



# Modelling Software-based Systems Lecture 3 Checking contracts with Event-B

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# General Summary

1 Programming by contract

2 Verification

3 Floyd to Hoare

# **Current Summary**

- 1 Programming by contract
- 2 Verification
- S Floyd to Hoare

# Verifying program correctness

### A program P satisfies a (pre,post) contract :

- P transforms a variable v from initial values  $v_0$  and produces a final value  $v_f: v_0 \xrightarrow{P} v_f$
- $\mathsf{v}_0$  satisfies  $\mathsf{pre} : \mathsf{pre}(v_0)$  and  $\mathsf{v}_f$  satisfies  $\mathsf{post} : \mathsf{post}(v_0, v_f)$
- $\bullet \ \operatorname{pre}(v_0) \wedge v_0 \stackrel{\mathsf{P}}{\longrightarrow} v_f \Rightarrow \operatorname{post}(v_0, v_f)$
- D est le domaine RTE de V

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- $\mathsf{v}_0$  satisfies pre :  $\mathsf{pre}(v_0)$  and  $\mathsf{v}_f$  satisfies post :  $\mathsf{post}(v_0, v_f)$
- $\operatorname{pre}(v_0) \wedge v_0 \xrightarrow{\mathsf{P}} v_f \Rightarrow \operatorname{post}(v_0, v_f)$
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```
requires pre(v_0) ensures post(v_0, v_f) variables X
\begin{array}{c} \text{begin} \\ 0: P_0(v_0, v) \\ \text{instruction}_0 \\ \dots \\ i: P_i(v_0, v) \\ \dots \\ \text{instruction}_{f-1} \\ f: P_f(v_0, v) \\ \text{end} \end{array}
```

- $pre(v_0) \wedge v = v_0 \Rightarrow P_0(v_0, v)$
- $pre(v_0) \wedge P_f(v_0, v) \Rightarrow post(v_0, v)$
- For any pair of labels  $\ell, \ell'$  such that  $\ell \longrightarrow \ell'$ , one verifies that, pour any values  $v, v' \in \operatorname{MEMORY}$   $\left( \begin{array}{c} pre(v_0) \wedge P_\ell(v_0, v) \\ \wedge cond_{\ell, \ell'}(v) \wedge v' = f_{\ell, \ell'}(v) \end{array} \right),$   $\Rightarrow P_{\ell'}(v_0, v')$

### **Contracts - Verification Conditions**

```
 \begin{array}{c} \text{contract P} \\ \text{variables v} \\ \text{requires } pre(v_0) \\ \text{ensures } post(v_0,v_f) \\ \\ begin \\ 0: P_0(v_0,v) \\ \\ S_0 \\ \dots \\ i: P_i(v_0,v) \\ \dots \\ S_{f-1} \\ f: P_f(v_0,v) \\ \text{end} \end{array}
```

### **Contracts - Verification Conditions**

 $\begin{array}{c} \text{contract P} \\ \text{variables v} \\ \text{requires } pre(v_0) \\ \text{ensures } post(v_0,v_f) \\ \\ \text{Begin} \\ 0: P_0(v_0,v) \\ \\ S_0 \\ \dots \\ i: P_i(v_0,v) \\ \dots \\ S_{f-1} \\ f: P_f(v_0,v) \\ \text{end} \end{array}$ 

Verification conditions are listed as follows:

- (initialisation)  $pre(v_0) \land v = v_0 \Rightarrow P_0(v_0, v)$
- (finalisation)  $pre(v_0) \land P_f(v_0, v) \Rightarrow post(v_0, v)$
- (induction)
  For each labels pair  $\ell, \ell'$ such that  $\ell \longrightarrow \ell'$ , one checks that,
  for any value  $v, v' \in \text{MEMORY}$   $\left(\begin{array}{c} pre(v_0) \wedge P_{\ell}(v_0, v) \\ \wedge cond, v(v) \wedge v' = f_{\ell}(v) \end{array}\right)$

$$\left(\begin{array}{c} pre(v_0) \wedge P_{\ell}(v_0, v)) \\ \wedge cond_{\ell, \ell'}(v) \wedge v' = f_{\ell, \ell'}(v) \end{array}\right),$$

$$\Rightarrow P_{\ell'}(v_0, v')$$

Three kinds of verification conditions should be checked and we justify the method in the full version..

### From PAP to Rodin . . .

### From PAP to Rodin ...

