

## Chapter 18

# Race in world politics

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### Framing Questions

- How are the histories of European imperialism and colonialism crucial for understanding the global impact of race?
- What is the relationship between race, biology, and culture?
- Is contemporary world politics less racist than it was in the past?

### Reader's Guide

This chapter introduces students to the various ways in which race can been understood as a fundamental ordering principle of world politics, in that it divides humanity into a hierarchy of distinct groups. The first section explores the historical processes that gave

rise to race, especially European imperial expansion and colonization. The second section goes on to engage with some key debates around the conceptualization of race. Finally, the third section builds on these historical and conceptual discussions to explore new ways in which race continues to order world politics.

## Introduction

Race has always been a fundamental concern of International Relations (IR). Indeed, in the early years of the field's formation, race was discussed as a mainstream issue, not a marginal one. In the aftermath of the First World War, W. E. B. Du Bois, a noted African-American intellectual, published an article in the journal *Foreign Affairs* entitled 'Worlds of Color' (Du Bois 1925), in which he repeated a prognosis he had made over 20 years earlier: 'The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the colour-line—the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea' (Du Bois 1961: 23).

*Foreign Affairs* was—and remains—one of the pre-eminent journals of foreign policy analysis. But as Robert Vitalis (2010) notes, it started life as the *Journal of Race Development*. Indeed, a number of scholars now argue that imperial administration was one the foremost concerns of early twentieth-century intellectuals studying world politics—perhaps even more so than inter-state relations. And race was key to the ordering and administration of empire. Nonetheless, mainstream IR theorists have ignored Du Bois's explanation of the racial causes of the First World War, even though this African-American intellectual wrote in the pre-eminent IR journal of its time.

But what is 'race'? This question has no easy answers. Usually racism conjures an idea of prejudice based on biological divisions that order humanity into group hierarchies—the 'whites', the 'Blacks', the 'Arabs', the 'Jews', etc. However, as an ordering principle of world politics, race references far more than skin colour, facial features, and hair texture. Some brief notes on the origins of the term will help to expand the canvas on which we view race.

## Histories of race in world politics

This section traces the emergence of race as an ordering principle of world politics through the making of the Atlantic world and subsequent European imperial expansion across the rest of the globe. The section then considers the ways in which race was implicated in the two world wars of the twentieth century and the subsequent cold war era.

Before the era of Columbus, when Europeans 'discovered' and conquered the 'new' world of the Americas, race—or, in the romance languages, *raza*—possessed a curious collection of meanings. These included a defect or a coarseness in fine cloth, or a defect in poetic speech. By the early seventeenth century *raza* also referred to the branding of purebred horses, as well as to a human lineage defined especially by Jewish or Moorish (North West African Muslim) ancestry. As time went by, these diverse references started to share common coordinates: a sense of defectiveness as well as reference to a non-Christian and/or non-European ('heathen') heritage.

This latter point is important because in fifteenth-century Christian Europe the religious group to which one professed affiliation was linked intimately with perceptions of one's humanity. Therefore it can be said that by the time of the European conquest of the Americas, race had begun to crystallize as a way to reference defects in humanity. The adjudication of these defects through European imperial expansion and colonization became a key ordering principle of world politics.

This chapter interrogates race as an ordering principle of world politics, intimately connected to imperial expansion, colonial rule, and their afterlives in the contemporary era. The chapter is guided by the following working definition of race: the hierarchical adjudication of human competencies through the categorizing of group attributes, wherein groups are delineated by some kind of shared heritage that is deemed visually identifiable through visual or other sensate cues. Additionally, the chapter explores two different but interconnected methods by which human competencies are adjudicated through race: a biological calculus and a cultural calculus.

## The making of the Atlantic World

The connecting of Europe, Africa, and the Americas to form what has been called the 'Atlantic world' resulted from the European colonial project that began in earnest in 1492. Two violent processes were central to this project: (1) dispossessing indigenous peoples of their lands in the Americas; and (2) dehumanizing Africans

trafficked across the Atlantic to labour on plantations as 'slaves'. Both processes questioned the humanity of those colonized and enslaved under European colonialism; it is this questioning that gave rise to race as an ordering principle of world politics.

As conquerors from Spain laid claim to the Americas, one key issue confronted Spanish theologians in the early 1500s: the inhabitants of the Americas did not appear in the Bible, and their appearance—especially their nakedness—suggested that they should be incorporated into the Christian world as animals, or at least as less-than-human. Such incorporation was subsequently used to justify dispossessing indigenous peoples of their land and compelling them to work for the conquistadors, the Spanish conquerors. But defenders of indigenous peoples, such as Bartolomé de las Casas, argued in favour of their humanity, claiming that their living practices demonstrated an ability to reason—taken to be a key competency of humanity. If this was the case then indigenous people could not be enslaved.

Although las Casas argued successfully that indigenous peoples could not be enslaved, he initially claimed that 'Negroes' could legitimately replace their slave labour. In fact the human trafficking of Africans across the Atlantic had already begun just before these theological debates but had not yet reached its apex, which was between the late seventeenth century and mid-nineteenth century. Overall, approximately 12 million Africans were trafficked, with at least 15 per cent dying during the passage. On arrival, captive Africans were sold to plantations and put to work farming export crops such as sugar, cotton, and tobacco. This horrific 'slave trade' in living peoples is another practice made possible through racialization, described in more detail later in the chapter.

In 1672 the Royal African Company received a monopoly over English trade with West Africa in 'red-wood, elephants teeth, negroes, slaves, hides, wax, guinea grains, or other commodities' (Mtubani 1983: 71). This legal instrument demonstrates the process whereby Africans were dehumanized to become chattel commodities akin to livestock. As merely property, enslaved peoples had hardly any recourse to natural justice, while their predominantly European owners effectively exercised the sovereign power of life or death over them.

Unlike other forms of slavery known at the time, in Atlantic slavery Africans alone were turned into less-than-human chattels, with this status being passed down to their descendants, to be recognized by skin colour. And so out of many diverse African peoples the 'negro'—or

Black race—was born. Moreover, in this same process, diverse Europeans became 'white'—humanity perfected. Here, one's humanity was judged on a biological basis.

And so, in the colonization of the Americas, race emerged as a way to calculate the competency of a group's humanity, either culturally (the cultural calculus) or biologically (the biological calculus). The cultural calculus came out of the theological debate over indigenous peoples. It was used to adjudicate the cultural competencies of a group whose heritage lay outside of the 'old' Biblical world, and the degree to which these competencies—especially the ability to reason—allowed them to enjoy basic protections as human beings. The biological calculus of race emerged out of the enslavement of Africans and adjudicated the humanity of groups by reference to gradations of skin colour, hair type, and physiognomy (facial features).

