

ECE 175B: Probabilistic Reasoning and Graphical Models: Lecture 6: Confounding in Causality and The Basic Junction Patterns – Part I

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Forced Node Values - The “do—operator”

- Instead of passively observing the value of a node in a graph, we can **intervene** and **force** the value of a node x to be **pinned** to a specified value $x \equiv x$, denoted by $\text{do}(x = x)$

- A “regular” conditioned probability is more clearly written as:

$$P(y|x) = P(y|\text{see}(x = x)) \quad (\text{by definition})$$

- **Important questions** are:
 - How to compute $P(y|\text{do}(x = x))$ in general
 - When, **if ever**, are we lucky enough to have

$$P(y|\text{do}(x = x)) = P(y|\text{see}(x = x)) = P(y|x)$$

The do-operator

- These questions can be clarified by reviewing what $P(y|\text{see}(x = x)) = P(y|x)$ means
- We can do this by running n independent experiments, and taking $n \rightarrow \infty$ and invoking the law of large numbers (LLN)
- For each experiment, we passively observe a joint outcome $(x(\omega_j) = x_j, y(\omega_j) = y_j), j = 1, \dots, n$
- We have the following counts for the outcomes $x = x(\omega_j), y = y(\omega_j)$

$$n_x = \sum_{j=1}^n \mathbb{I}(x(\omega_j) = x) \quad n_y = \sum_{j=1}^n \mathbb{I}(y(\omega_j) = y)$$
$$n_{x,y} = \sum_{j=1}^n \mathbb{I}(x(\omega_j) = x \wedge y(\omega_j) = y)$$

Note that the indicator function $\mathbb{I}(\cdot)$ is defined as $\mathbb{I}(\text{true}) = 1$ and $\mathbb{I}(\text{false}) = 0$

The do-operator

- LLN: As $n \rightarrow \infty$

$$P(x) = \frac{n_x}{n} ; P(y) = \frac{n_y}{n}$$

$$P(x, y) = \frac{n_{x,y}}{n} ; \text{fraction of times } (x, y) \text{ occurs (in all measurements)}$$

$$P(y|x) = \frac{n_{x,y}}{n_x} ; \text{fraction of times } y \text{ occurs in the measurements where } x \text{ occurs}$$

Note that $P(y|x) = \frac{n_{x,y}}{n_x} = \frac{n_{x,y}/n}{n_x/n} = \frac{P(x,y)}{P(x)}$ as expected

- Probabilities give the “long run” ($n \rightarrow \infty$) relative frequencies of occurrence of situations that are **passively observed**

The do-operator

Example: Suppose we observe the following values:

- We note that x, y are functionally related as $y = 2x$
- We consider the following take the BN model (M)


$$\begin{array}{c} \textcircled{x} \longrightarrow \textcircled{y} \\ \Leftrightarrow P(x, y) = \underbrace{P(y|x)}_{\mathbb{I}(y=2x)} P(x) \end{array}$$

- We **intervene** and force $x \equiv 2$, i.e. we **do**($x = 2$)
- We **expect** to see $y = 4$
- **Instead**, we observe $y = -2$. **What happened?**

x	y
1	2
0	0
-1	-2
1	2
3	6
4	8
0	0
2	4
-2	-4

The do—operator


We have not verified that model M conforms to the actual causal structure of the “world”

- Therefore we are not “licensed” to use M for the causal control purposes
- E.g., Maybe the actual model is $x = \frac{1}{2}y$,  or maybe not
- Maybe we have NOT captured all the variables and structure of interest

The do-operator


- Maybe the “Real World” is

“latent variable” \rightarrow



No actual causal relationship between x and y

- The do-operator $\text{do}(x = x)$ breaks a link in the graph g :




We have done “surgery” on g to create a modified graph g_m with modified distribution $P_m(x, y, z)$

The do-operator

- After this surgery, we have that

$$P(y|\text{do}(x = x)) = P_m(y|x)$$




Note that in our example $g_m : P(y|x = x) = P_m(y)$, i.e. $y \perp\!\!\!\perp x$

