

Three Themes

- Metaphysics:
 - The nature of events
 - The relation between events and time
- Methodology
 - How to construct appropriate causal models
- Metametaphysics
 - Problems of the first kind can be fruitfully recast as problems of the second kind


Events and Times: A Case Study in Means-ends Metaphysics

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A Historical Tradition

- Recasting metaphysical problems as problems about the utility of certain concepts for achieving certain epistemological goals


Immanuel Kant



- Metaphysics is not distinguished by its peculiar subject matter
- Metaphysics concerns the necessary pre-conditions for empirical knowledge
- Justified by the ‘Transcendental Deduction’




Rudolf Carnap



- Project of ‘explication’
- Contrasted with analysis in the ordinary language tradition
- Replace an ordinary concept with a new one
- Captures some features of the original
- More precise
- Better suited to some type of inquiry




Rudolf Carnap



- Inquiry is always carried out within a linguistic framework
- Two kinds of questions: internal and external
- Internal questions are answered using the rules of the linguistic framework
- Answers to such questions are analytic
- External questions concern which linguistic framework to use
- Answered on broadly pragmatic grounds



Karl Popper



- Replace Metaphysical Theses with Methodological Rules
- These Rules have the status of conventions, defining a form of inquiry
- Justify the rules by demonstrating that the resulting form of inquiry has various desirable features



Means-Ends Epistemology

- Apt phrase coined by Oliver Schulte (1999) to describe a certain approach to epistemology
- Consider epistemological goals
- Demonstrate that certain methods will achieve those goals





Hans Reichenbach



- End: Converge to the limiting relative frequency in a sequence of trials (if it exists)
- Means: Straight rule of induction
(If there have been m successes in n trials, posit m/n)



Means-Ends Metaphysics

- Replace metaphysical questions with methodological ones
- Justify answers in means-end fashion
- Define goals; show that methodological rules will meet those goals

+ Metaphysical Questions

Events and Times

- Is the time at which an event occurs an *essential* property of the event?
- If this talk had taken place March 22, would it have been the same talk?
- Does an event that hastens or delays another event count as a *cause* of that event?
- Is the time of an event's occurrence different from other properties of an event – e.g. whether I talk loudly or softly?
- It is hard to gain traction on these issues by conventional means – i.e., consulting intuitions

+ Framework

Causal Models

- An updated version of Carnap's external question – which linguistic framework should we adopt:
- How should we *model* various phenomena of interest
- I will work within a causal modeling framework that has been successful at facilitating causal inference
- But also natural for representing simple causal systems

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Causal Models

An Illustration

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


A Simple Causal System

My gas grill

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Causal Models




Steak cooked
= Lights \times Steak on

Lights = Gas \times Igniter

■ The model yields a unique solution for every setting of the exogenous variables


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Causal Models




- We could also use more fine-grained variables
- Gas could be off (0), low (1), medium (2), high(3)
- Steak could be raw (0), rare (1), medium (2), well-done (3)

+ Interventions & Counterfactuals



Steak cooked
= Lights X Steak on
~~Lights = Gas X Ignitor~~
Lights = no

+ Interventions & Counterfactuals



- Hypothetical changes only propagate forward through the model
- No ‘backtracking’

+ Metaphysics to Methodology

- We can now recast our metaphysical questions about events and times as methodological questions
- How should we model events that can occur at different times?
- What kinds of variables should we use?

+ Means-Ends Metaphysics

End:

- Consistently and accurately represent the results of possible interventions

+ Illustration

Based loosely on an example from Jonathan Bennett

- The ‘careless camper’ (CC) is planning a camping trip in early May
- He will go camping unless there is a forest fire in April
- If he goes camping, he will leave a fire unattended
- If the forest has not already been burned, the unattended fire will cause a forest fire in May
- In fact, there is forest fire in April and he does not go camping

+ Illustration

- How should we model the forest fire?
- What kind of variable(s) should we use?
- Three options

+ Illustration

- How should we model this scenario?

