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Defendant Ghislaine Maxwell moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 for summary judgment.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

FACTS

The following facts are undisputed. Additional undisputed facts are set forth in specific argument sections. All paragraphs containing undisputed facts will be sequentially numbered.

1. **Ms. Maxwell's response to publications of plaintiff's false allegations: the March 2011 statement.** In early 2011 plaintiff in two British tabloid interviews made numerous false and defamatory allegations against Ms. Maxwell. EXHIBITS A-B.[1] In the articles, plaintiff made no direct allegations that Ms. Maxwell was involved in any improper conduct with Jeffrey Epstein, who had pleaded guilty in 2007 to procuring a minor for prostitution.[2] Nonetheless, plaintiff suggested that Ms. Maxwell worked with Epstein and may have known about the crime for which he was convicted. *See generally* EXHIBITS A-B.

2. In the articles, plaintiff alleged she had sex with Prince Andrew, "a well-known businessman," a "world-renowned scientist," a "respected liberal politician," and a "foreign head of state." *Id.* at 5.

3. In response to the allegations Ms. Maxwell's British attorney, working with Mr. Gow, issued a statement on March 9, 2011, denying "the various allegations about [Ms. Maxwell] that have appeared recently in the media. These allegations are all entirely false." EXHIBIT C.

4. The statement read in full:

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[1]The articles were attached as exhibits to the author Sharon Churcher's declaration in support of her motion to quash an SDT issued to her. *See* Doc.216-2 & 216-3.

[2]Doc.1 ¶¶ 11, 14.

Statement on Behalf of Ghislaine Maxwell

By Devonshires Solicitors, PRNE
Wednesday, March 9, 2011

London, March 10, 2011 - Ghislaine Maxwell denies the various allegations about her that have appeared recently in the media. *These allegations are all entirely false.*

It is unacceptable that letters sent by Ms Maxwell's legal representatives to certain newspapers pointing out the truth and asking for the allegations to be withdrawn have simply been ignored.

In the circumstances, *Ms Maxwell is now proceeding to take legal action against those newspapers*.

"I understand newspapers need stories to sell copies. It is well known that certain newspapers live by the adage, "why let the truth get in the way of a good story." However, *the allegations made against me are abhorrent and entirely untrue* and I ask that they stop," said Ghislaine Maxwell.

"A number of newspapers have shown a complete lack of accuracy in their reporting of this story and a failure to carry out the most elementary investigation or any real due diligence. I am now taking action to clear my name," she said.

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Email: ross@acuityreputation.com

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EXHIBIT C (emphasis supplied; capitalization altered). We refer to this as "the March 2011 statement."

5. **Plaintiff's gratuitous and "lurid" accusations in an unrelated action.** In 2008 two alleged victims of Epstein brought an action under the Crime Victims' Rights Act against the United States government purporting to challenge Epstein's plea agreement. They alleged the government violated their CVRA rights by entering into the agreement. *See* EXHIBIT D, at 2.

6. Seven years later, on December 30, 2014, Ms. Giuffre moved to join the CVRA action, claiming she, too, had her CVRA rights violated by the government. On January 1, 2015, Ms. Giuffre filed a "corrected" joinder motion. EXHIBIT D, at 1, 9.

7. The issue presented in her joinder motion was narrow: whether she should be permitted to join the CVRA action as a party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, specifically, whether she was a "known victim[] of Mr. Epstein and the Government owed them CVRA duties," EXHIBIT E, at 5. Yet, the court noted, "the bulk of the [motion] consists of copious factual details that [plaintiff] and [her co-movant] 'would prove . . . if allowed to join.'" *Id.* (brackets omitted). Ms. Giuffre gratuitously included provocative and "lurid details" of her alleged sexual activities as an alleged victim of sexual trafficking. *Id.*

8. At the time they filed the motion, Ms. Giuffre and her lawyers knew that the media had been following the Epstein criminal case and the CVRA action. While they deliberately filed the motion without disclosing Ms. Giuffre's name, claiming the need for privacy and secrecy, they made no attempt to file the motion under seal. Quite the contrary, they filed the motion publicly. EXHIBIT D, at 1 & n.1.

9. As the district court noted in ruling on the joinder motion, Ms. Giuffre "name[d] several individuals, and she offers details about the type of sex acts performed and where they took place." EXHIBIT E, at 5. The court ruled that "these lurid details are unnecessary": "The factual details regarding whom and where the Jane Does engaged in sexual activities are immaterial and impertinent . . ., especially considering that these details involve *non-parties* who are not related to the respondent Government." *Id.* Accordingly, "[t]hese unnecessary details shall be stricken." *Id.* The court then struck all Ms. Giuffre's factual allegations relating to her alleged sexual activities and her allegations of misconduct by non-parties. *Id.* at 5-6. The court

said the striking of the "lurid details" was a sanction for Ms. Giuffre's improper inclusion of them in the motion. *See id.* at 6-7.

10. The district court found not only that the "lurid details" were unnecessary but also that the entire joinder motion was "entirely unnecessary," *id.* at 7. Ms. Giuffre and her lawyers knew the motion with all its "lurid details" was unnecessary because, as the court pointed out, the motion itself recognized that she would be able to participate as a fact witness to achieve the same result she sought as a party. *See id.* at 7-8; *see also id.* at 8 (noting that in the motion, Ms. Giuffre's lawyers said that "regardless of whether this Court grants the . . . Motion, 'they will call [her] as a witness at any trial'"). The court denied plaintiff's joinder motion. *Id.* at 10.

11. One of the non-parties Ms. Giuffre "named" repeatedly in the joinder motion was Ms. Maxwell. EXHIBIT D, at 3-6. According to the "lurid details" of Ms. Giuffre included in the motion, Ms. Maxwell personally was involved in a "sexual abuse and sex trafficking scheme" created by Epstein:

- Ms. Maxwell "approached" plaintiff in 1999 when plaintiff was "fifteen years old" to recruit her into the scheme. *Id.* at 3.
- Ms. Maxwell was "one of the main women" Epstein used to "procure under-aged girls for sexual activities." *Id.*
- Ms. Maxwell was a "primary co-conspirator" with Epstein in his scheme. *Id.*
- She "persuaded" plaintiff to go to Epstein's mansion "in a fashion very similar to the manner in which Epstein and his other co-conspirators coerced dozens of other children." *Id.*
- At the mansion, when plaintiff began giving Epstein a massage, he and Ms. Maxwell "turned it into a sexual encounter." *Id.*
- Epstein "with the assistance of" Ms. Maxwell "converted [plaintiff] into . . . a 'sex slave.'" *Id.* Plaintiff was a "sex slave" from "about 1999 through 2002." *Id.*
- Ms. Maxwell also was a "co-conspirator in Epstein's sexual abuse." *Id.* at 4.

- Ms. Maxwell "appreciated the immunity" she acquired under Epstein's plea agreement, because the immunity protected her from prosecution "for the crimes she committed in Florida." *Id.*

- Ms. Maxwell "participat[ed] in the sexual abuse of [plaintiff] and others." *Id.*

- Ms. Maxwell "took numerous sexually explicit pictures of underage girls involved in sexual activities, including [plaintiff]." *Id.* She shared the photos with Epstein. *Id.*

- As part of her "role in Epstein's sexual abuse ring," Ms. Maxwell "connect[ed]" Epstein with "powerful individuals" so that Epstein could traffick plaintiff to these persons. *Id.*

- Plaintiff was "forced to have sexual relations" with Prince Andrew in "[Ms. Maxwell's] apartment" in London. *Id.* Ms. Maxwell "facilitated" plaintiff's sex with Prince Andrew "by acting as a 'madame' for Epstein." *Id.*

- Ms. Maxwell "assist[ed] in internationally trafficking" plaintiff and "numerous other young girls for sexual purposes." *Id.*

- Plaintiff was "forced" to watch Epstein, Ms. Maxwell and others "engage in illegal sexual acts with dozens of underage girls." *Id.*

12. In the joinder motion, plaintiff also alleged she was "forced" to have sex with Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz, "model scout" Jean Luc Brunel, and "many other powerful men, including numerous prominent American politicians, powerful business executives, foreign presidents, a well-known Prime Minister, and other world leaders." *Id.* at 4-6.

13. Plaintiff said after serving for four years as a "sex slave," she "managed to escape to a foreign country and hide out from Epstein and his co-conspirators for years." *Id.* at 3.

14. Plaintiff suggested the government was part of Epstein's "conspiracy" when it "secretly" negotiated a non-prosecution agreement with Epstein precluding federal prosecution of Epstein and his "co-conspirators." *Id.* at 6. The government's secrecy, plaintiff alleged, was motivated by its fear that plaintiff would raise "powerful objections" to the agreement that would have "shed tremendous public light on Epstein and other powerful individuals. *Id.* at 6-7.

15. Notably, the other "Jane Doe" who joined plaintiff's motion who alleged she was sexually abused "many occasions" by Epstein was unable to corroborate any of plaintiff's allegations. *See id.* at 7-8.

16. Also notably, in her multiple and lengthy consensual interviews with Ms. Churcher three years earlier, plaintiff told Ms. Churcher virtually *none* of the details she described in the joinder motion. *See* EXHIBIT A-B.

17. **Ms. Maxwell's response to plaintiff's "lurid" accusations: the January 2015 statement.** As plaintiff and her lawyers expected, before District Judge Marra in the CVRA action could strike the "lurid details" of plaintiff's allegations in the joinder motion, members of the media obtained copies of the motion. *See* EXHIBIT G, at 31:2-36:4 & Depo.Exs.3-4.