Both modes of calculation sought to judge the (lack of) humanity of a group (either by cultural or biological attributes, or a combination of both) so as to determine the degree to which that group could be enslaved, dispossessed, excluded, or exploited in the colonial project. Colonial agents considered only their own white race to be competent to judge the humanity of others. Hence, the ordering principle of race was consistently hierarchical and exclusionary.

Sexual relations (often coerced) between Europeans and indigenous peoples and/or Africans that bore offspring were a fundamental challenge to race. Were the children of white fathers and Black mothers to be considered half-human? And could and should they be made property? In what ways might intimate relations with indigenous peoples corrupt and damage the cultural competencies—and superior humanity—of Europeans? In these respects, relations of gender and sex were seminal to the construction of race as an ordering principle of world politics (see Box 18.1).

### Box 18.1 Official colour hierarchies in the French Caribbean colony of St Domingue

Mulatto: cross between white and negro

Mestiço: cross between white and mulatto

Quadroon: cross between white and mestiço

Le capre: cross between mulatto and negro

Griffe: cross between le capre and negro

Mestif: cross between white and le capre

Quateron: cross between white and mestif

An even greater threat was the resistance of indigenous peoples and enslaved Africans to colonial rule and its race logics of hierarchy and exclusion. In this respect the Haitian Revolution deserves special attention. Between 1791 and 1804, enslaved Africans mounted a successful insurgency against European slaving powers on the French island of St Domingue. In 1805 the Haitian constitution, authored by the leaders of the revolution, was ratified.

By the late eighteenth century, European abolitionists (those campaigning for an end to the slave

trade) argued that 'negroes' were indeed biologically human but, degraded so deeply by slavery, lacked the cultural competencies to be treated as fully human (see **Opposing Opinions 18.1**). In short, they would need to be civilized by Europeans over generations. But the content of the Haitian Revolution fundamentally undermined Europeans' assumptions of their racial supremacy—even the paternalism of abolitionists.

Article 2 of the Haitian Revolution declared that 'slavery is forever abolished'. However, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen,

## Opposing Opinions 18.1 Racism emerged as a consequence of the slave trade

### For

**Racism was born out of capitalism.** When Karl Marx recounted the history of exploitation and expropriation that gave rise to global capitalism he mentioned the 'turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black-skins'. Similarly, Marxist-influenced political economists, most famously Trinidadian Eric Williams, argued that 'slavery was not born of racism: rather, racism was the consequence of slavery' (E. Williams 1944: 7).

**The capitalist profit motive determined that Africans would be enslaved.** Initially non-Africans were enslaved. Indigenous and even European labourers were enslaved or indentured by European capitalists to work in the mines and plantations of the Americas. Only when these labour supplies proved inadequate for various demographic and political reasons did European capitalists turn to African labour as the key source to exploit in order to gain super-profits from the colonies. The emergence of race as an ordering principle of the global capitalist division of labour was therefore driven by the profit motive.

**Anti-Black racism became naturalized.** The peculiar position of Africans in the 'global division of labour' as enslaved labourers became naturalized over time, so it appeared as if Africans had always been destined for slavery.

### Against

**Racism was born out of religious disputes.** Historians and cultural theorists such as James Sweet (1997), Sylvia Wynter (2003), and Walter Mignolo (2008) situate the emergence of race in the theological doctrines that European Christians developed before 1492 as part of a campaign to cleanse the Iberian peninsula of Muslim and Jewish influence.

**Anti-Semitism played an important part in the creation of race.** During the fifteenth century, Jews in Iberia were either expelled or compelled to convert to Christianity. However, many Jews who did convert continued to practise their faith in private. Over time, the fidelity of Jewish converts was questioned, with the belief that Judaism could not be sanitized by Christian baptism but rather was a 'stain' that was inherited in the blood. Purity of one's blood lineage was therefore a key factor in determining one's humanity.

**Anti-African prejudice was propagated by some Muslim scholars.** Iberian Christians learned a great deal from their Muslim contemporaries. However, a belief propagated by some—but not all—Muslim scholars was that Africans held more in common with animals than with humanity, hence predisposing them to a 'natural' enslavement.

**Theological disputes and religious prejudices become racialized.** Initially the conquistadors travelled to the Americas having been versed in the theological conflicts between Christians, Jews, and Muslims. But there, religious fault-lines were secularized and racialized to become the colonizers versus the colonized, or Spaniards and Portuguese versus 'Indians' and 'Negroes'. The 'black' skin of Africans became proof of a stain on the blood that marked a less-than-human and thus enslavable status.

1. How was racism made necessary through the pursuit of profit?
2. In what ways did religious controversies contribute to justifications for African enslavement?
3. 'Only with the end of global capitalism will racism be defeated.' How would you argue for and against this statement?



For advice on how to answer these questions, see the pointers [www.oup.com/he/baylis8e](http://www.oup.com/he/baylis8e)

penned in 1789 at the beginning of the French Revolution and just a few years before the Haitian Revolution began, said nothing of the kind. Haitians had therefore proved themselves more competent in the human spirit than 'enlightened' Europeans! What is more, the Haitian constitution defined the free peoples of Haiti as, collectively, Black (*noir*), thus revaluing Blackness as a quality that was exemplary of humanity rather than a sign of sub-humanity. In these two ways, the Haitian constitution confounded and refuted the received cultural and biological hierarchies of race that were fundamental ordering principles of the colonial project.

## European imperialism

By the mid-nineteenth century, race no longer relied on religious doctrine and salvation. Instead, race fundamentally informed secular understandings of human progress. Reaching back to Enlightenment thinkers such as Baron de Montesquieu, European intellectuals proposed a set of hierarchical stages that humanity travelled through from the dawn of its history, starting with savagery, leading to barbarism, and finally achieving civilization.

In this hierarchy, the state of savagery connoted basic incompetencies in self-rule—a lack of reason, law, property, and justice. Savages therefore threatened the political order of the civilized with anarchy. Barbarians, meanwhile, practised basic forms of law and order, but forms that were despotic and opposed to civilized orders. Facing savagery and barbarianism were the civilized Europeans who enjoyed the competencies of self-rule—a mastery of reason, the rule of law, respect for property, and democratic rights.

Nineteenth-century anthropologists considered the peoples who occupied this hierarchy of civilization as groups of different races differentiated by the relative simplicity or complexity of their cultures. Therefore the cultural calculus of race, previously used to differentiate Jews, Muslims, heathens, and Christians, now became a secular 'standard of civilization'. This standard was used to judge the cultural competencies of the peoples swept up in Europe's imperial expansion. It was applied globally. For instance, French naval officer and botanist Dumont d'Urville divided the Pacific into three racial zones: Polynesia, the least barbaric, followed by Micronesia, and then Melanesia, the most savage.

