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IN DEFENSE OF SOUTHERN FUNDAMENTALISM*

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What a waste it is to lose one's mind, or not to have a mind.
— Dan Quayle

In debate over the truth or falsity of folk psychology (henceforth, FP, a notation which also will go proxy for 'folk psychological'), the most influential players tend to line up on the U.S. coasts: friends of FP, like Jerry Fodor and William Lycan, on the East; foes, like Paul Churchland, Patricia Churchland, and Stephen Stich until recently, on the West.¹ There are important voices in other locales and periodic geographic shifts among the principals, but by and large gravity seems to pull east or west.² This is unfortunate, we believe, for the proper perspective lies in unexplored Southern states, and in a faith in FP that borders on the evangelical. It's time for gravitational pull to Dixie.³ It's time, in short, for Southern Fundamentalism.

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper defends a version of realism about FP. For reasons which will be explained in a moment, we call this version *Southern Fundamentalism* (hereafter SF).

In general terms, FP realism is the doctrine that our everyday FP descriptions of people are by and large true, and thus that humans generally do undergo the FP events, beliefs, desires, and so forth that we normally attribute to them; i.e., realism asserts that humans are, in Daniel Dennett's apt phrase, *true believers*.⁴ FP anti-realism, or eliminativism, is the doctrine that people really do not undergo FP events or states, and hence that FP is (radically, categorically) false. Adopting the ecclesiastical terminology we introduced in an earlier paper, we will sometimes refer to realists about FP (believers in true belief) as

churchmen, and to anti-realists or eliminativists (anti-believers) as *secularists*.⁵

In the debate between Eastern churchmen and Western secularists, the two sides typically share certain presuppositions concerning prerequisites for the truth of FP. The most popular and most fundamental presupposition is the requirement of *scientific absorbability*:

- (SA) Humans are true believers only if FP is absorbable into mature science.

The main idea behind (SA) is that FP, being a theory (or proto-theory) of human behavior, cannot be true unless its central principles and generalizations are destined to be part of science. Eastern churchmen argue that the total available evidence strongly favors the claim that science will absorb FP, whereas secularists argue that the evidential scales currently tip the other way.⁶

Other shared presuppositions about prerequisites for FP's truth also sometimes figure importantly in the East/West debate. In particular, Easterners and Westerners largely agree about the requirement of a *language of thought*:

- (LT) Humans are true believers only if they have internal mental representations that (i) possess language-like syntactic structure, and (ii) possess the propositional content of putatively attributable FP attitudes.

Eastern churchmen argue that current evidence points strongly toward mental representations with the syntax and semantics needed to subserve FP attitudes, whereas Western secularists maintain that it points in exactly the opposite direction.

We will refer to requirements like scientific absorbability and the existence of a language of thought as *putative true-believer conditions* (for short, PTB conditions). Another common presupposition shared by Easterners and Westerners, although generally implicit in their writings, rather than explicitly stated, is the following principle of *epistemic or evidential dynamics*:

- (ED) For each PTB condition C, if there were to arise strong epistemic warrant for the thesis that humans do not satisfy

C, then (i) this would thereby confer strong epistemic warrant upon the thesis that humans are not true believers, and (ii) it would not confer any significant degree of epistemic warrant upon the thesis that condition C is not really a prerequisite for being a true believer.

Thus, Easterners and Westerners alike agree that FP would be falsified under certain conceivable scenarios concerning the future course of science — for instance, scenarios in which there arises empirical evidence that FP is not scientifically absorbable, or that there is no language of thought. The main disagreement between the two sides concerns the likelihood that such scenarios will come to pass.

We wish to defend a version of FP realism that differs significantly from standard East Coast realism. As mentioned, we call it *Southern Fundamentalism*. The label is chosen for two reasons. One is light-hearted; the other serious. The light-hearted reason is that we write from the recesses of the American Deep South where True Belief is unquestioned. The serious reason is that according to SF, our ordinary epistemic standards for folk psychological attributions are linked so closely to the truth or satisfaction conditions of such attributions that the truth of FP is beyond all serious doubt. Thus, current evidence strongly warrants us in saying that humans believe, and warrants this claim in a way that would not be appreciably affected by any evidence we might acquire against theses like (SA) or (LT). More exactly, the central and particular tenets of SF are these:

- (SF.1) Humans are true believers.
- (SF.2) The thesis that humans are true believers is enormously well warranted, on the basis of total current evidence.
- (SF.3) For each PTB condition C, if there were to arise strong epistemic warrant for the thesis that humans do not satisfy C, then (i) this would thereby confer strong epistemic warrant upon the thesis that C is not really a prerequisite for being a true believer, and (ii) it would not confer any significant degree of epistemic warrant upon the thesis that humans are not true believers.

Theses (SF.1) and (SF.2) are held in common with our realist brethren

the Eastern churchmen. The crucial schism between ourselves and the Eastern sect involves (SF.3), a principle of epistemic dynamics that is flatly incompatible with the principle (ED) which the Eastern churchmen hold in common with the Western secularists. Because both Eastern churchmen and Western secularists hold (ED), the debate between them is primarily about PTB conditions. Friends of anti-realism/secularism/eliminativism would see the failure to meet PTB conditions as an exciting instance of falsification, encouraging the creation of non-folk-psychological theories. Meanwhile, Eastern realists see the defense of PTB conditions as necessary apologetics, protecting the favored creed from secular assault. To fundamentalist eyes, however, the outcome of debate over PTB conditions does not affect the evidential warrant for FP, for the epistemic dynamics is that of (SF.3).

Meanwhile, theses (SF.2) and (SF.3) together express the view that the truth of secularism/eliminativism is at most a *bare epistemic possibility*. That is, not only is the current epistemic warrant for (SF.1) overwhelmingly high, but (SF.1) would retain this same high epistemic status under any scenarios that currently might plausibly be viewed as live epistemic possibilities — scenarios like the non-absorbability of FP into science, and/or the non-existence of language-like mental representations. Thus, FP is not vulnerable to the kind of falsification countenanced by principle (ED), because evidence against scientific absorbability or against the language of thought would actually call into question not (SF.1), that is, not folk psychological realism, but rather the PTB conditions expressed in principles like (SA) and (LT). Even if it should turn out that FP is not absorbable or humans do not have a language of thought, (SF.1) would remain overwhelmingly warranted anyway.

2. PRELIMINARIES

We shall defend SF momentarily. Let's begin with several preparatory ablutions to more precisely demarcate our subject matter and relevant background assumptions.

