

ECE 175B: Probabilistic Reasoning and Graphical Models: Lecture 7: Confounding in Causality and The Basic Junction Patterns – Part II

Florian Meyer & Ken Kreutz-Delgado

*Electrical and Computer Engineering Department
University of California San Diego*

Fork Junction

$$\begin{array}{c} x \quad \quad z \quad \quad y \\ \bigcirc \longleftarrow \bigcirc \longrightarrow \bigcirc \end{array} \iff P(x, y, z) = P(x|z)P(y|z)P(z)$$

- Note that $P(x, y) = \sum_z P(x, y, z) \neq P(x)P(y)$ **except** when we numerically specify $P(x|z) = P(x)$ or $P(y|z) = P(y)$, i.e., we have

$$\begin{array}{c} x \quad \quad z \quad \quad y \\ \bigcirc \longleftarrow \bigcirc \longrightarrow \bigcirc \end{array} \implies \Diamond(x \amalg y) \text{ (likely, not guaranteed)}$$


- On the other hand we **always have**

$P(x, y, z) = P(x, z)P(y|z) \implies P(x, y|z) = P(x|z)P(y|z)$, i.e., now when conditioned on z , we have

$$\begin{array}{c} x \quad \quad z \quad \quad y \\ \bigcirc \longleftarrow \textcolor{blue}{\bigcirc} \longrightarrow \bigcirc \end{array} \implies \Box(x \perp\!\!\!\perp y \mid z) \text{ (guaranteed)}$$

Fork Junction

- Note that the Fork and Chain are **Markov Equivalent (ME)**



which can be shown directly:

$$\begin{aligned} P(x, y, z) &= \underbrace{P(x|z)P(y|z)P(z)}_{\substack{x \quad z \quad y \\ \bigcirc \leftarrow \bigcirc \rightarrow \bigcirc}} = P(y|z)P(x, z) \\ &= \underbrace{P(y|z)P(z|x)P(x)}_{\substack{x \quad z \quad y \\ \bigcirc \rightarrow \bigcirc \rightarrow \bigcirc}} \end{aligned}$$

- Of course the Fork and Chain are **NOT** causally equivalent

Collider Junction

$$\begin{array}{c} x \quad \quad z \quad \quad y \\ \circ \longrightarrow \circ \longleftarrow \circ \end{array} \iff P(x, y, z) = P(z|x, y)P(x)P(y)$$

- $P(x, y) = \sum_z P(x, y, z) = P(x)P(y) \sum_z P(z|x, y) = P(x)P(y)$

Thus, $\begin{array}{c} x \quad \quad z \quad \quad y \\ \circ \longrightarrow \circ \longleftarrow \circ \end{array} \implies \Box(x \perp\!\!\!\perp y)$ (unconditional independence)

- On the other hand


$$\begin{aligned} P(x, y|z) &= \frac{P(x, y, z)}{P(z)} = \left(\frac{P(z|x, y)}{P(z)} \right) P(x)P(y) \\ &\neq P(x|z)P(y|z) \end{aligned}$$

Except for special numerical specification, e.g., $P(z|x, y) = P(z|x)$


Thus, when conditioned on z

$$\begin{array}{c} x \quad \quad z \quad \quad y \\ \circ \longrightarrow \bullet \longleftarrow \circ \end{array} \implies \Diamond(x \perp\!\!\!\perp y|z)$$
 (likely, not guaranteed)


Junction Properties



ME
 \equiv



ME
 \neq






| Graph World | | | Probability World |
|-------------|---|---------------------|----------------------------------|
| Type | Structure | d-connected | |
| Chain | $\begin{array}{ccccc} x & & z & & y \\ \bigcirc & \longrightarrow & \bigcirc & \longrightarrow & \bigcirc \end{array}$ | $[x \emptyset y]_d$ | $\Diamond(x \amalg y \emptyset)$ |
| Fork | $\begin{array}{ccccc} x & & z & & y \\ \bigcirc & \longleftarrow & \bigcirc & \longrightarrow & \bigcirc \end{array}$ | $[x \emptyset y]_d$ | $\Diamond(x \amalg y \emptyset)$ |
| Collider | $\begin{array}{ccccc} x & & z & & y \\ \bigcirc & \longrightarrow & \textcolor{blue}{\bigcirc} & \longleftarrow & \bigcirc \end{array}$ | $[x z y]_d$ | $\Diamond(x \amalg y z)$ |

Information flow is **likely unblocked** (open)

