

Election Results and Democratic Discontent: Expectations, Extremism, and Democratic Values in Post-Election Brazil*

Matteo F. Ferroni[†]

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Abstract

This paper studies how shocks to socioeconomic expectations induced by elections contribute to democratic discontent in polarized societies. Using new large-scale survey data collected throughout the 2022 Brazilian presidential election, I investigate how respondents' electoral and socioeconomic expectations, polarization, emotions, and attitudes towards violence and democracy evolved as a result of the close victory of the main opposition candidate. My analysis is guided by a stylized model, in which I show that highly polarized voters who assign a large probability to their candidate's victory experience a larger negative shock to their socioeconomic expectations in case their candidate loses. This expectation shock may then lead to an increase in violent and anti-democratic sentiments. By resurveying 1,200 respondents right after the election, I confirm the model's predictions and show how the role of this negative expectation shock is particularly strong among the most extreme supporters. In an additional survey experiment, I provide complimentary evidence in which I positively update respondents' expectations about the economy and find that this information treatment reduces their violent and anti-democratic sentiments.

Keywords: Elections, Democracy, Institutions, Polarization, Protest, Violence, Survey, Online Experiment, Perceptions, Expectations.

JEL Codes: D72, D74, D84, D91, F52, P17

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[†]Ferroni: Boston University (e-mail: mferroni@bu.edu)

1 Introduction

In recent years, we have witnessed democratic backsliding and an increase in democratic fatigue across the world (Waldner and Lust, 2018; Wuttke et al., 2022). This shift has occurred even in countries with a long history of strong democratic institutions, such as the US. While citizens have long taken to the streets to demand change (Cantoni et al., 2023), violent attacks on democratic institutions in mature democracies have rarely occurred. The most remarkable departure from this norm was the US Capitol’s insurrection on January 6, 2021. Two years later, on January 8, 2023, a similar attack happened in Brazil following a similarly polarizing and uncertain election. One function of elections is to allow for the transition of power in a manner that maintains relative liberty and peace (Przeworski, 2018). However, the recent increase in populism (Guriev and Papaioannou, 2022) and polarization (Klein, 2020) in today’s societies appear to be testing these institutions. A surprising election outcome can, in fact, change social norms by providing new public information (Bursztyn et al., 2020) and reduce trust in electoral institutions (Marx et al., 2021). While other studies have documented the increase in violent protest after an electoral defeat (Nadeau and Blais, 1993), the findings from this literature do not provide evidence on how or why this takes place.

There are several different reasons why the electoral outcome may foster democratic discontent and induce a violent reaction. First, election losers may lose faith in democracy because they believe the election result was illegitimate. Moreover, as voters have a “winner-take-all” mindset, they may worry that the electoral outcome will have strong negative effects on their own group. This concern may be more pronounced in societies that are highly polarized. In such societies, it may also be more difficult for the losing side to accept defeat. I anticipate that all these factors will be even more significant in the case of an uncertain election that is perceived as having high stakes. These factors are not mutually exclusive and may all play a role in fostering democratic discontent. For this reason, it is challenging to understand which is the main driver behind a violent response to an electoral outcome.

In this paper, I focus on the link between the disagreement and uncertainty surrounding recent elections and the extreme, sometimes violent, responses to their outcomes. I highlight the importance of socioeconomic expectations in driving democratic discontent in a polarized society. To do so, I make three distinct contributions. First, I build a model that relates the choice of becoming violent and anti-democratic to polarization, extremism, and shocks to voters’ socioeconomic expectations. Second, I survey a large sample of respondents right before and right after the 2022 Brazilian presidential election. I exploit these recontacts to measure how the electoral outcome affected their socioeconomic expectations and how this change relates to an increase in violent and anti-democratic sentiments. Third, I design a survey experiment where I provide participants with positive news about the economy. By

increasing their socioeconomic expectations, the treatment makes respondents less willing to protest.

To provide structure to my setting and to guide the analysis, I develop a model where individuals face the choice of turning violent and anti-democratic to overthrow the government. In this setting, individuals are only concerned with their country's economy. Therefore, their utility is given by the current president's competence. If individuals believe that a more competent alternative is available, they will be willing to pay the cost of becoming violent and change the person in charge of the country. By focusing on the aftermath of an electoral outcome, I highlight the role of negative shocks to individuals' socioeconomic expectations and how they relate to polarization. When individuals hold extremely different views on the competence of the two candidates and assign a large probability to their candidate's victory, they will experience a larger negative shock to their socioeconomic expectations in case of defeat. My model predicts that only the most extreme supporters experiencing a sufficiently large negative shock to their expectations will become more violent and anti-democratic after losing an election.

My empirical analysis focuses on how Brazilian voters' attitudes toward violence and democratic institutions were affected by the results of the 2022 presidential election. To explore these changes, I run several waves of large-scale online surveys representative of the Brazilian adult population along the dimensions of income, age, gender, and geographical macro-region. To study the full evolution of voters' attitudes and expectations, the data was collected in six different waves for a total of 8,016 respondents. The first five waves were collected in a nine-week period around the election, with the first wave collected before the first round and the fifth three weeks after the election's final result. The last wave was collected one year after the election. Every survey wave asked respondents about their voting plans (or who they voted for) and how strongly they support their candidate. Respondents were then asked about the probability of victory for their candidate, their feelings towards the two candidates, their emotions, and their perceptions and expected evolution of various socioeconomic outcomes in Brazil, such as inflation and inequality. The survey also elicited a range of attitudes towards violence and democracy, together with preferences for multiple forms of government. In my descriptive analysis, I find that stronger supporters are more polarized in the perceived competence of the two candidates, and more likely to believe that their candidate will win. In line with these two findings, I also document that the magnitude of the negative shock to socioeconomic expectations experienced by election losers is increasing in their support strength.

The main results of my paper rely on a subsample of 1,213 respondents who have been surveyed twice: once before the second (and final) round of the election and once right after it. By resurveying these respondents, I am able to measure the within-individual variation in socioeconomic expectations caused by the election result as well as their attitudes toward

democratic institutions and regime change. Using a two-period panel data analysis, I find that the electoral defeat makes the most extreme supporters more accepting of violence, more supportive of army rule, and less likely to believe that democracy is a good political system. However, they still believe that democracy is the best political system for Brazil. Additionally, I find that these effects are more pronounced in those who have experienced a larger negative shock to their socioeconomic expectations. These results, confirmed by additional robustness checks to exclude alternative mechanisms, highlight the role that the change in expectations about the economy plays in increasing democratic discontent after an electoral defeat. Finally, by looking across all waves, I show that the election result's effect on expectations and emotions is persistent, remaining largely unchanged even after one year. This final result suggests that the increase in democratic discontent may be long-lasting.

To rule out other mechanisms, in the experimental part of the paper, I consider the causal impact that a change in the economy's expectations has on violent and anti-democratic attitudes. In September-October 2023, I recruited a sample of 3,000 participants representative of the adult Brazilian population through an online panel survey. The experiment showed a randomly selected subgroup of respondents a short video to manipulate their expectations about the economy. The treatment showed respondents the decline in inflation rate between September 2022 and June 2023. In the video, I highlight how, during the last months of incumbent's presidency, the inflation rate was decreasing very slowly, but after January, it started to decrease at a higher rate. When treated, respondents from both sides of the political spectrum become more likely to believe that inflation will keep decreasing, and their socioeconomic expectations are also positively updated. In turn, this leads supporters of the former president to become less willing to attend violent protests, and while not significant, the treatment also goes in the direction of increasing their support for democracy. These results highlight the role that economic concerns, in this case captured by individuals' expectations, play in shaping democratic discontent.

Overall, my results suggest that what leads people to become more violent and anti-democratic when losing an election is the shock they experience to their expectations about the future. This adds a rational component to the explanation for post-electoral violence, a phenomenon whose causes are still not well understood.

1.1 Related Literature

First and foremost, this paper contributes to the literature on the effects of election results and the literature on the drivers of violence and democratic discontent.

By recontacting the same individuals right after the election results, I manage to precisely measure how expectations, emotions, and preferences were affected by the election result and study how these changes affect each other. Although many studies have looked at the effects

of an election on various outcomes, most were not following the same individuals before and after the election. To the best of my knowledge, I am the first to analyze, with such a large sample, how the same individuals were affected by an electoral outcome. In doing so, I provide new insights that build on past work on how electoral defeats lead to dissatisfaction with democratic processes and outcomes, in terms of violent protests (Nadeau and Blais, 1993) and decrease in trust in electoral institutions (Marx et al., 2021). Various papers have also shown the effect of election results in signaling the most accepted social norms such as xenophobic views (Bursztyn et al., 2020), and hate crimes (Albornoz et al., 2020). Finally, Fetzer and Yotzov (2023) find that a significant electoral surprise is associated with a smaller economic growth rate.

Given the narrow margin that decided the 2022 Brazilian presidential elections, my paper also relates to the extensive literature from political science and legal studies on the consequences of close elections. Hasen (2005) and Hirsch (2020) argued that close elections are more vulnerable to manipulation or fraud, while Rapoport and Weinberg (2000) show how they might incentivize fraud and violence, and I show in particular that the latter concerns are well-founded. Przeworski (2018) and Hasen (2020) focus instead on how close elections are more likely to be disputed, reducing trust in the electoral process. Voter perceptions of fairness and election integrity are, in fact critical for legitimacy (Weatherford, 1992). Persily and Stewart III (2021), by looking at the 2020 US election, show how the election's closeness relates to confidence in an accurate vote count. But this effect is not unique to the 2020 election. It is also known as the "winners-losers effect": after the election, supporters of the losing candidate tend to question the legitimacy of the election, while supporters of the winning candidate tend to gain confidence in the election system, especially when the elections are close (Birch, 2008; Sances and Stewart, 2015; Sinclair et al., 2018; Clark and Stewart III, 2021). As I show, such reactions are particularly prominent for voters who experience the greatest shock to their expectations about a country's political and economic future. Finally, Banducci and Karp (2003) examine how the electoral outcome, together with attention to media coverage and campaign activity, are drivers of the change in support for the political system after an election.

I additionally contribute to existing literature on violence and democratic discontent. While many studies have explored the determinants of such phenomena, none have examined what triggers violent reactions following an electoral loss. In contrast, I utilize my large sample of recontacts to emphasize the role of socioeconomic expectations in this process. I provide an additional explanation for post-electoral violence and democratic discontent by finding that the increase in violent and anti-democratic sentiment among extreme supporters is caused by a negative shock to their socioeconomic expectations. Through my experiment, I provide further evidence to support this mechanism. Focusing on Africa, Mattes and Bratton (2007) provide a review of the determinants of institutional trust and satisfaction with

democracy, and Doorenspleet (2012) explores the reasons behind dissatisfaction with the way democracy is working among citizens who are strong supporters of the democratic ideal. Looking into elections, Hafner-Burton et al. (2018) study the risks of pre-election violence in triggering post-election mass political protests. Cantoni et al. (2023) provide an extensive overview of protests from every country worldwide in the last four decades. They find that a country's economic performance is not strongly correlated with protests, but, at the same time, individual values are predictive of protest participation. Differently from their results, I find that socioeconomic expectations at the individual level matter in increasing the propensity to protest. Sonin et al. (2023) look instead at what fueled the January 6 US Capitol attack. They highlight the role of political isolation in amplifying the effect of partisanship on participation, and they also find that mobilization increased sharply in states with narrow Trump losses.

More broadly, my paper also adds to the recent literature on populism and polarization by identifying an additional consequence of these phenomena: the higher likelihood of violent events after an election and a higher democratic discontent. As I will argue in detail in the paper, higher polarization leads to larger uncertainty surrounding the elections, and this will, in turn, trigger a more violent and anti-democratic reaction in case of defeat. Guriev and Papaioannou (2022) review some of the key papers on the driving of populism. Guiso et al. (2017) highlights the role of economic insecurity in the demand for populist parties in Europe, while Ali et al. (2023) focus on the role played by emotions in the US, mainly anger. My work also relates to Zaslove and Meijers (2023), where they study the relationship between populist and democratic attitudes. Looking at the Netherlands, they find that citizens with higher populist attitudes are not less supportive of liberal democracy. But, at the same time, they highly support forms of unconstrained majoritarian rule. In my sample, I find this same apparent contradiction. Even if extreme supporters become more in favor of anti-democratic options, they still believe democracy to be the best system for Brazil. Regarding polarization, a very close strand of literature from political science is the one on affective polarization (Druckman and Levendusky, 2019; Lees and Cikara, 2020; Moore-Berg et al., 2020; Lees and Cikara, 2021; Druckman et al., 2022). Focusing on the US, Iyengar et al. (2019) give an overview of the origins and consequences of affective polarization, highlighting the role played by partisanship and social identity. Other papers study instead the role played by political campaigns (Sood and Iyengar, 2016), overconfidence in beliefs (Ortoleva and Snowberg, 2015), and internet and social media (Boxell et al., 2017). To study the dynamics of this phenomenon, Boxell et al. (2022) look at the trends in affective polarization in the last forty years across various countries, while Michelitch and Utych (2018) explore how partisanship evolves during the electoral cycle.

Finally, my model relates to the theoretical literature that looked at the role of unfulfilled expectations on violence and anger, also in a theoretical way. For example, Card and Dahl

(2011) study the link between family violence and the emotional cues associated with wins and losses by professional football teams. Battigalli et al. (2019) and Aina et al. (2020) look instead at the role that frustration, due to unfulfilled expectations, has in shaping interactions and outcomes in two-stage games.

The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, I provide some information on Brazil's institutions and describe the 2022 presidential election and its aftermath. My data collection and survey design are explained in detail in Section 3. The full survey text is in the Appendix Section A-9. Section 4 presents my model, and Section 5 describes respondents' expectation shocks by their support strength. Section 6 studies the election results' effects. I discuss the findings from the experimental part of my study in Section 7. The last section concludes.

2 Institutional Setting

With 215 million people, Brazil is the 7th most populous country in the world and the 4th largest democracy. Brazil is a federal presidential representative democratic republic whereby the president is both head of state and of the government. The president is elected to a four-year term by absolute majority vote through a two-round system. On the same day of the first round, voters are called to vote for all the members of the Chamber of Deputies (the lower chamber) and one-third or two-thirds of the members of the Senate (the upper chamber). Voters also vote for the 26 governors of their states, plus the governor of the federal district, who are also elected through a two-round system.

Voting in Brazil is compulsory for all literate citizens over 18 and under 70. Nonetheless, if you do not vote, you are just required to present an acceptable justification or pay a fine of R\$ 3.51 (less than \$0.70). This might explain why around a fifth of registered voters generally end up not voting. The average turnout rate since the end of the military dictatorship in 1985 has been 80.27%, which is quite higher than the turnout in other more advanced democracies.¹

Since 1996, elections have been carried out through electronic voting. The Brazilian voting machine consists of a screen with a numeric keypad where voters just need to type the number of their candidate. Besides allowing illiterate voters to easily vote for their candidate, by performing voter identification, secure voting, and tallying in a single process, electronic voting allowed to eliminate fraud based on forged or falsified public documents. Another benefit of electronic voting is the increased speed of the vote-counting process. Generally, it takes less than 12 hours to count all the votes, allowing to have a clear result on the same night of the election.

¹The highest turnout rate has been reached with the first free election in 1989 (85.61%); the lowest turnout rate was in 2010 (78.50%). For comparison, in the US the average turnout rate in that same period (1988-2020) has been only 54.24%.

2.1 The 2022 Presidential Elections

The 2022 Brazilian presidential elections saw former president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (from now on only Lula), who ruled Brazil from 2003 to 2010, face the incumbent Jair Bolsonaro. From the polls, it has been clear from the start that this would have been a race between these two candidates.²

The Candidates. Bolsonaro was elected president in 2018 coming into office on a wave of populist anti-establishment indignation stirred by a massive corruption scandal. While considered as an outsider candidate, he had served as Federal Deputy from 1991 to 2018. A retired military officer, he managed to build a political base among cops and soldiers. Besides placing many army officers in key positions in his cabinet, he fought to increase their budgets and benefits, excluded soldiers and military police from pension cuts in 2019 and pardoned police convicted of illegal killings. Former union leader, and founder of the Workers' Party, Lula has been president from 2003 to 2010. During his presidency, Brazil witnessed rising incomes and a big expansion of the welfare state, mainly financed by a commodity boom. Having lifted 20 million out of poverty, Lula ended his presidency with an approval rating higher than 80%. In 2017, he was found guilty of taking bribes, as part of the huge corruption scandal Lava Jato, and has been imprisoned. In March 2021, the Supreme Federal Court annulled all convictions on the basis that the Federal Judge leading the case was biased against him, allowing him to run again for president in 2022.

The Campaign. Similarly to the 2020 US presidential elections, the 2022 Brazilian presidential election campaign has also been extremely polarizing with various episodes of violence. Most notably, Bolsonaro had been casting doubts on the legitimacy of the upcoming elections claiming multiple times that electronic voting machines are prone to fraud. Besides this, he also kept claiming that there was no way for him to lose the elections, or, as he put it in August 2021, that he would either be arrested, killed, or win Brazil's next election.³ Bolsonaro's claims, together with his affinity with the military, led multiple people to worry about the possibility of a military coup in case of a defeat of the incumbent.

Polls and Results. Since announcing he would run once more for president in May 2021, Lula had been leading in the polls with a margin of over 10% against Bolsonaro. As the first round drew closer, Lula's support grew, and he began to approach 50% in the polls. Meanwhile, Bolsonaro's numbers remained steady at around 35%. Regardless of whether Lula won in the first round, it seemed likely that he would win the second round easily. However,

²The third and fourth candidates, Simone Tebet and Ciro Gomes, were never given at more than 10%, and in the first round, they ended up getting only 4.16% and 3.04% respectively.

³<https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/29/americas/bolsonaro-brazil-elections-intl/index.html>

on October 2, Lula received 48.43% of the votes, while Bolsonaro received 43.20%. This outcome came as a surprise to both sides of the political spectrum. Bolsonaro's supporters did not believe the polls, so they believed their candidate underperformed. On the other hand, many of Lula's supporters were still expecting a first-round victory. After the results, Lula's supporters became concerned about his chances in the second round, given Bolsonaro's unexpected success. Following the first round results, subsequent polls predicted a very close second round, which turned out to be the case. On October 30, Lula won the election with 50.90% of the valid votes, winning by only 1.80 percentage points, making it Brazil's closest election result in history. On the same night, Lula was declared elected by the Superior Electoral Court at 7:56 pm local time. However, Bolsonaro did not release any comment for almost 48 hours. During that time, protests broke out in many states, with Bolsonaro's supporters blockading key roads. Finally, on the afternoon of November 1, Bolsonaro stated that he would "comply with the Constitution," but still without acknowledging the result.


2023 Brazilian Congress attack. One week after Lula was inaugurated president, on January 8th a mob of around 5,000 Bolsonaro's supporters attacked Brazil's federal government buildings in Brasilia. Echoing the January 6 US Capitol attack, the mob invaded and damaged the Presidential Palace, the National Congress, and the Supreme Federal Court. As declared by various rioters, the purpose of this attack was to spur military leaders to launch a coup d'état and disrupt the democratic transition of power. While by the end of the day order had been already restored, this has been a clear sign of how well-founded the concerns of a possible military coup were and how polarized Brazil's society had become in the aftermath of the 2022 presidential elections.

3 Data Collection, Sample, and Survey Design

3.1 Data Collection and Sample

I administered the survey in five waves between September and November 2022 to cover the entire period of the Brazilian presidential elections, as illustrated in Figure 1. The waves were run in the following periods: i) the first wave of 1,203 respondents from September 27 to October 1 (before the elections' first round); ii) the second wave of 501 respondents from October 13 to October 18 (between the first and second round); iii) the third wave of 2,001 respondents from October 24 to October 29 (before the second round); iv) the fourth wave of 801 respondents from October 31 to November 4 (right after the second round); v) the fifth wave of 500 respondents from November 21 to November 22 (three weeks after the

FIGURE 1: TIMELINE OF DATA COLLECTION



second round).⁴ The total sample contains 5,006 unique respondents. Each respondent who took part in the third wave of the survey was invited to take a follow-up survey designed to study the within respondents’ effect of the election result. 1,123 respondents completed the follow-up survey (recontact rate of 60.6%). In 2023, between September 22 and October 14, I collected a sixth wave of 3,000 respondents to study the persistence of certain outcomes, as I will describe in Section 6.4, and to run a survey experiment that I will discuss in Section 7.

The survey was designed using the online platform Qualtrics. The surveys were then distributed by the commercial survey company Lucid and its partner panels. Before entering the survey, respondents were only told the expected length of the questionnaire, but neither the topic nor the creator. They were assured that they were completely anonymous and that there was no way to ever link their responses to their identity. After starting the survey, respondents reached a consent page informing them that they were about to take an academic research survey destined solely for research purposes and run by a nonpartisan researcher from Boston University. They were asked to respond accurately to the best of their knowledge and were assured that participation was entirely voluntary. After proving their consent, respondents were channeled through a set of screening questions used to enforce the quotas, as I describe below. To ensure data quality, respondents also had to pass a reCAPTCHA test and an inattention trap to reach the first actual block of the survey.

The survey company rewarded respondents for completing the survey in its entirety. The average incentive per survey completed was \$0.75, which corresponds to around R\$4.00. To ensure a high enough recontact rate, respondents completing the follow-up survey were instead paid \$1.00 (R\$5.20). The median times for completing the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth waves were 25, 33, 32, 31 and 32 minutes. The median time for completing the follow-up survey was 23 minutes. The sixth wave was shorter, with a median completion time of 20 minutes.

The sample of every wave, recontacts included, is representative of the adult Brazilian

⁴The three-week interval was decided to avoid any possible effect caused by the beginning of the 2022 FIFA World Cup (Brazil’s first game was on November 24).

population. To achieve this, quotas were imposed on age, gender, income, and macro-regions of residence. My sample contains respondents from all 26 Brazilian states and the Federal District. Table 1 shows the characteristics of the sample in each wave compared with those of the overall Brazilian population. The population statistics are from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) and the Superior Electoral Court (TSE). The sample is by construction representative of the adult Brazilian population along the quota dimensions of age, gender, and macro-regions. As respondents from the lowest income quintile were harder to reach, this category ended up being underrepresented. Nonetheless, I still managed to have 10% of the sample of every wave from the lowest income group. In addition, the sample is also broadly representative of non-targeted dimensions such as race. Among the other non-targeted characteristics, respondents in the sample are more likely to have a college degree and to be employed. Respondents are also more likely to have voted in the presidential election than the average adult.⁵

3.2 The Survey

The complete questionnaire can be found in Appendix Section A-9, with a link that leads to the web interface of every wave of the survey (Appendix Section A-8). All survey waves share the same structure. The only differences among the five first waves derive from adapting questions related to the ongoing elections. The sixth wave's survey is instead shorter and focused more on question designed to capture democratic discontent. I now provide information on the blocks composing the survey and their core elements.

Background socioeconomic questions. After asking the consensus to take part in the study, the survey started by collecting information on respondents' citizenship, gender, age, income, and state of residency. This information was used to screen out respondents and for the quotas. I then asked additional questions about the respondents' demographics and socioeconomic backgrounds, such as race, education, employment status, ZIP code, and religion. I also queried them about their primary source of news and their overall social media consumption.

Expectations about the elections. In this block, respondents were asked about their expectations of the elections' results. Since what I am interested in are their expectations about who is going to be elected as president, in all waves I only focused on the elections'

⁵It is worth considering that the share of people who did not vote is computed out of the total Brazilian population. If we would focus on the population aged 18 to 59, as is my sample, this share would already lower from 21% to 17%. If we then consider that abstention is higher among uneducated people, since my sample is skewed towards more educated people, this will explain most of the remaining gap.