18. At Mr. Barden's direction, on January 2, 2015, Mr. Gow sent to numerous representatives of British media organizations an email containing "a quotable statement on behalf of Ms Maxwell." EXHIBIT F; EXHIBIT G, at 33:8-23. The email was sent to more than 6 and probably less than 30 media representatives. *See* EXHIBIT G, at 33:8-34:3. It was not sent to non-media representatives. *See id.* at 31:2-35:21.

19. Among the media representatives were Martin Robinson of the Daily Mail; P. Peachey of The Independent; Nick Sommerlad of The Mirror; David Brown of The Times; and Nick Always and Jo-Anne Pugh of the BBC; and David Mercer of the Press Association. *See, e.g.*, EXHIBIT F. These representatives were selected based on their request—after the joinder motion was filed—for a response from Ms. Maxwell to plaintiff's allegations in the motion. *See, e.g.*, EXHIBIT G, at 30:23-35:21 & Depo.Ex.3.

20. The email to the media members read:

> To Whom It May Concern,
> Please find attached a quotable statement on behalf of Ms Maxwell.

> No further communication will be provided by her on this matter.
> Thanks for your understanding.
> Best
> Ross
>
> Ross Gow
> ACUITY Reputation
>
> Jane Doe 3 is Virginia Roberts—so not a new individual. The allegations made by Victoria Roberts against Ghislaine Maxwell are untrue. The original allegations are not new and have been fully responded to and shown to be untrue.
>
> Each time the story is re told [sic] it changes with new salacious details about public figures and world leaders and now it is alleged by Ms Roberts [sic] that Alan Derschowitz [sic] is involved in having sexual relations with her, which he denies.
>
> Ms Roberts claims are obvious lies and should be treated as such and not publicised as news, as they are defamatory.
>
> Ghislaine Maxwell's original response to the lies and defamatory claims remains the same. Maxwell strongly denies allegations of an unsavoury nature, which have appeared in the British press and elsewhere and reserves her right to seek redress at the repetition of such old defamatory claims.

EXHIBIT F (emphasis supplied). We refer to this email as "the January 2015 statement."

21. Mr. Barden, who prepared the January 2015 statement, did not intend it as a traditional press release solely to disseminate information to the media. So he intentionally did engage a public relations firm, such as Mr. Gow's firm Acuity Reputation, to prepare the statement. *See* EXHIBIT K ¶¶ 10,15.

22. The January 2015 statement served two purposes. First, Mr. Barden intended that it mitigate the harm to Ms. Maxwell's reputation from the press's republication of plaintiff's false allegations. He believed this could be accomplished by suggesting to the media that, among other things, they should subject plaintiff's allegations to inquiry and scrutiny. For example, he noted in the statement that plaintiff's allegations changed dramatically over time, suggesting that they are "obvious lies" and therefore should not be "publicised as news." *Id.* ¶ 11.

23. Second, Mr. Barden intended the January 2015 statement to be "a shot across the bow" of the media, which he believed had been unduly eager to publish plaintiff's allegations without conducting any inquiry of their own. Accordingly, in the statement he repeatedly noted that plaintiff's allegations were "defamatory." In this sense, the statement was intended as a cease and desist letter to the media-recipients, letting the media-recipients understand the seriousness with which Ms. Maxwell considered the publication of plaintiff's obviously false allegations and the legal indefensibility of their own conduct. *Id.* ¶ 17.

24. Consistent with those two purposes, Mr. Gow's emails prefaced the statement with the following language: "Please find attached a *quotable statement* on behalf of Ms Maxwell" (emphasis supplied). The statement was intended to be a single, one-time-only, comprehensive response—quoted in full—to plaintiff's December 30, 2014, allegations that would give the media Ms. Maxwell's response. *Id.* ¶ 19. The purpose of the prefatory statement was to inform the media-recipients of this intent. *Id.*

25. **Plaintiff's activities to bring light to the rights of victims of sexual abuse.** Plaintiff has engaged in numerous activities to bring attention to herself, to the prosecution and punishment of wealthy individuals such as Epstein, and to her claimed interest of bringing light to the rights of victims of sexual abuse.

26. Plaintiff created an organization, Victims Refuse Silence, Inc., a Florida corporation, directly related to her alleged experience as a victim of sexual abuse. Doc.1 ¶¶ 24-25.

27. The "goal" of Victims Refuse Silence "was, and continues to be, to help survivors surmount the shame, silence, and intimidation typically experienced by victims of sexual abuse." *Id.* ¶ 25. Toward this end, plaintiff has "dedicated her professional life to helping victims of sex trafficking." *Id.*

28. Plaintiff repeatedly has sought out media organizations to discuss her alleged experience as a victim of sexual abuse. *See* This Motion at ¶¶ 51-54.

29. As discussed above, on December 30, 2014, plaintiff publicly filed an "entirely unnecessary"[3] joinder motion laden with what Judge Marra described as "unnecessary,"[4] "lurid details"[5] about being "sexually abused" as a "minor victim[]" by wealthy and famous men and being "trafficked" all around the world as a "sex slave." EXHIBIT D, at 1 n.1, 3-6.

30. The plaintiff's alleged purpose in filing the joinder motion was to "vindicate" her rights under the CVRA, expose the government's "secretly negotiated" "non-prosecution agreement" with Epstein, "*shed tremendous public light*" on Epstein and "other powerful individuals" that would undermine the agreement, and support the CVRA plaintiffs' request for documents that would show how Epstein "used his powerful political and social connections to secure a favorable plea deal" and the government's "motive" to aid Epstein and his "co-conspirators." *See* EXHIBIT D, at 1, 6-7, 10 (emphasis supplied).

31. Plaintiff has written the manuscript of a book she has been trying to publish detailing her alleged experience as a victim of sexual abuse and of sex trafficking in Epstein's alleged "sex scheme." EXHIBIT KK.

32. **Republication alleged by plaintiff.** Plaintiff[6] was required by Interrogatory No. 6 to identify any false statements attributed to Ms. Maxwell that were "'published globally, including

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[3]EXHIBIT E, at 7.

[4]*Id.* at 5.

[5]*Id.*

[6]The undisputed facts relevant to this Motion are contained in the Facts section, above, and within each argument as appropriate. The undisputed facts will be sequentially numbered throughout this Motion.

within the Southern District of New York,'" as plaintiff alleged in Paragraph 9 of Count I of her complaint. In response, plaintiff identified the January 2015 statement and nine instances in which various news media published portions of the January 2015 statement in news articles or broadcast stories. EXHIBIT H, at 7-8; EXHIBIT I, at 4.

33. In none of the nine instances was there any publication of the entire January 2015 statement. *See* EXHIBIT H, at 7-8; EXHIBIT I, at 4.

34. Ms. Maxwell and her agents exercised no control or authority over any media organization, including the media identified in plaintiff's response to Interrogatory No. 6, in connection with the media's publication of portions of the January 2015 statement. EXHIBIT J ¶ 24; EXHIBIT K ¶¶ 2-3..

35. **Plaintiff's defamation action against Ms. Maxwell.** Eight years after Epstein's guilty plea, plaintiff brought this action, repeating many of the allegations she made in her CVRA joinder motion. *See* Doc.1 ¶ 9.

36. The complaint alleged that the January 2015 statement "contained the following deliberate falsehoods":

(a) That Giuffre's sworn allegations "against Ghislaine Maxwell are untrue."

(b) That the allegations have been "shown to be untrue."

(c) That Giuffre's "claims are obvious lies."

Doc.1 ¶ 30 (boldface and underscoring omitted).

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

"[C]ourts should not be reluctant to grant summary judgment in appropriate cases. 'One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually insupportable claims,' thereby permitting courts to avoid 'protracted, expensive and harassing trials.'" *Don King Prods., Inc. v. Douglas*, 742 F. Supp. 778, 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (quoting

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986), and *Meiri v. Dacon*, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir. 1985)). Where summary judgment is sought under Article I, Section 8, of the New York Constitution, the New York Court of Appeals has declared, "we reaffirm our regard for the particular value of summary judgment, where appropriate, in libel cases," *Immuno AG v. Moor-Jankowski*, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 1282 (N.Y. 1991), particularly when as here a defendant is challenging a defamation claim under the "independent State law approach" articulated in *Immuno AG* that might make summary disposition more likely than under a federal approach, *see id.*

Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The relevant inquiry on application for summary judgment is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).

"[T]he mere existence of *some* alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no *genuine* issue of *material* fact." *Id.* at 247-48. The substantive law determines what facts are material. *Id.* at 248. "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." *Id.* A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." *Id.*

In the face of a properly supported summary judgment motion, the plaintiff may not "rest on [the] allegations" in her complaint. *Id.* at 249. The trial court's function is to determine

whether there is a genuine issue for trial, and "there is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." *Id.*

"[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment . . . against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In such a situation, "there can be 'no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is 'entitled to a judgment as a matter of law' because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof." *Id.* at 323; *see* Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee's notes (2010 amendments) (restoration of "*shall* grant summary judgment" was intended to "express the direction to grant summary judgment, and "avoids the unintended consequences of any other word").

ARGUMENT

I. Ms. Maxwell is not liable for republications of her January 2015 statement that she did not authorize or request and by entities she did not control.

A. Summary judgment is warranted to the extent plaintiff seeks to impose liability on any media's republication of all or a portion of the January 2015 statement.

Messrs. Barden and Gow, acting on behalf of Ms. Maxwell, caused the January 2015 statement to be transmitted—published—to various individuals employed by media organizations. The question presented in this Argument I is whether Ms. Maxwell is liable for any republication of all or a portion of the January 2015 statement by the media. Under New York law, the answer is no.

Liability for a republication "must be based on *real authority to influence the final product*." *Davis v. Costa-Gavras*, 580 F. Supp. 1082, 1096 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (emphasis supplied).