First, we shall say nothing here about why FP is a theory (or tacit or proto-theory). We assume, as do the main parties to the folk realism/anti-realism debate, that FP is a theory or proto-theory. In particular, following David Lewis and others, we shall suppose that folk psy-

chology is usefully construed as consisting of two components.⁷ These include a fundamental set of theoretical principles or nomological or lawlike generalizations; and, the existential or empirical thesis that people really do undergo the states specified in the fundamental principles (that is, people really do believe, desire, etc.). The primary focus of debate between churchmen and secularists is not the principles, or whether FP contains lawlike generalizations and should be classified as theory, but the truth of the existential thesis. Churchmen assert it; secularists deny it. The present paper is about debate over the existential thesis, not whether FP contains lawlike generalizations or is a theory. Hence, in speaking of FP being true, we mean specifically that the existential thesis (that people really do believe, etc.) is true. Of course, there are philosophers who question the plausibility of the folk-theory assumption; but without systematic, detailed discussion we should not try to defend the assumption in the present paper.⁸

Second, some remarks about the notion of the absorption of FP by science. The general idea is this: (i) beliefs, desires, intentions, and other such state-types (properties) posited by FP — or at any rate, state types very similar to these — would be posited within mature science; and (ii) the generalizations about such state types asserted by FP — or anyway, generalizations very similar to these — would be entailed by mature science. Tersely speaking, absorption could be either *horizontal* or *vertical* (or both). Horizontal absorption would involve the emergence, within cognitive science, of mature empirical psychological theories in which FP-like state types figure as natural kinds, subject to FP-like generalizations. Vertical absorption would occur if it should turn out that (i) beliefs, desires, and the other fundamental state types of FP are identical with — or anyway are nomically coextensive with — tractably describable state types within some lower-level, non-psychological, branch of mature science, such as neurobiology; and (ii) the relevant lower-level theories, together with type-type identity statements or bridge laws, entail FP-like generalizations.⁹ These characterizations of horizontal and vertical absorption could be liberalized somewhat — e.g., by allowing FP to get altered or corrected in the process of absorption. Obviously the more liberal one is about what counts as absorption, the better the odds that FP will eventually prove absorbable into mature science.¹⁰

Third, there are a variety of empirical conditions sometimes alleged

to be prerequisites for the truth of FP. In addition to the putative absorbability requirement, and the putative requirement that a creature with propositional attitudes must have language-like mental representations with the contents of those attitudes themselves, other putative conditions sometimes put forward include these: that FP agents must be ideally rational; that there must always be a precise answer to the question "What does a person (or animal) believe?"; that people must normally have privileged or first-person access to the contents of their own beliefs; and that creatures with propositional attitudes must have neurobiological composition rather than some other kind of physical constitution (e.g. tinfoil).¹¹ We will remain largely neutral about which such conditions, if any, might be advanced as PTB conditions. Our subsequent discussion will be applicable, *mutatis mutandis*, to any conditions which might merit this status. Thus, if there were to arise strong epistemic warrant for the thesis, for example, that beliefs may be vague and imprecise, then the SF view of the epistemic dynamics is that this would not appreciably alter the warrant for the thesis that humans are true believers, for the thesis that humans are true believers is strongly warranted anyway. The reasonable course would be to abandon the claim that there must always be a precise answer to the question of what does a person believe.

Fourth, some clarification is needed about what falls within the scope of the expression 'folk psychology'.¹² As we shall understand this phrase, 'folk psychology' includes notions like belief, desire, intention, action, and closely cognate notions; and the most fundamental principles or generalizations which common sense takes to be true of the ways such states interact with one another. So understood, FP should not be confused with what may be called *folksy psychology*. The latter includes lots of Grandma's wisdom and poetry's delight that is not presupposed by our practice of attributing propositional attitudes and proffering FP explanations; perhaps includes much of what we commonly say and believe about, e.g., passions and character traits; and perhaps also includes much that is positively contradictory or incoherent (e.g. "Out of sight, out of mind", "Absence makes the heart grow fonder"). We will remain non-committal about where to draw the line between folk and folksy psychology; our main point is that the FP realism we are defending concerns folk (not folksy) psychology. Not

every piece of conventional wisdom is really wise, and we do not want to be read as defending everything Grandma ever said about human psychology.¹³

Finally, fifth, we will be using epistemic, actional, and semantic notions in the course of the discussion. Yet concepts like epistemic warrant certainly seem folk psychological, being tied conceptually to belief and rational belief; the concept of action is folk psychological, being tied conceptually to causation by propositional attitudes (whereof more below); and, arguably, semantic notions like meaning and truth are folk psychological.¹⁴ So, in order not to beg the question against eliminativists, we should be understood as using these notions in a “scare-quoted” sense — i.e., without prejudging whether or not they ultimately can be, or should be, replaced by secularized successors. Connected to this last point is the dialectical fact that eliminativists themselves must engage in this scare-quoted usage, in order to communicate in the present non-secular milieu — a point they themselves appreciate. They, too, need to allow themselves notions like action and degree of epistemic warrant, as they seek to argue that secularism is the most strongly warranted view. However, from their own perspective, of course, these notions are methodological crutches, to be righteously and gleefully cast away at the dawn of the secular millenium.

3. RESONANT INTENTIONAL SYSTEMS AND THE AUSTERE CONCEPTION OF FP

The above should suffice to demarcate our subject matter. So, it's time to defend SF. Defense proceeds in two steps. First, we wish to describe a central concept which will be used in the defense; second, in sections 4 and 5, we offer two arguments in favor of SF.

In defending SF, we will borrow from Dennett the notion of an *intentional system*.¹⁵ For him, this is a system (organism, artifact) whose behavior can be usefully predicted and explained by ascribing to it beliefs, desires, and related attitudes. We here alter Dennett's characterization as follows: the system's behavior can be usefully predicted this way, and can be *seemingly* truly explained this way. For, note that FP attributions could be predictively and heuristically explanatorily useful even if they are radically false; however, in order to be useful for

bona fide explanation, they must be true, or at any rate, they must at least be *approximately* true.¹⁶ In addition, let a *resonant* intentional system (RIS) be one whose overall behavioral repertoire is sufficiently rich, environmentally intricate, and *prima facie* rational that under *ordinary, behavior-based*, epistemic standards for attribution of FP attitudes, no serious question would arise whether the system really has attitudes. Ordinary people, using FP idioms in the usual everyday manner, would readily suppose that the system has attitudes, and would readily attribute specific attitudes to it. Prototypically, RIS's are competent language users; simple nonlinguistic animals don't, or don't decisively or clearly, qualify. Quine is a RIS; the moth on his copy of *The World as Will and Idea* is not.

RIS's are common ground in the realist/secularist debate, so it is not controversial that there are RIS's.¹⁷ Everyone admits that certain organisms or creatures, particularly humans, naturally lead or strongly tempt one to ascribe beliefs, which in turn seemingly truly explain their behavior. Instead, secularists question whether RIS's really have propositional attitudes (and really perform actions), whether they are true believers. The secularists thus presuppose that rather stringent requirements (PTB conditions) must be met, over and above being a resonant intentional system, in order for a creature to be classified as a true believer; e.g. FP must be shown to be absorbable into mature science.

The fundamentalist conception of FP, however, rejects the idea that true believerhood involves stringent additional requirements beyond being an RIS in the first place. Fundamentalism concedes that there is *some* conceptual gap between being a RIS and being a true believer; there are conceivable, if highly far-fetched, scenarios under which an entity could be the former without being the latter, e.g. a robot completely controlled remotely by Martians.¹⁸ The sub-attitudinal configuration or organization of such a creature is one that prevents it from being a genuine believer (it's tethered to remote controls). It's dumb. This is merely to say, however, that the connection between a system's being a RIS and its being a true believer is abductive, rather than criterial, and thus that it is possible to be an RIS without being a true believer. Further, while admitting the presence of a gap, fundamentalism also claims that the gap is not a very wide one — that rather little is required, over and above being a RIS, to have propositional attitudes.