TABLE 1: SAMPLES CHARACTERISTICS

	Brazil	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Recontacts	Wave 4	Wave 5	Wave 6
Male	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.48	0.49	0.49	0.49
18-29 years old	0.31	0.32	0.31	0.32	0.28	0.32	0.32	0.32
30-39 years old	0.27	0.28	0.29	0.28	0.29	0.28	0.28	0.28
40-49 years old	0.23	0.24	0.23	0.22	0.24	0.23	0.23	0.23
50-59 years old	0.19	0.16	0.18	0.17	0.19	0.17	0.17	0.17
Census Income Group 1	0.20	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.09	0.11	0.11	0.11
Census Income Group 2	0.20	0.17	0.19	0.20	0.20	0.17	0.19	0.19
Census Income Group 3	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.22	0.21	0.21
Census Income Group 4	0.20	0.21	0.21	0.20	0.20	0.21	0.22	0.21
Census Income Group 5	0.20	0.32	0.30	0.29	0.32	0.29	0.28	0.29
North	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09
Northeast	0.27	0.28	0.27	0.28	0.29	0.28	0.28	0.28
Center West	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
Southeast	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.43	0.42	0.42	0.42
South	0.14	0.13	0.14	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.13
High-school degree or less	0.86	0.49	0.55	0.54	0.51	0.51	0.53	0.57
College degree or more	0.14	0.51	0.45	0.45	0.49	0.49	0.46	0.43
Employed	0.70	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.83	0.82	0.78	0.79
Unemployed	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.11	0.09
Out of the labor force	0.23	0.12	0.10	0.12	0.10	0.12	0.11	0.13
White	0.43	0.47	0.51	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.45
Black	0.09	0.12	0.09	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.13
Mixed	0.47	0.37	0.37	0.38	0.38	0.37	0.38	0.39
Lula voter	0.39	0.53	0.40	0.44	0.45	0.44	0.39	0.42
Bolsonaro voter	0.37	0.47	0.46	0.45	0.45	0.42	0.44	0.38
Invalid or null vote	0.04	NA	0.10	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.11	0.11
Won't/Didn't vote	0.21	NA	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.07	0.05	0.08
Sample size		1,203	501	2,001	1,213	801	500	3,000

Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the target population in Brazil, in the first column, and corresponding summary statistics for the various waves of the survey, in the following columns. Population statistics come from the *Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios* (PNAD) *Contínua* conducted by the IBGE in the following years: 2019 for education; 2021 for gender, age, income, region, and race; 2022 for employment. Population statistics on voting come from the *Tribunal Superior Eleitoral* (TSE). Population statistics for gender, age, region, and employment are computed out of the Brazilian population between 18 and 59 old; population statistics for income, education, and race are computed out of the Brazilian population aged 14 or older; population statistics for voting are computed out of the Brazilian population aged 18 or older. All survey statistics are computed out of a sample aged between 18 and 59.

second round.⁶ In Wave 4 and 5, conducted after the elections' results, respondents were asked to recall what their expectations were before the election day. These questions were not asked in Wave 6. To elicit their expectations about the election, I asked them what they think is the percent chance that each of the two candidates is going to be elected as president.⁷ Respondents had to move a slider to select a number between 0 and 100. To have an alternative but complementary measure, I asked respondents what share of valid votes they expect the two candidates to get. For both measures, respondents were also asked how confident they were with the answers they just provided. I also asked respondents how important these elections are going to be for Brazil's future, if they were surprised with the results of the elections, and the emotions they feel when thinking about the elections.

Political questions. Respondents were then asked to express their political affiliation in different ways.⁸ First, I asked where they would place themselves on a 10-point scale that goes from extreme left to extreme right. Second, I asked respondents which candidate they would vote for in the second round. If a respondent answered that would not/did not vote or expressed a null vote, they were asked who they would have chosen between Lula and Bolsonaro to allow me to classify all respondents in one of the two groups. To be able to capture the heterogeneity of respondents' support for their candidate, I asked them how strong of a supporter they consider themselves to be on a 10-point scale.

Affective polarization. In this block, I measured respondents' affective polarization, which can be defined as people's dislike of the out-group compared to their group, through the feeling thermometer.⁹ Respondents were explained that ratings between 0 and 49 degrees mean that they feel unfavorable and cold, with 0 being the coldest, while ratings between 51 and 100 degrees mean that they feel favorable and warm with 100 being the warmest. I then asked respondents to rate their feelings towards Bolsonaro, Lula, Bolsonaro supporters, Lula supporters, and Brazilians in general. This allowed me to have a measure of affective polarization of both the candidates and their supporters.

Institutions and Democratic Discontent. Respondents were then asked questions on

⁶Given the polls before the first round it was clear that, if there would have been a second round, it would have been a run-off between Lula and Bolsonaro. This is why in Wave 1 I only asked about who they would expect to win between these two candidates.

⁷I briefly introduce respondents to the concept of percent chance by providing them with a few examples, such as: *2 or 5 percent may indicate “almost no chance”; 83 percent or so may mean a “very good chance.”*

⁸These questions are asked at this point of the survey for two reasons: to not influence their answer to the expectations questions and to allow me to personalize subsequent questions depending on the candidate the respondents support.

⁹To have an alternative measure, I also asked the standard questions to measure social distance (e.g., how comfortable would you be having a close friend supporting the opposite candidate?).

their support for democracy and how much different types of political systems, such as having a strong leader, or military rule would work well in Brazil. They also had to say how acceptable is to resort to violence to express disagreement with the government. In the first five waves, respondents were asked about what they expect would happen after the elections, namely how likely each of the following scenarios were going to be: a peaceful transition of power, protests against the winner of the elections, violent riots, a military coup in favor of the loser of the election.¹⁰ In the last wave, respondents were asked how likely they are to participate in various kind of protests, how much they approve the January 8th Congress attack, and if they would be in favor of a military intervention to make Lula step down.

Socioeconomic perceptions and expectations. In this block, I elicited respondent's perceptions and expectations about various socioeconomic factors. For every factor, I asked respondents to tell how it evolved in the last year or its current situation, and then I asked their expectations on how it will evolve in the next 12 months. In Wave 6, I asked respondents their perceptions about 2022, during Bolsonaro's presidency, and about 2023, during Lula's. These socioeconomic factors are: inflation, unemployment, inequality, economic growth, criminality, and political division.

Other questions. In the survey, I also elicit respondents' perceptions of the political affiliation of other Brazilians, how homogeneous their interpersonal networks are, and how exposed to different political views they are. Respondents were also asked questions on their preferences towards various redistributive and moral policies. Finally, I also asked questions that allow me to compute measures of trust, morality, moral universalism, identity, and external and internal efficacy.

The survey ends by asking respondents whether they felt it was biased and inviting them to provide open-ended feedback.

4 Model

This section presents a simple model where individuals face the choice of turning violent to try to overthrow the government. My main assumption is that individuals' utility is given by the competence of the current president. If they believe a better alternative is available, they will be willing to incur the cost of being violent to change the person in charge of the country. While this framework holds at any moment of the political cycle, I explore what happens when election results occur. With this model, I show how polarized views of candidates'

¹⁰In the waves before the second round, respondents were asked about their expectations both in case of a Lula's and a Bolsonaro's victory.

competence and expectation shocks enter the individual choice of becoming violent. I then derive the condition that must hold for individuals to turn violent after an election, which I will use to guide the empirical analysis in the rest of the paper.

4.1 Environment

Let us assume that every individual i is either a Bolsonaro supporter (b) or a Lula supporter (l) and has their own perceived competence of Bolsonaro and Lula. Let us denote by c_B^i the perceived competence of Bolsonaro for individual i , and by c_L^i the perceived competence of Lula for individual i . In this setting, individuals' utility depends on how well the country will fare under the presidency of one of the two candidates. For simplicity, I assume that the utility of the individuals will depend on the candidates' competence c_C^i . Every individual assigns a certain probability to Bolsonaro's victory. I denote by $P^i(B)$ such probability for individual i . Finally, individuals face the binary choice of accepting violence to express disagreement with the government and express anti-democratic sentiment or not. This choice is captured by the variable $v = \{0, 1\}$.

4.2 Choice of Violence

In this setting, a citizen decides to show anti-democratic and violent sentiments to change the person in charge of the country. Showing this sentiment has a cost of $\delta > 0$. Before the election, every individual utility depends on who will win. Bolsonaro supporters have the following utility:

$$\begin{aligned} U^b(v|B) &= c_B^b - \delta v \\ U^b(v|L) &= (1 - v)c_L^b + v(c_B^b - \delta) \end{aligned}$$

Remark 1. In case of their candidate's victory, the supporters will not try to change who is in charge even if they decided to be violent before the election. Nonetheless, they have to pay the cost δ since they have been accepting more violence and/or undermining democracy and its institutions. ▲

Remark 2. In this model, I assume that the probability of success in overthrowing the government when they choose to be violent is equal to 1. In Appendix Section A-2.1, I explore an extension of this model where I include the perceived probability of success. ▲

For every i , the pre-election expected utility is then given by:

$$U_{Pre}^i(v) = P^i(B)U^i(v|B) + (1 - P^i(B))U^i(v|L) \quad (1)$$

Before the election, for Bolsonaro supporters to choose violence, the following condition must hold:

$$\begin{aligned} v_{Pre}^b = 1 &\Leftrightarrow U_{Pre}^b(v=1) > U_{Pre}^b(v=0) \\ &\Leftrightarrow (1 - P^b(B))(c_B^b - c_L^b) > \delta \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

From this condition, we can see that there are two factors influencing Bolsonaro supporters' decision to be more violent before the election. On the one hand, there is their perceived probability of who will win. If $P^b(B)$ is larger, they are less likely to choose violence. The intuition is that if they expect Bolsonaro to remain president, there is no need to be violent. On the other hand, keeping $P^b(B)$ fixed, Bolsonaro supporters are more likely to choose violence the more polarized they are. That is, the larger their perceived gap in competences ($c_B^b - c_L^b$) is. The reason for this is that the more an individual believes that Bolsonaro is better than Lula, the more willing they will be to pay the cost of becoming violent.

After the election, the state in which Lula wins is realized. Therefore, the condition that must hold for Bolsonaro supporters to choose violence is:

$$\begin{aligned} v_{Post}^b = 1 &\Leftrightarrow U^b(v=1|L) > U^b(v=0|L) \\ &\Leftrightarrow c_B^b - c_L^b > \delta \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

Since the election has been decided, Bolsonaro supporters will resort to violence only when their perceived gap between the competence of Bolsonaro and Lula is large enough.

4.3 Expectation Shocks

Let us now look into how expectations about the future of the country (θ) play a role in changing supporters' views towards violence. Before the election, assuming that no violence will occur, the expectations for individual i are given by $\theta_{Pre}^i = P^i(B)c_B^i + (1 - P^i(B))c_L^i$. After Lula's victory, the expectations about Brazil's future will entirely depend on Lula's perceived competence, that is: $\theta_{Post}^i = c_L^i$.

I define *expectation shock* as the difference between individual i 's pre- and post-election expectations, that is:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta\theta^i &= \theta_{Post}^i - \theta_{Pre}^i \\ &= P^i(B)(c_L^i - c_B^i) \end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

Two factors are at play in determining the size and direction of the expectation shock. First, which of the two candidates individual i considers more competent determines whether the expectation shock will be positive or negative. Assuming that $\forall i = l, c_L^i > c_B^i$ and $\forall i = b, c_B^i > c_L^i$,

$c_L^i < c_B^i$, I have that $\Delta\theta^i \geq 0 \forall i = l$ and $\Delta\theta^i \leq 0 \forall i = b$. That is, Lula supporters had a positive expectation shock, while Bolsonaro supporters had a negative one. The difference in perceived competences also affects the magnitude of the expectation shock. The larger the gap, the larger the expectation shock will be. In the extreme case that an individual considers Lula and Bolsonaro equally competent, their expectation shock will be zero since they believe they will do equally good (or equally bad). Finally, the second factor is the expectation of who would win the election. The more an individual expected Bolsonaro to win (high $P^i(B)$), the more they were surprised by the election result, and consequently the larger the expectation shock. In the extreme case that they were sure of Lula's victory ($P^i(B) = 0$), their expectation shock will be zero since they had already internalized whatever outcome you were expecting for the future of Brazil.

Across Group Comparison. I now investigate which kind of supporters this framework predicts to experience a larger expectation shock. For simplicity, I consider four groups of supporters: extreme Bolsonaro supporters (b_e), moderate Bolsonaro supporters (b_m), extreme Lula supporters (l_e), and moderate Lula supporters (l_m). I assume that stronger supporters are more sure that their candidate is going to win. Therefore, the probabilities of Bolsonaro winning follow the following ordering:

$$1 \geq P^{b_e}(B) > P^{b_m}(B) > P^{l_m}(B) > P^{l_e}(B) \geq 0 \quad (5)$$

Secondly, it is safe to assume that the more an individual supports a candidate, the more likely they are to consider him competent and his opponent incompetent. Therefore, the perceived competences of Lula and Bolsonaro are ranked as follows:

$$c_L^{l_e} > c_L^{l_m} > c_L^{b_m} > c_L^{b_e} \quad \text{and} \quad c_B^{b_e} > c_B^{b_m} > c_B^{l_m} > c_B^{l_e} \quad (6)$$

By combining these rankings with equation (4), I get that the expectation shocks are ranked in the following way:

$$\Delta\theta^{l_e} \leq \Delta\theta^{l_m} \geq 0 > \Delta\theta^{b_m} > \Delta\theta^{b_e} \quad (7)$$

The first thing to notice is that for every Bolsonaro supporter, the expectation shock is negative, and its magnitude is increasing in the support strength. On the other hand, while being weakly positive for all Lula supporters, the expectation shock does not follow a clear pattern. First, unlike Bolsonaro supporters, their expectation shock could be zero if they were sure about Lula's victory. Secondly, the magnitude is not related to their support strength. This interesting implication comes from the fact that the two factors determining the expectation shock go in opposite directions as the support strength among Lula supporters increases. While the gap between the two competences is increasing in support strength, the proba-

bility of Bolsonaro winning is instead tending towards zero. This implies that there might be moderate Lula supporters with larger expectation shocks than extreme supporters or the other way around. In Section 5, I will show how the data support this prediction.

Expectation Shocks and Violence. As a final step, I now use this framework to understand better which kind of supporters are more likely to become violent. In this section, I focus on Bolsonaro supporters since, as shown in Proposition 3, these are the groups that I expect to become more violent.

Since being accepting of violence is a binary choice, two trivial conditions must hold to have individual i becoming more accepting of it: individual i had to be non-violent before the election ($v_{Pre}^b = 0$) and has to be violent after the election ($v_{Post}^b = 1$). Rearranging conditions (2) and (3), we get that the two following conditions must hold:

$$\begin{aligned} v_{Pre}^b = 0 &\Leftrightarrow \delta > (1 - P^b(B))(c_B^b - c_L^b) \\ v_{Post}^b = 1 &\Leftrightarrow c_B^b - c_L^b > \delta \end{aligned}$$

By combining them and from equation (4) we get the following final condition:

$$(c_B^b - c_L^b) > \delta > (c_B^b - c_L^b) + \Delta\theta^b \quad (8)$$

This entails the following proposition:

Proposition 1. *For Bolsonaro supporters, the more negative the expectation shock, the more likely they are to switch from non-violence to violence. Moreover, the gap between the two competences must be sufficiently large, meaning that the switch is more likely to happen among stronger supporters.*

Intuitively, two conditions must hold simultaneously. On the one hand, an individual must believe that the gap between Bolsonaro and Lula's competence is large enough. If they believed who is president would not make much difference, they would not be willing to incur the cost of becoming violent. On the other hand, they also need to negatively update their expectations about the future of Brazil by a considerable amount. For these reasons, the model predicts that there will be an increase in violence only among strong supporters who experienced a large enough negative expectation shock. In Appendix Section A-2.1, I show that including the perceived probability of success in overthrowing the government would strengthen my result. In the next section, I will explore if the data supports these predictions.

5 Supporters' Strength and Expectation Shocks


In this section, I describe the expectations of the respondents regarding the election result, their feelings towards the two candidates, the expectation shocks that they experienced, and how these dimensions relate to their level of support. For this descriptive analysis, I focus on the data collected during the third wave of the survey, namely the one conducted just before the second round of the election. For the expectation shocks, I instead rely on the respondents who completed the follow-up survey, as I have to capture the within-respondent variation.

As described in section 3.2, every respondent was first asked if they would vote for Lula or Bolsonaro. Then, they had to report how strong their support for the chosen candidate was on a scale ranging from 0 to 10. The answer to this question defines respondents' support strength. In the subsequent figures, the support strength is reported on the x-axis, going from -10 (maximum support for Lula) to 10 (maximum support for Bolsonaro). Every red dot represents a Lula supporter, every blue dot represents a Bolsonaro supporter. In Figure 2, I show the relationship between support strength and respondents' perceived chance of Bolsonaro winning the election. As can be seen, there is a clear increasing trend where the stronger the support, the more likely Bolsonaro supporters are to believe that their candidate will win. Even if with a flatter slope, the same trend appears among Lula supporters. This might be due to some noise in reporting small probabilities. In Appendix Figure A-4, I report the answers to the same question about Lula's probability of winning, finding a similar trend.

Figures 3a and 3b show how respondents' feelings towards the two candidates relate to their support strength. On the y-axis are reported the values provided to the feeling thermometer question. Respondents were told that ratings between 0 and 49 mean they have unfavorable feelings, while between 51 and 100 mean they have favorable feelings. I use the answers to these questions as a proxy for the perceived competence of the two candidates.¹¹ A few results emerge from these figures. First, we can see that the feelings towards the supported candidate are increasing in the support strength. Interestingly, voters with low levels of support have, on average, unfavorable feelings toward the candidate they decided to vote for. This finding holds both for Lula and Bolsonaro voters. Two possible complementary reasons can explain this. On the one hand, a two-round system undoubtedly increases the chances that voters will have to vote for a candidate they dislike. On the other hand, for many people, the 2022 Brazilian election has been a choice for the least bad candidate, help-

¹¹In Appendix Section A-3, by looking at respondents from Wave 6, I show how the answers provided to the feeling thermometer are highly correlated with respondents' assessment of Lula and Bolsonaro's government performances. This question has been asked only in that wave.

FIGURE 2: PROBABILITY OF BOLSONARO WINNING BY STRENGTH OF SUPPORT



Notes: The figure shows the dispersion of respondents by strength of support and perceived probability of Bolsonaro winning the election. Variables defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. Respondents from Wave 3. Red dots represent Lula supporters, blue dots Bolsonaro supporters. The red line is a linear fit of Lula supporters, the blue line is a linear fit of Bolsonaro supporters.

ing to explain why so many voters have negative feelings towards both candidates. Figure 3c reports the level of affective polarization by support strength. This measure consists of the difference between the two feeling thermometers previously described. Its value can go from 100 (warmest feelings towards Lula and coldest towards Bolsonaro) to -100 (warmest feelings towards Bolsonaro and coldest towards Lula). A value of 0 means the respondent holds the same feelings for Bolsonaro and Lula. We can see a clear linear trend with a similar slope for Lula and Bolsonaro supporters. It is also interesting to notice how strong supporters reach values close to 100 (or -100), evidence of a very polarized election. Finally, we can see that almost the entirety of the sample is situated in the top left or bottom right quadrant of the figure. This means that almost all Lula voters reported having stronger feelings towards Lula than Bolsonaro, and Bolsonaro supporters reported the opposite. This result is evidence that respondents completed the survey carefully.


The data showed in Figures 2 and 3 matches with the ordering that I assumed in inequality 5 and 6 in the previous section of the paper. The next step is to show that the ranking of the expectation shocks, as presented in inequality 7, holds as well. To do so, I exploit the respondents who took the follow-up survey and look at how their answers to the questions on their expectations changed. More precisely, I use a set of seven questions that ask how optimistic they are about the future of Brazil and their expectations about the economy in general, inflation, finding a job, income inequality, criminality, and political division. Respondents had to select an answer on a five-point Likert scale from “decrease a lot” to “increase a lot.” The expectation shock consists of the average of the differences between the post- and pre-election answers to these questions.

Figure 4 shows how the expectation shock varies depending on the support strength of the respondent. As predicted by the model, among Bolsonaro supporters, the stronger the support, the more negative the expectation shock has been. On the other hand, while, on average, Lula supporters experienced a positive expectation shock, there is no relationship between their support strength and the magnitude of the shock. These results are perfectly in line with inequality 7. Appendix Figure A-5 shows an alternative way of building the expectation shock, where instead of taking the average of the difference of the seven questions, I created a PCA index. The results are indistinguishable. Finally, to ensure one particular outcome was not driving the shock, I report all seven variables separately in Appendix Figure A-6. The same pattern emerges for every variable.

6 Election Results’ Effects


In this section, I explore how Brazilian voters’ attitudes toward violence and democratic institutions were affected by the results of the 2022 presidential election. As I am interested

FIGURE 3: FEELINGS TOWARDS CANDIDATES BY STRENGTH OF SUPPORT



Notes: The figures show the dispersion of respondents by strength of support and feelings towards the two candidates (subfigure A and B) and their difference (subfigure C). Variables defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. Respondents from Wave 3. Red dots represent Lula supporters, blue dots Bolsonaro supporters. The red line is a linear fit of Lula supporters, the blue line is a linear fit of Bolsonaro supporters.

FIGURE 4: EXPECTATION SHOCK



Notes: The figure shows the dispersion of respondents by strength of support and expectation shock. Variables defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. Respondents from Wave 3. Red dots represent Lula supporters, blue dots Bolsonaro supporters. The red line is a linear fit of Lula supporters, the blue line is a linear fit of Bolsonaro supporters.

in studying the effects of an electoral loss, for this analysis I rely on the sample of Bolsonaro respondents who completed the follow-up survey, allowing me to build a two-period panel dataset. In Appendix Section A-4, I replicate this analysis for Lula supporters.

I divide Bolsonaro supporters into four groups depending on their support strength. I call “reluctant supporters” (r) those voters with a support strength between 0 and 3 (12.34% of Bolsonaro voters), “moderate supporters” (m) those between 4 and 7 (27.04%), “strong supporters” (s) those between 8 and 9 (21.05%), and “extreme supporters” (e) those who reported a support strength of 10 out of 10 (39.56%).¹²

The main independent variable of interest is my measure of expectation shock that I presented in the previous section and plotted in Figure 4. By construction, the value of this variable can range between 4 and -4. Among the Bolsonaro supporters in the sample, this measure ranges between 1.71 and -3.57, with a median value of -1. To facilitate the interpretation of my results, in the subsequent analysis I standardize this variable to have a standard deviation of 1 and utilize its negative values. My measure is therefore increasing in the negative change to socioeconomic expectations.¹³

The two-period panel data allows me to use the following specification:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \sum_{g \in G} \beta_g Post_t \times Group_{g,i} \times NegExpShock_i + \sum_{g \in G} \delta_g Post_t \times Group_{g,i} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where $G = \{e, s, m, r\}$, α_i are the individual fixed effects, $Post_t$ is a dummy taking the value of 1 in the after-election period, $Group_{g,i}$ are dummies taking the value of 1 for every supporter group $g \in G$, and $NegExpShock_i$ is the continuous variable measuring the negative expectation shock experienced by supporter i . The parameters of interest are the coefficients β_g since they capture the post-election effect of the negative expectation shock on outcome Y for the various groups of supporters.

I start by looking at the effects on the main outcome variables, that is the violent and anti-democratic sentiments, as well as the effects on the expectations of what would happen after the election. I then explore how other outcomes such as polarization, the perceived share of people supporting each candidate, and emotions have been affected by the electoral defeat. After this, I confirm my results by performing additional robustness checks to exclude alternative mechanisms. Finally, by exploiting all the waves of my survey, I provide some descriptive evidence of how persistent these effects are.

¹²In Appendix Section A-5.1, I replicate the analysis by splitting the sample between those above and below the support strength median finding similar results.

¹³In Appendix Section A-5.2, I use a discrete version of the negative expectation shock finding similar results.

6.1 Effects on Democratic Discontent

The electoral defeat significantly affected the violent and anti-democratic sentiment of Bolsonaro supporters. As predicted by Proposition 1, these effects are present only among extreme Bolsonaro supporters and are increasing in the size of the negative expectation shock.¹⁴

In column 1 of Table 2, we can see that, after the election result, the more negative the expectation shock, the more acceptant of violence Bolsonaro supporters became (as measured with agreement with the statement “*Violence is sometimes an acceptable way for Brazilians to express their disagreement with the government*”). This effect is entirely driven by the extreme supporters.

In columns 2 through 5, I report the effect on supporters’ attitudes towards democracy. These attitudes were measured in two distinct ways. First, respondents had to express their agreement with the following statement: “*Democracy may have problems but it is better than any other form of government*” (column 2). Then, they had to rate how good various political systems would be for Brazil from very bad to very good. These political systems were: a democratic political system (column 3); having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections (column 4); and having the army rule the country (column 5). From these results, it emerges that, after the election result, extreme supporters who experienced a larger negative expectation shock started to look democracy in a less favorable way and an army rule in a more favorable way. On the bright side, even if democratic discontent increased, democracy remains the most favorably viewed political system. This result is supported by the null result from column 2 and by the fact that, after the election result, I observe that 89% of extreme supporters consider democracy to be a good political system for Brazil while only 80% believe the same about army rule (values reported in Appendix Table A-5).¹⁵

In the last three columns of Table 2, I show how people’s views on what would happen in the aftermath of the elections were affected by its results. Respondents were asked to report how likely they thought mass protests against Lula (column 6), violent riots (column 7), and a military coup in favor of Bolsonaro (column 8) would have been in case of Lula’s victory. I find that extreme supporters who experienced a larger negative expectation shock became more likely to believe that violent riots and a military coup were going to happen. While these questions are just capturing their expectations and not their willingness to participate

¹⁴In Appendix Section A-5.3, I explore the heterogeneous effects by groups of supporters, excluding the negative expectation shock.

¹⁵While this number can appear extremely high for a democracy, two things are worth noticing. First, given the close ties between Bolsonaro and the army, it is not surprising that his extreme supporters view a possible army rule in a very favorable way. Second, Brazil experienced years of stability and growth during the years of the military dictatorship (1964-1985), leaving a sense of nostalgia in many Brazilians on both sides of the political spectrum.

nor their hope that they will happen, we can imagine that these three aspects are quite correlated, especially among extreme supporters who, as we just saw, became more accepting of violence and more anti-democratic.

