

Quantitative Tightening

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The views expressed on this paper do not necessarily reflect the positions of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis or the Federal Reserve System.

Introduction

Monetary policy normalization in the US

- Interest rate lift-off (conventional)
- Balance sheet unwinding (unconventional)

We ask the following questions:

- When, which, and how much?
- What if there is a new crisis?
- What if there are political constraints?

What we do and how

We study these questions by doing the following:

- Model of (un)conventional monetary policy
 1. TANK w/ rich mortgage setting
 2. Endogenous refinancing decisions and mortgage duration
 3. Crisis = worsening of issuance frictions
- Quantitative analysis of normalization scenarios
 1. Early unwinding
 2. Late unwinding
 3. New crisis in 2019Q2
 4. QE4 and institutional constraints

Unwinding later

- Enables housing, consumption boom
- All fine *if there is no new crisis*
- Political constraints more likely to bind \Rightarrow crisis might be worse


Unwinding *earlier*

- Has mild short-run costs
- Provides “room” for QE4

Precautionary benefits of unwinding soon after exiting ZLB.

Background: Mortgage Spreads

Mortgage Spreads and Issuance Frictions



Mortgage Spreads and Issuance Frictions, cont'd

- Data motivates functional form for issuance costs of the type

$$1 + \text{Cost}_t = \exp \{ \beta_{t,0} + \beta_{t,1} \log \text{GIR}_t \} = \eta_t \text{GIR}_t^{\psi_t}$$

- η_t, ψ_t rise during periods of financial stress [▶ Details on data/analysis](#)
- Embed this relationship in a GE model with realistic mortgages
- QE moderates private GIR, issuance costs
- Reduced-form way of capturing QE effects

Model

Demographics and Preferences

- Discrete time $t = 0, 1, \dots$
- **Borrowing** \implies impatient borrowers $j = b$, patient savers $j = s$
- Borrowers take out realistic mortgages
- Savers issue mortgages subject to frictions
- Preferences over numeraire, housing, labor

$$u_t^j = \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \beta_j^k \left[\log C_{t+k}^j + \xi \log H_{t-1+k}^j - \eta_j \frac{(N_{t+k}^j)^{1+\varphi}}{1+\varphi} \right]$$

Borrowers take out realistic mortgages

- Long-term fixed-rate nominal mortgage w/ costly prepayment
- **Family Construct:** continuum of members $i \in [0, 1]$ in borrower hh
- Prepaying allows member i to (i) optimize over house size h_t^* , (ii) optimize over mortgage size m_t^* , (iii) reset interest rate r_t^*
- subject to iid cost $\kappa_{i,t} \sim \Gamma$ (rebated lump-sum back to borrowers)
- \implies endogenous prepayment rate ρ_t

$$\rho_t = F(\overbrace{\text{rate incentive}_t}^+, \overbrace{\text{cash-out motive}_t}^+)$$

- New (and only new) mortgages subject to LTV constraint

Savers originate mortgages subject to frictions

- New mortgages ℓ_t^* tranced: ℓ_t^* of **PO strips**, $r_t^* \ell_t^*$ of **IO strips**
- Origination + securitization subject to a cost (rebated lump-sum)

$$\psi_t^S(\ell_t^*) = \frac{\eta_{m,t}}{1 + \psi^m} \left(\frac{\ell_t^*}{\ell_{ss}^*} \right)^{1+\psi^m}, \quad \eta_{m,t} \sim \text{AR}(1)$$

- Saver assets:

1. PO strips m_t^s traded at price q_t^m with payoff

$$Z_t^m = \underbrace{\nu}_{\text{sched. principal}} + \underbrace{(1-\nu)\rho_t}_{\text{unsched. principal}} + \underbrace{(1-\nu)(1-\rho_t)q_t^m}_{\text{value of future payments}}$$

2. IO strips x_t^s traded at price q_t^a with payoff

$$Z_t^a = \underbrace{1}_{\text{sched. interest}} + \underbrace{(1-\nu)(1-\rho_t)q_t^a}_{\text{value of future payments}}$$

3. One-period nominal treasury debt b_t^s at price q_t , payoff equal to 1
- Savers otherwise identical to the RA in a standard NK model.