There are, to be sure, certain restrictions on allowable sub-attitudinal organization, so that a puppet-creature like the remotely controlled robot does not count as a true believer. We will not attempt here to articulate these additional requirements precisely, or even to say how precise they are (or need to be). That is a philosophical issue we need not address directly, and about which we can maintain a certain neutrality for present purposes. The relevant claim of SF is this: *whatever* the additional requirements are for being a true believer, over and above being a RIS, they are quite modest, and hence are very likely satisfied in prototypical cases of RIS's, viz., humans.¹⁹ A creature's being a RIS, in the absence of evidence that it is a puppet-creature, is overwhelmingly strong evidence that it is a full-fledged true believer.

The term we shall deploy for the secularist (and Eastern realist) thesis that quite stringent requirements, or PTB conditions, must be met over and above being a RIS for true believerhood is *opulent*. Secularists suppose that the very concept of a folk psychological agent or true believer (or the very property or attribute of such believerhood or agenthood) is opulent. PTB conditions are built into true believerhood. The term we shall deploy for the fundamentalist thesis that the difference between RISHood and true believerhood is quite small or metaphysically negligible is *austere*. Fundamentalists propose that the very idea of a folk psychological agent or true believer is austere, involving mostly just what is involved in being a RIS. True believerhood is *more or less* realized by being a RIS. It should be noted that the differing epistemic dynamics of secularism and fundamentalism, (ED) as opposed to (SF.3), stem from their differing conceptions of true believerhood. Secularism would count the failure to meet PTB conditions as evidence against FP because it opulently presupposes that such conditions are necessary for true belief. By contrast, fundamentalism would count such failure as evidence that the conditions are not necessary for true belief, for fundamentalism austere presupposes that being a non-puppet RIS suffices for being a true believer.

As an example of a concept that is empirically austere, in something like the way SF alleges true believerhood is, consider *being able to fly*. There is little doubt that the very concept of being able to fly renders it correctly applicable to ordinary, prototypical, birds — that is, birds who (among other things) behave in ways that meet the behavior-based

epistemic standards we employ when attributing to some creature the ability to fly. Suppose that someone advances — possibly on the basis of plausible and scientifically sophisticated reasoning — a hypothesis to the effect that any creature capable of flying must satisfy a certain condition C. (For instance, the hypothesis might posit a specific minimal ratio of body surface to body weight.) And suppose that thereafter it is discovered that some birds, although they do not satisfy condition C, nonetheless do meet all the standards we normally employ in attributing the ability to fly. (In particular, they propel themselves through the air by flapping their wings.) Should we then conclude that, appearances to the contrary, these birds really cannot fly because they do not satisfy condition C? Surely not; rather, the proper conclusion would be that condition C is not after all a genuine prerequisite for being able to fly. It is too stringent, or perhaps is an appropriate marker for some kinds of flight but not flight in general.

According to SF's austere conception of FP, the concept of true believerhood works similarly; i.e. ordinary, behavior-based evidential standards are by and large sufficient for warranting the attribution of belief. This is not to say, however, that FP concepts are *analyzable* in terms of behavior or behavioral dispositions — even though the ability to fly perhaps is so analyzable. “Analytic behaviorism”, nowadays rightly regarded as highly implausible, is only one (the most extreme, the limit-case) species of the austere conception of FP.²⁰

What arguments can be given for the fundamentalist view?

4. CONCEPTUAL/SEMANTIC COMPETENCE AND THE AUSTERE CONCEPTION OF FP

Southern Fundamentalism asserts that since there is very strong evidence that humans are resonant intentional systems (conceded on all sides of the debate), and since the gap between resonant intentional system and true believer is negligible, there is very strong evidence that humans are true believers. So, the defense of SF must be the defense of the assertion that the gap between RISHood and true believerhood is negligible, i.e. the austere conception of FP must be defended. In this section and the next we will argue explicitly for the austere conception of FP, and thereby for Southern Fundamentalism.

The arguments we favor presuppose that the issue of whether true believerhood should be understood austerely or opulently is broadly an empirical issue. That is, whether the gap between RISHood and true believerhood is narrow (as fundamentalists assert) or wide-with-PTB conditions (as secularists [and our Eastern brethren] suppose or assert) is an empirical question. We shall consider a number of empirical facts of data concerning FP and the attribution of FP terms and concepts; and, then, in each case we shall argue that the hypothesis of austerity provides the most plausible overall explanation of those facts.

In asking how empirical considerations can be brought to bear upon this issue, it is illuminating to consider the analogous question concerning competing theories of natural-language syntax. The empirical data for syntactic theory includes certain judgments and judgment dispositions of competent language users — in particular, judgments and dispositions concerning the grammaticality or ungrammaticality of various sentence-like strings, and concerning grammatical ambiguity or nonambiguity of various sentences. Such judgments are relevant simultaneously to psychological theories of human language processing, and also to linguistic theories about the syntax of language itself. Native speakers, after all, can be expected to have judgment dispositions about these matters that reflect a solid mastery of their own language (or their own regional dialect, at any rate). So when native speakers are both intersubjectively consistent and also uniformly confident about such syntactic judgments, then normally the best psychological explanation will be that these judgments reflect the natives' syntactic competence, their mastery of the syntactic norms or syntactic structures underlying their language. And this psychological hypothesis, in turn, has a direct implication for linguistic theory — viz., that under an adequate theory of syntax for the natives' language (or dialect), those syntactic judgments will turn out correct.

Similar observations hold with respect to hypotheses or theories concerning the meanings of terms, and concerning the concepts those terms express. Here too certain robust patterns of judgment among native speakers are plausibly explained as manifesting linguistic competence; but now the operative form of competence is not syntactic, but instead pertains both to the relevant concepts themselves and to the terms expressing them. (We shall refer to this dual mastery as *con-*

ceptual/semantic competence.) And here too, as with grammaticality judgments, much of the relevant data is close at hand, some of it in the form of our own introspectively accessible linguistic intuitions. One instance of this phenomenon is quite familiar in analytic philosophy, viz., a proposed "conceptual analysis" is advanced, purporting to articulate conditions which are, as a matter of meaning, criterial for the truth of statements of a certain kind (e.g., statements of the form 'S knows that p'); then a counterexample is produced, consisting of a scenario for which competent speakers would judge that the analysandum-statement differs in truth value from the corresponding analysans-statement; and the hypothesized conceptual analysis is thereby refuted. Other patterns of judgment by competent language users might be plausibly explainable in a similar way, viz., as manifestations of conceptual/semantic competence. When competent speakers routinely, consistently, and uniformly think it intuitively obvious that certain kinds of descriptions are correctly applicable in various situations, normally the most plausible explanation will be that these intuitive judgments are the direct and reliable products of the speakers' conceptual/semantic competence. In such cases, these patterns among the judgments will provide empirical evidence that under an adequate account of the relevant concepts and the terms expressing them, the judgments usually will be correct. We shall refer to this kind of empirical reasoning as a *conceptual/semantic competence argument*.

