ACVP TLS Key Derivation Function JSON Specification

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Abstract

This document defines the JSON schema for testing SP800-135 TLS KDF implementations with the ACVP specification.

Keywords

The following are keywords to be used by search engines and document catalogues.

ACVP; cryptography

Foreword

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Audience

This document is intended for the users and developers of ACVP.

Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 of [RFC 2119] and [RFC 8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Acknowledgements

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Executive Summary

The Automated Crypto Validation Protocol (ACVP) defines a mechanism to automatically verify the cryptographic implementation of a software or hardware crypto module. The ACVP specification defines how a crypto module communicates with an ACVP server, including crypto

capabilities negotiation, session management, authentication, vector processing and more. The ACVP specification does not define algorithm specific JSON constructs for performing the crypto validation. A series of ACVP sub-specifications define the constructs for testing individual crypto algorithms. Each sub-specification addresses a specific class of crypto algorithms. This sub-specification defines the JSON constructs for testing SP800-135 TLS KDF implementations using ACVP.

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1. Introduction

The Automated Crypto Validation Protocol (ACVP) defines a mechanism to automatically verify the cryptographic implementation of a software or hardware crypto module. The ACVP specification defines how a crypto module communicates with an ACVP server, including crypto capabilities negotiation, session management, authentication, vector processing and more. The ACVP specification does not define algorithm specific JSON constructs for performing the crypto validation. A series of ACVP sub-specifications define the constructs for testing individual crypto algorithms. Each sub-specification addresses a specific class of crypto algorithms. This sub-specification defines the JSON constructs for testing SP800-135 TLS KDF implementations using ACVP.

2. Supported KDFs

The following key derivation functions **MAY** be advertised by the ACVP compliant cryptographic module:

- kdf-components / tls / 1.0
- TLS-v1.2 / KDF / RFC7627

3. Test Types and Test Coverage

This section describes the design of the tests used to validate SP800-135 TLS KDF implementations.

3.1. Test Types

There is only one test type: functional tests. Each has a specific value to be used in the testType field. The testType field definition is:

• "AFT"—Algorithm Functional Test. These tests can be processed by the client using a normal 'derive_key' operation. AFTs cause the implementation under test to exercise normal operations on a single block, multiple blocks, or partial blocks. In all cases, random data is used. The functional tests are designed to verify that the logical components of the key deriviation process are operating correctly.

3.2. Test Coverage

The tests described in this document have the intention of ensuring an implementation is conformant to [SP 800-135 Rev. 1].

3.2.1. TLS Requirements Covered

In [SP 800-135 Rev. 1], TBD.

3.2.2. TLS Requirements Not Covered

Some requirements in the outlined specification are not easily tested. Often they are not ideal for black-box testing such as the ACVP.

In [SP 800-135 Rev. 1], TBD.

4. Capabilities Registration

ACVP requires crypto modules to register their capabilities. This allows the crypto module to advertise support for specific algorithms, notifying the ACVP server which algorithms need test vectors generated for the validation process. This section describes the constructs for advertising support of TLS KDF algorithms to the ACVP server.

The algorithm capabilities **MUST** be advertised as JSON objects within the 'algorithms' value of the ACVP registration message. The 'algorithms' value is an array, where each array element is an individual JSON object defined in this section. The 'algorithms' value is part of the 'capability_exchange' element of the ACVP JSON registration message. See the ACVP specification [ACVP] for more details on the registration message.

4.1. Prerequisites

Each algorithm implementation **MAY** rely on other cryptographic primitives. For example, RSA Signature algorithms depend on an underlying hash function. Each of these underlying algorithm primitives must be validated, either separately or as part of the same submission. ACVP provides a mechanism for specifying the required prerequisites:

Prerequisites, if applicable, MUST be submitted in the registration as the prereqvals JSON property array inside each element of the algorithms array. Each element in the prereqvals array MUST contain the following properties

JSON PropertyDescriptionJSON Typealgorithma prerequisite algorithmstringvalValuealgorithm validation numberstring

Table 1 — Prerequisite Properties

A "valValue" of "same" **SHALL** be used to indicate that the prerequisite is being met by a different algorithm in the capability exchange in the same registration.

An example description of prerequisites within a single algorithm capability exchange looks like this

]

Figure 1

4.2. Property Registration

The TLS KDF mode capabilities are advertised as JSON objects within a root "algorithm" object.

