Welfare effects of Preferential Trade Agreements Course "Text-as-data analysis of international trade"

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Saint Petersburg 10 May 2018

Course outline

- Preferential Trade Agreements and International Economic Order
- Gravity and Gravitas
- Text factorisation I: Bag-of-words methods
- Text factorisation II: Distributive semantics
- Welfare effects of Preferential Trade Agreements

- Trade and Welfare
 - Baseline setup
 - Gains from trade
- Preferential Trade and Welfare
 - Why preferentialism?
 - PTAs in gravity framework

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Setup (slides follow Arkolakis (2015))

- Assume two-country world, Home and Foreign producing two differentiated goods: corn (c) and feta (f)
- Each country has one consumer who derives utility from consumption and earns labour income
- Let w and w^* be wages at Home and in Foreign country, respectively
- Price of corn at home is $p_c = w$, price of local good in Foreign is $p_f^* = w^*$
- There are iceberg trade costs τ , τ^{\star} so that $p_c^{\star} = w\tau$, $p_f = w^{\star}\tau^{\star}$
- Usually in trade 3 assumptions are made:
 - \bullet perfect competition \Rightarrow price of a good is its marginal cost
 - ullet Bertrand competition \Rightarrow price of a good is that of the least cost producer
 - monopolistic competition ⇒ firm's actions are affected by the overall level of competition

Consumers

• Consumers have CES "love of variety" preferences:

$$U\left(c_{c},c_{f}
ight)=\left(c_{c}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}+c_{f}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}
ight)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$$

• Home Consumer's problem is to

$$\max_{c_c,c_f} U_c\left(c_c,c_f\right) \ \ s.t. \ p_c c_c + p_f c_f = wL,$$

where L is labour endowment of individual, w is wage, $y \equiv wL$ is therefore labour income

Marginal rate of substitution:

$$MRS_{c,f} \equiv \frac{\frac{\partial U}{\partial c}}{\frac{\partial U}{\partial e}} = \left(\frac{c_c}{c_f}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}}$$

• At optimum, MRS between two goods is their relative prices (where are τ ?):

$$\frac{c_c}{c_f} = \left(\frac{p_c}{p_f}\right)^{-\sigma}$$

Optimal demand

Plugging in budget constraint we obtain Home consumer's optimal demand

$$c_{f} = \left(\frac{p_{f}^{-\sigma}}{P^{1-\sigma}}\right) wL$$

$$c_{c} = \left(\frac{p_{c}^{-\sigma}}{P^{1-\sigma}}\right) wL$$
(1)

where we define the price index as $P \equiv \left(p_c^{1-\sigma} + p_f^{1-\sigma}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$

Total Home expenditure on corn is

$$p_c c_c = \left(\frac{p_c}{P}\right)^{1-\sigma} wL$$

Price elasticity of demand

$$\frac{\partial \log p_c c_c}{\partial \log p_c} = 1 - \sigma$$

• Volume of trade between countries hinges on σ , substitutability of goods

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Production

• Now assume no trade costs $\tau=\tau^\star=1$ and different technologies in countries, A, so that

$$p_c = p_c^{\star} = \frac{w}{A}$$
 $p_f = p_f^{\star} = \frac{w^{\star}}{A^{\star}}$

- Then $P = P^*$ (why?)
- Labour market clearing (aggregate demand equals aggregate supply):

$$c_c + \tau c_c^* = L$$

$$\tau^* c_f + c_f^* = L^*$$
(2)

• Recalling (1), we can rewrite and combine labour market clearing conditions into

$$\frac{w}{w^*} = \left(\frac{A}{A^*}\right) \left(\frac{L}{L^*}\right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \tag{3}$$

Relative wages depend on relative productivity of the two countries

Is international trade a zero-sum game?

- Is international trade a zero-sum game? Would A* ↑ lead to a decreased welfare at home?
- Define Home welfare simply as the real wage $W \equiv \frac{w}{P}$.
- Putting (3) into labour market conditions (2) one obtains

$$W \equiv \frac{W}{P} = \frac{A}{\left(A + A^{\star} \left(\frac{L^{\star}}{L}\right)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}}$$

- Welfare is increasing in productivity and decreasing in labour endowment ratio
- Increase in A^* will drive P down \Rightarrow increase in foreign and domestic wages $\Rightarrow W \uparrow$

