

## Findings

**1. Phishing:** A fake "Security Update" email is being sent to Acme employees to steal user credentials (particularly email and password) and thereby obtain legitimate API tokens.

(json)

**POST /api/v1/login**

```
{  
  "email": "user@example.com",  
  "password": "secure_password"  
}
```

This vulnerability appears to be obvious because no MFA or IP restrictions are specified in the document. If such a login endpoint operates without MFA and the phishing attempt is successful, the attacker could obtain API tokens.

**2. SQL Injection (Web Application):** The attacker exploited SQL vulnerabilities in the "Trading Portal" web application to perform an SQL injection attack. Through this vulnerability, the attacker was able to obtain user records, password hashes or tokens, as well as the user\_id and account\_id values of the Backend API.

At API endpoints, user parameters are passed directly through "path" or "query." This indicates that the document doesn't directly demonstrate SQL injection, but there are some indirect indications.

(bash)

**GET /api/v1/transactions/{account\_id}?end\_date=2024-10-15**

It has been observed that the backend uses these parameters directly in the SQL query without a prepared statement.

(sql)

**SELECT \* FROM transactions WHERE account\_id = '\$account\_id';**

This vulnerability allows an attacker to discover account\_id values, see other user IDs, and combine with the next Broken Access Control vulnerability.

**3. Broken Access Control (Mobile API):** It has been observed that the **Broken Access Control** vulnerability on the mobile API doesn't verify whether the user's account\_id is the user's account.

## GET /api/v1/portfolio/1523

**Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIs...**

Here, 1523 represents the user's account\_id, and the JWT token in the Authorization header represents that user's identity. A Broken Access Control vulnerability has emerged because the server only checks whether the token is valid, but does not check whether the owner of this token is actually account\_id=1523.

### Incident Analysis (Attack Chain) table:

| Stage | Vector                | Description   | Impact                            |
|-------|-----------------------|---|-----------------------------------|
| 1     | Phishing              | Employee credentials were stolen                                      | Authentication bypassed           |
| 2     | SQL Injection         | User and token information obtained via web application vulnerability | Unauthorized data disclosure      |
| 3     | Broken Access Control | JWT is valid but account ownership is not verified                    | User data and transactions leaked |

### Technical Findings

| Category              | Description  | Severity |
|-----------------------|--|----------|
| Phishing              | Employee MFA absent, low security awareness                | High     |
| SQL Injection         | Input validation missing (e.g., GET /user?id=1' OR '1'='1) | Critical |
| Broken Access Control | API token validated but account ownership not checked      | Critical |
| Rate Limit            | Enforcement not strictly applied; brute force possible     | Medium   |
| Logging / Monitoring  | Logs exist but anomalous access not detected               | High     |

### Improvement Recommendations

| Area | Recommendation | Priority |
|------|----------------|----------|
|------|----------------|----------|

|                      |  |          |
|----------------------|--|----------|
| Phishing Prevention  | Employee awareness training, SPF/DKIM/DMARC, anti-phishing gateway | Medium   |
| Application Security | OWASP ASVS / Top 10 audit, secure coding training                  | High     |
| API Security         | Validate user_id from JWT, enforce Access Control Lists            | Critical |
| Rate Limiting        | Enforce via API Gateway, alert on threshold violations             | Medium   |
| Monitoring           | SIEM correlation: detect same token accessing multiple account_ids | High     |
| Incident Response    | Maintain logs, share IOC lists (IP, JWT, email)                    | High     |

### MITRE ATT&CK Mappings

| Aşama                 | Taktik                      | Teknik                                    |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|---|
| Phishing              | Initial Access              | T1566.001 – Spearphishing Attachment      |
| SQL Injection         | Initial Access / Collection | T1190 – Exploit Public-Facing Application |
| Broken Access Control | Exfiltration / Impact       | T1537 – Transfer Data to Cloud Account    |
| Token reuse           | Credential Access           | T1552.004 – Private Keys / Tokens         |

