Outline for ICE deportations study

To do’s:

* Summary of 287g types, full history and types, effectiveness to deport
* Lit review
* Create policy timeline for 287g and SC

Sample:

* Evaluate one specific state (maybe Utah)
* May 16, 2019 ->

**287(g) agreements**

Through this program, state and local law enforcement agencies (LEAs) collaborate with federal agencies to enforce immigration laws through Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs). These agreements are negotiated between DHS and LEAs and supervised by ICE; they establish delegation of authority to a determined number of officers. After an agreement expires, DHS is not obligated to renew it. Not all agreements include a specific expiration date, and once an agreement is entered into, it may be terminated at any time by either party.

Initially, 287(g) agreements were employed in two modalities and a hybrid of both: jail enforcement and task force. An [ICE memo](https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/fy-2012-ice-announces-year-end-removal-numbers-highlights-focus-key-priorities-and) (December 20, 2012) rescinded the task force model. The revised 287(g) agreements under the first Trump Administration kept only the jail enforcement model, while adding a new “warrant service officer (WSO)” model ([ICE memo May 6, 2019)](https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-launches-program-strengthen-immigration-enforcement). President Trump reinstated the task force modality on [January 20, 2025](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/protecting-the-american-people-against-invasion/).

* Jail enforcement model: Officers may interrogate *suspected noncitizens* who have been arrested about their immigration status and may place immigration detainers on those thought to be subject to removal.
* Task force model: Officers who encountered suspected noncitizens during the course of daily activities could question and arrest individuals they believed had violated federal immigration laws.
* Warrant service officer (WSO) model: ICE trains, certifies, and authorizes selected state and local law enforcement officers to execute ICE administrative warrants.

Though ending 287(g) was part of President Biden’s [electoral campaign](https://medium.com/@JoeBiden/the-biden-agenda-for-the-latino-community-4d7329c2644b), no policy changes outside of differences in [recruiting](https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2021/trump-ice-sheriffs-immigrants-287g/) or funding were observed.

Another policy connecting ICE enforcement with LEAs is the Secure Communities program. This established biometric information sharing between local LEAs and federal agencies for the detection of undocumented immigrants upon local detention. The program rolled out on a county-by-county basis from 2008 to 2014—the staggered release was due to technology barriers—until all U.S. counties were covered. Counties could not opt-in/out but LEAs had discretion to determine which detainers (requests to maintain in custody for up to 48 hours) to honor. Currently, all counties should have access to this biometric information sharing system. [Archived summary.](https://www.ice.gov/secure-communities)

On [November 20, 2014](https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secure_communities_0.pdf), the SC program was replaced by the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP). Under [PEP](https://www.ice.gov/pep), detainers, requests for transfer, or requests for notifications are issued to immigrants of immigration enforcement priority, who have participated in gang activity, or who pose a danger to national security.

On [January 25, 2017](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/01/30/2017-02102/enhancing-public-safety-in-the-interior-of-the-united-states), the Secure Communities program was reinstated under President Trump.

**Literature review**

Heightened immigration enforcement impacts US citizens’ birth outcomes: Evidence from early ICE interventions in North Carolina <https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7857575/> (PLOS One)

Data: North Carolina Detailed Birth Records (NCDBR) database from 2004-2006, the time Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act was first being implemented in NC. Data includes parental demographics, infant health, and geographic identifiers (parents’ county of residence and country of birth).

Method: difference-in-differences and triple-difference case-control regression analysis. activities impacted newborn health and prenatal care utilization.

Outcome:  
  
Fear and the Safety Net: Evidence from Secure Communities <https://direct.mit.edu/rest/article/106/6/1427/113163/Fear-and-the-Safety-Net-Evidence-from-Secure> (REStat, Marcella Alsan, Crystal S. Yang)

Data: FOIA requests to ICE, and restricted-use data agreements, on the roll-out of SC as well as micro-level data on the universe of detainers issued by ICE from 2002 to 2015 in the United States. Data includes the reason for the arrest, the crime level/severity, the date the detainer was issued, the county the detainer was issued in, the individual’s country of origin, and other individual-level demographics (age and sex). Universe of individuals who were removed (actually deported) from the country due to a fingerprint match under SC from 2008 to 2015, in addition to county-level yearly data on the number of fingerprint submissions and matches under SC from 2008 to 2015. ACS data was used for household outcomes.

Method: triple-differences methodology exploits the staggered roll-out of SC activation across counties as well as the disproportionate impact of SC on Hispanics within counties

Outcome: Hispanic-headed citizen households significantly reduced their participation in two large federal safety net programs, consistent with network effects that propagate fear through minority communities rather than stigma or lack of benefit information.

content analysis of 287(g) memorandums of agreement (MOAs)

<https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12134-024-01122-3>

“Agencies operating under the “jail enforcement” model have significantly more powers than those operating under the “warrant service” model. While these findings were expected, only a handful of programs operating under the JE model have enforcement and encounter reporting requirements. As such, the 287(g) program lacks proper data reporting safeguards, and implications are discussed.”