```
MACHINE M
SEES C0
VARIABLES
  v, pc
INVARIANTS
   \mathsf{typing}: v \in D
   control: pc \in L
  \mathsf{at}\ell: pc = \ell \Rightarrow P_\ell(v0, v)
th1: pre(v_0) \wedge v = v_0 \Rightarrow P_0(v_0, v)
th2: pre(v_0) \wedge P_f(v_0, v)
                    \Rightarrow post(v_0, v)
END
END
```

### From PAP to Rodin ...

```
MACHINE M
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  v, pc
INVARIANTS
    typing : v \in D
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th1: pre(v_0) \wedge v = v_0 \Rightarrow P_0(v_0, v)
th2: pre(v_0) \wedge P_f(v_0, v)
                    \Rightarrow post(v_0, v)
END
FND
```

```
MACHINE M
EVENTS
INITIALISATION
BEGIN
(pc, v) : | \begin{pmatrix} pc' = l0 \land v' = v0 \\ \land pre(v0) \end{pmatrix}
END
e(\ell, \ell')
   WHEN
     pc = \ell
     cond_{\ell,\ell'}(v)
  THEN
     pc := \ell'
     v := f_{\ell,\ell'}(v)
   END
END
```

# Technical problems for students

### (Induction Principle (I))

A property S(z0,z) is a safety for an annotated program P if, and only if, there exists a property I(z0,z) satisfying :

- $2 \ \forall z0,z,z' \in \mathsf{L} \times \mathsf{D}.init(z0) \wedge I(z0,z) \wedge (z \xrightarrow{P} z') \Rightarrow I(z0,z')$
- $3 \ \forall z0,z \in \mathsf{L} \times \mathsf{D}.init(z0) \wedge I(z0,z) \Rightarrow S(z0,z)$

### (Induction Principle (II))

A property  $S(\ell 0,x0,\ell,x)$  is a safety property for an annotated program P if, and only if, there exists a property  $I(\ell 0,x0,\ell,x)$  satisfying :

- $\bullet \forall \ell 0, \in \mathsf{L}, x 0 \in \mathsf{D}.\ell 0 \in \mathsf{L}0 \land pre(x 0) \land x = x 0 \land pc = \ell 0 \Rightarrow J(\ell 0, x 0, \ell, x)$
- $\forall \ell, \ell' \in \mathsf{L}, x, x0 \in \mathsf{D}.\ell0 \in \mathsf{L}0 \land pre(x0) \land J(\ell0, x0, \ell, x) \land BA(e(\ell, \ell'), )(\ell, x, \ell', x') \Rightarrow J(\ell0, x0, \ell', x')$
- 3  $\forall \ell 0, \ell \in \mathsf{L}, x0, x \in \mathsf{D}.pre(x0) \land \ell 0 \in \mathsf{L}0 \land J(\ell 0, x0, \ell, x) \Rightarrow S(\ell 0, x0, \ell, x)$

# Technical problems for students

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A property  $S(\ell 0,x0,\ell,x)$  is a safety property for an annotated program P if, and only if, there exists a property  $I(\ell 0,x0,\ell,x)$  satisfying :

- $\bullet \forall \ell 0, \in \mathsf{L}, x 0 \in \mathsf{D}.\ell 0 \in \mathsf{L}0 \land pre(x 0) \land x = x 0 \land pc = \ell 0 \Rightarrow J(\ell 0, x 0, \ell, x)$
- $\forall \ell, \ell' \in \mathsf{L}, x, x0 \in \mathsf{D}.\ell0 \in \mathsf{L}0 \land pre(x0) \land J(\ell0, x0, \ell, x) \land BA(e(\ell, \ell'), )(\ell, x, \ell', x') \Rightarrow J(\ell0, x0, \ell', x')$

### (Induction Principle (III))

A property  $S(x0,\ell,x)$  is a safety for an annotated program P with one entry point if, and only if, there exists a property  $I(x0,\ell,x)$  satisfying :

- $\forall x 0 \in \mathsf{D}.pre(x0) \land x = x0 \land \ell = \ell 0 \Rightarrow J(x0, \ell, x)$
- $\forall \ell, \ell' \in \mathsf{L}, x, x0 \in \\ \mathsf{D}.pre(x0) \land J(x0, \ell, x) \land BA(e(\ell, \ell'), )(\ell, x, \ell', x') \Rightarrow J(x0, \ell', x')$
- $\underset{\mathsf{Telecom}}{\bullet} \forall \ell \in \underset{\mathsf{Nancy}}{\longleftarrow} x 0 \underset{\mathsf{Dominioue}}{x} \in \underset{\mathsf{Meth}}{\mathsf{D}} pre(x0) \land J(x0,\ell,x) \Rightarrow S(x0,\ell,x)$

### Soundness of the translation

### (Soundness of the method)

If the initialisation init, the generalisation gen and the step induction are proved to be correct by the Rodin platform, the property  $S(x0,\ell,x)$  is a correct safety property for the program P. In particular, one can handle the partial correctness and the run time error safety properties.

### Soundness of the translation

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- Contract and verification conditions are translated into Event-B and are discharged by Rodin and its provers.
- Verification conditions are derived from Floyd's method.
- Annotation as assertion

s

