

C. THE ETHICAL RELATION AND TIME

1. Subjectivity and Pluralism

Separation, effected in the concrete as habitation and economy, makes possible the relation with the detached, absolute exteriority. This relation, metaphysics, is brought about primordially by the epiphany of the Other in the face. Separation opens up between terms that are absolute and yet in relation, that absolve themselves from the relation they maintain, that do not abdicate in it in favor of a totality this relation would sketch out. Thus the metaphysical relation realizes a multiple existing [*un exister multiple*]—a pluralism. But this relation would not realize pluralism if the formal structure of relationship exhausted the essence of relationship. We must explicate the power that beings placed in relation have of absolving themselves from the relation. This power entails a different sense of absolution for each of the separated terms; the Metaphysician is not absolute in the same sense as the Metaphysical. The dimension of height from which the Metaphysical comes to the Metaphysician indicates a sort of non-homogeneity of space, such that a radical multiplicity, distinct from numerical multiplicity, can here be produced. Numerical multiplicity remains defenseless against totalization. For a multiplicity to be able to be produced in the order of being, *disclosure* (where being does not only manifest itself, but effectuates itself, or exerts itself, or holds sway, or reigns) is not enough; it is not enough that its *production* radiate in the cold splendor of truth. In this splendor the diverse is united—under the panoramic look it calls for. Contemplation is itself absorbed into this totality, and precisely in this way finds that objective and eternal being or that “impassive nature resplendent in its eternal beauty” (according to Pushkin’s expression), in which common sense recognizes the prototype of being, and which, for the philosopher, confers its prestige on totality. The subjectivity of knowl-

edge cannot break with this totality, which is reflected in the subject or reflects the subject. The objective totality *remains exclusionary* of every other, despite its being laid bare, that is, despite its apparition to an other. Contemplation is to be defined, perhaps, as a process by which being is revealed without ceasing to be one. The philosophy it commands is a suppression of pluralism.

For a multiplicity to be maintained, there must be produced in it the subjectivity that could not seek congruence with the being in which it is produced. Being must hold sway as revealing itself, that is, in its very being flowing toward an I that approaches it, but flowing toward it infinitely without running dry, burning without being consumed. But this approach can not be conceived as a cognition in which the knowing subject is reflected and absorbed. That would be to forthwith destroy this exteriority of being by a total reflection—which cognition aims at. The impossibility of total reflection must not be posited negatively—as the finitude of a knowing subject who, being mortal and already engaged in the world, does not reach truth—but rather as the *surplus* of the social relation, where the subjectivity remains in face of . . . , in the straightforwardness of this welcome, and is not measured by truth. The social relation itself is not just another relation, one among so many others that can be produced in being, but is its ultimate event. The very utterance by which I state it and whose claim to truth, postulating a total reflection, refutes the unsurpassable character of the face to face relation, nonetheless confirms it by the very fact of stating this truth—of telling it to the Other. Multiplicity therefore implies an objectivity posited in the impossibility of total reflection, in the impossibility of conjoining the I and the non-I in a whole. This impossibility is not negative—which would be to still posit it by reference to the idea of truth contemplated. It results from the surplus of the epiphany of the other, who dominates me from his height.

This foundation of pluralism does not congeal in isolation the terms that constitute the plurality. While maintaining them against the totality that would absorb them, it leaves them in commerce or in war. At no moment are they posited as causes of themselves—which would be to remove from them all receptivity and all activity, shut them up each in its own interiority, and isolate them like the Epicurean gods living in the interstices of being, or like the gods immobilized in the between-time¹ of

¹ Cf. our article "La réalité et son ombre," *Les Temps modernes*, Nov., 1948.