Thus the standard of civilization became the new ordering principle of race. Moreover, 'civilized'

Europeans believed that they could 'improve' the savage and barbaric races through colonization. This ideology came to be known as *la mission civilisatrice*—the 'civilizing mission'.

In 1848 Algeria ceased to be a colony as such and became, according to the French government, a *département* of the republic. It is here that the contradictions of the civilizing mission became apparent. While the French republic proposed equality among *all* citizens, the culture of Algeria's *indigènes* (indigenous peoples) was deemed too barbaric to practise this equality. And while French authorities presumed that the *indigènes* would embrace the civilizing process that could turn them into true citizens, they regularly rebelled because 'civilization' brought with it the taking of their lands. Colonial administrators therefore started to question whether the savage and barbaric races *could* be civilized.

Such a pessimistic attitude is evident in the remark of Jules Ferry, President of the Council of Ministers in France, who in 1884 argued that 'the superior races have a right because they have a duty: it is their duty to civilize the inferior races' (Ferry 1884). Similar pessimism underwrites Rudyard Kipling's famous narration of the civilizing mission as the 'white man's burden'.

Consequently, as European imperialism reached its high point in the late nineteenth century, the assimilation of subject races was no longer deemed entirely possible or even desirable. Colonial policies shifted to encompass the new pessimism. For instance, at the Berlin Conference (1884–5), where European powers carved out their spheres of influence on the African continent, they made a paradoxical promise to 'preserve' tribal life even as they reaffirmed the desirability of civilizing the savages. Henceforth colonial authorities often deemed full civic rights to be undesirable for native peoples, who would be governed instead 'indirectly' through their own 'custom'.

But often, in reality, it was colonial administrators and anthropologists who defined 'custom' and they used racial caricatures to simplify complex and multifaceted cultures. In India, those groups whom the British administration decided were naturally hardy and aggressive were categorized as 'martial races', with their men recruited heavily into the British army to deter further rebellions. Alternatively, a violent response often awaited those 'savages' that rebelled and could not learn the first lesson of civilization—order and obedience to the superior race.

## Race and anti-racism in twentieth-century world politics

In 1919 the victors of the First World War met at Versailles to divide up the remainder of the Ottoman Empire and German colonies among themselves. They did so by creating a series of 'mandates' that determined the depth and directness of each colonial power's dominion over its new trusteeships. For this task, the victors utilized the standard of civilization. 'A' mandates encompassed barbarous races, principally in the Middle East; 'B' and 'C' mandates encompassed savage races in West and East Africa, and Southwest Africa and the Pacific, respectively.

The racial hierarchies of the mandate system were incorporated into the governance structure of the League of Nations. Moreover, white members of the League often used these hierarchies to judge whether non-white members of the League, especially Ethiopia, were competent to self-rule despite being de facto sovereign entities. In all these ways, the cultural calculus of race deeply informed the governance structures and practices of the first international organization of the twentieth century.

But what of the biological calculus of race? Instead of disappearing after the abolition of the slave trade and emancipation of enslaved Africans, this calculus returned in a new guise at the end of the nineteenth century. 'Scientific racism' proposed that each race contained naturally unchangeable characteristics and propensities such that the struggle for civilization should be understood less as a struggle over culture and more as a biological struggle of reproduction between the white and darker races.

Francis Galton, the originator of eugenics (meaning, in ancient Greek, 'good stock'), proposed that intelligence was inherited. Galton therefore advised that reproduction should be scientifically controlled so as to perfect humanity by ensuring that defects and deficiencies were not passed on. Alfred Ploetz, a German scientist who coined the term 'racial hygiene', advocated for eugenicist policies at the level of race rather than the individual. Here, the danger of miscegenation (the interbreeding of people considered to be of different racial types) was once more articulated: human perfection was possible, Ploetz argued, only through preservation and perpetuation of the Aryan race.

Just over 30 years later, the Nazi Party implemented the policy of racial hygiene in Germany. This domestic policy also interacted with an expansionist foreign policy of creating 'living space' (*Lebensraum*) for the Aryan race. In fact, this combination had at least in part already been undertaken in the genocidal war waged by the Imperial German army against the Herero and Nama peoples in Southwest Africa. During the Second World War, these conjoined policies targeted a number of so-called 'defective' groups. Central to the Nazi project, however, was the systematic slaughter between 1941 and 1945 of almost 6 million Jewish people who lived inside Germany and in neighbouring European countries.

As a result of the Shoah (Holocaust) and the victory over fascism in 1945, scientific racism was roundly and categorically refuted in a landmark statement on race issued in 1950 by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO 1950). However, this did not mean that race disappeared as a key—albeit contested—ordering principle of world politics in the cold war era.

In 1948 the South African government formalized a mode of governance called 'apartheid', which was based on the separate development of the races and which considered Africans to be racially inferior to whites. Condemnation of apartheid was a persistent feature of discussions in the UN's General Assembly throughout the cold war. In addition, a group of independent African and Asian states convened a historically unprecedented conference at Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955 in order to propose a governance structure for the emerging post-colonial era that expressly outlawed 'racialism'.

Race in twentieth-century world politics was contested not only through diplomatic relations but also by social movements. During the inter-war period, the Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities League made a striking attempt to confront the racial hierarchies and exclusions of world politics (see **Case Study 18.1**). In the cold war period, the Black Power movement in the United States confronted the visceral and institutional racism of American society. Promoting the self-empowerment of Black communities, the movement also (as had the Haitian constitution) re-valued 'blackness' as representing beauty and the best of humanity instead of ugliness and inferiority. Black Power in the 1960s influenced a number of social movements worldwide

that struggled against racism, including Māori and Pasifika peoples in New Zealand and Dalits in India (see Case Study 18.2).

In 2016 the singer Beyoncé performed at the American Super Bowl sports event with a troupe of dancers whose dress (leather, Afro hairstyles, and

berets) invoked images of Black Power. Allusions have been made to connections between the performance and the contemporary #BlackLivesMatter movement which confronts police brutality against Black peoples. This movement has also gained some popularity across the globe.

### Case Study 18.1 The Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities League (UNIA-ACL)



Circa 1920: Jamaican-born Pan-Africanist Marcus Garvey (1887-1940): the founder along with Amy Ashwood Garvey, of the Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities League (UNIA-ACL)

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In 1914 Marcus Garvey and Amy Ashwood Garvey set up the Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities League (UNIA-ACL) in colonial Jamaica. The organization exploded in size and influence after the Garveys established a branch in New York City in 1917. At the peak of its operations in the mid-1920s, the UNIA-ACL had approximately one million members with perhaps three times as many active participants. And while much of this membership was concentrated in the US, UNIA-ACL branches existed across the Caribbean, Latin America, Africa, Europe, and even Australia. At its peak, the newspaper of the UNIA-ACL, *The Negro World*, had a

circulation in the hundreds of thousands and was printed in three language editions: English, French, and Spanish.