Firms and Government

- Continuum of intermediate producers
 - Linear production function $Y_t = A_t N_t$
 - Rotemberg frictions \Rightarrow standard New Keynesian Phillips Curve
- Monetary policy [▶ MP Details](#)
 - **Conventional:** Set short rate following Taylor rule with ZLB
 - **Unconventional:** Purchase fraction $f_t^{QE} \in [0, 1)$ of new originations
- Consolidated government budget constraint

$$T_t + q_t B_t^G + \text{Net QE Income}_t = G + \Pi_t^{-1} B_{t-1}^G$$

- Lump-sum taxes grow slowly when gov't debt above steady state

Market Clearing

$$\text{Housing: } \chi h_t^B + (1 - \chi) \bar{h}_t^S = 1$$

$$\text{New Originations: } \chi \rho_t m_t^* = \ell_t^* = \ell_t^{*,S} + f_t^{QE} \ell_t^*$$

$$\text{POs: } (1 - \chi) m_t^S + m_t^G = \chi m_t$$

$$\text{IOs: } (1 - \chi) x_t^S + x_t^G = \chi x_t$$

$$\text{Treasuries: } (1 - \chi) b_t^S = B_t^G$$

$$\text{Labor: } \chi N_t^B + (1 - \chi) N_t^S = N_t$$

$$\text{Final goods: } \chi C_t^B + (1 - \chi) C_t^S + \delta p_t^h + G = Y_t$$

Model Features

- Four aggregate shocks: $\{TFP_t, MP_t, Origination_t, QE_t\}$
- Refinancing Incentive $_t \simeq$ Interest incentive $_t$ + Cash-out incentive $_t$
 - State- and history-dependent effects of monetary policy
 - State dependence of MP
- QE “works” by stabilizing r_t^*

$$q_t^m + q_t^a r_t^* = \eta_{m,t} \left[\frac{\rho_t m_t^* (1 - f_t^{QE})}{\rho_{ss} m_{ss}^*} \right]^{\psi^m}$$

$r_t^* \downarrow$, refinancing \uparrow , borrower (current) income \uparrow , GDP \uparrow

Quantitative Analysis: Monetary Policy Normalization

Design of the Experiment

Combine model and US data to study monetary policy normalization

1. Given the commitment to an interest rate rule, what are the effects of different balance sheet normalization plans?
2. Do these different plans matter should the US economy experience a new financial crisis?
3. Do these different plans matter if the Fed wants to engage in new asset purchases during a new crisis?

Our approach

1. Calibrate the model to the US [► Calibration](#)
2. Estimate the state of the US economy in 2015Q4 [► Details and Data](#)
3. Use that state as a starting point to study counterfactual scenarios
 - Benchmark, unwinding starts in 2017Q4
 - Early unwinding, starting in 2015Q4
 - Late unwinding, starting in 2020Q4
 - Unexpected crisis in 2019Q2
 - QE4 in response to unexpected crisis

Policy Normalization: Benchmark

Study nonlinear transitions from state in 2015Q4 s.t.:


- No exogenous shocks from this point onwards
- Interest rate normalization follows Taylor Rule subject to ZLB
- QE normalization follows the September 2017 FOMC instructions
 1. Maintenance regime in 2015Q4-2017Q4, purchases are such that

$$m_t^G = m_{\max}^G$$


where m_{\max}^G is the size of MBS holdings as of 2015Q4

2. Reinvestments subject to growing caps from 2017Q3 onwards
- Alternative Scenarios:
 1. *Early unwinding*, reinvestment caps start in 2015Q4
 2. *Late unwinding*, reinvestment caps start in 2020Q3