art, left for all eternity on the edge of the interval, at the threshold of a future that is never produced, statues looking at one another with empty eyes, idols which, contrary to Gyges, are exposed and do not see. Our analyses of separation have opened another perspective. The primordial form of this multiplicity is not, however, produced as war, nor as commerce. War and commerce presuppose the face and the transcendence of the being appearing in the face. War can not be derived from the empirical fact of the multiplicity of beings that limit one another, under the pretext that where the presence of the one inevitably limits the other, violence is identical with this limitation. Limitation is not of itself violence. Limitation is conceivable only within a totality where the parts mutually define one another. Definition, far from doing violence to the identity of the terms united into a totality, ensures this identity. The limit separates and unites in a whole. The reality fragmented into concepts that mutually limit one another forms a totality by virtue of that very fragmentation. As a play of antagonistic forces the world forms a whole, and is deducible or should be deducible, in a completed scientific thought, from one unique formula. What one is tempted to call antagonism of forces or of concepts presupposes a subjective perspective, and a pluralism of wills. The point at which this perspective converges does not form a part of the totality. Violence in nature thus refers to an existence precisely not limited by an other, an existence that maintains itself outside of the totality. But the exclusion of violence by beings susceptible of being integrated into a totality is not equivalent to peace. Totality absorbs the multiplicity of beings, which peace implies. Only beings capable of war can rise to peace. War like peace presupposes beings structured otherwise than as parts of a totality.

War therefore is to be distinguished from the logical opposition of the *one* and the *other* by which both are defined within a totality open to a panoramic view, to which they would owe their very opposition. In war beings refuse to belong to a totality, refuse community, refuse law; no frontier stops one being by another, nor defines them. They affirm themselves as transcending the totality, each identifying itself not by its place in the whole, but by its *self*.

War presupposes the transcendence of the antagonist; it is waged against man. It is surrounded with honors and pays the last honors; it aims at a presence that comes always from elsewhere, a being that appears in a face. It is neither the hunt nor struggle with an element. The possibility, retained by the adversary, of thwarting the

best laid calculations expresses the separation, the breach of totality, across which the adversaries approach one another. The warrior runs a risk; no logistics guarantees victory. The calculations that make possible the determination of the outcome of a play of forces within a totality do not decide war. It lies at the limit of a supreme confidence in oneself and a supreme risk. It is a relation between beings exterior to totality, which hence are not in touch with one another.

But would the violence that is impossible among beings ready to constitute a totality—that is, to reconstitute it—then be possible among separated beings? How could separated beings maintain any relation, even violence? It is that the refusal of totality in war does not refuse relationship—since in war the adversaries seek out one another.

Relationship between separated being would indeed be absurd were the terms posited as substances, each *causa sui*, since, as pure activities, capable of receiving no action, the terms could undergo no violence. But the relation of violence does not remain at the level of the wholly formal conjuncture of relationship. It implies a specific structure of the terms in relation. Violence bears upon only a being both graspable and escaping every hold. Without this living contradiction in the being that undergoes violence the deployment of violent force would reduce itself to a labor.

Thus for relationship between separated beings to be possible, the multiple terms would have to be partially independent and partially in relation. The notion of finite freedom then imposes itself to reflection. But how is such a notion to be formed? To say that a being is partially free immediately raises the problem of the relation existing in it between the free part, *causa sui*, and the non-free part. To say that the free part is impeded in the non-free part would bring us back indefinitely to the same difficulty: how can the free part, *causa sui*, undergo anything whatever from the non-free part? The finitude of freedom must therefore not signify some limit within the substance of the free being, divided into one part endowed with a causality of its own and one part subject to exterior causes. The notion of independence must be grasped elsewhere than in causality. Independence would not be equivalent to the idea of *causa sui*, which, moreover, is belied by birth, non-chosen and impossible to choose (the great drama of contemporary thought), which situates the will in an anarchic world, that is, a world without origin.

Thus freedom, an abstraction that reveals itself to be self-contradic-

tory when one supposes it to have a limitation, can not describe beings in the relation that does not constitute totality, beings in war.

A being independent of and yet at the same time exposed to the other is a temporal being: to the inevitable violence of death it opposes its time, which is postponement itself. It is not finite freedom that makes the notion of time intelligible; it is time that gives a meaning to the notion of finite freedom. Time is precisely the fact that the whole existence of the mortal being—exposed to violence—is not being for death, but the “not yet” which is a way of being against death, a retreat before death in the very midst of its inexorable approach. In war death is brought to what is moving back, to what *for the moment* exists completely. Thus in war the reality of the time that separates a being from its death, the reality of a being taking up a position with regard to death, that is, the reality of a conscious being and its interiority, is recognized. As *causa sui* or freedom beings would be immortal, and could not, in a kind of dumb and absurd hatred,* grapple on to one another. Were beings only given over to violence, only mortal, they would be dead in a world where nothing opposes anything, a world whose time would break up into eternity. The notion of a mortal but temporal being, apprehended in the will (a notion we shall develop) differs fundamentally from every causality leading to the idea of the *causa sui*. Such a being is exposed, but also opposed to violence. Violence does not befall it as an accident that befalls a sovereign freedom. The hold that violence has over this being—the mortality of this being—is the primordial fact. Freedom itself is but its adjournment by time. What is at issue is not finite freedom in which a singular compound of activity and passivity would be produced, but rather a freedom originally null, offered in death to the other, but in which time arises as a détente: the free will is necessity relaxed and postponed rather than finite freedom. It is détente or distension—postponement by virtue of which nothing is definitive yet, nothing consummated, skill which finds for itself a dimension of retreat there where the inexorable is imminent.

