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| **Title:** | | 6th Revised baseline text for X.arch-design: Design principles and best practices for security architectures | | | |
| **Contact:** | | Arnaud Taddei Broadcom Europe Ltd. United Kingdom | | | Tel: +41795061129 E-mail: [Arnaud.Taddei@broadcom.com](mailto:Arnaud.Taddei@broadcom.com) |

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| --- | --- |
| **Abstract:** | This contribution is the 6th revision of X.arch-design baseline text. It is based on [TD1398](https://www.itu.int/md/T22-SG17-230829-TD-PLEN-1398). |

**Introduction**

Since the last SG17 meeting a lot of team work and background work was performed between several SG17 members that lead to a context that had to be taken into account for this Contribution.

Indeed:

* the initialisation and development of the work in X.cs-ra,
* the welcome new work item proposal [C583](https://www.itu.int/md/T22-SG17-C-0583/en),
* the Broadcom proposal for a CRAMM Roadmap internal SG17 document as per [C652](https://www.itu.int/md/T22-SG17-C-0652/en),
* the outcome and the future of CG-SECAPA,
* the fact that some work items in the incubation queue of Q15 may be claimed by Q1,

is creating a context that led the contribution to decide to purge any aspect which is on developing reference architectures and methodology from this document in order to limit the contour of this contribution to solely on:

What are the design security principles and associated that can constitute an inventory of use for the architect/design for when preparing a reference architecture, a solution architecture or an implementation.

This will give the opportunity for a better delineation and focus of this document back to its origin but now helped by a bigger context and will allow this document to reuse results from other works if necessary rather than defining terminology outside of its scope.

The future CRAMM Roadmap may actually consider if the section on the Architect/Designer shall stay in X.arch-design or should be moved into a more wholistic document listing all the stakeholders that participate to a Reference Architecture, yet, acknowledging that the Architect/Designer is a central one.

Therefore this contribution is progressing the work on X.arch-design in the following ways:

Remove the methodological section 8

The methodology should not be defined in this Recommendation.

Removal of most ISO and IEC references and terminology

Most of ISO and IEC references are useful but for methodology and more for X.cs-ra and other documents. Some key elements were kept.

The contributor is wondering if, as part of this nascent new series, a document regrouping all the references, terminology, etc. shouldn’t be developed as a common denominator to avoid having to carry references and increase disalignment as much as the work is progressing.

Introduce a new section 6.2

The goal of this section is to give a reminder of what is done in other works to give a context and anchor the different work items. It may be tuned and refined in the future but the most important is that it shows that this Recommendation focuses on the point 3) mostly. This gives a clearer ‘interface’ between work items.

Regroup all the terms ‘defined here’ in the right place

This is in accordance to the document, yet a number of issues need to be considered:

* it is surprising to the editors that a number of these terms do not seem to be defined anywhere and more research is needed in databases and other SDOs,
* a number of interpretations need to be researched,
* keep investigating the right SG17 series of Recommendations and in particular SDL,
* a number of terms may need to be defined in other current and future Recommendations and may need to be removed from this document.

Make a convention section:

* this is to create labels and identifiers for normative references and easier identification and use by the users of this Recommendation.

Developed of a number of principles

* principle of least privilege,
* principle of Zero Trust,

Others

* the reference to RFC9413 is extremely relevant as illustrative of the complexity and wisdom that an architect/designer will need to exercise and was placed as an example in 6.3,
* the important remark on ‘Despite the fact that security of some elements in the system can be proved, there is no definite way to measure and compare security of the whole system’ is now included and helps to define the critical ‘Juvenal’ security design constraint that the contributor failed to find a good way to introduce it, now done,

To be done (as to not forget a number of useful considerations)

* keep developing all the sections,
* position Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability somewhere,
* confront this work with X.800,
* clarify ‘cyber security’ vs ‘cybersecurity’. The focus is on security of the entity of interest which may not be just a ‘cyber’ entity of interest and it provides a much more powerful context when ‘security’ is taken from the perspective of a design characteristic vs others and in particular vs the ‘dependability’ and later ‘resiliency work’,
* is ‘entity of interest’ not a definition?
* re-read the CISA TIC document and extract the ‘capabilities’ that are in fact principles,
* rework completely section 8 on architect/designer and before anything discuss if it should stay in this Recommendation or if a new work item should be proposed to regroup the definitions of all the stakeholders in which the architect and the designer are central but not alone,
* add about ‘beyond corp’ and then ‘Jericho forum’,
* consider the concept of ‘architecture building block ABB’ from the opengroup and see their ZT architecture document (see in CG-SECAPA),
* consider developing this one with metanorma and under GitHub. That would ease significantly maintaining the list of principles in proper tables, cross references, etc. and avoid mistakes.

**Proposal**

Broadcom would like Q1 to discussion this revision, get feedback and produce a new revision text for X.arch-design.

Draft Recommendation ITU-T X.arch-design

Design Principles and Best Practices for Security Architectures

Summary

Keywords

Security, Design, Design Principle, Architect, Designer

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Draft Recommendation ITU-T X.arch-design

Design Principles and Best Practices for Security Architectures

# Scope

The scope of this recommendation is the definition of a lightweight, pragmatic and proven set of design principles, concepts, and criteria; and how to select and apply them to any security design or architectural work.

# References

## Normative references

### Paired Recommendations | International Standards equivalent in technical content

### Other references

# Definitions

[Editors note: To Be Verified towards the end of the development of this Work Item if we need all of these definitions as we focused the scope on basic concepts and principles]

## Terms defined elsewhere

**3.1.1 concern ([b-ISO/IEC 42010] 3.7):** 〈system〉 interest in a system relevant to one or more of its stakeholders



NOTE A concern pertains to any influence on a system in its environment, including developmental, technological, business, operational, organizational, political, economic, legal, regulatory, ecological and social influences

**3.1.2 entity of interest ([b-ISO/IEC 42010:2022] 5.2.1):** The term "entity of interest" is used in this document to refer to the subject of an architecture description. The term is intended to encompass, but is not limited to, entities within the following fields of application, reflecting the intended scope of this document as specified in Clause 1.

