



# General Summary

- 1 Documentation
- 2 Introduction by Problems
  - Safety Properties of C Programs
  - Importance of Domain
- 3 Overview of formal techniques and formal methods
- 4 Modelling Language
- 5 A Simple Example : Management of Students and Teachers
- 6 Modelling state-based systems
- 7 The Event B modelling language
- 8 Examples of Event B models
- 9 Summary on Events

# Current Summary

- ## Summary on Events

- Event B : <http://www.event-b.org/>
- Atelier B : <http://www.atelierb.eu/>
- RODIN Platform : <http://www.event-b.org/platform.html>
- EB2ALL Toolset : <http://eb2all.loria.fr>
- RIMEL project : <http://rimel.loria.fr>
- The Modelling Language Event-B and related topics as lectures notes, tutorials, models. <https://mery54.github.io/teaching/>
- **Using the Arche platform of UL and accessing the course MOSOS with password mery**

## Current Summary

- Summary on Events

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <time.h>

int main() {
    int x, y;
    // Seed the random number generator with the current time
    srand(time(NULL));
    // Generate a random number between 1 and 100
    x = rand() % 100 + 1;
    // Perform some calculations
    y = x / (100 - x);
    printf("Result: -%d\n", y);
    return 0;
}
```

```
[kernel] Parsing bug0.c (with preprocessing)
[rte:annot] annotating function main
[wp] Running WP plugin...
[kernel:annot:missing-spec] FRAMAC_SHARE/libc/stdlib.h:299: Warning:
  Neither code nor explicit exits and terminates for function rand
  generating default clauses. See -generated-spec-* options for n
[kernel:annot:missing-spec] FRAMAC_SHARE/libc/stdlib.h:302: Warning:
  Neither code nor explicit exits and terminates for function srand
  generating default clauses. See -generated-spec-* options for n
[kernel:annot:missing-spec] FRAMAC_SHARE/libc/time.h:126: Warning:
  Neither code nor explicit exits and terminates for function time
  generating default clauses. See -generated-spec-* options for n
[kernel:annot:missing-spec] FRAMAC_SHARE/libc/stdio.h:211: Warning:
  Neither code nor explicit exits and terminates for function prin
  generating default clauses. See -generated-spec-* options for n
[wp] 8 goals scheduled
[wp] [Timeout] typed_main_call_printf_va_1_requires (Alt-Ergo)
[wp] [Timeout] typed_main_assert_rte_division_by_zero (Alt-Ergo)
[wp] Proved goals:      6 / 8
    Qed:                3
    Alt-Ergo 2.6.0:      3 (17ms-20ms-27ms)
    Timeout:             2
```

---

Function main

```
// Heisenbug
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <time.h>

int main() {
    int x, y, i=0;

    for (i = 0; i <= 100000; i++) {
        // Seed the random number generator with the current time
        srand(time(NULL));

        // Generate a random number between 1 and 100
        x = rand() % 100 + 1;
        printf(" Result: -x=-%d\n", x);
        // Perform some calculations
        y = x / (100 - x);

        printf(" Result: -i=%d -and- y=%d\n", i, y);
    }

    return 0;
}
```



# RTE with frama-c but a modification

```
// Heisenbug
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <time.h>

int main() {
    int x, y, i=0;

    for (i = 0; i <= 200000; i++) {
        // Seed the random number generator with the current time
        srand(time(NULL)+i);

        // Generate a random number between 1 and 100
        x = rand() % 100 + 1;
        printf(" Result: -x=- %d\n", x);
        // Perform some calculations
        y = x / (100 - x);