The contact of the soul with the body it has at its disposal is inverted into the non-contact of a blow struck in the void. The adversary's skill, which cannot be summed up in forces, has to be taken into account—but how take it into account? My skill postpones the inevitable. To hit, the blow must be struck there where the adversary has absented himself; to be parried, I have to pull back from the point at which he

* ". . . haine sourde et absurde . . ."

touches me. Ruse and ambush—Ulysses' craft—constitute the essence of war. This skill is inscribed in the very existence of the body; it is suppleness—a simultaneity of absence and presence. Corporeity is the mode of existence of a being whose presence is postponed at the very moment of his presence. Such a distension in the tension of the instant can only come from an infinite dimension which separates me from the other, both present and still to come, a dimension opened by the face of the Other. War can be produced only when a being postponing its death is exposed to violence. It can be produced only where discourse was possible: discourse subtends war itself. Moreover violence does not aim simply at disposing of the other as one disposes of a thing, but, already at the limit of murder, it proceeds from unlimited negation. It can aim at only a presence itself infinite despite its insertion in the field of my powers. Violence can aim only at a face.

It is therefore not freedom that accounts for the transcendence of the Other, but the transcendence of the Other that accounts for freedom—a transcendence of the Other with regard to me which, being infinite, does not have the same signification as my transcendence with regard to him. The risk that war involves measures the distance that separates bodies within their hand-to-hand struggle. The Other, in the hands of forces that break him, exposed to powers, remains unforeseeable, that is, transcendent. This transcendence is not to be described negatively, but is manifested positively in the moral resistance of the face to the violence of murder. The force of the Other is already and henceforth moral. Freedom, be it that of war, can be manifested only outside totality, but this "outside totality" opens with the transcendence of the face. To think of freedom as *within* totality is to reduce freedom to the status of an indetermination in being, and forthwith to integrate it into a totality by closing the totality over the "holes" of indetermination—and seeking with psychology the laws of a free being!

But the relation that subtends war, an asymmetrical relation with the other who, as infinity, opens time, transcends and dominates the subjectivity (the I not being transcendent with regard to the other in the same sense that the other is transcendent with regard to me), can take on the aspect of a symmetrical relation. The face, whose ethical epiphany consists in soliciting a response (which the violence of war and its murderous negation alone can seek to reduce to silence), is not satisfied with a "good intention" and a benevolence wholly Platonic. The "good intention" and the "benevolence wholly Platonic" are only the residue of

an attitude assumed where one enjoys things, where one can divest oneself of them and offer them. Henceforth the independence of the I and its position before the absolutely other can figure in a history and a politics. Separation is embedded in an order in which the asymmetry of the interpersonal relation is effaced, where I and the other become interchangeable in commerce, and where the particular man, an individuation of the genus man, appearing in history, is substituted for the I and for the other.

Separation is not effaced in this ambiguity. We must now show in what concrete form the freedom of separation is lost, and in what sense it is maintained even in its very loss, and can resurrect.

2. Commerce, the Historical Relation, and the Face

The will at work ensures the separated being's *being at home with itself*. But in its work, which has a signification but remains mute, the will remains unexpressed. Labor, in which it is exerted, is visibly inserted in the things, but the will forthwith absents itself from them, since works take on the anonymity of merchandise, an anonymity into which, as a wage-earner, the worker himself may disappear.

