Appendix (Not for Publication)

This appendix contains background information and additional empirical results referenced in the main text.

A   Consideration of Alternative Measures of Import Competition

As discussed in Section 4.1, our results may appear to be at odds with those in Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Majlesi (2020) who find that higher imports from China are associated with a shift, on net, toward conservative Republican candidates. As discussed there, and in Section 4.5, however, it is important to remember that the two papers focus on different time periods, with Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Majlesi (2020)'s analysis considering changes in voting behavior from 2002 forward and ours examining changes from 1992 forward. The starting point of 1992 is important to our paper because it allows us to observe voting before and after PNTR, but also because two-thirds of the drop in manufacturing employment between 2000 and the Great Recession takes place between the November 2000 and November 2002 elections. Using 2002 as a starting point, therefore, could miss some of the reaction to trade-induced job loss if those effects are already reflected in the 2002 election results.[49] The different time periods considered by the two papers helps explain the apparent discrepancies in their findings.

   To further facilitate comparison, in this section, we generate estimates of the relationship between the change in the Democratic vote share and either exposure to PNTR or the measure of import competition from China from Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Majlesi (2020) using an identical time period—the change from 2002 to 2010 employed in Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Majlesi (2020)—level of aggregation (county-level), and set of covariates (those employed in this paper). Results are displayed in Table A.1, with estimates based on exposure to PNTR in column 1 and those based on Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Majlesi (2020)'s measure of import competition in column 2. First, we note that the regression using the Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Majlesi (2020) measure in column 2 of Table A.1 essentially replicates the result in column 2 of their Table 4 , even though our regression is conducted at the county-level using our covariates (the sign is flipped in Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Majlesi (2020) because the dependent variable in that paper is the Republican vote share). Second, as indicated in the table, we obtain similar results using both measures—coefficient estimates that are near zero and not statistically significant. This is further evidence that when the two measures are used for a consistent time period, level of aggregation, and set of covariates, they yield results that are qualitatively similar.

   In sum, as discussed in the introduction, our analysis of election voting beginning in 1992, as well as our investigation into legislators' votes in the 1990s and 2000s, provides new information on the relationship between import competition and voting, relative to Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Majlesi (2020), while also being broadly consistent with their results. The shift in voting toward Democrats in the early 2000s in more PNTR-exposed counties is not apparent without comparison to the 1990s. However, our finding that this support for Democrats begins to dissipate in the 2010s is consistent with the movement toward more conservative Republican candidates found in Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Majlesi (2020).

B   Difference-in-differences with Two "Post" Periods

This Section presents results of an alternative difference-in-differences specification that interacts the NTR Gap (and all other time-invariant control variables) with two post-PNTR dummies: one for the years 2001-2008 (election years 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008) and one for the years 2009-2016

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[49]Evidence of this reaction being reflected in the 2002 election is discussed in Section 4.5.

(election years 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016). As shown in Table A.2, the results indicate a positive and statistically significant increase in support for Democrats in more PNTR-exposed counties in the first period and no statistically significant difference in support for Democrats in the second period, relative to the 1990s. However, the coefficient estimates on the DID terms for the two periods are not statistically significant from one another. These results are consistent with those from estimating the more generalized Equation 4 (Figure 4), as discussed in Section 6.

C Robustness Check Without County Fixed Effects

The baseline approach in Equation 3 includes county fixed effects. These county fixed effects absorb the $NTRGap_c$ term, so that term does not appear in Equation 3, and also imply that our DID estimates capture variation in the Democratic vote share within counties over time. An alternative approach is to estimate a difference-in-differences specification in which we exclude county fixed effects, include the $NTRGap_c$ term in levels, and also include the other covariates in levels. We present these results in Table A.3 below. As indicated in the Table, we continue to find a positive and significant coefficient for the difference-in-differences term of interest, indicating that counties more exposed to PNTR experience relative increases in the share of votes cast for Democrats.

