



# Modelling Software-based Systems The Modelling Language Event-B

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# General Summary

- Documentation
- Introduction by Problems
   Safety Properties of C Programs
   Importance of Domain
   Tracking bugs in C codes
- 3 Overview of formal techniques and formal methods
- 4 Modelling Language
- **6** A Simple Example : Management of Students and Teachers
- 6 Modelling state-based systems
- 7 The Event B modelling language
- 8 Examples of Event B models
- Summary on Events

#### **Current Summary**

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#### **Tools**

- Event B : http ://www.event-b.org/
- Atelier B : http ://www.atelierb.eu/
- RODIN Platform : http://www.event-b.org/platform.html
- EB2ALL Toolset : http://eb2all.loria.fr
- RIMEL project : http ://rimel.loria.fr
- The Modelling Language Event-B and related topics as lectures notes, tutorials, models. https://mery54.github.io/teaching/
- Using the Arche platform of UL and accessing the course MOSOS with password mery

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```
#include <stdio.h>
#include < stdlib . h>
#include <time.h>
int main() {
    int x, y;
    // Seed the random number generator with the current time
    srand(time(NULL));
    // Generate a random number between 1 and 100
    x = rand() \% 100 + 1;
    // Perform some calculations
    y = x / (100 - x);
    printf("Result:-%d\n", y);
    return 0;
```

```
int main(void)
  int __retres;
  int x:
  int v;
  time_t tmp;
  int tmp_0;
  tmp = time((time_t *)0);
  srand((unsigned int)tmp);
  { /* sequence */
   tmp_0 = rand();
    /*@ assert rte: signed_overflow: (int)(tmp_0 % 100) + 1 <= 214
    x = tmp_0 \% 100 + 1;
  /*@ assert rte: signed_overflow: 100 - x \le 2147483647; */
  /*@ assert rte: division_by_zero: (int)(100 - x) /= 0; */
  /*@ assert rte: signed_overflow: x / (int)(100 - x) \le 21474836
  y = x / (100 - x);
  printf("Result:-%d\n",y); /* printf_va_1 */
  _{-}retres = 0;
  return __retres;
```

#### RTE with frama-c

```
// Heisenbug
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <time.h>
int main() {
  int x, y, i=0;
    for (i = 0; i \le 100000; i++) {
    // Seed the random number generator with the current time
    srand(time(NULL));
    // Generate a random number between 1 and 100
    x = rand() \% 100 + 1;
         printf("Result:-x=-%d n'',x);
    // Perform some calculations
    y = x / (100 - x);
    printf("Result: -i=\%d--\%d \setminus n", i, y);
    return 0;
```

#### RTE with frama-c but a modification

```
// Heisenbug
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <time.h>
int main() {
  int x, y, i=0;
    for (i = 0; i \le 100; i++) {
    // Seed the random number generator with the current time
    srand(time(NULL)+i);
    // Generate a random number between 1 and 100
    x = rand() \% 100 + 1;
         printf("Result:-x=-%d n'',x);
    // Perform some calculations
    y = x / (100 - x);
    printf("Result: -i=\%d--\%d \setminus n", i, y);
    return 0;
```

#### Implicit and explicit in formal modelling

# Our aim is to analyze what is implicit and what is explicit in formal modelling...

- Semantics in modelling :
  - Semantics expressed by a theory (e.g. Event-B) used to formalize hardware and/or software systems
  - ► Same theory is used for wide variety of heterogeneous systems
- Semantics in domain :
  - ▶ Environment within which system evolve : application domain/context
  - Information provided by domain is often associated while in operation
  - Either assumed and omitted while formalising systems or hardcoded in formal models
  - Same context is used for wide variety of heterogeneous systems



A case study for studying these properties

# Nose Gear Velocity



Estimated ground velocity of the aircraft should be available only if
it is within 3 km/hr of the true velocity at some moment within

# Characterization of a System (I)

- NG velocity system :
  - Hardware :
    - Electro-mechanical sensor : detects rotations
    - Two 16-bit counters: Rotation counter, Milliseconds counter
    - Interrupt service routine : updates rotation counter and stores current time.
  - Software :
    - Real-time operating system: invokes update function every 500 ms
    - 16-bit global variable: for recording rotation counter update time
    - An update function : estimates ground velocity of the aircraft.
- Input data available to the system :
  - time: in milliseconds
  - distance : in inches
  - rotation angle : in degrees
- Specified system performs velocity estimations in *imperial* unit system
- Note: expressed functional requirement is in SI unit system (km/hr).

# Characterization of a System (II) cont.

#### What are the main properties to consider for formalization?

- Two different types of data :
  - counters with modulo semantics
  - non-negative values for time, distance, and velocity
- Two dimensions: distance and time
- Many units: distance (inches, kilometers, miles), time (milliseconds, hours), velocity (kph, mph)
- And interaction among components

#### How should we model?

- Designer needs to consider units and conversions between them to manipulate the model
- One approach: Model units as sets, and conversions as constructed types projections.
- Example :
  - 1  $estimateVelocity \in \texttt{MILES} \times \texttt{HOURS} \rightarrow \texttt{MPH}$
  - $2 mphTokph \in MPH \rightarrow KPH$

# Sample Velocity Estimation

0 degrees → "click"



120 degrees

time

240 degrees

0 degrees → "click

#### Listing 1 - Bug bug0

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdib.h>
#include <time.h>
int main() {
    int x. y;
    // Seed the random number generator with the current time
    srand(time(NULL));
    // Generate a random number between 1 and 100
    x = rand() % 100 + 1;
    // Perform some calculations
    y = x / (100 - x);
    printf("Result: %d\n", y);
    return 0;
}
```