6.2 Effects on Other Attitudes and Perceptions

In this section, I explore how polarization, perceived share of supporters, and emotions changed after the election results. Since expectation shocks do not play a role in this context, I only look at the heterogeneous effects on the various supporter groups. To do so, I rely on a simpler specification:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \sum_{g \in G} \delta_g Post_t \times Group_{g,i} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where $G = \{e, s, m, r\}$, α_i are the individual fixed effects, $Post_t$ is a dummy taking the value of 1 in the after-election period, and $Group_{g,i}$ are dummies taking the value of 1 for every supporter group $g \in G$. These results are reported in Table 3.

As shown in Figure 3c, affective polarization is very high in Brazil, especially among stronger supporters. Does an electoral defeat exacerbate this problem, or does it attenuate it? We could expect that supporters, especially the strongest ones, dislike the opposite candidate and his supporters even more after losing an election. Surprisingly, I find the opposite result in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3. Extreme supporters' affective polarization towards the candidates and their supporters decreased significantly after the election. While this is good news for society, it is nonetheless important to notice that the affective polarization level among extreme supporters remains extremely high.

As previously discussed, during the electoral campaign, Bolsonaro cast doubt on Brazil's elections, claiming that electoral fraud would certainly be committed, especially in case of his defeat. My data suggests that his supporters have accepted this view. In fact, by looking at the respondents who completed the survey right after the election result (Wave 4), I find that 47% of Bolsonaro supporters reported that they believe a lot or completely that Lula committed electoral fraud, and 61% believe that Lula's victory was probably or certainly illegitimate. Nonetheless, in columns 3 and 4, I show that all Bolsonaro supporters correctly updated their perception of how many voters of the two candidates are present in their city.¹⁶ After the electoral defeat, the perceived share of Lula supporters increased while the perceived share of Bolsonaro supporters decreased. On the one hand, this does not necessarily contradict the view that the election was rigged. People can still believe that Lula is not the legitimate winner while admitting they underestimated the share of his supporters. On

¹⁶The only exception is for the “reluctant supporters,” probably because their perceptions were already accurate.

TABLE 2: ELECTION EFFECTS ON DEMOCRATIC DISCONTENT

	Agreement violence acceptable to express disagreement (1)	Agreement democracy best form of government (2)	Belief good political system for Brazil: Democracy (3)	Strong Leader (4)	Army Rule (5)	After Lula's victory: Mass Protests (6)	Violent Riots (7)	Military Coup (8)
Panel A - Bolsonaro Voters by Support Strength								
Pre-election extreme supporters mean	0.10	0.03	0.02	0.29	0.40	0.20	0.21	0.19
Pre-election strong supporters mean	-0.01	0.02	0.05	-0.04	-0.05	-0.05	-0.16	-0.11
Pre-election moderate supporters mean	0.04	-0.06	-0.09	-0.23	-0.18	-0.19	-0.16	-0.11
Pre-election reluctant supporters mean	-0.38	0.00	0.04	-0.35	-0.82	-0.13	-0.05	-0.17
Observations	545	546	544	542	544	544	542	539
Panel B - All Bolsonaro Voters								
Post-Election × Neg Exp Shock	0.12*** (0.04)	-0.09** (0.05)	-0.09** (0.05)	-0.00 (0.05)	0.08** (0.04)	0.05 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.15*** (0.05)
Post-Election	0.03 (0.07)	0.06 (0.07)	0.07 (0.07)	-0.13** (0.06)	0.02 (0.05)	0.09 (0.07)	0.14** (0.07)	-0.05 (0.06)
Panel C - Post-Election Effect on:								
Extreme Bolsonaro Supporter × Neg Exp Shock	0.19*** (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.15** (0.07)	-0.04 (0.08)	0.15** (0.07)	0.05 (0.09)	0.17* (0.09)	0.29*** (0.08)
Strong Bolsonaro Supporter × Neg Exp Shock	0.06 (0.12)	-0.03 (0.11)	0.08 (0.15)	0.09 (0.11)	0.05 (0.09)	0.04 (0.13)	-0.11 (0.12)	0.14 (0.09)
Moderate Bolsonaro Supporter × Neg Exp Shock	0.04 (0.11)	-0.07 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.10)	0.00 (0.10)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)	0.02 (0.09)
Reluctant Bolsonaro Supporter × Neg Exp Shock	-0.03 (0.12)	-0.40* (0.22)	0.06 (0.12)	-0.06 (0.12)	-0.11 (0.12)	0.38** (0.17)	-0.02 (0.17)	-0.01 (0.14)
Extreme Bolsonaro Supporter	-0.06 (0.14)	-0.01 (0.12)	0.14 (0.14)	-0.03 (0.14)	-0.05 (0.13)	0.09 (0.17)	-0.12 (0.15)	-0.29** (0.14)
Strong Bolsonaro Supporter	0.17 (0.16)	0.08 (0.16)	-0.13 (0.22)	-0.40*** (0.13)	0.05 (0.12)	0.15 (0.18)	0.31* (0.16)	-0.09 (0.11)
Moderate Bolsonaro Supporter	0.03 (0.13)	-0.04 (0.11)	0.09 (0.12)	-0.10 (0.10)	0.00 (0.08)	0.19* (0.10)	0.23* (0.12)	0.12 (0.10)
Reluctant Bolsonaro Supporter	0.02 (0.09)	0.22 (0.14)	0.08 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.11)	0.13 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.13)	0.18 (0.14)	0.02 (0.11)
Observations	1090	1088	1084	1088	1085	1090	1087	1082

Notes: All dependent variables are continuous variables (Z-scores) defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. Panel A reports the mean of the dependent variables for extreme, strong, moderate, and reluctant Bolsonaro supporters before the election result (Wave 3). Panel B and C report the coefficients of a fixed-effects regression with cluster-robust standard errors within individual. In Panel B, the specification includes the interaction between “Post-Election” and the continuous negative expectation shock (“Neg Exp Shock”). In Panel C, the specification includes all triple interactions between “Post-Election,” the Bolsonaro supporter groups (“Extreme,” “Strong,” “Moderate,” “Reluctant supporter”) and the continuous negative expectation shock (“Neg Exp Shock”), and all double interactions between “Post-Election” and the Bolsonaro supporter groups. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE 3: ELECTION EFFECTS ON POLARIZATION, PERCEPTIONS, AND EMOTIONS

Affective Polarization		Perceived share of				When thinking about the election feel a lot of						
Candidate	Supporter	Lula supporters in their city	Bolsonaro supporters in their city	Hope	Joy	Enthusiasm	Fear	Indignation	Sadness	Pride		
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)		
Panel A - Bolsonaro Voters by Support Strength												
Pre-election extreme supporters mean	0.82	0.68	0.40	0.81	0.83	0.68	0.71	0.41	0.44	0.22	0.64	
Pre-election strong supporters mean	0.62	0.46	0.43	0.70	0.70	0.44	0.43	0.37	0.45	0.30	0.37	
Pre-election moderate supporters mean	0.38	0.27	0.46	0.69	0.43	0.26	0.23	0.47	0.40	0.29	0.25	
Pre-election reluctant supporters mean	0.13	0.04	0.55	0.55	0.26	0.15	0.15	0.43	0.59	0.44	0.10	
Observations	529	530	541	545	546	546	546	546	546	546	546	
Panel B - Post-Election Effect on:												
Extreme Bolsonaro Supporter	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.62*** (0.04)	-0.58*** (0.04)	-0.62*** (0.04)	0.27*** (0.04)	0.41*** (0.04)	0.55*** (0.04)	-0.54*** (0.04)	
Strong Bolsonaro Supporter	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.05** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.57*** (0.05)	-0.37*** (0.05)	-0.35*** (0.05)	0.23*** (0.05)	0.29*** (0.05)	0.30*** (0.06)	-0.30*** (0.05)	
Moderate Bolsonaro Supporter	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.05*** (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.02)	-0.31*** (0.05)	-0.20*** (0.04)	-0.17*** (0.04)	0.18*** (0.05)	0.21*** (0.05)	0.17*** (0.05)	-0.18*** (0.04)	
Reluctant Bolsonaro Supporter	0.04 (0.03)	0.05** (0.03)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.10** (0.05)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.15** (0.06)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.04)	
Observations	1060	1065	1085	1088	1090	1089	1085	1090	1088	1088	1090	

Notes: The dependent variables in columns 1-4 are continuous variables defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. The dependent variables in columns 5-11 are indicator variables defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. Panel A reports the mean of the dependent variables for extreme, strong, moderate, and reluctant Bolsonaro supporters before the election result (Wave 3). Panel B reports the coefficients of a fixed-effects regression with cluster-robust standard errors within individual. This specification includes all interactions between “Post-Election,” and the Bolsonaro supporter groups (“Extreme,” “Strong,” “Moderate,” “Reluctant supporter”). Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

the other hand, it could be that certain respondents stay stuck with their opinion that the election was rigged for partisan reasons. However, if asked differently (as through their perceived share of supporters), they are fine admitting that Lula received the largest share of votes.

As the 2022 presidential election has been very heartfelt, the emotional reaction to its results is a part of the story that cannot be omitted.¹⁷ In all survey waves, respondents were also asked to report how much they felt a range of emotions when thinking about the 2022 presidential election. In columns 5 through 12 of Table 3, I show that the electoral defeat led to a considerable drop in the share of supporters feeling positive emotions (hope, joy, enthusiasm) and an increase in the share feeling negative emotions (fear, indignation, sadness) and pride. It is interesting to notice how the magnitude of these effects is increasing in the strength of support, going from a mostly null effect on reluctant supporters to extreme supporters experiencing, for example, a 150% increase in sadness and an 87% drop in enthusiasm. These heterogeneous effects led to a convergence to the same level of every emotion for all supporters, as I found by combining the pre-election levels with the post-election effects.

¹⁷80.61% of my sample from Wave 3 reported that this election was important or extremely important for the future of Brazil.

6.3 Alternative Mechanisms

One concern that can be raised from previous results is that expectation shocks are highly correlated with other perceptions and beliefs. First, I showed how the magnitude of the expectation shock is driven by the affective polarization, which captures the gap in the two candidates' competences, and by the ex-ante perceived probability of victory. These relations already lead to two alternative mechanisms. First, it could be that highly polarized people are more likely to react violently to an electoral defeat. Alternatively, I could be capturing the effect of a surprise shock rather than an expectation shock. A very unexpected defeat could increase democratic discontent, independently of their expectations about the future. Second, I find that, after the election result (Wave 4), 83% of extreme Bolsonaro supporters believe that Lula's victory is probably or certainly illegitimate. Therefore, it could be that the post-election increase in violence is caused by the belief that the election was stolen. Finally, in the previous section, I showed how the electoral defeat not only negatively affected people's expectations but also greatly affected their emotions, particularly extreme supporters'. Could it then be that the increase in democratic discontent is driven by an emotional shock rather than a sharp change in their expectations?

These alternative stories are not mutually exclusive. It is not hard to believe that they all play a role in increasing the post-election democratic discontent among extreme supporters. Nonetheless, it is essential to understand which is the dominant mechanism. To do so, I use the recontact sample and focus on extreme Bolsonaro supporters. In Table 4, I regress the change in the three outcome variables affected by the expectation shock (acceptance of violence, support for democracy, and army rule) on the various alternative mechanisms presented above while controlling for individual-level characteristics. From the first three columns, it emerges that the negative expectation shock is the only variable significantly affecting the change in acceptance of violence and support for army rule among extreme supporters. While the effect on the change of support for democracy is insignificant, the coefficient goes in the right direction and is the largest in magnitude. In column 4, I build a PCA index including the previous three variables and find that the negative expectation shock is the only variable affecting these changes. From these results, the alternative stories seem unlikely to play an equally important role.

In Appendix Section A-5.4, as an additional robustness check, I replicate Table 2 by interacting the election effect with probability of victory (Table A-7), affective polarization (Table A-8), and the legitimacy of the election (Table A-9), rather than with the negative expectation shock. While the polarization level and the belief that the election has not been legitimate seem to have an effect in making extreme supporters more violent, the results are less clear and less significant, confirming, therefore, the findings from Table 4. These results are also going to be confirmed by the experiment that I will discuss in Section 7.

TABLE 4: EFFECT OF ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS

	Extreme Bolsonaro Supporters			
	Violence Acceptable to Express Disagreement (1)	Good Political System for Brazil		Index Democratic Discontent (4)
		Democracy (2)	Army Rule (3)	
Probability of victory	-0.01 (0.08)	0.02 (0.08)	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.08)
Affective polarization - Candidate	0.12 (0.08)	0.11 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.07)	0.05 (0.08)
Legitimacy of Lula's victory	0.04 (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.07)	0.00 (0.07)
Negative Expectation Shock	0.15* (0.08)	-0.13 (0.09)	0.23*** (0.08)	0.27*** (0.08)
Negative Emotional Shock	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.14 (0.09)
Observations	206	205	203	202
R ²	0.146	0.121	0.150	0.157

Notes: The dependent variables in columns 1-3 are continuous variables (Z-scores) defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. The dependent variables in column 4 is an index defined in Appendix Section A-1.2. Independent variables input as Z-scores. All regressions include only extreme Bolsonaro supporters. All regressions include controls for gender, age group, race, income group, employment status, education, religion, whether on welfare, and macro-region fixed effects. Coefficients not reported due to space constraints. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

6.4 Persistence


Given the important role that the negative shock to expectations had in increasing democratic discontent, it is crucial to understand how persistent this effect may be. On the one hand, it might be that this is just a temporary reaction in the heat of the moment given by the disappointment of having lost the election. On the other hand, it may be something more long-lasting. If the latter is the case, as my evidence suggests, this would be a more concerning result.

I rely on the fifth and sixth survey waves to answer this question. This data allows me to look at how respondents' answers evolved after three weeks and after one year of the election.¹⁸ As shown in Figure 5, the sharp drop Bolsonaro supporters experienced in their expectations is long-lasting. Even after one year, they are equally likely to believe that Brazil will get worse in the future. Appendix Figure A-7 reports the time trend for every socioeconomic expectation used, and the same result emerges from every variable.

A similar result emerges if we look at respondents' emotions when thinking about the 2022 election, as shown in Figure 6. While negative emotions among Bolsonaro supporters appear to have been on a downward trend (Panel B of Figure 6), they remain higher than

¹⁸Given the impossibility of re-contacting the same respondents after weeks, even more after a year, I rely on different batches of respondents.


FIGURE 5: AVERAGE EXPECTATIONS ACROSS TIME




Notes: The figure shows, for all six waves, the average level of expectations for Bolsonaro and Lula supporters with its associated 90% confidence interval. Variable defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. The two vertical red lines represent the two election's rounds.

FIGURE 6: AVERAGE EMOTIONS ACROSS TIME

(A) POSITIVE EMOTIONS



(B) NEGATIVE EMOTIONS



Notes: The figures shows, for all six waves, the average level of positive and negative emotions for Bolsonaro and Lula supporters with its associated 90% confidence interval. Variable defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. The two vertical red lines represent the two election's rounds.

before the election results. Positive emotions have instead remained as low as right after the previous year's elections (Panel A of Figure 6). These results are also not driven by a particular set of emotions, as can be seen in Appendix Figure A-8.

While this cannot prove that violent and anti-democratic sentiments are as persistent, the fact that their primary determinant (socioeconomic expectations) and a highly correlated outcome (emotions) are supportive evidence that this may be the case. In any case, it is important to note that persistent low expectations and negative emotions could be used to incite violent and anti-democratic behavior among Bolsonaro supporters. Such behavior could lead to events similar to those that occurred on January 8th, 2023.


7 Experimental Effects of Information on the Economy

To better test the mechanism identified by the electoral outcome, I designed a survey experiment that causally identifies the role that a change in the expectations about the economy has on violent and anti-democratic attitudes. The experiment was conducted between September and October 2023 on a sample of 3,000 respondents during an additional survey wave. Below, I describe the treatment in detail and present the experimental results.

7.1 The Treatment

In Wave 6 of the survey, respondents were randomly assigned to watch a short video (35 seconds) showing how inflation decreased between September 2022 and June 2023 (see Figure 7). In this treatment, I highlight how, during the last months of Bolsonaro's presidency, the inflation rate was decreasing very slowly, but once Lula became president, it started to

FIGURE 7: TREATMENT - INFLATION DECREASE



Notes: Data from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE).

decrease at a higher rate.

This treatment, designed to change respondents' economic expectations about the future, allows me to test how different groups of supporters react to an upward adjustment of their expectations.¹⁹ I hypothesize that a treatment making respondents more optimistic about Brazil's future would make them more satisfied with Brazil's current government. This effect would then make respondents less likely to hold violent and anti-democratic sentiments. In the next subsection, I present my model predictions for the treatment effect more formally.

7.2 Model Prediction

Given that Lula is the current president of Brazil, the only condition determining Bolsonaro supporters' violence is the following:

$$v^b = 1 \Leftrightarrow (c_B^b - c_L^b) > \delta$$

The treatment showing how inflation has decreased provides positive information about the economy. A better perception of the economy should then increase c_L^b . This increase makes the condition harder to hold, meaning that respondents should become less likely to choose violence.

To explore whether a particular kind of supporter is more likely to be affected by the

¹⁹I designed a second treatment to test the effect of a downward adjustment to respondent's expectations, but the information provided was not internalized as negative. I discuss the findings of this second treatment in Appendix Section A-7.2.

treatment, I have to look at the conditions that must hold to observe a switch from violence to non-violence. More precisely, I need to have violence in the control group and non-violence in the treated group. Therefore, the following two conditions must hold:

$$\begin{aligned} v_C^b = 1 &\Leftrightarrow (c_{B;C}^b - c_{L;C}^b) > \delta \\ v_T^b = 0 &\Leftrightarrow \delta > (c_{B;T}^b - c_{L;T}^b) \end{aligned}$$

By combining them, I reach the following condition:

$$(c_{B;C}^b - c_{L;C}^b) > \delta > (c_{B;T}^b - c_{L;T}^b)$$

The left-hand side of the inequality is more likely to hold among stronger supporters, but the right-hand side entirely depends on the strength of the first-stage effect of the treatment in changing c_B^b or c_L^b . For this reason, while the treatment is more likely to work on extreme supporters, given the uncertainty behind the intensity of the first-stage effect, I cannot clearly predict which group will be more affected. Therefore, from now on, I will not distinguish between supporter groups.

7.3 Experiment Results

Table 5 reports the effects of the treatment on the main outcomes of interest by Bolsonaro and Lula respondents separately ("T × Bolsonaro Supporter" and "T × Lula Supporter"). In Appendix Section A-7.1, I report the treatment effects on additional outcomes.

First-stage effects. The information treatment has significant first-stage effects. In columns 1 and 2, it can be seen that treated respondents are more likely to say that inflation decreased both in 2022, under Bolsonaro, and in 2023, under Lula. Providing positive news on how inflation decreased makes respondents also more optimistic that it will keep decreasing in the future (column 3). Interestingly, these effects are very significant among both Lula and Bolsonaro supporters and with a considerable magnitude among the latter (113% on the expectation about future inflation). This strong result among Bolsonaro supporters is not obvious since, as shown in other studies with similar treatments, positive information perceived as partisan often backfires. Moreover, this information significantly increased the socioeconomic expectations of both Lula and Bolsonaro supporters (column 4).²⁰ Finally, it is worth noticing how the treatment significantly increased the grade Lula supporters assigned to the first months of Lula's presidency and their expectations about it. Among Bolsonaro supporters, while positive, this effect is not significant (columns 2 and 3, Appendix Table

²⁰In Appendix Tables A-11 and A-12, I show the effects on every single component of the socioeconomic expectations index.

TABLE 5: TREATMENT EFFECTS - INFLATION DECREASE

	Inflation			Indices				
	decreased in 2022 (1)	decreased in 2023 (2)	will decrease in future (3)	Socioeconomic Expectations (4)	Violent Protests (5)	Violence Acceptance (6)	Support Military (7)	Support Democracy (8)
Descriptive Statistics (control group only)								
Bolsonaro supporters mean	0.30	0.13	0.08	-1.48	0.23	0.41	0.76	-0.20
Lula supporters mean	0.20	0.58	0.54	1.14	-0.11	-0.34	-0.67	0.17
Observations	878	878	878	876	861	877	869	872
Treatment Effects - Inflation Decrease								
T × Bolsonaro Supporter	0.09*** (0.03)	0.25*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.26*** (0.10)	-0.21** (0.10)	-0.06 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.07)	0.03 (0.09)
T × Lula Supporter	0.12*** (0.03)	0.23*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.44*** (0.09)	0.03 (0.08)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	0.10 (0.07)
Observations	1650	1650	1650	1645	1623	1649	1636	1640
R ²	0.069	0.299	0.318	0.564	0.094	0.206	0.460	0.114

Notes: The dependent variables in columns 1-3 are indicator variables defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. The dependent variables in columns 4-8 are indices defined in Appendix Section A-1.2. First two rows report the mean of the dependent variables for respondents who saw no treatment video separately for Bolsonaro and Lula supporters. The bottom panel reports the treatment effects of the inflation decrease video interacted with the respondent's political affiliation ("T × Bolsonaro Supporter" and "T × Lula Supporter") relative to the omitted category (no video). All regressions include controls for gender, age group, race, income group, employment status, education, religion, whether on welfare, strength of support, and macro-region fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A-11).

Second-stage effects. To study the treatment effect on democratic discontent, I build four different indices capturing various aspects of it: the propensity to attend violent protests if the economy starts to worsen, the acceptance of violence to express disagreement with the government, the support for military rule, and the support for democracy. The treatment effects on these four indices can be seen in columns 5 through 9 of table 5.²¹

For Lula supporters, the treatment does not have any second-stage effect. While I observe strong first-stage effects, their perceptions and expectations were already very high. This may be why I do not find an effect on their democratic discontent (if anything, they seem to become more supportive of democracy and less tolerant of violence).

Conversely, Bolsonaro supporters become significantly less willing to attend violent protests. While I do not find significant effects on the other indices, the coefficients all go in the right direction. The small second-stage effect can be explained by the fact that, while the treatment positively updated the perceptions and expectations about inflation of all respondents, this information was not strong enough to change Bolsonaro supporter's views of Lula's

²¹The treatment effects on the single variables composing the indices can be found in Appendix Table A-10.

government significantly. This might explain why the treatment did not significantly affect deeper preferences, such as support for the military. Nonetheless, these results confirm my previous finding that expectations about the economy affect people's propensity to violence and democratic discontent.

8 Conclusion

This paper leverages large-scale survey data collected during the 2022 Brazilian presidential election to study how democratic discontent is affected by the results of an uncertain and polarizing election. By surveying a large sample of respondents right before and after the election result, I observed how their expectations and attitudes changed in a very narrow time frame. Since more extreme supporters were more confident of their candidate's chances of winning, they held very high expectations about Brazil's future. Moreover, the stronger their support, the larger their perceived gap between the two candidates' competence. For these reasons, when Lula won the election, extreme Bolsonaro supporters experienced a very large negative shock to their expectations about the future of their country. What I find is that this negative expectation shock is the reason behind the increase in their violent and anti-democratic sentiments.

This result adds a rational element to the interpretation of the post-election violent events happening more frequently in recent years. Supporters who became more anti-democratic and violent did not do so just because they lost or were angry. They became more discontent with democracy because they became more concerned with the future of their country.

However, what can be done to reduce these expectation shocks? As highlighted by the model, two factors are at play. On the one hand, we have the expectations of who will win. As shown in the data, even if the election was extremely close, strong supporters on both sides of the political spectrum were convinced that their candidate would win. Trusting the polls and not casting doubt on the electoral process should lead to more realistic expectations about the election result. On the other hand, we have extremely high affective polarization. By believing that only their supported candidate can save the country, while the opponent would lead it to ruin, voters' expectations about the country's future performance will be extremely different depending on who will win. This highlights another ill-fated consequence of polarization. Not only does polarization lead to more tribal and dysfunctional politics, but increasing the perceived stakes of an election will also increase the likelihood of a violent reaction in its aftermath. By avoiding the demonization of the political opponents, voters' expectations will not rely much on who wins an election, reducing the risk of post-electoral violence.

My results also highlight the critical role that a healthy economy plays in sustaining good institutions. Not only did I show that the abrupt change in socioeconomic expectations after

the election led to an increase in violent and anti-democratic sentiment, but in the experimental part of the paper, I provided additional evidence of the role of economic expectations. Indeed, by providing good economic news, I managed to decrease respondents' democratic discontent. This result has important implications that extend beyond the election period. Economic indicators are double-edged swords. On the one hand, providing good economic outcomes can help restore confidence in democracy. On the other hand, when faced with negative economic outcomes, voters' discontent with democracy can increase even further. Future work should dig deeper into how people's views on democracy are shaped by their perceptions about the economy.

While this paper follows in the footsteps of a rich literature in economics and political science that exploits large-scale survey data, it is the first to exploit this method to measure within-individual changes in attitudes, beliefs, and expectations during an election and how they are affected by its result. Given the rise of democratic discontent and polarization in many democracies, it is likely that we will witness more instances of post-election violence in the future. These future events could have even more severe and long-lasting consequences than those caused by the attacks in Washington, D.C., and Brasilia. For this reason, it is important for future research to utilize this survey method to examine elections in other countries. In addition to shedding light on the causes of rising democratic discontent in other cultures and societies, such research may help us identify effective interventions to address these threats to democracy.