        printf(" Result: -i=%d - %d\n", i, y);
    }

    return 0;
}
```

Our aim is to analyze what is implicit and what is explicit in formal modelling...

- **Semantics in modelling :**

- ▶ Semantics expressed by a *theory* (e.g. Event-B) used to formalize hardware and/or software systems
- ▶ Same theory is used for wide variety of heterogeneous systems

- **Semantics in domain :**

- ▶ Environment within which system evolve : application domain/context
- ▶ Information provided by domain is often associated while in operation
- ▶ Either assumed and omitted while formalising systems or hardcoded in formal models
- ▶ Same context is used for wide variety of heterogeneous systems



## A case study for studying these properties

# Nose Gear Velocity



- Estimated ground velocity of the aircraft should be available only if it is within 3 km/hr of the true velocity at some moment within past 3 seconds

# Characterization of a System (I)


- NG velocity system :
  - ▶ **Hardware** :
    - *Electro-mechanical sensor* : detects rotations
    - *Two 16-bit counters* : Rotation counter, Milliseconds counter
    - *Interrupt service routine* : updates rotation counter and stores current time.
  - ▶ **Software** :
    - *Real-time operating system* : invokes update function every 500 ms
    - *16-bit global variable* : for recording rotation counter update time
    - *An update function* : estimates ground velocity of the aircraft.
- Input data available to the system :
  - ▶ *time* : in milliseconds
  - ▶ *distance* : in inches
  - ▶ *rotation angle* : in degrees
- Specified system performs velocity estimations in *imperial* unit system
- **Note** : expressed functional requirement is in *SI* unit system (km/hr).

- Two different types of data :

- ## How should we model ?

- 1  $estimateVelocity \in \text{MILES} \times \text{HOURS} \rightarrow \text{MPH}$
- 2  $mphTokph \in \text{MPH} \rightarrow \text{KPH}$

# Sample Velocity Estimation



# Current Summary

- ## Summary on Events

- Distributed systems : web services, information systems, distributed algorithms ...
- Safety critical systems : medical devices, embedded systems, cyber-physical systems, ...
- Fault-tolerant systems : networks, communication infrastructure, ...
- Environments : heart, the glucose-insulin regulatory system, ...



- Abstraction and refinement of features, 2000 *with D. Cansell*
- Incremental Proof of the Producer/Consumer Property for the PCI Protocol, 2002 *with D. Cansell, G. Gopalkrishnan, S. Jones.*
- A Mechanically Proved and Incremental Development of IEEE 1394 Tree Identify Protocol, 2003, *with J.-R. Abrial and D. Cansell.*
- The challenge of QoS for digital television services-. *EBU Technical Review* (avril 2005) *with D. Abraham, D. Cansell, C. Proch.*
- -Formal and Incremental Construction of Distributed Algorithms : On the Distributed Reference Counting Algorithm, 2006 *with D. Cansell.*

- Refinement : A Constructive Approach to Formal Software Design for a Secure e-voting Interface-, 2007 *with D. Cansell and P. Gibson.*
- Incremental Parametric Development of Greedy Algorithms, 2007, *with D. Cansell.*
- System-on-Chip Design by Proof-based Refinement, 2009 *with D. Cansell and C. Proch*
- -A simple refinement-based method for constructing algorithms, 2009. *Alone.*
- -Refinement-based guidelines for algorithmic systems-. *Alone. International Journal of Software and Informatics (2009),*

- Cryptologic algorithms : Event B development, combining cryptologic properties, modeling attacks.
- Access control systems : relating policy models and Event B models like in RBAC, TMAC, ORBAC
- Distributed algorithms : integration of local computation models into Event B, tool B2VISIDIA, algorithms of naming, election etc
- Medical devices : modelling the pacemaker, interacting with cardiologists, ...
- Modelling self- $\star$  systems
- Modelling medical devices item Modelling environments for medical devices : closed-loop modelling

## Next modelling

- Modelling human-in-the-loop systems
- Modelling cyber-physical systems

# General Approach

- Constructing a model of the system
- Elements for defining a formal or semi-formal model : syntax, semantics, verification, validation, documentation
- Mathematical structures : transition systems, temporal/modal/deontic/... logics,
- Validation of a model : tests, proofs, animation,...
- Modelling Techniques : state-based techniques
- Structure of a model : module, object, class,
- Design Patterns

# Mathematical tools for modelling systems

- set theory : sets, relations, functions ...
- transition systems
- predicate calculus
- decision procedures
- interactive theorem prover

## Examples of modelling languages

- Z : set theory, predicate calculus, schemas.
- VDM : types, pre/post specification, invariant, operations
- B : set theory, predicate calculus, generalized substitution, abstract machines, refinement, implementation.
- RAISE : abstract data types, functions,
- $TLA^+$  : set theory, modules, temporal logic of actions.
- UNITY : temporal logic, actions systems, superposition.
- UML
- JML and Spec# : programming by contract

## Objectives of the modelling

- To get a better understanding of the current system : requirements, properties, cost, maintenance . . .
- To document the the system
- To systematize operations of modelling : reuse, parametrization
- To ensure the quality of the final product : safety, security issues
- To elaborate a contract between the customer and the designer



# The Triptych Approach

$$\mathcal{D}, \mathcal{S} \longrightarrow \mathcal{R} \quad (1)$$


- $\mathcal{R}$  requirements or system properties
- $\mathcal{D}$  domain of the problem
- $\mathcal{S}$  model of the system
- $\longrightarrow$  relation of satisfaction

- Mathematical foundations of Models : syntax, semantics, pragmatics, theory, soundness.
- Mathematical reasoning is based on sound proof rules
- Common language for facilitating the communication.

## Current Summary


- ## Summary on Events

# Observing the safe system



- The context defines the possible values
- Safety requirement means that *something bad will never happen*.
- Invariant defines the set of effective possible values
- Transitions modify state variables and maintains the invariant.

# Observing the unsafe system



- Transitions modify state variables and **may not maintain** the invariant.
- ... and **may not guarantee** safety properties.

- Event B : <http://www.event-b.org/>
- Atelier B : <http://www.atelierb.eu/>
- RODIN Platform : <http://www.event-b.org/platform.html>

## The Event B Method

- The Event B Method is invented by J.-R. Abrial from 1988 : abstract system, events, refinement, invariant.
- Atelier B and RODIN are supporting the Event B method
- An event is observed and triggered, when a guard is true
- Proof obligations are generated using the weakest-precondition semantics.
- A Event B model intends to model a reactive system.

# Current Summary

- ## Summary on Events



## Managing teachers, students, lectures and class rooms

- Modelling the access control of students for lectures given by teachers
- When a student is attending a lecture, he/she can not attend another lecture
- When a teacher is lecturing, he/she is not lecturing another session.
- A student can not be lecturing without a teacher and when he is not attending a lecture, he is outside the classroom.
- When a teacher is ending a lecture, every student which is attending, is leaving the class room.
- When a student is not attending a lecture, he is free.

## First step : identification of sets, constants, properties

- Sets : students, teachers
- **Property 1** : When a student is attending a lecture, he/she can not attend another lecture
- **Property 2** : When a teacher is lecturing, he/she is not lecturing another session.
- **Property 3** :A student can not be lecturing without a teacher and when he is not attending a lecture, he is outside the classroom.
- **Property 4** : When a teacher is ending a lecture, every student which is attending, is leaving the class room.
- **Property 5** : When a student is not attending a lecture, he is free.

## Second step : definition of state variables

- The system model should be able to record the lecturing teachers and the attending students.
- The system model should be enough expressive to state when a given student is attending a lecture given by whom.
- Variable **attending** records students which attended some lecture with a given teacher.
- Variable **islecturing** records teachers who are lecturing.
- Variable **pause** records students are not attending a lecture but are somewhere not in a lecture.

## Expression of the invariant

$$\begin{aligned} \text{inv1} &: \text{attending} \in \text{STUDENTS} \rightarrow \text{TEACHERS} \\ \text{inv2} &: \text{islecturing} \subseteq \text{TEACHERS} \\ \text{inv3} &: \forall e \cdot e \in \text{STUDENTS} \wedge e \in \text{dom}(\text{attending}) \\ &\quad \Rightarrow \text{attending}(e) \in \text{islecturing} \\ \text{inv4} &: \text{pause} \subseteq \text{STUDENTS} \\ \text{inv5} &: \text{pause} \cap \text{dom}(\text{attending}) = \emptyset \\ \text{inv6} &: \text{pause} \cup \text{dom}(\text{attending}) = \text{STUDENTS} \end{aligned}$$

## Checking proof obligations!

## UseCases

- **EVENT** INITIALISATION : initializing state variables
- **EVENT** startingattending : a group of students is moving from *pause* to *lecture*
- **EVENT** teachergivinglecture : a teacher is starting a new lecture
- **EVENT** teacherendinglecture : a teacher is halting the lecture
- **EVENT** studentleavinglecture : a group of students is moving from *lecture* to *pause*

## Fourth step : Updating state variables

## EVENT INITIALISATION

**BEGIN**

$$act1 : attending := \emptyset$$
$$act2 : islecturing := \emptyset$$
$$act3 : pause := STUDENTS$$

END

## Fourth step : Updating state variables