The UNIA-ACL was in many ways an early manifestation of Black Power. Responding directly to the legacies of slavery, colonialism, and racism, the Garveys envisaged the UNIA-ACL to be a vehicle for the self-determination of African peoples worldwide. Especially important for this aim was the liberation of the continent of Africa from European rule, as expressed in the motto, 'Africa for the Africans at home and abroad'. Marcus Garvey developed a 'race first' ideology to support these aims, which took the form of pan-African nationalism.

In this respect, the UNIA-ACL took on all the outward trappings of a state, but one that organized its peoples within, above, and across state borders and national citizenships. The UNIA-ACL possessed paramilitary units such as the African Legion and auxiliary units such as the Black Cross Nurses. Its civil service administered its own exams. Disputes between members were adjudicated in a parallel court system. The UNIA-ACL even issued passports to its members in the US to be used when they migrated between cities. The UNIA-ACL also flew its own flag, 'the red, black and green', and members sang their own national anthem—*Ethiopia, Thou Land of Our Fathers*. Furthermore, the UNIA owned its own shipping company, the Black Star Line, and ran a cooperative, the Negro Factories Corporation, all owned by, staffed by, and servicing its members.

The first international convention of the UNIA-ACL took place in August 1920 at Madison Square Garden, New York City, and was attended by 20,000 international delegates. Held just half a year after the inauguration of the League of Nations at the Paris Peace Conference, the UNIA-ACL conference produced the *Declaration of Rights of the Negro Peoples of the World*. Article 1 announced the following:

we, the duly elected representatives of the Negro peoples of the world, invoking the aid of the just and Almighty God, do declare all men, women and children of our blood throughout the world free denizens, and do claim them as free citizens of Africa, the Motherland of all Negroes.

**Question 1:** What was 'Pan-African' about the aims of the UNIA-ACL?

**Question 2:** Although the UNIA-ACL ruled no territory, what elements of sovereignty did it exhibit?

## Key Points

- The making of the Atlantic world was crucial to the emergence of the West as the dominant regional force in world politics. And race was fundamental to this endeavour. Similarly, race was fundamental to the subsequent expansion of European empires across the globe.
- Race cannot, therefore, be understood as separate from, adjunctive to, or derivative of the making of contemporary world politics. Rather, race is a fundamental ordering principle of world politics.
- Race orders world politics by adjudicating which groups have competencies to be fully human. This adjudication relies on two calculi: the cultural calculus of race and the biological calculus of race. Each calculus determines the hierarchies and exclusions among peoples. Yet it is just as important to note that both calculi render the 'darker races' threats to the civilized race of white Europeans. And it is also important to note that each calculus took on new forms over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
- Even if race has been used to categorize and subjugate peoples, these same peoples have utilized racial ascriptions to resist their subjugation. While this dual usage of race might appear paradoxical, it is important to keep in mind that race is not something that simply happens to peoples considered 'lesser races'. Rather, these peoples have always been actively involved in contesting the ordering principles of race, especially its hierarchies and exclusions that determine who is competently human.

## Thinking through race

This section engages several debates over race that draw especially from the fields of philosophy and sociology, but which are increasingly being discussed in International Relations. These debates help to deepen conceptual understandings of the cultural calculus and biological calculus of race discussed in the previous section. This exercise also provides a basis for understanding the struggles over race that exist in contemporary world politics, considered in the following section.

### The genetic/social construction of race

The key purpose of the 1950 UNESCO Statement on Race was to separate the 'biological fact' of race from the 'social myth' of race which had been propounded by the advocates of scientific racism. The statement made it very clear that genetic inheritance—marked by visible characteristics—has no bearing whatsoever on mental competencies or cultural practices. In this respect, the statement refuted the validity of eugenics and the pursuit of racial hygiene.

More recently the 'biological fact' of race itself has been questioned by the successful mapping of the genetic material that constitutes human beings. Scientists now know that just 0.01 per cent of DNA accounts for physical appearance, and 99.9 per cent of the DNA of every human being is identical. Despite these facts, some psychologists and bio-scientists still argue that intelligence is partially inherited and unevenly distributed by race. In opposition, some sociologists such as Troy Duster (2006) argue that race is not a genetic condition *at all*—there is no race 'gene'.

The term 'racialization' has been increasingly used to address the socially constructed nature of race. While racialization has a long conceptual history, its contemporary usage owes much to the writings of Martiniquan psychiatrist Frantz Fanon in the 1950s and 1960s, which were imported into sociological debates in the 1970s. These debates can be seen as part of the 'constructivist' turn in sociology, which ultimately influenced IR theory. Nonetheless, constructivist theory in IR has yet to engage seriously with debates over racialization.

These debates challenge the assumption that persons, objects, processes, and issues are naturally comprised of race. Instead, they claim that social conventions impute racial characteristics to particular persons, objects, processes, and issues such that, over time, their very meaning and significance change to become inseparable from the racial trait they have been accorded. For instance, people are not naturally 'black'; they are racialized to become Black, and must thus struggle with social conventions that impute deficiency and incompetency to blackness. Yet even if race is socially constructed, racialization has real effects (see Box 18.2).

### Race and culture

What effect did the 1950 UNESCO statement have on the cultural calculus of race? As mentioned in a previous section (see 'European imperialism'), nineteenth-century anthropologists argued that cultures could be distinguished as simple and complex—the former belonging to (dark) savages and barbarians, the latter enjoyed by

### Box 18.2 The shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes

Jean Charles de Menezes was shot dead by London police in 2005. Menezes, a Brazilian man, lived in a block of flats that police believed was being used by suspected suicide bombers. Police followed Menezes as he left the building. Officers later claimed that they were satisfied that Menezes was one of the suspect bombers due to his 'Mongolian eyes'. As he boarded a train at Stockwell tube station, armed officers shot him at close range. Menezes, an innocent Brazilian, had been racialized by police into a Muslim terrorist and was consequently shot dead.

(white) civilized peoples. In the decades leading up to the Shoah, culture had been used to 'racialize' the undeniable diversity of human experiences and practices such that this difference could then be organized hierarchically, often for discriminatory and exclusionary purposes.

The problem facing the scholars who wrote the 1950 UNESCO statement was to find a way to represent human difference through a non-racial and non-hierarchical lens. For this purpose, as Alana Lentin (2005) demonstrates, 'ethnicity' was chosen to replace race, so that culture now referenced simple ethnic difference rather than racial hierarchies (see Box 18.3).