Do Immigration Enforcement Programs Reduce Crime? Evidence from the 287(g) Program in North Carolina, CATO. Andrew Forrester, Alex Nowrasteh. 2018

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep16983.pdf?acceptTC=true&coverpage=false&addFooter=false>

**Local Immigration Enforcement and Crime in the United States: A Nationwide Analysis of the 287(g) Program. UChicago thesis, 2018**

<https://knowledge.uchicago.edu/record/3299?v=pdf>

propensity-score matching to pair counties which implemented 287(g) agreements with comparable counties that did not. I then use a differences-in-differences design to compare changes in county crime rates in the treatment and control groups.

* no effect on the trend in violent crime rates.

**The Effects of Immigration Policy on Business Creation: A Study of the Effects of 287(g) Mandates**

* Closest to my idea: difference-in-differences model, we find that the implementation of 287(g) negatively affected the total number of businesses.  2000 to 2012
* Secure communities: was fully implemented in all 3,181 jurisdictions within 50 states, the District of Columbia, and five US Territories by ICE on January 22, 2013

<https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-agricultural-and-applied-economics/article/effects-of-immigration-policy-on-business-creation-a-study-of-the-effects-of-287g-mandates/E6BEDE7EE99F52E71D0FAE7EB89DE1BE#article>

hat stricter immigration laws targeting undocumented immigrants in local areas have affected the locational preferences of immigrants and have pushed undocumented immigrants to jurisdictions that are not subject to such laws (e.g. Bohn et al., [Reference Bohn, Lofstrom and Raphael2014](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-agricultural-and-applied-economics/article/effects-of-immigration-policy-on-business-creation-a-study-of-the-effects-of-287g-mandates/E6BEDE7EE99F52E71D0FAE7EB89DE1BE#ref6); Did the 2007 legal arizona workers act reduce the state’s unauthorized immigrant population?

Hoekstra et al., [Reference Hoekstra and Orozco-Aleman2017](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-agricultural-and-applied-economics/article/effects-of-immigration-policy-on-business-creation-a-study-of-the-effects-of-287g-mandates/E6BEDE7EE99F52E71D0FAE7EB89DE1BE#ref21); llegal immigration, state law, and deterrence

Leerkes et al., [Reference Leerkes, Leach and Bachmeier2012](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-agricultural-and-applied-economics/article/effects-of-immigration-policy-on-business-creation-a-study-of-the-effects-of-287g-mandates/E6BEDE7EE99F52E71D0FAE7EB89DE1BE#ref28); Borders behind the border: An exploration of state-level differences in migration control and their effects on US migration patterns

Lofstrom et al., [Reference Lofstrom, Bohn and Raphael2011](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-agricultural-and-applied-economics/article/effects-of-immigration-policy-on-business-creation-a-study-of-the-effects-of-287g-mandates/E6BEDE7EE99F52E71D0FAE7EB89DE1BE#ref29); Lessons From the 2007 legal Arizona Workers Act.

Orrenius et al., [Reference Orrenius and Zavodny2016](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-agricultural-and-applied-economics/article/effects-of-immigration-policy-on-business-creation-a-study-of-the-effects-of-287g-mandates/E6BEDE7EE99F52E71D0FAE7EB89DE1BE#ref38); The impact of E-Verify mandates on labor market outcomes.

Parrado, [Reference Parrado2012](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-agricultural-and-applied-economics/article/effects-of-immigration-policy-on-business-creation-a-study-of-the-effects-of-287g-mandates/E6BEDE7EE99F52E71D0FAE7EB89DE1BE#ref40); immigration enforcement policies, the economic recession, and the size of local Mexican immigrant populations.

Watson, [Reference Watson2013](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-agricultural-and-applied-economics/article/effects-of-immigration-policy-on-business-creation-a-study-of-the-effects-of-287g-mandates/E6BEDE7EE99F52E71D0FAE7EB89DE1BE#ref54)). Watson, T. Enforcement and Immigrant Location Choice (No. w19626). Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, described below

**The Effect of Immigration Enforcement on School Engagement: Evidence From 287(g) Programs in North Carolina**

<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/23328584211039467>

Immigration Policy and Labor Contractors: Evidence from 287(g) and Farm Labor Markets

<https://s.gifford.ucdavis.edu/uploads/pub/2023/03/09/charlton.pdf>

DOJ Intervention and the Checkpoint Shift: Profiling Hispanic Motorists under the Section 287(g) Program

<https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pandp.20241132>

Labor Market Shocks and Immigration Enforcement

<https://www.proquest.com/econlit/docview/3205672227/B642EA365AEF487EPQ/2?accountid=10422&sourcetype=Scholarly%20Journals>

Federal-Local Partnerships on Immigration Law Enforcement: Are the Policies Effective in Reducing Violent Victimization?