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Online Appendix for
“Election Results and Democratic Discontent:
Expectations, Extremism, and Democratic Values
in Post-Election Brazil”

Matteo F. Ferroni

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A-1 Variables' Definitions

A-1.1 Variables Based on Survey Questions

- Political Affiliation Variables

- *Strength of Support*: the question asks “How strong of a Lula/Bolsonaro supporter would you consider yourself?” depending on who the respondent reported to have voted or that would have voted for, answer options range from 0= “*Not a supporter*” to 10= “*Very strong supporter*”. Continuous variable range from -10= “*Very strong Lula supporter*” to 10= “*Very strong Bolsonaro supporter*”.
- *Extreme Bolsonaro supporter*: the question asks “How strong of a Lula/Bolsonaro supporter would you consider yourself?” depending on who the respondent reported to have voted or that would have voted for, answer options range from 0= “*Not a supporter*” to 10= “*Very strong supporter*”. Indicator=1 if voted/would have voted for Bolsonaro and answer=10.
- *Strong Bolsonaro supporter*: the question asks “How strong of a Lula/Bolsonaro supporter would you consider yourself?” depending on who the respondent reported to have voted or that would have voted for, answer options range from 0= “*Not a supporter*” to 10= “*Very strong supporter*”. Indicator=1 if voted/would have voted for Bolsonaro and answer=(8 or 9).
- *Moderate Bolsonaro supporter*: the question asks “How strong of a Lula/Bolsonaro supporter would you consider yourself?” depending on who the respondent reported to have voted or that would have voted for, answer options range from 0= “*Not a supporter*” to 10= “*Very strong supporter*”. Indicator=1 if voted/would have voted for Bolsonaro and answer=(4, 5, 6, or 7).
- *Reluctant Bolsonaro supporter*: the question asks “How strong of a Lula/Bolsonaro supporter would you consider yourself?” depending on who the respondent reported to have voted or that would have voted for, answer options range from 0= “*Not a supporter*” to 10= “*Very strong supporter*”. Indicator=1 if voted/would have voted for Bolsonaro and answer=(0, 1, 2, or 3).
- *Above median Bolsonaro supporter*: the question asks “How strong of a Lula/Bolsonaro supporter would you consider yourself?” depending on who the respondent reported to have voted or that would have voted for, answer options range from 0= “*Not a supporter*” to 10= “*Very strong supporter*”. Indicator=1 if voted/would have voted for Bolsonaro and answer=(9 or 10).
- *Below median Bolsonaro supporter*: the question asks “How strong of a Lula/Bolsonaro supporter would you consider yourself?” depending on who the respondent reported to have voted or that would have voted for, answer options range from 0= “*Not a supporter*” to 10= “*Very strong supporter*”. Indicator=1 if voted/would have voted for Bolsonaro and answer=(0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 8).
- *Extreme Lula supporter*: the question asks “How strong of a Lula/Bolsonaro supporter would you consider yourself?” depending on who the respondent reported to have voted or that would have voted for, answer options range from 0= “*Not a supporter*” to 10= “*Very strong supporter*”. Indicator=1 if voted/would have voted for Lula and answer=10.
- *Strong Lula supporter*: the question asks “How strong of a Lula/Bolsonaro supporter would you consider yourself?” depending on who the respondent reported to have voted or that would have voted for, answer options range from 0= “*Not a supporter*” to 10= “*Very strong supporter*”. Indicator=1 if voted/would have voted for Lula and answer=(8 or 9).
- *Moderate Lula supporter*: the question asks “How strong of a Lula/Bolsonaro supporter would you consider yourself?” depending on who the respondent reported to have voted or that would have voted for, answer options range from 0= “*Not a supporter*” to 10= “*Very strong supporter*”. Indicator=1 if voted/would have voted for Lula and answer=(4, 5, 6, or 7).
- *Reluctant Lula supporter*: the question asks “How strong of a Lula/Bolsonaro supporter would you consider yourself?” depending on who the respondent reported to have voted or that would have voted for, answer options range from 0= “*Not a supporter*” to 10= “*Very strong supporter*”. Indicator=1 if voted/would have voted for Lula and answer=(0, 1, 2, or 3).

- **Democratic Discontent**

- *Agreement violence acceptable to express disagreement:* the question asks “Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with each of the statements below: Violence is sometimes an acceptable way for Brazilians to express their disagreement with the government.” answer options range from 1=“Strongly disagree” to 5=“Strongly agree.” Indicator=1 if answer=(4=agree or 5=strongly agree).
- *Agreement democracy best form of government:* the question asks “Do you agree with the following statement? Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government.” answer options range from 1=“Strongly disagree” to 5=“Strongly agree.” Indicator=1 if answer=(4=agree or 5=strongly agree).
- *Belief good political system for Brazil - Democracy:* the question asks “We are going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a democratic political system.” answer options range from 1=“Very bad” to 4=“Very good.” Indicator=1 if answer=(3=fairly good or 4=very good).
- *Belief good political system for Brazil - Strong Leader:* the question asks “We are going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.” answer options range from 1=“Very bad” to 4=“Very good.” Indicator=1 if answer=(3=fairly good or 4=very good).
- *Belief good political system for Brazil - Army Rule:* the question asks “We are going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having the army rule the country.” answer options range from 1=“Very bad” to 4=“Very good.” Indicator=1 if answer=(3=fairly good or 4=very good).
- *Belief good political system for Brazil - Technocracy:* the question asks “We are going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Get rid of elections and parliaments and have experts make decisions on behalf of the people.” answer options range from 1=“Very bad” to 4=“Very good.” Indicator=1 if answer=(3=fairly good or 4=very good).
- *After Lula’s victory - Mass Protests:* the question asks “Now that Lula won, how likely do you think are the following events going to be? Mass protests against Lula.” answer options range from 1=“Impossible” to 6=“Certain.” Indicator=1 if answer=(4=likely or 5=very likely or 6=certain).
- *After Lula’s victory - Violent Riots:* the question asks “Now that Lula won, how likely do you think are the following events going to be? Violent riots.” answer options range from 1=“Impossible” to 6=“Certain.” Indicator=1 if answer=(4=likely or 5=very likely or 6=certain).
- *After Lula’s victory - Military Coup:* the question asks “Now that Lula won, how likely do you think are the following events going to be? Military coup in favor of Bolsonaro.” answer options range from 1=“Impossible” to 6=“Certain.” Indicator=1 if answer=(4=likely or 5=very likely or 6=certain).
- *Percentage Chance of Protests being Successful:* the question asks “How likely do you believe it is that protests similar to the one on January 8th would be successful in making Lula step down?”, answer options range from 0 to 100.
- *Likely to attend - Peaceful Protests:* the question asks “If Brazil’s economy started to worsen, how likely do you think you would be doing the following things? Attend peaceful protests against the government.” answer options range from 1=“Never” to 6=“For sure.” Indicator=1 if answer=(4=likely or 5=very likely or 6=for sure).
- *Likely to attend - Violent Protests:* the question asks “If Brazil’s economy started to worsen, how likely do you think you would be doing the following things? Attend protests against the government

even if they might turn violent." answer options range from 1= "Never" to 6= "For sure." Indicator=1 if answer=(4=likely or 5=very likely or 6=for sure).

- *Likely to attend - Confrontations with Authorities:* the question asks "If Brazil's economy started to worsen, how likely do you think you would be doing the following things? Participate in violent confrontations with the authorities." answer options range from 1= "Never" to 6= "For sure." Indicator=1 if answer=(4=likely or 5=very likely or 6=for sure).
- *Approve January 8 Protests:* the question asks "On January 8th, some Bolsonaro protesters were in Brasilia and occupied governmental buildings to show their dissatisfaction with the 2022 presidential election's results. In your opinion, how much do you approve or disapprove of this action?" answer options range from 1= "Completely approve" to 5= "Completely disapprove." Indicator=1 if answer=(1=completely approve or 2=partially approve).
- *Big protests likely to happen again:* the question asks "In your opinion, how likely it is that similar events to the ones from January 8th, even if of a different magnitude, are going to happen again in the future?" answer options range from 1= "For sure will happen again" to 4= "Definitely won't happen again." Indicator=1 if answer=(1=for sure will happen again or 2=likely will happen again).
- *In favor of military intervention:* the question asks "Are you in favor or against a military intervention to make Lula step down as president?" answer options range from 1= "Completely against" to 5= "Completely in favor." Indicator=1 if answer=(4=in favor or 5=completely in favor).
- *Agree violence by State acceptable to preserve democracy:* the question asks "Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with each of the statements below: The use of force by the state is justified to preserve democracy." answer options range from 1= "Strongly agree" to 5= "Strongly disagree." Indicator=1 if answer=(1=strongly agree or 2=agree).
- *Agree violence against other group acceptable if violent:* the question asks "Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with each of the statements below: [If voted for Lula:] If Bolsonaro supporters resorted to violence, the use of force by Lula supporters would be justified; [If voted for Bolsonaro:] If Lula supporters resorted to violence, the use of force by Bolsonaro supporters would be justified." answer options range from 1= "Strongly agree" to 5= "Strongly disagree." Indicator=1 if answer=(1=strongly agree or 2=agree).

• Expectations

- *Economy - Will ameliorate in next 12 months:* the question asks "Thinking about the next 12 months, what is your expectations about the Brazilian economy?" answer options range from 1= "Worsen a lot" to 5= "Improve a lot." Indicator=1 if answer=(4=improve or 5=improve a lot).
- *Inequality - Will decrease in the future:* the question asks "Do you think income inequality in Brazil will increase or decrease in the next few years?" answer options range from 1= "Increase a lot" to 5= "Decrease a lot." Indicator=1 if answer=(4=decrease or 5=decrease a lot).
- *Inflation - Will decrease in next 12 months:* the question asks "In the next 12 months, how do you think will inflation and goods' prices change?" answer options range from 1= "Will increase a lot" to 5= "Will decrease a lot." Indicator=1 if answer=(4=will increase a bit or 5=will increase a lot).
- *Criminality - Will decrease in next 12 months:* the question asks "Considering the next 12 months, do you believe that criminality and violence will increase, will stay the same, or will decrease?" answer options range from 1= "Will increase a lot" to 5= "Will decrease a lot." Indicator=1 if answer=(4=will decrease or 5=will decrease a lot).
- *Finding Job - Easy in next 12 months:* the question asks "In the next 12 months, finding a job will be" answer options range from 1= "Very hard" to 5= "Very easy." Indicator=1 if answer=(4=easy or 5=very hard).
- *Political Division - Will become less divided in next 12 months:* the question asks "Considering the next 12 months, do you believe that Brazil will become more divided because of politics?" answer options range from 1= "Will become much more divided" to 5= "Will become much less divided." Indicator=1 if answer=(4=will become less divided or 5=will become much less divided).

- *Optimistic about future of Brazil*: the question asks “Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future of Brazil?” answer options range from 1= “Very pessimistic” to 5= “Very optimistic.” Indicator=1 if answer=(4=optimistic or 5=very optimistic).
- *Average Expectations*: average of all the previous seven indicator variables.
- *Inflation decreased in 2022*: the question asks “In your opinion, how did inflation change in 2022?” answer options range from 1= “Increased a lot” to 5= “Decreased a lot”. Indicator=1 if answer=(4= decreased a bit or 5= decreased a lot).
- *Inflation decreased in 2023*: the question asks “In your opinion, how did inflation change so far in 2023?” answer options range from 1= “Increased a lot” to 5= “Decreased a lot”. Indicator=1 if answer=(4= decreased a bit or 5= decreased a lot).
- *Inflation will decrease in future*: the question asks “In the next 12 months, how do you think will inflation change?” answer options range from 1= “Will increase a lot” to 5= “Will decrease a lot”. Indicator=1 if answer=(4= will decrease a bit or 5= will decrease a lot).
- *Economy ameliorated in 2022*: the question asks “Thinking about the economy of the whole country, would you say that in 2022 the Brazilian economy:” answer options range from 1= “Worsened a lot” to 5= “Improved a lot”. Indicator=1 if answer=(4= improved or 5= improved a lot).
- *Economy ameliorated in 2023*: the question asks “In 2023 so far, the Brazilian economy:” answer options range from 1= “Worsened a lot” to 5= “Improved a lot”. Indicator=1 if answer=(4= improved or 5= improved a lot).
- *Economy will ameliorate in future*: the question asks “Thinking now about the next 12 months, what is your expectations about the Brazilian economy?” answer options range from 1= “Worsen a lot” to 5= “Improve a lot”. Indicator=1 if answer=(4= improve or 5= improve a lot).
- *Finding job easy in 2022*: the question asks “In your opinion, finding a job in 2022 was:” answer options range from 1= “Very easy” to 5= “Very hard”. Indicator=1 if answer=(1= very easy or 2= easy).
- *Finding job easy in 2023*: the question asks “In your opinion, finding a job today is:” answer options range from 1= “Very easy” to 5= “Very hard”. Indicator=1 if answer=(1= very easy or 2= easy).
- *Finding job easy in future*: the question asks “In the next 12 months, finding a job will be:” answer options range from 1= “Very easy” to 5= “Very hard”. Indicator=1 if answer=(1= very easy or 2= easy).
- *Inequality serious problem in 2022*: the question asks “How serious of a problem do you believe was income inequality in Brazil in 2022?” answer options range from 1= “Definitely not a problem” to 5= “A very serious problem”. Indicator=1 if answer=(4= a serious problem or 5= a very serious problem).
- *Inequality decreased in 2023*: the question asks “Do you think income inequality in Brazil increased or decreased in 2023?” answer options range from 1= “Increased a lot” to 5= “Decreased a lot”. Indicator=1 if answer=(4= decreased a bit or 5= decreased a lot).
- *Inequality will decrease in future*: the question asks “Do you think income inequality in Brazil will increase or decrease in the next few years?” answer options range from 1= “Will increase a lot” to 5= “Will decrease a lot”. Indicator=1 if answer=(4= will decrease a bit or 5= will decrease a lot).
- *Criminality decreased in 2022*: the question asks “Thinking about the criminality and violence in Brazil, would you say that in 2022 it was:” answer options range from 1= “Increasing a lot” to 5= “Decreasing a lot”. Indicator=1 if answer=(4= decreasing or 5= decreasing a lot).
- *Criminality decreased in 2023*: the question asks “In 2023 so far, would you say that criminality and violence in Brazil:” answer options range from 1= “Increased a lot” to 5= “Decreased a lot”. Indicator=1 if answer=(4= decreased or 5= decreased a lot).
- *Criminality will decrease in future*: the question asks “Considering the next 12 months, do you believe that criminality and violence will increase, will stay the same, or will decrease?” answer

options range from 1= “Will increase a lot” to 5= “Will decrease a lot”. Indicator=1 if answer=(4= will decrease or 5= will decrease a lot).

- *Political Division decreased in 2022*: the question asks “In 2022, would you say that Brazil was becoming more divided because of political reasons?” answer options range from 1= “Was becoming much more divided” to 5= “Was becoming much less divided”. Indicator=1 if answer=(4= was becoming less divided or 5= was becoming much less divided).
- *Political Division decreased in 2023*: the question asks “In 2023 so far, would you say that Brazil became more divided because of political reasons?” answer options range from 1= “Became much more divided” to 5= “Became much less divided”. Indicator=1 if answer=(4= became less divided or 5= became much less divided).
- *Political Division will decrease in future*: the question asks “Considering the next 12 months, do you believe that Brazil will become more divided because of politics?” answer options range from 1= “Will become much more divided” to 5= “Will become much less divided”. Indicator=1 if answer=(4= will become less divided or 5= will become much less divided).

- **Expectation Shocks**

- *Expectation Shock - Economy*: difference between the post-election and pre-election answer to the question “Thinking about the next 12 months, what is your expectations about the Brazilian economy?”. Continuous variable ranging between -4 and 4.
- *Expectation Shock - Inflation*: difference between the post-election and pre-election answer to the question “In the next 12 months, how do you think will inflation and goods’ prices change?”. Continuous variable ranging between -4 and 4.
- *Expectation Shock - Finding Job*: difference between the post-election and pre-election answer to the question “In the next 12 months, finding a job will be”. Continuous variable ranging between -4 and 4.
- *Expectation Shock - Inequality*: difference between the post-election and pre-election answer to the question “Do you think income inequality in Brazil will increase or decrease in the next few years?”. Continuous variable ranging between -4 and 4.
- *Expectation Shock - Criminality*: difference between the post-election and pre-election answer to the question “Considering the next 12 months, do you believe that criminality and violence will increase, will stay the same, or will decrease?”. Continuous variable ranging between -4 and 4.
- *Expectation Shock - Political Division*: difference between the post-election and pre-election answer to the question “Considering the next 12 months, do you believe that Brazil will become more divided because of politics?”. Continuous variable ranging between -4 and 4.
- *Expectation Shock - Future of the Country*: difference between the post-election and pre-election answer to the question “Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future of Brazil?”. Continuous variable ranging between -4 and 4.
- *Neg Exp Shock* and *Expectation shock - Average*: average of the seven previous expectation shocks. Continuous variable ranging between -4 and 4.
- *Expectation shock - PCA Index*: PCA index built using the seven previous expectation shocks.
- *Large Neg Exp Shock*: indicator=1 if value for *Neg Exp Shock* ≤ -1 .
- *Small Neg Exp Shock*: indicator=1 if value for *Neg Exp Shock* > -1 .

- **Election**

- *Percentage Chance of Bolsonaro Winning*: the question asks “What do you think is the percent chance that Bolsonaro is going to win the elections and be confirmed as President?”, answer options range from 0 to 100. Continuous variable.

- *Probability of victory*: the question asks “What do you think is the percent chance that Bolsonaro is going to win the elections and be confirmed as President?”, answer options range from 0 to 100. Continuous variable normalized to range between 0 and 1.
- *Percentage Chance of Lula Winning*: the question asks “What do you think is the percent chance that Lula is going to win the elections and becomes President again?”, answer options range from 0 to 100. Continuous variable.
- *Legitimacy of Lula’s victory*: the question asks “Do you believe that Lula’s victory in the presidential election was legitimate or not legitimate?”, answer options range from 1= “*Definitely not legitimate*” to 4= “*Definitely legitimate*”. Continuous variable.
- *Election Not Legit*: the question asks “Do you believe that Lula’s victory in the presidential election was legitimate or not legitimate?”, answer options range from 1= “*Definitely not legitimate*” to 4= “*Definitely legitimate*”. Indicator=1 if answer=(1=definitely not legitimate or 2=probably not legitimate).
- *Election Legit*: the question asks “Do you believe that Lula’s victory in the presidential election was legitimate or not legitimate?”, answer options range from 1= “*Definitely not legitimate*” to 4= “*Definitely legitimate*”. Indicator=1 if answer=(3=probably legitimate or 4=definitely legitimate).

• Emotions

- *When thinking about the election feel a lot of - Hope*: the question asks “When you think about this year’s elections, how much do you feel the following emotions? Hope” answer options range from 1= “*Nothing*” to 5= “*Extremely*.” Indicator=1 if answer=(4=a lot or 5=extremely).
- *When thinking about the election feel a lot of - Joy*: the question asks “When you think about this year’s elections, how much do you feel the following emotions? Joy” answer options range from 1= “*Nothing*” to 5= “*Extremely*.” Indicator=1 if answer=(4=a lot or 5=extremely).
- *When thinking about the election feel a lot of - Enthusiasm*: the question asks “When you think about this year’s elections, how much do you feel the following emotions? Enthusiasm” answer options range from 1= “*Nothing*” to 5= “*Extremely*.” Indicator=1 if answer=(4=a lot or 5=extremely).
- *When thinking about the election feel a lot of - Fear*: the question asks “When you think about this year’s elections, how much do you feel the following emotions? Fear” answer options range from 1= “*Nothing*” to 5= “*Extremely*.” Indicator=1 if answer=(4=a lot or 5=extremely).
- *When thinking about the election feel a lot of - Indignation*: the question asks “When you think about this year’s elections, how much do you feel the following emotions? Indignation” answer options range from 1= “*Nothing*” to 5= “*Extremely*.” Indicator=1 if answer=(4=a lot or 5=extremely).
- *When thinking about the election feel a lot of - Sadness*: the question asks “When you think about this year’s elections, how much do you feel the following emotions? Sadness” answer options range from 1= “*Nothing*” to 5= “*Extremely*.” Indicator=1 if answer=(4=a lot or 5=extremely).
- *When thinking about the election feel a lot of - Pride*: the question asks “When you think about this year’s elections, how much do you feel the following emotions? Pride” answer options range from 1= “*Nothing*” to 5= “*Extremely*.” Indicator=1 if answer=(4=a lot or 5=extremely).
- *Negative Emotional Shock*: average of the differences between the post-election and pre-election answers to the previous questions on *Hope*, *Joy*, *Enthusiasm* (inputted positively), and *Fear*, *Indignation*, *Sadness* (inputted negatively). Continuous variable ranging between -4 and 4.
- *Average Positive Emotions*: average of the indicator variables *When thinking about the election feel a lot of - Hope*, *When thinking about the election feel a lot of - Joy*, and *When thinking about the election feel a lot of - Enthusiasm*.
- *Average Negative Emotions*: average of the indicator variables *When thinking about the election feel a lot of - Fear*, *When thinking about the election feel a lot of - Indignation*, and *When thinking about the election feel a lot of - Sadness*.

- When thinking about the future of Brazil feel a lot of - *Hope*: the question asks “When thinking about the future of Brazil, how much do you feel the following emotions? Hope” answer options range from 1= “Nothing” to 5= “Extremely.” Indicator=1 if answer=(4=a lot or 5=extremely).
- When thinking about the future of Brazil feel a lot of - *Joy*: the question asks “When thinking about the future of Brazil, how much do you feel the following emotions? Joy” answer options range from 1= “Nothing” to 5= “Extremely.” Indicator=1 if answer=(4=a lot or 5=extremely).
- When thinking about the future of Brazil feel a lot of - *Enthusiasm*: the question asks “When thinking about the future of Brazil, how much do you feel the following emotions? Enthusiasm” answer options range from 1= “Nothing” to 5= “Extremely.” Indicator=1 if answer=(4=a lot or 5=extremely).
- When thinking about the future of Brazil feel a lot of - *Fear*: the question asks “When thinking about the future of Brazil, how much do you feel the following emotions? Fear” answer options range from 1= “Nothing” to 5= “Extremely.” Indicator=1 if answer=(4=a lot or 5=extremely).
- When thinking about the future of Brazil feel a lot of - *Indignation*: the question asks “When thinking about the future of Brazil, how much do you feel the following emotions? Indignation” answer options range from 1= “Nothing” to 5= “Extremely.” Indicator=1 if answer=(4=a lot or 5=extremely).
- When thinking about the future of Brazil feel a lot of - *Sadness*: the question asks “When thinking about the future of Brazil, how much do you feel the following emotions? Sadness” answer options range from 1= “Nothing” to 5= “Extremely.” Indicator=1 if answer=(4=a lot or 5=extremely).
- When thinking about the future of Brazil feel a lot of - *Pride*: the question asks “When thinking about the future of Brazil, how much do you feel the following emotions? Pride” answer options range from 1= “Nothing” to 5= “Extremely.” Indicator=1 if answer=(4=a lot or 5=extremely).

• Affective Polarization

- *Feelings toward Bolsonaro*: the question asks “We would like you to rate how you feel toward different people on a scale of 0 to 100, which we are going to call a “feeling thermometer.” How would you rate your feelings toward Bolsonaro?”, answer options range from 0 to 100. Continuous variable.
- *Feelings toward Lula*: the question asks “We would like you to rate how you feel toward different people on a scale of 0 to 100, which we are going to call a “feeling thermometer.” How would you rate your feelings toward Lula?”, answer options range from 0 to 100. Continuous variable.
- *Feelings toward Bolsonaro supporters*: the question asks “We would like you to rate how you feel toward different people on a scale of 0 to 100, which we are going to call a “feeling thermometer.” How would you rate your feelings toward Bolsonaro supporters?”, answer options range from 0 to 100. Continuous variable.
- *Feelings toward Lula supporters*: the question asks “We would like you to rate how you feel toward different people on a scale of 0 to 100, which we are going to call a “feeling thermometer.” How would you rate your feelings toward Lula supporters?”, answer options range from 0 to 100. Continuous variable.
- *Affective Polarization - Candidate*: continuous variable computed as the difference between *Feelings toward Bolsonaro* and *Feelings toward Lula*. Normalized to range between -1 and 1.
- *Affective Polarization - Supporter*: continuous variable computed as the difference between *Feelings toward Bolsonaro supporters* and *Feelings toward Lula supporters*. Normalized to range between -1 and 1.
- *Polarization*: continuous variable computed as the difference between *Feelings toward Bolsonaro* and *Feelings toward Lula*. Normalized to range between -1 and 1.

• Perceptions

- *Perceived share of Lula supporters in their city*: the question asks “Out of 10 people living in your city, how many do you think are Lula supporters?”, answer options range from 0 to 100. Continuous variable normalized to range between 0 and 1.