Nevertheless, a number of scholars argue that despite the swapping of overtly racial terminology for that of ethnicity, the cultural calculus of race has not disappeared. A useful argument by which to understand this complex shift in the race/culture relationship is provided by Martin Barker (1982) and Étienne Balibar (1991), who suggest that a 'new racism' has emerged in Europe.

Responding to an increase in peoples migrating to Europe from old colonies, European ideologues and politicians often claim that the cultures that 'ethnic minorities' bring with them lack the institutional and moral sophistication to integrate into advanced liberal-democratic societies. Critiques of this 'new racism' argue that while 'race talk' is not evident in such

### Box 18.3 UNESCO Statement on Race, Point 6

National, religious, geographic, linguistic and cultural groups do not necessarily coincide with racial groups: and the cultural traits of such groups have no demonstrated genetic connection with racial traits. Because serious errors of this kind are habitually committed when the term 'race' is used in popular parlance, it would be better when speaking of human races to drop the term 'race' altogether and speak of ethnic groups.  
(UNESCO 1950: 6)

discourse, the hierarchical and exclusionary ordering principles of race are.

For instance, there is an assumption that the 'traditional' cultures of non-European ethnic groups are immutably different from and necessarily conflicting with 'modern', 'developed', or 'progressive' Western society. According to this way of thinking, ethnic minorities must *learn* to be modern in Europe: they cannot become modern without advanced tuition. In this process, however, their 'traditional' attitudes towards issues such as gender relations and religion are viewed as threatening the integrity of modern liberal democracy itself. More recently, these ideas and assumptions have informed a resurgent 'white nationalism', buoyed by some supporters of President Donald Trump and by various far-right parties in Europe.

Despite defining groups in terms of ethnic rather than racial heritage, the starting *premise* of this way of thinking is in agreement with the nineteenth-century cultural calculus of race: the white races must civilize the savage and barbaric races, lest the latter destroy civilization itself. In this respect, the adjudication of cultural competency that is fundamental to race remains key to the ordering of world politics, even in the post-Holocaust, postcolonial era. In short, the ordering principles of race are still central to world politics even in the absence of explicitly racial language.

### Whiteness and privilege

Historically, the biological calculus of race posited only the white body as quintessentially human. Additionally, the cultural calculus of race posited only European societies as the standard of civilization, against which the competencies of all other races were measured and found variously deficient. Some theorists of race argue that, due to this history, persons racialized as white enjoy 'transparency', meaning that their cultural competencies and full humanity are presumed to be self-evident. Alternatively, persons racialized as non-white provoke an implicit or explicit questioning of their cultural competencies based on socially prevalent racial stereotypes.

The concept of 'white privilege' refers to this differential treatment and the social advantages that accrue to white persons due to their transparent and fundamentally unquestioned competence and humanity. Scholars argue, especially with regard to Western societies, that white persons rarely have to consider that their social advantages are accrued not simply by individual effort or intelligence but by racial hierarchies and exclusions. Whether these advantages accrue to poor white people

is a question of some controversy. Some campaigners in the 2016 UK European Union membership referendum claimed that Brexit would provide redress to a white working class who had been 'left behind' by globalization. However, it is important to note that in some ways whiteness is contextual and can shift in light of different colonial histories, divisions of labour, and social conventions. For example, Irish peoples, the first to be colonized under English imperial expansion, obtained the privilege of whiteness only after immigrating to North America in the nineteenth century. Even in 1960s Britain, it was still possible to see occasional signs on boarding houses warning: 'no Irish, no Coloureds'.

Moreover, similar privileges to whiteness are also garnered from gender hierarchies that posit maleness as the norm (especially in politics). In fact, scholars such as Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989) argue that race and gender 'intersect' to form a matrix of transparency, privilege, and domination. In this respect, the reader will

find it useful to read Chapter 17 alongside this present chapter.

Theorists of race describe the structural conditions that uphold white privilege as 'white supremacy'. Paradoxically, as philosopher Charles Mills argues, due to its transparency, white supremacy is often 'not seen as a political system at all' (Mills 1997: 2). White supremacy often becomes visible only when its privileges are exposed and challenged. This was the case, for example, in the Black Power movement when some white civil rights activists started to question their own privileges in the struggle.

'Whiteness studies' now seek to explain how the (often unspoken) privileges enjoyed by white persons depend on (often violent) processes of exclusion and discrimination that are justified by the assumption that it is always other races and cultures that are deviant, incompetent, the 'problem', and in need of 'saving'. As shall soon be discussed, this critique is instructive when it comes to understanding the dynamics of contemporary humanitarian discourses.

### Key Points

- There are no 'race genes': race is not natural but rather socially constructed. Race might even be mutable for at least some people, some of the time. Nonetheless, the effects of racialization are no less real for being constructed; indeed, they can be deadly.
- The modern concept of culture and its associated logics of ethnic categorization are inescapably entangled with the production and practice of race. The contemporary critique of 'new racism' speaks to this crucial issue.
- Through the critique of 'white privilege' it is possible to understand how a white person might be anti-racist in principle yet still reproduce—and even benefit from—the hierarchical and exclusionary ordering principle of race. White supremacy is a structural condition, not an individual prejudice.
- Thus, while explicitly 'racist' discourse and practice might nowadays be rare in world politics, race remains a key ordering principle.

## Contemporary manifestations of race in world politics

This section details the ways in which race remains a key ordering principle in contemporary world politics. It begins by applying the critique of 'new racism' to security and development issues in the context of the global war on terror (GWOT). It then goes on to assess the continued influence of struggles against race at the highest levels of world politics by reference to the UN World Conference against Racism convened in 2001 and reviewed in 2009 and 2011.

### Security, development, and the global war on terror

There is strong evidence to suggest that the premises of 'new racism' have increasingly framed development and security in the era of the GWOT. This framework is evident in Samuel Huntington's famous thesis on the

'clash of civilizations', first published in 1993 and, after the 9/11 attacks in 2001, taken by some to be a prophetic explanation of the war against 'Islamic terrorists'. Huntington (1993) argued that in the post-cold war era cultural differences rather than ideological differences or economic interests would become the root cause of global conflict. Among other fault-lines, Huntington pitted 'Western' against 'Islamic' culture.