- Thus $\text{do}(x = x)$ has **no effect** on y
- Thus our original model is wrong in the sense that it can not be used for control
- However, our model  is OK for **passive prediction** of y from x since $y = 2x$ **passively**


Prediction versus Control

- Consider $\mathcal{X} = (x, y)$ with $P(x, y) = P_{x,y}(x, y)$

We can model it in three ways:

- $P(x, y)$ 
- $P(y|x)P(x)$ 
- $P(x|y)P(y)$ 


- All three are equivalent for **prediction**
- Can any of these models be used for control?
Only if the model captures how the world “really is” **regarding causal behaviour**

- Consider  : Is $P(y|\text{do}(x)) = P(y|x)$?

Yes, **if** this is **truly** how the world is

Prediction versus Control

- But what if the world is actually, g :




Say, we have $x = z$ and $y = 2z$

I.e. with $P(x, y, z) = \underbrace{P(x|z)}_{\mathbb{I}(x=z)} \underbrace{P(y|z)}_{\mathbb{I}(y=2z)} P(z)$


This yields $P(y|x) = \mathbb{I}(y = 2x)$, which allows **perfect prediction**, i.e., from observational data, we see and infer that $y = 2x$; this does **NOT** mean we can control y from x

Prediction or Control?

- Suppose we “do($x = 2$)”, i.e., we **intervene** and force $x = 2$



Intervene
 \Rightarrow
do($x = 2$)



$$P(x, y, z) = P(x|z)P(y|z)P(z)$$

$$P(x|z) = \mathbb{I}(x = z)$$

$$P(y|z) = \mathbb{I}(y = 2z)$$

$$P(z) = \text{anything}$$

$$P(y|x) = \underbrace{\mathbb{I}(y = 2x)}_{\text{functional relationship for seeing}} : y \perp\!\!\!\perp x$$

$$P_m(x, y, z) = P(x|z)P(y|z)P(z)$$

$$P_m(x|z) = P_m(x) = \mathbb{I}(x = 2)$$

$$P_m(y|z) = P(y|z) = \mathbb{I}(y = 2z)$$

$$P_m(z) = P(z) = P_z(z)$$

$$P_m(y|x) = P_m(y) = P_z(y/2)$$

functional relationship for **seeing** is
 $y = 2x$

since $y \perp\!\!\!\perp x$ in g_m

Prediction or Control?

$$\begin{aligned}P_m(x, y) &= \sum_z P_m(x, y, z) \\&= \sum_z P_m(x) P_m(y|z) P_m(z) \\&= \sum_z \underbrace{\mathbb{I}(x=2)}_{P_m(x)} P_m(y, z) \\&= P_m(x) \sum_z P_m(y, z) \\&= P_m(x) P_m(y)\end{aligned}$$


$$\therefore P_m(x, y) = P_m(x) P_m(y) \Leftrightarrow y \perp\!\!\!\perp x \Leftrightarrow P_m(y|x) = P_m(y)$$

Thus, **y doesn't depend on what x is pinned to at all!**

$$y = 2z \text{ and } z \sim P_z(z) \implies P_m(y) = P_z(y/2)$$

Control or Prediction?

- Consider the more general situation, g :



$$P(x, y, z) = P(y|x, z) P(x|z) \underbrace{P(x)}_{\text{anything}}$$

$$\text{Let } x = z \Leftrightarrow P(x|z) = \mathbb{I}(x = z)$$

$$y = x + 2z \Leftrightarrow P(y|x, z) = \mathbb{I}(y = x + 2z)$$


$$P(y|z) = \mathbb{I}(y = 3z) \quad (y = 3z)$$

$$P(y|x) = \mathbb{I}(y = 3x) \quad (y = 3x)$$

Because we have the **functional relationship** $y = 3x$ for **seeing**, we can do perfect prediction of y from x

Control or Prediction?