"[W]here a defendant 'had no actual part in composing or publishing,' he cannot be held liable 'without disregarding the settled rule of law that no man is bound for the tortious act of another over whom he has not a master's power of control.'" *Id.* (quoting *Folwell v. Miller*, 145 F. 495, 497 (2d Cir. 1906)); *see Geraci v. Probst*, 938 N.E.2d 917, 921 (N.Y. 2010) (holding that defendant was not liable for republication, in part because "there is no indication that Probst had any control over whether or not Newsday published the article"). "Conclusive evidence of lack of actual authority [is] sufficiently dispositive that the [trial court] 'ha[s] no option but to dismiss the case . . . .'" *Id.* (quoting *Rinaldi v. Viking Penguin, Inc.*, 420 N.E.2d 377, 382 (N.Y. 1981)).

As the New York Court of Appeals held in *Geraci*:

> It is too well settled to be now questioned that one who . . . prints and publishes a libel[] is not responsible for its voluntary and unjustifiable repetition, without his authority or request, by others over whom he has no control and who thereby make themselves liable to the person injured, and that such repetition cannot be considered in law a necessary, natural and probable consequence of the original slander or libel.

938 N.E.2d at 921 (internal quotations and citation omitted). The rationale behind this rule is that "each person who repeats the defamatory statement is responsible for the resulting damages." *Id.* (internal quotations omitted).

With the goal of garnering maximum publicity and defaming Ms. Maxwell, Ms. Giuffre filed an "entirely unnecessary"[7] joinder motion with "lurid details" about sexual acts for the purpose of attracting the attention of the public, which was "'curious, titillated or intrigued'"[8] about alleged sexual acts and relationships among the rich and famous. In defense of Ms. Maxwell's reputation, Messrs. Barden and Gow responded with the January 2015 statement.

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[7] EXHIBIT E, at 7.

[8] *Time, Inc. v. Firestone*, 424 U.S. 448, 488 n.1 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting *Firestone v. Time, Inc.*, 271 So. 2d 745, 752 (Fla. 1972)).

The email transmitting the statement explained it was "a *quotable statement* on behalf of Ms Maxwell" and "[n]o further communication will be provided by her on this matter." EXHIBIT F (emphasis supplied). The media representatives were notified that if they intended to use the statement, it was to be quoted in its entirety. *See* This Motion ¶ 24, at 8. Ms. Maxwell and Messrs. Barden and Gow had no ability to control whether or how the media-recipients would use the statement, and they made no effort to control whether or how they would use the statement. EXHIBIT K ¶¶ 2-3; EXHIBIT J ¶ 24.

Ms. Maxwell is not responsible for any republication of the January 2015 statement, whether it was republished in whole or in part,[9] since she had no authority or control over any media that published any portion of it. In the words of this Court, she had no "real authority to influence the final product," *Davis*, 580 F. Supp. at 1096.

The media's *selective*, *partial* republication of the statement is more problematic yet. An original publisher of a statement cannot be charged with a republisher's "editing and excerpting of her statement." *Rand v. New York Times Co.*, 430 N.Y.S.2d 271, 275 (App. Div. 1980). The rule applies with even greater force where as here a defamation claim is grounded on the expression of opinion: An individual "cannot be liable for the republication of a derogatory but constitutionally protected opinion when the foundation upon which that opinion is based is omitted. The defamatory remark should be 'read against the background of its issuance.'" *Id.* (quoting *Mencher v. Chesley*, 75 N.E.2d 257, 259 (N.Y. 1947), and citing *James v. Gannett Co.*, 353 N.E.2d 834, 838 (N.Y. 1976)).

[9]Plaintiff has not disclosed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) any republication of the entirety of the January 2015 statement. In response to our discovery requests requiring her to identify republications of all or a portion of the statement, plaintiff identified no republication of the entirety of the statement.

The rationale for this rule is found in the New York Court of Appeals' explanation of how an original publisher's allegedly defamatory statement should be interpreted:

> The statement complained of will be read against the background of its issuance with respect to the circumstances of its publication. It is the duty of the court, in an action for libel, to understand the publication in the same manner that others would naturally do. *The construction which it behooves a court of justice to put on a publication which is alleged to be libelous is to be derived as well from the expressions used as from the whole scope and apparent object of the writer*.

James, 353 N.E.2d at 838 (emphasis supplied; citations and internal quotations omitted).

The January 2015 statement was intended to be read *by the media-recipients* in its entirety. **One**, it was intended to be a comprehensive, one-time-only response to all of plaintiff's lurid and false allegations of sexual and other misconduct by Ms. Maxwell. *See* EXHIBIT J ¶ 13. **Two**, the statement was complex in that it could not be quoted partially and out of context and still convey the intended meaning. Among other things, the statement was intended to show *why* plaintiff could not be believed—why her allegations are "obvious lies"—by pointing out how her story changed each time she retold the story. As Mr. Barden explains:

> Selective and partial quotation and use of the statement would disserve my purposes. It was intended to address Plaintiff's behavior and allegations against Ms. Maxwell on a broad scale, that is to say, Plaintiff's history of making false allegations and innuendo to the media against Ms. Maxwell. This is why the statement references Plaintiff's "original allegations" and points out that her story "changes"—i.e. is embellished—over time including the allegations "now" that Professor Dershowitz allegedly had sexual relations with her. This is why I distinguished in the statement between Plaintiff's "original" allegations and her "new," joinder-motion allegations, which differed substantially from the original allegations. And this is why I wrote, "Each time the story is re told [sic] it changes with new salacious details about public figures and world leaders and now it is alleged by [Plaintiff] that Alan Derschowitz [sic] is involved in having sexual relations with her, which he denies." (Emphasis supplied.) Having established the dramatic difference between Plaintiff's two sets of allegations, which suggested she was fabricating more and more-salacious allegations as she had more time to manufacture them, I added the third paragraph: "[Ms. Giuffre's] claims are obvious lies and should be treated as such and not publicised as news, as they are defamatory." (Emphasis supplied.) I believed then, and believe now, that it was and remains a fair inference and conclusion that her claims were and are "obvious

> lies." As noted, her claims not to have slept with Prince Andrew and to have slept with Prince Andrew are a classic example of an obvious lie. One or other account is on the face of it a lie.

EXHIBIT J ¶ 20. That Mr. Barden on behalf of Ms. Maxwell was expressing his *opinion*—in the form of a legal argument—as a lawyer would be lost if words and phrases are extracted from and used outside the context of the January 2015 statement. Yet, this is precisely what the media did in their articles on the statement and what plaintiff did in her complaint (*see* Doc.1 ¶ 30).

Finally, the statement was intended to be a "shot across the bow" of the media-recipients so that they understood the seriousness with which Ms. Maxwell considered the publication of plaintiff's obviously false allegations and the legal indefensibility of their own conduct. *See id.* ¶ 17. Selectively excerpting from the statement would seriously undermine this purpose by changing the force of the message to the media-recipients.

Under these circumstances, selective, partial and out-of-context republication of Mr. Barden's deliberate and carefully crafted message to the media-representatives, as a matter of law, cannot result in defamation liability for Ms. Maxwell. Accordingly, the Court should enter partial summary judgment.

B. Because plaintiff is a limited public figure, imposing liability upon Ms. Maxwell for republication of the January 2015 statement would violate the First Amendment.

As this Court recognized in *Davis*, *New York Times v. Sullivan*[10] and its progeny "preclude states from imposing liability without fault in actions for defamation, especially by public figures." 580 F. Supp. at 1097 (citing, *inter alia*, *Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.*, 418 U.S. 323 (1974)). This principle precludes the imposition of liability for republication of an allegedly

[10]376 U.S. 254 (1964).

defamatory statement on a party who had no "actual . . . responsibility for the decision to republish" the statement. *Id.*

A public figure includes a person who "voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues." *Gertz*, 418 U.S. at 351; *see, e.g.*, *James*, 353 N.E.2d at 839 (public figure includes those who have "thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved"). The evidence that plaintiff is a public figure is overwhelming, particularly in connection with the subject matters and issues addressed by and underlying the January 2015 statement. *See* This Motion ¶¶ 51-54.

In the case at bar, Ms. Maxwell and her agents had no responsibility for any media organization's decision to republish the January 2015 statement, and they did not participate in any such decision. *See* EXHIBITS J ¶ 24 & K ¶¶ 2-3. Liability for republication by media organizations of the January 2015 statement therefore is precluded under the First Amendment.

C. Plaintiff should be barred from introducing into evidence any republication of an excerpt from the January 2015 statement.

In *Geraci*, the plaintiff suggested in a letter to the Long Island fire district where defendant was a commissioner that defendant had engaged in self-dealing in the district's purchase of fire trucks. At trial the plaintiff sought to introduce into evidence portions of a Newsday article that republished parts of the defendant's letter. Defense counsel objected, arguing it was inflammatory and prejudicial. Plaintiff's counsel later argued the article "was not being offered as a republication, but on the issue of damages to show how far the allegations had circulated." 938 N.E.2d at 920. Additionally, plaintiff's counsel argued that the defendant "should have reasonably anticipated" that his letter to the fire district "would be newsworthy." *Id.* The trial court admitted the article, and the Appellate Division affirmed.

The New York Court of Appeals reversed. The risk of admitting such evidence, the court held, is the jury may "charge against defendant a separate, distinct libel (not pleaded in [the] complaint) by someone else, contrary to the rule that [t]he original publisher of a libel is not responsible for its subsequent publication by others." *Geraci*, 938 N.E.2d at 921. Accordingly, the court held, "'[A]bsent a showing that [defendant] *approved or participated in some other manner in the activities of the third-party republisher*[,]' there is no basis for allowing the jury to consider the article containing the republished statement as a measure of plaintiff's damages attributable to defendants." *Id.* (emphasis supplied; quoting *Karaduman v. Newsday, Inc.*, 416 N.E.2d 557, 560 (1980)).