In constructing his thesis Huntington drew on the work of Bernard Lewis, an influential historian of the Middle East. In a 1990 article entitled *The Roots of Muslim Rage* Lewis argued that Islamic jurisprudence recognized only two domains: Dar al-Islam—the 'house of Islam', where Islamic rule of law prevailed—and Dar al-Harb—'the house of war', where the rule of 'infidels' prevailed. Moreover, Lewis stated that Islamic culture did not possess the ability to reform its traditional

societies so as to compete, first, with European imperial expansion, and subsequently, with Western economic and military might (Lewis 1990). Controversially, Lewis argued that Islamic politics could only pursue ‘a perpetual state of war until the entire world either embraced Islam or submitted to the rule of the Muslim state’.

Lewis’s argument articulates the key premises of ‘new racism’: that traditional cultures are at fundamental odds with modern society, and that the former cannot reform without the guidance—or dominion—of the latter. Hence Lewis’s argument reproduces the key premises of the civilizing mission, including its pessimistic prescription that if uncooperative races cannot be civilized they must, at least, be pacified.

Crucially, Lewis does not acknowledge the importance for Islamic jurisprudence of Dar al-Ahd, the ‘house of treatises’ between non-Muslim and Muslim polities, and Dar al-Amn, the ‘house of safety’ wherein Muslims living in non-Muslim polities are allowed to practise their religion peaceably. In other words, contrary to the premises of ‘new racism’, Islam does possess its own resources for practising coexistence with and toleration of other ways of living. And given the many different peoples that compose the Muslim world, these resources might be applied in very diverse ways. Nonetheless, key Western politicians and commentators have largely accepted Lewis’s and Huntington’s depiction of Islam in their pursuit of the GWOT.

In fact, the focus on culture proposed in ‘new racism’ elides an engagement with the political consequences of consistent Western intervention in the domestic arrangements of an extremely diverse Muslim world. Some scholars even argue that the rise of terrorist jihadis is due in part to the US support of local groups in Afghanistan during the cold war battle against the presence of the Soviet Union in the country (Mamdani 2002).

The premises of ‘new racism’ have also influenced development projects that, in the era of the GWOT, have become increasingly tied to the security objectives of powerful states. Proponents of the ‘liberal peace’ thesis argue that societies of the Global South can avoid poverty and conflict only by adopting Western systems of governance based on liberal rule of law and the free market. Implicit in this argument is an assumption that poverty and conflict are primarily the result of incompetent domestic governance practices rather than also being a product of colonial and postcolonial interventions by Western states.

Despite using abstract and race-neutral terminologies that contrast ‘failed states’ with ‘developed states’, the liberal peace thesis can be said to reproduce hierarchical assumptions about the ‘natural’ cultural

(in)competency of non-white peoples for democratic self-governance, which were so crucial to the old ‘civilizing mission’. In this sense, one might argue that the politics and power-projections of contemporary peacekeeping and state-building in service of the liberal peace are a twenty-first-century version of the ‘white man’s burden’.

The interlocking of development and security concerns has also provided a marked increase in the popularity of humanitarian work, especially among civil society actors from the Global North. In this regard, it is important to recall Gayatri Spivak’s intersectional exposition of the moral justification for European colonialism, which she summarizes as ‘white men saving brown women from brown men’ (Spivak 1988). As Makau Mutua (2001) argues, this moral relationship holds between three core characters—saviours (white men), victims (brown women and children), and savages (brown men).

Some scholars argue that this colonial justification is now being mobilized to support the humanitarian agenda. For instance, Teju Cole (2012) has coined the term ‘white-saviour industrial complex’ to refer to the increasingly high-profile nature of white celebrities (the civilized) signing up to various civil society initiatives in order to save the women and children of Africa and Asia (the victims) from male warlords and terrorists (the savages). In addition to celebrities, many young white people from the Global North also tend to sign up to support humanitarian projects in the Global South.

But what is it that makes such non-experts qualified to intervene in the complex issues that surround poverty and violence? Are all women of the Global South victims and thus unable to address the humanitarian issues that they themselves face? And are all the men unqualified savages? The previous section considered how white privilege enables people racialized as white to claim moral leadership while not addressing their personal complicity and accountability in the reproduction of racial hierarchies. Some voices from the Global South now ask why these young humanitarians do not address the poverty and violence in their own societies first. Is contemporary humanitarianism, then, a global manifestation of ‘white supremacy’?

Finally it is important to note that the interlocking of development and security concerns in the GWOT also influences politics within and among the societies of the Global North. This is especially the case in Europe, where the perception is now commonplace that ethnic minorities pose an existential threat to the European ‘way of life’. The desirability of multicultural policies—the belief that different cultures can coexist within one national space—have now been challenged by a number

### Box 18.4 British Prime Minister David Cameron on terrorism, tolerance, and Islam

In the UK, some young men find it hard to identify with the traditional Islam practised at home by their parents, whose customs can seem staid when transplanted to modern Western countries. But these young men also find it hard to identify with Britain too, because we have allowed the weakening of our collective identity. Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream. We've failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong. We've even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values. So, when a white person holds objectionable views, racist views for instance, we rightly condemn them. But when equally unacceptable views or practices come from someone who isn't white, we've been too cautious frankly—frankly, even fearful—to stand up to them. The failure, for instance, of some to confront the horrors of forced marriage, the practice where some young girls are bullied and sometimes taken abroad to marry someone when they don't want to, is a case in point.

(Cameron, Speech at Munich Security Conference, 2011)

of European politicians who blame these policies for a loss of 'social cohesion'. Europe has been too 'tolerant' of the cultural practices of Muslim peoples in particular, they argue, and what is required now is a forceful reassertion of 'European values' (see Box 18.4).

However, some scholars argue that, as governments cut back on public services in response to the global economic crisis, it is all too convenient for politicians to blame Muslims for the diminution of 'social cohesion' rather than their own neoliberal austerity policies. Moreover, the current buoyancy of 'new racism' holds serious ramifications for the human rights of many vulnerable peoples fleeing from war and persecution. During the 2018 mid-term elections, President Donald Trump tweeted, without evidence, and in a clear effort to rouse his Republican base, that 'criminals and unknown Middle Easterners' had 'mixed' into the migrant 'caravan' that was slowly making its way across Mexico (Trump 2018). Implying that Islamic fundamentalists were making their way into the United States, the White House administration issued an order effectively prohibiting migrants from seeking asylum at the southern border, contra federal law and international convention.

### The UN World Conference against Racism

The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1969) was followed by

two UN-sponsored conferences on racism in 1978 and 1983. After a long hiatus, the UN convened the third such meeting, the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (WCAR), in Durban, South Africa, from 31 August to 8 September 2001. WCAR featured many innovations in the engagement with race at the UN level, including a pronounced focus on 'intersectionality', specifically the multiple discriminations that many indigenous women and women of African heritage face.

