



# Leap

## A Fast, Lattice-based OPRF with Application to Private Set Intersection

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Sebastian Ramacher<sup>◇</sup>   Christian Rechberger<sup>†,♣</sup>

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
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-  **simple** arithmetic operations
- ✓ 1<sup>st</sup> modification of 2HashDH UC proof for Naor-Reingold OPRF

# Leap is an Oblivious Pseudorandom Function (OPRF)



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
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
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
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
Extend with symmetric operations!



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


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


Generic construction from  $\lceil \log q \rceil$   $\binom{2}{1}$ -OTs !

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


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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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# Precomputation

**Client**


$$\mathbf{c} = [c_1, \dots, c_m] \in \{0, 1\}^m$$

**Server**

$$\mathbf{K} = [k_0, k_1, \dots, k_m] \in \mathbb{Z}_{q-1}^{n \times (m+1)}$$

- input length  $m = 128$


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
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
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
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
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
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- 2432 OTs



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- ~~2432~~ 128 base OTs + OT extension



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
$\binom{2}{1}$ -OT correction bits



correction polynomials




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





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
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
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
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
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
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


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





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
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
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# Interchangable Building Blocks: Precomputation Numbers

#	Protocol	Communication		Computation	
		Client	Server	Client	Server
$2^0$	Simplest OT+IKNP	39 kB	<b>4 kB</b>	63 ms	63 ms
	Kyber OT+IKNP	465 kB	328 kB	<b>10 ms</b>	<b>10 ms</b>
	Simplest OT+Silent	<b>22 kB</b>	22 kB	68 ms	68 ms
	Kyber OT+Silent	448 kB	392 kB	<b>10 ms</b>	10 ms
$2^{13}$	Simplest OT+IKNP	319 MB	<b>4.26 kB</b>	420 ms	463 ms
	Kyber OT+IKNP	319 MB	328 kB	<b>311 ms</b>	<b>423 ms</b>
	Simplest OT+Silent	<b>46 kB</b>	155 kB	2065 ms	3371 ms
	Kyber OT+Silent	487 kB	559 kB	2130 ms	3496 ms

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
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


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- If  $x_i = y_j$  then  $F_k(x_i) = z_j$
- Otherwise  $F_k(y_j)$  is pseudorandom.

	Parameters		Setup		Online	
	S	C	S	C	S	C
Leap (IKNP+Kyber)	$2^0$	$2^0$	1 ms	1 ms	0.2s	6 ms
			117 bytes	0 bytes	73.4 kiB	20 KiB
	$2^5$	$2^5$	1 ms	1 ms	0.08 s	0.07 s
			246 bytes	0 bytes	802 kiB	47.5 kiB
	$2^{10}$	$2^{10}$	4 ms	5 ms	2.4 s	2.46 s
			4.30 kiB	0 bytes	22.39 MiB	646.5 kiB
NR-OT (FHE OT) [Hei+24]	$2^0$	$2^0$	0.26 s	0.51 s	0.06 s	0.10 s
			134 bytes	1 byte	128 kiB	0.75MiB
	$2^5$	$2^5$	1.63 s	1.88 s	3.11 s	3.15 s
			263 bytes	1 byte	4MiB	8.5 MiB
	$2^{10}$	$2^{10}$	45.04 s	45.28 s	99.66 s	99.71 s
			4.31 MiB	1 byte	128 MiB	256.6 MiB
OPUS [Hei+24]	$2^0$	$2^0$	0.26 s	0.26 s	15.47 s	15.91 s
			133 bytes	0 bytes	17.07 kiB	9.04 kiB
	$2^5$	$2^5$	8.71 s	8.71 s	328.46 s	329.14 s
			262 bytes	0 bytes	546.25 kiB	290.26 kiB
	$2^{10}$	$2^{10}$	303.38 s	303.38 s	16367.12 s	16367.60 s
			4.31 kiB	0 bytes	34.14 MiB	18.08 MiB
ECNR (Simplest OT + IKNP) [Kal+19]	$2^0$	$2^0$	10 ms	0 s	0.23 s	0.05 s
			133 bytes	0 bytes	12.04 kiB	16 bytes
	$2^5$	$2^5$	0.02 s	0 s	0.21 s	0.06 s
			262 bytes	0 bytes	137.05 kiB	512 bytes
	$2^{10}$	$2^{10}$	0.3 s	0 s	0.64 s	0.57 s
			4.36 kiB	0 bytes	4.04 MiB	16 kiB

