

# ec3: Elliptic Curve Cryptography Compiler

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Recurse Center m6'19

# Diffie-Hellman

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# Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange


Alice and Bob want to *establish a shared secret*.


Use integers modulo a *prime*  $p$ , and choose a multiplicative *generator*  $g$ .

# Protocol

Alice

Bob


$$g^x \pmod{p}$$


$$g^y \pmod{p}$$



# Protocol

Alice

Bob

$$g^x \pmod{p}$$


```
graph LR; Alice -- "g^x mod p" --> Bob
```

$$g^y \pmod{p}$$


```
graph RL; Bob -- "g^y mod p" --> Alice
```


Alice chooses secret  $x$ .


Sends  $g^x \pmod{p}$  to Bob.

# Protocol

Alice

Bob

$$g^x \pmod{p}$$
A horizontal arrow pointing from left to right, representing the transmission of the value  $g^x \pmod{p}$  from Alice to Bob.

$$g^y \pmod{p}$$
A horizontal arrow pointing from right to left, representing the transmission of the value  $g^y \pmod{p}$  from Bob to Alice.

Bob chooses secret  $y$ .

Sends  $g^y \pmod{p}$  to Alice.

Both Alice and Bob can compute

$$g^{xy}$$

Alice knows  $x$  and received  $g^y$  so  
computes

$$(g^y)^x \pmod{p}$$



Bob knows  $y$  and received  $g^x$  so  
computes

$$(g^x)^y \pmod{p}$$

You could break this if you could  
*find  $x$  given  $g^x$ .*

This is the **discrete log problem**.

$$\mathcal{O} \left( e^c \sqrt[3]{(\log p)(\log \log p)^2} \right)$$

Discrete log for integers modulo  $p$   
is **sub-exponential**.

# Requirements

- **Set:** set of elements  $G$  to manipulate
- **Operation:** definition of  $g^x$
- **Security:** discrete log problem is *hard*

We can perform Diffie-Hellman on  
any mathematical group.

# Elliptic Curves

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*Not to be confused with **Ellipse**.*


Smooth, projective, algebraic curve  
of genus one.





$$A = \pi r^2$$

$$C = 2\pi r$$



$$V = \pi r^2 h$$

	30°	45°	60°
sin	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{\sqrt{2}}{2}$	$\frac{\sqrt{3}}{2}$
cos	$\frac{\sqrt{3}}{2}$	$\frac{\sqrt{2}}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
tan	$\frac{\sqrt{3}}{3}$	1	$\sqrt{3}$



$$\int \sin x dx = -\cos x + C$$

$$\int \frac{dx}{\cos^2 x} = \tan x + C$$

$$\int \tan x dx = -\ln|\cos x| + C$$

$$\int \frac{dx}{\sin x} = \ln\left|\tan \frac{x}{2}\right| + C$$

$$\int \frac{dx}{a^2 + x^2} = \frac{1}{a} \arctan \frac{x}{a} + C$$




$$ax^2 + bx + c = 0$$

$$a\left(x^2 + \frac{b}{a}x + \frac{c}{a}\right) = 0$$

$$x^2 + 2\frac{b}{a}x + \left(\frac{b}{a}\right)^2 - \left(\frac{b}{a}\right)^2 + \frac{c}{a} = 0$$


$$y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$$

1



$$y^2 = x^3 - x$$


2




$$y^2 = x^3 - x + 1$$

# Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman

- **Set:** points  $(x, y)$  on the elliptic curve
- **Operation:** repeated point addition  $kP$
- **Security:** discrete log on elliptic curves has *exponential complexity*



Addition  $P + Q$  "Chord rule"



Addition  $P + Q$  "Chord rule"

In *Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman* we  
replace exponentiation  $g^x$  with  
**repeated addition** of points  $kP$ .

# Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman

- **Set:** points  $(x, y)$  on the elliptic curve
- **Operation:** repeated point addition  $kP$
- **Security:** discrete log on elliptic curves has *exponential complexity*



$$\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{p})$$

Discrete log for Elliptic Curves is  
**exponential.**

# Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman

- **Set:** points  $(x, y)$  on the elliptic curve
- **Operation:** repeated point addition  $kP$
- **Security:** discrete log on elliptic curves has *exponential complexity*

Elliptic Curves are smaller and faster for the same security level.

## Connection is secure

Your information (for example, passwords or credit card numbers) is private when it is sent to this site. [Learn more](#)



Flash

Allow

Allowed by your administrator



Certificate (Valid)



Cookies (10 in use)



Site settings

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# Center

is a self-directed, community-  
grammers in New York City.

Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is  
very widely used in TLS.

# Implementation

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
Implementations must be **secure**.

Error-free and constant-time.



Implementations must be fast.

Low-level arithmetic almost always  
implemented in **assembly**.