```

EVENT starting
ANY
   $e$   $e$  is a student
   $p$   $p$  is a teacher
WHERE
   $grd1 : e \in STUDENTS$ 
   $grd3 : p \in TEACHERS$ 
   $grd4 : p \in islecturing$ 
   $grd2 : e \notin dom(attending)$ 
THEN
   $act1 : attending(e) := p$ 
   $act2 : pause := pause \setminus \{e\}$ 
END

```

## Fourth step : Updating state variables

```
EVENT teachergivinglecture
  ANY
     $p$ 
  WHERE
     $grd2 : p \in TEACHERS$ 
     $grd1 : p \notin islecturing$ 
  THEN
     $act1\ islecturing := islecturing \cup \{p\}$ 
  END
```



## Fourth step : Updating state variables

```
EVENT teacherendinglecture
ANY
  p
WHERE
  grd1 :  $p \in TEACHERS$ 
  grd2 :  $p \in islecturing$ 
THEN
  act1 :  $islecturing := islecturing \setminus \{p\}$ 

  act3 :  $attending := attending \setminus \{f \mapsto q \mid \left( \begin{array}{l} f \in STUDENTS \\ \wedge q \in TEACHERS \\ \wedge f \mapsto q \in attending \\ \wedge q = p \end{array} \right)\}$ 

  act2 :  $pause := pause \cup \{f \mid f \in STUDENTS \wedge f \in attending^{-1}[\{p\}]\}$ 
END
```

## Fourth step : Updating state variables

