


Announcements & Such

- Administrative Stuff
 - HW #6 to be handed back today. Resubs due Thursday.
 - I will be posting both the sample in-class final and the take-home final on Thursday. [I'll discuss them Thursday.]
 - I'll have office hours on Thursday from 2-4. [Not today.]
 - Review session: Monday, May 10 @ 4-6pm @ Wheeler 213.
 - GSI Office Hours: Tamar (W: 10-12 & next W: 10-12), Julia (W: 2-4 & Tu: 3-5), David (F: tba)
 - In-class final: Thurs. May 13 @ 3-6pm *here* (A1 Hearst Annex).
 - I've posted my solutions to HW #4 (I'll post others before final).
 - I've posted a handout with *all* natural deduction rules (for final).
- Today: Beyond Chapter 6 — “L2PL” — Binary Relations



Beyond LMPL: 2-Place Predicates (*a.k.a.*, Relations) II

- From the point of view of logic (as opposed to mathematics) what matters is *capturing validities*. And, LMPL captures more than LSL.
- But, LMPL also has its own *logical* limitations. The problem: we can't capture some of the intuitively valid arguments involving *relations*.
- Consider the following argument, which involves a 2-place predicate:
 - (1) Brutus killed Caesar.
 - (2) \therefore Brutus killed someone and someone killed Caesar.
- If we were to symbolize this argument using monadic predicates, we would end-up with something like the following LMPL reconstruction:
 - (1') Kb .
 - (2') $\therefore (\exists x)Bx \ \& \ (\exists y)Ky$.

Where Kx : x killed Caesar, Bx : Brutus killed x , and b : Brutus.

- This argument is *not* valid in LMPL. But, the English argument *is* valid!

- The problem here is that “ x killed y ” is a *2-place* predicate (or *relation*).
- If we expand our language to include predicates that can take 2 arguments, then we can capture statements and arguments like these.
- In chapter 7, a more general language is introduced that allows n -place predicates, for any finite n . We will only discuss 2-place predicates.
- For instance, we can introduce the 2-place predicate Kxy : x killed y . With this relation in hand, we can express the above argument as:

(1*) Kbc .

(2*) $\therefore (\exists x)Kbx \ \& \ (\exists y)Kyc$.

- In 2-place predicate logic (“L2PL”), this argument *is* valid. So, this is a more accurate and faithful formalization of the English argument.
- We will (in chapter 8) discuss the semantics for 2-place predicate logic (L2PL). The natural deduction system for L2PL is *the same as* LMPL’s!
- Before that, we will look at various complexities of L2PL *symbolization*.

Some Sample L2PL Symbolization Problems

1. Someone loves someone. [Lxy : x loves y]
 - First, work on the the quantifier with widest scope, then *work in*.
 - There exists an x such that x loves someone.
 - (i) $(\exists x)$ x loves someone.
 - Now, work on expression within the scope of the quantifier in (i).
 - (ii) x loves someone
 - there exists a y such that Lxy
 - $(\exists y)Lxy$
 - Plugging the symbolization of (ii) into (i) yields the **final product**:

$$(\exists x)(\exists y)Lxy$$

2. Everyone loves everyone.

- For all x , x loves everyone.
- $(\forall x) x$ loves everyone.
- x loves everyone $\mapsto (\forall y) Lxy$
- $(\forall x)(\forall y) Lxy$

3. Everyone loves someone.

- For all x , x loves someone.
- $(\forall x) x$ loves someone.
- x loves someone $\mapsto (\exists y) Lxy$
- $(\forall x)(\exists y) Lxy$

4. Someone loves everyone.

- There exists an x such that x loves everyone.
- $(\exists x) x$ loves everyone.
- x loves everyone $\mapsto (\forall y) Lxy$
- $(\exists x)(\forall y) Lxy$

Four Important Properties of Binary Relations

- **Reflexivity.** A binary relation R is said to be *reflexive* iff $(\forall x)Rxx$.
- **Symmetry.** R is *symmetric* iff $(\forall x)(\forall y)(Rxy \rightarrow Ryx)$.
- **Transitivity.** R is *transitive* iff $(\forall x)(\forall y)(\forall z)[(Rxy \ \& \ Ryz) \rightarrow Rxz]$.
- If R has *all three* of these properties, then R is an *equivalence relation*.
- **Fact.** If R is Euclidean and reflexive, then R is an equivalence relation.


