


Announcements and Such

- *Genesis*: “Watcher of the Sky” from *Foxtrot*
- Sections meet this week **in their permanent location**
 - Permanent section locations are posted on web
 - You should have received an email re sections
 - Talk to GSIs about section times/changes
- Final course roster will be set this week (everyone?)
- First Chunk of Audi is online <122/audi_1.pdf>
- Today: Perception II (of III)
 - First, brief review from last time (the “map”)
 - Then, continuing on with the perception readings

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Seeing, Justification & Knowledge I

- In a “good” case of perception (as in my “map”), *S* succeeds in *seeing that p* (⑥)
- And, *S*’s *seeing that p* implies two things:
 - *S* believes that *p*, **and** *p* is true
- Moreover, *normally*, we will *also* have:
 - *S* is *justified in* believing that *p* on the basis of their seeing that *p* (⑧)
 - Audi calls this the **Visual Principle**
- But, this isn’t *necessarily* the case:
 - This justification is *prima facie* (⑦) — it can be *defeated* by other evidence

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Seeing, Justification & Knowledge II

- Example: Charles sees that a bird is blue, but he also knows he’s been mistaking black birds for blue birds all morning
- Charles’s awareness of his bias in favor of seeing birds *as* blue can *defeat* his justification provided by his *seeing that*
- Moreover, if Charles *doesn’t* realize that he’s been unreliable, then his belief that *p* can be justified by his seeing that *p*
- **Visual Experience Principle:**
 - When, on the basis of *apparently normal* visual experience, one believes something of the kind the experience *seems* to show, then this belief is justified (⑧ again).

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Seeing, Justification & Knowledge III

- The Visual Principle (VP) connects *vision* (*seeing that* or *to be*) and justification
- The Visual Experience Principle (VEP) connects *visual experience* — *conceived as apparent seeing* — and justification
- The VEP involves a an *internal* standard for justification, whereas VP is consistent with an *external* standard.
- What about perceptual *knowledge*?
- That's *even harder* to come by, but, still, in “normal” cases, knowledge *does* result from both “vision” & “visual experience”
- Our first glance at knowledge vs JTB...

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Seeing, Justification & Knowledge IV

- Reconsider the second case in which Charles is *unaware* of his unreliability
- We wouldn't *fault* Charles for believing that *p* on the basis of his seeing that *p*
- The belief *justified* in an *internal* sense.
- But, still, Charles doesn't *know* that *p*.
- Why not?
- Intuitively, knowledge requires *more* than just *justified true belief*.
- His true belief is *accidental* here in a way that seems to preclude *knowledge*
- We'll return to this later in the term...!

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Naïve, Direct Perceptual Realism

- One commonsense view about perception goes (roughly) as follows:
 - Objects in the external world (“real”/physical objects) *directly cause* us to have our visual experiences of them
 - In this way, in “normal” circumstances, we *directly see* “real”/physical objects
 - Perception is simply a matter of our senses (directly) *telling us about real things* — *no philosophy needed!*
- This view is *realist* (we can *see* “real”/physical objects), and *direct* (it involves an *unmediated* causal connection)

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Causation and Perception I

- Most theories assume a special *causal relation* between object and perceiver:
 - If someone steals my vase and replaces it with an exact replica, my *experience* of it will (let us assume) be “*the same*”
 - But, I will not be seeing *my vase* when I am looking at the replica — even though the experiences are “*the same*”
- So, objects need to have some (and the right sort of) causal connection to the perceiver and the perceptual experience
- The details of this causal nexus will involve psychology *and* philosophy.

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Causation and Perception II

- *Psychology* (as well as physiology, physics, biology,...) are involved here as they are in *all* such *causal relations*
- But, we also need *philosophy* to tell us *which kinds* of causal connections are relevant for *perception* (in our sense)
- Imagine a *gizmo* which responds to piano sounds (of a song playing) by causing both temporary deafness and a faithful auditory experience *as of* the song being played on the piano.
- I don't hear *the piano playing the song* if I'm on the business end of a *gizmo*

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
Illusion & Hallucination

- The problem with naive, direct realism (so far) is that it has not much to say about cases of illusion & hallucination
- Illusions are cases in which *o* is *present*, and *S* sees *o*, but *S* is "fooled" into seeing *o* as *F*, when *o* is (in fact) *not F*.
 - We'll look at several examples, below.
- Hallucinations, on the other hand, are cases in which *S* has an experience "*as of o* being *F*", but *o* is *not even present*
- Hallucinations may be drug-induced, but they can also occur when waking from sleep (or in dreams themselves)

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Some Visual Illusions



EncycloZine.com

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These two tables appear to have very different dimensions. In fact, the length of the green table is identical to the width of the red table; and the length of the red table is the same as the width of the green table. Move your mouse over the 'mask' to reveal their 'true' similarity.




Image by R. Beau Lotto

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The upper and lower cubes in the foreground appear very different in brightness: white below and dark grey above. Despite this appearance, the surfaces are in fact physically identical. Move your mouse over the 'mask' to reveal their 'true' similarity.





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
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Not only does the blue tile in 'shadow' appear brighter than the blue tile on the top of the cube, the tiles also appear different in kind: One a surface and the other a light source. Despite this appearance, the surfaces are in fact physically identical. Move your mouse over the 'mask' to reveal their 'true' similarity.