```
EVENT studentleavinglecture
  ANY
     $ge$ 
  WHERE
     $grd1 : ge \subseteq dom(attending)$ 
     $grd2 : ge \neq \emptyset$ 
  THEN
     $act1 : attending := ge \triangleleft attending$ 
     $act2 : pause := pause \cup ge$ 
  END
```

# Mathematical tools for modelling systems

- **set theory : sets, relations, functions . . .**
- **transition systems**
- **predicate calculus**
- **decision procedures**
- **interactive theorem prover**

# Current Summary

- ## Summary on Events

- A **system** is **observed**
- Observation of things which are
  - ▶ either changing over the **time** (*variable*)
  - ▶ or stuttering over the **time** (*constant*)
- A system is characterized by a **state**
- A state is made up of contextual **constant informations** over the problem theory and of **modifiable flexible informations** over the system.

## Changing state of system

A **flexible variable**  $x$  is observed at different instants :

$$x_0 \xrightarrow{\tau} x_1 \xrightarrow{\tau} x_2 \xrightarrow{\tau} x_3 \xrightarrow{\tau} \dots \xrightarrow{\tau} x_i \xrightarrow{\tau} x_{i+1} \xrightarrow{\tau} \dots$$

## Changing state of system

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$\tau$  hides effectives changes of state or actions or events

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$$x_0 \xrightarrow{\alpha_1} x_1 \xrightarrow{\alpha_2} x_2 \xrightarrow{\alpha_3} x_3 \xrightarrow{\alpha_4} \dots \xrightarrow{\alpha_i} x_i \xrightarrow{\alpha_{i+1}} x_{i+1} \xrightarrow{\alpha_{i+2}} \dots$$



## Changing state of system

A **flexible variable**  $x$  is observed at different instants :

$$x_0 \xrightarrow{\tau} x_1 \xrightarrow{\tau} x_2 \xrightarrow{\tau} x_3 \xrightarrow{\tau} \dots \xrightarrow{\tau} x_i \xrightarrow{\tau} x_{i+1} \xrightarrow{\tau} \dots$$

$\tau$  hides effectives changes of state or actions or events

$$x_0 \xrightarrow{\alpha_1} x_1 \xrightarrow{\alpha_2} x_2 \xrightarrow{\alpha_3} x_3 \xrightarrow{\alpha_4} \dots \xrightarrow{\alpha_i} x_i \xrightarrow{\alpha_{i+1}} x_{i+1} \xrightarrow{\alpha_{i+2}} \dots$$

Occurrences of  $e \tau$  can be added between two instants ie **stuttering steps** :

# Changing state of system

A **flexible variable**  $x$  is observed at different instants :

$$x_0 \xrightarrow{\tau} x_1 \xrightarrow{\tau} x_2 \xrightarrow{\tau} x_3 \xrightarrow{\tau} \dots \xrightarrow{\tau} x_i \xrightarrow{\tau} x_{i+1} \xrightarrow{\tau} \dots$$

$\tau$  hides effective changes of state or actions or events

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Occurrences of  $\tau$  can be added between two instants ie **stuttering steps** :

$$x_0 \xrightarrow{\alpha_1} x_1 \xrightarrow{\alpha_2} x_2 \xrightarrow{\tau} x_2 \xrightarrow{\alpha_3} x_3 \xrightarrow{\alpha_4} \dots \xrightarrow{\alpha_i} x_i \xrightarrow{\tau} x_i \xrightarrow{\alpha_{i+1}} x_{i+1} \xrightarrow{\alpha_{i+2}} \dots$$

A **safety** property  $S$  over  $x$  states that something will not happen :  $S(x)$   
means that  $S$  holds for  $x$

An **invariant** property  $I$  over  $x$  states a strong safety property

$$\begin{array}{l} x_0 \xrightarrow{\alpha_1} x_1 \xrightarrow{\alpha_2} x_2 \xrightarrow{\tau} x_2 \xrightarrow{\alpha_3} x_3 \xrightarrow{\alpha_4} \dots \xrightarrow{\alpha_i} x_i \xrightarrow{\tau} x_i \xrightarrow{\alpha_{i+1}} x_{i+1} \xrightarrow{\alpha_{i+2}} \dots \\ (S(x_0) \xrightarrow{\alpha_1} S(x_1) \xrightarrow{\alpha_2} S(x_2) \xrightarrow{\tau} S(x_2) \xrightarrow{\alpha_3} S(x_3) \xrightarrow{\alpha_4} \dots \xrightarrow{\alpha_i} S(x_i) \xrightarrow{\tau} \\ S(x_i) \xrightarrow{\alpha_{i+1}} S(x_{i+1}) \xrightarrow{\alpha_{i+2}} \dots \\ \text{or equivalently } \forall i \in \mathbb{N} : S(x_i) \end{array}$$

## Checking the relation

- You can check for every  $i$  in  $\mathbb{N}$  that  $S(x_i)$  is true but it can be long if states are different
- You can compute an abstraction of the set of states
- You can try to prove and for instance the induction principle may be usefull
- So be carefull and improve your modelling before to run the checker
- Use the induction

# State properties of a system

- A state property namely  $P(x)$  is a first order predicate with free variables  $x$ , where  $x$  is a flexible variable.
- A flexible variable  $x$  has a current value  $x$ , a next value  $x'$ , an initial value  $x_0$  and possibly a final value  $x_f$ .
- A predicate  $P(x)$  is considered as a set of values  $v$  such that  $P(v)$  holds : set-theoretical interpretation

## Safety Property

A safety property states that nothing bad can happen.

## Example

## Safety Properties

- Partial correctness a component is correct with respect to a precondition and a postcondition.
- No Run Time Error any software action or event does not produce a run-time error as overflow, division by zero ...
- Mutual exclusion a set of processes share common resources, a printer is shared by users, ...
