0.028 (0.054)
Pardo	0.007 (0.029)	0.106** (0.039)
Other	-0.007 (0.079)	-0.001 (0.105)
Constant	3.544*** (0.019)	3.213*** (0.025)
<b>Religion</b>		
Atheist/Agnostic	0.176*** (0.049)	-0.456*** (0.065)
Evangelical	-0.059 (0.034)	0.064 (0.045)
Afro-Brazilian Religions	0.166** (0.053)	-0.129 (0.070)
Other	0.045 (0.035)	-0.195*** (0.046)
Constant	3.52*** (0.024)	3.338*** (0.031)
<b>Religiosity</b>		
Moderate	-0.068 (0.041)	0.092 (0.055)
High	-0.061* (0.028)	0.189*** (0.037)

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	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Feminist Policy Score (1)	Gender Punishment Policy Score (2)
Constant	3.579*** (0.019)	3.170*** (0.025)
<b>Age</b>		
31 - 40	-0.043 (0.035)	0.142** (0.046)
41 - 50	-0.114** (0.035)	-0.006 (0.047)
51 - 60	-0.111** (0.041)	-0.122* (0.055)
60+	-0.227*** (0.064)	0.001 0.086
Constant	3.611*** (0.022)	3.240*** (0.030)
<b>Income (in minimum wages)</b>		
2 - 5	0.0069 (0.029)	-0.128*** (0.038)
5 - 10	0.067 (0.044)	-0.269*** (0.057)
10+	0.033 (0.053)	-0.484*** (0.068)
Constant	3.53*** (0.019)	3.371*** (0.025)
<b>Education</b>		
High School	0.107 (0.088)	0.161 (0.116)
College	0.168 (0.088)	-0.032 (0.115)
Master's or PhD	0.327** (0.111)	-0.422** (0.145)
Constant	3.400*** (0.086)	3.225*** (0.113)
<b>Number of children</b>		
1 - 2	-0.094**	0.167***

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	Dependent variable:	
	Feminist Policy	Gender Punishment Policy
	Score (1)	Score (2)
3 +	(0.029) −0.041 (0.038)	(0.039) 0.242*** (0.051)
Constant	3.600*** (0.022)	3.131*** (0.030)

Note: \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$

### *Political Preferences*

Women from the center and right are significantly less supportive of feminist policies than women from the left. However, even on the right, the average Feminist Policy Score is 3.37 out of 4, which indicates that even women who are politically conservative express extremely high support for feminist policies.

At the same time, women from the center and right are significantly more supportive of gender punishment policies. This might be associated to the fact that, historically, *mano dura* policies have been proposed by governments on the right (Holland, 2013). It is important to observe, however, that the support from these leftist women for these policies is still very high, averaging 3.06 on a 4-point scale. This supports the argument that the demand for gender policy is high across all women, from different parts of the political spectrum. Women with different political positions therefore perceive that the government should be providing more to women in the form of gender policy and shows that there is widespread support for this, although there is a

certain inclination from women from left and right towards, respectively, feminist and gender punishment policy preferences.

### *Race*

There are no statistically significant effects of race on feminist policy preferences. When it comes to gender punishment policies, however, it is possible to observe higher scores among *Pardo* women, while Black and White women have very similar preferences. This is a surprising finding, considering that it could be expected that Black people would be less supportive of harsher punishment, because of experiences with police violence and the disproportional responses of justice systems (Jornal Nacional, 2022). One possible explanation for why this higher support is seen among Pardo women and the same levels between Black and White women might be that Black and Pardo women have lower levels of safety, as shown in the previous chapter. Therefore, this factor might play a larger role in determining their punitive attitudes than the experienced and perceived police violence, as it had been initially predicted.

### *Religion and religiosity*

Atheists/Agnostic women and women who follow Afro-Brazilian religions are more supportive of feminist policy preferences than Catholics. However, there are no statistically significant effects when comparing other religions to the Catholic group in terms of Feminist Policy Score. Women of high religiosity levels are also less supportive of feminist policies, compared to those of low religiosity.

In regard to gender punishment policy preferences, there is a statistically significant difference between Catholics and the groups of atheists/agnostics and people of other religions. In addition, people of high religiosity levels are significantly more supportive of gender

punishment policies than women of low religiosity. Lastly, it is important to highlight that the two largest religious groups, Catholics and Evangelicals, behave very similarly, with high Feminist Policy and Gender Punishment Policy Scores, and no statistically significant differences between them.

### *Age*

Support for feminist policies and age are inversely correlated, meaning that the Feminist Policy Score decreases among older age brackets. However, even among the age group with the lowest support, that of women over 60, the average Feminist Policy Score is still 3.39 out of 4. This is consistent with the earlier predictions that support for feminist policies would be particularly higher among younger women, who might have had more contact with widespread feminist movements.

In regard to gender punishment policy preferences, we do not observe a linear progression, as it was the case for feminist policy preferences. The group with the least support for gender punishment policies was the one with ages 51-60, and the most supportive was the group from 31-40. All the age categories, however, had a very high support for this policy, with all averages above 3. These findings are not consistent with earlier hypotheses from the literature that mention higher punitiveness among older people (Hough and Roberts, 2002), which might be due, for example, to the different type of media consumed by these individuals and the large audience of crime-related TV programs in Brazil. In fact, the findings point to an opposite direction of this relationship, with younger groups being more punitive.

### *Income*

There is no statistically significant relationship between feminist policy preferences and income, with the Feminist Policy Score remaining high across all income brackets. On the other hand, income and gender punishment policies are inversely correlated, with the Gender Punishment Policy Score significantly decreasing when income increases. This relationship appears to be consistent with the previously illustrated inverse correlation between safety and punitive preferences. In the previous chapter, it was possible to observe that people in higher income brackets felt safer and had less punitive preferences.

### *Education*

Education and policy preferences have a weak relationship, with only the highest level of education (Master's and PhD) behaving differently than the rest of women. This highly educated group supports feminist policies significantly more than the group with middle school level of education, as well as supports gender punishment policies significantly less. Although it is possible to observe this higher support among the most educated group, there are no statistically significant differences between the other educational groups. At the same time, gender punishment policies have less support among the most educated women, considering that they might question the efficiency of these more often, but it is not possible to observe statistically significant differences among any of the other educational groups.

### *Number of children*

There is a small, but statistically significant, decrease in support in feminist policy preferences among women with one or two children, compared to those without children. This effect, however, is not maintained among the group of women with three children or more. In

addition, Gender Punishment Policy Score and number of children are directly correlated, with women with more children presenting more support for gender punishment policies.

## **Perceptions of policies: Interview impressions**

As previously mentioned, the elaboration of the survey part of this study was heavily based on observations and hypotheses created from the interviews. The interviews covered opinions of the respondents about several policies: all the feminist policies included in the survey, two of the gender punishment policy questions (about relaxation of gun control and chemical castration for rapists) and a few questions not included in the survey that were not either feminist nor gender punishment policies, but were gender and sexuality related policies (such as the proposal of a policy that would require people below 18 to have their parents with them when buying contraceptives).

### ***Least supported policies***

The immense majority of the feminist policies were almost unanimously supported in the interviews. There was also extensive support for chemical castration, but the other gender punishment and gender related policies were more controversial. Particularly, the least supported policies were: gun relaxation, minimum age to buy contraceptives, sex education in schools and legalization of abortion.

When participants were asked about whether they would support the relaxation of gun control for women to be able to defend themselves, there was a strong opposition, which was repeated in the survey, considering that this was the least supported gender punishment policy. This strong rejection was surprising among the participants who have supported Bolsonaro, considering that defending the right to own guns was a very relevant part of Bolsonaro's

campaign (Campanha Bolsonaro, 2018). One of the women interviewed, for instance, showed awareness of this apparent contradiction:

“I am a little against guns, right? Even though I am 100% pro-Bolsonaro, I will have to tell you, you know? I think guns, in the hands of people who don’t know how to use them, are a mistake. So, I am against guns for people who do not know how to use it” - 54-year-old interviewee

Others pointed out to the general risks of having guns, particularly to how they would cause more fatalities in moments of heated arguments. One of the interviewees says, for instance, that “on a first fight, women would want to show that they can also fight” and that this would lead to fatalities. Women also expressed concerns about the fact that children could accidentally harm themselves if women are allowed to have guns in the house. A particularly interesting observation from some interviews was also the perception that the justice system would often fail women who use a gun for self-defense, and that they would end up in jail. Lastly, most women opposed the idea of relaxing this policy even if it was just for women: “I don’t even think guns should exist, neither for men nor for women. The only people who should have guns are the police officers.”

The second policy with low support among interviewees involved making it mandatory that people below the age of 18 only buy contraceptives when accompanied by their parents. There was strong opposition to this policy because of the perception that people initiate their sexual lives earlier than that and that this measure would lead to more teenage pregnancies and ISTs. For instance, one of the participants said:

“No, I don’t think so. Because not everyone starts their sexual life at 18. There are a lot of teenagers who start their sexual life earlier. And if they have this access before, they can avoid several things, several diseases, or even an unwanted, unwanted pregnancy” - 23-year-old interviewee

The third policy here discussed - promoting sexual education in schools - did not have low support, in fact it was very highly supported, but the interviewees presented a lot of caveats when expressing their support for the policy. This policy was included in the interviews with the prediction that it would help identify some respondents with conservative gender attitudes. Another prediction was that women who support Bolsonaro would reject this policy, considering that he strongly opposed this policy during his campaign and presidency (Ferreira and Grandelle, 2019). This was, however, not what was observed. In fact, only one interviewee said she would not support sex education in schools, and there was complete consensus in terms of the importance of sex education to prevent and identify sexual abuse. A lot of the participants, however, supported the policy but added the caveat that it is important to be careful with what is transmitted to children and that some teachers are teaching too much. In the survey, it was possible to observe the strong support for this policy, with the average score of 3.26 in a 4-point scale. Some of the opinions expressed about this policy are displayed below:

"I think it is super important, it is valid, because you are teaching your daughter to defend herself, teaching her various situations, even at home, the vast majority are at home. So, it is important for children, from a young age, to learn what is right and what is wrong." - 43-year-old interviewee

"Well, it should be with more qualified teachers, because the sexual education that I've heard about nowadays, you know, is very... It doesn't need to be spoken the way they say it. I think sexual education is about explaining: look, don't maintain a relationship outside of marriage or if you are going to maintain a relationship outside of marriage, use a condom to avoid contamination and not get pregnant. Nowadays, they talk about sex very openly, I think it's unnecessary." - 56-year-old interviewee

Participants were also asked about their opinions on the current abortion law in Brazil and whether they thought the law should be expanded to incorporate more cases in which abortion is legal, whether they thought it should be more restricted or whether the current law should be maintained. The latter opinion was the most popular one among the interviewees. The

abortion law in Brazil nowadays allows abortions in three situations: in pregnancies caused by rape, when the life of the mother is at risk and in cases of fetus anencephaly. Most of the respondents would also mention their strong opposition to allowing abortions in case of unplanned pregnancies, as exemplified below:

"I agree with the case [of pregnancy caused by] rape, I agree in cases of sickness. In these cases, I agree. I agree. But I don't agree when the person gets pregnant and then wants to take the baby out." - 52-year-old interviewee

"In these three situations, yes, I agree with the abortion law. But I am against abortions. Because a child with no brain [referring to the fetus anencephaly case] will not live, she will vegetate, right? The moment they are born, they die. No, if the person wants to get an abortion because she does not have the means to raise the child, because she drinks, because she uses drugs, then I don't agree" - 45-year-old interviewee

Most of the respondents who supported the legalization of abortion were people with lower levels of religiosity and who identified as leftists, as it would be expected, considering that this is the political group who advocates for the legalization of abortion in Brazil and the main resistance to this tends to come from religious groups (Machado, 2017). It was surprising to observe in this qualitative data, however, that even some religious women supported some level of expansion of the abortion law, particularly in cases of teenage pregnancy, for instance, a Catholic 56-year-old interviewee answered:

"I think that the hall of options [in the abortion law] is not so bad, but it could be a little more expansive. [...] I don't know, if it's a very young child, like 15 years old. Is it worth leaving this child, who sometimes it's not even fully formed [continue with a pregnancy]? The girl's uterus isn't even properly formed yet, she's going to have a pregnancy. Is it worth taking this forward? [...] Like, I think there are cases and cases, I think there has to be an investigation behind it, a study behind it, thinking carefully about the child, the teenager, right? That's also what ECA [the Children and Teenager's Statute] is for, right? But I don't know if it works that well."

Although less common, there were also some respondents who supported full prohibition of abortion, often mentioning religious reasons and saying that there is always the option to put

children for abortion, in cases of a pregnancy caused by a rape. Another surprising view came from a 56-year-old evangelical woman who attends church very regularly, who argued that abortion should be legalized but only the current three cases currently covered by the law should be covered by the public health system.

Due to the extreme controversial nature of abortion in Brazilian politics, I opted to not include it in the feminist policy preference questions in the survey in order to not have respondents abandoning the survey. The sensitive nature of this topic was observed in the interviews, for instance, with two respondents having teary eyes and chokes voice when answering this question, affirming that it is extremely hard for them to talk about this topic but that they strongly opposed abortion. To measure abortion preferences without directly asking about this topic, the survey included the abortion experiment that was described in the methods chapter. The results of this experiment will be covered in the next chapter.