```
\begin{array}{l} \text{contract SIMPLE} \\ \text{variables } \times \\ \text{requires } x_0 \in \mathbb{N} \\ \text{ensures } x_f = 0 \\ \text{begin} \\ \ell_0 : \{0 \leq x \leq x_0 \wedge x_0 \in \mathbb{N}\} \\ \text{while } 0 < x \operatorname{\mathbf{do}} \\ \ell_1 : \{0 < x \wedge x \leq x_0 \wedge x_0 \in \mathbb{N}\} \\ \times := x - 1; \\ \text{od} \\ \ell_2 : \{x = 0\} \text{end} \end{array}
```

#### 

#### **INVARIANTS**

```
\begin{array}{l} inv1:x\in\mathbb{N}\\ inv2:l\in L\\ inv3:l=l0\Rightarrow\\ 0\leq x\wedge x\leq x0\wedge x0\in\mathbb{N}\\ inv4:l=l1\Rightarrow\\ 0< x\wedge x\leq x0\wedge x0\in\mathbb{N}\\ inv5:l=l2\Rightarrow x=0\\ requires:x0\in\mathbb{N}\wedge x=x0\\ \Rightarrow x=x0\wedge x0\in\mathbb{N}\\ ensures:x=0\wedge x=x0\\ \Rightarrow x=0\\ x=0
```

 $\begin{aligned} & \text{Event } el0l2 \\ & \textbf{WHEN} \\ & grd1: l = l0 \\ & grd2: \neg (0 < x) \\ & \textbf{THEN} \\ & act1: l := l2 \end{aligned}$ 

```
Event el1l0
WHEN
grd1: l = l1
THEN
act1: l := l0
act2: x := x - 1
```

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### Annotation of programs

```
\begin{array}{l} \ell: \{P_{\ell}(v)\} \\ cond_{\ell,\ell'}(v) \longrightarrow v := f_{\ell,\ell'}(v) \\ \ell': \{P_{\ell'}(v)\} \end{array}
```

```
\begin{array}{l} e(\ell,\ell') \\ \textbf{WHEN} \\ c = \ell \\ cond_{\ell,\ell'}(v) \\ \textbf{THEN} \\ c := \ell' \\ v := f_{\ell,\ell'}(v) \\ \textbf{END} \end{array}
```

$$\ell_0^1 : \{x = 0\} \\ x := x + 1; \\ \ell_0^1 : \{x = 1\}$$

- v is the state meory variable or list of memory variables; v includes the local variables and the results variables.
- c is a new variable which is modelling the control flow and its type is LOCATIONS.
- $e(\ell,\ell')$  is simulating the computation flow starting from  $\ell$  and moving to  $\ell'$ ; v is updated.

### From annotations to invariants

#### INVARIANTS

