Question #1

When it comes to "Smash the Stack", what are stack canaries? Give a definition and an example.

Answer #1

Stack Canaries (also called security cookies, an analogy to the harbinger canary birds used in coal mines) are secret values added to binaries during compilation to protect critical stack values like the Return Pointer against buffer overflow attacks.

They detect stack buffer overflows to prevent the execution of possibly malicious code by placing the secret value on the stack which changes every time the program is started. Prior to a function return, the stack canary is checked and if it appears to be modified, the program exits immediately.

Stack canaries make the exploitation of the "Smash the Stack" vulnerability more difficult, but not impossible.

Example:

Assembly without Canary	Assembly with Canary
<inside askuser="" function=""></inside>	<inside askuser="" function=""></inside>
	0x080485d9 mov eax, <canary></canary>
	0x080485dc xor eax, <right canary="" val=""></right>
	0x080485e3 je 0x080485ea
	0x080485e5 call <stack_chk_fail@plt></stack_chk_fail@plt>
0x0804856e leave	0x0804856e leave
0x0804856f ret	0x0804856f ret

```
The program being debugged has been started already.
Start it from the beginning? (y or n) y
Starting program: /home/osboxes/canaries/user3_input < <(python -c 'print "Hello" + "\n" + "A"*100 + "C" * 4 + "D" * 12 + "BBBB"')
Tell me your name, please
Hi Hello
What color is your hat?
Breakpoint 1, 0x0804859b in askUser ()
(gdb) x/24x $esp+160
0xbfffef60:
                 0x00000000
                                  0xbffff004
                                                   0xb7fbb000
                                                                    0x0000f017
                 0xffffffff
                                  0x0000002f
                                                   0xb7e14dc8
                                                                    0xb7fd51b0
0xbfffef70:
0xbfffef80:
                 0x00008000
                                  0xb7fbb000
                                                   0xb7fb9244
                                                                    0xb7e200fc
0xbfffef90:
                 0x00000001
                                  0x00000000
                                                   0xb7e36a60
                                                                    0x08a5f900
0xbfffefa0:
                 0x00000001
                                  0xbffff064
                                                   0xbfffefb8
                                                                   0x08048511
0xbfffefb0:
                 0xb7fbb3dc
                                  0xbfffefd0
                                                   0x00000000
                                                                    0xb7e20647
(gdb) c
Continuing.
Breakpoint 2, 0x080485a0 in askUser ()
(gdb) x/24x $esp+160
0xbfffef60:
                 0x41414141
                                  0x41414141
                                                                    0x41414141
                                                   0x41414141
0xbfffef70:
                                  0x41414141
                                                                    0x41414141
                 0x41414141
                                                   0x41414141
0xbfffef80:
                 0x41414141
                                  0x41414141
                                                   0x41414141
                                                                    0x41414141
0xbfffef90:
                 0x41414141
                                  0x41414141
                                                   0x41414141
                                                                    0x43434343
0xbfffefa0:
                 0x4444444
                                  0x4444444
                                                   0x4444444
                                                                    0x42424242
0xbfffefb0:
                 0xb7fbb300
                                  0xbfffefd0
                                                   0x00000000
                                                                    0xb7e20647
(gdb)
```

Note here that two distinct executions of the same program yields different stack canary values (in orange), preceding their respective return function pointers (in yellow).

```
Starting program: /home/osboxes/canaries/user3_input_can < <(python -c 'print "A"*100"')
/bin/bash: python: command not found
Tell me your name, please
Breakpoint 1, 0x0000055555555220 in askUser ()
(gdb) x/16x $rbp-32
   'ffffffe010: 0x00000000000000000
                                         0x00000000000000000
 x7fffffffe020: 0x000055555555552d0
                                         0x75c55e80bc05af00
 )x7fffffffe030: 0x00007fffffffe040
                                         0x00005555555551db
                                         0x00007ffff7df3cb2
 )x7fffffffe040: 0x00005555555552d0
 )x7fffffffe050: 0x00007ffffffffe138
                                         0x000000
                                                    7df3ad3
                                                     9000000
0x7fffffffe060: 0x000055555555551c9
                                         0x00000
                                         0x939f
 )x7fffffffe070: 0x0000000000000000
                                                     536ccb
 )x7fffffffe080: 0x00005555555550e0
                                         0x000000
                                                    0000000
(gdb) bt
#0 0x00005555555555220 in askUser ()
#1 0x00005555555551db in main ()
(gdb)
```

<u>Note</u> here that stack canaries can also be 64-bits (quad-words) in values, which exponentially increases the permutations required for a brute force attack.

Question #2

The following code contains errors that could be exploited. How would you fix it?

```
hashOut.data = hashes + SSL MD5 DIGEST LEN;
hashOut.length = SSL SHA1 DIGEST LEN;
if ((err = SSLFreeBuffer(&hashCtx)) != 0)
  goto fail;
if ((err = ReadyHash(&SSLHashSHA1, &hashCtx)) != 0)
  goto fail;
if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.update(&hashCtx, &clientRandom)) != 0)
  goto fail;
if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.update(&hashCtx, &serverRandom)) != 0)
  goto fail;
if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.update(&hashCtx, &signedParams)) != 0)
  goto fail;
  goto fail;
if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.final(&hashCtx, &hashOut)) != 0)
 goto fail;
err = sslRawVerify(...);
```

Answer #2

The error in the above code is fixed by discarding the duplicate 'goto fail;' line of code present in line number 13.

Question #3

How could you catch this error in the future?

Answer #3

To avoid this error in the future, the user could:

- avoid insecure networks
- use a web filtering product that can scan HTTPS traffic (for example, Sophos UTM)
- switch to an alternative web browser (for example, Firefox or Chromium)

This error could be caught

- through negative testing in test cases (via dynamic analysis)
- through coverage analysis (via CI/CD tools)
- by properly detecting and checking unreachable code (by setting warning flags, via static analysis)
- by performing a duplicate lines detection (via static code analysis)
- by performing a manual code review
- by implementing the use of braces in conditions and loops (during development)
- by avoiding misleading indentation (during development)
- by setting the default value for the error code (0) as 'access failure'

Question #4 Heartbleed bug could be traced to a single line of code. What was that line of code?		
Answer #4		
The following line of code caused the Heartbleed bug:		
memcpy (bp, pl, payload);		