### *Redistribution policies and single mothers*

Some policies also faced rejection of the interviewees based on the idea of women being benefited by these policies as “lazy” and “just relying on the government for a living.” These mainly included a proposal of offering government-paid maternity leave to informal workers and to provide priority to single mothers in public kindergarten. Although these policies were supported by most of the respondents, they were particularly rejected among richer women and among respondents who perceived that a significant portion of the population just took advantage of redistribution policies. The latter would often also be women who oppose the current president Lula and his signature conditional cash transfer program, as exemplified below:

“[About longer maternity leave for single mothers] I don’t know about that one, because if we do that they might get used and not go out to work, right? So it has to be very controlled. Until a certain date, after some specific time, the person has to find a job,

something, right? It's like this Bolsa Família that Lula gives. A lot of people don't go out to work or anything, because they have an income [from the Bolsa Família program], right?" - 32-year-old interviewee

"[If the woman is paying a monthly contribution to social security] In this case, I think so [that informal workers should be paid a maternity leave]. But I don't think this should be given for no reason, I don't think so. Why? Because many would be getting pregnant just to get this governmental support. So, I will give it to you, but you have to be working for it. So, if something needs to be paid [referring to autonomous contribution to social security], then let's pay it and then you have access to this right. Because it is the same thing as Bolsa Família. Does Bolsa Família help people? Yes. But how many mothers don't just have a lot of children just to be able to live off of Bolsa Família? Many, because they get lazy and this is what I think cannot be allowed." - 41-years-old interviewee

This negative perception was particularly applied to single mothers. For instance, when asked about whether single mothers should have priority in the access to public kindergartens, one of the participants answered the following:

"I think all mother should have this right, you know? Whether she is single or married. Because, the moment that you had your child being single, you're going to have to figure out a way to raise them. But a lot of times, like I said, it is the grandparents who support the child right?" - 43-years-old interviewee

### *Maternity and paternity leave*

The support for expanding the maternity leave to a minimum of 6 months was very highly supported by most of the survey respondents, with an average score of 3.62 on a 4-point scale. This was also the case in the interviews, but it was possible to observe that a lot of the respondents lacked knowledge about both the paternity and maternity leave duration, frequently overestimating how long these lasted. It is particularly relevant to understand these attitudes towards maternity and paternity leave because the first is used as one of the policies inserted in the conjoint experiment that will be covered in the next chapter. While there was a majority of women supporting the expansion of maternity leave, but this was not the case for paternity leave.

They frequently mentioned that men mostly do not help with the children as much and therefore do not need to have a longer paternity leave, as illustrated below:

“There are the cases of men who don’t even live with the woman, and sometimes they will take advantage of this to stay at home and don’t even take care of the child.”

At the same time, some respondents also expressing not being in favor of expanding maternity leave, mostly mentioning that this would make employment discrimination worse:

“Look, it’s very complicated because half of me says yes, the other half says no, because it gets in the way of her getting the job. Because it’s already difficult, people already discriminate because they already have a small child, so if they find out later that she will have this benefit, she won’t get the job. So, a law that favors this direction could end up hindering it as well.” - 54-year-old-interviewee

### *Most important policies*

As it was mentioned, there was general widespread support for feminist policies and for gender punishment policies. However, the ones that appeared to take the most important position for women in the interviews when asked directly about it were: (1) policies to reduce employment discrimination, (2) increasing maternity leave, (3) policies to combat domestic and sexual violence, (4) provision of menstrual products in schools and (5) promoting sex education in schools.

As exemplified in the previous chapters, most women perceive that there is gender discrimination in the process of hiring and even inside companies that they have either experienced personally or heard about. Because of this, there was great support for policies that aimed at reducing this discrimination and its impact, such as programs of fiscal incentive for companies to hire more women and policies to support mothers in re-entering the job market.

When mentioning these as a priority, a lot of the interviewees also highlighted the policies targeting single mothers:

“I think the ones about single mothers [should be a priority], the one about having spots in the kindergartens, I think this is very important. Her having a longer maternity leave, because sometimes she has to leave the baby at 2, 3 months old at a kindergarten because she needs to work, a very small child, I think that we should implement things to help this mother” - 35-year-old interviewee

One of the policies that was also mentioned by several participants as one of the main policy priorities. Often they mentioned that the leave should be even larger than six months, with some mentioning eight months, and others proposing, for example, “six months of maternity leave and other six months of employment stability.” In the survey, it is also possible to observe the very high support for feminist policies related to employment, with the average score of support for a 6-month maternity leave being of 3.62 on a 4-point scale. The support for increasing fines for companies who pay men and women differently was also very high, with an average score of 3.56.

A third set of policy priorities to the interviewees were policies to combat domestic and sexual violence. The preoccupations of the participants in terms of these widespread violences surrounded both the lack of punishment faced by perpetrators, and the lack of support for the victims. In the case of domestic violence, women were particularly critical about the implementation of the main law against domestic violence in Brazil, the Maria da Penha Law:

“We urgently need an adjustment to the Maria da Penha Law, it can’t be like that, you know? There are the protective measures<sup>4</sup>, but I think this is absurd. The guy comes, what are you going to do? Are you going to throw the paper [the document establishing the protective measure] at his face? [...] So it is necessary to change [the law] so that people

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<sup>4</sup> Legal determinations establishing that the perpetrator of violence has to be at a minimum distance of the victim at all moments

who commit this type of crime remain in jail, this should be implemented as soon as possible. This is a very good law, but it has a lot of problems.” - 35-year-old interviewee

“I think that the Maria da Penha law could be improved, because the husband hits the wife, but then he is released [from jail], then he goes and kills her, this thing should be improved.” - 47-year-old interviewee

In the case of sexual violence, there was also the perception that perpetrators were not properly punished. In the interviews, this was mainly shown through the strong support for chemical castration for convicted rapists. When asked about what were the most important policies to be implemented, these were some of the answers from participants:

“The chemical castration of rapists. To me this would be the most urgent, because if there was a chemical castration law, the cases of sexual harassment would reduce 100%” - 27-year-old interviewee

“This thing about the modifying the punishment, because we feel very insecure. For example, I think a thousand times before I leave the house at night, you know? This would not be necessary [if there was harsher punishment], I would not have to spend money with, for instance, Ubers” - 25-year-old interviewee

Lastly, there is also the perception that victims of gender-based violence do not receive appropriate support. A lot of them mentioned the financial and emotional dependency that victims of domestic violence often have on their husbands and consider that policies that support these women to report and leave their abusive households should be priorities:

“I think that victims of domestic violence should, in the first place, be more supported. It should be easier for women who suffer domestic violence to find a job and things like that. I think this is the most important [policy].” - 25-year-old interviewee

“The 24-hour police stations specialized for women, I think that should also increase” - 36-year-old interviewee

The prioritization of these policies is also reflected in the survey's results, in which the *Casa da Mulher* policy has the second-highest support, with an average score of 3.75. This policy predicts the expansion of center of support to women victims of domestic violence, which include shelters, 24-hour police stations and programs to reintegrate these women into the labor market.

Lastly, it was also possible to observe a strong support for the policy that predicted the distribution of free menstrual products in public schools, as well as for the promotion of sex education in schools. As for the first one, respondents often had the perception that some families could not afford menstrual products, with some of them sharing personal stories about it, and that this had a very negative impact on girls' education. As for the second one, the main support for sex education spurred from observations that the lack of this knowledge leads to more teenage pregnancies, as well as the perception that this type of education is important to avoid and identify cases of sexual abuse.

## **Correlation between the independent variables and policy preferences**

This next section will explore how the important independent variables being measured in this study - gender identification, gender attitudes, general punishment preferences, gender injustice and safety score - impact policy preferences of Brazilian women. Due to the nature of the variables being measured, and the hypotheses posed of overall progressiveness in terms of gender attitudes as well as high demand for gender policy, it is possible to make some assumptions about how these independent variables and policy preferences are correlated, which will be tested in the sections below.

First, gender identification should be positively correlated with support for both feminist and gender punishment policies. This is because women with higher gender identification can perceive how they are part of a general group of women, and that policies that serve to advance equality or provide protection to women will personally impact them.

Second, gender attitudes should be positively correlated with feminist policies and have no correlation with gender punishment policies. This is because women who have more progressive views on gender issues will be more likely to support policies that advance gender equality, here framed as feminist policies. On the other hand, although one could assume that progressive gender attitudes are related to a general progressiveness and therefore to the rejection of harsher punishment policies, this is not what was observed in the interviews conducted. There was extremely strong support for a few punishment policies proposed in the interviews, that came from women with different gender attitudes and political preferences, as well as by the fact that politicians with *mano dura* policies have had great electoral success in Brazil. Therefore, it is possible to predict that this pattern would be repeated across the broader population covered in the survey.

Lastly, gender injustice and general punishment scores should be positively correlated with gender punishment policies, considering that women with higher Gender Injustice Scores perceive that gender-based crimes are not properly addressed and would view these policies as a way of promoting more just penalties. In addition, because of the nature of these measures, higher support for harsher punishment for general crimes should also be related to more support for gender-based punishment. The next sections will cover these relationships and test the previously mentioned assumptions.

## Feminist Policy Preferences

The table below shows the correlation between each of the relevant independent variables to the Feminist Policy Score. In columns 1 to 5, it is possible to observe the estimates from regressions without covariates. Column 6 shows the results controlling for the other independent variables in the table, while column 7 includes both the independent variables and all the demographic variables being measured.

Table 23. Regression Results - Dependent Variable: Feminist Policy Score

	<i>Independent variables:</i>						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6) With all IVs	(7) With demographics
Identification Score	0.344*** (0.018)					0.239*** (0.019)	0.218*** (0.020)
Attitudes Score		0.505*** (0.032)				0.312*** (0.032)	0.286*** (0.033)
General Punishment Score			0.042** (0.016)			0.066*** (0.013)	0.084*** (0.015)
Gender Injustice Score				0.160*** (0.014)		0.073*** (0.013)	0.072*** (0.013)
Safety Score					-0.131*** (0.019)	-0.030 (0.017)	-0.034* (0.017)
Constant	2.546*** (0.055)	1.699*** (0.119)	3.437*** (0.043)	3.042*** (0.046)	3.810*** (0.040)	1.364*** (0.134)	1.174* (0.597)
Observations	1,191	1,192	1,192	1,188	1,192	1,183	1,154
R <sup>2</sup>	0.222	0.169	0.005	0.094	0.038	0.321	0.355

Note: \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$

When observing how the independent variables of interest relate to feminist policy preferences, it is possible to observe some assumptions supported: both identification and attitudes score are positively correlated with support for feminist policies. In the case of the identification score, when controlling for all the independent variables of interest and demographics, it is possible to observe an increase of 0.218 in feminist policy score when there is a 1-point increase in identification score, on a 4-point scale.

As mentioned in the previous chapter and more explored in the literature review chapter, this might be associated with the fact that higher levels of gender identification have been thought to be correlated with the idea of a shared fate of a group (Gay and Tate, 1998). The measure here being used for Gender Identification Score also includes levels of solidarity, and therefore might include how women perceive that feminist policies will impact them and other women. In addition, from theories of substantive representation, it would be expected that women who can recognize the obstacles suffered by them and other women because of their gender are going to support feminist policies.

It is also possible to notice a small positive correlation between General Punishment Score (0.084) and Gender Injustice Score (0.072) with the Feminist Policy Score. In the case of the gender injustice score, it is possible to think that someone who perceives gender injustice as a systematic problem will also be more supportive of policies that aim to reduce sexism structurally, such as the feminist policies propose.

### ***Gender Punishment Policy Preferences***

The table below shows the same relationships with the independent variables of interest, using the Gender Punishment Policy Score as the dependent variable of this analysis.

Table 24. Regression Results - Dependent Variable: Gender Punishment Policy Score

	<i>Independent variables:</i>						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6) With all IVs	(7) With demographics
Identification Score	-0.037 (0.028)					-0.014 (0.021)	0.025 (0.022)
Attitudes Score		-0.09 (0.047)				0.054 (0.035)	0.116** (0.035)
General Punishment Score			0.549*** (0.014)			0.541*** (0.014)	0.500*** (0.016)
Gender Injustice Score				0.111*** (0.019)		0.058*** (0.014)	0.065*** (0.014)
Safety Score					-0.170*** (0.025)	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.022 (0.0178)
Constant	3.366*** (0.083)	3.592*** (0.174)	1.835*** (0.039)	2.907*** (0.064)	3.596*** (0.054)	1.555*** (0.145)	1.064 (0.634)
Observations	1,191	1,192	1,192	1,188	1,192	1,183	1,154
R <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.003	0.547	0.025	0.035	0.556	0.590

Note: \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$

First, it is possible to observe that there is no statistically significant correlation between Gender Identification Score and Gender Punishment Policy Score. Second, perhaps the most interesting correlation observed when analyzing gender punishment policy preferences is the one with gender attitudes. When analyzing the relationship between these two variables without controls, it is possible to see only a small inverse relationship (-0.09), which is not statistically significant. However, when we observe this variable controlling for other independent variables and for demographics, this correlation becomes positive, a lot stronger and statistically significant (0.116). This shift may be indicating that a third unknown variable is impacting both of these variables. Therefore, an important conclusion comes from looking at these variables in isolation, with controls: unlike the stated hypothesis, gender attitudes do have a correlation with gender punishment policies, but they do not go in the intuitive direction one would expect. When thinking about a person with progressive gender views, it is possible to imagine that they would also have progressive views on other issues, and therefore would not be very supportive of

harsher punishment policies. However, this is not the case. What we observe in this table is that more progressive gender attitudes are actually correlated with more support for gender punishment policies. Therefore, the second assumption proposed is not supported in the sense that there is a statistically significant relationship between these variables (unlike what was predicted). However, like assumed, support for punishment is high among both people with conservative and progressive gender attitudes is supported by this table.