D List of Trade-Related Bills

Table A.4 provides the list of trade-related bills sourced from Comparative Agendas, along with our rankings of each bill as either pro- or anti-trade. We use four classifications of bills: clearly anti-trade, marginally anti-trade, marginally pro-trade, and clearly pro-trade. The baseline results presented in Section 5 are based on the set of clearly pro- or anti-trade bills. Here, in Table A.5, we also present results based on the full set of bills, including those that are marginally anti- or pro-trade. As indicated in the Table, we continue to find that Democratic representatives' votes were relatively anti-trade in the early 2000s, and we also find that based on this broader set of bills, the shift toward relatively anti-trade positions by Republicans in 2012-2014 is even more pronounced.

E Voting on Trade-Related Bills, By Party

This section provides tables showing the share of pro-trade votes cast by parties. Table A.6 displays pro-trade vote shares, by party, for each Congress. In the table, there is a sharp decrease in the share of pro-trade votes cast by Democrats, and a similarly sharp increase in the share of pro-trade votes cast by Republicans between the 106th Congress elected in 1998 (the last Congress of Democratic President Bill Clinton's term) and the 107th Congress elected in 2000 (the first Congress of Republican President George W. Bush's term).[50] Table A.7 displays the share of pro-trade votes cast for the set of Representatives who were in Congress and voted on the granting of PNTR to China in 2000 (HR 4444, 106th Congress). The table separates these representatives into four groups, Democrats who voted Aye for HR 4444, Democrats who voted No, Republicans who voted Aye, and Republicans who voted No. As shown in the Table, the shift toward anti-trade positions by Democrats following the 2000 election was present for legislators who voted for PNTR and also those who voted against PNTR, with the anti-trade positions being more persistent for those who voted against PNTR.

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[50]The increase in the pro-trade vote share exhibited by both parties in the 110th Congress is due to the consideration of only three bills and the presence of one bill—H.R. 1830, extending the authority of the Andean Trade Preference Act—that was passed with an overwhelming bipartisan majority.

F   Visual Representations of RD Approach

This section examines the assumptions underlying the regression discontinuity (RD) identification strategy pursued in Section 7 of the main text. Figure A.1 provides a visual representation of the RD approach using binned local averages as suggested in Lee and Lemieux (2010). As shown in the left panel of the Figure, from 1992 to 2000, the share of a district's pro-trade votes is not statistically different on either side of the Democratic margin of victory cutoff point $Margin_{dh} = 0$. This outcome suggests that during the 1990s, Democrat and Republican legislators with narrow margins of victory, on average, voted similarly on legislation related to trade. The center panel, however, indicates that the parties diverge in their voting on trade in the 2000s, after implementation of PNTR. Specifically, in this period, the share of districts' pro-trade votes drops discontinuously at the cutoff point where the Democrat earns a larger share of the vote. Given that the chance of winning the election jumps discontinuously at the same point (see Figure A.2), this outcome reveals that Democratic representatives during this period take more anti-trade positions than their Republican colleagues. The final panel of Figure A.1, like the first panel, reveals little divergence in voting patterns, indicating that Republicans and Democrats were again voting similarly on trade-related bills, though we caution that this period contains relatively few bills, as illustrated in Appendix Table A.4.

G   Tests for the Appropriateness of the RD Approach

The first panel of Figure A.3 displays the McCrary (2008) test of whether there is a discontinuity in the density of Democrats winning margin over Republicans. Specifically, the test statistic considers whether there is a discontinuity in the density function at the point at which the Democrat margin of victory is zero, with a null hypothesis that there is no discontinuity at this cutoff. The test yields an estimated statistic of 0.077 with a standard error of 0.119, indicating that we fail to reject the null hypothesis of continuity at the cutoff. The remaining panels examine the distributions of important district-level attributes plotted against the Democrat margin of victory. As indicated in those panels of the Figure, none of these distributions exhibit discontinuities at the cutoff point at which the Democrat margin of victory is 0.