Are there empirical facts that will underwrite a conceptual/semantic competence argument in favor of the austere conception of FP, over against the opulent conception? Are there facts supporting the claim that everyday ascriptions of FP states and attitudes are by and large true of humans, irrespectively of whether humans satisfy any PTB conditions? There certainly are; indeed, such facts are legion. (They are present on an epic scale, to adapt the purple prose favored by our secularist bretheren.²¹) Consider the following: people constantly find themselves assigning attitudes, and employing actional descriptions of behavior, with an enormous amount of confidence; they experience no serious doubt at all that certain specific attitudinal and actional attributions, applied to themselves and to others, are correct. This fact is a datum, requiring explanation. In addition, there is enormously wide intersubjective agreement among people, across a vast range of actual

and realistically hypothetical and counterfactual situations, about appropriate attitudinal and actional attributions. This strong interpersonal robustness of epistemic standards for FP attributions also calls out for explanation.

What explains such facts? What explains why people so robustly, consistently, and uniformly ascribe FP terms and concepts? Under the austere conception of FP, a simple and natural explanation is available: people make these judgments by drawing upon their conceptual/semantic competence concerning attitudinal and actional concepts and terms; by and large, therefore, people confidently ascribe attitudes and actions when, and only when, the ascriptions are actually *true*. Under the opulent conception of FP, on the other hand, no equally simple or natural explanation is forthcoming. Rather, advocates of the opulent conception face the awkward task of explaining why it should be that competent speakers uniformly adopt a set of *mistaken* epistemic standards for attitudinal and actional ascriptions — standards that are actually far too lax, because they often assign high epistemic warrant to FP ascriptions merely on the basis of behavioral evidence, irrespective of whether or not there is any available evidence for theses like (SA) or (LT). So, while the austere conception of FP provides a natural and elegant explanation of the empirical phenomena cited in the previous paragraph, the opulent conception does not. This fact constitutes weighty evidence in favor of the austere conception, over against the opulent conception.

Conceptual/semantic competence arguments are empirical arguments, a species of the genus “inference to the best explanation.” So the conceptual/semantic competence argument just set forth is defeasible, admittedly. It is possible that FP actually carries very strong and controversial empirical commitments — over and above its commitment to the uncontroversial contention that humans satisfy all requisite conditions (whatever those conditions might be) for non-puppet RISHood. If so, then the phenomenology of attitude ascription and the intersubjective agreement among ascribers are radically misleading; people are massively misguided and overconfident about this matter. They wrongly expect to know whether people have beliefs without knowing, e.g., whether mature science will make reference to beliefs. Surely, however, the reasonable “default assumption” about FP, com-

parable to the analogous assumptions in linguistic theory, is that people's uniformly consistent, deeply confident, linguistic intuitions about the applicability of attitudinal and actional ascriptions are generally *correct*, and thus that ordinary behavior-based epistemic standards for attitude attribution are appropriate rather than unduly lax.²²

The following additional facts about people's judgment dispositions further strengthen the conceptual/semantic competent argument for the austere conception. In order to describe a situation where it is intuitively quite clear that an entity fails to qualify as a true believer even though it satisfies the usual behavior-based evidential standards, we need to imagine goofball cases of a sort that humans are very unlikely to be in, involving a striking lack of autonomous behavioral control — for instance, the case of a robot-body being totally controlled from afar by Martians. Phenomenologically, envisioning less bizarre scenarios — e.g., scenarios where FP proves non-absorbable into mature science, but nothing like Martian behind-the-scenes “puppeteering” goes on — just does not seem persuasive as a case where the non-puppet RIS's in question fail to be true believers. On the contrary, the natural way of describing such scenarios is to say, “People would come to *believe* that FP is not absorbable into mature science” — a description which presupposes that people would be true believers anyway.

The most plausible explanation, once again, is that these facts too reflect people's conceptual/semantic competence with FP terms and concepts. If our linguistic intuitions do not incline us to describe a given envisioned scenario as one in which people turn out not to be true believers, then probably this is because that description is *not correct* for the given scenario. Accordingly, we have here further empirical evidence in favor of the austere conception of FP, over against the opulent conception.

5. CONCEPTUAL CONSERVATISM AND THE AUSTERE CONCEPTION OF FP

The notion of agency plays a fundamental and ubiquitous role in the conceptual scheme we all employ. People conceive of themselves and one another as agents, beings who do not merely undergo internally

caused bodily movements, but who perform *actions*.²³ A number of principles are central to our conception of human agency, including these: (1) Some, but not all, human actions are *deliberate*, i.e., performed *on purpose*. (2) Normally when someone deliberately acts in a certain way, he does so *for a reason*. (3) Linguistic behavior is actional: *asserting* is an important species of doing. And (4) certain kinds of deliberate actions, assertions among them, can be performed either *sincerely* or *insincerely*.

The ordinary notion of agency, which includes the various notions and distinctions just mentioned, and more besides, evidently is thoroughly folk psychological. The distinction between action and non-actional bodily motion is one we draw in FP terms: an action is an item of behavior involving a certain characteristic kind of causation by FP states like belief, desire, and intention.²⁴ Acting *because* of a reason, as opposed to merely acting and having a reason, involves possessing propositional attitudes that both (i) rationalize an action of the kind performed, and (ii) cause the action. The distinction between actions performed intentionally and those performed unintentionally is clearly folk psychological: an action, described as falling under a certain act type, is intentional (as so described) only if the agent intended to perform an act of that type. The distinction between sincere and insincere assertion comes basically to this: whether the speaker does, or does not, believe what he is asserting.

So if eliminativism is true then there are no actions, properly so called; hence there are no deliberate or unintentional actions and no sincere or insincere actions, and human behavior is not really explicable on the basis of reasons. This is not to deny that there is at least a bare epistemic possibility that the notion of action, and some or all of the key distinctions associated with this notion, might be replaceable by secularized successor notions and distinctions (although the secularists themselves have been deafeningly silent about what such putative successor notions could be like).²⁵ But the fact remains that if humans are not true believers, then the *ordinary* notion of action is just not applicable to human behavior.

This fact provides the basis for another argument through which to strengthen the plausibility of the austere conception of FP, in addition to the conceptual/semantic competence argument set forth above. The

conceptual conservatism argument, as we shall call this supplemental line of reasoning, goes as follows. Human concepts and language are the product of cultural (and biological) evolution. Accordingly, our concepts and terms are likely to be closely intertwined with the cultural (and biological) purposes for which we employ them. In particular, they are not likely to be more severe or restrictive than is required by these purposes; for, such restrictiveness normally would be gratuitous, and also could tend to undermine the usefulness of our concepts and terms for serving the very kinds of purposes for which they arose in the first place.