- Deadlock freedom the system is never blocked, there is always at least one next state, ...

- An action  $\alpha$  over states is a relation between values of state variables **before** and values of variables **after**

$$\alpha(x, x') \text{ or } x \xrightarrow{\alpha} x'$$

- Flexible variable  $x$  has two values  $x$  and  $x'$ .
- Priming flexible variables is borrowed from TLA
- **Hypothesis 1** : **Values of  $x$  belongs to a set of values called VALUES** and defines the context of the system.
- **Hypothesis 2** : **Relations over  $x$  and  $x'$  belong to a set of relations  $\{r_0, \dots, r_n\}$**

# Operational model of a system

- A system  $\mathcal{S}$  is observed with respect to flexible variables  $x$ .
- Flexible variables  $x$  of  $\mathcal{S}$  are modified according to a finite set of relations over the set of values  $\text{VALUES} : \{r_0, \dots, r_n\}$
- $\text{INIT}(x)$  denotes the set of possible initial values for  $x$ .

$$\mathcal{OMS} = (x, \mathbf{Values}, \mathbf{Init}(x), \{r_0, \dots, r_n\})$$



## Safety and invariance of system

- **Hypothesis 3** :  $\mathcal{O}\mathcal{M}\mathcal{S} = (x, \text{VALUES}, \text{INIT}(x), \{r_0, \dots, r_n\})$
- **Hypothesis 4** :  $x \longrightarrow x' \triangleq (x \ r_0 \ x') \vee \dots \vee (x \ r_n \ x')$
- $\text{I}(x)$  is inductively invariant for a system called  $\mathcal{S}$ , if
 
$$\begin{cases} \forall x \in \text{VALUES} : \text{INIT}(x) \Rightarrow \text{I}(x) \\ \forall x, x' \in \text{VALUES} : \text{I}(x) \wedge x \longrightarrow x' \Rightarrow \text{I}(x') \end{cases}$$
**I(x) is called an invariant in B**
- $\text{Q}(x)$  is a safety property for a system called  $\mathcal{S}$ , if
 
$$\forall x, y \in \text{VALUES} : \text{INIT}(x) \wedge x \xrightarrow{\star} y \Rightarrow \text{Q}(y)$$
**Q(x) is called a theorem in B**

# Modelling systems : first attempt

## MODEL

$m$

...

...

...

## VARIABLES

$x$

## INVARIANT

$I(x)$

## THEOREMS

$Q(x)$

## INITIALISATION

$Init(x)$

## EVENTS

$\{r_0, \dots, r_n\}$

## END

- A model has a name  $m$
- Flexible variables  $x$  are declared
- $I(x)$  provides information over  $x$
- $Q(x)$  provides information over  $x$

- $\forall x_0, x \in \text{VALUES} : \text{INIT}(x_0) \wedge x_0 \xrightarrow{*} x \Rightarrow Q(x)$
- **Solution 1** Writing a procedure checking  $\text{INIT}(x_0) \wedge x_0 \xrightarrow{*} x \Rightarrow Q(x)$  for each pair  $x_0, x \in \text{VALUES}$ , when  $\text{VALUES}$  is finite and small.
- **Solution 2** Writing a procedure checking  $\text{INIT}(x_0) \wedge x_0 \xrightarrow{*} x \Rightarrow Q(x)$  for each pair  $x_0, x \in \text{VALUES}$ , by constructing an abstraction of  $\text{VALUES}$ .
- **Solution 3** Writing a proof for  $\forall x_0, x \in \text{VALUES} : \text{INIT}(x_0) \wedge x_0 \xrightarrow{*} x \Rightarrow Q(x)$ .

# Defining an induction principle for an operational model

(I)  $\forall x_0, x \in \mathbf{Values} : \mathbf{Init}(x_0) \wedge x_0 \xrightarrow{\star} x \Rightarrow \mathbf{Q}(x)$

if, and only if,

(II) there exists a state property  $\mathbf{I}(x)$  such that :

$$\forall x_0, x, x' \in \mathbf{Values} : \begin{cases} (1) & \mathbf{Init}(x_0) \Rightarrow \mathbf{I}(x_0) \\ (2) & \mathbf{I}(x) \Rightarrow \mathbf{Q}(x) \\ (3) & \mathbf{I}(x) \wedge x \longrightarrow x' \Rightarrow \mathbf{I}(x') \end{cases}$$

if, and only if,

(III) there exists a state property  $\mathbf{I}(x)$  such that :

$$\forall x_0, x, x' \in \mathbf{Values} : \begin{cases} (1) & \mathbf{Init}(x_0) \Rightarrow \mathbf{I}(x_0) \\ (2) & \mathbf{I}(x) \Rightarrow \mathbf{Q}(x) \\ (3) & \forall i \in \{0, \dots, n\} : \mathbf{I}(x) \wedge x \ r_i \ x' \Rightarrow \mathbf{I}(x') \end{cases}$$

# Modelling systems : second attempt

## MODEL

$m$

...

...

...

## VARIABLES

$x$

## INVARIANT

$I(x)$

## THEOREMS

$Q(x)$

## INITIALISATION

$Init(x)$

## EVENTS

$\{r_0, \dots, r_n\}$

## END

- $\forall x_0 \in \text{VALUES} : \text{INIT}(x_0) \Rightarrow I(x_0)$
- $\forall x, x' \in \text{VALUES} : \forall i \in \{0, \dots, n\} :$   
$$I(x) \wedge x \text{ } r_i \text{ } x' \Rightarrow I(x')$$
- $\forall x \in \text{VALUES} : I(x) \Rightarrow Q(x)$

# Modelling systems : last attempt ?

**MODEL**

$m$

?

?

?

**VARIABLES**

$x$

**INVARIANT**

$I(x)$

**THEOREMS**

$Q(x)$

**INITIALISATION**

$Init(x)$

**EVENTS**

$\{r_0, \dots, r_n\}$

**END**

- What are the environment of the proof for properties ?
- What are theories ?
- How are defining the static objects ?

# Modelling systems : last attempt !

## MODEL

$m$

$\Gamma(m)$

## VARIABLES

$x$

## INVARIANT

$I(x)$

## THEOREMS

$Q(x)$

## INITIALISATION

$Init(x)$

## EVENTS

$\{r_0, \dots, r_n\}$

## END

- $\Gamma(m)$  defines the static environment for the proofs related to  $m$ .
- $\Gamma(m) \vdash \forall x \in \text{VALUES} : \text{INIT}(x) \Rightarrow I(x)$
- $\forall i \in \{0, \dots, n\} :$   