H   Timing of Republican Move toward Protectionism

In this section, we discuss two potential reasons that Republicans may have maintained their relatively pro-trade positions during the 2000s, even as Democrats seemed to benefit in House of Representatives elections from their relatively anti-trade positions. The first potential reason relates to partisanship, as discussed in Section 7.3. Table A.6 documents a clear shift in positions by both Democrats and Republicans following the transition from the Democratic administration of Bill Clinton to the Republican administration of George W. Bush. Republican representatives during the Bush administration may have felt pressure to support the pro-trade views of the President from their party. This pressure may have delayed their adoption of anti-trade positions even as they saw Democratic candidates benefiting from anti-trade views.

The second potential explanation is that Republicans were less concerned with the increase in the Democratic vote share because it was occurring in "safe" Democratic districts and thus was less likely to lead to losses of seats to Democrats. We examine this possibility by estimating a variation of equation 3 that includes interactions of the main difference-in-differences term with indicators for safe Democratic districts or safe Republican districts. Competitive districts are the excluded category; safe districts are defined as those with a vote margin between the two parties of 5 percent or more in every House election from 1992 to 2008. As shown in Table A.8, we continue to find a positive and statistically significant coefficient on the main DID term. The coefficient on the triple interaction of

Post x *NTR Gap* x *Dem Safe District* is positive—consistent with Democratic gains being modestly larger in safe districts—but is just outside standard levels of statistical significance (p-value of 0.14).

I OLS Estimates of Relationship Between Pro-Trade Vote Share, Exposure to PNTR, and Party Affiliation

In this section, we present results of OLS regressions examining the relationship between the pro-trade vote share and exposure to PNTR, an indicator for Democratic party affiliation, and the interaction of these two variables. Results are presented in Table A.9. As indicated in the Table, the coefficient on the Democrat indicator is negative and significant in the early 2000s, indicating the party's relatively anti-trade positions during that period. The coefficient on the NTR gap is negative and significant in the 1990s and 2000s, indicating that local conditions influenced anti-trade views regardless of parties, and the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and significant in the 2010s, indicating that Democrats in high NTR gap districts were more anti-trade during this period.

J RD Results Across Periods Defined by Presidencies

This section provides results of the regression discontinuity approach outlined in Section 7, but with the cutoff between the three periods determined by Presidential elections. In other words, these cutoffs separate the three periods by presidencies, with the first period corresponding to the Clinton presidency, the second period corresponding to the George W. Bush presidency, and the third period corresponding to the Obama presidency. Note that the column headers refer to the election years that seated the Congresses.

Panel A of Table A.10 presents results from parametric estimation and Panel B of the Table presents results from nonparametric estimation. The general shifts in preferences toward trade that we find when separating periods by Presidencies are broadly similar to our baseline results. As shown in the Table, under both approaches, we continue to find a strong shift by Democrats from being more pro-trade than Republicans during the Clinton presidency to being much more strongly anti-trade during the George W. Bush presidency. We also continue to find that the two parties move closer in their views on trade in the third period.

K Ordinary Least Squares Estimates

As discussed in Section 7, our baseline RD estimates represent weighted average treatment effects, with the weights being proportional to the *ex-ante* likelihood that a representatives realization of the assignment variable is close to the threshold, i.e. comes from a district with an expected close election. If the behavior of representatives facing close elections is different from the general population of representatives, our RD estimates may not capture the overall voting behavior of the party on trade bills. To provide further context, in Table A.11, we report results from an OLS regression of the pro-trade vote share on an indicator for the representative being a member of the Democratic Party. As shown in the table, results are broadly consistent with those found with the RD approach. We find that Democrats were modestly more protectionist than Republicans from 1992-2000, become much more protectionist from 2002-2010, and then shift to being relatively more pro-trade from 2012-2014.