#### Listing 2 - Bug bug00

```
// Heisenbug
#include < stdio.h>
#include < stdlib . h>
#include <time.h>
int main() {
  int x, y, i=0;
    for (i = 0; i \le 100000; i++) {
    // Seed the random number generator with the current time
    srand(time(NULL));
    // Generate a random number between 1 and 100
    x = rand() \% 100 + 1;
        printf("Result: -x=--%d\n",x);
    // Perform some calculations
    y = x / (100 - x);
    printf("Result: -i=%d - -%d\n", i, y);
    return 0;
```

#### Listing 3 – Bug bug000

```
// Heisenbug
#include <stdio.h>
#include < stdlib . h>
#include <time.h>
int main() {
  int x, y, i=0;
    for (i = 0; i \le 100; i++) {
    // Seed the random number generator with the current time
    srand(time(NULL)+i);
    // Generate a random number between 1 and 100
    x = rand() \% 100 + 1;
        printf("Result: -x=--%d\n",x);
    // Perform some calculations
    y = x / (100 - x);
    printf("Result: -i=%d - -%d\n", i, y);
    return 0;
```

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# Modelling Systems

- Distributed systems : web services, information systems, distributed algorithms . . .
- Safety critical systems: medical devices, embedded systems, cyber-physical systems, . . .
- Fault-tolerant systems : networks, communication infrastructure, ...
- Environments : heart, the glucose-insulin regulatory system, ...

# Modelling in action

- Abstraction and refinement of features, 2000 with D. Cansell
- Incremental Proof of the Producer/Consumer Property for the PCI Protocol, 2002 with D. Cansell, G. Gopalkrishnan, S. Jones.
- A Mechanically Proved and Incremental Development of IEEE 1394
   Tree Identify Protocol, 2003, with J.-R. Abrial and D. Cansell.
- The challenge of QoS for digital television services-. *EBU Technical Review* (avril 2005) *with D. Abraham, D. Cansell, C. Proch.*
- -Formal and Incremental Construction of Distributed Algorithms:
   On the Distributed Reference Counting Algorithm, 2006 with D. Cansell.

# Modelling in action

- Refinement: A Constructive Approach to Formal Software Design for a Secure e-voting Interface-, 2007 with D. Cansell and P. Gibson.
- Incremental Parametric Development of Greedy Algorithms, 2007, with D. Cansell
- System-on-Chip Design by Proof-based Refinement, 2009 with D. Cansell and C. Proch
- -A simple refinement-based method for constructing algorithms, 2009. Alone.
- Refinement-based guidelines for algorithmic systems-. Alone. International Journal of Software and Informatics (2009),

# Modelling in action

- Cryptologic algorithms: Event B development, combining cryptologic properties, modeling attacks.
- Access control systems: relating policy models and Event B models like in RBAC, TMAC, ORBAC
- Distributed algorithms: integration of local computation models into Event B, tool B2VISIDIA, algorithms of naming, election etc
- Medical devices: modelling the pacemaker, interacting with cardiologists, . . .
- Modelling self-⋆ systems
- Modelling medical devices item Modelling environments for medical devices: closed-loop modelling

# Next modelling

- Modelling human-in-the -loop systems
- Modelling cyber-physical systems

# General Approach

- Constructing a model of the system
- Elements for defining a formal or semi-formal model : syntax, semantics, verification, validation, documentation
- Mathematical structures: transition systems, temporal/modal/deontic/...logics,
- Validation of a model : tests, proofs, animation,...
- Modelling Techniques : state-based techniques
- Structure of a model : module, object, class,
- Design Patterns

#### Mathematical tools for modelling systems

- set theory : sets, relations, functions . . .
- transition systems
- predicate calculus
- decision procedures
- interactive theorem prover

# Examples of modelling languages

- Z : set theory, predicate calculus, schemas.
- VDM : types, pre/post specification, invariant, operations
- B : set theory, predicate calculus, generalized susbtitution, abstract machines, refinement, implementation.
- RAISE: abstract data types, functions,
- TLA<sup>+</sup>: set theory, modules, temporal logic of actions.
- UNITY: temporal logic, actions systems, superposition.
- UML
- JML and Spec# : programming by contract

# Objectives of the modelling

- To get a better understanding of the current system : requirements, properties, cost, maintenance . . .
- To document the the system
- To systematize operations of modelling : reuse, parametrization
- To ensure the quality of the final product : safety, security issues
- To elaborate a contract between the customer and the designer

# The Triptych Approach

$$\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{S} \longrightarrow \mathcal{R}$$
 (1)

- $\mathcal{R}$  requirements or system properties
- ullet  ${\cal D}$  domain of the problem
- ullet  ${\cal S}$  model of the system
- --> relation of satisfaction


# Formal modelling

- Mathematical foundations of Models: syntax, semantics, pragmatics, theory, soundness.
- Mathematical reasoning is based on sound proof rules
- Common language for fac ilitating the communication.

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# Observing the safe system



- The context defines the possible values
- Safety requirement means that something bad will never happen.
- Invariant defines the set of effective possible values
- Transitions modify state variables and maintains the invariant.