 $\Gamma(m) \vdash \forall x, x' \in \text{VALUES} : I(x) \wedge x \ r_i \ x' \Rightarrow I(x')$
- $\Gamma(m) \vdash \forall x \in \text{VALUES} : I(x) \Rightarrow Q(x)$

An **event system model** is made of

State **constants** and state **variables** constrained by a state **invariant**

A finite set of **events**

**Proofs** ensures the consistency between the invariant and the events

An event system model can be **refined**

**Proofs** must ensure the correctness of refinement



# Modelling systems : Hello world !

## MODEL FACTORIAL\_EVENTS

Static Part *context*

### CONSTANTS

*factorial, m*

### AXIOMS

$$\begin{aligned} & m \in \mathbb{N} \wedge factorial \in \mathbb{N} \leftrightarrow \mathbb{N} \wedge 0 \mapsto 1 \in factorial \wedge \\ & \forall(n, fn).(n \mapsto fn \in factorial \Rightarrow n + 1 \mapsto (n + 1) * fn \in factorial) \wedge \\ & \forall f. \left( \begin{array}{l} f \in \mathbb{N} \leftrightarrow \mathbb{N} \wedge \\ 0 \mapsto 1 \in f \wedge \\ \forall(n, fn).(n \mapsto fn \in f \Rightarrow n + 1 \mapsto (n + 1) \times fn \in f) \\ \Rightarrow \\ factorial \subseteq f \end{array} \right) \end{aligned}$$

Dynamic Part *machine*

### VARIABLES

*result, ok*

### INVARIANT

$result \in \mathbb{N}$

$ok \in \mathbb{B}$

$ok = TRUE \Rightarrow result = factorial(n)$

### THEOREMS

$factorial \in \mathbb{N} \longrightarrow \mathbb{N}$  ;

$factorial(0) = 1$  ;

$\forall n.(n \in \mathbb{N} \Rightarrow factorial(n + 1) = (n + 1) \times factorial(n))$

### INITIALISATION

$result : \in \mathbb{N}$

$ok := FALSE$

### EVENTS

*computation* = **ANY**  $ok = FALSE$  **THEN**  $result, ok := factorial(m), TRUE$  **END**

**END**

# Modelling systems relations as events

## MODEL

$m$

Static Part *context*

### SETS

$s$

### CONSTANTS

$c$

### AXIOMS

$P(s, c)$

### THEOREMS

$Q(s, c)$

Dynamic Part *machine*

### VARIABLES

$x$

### INVARIANT

$I(s, c, x)$

### THEOREMS

$S(s, c, x)$

### INITIALISATION

$Init(s, c, x)$

### EVENTS

$\{r_1, \dots, r_n\}$

### END

- $\Gamma(m)$  defines the static environment for the proofs related to  $m$  from  $s$ ,  $c$  and  $P(s, c)$  and  $\Gamma(m)$  is defined from the static part.
- $\Gamma(m) \vdash Q(s, c)$
- $\Gamma(m) \vdash \forall x, x' \in \text{VALUES} : \text{INIT}(s, c, x) \Rightarrow I(s, c, x)$
- $\forall i \in \{1, \dots, n\} :$   
 $\Gamma(m) \vdash \forall x, x' \in \text{VALUES} :$   
 $I(s, c, x) \wedge x \ r_i \ x' \Rightarrow I(s, c, x')$
- $\Gamma(m) \vdash \forall x, x' \in \text{VALUES} : I(s, c, x) \Rightarrow S(s, c, x)$

# Modelling systems relations as events

## CONTEXT

*context\_name*

## SETS

*s*

## CONSTANTS

*c*

## AXIOMS

$P(s, c)$

## THEOREMS

$Q(s, c)$

## MACHINE

*m*

## SEES

*context\_name*

## VARIABLES

*x*

## INVARIANT

$I(s, c, x)$

## THEOREMS

$S(s, c, x)$

## INITIALISATION

$Init(s, c, x)$

## EVENTS

$\{e_1, \dots, e_n\}$

## END

- $\Gamma(m)$  defines the static environment for the proofs related to  $m$  from  $s$ ,  $c$  and  $P(s, c)$  and  $\Gamma(m)$  is defined from the static part.
- $\Gamma(m) \vdash Q(s, c)$
- $\Gamma(m) \vdash \forall x, x' \in \text{VALUES} : \text{INIT}(s, c, x) \Rightarrow I(s, c, x)$
- $\forall i \in \{0, \dots, n\} : r_i(x, x') \triangleq BA(e_i)(s, c, x, x')$
- $\forall i \in \{0, \dots, n\} :$   
 $\Gamma(m) \vdash \forall x, x' \in \text{VALUES} :$   
 $I(x) \wedge BA(e_i)(s, c, x, x') \Rightarrow I(s, c, x')$
- $\Gamma(m) \vdash \forall x, x' \in \text{VALUES} : I(x) \Rightarrow S(s, c, x)$

**step 1** : Understanding the **problem** to solve

## step 2 : Organizing requirements and extracting properties

### step 3 : Writing a first very **abstract** system model

**step 4** : Consulting the requirements and **adding** a new detail in the current model by **refinement**

**step 5** : Either the model is enough detailed and the process stops, or the model is not yet enough concrete and the step 4 is repeated.

## Current Summary

- 1 Documentation
- 2 Introduction by Problems
- 3 Overview of formal techniques and formal methods
- 4 Modelling Language
- 5 A Simple Example : Management of Students and Teachers
- 6 Modelling state-based systems
- 7 The Event B modelling language
- 8 Examples of Event B models

- ## Summary on Events

## Expressing models in the event B notation

- Models are defined in two ways :
  - ▶ an abstract machine
  - ▶ a refinement of an existing model
- Models use **constants** which are defined in structures called **contexts**
- B structures are related by the three possible relations :
  - ▶ the **sees** relationship for expressing the use of constants, sets satisfying axioms and theorems.
  - ▶ the **extends** relationship for expressing the extension of contexts by adding new constants and new sets
  - ▶ the **refines** relationship stating that a B model is refined by another one.

## Machines

- **REFINES**
- **SEES** a context
- **VARIABLES** of the model
- **INVARIANTS** satisfied by the variables