But the attitudinal and actional concepts of FP not only are pragmatically indispensable in our *current* epistemic and cultural milieu, but also would very probably remain indispensable even if we were to acquire evidence for the non-absorbability of FP, and/or for the non-existence of a language of thought. Although we certainly can envision a scenario in which there arises strong empirical evidence against the absorbability of FP into mature science, or against a language of thought, we cannot even conceive of what it would be for language-using, rationality-aspiring, creatures like ourselves to repudiate the notion of action (since repudiating it, or attempting to repudiate it, would itself be an action); or to sincerely assert that nobody ever sincerely asserts anything; or to find epistemically warranted the contention that epistemic warrant does not exist. Nor can we conceive how such notions could be replaced by secularized successor concepts which, despite being purged of any folk psychological presuppositions, still somehow manage successfully to take over the key roles these notions play in our everyday conceptual scheme and cultural life. Nor can we conceive how attitudinal and actional attributions could be systematically false while also being indispensable and irreplaceable; for, if there are no speech acts then how can human vocal noises and written markings express truth-bearing statements at all? There seems to be no way to understand Indispensible But False "Attitudes" which does not express allegiance to FP.²⁶

These considerations do not constitute an *a priori* refutation of secularism.²⁷ Scenarios we cannot now conceive might be metaphysically possible anyway. (Before Freud, who could conceive of unconscious attitudes? Before Einstein, who could conceive of the relativity of

simultaneity, or of curved spacetime?) Rather, the crucial point is this: since at present we cannot cogently conceive of ourselves as not being true believers, and since there exists an austere conception of FP according to which FP's integrity would not be threatened by non-absorbability into science or by the non-existence of a language of thought, considerations of conceptual conservatism strongly favor the hypothesis that our attitudinal and actional concepts conform to the austere conception of FP, rather than to the opulent conception. It is very unlikely that FP concepts contain commitments to strong empirical theses like (SA) or (LT); for, not only would such commitments be gratuitous, but FP concepts apparently would remain indispensable even if we should discover that (SA) or (LT) is false.

Conceptual conservatism arguments are empirical arguments, and hence are defeasible. So the argument just given is empirical and defeasible, as was our earlier conceptual/semantic competence argument. But now the burden of proof falls squarely upon the shoulders of the eliminativists; they owe us arguments for opulence and against austerity that they have not provided. In the meantime, the empirical evidence strongly favors the austere conception of FP over the opulent conception, thereby strongly supporting Southern Fundamentalism.

6. APOLOGETICS

Southern Fundamentalism is very different from existing versions of folk psychological realism and anti-realism. We suspect that for this reason the position is easily misunderstood, and so we should be careful to state clearly what it says and what it does not say. To this end, we shall conclude by briefly addressing four possible questions of the fundamentalist approach to FP.

1. Putative true-believer conditions are central topics of debate between realists and anti-realists. Does SF, with its austere conception of FP, deny outright all PTB conditions like (SA) and (LT)? If not, what exactly is SF's stance toward PTB conditions, and how does this stance mesh with SF's principle of epistemic dynamics (SF.3)?

Fundamentalism does not flatly deny theses like (SA) or (LT). Rather, it *relocates* the disputes about whether FP is absorbable into mature science, whether humans have a language of thought, or

whether other putative empirical commitments of FP are satisfied. Under SF's austere conception of FP, these disputes are not about what it takes, over and above being non-puppet RIS's, to qualify as true believers. Instead, the disputes involve *what it takes to be such a RIS in the first place*. RIS's, after all, are very sophisticated creatures with very sophisticated behavioral capacities. Maybe a non-puppet creature could have these capacities only if its inner workings are describable by a scientific account that absorbs FP; or, only if it has mental representations with compositional syntax and semantics; or, only if it is not tinfoil; etc. In general, anything required for being a non-puppet RIS is also required, *ipso facto*, for being a true believer; and the austere conception of FP is officially neutral about what it takes to be a non-puppet RIS.²⁸

On the other hand, if indeed non-puppet RISHood requires having a language of thought, and/or being describable by a scientific theory that absorbs FP, then these are *de facto* prerequisites; they are not built directly into the concept of a non-puppet RIS, or into the concept of a true believer. (An analogy: perhaps the ability to fly requires a certain minimal ratio R of body surface to body weight; but even if this is a genuine prerequisite for flying, it is a *de facto* requirement, rather than a condition dictated by the very concept of flying ability.)

As a consequence, the realism/eliminativism debate now takes on a very different dialectical structure than it has had recently. From the fundamentalist perspective, disputed empirical claims associated with FP, like (SA) and (LT), just don't threaten the fate of FP at all, because the outcome of these disputes would not significantly alter our overwhelming evidence that humans are non-puppet RIS's. If it should turn out that FP is not absorbable into mature science, or that humans don't possess a language of thought, then the proper conclusion would be not that FP is false, but rather that the given condition is not really a *de facto* prerequisite for being a non-puppet RIS — and hence is also not really a *de facto* prerequisite for being a true believer.

Consider, for instance, (LT). Under SF, this PTB condition is properly viewed as an "engineering hypothesis" about the *de facto* cognitive-level design requirements for being a non-puppet RIS, and thereby for being a true believer. It is not a requirement built into the very concept of a true believer (or into the very concept of a non-

puppet RIS). Briefly, an engineering hypothesis purports to describe the requisite functional architecture of the cognitive system, the mental representational and information processing mechanisms which allegedly must subserve its rich behavioral repertoire. *Qua* engineering hypothesis, (LT) might very well be true.²⁹ However, suppose there were to emerge strong evidence that humans do not undergo mental representations possessing both language-like syntactic structure and the semantic content of the putative FP attitudes. Such evidence certainly would not show that humans are not non-puppet RIS's, for the evidence for humans being such RIS's is beyond question. Rather, it would show that the proposed engineering hypothesis is just mistaken — and hence that the behavioral capacities that allegedly required language-like mental representations are actually subserved, in humans, by some other form of cognitive-level architecture. Indeed, the most convincing kind of case against the existence of a language of thought would incorporate (i) some alternative cognitive-level engineering proposal; (ii) a suitable theoretical elaboration of this proposal, including new explanations of those human capacities which supposedly cannot be adequately explained except by positing a language of thought; and (iii) a suitably rich body of empirical data favoring this novel proposal over the language-of-thought hypothesis.³⁰ If an alternative account with these features were to emerge, says SF, then the appropriate response would be to reject the language of thought as necessary for non-puppet RIShood and thus also as essential for being a true believer, rather than to deny that humans are non-puppet resonant intentional systems or true believers.

Or consider principle (SA). Suppose that the natural sciences, as they mature, turn out not to employ any theoretical concepts that correlate neatly with FP concepts; i.e., FP fails to be vertically absorbable into mature science. Perhaps the corpus of the physical sciences will develop in the manner envisioned by Paul Churchland, who says of FP that "Its intentional categories stand magnificently alone, without any visible prospect of reduction to that larger corpus."³¹ Under SF this would not be grounds for concluding that FP is radically false — that humans are not true believers. Rather, the appropriate conclusion would be that FP need not be vertically absorbable in order to be true; instead, the mode of inter-level "fit" between FP and physical science is

more complex than simple absorbability by means of tractable type-type identities or tractable type-type nomic correlations.