L Alternative Regression Discontinuity Approaches

In the main text (Panel A of Table 6), we implement a parametric estimation approach using third-order polynomial functions of $g(.)$ and $f(.)$ with potentially different coefficients on the two sides of the cutoff point, making use of all observations over the domain of the assignment variable. Following

Lee and Card (2008), we calculate standard errors clustered at the assignment variable level. Here, we report results using second- and fourth-order polynomials to examine the sensitivity of our estimates using third order polynomials. As indicated in Table A.12, both sets of polynomials indicate that after having similar voting on trade-related bills in the 1990s, Democrats become more protectionist than Republicans in the early 2000s. From 2012 forward, as the Republican party becomes increasingly hostile to trade, Democrats are actually more pro-trade than Republicans.

The nonparametric approach to regression discontinuity estimation used in the main text (Panel B of Table 6) is a "local linear" estimation that uses observations within a window of width w on both sides of the cutoff point and assumes that $g(.)$ and $f(.)$ are linear, with potentially different slopes on the two sides of the cutoff point. We implement this approach using the procedure developed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) to calculate the optimal bandwidth w^*, and estimate standard errors that are clustered on the assignment variable. In Table A.13, we report robustness checks using different bandwidths, specifically, halving and doubling w^*, as in Lee and Lemieux (2010). As indicated in the table, results with these alternative bandwidths are similar to those reported in Section 7.3.

Table A.1: Alternative Measures of Import Competition

	δHouse Democratic Share$_{2002-2010,c}$	δHouse Democratic Share$_{2002-2010,c}$
NTR Gap$_c$	-0.007	
	0.167	
ΔImport Penetration$_{2002-2010,c}$		1.786
		4.324
Median HHI in 1990$_c$	0.092	0.089
	0.118	0.121
Percent Bachelors in 1990$_c$	0.092	0.083
	0.261	0.267
Percent Graduate in 1990$_c$	0.304	0.302
	0.392	0.384
Percent Non-White in 1990$_c$	0.016	0.015
	0.071	0.071
Percent Over 65 in 1990c	-0.229	-0.226
	0.277	0.269
Percent Veteran in 1990$_c$	0.449	0.456
	0.413	0.411
Observations	3,029	3,029
Weighting	2002 Population	2002 Population
Clustering	State	State
R-Squared	0.03	0.02

Notes: Table displays results of county-level regressions in which the dependent variable is the change from 2002 to 2010 in the share of votes cast for Democrats. First column reports results of OLS regressions with independent variables including the county-level NTR Gap and noted county-level attributes, defined as of 2000. Second column reports second stage results of an instrumental variables regression in which U.S. import penetration from China is instrumented with import penetration from China in eight other developed countries as in Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Majlesi (2020). Regressions are weighted using 2002 population and standard errors adjusted for clustering at the state level are reported below coefficients. *, **, and, *** signify statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.

Figure A.1: Democrat Votes on Trade Bills

Source: Dave Leip's Atlas of US Presidential Elections and authors' calculations. Unit of analysis is a district-year pair across the election years 1992 to 2014. Figure displays the share of pro-trade votes (vertical axis) versus the Democratic vote share margin of victory (horizontal axis) for three periods corresponding to the terms of the 103rd to the 107th Congresses (elected in the years 1992 to 2000), the 108th through the 112th Congresses (2002 to 2010), and the 113th and 114th Congresses (2012 to 2014). Estimates binned local averages as in Lee and Lemieux (2010). Shading represents the 95 percent confidence interval.