— software, including software products and services, per ISO/IEC/IEEE 12207;

— systems, including one-of-a-kind systems, mass-produced systems, customized, adaptive systems, stand-alone and embedded systems, per ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288;

— enterprises as described in ISO 15704, i.e. human undertakings or ventures that have mission, goals and objectives to offer products or services, or to achieve a desired project outcome or business outcome.

## Terms defined in this Recommendation

**architecture:** [should be defined elsewhere]

Note: an architecture identifies a particular problem space and defines a technology-independent analysis of requirements.

[should be defined elsewhere]

**design:** [should be defined elsewhere]

Note: a design maps architectural requirements into a particular family of solutions based upon standards and technical approaches.

**framework:** [should be defined elsewhere]

Note: a framework sits at a broad, conceptual level and provides context for more detailed technical aspects.

**implementation:** realisation of an entity of interest. [should be defined elsewhere]

**reference architecture:** template for solution architecures which realizes a prefefined set of requirements.

Note: A reference architecture uses its subject field reference model (as the next higher level of abstraction) and provides a common (architectural) vision, a modularization and the logic behind the architectural decisions taken.

**reference model:** abstract framework for understanding concepts and relationships between them in a particular problem space (or subject field).

**s**

**security architectural principle:** a guiding believe or rule that informs the design and development of the security aspects within an architecture.

**security concern:** interest to the security aspects of an entity of interest relevant to one or more of its stakeholders.

Note 1: The same NOTE as for the term concern in section 3.1 applies: A concern pertains to any influence on a system in its environment, including developmental, technological, business, operational, organizational, political, economic, legal, regulatory, ecological and social influences.

Note 2: These concerns encompass the identification and understanding of potential security risks, vulnerabilities, threats and protective measures that need to be addressed within the architecture.

**security design**: the process of conceptualizing, selecting, tailoring and organizing the composition of the appropriate security capabilities and security design principles to protect a specific entity of interest throughout its lifecycle.

Note: this involves assessing risks, identifying security concerns, security requirements and applying relevant security design principles - such as Zero Trust, Defense in Depth, and the Principle of Least Privilege - to develop the corresponding architecture (reference, solution, implementation)

**security design best practice:** The established and proven techniques, methodologies, and guidelines that represent the most effective and reliable approaches for enhancing the security of a specific entity of interest.

**security design consideration:** the factors that influence the security design for a specific entity of interest.

**security design constraint:** a limitation or requirement that shapes the selection, organization and implementation of security capabilities and security design principles within the security design process.

Note: these constraints can stem from regulatory requirements, technical limitations, business objectives, or environmental factors, and they directly influence the development of security architectures and solutions to ensure protection of a specific entity of interest throughout its lifecycle.

**security design principle:** a guiding believe or rule that directs the security design of an entity of interest.

**solution:** [should be defined elsewhere]

Note: a solution manifests a design into a particular vendor technology, ensuring adherence to designs, models, and frameworks.

**solution architecture:** architecture of an entity of interest.

Note: a solution architecture (also known as a blueprint) can be a tailored version of a particular reference architecture (which is the next higher level of abstraction).

# 4 Abbreviations and acronyms

DF DeFinition

PoLP Principle of List Privilege

SAP Security Architecture Principle

SDB Security Design Best Practice

SDC Security Design Consideration

SDP Security Design Principle

SDX Security Design Constraint

# Conventions

In this document the following conventions will be used:

The label DFxx is labelling a definition in a given principle.

The label SAPxx is labelling a security architecture principle.

The label SDPxx is labelling a security design principle.

Labels can be combined into identifiers in an absolute name space e.g.:

SDPxxDFyy is the identifier which represents the definition yy in the security design principle xx.

# Context

## Introduction

The audience of this Recommendation is a designer and/or an architect in need to produce a security reference architecture, or a derived security solution architecture, or the derived actual security solution implementation and lifecycle.

Whilst security is an imperative for any design, security is only one aspect of the overall design and, in this perspective, security is only one characteristic among a growing number of conflicting characteristics.

Achieving security within a design requires the support of a number of meta-reference architecture elements and this Recommendation will concentrate on:

* Design principles and best practices for security architectures (section 7),
* An understanding of the role of the designer and/or architect (section 9).

## Architectural methodological reminders

The adoption of architecture practice is a strategic decision for an organization that can help improve its overall value to a variety of stakeholders. Developing and using architectures in any domain has major benefits because a well-developed architecture can:

* foster stakeholder engagement and cooperation with decision-making activities,
* promote uniformity of products and services delivered,
* frame development and usage of solutions (including products, services and systems),
* increase the efficiency and effectiveness of transformation or modernization initiatives,
* promote coherence between enterprise and technical solutions (e.g. systems, software, services),
* improve interoperability between enterprises, systems, services and software applications,
* improve compatibility between systems and technologies,
* drive development of technologies for future applications,
* provide a framework for identifying teams and enabling systems,
* meet consumer demand in the evolving landscape of the marketplace,
* help structure a plan and integration points.

The architecting principles are defined in three categories:

1. Principles about the meaning of architecture
   1. architecture as embodiment of decisions
   2. understanding the problem space and solution space
   3. identifying fundamental concepts and properties of the architecture
   4. architecture as abstractions relevant to nature of architecture entity
2. Principles about the intent of architecture
   1. architecting with a focus on informing decision making
   2. architecting with a focus on value
   3. achieving a balanced and robust architecture
   4. describing architecture to enhance understanding of its intent
3. Principles about the nature of architecture
   1. architecting with a focus on key architectural properties
   2. architecting with a focus on relationships and interfaces
   3. identifying principles guiding solution development
   4. identifying principles guiding the evolution of architecture entities

This Recommendation focuses on 3) and in particular c) and d) though the reader of this Recommendation should be mindful of the wider context of this Recommendation.