A first possible explanation for why women with progressive gender attitudes support gender punishment policies so strongly is that progressive gender attitudes are related to generally having a greater concern for women, which is reflected in a bigger concern in terms of gender-based crimes and therefore in support for gender punishment policies. This is supported by the fact that gender attitudes and feminist policy preferences are highly positively correlated, that is, people with progressive gender attitudes are supportive of measures that will improve gender equality, and therefore appear to be considering the issue of gender discrimination in their decisions. It is also supported by the fact that more progressive gender attitudes are negatively correlated with general punishment preferences (-0.33 without control and -0.14 with controls, both statistically significant results), which therefore shows that the insertion of a gender perspective to the punishment policies plays an important role in the support of women with progressive gender attitudes for these policies.

A second possible explanation relates to personal experiences of violence. It is possible to think that women with progressive gender attitudes may have a greater perception that some violences that they have suffered in their lives were due to being women. With this clearer perception of the gendered nature of crimes and how they impacted them, there would be greater support for gender punishment policies. This is complementary to the first explanation, and also

supported by the fact that gender attitudes are negatively correlated to general punishment policies.

In addition, as expected based on the nature of the measures, General Punishment Score is highly correlated with Gender Punishment Policy Preferences (0.5) Lastly, Gender Injustice Score is positively correlated with gender punishment policy preferences, although to a small degree (0.06) when controlling for other independent variables and demographics.

## **Conclusion: Main takeaways**

This chapter has provided a profound insight into the policy preferences of Brazilian women. First, it was possible to observe that there is overall extremely high support for both feminist and gender punishment policies. This support is stable across all demographic groups, although it was possible to observe more variability when it came to the Gender Punishment Policy Score. Insights from the interviews also allowed for the understanding of which are the least and most supported policies and why this is the case. This variation between these two policy preferences, as well as their relationships to different demographics, that pointed to which groups were the most supportive of each of them, points to the interpretation that these policies, although both related to gender, do fulfill different roles to the electorate and attend different demands, although it is also clear that there is significant overlap between the groups supporting each of these.

Another valuable result from this chapter was that gender identification and gender attitudes are positively correlated with feminist policy preferences, which confirms the validity of these measures. Gender attitudes are also positively correlated with gender punishment policies, while at the same time negatively correlated with general punishment policy

preferences, which shows the importance of the gender dimension when it comes to opinions about punishment from women in Brazil and, more specifically, indicates that progressive women that would otherwise not support harsher punishments for general crimes are willing to support harsher punishments for gender-based crimes. Lastly, it was possible to observe that the Gender Injustice Score is also positively correlated with both feminist and gender punishment policies.

This in-depth understanding of policy preferences and how they relate to the important independent variables of this study will be extremely important to the development of the next chapter, which will present how these impact voting behavior of Brazilian women, through the analysis of the conjoint experiment and survey experiment conducted in this study.

## **Chapter 7 | What does it mean to vote for gender equality?: How gender policy preferences inform voting behavior**

This chapter will analyze how the formerly described political preferences impact Brazilian women's voting behavior through a conjoint experiment. It will particularly address hypothesis 3 of this thesis, which states that "Considering the progressive gender attitudes and high demand for feminist policy here being hypothesized, gender policies will play an important role in terms of voting behavior of women. First, there will be preference for policies that incorporate a gender perspective over ones that do not. Second, when observing the two main types of gender policy here conceptualized, gender punishment policies and feminist policies, the first will take preference to women when voting. This is due to the perception of gender identification as correlated with the violence and injustice suffered by women."

To do so, this chapter will cover how the interaction of different policy preferences informs the priorities of the participants. The findings from it show that there is variation when it comes to this hypothesis, with one of the feminist policy preferences used in the experiment - expansion of the Casa da Mulher Basileira - being the most supported across all groups, followed by the two gender punishment policies and followed by the second option of feminist policy - expanding maternity leave. This finding, which will be further elaborated on in the next sections, points to the fact that there is strong support for gender-framed policies among all women and that the content of particularly feminist policies is important when compared to gender-based policies.

When observing the different levels of support across demographics and political preferences, it is also possible to conclude that the immense majority of Brazilian women care about gender and want to advance policies that protect women, but one of the reasons why they

fail to achieve so is due to partisan divides. Parties bundle together policies that have widespread support (for example, expansion of *Casa da Mulher Brasileira*) with other policies that are divisive based on political preferences (gender punishment policies and abortion, for example). To explore these results, this chapter will first cover a general average marginal component effect (AMCE) analysis of the conjoint experiment, connecting these findings to the qualitative data and analysis of policy preferences discussed so far. It will later elaborate on a conditional AMCE analysis that will provide the understanding of how the support for the conjoint experiment policies varies across different covariates of interest. Lastly, it will discuss the results of the randomized control trial abortion experiment and how these finding connect to the general conjoint analysis.

## General conjoint analysis

On chapter 4, I described why the choice of a conjoint experiment is ideal for this study and provided more details on how the average marginal component effect analysis works. In that chapter, it is also possible to see the different levels of choice that each category included in the study has. For this section, the category of interest is described as “One of the projects that this candidate defends.” These include four types of policies and two options per type of policy, as listed below:

**Table 25. Levels of the policy variable in the conjoint experiment**

***Feminist Policy***

1. Establish 6 months as the minimum time that companies have to offer of maternity leave
2. Increase the number of *Casas da Mulher Brasileira*, a 24-hour government center that combines different services for women victims of domestic violence, such as shelter homes,

*delegacia da mulher*, children's shelter and re-inclusion in the labor market

***Gendered punishment policy***

3. Chemical castration for convicted rapists
4. Life sentence for people convicted of femicide

***General punishment policy***

5. Use of electronic ankle bracelet for 10 years after release for people convicted of violent robbery
6. Life sentence for people convicted of homicide

***General justice policy***

7. Expansion of areas under government environmental protection, which impedes, for example, deforestation in these regions
8. Increase satellite monitoring in areas with high concentrations of illegal mining, to reduce these occurrences

The choice of including these four categories was based on the fact that (1) the study aimed to analyze which policies took priority for Brazilian voters: gender punishment or feminist policies and (2) it also aimed to understand the importance of incorporating a gender lens to the policies and the impact that this had in the support that these policies had. Therefore, this design allows us to compare the support of general punishment policies to gender punishment policies, as well as the support for general justice with the support for feminist policies and understand the effect of gender specifically in predicting voting behavior. This way, the prediction is that, if gender is important for women and plays an important role in their voting behavior, feminist

policies will take priority over general justice policies, and gender punishment policies will take priority over general punishment ones.

In terms of the choice of specific policies, the feminist and gender punishment policies were based in observations from the interviews and pilot survey. These were some of the policies most strongly supported by women in both of these. When it comes to general punishment, there was an attempt of having a directly comparable policy (in this case “life sentence for femicide” vs. “life sentence for homicide”), as well as having one of the punishment policies that are included in the General Punishment Index. Lastly, when defining general justice policies, the focus on the environment was given due to the fact that it is not listed as one of the main priorities of Brazilian voters in most electoral surveys, the same way that gender is not either (Veja, 2022). In addition, the statements about environmental policy included avoided controversial topics, like it was the case among the feminist policies, to make them the closest possible for comparison.

As previously detailed in the methodology chapter, the average marginal component effect is used for the analysis of the conjoint answers and each of the participants answered two conjoint experiments, resulting in 2,388 data points to be analyzed here. It is important to observe that in the general population of the study, there are more women from the left than from the center and the right, so this sample influences the general results presented here. The graph below presents the results of the general conjoint analysis, with the answers of the entire study population:




Figure 4: General AMCE analysis of conjoint experiment

In this analysis, the policy proposing to increase maternity leave to 6 months is set as the reference level. Based on this, it is possible to observe that the most supported policy is one of the feminist policies, which proposed the increase in the number of *Casas da Mulher Brasileira* - a centralized space of support for victims of gender-based violence. This policy had 35.9 percentage points higher support than the reference policy. After that, the policies most supported by the general sample were the life sentence for femicide (10.2 percentage points higher than the reference level) and chemical castration for rapists (8 percentage points higher). They are then followed by deforestation protection, life sentence for homicide, expansion of

maternity leave, and reduction of illegal mining. Still, it is important to note that there is no statistically significant difference in support for these four. Lastly, the least supported policy was the implementation of electronic ankles for violent robbery.

It is interesting to observe the large discrepancy between the *Casa da Mulher Brasileira* and the maternity leave policies, considering that both of these policies fall under the category of feminist policy. This might be related to the fact that, although the *Casa da Mulher Brasileira* policy is not a gender punishment policy, it is still related to violence. In contrast, the maternity leave policy is associated with employment opportunities. Through the qualitative data, it was possible to observe that there was a perception of overall improvements on gender inequality in several areas, including employment, but this perceived improvement was not reflected in terms of gender-based violence. In this case, women perceived that the situation was getting worse. 81% of the times in which the code “Perceived worsening” was used in the analysis of the interviews, it was related to gender-based violence (sexual harassment, sexual violence, or domestic violence). As illustrated in the last chapter, the interviews also showed a clear demand for policies that not only promote punishment for perpetrators, but that also support and protect women who are victims of violence. When it comes to the perceived worsening vs. perceived improvement explanation, it is possible to observe below some excerpts that show when interviewees perceived improvement in a situation:

“Interviewer: Do you think that men and women currently receive the same salary when they perform the same work in Brazil?

Respondent: Not in the past, but I think today it is becoming more equal. There used to be this a lot, right? Nowadays, I observe that we are [...] We are two women in my service, and we are the ones who receive the most. Out of eight employees, there are two of us, the rest are men and we receive more. So I think nowadays it’s becoming more equal.” - 29-year-old interviewee

“It’s very difficult to be a woman, very difficult, you know? Although these days it is much better than before.” - 27-year-old interviewee

At the same time, the perceptions of worsening related to the following issues:

“Ah, I think there are more and more cases of domestic violence. Unfortunately, it is very common in Brazil, there is a lot of violence against women. And there are a lot of femicides occurring, too. So it's very, it's ugly, it's dangerous, and it's scary, right? It's really scary.” - 43-year-old interviewee

“I agree because many times, the husband is trying to kill the wife, and that's what you see most in Brazil nowadays: femicide. And the rates have increased, right?” - 27-year-old interviewee

A second interesting pattern that emerges from this general conjoint analysis is that gender punishment policies have significantly more support than the general punishment. This is particularly evident when observing the support of policies proposing life sentences for people who commit homicide and people who commit femicide. These two policies are phrased exactly the same, with the only difference being the words “homicide” and “femicide.” The support for life sentences for people condemned of femicide is more than 3 times higher than the one for homicide. The first is 10.2 percent more supported than the reference level policy (increase of maternity leave duration), while the second is 3 percent more supported than the reference level.

This might indicate that women perceive more injustice in the punishments given for gender-based crimes than they do for general crimes. When participants of the survey were asked about how much they think the justice system would punish specific types of crimes, it was possible to observe overall big distrust in the capacity of the justice system to punish crimes, with an average of 1.8 in a 4-point scale when it came to the punishment of drug trafficking, robbery, and sexual violence. The score for punishment of domestic violence was even lower, with an average of 1.6. The disparity in the perceptions of injustices in the prosecution of gender-based crimes is, however, clearer when respondents are asked how much they think that

judges do not take claims of violence seriously. Each respondent answered this question about two types of violence, which could include domestic violence, sexual violence, sexual harassment, and robbery. It was possible to observe that, on average, respondents think that judges take claims of gender based-violence less seriously than they take claims of robbery, even when considering crimes that in theory should have harsher punishment (that is, when comparing, for example, sexual violence with simple robbery). The average score for this question, on a scale of 4, was 3.14 for domestic violence, 3.10 for sexual violence, 3.19 for sexual harassment, and 2.89 for robbery.

## **Conditional Conjoint Analysis**

Considering the composition of the sample, it is also important to do different conditional AMCE analyses, to understand how the voting behavior of different demographic groups and independent variables impact the manner that people vote.