Table A.2: DID With Two "Post" Periods

	House Democratic Share$_{ct}$
1{ 2001-2008 } x NTR Gap$_c$	0.592***
	0.21
1{ 2009-2016 } x NTR Gap$_c$	0.407
	0.264
1{ 2001-2008 } x Median HHI$_c$	0.205***
	0.058
1{ 2009-2016 } x Median HHI$_c$	0.426***
	0.088
1{ 2001-2008 } x %Bachelors$_c$	0.089
	0.171
1{ 2009-2016 } x %Bachelors$_c$	0.522**
	0.229
1{ 2001-2008 } x %Graduate$_c$	0.443***
	0.163
1{ 2009-2016 } x %Graduate$_c$	0.251
	0.234
1{ 2001-2008 } x %Non-White$_c$	0.073
	0.051
1{ 2009-2016 } x %Non-White$_c$	0.189***
	0.052
1{ 2001-2008 } x %Over-65$_c$	0.255**
	0.118
1{ 2009-2016 } x %Over-65$_c$	0.318
	0.219
1{ 2001-2008 } x %Veteran$_c$	-0.136
	0.292
1{ 2009-2016 } x %Veteran$_c$	0.028
	0.313
1{ 2001-2008 } x %Manufacturing$_c$	-0.116*
	0.067
1{ 2009-2016 } x %Manufacturing$_c$	-0.123
	0.096
1{ 2001-2008 } x NAFTA$_c$	1.863
	1.233
1{ 2009-2016 } x NAFTA$_c$	1.514
	1.541
MFA Exposure$_{ct}$	-0.521**
	0.259
NTR$_{ct}$	1.579
	1.283
Observations	40,027
R-squared	0.73
Estimation	OLS
Period	1992(2)2016
FE	c,t
Weighting	1992 Pop.
Clustering	State

 Notes: Table reports difference-in-differences (DID) OLS regression results of the Democratic vote shares on noted covariates. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the state level are reported below coefficients. *, **, and *** signify statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.

Table A.3: DID Without County Fixed Effects

VARIABLES	House Democratic Share$_{ct}$
Post x NTR Gap$_c$	0.528**
	0.208
NTR Gap$_c$	-0.267
	0.327
Post x Median HHI in 1990$_c$	0.208***
	0.059
Post x Percent Bachelors in 1990$_c$	0.068
	0.172
Post x Percent Graduate in 1990$_c$	0.454***
	0.166
Post x Percent Non-White in 1990$_c$	0.068
	0.051
Post x Percent Over 65 in 1990$_c$	0.195*
	0.115
Post x Percent Veteran in 1990$_c$	-0.16
	0.294
Post x Manufacturing Share$_c$	-0.105
	0.065
Pre x NAFTA Exposure$_c$	-2.624*
	1.313
Median HHI in 1990$_c$	-0.03
	0.098
Percent Bachelors in 1990$_c$	-0.849**
	0.386
Percent Graduate in 1990$_c$	1.396***
	0.426
Percent Non-White in 1990$_c$	0.423***
	0.082
Percent Over 65 in 1990$_c$	0.909**
	0.379
Percent Veteran in 1990$_c$	-0.994**
	0.445
Manufacturing Share$_c$	-0.017
	0.126
NAFTA Exposure$_c$	4.004*
	2.003
MFA Exposure$_{ct}$	0.026
	0.409
NTR$_{ct}$	0.185
	0.96
Observations	27,661
R-squared	0.26
Estimation	OLS
Period	1992(2)2008
FE	t
Weighting	1992 Pop.
Clustering	State

Notes: Table reports difference-in-differences (DID) OLS regression results of the Democratic vote shares on noted covariates. Note that this specification excludes county fixed effects. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the state level are reported below coefficients. *, **, and *** signify statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.