- *Perceived share of Bolsonaro supporters in their city*: the question asks “Out of 10 people living in your city, how many do you think are Bolsonaro supporters?”, answer options range from 0 to 100. Continuous variable normalized to range between 0 and 1.
- *Assessment of Bolsonaro’s Government and Government Performance - Bolsonaro*: the question asks “How would you rate, on a scale from 0 to 10, Bolsonaro’s government?”, answer options range from 0 to 10. Continuous variable.
- *Assessment of Lula’s Government so far and Government Performance - Lula so far*: the question asks “How would you rate, on a scale from 0 to 10, Lula’s government so far?”, answer options range from 0 to 10. Continuous variable.
- *Expectation about Lula’s Government and Government Performance - Lula in future*: the question asks “How do you think Lula’s government is going to be in the next three years on a scale from 0 to 10?”, answer options range from 0 to 10. Continuous variable.

- **Trust**

- *Trust federal Govt to do what is right*: the question asks “How much of the time do you think you can trust the Federal Government to do what is right?”, answer options range from 0 to 10. Continuous variable.
- *Most politicians can be trusted*: the question asks “Generally speaking, would you say that most politicians can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with them?”, answer options range from 0 to 10. Continuous variable.
- *Most people can be trusted*: the question asks “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with them?”, answer options range from 0 to 10. Continuous variable.
- *Most people would try to be fair*: the question asks “Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance or would they try to be fair?”, answer options range from 0 to 10. Continuous variable.

- **Brazil’s Problems**

- *Access to Education*: the question asks “In your opinion, which are the biggest problems Brazil is facing today? Select up to three options.” Indicator=1 if answer=access to education.
- *Access to Health-care*: the question asks “In your opinion, which are the biggest problems Brazil is facing today? Select up to three options.” Indicator=1 if answer=access to health-care.
- *Unemployment*: the question asks “In your opinion, which are the biggest problems Brazil is facing today? Select up to three options.” Indicator=1 if answer=unemployment.
- *Low Wages*: the question asks “In your opinion, which are the biggest problems Brazil is facing today? Select up to three options.” Indicator=1 if answer=low wages.
- *High Taxes*: the question asks “In your opinion, which are the biggest problems Brazil is facing today? Select up to three options.” Indicator=1 if answer=high taxes.
- *Inflation*: the question asks “In your opinion, which are the biggest problems Brazil is facing today? Select up to three options.” Indicator=1 if answer=inflation.
- *Low Econ Growth*: the question asks “In your opinion, which are the biggest problems Brazil is facing today? Select up to three options.” Indicator=1 if answer=low economic growth.
- *Inequality*: the question asks “In your opinion, which are the biggest problems Brazil is facing today? Select up to three options.” Indicator=1 if answer=inequality.
- *Poverty*: the question asks “In your opinion, which are the biggest problems Brazil is facing today? Select up to three options.” Indicator=1 if answer=poverty.

- *Weakened Democracy*: the question asks “In your opinion, which are the biggest problems Brazil is facing today? Select up to three options.” Indicator=1 if answer=weakening of the democratic institutions.
- *Corruption*: the question asks “In your opinion, which are the biggest problems Brazil is facing today? Select up to three options.” Indicator=1 if answer=corruption.
- *Criminality*: the question asks “In your opinion, which are the biggest problems Brazil is facing today? Select up to three options.” Indicator=1 if answer=criminality.
- *Lack of Moral Values*: the question asks “In your opinion, which are the biggest problems Brazil is facing today? Select up to three options.” Indicator=1 if answer=lack of moral values.
- *Intolerance to Minorities*: the question asks “In your opinion, which are the biggest problems Brazil is facing today? Select up to three options.” Indicator=1 if answer=intolerance to minorities.
- *Environmental Degradation*: the question asks “In your opinion, which are the biggest problems Brazil is facing today? Select up to three options.” Indicator=1 if answer=environmental degradation.

A-1.2 Indices

- **PCA Indices**

- **Democratic Discontent**: principal component analysis index increasing in *Agreement violence acceptable to express disagreement, Belief good political system for Brazil - Army Rule*, and decreasing in *Belief good political system for Brazil - Democracy*.
- **Socioeconomic Expectations**: principal component analysis index increasing in *Inflation will decrease in future, Economy will ameliorate in future, Finding job easy in future, Inequality will decrease in future, Criminality will decrease in future, and Political Division will decrease in future*.
- **Violent Protests**: principal component analysis index increasing in *Likely to attend - Violent Protests* and *Likely to attend - Confrontations with Authorities*.
- **Violence Acceptance**: principal component analysis index increasing in *Approve January 8 Protests* and *Agreement violence acceptable to express disagreement*.
- **Support Military**: principal component analysis index increasing in *Belief good political system for Brazil - Army Rule* and *In favor of military intervention*.
- **Support Democracy**: principal component analysis index increasing in *Belief good political system for Brazil - Democracy* and *Agreement democracy best form of government*.

A-2 Model Appendix

A-2.1 Model Extension

In this section, I will extend my model to include the perceived probability of success of violence in overthrowing the government. In this new setting, I assume that can choose between three actions: never violence ($v = 0$), always violence ($v = 1$), contingent violence ($v = v^c$). This last action mean that you are not violent before the election, and you decide to become violent after the election only if you candidate loses. I will assume that if you are always violent, that is also before the election result, your perceived probability of success in overthrowing the government is going to be higher than if you choose contingent violence. The intuition is that by having violent attitudes already before the result, you contributed to set up the stage to a more successful overthrowing of the government. For simplicity, I will assume that the perceived probability of success if you chose $v = 1$ is going to be equal to 1. If you instead chose $v = v^c$, it is going to be $0 < p^i < 1$.

The conditional utilities of the three actions for Bolsonaro supporters are going to be the following:

$$U^b(v = 0|B) = c_B^b$$

$$U^b(v = 0|L) = c_L^b$$

$$U^b(v = 1|B) = c_B^b - \delta$$

$$U^b(v = 1|L) = c_B^b - \delta$$

$$U^b(v = v^c|B) = c_B^b$$

$$U^b(v = v^c|L) = p^b c_B^b + (1 - p^b) c_L^b - \delta$$

By combining the conditional utilities, I get that the three expected utilities are:

$$U^b(v = 0) = P^b(B)c_B^b + (1 - P^b(B))c_L^b$$

$$U^b(v = 1) = c_B^b - \delta$$

$$U^b(v = v^c) = P^b(B)c_B^b + (1 - P^b(B))[p^b c_B^b + (1 - p^b) c_L^b - \delta]$$

I'm interesting in understanding which supporters are more likely to chose the contingent violence. That is, who are those that are not violent before the election but then decide to switch once Bolsonaro lost. An individual is going to choose contingent violence, if and only if the expected utility of this choice is greater than the one they would get from choosing $v = 0$ or $v = 1$. That is:

$$U^b(v = v^c) > U^b(v = 0) \Leftrightarrow p^b(c_B^b - c_L^b) > \delta$$

$$U^b(v = v^c) > U^b(v = 1) \Leftrightarrow \delta > \frac{1 - p^b}{P^b(B)}[(c_B^b - c_L^b) + \Delta\theta^b]$$

By combing these two conditions, I find that a Bolsonaro supporter is going to choose the contingent violence if and only if the following condition holds.

$$p^b(c_B^b - c_L^b) > \delta > \frac{1 - p^b}{P^b(B)}[(c_B^b - c_L^b) + \Delta\theta^b]$$


It can be noticed that this condition is very similar to the one from the main model with the only difference of the factor p^b on the left-hand side on the inequality and of $\frac{1 - p^b}{P^b(B)}$ on the right-hand side. As I will show

in the next section, my data shows that the perceived probability of success is increasing in the strength of support. This means that the more extreme you are, the more likely you are to satisfy both the left-hand side condition (p^b increasing in strength of support), and the right-hand side ($\frac{1-p^b}{P^b(B)}$ decreasing in strength of support). Therefore, this extension strengthen the prediction of my model.

A-2.2 Measuring Probability of Success

In Wave 6 of the survey, respondents were asked how much they believe that protests similar to the one on January 8th would be successful in making Lula step down. While being specific on the kind of “violence” considered as well as the outcome (for the sake of comparability across respondents), I can use the answer provided to this question as a measure of the perceived probability of success in overthrowing the government in the case they choose to be violent. In Figure A-1 we can see how this probability is increasing in the strength of support among Bolsonaro supporters. While respondents would provide different probabilities of success to different kind of violent actions, I am confident that I would still find a positive relationship with the strength of support.

FIGURE A-1: PROBABILITY OF PROTESTS BEING SUCCESSFUL IN MAKING LULA STEP DOWN



Notes: The figure shows the dispersion of respondents by strength of support and perceived probability of Lula winning the election. Variables defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. Respondents from Wave 6, control group only. Red dots represent Lula supporters, blue dots Bolsonaro supporters. The red line is a linear fit of Lula supporters, the blue line is a linear fit of Bolsonaro supporters.

A-3 Assessment of Government Performance and Feeling Thermometer


In Wave 6, respondents were asked to rate on a scale from 0 to 10 Bolsonaro's government, Lula's government so far, and their expectations of Lula's government in the next three years. These questions allow me to test how correlated perceptions of the two candidates' competences, captured by the assessments of their governments, are with the feelings that respondents have toward them.

In Figure A-2, I start by showing how these assessments relate to respondents' support strength. Besides the clear positive correlation between these two variables, it is worth noticing how similar these patterns are the ones observed in Panels A and B of Figure 3, suggesting that these two variables are highly related.

In Figure A-3, I instead directly plot the relationship between the feelings toward the two candidates and the assessment of their government performances. As it can be seen, I found a clear positive relationship between these two variables, both for Bolsonaro and Lula supporters.

Taken all together, this evidence supports my choice of using the feelings toward the two candidates as a proxy for their perceived competence.


FIGURE A-2: ASSESSMENT OF GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE BY STRENGTH OF SUPPORT




Notes: The figures show the dispersion of respondents by strength of support and their assessments of government performances. Variables defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. Respondents from Wave 6, control group only. Red dots represent Lula supporters, blue dots Bolsonaro supporters. The red line is a linear fit of Lula supporters, the blue line is a linear fit of Bolsonaro supporters.

FIGURE A-3: RELATION BETWEEN FEELINGS TOWARD CANDIDATES AND ASSESSMENT OF THEIR GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCES


(A) FEELINGS TOWARD BOLSONARO AND ASSESSMENT OF HIS GOVERNMENT



(B) FEELINGS TOWARD LULA AND ASSESSMENT OF HIS GOVERNMENT SO FAR



(C) FEELINGS TOWARD LULA AND EXPECTATIONS ABOUT HIS GOVERNMENT



Notes: The figures show the dispersion of respondents by feelings toward the two candidates and their assessments of government performances. Variables defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. Respondents from Wave 6, control group only. Red dots represent Lula supporters, blue dots Bolsonaro supporters. The red line is a linear fit of Lula supporters, the blue line is a linear fit of Bolsonaro supporters.

A-4 Effects on Lula Supporters

In this section, I replicate Tables 2 and 3 but looking at Lula supporters only. Among Lula voters, 15.58% are “reluctant supporters,” 27.14% are “moderate” supporters, 16.92% are “strong” supporters, and 40.37% are extreme supporters. Among the Lula supporters in my sample, the expectation shock ranges between 3 and -1.29, with a median value of 0.29.

TABLE A-1: ELECTION EFFECTS ON DEMOCRATIC DISCONTENT - LULA SUPPORTERS

	Agree violence acceptable to express disagreement (1)	Agree democracy best form of government (2)	Believe good political system for Brazil:			If Lula wins:		
			Democracy (3)	Strong Leader (4)	Army Rule (5)	Mass Protests (6)	Violent Riots (7)	Military Coup (8)
Panel A - Lula Voters by Support Strength								
Pre-election extreme supporters mean	0.05	0.04	0.01	0.08	0.10	-0.13	-0.14	0.12
Pre-election strong supporters mean	0.10	0.10	0.07	-0.01	-0.02	0.18	0.09	-0.08
Pre-election moderate supporters mean	-0.06	-0.15	-0.06	-0.02	-0.04	-0.02	-0.03	-0.05
Pre-election reluctant supporters mean	-0.13	0.05	0.01	-0.16	-0.18	0.18	0.32	-0.12
Observations	595	592	590	590	591	591	590	583
Panel B - All Lula Voters								
Post-Election × Neg Exp Shock	0.02 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.04)	0.05 (0.05)
Post-Election	-0.15*** (0.05)	0.12** (0.05)	0.13*** (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.04)	0.20*** (0.06)	0.13*** (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)
Panel C - Post-Election Effect on:								
Extreme Lula Supporter × Neg Exp Shock	0.06 (0.07)	0.04 (0.06)	0.00 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.07)	0.10 (0.07)	0.08 (0.09)	0.09 (0.07)	0.02 (0.06)
Strong Lula Supporter × Neg Exp Shock	0.02 (0.14)	0.03 (0.07)	0.05 (0.09)	-0.18 (0.13)	-0.16* (0.09)	0.07 (0.11)	-0.00 (0.10)	0.01 (0.15)
Moderate Lula Supporter × Neg Exp Shock	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.13 (0.09)	-0.14* (0.08)	-0.03 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)	0.05 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.09)	0.11 (0.11)
Reluctant Lula Supporter × Neg Exp Shock	0.08 (0.10)	-0.17 (0.13)	-0.15* (0.08)	0.01 (0.14)	0.03 (0.07)	0.08 (0.09)	0.20* (0.10)	0.04 (0.09)
Extreme Lula Supporter	-0.16* (0.08)	0.10 (0.07)	0.12 (0.09)	0.06 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.07)	0.29*** (0.09)	0.25*** (0.08)	-0.13 (0.08)
Strong Lula Supporter	-0.12 (0.19)	0.27*** (0.09)	0.25** (0.12)	-0.29* (0.15)	-0.41*** (0.14)	0.08 (0.13)	0.04 (0.13)	0.09 (0.14)
Moderate Lula Supporter	-0.26*** (0.09)	0.16* (0.09)	0.18* (0.09)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.07)	0.23** (0.11)	0.17* (0.09)	-0.09 (0.10)
Reluctant Lula Supporter	0.03 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.11)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.10)	0.06 (0.07)	0.03 (0.10)	-0.11 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.09)
Observations	1189	1186	1182	1182	1185	1185	1180	1177

Notes: All dependent variables are continuous variables (Z-scores) defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. First four rows report the mean of the dependent variables for extreme, strong, moderate, and reluctant Lula supporters before the election result (Wave 3). The following rows report the coefficients of a fixed-effects regression with cluster-robust standard errors within individual. This specification includes all triple interactions between “Post-Election,” the Lula supporter groups (“Extreme,” “Strong,” “Moderate,” “Reluctant supporter”), and the continuous negative expectation shock (“Neg Exp Shock”), and all double interactions between “Post-Election” and the Lula supporter groups. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-2: ELECTION EFFECTS ON POLARIZATION, PERCEPTIONS, AND EMOTIONS - LULA SUPPORTERS

	Affective Polarization		Perceived share of		When thinking about the election feel a lot of							
	Candidate	Supporter	Lula supporters in their city	Bolsonaro supporters in their city	Hope	Joy	Enthusiasm	Fear	Indignation	Sadness	Pride	
			(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A - Lula Voters by Support Strength												
Pre-election extreme supporters mean	0.82	0.68	0.77	0.40	0.82	0.68	0.68	0.35	0.44	0.25	0.56	
Pre-election strong supporters mean	0.66	0.52	0.68	0.48	0.70	0.38	0.38	0.41	0.51	0.32	0.36	
Pre-election moderate supporters mean	0.46	0.32	0.64	0.48	0.48	0.27	0.33	0.45	0.48	0.28	0.23	
Pre-election reluctant supporters mean	0.21	0.19	0.59	0.48	0.27	0.12	0.13	0.56	0.58	0.44	0.08	
Observations	589	588	595	594	595	595	595	595	595	595	595	
Panel B - Post-Election Effect on:												
Extreme Lula Supporter	-0.04*** (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04*** (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.23*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)	-0.21*** (0.03)	-0.34*** (0.04)	-0.20*** (0.03)	0.25*** (0.03)	
Strong Lula Supporter	0.01 (0.03)	-0.04* (0.03)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.17*** (0.05)	0.43*** (0.06)	0.36*** (0.06)	-0.27*** (0.05)	-0.42*** (0.06)	-0.28*** (0.05)	0.40*** (0.05)	
Moderate Lula Supporter	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.23*** (0.04)	0.36*** (0.04)	0.23*** (0.04)	-0.25*** (0.04)	-0.38*** (0.04)	-0.22*** (0.04)	0.26*** (0.04)	
Reluctant Lula Supporter	0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.12*** (0.05)	0.17*** (0.05)	0.17*** (0.05)	-0.30*** (0.06)	-0.45*** (0.06)	-0.33*** (0.06)	0.13*** (0.04)	
Observations	1173	1177	1190	1187	1188	1190	1185	1189	1189	1185	1188	

Notes: The dependent variables in columns 1-4 are continuous variables defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. The dependent variables in columns 5-11 are indicator variables defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. First four rows report the mean of the dependent variables for extreme, moderate, and reluctant Lula supporters before the election result (Wave 3). The following rows report the coefficients of a fixed-effects regression with cluster-robust standard errors within individual. This specification includes all interactions between “Post-Election,” and the Lula supporter groups (“Extreme,” “Strong,” “Moderate,” “Reluctant supporter”). Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A-5 Robustness Checks

A-5.1 Alternative Sample Split

In this section, I replicate Tables 2 and 3 using a simpler sample split. Instead of dividing supporters into four groups, I differentiate between those above or below the support strength median. For this specification, I included only respondents who reported to have voted in the election.

In Table A-3, I use the following specification:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \sum_{g \in G} \beta_g Post_t \times Group_{g,i} \times NegExpShock_i + \sum_{g \in G} \delta_g Post_t \times Group_{g,i} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

while in Table A-4, I use the following one:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \sum_{g \in G} \delta_g Post_t \times Group_{g,i} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where $G = \{above, below\}$, α_i are the individual fixed effects, $Post_t$ is a dummy taking the value of 1 in the after-election period, $Group_{g,i}$ are dummies taking the value of 1 for every supporter group $g \in G$, and $NegExpShock_i$ is the continuous variable measuring the expectation shock experienced by supporter i .

TABLE A-3: ELECTION EFFECTS ON DEMOCRATIC DISCONTENT - MEDIAN SPLIT

	Agreement violence acceptable to express disagreement (1)	Agreement democracy best form of government (2)	Belief good political system for Brazil: Democracy (3) Strong Leader (4) Army Rule (5)			After Lula's victory: Mass Protests (6) Violent Riots (7) Military Coup (8)		
Panel A - Bolsonaro Voters by Support Strength								
Pre-election above median supporters mean	0.09	-0.02	0.02	0.24	0.32	0.18	0.17	0.17
Pre-election below median supporters mean	-0.09	0.02	-0.02	-0.25	-0.34	-0.19	-0.18	-0.17
Observations	495	496	494	492	494	494	492	489
Panel B - Post-Election Effect on:								
Above Median Bolsonaro Supporter \times Neg Exp Shock	0.18*** (0.07)	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.12* (0.07)	-0.03 (0.07)	0.17*** (0.06)	0.05 (0.08)	0.11 (0.08)	0.26*** (0.07)
Below Median Bolsonaro Supporter \times Neg Exp Shock	0.03 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.09)	0.03 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.02 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.08)	0.05 (0.07)
Above Median Bolsonaro Supporter	-0.05 (0.13)	0.09 (0.12)	0.11 (0.12)	-0.07 (0.12)	-0.08 (0.11)	0.06 (0.15)	-0.04 (0.14)	-0.29** (0.12)
Below Median Bolsonaro Supporter	0.08 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.11)	-0.18** (0.09)	0.08 (0.06)	0.17** (0.08)	0.25*** (0.09)	0.09 (0.08)
Observations	990	988	985	988	985	990	988	983

Notes: All dependent variables are continuous variables (Z-scores) defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. Panel A reports the mean of the dependent variables for Bolsonaro supporters, whose support strength is above or below the median, before the election result (Wave 3). Panel B reports the coefficients of a fixed-effects regression with cluster-robust standard errors within individual. This specification includes all triple interactions between "Post-Election," the Bolsonaro supporter groups ("Above Median," "Below Median") and the continuous negative expectation shock ("Neg Exp Shock"), and all double interactions between "Post-Election" and the Bolsonaro supporter groups. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-4: ELECTION EFFECTS ON DEMOCRATIC DISCONTENT - MEDIAN SPLIT

	Affective Polarization		Perceived share of		When thinking about the election feel a lot of						
	Candidate	Supporter	Lula supporters in their city	Bolsonaro supporters in their city	Hope	Joy	Enthusiasm	Fear	Indignation	Sadness	Pride
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Panel A - Bolsonaro Voters by Support Strength											
Pre-election above median supporters mean	0.80	0.66	0.41	0.79	0.82	0.65	0.69	0.40	0.44	0.24	0.61
Pre-election below median supporters mean	0.42	0.29	0.46	0.69	0.51	0.30	0.27	0.44	0.45	0.30	0.27
Observations	481	483	492	495	496	496	496	496	496	496	496
Panel B - Post-Election Effect on:											
Above Median Bolsonaro Supporter	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.61*** (0.03)	-0.56*** (0.03)	-0.60*** (0.03)	0.27*** (0.04)	0.41*** (0.04)	0.52*** (0.04)	-0.52*** (0.03)
Below Median Bolsonaro Supporter	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.05*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.38*** (0.03)	-0.24*** (0.03)	-0.21*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.19*** (0.04)	0.20*** (0.04)	-0.19*** (0.03)
Observations	963	968	987	989	990	989	985	990	988	988	990

Notes: The dependent variables in columns 1-4 are continuous variables defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. The dependent variables in columns 5-11 are indicator variables defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. Panel A reports the mean of the dependent variables for Bolsonaro supporters, whose support strength is above or below the median, before the election result (Wave 3). Panel B reports the coefficients of a fixed-effects regression with cluster-robust standard errors within individual. This specification includes all interactions between “Post-Election,” and the Bolsonaro supporter groups (“Above Median,” “Below Median”). Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A-5.2 Discrete Expectation Shock

In this section, I replicate Table 2 using a discrete version of the expectation shock. Respondents are divided between those who experienced a negative expectation shock and those who didn't. Using the usual expectation shock variable (which ranges between 4 and -4), I will consider as a large negative expectation shock a value below -1, the median value among Bolsonaro supporters.

The specification is going to be the following:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \sum_{g \in G} \beta_g Post_t \times Group_{g,i} \times LargeNegExpShock_i + \sum_{g \in G} \beta_g Post_t \times Group_{g,i} \times SmallNegExpShock_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where $G = \{e, s, m, r\}$, α_i are the individual fixed effects, $Post_t$ is a dummy taking the value of 1 in the after-election period, $Group_{g,i}$ are dummies taking the value of 1 for every supporter group $g \in G$, $LargeNegExpShock_i$ is a dummy taking the value of 1 if supporter i 's expectation shock was below -1, and $SmallNegExpShock_i$ is a dummy taking the value of 1 if supporter i 's expectation shock was greater or equal than -1.

TABLE A-5: ELECTION EFFECTS ON DEMOCRATIC DISCONTENT - DISCRETE EXPECTATION SHOCK

	Agree violence acceptable to express disagreement (1)	Agree democracy best form of government (2)	Believe good political system for Brazil: Democracy (3) Strong Leader (4) Army Rule (5)			If Lula wins: Mass Protests (6) Violent Riots (7) Military Coup (8)		
Panel A - Bolsonaro Voters by Support Strength								
Pre-election extreme supporters mean	0.23	0.79	0.88	0.74	0.70	0.82	0.70	0.44
Pre-election strong supporters mean	0.16	0.84	0.94	0.60	0.50	0.80	0.61	0.31
Pre-election moderate supporters mean	0.20	0.74	0.89	0.53	0.44	0.80	0.62	0.33
Pre-election reluctant supporters mean	0.06	0.74	0.93	0.51	0.18	0.76	0.65	0.28
Observations	550	551	549	547	549	549	547	544
Panel B - Post-Election Effect on:								
Extreme Bolsonaro Supporter \times Large Neg Exp Shock	0.13*** (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.11** (0.04)	0.08** (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)	0.14*** (0.04)
Extreme Bolsonaro Supporter \times Small Neg Exp Shock	-0.11 (0.07)	0.02 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.03 (0.07)	0.07 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.08)
Strong Bolsonaro Supporter \times Large Neg Exp Shock	0.15** (0.07)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.08 (0.07)	0.08 (0.05)	0.10 (0.06)	0.08 (0.07)
Strong Bolsonaro Supporter \times Small Neg Exp Shock	0.04 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.19*** (0.07)	0.06 (0.07)	0.07 (0.07)	0.17* (0.09)	0.11* (0.06)
Moderate Bolsonaro Supporter \times Large Neg Exp Shock	0.00 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.07)	0.04 (0.06)	0.02 (0.05)	0.11 (0.07)	0.07 (0.06)
Moderate Bolsonaro Supporter \times Small Neg Exp Shock	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	0.02 (0.06)	0.02 (0.05)
Reluctant Bolsonaro Supporter \times Large Neg Exp Shock	0.00 (.)	0.00 (0.15)	0.00 (.)	-0.08 (0.13)	-0.08 (0.13)	0.08 (0.07)	0.08 (0.13)	0.15 (0.15)
Reluctant Bolsonaro Supporter \times Small Neg Exp Shock	0.00 (0.04)	0.07 (0.06)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.07)	0.07 (0.06)	0.04 (0.07)	0.13* (0.07)	0.05 (0.07)
Observations	1100	1098	1093	1098	1095	1100	1097	1092

Notes: All dependent variables are indicator variables defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. Panel A reports the mean of the dependent variables for extreme, strong, moderate, and reluctant Bolsonaro supporters before the election result (Wave 3). Panel B reports the coefficients of a fixed-effects regression with cluster-robust standard errors within individual. This specification includes all triple interactions between "Post-Election," the Bolsonaro supporter groups ("Extreme," "Strong," "Moderate," "Reluctant supporter") and the negative expectation shock ("Large Neg Exp Shock," "Small Neg Exp Shock"). Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A-5.3 Election Effects by Support Strength

In this section, I replicate Table 2 focusing only on the heterogeneous effects of the election result on the various groups of supporters:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \sum_{g \in G} \delta_g Post_t \times Group_{g,i} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where $G = \{e, s, m, r\}$, α_i are the individual fixed effects, $Post_t$ is a dummy taking the value of 1 in the after-election period, and $Group_{g,i}$ are dummies taking the value of 1 for every supporter group $g \in G$.