The separated being can, to be sure, shut itself up in its interiority. Things can not counter it absolutely, and Epicurean wisdom lives from this truth. But the will, whereby a being wields itself by somehow holding in its own hands all the strings that operate its being, is by its work exposed to the Other. Its exertion is seen as a thing, if only by virtue of the insertion of its body in the world of things. Corporeity thus describes the ontological regime of a primary self-alienation, contemporaneous with the very event by which the self ensures, against the unknown factor of the elements, its own independence, that is, its self-possession or its security. The will equivalent to atheism—which refuses the Other as an influence being exerted on an I or holding it in its invisible meshes, which refuses the Other as a God inhabiting the I—the will which tears itself from this possession, from this enthusiasm, as the very power of rupture, delivers itself over to the Other in its work, the very work which permits it to ensure its interiority. Interiority thus does not exhaust the existence of the separated being.

The idea of *fatum* accounted for the reversal every heroism in a role suffers. The hero finds himself playing a role in a drama exceeding his heroic intentions, which, by their very opposition to that drama, hasten

the accomplishment of designs foreign to them. The absurdity of the *fatum* foils the sovereign will. In fact inscription in a foreign will is produced through the mediation of the work, which separates itself from its author, his intentions, and his possession, and which another will lays hold of. The labor which brings being into our possession ipso facto relinquishes it, is in the very sovereignty of its powers unceremoniously delivered over to the Other.

Every will separates itself from its work. The movement proper to action consists in issuing in the unknown—in not being able to measure all its consequences. The unknown does not result from a factual ignorance; the unknown upon which action issues resists all knowledge, does not stand out in the light, since it represents the meaning the work receives from the other. The other can dispossess me of my work, take it or buy it, and thus direct my very behavior; I am exposed to instigation. The work is destined to this alien *Sinngebung* from the moment of its origin in me. It is to be emphasized that this destination of the work to a history that I cannot foresee—for I cannot see it—is inscribed in the very essence of my power, and does not result from the contingent presence of other persons alongside of me.

Power is not entirely one with its own impetus, does not accompany its work up to the end. A separation opens between the producer and the product. At a given moment the producer no longer *follows up*, remains behind. His transcendence stops mid-way. In contrast with the transcendence of expression, in which the being that expresses himself personally attends the work of expression, production attests the author of the work in his absence, as a plastic form. This inexpressive character of the product is reflected positively in its market value, in its suitability for others, in its capability to assume the meaning others will give it, to enter into an entirely different context from that which engendered it. The work does not defend itself against the Other's *Sinngebung*, and exposes the will that produced it to contestation and unrecognition; it lends itself to the designs of a foreign will and allows itself to be appropriated. The willing of the living will *postpones* this subjection, and accordingly wills against the Other and his threat. But this way a will plays in history a role it has not willed marks the limits of interiority: the will finds itself caught up in events that will appear only to the historian. Historical events link up in works. Wills without works will constitute no history; there is no purely interior history. History, in which the interiority of each will manifests itself

only in plastic form—in the muteness of products—is an economic history. In history the will is congealed into a personage interpreted on the basis of his work, in which the essential of the will productive of things, dependent on things, but struggling against this dependence which delivers it to the Other, is obscured. As long as the will, in a being who speaks, takes up again and defends his work against a foreign will, history lacks the distance it lives from. Its reign commences in the world of realities-results, the world of “complete works,” the heritage of dead wills.

The whole being of willing is hence not enacted within oneself. The capacity of the independent I does not contain its own being; willing escapes willing. The work is always in a certain sense an abortive action. I am not entirely what I want to do. Thus there lies open an unlimited field of investigation for psychoanalysis or sociology, which apprehend the will on the basis of its apparition in the work, in its behavior, or in its products.

The order hostile to the will dispossessed of its work, from which the willing is thus turned, depends on foreign wills. The work has a meaning for other wills; it can serve another and eventually turn against its author. The “misconstruction” acquired by the result of the will that has withdrawn from its work is due to the will that has survived. The absurd has a meaning for someone. Fate does not precede history; it follows it. Fate is the history of the historiographers, accounts of the survivors, who interpret, that is, utilize the works of the dead. The historical distance which makes this historiography, this violence, this subjection possible is proportionate to the time necessary for the will to lose its work completely. Historiography recounts the way the survivors appropriate the works of dead wills to themselves; it rests on the usurpation carried out by the conquerors, that is, by the survivors; it recounts enslavement, forgetting the life that struggles against slavery.