### ISO27001 Annex A — Acme API Mapping

| Issue / Risk                           | ISO 27001 Annex A Control                       | API-specific Recommendation  |
|--|---|--|
| <b>Broken Access Control (IDOR)</b>    | <b>A.9 Access Control</b> (A.9.1, A.9.2, A.9.4) | Implement token + resource ownership check. Ensure RBAC/least-privilege applied per endpoint.      |
| <b>Token / Secret Management (JWT)</b> | <b>A.10 Cryptography, A.8 Asset Management</b>  | Manage JWT secrets via KMS, enforce token expiry, implement refresh/revoke mechanism, rotate keys. |

|   |   |  |
|---|---|--|
| <b>SQL Injection (lack of input validation)</b> | <b>A.14 System acquisition, development and maintenance</b> (A.14.2 Secure Development)                             | Enforce input validation, use parameterized queries/prepared statements, conduct SAST/DAST and secure code reviews.          |
| <b>Phishing / Human factor</b>                  | <b>A.7 Human Resource Security, A.6 Organization of Information Security</b>  | Regular user training, phishing simulations, enforce SPF/DKIM/DMARC, sandbox attachments at mail gateway.                    |
| <b>Logging &amp; Monitoring Insufficient</b>    | <b>A.12 Operations Security</b> (A.12.4 Logging & Monitoring), <b>A.16 Information Security Incident Management</b> | Centralize logs (API Gateway, DB, auth server), ensure audit trail integrity, configure alerts for abnormal access patterns. |
| <b>Rate Limiting / Brute-force / DoS</b>        | <b>A.12 Operations, A.13 Communications Security</b>  | Implement API rate limiting, throttling, IP filtering, anomaly detection.  |
| <b>Vulnerability Management / Patching</b>      | <b>A.12.6 Technical Vulnerability Management</b>  | Regular dependency scanning, timely patching, emergency patch procedures for critical vulnerabilities.                       |
| <b>Data Protection / Privacy</b>                | <b>A.18 Compliance</b> (laws, regulations, info classification)   | Encrypt personal data in transit & at rest, apply data minimization, classify sensitive data, implement retention policies.  |
| <b>Incident Response Readiness</b>              | <b>A.16 Information Security Incident Management</b>  | Maintain incident response playbooks, IOC ingestion, tabletop exercises, ensure rapid escalation & containment procedures.   |

#### NIST CSF Mapping — Acme API Scenario

| <b>Attack Stage / Risk</b>           | <b>NIST CSF Function</b> | <b>Category</b>              | <b>Subcategory / Notes</b>   |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|--|
| <b>Phishing (Stolen Credentials)</b> | <b>Protect (PR)</b>      | PR.AT – Awareness & Training | Employee security awareness, phishing simulations, training on credential protection |

|   |                     |  |   |
|---|---------------------|--|---|
|   |                     | PR.AC – Identity Management, Authentication and Access Control | Enforce MFA, strong password policy, token lifecycle management       |
| <b>SQL Injection (Input Validation Lapse)</b> | <b>Protect (PR)</b> | PR.IP – Information Protection Processes and Procedures        | Input validation, prepared statements, WAF rules                      |
|   | <b>Detect (DE)</b>  | DE.CM – Continuous Security Monitoring                         | Detect anomalous database queries and input patterns                  |
| <b>Broken Access Control (IDOR)</b>           | <b>Protect (PR)</b> | PR.AC – Access Control   | Validate resource ownership with token; enforce RBAC / ACLs           |
|   | <b>Detect (DE)</b>  | DE.CM – Continuous Monitoring                                  | Alert SIEM on token accessing multiple account_ids                    |
| <b>Rate Limiting / Brute-force</b>            | <b>Protect (PR)</b> | PR.DS – Data Security  | API Gateway rate limiting, IP / user throttling                       |
|   | <b>Detect (DE)</b>  | DE.CM – Continuous Monitoring                                  | Detect repeated failed login attempts / excessive requests            |
| <b>Logging &amp; Monitoring Gap</b>           | <b>Detect (DE)</b>  | DE.CM – Continuous Monitoring                                  | Centralized logging (API, auth, DB), correlation of anomalies         |
| <b>Incident Response Readiness</b>            | <b>Respond (RS)</b> | RS.MI – Mitigation   | Incident playbooks, IOC ingestion, response actions                   |
|   | <b>Recover (RC)</b> | RC.IM – Improvements   | Lessons learned, policy/process updates post-incident                 |
| <b>Data Protection / Privacy</b>              | <b>Protect (PR)</b> | PR.DS – Data Security  | Encrypt sensitive data in transit & at rest, enforce retention policy |

**VIDEO Bağlantı Linki:**

**<https://vimeo.com/1135097518?fl=ip&fe=ec>**