## The complex and nuanced nature of the object called ‘Security’

In the context of this Recommendation, on a technological level only, security architectures can be interpreted as:

* security is an architecture,
* security is a design and/or architecture characteristic,
* security is a design and/or architecture criterion,
* security needs to follow some set of design principles for architecture,

When considering an entity of interest, all the security measures form an architecture by themselves and all the above interpretations should be considered at the same time.

This security architecture:

* like any, is subject to comply to a number of functional and non-functional characteristics,
* is therefore subject to the security characteristics itself,
* needs to follow some set of design principles for architecture,
* may be evaluated against various criteria including security criteria.

This approach is partly revealing one aspect of the significant complexity of the nature of security architecture on a technological level only.

It should be completed with the fundamental issue that despite the fact that security of some elements in the system can be proved, there is no definite way to measure and compare security of the whole system.

This will be called the Juvenal security design constraint in reference to the famous quote: ‘sed quis custodiet, ipsos custodet’ which can be interpreted as ‘who guards the guards’. This security design constraint represents a key ‘glass roof’ that may be pushed, may be deformed but doesn’t seem to have any possibility to be pierced.

All the above considerations are part of an even wider context. Indeed, the theory of design includes three other dimensions of law, ethics and anthropology that the architect and/or designer needs to consider when developing a design. Whilst this is clearly important, these dimensions are not in the scope of this Recommendation, yet they are represented as attributes in the role of the architect and/or designer in this document.

* Whilst there are few well-constructed examples to illustrate the logical complexity that the above represents, a good example can be found in [b-RFC9413] in a specific context of the Maintaining Robust Protocols. Robustness is a typical example of a design characteristic that is expressed and it shows how this ‘robustness principle’ led to unanticipated interpretations that led to pitfall putting at test security design principles.

# Security meta reference architecture framework

This section defines a high-level framework that encompasses the concepts that can be utilised by a designer and/or architect in need to produce a security reference architecture, or a derived security solution architecture, or the derived actual security solution implementation and lifecycle.

## Representation method

Each concept proposed in this Recommendation will be represented in the following uniform schema:

* ID: MUST
* Name: MUST
* Abbreviation: MAY
* Type: MUST
* Definition(s): MUST (at least one)
* Description: SHOULD
* Source(s): SHOULD
* Evolution: MAY
* Position in any security model: MAY
* Include: MAY
* Is included by: MAY
* Is obsoleted by: MAY
* Notes: MAY

Template table:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ID |  |
| Name |  |
| Abbreviation |  |
| Type |  |
| Definition(s) |  |
| Description(s) |  |
| Source(s) |  |
| Evolution |  |
| Position in any security model |  |
| Include |  |
| Is included by |  |
| Is obsoleted by |  |
| Notes |  |

## Security concerns

Whilst the identification of security concerns are an essential part of any design and architecture work, they are outside of the scope of this Recommendation.

## Security architectural principles

### The system architecture is able to log and detect

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ID | SAP01 |
| Name | Th system architecture is able to log and detect |
| Abbreviation |  |
| Type | Security architectural principle |
| Definition(s) |  |
| Description(s) |  |
| Source(s) |  |
| Evolution |  |
| Position in any security model |  |
| Include |  |
| Is included by |  |
| Is obsoleted by |  |
| Notes | i  [This is a very good architecture consideration.  Perhaps this should be split in detection and logging as 2 items.  Is it a universal capability and should this stay in this Recommendation] |

### Ensure the system is scalable

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ID | SAP02 |
| Name | Ensure the system is scalable |
| Abbreviation |  |
| Type | Security architectural principle |
| Definition(s) |  |
| Description(s) |  |
| Source(s) |  |
| Evolution |  |
| Position in any security model |  |
| Include |  |
| Is included by |  |
| Is obsoleted by |  |
| Notes | Scalability must be handled with great care.  Scalability is a key property of security architecture.  [This is an overall architecture characteristic.  Shall it be defined here or elsewhere?  In fact yes here as from Security perspective.  It could be part of dependability, resiliency see [b-DEPENDABILITY] ] |

### Compartmentalize and de-couple whenever possible

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ID | SAP03 |
| Name | Compartmentalize and de-couple whenever possible |
| Abbreviation |  |
| Type | Security architectural principle |
| Definition(s) |  |
| Description(s) |  |
| Source(s) |  |
| Evolution |  |
| Position in any security model |  |
| Include |  |
| Is included by |  |
| Is obsoleted by |  |
| Notes | To segment or modularize the system design, is sound advice.  Likewise, to reduce coupling to the minimum is a sensible goal.  [That could be a security design principle, but what makes it different with defense in depth?  It could be micro-segmentation, or network design, etc.  In fact it is different from defence in depth because this is not layered] |

## Security design principles

### Vulnerable components are unacceptable

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ID | SDP01 |
| Name | Vulnerable components are unacceptable |
| Abbreviation |  |
| Type | Security design principle |
| Definition(s) |  |
| Description(s) | During security architecture design, it’s required to either deprecate or refactor the vulnerable components of the product/system. |
| Source(s) |  |
| Evolution |  |
| Position in any security model |  |
| Include |  |
| Is included by |  |
| Is obsoleted by |  |
| Notes | [This is (too) obvious, perhaps this should be re-interpreted from a different point of view on classification regarding an overall safety approach which would allow to classify this principle in the paradigm ‘removal’ in the 4 paradigms: prevention, tolerance, removal, forecasting.] |