Image by R. Beau Lotto


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The Theory of Appearing I

- We already have the distinctions in place to handle (simple) illusion cases
- In cases of (simple) illusion, you see an object, but you see it *as F*, when it's *not*
- There is still an object out there causing you to have an experience; but, in that experience you see *o as F* when it isn't
- We won't fuss (*yet*) over *precisely where* in the "causal process" things go wrong
- For instance, are these errors *conscious* or *subconscious*, and do they involve a form of *judgment* (if so, what sort)?
- In any case, hallucinations are *harder...*

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The Theory of Appearing II

- With *empty hallucinations* (where *nothing* external/physical is there), we can't even say that *S* sees *o* (in the simplest sense)
- So, we can (*a fortiori*) also not say that *S* sees *o* as *F*, when *o* is not in fact *F*. There *seems* to be *no object of perception* at all!
- But, it's tempting to say that there is still *something* that *appears to S as being F*
- *Sense-datum* theories of perception will take this approach to hallucination
- *Adverbial* theories will have the option of denying this view on empty hallucination
- First, let's consider sense-datum theory

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The Sense-Datum Theory I

- The sense-datum theory differs from naive, direct realism in two crucial ways:
 - The objects of *direct* perception are *not* external, but *mental* (viz., *sense-data*)
 - The causal relation between physical objects and sensory experiences is *indirect* or *mediated* (by *sense-data*)
- Roughly, the idea is that physical objects cause (the mind to generate) sense-data, and the sense-data are directly perceived
- According to SD, the *direct* objects of experience are *the same* in genuine perception, illusion, *and hallucination*

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The Argument from Hallucination

1. A perfectly faithful hallucination of a field is *intrinsically indistinguishable* from an ordinary experience of seeing that field [i.e., not distinguishable from it *just in itself as a visual experience*.]
2. Therefore (?), what is *directly* seen — the *immediate* object of one's visual experience — is the same sort of thing in a perfect hallucination of a field as in an ordinary experience of seeing a field.
3. What is *directly* seen in a hallucination of a field isn't a field (or any other physical thing).
4. So, what is directly seen in an ordinary experience of seeing a field isn't a field.

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The Sense-Datum Theory II

- The sense-datum theory is consistent with causal/realist theories of perception — so long as they are *indirect* theories
- Objects (in concert w/our visual systems) cause sense-data, and by seeing *them* (*directly*), we see objects (*indirectly*)
- When sense-data are *not* caused by physical objects, we're not perceiving physical objects (*only* sense-data)
- Even when objects *are* causing SD, the SD can *misrepresent*, and lead us to see objects *as* having properties they lack
- Thus, SD is *indirect* and *representative*

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The Sense-Datum Theory III

- Question for SD: Why don't we normally *notice* the indirectness of perception?
 - First, under “normal” conditions, the SD closely resemble the external scene
 - Second, perceptual beliefs are formed *spontaneously* (subconsciously?) and *not* on the basis of “inference from sense-data” — *epistemically direct*.
- The SD theorist can still say that the external objects *cause* our perceptual experiences (and beliefs) — *via* SD.
- And, they can still say the experiences (in “good” cases) are *about* external objects.

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The Sense-Datum Theory IV

- While SD has some initial plausibility, it also faces several serious challenges
- First, the argument from hallucination is *unsound* — (2) *does not follow* from (1)
 - Why must *anything at all* be seen in a hallucination? After all, hallucinations can be caused by various processes.
 - Even if *something* is seen, why must it be *of the same sort* as in perception?
 - In genuine perception, there is a causal connection to a “real”/physical object. Intuitively, in hallucination, there isn’t.
 - Finally, why make them both *mental*?

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The Sense-Datum Theory V

- Analogy: The experience of a *picture* of a painting is *intrinsically indistinguishable* from the experience of the painting
- It does *not* follow that the *ordinary* (museum) seeing of the painting is *indirect*
- Nor does it follow that both experiences have *the same internal elements*
- Two objects can be *intrinsically* identical, without be identical *simpliciter*. They may have different *relational* properties
- Intuitively, in the genuine experience, an external object is *represented to me*, but in a hallucination this is *not* the case.

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Adverbial Theories I

- So, the SD-story faces serious problems.
- Still, SD offers a *challenge* to other (putative) accounts of hallucination
- How *else* might we account for (perfect) hallucinatory experience?
- *Adverbial* theories offer an alternative.
- Instead of postulating a *mediating representation*, an adverbial theorist can simply speak of being “appeared to *F*-ly”
- They can say (*e.g.*) that the cup “appears elliptically” to *S*, without positing something that appears *and is* elliptical.

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Adverbial Theories II

- The adverbial theory is consistent with *direct realism*. It has us seeing *objects (o)* *directly*, but seeing them *in certain ways*.
- Sometimes we see *o as it really is*, and sometimes we don’t (in cases of illusion).
- In these ways, it is similar to the (naive) theory of appearing. But, when it comes to cases of hallucination, they differ.
- Naive theories of appearing (including SD) posit *something that is seen as F*.
- The adverbial theory *need not* do this. It can simply talk about an “*F-like*” visual experience (having *no object* at all).

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