Relation	Reflexive?	Symmetric?	Transitive?	Euclidean?
$x > y$	No	No	Yes	No
$x \models y$	Yes	No	Yes	No
x is a sibling of y	No	Yes	No	No
$x \approx y$	Yes	Yes	No	No
x respects y	No	No	No	No
$x = y$	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

L2PL Interpretations I

- Here's an example L2PL interpretation. Oxy : x was older than y , \mathcal{D} : The Three Stooges, $\text{Ref}(a) = \text{Curly}$, $\text{Ref}(b) = \text{Larry}$, and $\text{Ref}(c) = \text{Moe}$.
- The matrix representation of $\text{Ext}(O)$ for this interpretation is:

O	α	β	γ
α	—	+	+
β	—	—	+
γ	—	—	—


- The pictorial or diagrammatic representation of $\text{Ext}(O)$ is:



L2PL Interpretations III

(\mathcal{I}_1) Let \mathcal{D} be the set consisting of George W. Bush (α) and Jeb Bush (β). And, let Bxy : x is a brother of y . Determine \mathcal{I}_1 -truth-values for:

1. $(\forall x)(\exists y)Bxy$
2. $(\exists y)(\forall x)Bxy$



- (1) is \top on \mathcal{I}_1 , since *both* of its \mathcal{D} -instances are \top on \mathcal{I}_1 .
 - * ‘ $(\exists y)Bay$ ’ is \top on \mathcal{I}_1 because its instance ‘ Bab ’ is \top on \mathcal{I}_1 .
 - That is, $\langle \alpha, \beta \rangle \in \text{Ext}(B)$. Note: $\text{Ext}(B) = \{\langle \alpha, \beta \rangle, \langle \beta, \alpha \rangle\}$.
 - * ‘ $(\exists y)Bby$ ’ is \top on \mathcal{I}_1 because its instance ‘ Bba ’ is \top on \mathcal{I}_1 .
- (2) is \perp on \mathcal{I}_1 , since *both* of its \mathcal{D} -instances are \perp on \mathcal{I}_1 .
 - * ‘ $(\forall x)Bxa$ ’ is \perp on \mathcal{I}_1 because its instance ‘ Baa ’ is \perp on \mathcal{I}_1 .
 - That is, $\langle \alpha, \alpha \rangle \notin \text{Ext}(B)$.
 - * ‘ $(\forall x)Bxb$ ’ is \perp on \mathcal{I}_1 because its instance ‘ Bbb ’ is \perp on \mathcal{I}_1 .

L2PL Interpretations IV

- Just as with LMPL, L2PL interpretations can be used as counterexamples to validity claims. Establishing \neq claims works just as you'd expect.
- We have just seen an L2PL interpretation that shows the following:

$$(\forall x)(\exists y)Rxy \neq (\exists x)(\forall y)Rxy$$

- Interpretation \mathcal{I}_1 on the previous slide is a counterexample. Why?
 - $(\forall x)(\exists y)Bxy$ is \top on \mathcal{I}_1 , since both of its instances are \top on \mathcal{I}_1 .
 - $(\exists x)(\forall y)Rxy$ is \perp on \mathcal{I}_1 , since both of its instances are \perp on \mathcal{I}_1 .
- Here is a *very important* L2PL invalidity:

$$(\dagger) \quad (\forall x)(\exists y)Rxy, (\forall x)(\forall y)(\forall z)[(Rxy \ \& \ Ryz) \rightarrow Rxz] \neq (\exists x)Rxx$$

- (\dagger) reveals a surprising difference between LMPL (and LSL) and L2PL — **sometimes *infinite* interpretations are needed to prove \neq in L2PL!**