### *Political Preferences*

The graphs below exhibit the voting behavior of respondents from different parts of the political spectrum. It is important to note that participants from the center and the right behaved very similarly in terms of voting behavior in the conjoint experiment, and therefore they are combined in this analysis to increase statistical power, considering that the combination of both of these groups is approximately equivalent to the number of people from the left.




Figure 5. Conditional AMCE analysis by political preferences

Therefore, it is possible to observe that women from the left are not generally supportive of punishment policies when it comes to voting preferences. Although their support is slightly higher for gender punishment policy preferences than for general punishment policies, all of these are less supported than both feminist policies listed.

In addition, across the different political preferences, there is stable high support for the policy of *Casa da Mulher Brasileira*. However, it is important to note that there seem to be few observations for the center and right in this category.

### Race

In this graph, the observations for Black and Pardo people were combined in one of the graphs due to their very similar voting behavior in this conjoint experiment. In addition, only the

three major racial groups are displayed. There are no substantial differences in the support for policies by race.




Figure 6. Conditional AMCE analysis by race

### ***Religion and Religiosity***

In the graph below, voting behavior across the two main religions in the sample and in the country is also visible. Again, there are no statistically significant differences in the policies supported by each of them.




Figure 7. Conditional AMCE analysis by religion

However, when we look at the different levels of religiosity, we can observe higher support for gender punishment policies and general punishment among people with high religiosity levels, which is consistent with findings from previous chapters.




Figure 8. Conditional AMCE analysis by religiosity level

### *Education*

In the graphs below, the voting behavior of the group of women with a high school level of education does not differ significantly from the voting behavior of those with a college degree or above. It is possible to see a reduction in the support for gender punishment policies among more educated women, but this is not a significant reduction. Lastly, it is also possible to note a diminished support for life sentences for homicide among the more educated group.




Figure 9. Conditional AMCE analysis by educational level

## *Income*

Observing the variation of voting behavior across income, it is possible to note that people with income below 2 minimum wages and between 2 and 5 minimum wages behave very similarly. The group of income with over 5 minimum wages, however, supports punitive policies a lot less, both when it comes to gender punishment policies and general punishment ones. This is consistent with the previous measures of punitive attitudes and support for gender punishment policies, which were shown to be inversely correlated to income in previous chapters.




Figure 10. Conditional AMCE analysis by income

### *Feminist Policy Preferences*

As shown in the previous chapter, most of the Feminist Policy Preference Scores are very high and stable. To compare how voting behavior varied across the Feminist Policy Score, it was impossible to use a 2.5 or lower threshold (on a 4-point scale) to define the category of low Feminist Policy Score because of the low number of observations below this threshold. The way to approach this comparison was, therefore, to divide the distribution of scores into three parts and compare the lower and upper end of the distribution, as pictured below. However, it is important to highlight that even the lower end of the distribution has a very high average score of 3.03.




Figure 11. Conditional AMCE analysis by Feminist Policy Score

It is possible to observe that the order of preference for policies does not vary significantly among these subgroups of the feminist policy score distribution. A policy that decreases in support with the increase of the feminist policy score is the life sentence for homicide. At the same time, it is possible to observe that the support for the two gender punishment policies, at the lower end of the distribution, is higher than the support for maternity leave, and this difference is statistically significant. In the case of the higher end of the distribution, the difference is no longer statistically significant.

## *Gender Punishment Policy Preferences*

The same approach from the Feminist Policy Score analysis was used for the Gender Punishment Policy Score. It was possible to observe that the middle part of the distribution and the higher end of it behaved very similarly in terms of voting behavior.




Figure 12. Conditional AMCE analysis by Gender Punishment Policy Score

Considering that the gender punishment policy score distribution has significantly more variation than the Feminist Policy Score distribution, it is possible to see this reflected in the voting behavior graphs above. In the group with the lower gender punishment policy scores, it is possible to observe that both feminist policies are significantly more supported in the conjoint experiment than both gender punishment policies. It is interesting to observe, however, that in

this group, gender punishment policies are still more supported than the general punishment. On the other hand, in the group with the highest gender punishment policy scores, although the most supported policy is still the *Casa da Mulher Brasileira*, the support for chemical castration and life sentence for femicide is comparable to the support for this feminist policy. It is also possible to observe that one of the general punishment policies, defending life sentences for perpetrators of homicide, is significantly more supported than the reference level policy, which aims to expand the time of maternity leave but still below the support for gender punishment policies.

## **Interaction between Feminist and Gender Punishment Policies to shape voting behavior**

### *High support for both feminist and gender punishment policies*

This section will analyze how different policy preferences interact to shape voting behavior. Throughout this portion of the chapter, I will frequently refer to high and low support for policies. Considering that most participants had a policy support score above 3 out of 4 in both policies, the definitions for high and low were based in the distribution scores. The distribution of these variables was divided into three parts and the lower end of the distribution were classified as “low support” and the middle and upper end of the distribution were classified as “higher support.”

First, the findings from last chapter showed that most women had both high support for feminist policies and for gendered punishment policies. When thinking about women in this group with high support for both policies and referring back to hypothesis 3 stated in the introduction of the current chapter, the predictions made are that these voters will, first, favor

gender policies over non-gender policies. This is because they show a clear concern for gender issues when demonstrating high support for these policies. Second, I predicted that women in this group will favor gender punishment policies over feminist policies, due to the previous elaborated reasons of the salience that gender violence seems to take among them. After these two priorities, it is likely that they also have greater support for general punishment, considering how widespread the support for these policies is in Brazil, which would lead to general punishment policies being favored compared to general justice policies.

As predicted, most of the women had high support for both feminist and gender punishment policies, corresponding to 556 women in the sample (46% of all respondents). The order of support for policies in the conjoint experiment for this group follows a very similar pattern to the general conjoint analysis earlier presented. It is possible to observe that the most supported policy is the expansion of *Casa da Mulher Brasileira*, followed by both gender punishment policies. Like predicted, the fourth most supported policy is the proposal of life sentence for homicides. However, it is possible to observe that the policies of proposal of expansion of maternity leave, stating the use of electronic ankles for violent robbery and prevention of illegal mining were the least supported ones, with no statistically significant difference between them.




Figure 13. Conditional AMCE analysis of participants with high support for both feminist and gender punishment policies

Therefore, the predictions earlier posed are partially supported, as there is generally a larger support for feminist policies, followed by gender punishment policies, general punishment and general justice. It is important to notice, however, that the content of individual policies appears to take a significant role in the definition of support.

### *High support for feminist policies and low support for gender punishment policies*

When observing the group of women with high support for feminist policies and low support for gender punishment policies, I predicted that these participants will favor, in this order, feminist policies, general justice policies, gender punishment policies and general punishment policies. This predicts that will favor the gendered punishment policies over the general punishment policies because they have a clear concern for gender issues (manifested through their support for feminist policies), while they have a low affinity with punishment policies, which leads to prioritizing both feminist and general justice policies first.

This group involved 211 women, which corresponds to 17.6% of the sample. As shown by the graph below, this hypothesis is partially supported, with feminist policies being significantly more supported than all others. General justice policies are the second group of policies most supported, but when it comes to gender and general punishment policies, there is not a clear group being more supported over the other, the content of each policy seems to matter more than the insertion of the gender lens to it.




Figure 14. Conditional AMCE analysis of participants with high support for feminist policies and low support for gender punishment policies

### *Low support for feminist policies and high support for gender punishment policies*

When it comes to the group of women that have low support for feminist policies and high support for gender punishment policies, my predictions were that the order of preference of the policies in the conjoint experiment would be gender punishment, general punishment, feminist and general justice policies. It is possible to think that these women take anti-feminist stances, while at the same time are concerned with criminality in the country and can recognize that their condition as a woman makes them more vulnerable to violence and particularly

gender-base crimes, which may explain the incorporation of this gender lens to some policies while at the same time rejecting feminist policies.

In the graph below, although it is possible to observe high support for both gender and general punishment, the second most supported policy is a feminist one. However, it is not possible to draw any meaningful conclusions from these observations, because the sample here being used is too small. Only 64 women (5% of the entire study population) fit the definition of low support for feminist policies and high support for gender punishment policies, leading to only 128 conjoint observations. This is consistent with the fact that the immense majority of women have high support for both of these policies.




Figure 15. Conditional AMCE analysis of participants with low support for feminist policies and high support for gender punishment policies

### *Low support for both feminist and gender punishment policies*

Lastly, in terms of the group of women with low support for both feminist and gender punishment policies, I initially predicted that women would favor the non-gendered policies, preferring the general punishment and general justice policies over the gender punishment policy and the feminist policy. 190 women were in this category, corresponding to 15.9% of the sample. The proposed hypothesis was not supported here, since it was possible to observe that the most

supported policy was the expansion of *Casa da Mulher Brasileira* but that the support for all other policies was not statistically different among themselves. Therefore, even among women with low support for policies that incorporate a gender lens, support for one of the feminist policies in the conjoint experiment is very high.




Figure 16. Conditional AMCE analysis of participants with low support for both feminist and gender punishment policies

Overall, the policy measures operate in manners previously hypothesized, with the demographics that impact punishment in the policy measures also impacting the results of the conjoint experiment, collaborating to the validity of the indexes and the experiment itself.

## Abortion experiment

As described in more detail in Chapter 4, this experiment consists of a survey experiment that measures the effect of including abortion in the platform of a feminist politician. In the control group, participants decide between Candidate A, who supports several feminist policies, and Candidate B, who supports several gender punishment policies. Both support the maintenance of the current abortion law in Brazil. In the treatment group, the same candidates are presented. However, Candidate A supports the legalization of abortion until three months of pregnancy, and Candidate B still wants to maintain the current abortion law.

The following table consists of a balance test of the important demographic variables across the control and treatment groups:

**Table 26. Abortion Experiment Balance Check (n= 1,194)**

	Control	Treatment
<b>Age</b>		
18-30	51.17%	48.83%
31-40	48.25%	51.75%
41-50	47.73%	52.27%
51-60	53.57%	46.43%
60+	50.00%	50.00%
<b>Race</b>		
White	52.09%	47.91%
<i>Pardo</i>	47.97%	52.03%
Black	49.35%	50.65%
Other/Prefer not to inform	42.86%	57.14%
<b>Income</b>		
Less than 2 monthly minimum wages	50.47%	49.53%
Between 2 and 5 monthly minimum wages	49.39%	50.61%

Between 5 and 10 monthly minimum wages	49.23%	50.77%
More than 10 monthly minimum wages	50.57%	49.43%
<b>Religion</b>		
Catholic	47.09%	52.91%
Evangelical	50.91%	49.09%
Atheist/Agnostic	52.34%	47.66%
Afro-Brazilian Religions	45.35%	54.65%
Other	52.76%	47.24%
<b>Education</b>		
Some or complete middle school	40.74%	59.26%
Some or complete high school	51.76%	48.24%
Some or complete college	49.45%	50.55%
Master's or PhD	44.19%	55.81%
<b>Number of children</b>		
0	48.59%	51.41%
1 - 2	50.80%	49.20%
3+	50.24%	49.76%
<b>Political Preference</b>		
Left	51.08%	48.92%
Center	47.66%	52.34%
Right	49.86%	50.14%
<b>Religiosity Level</b>		
Low	48.38%	51.62%
Moderate	50.34%	49.66%
High	51.76%	48.24%

The results of the general analysis of the survey experiment presented in the table below point to a significant impact of the treatment, with a reduction in the support for the feminist candidates in the control group. Among the control group, there is a 68.8% probability that respondents vote for the feminist candidate, while this probability falls to 58% in the treatment group.




Figure 17. Log-Odds of voting for the feminist candidate, per treatment assignment

Considering that abortion tends to raise particular resistance among religious groups, it was also important to observe the effect of the treatment among different religious groups:




Figure 18. Log-Odds of voting for the feminist candidate, per religion and treatment assignment

When interacting the treatment with different religions, it is possible to observe that the treatment does not have a significant impact in any of the religions separately, except among Catholics. When in control, Catholics have a 69.7% probability of voting for the feminist candidate, which drops to 53.8% when in the treatment group. Evangelicals, on the other hand, are significantly less likely to support the feminist candidate even when in control, that is, even when the idea of abortion is not introduced. In control, they have a 54.1% probability of supporting the feminist candidate, against 41.9% in treatment. This is a surprising finding considering that in the other variables considered in this study and in the conjoint experiment, Catholics and Evangelicals do not present a significant difference in almost any of the analyses. Considering that there are no statistically significant differences among the other religions, the graph above analyzes the impact of the treatment in Evangelicals and Non-Evangelicals. When

observing these groups, the logistic regressions indicate that Non-Evangelicals in control have a 74.8% probability of voting for the feminist candidate, which drops to 64.2% in treatment.