Neither Ms. Maxwell nor her agents approved or participated in any activity of any media organization in its decision to publish or not to publish any part of the January 2015 statement. EXHIBIT J ¶ 2; K ¶¶ 2-3.. Accordingly, "there is no basis for allowing the jury to consider [any] article containing the republished statement as a measure of plaintiff's damages attributable to [Ms. Maxwell]," *id.* Plaintiff should be barred from introducing any evidence of any republication of the January 2015 statement by any non-party. *See, e.g.*, *Soley v. Wasserman*, No. 8 CIV. 9262 KMW FM, 2013 WL 3185555, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2013) (precluding plaintiff from adducing evidence intended to establish claim on which court had entered partial summary judgment).

II. Summary judgment is warranted under the New York Constitution.

A. The January 2015 statement constitutes nonactionable opinion.

"'Whether particular words are defamatory presents a legal question to be resolved by the court in the first instance.'" *Germain v. M & T Bank Corp.*, 111 F. Supp. 3d 506, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (brackets omitted; quoting *Celle v. Filipino Reporter Enters. Inc.*, 209 F.3d 163,

177 (2d Cir. 2000)); *accord, e.g.*, *Aronson v. Wiersma*, 483 N.E.2d 1138, 1139 (N.Y. 1985). New York defamation law applies. Doc.37 at 6 n.2.

"It is a settled rule that expressions of an opinion false or not, libelous or not, are constitutionally protected and may not be the subject of private damage actions." *Steinhilber v. Alphonse*, 501 N.E.2d 550, 550 (N.Y. 1986) (internal quotations omitted). Whether a challenged statement is fact or opinion is a question of law to be decided by the Court. *Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC v. Bleeping Computer LLC*, No. 16 CIV. 57 (PAE), 2016 WL 3773394, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2016); *accord, e.g.*, *Steinhilber*, 501 N.E.2d at 553.

In *Immuno AG v. Moor-Jankowski*,[11] the New York Court of Appeals declared that the New York Constitution provides greater protection to opinion than the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The court recognized that in *Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.*, 497 U.S. 1 (1990), the United States Supreme Court reversed a state court decision dismissing a complaint on the ground that the allegedly defamatory statement was nonactionable opinion. The Supreme Court held there is no "wholesale defamation exemption" protecting opinion. The First Amendment analysis under *Milkovich*, the New York court observed, was one-dimensional: the trial court should look first to the allegedly defamatory statement's specific words as commonly understood and then determine whether the statements were "verifiable"; if the statements were verifiable, then they were actionable statements of fact. *See Immuno AG*, 567 N.E.2d at 1274-75. The Supreme Court's holding made it clear that it would not consider as part of the First Amendment analysis "the full context of the article in which the challenged statements appear, and the broader social context or setting surrounding the communication." *Id.* at 1274.

[11] 567 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y. 1991).

The *Immuno AG* Court of Appeals held that Article I, Section 8, of the New York Constitution required a multidimensional approach to the determination whether an allegedly defamatory statement constitutes constitutionally protected opinion. The court gave numerous reasons. New York's "expansive" constitutional guarantee of speech was formulated and adopted before the application of the First Amendment to the states; "[i]t has long been our standard in defamation actions" to consider factors beyond whether facts are "verifiable"; and the court was concerned that if "'type of speech' is to be construed narrowly[,] . . . insufficient protection may be accorded to central values protected by the law of this State." *Id.* at 1277-78. The *Immuno AG* court reaffirmed that where a defendant alleges that the subject statement is opinion, *Steinhilber* supplies the analytical framework. *Id.* at 1280.

Steinhilber held that whether an allegedly defamatory statement is fact or nonactionable opinion should be decided based on four factors: (1) an assessment of whether the specific language in issue has a precise meaning which is readily understood or whether it is indefinite and ambiguous; (2) a determination of whether the statement is capable of being objectively characterized as true or false; (3) an examination of the full context of the communication in which the statement appears; and (4) a consideration of the broader social context or setting surrounding the communication including the existence of any applicable customs or conventions which might signal to readers or listeners that what is being read or heard is likely to be opinion, not fact. 501 N.E.2d at 554.

Application of these factors to the January 2015 statement compels the conclusion that the allegedly defamatory words, phrases and clauses are nonactionable opinion.

Whether the specific language in issue has a precise meaning which is readily understood or whether it is indefinite and ambiguous. The three sentences plaintiff alleges are

defamatory are indefinite and ambiguous. The first says plaintiff's "allegations" against Ms. Maxwell are "untrue." But plaintiff has made many dozens of allegations against Ms. Maxwell, and some are provably false. *See* This Motion, at ¶¶ 37-50. The statement does not specify *which* of the allegations are untrue. The second statement is that the "original allegations" have been "shown to be untrue." The "original allegations" were first revealed in the 2011 Churcher articles. Plaintiff made many dozens of allegations "originally." The statement does not specify *which* of the "original" allegations were shown to be untrue. Some *have* been shown to be untrue. *See* This Motion, at 53-65. The third statement is that plaintiff's "claims" are "obvious lies." This too is indefinite and ambiguous. Plaintiff has made many dozens of claims. The statement does not specify which ones are being referenced. More importantly, it does not say how or why some of the claims are "obvious" lies. Regardless, some of plaintiff's claims are "obvious lies." *See* This Motion, at 53-65.

Whether the three sentences in the January 2015 statement are capable of being objectively characterized as true or false. Can the three sentences be characterized as true or false? They cannot, because the statement does not specify which of the many dozens of allegations plaintiff has made are "untrue" and "shown to be untrue," and which of plaintiff's many dozens of "claims" are "obvious lies."

It is axiomatic that the plural form of a word, e.g., "allegations" and "claims," universally denotes—only—"*more than one*," *People v. Kocsis*, 28 N.Y.S.3d 466, 471 (App. Div. 2016) (emphasis supplied). *See, e.g.*, *Lehman Bros. Commercial Corp. v. Minmetals Int'l Non-Ferrous Metals Trading Co.*, No. 94 CIV. 8301(JFK), 1995 WL 380119, at *6 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1995). So for *Steinhilber* purposes it is dispositive of the fact versus opinion question if we can

identify *two* instances in which plaintiff's allegations or claims[12] are incapable of being proved true or false. Such examples abound. It cannot be proven true or false whether Ms. Maxwell "appreciated the immunity granted"[13] under the Epstein plea agreement or whether she "act[ed] as a 'madame' for Epstein."[14] That is because these are plaintiff's counsel's arguments or opinions. The January 2015 statement asserts that these allegations/claims are "false" or "obvious lies." That assertion cannot be proven true or false under *Steinhilber*.

The full context of the communication in which the statement appears. This factor "is often the key consideration in categorizing a statement as fact or opinion." *Davis v. Boeheim*, 22 N.E.3d 999, 1006 (N.Y. 2014) (internal quotations omitted).

In deciding whether a statement is defamatory, "[t]he words must be construed in the context of the entire statement or publication as a whole, tested against the understanding of the average reader." *Aronson v. Wiersma*, 483 N.E.2d 1138, 1139 (1985); *accord Elias v. Rolling Stone LLC*, No. 15-CV-5953 (PKC), 2016 WL 3583080, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2016). "It is the duty of the court, in an action for libel, to understand the publication in the same manner that others would naturally do. The construction which it behooves a court of justice to put on a publication which is alleged to be libelous is to be derived as well from the expressions used as

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[12]In the context of the January 2015 statement, an "allegation" is synonymous with a "claim." *See, e.g.*, *Maule v. Philadelphia Media Holdings, LLC*, No. CIV.A. 08-3357, 2010 WL 914926, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2010); *see generally* Black's Law Dictionary 68 (5th ed. 1979) (defining "allegation" as "[t]he assertion, *claim*, declaration, or statement of a party to an action, made in a pleading, setting out what he expects to prove"), *quoted with approval in Martin v. City of Oceanside*, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1147 (S.D. Cal. 2002), *aff'd*, 360 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2004).

[13]EXHIBIT D, at 4.

[14]*Id.*

from the whole scope and apparent object of the writer." *James v. Gannett Co.*, 353 N.E.2d 834, 838 (N.Y. 1976); *accord, e.g.*, *Chau v. Lewis*, 935 F. Supp. 2d 644, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

In general the trial court should view allegedly defamatory statements from the perspective of the average member of the public. Statements directed to a specific audience, however, are considered from the viewpoint of that audience. Instructive is this Court's analysis of the perspective from which it should assess an allegedly defamatory article on boxing published to sports readers:

> The issue of how the "average reader" would construe the statements is certainly a fair one, for the question of whether statements are defamatory turns on *how the audience to whom the statements are addressed* would interpret them. . . . As the New York State Court of Appeals has explained in [a] boxing-defamation case[]: . . . . "The words are to be construed not with the close precision expected from lawyers and judges but as they would be read and understood by the public to which they are addressed. . . ."
>
> Here, the statements in question were addressed to readers of an Internet boxing website and the sports pages of daily newspapers. The statements must be considered from their viewpoint. As Judge Martin . . . held [in *Horne v. Matthews*, No. 97 Civ. 3605(JSM), 1997 WL 598452 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1997)]: "An article on the sports page of a newspaper should be viewed *from the perspective of the audience to whom it is addressed*, *i.e.*, *the understanding of "a sophisticated and sports-conscious reader.*"

Dibella v. Hopkins, No. 01 CIV. 11779 (DC), 2002 WL 31427362, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2002) (emphasis supplied; citation omitted).