However, the Durban meeting was extremely contentious, demonstrating the degree to which long-standing issues concerning race still influence world politics at the highest level. Two issues deserve special attention: the question of the racist nature of Zionism, and the demand for reparations for slavery and the slave trade.

In 1975 the USSR, seeking to counter US influence in the Middle East, successfully pushed for the adoption of Resolution 3379 in the UN General Assembly. The resolution observed that Israel, now occupying Palestinian lands, shared the same 'racist structure' as apartheid South Africa. Zionism, therefore, had to be understood as 'a form of racism and racial discrimination'. In 1991, with the imminent dissolution of the USSR, the United States was able to orchestrate a repeal of this resolution.

However, in the Asian regional preparatory meeting of the WCAR convened in Tehran in early 2001, the argument was made again that, by embarking on an 'ethnic cleansing of the Arab population of historic Palestine', the Israeli state had manufactured a 'new kind of apartheid'. Ultimately, Israeli and United States representatives responded to this claim by withdrawing from the conference, subsequently arguing that anti-Semitism had infiltrated the WCAR in so far as Israel was being singled out and charged with racist policies.

The 9/11 attacks occurred just days after the close of the WCAR, and the subsequent conduct of the GWOT heightened existing tensions over the role of the United States in the Middle East. This was manifest in the review conference of the WCAR in 2009, which the United States and many other Western states boycotted after the address by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad asserted in no uncertain terms the racist nature of the Israeli state. The United States and other Western states also refused to participate in the 2011 one-day conference in New York to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the WCAR.

Some critics have argued that the Israel/Palestine issue was used as pretence, especially by the United States, to limit involvement in the extremely expansive agenda of the WCAR. Intimate domestic issues on the agenda for

United States representatives included reparations for the violent dispossession of indigenous peoples and the enslavement of Africans in their country's colonial past.

During the 2001 conference, representatives of the United States, Canada, and the European Union made it clear that they were not prepared to discuss reparations, an issue with significant political and financial ramifications. They were, however, willing to recognize the damage done to peoples of African descent through the slave trade, slavery, and colonialism. Ultimately the final declaration of the WCAR acknowledged the 'appalling tragedies' of slavery and the slave trade but stopped short of making an apology. Instead, the text claimed that slavery and the slave trade 'should always

have been'—rather than definitively *was*—a crime against humanity, thus avoiding a route to legal redress.

Meanwhile, despite the official withdrawal of the United States government, members of its Black Congressional Caucus remained at the 2001 conference. Danny Glover, famous African-American actor and UN Goodwill Ambassador, helped to promote a notion of reparation that went beyond financial compensation to target the iniquitous structures of white supremacy. This focus on structural transformation resonates with demands consistently made by various activists and organizations of the African *diaspora*, and they were repeated at the tenth anniversary of the WCAR. More recently, the Caribbean Community and

### Case Study 18.2 Race, caste, and Dalits



Thousands of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Backward Classes, and Indian Railway Employees Association take part in a rally in New Delhi on 22 August 2012

© RAVEENDRAN/AFP/GettyImages

In India, caste has historically been composed of two different aspects. 'Jati' in the Sanskrit language denotes birth and is associated with specific occupations. 'Varna', however, refers to a larger hierarchy of different peoples defined by hereditary positions in the social order—Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, and Sudras. Outside of this hierarchy are, among others, the 'untouchables', who have suffered and continue to suffer great oppression and stigmatization in India especially, but also elsewhere. Scholars and activists still debate the degree to which 'caste' can be considered another word for 'race'. The connections are suggestive. In fifteenth-century romance languages, the word 'casta' (caste) was intimately associated with *raza* (race) and *linaje* (lineage); moreover, Varna is also Sanskrit for 'colour'.

Similarities between the racism suffered by enslaved Africans in the West and caste prejudice suffered by untouchables in India have always generated comparisons. Such associations were being made as early as the 1920s by important Indian figures such as Mahatma Gandhi and Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar, who founded the Scheduled Castes Federation in 1942. But as Nico Slater (2012) has argued, the relationship took on new meaning in

the cold war context wherein civil rights struggles, Black Power, and decolonization agendas combined to produce a global network of anti-racist movements. Indeed, in this context, comparisons sometimes led to invocations of solidarity across caste and race. Such was the case when Martin Luther King Jr, visiting a school for untouchables, was introduced to students as 'a fellow Untouchable from the United States of America'.

This process of mutual identification was clearly expressed in the Dalit Panthers movement of the early 1970s. 'Dalit', meaning 'broken', was a term of self-identification popularized by Ambedkar that replaced the imposed label of 'untouchables'; 'Panthers' referenced the Black Panther movement of the United States. The Dalit Panthers' manifesto, while identifying the origins of the caste system in 'Hindu feudalism' rather than European colonialism, nonetheless analogized the African-American context by describing caste as a modern form of 'slavery'. In 1979, the Dalit Action Committee published a book entitled *Apartheid in India*, thus connecting to the broader debate in the UN about South African apartheid and the Israeli occupation of Palestine.

Dalit organizations were extremely active in the World Conference against Racism (WCAR) in 2001. They argued that caste might not equal race, yet it should nevertheless be included on the basis that caste, like race, was a system of group discrimination and exclusion based on descent. However, caste was kept off the agenda of the Durban Review Conference in 2009 due to pressure by the Indian government. 'Castism', argued the government's representatives, was not racism and, indeed, was a domestic rather than international matter. In this respect, as Sankaran Krishna (2014) argues, India made common cause with the United States and Israel in seeking to keep 'domestic' matters of race off the agenda of the UN conference.

**Question 1:** Is race the same as caste? Does it matter?

**Question 2:** In this case study the 'white man' is not the key protagonist. What significance does this fact hold for a global understanding of race?

Common Market (CARICOM), a regional organization of Caribbean states, has begun to inquire into the prospect of seeking reparations for slavery and the slave trade from culpable European states.

The politics that surround the WCAR confirm that struggles over race remain a significant force in world politics at both diplomatic and grassroots levels. The historical impact of the Shoah and the responses to this genocide still provide an important—and contentious—framing of race. Meanwhile, the interpretation of Israeli occupation as a form of apartheid, as well as debates over the inclusion of caste discrimination into the WCAR (see **Case Study 18.2**), show that race is not a static concept but rather consistently evolving in its meanings and applications. Finally, the reparations debate demonstrates that the racial ordering principles created in the making of the Atlantic world over 400 years ago still influence world politics and demands for global justice.