Notation: $x \amalg y|\emptyset = x \amalg y$

Junction Properties

| Graph World | | | Probability World |
|-------------|---|-----------------------------------|---|
| Type | Structure | d-separated | |
| Chain |  | $\langle x z y \rangle_d$ | $\square(x \perp\!\!\!\perp y z)$ |
| Fork |  | $\langle x z y \rangle_d$ | $\square(x \perp\!\!\!\perp y z)$ |
| Collider |  | $\langle x \emptyset y \rangle_d$ | $\square(x \perp\!\!\!\perp y \emptyset)$ |



Information flow is
guaranteed to be blocked

The Collider junction has the opposite behaviour compare to the Chain and Fork junctions

Junctions and Confounding

Definition of Confounding: $P(y|\text{do}(x)) \neq P(y|x)$ (seeing \neq doing)

Consider the following situations that all assume a **direct causal link** from x to y



$$P(x, y, z) = P(z|x, y)P(y|x)P(x)$$


$$P(x, y) = \left(\sum_z P(z|x, y) \right) P(y|x)P(x) = P(y|x)P(x)$$

$$P(y|\text{do}(x)) = P(y|x)$$

\implies **NO** confounding

Junctions and Confounding

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direct influence of x on y


$$P(x, y, z) = P(y|x, z)P(z|x)P(x)$$

$$P(x, y) = P(x) \left(\sum_z P(y|x, z)P(z|x) \right) = P(y|x)P(x)$$

$$P(y|\text{do}(x)) = P(y|x) = \sum_z \overbrace{P(y|x, z)}^{z \text{ has an influence on } y} \underbrace{P(z|x)}_{\text{part of } z \text{ due to } x}$$

\implies NO confounding



Junctions and Confounding



\implies Confounding

- As we have seen, information flow between x and y “mixes up” prediction of y (for seeing z) and control of y (for doing x)
- Note that $x \leftarrow z \rightarrow y$ is a confounding path, i.e., it implies that $P(y|\text{do}(x)) \neq P(y|x)$,


“Backdoor Path” and Confounding



- Let us assume we have a directed edge $x \rightarrow y$
- When another edge into x allows further information flow between x and y , we have a **backdoor path** that causes confounding
- Note that in the two cases shown, we can **close** the backdoor path by **conditioning on z** to **block** the information flow between x and y
- This is called **controlling** for confounding (caused by the backdoor path) and z is called a **deconfounder variable**

“Backdoor Path” and Confounding

- Consider why this works for fork:



$$P(x, y, z) = P(y|x, z)P(x|z)P(z)$$


$$\xRightarrow{\text{Surgery}} P_m(x, y, z) = \overbrace{P_m(y|x, z)}^{P(y|x, z)} \underbrace{P_m(z)}_{P(z)} P_m(x)$$

$$P_m(y|x) = \sum_z P_m(y, z|x) = \sum_z P_m(y|x, z)P_m(z)$$

$$P(y|\text{do}(x)) = \sum_z \underbrace{P(y|x, z)}_{\text{conditioned on } z} P(z) = \mathbb{E}_z\{P(y|x, z)\}$$

Fork Backdoor Path

- $P(y|\text{do}(x = x)) = \sum_z P(y|x, z)P(z) = \mathbb{E}_z\{P(y|x, z)\}$
By conditioning on $z = z$ we determine the consequence of $\text{do}(x = x)$ for each “level” of z -value, $z = z$
- In particular, we first determine




- We then get the average control effect of $x = x$ by averaging $P(y|x, z = z)$ over the different z -values

Backdoor Procedure: $P(y|\text{do}(x = x)) = \mathbb{E}_z\{P(y|x, z)\}$


Confounding and Simpson's Paradox


- Simpson's “paradox” arises from confusing $P(y|x)$ with $P(y|\text{do}(x))$
- **Example:** Doctors know that for a specific individual, exercise reduces cholesterol. A **population study** is done which yields the following scatter plot of cholesterol versus exercise



This seems paradoxical given what doctors see for each patient. What is happening?

Simpson's Paradox

- The assumed model is 
- However, in reality age a is a (de)confounder variable




- We should determine the response $P(c|e, a)$ for each age stratum $a = a$, and then get the average of these responses to obtain


$$P(c|\text{do}(e)) = E_a\{P(c|e, a)\}$$

Simpson's Paradox

- This procedure yields



- We average over the age-dependent response to get



- It is apparent that $P(c|do(e)) \neq P(c|e)$