When it comes to the interaction between the treatment with level of religiosity, as presented in the graph below, the main effect of the treatment is between the participants with high religiosity levels:




Figure 19. Log-Odds of voting for the feminist candidate, per religiosity level and treatment assignment

Setting as a reference level the group with low religiosity, it is possible to observe that the treatment has no statistically significant effect in any of the categories besides the one with high religiosity, in which the treatment leads to a decrease in 19.2% of the probability of respondents

voting for the feminist candidate. Among people with high religiosity in the control group, there is 63.4% of probability of voting for the feminist candidate, while this probability is of 44.2% in the treatment group. It is also important to note that there was already a 9% lower probability of women with high religiosity in the control group to support the feminist candidate when compared to the women with low religiosity in the control group

Lastly, an important interaction with this treatment is the one with political preferences, particularly considering that the proposals of legalization of abortion mostly come from the left. As it is possible to observe in the graph below, the main effect of the treatment happens in the group of people in the political center:




Figure 20. Log-Odds of voting for the feminist candidate, per political preference and treatment assignment

The group of people from the center in the control group had a 70.4% probability of supporting the feminist politician - compared to 83% in the left and 44% in the right. When in the treatment group, the support of women from the center drops significantly, to a 48.5% probability. In the left this decrease is to 78.9% and in the right to 32.7%. Therefore, it is interesting to observe that the support among women from the left for the feminist candidate is high with or without the mention of legalization of abortion, and it is consistently low among women from the right. In the center, however, the support is very high when the candidate does not mention abortion and drops to low levels when this policy is added.

## Conclusion

There is a great amount of consensus among women when it comes to gender policy. Women from all races, political backgrounds and religions are very supportive of feminist policies and most of them also really approve of gender punishment policies. The findings also showed that there is almost no difference in the support for these policies across important demographics, such as race and religion. This points to a relative consensus among women on the support for specific feminist policies, namely the expansion of *Casa da Mulher Brasileira* here. In addition, it is possible to observe the variation of priority policies among women with low and high support for gender punishment policies, with the first tending to prioritize feminist policies and the second tending to prioritize gender punishment policies. This is again an indication that these two policies represent different demands to the population, although there is significant overlap in the groups that support each.

In addition, it is relevant to point that religiosity level and political preferences appear to have an impact in voting behavior in the conjoint experiment. In regard to the first, people with

higher religiosity levels prioritize gender punishment policies more than people with lower religiosity levels. When it comes to political preferences, although women from the left, right and center vote more often for the feminist policy of *Casa da Mulher Brasileira*, women from the center and right support gender punishment policies significantly more than women from the left. They have these gender punishment policies as the second most voted in the conjoint experiment, being more supported than the other feminist policy - expansion of maternity leave time - while women from the left prioritize feminist policy and general justice policies before gender punishment ones. It is therefore possible to observe a division based on political preference lines, particularly in terms of support for gender punishment policies, although when looking at these policies in isolation, as shows in the previous chapters, they garner significant support from the left as well.

Another relevant finding from this chapter is that abortion is a very divisive subject, highly rejected by many groups in Brazil. Although women present high support for feminist candidates when they mention that they do not want to change abortion law, this support overall falls significantly among the treatment group, which incorporates the legalization of abortion into the policy platform of the feminist candidate. The negative effect of the incorporation of this policy is particularly high among Catholic women and women from the political center. Evangelical and rightist women are significantly less likely to support the presented feminist candidate even in the control group, so the effect of the treatment is not significant among them. This is an interesting finding considering that there is high support from both Evangelical and rightist women to feminist policies, as observed in the previous chapter. Therefore, these policy preferences are not necessarily translating into voting behavior. It is particularly relevant here to

observe that the women from the center align with women from the left, voting more conservatively in terms of gender, once the issue of legalization of abortion is introduced.

When it comes to translating this analyzed voting behavior to real life candidate options, it is possible to observe that gender punishment policies tend to be more defended by rightist parties, who do not support most of the feminist policies that lead to this consensus among women. At the same time, leftist parties, which do defend most of these feminist policies, tend to bundle them together with the defense of legalization of abortion, which is highly opposed by the majority of the population. Therefore, these partisan lines divide gender policies in a way that to break the consensus formed by women in most of feminist policies. This idea will be further elaborated in the next chapter, which will discuss the combination of all these findings, their implications to Brazilian politics and conclude the thesis.

## **Chapter 8 | Discussion**

This thesis has provided a detailed panorama of what gender attitudes and policy preferences among women in Brazil look like, as well as how they reflect in their voting behavior. Particularly, it has shown that Brazilian women have high awareness of the discrimination that they suffer just for being women. This awareness is particularly high when it comes to gender-based violence. Considering this awareness and the high levels of violence and discrimination in Brazil, these women present a high demand for gender policies in general. However, it is possible to observe that the content of the policies demanded vary, particularly between general feminist policies and gender punishment policies. The support for both of these is widespread, so there is a significant overlap of the groups that support these policies. Although the most supported policy (*Casa da Mulher Brasileira*) is shared across women from these different political preferences, it is possible to observe that, when it comes to voting behavior, women are divided across political preferences, with women from the left favoring feminist policies and women from the right and center favoring gender punishment policies. In addition, there is high rejection of policies of legalization of abortion, particularly among women from the center and right.

This is particularly relevant when translating the conjoint experiment findings to real politics, in which parties bundle together different policies. This is seen by the fact that leftist parties, for example, usually defend several of the feminist policies mentioned in previous chapters, but they tend to be bundled together with the defense for abortion, which is highly rejected by women from the center and right, who would otherwise be very aligned with this strong support for feminist policies. At the same time, parties on the right historically have not defended most of the feminist policies mentioned, but have started to incorporate gender

punishment policies into the platform, as a way of attracting female voters who care about a gender lens. This chapter will further elaborate on some of the important findings of the thesis, as well as discuss in more detail how this voting behavior and use of gender in political platforms has been reflected in Brazilian politics. Lastly, it will discuss some of the limitations of the study and some avenues for further research.

When translating the gender policy preferences that Brazilian women have to their voting behavior, an important finding of this study was that being pro-women - that is, having progressive gender attitudes - does not necessarily mean to be pro-progressive policies. Although this is a frequent association considering that progressive parties have been the main ones defending feminist policies, people who care about women's issues will not necessarily vote for these. This study in particular highlights the possibility that women who strongly support feminist policies may still vote for policies and parties not aligned with these progressive gender attitudes due to the appeal of penal populism. That is, parties and candidates that are not progressive nor defend traditional feminist policies begin to understand the importance that gender issues have for this part of the electorate and proposed policies such as gender punishment policies, which have a clear relationship to penal populism, in the sense that these politicians use the fear and sense of injustice that these women have in terms of gender-based crimes to gain their votes with policies that have no proven effect, such as chemical castration. This appeal to the topic that is so personal and important to them therefore leads women with progressive gender attitudes to sometimes vote for conservative policies that incorporate gender instead of feminist policies.

Lastly, one of the main findings of this study is that the incorporation of gender into different types of policies has a very important effect, among women from all political

preferences. That is, even among women from the right with conservative views, who do not tend to support feminist politicians in Brazil, the incorporation of a gender lens into a policy makes them more willing to support it. This was observed, for instance, in the conjoint experiment, in which the policy proposing life sentence for femicide had more than double the support of the policy proposing life sentence for homicide. This is particularly important when considering that, through the qualitative data, it was possible to observe that female voters think that female candidates are more likely to represent their gender demands, therefore it is possible to infer that they will look for women representation for these issues, which may result in the use of strategic descriptive representation by some parties, which will be further developed in this chapter.

## **Translating to Brazilian politics**

As previously mentioned, in real-life politics, policies are not defended in isolation, candidates create bundles of policies that they defend. In the context of this bundling of policies in Brazil, it is rare to observe candidates that defend the feminist candidates in which there is consensus but, for example, do not include legalization of abortion in their platform. The last is, as shown in the previous chapter, a very controversial and rejected topic in Brazil. Therefore, the women who strongly oppose the legalization of abortion but still care about gender look for candidates that can fulfill this demand. In Brazil, this right now takes the format of conservative women who, for example, highlight gender punishment policies.

In terms of this demand for gender policy and female representation in Congress, it is possible to observe that, in 2018 - the year in which Bolsonaro was elected, and Brazil faced its

most divisive election on the basis of gender - there was a 52% increase in the number of elected women in Congress (Coelho, 2022). In 2022, this number also increased by 18% (Coelho, 2022). Many of these women are part of leftist parties and defend progressive feminist policies, a pattern observed globally (Kittilson, 2016). In the context of Brazil, the parties that elected the largest number of women were the largest leftist coalition parties, namely the Worker's Party (PT) and the Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB) (Coelho, 2022).. However, in the 2018 and 2022 elections, there was also a significant increase in the number of conservative women, culminating in the fact that around 19% of the women elected to Congress in 2022 represent the Partido Liberal (PL), Bolsonaro's former party, which makes this party the second largest in number of elected women (Coelho, 2022). This increase in conservative women from parties that are historically anti-feminist and very vocal about their opposition to, for example, abortion, responds to this demand for the incorporation of a gender lens to policies without bundling them with other policies usually included in progressive politicians' platforms.

Therefore, there appears to be an understanding from parties that gender matters. They are no longer competing on who is offering gender policies -which had been historically leftist parties (Kittilson, 2016) -, but on what type of gender policies are being offered. This is clear, for example, observing the recent changes happening in PL, Bolsonaro's party. As mentioned in previous chapters, this party and Bolsonaro have been strong supporters of *mano dura* policies and openly anti-feminist and anti-LGBTQ rights. However, his misogynistic rhetoric costed Bolsonaro a lot of votes in the 2018 elections, particularly from women. Polls before the 2022 elections also pointed to a significant gender divide, with Lula having 49% of intention of votes from women, against 23% for Bolsonaro (Tavares, 2022). As the 2022 elections approached, it was possible to observe a movement - probably very strategic - from Bolsonaro's party to attract

this female electorate. Inside PL, this took the form of bringing a lot of attention to *PL Mulher*, the group of women inside the party. Michelle Bolsonaro, the wife of Jair Bolsonaro, became president of this group inside the party and gained a lot of notoriety in it (Sabóia, 2023). Although the policies proposed and the rhetoric by *PL Mulher* have a strong focus on gender based violence and traditional family values, there is also a clear appeal to progressive ideas of increasing the number of women in politics, speaking to the electorate that cares about gender but rejects part of the policies proposed by the left. This can be observed, for instance, in their mission statement:

“That is why the PL, over the years, has been calling on men, women and young people to realize the dream of a Brazil with political structures focused on serving the country and forming a just and Christian society. And in this context, women are more than important, they are essential. The way of being, the human outlook, the defense of the family, the work potential and the ability to reinvent oneself contribute decisively to the development process that we need to accelerate. That’s why the PL has been making efforts to have more women in politics.” (PL Mulher, 2024)

This has led to a significant increase in the number of women registered in the party, as well as a significant portion of elected female candidates, as previously mentioned. In their own website and social media, PL takes pride in saying that the number of women registered in the party increased by 370% (PL Mulher, 2024). Although the party incorporates gender into its discourse, there is also a clear attempt in separating themselves from the feminist movement, claiming a “feminine, not feminist, politics”. In an event of *PL Mulher*, Michelle Bolsonaro, said “We don't need to scream, we don't need to burn our bras, we don't need to belittle men's figures (UOL, 2024)” and added that women are “collaborators and helpers (UOL, 2024)” and that God has added the feminine figure next to their husbands so that they can help them (UOL, 2024). In addition, there is strong reinforcement of their opposition to abortion. Michelle Bolsonaro, while

representing PL Mulher, also stated that "We women have the greatest gift that God gave us, the gift of generating [life]. And along with it, the Lord added: Faith, resilience, visceral love, intuition, you see, husbands? And women have a special look at politics (UOL, 2024)," reinforcing the importance of pregnancy and generating life to the value of women and to their role in politics.

The attempt to incorporate a gender lens into politics did not just come from the women in the party, but also from Bolsonaro himself. Known internationally for his sexist views, Bolsonaro made an effort to show his concern about women, and particularly women's safety, during his last campaign. However, this contradictory attempt to show defense for women's rights while opposing feminist policies and behaving misogynistically is not novel for Bolsonaro. In 2013, he proposed a famous bill in Congress, which would establish chemical castration and increase of punishment for rapists (Bolsonaro, 2013). In 2014, however, inside Congress, Bolsonaro told a fellow congresswoman "you are not worthy of being raped because you are too ugly," later being convicted of inciting rape. His defense involved saying that he has always defended harsher punishment for these crimes and that the person who is defending the criminal, the fellow congresswoman in his view, is the one who becomes the victim now (Mendes, 2023). It is, therefore, clear that even around a decade ago, Bolsonaro heavily relied on his defense of harsher punishment as a form of incorporating women's issue into his platform.

Throughout Bolsonaro's careers, he has also defended that women should be paid less because they get pregnant (Chagas, 2022), an idea that is opposed by most women of all political ideologies, as shown in previous chapters, among several other sexist ideas. During his presidency he also implemented some of these anti-feminist policies, for instance, he vetoed a policy proposing menstrual products for free for low-income women, which had been approved

by Congress and also has widespread support, as presented in previous chapters (Chagas, 2022). Although Bolsonaro has always been very open about these views and only had 2 female ministers, out of 22, during his government, he claimed the following about women's policies in his term:

"We have already sanctioned laws and other measures, more than 70, in defense of women. Nobody did that. I just sanctioned a law on tubal ligation: it [the minimum age] was 25 years old, now it's 21. And a married woman doesn't have to ask for her husband's permission, and [the procedure] can be done immediately. It is a tremendous advance. A woman who has two children and doesn't want more should have a tubal ligation (Bolsonaro, 2022)."