### Key Points

- The cultural calculus of race remains influential in world politics in so far as it provides the core premises informing ‘new racism’. Practices of racialization now tend to proceed mainly through cultural rather than biological referents.
- For Western states, the premises of ‘new racism’ have helped to frame foreign policy concerns over the global war on terror as well as domestic concerns over multiculturalism and immigration.
- The description of Israel as an apartheid state is contentious. Nonetheless, racialized policies associated with apartheid—population segregation, land occupation, granting of differential rights, and violent policing of divisions—continue in the present, and not only in Israel.
- The violence, dispossessions, and injustices through which the Atlantic world was formed have enduring legacies in world politics. They constitute a living past through which claims on global justice are made.

## Conclusion

This chapter has engaged with race as a key ordering principle of world politics. The kind of order produced by race has been presented as a hierarchical adjudication of human competencies through the categorizing of group attributes. This categorization is a process of racialization—that is, group attributes are delineated by some kind of shared heritage that is identified by visual and other sensate markers. The chapter explored two different ways in which this adjudication proceeded: a biological calculus of race and a cultural calculus of race. Differing in the basis of their calculations of human competency, both calculi serve to hierarchically order humanity with inequitable consequences.

The first section of the chapter explored how the biological calculus and cultural calculus emerged in the making of the Atlantic world to form the ordering principle of race. This ordering principle evolved as European countries violently expanded their empires across the rest of the globe. The section also showed how race was mobilized by the enslaved and colonized to paradoxically subvert the ordering principle of race, especially its hierarchies and exclusions when it comes to identifying who is competently ‘human’.

The next section examined some key debates surrounding the conceptualization of race. These debates reveal that while the biological calculus of race has been refuted in an age that denies any support for explicit

racism, culture has increasingly come to do the work of racial ordering, although those who use this calculus never speak the language of race directly. This section also suggested how white supremacy should be understood as a structure of privilege and not primarily as individual prejudice.

The final section applied these issues to contemporary world politics. Specifically, it examined the global war on terror, the development/security nexus, humanitarianism, and multiculturalism through the critique of ‘new racism’, and also ‘white privilege’. Finally, the World Conference against Racism was used to demonstrate that, despite the contemporary lack of explicit reference to race, global social movements and diplomats alike still struggle over race as an ordering principle of world politics.

In closing, it is useful to return to the way in which W. E. B. Du Bois’s early explanation of the racial origins of the First World War has been ignored by IR theorists. In part this might be due to the fact that Du Bois was an African-American and that the key thinkers in IR theory tend to be white. Perhaps, also, this ignorance might relate to the fact that IR theories find it hard to accommodate race. The hierarchical nature of racial order is made invisible in the realist image of world politics as a collection of anarchically ordered states. So, too, do the hierarchical and group attributes of race

vanish in the liberal image of a world composed of like individuals.

But not all IR theories have made—or need to make—race invisible. Marxist theories understand global hierarchy principally in terms of class and not race, although, as has been shown, some scholars have tried to link the two. Constructivism could in principle engage with ‘racialization’ as a key process of identity formation. However, most constructivists have yet to

do so. Historically, feminist theory spoke to the experiences of middle-class white women. More recent engagements with ‘intersectional’ analysis by feminist theorists in IR hold the potential to advance understandings of race in world politics. Finally, because colonial rule is so crucial in the historical formation of race, there is much that **postcolonial** theory can contribute to an understanding of race, even though many postcolonial theorists do not address race directly.

## Questions

1. How did the Haitian Revolution fundamentally challenge the racial ordering of world politics?
2. How is the biological calculus of race distinct from the cultural calculus of race?
3. Why is the UNESCO 1950 statement on race such an important document?
4. ‘I’m not racist: I’m talking about their culture, not their skin.’ Discuss.
5. How might the ‘new racism’ connect concerns over multiculturalism in liberal democratic polities with the waging of the global war on terror?
6. Is humanitarianism a racist pursuit?
7. In what ways have gender issues intersected with race?
8. Detail the different ways in which ascriptions of group ‘competency’ have been central to the making of world politics.
9. Does race only oppress?
10. To what extent can IR theories account for race as an ordering principle of world politics?



Test your knowledge and understanding further by trying this chapter’s Multiple Choice Questions [www.oup.com/he/baylis8e](http://www.oup.com/he/baylis8e)

## Further Reading

**Anievas, A., Manchanda, N., and Shilliam, R. (eds.) (2014), *Confronting the Global Colour Line: Race and Racism in International Relations* (New York: Routledge).** Presents a collection of diverse theoretical and empirical investigations that explicitly draw out the significance of race for understanding world politics.

**Bhattacharyya, G. (2008), *Dangerous Brown Men* (London: Zed Books).** This challenging and provocative book explores the construction of the Muslim man in the global war on terror through the notion of ‘sexualized racism’.

**Biko, S. (1978), *I Write What I Like* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).** Famous anti-apartheid activist Steve Biko explains the meaning and politics of Black Consciousness. While the context that Biko speaks to is 1970s South Africa, his writings are informed by and still help to illuminate struggles over race in world politics more generally.

**‘Critiquing “race” and racism in development studies’ (2006), special issue of *Progress in Development Studies*, 6(1).** This special issue is themed around the formative influence of race on development scholarship and practice. It includes articles on the intersection of gender and race in development, as well as race in migration and development.

- Fanon, F.** (1952), *Black Skin, White Masks* (Paris: Editions de Seuil). The classic text by a psychiatrist and anti-colonial activist documents his attempt as a Black man from the French Caribbean to 'rehumanize' himself and French society from the effects of racism.
- Hobson, J.** (2012), *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). This book explores the shifting nature of race thinking throughout the twentieth century, as well as its internal differences, and shows how these shifts and differences have influenced international relations theory.
- Mani, L.** (1987), 'Contentious Traditions: The Debate on Sati in Colonial India', *Cultural Critique*, 7: 119–56. By investigating the tradition of widows immolating themselves on their husbands' funeral pyres, this article examines the colonial response that has been famously described as 'white men saving brown women from brown men'.
- Morrison, T.** (1988), 'Unspeakable Things Unspoken: The Afro-American Presence in American Literature' (delivered at the Tanner Lectures on Human Rights, University of Michigan), [http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/\\_documents/a-to-z/m/morrison90.pdf](http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/m/morrison90.pdf). This lecture asks the question: Why is it so hard to focus on race in academic debate? While Morrison is speaking to debates in literature, her arguments and insights are also relevant to International Relations.
- Quijano, A.** (2000), 'Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America', *Nepantla: Views from South*, 1(3): 533–80. An important text that uses a 'decolonial' approach to explain that the 'rules' created through European colonialism still have effects in the postcolonial era, and that central to these rules was—and is—race.
- Vitalis, R.** (2015), *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press). A rereading of the history of International Relations in the US as a discipline fundamentally concerned with race and imperialism. Vitalis demonstrates the crucial importance of Black scholars from Howard University in the development of the discipline.



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