Policy Normalization Scenarios




Policy Normalization



Policy Normalization: Unexpected Crisis in 2019Q2



Policy Normalization: QE4 and Political Constraints



Policy Normalization: QE4 and Political Constraints

	Benchmark	Early Unwinding	Late Unwinding
r_t^*	+1.69pp	+0.64pp	+3.35pp
p_t^h	-8.74%	-3.25%	-16.49%
C_t^B	-3.88%	-1.68%	-8.48%

Conclusion

Conclusion

Unwinding later

- Enables housing, consumption boom
- Everything goes well *if there is no new crisis*
- Political constraints more likely to bind \Rightarrow crisis might be worse

Unwinding *earlier*

- Has mild short-run costs
- Provides “room” for QE4

Precautionary benefits of unwinding soon after exiting ZLB.

Appendix

Mortgage Spreads and Issuance Frictions

How much of the variation in OPUCs can be explained by mortgage origination?

$$\log \text{OPUC}_t = \beta_{s,0} + \beta_{s,1} \log \text{GIR}_t + \epsilon_t, \quad s \in \{pre, post\}$$


$$\text{GIR}_t = \frac{\text{Mortgages}_t - (1 - \text{Prepayment}_t) \cdot \text{Mortgages}_{t-1}}{\text{Mortgages}_{t-1}}$$

Sample	$\beta_{s,0}$	$\beta_{s,1}$	Adj. R^2	N
Pre (to 2008 Q2)	3.183*** (0.185)	0.536*** (0.065)	0.676	58
Post (since 2008 Q3)	6.318*** (0.853)	1.159*** (0.262)	0.517	38

pre is 1994 Q1 - 2008 Q2, *post* is 2008 Q3 - 2018 Q1

► back

State Dependent Effects of Monetary Policy



Borrower Problem

$$\max_{C_t^b, H_t^b, N_t^b, m_t^*, h_t^*, \kappa_t^*} \mathcal{U}_t^j$$

s.t.

$$\begin{aligned} & C_t^b + \underbrace{\rho_t p_t^h (h_t^{*,b} - h_{t-1}^b)}_{\text{New houses}} + \underbrace{\delta p_t^h h_t^{b-1}}_{\text{Maintenance}} + T_t + \underbrace{(\Psi_t^B(\kappa_t^*) - \Psi_t^B(\cdot))}_{\text{Rebated refi cost}} \\ = & \underbrace{w_t N_t^b}_{\text{Labor income}} - \underbrace{\Pi_t^{-1}(x_{t-1}^b + \nu m_{t-1}^b)}_{\text{Mtge payments}} + \underbrace{\rho_t [m_t^{*,b} - \Pi_t^{-1}(1 - \nu)m_{t-1}^b]}_{\text{New borrowing}} \end{aligned}$$

$$m_t^{*,b} \leq \theta^{LTV} p_t^h h_t^b$$

$$m_t^b = \rho_t m_t^* + (1 - \rho_t)(1 - \nu)\Pi_t^{-1}m_{t-1}^b$$

$$x_t^b = \rho_t r_t^* m_t^* + (1 - \rho_t)(1 - \nu)\Pi_t^{-1}x_{t-1}^b$$

Conventional and Unconventional MP

Conventional: Taylor Rule subject to the ZLB

$$\frac{1}{q_t} = \max \left\{ 0, \left[\frac{1}{q_{t-1}} \right]^{\rho_i} \left[\frac{1}{\bar{q}} \left(\frac{\Pi_t}{\bar{\Pi}} \right)^{\phi_\pi} \left(\frac{Y_t}{\bar{Y}} \right)^{\phi_y} \right]^{1-\rho_i} m p_t \right\}$$