### Defense in depth

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ID | SDP02 |
| Name | Defense in depth |
| Abbreviation | N/A |
| Type | Security design principle |
| Definition | DF1) Information security strategy integrating people, technology, and operations capabilities to establish variable barriers across multiple layers and missions of the organization.  DF2) The application of multiple countermeasures in a layered or stepwise manner to achieve security objectives. The methodology involves layering heterogeneous security technologies in the common attack vectors to ensure the attacks missed by one technology are caught by another one. |
| Description | Defense in depth is an approach in which a series of defensive mechanisms are layered in order to protect valuable data and information. This may be according to segmentation boundaries, etc. If one mechanism fails, the perpetrator must very soon face another security mechanism. This will make an attack more complex to conduct, and it will incur a greater cost in the attack. This will effectively make the attack less scalable and may even thwart the attack. |
| Source | CNSSI 4009-2015  NIST SP 800-172  NIST SP 800-172A  NIST SP 800-30 Rev1 under Defense-in-Depth from CNSSI 4009  NIST SP 800-39 under Defense-in-Depth from CNSSI 4009  NIST SP 800-53 Rev.5 under defense in depth  NISTIR 7622 under Defense-in-Depth  NSTIR 8183 under Depfense-in-depth from ISA/IEC 62443, ISO/IEC 62443 1-1  NSTIR 8183 Rev.1 under Depfense-in-depth from ISA/IEC 62443  NSTIR 8183A Vol.2 under Depfense-in-depth from ISO/IEC 62443 1-1  NSTIR 8183A Vol.3 under Depfense-in-depth from ISO/IEC 62443 1-1 |
| Date of first release |  |
| Date of last update |  |
| Position in any security model |  |

### Security coverage must be comprehensive and consistent

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ID | SDP03 |
| Name | Security coverage must be comprehensive and consistent |
| Abbreviation |  |
| Type | Security design principle |
| Definition(s) |  |
| Description(s) | Security features of the product/system typically comprise identification and authentication schemes, security protection for data in transit and data at rest, and security schemes for authorization and access protection. These functionalities need to be there and be as consistent and comprehensive as possible. |
| Source(s) |  |
| Evolution |  |
| Position in any security model |  |
| Include |  |
| Is included by |  |
| Is obsoleted by |  |
| Notes | [this is indeed a security design principle but is it weak? The issue is that you can never be as complete as you want because of the ‘capability/TCO/Risk appetite’ curve] |

### A threat modelling mindset must apply to security architecture design

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ID | SDP04 |
| Name | A threat modelling mindset must apply to security architecture design. |
| Abbreviation |  |
| Type | Security design principle |
| Definition(s) |  |
| Description(s) |  |
| Source(s) |  |
| Evolution |  |
| Position in any security model |  |
| Include |  |
| Is included by |  |
| Is obsoleted by |  |
| Notes | Threat modelling is an activity normally associated with the design phase of a system, including security architecture design. |

### Zero Trust when considered a deisgn security principle

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ID | SDP05 |
| Name | Zero Trust when considered a deisgn security principle |
| Abbreviation | ZT |
| Type | Security design principle |
| Definition(s) |  |
| Description(s) | Zero Trust is a security design principle and strategic approach that assumes no implicit trust is granted to assets or user accounts based solely on their physical or network location (i.e., local area networks vs. the internet) or based on asset ownership (enterprise or personally owned). Instead, Zero Trust requires verifying the identity of anything and everything trying to connect to its systems before granting access, regardless of where the request originates.  Under the Zero Trust model, security is not determined by the perimeter of the network but is instead based on strict identity verification, device health checks, least-privilege access, and microsegmentation to minimize lateral movement within networks. Access to resources is granted on a need-to-know basis, and transactions are securely authenticated and authorized within a segmented environment. |
| Source(s) | [To be further researched through the SG17 ZT workshop  NIST SP 800-207  Forrester] |
| Evolution | [Consider section 1.1 of NIST SP 800-207  Consider further: ] |
| Position in any security model |  |
| Include | [Identify existing SDPs / Generate the missing SDPs from this list e.g. MFA, Encryption, Continuous Verification. Is SAP03 an SAP or an SDP?]  Continuous Verification: Trust is never assumed and must be continually reassessed. Authentication and authorization are required for all users and devices seeking access to resources, regardless of their location.  SDP07 Least-Privilege Access: Users and devices are given the minimum access necessary to perform their duties, reducing the potential impact of a breach.  SAP03 Microsegmentation: Networks are divided into small, secure zones to maintain separate access for separate parts of the network. This limits an attacker's ability to move laterally across a network.  Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): The use of multiple verification methods to ensure that a user or device is granted access only after successfully presenting two or more pieces of evidence to an authentication mechanism.  Encrypt Data: Encrypting data at rest and in transit to protect the integrity and confidentiality of the data, even if a network is compromised. |
| Is included by |  |
| Is obsoleted by |  |
| Notes |  |

### Minimize the attack surface area

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ID | SDP06 |
| Name | Minimize the attack surface area |
| Abbreviation |  |
| Type | Security design principle |
| Definition(s) |  |
| Description(s) |  |
| Source(s) |  |
| Evolution |  |
| Position in any security model |  |
| Include |  |
| Is included by |  |
| Is obsoleted by |  |
| Notes |  |