The statement that his government has approved more than seventy policies for women was repeated by Bolsonaro throughout his 2022 campaign several times. However, only one of these policies had actually been proposed by the government and several of them were not even indirectly related to women's rights (Hollanda and Brant, 2022). Therefore, it is possible to observe an attempt to gain support from this female electorate, knowing the importance that gender policies have for them, without actually implementing those.

This is also clear when observing the use of strategic descriptive representation, which consists basically in the use of female candidates by parties to attract female voters, exploring the idea of descriptive representation, but often proposing policies that often go against women's equality advancement (Weeks et al., 2022). There is a perception, defended by the Theory of the politics of presence - further explained in Chapter 2 - and supported by the interviews, that women, just for being women, are already more capable of defending women's interests (Phillips, 1995). What happens, however, is that some of these women openly declare themselves anti-feminist and do not promote any of the policies of gender equality that the women supported in the survey. That is, they bring a gender lens and therefore attract women who would otherwise

be more aligned with feminist politicians but end up rejecting them because of, for example, their support for abortion or because of the party that they are a part of.

An important example of this is the Liberal Party (PL) congresswoman Carla Zambelli. She was the most voted congresswoman of Brazil, representing São Paulo, with 946,244 votes (G1, 2022). She openly views herself as anti-feminist, saying, for instance: “I, for example, do not identify at all with the points they [feminists] say they defend: abortion and a series of devices that place women in a situation in which they appear to be people with less ability and fewer resources, less possibility than the man (Haje, 2018).” However, her platform and proposed policies in Congress include a gender lens, particularly defending gender punishment policies. One of these entails increasing penalties for pedophiles (Meira et al., 2023). At the same time, Carla Zambelli has proposed an anti-feminist policy that adds steps to access legal abortion after a rape, making it harder for victims of sexual violence to access this service (Zambelli and Fabiana, 2021). Therefore, although she shows concern about women and children through proposing harsher punishment, other of her policies harm victims of sexual violence in the name of taking an anti-abortion stance. A similar dynamic is seen in the platform of Bia Kicis, also an important figure in the PL, and the most voted among all congresswomen and congressmen of the Distrito Federal (G1, 2022). Among policies promoting homeschooling, the use of biological sex to define participation in sports and the crime of apology to communism, this deputy also proposes harsher punishment for sexual violence and chemical castration, mentioning the use of this policy in other countries to defend its efficiency in reducing sexual violence. Therefore, it is possible to observe that a lot of the gender lens proposed by these far-right politicians in Brazil is related to gender punishment policies (Bia Kicis, 2022).

As previously mentioned, although there are partisan divides in terms of what gender policies are prioritized, there is widespread support and demand for most of the policies, particularly excluding abortion and some gender punishment policies among more leftist women. Therefore, it would be possible to imagine that some political sectors and candidates try to use this consensus in their favor, defending feminist policies without including the ones that are divisive, such as a party focused particularly in women's demands. Although Brazil does have the Brazilian Women's Party, it does not succeed at finding and defending the existent consensus on gender policies. It is possible to point, however, to some ascending politicians who are defending these noncontroversial policies in the center.

The Brazilian Women's Party was created in an attempt to frame gender as central in politics, but the party does not declare itself as a feminist party (Klein, 2015). In addition, as of 2015, out of 20 federal deputies in 2015, only 2 were women (Klein, 2015). Nowadays, the party does not have any representatives in Congress (G1, 2022). There is also a gender disparity in terms of the electorate registered in the party, with 60% of them being men and only 40% of women (Klein, 2015). When it comes to the policies defended by the party, it is possible to see that it gives importance to several feminist policies, such as fighting against the gender pay gap, promoting more women in politics and combating domestic violence (Klein, 2015). They are, however, against abortion legalization and defend harsher punishment policies as a form of reducing gender-based violence, one of them including the reduction of the penal majority (Klein, 2015). In addition, representatives from the party themselves often transmit sexist views. The founder of the party herself, when questioned whether she had been a victim of domestic violence, used victim blaming rhetoric, stating: "Me? No. I've always been very independent. I don't accept it. When a woman is determined, a man doesn't act cute. I'm not submissive. I'm an

exception. And luckily I have someone who respects the female sex (Klein, 2015)." Therefore, it is possible to notice that, although the party defends some feminist policies, it does not seem to have gained attention from the female electorate and still reproduces some traditional gender roles in politics.

When it comes to centrist politicians who try to defend some of the gender policies in which there is consensus, it is possible to observe some important figures in politics, which were mentioned by several women in the interviews I conducted, and appear to look for the middle ground, defending highly supported policies and staying away from the controversial topics of abortion and punishment, for example.

An example is Simone Tebet, who ran for presidency in 2022, has been a senator and is currently a minister in Lula's government (Ministério do Planejamento e Orçamento, 2024). In her government plan, she defended several feminist policies, such as having gender parity in the ministries, incentivizing policies of equal pay and strengthening the care for pregnant women, in order to reduce children's mortality and guarantee that women have the right to family planning (Campanha Tebet, 2022). When it comes to violence, she proposed expanding the patrols *Maria da Penha* for identification and combat of domestic violence (Campanha Tebet, 2022). In addition, she defends "Combatting femicide, domestic violence and the crimes against children, with campaigns, awareness, safer reporting channels and punishment (Campanha Tebet, 2022, p. 43)." In addition, although Simone considers herself a feminist and says that not only leftist women are feminist, she is also against the legalization of abortion (Fontes, 2022). Therefore, she is a politician from a centrist party who proposes several policies that can leverage almost consensus among women, staying away from contradictory gender policies, such as abortion. Another ascending politician with a very similar behavior in terms of gender policy, who was

also extensively mentioned throughout the interviews, is Tabata Amaral, who was the second most voted woman in Brazil, currently congresswoman for the state of São Paulo (G1, 2022).

It is important to highlight, that, although these type of politicians can represent a way of building a bigger coalition of women in Brazilian politics, they are also often framed as a “less radical” alternative to feminist, which therefore frames that some of the demands of feminism are too extreme when they are often a few basic demands for gender equality. As a result, these politicians may move support away from other feminist politicians who are pushing for demands essential to achieving gender equality but who are framed as too extreme, which overall might have a negative effect on advancing a few feminist demands. It is relevant, however, to point out that it is extremely important to see women from the center taking feminist stances and not just aligning themselves with the anti-feminist discourse of a significant part of the right, which focuses on the promotion of gender punishment policies. This is particularly relevant considering that the previous chapters showed this ideological approximation between the right and the center.

Lastly, in regard to gender policy in Brazilian politics, a constant trend has been the increase of feminist politicians from the left in Congress. As previously mentioned, there was a rise of 52% of the number of female politicians in Congress in 2018 and 18% increase in the number of women in Congress in 2022, with the main group being of women from PT and PCdoB, both leftist parties (Coelho, 2022). Out of the women elected in 2022, 2 were trans women, showing the advancement of progressive segments in electing feminist and LGBTQ politicians (Coelho, 2022). It is also relevant to mention that, out of the 10 most voted congresswomen of Brazil in 2022, 2 were from the Socialism and Liberty Party (PSOL), the representatives Erika Hilton and Sâmia Bomfim, with the first of them being a trans woman (G1,

2022). PSOL is a leftist party in Brazil, which is openly feminist and has a significant participation of marginalized groups (PSOL, 2024). Both of the politicians mentioned here defend several of the policies covered in this survey, including, for example, paternity license and abortion (Sâmia Bomfim, 2024). This also points to a significant increase in the demand for these feminist policies among the population.

Therefore, the gender policy panorama of Brazilian politics indicates an increasing demand for both descriptive representation, with an increase in the number of women elected, and in substantive representation, with even anti-feminist parties recognizing the importance of gender issues to Brazilian voters and incorporating them into their platforms. Particularly, it is also possible to observe (1) numerous feminist politicians, who defend progressive gender policies and come from the left, (2) a new group of female politicians from the right that incorporate a gender lens to their conservative policies, particularly in the format of harsher punishment for gender-based crimes, while opposing several feminist policies, and (3) a group of politicians from the center that try to address the consensual feminist policies, while opposing policies that have contradictory opinions among the female electorate, such as abortion.

## **General contributions**

Besides the specific contributions that this thesis makes for the understanding of how punitive preferences impact gender policy preferences and how these impact voting behavior in Brazil - outlined in the initial section of this chapter -, this study also contributes to the general fields of substantive representation and group identity. In regard to the first one, this study contributes to the construction of the conceptualization of substantive representation from the bottom-up, that is, it constructs a visualization of what are the important issues for female voters

and what types of policies are their priorities, as a way of informing what substantive representation looks like when it comes to gender in Brazil. A significant part of the literature deals with top-down conceptualizations, which analyze what policies female politicians are implementing when defining what constitutes substantive representation of women (Wängnerud, 2009). These top-down conceptualizations are highly criticized, since they exclude the voices of the groups of women that do not have sufficient political power to elect representatives. Through the in-depth interviews here conducted, it was possible to understand what issues were priorities to women and what policies they valued the most, both drawing from pre-existing policies but also observing the ones that they suggested throughout the conversation. With this, it was possible to measure the prioritization and importance of each of those quantitatively through the survey.

Secondly, this study showed that facing violence and sexism is an important part of what women perceive as factors that connect them as an identity group. Due to this, their perceptions of lack of punishment, the personal victimization that many have faced, and perception of worsening of violence constitute the three main important reasons that mediate women's views of punishment and how this impacts gender policy preferences. The comprehension of these three factors emerged from the interviews, frequently in an unprompted manner, and became extremely important in understanding how violence shapes different policy demands inside a marginalized group. Therefore, this finding, as well the method and measures used here can possibly be applied to the analysis of policy preferences of other marginalized groups, of whom an important part of their identity comes from shared oppression, for instance the Black population and LGBTQ+ people.

## Main limitations and future research

This study observes the relationship between gender policy preferences and voting behavior in isolation of all other types of policies, except general punishment and environmental policies. Therefore, it does not allow us to make conclusions of the relative importance of gender policy in general voting behavior, outside the controlled setting of the conjoint experiment, when accounting for policies such as health and education, which take high priority in the voting choices of the general electorate. Considering that it is expected that candidates that defend feminist policies will overall have more progressive stances on other important issues, it is important to understand if women with aligned feminist policy preferences are aligned in these other stances too and, if not, which policy takes priority when deciding who to vote for. Therefore, future research should incorporate other types of policies into the analysis, in order to understand which non-gender policies may be dealbreakers that push voters with feminist preferences away from feminist candidates.

A second limitation of this study comes from the fact that a significant part of the sample involves women from the Southeast region, which makes these findings mostly applicable to this region of Brazil. It is important to note, however, that this region contains 40% of the population of the country (Catto, 2023), providing a very important picture of an influential part of its electorate.

Third, the gender policies mentioned here focus solely on women's policies, but a lot of what concerns gender policy in real politics has to do with LGBTQ+ policies as well. Therefore, it would be important to understand attitudes towards the LGBTQ+ population and support for policies for this group when understanding gender policy preferences in general in future research.

Lastly, the voting experiments presented in this study did not display parties of the candidates, and it would be important to understand how much partisanship moderates the translation of gender policy preferences into voting behavior. It would be important for future research to explore this issue, with a particular focus on *antipetismo* (anti-Workers' Party sentiment), considering that a relevant amount of current feminist politicians comes from this party. In addition, a significant portion of the women interviewed in this study who had progressive gender attitudes and still voted for Bolsonaro pointed out that they voted for him because they did not like the Workers' Party, due to their corruption scandals.

## Conclusion

Coming into this study, I created an interview questionnaire that included questions about different types of gender policies, including feminist and gender punishment policies. When researching what policies to include, I searched for the policies being proposed by actual Brazilian politicians, which included the proposal of chemical castration by Bolsonaro. I had heard about this proposal in the past, but it always sounded so extremist that I only expected Bolsonaro's supporters to agree with it. The interviews showed, however, a very different scenario, with 31 out of the 39 interviewees being in favor of it, and great support in the survey too. Women in Brazil are constantly scared, and a significant portion of them have experienced gender-based violence personally. They also feel that the institutions and the government do not care about these forms of violence: they mentioned times in which they called the police for cases of domestic violence and the police did not come, as well as judges laughing at their claims of sexual violence. This constant violence and sense of injustice is reflected in their preferences, with women resorting to supporting harsh punishment policies as a hope of reducing this

violence, or at least providing justice for it. At the same time, several parties and politicians appear to explore this fear proposing punitive populist measures, while ignoring all structural causes for this violence and the well-being of women victims of violence. My hope is that this work can shed some light on the experiences of these women and how this translates into their preferences, in order to inform policymakers about their needs and struggles, with the purpose of creating policies that actually promote security and violence to these women, instead of resorting to simplistic solutions that will not in fact advance gender equality.