In fact, the demand for vertical absorbability is widely considered implausible anyway, either as a criterion of inter-theoretic fit between the "special sciences" and physics, or as a criterion of fit between FP and the physico-biological sciences.³² In the case of FP, at least two reasons to reject this demand have figured prominently in the recent philosophical literature: first, the contention that beliefs, desires, and other FP attitudes could in principle be physically realized in indefinitely many different ways, especially when one considers the indefinitely large range of physically possible creatures who all would be intelligent enough to qualify, under ordinary behavior-based standards, as true believers; and second, the contention that typically the content of many FP attitudes is partially determined by social or environmental facts, rather than supervening upon "what's in the head."³³ Vertical absorption is blocked in the first case because there is no way to tractably delimit in the language of physico-biology what the physico-chemical realizations of attitudes might be; whereas it is thwarted in the second because any theory which purports to absorb FP would essentially refer to social and other non-physico-biological facts or attributes and these references arguably presuppose FP. While these problems may not be insurmountable, they render suspect the demand for vertical absorption.

However, although the demand for vertical absorbability of FP is dubious on independent grounds, there is considerably more plausibility in the contention that *horizontal* absorbability is a prerequisite for FP's truth. Under SF, this contention should be viewed in the same way as principle (LT) — viz., as an engineering hypothesis about the *de facto* cognitive-level design requirements for being a non-puppet RIS, and thereby for being a true believer. If a creature is complex and sophisticated enough to be a non-puppet RIS, the claim goes, then its inner information-processing capacities must be describable by an empirical cognitive-level theory that posits natural-kind states very much like beliefs and desires, interacting with one another and with sensation and behavior in much the way FP says beliefs and desires do. This claim might very well be true, and thus (SA) might very well be true.

Suppose however that cognitive science, as it matures, turns out not to employ any theoretical concepts that are recognizably similar to FP concepts like belief, desire, intention, and the like. Perhaps it will develop in the manner envisioned by Dennett, who claims that theories in cognitive science “are or should be theories of the subpersonal level, where beliefs and desires disappear, to be replaced by representations of other sorts on other topics.”³⁴ Under SF, this would not be grounds for concluding that FP is radically false — that humans are not true believers. Rather, the appropriate conclusion would be that FP is linked to cognitive science not by horizontal (or vertical) absorbability but instead by a relation of vertical inter-level fit. The operative mode of fit presumably would be quite baroque, rather than being simple vertical absorption. Belief types and desire types typically would be “cognitively realized” by states whose description at the level of cognitive science is very complex; and a given FP state type might well be cognitively realized in numerous different ways on the different occasions of its instantiation by humans. (Cognitive science, in turn, might itself be linked to lower-level *physical* theories by a comparably baroque relation of inter-level fit, rather than by vertical absorption.)³⁵

2. A second and related question raised by SF is whether folk psychological explanations really are or can be true if SF is true and, particularly, if FP fails to be absorbed by science. Fans of absorption might argue as follows: FP must be absorbed because FP ascribes certain causal roles to beliefs, desires, and other FP attitudes; and it proffers causal explanations in terms of such states *qua* FP attitudes. In the very proffering of causal explanations FP poses as scientific explanation; thus, FP must be absorbed by science if its explanations are to be classified as true.

The best reply to this question or criticism, we think, is to deny that causal explanations must be scientific (absorbed by science) to be true. For, it is not obvious that reference to a state type must figure in science in order for tokens of that type to be causes, or in order for the type itself to figure in genuine causal explanations. *Prima facie*, it seems that less will do, something like figuring in a sufficiently broad-ranging pattern of counterfactual dependencies.³⁶ After all, there are numerous singular causal explanations involving non-scientific language — e.g., ‘Sam’s SAT scores improved because he took the SAT preparation

course', or 'The grass turned green because Tom spread fertilizer on it', or 'Mario won the race because his car corners so well'. Predicates like 'took the SAT preparation course', 'spread fertilizer upon', and 'corners well' presumably do not appear in any genuine scientific laws, and presumably would not figure in a body of mature scientific theories; but this does not show that singular causal explanations employing such predicates are somehow bogus or defective. According to SF, the same would go for the terms and concepts of FP, should FP turn out not to be scientifically absorbable. Causal/explanatory truth is one thing; absorbability into science is quite another.

We wish to stress again that SF is officially neutral about the purport of PTB principles such as (SA). These principles might state genuine cognitive-level engineering prerequisites for being an autonomous RIS, and hence for being a true believer. SF does not *deny* (SA), but instead claims this: if there were to emerge evidence against the thesis that FP is absorbable into mature science, then the appropriate response would be to reject (SA) as an essential for true believerhood, rather than to deny that humans are true believers. This counterfactual claim might well be true even if (SA) is also true.

3. Let us turn now to a question which might be pressed by realist friends in the Eastern sect. A confident Easterner might grant that FP is very likely true but argue both that (*pace* austerity) PTB conditions must be met and therefore that such conditions very likely are met. Why should such a realist consider endorsing SF with its austere conception?

We believe that a powerful consideration should incline that true friend of FP toward SF and away from Easternism. Consider the implications, for the Eastern creed, of the possibility that empirical evidence might emerge against a favored PTB condition such as, for instance, (LT). Should this happen, only two real options would be available to the nonfundamentalist. One is to concede to secularism that the failure of (LT) undermines the truth of FP, and then seek to create or discover new psychological theories which do not presuppose FP. The other is to hope that the failure of (LT) is apparent only, and that counter-defenses of (LT) may be discovered.

Now one significant consequence of the deep entrenchment of FP's attitudinal and actional concepts in our conceptual scheme is that it

decreases the perceived availability and appeal of the first option. For, to create (sic!) the new theory one must imagine (sic!) doing without FP, and engaging in such activities seems to presuppose FP. The second option, however, can be also if not equally unappealing, for the more powerful the evidence against (LT), the less reasonable the hope for effective rebuttal. By contrast, if SF is correct and FP is understood austere, then the failure by itself of favored PTB conditions would not mean that FP is false; *a fortiori* there would be no need to cling to hope of effective rebuttal, should the empirical evidence mount against (LT), (SA), or some other PTB condition.

4. Finally, consider a fourth query. One alternative to realism and to anti-realism about FP is to treat FP as pragmatically inescapable (at least by current lights) without actually believing that it is literally true. Let's call this *folk psychological quasi-realism*. According to quasi-realism, FP may be culturally entrenched, but we are not warranted in endorsing it. Dennett's "instrumentalism" may be interpreted as a version of quasi-realism.³⁷ The question is, then, why prefer realism to quasi-realism?

If FP presupposed PTB conditions, and these were unsatisfied, then there would be strong temptation to endorse quasi-realism. Quasi-realism would offer means of recognizing the simultaneous warrant failure and cultural inescapability of FP. But this just re-raises the same question we have raised throughout this paper: why wed FP to PTB conditions? FP is austere, not opulent. Thus, the negative fate of PTB conditions should not threaten the overall warrant for FP. Fundamentalism maintains that RISHood is ample evidence of true belief; and since there is plenty of evidence that humans are RIS's, there is ample evidence that humans are true believers. That is, there is strong warrant for folk psychological realism.