### The principle of least privilege

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ID | SDP07 |
| Name | The principle of least privilege |
| Abbreviation | PoLP |
| Type | Security design principle |
| Definition(s) | DF01 NIST 800-53 R5 AC-6 Control Statement: Employ the principle of least priviledge, allowing only authorized accesses for users (or processes acting on behalf of users) that are necessary to accomplish assigned organizational tasks. |
| Description(s) | It refers to the practice of limiting access rights for users (and systems) to the bare minimum necessary to perform their functions. This means that a user, program, or process should have only the privileges which are essential for its intended function, nothing more.  Implementing the least privilege principle helps to reduce the attack surface of a system by limiting access to critical systems and data to only those entities that require it to perform their duties. This can significantly mitigate the potential damage from various security threats, such as malware infections or the actions of malicious actors. By ensuring that users and systems operate using the minimal set of privileges, organizations can better protect sensitive information and critical infrastructure from unauthorized access and exploitation.  The principle of least privilege can be applied across various aspects of IT environments, including user permissions, software execution, system processes, and network access. It is often enforced through user account management processes, role-based access control (RBAC), access control lists (ACLs), and other security mechanisms designed to control access and privileges effectively. |
| Source(s) | [To research into:  ISO/IEC 27001 and in particular ISO/IEC 27001:2013 A.9  NIS Special Publication 80-53  ISO/IEC 15408 The Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CC)  Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI/DSS)  The Center for Internet Security (CIS) Controls  Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS)] |
| Evolution | The principle of least privilege (PoLP) is widely attributed to Jerome Saltzer and Michael D. Schroeder, who first articulated it in their seminal paper titled "The Protection of Information in Computer Systems," published in 1975 as part of the Proceedings of the IEEE, Vol. 63, No. 9. This paper laid out a set of design principles for securing information in computer systems, among which the principle of least privilege played a crucial role.  Saltzer and Schroeder were part of the research community at MIT's Project MAC, which later became the MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL). Their work was foundational in the field of computer security, influencing not only academic research but also the practical design and implementation of secure computing systems.  The principle of least privilege is one of several key principles they introduced, which also include concepts like economy of mechanism, fail-safe defaults, and separation of privilege. These principles have since become standard guidelines in the design and operation of secure systems.  While the formal articulation of the principle dates back to Saltzer and Schroeder's 1975 paper, the underlying concept of minimizing access or privilege to what is necessary for a particular purpose has been a common practice in security-sensitive environments even before its formalization in the context of computer security. |
| Position in any security model |  |
| Include |  |
| Is included by | SDP05 (ZT) |
| Is obsoleted by |  |
| Notes |  |

### Separation of duties

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ID | SDP08 |
| Name | Separation of duties |
| Abbreviation |  |
| Type | Security design principle |
| Definition(s) |  |
| Description(s) |  |
| Source(s) |  |
| Evolution |  |
| Position in any security model |  |
| Include |  |
| Is included by |  |
| Is obsoleted by |  |
| Notes | [Need to clarify relationship with Least privilege] |

### Security by Design is the most cost-effective approach to security

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ID | SDP09 |
| Name | Security by Design is the most cost-effective approach to security |
| Abbreviation |  |
| Type | Security design principle |
| Definition(s) |  |
| Description(s) |  |
| Source(s) |  |
| Evolution |  |
| Position in any security model |  |
| Include |  |
| Is included by |  |
| Is obsoleted by |  |
| Notes | Security is vital for all critical infrastructures and should be designed into systems and operations from the beginning, rather than being applied after the systems have been implemented.  [there is another definition earlier:  Security by design is an approach in development that helps to focus on making a system as secure as possible already in the development process. It also helps to focus on best design practices.  Where is it defined in a normative term  It is not always feasible  It is not the solution because of judge and party see CG-SECAPA discussion  What’s about security by implementation, migraton, etc.] |



## Security design considerations

### Robustness is a prerequisite for a security architecture

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ID | SDC01 |
| Name | Robustness is a prerequisite for a security architecture |
| Abbreviation |  |
| Type | Security design consideration |
| Definition(s) |  |
| Description(s) |  |
| Source(s) |  |
| Evolution |  |
| Position in any security model |  |
| Include |  |
| Is included by |  |
| Is obsoleted by |  |
| Notes |  |

### Threat landscape awareness is a prerequisite

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ID | SDC02 |
| Name | Threat landscape awareness is a prerequisite |
| Abbreviation |  |
| Type | Security design consideration |
| Definition(s) |  |
| Description(s) |  |
| Source(s) |  |
| Evolution |  |
| Position in any security model |  |
| Include |  |
| Is included by |  |
| Is obsoleted by |  |
| Notes |  |

### Awareness of the Cyber Kill Chain is necessary

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ID | SDC03 |
| Name | Awareness of the Cyber Kill Chain is necessary |
| Abbreviation |  |
| Type | Security design consideration |
| Definition(s) |  |
| Description(s) |  |
| Source(s) |  |
| Evolution |  |
| Position in any security model |  |
| Include |  |
| Is included by |  |
| Is obsoleted by |  |
| Notes |  |

### Fallback and backwards compatibility must be managed

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ID | SDC04 |
| Name | Fallback and backwards compatibility must be managed |
| Abbreviation |  |
| Type | Security design consideration |
| Definition(s) |  |
| Description(s) |  |
| Source(s) |  |
| Evolution |  |
| Position in any security model |  |
| Include |  |
| Is included by |  |
| Is obsoleted by |  |
| Notes |  |

### Single point of failure must be avoided (and planned for)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ID | SDC05 |
| Name | Single point of failure must be avoided (and planned for) |
| Abbreviation |  |
| Type | Security design consideration |
| Definition(s) |  |
| Description(s) |  |
| Source(s) |  |
| Evolution |  |
| Position in any security model |  |
| Include |  |
| Is included by |  |
| Is obsoleted by |  |
| Notes |  |

### All security functions [must][should] be upgradable, replaceable and updatable

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ID | SDC06 |
| Name | All security functions [must][should] be upgradable, replaceable and updatable |
| Abbreviation |  |
| Type | Security design consideration |
| Definition(s) |  |
| Description(s) |  |
| Source(s) |  |
| Evolution |  |
| Position in any security model |  |
| Include |  |
| Is included by |  |
| Is obsoleted by |  |
| Notes |  |

### There must be strong detection and response capabilities

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ID | SDC07 |
| Name | There must be strong detection and response capabilities |
| Abbreviation |  |
| Type | Security design consideration |
| Definition(s) |  |
| Description(s) |  |
| Source(s) |  |
| Evolution |  |
| Position in any security model |  |
| Include |  |
| Is included by |  |
| Is obsoleted by |  |
| Notes |  |

### Plan for success and a long-term future

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ID | SDC08 |
| Name | Plan for success and a long-term future |
| Abbreviation |  |
| Type | Security design consideration |
| Definition(s) |  |
| Description(s) |  |
| Source(s) |  |
| Evolution |  |
| Position in any security model |  |
| Include |  |
| Is included by |  |
| Is obsoleted by |  |
| Notes |  |