# Appendix 1 | Interview Protocol

## Interview Guide

*\*It is important to notice that these questions will work as a guide for the conversation, but this research took a semi-structured approach to interviewing, and some of the topics covered will be adapted as each interview evolves.*

### 1. Personal Background

- a. Tell me about you
- b. How old are you?

### 2. Socioeconomic background

- a. Are you from São Paulo?
  - i. Is your family also from here?
  - ii. What neighborhood are you from?
- b. What is your marital status?
- c. Tell me about your job
  - i. Are you a formal worker?
  - ii. What is your approximate monthly income?
  - iii. Who is the main source of income in your family?
    - 1. Who makes the decisions in your household? (About finance, children, health)
- d. Have you attended school?
- e. Do you have children?
  - i. [If applicable] How many?
  - ii. [If applicable] How old are they?
- f. What is your race?
- g. What is your religion?
  - i. Ask when they converted to it
  - ii. How frequently do you go to church?
  - iii. How important is it religion in your life?

### 3. Gender identification

- a. Do think being a woman affects your daily experiences?
- b. Do you think you share similar experiences with women in general?
- c. Do you feel that what happens to women generally in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?
- d. Do you think that women in general can benefit from collaborating with one another?
- e. Do you feel solidarity with other women in your country?

- f. Have you ever experienced sexism?
- g. Tell me all about the most current ways you/your female friends and relatives experience sexism in your life
- h. Who are some women who inspire you?

#### **4. Perceptions about women's issues**

- a. Political Issues
  - i. Do you think women are underrepresented in politics?
    - 1. If yes, why do you think that is the case?
  - ii. Do you think it is harder for a woman to be in politics than it is for a man?
    - 1. If yes, why do you think that is the case?
  - iii. Do you think this impacts you or anyone you know?
- b. Economic issues
  - i. Do you think women and men should be paid the same when performing the same job?
    - 1. Do you think that happens in Brazil?
    - 2. Do you think women should be paid less than men because they often need to take a maternity leave?
  - ii. Do you think it is harder for women to get and to keep jobs than it is for men?
    - 1. If yes, why do you think that is the case?
  - iii. Do you think this impacts you or anyone you know?
- c. Violence
  - i. Do you agree with the following statements?
    - 1. Women should not be surprised if they are harassed at a party when they are using promiscuous clothes
    - 2. If a woman doesn't physically fight back, it's not rape
  - ii. Do you think there are instances in which it is ok for a husband to beat a wife or vice versa?
  - iii. Do you agree that "em briga de marido e mulher não se mete a colher"?
  - iv. How prevalent do you think domestic and sexual violence are in society?
- d. Reproductive Issues
  - i. Tell me your opinions about the current abortion law in Brazil
  - ii. Tell me about your experience with accessing contraception
    - 1. [If applicable] Have you ever gotten contraception in the public health system?

- iii. Tell me about your experience with accessing menstrual hygiene products
    - 1. [If applicable] Has it ever constituted a significant expense for your household?
  - iv. How important do you think it is for the government to address
- e. Family Values
- i. What do you think is the role of women in the family and society?
    - 1. Do you agree that women are responsible for the family and children and men should be the main providers?

## 5. Policy Preferences

- a. Tell me what policies you would implement to improve women's lives
- b. I will tell you some policies that are being proposed in different parts of Brazil and in the world and I want to hear your opinions about it and understand if you would favor or oppose it, or if you do not have any established opinions on this issue
  - i. Political issues
    - 1. Tell me what you think about instituting a gender quota of 50% in the Congress to guarantee gender parity
      - a. Tell me what you think about the current gender quota that institutes that parties need to have a minimum of 30% of female candidates
      - b. [If does not agree] Tell me what you think about revoking the current 30% gender quota in candidacies, because women should be in politics because of their own potential
  - ii. Economic issues
    - 1. Tell me what you think about an expansion of the time of maternity leave in Brazil
      - a. Tell me what you think about the government also covering a maternity leave for women who are informal workers
    - 2. Tell me what you think about an expansion of the time of paternity leave in Brazil
    - 3. Tell me what you think about governmental programs to facilitate the entrance of women who just became mothers into the labor market
    - 4. Tell me what you think about giving fiscal incentives for companies to hire more women
  - iii. Violence

1. Tell me what you think about the current policies to combat sexual violence
  - a. Do you think they are sufficient?
  - b. [If applicable] What would you change about them?
2. Tell me what you think about the current policies to combat domestic violence
  - a. Do you think they are sufficient?
  - b. [If applicable] What would you change about them?
3. Tell me what you think about the expansion of the number of public shelters for victims of domestic violence
4. Tell me what you think about the flexibilization of gun control in order for women to be able to defend themselves
5. Tell me what you think about instituting that clubs and bars should have a procedure to protect women from sexual violence and to report violators immediately
6. Tell me what you think about the chemical castration of convicted rapists
7. Tell me what you think about the promotion of a training to public transportation employees about harassment in public transportation
8. Tell me what you think of the law that allows women to request buses to stop outside the established bus stops at 10 pm

iv. Reproductive issues

1. Tell me what you think about offering free menstrual products for low-income girls in public schools
2. Tell me what you think about sexual education in schools covering how to prevent pregnancy, STIs and explaining consent
3. Tell me what you think about teaching abstinence in schools
4. Tell me what you think about the current Brazilian abortion law
  - a. Do you think it should be expanded? Do you think it should be more restricted? Or do you think that it is appropriate the way it currently is
  - b. What do you think about the fact that hospitals can deny abortions even to the women who are covered by the law?
5. Tell me what you think of the law of the rights of solo mothers, that gives them priority access to public kindergartens, hiring quotas in large companies, larger maternity leave and transportation subsidies
6. Do you see the creation of more kindergarten public schools as a women's issue?

- v. Out of the policies mentioned, or any that were not mentioned, which do you think are the most important to you?

## 6. Voting

- a. Tell me about your political views
  - i. Do you identify with any parties?
- b. How politically active are you?
  - i. [If applicable] Have you ever participated in marches? Volunteered in campaigns? Part of any collective?
- c. Who did you vote for in the 2018 and 2022 presidential elections?
- d. Tell me about your process of choosing who you vote for
  - i. Tell me about the issues that matter to you the most when you vote and how you check if the candidates are aligned with your opinions about it or not
  - ii. Do you consider that any of the gender policies we talked about before are central topics to you when you vote? Do you take them into consideration at all?
    - 1. If yes, what are the most important issues and policies to you?
- e. Have you ever voted for a woman? (In any level, not necessarily in the presidential elections)
  - i. If yes, did the fact that she was a woman played any role in your decision?
  - ii. If no, why do you think that is the case?
  - iii. Does she defend any specific gender policies?
  - iv. Are her views on the gender issues we talked about before aligned with yours?
- f. Tell me who are some women you admire in politics
- g. Do you consider yourself a feminist?

## Appendix 2 | Survey Questionnaire

### Demographics

1. Age
2. Race (For form in Portuguese, I will use the IBGE definitions, adding “preto” and “pardo” instead of simply “Black”)
  - a. Black
  - b. White
  - c. Asian
  - d. Indigenous
  - e. Other
3. Income
  - a. Less or equal to one minimum salary (less or equal to R\$ 1.212)
  - b. Between 1 and 2 minimum salaries (R\$1.212 - R\$2.424)
  - c. Between 2 and 3 minimum salaries (R\$ 1.212 - R\$ 3.636)
  - d. Between 3 and 5 minimum salaries (R\$ 3.636 - R\$ 6.060)
  - e. Between 5 and 10 minimum salaries (R\$ 6.060 - R\$ 12.120)
  - f. Between 10 and 20 minimum salaries (R\$ 12.120 - R\$ 24.240)
  - g. More than 20 minimum salaries (more than R\$ 24.240)
4. Do you work for pay?
  - a. No
  - b. Yes, I am formally employed
  - c. Yes, I am self-employed
5. Educational Level (For form in Portuguese, I will use the IBGE definitions, which are very similar to these, just phrased differently)
  - a. Doctoral degree or further
  - b. Master’s degree
  - c. Bachelor’s degree
  - d. Incomplete college education
  - e. High school graduate
  - f. Some high school, no diploma
  - g. Complete secondary school
  - h. Incomplete secondary school
  - i. Complete elementary school
  - j. Incomplete elementary school
  - k. No formal education
6. Religion
  - a. Catholic

- b. Evangelical
  - c. Spiritualist
  - d. Jewish
  - e. Budist
  - f. Muslim
  - g. Candomblé
  - h. Umbanda
  - i. Atheist/Agnostic
  - j. Other
7. Not accounting for weddings and funerals, how frequently do you participate in religious activities? (WVS)
- a. More than once a week
  - b. Once a week
  - c. Once a month
  - d. Only in holy days
  - e. Once a year
  - f. Very rarely
  - g. Never or practically never
8. Civil status
- a. Single
  - b. Married
  - c. Divorced
  - d. Widow
9. Number of children
10. City
11. State
12. Political affiliation
- a. Scale of 5 points from left to right
13. If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party on this list would you vote? If you don't know, which party appeals to you most?
- a. PMDB
  - b. PT
  - c. PL
  - d. PSDB
  - e. PP
  - f. PDT
  - g. PSC
  - h. PODEMOS
  - i. PSOL
  - j. PCdoB

- k. Rede Sustentabilidade
- l. Outro

## Conjoint experiment

1. Which of the two candidates would you vote for federal deputy?

Option 1 - Randomize whether gender or environmental policy appears first (2 candidates)

Characteristics	Options to be randomized
Gender	i. Woman ii. Man
Age	iii. 33 iv. 42 v. 57 vi. 68
Race	Insert IBGE options
Policy preference (Only one will be displayed per candidate)	<p>Feminist Policy</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establish 6 months as the minimum time that companies have to offer of maternity leave</li> <li>• Implement 50% gender quotas in Congress</li> <li>• Increase the number of “Casas da Mulher Brasileira”, a 24-hour government center that combines different services for women victims of domestic violence, such as shelter homes, <i>delegacia da mulher</i>, children’s shelter and re-inclusion in the labor market</li> </ul> <p>Gendered punishment policy</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Chemical castration for convicted rapists</li> <li>• Longer sentences in closed regime for perpetrators of domestic violence</li> <li>• Life sentence for people convicted of femicide</li> </ul> <p>General punishment policy</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use of electronic ankle bracelet for 10 years after release for people convicted of violent robbery</li> <li>• Longer sentences in closed regime for people convicted of violent robbery</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Life sentence for people convicted of homicide</li> </ul> <p>General justice policy</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Expansion of areas under government environmental protection, which impedes, for example, deforestation in these regions</li> <li>• Increase satellite monitoring in areas with high concentration of illegal mining, in order to reduce these occurrences</li> <li>• Invest more resources in “de-pollution” of rivers in different states</li> </ul>
Education level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Incomplete Bachelor’s degree</li> <li>• Bachelor’s degree</li> <li>• Master’s degree</li> </ul>
Previous government experience	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Yes</li> <li>• No</li> </ul>

These randomized options will be displayed as a blurb like this one:

“I am [Name] and I am running for the elections for federal deputy. Some important information about me is: I consider myself [race], I am [age] years old, and I have a [education] and [previous experience in the government/ this would be my first time working in the government]. Today I want to talk to you about part of my platform. In Congress, I will defend the [policy]”

## Abortion Policy Experiment

1. Now imagine you have to choose a candidate to vote for state deputy. Which of these two options would you choose?

Control	
Candidate A	Candidate B
Age: 32 years old Education: Has a bachelor’s degree Some policies: Wants to increase the number of	Age: 35 years old Education: Has a bachelor’s degree Some policies: Wants to increase the penalty for

programs to combat sexual violence, increase the gender quotas in Congress and create incentives for companies to hire single mothers, thinks the current abortion law is sufficient	rapists, thinks that there should be a flexibilization of gun control in order for women to be able to defend themselves, and thinks that the current abortion law is sufficient
<b>Treatment</b>	
<b>Candidate A</b> Age: 32 years old Education: Has a bachelor's degree Some policies: Wants to increase the number of programs to combat sexual violence, increase the gender quotas in Congress and create incentives for companies to hire single mothers, supports the legalization of abortion until 3 months of pregnancy	<b>Candidate B</b> Age: 35 years old Education: Has a bachelor's degree Some policies: Wants to increase the penalty for rapists, thinks that there should be a flexibilization of gun control in order for women to be able to defend themselves, and thinks that the current abortion law is sufficient

## Gender Identification

1. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? (5-point scale)
  - a. I think being a woman affects my daily experiences
  - b. I share similar experiences with women in general
  - c. I think that public policies targeted towards women in this country also personally impact me
  - d. Women in general can benefit from collaborating with one another
  - e. I feel solidarity with other women in my country

## Gender attitudes

1. How much do you agree with the following statements? (The order of the issues and the policies will be randomized and not divided by these categories, 5 statement will be shown per person, randomized)
  - a. Sexual violence/harassment
    - i. Women should not be surprised if they are harassed at a party when they are using promiscuous clothes
    - ii. If a woman doesn't physically fight back, it's not rape