# Observing the unsafe system



- Transitions modify state variables and may not maintain the invariant.
- ... and may not guaranteesafety properties.

#### Tools

- Event B : http ://www.event-b.org/
- Atelier B : http ://www.atelierb.eu/
- RODIN Platform : http://www.event-b.org/platform.html

#### The Event B Method

- The Event B Method is invented by J.-R. Abrial from 1988 : abstract system, events, refinement, invariant.
- Atelier B and RODIN are supporting the Event B method
- An event is observed and triggered, when a guard is true
- Proof obligations are generated using the weakest-precondition semantics.
- A Event B model intends to model a reactive system.

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# A Simple Example

#### Managing teachers, students, lectures and class rooms

- Modelling the access control of students for lectures given by teachers
- When a student is attending a lecture, he/she can not attend another lecture
- When a teacher is lecturing, he/she is not lecturing another session.
- A student can not be lecturing without a teacher and when he is not attending a lecture, he is outside the classroom.
- When a teacher is ending a lecture, every student which is attending, is leaving the class room.
- When a student is not attending a lecture, he is free.

# First step: identification of sets, constants, properties

- Sets: students, teachers
- Property 1: When a student is attending a lecture, he/she can not attend another lecture
- Property 2: When a teacher is lecturing, he/she is not lecturing another session.
- **Property 3**: A student can not be lecturing without a teacher and when he is not attending a lecture, he is outside the classroom.
- **Property 4 :** When a teacher is ending a lecture, every student which is attending, is leaving the class room.
- Property 5: When a student is not attending a lecture, he is free.

#### Second step: definition of state variables

- The system model should be able to record the lecturing teachers and the attending students.
- The system model should be enough expressive to state when a given student is attending a lecture given by whom.
- Variable attending records students which atteding some lecture with a given teacher.
- Variable islecturing records teachers who are lecturing.
- Variable pause records sudents are not attending a lecture but are somewhere not in a lecture.

#### Third step: properties of state variables

#### Expression of the invariant

```
 \begin{split} &inv1: attending \in STUDENTS \to TEACHERS \\ &inv2: islecturing \subseteq TEACHERS \\ &inv3: \forall e \cdot e \in STUDENTS \land e \in dom(attending) \\ & \Rightarrow \quad attending(e) \in islecturing \\ &inv4: pause \subseteq STUDENTS \\ &inv5: pause \cap dom(attending) = \varnothing \\ &inv6: pause \cup dom(attending) = STUDENTS \end{split}
```

#### Checking proof obligations!

#### **UseCases**

- EVENT INITIALISATION : initializing state variables
- EVENT startingattending: a group of students is moving from pause to lecture
- EVENT teachergivinglecture : a teacher is starting a new lecture
- EVENT teacherendinglecture : a teacher is halting the lecture
- **EVENT** studentleavinglecture : a group of students is moving from *lecture* to *pause*

#### **EVENT** INITIALISATION

#### **BEGIN**

 $\begin{array}{ll} act1: \ attending := \varnothing \\ act2: \ islecturing := \varnothing \\ act3: \ pause := STUDENTS \\ \hline {\bf END} \\ \end{array}$ 

```
EVENT startingattending ANY e e is a student p p is a teacher WHERE grd1: e \in STUDENTS grd3: p \in TEACHERS grd4: p \in islecturing grd2: e \notin dom(attending) THEN act1: attending(e) := p act2: pause := pause \setminus \{e\} END
```

```
EVENT teachergiving lecture 
ANY p WHERE grd2: p \in TEACHERS grd1: p \notin is lecturing THEN act1: is lecturing := is lecturing <math>\cup \{p\} END
```

```
EVENT studentleaving lecture 

ANY
ge
WHERE
grd1: ge \subseteq dom(attending)
grd2: ge \neq \varnothing
THEN
act1: attending := ge \lessdot attending
act2: pause := pause \cup ge
END
```

#### Mathematical tools for modelling systems

- set theory : sets, relations, functions . . .
- transition systems
- predicate calculus
- decision procedures
- interactive theorem prover

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# Modelling systems

- A system is observed
- Observation of things which are
  - either changing over the time (variable)
  - or stuttering over the time (constant)
- A system is characterized by a state
- A state is made up of contextual constant informations over the problem theory and of modifiable flexible informations over the system.

#### A **flexible variable** x is observed at different instants :

$$x_0 \stackrel{\tau}{\to} x_1 \stackrel{\tau}{\to} x_2 \stackrel{\tau}{\to} x_3 \stackrel{\tau}{\to} \dots \stackrel{\tau}{\to} x_i \stackrel{\tau}{\to} x_{i+1} \stackrel{\tau}{\to} \dots$$

hides effectives changes of state or actions or event

$$x_0 \stackrel{\alpha_1}{\rightarrow} x_1 \stackrel{\alpha_2}{\rightarrow} x_2 \stackrel{\alpha_3}{\rightarrow} x_3 \stackrel{\alpha_4}{\rightarrow} \dots \stackrel{\alpha_i}{\rightarrow} x_i \stackrel{\alpha_{i+1}}{\rightarrow} x_{i+1} \stackrel{\alpha_{i+2}}{\rightarrow} \dots$$