## Security design best practices

### Failures provide invaluable information

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ID | SDB01 |
| Name | Failures provide invaluable information |
| Abbreviation |  |
| Type | Security design best practice |
| Definition(s) |  |
| Description(s) |  |
| Source(s) |  |
| Evolution |  |
| Position in any security model |  |
| Include |  |
| Is included by |  |
| Is obsoleted by |  |
| Notes | To learn from failure is essential. Failures provide vital information about how the system actually works. To learn from security failures in other systems is also important. |

### System interfaces and exposure should be explicitly defined

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ID | SDB02 |
| Name | System interfaces and exposure should be explicitly defined |
| Abbreviation |  |
| Type | Security design best practice |
| Definition(s) |  |
| Description(s) |  |
| Source(s) |  |
| Evolution |  |
| Position in any security model |  |
| Include |  |
| Is included by |  |
| Is obsoleted by |  |
| Notes | Be explicit about intended exposure. To be explicit about intended exposure does not guarantee that the attack surface is well-contained, but it will at least indicate that the problem has been considered |

### Be explicit. Do not assume

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ID | SDB03 |
| Name | Be explicit. Do not assume |
| Abbreviation |  |
| Type | Security design best practice |
| Definition(s) |  |
| Description(s) |  |
| Source(s) |  |
| Evolution |  |
| Position in any security model |  |
| Include |  |
| Is included by |  |
| Is obsoleted by |  |
| Notes |  |

### Known vulnerabilities should be prioritised and fixed accordingly, through different security and protection levels.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ID | SDB04 |
| Name | Known vulnerabilities should be prioritised and fixed accordingly, through different security and protection levels. |
| Abbreviation |  |
| Type | Security design best practice |
| Definition(s) |  |
| Description(s) |  |
| Source(s) |  |
| Evolution |  |
| Position in any security model |  |
| Include |  |
| Is included by |  |
| Is obsoleted by |  |
| Notes | An attacker would need to exploit some kind of vulnerability in order to successfully carry out an attack. This is not to suggest that every vulnerability is equally important or need urgent attention. It simply means that all known vulnerabilities could be fixed through different security and protection levels. Sometimes it may suffice to reduce the exposure to provide an effective stopgap mitigation  [As there might be thousands of vulnerabilities, prioritisation is essential and the most severe/critical ones should be addressed.] |

### Fail securely

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ID | SDB05 |
| Name | Fail securely |
| Abbreviation |  |
| Type | Security design best practice |
| Definition(s) |  |
| Description(s) |  |
| Source(s) |  |
| Evolution |  |
| Position in any security model |  |
| Include |  |
| Is included by |  |
| Is obsoleted by |  |
| Notes |  |

### Avoid security by obscurity

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ID | SDB06 |
| Name | Avoid security by obscurity |
| Abbreviation |  |
| Type | Security design best practice |
| Definition(s) |  |
| Description(s) |  |
| Source(s) |  |
| Evolution |  |
| Position in any security model |  |
| Include |  |
| Is included by |  |
| Is obsoleted by |  |
| Notes |  |

### Keep security simple

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ID | SDB07 |
| Name | Keep security simple |
| Abbreviation |  |
| Type | Security design best practice |
| Definition(s) |  |
| Description(s) |  |
| Source(s) |  |
| Evolution |  |
| Position in any security model |  |
| Include |  |
| Is included by |  |
| Is obsoleted by |  |
| Notes |  |

### Asset clarification

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ID | SDB08 |
| Name | Asset clarification |
| Abbreviation |  |
| Type | Security design best practice |
| Definition(s) |  |
| Description(s) |  |
| Source(s) |  |
| Evolution |  |
| Position in any security model |  |
| Include |  |
| Is included by |  |
| Is obsoleted by |  |
| Notes | [change the title this is about Asset identification and classification] |

### Establish secure defaults

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ID | SDB09 |
| Name | Establish secure defaults |
| Abbreviation |  |
| Type | Security design best practice |
| Definition(s) |  |
| Description(s) |  |
| Source(s) |  |
| Evolution |  |
| Position in any security model |  |
| Include |  |
| Is included by |  |
| Is obsoleted by |  |
| Notes | [massive difference between setting defaults in Vendor X products vs Vendor Y products] |

## Security design constraint

### Juvenal

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ID | SDX01 |
| Name | Juvenal |
| Abbreviation |  |
| Type | Security design constraint |
| Definition(s) |  |
| Description(s) | Despite the fact that security of some elements in the system can be proved, there is no definite way to measure and compare security of the whole system.  This will be called the Juvenal security design constraint in reference to the famous quote: ‘sed quis custodiet, ipsos custodet’ which can be interpreted as ‘who guards the guards’.  This security design constraint represents a key ‘glass roof’ that may be pushed, may be deformed but doesn’t seem to have any possibility to be pierced. |
| Source(s) |  |
| Evolution |  |
| Position in any security model |  |
| Include |  |
| Is included by |  |
| Is obsoleted by |  |
| Notes |  |

## Evolutionary considerations



## Security design principles relationships

This section studies the relationships between security design principles with the objective to build an Euler-Venn diagram.

### Zero Trust vs Defence in depth

#### Is Zero Trust included in Defence in depth?

#### Is Defence in depth included in Zero Trust?

#### Do Zero Trust and Defence in depth partially overlap?

### Perimeter defence vs Defence in depth

#### Is Perimeter defence included in Defence in depth?

#### Is Defence in depth included in Perimeter defence?

### Do Perimeter defence and Defence in depth partially overlap?

## Not a security design principle

There are a number of concepts in the industry that depending on the context are not security design principles. Examples:

* SASE
* SSE
* MESH

# Consideration on Designer and Architect Roles

[Editor’s note: This section is important but will require a lot of rewording]

Designers and architects form a key constituency of this Recommendation.

* They play an important if not existential role in the success of a solution.
* They can too be the limit to this success.