A registration **SHALL** use these properties

Table 2 — TLS KDF Mode Capabilities JSON Values

JSON Property	Description	JSON Type	Valid Values
algorithm	Name of the algorithm to be	string	"kdf-components", "TLS-
	validated		v1.2"
mode	Mode of the algorithm to be	string	"tls", "KDF"
	validated		
revision	ACVP Test version	string	"1.0", "RFC7627"
tlsVersion	The version of TLS	array	"v1.0/1.1", "v1.2". Note
	supported		TLS v1.2 w/ extended
			master secret testing, i.
			e., TLS-v1.2 / KDF /
			RFC7627, does not use this
			property.
hashAlg	SHA functions supported	array	See Section 4.2.1
	if TLS Version "v1.2" is		
	included in the registration		

Note that the "hashAlg" field is **REQUIRED** when "v1.2" is present within the "tlsVersion" array.

4.2.1. Valid Hash Functions

The following hash functions **MAY** be advertised by an ACVP compliant client under the 'hashAlg' property

- SHA2-256
- SHA2-384
- SHA2-512

4.3. Registration Example

An example registration within an algorithm capability exchange looks like this

```
"algorithm": "kdf-components",
"mode": "tls",
```

```
"revision": "1.0",
    "tlsVersion": [
       "v1.0/1.1",
       "v1.2"
   ],
   "hashAlg": [
        "SHA2-256",
       "SHA2-384",
       "SHA2-512"
   ]
},
   "algorithm": "TLS-v1.2",
    "mode": "KDF",
    "revision": "RFC7627",
    "hashAlg": [
       "SHA2-256",
       "SHA2-384",
       "SHA2-512"
   ]
}
```

Figure 2

5. Test Vectors

The ACVP server provides test vectors to the ACVP client, which are then processed and returned to the ACVP server for validation. A typical ACVP validation test session would require multiple test vector sets to be downloaded and processed by the ACVP client. Each test vector set represents an individual algorithm defined during the capability exchange. This section describes the JSON schema for a test vector set used with SP800-135 TLS KDF algorithms.

The test vector set JSON schema is a multi-level hierarchy that contains meta data for the entire vector set as well as individual test vectors to be processed by the ACVP client. The following table describes the JSON elements at the top level of the hierarchy.

JSON Values	Description	JSON Type
acvVersion	Protocol version identifier	string
vsId	Unique numeric vector set identifier	integer
algorithm	Algorithm defined in the capability exchange	string
mode	Mode defined in the capability exchange	string
revision	Protocol test revision selected	string
testGroups	Array of test groups containing test data, see Section 5.1	array

Table 3 — Top Level Test Vector JSON Elements

An example of this would look like this

```
{
  "acvVersion": "version",
  "vsId": 1,
  "algorithm": "Alg1",
  "mode": "Mode1",
  "revision": "Revision1.0",
  "testGroups": [ . . . ]
}
```

Figure 3

5.1. Test Groups

The testGroups element at the top level in the test vector JSON object is an array of test groups. Test vectors are grouped into similar test cases to reduce the amount of data transmitted in the vector set. For instance, all test vectors that use the same key size would be grouped together. The Test Group JSON object contains meta data that applies to all test vectors within the group. The following table describes the SP800-135 TLS KDF JSON elements of the Test Group JSON object

Table 4 — Test Group JSON Object

JSON Value	Description	JSON Type
tgId	Test group identifier	integer
testType	Test operations to be	string
	performed	
tlsVersion	The version of TLS used	string
	in the test group. Not	
	included for TLS-v1.2 /	
	KDF / RFC7627 testing.	
hashAlg	SHA version used string	
preMasterSecretLength	Pre-master secret length in integer	
	bits	
keyBlockLength	Key block length in bits	integer
tests	Array of individual test	array
	cases	

The 'tgId', 'testType' and 'tests' objects **MUST** appear in every test group element communicated from the server to the client as a part of a prompt.

5.2. Test Cases

5.2.1. Revision 1.0 Test Cases

Each test group contains an array of one or more test cases. Each test case is a JSON object that represents a single test vector to be processed by the ACVP client. The following table describes the JSON elements for each SP800-135 TLS KDF test vector.