work	assumption	rounds	comm.	cost	security(C-S)	preprocessing	no trusted setup	verifiable	available
<a href="#">ADDS21</a>	(R)LWE+SIS	2	2	MB	semihonest-semihonest	-	YES	NO	<a href="#">YES</a>
<a href="#">ADDS21</a>	(R)LWE+SIS	2	128	GB	malicious-malicious	-	YES	YES	NO
<a href="#">AG24</a>	(R)LWE+SIS	2	316	kB	malicious-malicious	221.5 kB	YES	YES	NO
<a href="#">ADDG23</a>	mod(2,3)+lattices	2	10	KB	malicious-semihonest	2.5 MB	YES	NO	NO
<a href="#">ADDG23</a>	mod(2,3)+lattices	2	160	KB	malicious-semihonest	2.5 MB	YES	YES	NO
<a href="#">HKL+25</a>	heuristic LWR	6	23	KB	semihonest-semihonest	793 KB	YES	NO	<a href="#">YES</a>
<a href="#">ESTX24</a>	iMLWER-RU+MLE+SIS	2	126	KB <sup>*</sup>	malicious-malicious	10 KB	YES	YES	NO
<a href="#">APRR24</a>	mod(2,3)	2	916	bits	malicious-semihonest	38 bits	YES	YES	NO
<a href="#">DGH+21</a>	mod(2,3)	2	641	bits	semihonest-semihonest	1836 bits	NO	NO	NO
<a href="#">SHB23</a>	Legendre PRF	3	13	kB	semihonest-semihonest	?	YES	YES	NO
<a href="#">KCM24</a>	Legendre PRF	2	?		semihonest-semihonest	?	YES	YES	<a href="#">YES</a>
<a href="#">BDFH24</a>	Legendre PRF as 2HashDH	9	356	KB	malicious-malicious	392 kB	YES	YES	<a href="#">YES</a>
<a href="#">YBHKR24</a>	generalized power residue (Legendre) PRF	3	774	kB	malicious-semihonest	-	YES	YES	NO
<a href="#">YBHKR24</a>	generalized power residue (Legendre) PRF	3	970	kB	malicious-malicious	-	YES	YES	NO
<a href="#">FO023</a>	AES+Garbled Circuits	2	6.79	MB	semihonest-semihonest	-	YES	NO	<a href="#">YES</a>
<a href="#">HKLS24</a>	Minicrypt	?	22	bytes <sup>Ä¶</sup>	malicious-malicious	-	YES	NO	NO
<a href="#">Basso23</a>	Isogenies F_p^2	2	3.0	MB	malicious-malicious	-	NO	NO	NO
<a href="#">Basso23</a>	Isogenies F_p^2	2	8.7	MB	malicious-malicious	-	NO	YES	NO
<a href="#">Basso24</a>	Higher-Dimensional isogenies	2	28.9	kB	malicious-malicious	-	YES	YES	<a href="#">YES</a>
<a href="#">BKW20</a>	Isogenies F_p + lattices	2	20.54	kB	semihonest-semihonest	-	NO	NO	NO
<a href="#">BKW20</a>	Isogenies F_p + lattices	4	34.88	kB	malicious-semihonest	-	NO	NO	NO
<a href="#">HHM+23</a>	Isogenies F_p + lattices + HE OT	2	640	kB	semihonest-semihonest	-	YES	NO	<a href="#">YES</a>
<a href="#">HHM+23</a>	Isogenies F_p	258	24.7	kB	semihonest-semihonest	-	YES	NO	<a href="#">YES</a>
<a href="#">dSP23</a>	Isogenies F_p	2	384	bytes	malicious-semihonest	68.4 kB	YES	YES	NO
<a href="#">dSP23</a>	Isogenies F_p	2	16.38	kB	malicious-semihonest	-	YES	YES	NO