## Context for the role

### Designer and architect jobs across domains

In military engineering and way later in civil engineering (as this is a domain where humans have a long experience) designers and architects have rather well codified job descriptions with full curricula that are not only licensed but deliver diploma which not only gives the right to the architect to do his job, but comes too with responsibilities and liabilities.

If a bridge falls down, both from a legal and an insurance perspective, the process will inevitably lead to the question of whether or not the architect is responsible (liable) or not. His/her responsibility may be engaged.

### Designer and architect jobs in ICT

The ICT industry incrementally recognized the problem and attributed its solution to architects and designers which were allocated in various types and companies functions

in IT and ICT we observe many differences, at this stage:

* IT and ICT are domains that are much younger by orders of magnitude than civil engineering
* The role/job of an architect is extremely recent and was mostly hidden in the wordings ‘software engineer’, etc.
* The role/job and covers many subtypes:
  + Software architect
  + System architect
  + Solution architect
  + Etc.
* For a long time there were no codification and even trainings or certification for this job until TOGAF arrived in 1995 and yet, even today, like anything, it has limits
* There are no liabilities attached to any architect. An architect making a mistake at design level has absolutely no risk even if (lived stories) it could incur enormous costs and liabilities for the ‘customer’ and for the ‘provider’ of the architecture.

## Different types of ICT Designer and Architects

Firstly, at product and service level, there are various types of architects (the list is not meant to be exhaustive)

Table 1 - Architect and Designer types

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Architect type** | **Coverage** | **Organization** |
| Software Architect | Covers the architecture of a software that needs to be developed | Engineering / R&D |
| Product Architect | Covers the end to end architecture of product that needs to be developed | Engineering / R&D |
| Designer | Covers the full design of a product or groups of products including other design criteria such as Societal, Technical, Ecological, Environmental, Political, Human Factor, etc. | Engineering / R&D |
| Security Architect | Covers the security aspect of a solution and proposes either a security architecture or a security by design ‘design’ | SoC / CISO / etc. |
| System Architect | Covers the design of an entire set of systems (hardware, software, etc.) that needs to be put in production for a given period of time (usually years or more) | Field |
| Solution Architect | Covers the end to end solution (hardware, software, professional services, partners, compliancy, etc.) for a given customer | Field |
| Technical Directors | Office of the CTO and CTOs do have a view on design in terms of internal standardisation, design directions, harmonisation, composability and do participate in the organization transformation, breaking the silos or contributing to the collaboration and coordination between the silos based on design approaches | Office of CTO |

## The nature of the job

The architects and designers have a pivot job in each organization because they have to produce deliverables that will take into

[Editors note: the first and second bullets should be checked vs above terminology, e.g. shouldn’t we use the term ‘concern’ in the first bullet]

* In one hand, the considerations of definitions, standards, requirements, limits and constraints
* On the other hand, the whole lifecycle of a product or a service

The diagram below shows this pivot role on the top and on the bottom shows a number of dimensions that make the characteristics of the architect in his core and deepest nature.

[Editorial note: Harmonise the cycle with the cycle proposed in section 9.4]

Table 2 - The architect and designers play a pivot role

Une image contenant capture d’écran

Description générée automatiquement

As well it is important that each architect / designer, will come with his own approach which will likely be unique in itself. The architect / designer, could consider his/her deliverables vs the four below dimensions:

* Anthropology
* Ethics
* Law
* Technology

In special conditions though, especially when no human being had any previous experience, one needs to consider the reverse order:

* Technology
* Law
* Ethics
* Anthropology

# Examples

[Editor’s note: this section will need a lot of curation but will be done after section 7, 8 and 9 are complete]

## Key Concepts for Cyber Security

### Concept #1

Resilience should be the overall strategy for ensuring business continuity: When focusing on resilience in general, organizations must consider safety, security, and reliability of the processes and the delivery of their services. Resilience includes security measures that can mitigate impacts, not only before incidents (identify & prevent), but also during such incidents (detect & respond) and after incidents have been resolved (recover).

[Editors note: is this a security design principle? Or is it a context where security design principles should apply? Or is it a context that imposes new security design principles, or constraints or composition issues? This infers a new section on composition/usage, even perhaps AFTER Kishor’s section]

### Concept #3

IT and OT are similar but different: Technologies in Operational environments (called OT) have many differing security constraints and requirements from Informational Technologies (IT) environments.

[Editors note

* Same as concept #1 this is not a design principle but areas of applicability
* We should look at transformation of NT, AI, IOT, OT, IT]

### Concept #4

Risk assessment, risk mitigation, and continuous update of processes are fundamental to improving security: Based on an organization’s business requirements, its security risk exposure must be determined (human safety, physical, functional, environmental, financial, societal, reputational) for all its business processes.

[Same as concept #1 this is more of a context]

### Concept #5

Cyber security standards and best practice guidelines for OT environments should be used to support the risk management process and establish security programs and policies: at the right time.

[Same as concept #1 this is applicability]

Appendix 1 – A comprehensive and granular Cyber Security Architecture imperative for Civic Infrastructure.

**Context:**

International law defines Four Global Commons (natural assets outside national jurisdiction) which are the earth’s natural resources i.e. the High Seas, the Atmosphere, Antarctica, and Outer Space. Cyberspace is the 5th Global Common. It is also considered as the 5th Dimension beyond the 3 dimensions of Space & 4th dimension being the Time.

Challenges that all economies are facing today in safeguarding the security and privacy of its ecosystem including citizen are - Transnational Nature of Cyber Crime, ‘Cultural’ Vulnerabilities, Internet Resilience and Threat Landscape.

Cyber risk threat vectors have evolved rapidly, and attacks have become increasingly sophisticated, deliberate, and unrelenting in nature. In the digital era, trust is a complex issue fraught with myriad existential threats to the enterprise. And while disruptive technologies are often viewed as vehicles for exponential growth, tech alone can’t build long-term trust. Every aspect of an organization disrupted by technology represents an opportunity to gain or lose stakeholders' trust. Leaders are approaching trust not as a compliance issue but as a business-critical goal. For this reason, leading organizations are taking a 360-degree approach to maintain the high level of trust their stakeholders expect.