Occurrences of e  $\tau$  can be added between two instants ie stuttering steps :

$$x_0 \overset{\alpha_1}{\to} x_1 \overset{\alpha_2}{\to} x_2 \overset{\tau}{\to} x_2 \overset{\alpha_3}{\to} x_3 \overset{\alpha_4}{\to} \dots \overset{\alpha_i}{\to} x_i \overset{\tau}{\to} x_i \overset{\alpha_{i+1}}{\to} x_{i+1} \overset{\alpha_{i+2}}{\to} \dots$$

A **flexible variable** x is observed at different instants:  $x_0 \stackrel{\tau}{\to} x_1 \stackrel{\tau}{\to} x_2 \stackrel{\tau}{\to} x_3 \stackrel{\tau}{\to} \dots \stackrel{\tau}{\to} x_i \stackrel{\tau}{\to} x_{i+1} \stackrel{\tau}{\to} \dots$   $\tau$  hides effectives changes of state or actions or events

Occurences of e  $\boldsymbol{\tau}$  can be added between two instants ie stuttering steps :

 $x_0 \stackrel{\alpha_1}{\to} x_1 \stackrel{\alpha_2}{\to} x_2 \stackrel{\tau}{\to} x_2 \stackrel{\alpha_3}{\to} x_3 \stackrel{\alpha_4}{\to} \dots \stackrel{\alpha_i}{\to} x_i \stackrel{\tau}{\to} x_i \stackrel{\alpha_{i+1}}{\to} x_{i+1} \stackrel{\alpha_{i+2}}{\to}$ 

#### A **flexible variable** $\boldsymbol{x}$ is observed at different instants :

$$x_0 \stackrel{\tau}{\rightarrow} x_1 \stackrel{\tau}{\rightarrow} x_2 \stackrel{\tau}{\rightarrow} x_3 \stackrel{\tau}{\rightarrow} \dots \stackrel{\tau}{\rightarrow} x_i \stackrel{\tau}{\rightarrow} x_{i+1} \stackrel{\tau}{\rightarrow} \dots$$

au hides effectives changes of state or actions or events

$$x_0 \overset{\alpha_1}{\to} x_1 \overset{\alpha_2}{\to} x_2 \overset{\alpha_3}{\to} x_3 \overset{\alpha_4}{\to} \dots \overset{\alpha_i}{\to} x_i \overset{\alpha_{i+1}}{\to} x_{i+1} \overset{\alpha_{i+2}}{\to} \dots$$

Occurrences of e  $\tau$  can be added between two instants ie stuttering steps :

 $x_0 \stackrel{\alpha_1}{\to} x_1 \stackrel{\alpha_2}{\to} x_2 \stackrel{\tau}{\to} x_2 \stackrel{\alpha_3}{\to} x_3 \stackrel{\alpha_4}{\to} \dots \stackrel{\alpha_i}{\to} x_i \stackrel{\tau}{\to} x_i \stackrel{\alpha_{i+1}}{\to} x_{i+1} \stackrel{\alpha_{i+2}}{\to} \dots$ 

A flexible variable x is observed at different instants :  $x_0 \stackrel{\tau}{\to} x_1 \stackrel{\tau}{\to} x_2 \stackrel{\tau}{\to} x_3 \stackrel{\tau}{\to} \dots \stackrel{\tau}{\to} x_i \stackrel{\tau}{\to} x_{i+1} \stackrel{\tau}{\to} \dots$   $\tau$  hides effectives changes of state or actions or events  $x_0 \stackrel{\alpha_1}{\to} x_1 \stackrel{\alpha_2}{\to} x_2 \stackrel{\alpha_3}{\to} x_3 \stackrel{\alpha_4}{\to} \dots \stackrel{\alpha_i}{\to} x_i \stackrel{\alpha_{i+1}}{\to} x_{i+1} \stackrel{\alpha_{i+2}}{\to} \dots$  Occurences of e  $\tau$  can be added between two instants ie stuttering steps :

A **flexible variable** x is observed at different instants :  $x_0 \stackrel{\tau}{\to} x_1 \stackrel{\tau}{\to} x_2 \stackrel{\tau}{\to} x_3 \stackrel{\tau}{\to} \dots \stackrel{\tau}{\to} x_i \stackrel{\tau}{\to} x_{i+1} \stackrel{\tau}{\to} \dots$   $\tau$  hides effectives changes of state or actions or events  $x_0 \stackrel{\alpha_1}{\to} x_1 \stackrel{\alpha_2}{\to} x_2 \stackrel{\alpha_3}{\to} x_3 \stackrel{\alpha_4}{\to} \dots \stackrel{\alpha_i}{\to} x_i \stackrel{\alpha_{i+1}}{\to} x_{i+1} \stackrel{\alpha_{i+2}}{\to} \dots$  Occurences of e  $\tau$  can be added between two instants ie **stuttering steps** :  $x_0 \stackrel{\alpha_1}{\to} x_1 \stackrel{\alpha_2}{\to} x_2 \stackrel{\tau}{\to} x_2 \stackrel{\alpha_3}{\to} x_3 \stackrel{\alpha_4}{\to} \dots \stackrel{\alpha_i}{\to} x_i \stackrel{\tau}{\to} x_i \stackrel{\alpha_{i+1}}{\to} x_{i+1} \stackrel{\alpha_{i+2}}{\to} \dots$ 

#### Properties of system

A safety property S over x states that something will not happen : S(x)means that S holds for x

An **invariant** property I over x states a strong safety property

# Checking the relation

- You can check for every i in  $\mathbb N$  that  $S(x_i)$  is true but it can be long if states are different
- You can compute an abstraction of the set of states
- You can try to prove and for instance the induction principle may be usefull
- So be carefull and improve your modelling before to run the checker
- Use the induction

#### State properties of a system

- A state property namely P(x) is a first order predicate with free variables x, where x is a flexible variable.
- A flexible variable x has a current value x, a next value x', an initial value  $x_0$  and possibly a final value  $x_f$ .
- A predicate P(x) is considered as a set of values v such that P(v) holds : set-theoretical interpretation

#### State Properties

#### Safety Property

A safety property states that nothing bad can happen.