The entirety of the email containing the January 2015 statement from Mr. Gow sent to various media representatives reads:

> To Whom It May Concern,
> Please find attached a quotable statement on behalf of Ms Maxwell.
>
> No further communication will be provided by her on this matter.
> Thanks for your understanding.
> Best
> Ross
>
> Ross Gow
> ACUITY Reputation

> Jane Doe 3 is Virginia Roberts—so not a new individual. The allegations made by Victoria Roberts [sic] against Ghislaine Maxwell are untrue. The original allegations are not new and have been fully responded to and shown to be untrue.
>
> Each time the story is re told [sic] it changes with new salacious details about public figures and world leaders and *now* it is alleged by Ms Roberts [sic] that Alan Derschowitz [sic] is involved in having sexual relations with her, which he denies.
>
> Ms Roberts claims are obvious lies and should be treated as such and not publicised as news, as they are defamatory.
>
> Ghislaine Maxwell's original response to the lies and defamatory claims remains the same. Maxwell strongly denies allegations of an unsavoury nature, which have appeared in the British press and elsewhere and reserves her right to seek redress at the repetition of such old defamatory claims.

EXHIBIT F (italics and underscoring supplied).

Plaintiff listed the underscored clauses/phrases in the Complaint as the "deliberate falsehoods," Doc.1 ¶ 30, and "false and defamatory statements," *id.* ¶ 32, plaintiff is suing on.[15] As discussed above, it is improper to remove from their context and isolate allegedly defamatory words, phrases and clauses of sentences from an allegedly defamatory publication. Instead, the allegedly defamatory words, phrases and clauses must be (a) "construed in the context of the entire statement or publication as a whole";[16] (b) considered "from the whole scope and apparent object of the writer";[17] and (c) "viewed from the perspective of the audience to whom it is addressed."[18]

The statement was directed at a discrete number of—some 30—members of the media in reply to their request for a response from Ms. Maxwell to Ms. Giuffre's CVRA joinder motion.

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[15]Plaintiff also alleges that Ms. Maxwell slandered her on January 4, 2015, when responding to a question posed to her while she was on a Manhattan street. Doc.1 ¶ 37. This allegedly defamatory statement is addressed in Argument IV, below.

[16]*Aronson*, 483 N.E.2d at 1139.

[17]*James*, 353 N.E.2d at 838.

[18]*Dibella*, 2002 WL 31427362, at *2.

Mr. Barden, who prepared the January 2015 statement, did not intend the January 2015 statement to be a traditional press release solely to disseminate information to the media. EXHIBIT K ¶ 15. So he did not request that Mr. Gow or any other public relations specialist prepare the statement. *Id.* Instead, Mr. Gow served only as Mr. Barden's conduit to the media representatives who had requested a response to the joinder motion allegations and who Mr. Barden believed might republish those allegations. *Id.*

Mr. Barden intended the statement to mitigate the harm to Ms. Maxwell's reputation from the press's republication of plaintiff's false allegations. *Id.* ¶ 16. He believed this could be accomplished by suggesting to the media that, among other things, they should subject plaintiff's allegations to inquiry and scrutiny. *Id.* For example, he noted that plaintiff's allegations changed dramatically over time, suggesting that they are "obvious lies" and therefore should not be "publicised as news." *Id.*

Mr. Barden also intended the January 2015 statement to be "a shot across the bow" of the media, which he believed had been unduly eager to publish plaintiff's allegations without conducting any inquiry of their own. *Id.* ¶ 17. So Mr. Barden stated repeatedly that plaintiff's allegations were "defamatory." *Id.* In this sense, the statement was very much intended as a cease and desist letter to the media-recipients, letting the media-recipients understand the seriousness with which Ms. Maxwell considered the publication of plaintiff's obviously false allegations and the legal indefensibility of their own conduct. *Id.*

Consistent with Mr. Barden's purposes for the statement, Mr. Gow's emails prefaced the statement with the following language: "Please find attached a *quotable statement* on behalf of Ms Maxwell" (emphasis supplied). *Id.* ¶ 19. The statement was intended to be a single, one-time-only, comprehensive response—quoted in full—to plaintiff's December 30, 2014,

allegations that would give the media Ms. Maxwell's response. *Id.* The purpose of the prefatory statement was to inform the media-recipients of this intent. *Id.*

We note that plaintiff in her Complaint makes the same mistake as the *Steinhilber* plaintiff—extracting words and phrases from their opinion context so that she can claim the assertion of a "defamatory" fact. *See* Doc.1 ¶ 30. That is not permissible. *See Steinhilber*, 501 N.E.2d at 555 ("The sentence which plaintiff selects from the message and claims is "factually laden"—impugning her as lacking in "talent, ambition, and initiative"[5]—is preceded and followed by statements which are clearly part of the attempt at humor prevailing throughout . . . .").

The broader social context or setting surrounding the communication, including the existence of any applicable customs or conventions which might signal to readers that what is being read is likely to be opinion, not fact. This factor is concerned with "the factual background" leading up to the preparation of the statement. It is a critical factor here. In December 2014, plaintiff and her lawyers had timed for maximum effect—during the slow news cycle between Christmas and New Year's Day—the public filing of a superfluous motion filled with salacious and provocative allegations of "sexual abuse" and "sexual trafficking" involving wealthy and prominent Americans. Plaintiff deliberately placed Ms. Maxwell in the middle of the abuse and trafficking, alleging that she recruited plaintiff into the sexual abuse/trafficking scheme and engaged in numerous criminal acts.

Importantly, three years earlier when plaintiff was interviewed extensively by Churcher for two lengthy articles published in March 2011, plaintiff's allegations concerning Ms. Maxwell were very much different. In the articles discussing plaintiff's "shocking account"[19] of being

[19]EXHIBIT A, at 2.

sexually exploited by Epstein, Prince Andrew and Epstein's "male peers,"[20] plaintiff made virtually *none* of what Judge Marra found were "unnecessary"[21] and "lurid details"[22] about how Ms. Maxwell allegedly had subjected her to sexual abuse and trafficking.

After plaintiff filed the CVRA motion, some thirty reporters contacted Ms. Maxwell's press representative, Mr. Gow, for Ms. Maxwell's response. As Ms. Maxwell's lawyer, Mr. Barden undertook that task. Relying on his knowledge of the 2011 articles publishing plaintiff's allegations and drawing on his experience and training as a lawyer, Mr. Barden crafted a response with the goal of discrediting plaintiff and what the statement called plaintiff's "new" allegations. To that end Mr. Barden contrasted plaintiff's "old" allegations from 2011 with the "new" 2014 allegations. The second paragraph of the statement is indicative of this strategy: "*Each time the story is re told [sic] it changes* with *new salacious details* about public figures and world leaders and *now* it is alleged by [Ms. Giuffre] that Alan Derschowitz [sic] is involved in having sexual relations with her, which he denies." EXHIBIT F (emphasis supplied). Having established the dramatic difference between these sets of allegations suggesting plaintiff was fabricating more and more-salacious allegations as she had more time to manufacture them, Mr. Barden added the third paragraph: "[Ms. Giuffre's] claims are *obvious lies* and should be treated as such and not publicised as news, as they are defamatory." *Id.* (emphasis supplied).

Mr. Barden's arguments constitute "pure opinion," *Steinhilber*, 501 N.E.2d at 552. They take established and revealed facts—plaintiff's modest 2011 allegations to a newspaper reporter and plaintiff's expansive, unnecessary and lurid 2014 allegations in a motion to open the door to

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[20] *Id.*

[21] EXHIBIT E, at 5.

[22] *Id.*

criminal prosecutions of (and civil lawsuits against) wealthy and prominent men around the world—to draw an obvious inference that plaintiff was (more) truthful in the 2011 articles and engaged in massive manufacturing of fiction in the 2014 joinder motion. There is no limit to the subject matters on which pure opinions may be expressed with constitutional immunity, including whether a person believes another is "lying" or is a "liar." *See, e.g.*, *Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Maxi-Aids, Inc.*, 981 F. Supp. 124, 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (granting summary judgment: "Read in the context of the entire article, Zaretsky's remarks, calling Sandler and others 'liars,' can only be understood as a denial of their accusations. . . . Even the most careless reader must have perceived that the words were no more than rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by Zaretsky who considered himself unfairly treated and sought to bring what he alleged were the true facts to the readers. The epithet 'liar' in this context, standing by itself, merely expressed the opinion that anyone who persisted in accusing Zaretsky of improper business practices could not be telling the truth. Since the basis for this opinion was fully set forth, the communication of Zaretsky's views cannot be libelous.") (citations, ellipsis, brackets and internal quotations omitted); *see Gross v. New York Times*, 623 N.E.2d 1163, 1169 (N.Y. 1993) ("[E]ven when uttered or published in a . . . serious tone, accusations of criminality could be regarded as mere hypothesis and therefore not actionable if the facts on which they are based are fully and accurately set forth and it is clear to the reasonable reader . . . that the accusation is merely a personal surmise built upon those facts. In all cases, whether the challenged remark concerns criminality or some other defamatory category, the courts are obliged to consider the communication as a whole, as well as its immediate and broader social contexts, to determine whether the reasonable listener . . . is likely to understand the remark as an assertion of provable fact.").

Mr. Barden's inference from disclosed facts qualifies as "pure opinion," *Steinhilber*, 501 N.E.2d at 552. Accordingly, that Mr. Barden characterized plaintiff's 2014 allegations harshly as "obvious lies" as opposed to "untruths" or some softer term is of no moment. "[U]nder New York law, pure opinion . . . is not actionable because expressions of opinion, as opposed to assertions of fact, are deemed privileged and, no matter how offensive, cannot be the subject of an action for defamation." *Ratajack v. Brewster Fire Dep't, Inc. of the Brewster-SE Joint Fire Dist.*, 178 F. Supp. 3d 118, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (internal quotations and ellipsis omitted; brackets altered); *accord, e.g.*, *Mann v. Abel*, 885 N.E.2d 884, 885-86 (N.Y. 2008).