Table A.4: Trade Bills

Bill	Year	Congress	Ranking	Bill	Year	Congress	Ranking
HJRES208	1993	103	4	HRES509	2002	107	1
HR3450	1993	103	1	HR2738	2003	108	1
HJRES373	1994	103	4	HR2739	2003	108	1
HR5110	1994	103	1	HRES252	2003	108	2
HJRES96	1995	104	4	HRES329	2003	108	1
HR1555	1995	104	3	HR4759	2004	108	1
HJRES182	1996	104	4	HR4842	2004	108	1
HR1643	1996	104	1	HRES705	2004	108	2
HR3161	1996	104	1	HJRES 27	2005	109	4
HJRES79	1997	105	4	HR 2864	2005	109	3
HR2644	1997	105	2	HR 3045	2005	109	1
HCONRES213	1998	105	2	HR 4340	2005	109	1
HJRES120	1998	105	4	HRES 57	2005	109	3
HR2621	1998	105	2	HR1053	2006	109	1
HR4276	1998	105	4	HR4954	2006	109	3
HJRES121	1998	105	4	HR5602	2006	109	1
HCONRES190	1999	106	1	HR5684	2006	109	1
HJRES58	1999	106	4	HR6406	2006	109	1
HR975	1999	106	4	HR1830	2007	110	1
HJRES57	1999	106	4	HR2264	2007	110	2
HJRES103	2000	106	4	HR3688	2007	110	1
HJRES90	2000	106	4	HR515	2009	111	3
HJRES99	2000	106	4	HR 5307	2010	111	3
HR4444	2000	106	1	HR2832	2011	112	1
HCONRES262	2001	107	3	HR3078	2011	112	1
HJRES50	2001	107	4	HR3079	2011	112	1
HJRES55	2001	107	4	HR3080	2011	112	1
HR2500	2001	107	3	HR4105	2012	112	4
HR2722	2001	107	3	HR6156	2012	112	1
HR3005	2001	107	1	HRES841	2012	112	3
HR3009	2001	107	1	HR1295	2015	114	1
HJRES101	2002	107	4	HR2578	2015	114	3
HRES414	2002	107	3	HR4923	2016	114	2
HRES450	2002	107	1	HRES819	2016	114	3

Source: Comparative Agendas and authors' calculations. Table lists the set of trade-related bills considered by the US House of Representatives from 1992 to 2016. These bills are identified via the Comparative Agenda subject-area classifications 1802 ("Trade Agreements") and 1807 ("Tariff & Imports"). From this set, we keep only votes on final passage of a bill (i.e., we exclude procedural votes) and also exclude bills that deal with trade only tangentially, such as broad appropriations bills. Bills are ranked as "pro-trade" or "anti-trade" separately by two of the authors and three research assistants. A ranking of 1 denotes "clearly pro-trade" bills, a ranking of 2 denotes "Marginally pro-trade" bills, a ranking of 3 denotes "marginally anti-trade bills," and a ranking of 4 denotes "clearly anti-trade bills." The final ranking displayed in the table is the modal rank across these reviewers.

Table A.5: RD Results: All Trade Bills

Variables	1992-2000	2002-2010	2012-2014
Democrat	0.028	-0.167***	0.255***
	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.043)
Stock-Yogo	87	85	NA
Kleinbergen-Papp	411	265	NA
Observations	2,174	1,739	435

Source: Dave Leip's Atlas of US Presidential Elections and authors' calculations. Table summarizes the results of district-year level regression discontinuity specifications of the share of pro-trade votes on an indicator for whether the representative is a Democrat using all trade bills. Column headers refer to the years in which the representatives are elected (their two-year service begins in January of the following years). Standard errors clustered at the assignment variable level are reported below coefficients. *, ** and *** signify statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.

Table A.6: Share of Pro-Trade Votes, by Party and Congress

| Congress	Election Year	Democrat Pro-Trade Vote Share	Republican Pro-Trade Vote Share
103	1992	68%	71%
104	1994	67%	64%
105	1996	61%	47%
106	1998	63%	72%
107	2000	40%	80%
108	2002	43%	89%
109	2004	54%	81%
110	2006	64%	88%
112	2010	42%	74%
114	2014	98%	87%

Notes: Table displays the share of pro-trade votes cast by Representatives of both parties on trade-related legislation, by Congress. The set of trade-related bills and classification of pro- or anti-trade is displayed in Appendix Table A.4. No data are displayed for years 2008 and 2012 as there were no clearly defined trade bills introduced during those Congresses.