#### Example

#### Safety Properties

- Partial correctness a component is correct wit respect to a precondition and a postcondition.
- No Run Time Error any software action or event does not produce a run-time error as overflow, division by zero . . .
- Mutual exclusion a set of processes share common ressources, a printer is shared by users, . . .
- Deadlock freedom the system is never blocked, there is always at least one next state, . . .

#### Relation/action over states

 An action α over states is a relation between values of state variables before and values of variables after

$$\alpha(x,x')$$
 or  $x \xrightarrow{\alpha} x'$ 

- Flexible variable x has two values x and x'.
- Priming flexible variables is borrowed from TLA
- Hypothesis 1 : Values of x belongs to a set of values called VALUES and defines the context of the system.
- Hypothesis 2 : Relations over x and x' belong to a set of relations  $\{r_0,\dots,r_n\}$

# Operational model of a system

- A system S is observed with respect to flexible variables x.
- Flexible variables x of S are modified according to a finite set of relations over the set of values  $VALUES: \{r_0, \ldots, r_n\}$
- INIT(x) denotes the set of possible intial values for x.

$$\mathcal{OMS} = (x, Values, Init(x), \{r_0, \dots, r_n\})$$

#### Safety and invariance of system

- Hypothesis 3 :  $\mathcal{OMS} = (x, \text{VALUES}, \text{INIT}(x), \{r_0, \dots, r_n\})$
- Hypothesis 4:  $x \longrightarrow x' \stackrel{\triangle}{=} (x \ r_0 \ x') \lor \ldots \lor (x \ r_n \ x')$
- I(x) is inductively invariant for a system called S, if  $\begin{cases} \forall x \in \text{Values} : \text{Init}(x) \Rightarrow \text{I}(x) \\ \forall x, x' \in \text{Values} : \text{I}(x) \land x \longrightarrow x' \Rightarrow \text{I}(x') \end{cases}$ 
  - I(x) is called an invariant in B
- Q(x) is a safety property for a system called S, if  $\forall x, y \in \text{VALUES} : \text{INIT}(x) \land x \xrightarrow{\star} y \Rightarrow Q(y)$ Q(x) is called a theorem in B

# Modelling systems : first attempt

```
\begin{tabular}{ll} MODEL & m & & & \\ & \cdots & & & \\ & \cdots & & & \\ & VARIABLES & & \\ & x & & \\ INVARIANT & & \\ & I(x) & & \\ & THEOREMS & \\ & Q(x) & & \\ & INITIALISATION & \\ & Init(x) & & \\ & EVENTS & & \\ & \{r_0, \dots, r_n\} & \\ END & & \\ \end{tabular}
```

- $\bullet$  A model has a name m
- Flexibles variables x are declared
- I(x) provides informations over x
- ullet Q(x) provides informations over x

# Checking safety properties of the model

- $\forall x_0, x \in \text{Values} : \text{Init}(x_0) \land x_0 \xrightarrow{\star} x \Rightarrow Q(x)$
- Solution 1 Writing a procedure checking INIT $(x_0) \wedge x_0 \xrightarrow{\star} x \Rightarrow Q(x)$  for each pair  $x_0, x \in VALUES$ , when VALUES is finite and small.
- Solution 2 Writing a procedure checking INIT $(x_0) \land x_0 \xrightarrow{\star} x \Rightarrow Q(x)$  for each pair  $x_0, x \in VALUES$ , by constructing an abstraction of VALUES.
- Solution 3 Writing a proof for  $\forall x_0, x \in \text{VALUES} : \text{INIT}(x_0) \land x_0 \xrightarrow{\star} x \Rightarrow Q(x).$

# Defining an induction principle for an operational model

(I) 
$$\forall x_0, x \in \text{Values} : \text{Init}(x_0) \land x_0 \xrightarrow{\star} x \Rightarrow \mathbf{Q}(x)$$

#### if, and only if,

(II) there exists a state property I(x) such that :

$$\forall x_0, x, x' \in \mathbf{Values} : \left\{ \begin{array}{l} (1) \quad \mathbf{Init}(x_0) \Rightarrow \mathbf{I}(x_0) \\ (2) \quad \mathbf{I}(x) \Rightarrow \mathbf{Q}(x) \\ (3) \quad \mathbf{I}(x) \land x \longrightarrow x' \Rightarrow \mathbf{I}(x') \end{array} \right.$$

(3) 
$$\mathbf{I}(x) \wedge x \longrightarrow x' \Rightarrow \mathbf{I}(x')$$

#### if, and only if,

(III) there exists a state property I(x) such that :