Unconventional MP: Fed buys fraction f_t^{QE} of *newly issued* PO & IO

$$\begin{aligned} m_t^G &= f_t^{QE} \ell_t^* + (1 - \nu)(1 - \rho_t) \Pi_t^{-1} m_{t-1}^G \\ x_t^G &= f_t^{QE} r_t * \ell_t^* + (1 - \nu)(1 - \rho_t) \Pi_t^{-1} x_{t-1}^G \end{aligned}$$

where

$$f_t^{QE} = \frac{QE_t - 1}{1 + QE_t}$$

$$\log QE_t = \rho_{QE} \log QE_{t-1} + \sigma_{QE} \varepsilon_t^{QE}$$

Net income follows

$$\text{Net QE Income}_t = \Pi_t^{-1} (Z_t^m m_{t-1}^G + Z_t^a x_{t-1}^G) - (q_t^m m_t^G + q_t^a x_t^G)$$

Calibration

► Back

Parameter	Description	Value	Target
<i>Demographics and Preferences</i>			
χ	Fraction of borrowers	0.45	Avg share w/ neg fixed income pos, SCF 93-16
β_s	Discount factor savers	0.9959	Avg level of fixed funds rate 2000-2018
β_b	Discount factor borrowers	0.9829	Value of housing to income of 8.89
φ	Frisch elasticity	1	Standard
ξ	Housing preference parameter	0.25	Davis and Ortalo-Magne (2011)
η_b	Borrower labor disutility	14.13	$N_t^b = 0.33$
η_s	Saver labor disutility	8.28	$N_t^s = 0.33$
<i>Production</i>			
ε	Micro elasticity of substitution across varieties	6	20% markup in SS
ζ	Rotemberg Menu Cost	98.37	Prices adjust once every five quarters
<i>Government</i>			
\bar{G}	SS Govt. Spending	$0.2 \times Y$	20% for the US
\bar{B}^g	SS Govt. Debt	$0.14 \times Y$	Avg. maturity of 20 months, 70% of GDP
$\bar{\pi}$	Trend Inflation	$1.02^{0.25}$	2% for the US
ϕ_π	Taylor rule: Inflation	1.5	Standard
ϕ_y	Taylor rule: Output	0.5/4	Standard
ρ_i	Taylor rule: Smoothing	0.8	Standard
ϕ_τ	Fiscal Rule	0.01	Faria-e-Castro (2018)
<i>Housing and Mortgages</i>			
θ^{LTV}	Maximum LTV at origination	0.80	Max LTV for GSE conforming loans
ν	Contractual duration of mortgages	0.005	Standard
δ	Maintenance cost of housing	0.0065	2.5% annual, standard
\bar{H}	Total stock of housing	1	Normalization
s_n	SD of prepayment shock	0.152	Greenwald (2018)
μ_n	Mean of prepayment cost shock	0.2902	$\rho_{nn} = 0.0376$
$\eta_{m,ss}$	Mean financial friction	1.0969	Annual. mortgage spread of 2%
ϕ_m	Elasticity of Ψ to originations	2.5	
<i>Shock Parameters</i>			
ρ_a	Persistence of TFP	0.90	Standard
σ_a	SD of TFP Innovations	0.01	Standard
ρ_i	Persistence of nominal rate	0.80	Standard
ρ_r	Persistence of MP Shock	0.80	Standard
σ_r	SD of MP Shock Innovations	0.005	Standard
ρ_{QE}	Persistence of QE	0.75	Estimated
σ_{QE}	SD of QE Innovations	1	Normalization
ρ_η	Persistence of financial shock	0.75	
σ_η	SD of financial shock Innovations	1	Normalization





Estimating the state of the US economy in 20154

- Standard state space methods
- Use Kalman Filter to estimate paths for states 2000Q1-2015Q4
- Four exogenous shocks


$$\{\varepsilon_t^a, \varepsilon_t^r, \varepsilon_t^m, \varepsilon_t^{QE}\}_{t=0}^T$$

- Four observables
 1. (Detrended) PCE consumption
 2. 3-month treasury bill rate
 3. Share of mortgages owned by the Fed
 4. Real mortgage growth


Data: Observables




Smoothed Exogenous Processes



Policy Normalization



Policy Normalization: Unexpected Crisis in 2019Q2



Policy Normalization: QE4 and Political Constraints