By contrast, what warrant exists for quasi-realism? Very little, as far as we can see. The most important reasons offered by Dennett, for example, are those concerning the rationality of true believers. Dennett envisages FP presupposing idealized rational agents. This allegedly has the consequence that FP is a not falsifiable theory and cannot be empirically assessed. However, Dennett saddles the advocate of realism with a contentious PTB condition, viz., the idealized rationality of true believers. Although true believerhood probably does require at least a

modicum of rational coherence among a person's beliefs, desires, and actions, the demand for idealized rationality seems entirely excessive. (It's like requiring complete sinlessness as a condition for being Born Again.) The extent of rationality in a true believer evidently can be far from ideal, and hypotheses about this matter are certainly falsifiable.

Quasi-realists are like unitarians: they wish to be realists/theists but anti-realists/skeptics too. They cherish the practices of believers without cherishing belief. Our response to quasi-realism reduces to: Be ye not lukewarm in commitment to Belief. Folk Psychology is the faith of our fathers, living still, in spite of phlogiston, Churchland, and Stich.

NOTES

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¹ Jerry Fodor, *The Language of Thought* (Scranton, PA: Crowell, 1975); "Propositional Attitudes," *The Monist*, 61 (1978), pp. 501–523; *Psychosemantics* (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1987); William Lycan, "Toward a Homuncular Theory of Believing," *Cognition and Brain Theory*, 4 (1981), pp. 139–59; Paul Churchland, "Eliminative Materialism and Propositional Attitudes," *Journal of Philosophy*, 78 (1981), pp. 67–90; *Matter and Consciousness* (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1984); "Folk Psychology and the Explanation of Behavior," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, supp. vol. 62 (1988), pp. 209–21; Patricia Churchland, *Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Theory of Mind/Brain* (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1981); Stephen Stich, *From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science* (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1983).

² A partial list of friends includes Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit, "In Defense of Folk Psychology" (forthcoming); Christopher Maloney, *The Mundane Matter of the Mental Language* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Classical foes include W. V. Quine (e.g. "Mental Entities," in *The Ways of Paradox* [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976]) and B. F. Skinner (e.g. *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* [New York: Knopf, 1971]). In the interest of avoiding national and geographic chauvinism, and of accommodating philosophers' shifts to institutions in new locales, our geographic metaphors should hereafter be understood as referring to certain philosophical positions in logical space, irrespective of the geographic locations of the various philosophers who espouse these different positions.

³ We are not the first to use geographic metaphors for recent philosophy of mind; see Daniel Dennett, "The Logical Geography of Computational Approaches," in R. Harnish and M. Brand, eds., *The Representation of Knowledge and Belief* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1986).

⁴ "True Believers," in *The Intentional Stance* (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1987).

⁵ George Graham and Terence Horgan, "How to be Realistic About Folk Psychology," *Philosophical Psychology*, 1 (1988), pp. 69–81.

⁶ Fodor puts it this way: "Holding onto the attitudes — vindicating common sense psychology — means showing how you could have . . . a respectable science whose ontology explicitly acknowledges states that exhibit the sort of properties that common sense attributes to the attitudes" (*Psychosemantics*, p. 10). It is not clear why Fodor mentions in this passage that vindicating FP means demonstrating the *mere possibility* of scientific absorption. But in any case, he also adds this: "[T]here is already in the field a (more or less) empirical theory that is, in my view, reasonably construed as ontologically committed to the attitudes and that — again, in my view, is quite probably approximately true. If I'm right about this theory, it is a vindication of the attitudes . . . [D]efending the commonsense assumptions about the attitudes and defending the theory turn out to be much the same enterprise" (*ibid.*, p. 16).

⁷ David Lewis, "Radical Interpretation," *Synthese*, 23 (1974), pp. 331–344; Terence Horgan and James Woodward, "Folk Psychology is Here to Stay," *Philosophical Review*, 94 (1985), pp. 197–226.

⁸ Robert Gordon, "Folk Psychology as Simulation," *Mind and Language*, 1 (1986), pp. 158–171; Alvin Goldman, "Interpretation Psychologized," *Mind and Language* (1989), pp. 161–185. For a systematic defense of the folk theory assumption, see John Preston, "Folk Psychology as Theory or Practice?," *Inquiry*, 32 (1989), pp. 277–303.

⁹ Tractably describable lower-level state types are either natural-kind properties of the lower-level theory, or anyway properties that are fairly crisply and cleanly describable in lower-level terminology. An example of a property of the latter kind is *mean molecular kinetic energy*, the lower-level correlate of *temperature* in the reduction of classical thermodynamics to statistical molecular mechanics.

¹⁰ In general, in broaching the possibility of *liberal* absorption, we mean to recognize that conceptions of absorption as well as related conceptions of scientific explanation, law, confirmation, and scientific unity do not remain at rest but change, and that certain plausible changes in this family of concepts might be compatible with claiming that FP is absorbed by mature science. In contrast, many of the standard eliminativist arguments presuppose narrow and stringent concepts from this family.

¹¹ These conditions have been discussed in a variety of places, such as Daniel Dennett, "Making Sense of Ourselves" and "Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology" in *The Intentional Stance*; Christopher Cherniak, *Minimal Rationality* (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1986); Stephen Stich, "Do Animals Have Beliefs?," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 57 (1979), pp. 15–28; Searle, *Minds, Brains, and Science* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1986); William Lycan, *Consciousness* (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1987).

¹² One does well to remember that the phrase 'folk psychology' was introduced by eliminativists into the literature to derogate the attitudes (compare with 'folk physics', 'folk biology', etc.). To make elimination seem plausible secularists try to identify relevant similarities between folk psychology and other folk theories which have been replaced by mature science. Two points are worth making here about this argument for guilt by association. The first is that folksy psychology might deserve derogation. But, on our view, FP definitely does not. The second is that the fact that other folk theories have proven mistaken does not establish that FP should also be replaced, unless FP and those other theories are relevantly similar. But, on our view, they are not. See also Barbara Hannan, "Non-scientific realism' as a Response to Eliminativist Arguments," *Behaviorism* (forthcoming).

¹³ We do not address the issue of how to distinguish folk from folksy psychology here, since the issue raises concern about how attitudes interact, the holism of FP, and the contextual sensitivity of FP attribution. Debate over PTB conditions is likely also implicated. Suffice it to say, our guess is that various approaches to these complex topics are consistent with the argument of this paper.

¹⁴ See e.g. Lynne Rudder Baker, *Saving Belief* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).

¹⁵ See e.g. "Intentional Systems," in *Brainstorms* (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1978); "Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology," in *The Intentional Stance*.

¹⁶ By the qualification 'approximately' we mean only that statements that figure in genuine explanations might only be literally true under idealized circumstances (e.g. the absence of friction).

¹⁷ Even instrumentalists — hybrids in a sense (unitarians?), half realists, half anti-realists — suppose RIS's exist. See Daniel Dennett, "Reflections: Real Patterns, Deeper Facts, and Empty Questions" in *The Intentional Stance*. See also our discussion of quasi-realism at the end of the present paper.

¹⁸ See Christopher Peacocke, *Sense and Content* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 205—6; Ned Block, "Psychologism and Behaviorism," *Philosophical Review* 95 (1986), pp. 5—40.

¹⁹ Fundamentalism is neutral, however, about what it takes to be a non-puppet RIS. Perhaps it isn't possible to be a non-puppet RIS except by having a language of thought, or by being describable by a psychological theory that is absorbable into science. But humans are certainly non-puppet RIS's; so whatever the prerequisites are for being one, humans satisfy them. More on this point in section 6.