(1) 
$$\operatorname{Init}(x_0) \Rightarrow \operatorname{I}(x_0)$$

$$(x_0, x, x' \in \mathsf{Values} : \{ (2) \mid \mathsf{I}(x) \Rightarrow \mathsf{Q}(x) \}$$

$$(2) \quad \mathbf{I}(x) \Rightarrow \mathbf{Q}(x)$$

$$\forall x_0, x, x' \in \textbf{Values}: \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} (1) & \textbf{Init}(x_0) \Rightarrow \textbf{I}(x_0) \\ (2) & \textbf{I}(x) \Rightarrow \textbf{Q}(x) \\ (3) & \forall i \in \{0, \dots, n\}: \textbf{I}(x) \land x \ r_i \ x' \Rightarrow \textbf{I}(x') \end{array} \right.$$

#### Modelling systems : second attempt

```
\begin{tabular}{ll} MODEL & m & & & \\ & \cdots & & & \\ & \cdots & & & \\ & VARIABLES & & \\ & x & & & \\ INVARIANT & & \\ & I(x) & & \\ & THEOREMS & & \\ & Q(x) & & \\ & INITIALISATION & \\ & Init(x) & & \\ & EVENTS & & \\ & \{r_0, \dots, r_n\} & \\ & END & & \\ \end{tabular}
```

- $\forall x_0 \in \text{Values} : \text{Init}(x_0) \Rightarrow \text{I}(x_0)$
- $\forall x, x' \in \text{VALUES} : \forall i \in \{0, \dots, n\} :$  $I(x) \land x \ r_i \ x' \Rightarrow I(x')$
- $\forall x \in \text{Values} : I(x) \Rightarrow Q(x)$

#### Modelling systems : last attempt?

- What are the environment of the proof for properties?
- What are theories?
- How are defining the static objects?

#### Modelling systems : last attempt!

# $\begin{array}{c} \textbf{MODEL} \\ m \\ \Gamma(m) \\ \textbf{VARIABLES} \\ x \\ \textbf{INVARIANT} \\ I(x) \\ \textbf{THEOREMS} \\ Q(x) \\ \textbf{INITIALISATION} \\ Init(x) \\ \textbf{EVENTS} \\ \{r_0, \dots, r_n\} \\ \textbf{END} \end{array}$

- $\Gamma(m)$  defines the static environment for the proofs related to m.
- $\Gamma(m) \vdash \forall x \in \text{Values} : \text{Init}(x) \Rightarrow \text{I}(x)$
- $\forall i \in \{0, \dots, n\}$ :  $\Gamma(m) \vdash \forall x, x' \in \text{Values} : I(x) \land x \ r_i \ x' \Rightarrow I(x')$
- $\Gamma(m) \vdash \forall x \in \text{Values} : I(x) \Rightarrow Q(x)$

#### **Events System Models**

An event system model is made of

State **constants** and state **variables** constrained by a state **invariant** 

A finite set of events

**Proofs** ensures the consistency between the invariant and the events An event system model can be **refined** 

**Proofs** must ensure the correctness of refinement

# Modelling systems : Hello world !

```
MODEL FACTORIAL EVENTS
   Static Part context
      CONSTANTS
         factorial, m
      AXIOMS
           m \in \mathbb{N} \land factorial \in \mathbb{N} \leftrightarrow \mathbb{N} \land 0 \mapsto 1 \in factorial \land
           \forall (n, fn). (n \mapsto fn \in factorial \Rightarrow n+1 \mapsto (n+1) * fn \in factorial) \land
          \forall f \cdot \left( \begin{array}{c} f \in \mathcal{H} \setminus \mathcal{H} \\ 0 \mapsto 1 \in f \land \\ \forall (n, fn) \cdot (n \mapsto fn \in f \Rightarrow n+1 \mapsto (n+1) \times fn \in f) \\ \Longrightarrow \end{array} \right)
  Dynamic Part machine
  VARIABLES
     result.ok
   INVARIANT
     result \in \mathbb{N}
     ok \in \mathbb{B}
     ok = TRUE \Rightarrow result = factorial(n)
  THEOREMS
      factorial \in \mathbb{N} \longrightarrow \mathbb{N}:
     factorial(0) = 1;
     \forall n.(n \in \mathbb{N} \Rightarrow factorial(n+1) = (n+1) \times factorial(n))
   INITIALISATION
     result : \in \mathbb{N}
     ok := FALSE
   EVENTS
      computation = ANY \ ok = FALSE \ THEN \ result, ok := factorial(m), TRUE \ END
Telecom Aancy 2024-2025 (Dominique Méry)
```

#### Modelling systems relations as events

```
MODEL
Static Part context
  SETS
  CONSTANTS
  AXIOMS
   P(s,c)
  THEOREMS
   Q(s,c)
Dynamic Part machine
VARIABLES.
INVARIANT
 I(s,c,x)
THEOREMS
  S(s,c,x)
INITIALISATION
 Init(s, c, x)
EVENTS
  \{r_1,\ldots,r_n\}
FND
```

- $\Gamma(m)$  defines the static environment for the proofs related to m from s, c and P(s,c) and  $\Gamma(m)$  is defined from the static part.
- $\Gamma(m) \vdash Q(s,c)$
- $\Gamma(m) \vdash \forall x, x' \in \text{Values} : \text{Init}(s, c, x) \Rightarrow I(s, c, x)$
- $\forall i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ :  $\Gamma(m) \vdash \forall x, x' \in \text{VALUES}$ :  $I(s, c, x) \land x \ r_i \ x' \Rightarrow I(s, c, x')$
- $\Gamma(m) \vdash \forall x, x' \in \text{VALUES} : I(s, c, x) \Rightarrow S(s, c, x)$