Table A.7: Share of Pro-Trade Votes by Representatives Who Voted on Bill Granting PNTR to China

Congress	Election Year	Number of Members Who Voted on PNTR Bill In Office	Democrat & Aye	Democrat & No	Republican & Aye	Republican & No
103	1992	248	82%	50%	84%	37%
104	1994	313	75%	63%	69%	57%
105	1996	387	63%	60%	52%	35%
106	1998	435	85%	51%	87%	32%
107	2000	391	55%	31%	89%	52%
108	2002	332	81%	18%	96%	70%
109	2004	297	73%	41%	90%	61%
110	2006	255	93%	43%	94%	66%
112	2010	164	61%	32%	77%	55%
114	2014	99	96%	95%	95%	73%

 Notes: Table displays the share of pro-trade votes cast by representatives who were in Congress and voted on the bill granting Permanent Normal Trade Relations to China (HR 4444, 106th Congress), separated by party and by vote on PNTR (Aye or No). Table also displays the number of those representatives who were in office in prior and subsequent Congresses. No data are displayed for years 2008 and 2012 as there were no clearly defined trade bills introduced during those Congresses.

Figure A.2: Regression Discontinuity Intuition

Source: Dave Leip's Atlas of US Presidential Elections and authors' calculations. Unit of analysis is a district-year pair across House elections from 1992 to 2014. The horizontal axis is the difference between the Democrat and Republican vote margin. The vertical axis is a dummy variable indicating whether the district is represented by a Democrat. Note that because a district could be controlled by a third party, positive margin does not perfectly predict Democratic representation. Shading represents the 95 percent confidence interval.

Table A.8: PNTR and Safe Versus Competitive Districts

VARIABLES	House Democratic Share$_{dt}$
Post x NTR Gap$_d$	2.086***
	0.730
Post x NTR Gap$_d$ x Dem. Safe District$_d$	0.327
	0.221
Post x NTR Gap$_d$ x Rep. Safe District$_d$	-0.193
	0.225
Post x Dem. Safe District$_d$	2.721*
	1.371
Post x Rep. Safe District$_d$	-4.601***
	1.240
Post x Median HHI in 1990$_d$	0.185**
	0.079
Post x Percent Bachelors in 1990$_d$	20.521
	41.609
Post x Percent Graduate in 1990$_d$	-2.666
	54.260
Post x Percent Non-White in 1990$_d$	-6.726
	5.988
Post x Percent Over 65 in 1990$_d$	-31.071
	21.040
Post x Percent Veteran in 1990$_d$	30.256
	40.148
Post x Manufacturing Share$_d$	-0.560**
	0.246
Post x NAFTA Exposure$_d$	5.297*
	3.102
MFA Exposure$_{dt}$	-0.275
	0.417
NTR$_{dt}$	7.055
	4.867
Observations	3,847
R-squared	0.790
Estimation	OLS
Period	1992(2)2008
FE	d,t
Weighting	1992 Pop.
Clustering	State

Notes: Table reports difference-in-differences (DID) OLS regression results of the Democratic vote shares on noted covariates using constructed district-year-level observations. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the state level are reported below coefficients. *, **, and *** signify statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.

Table A.9: OLS Regressions of Pro-Trade Vote Share on Exposure to PNTR and Party Affiliation

	1992-2000	2002-2010	2012-2014
Democrat$_{dt}$	-0.092***	-0.316***	-0.011
	(0.025)	(0.038)	(0.047)
NTRGap$_d$	-0.012***	-0.012***	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Democrat$_{dt}$ x NTRGap$_d$	0.004	0.001	-0.013*
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Observations	2,165	1,301	865

Notes: Table summarizes the results of district-year-level OLS regressions of the share of pro-trade votes on noted covariates and district-level controls. Years in column headers are the election years that seat Congresses that serve for the following two years. *, **, and *** signify statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.

Table A.10: RD Results: Periods Corresponding to Presidencies

Panel A: Parametric Estimation

	(1) 1992-1998	(2) 2000-2006	(3) 2008-2014
Democrat	0.069*	-0.279***	-0.193
	(0.037)	(0.055)	(0.064)
R2	0.02	0.26	0.05
Observations	1,739	1,739	867

Panel B: Non-Parametric Estimation

	(1) 1992-1998	(2) 2000-2006	(3) 2008-2014
Democrat	0.072**	-0.284***	-0.135**
	(0.029)	(0.037)	(0.062)
Observations	1,050	1,325	311

Notes: Table summarizes the results of district-year level regression discontinuity regressions of the share of pro-trade votes on an indicator for whether the representative is a Democrat. Panel A reports results using parametric estimation with third-order polynomials. Panel B reports results using nonparametric local linear estimation, in which observations are limited to those within the optimal bandwidth. Column headers refer to the years in which the representatives are elected (their two-year service begins in January of the following years), with each column representing a different presidency. Standard errors clustered at the assignment variable level are reported below coefficients. *, ** and *** signify statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.