²⁰ In casting about for a position about the austerity of FP's concepts comparable to our own, we find that Jackson and Pettit's (op. cit.) commonsense functionalist conception of FP's semantics perhaps is closest; and, they point out that analytic behaviorism is also the limit-case of the commonsense functionalist conception. Whatever its other merits (or demerits), functionalizing FP terms and concepts, in the manner Jackson and Pettit suggest, helps to keep them close to ordinary, behavior-based evidential standards for their application.

²¹ Paul Churchland writes, "FP suffers explanatory failures on an epic scale, . . . it has been stagnant for at least twenty-five centuries, and . . . its categories appear (so far) to be incommensurable with or orthogonal to the categories of the background physical science whose long-term claim to explain human behavior seems undeniable." (1981, p. 76) For replies to these putative objections to FP, see Horgan and Woodward (op. cit.); Baker (op. cit.), chapter 7; and Colin McGinn, *Mental Content* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989) chapter 2.

²² We emphasize that we are speaking here about a kind of confidence and interpersonal agreement that reflects speakers' *linguistic intuitions*, and therefore probably stems directly from people's conceptual/semantic competence with attitudinal and actional concepts and terms. We are not arguing that if a belief is commonplace, then this fact constitutes good grounds for thinking the belief is true.

²³ Even if actions themselves, as ordinarily conceived, are a species of bodily motions, people construe them as fundamentally different in kind from non-actional bodily motions.

²⁴ See e.g. Donald Davidson, "Actions, Reasons, and Causes," *Journal of Philosophy* 60 (1963), pp. 685—700; Alvin Goldman, *A Theory of Human Action* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970); Myles Brand, *Intending and Acting* (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1984).

²⁵ Some secularists doubt whether successor notions can be developed. Stephen Stich, for example, says that it is difficult to see how the notion of sincere assertion "could be unpacked without invoking the idea of an utterance caused by . . . belief" (*From Folk Psychology*, p. 79; emph. his). Others, the Churchlands, seem to hope for secularized succession for at least some folk notions and roles, though, as William Bechtel writes, "they cannot now offer detailed examples of what such discourse will look like" (*Philosophy of Science: An Overview for Cognitive Science* [Hillsdale, New Jersey: Earlbaum, 1988], p. 89).

²⁶ The inconceivability phenomena just canvassed reveal a "pragmatic paradox" in the suggestion that there are no actions. Various philosophers have invoked pragmatic

paradoxes in arguing against eliminativism. See e.g. Peter Geach, *The Virtues* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 49; Richard Swinburne, "Review of *Scientific Realism and Plasticity of Mind*", *Philosophy*, 55 (1980), pp. 273–75; Terence Horgan, "Cognition is Real," *Behaviorism*, 15 (1987), pp. 13–25; Graham and Horgan (op. cit.); and especially Baker (op. cit.).

²⁷ Not every realist who uses pragmatic paradox arguments to defend FP regards them as *a priori* or transcendental refutations of eliminativism. We employed such arguments in the paper cited in Note # 5, for example, where we viewed them as burden of proof arguments, which approach is perfectly consistent with admitting the epistemic possibility that FP is false.

²⁸ This is an important clarification or modification in our position in the paper cited in Note # 5. Although our discussion in that paper is consistent with neutrality about the prerequisites for being a true believer, the earlier paper also can be read as denying outright that scientific absorbability is a prerequisite for the truth of FP. Some critics of eliminativism do deny explicitly that the truth of FP requires a language of thought; see Andy Clark, "Thoughts, Sentences, and Cognitive Science," *Philosophical Psychology* 1 (1988), pp. 263–278.

²⁹ Many Eastern arguments for the language of thought lend support to (LT) as thus construed. So does the argument for language-like mental representations propounded by Terence Horgan and John Tienson, "Setting into a New Paradigm," *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 24, Spindel Conference Supplement (1988), p. 97–113; "Representations without Rules," *Philosophical Topics* 17 (1989), pp. 147–174; and *Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology* (Cambridge, MA: MIT, forthcoming).

³⁰ Colin McGinn argues that the language of thought hypothesis is best viewed as pertaining to cognitive-level engineering, op. cit., Chapter 3. He defends the alternative proposal that human mental representations are map-like, rather than language-like.

³¹ Churchland, "Eliminative Materialism and Propositional Attitudes" (op. cit.), p. 75.

³² See e.g. Jerry Fodor, "Special Sciences (Or: Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis)," *Synthese*, 28 (1974), pp. 97–115. Although Fodor ardently defends the *horizontal* absorbability of FP into mature science, he explicitly repudiates the demand that the special sciences (or FP) should be vertically absorbable by lower-level theories.

³³ See Tyler Burge, "Individualism and the Mental," in P. French, T. Euhling, and H. Wettstein, eds., *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, 4 (Minneapolis: Minnesota); "Individualism and Psychology," *Philosophical Review*, 95 (1986), pp. 3–45.

³⁴ Dennett, *Brainstorms* (op. cit.), p. 105.

³⁵ See L. Darden and N. Maull, "Interfield Theories," *Philosophy of Science*, 43 (1977), pp. 44–64; for discussion see Bechtel (op. cit.), pp. 94–118. See also Terence Horgan, "Nonreductive Materialism and the Explanatory Autonomy of Psychology" (forthcoming).

³⁶ For a general approach to the causal/explanatory relevance of FP state-types that is compatible with the non-absorbability of FP into science, see Terence Horgan, "Mental Quasation," in J. Tomberlin, ed., *Philosophical Perspectives*, Vol. 4 (forthcoming); and "Actions, Reasons, and the Explanatory Role of Content," in B. McLaughlin, ed., *The Philosophy of Fred Dretske* (Basil Blackwell, forthcoming).

³⁷ Dennett, "Intentional Systems" (op. cit.), and "Instrumentalism Reconsidered," in *The Intentional Stance*. In the latter paper he quotes approvingly the following remarks of Michael Friedman (from Friedman's "Theoretical Explanation," in R. Healy, ed., *Reduction, Time, and Reality* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981], p. 4):

Scientists themselves distinguish between aspects of theoretical structure that are intended to be taken literally and aspects that serve a purely representational function. No one believes, for example, that the so-called "state spaces" of mechanics — phase

space in classical mechanics and Hilbert space in quantum mechanics — are part of the furniture of the physical world.

Shortly after quoting this passage, Dennett writes:

My *ism* is whatever *ism* serious realists adopt with regard to centers of gravity and the like [e.g., state spaces], since I think beliefs (and other mental items drawn from folk psychology) are *like that* — in being *abstracta* rather than part of the “furniture of the physical world” and in being attributed in statements that are *true* only if we exempt them from a certain familiar standard of literality. (p. 72)

This position stands to Southern Fundamentalism roughly as Rudolph Bultmann’s “demythologized” interpretation of biblical scripture (cf. his *Kerygma and Myth* [New York: Harper and Row, 1961]) stands to *religious* fundamentalism. We Southern Fundamentalists hold that attitudinal attributions are often true even when interpreted according to “a certain familiar standard of literality”; Dennett denies this.

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