#### Modelling systems relations as events

```
\begin{array}{c} \textbf{CONTEXT} \\ context\_name \\ \textbf{SETS} \\ s \\ \textbf{CONSTANTS} \\ c \\ \textbf{AXIOMS} \\ P(s,c) \\ \textbf{THEOREMS} \end{array}
```

Q(s,c)

```
MACHINE m
SEES context\_name
VARIABLES x
INVARIANT
I(s, c, x)
```

```
THEOREMS S(s,c,x) INITIALISATION Init(s,c,x) EVENTS
```

EVENTS  $\{e_1, \ldots, e_n\}$ 

•  $\Gamma(m)$  defines the static environment for the proofs related to m from s, c and P(s,c) and  $\Gamma(m)$  is defined from the static part.

- $\Gamma(m) \vdash Q(s,c)$
- $\Gamma(m) \vdash \forall x, x' \in \text{Values} : \text{Init}(s, c, x) \Rightarrow I(s, c, x)$
- $\forall i \in \{0,\ldots,n\} : r_i(x,x') \stackrel{\Delta}{=} BA(e_i)(s,c,x,x')$
- $\forall i \in \{0, \dots, n\}$ :  $\Gamma(m) \vdash \forall x, x' \in \text{VALUES}:$  $I(x) \land BA(e_i)(s, c, x, x') \Rightarrow I(s, c, x')$
- $\Gamma(m) \vdash \forall x, x' \in \text{Values} : I(x) \Rightarrow S(s, c, x)$

# Modelling systems

- **step 1**: Understanding the **problem** to solve
- step 2 : Organizing requirements and extracting properties
- step 3: Writing a first very abstract system model
- **step 4**: Consulting the requirements and **adding** a new detail in the current model by **refinement**
- **step 5**: Either the model is enough detailed and the process stops, or the model is not yet enough concrete and the step 4 is repeated.

# **Current Summary**

- Documentation
- 2 Introduction by Problems
- Overview of formal techniques and formal methods
- 4 Modelling Language
- **6** A Simple Example : Management of Students and Teachers
- 6 Modelling state-based systems
- 7 The Event B modelling language
- 8 Examples of Event B models

# Expressing models in the event B notation

- Models are defined in two ways :
  - an abstract machine
  - a refinement of an existing model
- Models use constants which are defined in structures called contexts
- B structures are related by the three possible relations :
  - the sees relationship for expressing the use of constants, sets satisfying axioms and theorems.
  - the extends relationship for expressing the extension of contexts by adding new constants and new sets
  - the refines relationship stating that a B model is refined by another one.

## Machines and contexts

#### **Machines**

- REFINES
- SEES a context
- VARIABLES of the model
- INVARIANTS satisfied by the variables
- THEOREMS satisfied by the variables
- EVENTS modifying the variables
- VARIANT

#### Contexts

- EXTENDS another context
- SETS declares new sets
- CONSTANTS define a list of constants
- AXIOMS define the properties of constants and sets
- THEOREMS list the theorems which should be derived from axioms

#### Machines en Event B

```
MACHINE
 m
REFINES
 am
SEES
VARIABLES
INVARIANTS
 I(u)
THEOREMS
 Q(u)
VARIANT
  < variant >
EVENTS
  < event >
END
```

- $\Gamma(m)$  : environment for the machine m defined by the context c
- $\Gamma(m) \vdash \forall u \in \text{Values} : \text{Init}(u) \Rightarrow \text{I}(u)$
- For each event e in E:  $\Gamma(m) \vdash \forall u, u' \in \text{VALUES} : I(u) \land BA(e)(u, u') \Rightarrow I(u')$
- $\Gamma(m) \vdash \forall u \in \text{Values} : I(u) \Rightarrow Q(u)$

### Contexts in Event B

# CONTEXTS cEXTENDS acSETS sCONSTANTS cAXIOMS ax1:...THEOREMS th1:...END

- ac:c is extending ac and add new features
- s : sets are defined either by intension or by extension
- c : constants are defined and
- axioms characterize constants and sets
- theorems are derived from axioms in the current context

# **E**vents

Event : $E$	Before-After Predicate
$\textbf{BEGIN} \ x:  P(x,x') \ \textbf{END}$	P(x,x')
WHEN $G(x)$ THEN $x: P(x,x') $ END	$G(x) \wedge P(x,x')$
ANY $t$ WHERE $G(t,x)$ THEN $x: P(x,x',t) $ END	$\exists t \cdot (G(t,x) \land P(x,x',t))$

# Guards of event

Event : E	Guard : grd(E)
BEGIN S END	TRUE
WHEN $G(x)$ THEN $T$ END	G(x)
ANY $t$ WHERE $G(t,x)$ THEN $T$ END	$\exists t \cdot G(t, x)$

# Proof obligations for a B model

	Proof obligation
(INV1)	$\Gamma(s,c) \vdash Init(x) \Rightarrow I(x)$
(INV2)	$\Gamma(s,c) \vdash I(x) \land BA(e)(x,x') \Rightarrow I(x')$
(DEAD)	$\Gamma(s,c) \vdash I(x) \Rightarrow (\operatorname{grd}(e_1) \lor \dots \operatorname{grd}(e_n))$
(SAFE)	$\Gamma(s,c) \vdash I(x) \Rightarrow A(x)$
(FIS)	$\Gamma(s,c) \; \vdash \; I(x) \; \land \; \operatorname{grd}\left(E\right) \; \Rightarrow \; \exists x' \cdot P(x,x')$