- b. Domestic violence
  - i. Physical violence between members of a couple is a private matter and should be handled by the couple or close family
- c. Views on household and caretaker roles
  - i. Women should be provided with more opportunities to work outside the home
  - ii. It is important for women to be financially independent
  - iii. Women should have more responsibility than men when it comes to taking care of children and the household
- d. Public life (job market and politics)
  - i. Women have more obstacles than men when entering the job market
  - ii. Women have more obstacles than men when entering politics
  - iii. Women should be paid less than men because they often need to take a maternity leave
  - iv. The country would be less corrupt if there were more women in politics

## **Gender punishment policies**

1. How much would you support the following policies?
  - a. Sexual violence/harassment
    - i. Chemical castration of convicted rapists
    - ii. Increase the time in prison for convicted rapists
  - b. Domestic violence
    - i. Flexibilization of gun control in order for women to be able to defend themselves
    - ii. Increase the time in prison for people convicted of domestic violence
    - iii. Use of electronic ankle bracelet for 10 years after release for people convicted of domestic violence
  - c. Femicide
    - i. Life sentence for men convicted of femicide

## **Feminist policies**

2. How much would you support the following policies?
  - a. Sexual violence/harassment
    - i. Creation of a national campaign of awareness about sexual and domestic violence against women in schools
    - ii. Mandatory training of employees that are likely to have to deal with women in situation of sexual violence (in hospital, polices, but also clubs)
  - b. Domestic violence

- i. Increase the number of “Casas da Mulher Brasileira”, a 24-hour government center that combines different services for women victims of domestic violence, such as shelter homes, *delegacia da mulher*, children’s shelter and re-inclusion in the labor market
  - c. Views on household/caretaking
    - i. Women who take care of their household and children should receive a stipend
    - ii. The government should create incentives for the companies to hire mothers
    - iii. The government should invest more money in the creation of full-time public kindergartens
    - iv. The government should provide access to contraceptive methods and promote awareness about the use of it
    - v. Promote sex education in schools
    - vi. Increase the minimum maternity leave to 6 months
  - d. Public life (job market and politics)
    - i. Implementing 50% quotas for female candidates in Congress
    - ii. The government should increase fines to companies that pay women and men unequally
3. To what extent does a candidate’s opinions on gender issues influence your decision to vote for them? (4 point scale)

## **Support for punishment policies**

1. To what extent do you support the following: (Scale of 1-5) (Control)
  - a. Lynching a criminal rather than releasing him on a technicality
  - b. Instating the death penalty
  - c. Use of electronic ankle bracelet for 10 years after release for people convicted of violent robbery
  - d. Life sentence for people convicted of homicide
2. To what extent do you support the following: (Scale of 1-5) (Treatment)
  - a. Chemical castration as punishment for convicted rapists
  - b. Increasing the number of years of prison for people convicted of domestic violence
  - c. Use of electronic ankle bracelet for 10 years after release for people convicted of domestic violence
  - d. Life sentence for people convicted of femicide
  - e. Aumentar o tempo de prisão para pessoas condenadas por estupro
  - f. Aumentar o tempo de prisão para pessoas condenadas por violência doméstica

- g. Uso obrigatório tornozeleira eletrônica por 10 anos depois da liberação de pessoas condenadas por violência doméstica
3. How much do you agree with the following statements? (Scale of 1-5)
- To reduce criminality in Brazil, it is important to implement preventative measures
  - To reduce criminality in Brazil, it is important to increase the punishment of criminals
  - The current laws in Brazil are sufficient in terms of years of punishment, but the current judicial system is flawed and does not convict people who are guilty
  - Frequently, judges and policemen will not take claims of domestic violence seriously
  - Frequently, judges and policemen will not take claims of sexual assault seriously
  - Frequently, judges and policemen will not take claims of robbery seriously
  -

## **Perception of justice**

- How much do you trust the criminal justice system in your country? (Scale of 1-5, all of these questions in one matrix)
- How much faith do you have that the judicial system would punish someone guilty of robbery?
- How much faith do you have that the judicial system would punish someone guilty of drug trafficking?
- How much faith do you have that the judicial system would punish someone guilty of sexual assault?
- How much faith do you have that the judicial system would punish someone guilty of domestic violence?

## **Appendix 3 | Facebook advertisement description**

### **Recruitment for interviews**

Recruiting women aged 23 to 61 for a paid interview

Share your opinions about the situation of women in Brazilian society and politics in an interview for a university research in an interview with a researcher at Stanford University.

Eligibility:

- Women aged 23 to 61
- Residents of São Paulo
- Was eligible to vote in Brazil in the 2018 and 2022 elections

Interviews can be conducted in person (in your preferred neighborhood) or online, and last 1 to 2 hours. The interviews will be audio recorded and are confidential. You will receive compensation of R\$50 for transportation and other costs.

Fill out this form if you are interested in participating in an interview:

[Qualtrics form]

If you prefer, send an email to [solangem@stanford.edu](mailto:solangem@stanford.edu) or send a WhatsApp message to (11) 93051-7837 to schedule an interview.

If you have any questions or concerns about the study, please contact the researcher:

Solange Melissa Severino de Oliveira

Bachelor of Arts in Political Science, Stanford University

[solangem@stanford.edu](mailto:solangem@stanford.edu)

### **Recruitment for the survey**

Recruiting Women over 18 for Stanford University Online Survey

Anonymously share your opinions about the situation of women in Brazilian society and politics at Stanford University and join a raffle to win 7 R\$300 gift cards from Amazon (or online store

of your choice). To participate, simply fill out the form below. Completing the form takes between 10 and 15 minutes:

[Qualtrics form]

If you wish to participate in the raffle for 7 R\$300 gift cards, you must provide your cell phone number. This information will not be connected to any of your responses on the form (which is anonymous) and will be kept confidential and used only to contact the prize draw winners. The raffle will be conducted by Melissa Oliveira, in Palo Alto, California, on February 15th.

Participating in the study is not a requirement to participate in the raffle. You can enter the prize raffle if you do not start or complete the study. The chance of winning this prize is approximately 1 in 300.

If you have any questions or concerns about the study, please contact the researcher:

Solange Melissa Severino de Oliveira

Bachelor of Arts in Political Science, Stanford University

[solangem@stanford.edu](mailto:solangem@stanford.edu)

## Appendix 4 | Facebook recruitment campaigns

Meta recruitment campaigns					
Campaign Number	Dates	Type	Target audience	Total spent	Strategy
1	1/30/24 - 6/2/24	Traffic campaign	Women over 18 in Brazil	\$111	General target audience with higher invested value, following pilot results
2	2/1/24 - 2/6/24	Conversion campaign	Specified Brazil as the location and added advantage public, tool that allows Meta to show the ad to the people who are the most interested in it	\$30	General target audience, with lower value and automated Meta selection
3	2/6/24 - 2/8/24	Conversion campaign	Specified Brazil as the location and advantage public	\$20	Tested the same target audience, but reducing the time of placement of the ad
4	2/6/24 - 2/13/24	Conversion campaign	Women over 18 in a 60 km radius of the city of Rio de Janeiro	\$30	Tested targeted audience in specific cities, due to an immense concentration of answers in the city of São Paulo. The criteria to choose these cities was to target the largest city per region (the only exception is in the Southeast, in which Rio de Janeiro was targeted instead of São Paulo, which is the largest city in the region)
5	2/6/24 - 2/13/24	Conversion campaign	Women over 18 in a 40 km radius of the city of Curitiba	\$30	Same as previous
6	2/6/24 - 2/13/24	Traffic campaign	Women over 18 in a 20 km radius of the city of Manaus	\$30	Same as previous
7	2/6/24 - 2/13/24	Traffic campaign	Women over 18 in a 20 km radius of the city of Brasília and 30 km radius of the city of Goiânia	\$30	Same as previous
8	2/6/24 - 2/13/24	Traffic campaign	Women over 18 in a 20 km radius of the city of Fortaleza	\$30	Same as previous
9	2/6/24 - 2/13/24	Conversion campaign	Women over 18 in a 17 km radius of the city of Boa Vista and 30 km radius of the city of Rio Branco	\$30	Tested targeted audience in the capitals with the highest percentage of votes for Bolsonaro, because the sample was majoritarily composed of leftist women

10	2/9/24 - 2/15/24	Conversion campaign	Women over 18 in several rural cities in the states Mato Grosso, Pará and Rondônia	\$30	Tested targeted audience in rural areas with some of the highest percentage of votes for Bolsonaro, because the sample was majoritarily composed of leftist women
11	2/9/24 - 2/15/24	Conversion campaign	Women over 18 in a 40 km radius of the city of Vitória, 20 km radius of the city of Campo Grande, 10 km radius of the city of Cuiabá, and 20 km radius of the city of Porto Velho	\$30	Tested targeted audience in the capitals with the highest percentage of votes for Bolsonaro, because the sample was majoritarily composed of leftist women
12	2/9/24 - 2/12/24	Conversion campaign	Women over 18 who have some or complete high school	\$10	Most of the respondents of the survey at this point were highly educated women, so this ad aimed at targetting less educated women
12	2/9/24 - 2/12/24	Conversion campaign	Women over 35 who are mothers	\$10	Most of the respondents of the survey at this point were younger women with no children, so this ad aimed at targetting a slightly older population of women with children
13	2/12/24 - 2/15/24	Conversion campaign	Women over 40 who are mothers	\$30	Same as previous
14	2/12/24 - 2/15/24	Conversion campaign	Women over 18 who have not completed high school and/or are married	\$50	Attempt to increase the number of respondents who are less educated and married women, since the sample still had a significantly higher amount of highly educated single women
15	2/13/24 - 2/15/24	Conversion campaign	Women over 30 who are mothers	\$20	Aimed at increasing the number of respondents with children

## Appendix 5 | Excerpt of codebook

Code	Definition	Example	Type	Passes	Frequency
Attitudes	Applied to the answers to questions that concern gender attitudes. It is applied on a first pass of coding with the objective to organize data into large categories.	"I think, I consider that the role of women is the main one, okay? The main thing is because we are, whether we like it or not, we are front lines. Everything is us, we are the ones who separate bills, we are the ones who make the purchases in the house."	Categorical   Deductive	1st pass	8
Policy	Applied to the answers to questions that concern opinions about gender policy. It is applied on a first pass of coding with the objective to organize data into large categories.	"Yes, too. Four months is too little, the child is still too young to go to a daycare center or leave it to someone else to take care of, because there are people who can't even trust our own shadow. It must be a little longer."	Categorical   Deductive	1st pass	4
Voting Behavior	Applied to the answers to questions that concern the participants' voting behavior. It is applied on a first pass of coding with the objective to organize data into large categories.	"In 2018 I voted for Haddad, right? Because he's the one there... "Ah, taking care of schools! Take care of hospitals! From schools, from the hospital..." He is... Oh my God... I, you know... I believed him."	Categorical   Deductive	1st pass	4
High	Applied when participants show high support to some idea or high identification with some concept. This code is always combined with other codes, e.g: high and gender identification to indicate when participants express high	"Yes, yes, it impacts a little, because women should also have a little space to be able to lead, have leadership, have an opinion, right? Because, like now, there are very few candidacies for women."	Interpretative   Deductive	1st pass	39

	levels of gender identification				
Conservative	Applied when participants display traditional/regressive views on issues or policies.	"True, I agree with that. Because in the end, we go in to break up a couple's fight, then the next day they are fine, and we are framed as bad."	Interpretative   Deductive	1st pass	9
Support	Used to classify when women show that they agree with proposed policies	"Yes, yes. It would be really good, you know? Very good, because we were going to have... We were going to have to... How can I say it? We would have, Melissa, the security we need. You know, having more women's police stations, having more laws"	Descriptive   Deductive	1st pass	65
Bolsonaro	Used when women mention they have voted for Bolsonaro or support him, other politicians in his government or policies proposed by him	"No, I never voted. When I was going to go back to Marta, I didn't vote. [Laughter] I didn't vote for Marta. Because the point is that she reconciled with... Oh my God. What's his name, my God? Bolsonaro. I think she is linked to something with him."	Descriptive   Deductive	1st pass	8
Null	Used when women mention they have voted null or have abstained from voting	"I voted blank in 2018"	Descriptive   Deductive	1st pass	1
Fear	Used when women communicate feeling fear, both of general violence and gender-based violence	"Even going out to work myself, I'm afraid, it's difficult to go out to work, because you don't know that you can find me on the street corners."	Interpretative   Deductive	2nd pass	4
Sexism	Used when women report observing sexist	"Well, not having power because men are sexist"	Interpretative   Deductive	2nd pass	28

	actions or systems around them				
Personal	Subcode of sexism: Used when women observe sexist actions in their personal life, impacting them or their social circle	"An example, there are people I know, people, who don't, you know? Who does light work and earns well. Not us, we have to work hard at cleaning, regardless of whether it's a townhouse, a condominium, that's all."	Interpretative   Inductive	2nd pass	4
"Preconceito"	Portuguese word used to describe any type of discrimination. In the interviews it has often replaced sexism, racism and several other types of discrimination. Used to code broad forms of oppression pointed by the interviewees	"Look, what would I say? Prejudice. Prejudice and domestic violence. These two."	"In vivo"   Interpretative   Inductive	2nd pass	6

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