- **THEOREMS** satisfied by the variables
- **EVENTS** modifying the variables
- **VARIANT**

## Contexts

- **EXTENDS** another context
- **SETS** declares new sets
- **CONSTANTS** define a list of constants
- **AXIOMS** define the properties of constants and sets
- **THEOREMS** list the theorems which should be derived from axioms

## Machines in Event B

 $m$  $am$ 

*C*

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$$I(u)$$
$$Q(u)$$

*< variant >*

*< event >*

- $\Gamma(m)$  : environment for the machine  $m$  defined by the context  $c$
- $\Gamma(m) \vdash \forall u \in \text{VALUES} : \text{INIT}(u) \Rightarrow \text{I}(u)$
- For each event  $e$  in  $E$  :  
 $\Gamma(m) \vdash \forall u, u' \in \text{VALUES} : \text{I}(u) \wedge \text{BA}(e)(u, u') \Rightarrow \text{I}(u')$
- $\Gamma(m) \vdash \forall u \in \text{VALUES} : \text{I}(u) \Rightarrow \text{Q}(u)$



**CONTEXTS** $c$ **EXTENDS** $ac$ **SETS** $s$ **CONSTANTS** $c$ **AXIOMS** $ax1 : \dots$ **THEOREMS** $th1 : \dots$ **END**

- $ac : c$  is extending  $ac$  and add new features
- $s$  : sets are defined either by intension or by extension
- $c$  : constants are defined and
- axioms characterize constants and sets
- theorems are derived from axioms in the current context

## before-after relation for e

For each event e, a before-after relation is defined over (flexible) variables.  
Three events are possible

- $e \triangleq \text{BEGIN } x : |P(x, x') \text{ END} : \text{BA}(e)(x, x') \triangleq P(x; x')$
- $e \triangleq \text{WHEN } G(x) \text{ THEN } x : |P(x, x') \text{ END} : \text{BA}(e)(x, x') \triangleq G(x) \wedge P(x; x')$
- $e \triangleq \text{ANY } p \text{ WHEN } G(p, x) \text{ THEN } x : |P(p, x, x') \text{ END} : \text{BA}(e)(x, x') \triangleq \exists p. G(p, x) \wedge P(x; x')$

## guard for e

For each event e, a guard is defined over (flexible) variables.  
Three events are possible

- $e \triangleq \text{BEGIN } x : |P(x, x') \text{ END} : \text{grd}(x) \triangleq \text{TRUE}$
- $e \triangleq \text{WHEN } G(x) \text{ THEN } x : |P(x, x') \text{ END} : \text{grd}(e)(x) \triangleq G(x)$
- $e \triangleq \text{ANY } p \text{ WHEN } G(p, x) \text{ THEN } x : |P(p, x, x') \text{ END} : \text{grd}(e)(x) \triangleq \exists p. G(p, x)$

# Proof obligations for a B model

$$\text{inv1} \quad \Gamma(s, c) \vdash \text{Init}(x) \Rightarrow I(x)$$

$$\text{inv2} \quad \Gamma(s, c) \vdash I(x) \wedge \text{BA}(e)(x, x') \Rightarrow I(x')$$

$$\text{fis} \quad \Gamma(s, c) \vdash I(x) \wedge \text{grd}(E) \Rightarrow \exists x' \cdot P(x, x')$$

$$\text{safe} \quad \Gamma(s, c) \vdash I(x) \Rightarrow A(x)$$

$$\text{dead} \quad \Gamma(s, c) \vdash I(x) \Rightarrow (\text{grd}(e_1) \vee \dots \vee \text{grd}(e_n))$$

## Current Summary

- ## Summary on Events

# The factorial model

## CONTEXT

*fonctions*

## CONSTANTS

*factorial, n*

## AXIOMS

*ax1* :  $n \in \mathbb{N}$

*ax2* :  $factorial \in \mathbb{N} \leftrightarrow \mathbb{N}$

*ax3* :  $0 \mapsto 1 \in factorial$

*ax4* :  $\forall(i, fn).(i \mapsto fn \in factorial \Rightarrow i + 1 \mapsto (i + 1) * fi \in factorial) \wedge$

$$\forall f \cdot \left( \begin{array}{l} f \in \mathbb{N} \leftrightarrow \mathbb{N} \wedge \\ 0 \mapsto 1 \in f \wedge \\ \forall(n, fn).(n \mapsto fn \in f \Rightarrow n + 1 \mapsto (n + 1) \times fn \in f) \\ \Rightarrow \\ factorial \subseteq f \end{array} \right)$$

## END

# The factorial model

## **MACHINE**

*specification*

**SEES** *fonctions*

## **VARIABLES**

*resultat*

## **INVARIANT**

*resultat*  $\in \mathbb{N}$

## **THEOREMS**

*th1* : *factorial*  $\in \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$  ;

*th2* : *factorial*(0) = 1 ;

*th3* :  $\forall n. (n \in \mathbb{N} \Rightarrow \text{factorial}(n+1) = (n+1) \times \text{factorial}(n))$

## **INITIALISATION**

*resultat* :  $\in \mathbb{N}$

## **EVENTS**

*computing1* = **BEGIN** *resultat* := *factorial*(*n*) **END**

**END**

# Communications between agents

**MACHINE** *agents*

**SEES** *data*

**VARIABLES**

*sent*

*got*

*lost*

**INVARIANTS**

*inv1* :  $sent \subseteq AGENTS \times AGENTS$

*inv2* :  $got \subseteq AGENTS \times AGENTS$

*inv4* :  $(got \cup lost) \subseteq sent$

*inv6* :  $lost \subseteq AGENTS \times AGENTS$

*inv7* :  $got \cap lost = \emptyset$

**INITIALISATION**

**BEGIN**

*act1* :  $sent := \emptyset$

*act2* :  $got := \emptyset$

*act4* :  $lost := \emptyset$

**END**



# Communications between agents

**EVENT** sending a message

**ANY**

$a, b$

**WHERE**

$grd11 : a \in AGENTS$

$grd12 : b \in AGENTS$

$grd1 : a \mapsto b \notin sent$

**THEN**

$act11 : sent := sent \cup \{a \mapsto b\}$

**END**

**EVENT** getting a message

**ANY**

$a, b$

**WHERE**

$grd11 : a \in AGENTS$

$grd12 : b \in AGENTS$

$grd13 : a \mapsto b \in sent \setminus (got \cup lost)$

**THEN**

$act11 : got := got \cup \{a \mapsto b\}$

**END**

# Communications between agents