The new paradigm of Smart Grid, Smart Home, Smart Building, Smart Manufacturing, Smart City already complicated by the ‘Internet of Things’ & Internet of ‘Everything’ made further complex by the 5G, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, Blockchain & Quantum Computing, make it truly complex to develop and embed comprehensive Security, Privacy and Trustworthiness attributes in the products, systems and solutions for any use case or application - be it consumer, commercial, industrial, automotive or strategic domains like civic infrastructure.

The recent evolution of disruptive technologies and digitalization compounded by the Covid 19, changing geopolitical situations, and increasing cyber-attacks bring a whole new set of challenges for the Security and Security Evaluation Methodologies for complex nature & architectures of Civic Infrastructures of the nation leveraging the IT & Communication Networks evolving to meet these rising needs of the Society.

The highly protected Networks for the ‘Civic Infrastructures’ need to give access to the consumers for Consumer Engagement and Participation in these Smart (Digital) Infrastructures to meet the true drivers of setting them up. These large Smart Networks are actually highly complex ‘Systems of Systems’ and “Networks of Networks’, and thus create fresh challenges in the Security Paradigm and development of Protection Profiles.

It is evident that Cyber Security is a very complex paradigm, and with evolving new technologies, requirements, and ever-increasing Attack Surface the vulnerabilities are rising many folds with time. In such a dynamic scenario, it is required to develop a Cyber Security Strategy to make our Critical Infrastructure comprehensively Safe, Secure, Resilient and Trustworthy.

**Imperative:**

The civic infrastructure cyberthreat landscape is rapidly evolving and expanding, with more frequent attacks, more numerous and varied threat actors, and increasingly sophisticated malware and tools that are more widely available and sometimes indiscriminately deployed. Civic infrastructure operations are among the most frequently attacked targets, increasingly by nation-state actors aiming for disruption and even destruction through ICS.

It would be reasonable to assume that all the stakeholders have already understood the urgency of ensuring the Security & Resilience of Civic Infrastructure; however, the initiatives and approaches already adopted and/or being adopted by the different arms of the governments are quite arbitrary and random, considering point solutions with limited effectiveness to mitigate highly complex cyber threats.

Improving cyber safety and resilience requires all stakeholders to act together at scale and in a coordinated way, including governments, the engineering professionals, operators of civic infrastructure and other systems, and developers of products and components. The evolving nature of the challenges will require continual responsiveness and agility by governments and other stakeholders.

The need for proven, scalable, and standards-based solutions for Civic Infrastructures’ deployment scenario, with inherent complexity and trade-offs, requires specialized, skilled, and multi-stakeholder engagement. THUS, it is required to undertake this task of global importance, which shall make a significant contribution in building a “Robust Foundation for Civic Information Infrastructures” along with paving ways to make our community “secure & sustainable”.

The only approach would be to adopt top-down approach to standardization starting at the system or system-architecture rather than at the product level. It is required to Study & Analyse the diverse Use Cases, Applications and corresponding Stakeholders & their respective requirements to understand their respective Characteristics and concerns. Develop a Granular Civic Infrastructures’ Cyber Security Architecture mapping all the security, privacy, safety, resilience characteristics with the Granular Civic Infrastructure Architecture.

Based on the developed Cyber Security Reference Architecture, the diverse standards shall need to be mapped to well identified Stakeholders’ concerns and diverse Products, Systems & Solutions being deployed. In accordance with the appropriate Standards identified & mapped, a comprehensive Compliance Testing Framework followed by granular Testing Schemas shall need to be developed based on which the Testing Infrastructure could be created.

Unless, the aforementioned milestones are achieved, the Security Compliance & Testing Strategy shall NOT deliver the desired results.

**Conclusion**

Innovation and technology development are accelerating. Strategic plans and roadmaps are needed to help ensure that the market is suitably served with best practices that is pertinent to the goals and context of this very large market.

The multiplicity of technologies and their convergence in many new and emerging markets, however, particularly those involving large-scale infrastructure demand a top-down approach to standardization starting at the system or system-architecture rather than at the product level. Therefore, the systemic approach in standardization work can define and strengthen the systems approach throughout the technical community to ensure that highly complex market sectors can be properly addressed and supported. It promotes an increased co-operation with many other standards-developing organizations and relevant non-standards bodies needed on an international level.

Given the scale, moving forward through the labyrinth of Disruptive Technologies cannot be successfully, efficiently, and swiftly accomplished without standards. The role of standards to help steer and shape this journey is vital. Standards provide a foundation to support innovation. The Standards support our need to balance agility, openness, and security in a fast-moving environment. The Standards provide us with a reliable platform to innovate, differentiate and scale up our technology development. They help to control essential security and integrate the right level of interoperability. Standards help ensure cyber security in ICT and IoT systems (Digital & Cyber Physical systems). Standards capture best practices and set regulatory compliance requirements, which is crucial for the sustainable Digital Transformation of the Critical Infrastructure.

It is imperative to delve into the security, privacy & trustworthiness aspects, and implications of the new paradigm of “Digital Infrastructure” and “Internet of Things” that the pervasive computing has enabled, thus raising new challenges for the ‘IT & Communication Security’ Development & Evaluation Eco-system. Hence, needing a new rigorous and vigorous effort in developing a “Comprehensive Cyber Security, Resilience & Trustworthiness” Strategy Framework encompassing all the critical domains and Stakeholders’ classifications and their respective imperatives from Cyber Security & Resilience & Trustworthiness Perspective.

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keywords: {Taxonomy;Availability;Fault tolerance;Safety;Maintenance;Communication system security;Uncertainty;Standardization;Books;Index Terms- Dependability;security;trust;faults;errors;failures;vulnerabilities;attacks;fault tolerance;fault removal;fault forecasting.},

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_