Outline for ICE deportations study

To do’s:

* Summary of 287g types, full history and types, effectiveness to deport
* Lit review

Sample:

* Evaluate one specific state (maybe Utah)
* May 16, 2019 ->

**287(g) agreements**

Through this program, state and local law enforcement agencies (LEAs) collaborate with federal agencies to enforce immigration laws through Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs). These agreements are negotiated between DHS and LEAs and supervised by ICE; they establish delegation of authority to a determined number of officers. After an agreement expires, DHS is not obligated to renew it. Not all agreements include a specific expiration date, and once an agreement is entered into, it may be terminated at any time by either party.

Initially, 287(g) agreements were employed in two modalities and a hybrid of both: jail enforcement and task force. An [ICE memo](https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/fy-2012-ice-announces-year-end-removal-numbers-highlights-focus-key-priorities-and) (December 20, 2012) rescinded the task force model. The revised 287(g) agreements under the first Trump Administration kept only the jail enforcement model, while adding a new “warrant service officer (WSO)” model ([ICE memo May 6, 2019)](https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-launches-program-strengthen-immigration-enforcement). President Trump reinstated the task force modality on [January 20, 2025](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/protecting-the-american-people-against-invasion/).

* Jail enforcement model: Officers may interrogate *suspected noncitizens* who have been arrested about their immigration status and may place immigration detainers on those thought to be subject to removal.
* Task force model: Officers who encountered suspected noncitizens during the course of daily activities could question and arrest individuals they believed had violated federal immigration laws.
* Warrant service officer (WSO) model: ICE trains, certifies, and authorizes selected state and local law enforcement officers to execute ICE administrative warrants.

Though ending 287(g) was part of President Biden’s [electoral campaign](https://medium.com/@JoeBiden/the-biden-agenda-for-the-latino-community-4d7329c2644b), no policy changes outside of differences in [recruiting](https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2021/trump-ice-sheriffs-immigrants-287g/) or funding were observed.

Another policy connecting ICE enforcement with LEAs is the Secure Communities program. This established biometric information sharing between local LEAs and federal agencies for the detection of undocumented immigrants upon local detention. The program rolled out on a county-by-county basis from 2008 to 2014—the staggered release was due to technology barriers—until all U.S. counties were covered. Counties could not opt-in/out but LEAs had discretion to determine which detainers (requests to maintain in custody for up to 48 hours) to honor. Currently, all counties should have access to this biometric information sharing system. [Archived summary.](https://www.ice.gov/secure-communities)

On [November 20, 2014](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secure_communities_0.pdf), the SC program was replaced by the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP). Under [PEP](https://www.ice.gov/pep), detainers, requests for transfer, or requests for notifications are issued to immigrants of immigration enforcement priority, who have participated in gang activity, or who pose a danger to national security.

On [January 25, 2017](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/01/30/2017-02102/enhancing-public-safety-in-the-interior-of-the-united-states), the Secure Communities program was reinstated under President Trump.

**Literature review**

Heightened immigration enforcement impacts US citizens’ birth outcomes: Evidence from early ICE interventions in North Carolina <https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7857575/> (PLOS One)

Data: North Carolina Detailed Birth Records (NCDBR) database from 2004-2006, the time Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act was first being implemented in NC. Data includes parental demographics, infant health, and geographic identifiers (parents’ county of residence and country of birth).

Method: difference-in-differences and triple-difference case-control regression analysis. activities impacted newborn health and prenatal care utilization.

Outcome:  
  
Fear and the Safety Net: Evidence from Secure Communities <https://direct.mit.edu/rest/article/106/6/1427/113163/Fear-and-the-Safety-Net-Evidence-from-Secure> (REStat)

Data: FOIA requests to ICE, and restricted-use data agreements, on the roll-out of SC as well as micro-level data on the universe of detainers issued by ICE from 2002 to 2015 in the United States. Data includes the reason for the arrest, the crime level/severity, the date the detainer was issued, the county the detainer was issued in, the individual’s country of origin, and other individual-level demographics (age and sex). Universe of individuals who were removed (actually deported) from the country due to a fingerprint match under SC from 2008 to 2015, in addition to county-level yearly data on the number of fingerprint submissions and matches under SC from 2008 to 2015. ACS data was used for household outcomes.