The drawing of such inferences would be constitutionally protected even under the standards of the First Amendment that are less protective of opinion than is Article I, Section 8, of the New York Constitution. *See Adelson v. Harris*, 973 F. Supp. 2d 467, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("In determining whether a statement constitutes constitutionally protected opinion, courts also look to the specific context of the statement. When looking at a statement's specific context, of particular importance is the principle that when an author outlines the facts available to him, thus making it clear that the challenged statements represent his own interpretation of those facts and leaving the reader free to draw his own conclusions, those statements are generally protected by the First Amendment.") (internal quotations and brackets omitted).

The application of the four *Steinhilber* factors confirms that the three phrases and/or clauses plaintiff alleges are defamatory are in fact part of a statement that taken as a whole constitutes nonactionable opinion. The premise of plaintiff's Complaint is that once she is able to identify references in the January 2015 statement to any assertion of fact that potentially is subject to proof, e.g., the truth or falsity of her many dozens of allegations old and new, then she has a viable defamation claim. That ignores the teaching of *Steinhilber* and *Immuno AG*. As the

Steinhilber court held, "even apparent statements of fact may assume the character of statements of opinion, and thus be privileged, when made in public debate, heated labor dispute, or other circumstances in which an audience may anticipate the use of epithets, fiery rhetoric or hyperbole." *Id.* (internal quotations and brackets omitted); *see Gross*, 623 N.E.2d at 1169 ("we stress once again our commitment to avoiding the 'hypertechnical parsing' of written and spoken words for the purpose of identifying 'possible "fact[s]"' that might form the basis of sustainable libel action") (quoting *Immuno AG*, 567 N.E.2d at 1282).

To the same effect is this Court's citation to a Louisiana Supreme Court decision for the proposition that "'[w]ords which, taken by themselves, would appear to be a positive allegation of fact, *may be shown by the context to be a mere expression of opinion or argumentative influence*.'" *Adelson*, 973 F. Supp. 2d at 488 (emphasis supplied; quoting *Mashburn v. Collin*, 355 So. 2d 879, 885 (La. 1977)).

It also is important to take into account, as *Steinhilber* requires, that Mr. Barden was directing the January 2015 statement to a discrete number of media representatives who were aware of plaintiff's "original" and "new," joinder-motion allegations and who were requesting a response from Ms. Maxwell to the "new" allegations. These newspaper reporters and other media representatives would have the point Mr. Barden was making—the opinion he was expressing—namely, that there was good reason to believe plaintiff was fabricating allegations for her purposes. In the context of the media circus that ensued the public filing of the joinder motion and the media's repeated and insistent requests for an immediate response from Ms. Maxwell, it is highly unlikely any media-recipients of the January 2015 statement expected anything other than a statement equivalent to the March 2011 statement condemning the allegations; and it is highly likely all the media-recipients understood the statement to be a

forceful argument that plaintiff's shifting and inconsistent stories about what allegedly happened rendered her inherently unbelievable and proved her increasingly provocative and lurid allegations were "obvious lies." These are precisely the messages Mr. Barden sent to them.

The general nature of Mr. Barden's assertions ("allegations," "original allegations," "claims"), the distinction between plaintiff's "original" and "new" allegations, and the inferences he drew from comparing the "original" and "new" allegations—together—powerfully demonstrate that the January 2015 statement was nothing more than opinion.

B. In this Rule 56 proceeding, this Court's Rule 12(b)(6) opinion does not control the question of law whether the January 2015 statement constitutes nonactionable opinion.

In its Rule 12(b)(6) opinion the Court, relying on *Davis v. Boeheim*, 22 N.E.3d 999 (2014), ruled that the three allegedly defamatory statements in the January 2015 statement (*see* Doc.1 ¶ 30(a)-(c)) have a specific and readily understood factual meaning, are capable of being proven true or false, and "clearly constitute fact to the reader." Doc.37 at 9. We respectfully suggest the Court's Rule 12(b)(6) decision does not control in this Rule 56 proceeding.

To begin with, the standards for deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion are substantially different from the standards for deciding a Rule 56 motion. As the Court noted, in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion the court must accept as true the factual allegations and draw all inferences in the plaintiff's favor; a plaintiff need only state a claim that is "plausible on its face." *Id.* at 3 (internal quotations omitted). In contrast, in deciding a Rule 56 motion the plaintiff defending the motion may *not* "rest on [the] allegations" in her complaint. *Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 249. The difference in the standards is crucial here.

As this Court recognized, "'[t]he dispositive inquiry'" for purposes of deciding whether an allegedly defamatory statement is fact or nonactionable opinion is whether "'a reasonable reader could have concluded that the statements were conveying facts about the plaintiff.'"

Doc.37 at 7 (quoting *Davis*, 22 N.E.3d at 1005). To answer that inquiry, the Court applied the three factors enumerated in *Davis*. *See id.* These three factors are the same as the four factors in *Immuno AG*; the difference is that the *Davis* court collapsed the *Immuno AG*'s third and fourth factors into one. *See Davis*, 22 N.E.3d at 1005.

As framed by the *Davis* court, the third factor is "whether either the *full context of the communication* in which the statement appears or the *broader social context and surrounding circumstances* are such as to signal . . . readers or listeners that what is being read or heard is likely to be opinion, not fact." *Id.* (internal quotations omitted; emphasis supplied), *quoted in* Doc.37 at 7. Although this Court did not note this in its opinion, this third factor "is often *the key consideration* in categorizing a statement as fact or opinion." *Id.* at 1006 (emphasis supplied).

As in *Davis*, which also was decided on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,[23] this Court when considering the third factor did not have the benefit of any of the evidence presented in this motion. That is to say, the Court did not have the "full context of the" July 2015 statement or the "broader social context and surrounding circumstances" of the statement, since none of the evidence presented in this Motion was pleaded in the Complaint.

Nor, in the context of the 12(b)(6) motion, did the Court consider that the relevant "readers" of the July 2015 statement were not the "average reader"[24] in the general public, but a "cynical"[25] and "sophisticated"[26] group of about 30 reporters and journalists who were knowledgeable about plaintiff's allegations of being the victim of sexual abuse and sexual

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[23] *Davis*, 22 N.E.3d at 1001.

[24] *Aronson*, 483 N.E.2d at 1139.

[25] Steven Shiffrin, *The Politics of the Mass Media and the Free Speech Principle*, 69 Ind. L.J. 689, 702 (1994).

[26] *Dibella*, 2002 WL 31427362, at *2.

trafficking. Viewing the July 2015 statement from the perspective of these reporters and journalists—the only persons who received the July 2015 statement—presents a different landscape in the "fact versus opinion" analysis.

Applying the third factor with the benefit of the Rule 56 records compels a conclusion different from the one this Court reached on the barren Rule 12(b)(6) record. For example, this Court did not consider that the media-recipients of the July 2015 statement would have understood the statement in precisely the way Mr. Barden intended: Based on a comparison of dramatic differences between her "original" and "new" allegations, Ms. Giuffre is a teller of falsehoods—is a liar—and cannot be trusted, and her new CVRA joint-motion allegations, which deviated so substantially from her originally allegations, are falsehoods—proven false by her increasingly provocative and lurid versions of her story of "victimhood." *See generally* Exhibit J.

III. The pre-litigation privilege bars this action.

Statements pertinent to a good faith anticipated litigation made by attorneys (or their agents under their direction[27]) before the commencement of litigation are privileged and "no cause of action for defamation can be based on those statements," *Front, Inc. v. Khalil*, 28 N.E.3d 15, 16 (N.Y. 2015). So long as there was "a good faith basis to anticipate litigation," a statement concerning either "actual litigation or prelitigation matters" is subject to an "*absolute privilege*." *Flomenhaft v. Finkelstein*, 8 N.Y.S.3d 161, 164 n.2 (App. Div. 2015) (emphasis supplied); *accord Kirk v. Heppt*, 532 F. Supp. 2d 586, 593 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).

The privilege covers statements made in connection with "pending or "*contemplated* litigation." *Goldstein v. Cogswell*, No. 85 CIV. 9256 (KMW), 1992 WL 131723, at *27 n.32 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 1992) It covers statements made outside court, including in written

[27]*See Chambers v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.*, No. 2016 WL 3533998, at *8 (D.N.J. June 28, 2016); *see generally Hawkins v. Harris*, 661 A.2d 284, 289-91 (N.J. 1995).

communications "between litigating parties or their attorneys." *Klein v. McGauley*, 29. A.D.2d 418, 420 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968), *cited with approval in Petrus v. Smith*, 91 A.D.2d 1190, 1191 (N.Y. App. App. Div. 1983). It covers "cease and desist letters." *Khalil*, 28 N.E.3d at 19. And it covers "all pertinent communications among the parties, counsel, witnesses and the court," regardless "[w]hether a statement was made in or out of court, was on or off the record, or was made orally or in writing." *Frechtman v. Gutterrnan*, 979 N.Y.S. 2d 58 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting *Sexter v. Warmflash, P.C. v. Margrabe*, 828 N.Y.S. 2d 315 (App. Div. 2007)).

When the pre-litigation privilege is invoked in connection with an allegedly defamatory statement made during pending or contemplated litigation, "any doubts are to be resolved in favor of pertinence." *Flomenhaft*, 8 N.Y.S.3d at 164. "[T]he test to determine whether a statement is pertinent to litigation is '"extremely liberal,"' such that the offending statement, to be actionable, must have been '*outrageously out of context*.'" *Id.* at 164-65 (emphasis supplied; quoting *Black v. Green Harbour Homeowners' Ass'n*, 798 N.Y.S.2d 753 (App. Div. 2005), and *Martirano v. Frost*, 255 N.E.2d 693 (1969)); *Kirk*, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 593.

