Philosophy 148 — Extra-Credit Problems

05/12/08

These extra-credit problems are due at the final exam (May 20 @ 8am). A total of 160 points are possible here. Any points you earn will be super-added to your homework point total for the semester.

1 Proving Some Things About Hempel's Theory of Confirmation

The following problems can be solved in varying degrees of generality. If you are able to prove them in *maximal generality* (*i.e.*, for *all* salient *E*'s and *H*'s) and for *direct or indirect* Hempel-confirmation, then they are worth 10 points each. If you prove them in maximal generality, but only for *direct* Hempel-confirmation, then they are worth 5 points each. And, if you prove them only for *direct* Hempel confirmation, and only for universal hypotheses (*i.e.*, only for *H*'s that are universally quantified sentences), then they are worth 2.5 points each. Make sure to consult my handout on "Some Abstract Properties of Conprmation Relations & Four Theories of Conprmation" (pages 2 and 3) for the details of Hempel's theory.

- 1. Explain why Hempel's theory implies (CC): If E confirms H, and E confirms H', then H and H' are logically consistent.
- 2. Explain why Hempel's theory implies (SCC): If E confirms H, and $H \models H'$, then E confirms H'.
- 3. Explain why Hempel's theory implies (M): If E confirms H, then E & E' confirms H, provided that E' contains no individual constants not already contained in E. [Easier version, worth half points: If Fa confirms H, then Fa & Ga confirms H, for any consistent predicates F and G.]
- 4. Explain why Hempel's theory implies (&): If *E* confirms both *H* and *H'*, then *E* confirms *H* & *H'*.
- 5. Explain why Hempel's theory implies (G): Ea & Ga & Oa confirms both H_1 : $(\forall x)(Ex \supset Gx)$ and H_2 : $(\forall x)[Ex \supset (Ox \equiv Gx)]$. [This one's a gimmie see my lecture notes on "grue".]

2 Generalizing the "Standard Bayesian Ravens Theorem"

2.1 Proving The Bayesian Ravens Theorem from Weaker Assumptions

Let $H = (\forall x)(Rx \supset Bx)$. Recall that the standard Bayesian resolution of the ravens paradox involves showing that the following argument in the probability calculus is valid (assuming a *regular* Pr-function):

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(i) Pr(\sim Ba) > Pr(Ra)

(ii) Pr(Ra \mid H) = Pr(Ra)

(iii) Pr(Ba \mid H) = Pr(Ba)

Therefore, (iv) Pr(H \mid Ra \& Ba) > Pr(H \mid \sim Ra \& \sim Ba)
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On HW #5, you were asked to prove this theorem. For extra-credit (worth 20 points), prove that (*iv*) still follows, even if (*ii*) and (*iii*) are replaced by the following, *strictly weaker* assumption:

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(\star) \Pr(H \mid Ra) = \Pr(H \mid \sim Ba)
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2.2 Qualitative Consequences of these Two Bayesian Approaches

Consider the following three qualitative claims:

- (a) Pr(H | Ra & Ba) > Pr(H)
- (b) $Pr(H \mid \sim Ba \& \sim Ra) > Pr(H)$
- (c) $Pr(H \mid Ba \& \sim Ra) < Pr(H)$

There are six extra-credit problems (10 points each) relating to (a)–(c). The first three are to prove (a)–(c) from the standard Bayesian assumptions (i)–(iii). The second three are to prove that (a)–(c) do not follow from the weaker pair (i) & (\star). These last problems require that you give probability model(s) on which both (i) and (\star) are true, but (a)–(c) are not. [Hint: You may be able to do this with fewer than 3 models.]

3 Three "Odd Properties" of Pr-Relevance Confirmation

Consider the following three possibilities:

- (I) *E* confirms *H* and *E* confirms H', but *E* disconfirms $H \vee H'$.
- (II) E disconfirms H and E disconfirms H', but E confirms H & H'.
- (III) E confirms H relative to K and E confirms H relative to $\sim K$, but E disconfirms H, relative to \top .

Show that each of these three possibilities can be satisfied by the probabilistic relevance confirmation relation. That is, give probability models on which (I)–(III) are true, assuming a probabilistic relevance definition of the confirmation relation. Correct models are worth 10 points each.