TABLE A-6: ELECTION EFFECTS ON DEMOCRATIC DISCONTENT BY SUPPORT STRENGTH

	Agreement violence acceptable to express disagreement (1)	Agreement democracy best form of government (2)	Belief good political system for Brazil: Democracy (3) Strong Leader (4) Army Rule (5)			After Lula's victory: Mass Protests (6) Violent Riots (7) Military Coup (8)		
Panel A - Bolsonaro Voters by Support Strength								
Pre-election extreme Bolsonaro supporters mean	0.10	0.03	0.02	0.29	0.40	0.20	0.21	0.19
Pre-election strong Bolsonaro supporters mean	-0.01	0.02	0.05	-0.04	-0.05	-0.05	-0.16	-0.11
Pre-election moderate Bolsonaro supporters mean	0.04	-0.06	-0.09	-0.23	-0.18	-0.19	-0.16	-0.11
Pre-election reluctant Bolsonaro supporters mean	-0.38	0.00	0.04	-0.35	-0.82	-0.13	-0.05	-0.17
Observations	545	546	544	542	544	544	542	539
Panel B - Post-Election Effect on:								
Extreme Bolsonaro Supporter	0.22*** (0.07)	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.07)	0.17** (0.07)	0.17** (0.08)	0.13 (0.08)	0.14* (0.08)
Strong Bolsonaro Supporter	0.23** (0.10)	0.05 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.31*** (0.09)	0.10 (0.08)	0.19 (0.12)	0.20** (0.10)	0.04 (0.08)
Moderate Bolsonaro Supporter	0.05 (0.09)	-0.09 (0.08)	0.01 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.08)	0.01 (0.06)	0.13 (0.08)	0.19** (0.09)	0.13* (0.07)
Reluctant Bolsonaro Supporter	0.01 (0.09)	0.10 (0.12)	0.10 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.10)	0.10 (0.08)	0.01 (0.11)	0.18 (0.11)	0.02 (0.10)
Observations	1090	1088	1084	1088	1085	1090	1087	1082

Notes: All dependent variables are continuous variables (Z-scores) defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. Panel A reports the mean of the dependent variables for extreme, strong, moderate, and reluctant Bolsonaro supporters before the election result (Wave 3). Panel B reports the coefficients of a fixed-effects regression with cluster-robust standard errors within individual. This specification includes all interactions between “Post-Election,” and the Bolsonaro supporter groups (“Extreme,” “Strong,” “Moderate,” “Reluctant supporter”). Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A-5.4 Alternative Mechanisms

In this section, I replicate Table 2 by interacting the election effect with probability of victory (Table A-7), affective polarization (Table A-8), and the legitimacy of the election (Table A-9), rather than with the expectation shock.

The three used specifications are the following:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \sum_{g \in G} \beta_g Post_t \times Group_{g,i} \times ProbVictory_i + \sum_{g \in G} \delta_g Post_t \times Group_{g,i} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \sum_{g \in G} \beta_g Post_t \times Group_{g,i} \times Polarization_i + \sum_{g \in G} \delta_g Post_t \times Group_{g,i} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \sum_{g \in G} \beta_g Post_t \times Group_{g,i} \times ElectionNotLegit_i + \sum_{g \in G} \beta_g Post_t \times Group_{g,i} \times ElectionLegit_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where $G = \{e, s, m, n\}$, α_i are the individual fixed effects, $Post_t$ is a dummy taking the value of 1 in the after-election period, $Group_{g,i}$ are dummies taking the value of 1 for every supporter group $g \in G$, $ProbVictory_i$ is the continuous variable measuring the perceived probability of supporter i that Bolsonaro was going to win, $Polarization_i$ is the continuous variable measuring the affective polarization of supporter i , $ElectionNotLegit_i$ is a dummy taking the value of 1 if supporter i believes that Lula's victory was not legitimate, and $ElectionLegit_i$ is a dummy taking the value of 1 if supporter i believes that Lula's victory was legitimate.

TABLE A-7: ELECTION EFFECTS ON DEMOCRATIC DISCONTENT - PROBABILITY OF VICTORY

	Agree violence acceptable to express disagreement (1)	Agree democracy best form of government (2)	Believe good political system for Brazil:			If Lula wins:		
			Democracy (3)	Strong Leader (4)	Army Rule (5)	Mass Protests (6)	Violent Riots (7)	Military Coup (8)
Post-Election Effect on:								
Extreme Bolsonaro Supporter × Probability of Victory	-0.02 (0.48)	0.42 (0.46)	-0.09 (0.49)	0.10 (0.47)	-0.33 (0.50)	-0.67 (0.55)	-0.36 (0.52)	0.32 (0.61)
Strong Bolsonaro Supporter × Probability of Victory	-0.07 (0.58)	-0.08 (0.37)	0.16 (0.51)	0.06 (0.42)	-0.10 (0.37)	-1.17 (0.72)	-0.80 (0.63)	1.14** (0.48)
Moderate Bolsonaro Supporter × Probability of Victory	-0.75* (0.45)	-0.01 (0.43)	-0.15 (0.34)	0.16 (0.39)	-0.69** (0.31)	-0.33 (0.50)	-0.28 (0.52)	-0.46 (0.38)
Reluctant Bolsonaro Supporter × Probability of Victory	-0.59* (0.36)	0.26 (0.85)	0.20 (0.34)	-0.17 (0.45)	-0.48 (0.30)	-0.79 (0.60)	-1.73*** (0.61)	-0.47 (0.40)
Extreme Bolsonaro Supporter	0.24 (0.44)	-0.48 (0.40)	-0.00 (0.44)	-0.18 (0.42)	0.45 (0.45)	0.75 (0.50)	0.45 (0.47)	-0.13 (0.55)
Strong Bolsonaro Supporter	0.30 (0.46)	0.11 (0.26)	-0.18 (0.41)	-0.34 (0.32)	0.16 (0.29)	1.10* (0.58)	0.82 (0.52)	-0.86** (0.38)
Moderate Bolsonaro Supporter	0.57* (0.31)	-0.08 (0.30)	0.12 (0.26)	-0.22 (0.25)	0.50** (0.23)	0.37 (0.37)	0.38 (0.39)	0.44* (0.26)
Reluctant Bolsonaro Supporter	0.36 (0.25)	-0.05 (0.55)	-0.02 (0.19)	0.04 (0.29)	0.37* (0.21)	0.47 (0.31)	1.19*** (0.34)	0.30 (0.23)
Observations	1100	1098	1093	1098	1095	1100	1097	1092

Notes: All dependent variables are continuous variables (Z-scores) defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. The table reports the coefficients of a fixed-effects regression with cluster-robust standard errors within individual. This specification includes all triple interactions between "Post-Election," the Bolsonaro supporter groups ("Extreme," "Strong," "Moderate," "Reluctant supporter") and the perceived probability of Bolsonaro winning ("Probability of Victory"), and all double interactions between "Post-Election" and the Bolsonaro supporter groups. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-8: ELECTION EFFECTS ON DEMOCRATIC DISCONTENT - AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION

	Agree violence acceptable to express disagreement (1)	Agree democracy best form of government (2)	Believe good political system for Brazil:			If Lula wins:		
	Democracy (3)	Strong Leader (4)	Army Rule (5)	Mass Protests (6)	Violent Riots (7)	Military Coup (8)		
Post-Election Effect on:								
Extreme Bolsonaro Supporter × Polarization	-0.50** (0.24)	0.21 (0.28)	-0.20 (0.22)	0.13 (0.21)	-0.00 (0.21)	0.17 (0.26)	0.36 (0.25)	-0.11 (0.45)
Strong Bolsonaro Supporter × Polarization	-0.15 (0.35)	-0.03 (0.37)	0.12 (0.31)	-0.03 (0.30)	-0.24 (0.25)	0.52 (0.43)	0.58 (0.39)	0.02 (0.31)
Moderate Bolsonaro Supporter × Polarization	0.17 (0.27)	-0.09 (0.28)	0.28 (0.26)	-0.09 (0.27)	0.36* (0.20)	0.26 (0.22)	-0.11 (0.27)	0.01 (0.26)
Reluctant Bolsonaro Supporter × Polarization	0.38 (0.34)	0.78 (0.64)	-0.12 (0.34)	0.30 (0.30)	0.40* (0.22)	0.28 (0.30)	0.61* (0.36)	-0.32 (0.55)
Extreme Bolsonaro Supporter	-0.16 (0.20)	0.07 (0.25)	-0.26 (0.19)	0.00 (0.18)	0.15 (0.18)	0.28 (0.23)	0.41* (0.22)	0.09 (0.39)
Strong Bolsonaro Supporter	0.12 (0.24)	0.01 (0.21)	-0.01 (0.21)	-0.33 (0.21)	-0.07 (0.17)	0.53* (0.29)	0.60** (0.27)	0.07 (0.20)
Moderate Bolsonaro Supporter	0.07 (0.12)	-0.12 (0.12)	0.10 (0.14)	-0.16 (0.12)	0.14* (0.08)	0.25*** (0.10)	0.14 (0.13)	0.12 (0.12)
Reluctant Bolsonaro Supporter	0.04 (0.11)	0.20 (0.17)	0.06 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.11)	0.13* (0.08)	0.06 (0.13)	0.25* (0.13)	-0.05 (0.13)
Observations	1066	1064	1059	1064	1063	1066	1063	1058

Notes: All dependent variables are continuous variables (Z-scores) defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. The table report the coefficients of a fixed-effects regression with cluster-robust standard errors within individual. The specification includes all triple interactions between “Post-Election,” the Bolsonaro supporter groups (“Extreme,” “Strong,” “Moderate,” “Reluctant supporter”) and affective polarization (“Polarization”), and all double interactions between “Post-Election” and the Bolsonaro supporter groups. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.


TABLE A-9: ELECTION EFFECTS ON DEMOCRATIC DISCONTENT - LEGITIMACY OF ELECTION

	Agree violence acceptable to express disagreement (1)	Agree democracy best form of government (2)	Believe good political system for Brazil:			If Lula wins:		
	Democracy (3)	Strong Leader (4)	Army Rule (5)	Mass Protests (6)	Violent Riots (7)	Military Coup (8)		
Post-Election Effect on:								
Extreme Supporter × Election Not Legit	0.08** (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.08** (0.04)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	0.12*** (0.04)
Extreme Supporter × Election Legit	0.00 (0.08)	0.00 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.04 (0.09)	0.04 (0.09)	0.15** (0.07)	0.15** (0.07)	0.00 (0.09)
Strong Supporter × Election Not Legit	0.12** (0.06)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.09 (0.06)	0.09 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	0.12* (0.06)	0.15*** (0.06)
Strong Supporter × Election Legit	0.06 (0.08)	0.04 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.15** (0.07)	0.04 (0.09)	0.13** (0.07)	0.15* (0.09)	0.02 (0.08)
Moderate Supporter × Election Not Legit	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.01 (0.05)	0.09 (0.07)	0.11** (0.05)
Moderate Supporter × Election Legit	0.01 (0.06)	0.05 (0.05)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.00 (0.05)	0.07 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.05)
Reluctant Supporter × Election Not Legit	0.06 (0.05)	-0.17* (0.09)	0.06 (0.06)	-0.22* (0.13)	-0.06 (0.12)	-0.11 (0.07)	0.00 (0.11)	0.28** (0.13)
Reluctant Supporter × Election Legit	-0.02 (0.04)	0.14** (0.06)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.07)	0.08 (0.06)	0.10 (0.07)	0.16** (0.07)	0.00 (0.07)
Observations	1100	1098	1093	1098	1095	1100	1097	1092

Notes: All dependent variables are indicator variables (Z-scores) defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. The table report the coefficients of a fixed-effects regression with cluster-robust standard errors within individual. The specification includes all triple interactions between “Post-Election,” the Bolsonaro supporter groups (“Extreme,” “Strong,” “Moderate,” “Reluctant supporter”) and legitimacy of the election (“Election Not Legit,” “Election Legit”). Only some of these coefficients are reported due to space constraints. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.


A-6 Additional Figures

FIGURE A-4: PROBABILITY OF LULA WINNING BY STRENGTH OF SUPPORT




Notes: The figure shows the dispersion of respondents by strength of support and perceived probability of Lula winning the election. Variables defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. Respondents from Wave 3. Red dots represent Lula supporters, blue dots Bolsonaro supporters. The red line is a linear fit of Lula supporters, the blue line is a linear fit of Bolsonaro supporters.

FIGURE A-5: EXPECTATION SHOCK - PCA INDEX




Notes: The figure shows the dispersion of respondents by strength of support and expectation shock. Variables defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. Respondents from Wave 3. Red dots represent Lula supporters, blue dots Bolsonaro supporters. The red line is a linear fit of Lula supporters, the blue line is a linear fit of Bolsonaro supporters.

FIGURE A-6: EXPECTATION SHOCKS




Notes: The figures show the dispersion of respondents by strength of support and various expectation shock. Variables defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. Respondents from Wave 3. Red dots represent Lula supporters, blue dots Bolsonaro supporters. The red line is a linear fit of Lula supporters, the blue line is a linear fit of Bolsonaro supporters.

FIGURE A-7: EXPECTATIONS ACROSS TIME



Notes: The figures show, for all six waves, the share of respondents agreeing with the statement at the top of every subfigure for Bolsonaro and Lula supporters with its associated 90% confidence interval. Variable defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. The two vertical red lines represent the two election's rounds.

FIGURE A-8: EMOTIONS ACROSS TIME



Notes: The figures show, for all six waves, the share of respondents feeling a lot of the emotion listed at the top of every subfigure for Bolsonaro and Lula supporters with its associated 90% confidence interval. Variable defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. The two vertical red lines represent the two election's rounds.

A-7 Experiment Appendix

A-7.1 Additional Treatment Effects

In this section, I show the treatment effect on all the additional outcomes not included in my main analysis. All tables use the same specifications from Table 5.

TABLE A-10: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON INDICES COMPONENTS

	Violent Protests		Violence Acceptance		Support Military		Support Democracy	
	Likely to attend:		Approve January 8 Protests	Agree violence acceptable to express disagreement	Believe army rule good political system for Brazil	In favor of military intervention	Agree democracy best form of government	Believe democracy good political system for Brazil
	Violent Protests	Confrontations with Authorities	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Descriptive Statistics (control group only)								
Bolsonaro supporters mean	0.25	0.12	0.16	0.24	0.53	0.42	0.62	0.85
Lula supporters mean	0.15	0.09	0.05	0.12	0.22	0.02	0.74	0.91
Observations	878	878	878	878	878	878	878	878
Treatment Effects - Inflation Decrease								
Treatment	-0.03*	-0.02*	0.01	-0.02	-0.03	0.01	0.04*	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
T × Bolsonaro Supporter	-0.05	-0.03	0.03	-0.02	-0.05	0.02	0.04	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
T × Lula Supporter	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.04	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Observations	1650	1650	1650	1650	1650	1650	1650	1650
R ²	0.093	0.069	0.097	0.065	0.175	0.421	0.068	0.061

Notes: All dependent variables are indicator variables defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. First two rows report the mean of the dependent variables for respondents who saw no treatment video separately for Bolsonaro and Lula supporters. The bottom panel reports the coefficients from two different specifications, whose only difference is given by the interaction of the treatment effects. The first row shows the treatment effect of the inflation decrease video (“Treatment”) relative to the omitted category (no video). The following two rows show the treatment effects of the video interacted with the respondent’s political affiliation (“T × Bolsonaro Supporter” and “T × Lula Supporter”). All regressions include controls for gender, age group, race, income group, employment status, education, religion, whether on welfare, strength of support, and macro-region fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-11: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON ECONOMIC PERCEPTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS

	Government performance			Economy			Finding Job		
	Bolsonaro	Lula so far	Lula in future	ameliorated in 2022	ameliorated in 2023	will ameliorate in future	easy in 2022	easy today	easy in future
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Descriptive Statistics (control group only)									
Bolsonaro supporters mean	7.90	2.59	2.71	0.52	0.09	0.17	0.31	0.07	0.08
Lula supporters mean	2.10	7.23	7.93	0.20	0.67	0.78	0.07	0.22	0.42
Observations	858	858	863	878	878	878	878	878	878
Treatment Effects - Inflation Decrease									
Treatment	-0.15 (0.11)	0.33*** (0.10)	0.25** (0.10)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
T × Bolsonaro Supporter	-0.19 (0.13)	0.12 (0.17)	0.11 (0.18)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
T × Lula Supporter	-0.11 (0.17)	0.52*** (0.11)	0.38*** (0.10)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.08*** (0.03)	0.05** (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.06** (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)
Observations	1618	1616	1621	1650	1650	1650	1650	1650	1650
R ²	0.701	0.665	0.685	0.233	0.454	0.445	0.151	0.114	0.259

Notes: All dependent variables are indicator variables defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. See notes to Table A-10. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-12: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON SOCIAL PERCEPTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS

	Inequality			Criminality			Political Division		
	serious prob in 2022	decreased in 2023	will decrease in future	decreased in 2022	decreased in 2023	will decrease in future	decreased in 2022	decreased in 2023	will decrease in future
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Descriptive Statistics (control group only)									
Bolsonaro supporters mean	0.36	0.04	0.08	0.49	0.02	0.04	0.20	0.06	0.07
Lula supporters mean	0.71	0.32	0.53	0.07	0.20	0.42	0.07	0.29	0.35
Observations	878	878	878	878	878	878	878	878	878
Treatment Effects - Inflation Decrease									
Treatment	0.01 (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)
T × Bolsonaro Supporter	0.03 (0.03)	0.04** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.01)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
T × Lula Supporter	0.00 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.00 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)	-0.03** (0.02)	0.06** (0.03)	0.08** (0.03)
Observations	1650	1650	1650	1650	1650	1650	1650	1650	1650
R ²	0.154	0.214	0.290	0.335	0.148	0.292	0.110	0.155	0.198

Notes: All dependent variables are indicator variables defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. See notes to Table A-10. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-13: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON EMOTIONS

	When thinking about the future of Brazil feel a lot of						
	Hope (1)	Joy (2)	Enthusiasm (3)	Fear (4)	Indignation (5)	Sadness (6)	Pride (7)
Descriptive Statistics (control group only)							
Bolsonaro supporters mean	0.18	0.09	0.11	0.57	0.59	0.50	0.09
Lula supporters mean	0.61	0.51	0.46	0.23	0.18	0.13	0.44
Observations	878	878	878	878	878	878	878
Treatment Effects - Inflation Decrease							
Treatment	0.01 (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
T × Bolsonaro Supporter	-0.03 (0.03)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)
T × Lula Supporter	0.04 (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)	-0.06** (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)
Observations	1650	1650	1650	1650	1650	1650	1650
R ²	0.351	0.380	0.324	0.210	0.255	0.249	0.339

Notes: All dependent variables are indicator variables defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. See notes to Table A-10. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-14: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON ADDITIONAL OUTCOMES (PART 1)

	Believe strong leader good political system for Brazil (1)	Believe technocracy good political system for Brazil (2)	Likely to attend Peaceful Protests (3)	Big protests likely to happen again (4)	Agree violence	
					by State acceptable to preserve democracy (5)	against other group acceptable if violent (6)
Descriptive Statistics (control group only)						
Bolsonaro supporters mean	0.58	0.34	0.56	0.41	0.31	0.24
Lula supporters mean	0.55	0.28	0.45	0.32	0.35	0.27
Observations	878	878	878	878	878	878
Treatment Effects - Inflation Decrease						
Treatment	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
T × Bolsonaro Supporter	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
T × Lula Supporter	0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Observations	1650	1650	1650	1650	1650	1650
R ²	0.041	0.039	0.083	0.071	0.042	0.045

Notes: All dependent variables are indicator variables defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. See notes to Table A-10. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-15: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON ADDITIONAL OUTCOMES (PART 2)

	Affective Polarization		Trust federal Govt to do what is right	Most politicians can be trusted	Most people can be trusted	Most people would try to be fair
	Candidate	Supporter	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	(1)	(2)				
Descriptive Statistics (control group only)						
Bolsonaro supporters mean	0.50	0.43	0.34	0.26	0.36	0.43
Lula supporters mean	0.56	0.48	0.60	0.33	0.40	0.49
Observations	850	846	869	854	870	869
Treatment Effects - Inflation Decrease						
Treatment	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
T × Bolsonaro Supporter	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
T × Lula Supporter	0.03 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.04** (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Observations	1599	1593	1632	1603	1627	1633
R ²	0.457	0.387	0.368	0.117	0.079	0.097

Notes: All dependent variables are continuous variables defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. See notes to Table A-10. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-16: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON PERCEIVED BRAZIL'S PROBLEMS

	3 Main Problems of Brazil nowadays														
	Access to Education (1)	Access to Healthcare (2)	Unemployment (3)	Low Wages (4)	High Taxes (5)	Inflation (6)	Low Econ Growth (7)	Inequality (8)	Poverty (9)	Weakened Democracy (10)	Corruption (11)	Criminality (12)	Lack of Moral Values (13)	Intolerance to Minorities (14)	Environmental Degradation (15)
Descriptive Statistics (control group only)															
Bolsonaro supporters mean	0.25	0.25	0.45	0.08	0.19	0.33	0.06	0.19	0.22	0.04	0.45	0.28	0.10	0.00	0.05
Lula supporters mean	0.29	0.28	0.45	0.15	0.10	0.23	0.05	0.36	0.31	0.05	0.24	0.24	0.04	0.05	0.09
Observations	878	878	878	878	878	878	878	878	878	878	878	878	878	878	878
Treatment Effects - Inflation Decrease															
Treatment	-0.05** (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.05** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.03 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)
T × Bolsonaro Supporter	-0.04 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.07** (0.03)	0.04** (0.02)	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.07** (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	0.07*** (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.02)
T × Lula Supporter	-0.05 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.06** (0.03)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.06* (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)	-0.03** (0.03)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.06** (0.02)
Observations	1650	1650	1650	1650	1650	1650	1650	1650	1650	1650	1650	1650	1650	1650	1650
R ²	0.020	0.030	0.034	0.035	0.038	0.043	0.024	0.073	0.047	0.041	0.100	0.028	0.064	0.044	0.054


Notes: All dependent variables are indicator variables defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. See notes to Table A-10. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A-7.2 Income's Stagnation Treatment

As stated in my registered pre-analysis plan, I wanted to test the effect of both a positive and negative update to people's expectations about the economy. A negative update to Bolsonaro supporters' expectations would have replicated more closely what happened after the election result. To avoid deceiving the respondents, I had to rely on real data. For this reason, I decided to use as treatment the average real income trend. As can be seen in Figure A-9, during the last months of Bolsonaro's presidency the average real income was increasing but after Lula took office, this positive trend stopped. My initial hypothesis was that this information would have been perceived by Bolsonaro supporters as a negative news about the economy. This would have led to negative expectations about the future and an increase in their democratic discontent.

But, as can be seen in Table A-17, this is not what happened. Bolsonaro supporters ameliorated their perceptions on how the economy was doing in 2022 (column 1), but they didn't perceive this information as something negative regarding the current state of the economy. If anything, they seem to have perceived as positive news and positively updated their expectations about the future, even if not in a significant way (columns 2 and 3). This might because their expectations about Lula were so low, that just seeing that the economy isn't in a downward trend is perceived as good news. Given the positive first-stage effect, it is not surprising that I find a decrease in the likelihood to attend violent protests (column 5) as well as negative signs on "violence acceptance" and "support military" indices (columns 6 and 7), while a positive one on the "support democracy" index (column 8).

FIGURE A-9: TREATMENT - INCOME STAGNATION



Notes: Data from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE).