Why (\dagger) is So Important — L2PL vs LMPL: Infinite Domains


- In LMPL, if p is true on any interpretation \mathcal{I} , then it is true on a *finite* interpretation. Indeed, p will be true on an interpretation of size no greater than 2^k , where k is the # of monadic predicate letters in p .
- In L2PL, some statements are true *only* on *infinite* interpretations. It is for this reason that there is no general decision procedure for validity (or logical truth) in L2PL. (\dagger) on the last slide is a good example of this.
 $(\dagger) \quad (\forall x)(\exists y)Rxy, (\forall x)(\forall y)(\forall z)[(Rxy \ \& \ Ryz) \rightarrow Rxz] \not\models (\exists x)Rxx$
- **Fact.** *Only infinite interpretations \mathcal{I} can be counterexamples to the validity in (\dagger) .* To see why, try to *construct* such an interpretation.
- We start by showing that no interpretation \mathcal{I}_1 with a 1-element domain can be an interpretation on which the premises of (\dagger) are \top and its conclusion is \perp . Then, we will repeat this argument for \mathcal{I}_2 and \mathcal{I}_3 .
- This reasoning can, in fact, be shown correct for *all* (finite) n . So, only \mathcal{I} 's with infinite domains will work [*e.g.*, $\mathcal{D} = \mathbb{N}$, $Rxy: x < y$].
- Begin with a 1-element domain $\{\alpha\}$. For the conclusion of (4) to be \perp , no

object can be related to itself: $(\forall x) \sim Rxx$. Thus, we must have $\sim Raa$:



α


- But, to make the first premise \top , we need there to be *some* y such that Ray is \top . That means we need *another object* β to allow Rab . Thus:



α

β


- Now, because we need the conclusion to remain \perp , we must have $\sim Rbb$. And, because we need the first premise to remain \top , we need there to be *some* y such that Rby is \top . We could *try* to make Rba \top , as follows:




α

β

- But, this picture is not consistent with the second premise being \top and (at the same time) the conclusion being \perp . If R is transitive, then $Rab \& Rba$ (as pictured) entails Raa , which makes the conclusion \top .




- Thus, the only way to consistently ensure that there is some y such that Rby is to introduce *yet another object* y (such that Rbc), which yields:



- Again, in order to make the conclusion \perp , we must have $\sim Rcc$, and in order to make the first premise \top , there must be some y such that Rcy .
- We could *try* to make either Rca or Rcb true. But, both of these choices will end-up with the same sort of inconsistency we just saw with β .

- In other words, *no finite interpretation* will give us what we want here.
- However, if we let $\mathcal{D} = \mathbb{N}$ and $Rxy: x < y$, then we get what we want.



- That is, the relation $Rxy: x < y$ on the natural numbers \mathbb{N} is such that:
 - For all x , there exists a y such that $x < y$. [seriality]
 - For all x, y, z , if $x < y$ and $y < z$, then $x < z$. [transitivity]
 - For all x , $x \not< x$. [irreflexivity]
- It is crucial that the set \mathbb{N} of *all* natural numbers is *infinite*. The relation $<$ cannot satisfy all three of these properties on *any finite* domain.
- *I.e.*, no finite subset of \mathbb{N} will suffice to show that the invalidity in (4) holds. Equivalently, the following sentence of L2PL is \perp on *all finite* \mathcal{I} 's:

$$p \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\forall x)(\exists y)Rxy \ \& \ (\forall x)(\forall y)(\forall z)[(Rxy \ \& \ Ryz) \rightarrow Rxz] \ \& \ (\forall x)\sim Rxx$$
- This sort of thing *cannot happen* in LMPL. In this sense, the introduction of a single 2-place predicate involves a *quantum leap* in complexity.