In denying Ms. Maxwell's motion to dismiss the Complaint based on the pre-litigation privilege, this Court limited its analysis of the privilege to whether under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded that the January 2 and 4 statements were made with actual malice. Doc.37 at 18-19. The Court's Rule 12(b)(6) analysis does not bear on the question presented here, for two reasons.

Under the "substantive law"[28] actual malice is not relevant to the pre-litigation defense. The New York Court of Appeals in *Khalil* held that to prevail on the pre-litigation privilege the defendant need only establish *one element*: the allegedly defamatory statement at issue was

[28] *Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 248.

"pertinent to a good faith anticipated litigation." 28 N.E.3d at 16. Upon establishing that element, summary judgment for the defendant is required. *See id.* Additionally, this is a summary judgment proceeding. Plaintiff cannot rely on the allegations of her Complaint. Evidence is required.

The following evidence is not in dispute. By January 2015 Ms. Maxwell had retained British Solicitor Philip Barden to represent and advise her in connection with plaintiff's publication in the British press of salacious, defamatory allegations of criminal sexual abuse during the period 1999-2002. EXHIBIT K ¶¶ 8-10. Mr. Barden in turn engaged UK press agent Ross Gow. *Id.* ¶ 9. Mr. Barden prepared the January 2015 statement and instructed Mr. Gow to transmit it via email to members of the UK media who had made inquiry about the allegations in the joinder motion. *Id.* ¶ 10.

Mr. Barden did not intend the January 2015 statement as a traditional press release solely to disseminate information to the media. *Id.* ¶ 15. This is why he intentionally did not request that Mr. Gow or any other public relations specialist prepare the statement. *Id.* Instead, Mr. Gow served as his conduit to the media representatives who had requested a response to the joinder motion allegations and who Mr. Barden believed might republish those allegations. *Id.*

Mr. Barden had two purposes in preparing and causing the statement to be disseminated to those media representatives. First, he wanted to mitigate the harm to Ms. Maxwell's reputation from the press's republication of plaintiff's false allegations. *Id.* ¶ 16. He believed these ends could be accomplished by suggesting to the media that, among other things, they should subject plaintiff's allegations to inquiry and scrutiny. *Id.* For example, he noted in the January 2015 statement that plaintiff's allegations changed dramatically over time, suggesting that they are "obvious lies" and therefore should not be "publicised as news." *Id.*

Second, Mr. Barden intended the January 2015 statement to be "a shot across the bow" of the media, which he believed had been unduly eager to publish plaintiff's allegations without conducting any inquiry of their own. *Id.* ¶ 17. This was the purpose of repeatedly stating that plaintiff's allegations were "defamatory." *Id.* The statement was intended as a cease and desist letter to the media-recipients, letting the media-recipients understand the seriousness with which Ms. Maxwell considered the publication of plaintiff's obviously false allegations and the legal indefensibility of their own conduct. *Id.*

At the time Mr. Barden directed the issuance of the statement, he was contemplating litigation against the media-recipients as an additional means to mitigate and prevent harm to Ms. Maxwell. *Id.* ¶ 28. Toward this end, he prepared the statement so that it made clear Ms. Maxwell "strongly denie[d] the allegations of an unsavoury nature," declared the republications of the allegations to be false, gave the press-recipients notice that the republications of the allegations "are defamatory," and informed them that Ms. Maxwell was "reserv[ing] her right to seek redress." *Id.* ¶ 30. In any such UK defamation, or other related, action Ms. Giuffre would be a defendant or a witness. *Id.* ¶ 29.

The question presented is whether Mr. Barden's statement, which he directed to be sent to various media representatives, is "pertinent to a good faith anticipated litigation," *Khalil*, 28 N.E.3d at 16.

The requirement of "good faith" anticipated litigation is intended to prevent attorneys (or their agents) from "bully[ing], harass[ing], or intimidat[ing] their client's adversaries by threatening baseless litigation or by asserting unmeritorious claims, unsupported in law and fact, in violation of counsel's ethical obligations," *id.* at 19. The statement Mr. Barden prepared and caused to be issued was not intended to bully, harass or intimidate the press-recipients, i.e., the

potential defendants in an action by Ms. Maxwell for defamation. *See* EXHIBIT K ¶¶ 26-30. Nothing about the statement on its face suggested bullying, harassing or intimidating the press-recipients (or anyone else). At the time Mr. Barden directed the issuance of the statement, he had sufficient factual and legal grounds to pursue in good faith a defamation action against one or more of the press-recipients for republishing plaintiff's allegations. *See generally id.* ¶¶ 8-30.

That the statement was directed at the press-recipients—which had republished plaintiff's false allegations and was not directed at plaintiff—is irrelevant to the absolute privilege protecting pre-litigation communications. In *International Publishing Concepts, LLC v. Locatelli*, letters and emails detailing likely litigation and an intent to sue were extended the same pre-litigation privilege although sent to two non-parties who were only potentially affected by the litigation or witnesses to it. *See also Kirk*, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 593 ("The privilege is broad, and embraces anything that may possibly or plausibly be relevant to the litigation.") (internal quotations omitted).

The only issue remaining is whether the statement was pertinent to the contemplated litigation. Applying the "extremely liberal" test of pertinence, in which "any doubts are to be resolved in favor of pertinence,"[29] the court must decide whether the allegedly defamatory statement is "outrageously out of context" in relation to the contemplated litigation. *Flomenhaft*, 8 N.Y.S.3d at 164-65 (internal quotations omitted). Nothing in the statement is "outrageously out of context." Every statement was directly related to the press-recipients' republication of plaintiff's false allegations against Ms. Maxwell.

The January 4 statement also is absolutely privileged. According to plaintiff, Ms. Maxwell told a reporter on that date when asked to comment on plaintiff's joinder-motion

[29] *Flomenhaft*, 8 N.Y.S.3d at 164 (internal quotations omitted).

allegations: "I am referring to the statement that was made." Doc.1 ¶ 32. Assuming *arguendo* the statement is defamatory,[30] it is absolutely privileged since it simply refers to an absolutely privileged statement. *See, e.g., Klein*, 29 A.D.2d at 420 (privilege protects communications "between litigating parties"); *Frechtman*, 979 N.Y.S.2d at 63 (privilege protects communications "made in or out of court, … on or off the record, … orally or in writing") (internal quotations omitted).

Under these circumstances the pre-litigation privilege is absolute and "no cause of action for defamation can be based on those statements," *Khalil*, 28 N.E.3d at 16. The Court should enter summary judgment on plaintiff's defamation claim.

IV. Ms. Maxwell's January 4, 2015, statement is nonactionable.

Plaintiff alleges that on January 4, 2015, a reporter approached Ms. Maxwell on a public street in Manhattan and "asked Maxwell about Giuffre's allegations against Maxwell." Doc.1 ¶ 37. Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Maxwell responded with a single sentence: "'I am referring to the statement that we made.'" *Id.* According to plaintiff, Ms. Maxwell's statement was defamatory. *See id.* ¶ 37 & Count I ¶ 5, at 8. Judgment should enter against plaintiff as to Ms. Maxwell's statement.

Adelson controls this portion of plaintiff's defamation claim. In *Adelson* a non-profit organization during the 2012 presidential campaign published a statement on its website critical of Sheldon Adelson, a wealthy Republican donor. The statement alleged Adelson had donated "tainted" and "dirty" money to Governor Romney. Eight days later the organization withdrew the statement from its website. On the same day it issued a press release explaining that although

[30] As discussed in Argument IV, the January 4 statement is nonactionable.

it took down the statement, "we stand by everything we said, which was sourced from current, credible news accounts." 973 F. Supp. 2d at 474.

Adelson sued. He alleged that the statement was defamatory and that the press release constituted a republication of the defamatory statement. This court held that the statement contained only constitutionally protected opinion and was nonactionable. The court then rejected the defamation claim based on republication: "'[A] mere reference to another writing that contains defamatory matter does not constitute an actionable repetition or republication." *Id.* (quoting *Goforth v. Avemco Life Ins. Co.*, 368 F.2d 25, 28 n.7 (4th Cir.1966)). This is the settled rule. *See In re Philadelphia Newspapers*, LLC, 690 F.3d 161, 175 (3d Cir. 2012), *as corrected* (Oct. 25, 2012) ("under traditional principles of republication, a mere reference to an article, regardless how favorable it is as long as it does not restate the defamatory material, does not republish the material"); *Salyer v. S. Poverty Law Ctr., Inc.*, 701 F. Supp. 2d 912, 916 (W.D. Ky. 2009) ("[T]he common thread of traditional republication is that it presents the material, in its entirety, before a new audience. A mere reference to a previously published article does not do that.").

Ms. Maxwell's one-sentence response that merely referenced an earlier statement is nonactionable. This Court should enter partial summary judgment on the defamation claim to the extent it is based on Ms. Maxwell's response.

V. The defamation claim should be dismissed because the publication is substantially true.

"'[A] statement is substantially true if the statement would not "have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have produced."'" *Franklin v. Daily Holdings, Inc.*, 21 N.Y.S.3d 6, 12 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting *Biro v. Condé Nast*, 883 F. Supp. 2d 441, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting *Jewell v. NYP Holdings, Inc.*, 23 F. Supp. 2d 348,

366 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (quoting *Fleckenstein v. Friedman*, 193 N.E. 537, 538 (1934)))). Indeed, it is well settled in New York "that an alleged libel is not actionable if the published statement could have produced no worse an effect on the mind of a reader than the truth pertinent to the allegation." *Id.* (internal quotations omitted). "When the truth is so near to the facts as published that fine and shaded distinctions must be drawn and words pressed out of their ordinary usage to sustain a charge of libel, no legal harm has been done." *Fleckenstein*, 193 N.E. at 538.