TABLE A-17: TREATMENT EFFECTS - INCOME STAGNATION

	Economy			Indices				
	ameliorated in 2022 (1)	ameliorated in 2023 (2)	will ameliorate in future (3)	Socioeconomic Expectations (4)	Violent Protests (5)	Violence Acceptance (6)	Support Military (7)	Support Democracy (8)
Descriptive Statistics (control group only)								
Bolsonaro supporters mean	0.52	0.09	0.17	-1.48	0.23	0.41	0.76	-0.20
Lula supporters mean	0.20	0.67	0.78	1.14	-0.11	-0.34	-0.67	0.17
Observations	878	878	878	876	861	877	869	872
Treatment Effects - Income's Stagnation								
T × Bolsonaro Supporter	0.08** (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.08 (0.10)	-0.16* (0.09)	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.07)	0.03 (0.08)
T × Lula Supporter	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.01 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.05 (0.07)
Observations	1665	1665	1665	1662	1638	1664	1650	1656
R ²	0.232	0.420	0.420	0.536	0.081	0.203	0.470	0.116

Notes: The dependent variables in columns 1-3 are indicator variables defined in Appendix Section A-1.1. The dependent variables in columns 4-8 are indices defined in Appendix Section A-1.2. First two rows report the mean of the dependent variables for respondents who saw no treatment video separately for Bolsonaro and Lula supporters. The bottom panel reports the treatment effects of the income stagnation video interacted with the respondent's political affiliation ("T × Bolsonaro Supporter" and "T × Lula Supporter") relative to the omitted category (no video). All regressions include controls for gender, age group, race, income group, employment status, education, religion, whether on welfare, strength of support, and macro-region fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A-8 Survey Links

The web interface of the survey can be experienced at the following links. Surveys are in the original language, translations of the surveys can be found in the next Appendix Section. Screen outs and quotas have been deactivated as well to allow an easier survey experience In Wave 6, the treatment randomization has been deactivated to allow every survey taker to watch both treatments.

- Wave 1: https://bostonu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_d4E9cC3WlpV0ap0
- Wave 3: https://bostonu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_bJwapmQEzQnyKB8
- Wave 4: https://bostonu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_esUL15BcP0WX1D8
- Wave 6: https://bostonu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_4Z2aU0uJ2kc9XTw

A-9 Questionnaires

A-9.1 Wave 1 to 5

Consent

1. We are a non-partisan group of academic researchers from Boston University. By completing this survey, you are contributing to our knowledge as a society.

Our survey will give you an opportunity to express your own views.

It is very important for the success of our research that you answer honestly and read the questions very carefully before answering. Don't leave any question blank, if you don't know an answer, please give your best guess. There aren't right or wrong answers. However, be sure to spend enough time reading and understanding the question.

It is also very important for the success of our research that you complete the survey on your own, that you don't ask anyone for help and that you complete it entirely once you have started.

This survey takes an average of about 20 minutes to complete.

Note: Your participation in this study is purely voluntary. Your name will never be recorded. Results may include summary data, but you will never be personally identified. If you have any question about this study, you may contact us at mferroni@bu.edu

Yes, I would like to take part in this study; No, I would not like to participate

Screening Questions

We would like to ask some questions about yourself.

1. Are you a Brazilian citizen?

Yes; No

2. What is your gender?

Male; Female; Prefer not to say.

3. What is your age?

4. What was your total monthly household income, before taxes, that you normally received last year?

Less than R\$500; R\$500 - R\$1,000; R\$1,000 - R\$1,500; R\$1,500 - R\$2,000; R\$2,000 - R\$3,000; R\$3,000 - R\$4,000; R\$4,000 - R\$5,000; R\$5,000 - R\$7,500; R\$7,500 - R\$10,000; More than R\$10,000.

5. How many people live in you house?
1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more.
6. Which State do you live in?
7. reCAPTCHA
8. This is a question to check whether whether you are paying attention and reading the questions carefully.
Please select both "1" and "4" to move to the next page of the survey.
1; 2; 3; 4; 5.

Background Questions

1. Which are the first five digits of your CEP of residency?
2. What is your level of education?
No education; Primary school; High school; Vocational training; Education of Young and Adults; Bachelor's degree; Master's degree; Doctorate.
3. Your color or race is:¹
White; Black; Yellow; Mixed race; Indigenous.
4. What is your current employment status?
Full-time employee; Part-time employee; Self-employed; Unemployed and looking for work; Stay at home wife/husband; Student; Not currently working and not looking for work; Retiree
5. [If Full-time employee, Part-time employee, or Self-employed:] Which category best describes your main occupation?
Culture, arts, and entertainment; Computers and information technology; Finance; Agriculture; Health or education; Electoral politics; Other private sector; Other public sector.
6. Are you or someone in your household receiving the new Auxílio Brasil that replaced Bolsa Família?
There is someone already receiving it; No one is receiving but someone will soon; No one is receiving it and no one will.
7. What is your religion or cult?⁵
Catholic; Evangelical; Protestant; Spiritist; Spiritualized without following a given religion; Atheist or agnostic; Other [text entry box].
8. Which of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible?
The Bible is the actual Word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word; The Bible is the Word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word; The Bible is a book written by men and is not the Word of God
9. Do you consider religion to be an important part of your life, or not?
Not at all important; Not very important; Important; Extremely important.
10. What would you say it's your main source of news about politics?
TV; Social networks; Websites and blogs; Friends, family members or acquaintances; Digital newspapers; Printed newspapers; WhatsApp or Telegram; Radio; I don't follow the news.
11. If you had to estimate how much time in total you spend every day on social media platforms (such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Telegram, Instagram, YouTube, etc...), it would be:
None at all; Some, but less than 30 minutes; Between 30 minutes and 1 hour; Between 1 and 2 hours; Between 2 and 4 hours; More than 4 hours.

¹Wording from the Brazilian Census.

Expectations about the elections

1. [Showed only in Wave 4 and 5] In the next set of questions we would like to ask you to remember what were your thoughts on the elections [Wave 4: last week] [Wave 5: last month], that is before the election results were revealed. Please try to remember as best as you can, thank you!
2. In the next question we will ask you to think about the percent chance of something happening in the future. Your answer can range from 0 to 100, where 0 means there is absolutely no chance, and 100 means that is absolutely certain.

For example, numbers like:

- 2 or 5 percent may indicate “almost no chance”.
- 18 percent or so may mean “not much chance”.
- 47 or 52 percent chance may be a “pretty even chance”.
- 83 percent or so may mean a “very good chance”.
- 95 or 98 percent chance may be “almost certain”.

- 2.1 [Wave 1, 2, and 3 version] What do you think is the percent chance that Bolsonaro is going to win the elections and be confirmed as President?

Slider 0-100.

[Wave 4 and 5 version] Before the second round, what was the percent chance that you were giving to a Bolsonaro victory in the elections and his confirmation as president?

Slider 0-100.

- 2.2 [Wave 1, 2, and 3 version] What do you think is the percent chance that Lula is going to win the elections and becomes President again?

Slider 0-100.

[Wave 4 and 5 version] Before the second round, what was the percent chance that you were giving to a Lula victory in the elections and him becoming President again?

Slider 0-100.

3. [Asked only in Wave 1, 2, and 3] How much do you believe the answers that you just provided?

I'm certain; I believe them a lot; I believe them a bit; I don't believe to them.

4. [Wave 1, 2, and 3 version] In the second round of the elections, [Wave 1: it is very likely that] voters will have to choose between Lula and Bolsonaro. What share of valid votes do you think will Bolsonaro get and what share of valid votes will Lula get?

As a reference, in the last 5 elections, the winner got between 51.64% and 61.27% of valid votes, while the loser got between 38.72% and 48.36%.

If your answer is going to be close enough to the actual results (within a 2 percentage points interval), you are going to be automatically enrolled in a lottery to receive an additional monetary reward of R\$100.

Please move the slider to select the share of votes that you expect Bolsonaro is going to get. The pie chart will automatically update to show the share of votes that you predict both Bolsonaro and Lula will get.

Slider 0-100 with pie chart

[Wave 4 and 5 version] Before the second round, what share of valid votes were you expecting Bolsonaro to get and what share of valid votes were you expecting Lula to get?

As a reference, in the last 5 elections, the winner got between 51.64% and 61.27% of valid votes, while the loser got between 38.72% and 48.36%.

Please move the slider to select the share of votes that you were expecting Bolsonaro to get. The bar chart will automatically update to show the share of votes that you were predict both Bolsonaro and Lula

would have gotten.

Slider 0-100 with pie chart

5. [Asked only in Wave 1, 2, and 3] How much do you believe the answers that you just provided?
I'm certain; I believe them a lot; I believe them a bit; I don't believe to them.
6. [Asked only in Wave 2 and 3] In the first round, Lula got 48.43% of the votes while Bolsonaro got 43.20%. Were you surprised by these results?
Yes, I was expecting more votes for Lula and fewer for Bolsonaro; Yes, I was expecting more votes for Bolsonaro and fewer for Lula; No, this result is similar to what I was expecting.
7. [Asked only in Wave 2 and 3] Were you more disappointed or happy with the results of the first round?
Very disappointed; Disappointed; Indifferent; Happy; Very happy.
8. [Asked only in Wave 4 and 5] In the second round, Lula got 50.90% of the votes while Bolsonaro got 49.10%. Were you surprised by these results?
Yes, I was expecting more votes for Lula and fewer for Bolsonaro; Yes, I was expecting more votes for Bolsonaro and fewer for Lula; No, this result is similar to what I was expecting.
9. [Asked only in Wave 4 and 5] Were you more disappointed or happy with the results of the second round?
Very disappointed; Disappointed; Indifferent; Happy; Very happy.
10. [Asked only in Wave 4 and 5] [If expecting more votes for Lula or Bolsonaro in Q9:] Why do you think the results ended up to be different from what you were expecting?
[Text entry box]
11. [Asked only in Wave 4 and 5] [If expecting more votes for Lula or Bolsonaro in Q9:] Among the options below, which one would you say are the main reasons why your expectations were different from what actually happened? Please select up to 3 options
I relied too much on the polls; I have been influenced too much by the news; I have been influenced too much by what my family and friends were going to do; I have been influenced too much by what I read on the social networks; The votes have not been counted properly; I was expecting voters to be smarter; I was hoping on a different result and this influenced my expectations; I was expecting a different turn-out rate; I was not paying much attention to the election; Lula tricked voters into believing him much more than I was expecting; Bolsonaro tricked voters into believing him much more than I was expecting; Some voters haven't been allowed to vote.
12. [Asked only in Wave 4 and 5] Lula got the majority of votes in the elections' second round. How much do you believe he is the actual winner of these elections?
Slider (0 Not at all - 100 Completely)
13. [Asked only in Wave 4 and 5] Do you believe that Lula's victory in the presidential election was legitimate or not legitimate?
Definitely not legitimate; Probably not legitimate; Probably legitimate; Definitely legitimate.
14. How important do you believe these elections are going to be in determining the future of Brazil?
Extremely important; Important; Not very important; Not at all important.
15. When you think about this year's elections, how much do you feel the following emotions?

16.1 Hope

Nothing; A bit; More or less; A lot; Extremely.

16.2 Joy

Nothing; A bit; More or less; A lot; Extremely.

16.3 Fear

Nothing; A bit; More or less; A lot; Extremely.

16.4 Pride

Nothing; A bit; More or less; A lot; Extremely.

16.5 Indignation

Nothing; A bit; More or less; A lot; Extremely.

16.6 Sadness

Nothing; A bit; More or less; A lot; Extremely.

16.7 Enthusiasm

Nothing; A bit; More or less; A lot; Extremely.

Political Questions

1. In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right”. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where 1 means extreme left and 10 means extreme right?

Slider (0 Extreme Left – 5 Center - 10 Extreme Right)

2. How much do you believe religion should be taken into account in political decisions?

Not at all; To some extent; To a considerable extent; To a very large extent; Religious views should always take precedence.

3. To what extent are you interested in politics?

A lot; Moderately; A little; Not at all.

4. How much attention have you been paying to the 2022 election campaign for president?

A lot; Some; Only a little; None at all.

5. Please indicate how many times have you done the following activities in the last year:

- 5.1 Attended a political rally, speech or campaign event.

Never; Once; A few times; A lot of times.

- 5.2 Worked or volunteered for a political party, candidate or campaign.

Never; Once; A few times; A lot of times.

- 5.3 Contributed money to a candidate’s campaign.

Never; Once; A few times; A lot of times.

- 5.4 Publicly expressed your support for a political campaign on social media.

Never; Once; A few times; A lot of times.

6. Did you vote in the [Wave 1, 2, and 3: last] [Wave 4 and 5: before last] Brazilian Presidential Elections (2018)?

Yes; No

7. [If Yes to Q6:] Which candidate did you support in the second round of the [Wave 1, 2, and 3: last] [Wave 4 and 5: before last] presidential election?

Jair Bolsonaro; Fernando Haddad

[If No to Q6:] Even though you didn’t vote, which candidate would have you supported in the second round of the [Wave 1, 2, and 3: last] [Wave 4 and 5: before last] presidential election?

Jair Bolsonaro; Fernando Haddad

8. [Wave 1 version] Who are you planning to vote for President in the first round (October 2nd)?

Jair Bolsonaro; Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva; Ciro Gomes; Simone Tebet; Other [text entry box]; I will not vote.

[Wave 2, 3, 4, and 5 version] Who did you vote for President in the first round (October 2nd)?
Jair Bolsonaro; Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva; Ciro Gomes; Simone Tebet; Other [text entry box]; Invalid; Null vote; I didn't vote.

9. **[Wave 1 version]** If there is going to be a run-off between Lula and Bolsonaro, who are you going to vote for? If you don't plan in voting, please tell us the candidate that gets closer to your views.
Lula; Bolsonaro.

[Wave 2 and 3 version] Who are you going to vote for President in the second round (October 30th)?
Lula; Bolsonaro; Invalid or null; I won't vote

[Wave 4 and 5 version] Who did you vote for President in the second round (October 30th)?
Lula; Bolsonaro; Invalid or null; I didn't vote

10. **[Asked in Wave 2, 3, 4, and 5]** *[If Invalid or null to Q9:]* Even voting/having voted invalid or null, which candidate would you say gets closer to your views?
Lula; Bolsonaro.

[Asked in Wave 2, 3, 4, and 5] *[If I won't/didn't vote to Q9:]* Even not voting/not having voted, which candidate would you say gets closer to your views?
Lula; Bolsonaro.

11. *[If voting/voted for Lula:]* How strong of a Lula supporter would you consider yourself?
Slider (0 Not a supporter – 10 Very strong supporter)

[If voting/voted for Bolsonaro:] How strong of a Bolsonaro supporter would you consider yourself?
Slider (0 Not a supporter – 10 Very strong supporter)

12. **[Asked in Wave 2, 3, 4, and 5]** *[If voting/voted for Lula:]* Please, briefly tell us what you like about Lula:
[Text entry box]

[Asked in Wave 2, 3, 4, and 5] *[If voting/voted for Bolsonaro:]* Please, briefly tell us what you like about Bolsonaro:
[Text entry box]

13. **[Asked in Wave 2, 3, 4, and 5]** *[If voting/voted for Lula:]* Tell us also what you don't like about Bolsonaro:
[Text entry box]

[Asked in Wave 2, 3, 4, and 5] *[If voting/voted for Bolsonaro:]* Tell us also what you don't like about Lula:
[Text entry box]

Extra Questions

1. **[Asked in Wave 2, 3, 4, and 5]** These are two questions to make sure that you are paying attention. Thanks for completing the survey so far!

- 1.1 In a sale, a shop is selling all items at half price. Before the sale, a sofa costs R\$300. How much will it cost in the sale?
[Text entry box]

- 1.2 If the chance of getting a disease is 10 per cent, how many people out of 1,000 would be expected to get the disease?
[Text entry box]

2. [Asked in Wave 2, 3, 4, and 5] In your opinion, which are the biggest problems Brazil is facing today? Select up to three options:
Access to education; Access to health care; Low economic growth; Corruption; Environmental degradation; Unemployment; Inequality; Weakening of the democratic institutions; Lack of moral values; High taxes; Inflation; Poverty; Intolerance to minorities; Low wages; Criminality.
3. [Asked only in Wave 4]² Last week, which did you think were the biggest problems Brazil is facing today? Select up to three options:
Access to education; Access to health care; Low economic growth; Corruption; Environmental degradation; Unemployment; Inequality; Weakening of the democratic institutions; Lack of moral values; High taxes; Inflation; Poverty; Intolerance to minorities; Low wages; Criminality.

Perceptions of others

1. Out of 10 people living in your city, how many do you think are Lula supporters?
 Please tell us what you think by moving the slider below.
Slider 0-10.
2. Out of 10 people living in your city, how many do you think are Bolsonaro supporters?
Slider 0-10.
3. Out of 10 Brazilians, how many do you think are strong Lula supporters?
Slider 0-10.
4. Out of 10 Brazilians, how many do you think are strong Bolsonaro supporters?
Slider 0-10.
5. [Wave 1, 2, and 3 version] *[If voting for Lula:]* Think about your family members and close friends, how many of them do you think are also going to vote for Lula?
All of them; Almost all of them; A majority of them; Roughly half of them; A minority of them; Almost no one; No one.

[Wave 4 and 5 version] *[If voted for Lula:]* Think about your family members and close friends, how many of them do you think also voted for Lula?
All of them; Almost all of them; A majority of them; Roughly half of them; A minority of them; Almost no one; No one.

[Wave 1, 2, and 3 version] *[If voting for Bolsonaro:]* Think about your family members and close friends, how many of them do you think are also going to vote for Bolsonaro?
All of them; Almost all of them; A majority of them; Roughly half of them; A minority of them; Almost no one; No one.

[Wave 4 and 5 version] *[If voted for Bolsonaro:]* Think about your family members and close friends, how many of them do you think also voted for Bolsonaro?
All of them; Almost all of them; A majority of them; Roughly half of them; A minority of them; Almost no one; No one.

6. [Wave 1, 2, and 3 version] *[If voting for Lula:]* How often do you socialize with friends or acquaintances, for example at the workplace, that you believe are going to vote for Bolsonaro?
Never; Once a year or less; A few times a year; Once or twice a month; About every week; Once a week; Every day or almost every day.

²In Wave 4, the order of Q2 and Q3 was randomized with half respondents having to answer Q2 before Q3 and the other half the other way around.

[Wave 4 and 5 version] *[If voted for Lula:]* How often do you socialize with friends or acquaintances, for example at the workplace, that you believe voted for Bolsonaro?

Never; Once a year or less; A few times a year; Once or twice a month; About every week; Once a week; Every day or almost every day.

[Wave 1, 2, and 3 version] *[If voting for Bolsonaro:]* How often do you socialize with friends or acquaintances, for example at the workplace, that you believe are going to vote for Lula?

Never; Once a year or less; A few times a year; Once or twice a month; About every week; Once a week; Every day or almost every day.

[Wave 4 and 5 version] *[If voted for Bolsonaro:]* How often do you socialize with friends or acquaintances, for example at the workplace, that you believe voted for Lula?

Never; Once a year or less; A few times a year; Once or twice a month; About every week; Once a week; Every day or almost every day.

Affective polarization

1. How comfortable are you or would you be having a close friend who is a Bolsonaro supporter?
Not at all comfortable; Not too comfortable; Comfortable; Extremely comfortable.

2. Suppose a son or daughter of yours was getting married. How would you feel if he or she married a Bolsonaro supporter?
Very upset; Upset; Not too upset; Not at all upset.

3. How comfortable are you or would you be having a close friend who is a Lula supporter?
Not at all comfortable; Not too comfortable; Comfortable; Extremely comfortable.

4. Suppose a son or daughter of yours was getting married. How would you feel if he or she married a Lula supporter?
Very upset; Upset; Not too upset; Not at all upset.

5. We would like you to rate how you feel toward different people on a scale of 0 to 100, which we are going to call a “feeling thermometer.”

On this feeling thermometer scale, ratings between 0 and 49 degrees mean that you feel unfavorable and cold (with 0 being the most unfavorable and coldest). Ratings between 51 and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm (with 100 being the most favorable and warmest). A rating of 50 means you have no feelings one way or the other.

- 5.1 How would you rate your feelings toward other Brazilians?

Slider 0-100

- 5.2 And how would you rate your feelings toward Bolsonaro supporters?

Slider 0-100

- 5.3 And your feelings toward Lula supporters?

Slider 0-100

- 5.4 How would you rate your feelings toward Bolsonaro?

Slider 0-100

- 5.5 And your feelings toward Lula?

Slider 0-100

Trust

1. How much of the time do you think you can trust the Federal Government to do what is right?

Please tell us what you think by moving the slider below.

Slider (0 Never – 10 Always)

2. Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance or would they try to be fair?

Slider (0 Most people would try to take advantage of me – 10 Most people would try to be fair)

3. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with them?

Slider (0 You need to be very careful – 10 Most people can be trusted)

4. Generally speaking, would you say that most politicians can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with them?

Slider (0 You need to be very careful – 10 Most politicians can be trusted)

Policy preferences - Redistribution policies

1. Some people think the government should provide fewer services, in areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. Other people feel that it is important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending.

On a scale of 1 to 7 (where 1 means the government should provide fewer services to reduce spending and 7 means that the government should provide more services even if it will increase its spending), which score comes closest to the way you feel?

1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7.

2. The next two questions ask about the role of government regarding two social issues. For each, a score of 1 means that the government should not concern itself with the issue and a score of 7 means the government should do as much as possible to resolve the issue.

2.1 Unequal opportunity for children from rich and poor families.

On a scale of 1 to 7 (where 1 means the government should not concern itself with creating opportunities to make children from poor and rich families less unequal and 7 means that the government should do everything in its power to reduce inequality of opportunity for children), which score comes closest to the way you feel?

1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7.

2.2 Large income differences between rich and poor people.

On a scale of 1 to 7 (where 1 means that the government should not concern itself with reducing income differences between the rich and poor and 7 means that the government should do everything in its power to reduce income differences between rich and poor), which score comes closest to the way you feel

1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7.

3. How much you agree with the following statements?

3.1 “Who earns more should pay a higher tax rate than those who earn less.”

Strongly disagree; Disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Agree; Strongly agree.

3.2 “The government should increase taxes to ensure better education and better health care to those who need it.”

Strongly disagree; Disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Agree; Strongly agree.

4. Do you think that upper-income people are paying their fair share in taxes, paying too much, or paying too little?

Too much; Fair share; Too little.

5. If you had a say in making up the federal budget this year, for which of the following programs would you like to see spending increased and for which would you like to see spending decreased:

5.1 Public health and education

Decrease a lot; Decrease a bit; Stay the same; Increase a bit; Increase a lot.

5.2 Social security

Decrease a lot; Decrease a bit; Stay the same; Increase a bit; Increase a lot.

5.3 Auxílio Brasil (former Bolsa Família)

Decrease a lot; Decrease a bit; Stay the same; Increase a bit; Increase a lot.

5.4 Infrastructure

Decrease a lot; Decrease a bit; Stay the same; Increase a bit; Increase a lot.

5.5 Environment protection

Decrease a lot; Decrease a bit; Stay the same; Increase a bit; Increase a lot.

5.6 Public security and police

Decrease a lot; Decrease a bit; Stay the same; Increase a bit; Increase a lot.

5.7 Defense and national security

Decrease a lot; Decrease a bit; Stay the same; Increase a bit; Increase a lot.

Policy preferences - Moral policies

- When you think about the rights of same-sex couples, which of the following comes closest to your personal opinion?

Same sex couples should be allowed to marry legally; Same sex couples should be allowed to obtain some kind of legal recognition, but not to marry; Same sex couples should not be allowed to marry or obtain any kind of legal recognition.

- Do you think homosexual couples should be legally permitted to adopt children?

Strongly against; Against; Neither against nor in favor; In favor; Strongly in favor.

- There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. Which one of the following opinions is closer to your view?

By law, abortion should never be permitted; The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest, or when the woman's life is in danger; The law should permit abortion for other reasons as well but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established; By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice.

- What is your opinion on the right to bear arms?

I am in favor of people bearing arms everywhere; I am in favor of people bearing arms only in their house or in their stores; I am against people bearing arms.

- Do you agree with the following statement:

"The Army should be deployed to keep the streets of our cities safe." Strongly disagree; Disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Agree; Strongly agree.

- What is your opinion on the legalization of cannabis?

Cannabis should be completely forbidden; I am in favor of legalization for medical purposes; I am in favor of legalization for any purpose.

- Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with each of the statements below:

7.1 "Climate change is an important problem."

Strongly disagree; Disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Agree; Strongly agree.

7.2 "Brazil should take measures to fight climate change."

Strongly disagree; Disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Agree; Strongly agree.

7.3 "The protection of the Amazon forest should be a priority of the federal government."

Strongly disagree; Disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Agree; Strongly agree.

Democratic discontent

1. Do you agree with the following statement?

“Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government.”

Strongly disagree; Disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Agree; Strongly agree.

2. [Asked only in Wave 4]³ And before the second round, how much did you agree with the following statement?

“Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government.”

Strongly disagree; Disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Agree; Strongly agree.

3. We are going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?

- 3.1 Having a democratic political system.

Very bad; Fairly bad; Fairly good; Very good.

- 3.2 Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.

Very bad; Fairly bad; Fairly good; Very good.

- 3.3 Having the army rule the country.

Very bad; Fairly bad; Fairly good; Very good.

- 3.4 We should get rid of elections and parliaments and have experts make decisions on behalf of the people.

Very bad; Fairly bad; Fairly good; Very good.

4. [Wave 1, 2, and 3 version] How much confidence do you have that the 2022 election will be held fairly, that is that electoral fraud is not going to be committed?