- Perform $\text{do}(x = x)$, g_m :



Then we have $y = \text{do}(x = x) + 2z$ with $x \neq z$: $P_m(x) = \mathbb{I}(x = x)$

$$\begin{aligned} P_m(x, y, z) &= P_m(y|x, z)P_m(x)P_m(z) \\ &= P(y|x, z)P_m(x)P(z) \end{aligned}$$

- If we “see” $x = x$, then we can **predict** $y = 3x$
- If we $\text{do}(x = x)$, then we can obtain $y = x + 2z$, $z \sim P(z)$
- This suggest that **if** we can **observe** z , then we can control for its influence on y


Basic Junction Patterns

- We want to understand and analyse how “information flows” through paths in a BN
- There are the following three basic (“atomic”) 3-node/2-link paths or junction patterns

- Chain:



- Fork:



- Collider:



Basic Junction Patterns

- Consider any path through a DAG between any two nodes A and B having at least two edges
- Along such a path, one will encounter one or more of the **three (basic) junction patterns**; there are **only three** such patterns

Pattern	Model
chain	$x \rightarrow z \rightarrow y$
fork	$x \leftarrow z \rightarrow y$
collider	$x \rightarrow z \leftarrow y$


- Note that a junction always involves two consecutive edges and three consecutive nodes, where the middle node is the **junction node**
- Every non-endpoint node** of a path is a junction node for some junction

Basic Junction Patterns

Pattern	Model
chain	$x \rightarrow z \rightarrow y$
fork	$x \leftarrow z \rightarrow y$
collider	$x \rightarrow z \leftarrow y$

- We can look at any **non-endpoint** node and decide what kind it is: **mediator** (for a chain); **forking** (for a fork); or **collider** (for a collider)
- We want to know the information blocking/transmission properties of the junction

Chain Junction


- g : 
 $P(x, y, z) = P(y|z)P(z|x)P(x)$

- Note that we can alternatively expand $P(x, y, z)$ as

$$P(x, y, z) = \left(\frac{P(z|y)P(y)}{P(z)} \right) P(x, z) = P(x|z)P(z|y)P(y)$$

by applying Bayes Rule for $P(y|z)$ term and $P(z|x)P(x) = P(x, z)$


- Thus, the graph g is **probabilistically equivalent** to the chain



- When two graphs g and g' encode the same **probability structure**; we say they are **Markov Equivalent (ME)** and write $g \stackrel{\text{ME}}{\equiv} g'$

Chain Junction

- Two junctions are ME if they have the same **moral graph** = drop the arrows and “marry the parents”, i.e.,



- Being ME means that $g \equiv g'$ are equivalent for **prediction purposes**; it does **NOT** mean that they are equivalent for **causal** modeling (this should be obvious)

- Note that $P(x, y) = \sum_z P(x, y, z) = P(x) \underbrace{\sum_z P(y|z)P(z|x)}_{\text{In general, not } = P(y)}$

We **expect** that $P(x, y) \neq P(x)P(y) \iff x \perp\!\!\!\perp y$
(Notation: $x \perp\!\!\!\perp y = \neg(x \perp y)$)

Chain Junction


- But if the numerical specification values are chosen to satisfy $P(y|z) = P(y)$ or $P(z|x) = P(z)$ then we can have $P(x, y) = P(x)P(y) \iff x \perp\!\!\!\perp_P y$ but this is highly unlikely (Notation: $\perp\!\!\!\perp_P$ “special P” indicates that this is an independency that is not shown in the graph)

- We write: $\overset{x}{\circ} \longrightarrow \overset{z}{\circ} \longrightarrow \overset{y}{\circ} \implies \diamond(x \amalg y)$

\diamond denotes “likely”, not guaranteed; it is likely that “information flows” from x to y

Chain Junction

- Now note that $P(x, y|z) = P(y|z)P(x|z)$ **always structurally true**

$\forall P(x, y, z)$ when conditioned on z , we have 
 $\implies \Box(x \perp\!\!\!\perp y \mid z)$

\Box denotes “guaranteed, always necessarily”; it is **guaranteed** that information flow between x and y is **blocked** when conditioned on z

- This is the **general theme**: We can 100% guarantee independencies (they are structurally true) from graph separation, but **NOT** dependencies (they are likely but can be numerically untrue)