Some Further Remarks on Validity in L2PL

- As I just explained, there is no general decision procedure for \models claims in L2PL. This is because we can't always establish \models claims in finite time.
- However, there is a method for proving \models claims — *natural deduction*. And, L2PL's natural deduction system *is exactly the same as LMPL's!*
- Before we get to proofs, however, I want to look at the alternating quantifier example that I said separates LMPL and L2PL.
- As we have seen, $(\forall x)(\exists y)Rxy \not\models (\exists y)(\forall x)Rxy$. But, the converse entailment *does* hold. That is, $(\exists y)(\forall x)Rxy \models (\forall x)(\exists y)Rxy$.
- We will *prove* — *i.e., deduce* — $(\exists y)(\forall x)Rxy \vdash (\forall x)(\exists y)Rxy$ shortly.
- Before we do that, let's think about $(\exists y)(\forall x)Rxy \models (\forall x)(\exists y)Rxy$ using our definitions, and our informal method of thinking of \forall as & and \exists as \vee . This is interesting for both directions of the entailment.
- But, we need to be much more careful here than with LMPL!

- First, consider what $(\exists y)(\forall x)Rxy$ says on a domain of size n :

$$(\exists y)(\forall x)Rxy \approx_n (\forall x)Rxa \vee (\forall x)Rxb \vee \dots \vee (\forall x)Rxn$$

$$\approx_n (Raa \& \dots \& Rna) \vee (Rab \& \dots \& Rnb) \vee \dots \vee (Ran \& \dots \& Rnn)$$
- Next, consider what $(\forall x)(\exists y)Rxy$ says on a domain of size n :

$$(\forall x)(\exists y)Rxy \approx_n (\exists y)Ray \& (\exists y)Rby \& \dots \& (\exists y)Rny$$

$$\approx_n (Raa \vee \dots \vee Ran) \& (Rba \vee \dots \vee Rbn) \& \dots \& (Rna \vee \dots \vee Rnn)$$
- Then, we notice that these two sentential forms are intimately related. Specifically, we note that $(\exists y)(\forall x)Rxy$ has the following n -form:

$$\mathcal{X}_n = (p_1 \& p_2 \& \dots \& p_n) \vee (q_1 \& q_2 \& \dots \& q_n) \vee \dots \vee (r_1 \& r_2 \& \dots \& r_n)$$
- And, we notice that $(\forall x)(\exists y)Rxy$ has the following n -form:

$$\mathcal{Y}_n = (p_1 \vee q_1 \vee \dots \vee r_1) \& (p_2 \vee q_2 \vee \dots \vee r_2) \& \dots \& (p_n \vee q_n \vee \dots \vee r_n)$$
- **Fact.** $\mathcal{X}_n \models \mathcal{Y}_n$, for any n . Each disjunct of \mathcal{X}_n entails every conjunct of \mathcal{Y}_n . **Caution!** This *doesn't* show that $(\exists y)(\forall x)Rxy \models (\forall x)(\exists y)Rxy$!
- **Fact.** $\mathcal{Y}_n \not\models \mathcal{X}_n$, for all $n > 1$. This can be shown (next slide) using only LSL reasoning. This *does* show that $(\forall x)(\exists y)Rxy \not\models (\exists y)(\forall x)Rxy$.
- The moral is that our “informal” semantical approach to the quantifiers works for LMPL, since no infinite domains are required for $\not\models$ in LMPL.

- However, our “informal” semantical approach breaks down for L2PL, since we sometimes need an infinite domain to establish \neq in L2PL.
- In L2PL, if the “informal” method above reveals $p_n \neq q_n$ for *some* finite n , then it *does* follow that $p \neq q$. For instance, $\mathcal{Y}_2 \neq \mathcal{X}_2$ on the last slide:
 - $(Raa \vee Rab) \& (Rba \vee Rbb) \neq (Raa \& Rba) \vee (Rab \& Rbb)$
 - This is just an LSL problem with 4-atoms [$A = Raa$, $B = Rab$, $C = Rba$, $D = Rbb$]. Truth-tables will generate a counterexample.
- On the other hand, if (in L2PL) our “informal” method indicates (as above) that $p_n \models q_n$ for *all* finite n , this does *not* guarantee $p \models q$. *E.g.*:
 - $p = (\forall x)(\exists y)Rxy \& (\forall x)(\forall y)(\forall z)[(Rxy \& Ryz) \rightarrow Rxz]$.
 - $q = (\exists x)Rxx$.
- We showed above (informally) that $p_n \models q_n$ for *all* finite n . But, we also saw that there are infinite interpretations on which p is \top but q is \perp .