```
EVENT loosing a message  
ANY  
  a  
  b  
WHERE grd1 : a ∈ AGENTS  
        grd2 : b ∈ AGENTS  
        grd3 : a ↦ b ∈ sent \ (got ∪ lost)  
THEN  
  act1 : lost := lost ∪ {a ↦ b}  
END
```

## CONTEXTS

*data*

## SETS

*MESSAGES*

*AGENTS*

*DATA*

## CONSTANTS

*n*

*infile*

## AXIOMS

*axm1* : *n* ∈ ℕ

*axm2* : *n* ≠ 0

*axm3* : *infile* ∈ 1 .. *n* → *DATA*

## END

## Current Summary

## Summary on Events

# General form of an event

```
EVENT e
  ANY t
  WHERE
     $G(c, s, t, x)$ 
  THEN
     $x : |(P(c, s, t, x, x'))|$ 
  END
```

- $c$  et  $s$  are constantes and visible sets by  $e$
- $x$  is a state variable or a list of variables
- $G(c, s, t, x)$  is the condition for observing  $e$ .
- $P(c, s, t, x, x')$  is the assertion for the relation over  $x$  and  $x'$ .
- $BA(e)(c, s, x, x')$  is the *before-after* relationship for  $e$  and is defined by  $\exists t. G(c, s, t, x) \wedge P(c, s, t, x, x')$ .

## General form of proof obligations for an event $e$

Proofs obligations are simplified when they are generated by the module called POG and goals in sequents as  $\Gamma \vdash G$  :

- ①  $\Gamma \vdash G_1 \wedge G_2$  is decomposed into the two sequents
 

$(1) \Gamma \vdash G_1$   
 $(2) \Gamma \vdash G_2$
- ②  $\Gamma \vdash G_1 \Rightarrow G_2$  is transformed into the sequent  $\Gamma, G_1 \vdash G_2$

## Proof obligations in Rodin

- $INIT/I/INV : C(s, c), INIT(c, s, x) \vdash I(c, s, x)$
- $e/I/INV : C(s, c), I(c, s, x), G(c, s, t, x), P(c, s, t, x, x') \vdash I(c, s, x')$
- $e/act/FIS : C(s, c), I(c, s, x), G(c, s, t, x) \vdash \exists x'. P(c, s, t, x, x')$

- U