`crypto/elliptic/p256_asm_amd64.s`

```

739             MOVQ  X3, (16*3)(DX)
740
741             RET
742  /* -----*/
743  // func p2560rdMul(res, in1, in2 []uint64)
744  TEXT ·p2560rdMul(SB),NOSPLIT,$0
745             MOVQ  res+0(FP), res_ptr
746             MOVQ  in1+24(FP), x_ptr
747             MOVQ  in2+48(FP), y_ptr
748             // x * y[0]
749             MOVQ  (8*0)(y_ptr), t0
750
751             MOVQ  (8*0)(x_ptr), AX
752             MULQ  t0
753             MOVQ  AX, acc0
754             MOVQ  DX, acc1

```

```
1008      MOVQ acc5, acc3
1009      MOVQ acc0, t0
1010      MOVQ acc1, t1
1011      // Subtract p256
1012      SUBQ p256ord<>+0x00(SB), acc4
1013      SBBQ p256ord<>+0x08(SB) ,acc5
1014      SBBQ p256ord<>+0x10(SB), acc0
1015      SBBQ p256ord<>+0x18(SB), acc1
1016      SBBQ $0, acc2
1017
1018      CMOVQCS x_ptr, acc4
1019      CMOVQCS acc3, acc5
1020      CMOVQCS t0, acc0
1021      CMOVQCS t1, acc1
1022
1023      MOVQ acc4. (8*0)(res ptr)
```

```
1521  /* ----- */
1522  TEXT p256SqrInternal(SB),NOSPLIT,$0
1523
1524      MOVQ acc4, mul0
1525      MULQ acc5
1526      MOVQ mul0, acc1
1527      MOVQ mul1, acc2
1528
1529      MOVQ acc4, mul0
1530      MULQ acc6
1531      ADDQ mul0, acc2
1532      ADCQ $0, mul1
1533      MOVQ mul1, acc3
1534
1535      MOVQ acc4, mul0
1536      MULQ acc7
```

```
1763      MOVL t1, sel_save
1764      MOVL t2, zero_save
1765      // Negate y2in based on sign
1766      MOVQ (16*2 + 8*0)(CX), acc4
1767      MOVQ (16*2 + 8*1)(CX), acc5
1768      MOVQ (16*2 + 8*2)(CX), acc6
1769      MOVQ (16*2 + 8*3)(CX), acc7
1770      MOVQ $-1, acc0
1771      MOVQ p256const0<>(SB), acc1
1772      MOVQ $0, acc2
1773      MOVQ p256const1<>(SB), acc3
1774      XORQ mul0, mul0
1775      // Speculatively subtract
1776      SUBQ acc4, acc0
1777      SBBQ acc5, acc1
1778      SBBQ acc6, acc2
```



```

2334
2335     LDt (y)
2336     CALL p256SubInternal(SB)
2337     MOVQ rptr, AX
2338     // Store y
2339     MOVQ acc4, (16*2 + 8*0)(AX)
2340     MOVQ acc5, (16*2 + 8*1)(AX)
2341     MOVQ acc6, (16*2 + 8*2)(AX)
2342     MOVQ acc7, (16*2 + 8*3)(AX)
2343     //////////////////////////////////
2344     MOVQ $0, rptr
2345
2346     RET
2347 /* -----*/
2348

```

2345

2346

RET

2347

/\*

-----


2348

Is this fine?

## crypto/elliptic: carry bug in x86-64 P-256 #20040



agl opened this issue on Apr 19, 2017 · 12 comments



# Elliptic Curve Cryptography Compiler

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Most elliptic curve  
implementations are hand rolled.

It's just f\*\*king arithmetic!



Can we automate code-generation  
for elliptic curves?

# ec3: Elliptic Curve Cryptography Compiler

# ec3

Inputs:

- Curve type and equation
- Coordinate system
- Finite field implementation

Outputs **assembly and Go code** to implement the curve.

# Status

Generates correct elliptic curve code for P-256.

```
3871 DATA p<>+0(SB)/8, $0xffffffffffffffff
3872 DATA p<>+8(SB)/8, $0x00000000ffffffff
3873 DATA p<>+16(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000
3874 DATA p<>+24(SB)/8, $0xffffffff00000001
3875 GLOBAL p<>(SB), RODATA|NOPTR, $32
3876
3877 // func double(X1_ *Elt, X3_ *Elt, Y1_ *Elt, Y3_ *Elt, Z1_ *E
3878 TEXT ·double(SB), $800-48
3879     MOVQ X1_+0(FP), BX
3880     MOVQ (BX), AX
3881     MOVQ 8(BX), CX
3882     MOVQ 16(BX), DX
3883     MOVQ 24(BX), BX
3884     MOVQ AX, 160(SP)
3885     MOVQ CX, 168(SP)
```

10106 lines (9230 sloc) | 170 KB

```
1  // Code generated by ec3. DO NOT EDIT.
2
3  #include "textflag.h"
4
5  // func lookup(p *Jacobian, tbl []Jacobian, idx int)
6  TEXT ·lookup(SB), $0-40
7      MOVQ p+0(FP), AX
8      MOVQ tbl_base+8(FP), CX
9      MOVQ tbl_len+16(FP), DX
10     MOVQ idx+32(FP), BX
11
12     // Initialize a 1 register.
13     PXOR    X0, X0
```

# Performance

```
pkg: github.com/mmcloughlin/ec3/examples/p256
BenchmarkScalarMult-4      136772      89073 ns/op
BenchmarkStdScalarMult-4   213002      56462 ns/op
```

# Thank you!

@mbmcloughlin