- Variables:

CCC – CC goes camping in early May (0 or 1)

UF – unattended fire in early May (0 or 1)

- Equation:

$$UF = CCC$$

There will be an unattended fire just in case CC goes camping

+ Option 1

- One variable, FF

FF = 1 if there is a forest fire

FF = 0 if there is not

+ Option 1

- Since CC will go camping just in case there is no fire (in April), we need an equation like:

$$CCC = 1 - FF$$

- Since there will be a forest fire (in May) just in case there is an unattended fire, we need an equation like:

$$FF = UF$$

- Putting this together with our other equations...

+ Option 1


$$CCC = 1 - FF$$

$$UF = CCC$$

$$FF = UF$$

- Cycle


- No consistent solution to these equations



+ Option 1

Diagnosis:

- This representation does not allow us to distinguish between a fire in April and a fire in May
- The former prevents CC from camping, the latter is caused by CC camping



+ Option 2

- One variable, FF_t

$FF_t = 1$ if there is a forest fire in April

$FF_t = 2$ if there is a forest fire in May

$FF_t = 0$ if there is no forest fire

- This is more promising, since it allows us to distinguish between a fire in April and a fire in May

+ Option 2

- CC will go camping unless there is a forest fire in April, so:

$$CCC = 0 \text{ if } FFt = 1$$

$$CCC = 1 \text{ if } FFt = 0 \text{ or } 2$$

+ Option 2

- What is the right equation for FFt?
- Recall that there was in fact a fire in April
- Suppose $FFt = f(CCC, UF)$, where f is a non-trivial function of at least one argument
- Then, the equation says that intervening on whether CC camps in *May*, and/or on whether there is an unattended fire in *May*, could affect whether there is a forest fire in *April*
- This is clearly wrong

+ Option 2

- Since the forest fire would have occurred in April regardless of whether CC camps, or there is an unattended fire in May
- The equation must just be:

$$FFt = 1$$


+ Option 2

$$FFt = 1$$

$$CCC = 0 \text{ if } FFt = 1$$

$$= 1 \text{ if } FFt = 0, 2$$

$$UF = CCC$$



+ Option 2

$$FFt = 1$$

$$CCC = 0 \text{ if } FFt = 1$$

$$= 1 \text{ if } FFt = 0, 2$$

$$UF = CCC$$

- These equations have consistent solutions:

- $FFt = 1, CCC = 0,$
 $UF = 0$

+ Option 2

$$FFt = 1$$

$$CCC = 0 \text{ if } FFt = 1$$

$$= 1 \text{ if } FFt = 0, 2$$

$$UF = CCC$$

- But they do not correctly tell us what will happen if we intervene to prevent a fire in April

+ Option 2

$$FFt = 1$$

$$CCC = 0 \text{ if } FFt = 1$$

$$= 1 \text{ if } FFt = 0, 2$$

$$UF = CCC$$

- They tell CC would go camping
- And leave an unattended fire
- But then they stop

+ Option 2

$$FFt = 1$$

$$CCC = 0 \text{ if } FFt = 1$$

$$= 1 \text{ if } FFt = 0, 2$$

$$UF = CCC$$

- They do not tell us that the unattended fire will cause a forest fire in May
- Or that if there is no fire in April, we can influence whether there is a fire in May by intervening on CCC or UF

+ Option 3

- Two variables: FFa and FFm

FFa = 1 if there is a forest fire in April

= 0 if there is not

FFm = 1 if there is a forest fire in May

= 0 if there is not


+ Option 3

$$CCC = 1 - FFa$$

$$UF = CCC$$

$$FFm = UF \times (1 - FFa)$$

- No cycles
- Consistent solutions
- Captures intervention relations



Moral

The right way to model this scenario
is with two separate variables
corresponding to the two separate
times

+ Generalization

- There is a general principle at work here
- Fire in April and fire in May stand in causal relations: a fire in April *prevents* a fire in May
- We can only capture this if we represent these as values of different variables

Generalization

- In general, events that potentially stand in causal relations must be represented as values of *different* variables
- Distinct values of the *same* variable represent events that are incompatible on *logical or conceptual* grounds
- This is general methodological rule for constructing causal models
- It can be justified by the goal of accurately representing results of interventions

Why Time is Special

- ‘Alterations’ of an event that differ with respect to their time of occurrence are different from ‘alterations’ that differ along other dimensions
 - E.g. the gas on my grill being set to low, medium, or high
- Alterations that occur at different times have the potential to stand in *causal* relations