```
\begin{array}{l} inv_i: c \in \text{LOCATIONS} \\ inv_j: v \in Type \\ \cdots \\ inv_k: c = \ell \Rightarrow P_\ell(v) \\ inv_m: c = \ell' \Rightarrow P_{\ell'}(v) \\ \cdots \\ th_n: A(c,v) \end{array}
```

- Type is the type of the variables v and is a set of possible values defined in the context C.
- The annotation is giving us for free the conditions satisfied by v when the control is in \(\ell,\) (resp. in \(\ell')\).
- A(c, v) is a safety property that we are supposed to check and the case of Event-B, it is a theorem.

### Partial correctness using Event-B models

For each pair of successive labels  $\ell,\ell'$ , the three statements are equivalent :

- $P_{\ell}(v) \wedge cond_{\ell,\ell'}(v) \wedge v' = f_{\ell,\ell'}(v) \Rightarrow P_{\ell'}(v')$
- $I(c,v) \wedge c = \ell \wedge cond_{\ell,\ell'}(v) \wedge c' = \ell' \wedge v' = f_{\ell,\ell'}(v) \Rightarrow (c' = \ell' \Rightarrow P_{\ell'}(v'))$
- $I(c,v) \wedge BA(e(\ell,\ell'))(c,v,c',v') \Rightarrow (c'=\ell' \Rightarrow P_{\ell'}(v'))$

#### L

et AA an annotated algorithm with precondition  $\operatorname{pre}(AA)(v)$  and postcondition  $\operatorname{post}(AA)(v_0,v)$ . Let the context C and the machine M generated from AA using the construction given previously. We assume that  $\ell_0$  is the first label and  $\ell_e$  is the last label. We add the following safety properties in the machine M:

- $c = \ell_0 \land \operatorname{pre}(AA)(v) \Rightarrow P_{\ell_0}(v)$
- $c = \ell_e \Rightarrow (P_{\ell_e}(v) \Rightarrow \mathsf{post}(AA)(v_0, v)$

If proof obligations are discharged, then the annotated algorithm AA is partially correct with respect to ist pre/post specification.

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 $\bullet \ \forall x_f, x_0.\mathsf{pre}(x_0) \land x_0 \overset{\mathsf{P}}{\longrightarrow} x_f \Rightarrow \mathsf{post}(x_0, x_f)$ 

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- $\forall x_f, x_0.\mathsf{pre}(x_0) \Rightarrow x_0 \xrightarrow{\mathsf{P}} x_f \Rightarrow \mathsf{post}(x_0, x_f)$

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- $\forall x_0.\mathsf{pre}(x_0) \Rightarrow [P]\mathsf{post}(x_0,x_f)$
- wlp calculus is introduced

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- $[x := e]P(x) = P[x \mapsto e]$
- [if b(x) then S1 else S2 ]  $P(x) = b(x) \wedge [S1]P(x) \vee \text{ not } b(x)$  [S2] P(x)

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- Frama-c uses the HOARE logic for defining the verification conditions as R. Leino in DAFNY.

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- $\forall x_0.\mathsf{pre}(x_0) \Rightarrow \forall x_f.x_0 \overset{\mathsf{P}}{\longrightarrow} x_f \Rightarrow \mathsf{post}(x_0,x_f)$
- $\forall x_0.\mathsf{pre}(x_0) \Rightarrow [P]\mathsf{post}(x_0,x_f)$
- wlp calculus is introduced
- $[x := e]P(x) = P[x \mapsto e]$
- [if b(x) then S1 else S2 ] $P(x) = b(x) \land [S1]P(x) \lor \text{ not } b(x)$  [S2]P(x)
- Frama-c uses the HOARE logic for defining the verification conditions as R. Leino in DAFNY.
- Questions of termination require the wp calculus . . .