Table A.11: OLS Estimates of Relationship Between Pro-Trade Vote Share and Party Affiliation

	1992-2000	2002-2010	2012-2014
Democrat	-0.066***	-0.313***	0.119***
	-0.011	-0.014	-0.024
Observations	2174	1738	433

Notes: Table summarizes the results of OLS regressions of the pro-trade vote share on an indicator for whether the Representative is a Democrat. Column headers refer to the years in which the representatives are elected (their two-year service begins in January of the following years). Standard errors are reported below coefficients. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level.

Table A.12: RD Results: Alternate Polynomial Functions

Panel A: Second-Order Polynomial Function

	(1) 1992-2000	(2) 2002-2010	(3) 2012-2014
Democrat	0.072*	-0.315***	0.007
	(0.027)	(0.037)	(0.065)
Stock-Yogo	20	83	NA
Kleinbergen-Papp	671	442	NA
Observations	2,174	1,738	433

Panel B: Fourth-Order Polynomial Function

	(1) 1992-2000	(2) 2002-2010	(3) 2012-2014
Democrat	0.028	-0.243***	0.089
	(0.044)	(0.061)	(0.111)
Stock-Yogo	99	49	NA
Kleinbergen-Papp	255	171	NA
Observations	2,174	1,738	433

Notes: Table summarizes the results of district-year level regression discontinuity regressions of the share of pro-trade votes on an indicator for whether the representative is a Democrat using a parametric estimation approach with either second-order (Panel A) of fourth-order polynomials (Panel B). Column headers refer to the years in which the representatives are elected (their two-year service begins in January of the following years). Standard errors clustered at the assignment variable level are reported below coefficients. *, ** and *** signify statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.

Table A.13: RD Results: Alternate Bandwidths

Panel A: Half Optimal Bandwidth

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	1992-2000	2002-2010	2012-2014
Democrat	0.046	-0.292***	0.061
	(0.038)	(0.044)	(0.080)
Band	0.23	0.28	0.24
R2	0.01	0.23	0.03
Observations	693	680	145

Panel B: Double Optimal Bandwidth

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	1992-2000	2002-2010	2012-2016
Democrat	0.053**	-0.313***	0.089**
	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.040)
Band	0.79	1.14	0.94
R2	0.03	0.24	0.04
Observations	1,928	1,738	401

Notes: Table summarizes the results of district-year level regression discontinuity regressions of the share of pro-trade votes on an indicator for whether the representative is a Democrat using a non-parametric local linear approach with either half (Panel A) or double (Panel B) the optimal bandwidth size. Column headers refer to the years in which the representatives are elected (their two-year service begins in January of the following years). Standard errors clustered at the assignment variable level are reported below coefficients. *, ** and *** signify statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level.

Figure A.3: RD Identifying Assumption Tests

Source: Dave Leip's Atlas of US Presidential Elections and authors' calculations. Observations are defined at the district-year level for the election years 1992 to 2014. The horizontal axis for all panels is the difference between the Democrat and Republican vote shares. The upper left panel displays the McCrary (2008) test of whether there is a discontinuity in the density of the Democrat win margin across districts. The estimated discontinuity, 0.077 with a standard error of 0.119 is statistically insignificant, indicating that the null hypothesis of continuity is not rejected. The remaining seven panels examine the distributions of district-level attributes plotted against the Democrat margin of victory. Shading represents the 95 percent confidence interval. Note that because a district could be controlled by a third party, a positive Democrat margin of victory does not perfectly predict that a Democrat represents the district.