The fact that the will escapes itself, that the will does not contain itself, amounts to the possibility the others have of laying hold of the work, alienating, acquiring, buying, stealing it. The will itself thus takes on a meaning for the other, as though it were a thing. In the historical relation one will, to be sure, does not approach another as a thing. This relation does not resemble that which characterizes labor: in commerce and war the relation with the work remains a relation with the worker. But across the gold that buys him or the steel that kills him the Other is not approached face to face; even though they traverse the

interval of a transcendence commerce aims at the anonymous market, war is waged against a mass. Material things, bread and wine, clothing and the home, like the blade of steel, have a hold on the "for itself" of the will. The part of eternal truth that materialism involves lies in the fact that the human will can be laid hold of in its works. The point of the sword, a physical reality, can exclude a meaningful activity, a subject, a "for itself," from the world. This great banality is nonetheless most astonishing: the for itself of the will, unshakeable in its happiness, is exposed to violence; spontaneity *undergoes*, turns into its contrary. The steel touches not an inert being, the gold attracts not a thing but a will which qua will, qua "for itself," should have been immune from every attack. Violence recognizes, but bends the will. Threat and seduction act by slipping into the interstice that separates the work from the will. Violence is corruption—seduction and threat, where the will is betrayed. This status of the will is the body.

The body exceeds the categories of a thing, but does not coincide with the role of "lived body" ["*corps propre*"] which I dispose of in my voluntary action and by which *I can*. The ambiguity of corporeal resistance which turns into a means and from means turns into a resistance does not account for its ontological *hybris*. The body in its very activity, in its for itself, inverts into a thing to be treated as a thing. This is what we express concretely in saying that it abides between health and sickness. Through it one not only fails to recognize, one can mistreat the "for itself" of the person; one does not only offend him, one coerces him. "I am anything you like," says Sganarelle, under the blows. One does not adopt successively and independently the biological point of view on it and the "point of view" which from the interior maintains it as a lived body; the originality of the body consists of the coinciding of two points of view. This is the paradox and the essence of time itself proceeding unto death, where the will is affected as a thing by the things —by the point of steel or by the chemistry of the tissues (due to a murderer or to the impotency of the doctors)—but gives itself a reprieve and postpones the contact by the against-death of postponement. The will essentially violable harbors treason in its own essence. It is not only offendable in its dignity—which would confirm its inviolable character—but is susceptible of being coerced and enslaved as a will, becoming a servile soul. Gold and threats force it not only to sell its products but to sell itself. Or again, the human will is not heroic.

The corporeity of the will must be understood on the basis of this

ambiguity of voluntary power, exposing itself to the others in its centripetal movement of egoism. The body is its ontological regime, and not an object. The body, where expression can dawn forth and where the egoism of the will becomes discourse and primal opposition, at the same time conveys the entry of the I into the calculations of the Other. An interaction of wills or a history then becomes possible—an interaction of wills each defined as *causa sui*, since action upon a pure activity would presuppose a passivity in that activity. The ambiguity of the ontological regime of the body is founded in mortality, which we shall treat of below.

But is not total independence of the will realized in courage? Courage, the power to face death, at first sight does seem to carry out the total independence of the will; he who has accepted his death remains exposed to the violence of the assassin, but does he not refuse his consent to a foreign will to the end? —Unless the Other wills that very death. Then, while refusing consent, the will gives satisfaction to the foreign will in spite of itself, by the result of its behavior, precisely by its *work*. In the extreme situation of the struggle unto death the refusal to acquiesce to a foreign will can revert into satisfaction given to this hostile will. The acceptance of death therefore does not enable me to resist with certainty the murderous will of the Other. Absolute dissension with a foreign will does not preclude the carrying out of his designs. Refusing to serve another by one's life does not preclude serving him by one's death. The being that wills does not exhaust the destiny of his existence in his will. This destiny does not necessarily imply a tragedy, for resolute opposition to the foreign will is, perhaps, madness, since one can speak to the Other and desire him.