<https://www.proquest.com/econlit/docview/2835254721/B642EA365AEF487EPQ/4?accountid=10422&sourcetype=Working%20Papers>

[Sheriffs, State Troopers, and the Spillover Effects of Immigration Policing](https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2541&context=facscholar)

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/1555/

Enforcement and immigrant location choice

<https://www.proquest.com/econlit/docview/1511798351/B642EA365AEF487EPQ/5?accountid=10422&sourcetype=Working%20Papers>

* On migration, ending in 2005-2011
* To create an index of local 287(g) agreement intensity, the average number of local agreements faced by a given resident of a local area is calculated. Index using months
* Compares immigrant population size in a local area

https://www.nber.org/system/files/working\_papers/w19626/w19626.pdf

Can Technology Compensate for a Labor Shortage? Effects of 287(g) Immigration Policies on the U.S. Dairy Industry

<https://www.proquest.com/econlit/docview/2492243153/B642EA365AEF487EPQ/6?accountid=10422&sourcetype=Scholarly%20Journals>

Health and Mental Health Effects of Local Immigration Enforcement

<https://www.proquest.com/econlit/docview/2064758290/B642EA365AEF487EPQ/7?accountid=10422&sourcetype=Working%20Papers>

Is ICE Freezing US Agriculture? Farm-Level Adjustment to Increased Local Immigration Enforcement

<https://www.proquest.com/econlit/docview/2769228769/B642EA365AEF487EPQ/15?accountid=10422&sourcetype=Scholarly%20Journals>

Local Immigration Enforcement and Local Economies

<https://www.proquest.com/econlit/docview/1915310551/B642EA365AEF487EPQ/16?accountid=10422&sourcetype=Scholarly%20Journals>

Immigration Enforcement and Economic Resources of Children with Likely Unauthorized Parents

<https://www.proquest.com/econlit/docview/2064763896/F314CD800A9E4AD3PQ/17?accountid=10422&sourcetype=Scholarly%20Journals>

Remittances and Immigration Enforcement

<https://www.proquest.com/econlit/docview/1775617077/F314CD800A9E4AD3PQ/20?accountid=10422&sourcetype=Scholarly%20Journals>

With a Little Help from Our Feds: Understanding State Immigration Enforcement Policy Adoption in American Federalism

<https://www.proquest.com/econlit/docview/1347768041/F314CD800A9E4AD3PQ/21?accountid=10422>

Rhodes, Scott D, Lilli Mann, Florence M Sim´an, Eunyoung Song, Jorge Alonzo, Mario

Downs, Emma Lawlor, Omar Martinez, Christina J Sun, Mary Claire O’Brien,

et al. 2015. “The impact of local immigration enforcement policies on the health of immigrant

Hispanics/Latinos in the United States.” American Journal of Public Health, 105(2): 329–337.

<https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4318326/>

Bohn, Sarah, and Robert Santillano. 2017. “Local Immigration Enforcement and Local

Economies.” Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, 56(2): 236–262.

Pham, Huyen, and Pham Hoang Van. 2010. “Economic impact of local immigration regula-

tion: an empirical analysis.” Immigr. & Nat’lity L. Rev., 31: 687.

Several recent papers have examined effects of local enforcement on migration using aggregate

data. Bohn, Lofstrom, and Raphael (forthcoming) document declines in the foreign-born

population in Arizona following restrictive state legislation. Kostandini, Mykerezi, and Escalante

(2012) focus on the agricultural sector and find that local 287(g) enforcement reduces

immigrant population, changed farm inputs, and reduced farm profits in affected counties.

O’Neil (2013) finds no systematic relationship between 287(g) implementation and Hispanic or

foreign born population growth

**Data**

1. 287(g) Mutually Signed Agreements

Starting in 2011, ICE has included lists of current Mutually Signed Agreements on its official website. These lists included the name of the participating agency, state, support type, date of signing, and (potentially) link to individual MOAs. Using the [Wayback Machine](https://web.archive.org/), I can extract snapshots of these lists; however, the available snapshots are recorded every time the site was crawled, not necessarily every time the site was actually updated. Four main website URLs were identified from 2011-2025. I extract snapshots using [Waybackpack](https://github.com/jsvine/waybackpack), a command line tool that allows you to download the entire Wayback Machine archive (excluding redirections) for a given URL.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| URL | Time period | Retrieved snapshots |
| <http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm> | 2011 - 2014 |  |
| <https://www.ice.gov/factsheets/287g> | 2015 - 2017 |  |
| <https://www.ice.gov/287g> | 2017 - 2021 |  |
| <https://www.ice.gov/identify-and-arrest/287g> | 2021 - 2025 |  |

1. Secure Communities
2. ACS

Immigrant-level data is estimated using ACS household level whatever

exposurecy=13651JMOAdj \* pop 2010jpop 2010c

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