For the reasons articulated in Argument VI, the January 2015 statement is substantially true as matter of law.

VI. Plaintiff cannot establish actual malice by clear and convincing evidence.

A. Facts.

The following numbered facts are not in dispute and are sequentially numbered following the undisputed facts cited earlier. *See* This Motion at ¶¶ 1-36.

37. **Plaintiff lived independently from her parents with her fiancé long before meeting Epstein or Ms. Maxwell.** After leaving the Growing Together drug rehabilitation facility in 1999, plaintiff moved in with the family of a fellow patient. EXHIBIT L at 7-8, 12-14. There she met, and became engaged to, her friend's brother, James Michael Austrich. *Id.* & at 19. She and Austrich thereafter rented an apartment in the Ft. Lauderdale area with another friend and both worked at various jobs in that area. *Id.* at 11, 13-17. Later, they stayed briefly with plaintiff's parents in the Palm Beach/Loxahatchee, Florida area before Austrich rented an apartment for the couple on Bent Oak Drive in Royal Palm Beach. *Id.* at 17, 19, 25-27; EXHIBIT M. Although plaintiff agreed to marry Austrich, she never had any intention of doing so. EXHIBIT N at 127-128.

38. **Plaintiff re-enrolled in high school from June 21, 2000 until March 7, 2002**. After finishing the 9th grade school year at Forest Hills High School on June 9, 1999, plaintiff re-

enrolled at Wellington Adult High School on June 21, 2000, again on August 16, 2000 and on August 14, 2001. EXHIBIT O. On September 20, 2001, Plaintiff then enrolled at Royal Palm Beach High School. *Id.* A few weeks later, on October 12, 2001, she matriculated at Survivors Charter School. *Id.* Survivor's Charter School was an alternative school designed to assist students who had been unsuccessful at more traditional schools. EXHIBIT P at 23-24. Plaintiff remained enrolled at Survivor's Charter School until March 7, 2002. EXHIBIT O. She was present 56 days and absent 13 days during her time there. *Id.* Plaintiff never received her high school diploma or GED. EXHIBIT Q at 475, 483. Plaintiff and Figueroa went "back to school" together at Survivor's Charter School. EXHIBIT P at 23-27. The school day there lasted from morning until early afternoon. *Id.* at 23-27, 144-46.

39. During the year 2000, plaintiff worked at numerous jobs. In 2000, while living with her fiancé, plaintiff held five different jobs: at Aviculture Breeding and Research Center, Southeast Employee Management Company, The Club at Mar-a-Lago, Oasis Outsourcing, and Neiman Marcus. EXHIBIT R. Her taxable earnings that year totaled nearly $9,000. *Id.* Plaintiff cannot now recall either the Southeast Employee Management Company or the Oasis Outsourcing jobs. EXHIBIT Q at 470-471.

40. Plaintiff's employment at the Mar-a-Lago spa began in fall 2000. Plaintiff's father, Sky Roberts, was hired as a maintenance worker at the The Mar-a-Lago Club in Palm Beach, Florida, beginning on April 11, 2000. EXHIBIT S. Mr. Roberts worked there year-round for approximately 3 years. *Id.*; EXHIBIT T at 72-73. After working there for a period of time, Mr. Roberts became acquainted with the head of the spa area and recommended plaintiff for a job there. *Id.* at 72. Mar-a-Lago closes every Mother's Day and reopens on November 1. EXHIBIT U at Mar-a-Lago0212. Most of employees Mar-a-Lago, including all employees of the spa area

such as "spa attendants," are "seasonal" and work only when the club is open, i.e., between November 1 and Mother's Day. EXHIBIT T at 72-73; EXHIBIT U at MAR-A-LAGO 0212; EXHIBIT V. Plaintiff was hired as a "seasonal" spa attendant to work at the Mar-a-Lago Club in the fall of 2000 after she had turned 17.

41. **Plaintiff represented herself as a masseuse for Jeffrey Epstein.** While working at the Mar-a-Lago spa and reading a library book about massage, plaintiff met Ms. Maxwell. Plaintiff thereafter told her father that she got a job working for Jeffrey Epstein as a masseuse. EXHIBIT T at 79. Plaintiff's father took her to Epstein's house on one occasion around that time, and Epstein came outside and introduced himself to Mr. Roberts. *Id.* at 82-83. Plaintiff commenced employment as a traveling masseuse for Mr. Epstein. Plaintiff was excited about her job as a masseuse, about traveling with him and about meeting famous people. EXHIBIT L at 56; EXHIBIT P at 126. Plaintiff represented that she was employed as a masseuse beginning in January 2001. EXHIBIT M; EXHIBIT N. Plaintiff never mentioned Ms. Maxwell to her then-fiancé, Austrich. EXHIBIT L at 74. Plaintiff's father never met Ms. Maxwell. EXHIBIT T at 85.

42. **Plaintiff resumed her relationship with convicted felon Anthony Figueroa.** In spring 2001, while living with Austich, plaintiff lied to and cheated on him with her high school boyfriend, Anthony Figueroa. EXHIBIT L at 68, 72. Plaintiff and Austrich thereafter broke up, and Figueroa moved into the Bent Oak apartment with plaintiff. EXHIBIT L at 20; EXHIBIT P at 28. When Austrich returned to the Bent Oak apartment to check on his pets and retrieve his belongings, Figueroa in Plaintiff's presence punched Austrich in the face. EXHIBIT X; EXHIBIT L at 38-45. Figueroa and plaintiff fled the scene before police arrived. EXHIBIT X. Figueroa was then a convicted felon and a drug abuser on probation for possession of a controlled substance. EXHIBIT Y.

43. **Plaintiff freely and voluntarily contacted the police to come to her aid in 2001 and 2002 but never reported to them that she was Epstein's "sex slave."** In August 2001 at age 17, while living in the same apartment, plaintiff and Figueroa hosted a party with a number of guests. EXHIBIT Z. During the party, according to plaintiff, someone entered plaintiff's room and stole $500 from her shirt pocket. *Id.* Plaintiff contacted the police. She met and spoke with police officers regarding the incident and filed a report. She did not disclose to the officer that she was a "sex slave." A second time, in June 2002, plaintiff contacted the police to report that her former landlord had left her belongings by the roadside and had lit her mattress on fire. EXHIBIT AA. Again, plaintiff met and spoke with the law enforcement officers but did not complain that she was the victim of any sexual trafficking or abuse or that she was then being held as a "sex slave." *Id.*

44. **From August 2001 until September 2002, Epstein and Maxwell were almost entirely absent from Florida on documented travel unaccompanied by Plaintiff.** Flight logs maintained by Epstein's private pilot Dave Rodgers evidence the substantial number of trips away from Florida that Epstein and Maxwell took, unaccompanied by Plaintiff, between August 2001 and September 2002. EXHIBIT BB. Rodgers maintained a log of all flights on which Epstein and Maxwell traveled with him. EXHIBIT CC at 6-15. Epstein additionally traveled with another pilot who did not keep such logs and he also occasionally traveled via commercial flights. *Id.* at 99-100, 103. For substantially all of thirteen months of the twenty-two months (from November 2000 until September 2002) that Plaintiff lived in Palm Beach and knew Epstein, Epstein was traveling outside of Florida unaccompanied by Plaintiff. EXHIBIT BB. During this same period of time, Plaintiff was employed at various jobs, enrolled in school, and living with her boyfriend.

45. **Plaintiff and Figueroa shared a vehicle during 2001 and 2002.** Plaintiff and Figueroa shared a '93 white Pontiac in 2001 and 2002. EXHIBIT P at 67; EXHIBIT EE. Plaintiff freely traveled around the Palm Beach area in that vehicle. *Id.* In August 2002, Plaintiff acquired a Dodge Dakota pickup truck from her father. EXHIBIT P at 67-68. Figueroa used that vehicle in a series of crimes before and after Plaintiff left for Thailand. *Id.;* EXHIBIT FF.

46. **Plaintiff held a number of jobs in 2001 and 2002**. During 2001 and 2002, plaintiff was gainfully employed at several jobs. She worked as a waitress at Mannino's Restaurant, at TGIFriday's restaurant (aka CCI of Royal Palm Inc.), and at Roadhouse Grill. EXHIBIT R. She also was employed at Courtyard Animal Hospital (aka Marc Pinkwasser DVM). *Id.*; EXHIBIT W.

47. **In September 2002, Plaintiff traveled to Thailand to receive massage training and while there, met her future husband and eloped with him.** Plaintiff traveled to Thailand in September 2002 to receive formal training as a masseuse. Figueroa drove her to the airport. While there, she initially contacted Figueroa frequently, incurring a phone bill of $4,000. EXHIBIT P at 35. She met Robert Giuffre while in Thailand and decided to marry him. She thereafter ceased all contact with Figueroa from October 2002 until two days before Mr. Figueroa's deposition in this matter in May 2016. *Id.* at 29, 37.

48. **Detective Recarey's investigation of Epstein failed to uncover any evidence that Ms. Maxwell was involved in sexual abuse of minors, sexual trafficking or production or possession of child pornography.** Joseph Recarey served as the lead detective from the Palm Beach Police Department charged with investigating Jeffrey Epstein. EXHIBIT GG at 10. That investigation commenced in 2005. *Id.* Recarey worked only on the Epstein case for an entire year. *Id.* at 274. He reviewed previous officers' reports and interviews, conducted numerous interviews of witnesses and alleged victims himself, reviewed surveillance footage of the Epstein