The Other's designs do not present themselves to me as do the laws of things. His schemes show themselves to be inconvertible into data of a problem, which the will might calculate. The will that refuses the foreign will is obliged to recognize this foreign will as absolutely exterior, as untranslatable into thoughts that would be immanent in itself. Whatever be the extension of my thoughts, limited by nothing, the Other cannot be contained by me: he is unthinkable—he is infinite and recognized as such. This recognition is not produced again as a thought, but is produced as morality. The total refusal of the other, the will preferring death to servitude, annihilating its own existence in order to cut short every relation with the exterior, cannot prevent this work, which does not express him, from which he absents himself (for it is not a word), from

being entered in this alien reckoning, which it defies, but recognizes precisely in its supreme courage. By its work the sovereign and self-enclosed will confirms the foreign will it means to ignore, and finds itself "made game of" by the Other. Thus a plane is manifested in which the will, though it have broken with participation, finds itself inscribed, and in which, in spite of itself, impersonally, even its supreme initiative, the breaking with being, is transcribed. In its effort to escape the Other in dying, it recognizes the other. The suicide to which it resolves itself in order to escape servitude is inseparable from the pain of "losing," whereas this death should have shown the absurdity of every game. Macbeth wishes for the destruction of the world in his defeat and his death ("and wish th'estate o'th'world were now undone")—or more profoundly still, he wishes that the nothingness of death be a void as total as that which would have reigned had the world never been created.

And yet in its separation from the work and in the possible betrayal that threatens it in the course of its very exercise, the will becomes aware of this betrayal and thereby keeps itself at a distance from it. Thus, faithful to itself, it remains in a certain sense inviolable, escapes its own history, and renews itself. There is no inward history. The inwardness of the will posits itself subject to a jurisdiction which scrutinizes its intentions, before which the meaning of its being coincides totally with its inward will. The volitions of the will do not weigh on it, and from the jurisdiction to which it opens comes pardon, the power to efface, to absolve, to undo history. The will thus moves between its betrayal and its fidelity which, simultaneous, describe the very originality of its power. But the fidelity does not forget the betrayal—and the religious will remains a relation with the Other. Fidelity is won by repentance and prayer (a privileged word in which the will seeks its fidelity to itself); and the pardon which ensures it this fidelity comes to it from the outside. Hence the rights of the inward will, its certitude of being a misunderstood will, still reveal a relation with exteriority. The will awaits its investiture and pardon. It awaits them from an exterior will, but one from which it would experience no longer shock but judgment, an exteriority withdrawn from the antagonism of wills, withdrawn from history. This possibility of justification and pardon, as religious consciousness in which interiority tends to coincide with being, opens before the Other, to whom I can speak. I speak a word that, in the measure that it welcomes the Other as Other, offers or sacrifices to him a product of labor, and consequently does not play above economy. Thus we see

expression, the other extremity of the voluntary power that is separated from its work and betrayed by it, nonetheless referring to the inexpressive work by which the will, free with regard to history, partakes of history.

The will, in which the identity of the same holds sway in its fidelity to itself and in its betrayal, does not result from the empirical accident that would have placed a being in the midst of a multiplicity of beings which contest its identity. The will contains this duality of betrayal and fidelity in its mortality, which is produced or holds sway in its corporeity. A being in which multiplicity does not designate the simple divisibility of a whole into parts nor the simple unity of number of the gods living each for itself in the interstices between beings requires mortality and corporeity. For otherwise either the imperialist will would reconstitute a whole, or, as a physical body, neither mortal nor immortal, it would form a simple block. The postponement of death in a mortal will—time—is the mode of existence and reality of a separated being that has entered into relation with the Other. This space of time has to be taken as the point of departure. In it is enacted a meaningful life which one must not measure against an ideal of eternity, taking its duration and its interests to be absurd or illusory.

3. The Will and Death

Death is interpreted in the whole philosophical and religious tradition either as a passage to nothingness or as a passage to another existence, continuing in a new setting. It is thought within the alternative of being and nothingness, which is accredited by the death of our relatives, who do indeed cease to exist in the empirical world, which, for this world, means disappearance or departure. More profoundly and as it were *a priori* we approach death as nothingness in the passion for murder. The spontaneous intentionality of this passion aims at annihilation. Cain, when he slew Abel, should have possessed this knowledge of death. The identifying of death with nothingness befits the death of the other in murder. But at the same time this nothingness presents itself there as a sort of impossibility. For the Other cannot present himself as Other outside of my conscience, and his face expresses my moral impossibility of annihilating. This interdiction is to be sure not equivalent to pure and simple impossibility, and even presupposes the possibility which precisely it forbids—but in fact the interdiction already