Table 5 — 1.0 Test Case JSON Object

JSON Value	Description	JSON Type
tcId	Test case idenfitier	integer
preMasterSecret	Pre-master secret value	hex
serverHelloRandom	Server Hello random value	hex
clientHelloRandom	Client Hello random value	hex
serverRandom	Server random value	hex
clientRandom	Client random value	hex

Here is an abbreviated yet fully constructed example of the prompt.

```
"hashAlg": "SHA-1",
            "tlsVersion": "v1.0/1.1",
            "keyBlockLength": 832,
            "preMasterSecretLength": 384,
            "testType": "AFT",
            "tests": [
                {
                    "tcId": 1,
                    "preMasterSecret": "2F0D26CC2487169D83D9...",
                    "clientHelloRandom": "00D5EDFC0A7D8B0913...",
                    "serverHelloRandom": "14D06FC8F2792762BA...",
                    "clientRandom": "DDFB77CB1304A0541C6CC07...",
                    "serverRandom": "D59EB4E444005709409C572..."
            ]
    ]
}
```

Figure 4

5.2.2. Revision RFC7627 Test Cases

Each test group contains an array of one or more test cases. Each test case is a JSON object that represents a single test vector to be processed by the ACVP client. The following table describes the JSON elements for each SP800-135 TLS KDF test vector.

JSON Value	Description	JSON Type
tcId	Test case idenfitier	integer
preMasterSecret	Pre-master secret value	hex
sessionHash	the hash value of the concatenated handshake messages	hex
serverRandom	Server random value	hex
clientRandom	Client random value	hex

Table 6 — RFC7627 Test Case JSON Object

Here is an abbreviated yet fully constructed example of the prompt.

```
"tgId": 1,
            "hashAlg": "SHA2-256",
            "keyBlockLength": 1024,
            "preMasterSecretLength": 384,
            "testType": "AFT",
            "tests": [
                {
                    "tcId": 1,
                    "preMasterSecret": "2F0D26CC2487169D83D9...",
                    "sessionHash": "00D5EDFC0A7D8B0913...",
                    "clientRandom": "DDFB77CB1304A0541C6CC07...",
                    "serverRandom": "D59EB4E444005709409C572..."
            ]
       }
   ]
}
```

Figure 5

6. Responses

After the ACVP client downloads and processes a vector set, it must send the response vectors back to the ACVP server. The following table describes the JSON object that represents a vector set response.

Table 7 — Vector Set Response JSON Object

JSON Property	Description	JSON Type
acvVersion	The version of the protocol	string
vsId	The vector set identifier	integer
testGroups	The test group data	array

An example of this is the following

```
"acvVersion": "version",
    "vsId": 1,
    "testGroups": [ ... ]
}
```

Figure 6

The testGroups section is used to organize the ACVP client response in a similar manner to how it receives vectors. Several algorithms **SHALL** require the client to send back group level properties in their response. This structure helps accommodate that.

Table 8 — Vector Set Group Response JSON Object

JSON Property	Description	JSON Type
tgId	The test group identifier	integer
tests	The test case data	array

An example of this is the following

```
{
    "tgId": 1,
    "tests": [ ... ]
}
```

Figure 7

The following table describes the JSON object that represents a test case response for a SP800-135 TLS KDF.

Table 9 — Test Case Results JSON Object

JSON Property	Description	JSON Type
tcId	The test case identifier	integer

JSON Property	Description	JSON Type
masterSecret	Master secret value	hex
keyBlock	Key block value of the expansion	hex
	step	

Here is an abbreviated example of the response

```
{
  "vsId": 1,
  "testGroups": [{
     "tgId": 1,
     "tests": [{
        "tcId": 1,
        "masterSecret": "38E544579C06B3F515E...",
        "keyBlock": "9F39392B46ABF3D852F4F31..."
     }]
  }]
}
```

Figure 8

7. Security Considerations

There are no additional security considerations outside of those outlined in the ACVP document.

Appendix A — Terminology

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.

A.1.

Prompt

JSON sent from the server to the client describing the tests the client performs

Registration

The initial request from the client to the server describing the capabilities of one or several algorithm, mode and revision combinations

Response

JSON sent from the client to the server in response to the prompt

Test Case

An individual unit of work within a prompt or response

Test Group

A collection of test cases that share similar properties within a prompt or response

Test Vector Set

A collection of test groups under a specific algorithm, mode, and revision

Validation

JSON sent from the server to the client that specifies the correctness of the response

Appendix B — Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACVP Automated Crypto Validation Protocol

JSON Javascript Object Notation

Appendix C — Revision History

Table C-1

Version	Release Date	Updates
1	2019-06-05	Initial Release

Appendix D — References

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