work	assumption	rounds	comm.	cost	security(C-S)	preprocessing	no trusted setup	verifiable	available	
<a href="#">ADDS21</a>	(R)LWE+SIS						YES	NO	<u>YES</u>	
<a href="#">ADDS21</a>	(R)LWE+SIS						YES	YES	NO	
<a href="#">AG24</a>	(R)LWE+SIS						KB	YES	NO	
<a href="#">ADDG23</a>	mod(2,3)+lattices						MB	YES	NO	
<a href="#">ADDG23</a>	mod(2,3)+lattices						MB	YES	NO	
<a href="#">HKL+25</a>	heuristic LWR						KB	YES	<u>NO</u>	<u>YES</u>
<a href="#">ESTX24</a>	iMLWER-RU+MLE+SIS						B	YES	YES	NO
<a href="#">APRR24</a>	mod(2,3)						ts	YES	YES	NO
<a href="#">DGH+21</a>	mod(2,3)						its	NO	NO	NO
<a href="#">SHB23</a>	Legendre PRF							YES	YES	NO
<a href="#">KCM24</a>	Legendre PRF						YES	YES	<u>YES</u>	
<a href="#">BDFH24</a>	Legendre PRF as 2HashDH						KB	YES	YES	<u>YES</u>
<a href="#">YBHKR24</a>	generalized power residue (Legendre							YES	YES	NO
<a href="#">YBHKR24</a>	generalized power residue (Legendre							YES	YES	NO
<a href="#">FO023</a>	AES+Garbled Circuits							YES	NO	<u>YES</u>
<a href="#">HKLS24</a>	Minicrypt							YES	NO	NO
<a href="#">Basso23</a>	Isogenies $F_p^2$							NO	NO	NO
<a href="#">Basso23</a>	Isogenies $F_p^2$							NO	YES	NO
<a href="#">Basso24</a>										<u>YES</u>
<a href="#">BKW20</a>		<div>heimberger.xyz/oprfs.html</div>							NO	
<a href="#">BKW20</a>									NO	
<a href="#">HHM+23</a>									<u>YES</u>	
<a href="#">HHM+23</a>									<u>YES</u>	
<a href="#">dSP23</a>	Isogenies $F_p$								NO	
<a href="#">dSP23</a>	Isogenies $F_p$	2	384 bytes	malicious-semihonest	68.4 KB	YES	YES	NO		
		2	16.38 KB	malicious-semihonest	-	YES	YES	NO		



# Leap

## A Fast, Lattice-based OPRF with Application to Private Set Intersection

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# Performance

Phase	Client			Server		
	Comm.	Comp.	Idle	Comm.	Comp.	Idle
Subset-Sum	16 bytes	5 $\mu s$	21 $\mu s$	16 384 bytes	863 $\mu s$	46 $\mu s$
OLE	144 bytes	4 $\mu s$	3 $\mu s$	1 296 bytes	72 $\mu s$	88 $\mu s$
Rounding	144 bytes	2 $\mu s$	726 $\mu s$	4 118 bytes	814 $\mu s$	67 $\mu s$
BCH	0 bytes	1 $\mu s$	0 $\mu s$	8 bytes	/	26 $\mu s$
Overall	304 bytes	11 $\mu s$	750 $\mu s$	21 806 bytes	1.7 ms	227 $\mu s$
(Network)	(328 bytes)			(22 840 bytes)		



# References

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- [Ban+15] Abhishek Banerjee et al. “SPRING: Fast Pseudorandom Functions from Rounded Ring Products”. In: *FSE 2014*. Ed. by Carlos Cid and Christian Rechberger. Vol. 8540. LNCS. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, Mar. 2015, pp. 38–57. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-46706-0\_3.
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- [Kal+19] Daniel Kales et al. “Mobile Private Contact Discovery at Scale”. In: *USENIX Security 2019*. Ed. by Nadia Heninger and Patrick Traynor. USENIX Association, Aug. 2019, pp. 1447–1464.