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#### The factorial model

```
CONTEXT fonctions CONSTANTS factorial, n

AXIOMS ax1:n\in\mathbb{N}
ax2:factorial\in\mathbb{N}\leftrightarrow\mathbb{N}
ax3:0\mapsto 1\in factorial
ax4:\forall (i,fn).(i\mapsto fn\in factorial)\Rightarrow i+1\mapsto (i+1)*fi\in factorial)\land

\forall f\cdot\begin{pmatrix} f\in\mathbb{N}\leftrightarrow\mathbb{N}\land\\ 0\mapsto 1\in f\land\\ \forall (n,fn).(n\mapsto fn\in f\Rightarrow n+1\mapsto (n+1)\times fn\in f)\\ \Longrightarrow\\ factorial\subseteq f
```

## The factorial model

```
MACHINE
  specification
SEES fonctions
VARIABLES
  result at
INVARIANT
  resultat \in \mathbb{N}
THEOREMS
  th1: factorial \in \mathbb{N} \longrightarrow \mathbb{N};
  th2: factorial(0) = 1;
  th3: \forall n.(n \in \mathbb{N} \Rightarrow factorial(n+1) = (n+1) \times factorial(n))
INITIALISATION
  resultat :\in \mathbb{N}
EVENTS
  computing1 = BEGIN \ resultat := factorial(n) \ END
END
```

# Communications between agents

```
\begin{tabular}{ll} \textbf{VARIABLES}\\ sent\\ got\\ lost\\ \textbf{INVARIANTS}\\ inv1: sent \subseteq AGENTS \times AGENTS\\ inv2: got \subseteq AGENTS \times AGENTS\\ inv4: (got \cup lost) \subseteq sent\\ inv6: lost \subseteq AGENTS \times AGENTS\\ \end{tabular}
```

MACHINE agents SEES data

#### INITIALISATION BEGIN

 $\begin{aligned} act1:sent &:= \varnothing \\ act2:got &:= \varnothing \\ act4:lost &:= \varnothing \end{aligned}$  END

 $inv7:got\cap lost=\varnothing$ 

# Communications between agents

```
EVENT sending a message ANY a, b WHERE grd11: a \in AGENTS grd12: b \in AGENTS grd1: a \mapsto b \notin sent THEN act11: sent := sent \cup \{a \mapsto b\} END
```

```
EVENT getting a message ANY a,b WHERE grd11:a\in AGENTS\\ grd12:b\in AGENTS\\ grd13:a\mapsto b\in sent\setminus (got\cup lost) THEN act11:got:=got\cup \{a\mapsto b\} END
```

# Communications between agents

```
EVENT loosing a messge ANY \begin{matrix} a \\ b \\ \end{matrix} WHERE grd1: a \in AGENTS grd2: b \in AGENTS grd3: a \mapsto b \in sent \setminus (got \cup lost) THEN act1: lost := lost \cup \{a \mapsto b\} END
```

```
\begin{array}{l} \textbf{CONTEXTS} \\ data \\ \textbf{SETS} \\ MESSAGES \\ AGENTS \\ DATA \\ \textbf{CONSTANTS} \\ n \\ infile \\ \textbf{AXIOMS} \\ axm1: n \in \mathbb{N} \\ axm2: n \neq 0 \\ axm3: infile \in 1 \dots n \rightarrow DATA \\ \textbf{END} \end{array}
```

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## General form of an event

```
\begin{aligned} & \textbf{EVENT e} \\ & \textbf{ANY} & t \\ & \textbf{WHERE} \\ & G(c,s,t,x) \\ & \textbf{THEN} \\ & x: |(P(c,s,t,x,x')) \\ & \textbf{END} \end{aligned}
```

- c et s are constantes and visible sets by e
- x is a state variable or a list of variabless
- G(c, s, t, x) is the condition for observing e.
- P(c, s, t, x, x') is the assertion for the relation over x and x'.
- BA(e)(c, s, x, x') is the before-after relationship for e and is defined by  $\exists t. G(c, s, t, x) \land P(c, s, t, x, x')$ .

# General form of proof obligations for an event e

Proofs obligations are simplified when they are generated by the module called POG and goals in sequents as  $\Gamma \vdash G$ :

- **1**  $\Gamma \vdash G_1 \land G_2$  is decomposed into the two sequents  $\begin{array}{c} (1)\Gamma \vdash G_1 \\ (2)\Gamma \vdash G_2 \end{array}$
- 2  $\Gamma \vdash G_1 \Rightarrow G_2$  is transformed into the sequent  $\Gamma, G_1 \vdash G_2$

#### Proof obligations in Rodin

- $INIT/I/INV : C(s,c), INIT(c,s,x) \vdash I(c,s,x)$
- $e/I/INV : C(s,c), I(c,s,x), G(c,s,t,x), P(c,s,t,x,x') \vdash I(c,s,x')$
- e/act/FIS :  $C(s,c), I(c,s,x), G(c,s,t,x) \vdash \exists x'. P(c,s,t,x,x')$

#### notation

- Chapter Event B
- The Event B Modelling Notation Version 1.4
- The Event-B Mathematical Language 2006
- User Manual of the RODIN PLatform