Pearl

Tor relay implementation in Golang 31 October 2017

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Background

Motivations:


- Learn about the Tor protocol
- Learn by doing!
- Goaded by a glib writeup of a previous Go implementation
- "After a while I realized the language was not suited for the project"


Thus pearl was born out of *hubris* on my part.

- Bradfield Sabbatical Program was a great way to revive my project
- Turns out it's non-trivial


Tor network enables anonymous internet access








Clients send traffic via a circuit




3-hop circuits consist of: guard (red), middle (green) and exit.

Circuit initiated with a CREATE command




Shared secrets established for symmetric encryption.

Circuit extended with RELAY_EXTEND




Relay to green node without green knowing the gopher's location.

Repeated to complete 3-hop circuit




Now streams can be established on the circuit.


Data can now be relayed




Each node removes its layer of encryption




It's like peeling and onion...



Exit node sees the actual packet




The crux of a relay implementation




Relay maintains many server and client connections.

Traffic on a circuit is relayed between them



Demux/mux circuit traffic



Relay must demux/mux circuit traffic. Circuits must not interfere with each other.

Why Go?

Strikes a sweet spot

- Fast statically typed compiled language
- Feels like writing in a dynamic language
- Strong tooling, standard libary and ecosystem

Concurrency features:

- Goroutines: "green threads" mapped to OS threads, running ~100k is reasonable
- Channels: send and receive operations between goroutines

Gained a reputation for:

- Systems programming
- High performance servers

Why not?

Tom van der Woerdt had harsh criticisms:

- Limited cipher suites and poor performance of crypto/tls
- Hence forced to use C bindings to openss1
- Blamed cgo for buildup of OS threads and excessive locking
- Memory usage per connection: 16KB buffer plus 4KB goroutine stack
- Buffered channel: static array implementation causes high memory usage

Maybe we can avoid these problems now:

- crypto/tls has massively improved
- Memory problems result from *design decisions*

Challenges

Grunt work:

- Forking crypto/tls standard library package
- Parsing protocol data formats
- Navigating a work-in-progress spec

Cryptographic details:

- Auth flow
- NTor handshake
- Old TAP handshake
- Some hand-rolled algorithms

Concurrency is hard

State managed by an associated goroutine

- Connection
- TransverseCircuit

Connection offloads to circuit via channel:

```
cell, _ := c.ReceiveCell()
switch cell.Command() {
case CommandCreate, CommandCreate2:
    CreateHandler(c, cell)
case CommandCreated, CommandCreated2, CommandRelay, CommandRelayEarly, CommandDestroy:
    s, ok := c.circuits.Sender(cell.CircID())
    if !ok {
        bad()
    s.SendCell(cell)
case CommandPadding, CommandVpadding:
    logger.Debug("skipping padding cell")
default:
    logger.Error("no handler registered")
```

Current Status



It's gone viral




(Not quite. I did crash the tor metrics system though.)

Accepted into consensus

```
$ wget http://86.59.21.38/tor/server/all
$ cat all
router pearl000 35.203.138.1 9001 0 0
signing-key
----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY----
MIGJAoGBAKzTaN4tZGv1kiQWBzeu0k+ovr2LtIURlaVC38j6j/fQuYfuAZX/XvV1
fQr9EVh+T617dh+frt2D0QDuzLUvP3hpgVozW94w+Ib85pUCne03f4rj3QYu5Qtg
GvzShslZI6vgyy0g2jAOGa4jxT/UYAcKE5dQo8CBKA6Qb0P5Joc1AgMBAAE=
----END RSA PUBLIC KEY----
fingerprint 6832 5B4B 1E17 7374 B84D 372F 0304 6351 BEE7 FF6A
...
platform Pearl cfaf5d6 on Linux
contact pearl@m15n.org https://github.com/mmcloughlin/pearl
...
```

Pearl node running in the Tor network



Future Work

There is a long way to go.

Near term:

- Nurse **production** deployment
- Develop more realistic local testing
- Focus on **performance**
- Revisit parser

Longer term expand protocol support:

Exit node, client side, hidden services...

Alternatively:

Contribute to new go-tor project or the official tor project

Acknowledgements

- Myles for our daily check-in and keeping me on the straight and narrow
- Oz and Myles for setting up the program
- Bradfield Sabbatical Program for the community and emotional suport
- **Uber** for letting me participate

Thank you

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