


Applied Cryptography: 2018/9 Assignment

CPS3232

Hands-on Crypto

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Block cipher modes and message authenticity

Transparent access control on the Blockchain

Implement the required reference monitor

The reference monitor was implemented in Jupyter Lab. The RSA modulus was generated using PyCryptodome's *RSA.generate* function, where the number of bits was set to 2048 as this was deemed a sufficient length for 2017 and the public exponent e was set to be 65537 as this is the FIPS standard. The generated key (which contains the RSA modulus $n = p.q$) was then saved to a file protected by a password in order to simulate that only Rene the reference monitor has access to it.

```
%reset
from Crypto.PublicKey import RSA
import random

#Setting up FS
#Generate n:
key = RSA.generate(2048,e=65537) #nbits = 2048 (Sufficient length for
#save the secure key to a file to only be accessed by Rene
passphrase = 'Str0ngPassw0rd!%'
f = open('mykey.pem', 'wb')
f.write(key.exportKey('PEM',passphrase=passphrase)) #Use a passphras
f.close()
n = key.n #assume n is public knowledge

#Rene will then generate s, which lies in integer ring (Z_n)
s = random.randint(1,key.n+1)
#Assume this is sent to Alice and Bob over a secure channel

#Delete Secrets:
del key
del passphrase
#Authorised parties will then be given mykey.pem and with knowledge
#have access to the secure key
```

Once the RSA key was set up, Rene then set v by using the equation $v = s^2 \bmod n$.

```

#Rene:
#get the key
f = open('mykey.pem', 'r')
Rene_key = RSA.importKey(f.read(), passphrase='Str0ngPassw0rd!%')
f.close()
#set v
v = (s**2)%Rene_key.n

```

The interactive protocol was then implemented setting $t = 100$, thus having a successful attack probability of 2^{-100} .

```

t = 100
for i in range(t):
    #Interactive Protocol
    #Alice
    #pick random r
    r = random.randint(1,n+1)
    x = (r**2)%n #compute x
    #x is now sent to Rene

    #Rene
    e = random.randint(0,1)
    #e is sent to Alice

    #Alice
    #if (i == 97):
    #    s = random.randint(1,n+1) #bad secret key
    y = (r*(s**e)) % n
    #y is sent to Rene

    #Rene:
    if (y**2 % n != (x*(v**e))%n):
        print('Attack!')
        break

```

Attack 1

Weaken the implementation in a way so that Alice always commits to the same $r \in Z_n$. Demonstrate an attack that discloses s and which hinges on the fact that whenever $e = 0$ Alice sends $yr \bmod n$ as a response.

The implementation of the reference monitor was then weakened as specified. Given the fact that r wasn't changing, Oscar could simply extract r by intercepting y when $e = 0$. Once Oscar has r then, when $e = 1$, Oscar intercepts y and can extract s by using the equation $s = y.r^{-1} \bmod n$. The modified code to the previous implementation can be seen below.

```
from sympy import mod_inverse

gotR = 0

t = 100
#Alice will pick a random r and keep it fixed:
r = random.randint(1,n+1)
for i in range(t):
    #Interactive Protocol
    #Alice:
    x = (r**2)%n #compute x
    #x is now sent to Rene

    #Rene
    e = random.randint(0,1)
    #e is sent to Alice on open channel, Oscar can intercept this

    #Alice
    y = (r*(s**e)) % n
    #y is sent to Rene on an open channel, Oscar can intercept this

    #Oscar's Attack:
    if e==0 and gotR == 0:
        oscar_r = y
```

```

        gotR = 1
if e==1 and gotR == 1:
    oscar_s=(y*mod_inverse(r,n)) % n
    print(s==oscar_s)
    break

#Rene:
if (y**2 % n != (x*(v**e))%n):
    print( 'Attack! ')
    break

```

Setting up Certificate Authority (CA) trees and HTTPS servers