Gains from trade — I

- ullet Gains from trade are changes in welfare W when a country goes from autarky to free trade
- Domestic trade share is defined as

$$\lambda \equiv \frac{p_c c_c}{p_c c_c + p_f p_f}$$

 Now recall that total expenditure on good is proportional to labour income and prices

$$p_c c_c = \left(\frac{p_c}{P}\right)^{1-\sigma} wL$$

therefore

$$\lambda \equiv \frac{p_c c_c}{wL}$$

Gains from trade — II

• Welfare is the real wage. We are in differentiated goods world, so $p_c = w$. As a result

$$W \equiv \frac{w}{P}$$

$$= \frac{p_c}{P}$$

$$= \left(\frac{p_c^{1-\sigma}}{P^{1-\sigma}}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$

$$= \lambda^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$

- Welfare is a function of the domestic trade share and the elasticity of demand (Eaton and Kortum, 2002)
- \bullet Ex-post gains from trade at Home in two hypothetical scenarios λ and λ' are then

$$\frac{W'}{W} = \left(\frac{\lambda'}{\lambda}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$$

Back-of-the-envelope calculation (Arkolakis, 2015)

- \bullet To compute welfare gains from going from autarky into free trade, recall that $\lambda_{autarky}=1$
- Literature estimates trade elasticity at $1 \sigma = [-10, -5]$
- Import penetration in 2007's Russia was \sim 25% (OECD, 2010), so that domestic trade share $\lambda_{trade}=0.75$
- Then

gains from trade
$$=\left(\frac{0.75}{1}\right)^{-\frac{1}{10}}=1.0292=2.92\%$$
 of income

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Reasons for preferential trade (slides follow Baldwin (2011))

- Why are concepts "trade diversion" and "trade creation" not helpful when studying reasons for preferential trade?
- One can hypothesise different effects of preferential trade:
 - "Adam Smith's certitude": "the merchants and manufacturers of the country whose commerce is so favoured must necessarily derive great advantage"
 - "Haberler's spillover": all members of a preferential trade agreement must gain, rest of world loses
 - "Viner's ambiguity": preferential tariff liberalisation has ambiguous welfare effects on the preference-granting nation
- Consider a two-member PTA and Rest of World





Figure 2: Equilibrium in PTA for Home. Source: Baldwin (2011, fig. 3.2)

border price border price internal price MS_{MFN}

XS^R | XS^P | XS^P |



Under free trade domestic/border price is P^{FT} . Then all nations impose MFN tariff T, internal price at home is P, border price is P-T. Home imports drop, exports at Partner/RoW drop equally. When PTA(H,P) is formed, the total supply is MS^{PTA} . Price at home falls to P'. Two border prices emerge: for parter it goes from MFN's P-T to P', the price for RoW falls from P-T to P'-T. Partner exports more, RoW Exports less. Smith's certitude is Partner's gains a+b. Haberler's spillover is RoW's loss e. a is also called the preference rate because under MFN cutting the Partner would gain only b.

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PTAs in gravity

• Recall from Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) that when $\tau_{i,j} = \tau_{j,i}$ (symmetric trade costs) export equation can be written as

$$X_{i,j} = \left\{\frac{\tau_{i,j}}{P_j P_i}\right\}^{1-\sigma} \frac{Y_i Y_j}{Y_{world}}$$

where

$$P_j = \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^N P_i^{\sigma-1} \tau_{i,j}^{1-\sigma} \theta_i \right\}^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}},$$

and θ_i is income share of country *i*

• From Anderson and Yotov (2016) you've learned that PTAs can have the direct effect through τ and indirect effects through P. To measure the total effect of PTAs on trade one needs to estimate their effects on multilateral resistance terms, output, expenditures, and sectoral linkages

tab. 2)

Welfare

Figure 3: Welfare Effects from NAFTA's tariff reductions (Caliendo and Parro, 2015,

Mexico	1.31%	-0.41%	1.72%	1.72%
Canada	-0.06%	-0.11%	0.04%	0.32%
U.S.	0.08%	0.04%	0.04%	0.11%

Country Name	All FTAs	No NAFTA	No FTAs Mexico
Argentina	2.115	2.12	1.955
	(.062)	(.053)	(.046)
Australia	059	049	045
	(.002)	(.002)	(.006)
Austria	7.868	7.874	7.87
	(.296)	(.266)	(.261)
Bulgaria	11.079	11.088	11.074
	(.349)	(.32)	(.32)
Blgm-Lxmbrg	.311	.315	.308
	(.011)	(.006)	(.011)
Bolivia	6.743	6.741	6.457
	(.187)	(.166)	(.151)
Brazil	.331	.337	.251
	(.01)	(.009)	(.009)
Canada	.043	007	003
	(.002)	(.003)	(.007)
Switzerland	.172	.178	.174
	(.009)	(.019)	(.027)
Chile	3.012	2.998	2.77
	(.092)	(.083)	(.071)
China	18	171	155
	(.006)	(.01)	(.011)

Take-aways

- International trade is not a zero-sum game
- Domestic trade share and elasticity of substitution drive international trade
- Ambiguous welfare effects of PTAs on ROW
- Naïve gravity will measure only a fraction of the total effect of PTAs on welfare

Thank you for your attention!

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