Method: triple-differences methodology exploits the staggered roll-out of SC activation across counties as well as the disproportionate impact of SC on Hispanics within counties

Outcome: Hispanic-headed citizen households significantly reduced their participation in two large federal safety net programs, consistent with network effects that propagate fear through minority communities rather than stigma or lack of benefit information.

content analysis of 287(g) memorandums of agreement (MOAs)

<https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12134-024-01122-3>

“Agencies operating under the “jail enforcement” model have significantly more powers than those operating under the “warrant service” model. While these findings were expected, only a handful of programs operating under the JE model have enforcement and encounter reporting requirements. As such, the 287(g) program lacks proper data reporting safeguards, and implications are discussed.”

Do Immigration Enforcement Programs Reduce Crime? Evidence from the 287(g) Program in North Carolina, CATO. Andrew Forrester, Alex Nowrasteh. 2018

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep16983.pdf?acceptTC=true&coverpage=false&addFooter=false>

**Local Immigration Enforcement and Crime in the United States: A Nationwide Analysis of the 287(g) Program. UChicago thesis, 2018**

<https://knowledge.uchicago.edu/record/3299?v=pdf>

propensity-score matching to pair counties which implemented 287(g) agreements with comparable counties that did not. I then use a differences-in-differences design to compare changes in county crime rates in the treatment and control groups.

**The Effects of Immigration Policy on Business Creation: A Study of the Effects of 287(g) Mandates**

* Closest to my idea

<https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-agricultural-and-applied-economics/article/effects-of-immigration-policy-on-business-creation-a-study-of-the-effects-of-287g-mandates/E6BEDE7EE99F52E71D0FAE7EB89DE1BE#article>

**The Effect of Immigration Enforcement on School Engagement: Evidence From 287(g) Programs in North Carolina**

<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/23328584211039467>

Immigration Policy and Labor Contractors: Evidence from 287(g) and Farm Labor Markets

<https://s.gifford.ucdavis.edu/uploads/pub/2023/03/09/charlton.pdf>

DOJ Intervention and the Checkpoint Shift: Profiling Hispanic Motorists under the Section 287(g) Program

<https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pandp.20241132>

Labor Market Shocks and Immigration Enforcement

<https://www.proquest.com/econlit/docview/3205672227/B642EA365AEF487EPQ/2?accountid=10422&sourcetype=Scholarly%20Journals>

Federal-Local Partnerships on Immigration Law Enforcement: Are the Policies Effective in Reducing Violent Victimization?

<https://www.proquest.com/econlit/docview/2835254721/B642EA365AEF487EPQ/4?accountid=10422&sourcetype=Working%20Papers>

Enforcement and immigrant location choice

<https://www.proquest.com/econlit/docview/1511798351/B642EA365AEF487EPQ/5?accountid=10422&sourcetype=Working%20Papers>

* On migration

Can Technology Compensate for a Labor Shortage? Effects of 287(g) Immigration Policies on the U.S. Dairy Industry

<https://www.proquest.com/econlit/docview/2492243153/B642EA365AEF487EPQ/6?accountid=10422&sourcetype=Scholarly%20Journals>

Health and Mental Health Effects of Local Immigration Enforcement

<https://www.proquest.com/econlit/docview/2064758290/B642EA365AEF487EPQ/7?accountid=10422&sourcetype=Working%20Papers>

Is ICE Freezing US Agriculture? Farm-Level Adjustment to Increased Local Immigration Enforcement

<https://www.proquest.com/econlit/docview/2769228769/B642EA365AEF487EPQ/15?accountid=10422&sourcetype=Scholarly%20Journals>

Local Immigration Enforcement and Local Economies

<https://www.proquest.com/econlit/docview/1915310551/B642EA365AEF487EPQ/16?accountid=10422&sourcetype=Scholarly%20Journals>

Immigration Enforcement and Economic Resources of Children with Likely Unauthorized Parents

<https://www.proquest.com/econlit/docview/2064763896/F314CD800A9E4AD3PQ/17?accountid=10422&sourcetype=Scholarly%20Journals>

Remittances and Immigration Enforcement

<https://www.proquest.com/econlit/docview/1775617077/F314CD800A9E4AD3PQ/20?accountid=10422&sourcetype=Scholarly%20Journals>

With a Little Help from Our Feds: Understanding State Immigration Enforcement Policy Adoption in American Federalism

<https://www.proquest.com/econlit/docview/1347768041/F314CD800A9E4AD3PQ/21?accountid=10422>