Not at all; A little; A moderate amount; A lot; Completely.

[Wave 4 and 5 version] How much confidence do you have that the 2022 election was held fairly, that is that electoral fraud was not committed?

Not at all; A little; A moderate amount; A lot; Completely.

5. How much do you trust the data from electoral polls, such as Datafolha and IBOPE?

Not at all; A little; A moderate amount; A lot; Completely.

6. [Asked only in Wave 2 and 3] [Wave 2 version] How frequently have you heard or do you hear talking about the possibilities that there might be committed electoral fraud in these elections?

Never; A few times; Many times; Almost every day; Constantly.

[Asked only in Wave 2 and 3] [Wave 3 version] How frequently have you heard or do you hear talking about the possibilities that Lula might commit electoral fraud in these elections?

Never; A few times; Many times; Almost every day; Constantly.

7. [Asked only in Wave 2 and 3] Where did you mainly hear talking about this?

TV; Social networks; Websites and blogs; Friends, family members or acquaintances; Digital newspapers; Printed newspapers; WhatsApp or Telegram; Radio.

8. [Asked only in Wave 2 and 3] How much do you trust the source of these information?

Not at all; A little; A moderate amount; A lot; Completely.

9. [Asked only in Wave 3, 4, and 5] [Wave 3 version] How much do you believe that Lula is going to commit electoral fraud?

Not at all; A little; A moderate amount; A lot; Completely.

³In Wave 4, the order of Q1 and Q2 was randomized with half respondents having to answer Q1 before Q2 and the other half the other way around.

[Asked only in Wave 3, 4, and 5] [Wave 4 and 5 version] How much do you believe that Lula committed electoral fraud in these elections?

Not at all; A little; A moderate amount; A lot; Completely.

10. **[Showed only in Wave 4 and 5]⁴** In the next set of questions we would like to ask you to remember what were your thoughts last **[Wave 4: week]** **[Wave 5: month]**, that is before the election results were revealed. Please try to remember as best as you can, thank you!

11. **[Asked only in Wave 4 and 5]** Before the second round, how frequently did you hear talking about the possibility that Lula was going to commit electoral fraud in these elections?

Never; A few times; Many times; Almost every day; Constantly.

12. **[Asked only in Wave 4 and 5]** Where did you mainly hear talking about this??

TV; Social networks; Websites and blogs; Friends, family members or acquaintances; Digital newspapers; Printed newspapers; WhatsApp or Telegram; Radio.

13. **[Asked only in Wave 4 and 5]** How much did you trust the source of these information?

Not at all; A little; A moderate amount; A lot; Completely.

14. **[Asked only in Wave 4, and 5]** How much did you believe that Lula was going to commit electoral fraud?

Not at all; A little; A moderate amount; A lot; Completely.

15. **[Asked in Wave 2, 3, 4, and 5]** Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with each of the statements below:

15.1 "Lula committed many corrupt doings."

Strongly disagree; Disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Agree; Strongly agree.

15.2 "The Supreme Federal Court (STF) did well annulling all of Lula's convictions."

Strongly disagree; Disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Agree; Strongly agree.

16. **[Wave 1, 2, and 3 version:]** If Lula wins the elections, how likely do you think are the following events going to be?

[Wave 4 and 5 version:] Now that Lula won, how likely do you think are the following events going to be?

16.1 Peaceful transition of power in January.

Impossible; Very Unlikely; Unlikely; Likely; Very likely; Certain.

16.2 Mass protests against Lula.

Impossible; Very Unlikely; Unlikely; Likely; Very likely; Certain.

16.3 Violent riots.

Impossible; Very Unlikely; Unlikely; Likely; Very likely; Certain.

16.4 Military coup in favor of Bolsonaro.

Impossible; Very Unlikely; Unlikely; Likely; Very likely; Certain.

17. **[Asked only in Wave 1, 2, and 3:]** If Bolsonaro wins the elections, how likely do you think are the following events going to be?

17.1 Peaceful transition of power in January.

Impossible; Very Unlikely; Unlikely; Likely; Very likely; Certain.

17.2 Mass protests against Bolsonaro.

Impossible; Very Unlikely; Unlikely; Likely; Very likely; Certain.

⁴In Wave 4, the order of this set of questions was randomized in the following way: half saw Q4, Q5, Q9, Q10, Q11, Q12, Q13, and Q14; the other half saw Q10, Q11, Q12, Q13, Q14, Q4, Q5, and Q9.

17.3 Violent riots.

Impossible; Very Unlikely; Unlikely; Likely; Very likely; Certain.

17.4 Military coup in favor of Lula.

Impossible; Very Unlikely; Unlikely; Likely; Very likely; Certain.

Socio-economic perceptions and expectations

1. Financially, are you better off now than you were four years ago?

Better off now; More or less the same; Better off four years ago.

2. Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future of Brazil?

Very optimistic; Optimistic; Neither optimistic nor pessimistic; Pessimistic; Very pessimistic.

3. In your opinion, how did inflation and goods' prices change in the last 12 months?

Increased a lot; Increased a bit; Stayed the same; Decreased a bit; Decreased a lot.

4. And in the next 12 months, how do you think will inflation and goods' prices change?

Will increase a lot; Will increase a bit; Will stay the same; Will decrease a bit; Will decrease a lot.

5. In your opinion, finding a job today is:

Very easy; Easy; Normal; Hard; Very hard.

6. In the next 12 months, finding a job will be:

Very easy; Easy; Normal; Hard; Very hard.

7. How serious of a problem do you believe is income inequality in Brazil?

Definitely not a problem; A small problem; A problem; A serious problem; A very serious problem.

8. Do you think income inequality in Brazil will increase or decrease in the next few years?

Increase a lot; Increase; Stay the same; Decrease; Decrease a lot.

9. Thinking about the economy of the whole country, would you say that in the last year the Brazilian economy:

Worsened a lot; Worsened; Stayed the same; Improved; Improved a lot.

10. Thinking now about the next 12 months, what is your expectations about the Brazilian economy?

Worsen a lot; Worsen; Stay the same; Improve; Improve a lot.

11. Considering the last 12 months, would you say that criminality and violence increased, stayed the same, or decreased?

Increased a lot; Increased; Stayed the same; Decreased; Decreased a lot.

12. Now, considering the next 12 months, do you believe that criminality and violence will increase, will stay the same, or will decrease?

Will increase a lot; Will increase; Will stay the same; Will decrease; Will decrease a lot.

13. In the last 12 months, would you say that Brazil became more divided because of politics?

Became much more divided; Became more divided; Didn't change; Became less divided; Became much less divided.

14. Now, considering the next 12 months, do you believe that Brazil will become more divided because of politics?

Will become much more divided; Will become more divided; Will not change; Will become less divided; Will become much less divided.

Other attitudes

1. Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with each of the statements below:
 - 1.1 "The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society."
Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree.
 - 1.2 "The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes."
Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree.
 - 1.3 "This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties."
Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree.
2. How would you split R\$100 between a randomly-selected person who lives in Brazil and a member of one of your past or current organizations (local church, leisure club or association, etc.)?
Please assume both individuals below have the same income, and would not find out that it was you who sent them the money.
Write down how much you would give to each one of them, remembering that the total must be 100.
Randomly-selected person who lives in Brazil [text entry box]; Member of one of your past or current organizations [text entry box].
3. And how would you instead split R\$100 between a randomly-selected person who lives anywhere in the world and a randomly-selected person who lives in Brazil?
Randomly-selected person who lives anywhere in the world [text entry box]; Randomly-selected person who lives in Brazil [text entry box].
4. How important are the following aspect for your identity?
 - 4.1 Being Brazilian
Not important at all; A little important; Moderately important; Very important; Extremely important.
 - 4.2 My race
Not important at all; A little important; Moderately important; Very important; Extremely important.
 - 4.3 My religion
Not important at all; A little important; Moderately important; Very important; Extremely important.
 - 4.4 My occupation
Not important at all; A little important; Moderately important; Very important; Extremely important.
 - 4.5 My political affiliation
Not important at all; A little important; Moderately important; Very important; Extremely important.
5. Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with each of the statements below:
 - 5.1 "Public officials don't care much about what people like me think."
Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree.
 - 5.2 "People like me don't have much to say in what government does."
Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree.
 - 5.3 "I consider myself well qualified to participate in politics."
Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree.
 - 5.4 "Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on."
Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree.
6. Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with each of the statements below:

- 6.1 "Violence is sometimes an acceptable way for Brazilians to express their disagreement with the government."
Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree.
- 6.2 "If needed to reach important objectives, the use of violence is acceptable."
Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree.
- 6.3 "Sometimes I share information on social media about politics even though I believe it may be false."
Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree.

Concluding Questions

1. [Showed only in Wave 3] In one week we are going to reach out to you again to ask you to complete a second shorter and more remunerated survey. Please check your in-box and wait for us! Thank you!
2. Do you feel that the survey was biased?
Yes, it was biased toward the left; Yes, it was biased toward the right; No, it did not feel biased.
3. Please feel free to give us any feedback or impression regarding this survey.
Text entry box.

A-9.2 Wave 6

Consent

1. We are a non-partisan group of academic researchers from Boston University. By completing this survey, you are contributing to our knowledge as a society.

Our survey will give you an opportunity to express your own views.

It is very important for the success of our research that you answer honestly and read the questions very carefully before answering. Don't leave any question blank, if you don't know an answer, please give your best guess. There aren't right or wrong answers. However, be sure to spend enough time reading and understanding the question.

It is also very important for the success of our research that you complete the survey on your own, that you don't ask anyone for help and that you complete it entirely once you have started.

This survey takes an average of about 20 minutes to complete.

Note: Your participation in this study is purely voluntary. Your name will never be recorded. Results may include summary data, but you will never be personally identified. If you have any question about this study, you may contact us at mferroni@bu.edu

Yes, I would like to take part in this study; No, I would not like to participate

Screening Questions

We would like to ask some questions about yourself.

1. Are you a Brazilian citizen?
Yes; No
2. What is your gender?
Male; Female; Prefer not to say.
3. What is your age?
4. What was your total monthly household income, before taxes, that you normally received last year?
Less than R\$500; R\$500 - R\$1,000; R\$1,000 - R\$1,500; R\$1,500 - R\$2,000; R\$2,000 - R\$3,000; R\$3,000 - R\$4,000; R\$4,000 - R\$5,000; R\$5,000 - R\$7,500; R\$7,500 - R\$10,000; More than R\$10,000.

5. How many people live in your house?
1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more.
6. Which State do you live in?
7. reCAPTCHA
8. This is a question to check whether you are paying attention and reading the questions carefully.
Please select both "1" and "4" to move to the next page of the survey.
1; 2; 3; 4; 5.

Background Questions

1. Which are the first five digits of your CEP of residency?
2. What is your level of education?
No education; Primary school; High school; Vocational training; Education of Young and Adults; Bachelor's degree; Master's degree; Doctorate.
3. Your color or race is:⁵
White; Black; Yellow; Mixed race; Indigenous.
4. What is your current employment status?
Full-time employee; Part-time employee; Self-employed; Unemployed and looking for work; Stay at home wife/husband; Student; Not currently working and not looking for work; Retiree
5. [If Full-time employee, Part-time employee, or Self-employed:] Which category best describes your main occupation?
Culture, arts, and entertainment; Computers and information technology; Finance; Agriculture; Health or education; Electoral politics; Other private sector; Other public sector.
6. Are you or someone in your household receiving Bolsa Família (former Auxílio Brasil)?
There is someone already receiving it; No one is receiving but someone will soon; No one is receiving it and no one will.
7. What is your religion or cult?⁵
Catholic; Evangelical; Protestant; Spiritist; Spiritualized without following a given religion; Atheist or agnostic; Other [text entry box].
8. Which of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible?
The Bible is the actual Word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word; The Bible is the Word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word; The Bible is a book written by men and is not the Word of God
9. Do you consider religion to be an important part of your life, or not?
Not at all important; Not very important; Important; Extremely important.
10. Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with each of the statements below:
 - 10.1 "The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society."
Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree.
 - 10.2 "The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes."
Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree.

⁵Wording from the Brazilian Census.

10.3 "This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties."

Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree.

11. What would you say it's your main source of news about politics?

TV; Social networks; Websites and blogs; Friends, family members or acquaintances; Digital newspapers; Printed newspapers; WhatsApp or Telegram; Radio; I don't follow the news.

12. If you had to estimate how much time in total you spend every day on social media platforms (such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Telegram, Instagram, YouTube, etc...), it would be:

None at all; Some, but less than 30 minutes; Between 30 minutes and 1 hour; Between 1 and 2 hours; Between 2 and 4 hours; More than 4 hours.

Pre-Treatment Elicitation

1. Compared to last year, how do you think is the Brazilian economy doing?

Much better; A bit better; The same; A bit worse; Much worse.

2. Compared to last year, do you think inflation is higher or lower than before?

Much lower; Lower; Almost the same; Higher; Much higher.

Expectations about the elections

1. In the second round, Lula got 50.90% of the votes while Bolsonaro got 49.10%. Were you surprised by these results?

Yes, I was expecting more votes for Lula and fewer for Bolsonaro; Yes, I was expecting more votes for Bolsonaro and fewer for Lula; No, this result is similar to what I was expecting.

2. Were you more disappointed or happy with the results of the second round?

Very disappointed; Disappointed; Indifferent; Happy; Very happy.

3. Lula got the majority of votes in the elections' second round. How much do you believe he is the actual winner of these elections?

Slider (0 Not at all - 100 Completely)

4. Do you believe that Lula's victory in the presidential election was legitimate or not legitimate?

Definitely not legitimate; Probably not legitimate; Probably legitimate; Definitely legitimate.

5. How important do you believe these elections were in determining the future of Brazil?

Extremely important; Important; Not very important; Not at all important.

6. When you think about last year's elections, how much do you feel the following emotions?

6.1 Hope

Nothing; A bit; More or less; A lot; Extremely.

6.2 Joy

Nothing; A bit; More or less; A lot; Extremely.

6.3 Fear

Nothing; A bit; More or less; A lot; Extremely.

6.4 Pride

Nothing; A bit; More or less; A lot; Extremely.

6.5 Indignation

Nothing; A bit; More or less; A lot; Extremely.

6.6 Sadness

Nothing; A bit; More or less; A lot; Extremely.

6.7 Enthusiasm

Nothing; A bit; More or less; A lot; Extremely.

Political Questions

1. In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right”. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where 1 means extreme left and 10 means extreme right?

Slider (0 Extreme Left – 5 Center - 10 Extreme Right)

2. How much do you believe religion should be taken into account in political decisions?

Not at all; To some extent; To a considerable extent; To a very large extent; Religious views should always take precedence.

3. To what extent are you interested in politics?

A lot; Moderately; A little; Not at all.

4. Did you vote in the before last Brazilian Presidential Elections (2018)?

Yes; No

5. [If Yes to Q4:] Which candidate did you support in the second round of the presidential election?

Jair Bolsonaro; Fernando Haddad

[If No to Q4:] Even though you didn't vote, which candidate would have you supported in the second round of the presidential election?

Jair Bolsonaro; Fernando Haddad

6. Did you vote in the last Brazilian Presidential Elections (2022)?

Yes; No

[If Yes to Q6:] Who did you vote for President in the second round of the last election?

Lula; Bolsonaro; Invalid or null

7. [If Invalid or null:] Even having voted invalid or null, which candidate would you say was closer to your views?

Lula; Bolsonaro.

[If No to Q6:] Even not having voted, which candidate would you say was closer to your views?

Lula; Bolsonaro.

8. [If voting/voted for Lula:] How strong of a Lula supporter would you consider yourself?

Slider (0 Not a supporter – 10 Very strong supporter)

[If voting/voted for Bolsonaro:] How strong of a Bolsonaro supporter would you consider yourself?

Slider (0 Not a supporter – 10 Very strong supporter)

Perceptions of others

1. Out of 10 people living in your city, how many do you think are Lula supporters?

Please tell us what you think by moving the slider below.

Slider 0-10.

2. Out of 10 people living in your city, how many do you think are Bolsonaro supporters?

Slider 0-10.

3. [If voted for Lula:] Think about your family members and close friends, how many of them do you think also voted for Lula?

All of them; Almost all of them; A majority of them; Roughly half of them; A minority of them; Almost no one; No one.

[If voted for Bolsonaro:] Think about your family members and close friends, how many of them do you think also voted for Bolsonaro?

All of them; Almost all of them; A majority of them; Roughly half of them; A minority of them; Almost no one; No one.

4. *[If voted for Lula:]* How often do you socialize with friends or acquaintances, for example at the workplace, that you believe voted for Bolsonaro?

Never; Once a year or less; A few times a year; Once or twice a month; About every week; Once a week; Every day or almost every day.

[If voted for Bolsonaro:] How often do you socialize with friends or acquaintances, for example at the workplace, that you believe voted for Lula?

Never; Once a year or less; A few times a year; Once or twice a month; About every week; Once a week; Every day or almost every day.

Treatment

Randomization:

1/3: Inflation's Decrease Treatment; 1/3: Income's Stagnation Treatment; 1/3: Control Group.

Treatments' Texts:

We will now show you one short animation on Brazil's economy. The animation will last around 1 minute. Please pay attention to the information provided as you will be asked questions about it later. Please proceed to the next page when you are ready.

1. Inflation's Decrease Treatment

How did inflation evolve in the last year?

To answer this question, we are going to rely on data from the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), the non-partisan agency responsible for official collection of statistical information in Brazil.

In the last months of 2022, inflation was slightly decreasing but was still at a high level.

In the first months of 2023, inflation started to quickly decrease and reached a much lower level.

2. Income's Stagnation Treatment

How did the average monthly income evolve in the last year?


To answer this question, we are going to rely on data from the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), the non-partisan agency responsible for official collection of statistical information in Brazil.

In the last months of 2022, the average monthly income was steadily increasing.


In the first months of 2023, the average monthly income stopped increasing and has been constant at the same level since then.

FIGURE A-10: TREATMENTS' SCREENSHOTS

(A) INFLATION'S DECREASE



(B) INCOME'S STAGNATION



Treatments' Links:

- Inflation's Decrease: https://bostonu.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/File.php?F=F_nJEyJrSZDFSBdU3
- Income's Stagnation: https://bostonu.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/File.php?F=F_dicS02gH1mgcsHj

Socio-economic perceptions and expectations⁶

1. How would you rate, on a scale from 0 to 10, Bolsonaro's government?
Slider (0 Terrible – 10 Excellent)
2. How would you rate, on a scale from 0 to 10, Lula's government so far?
Slider (0 Terrible – 10 Excellent)
3. And how do you think Lula's government is going to be in the next three years on a scale from 0 to 10?
Slider (0 Terrible – 10 Excellent)
4. Financially, are you better off now than you were in 2022?
Better off now; More or less the same; Better off in 2022.
5. Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future of Brazil?
Very optimistic; Optimistic; Neither optimistic nor pessimistic; Pessimistic; Very pessimistic.
6. In your opinion, how did inflation change in 2022?
Increased a lot; Increased a bit; Stayed the same; Decreased a bit; Decreased a lot.
7. In your opinion, how did inflation change so far in 2023?
Increased a lot; Increased a bit; Stayed the same; Decreased a bit; Decreased a lot.
8. And in the next 12 months, how do you think will inflation change?
Will increase a lot; Will increase a bit; Will stay the same; Will decrease a bit; Will decrease a lot.
9. In your opinion, finding a job in 2022 was:
Very easy; Easy; Normal; Hard; Very hard.
10. In your opinion, finding a job today is:
Very easy; Easy; Normal; Hard; Very hard.
11. In the next 12 months, finding a job will be:
Very easy; Easy; Normal; Hard; Very hard.
12. How serious of a problem do you believe was income inequality in Brazil in 2022?
Definitely not a problem; A small problem; A problem; A serious problem; A very serious problem.
13. Do you think income inequality in Brazil increased or decreased in 2023?
Increased a lot; Increased; Stayed the same; Decreased; Decreased a lot.
14. Do you think income inequality in Brazil will increase or decrease in the next few years?
Increase a lot; Increase; Stay the same; Decrease; Decrease a lot.
15. Thinking about the economy of the whole country, would you say that in 2022 the Brazilian economy:
Worsened a lot; Worsened; Stayed the same; Improved; Improved a lot.
16. And in 2023 so far, the Brazilian economy:
Worsened a lot; Worsened; Stayed the same; Improved; Improved a lot.

⁶The order of the following three blocks was randomized. Half of the respondents saw the questions in the following order: Socio-economic perceptions and expectations, Institutions, Violence; the other half saw them in the following order: Institutions, Violence, Socio-economic perceptions and expectations.

17. Thinking now about the next 12 months, what is your expectations about the Brazilian economy?
Worsen a lot; Worsen; Stay the same; Improve; Improve a lot.
18. Thinking about the criminality and violence in Brazil, would you say that in 2022 it was:
Increasing a lot; Increasing; Staying the same; Decreasing; Decreasing a lot.
19. And in 2023 so far, would you say that criminality and violence in Brazil:
Increased a lot; Increased; Stayed the same; Decreased; Decreased a lot.
20. Now, considering the next 12 months, do you believe that criminality and violence will increase, will stay the same, or will decrease?
Will increase a lot; Will increase; Will stay the same; Will decrease; Will decrease a lot.
21. In 2022, would you say that Brazil was becoming more divided because of political reasons?
Was becoming much more divided; Was becoming more divided; Wasn't changing; Was becoming less divided; Was becoming much less divided.
22. In 2023 so far, would you say that Brazil became more divided because of political reasons?
Became much more divided; Became more divided; Didn't change; Became less divided; Became much less divided.
23. Now, considering the next 12 months, do you believe that Brazil will become more divided because of politics?
Will become much more divided; Will become more divided; Will not change; Will become less divided; Will become much less divided.
24. When thinking about the future of Brazil, how much do you feel the following emotions?
 - 24.1 Hope
Nothing; A bit; More or less; A lot; Extremely.
 - 24.2 Joy
Nothing; A bit; More or less; A lot; Extremely.
 - 24.3 Fear
Nothing; A bit; More or less; A lot; Extremely.
 - 24.4 Pride
Nothing; A bit; More or less; A lot; Extremely.
 - 24.5 Indignation
Nothing; A bit; More or less; A lot; Extremely.
 - 24.6 Sadness
Nothing; A bit; More or less; A lot; Extremely.
 - 24.7 Enthusiasm
Nothing; A bit; More or less; A lot; Extremely.

Democratic Discontent

1. Do you agree with the following statement?
“Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government.”
Strongly disagree; Disagree; Neither agree nor disagree; Agree; Strongly agree.
2. We are going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?
 - 2.1 Having a democratic political system.
Very bad; Fairly bad; Fairly good; Very good.

- 2.2 Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.
Very bad; Fairly bad; Fairly good; Very good.
- 2.3 Having the army rule the country.
Very bad; Fairly bad; Fairly good; Very good.
- 2.4 We should get rid of elections and parliaments and have experts make decisions on behalf of the people.
Very bad; Fairly bad; Fairly good; Very good.
3. If Brazil's economy started to worsen, how likely do you think you would be doing the following things?
- 3.1 Attend peaceful protests against the government.
Never; Very unlikely; Unlikely; Likely; Very likely; For sure.
- 3.2 Attend protests against the government even if they might turn violent.
Never; Very unlikely; Unlikely; Likely; Very likely; For sure.
- 3.3 Participate in violent confrontations with the authorities.
Never; Very unlikely; Unlikely; Likely; Very likely; For sure.
4. On January 8th, some Bolsonaro protesters were in Brasilia and occupied governmental buildings to show their dissatisfaction with the 2022 presidential election's results. In your opinion, how much do you approve or disapprove of this action?
Completely approve; Partially approve; Neither approve nor disapprove; Partially disapprove; Completely disapprove.
5. In your opinion, how likely it is that similar events to the ones from January 8th, even if of a different magnitude, are going to happen again in the future?
For sure will happen again; Likely will happen again; Unlikely will happen again; Definitely won't happen again.
6. How likely do you believe it is that protests similar to the one on January 8th would be successful in making Lula step down?
Slider (0 Would never succeed – 100 Would certainly succeed)
7. Are you in favor or against a military intervention to make Lula step down as president?
Completely against; Against; Indifferent; In favor; Completely in favor.
8. [If In favor or Completely in favor:] If a military intervention would make Lula step down as president, what would be your most preferred outcome?
Military junta in charge of the country until next election; Bolsonaro reinstated as president; New elections.
9. Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with each of the statements below:
- 9.1 "Violence is sometimes an acceptable way for Brazilians to express their disagreement with the government."
Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree.
- 9.2 "The use of force by the state is justified to preserve democracy."
Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree.
- 9.3 [If voted for Lula:] "If Bolsonaro supporters resorted to violence, the use of force by Lula supporters would be justified."
[If voted for Bolsonaro:] "If Lula supporters resorted to violence, the use of force by Bolsonaro supporters would be justified."
Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree.

Other attitudes

Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with each of the statements below:

1. "Public officials don't care much about what people like me think."
Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree.
2. "People like me don't have much to say in what government does."
Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree.
3. "I consider myself well qualified to participate in politics."
Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree.
4. "Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on."
Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree.

Affective polarization

We would like you to rate how you feel toward different people on a scale of 0 to 100, which we are going to call a "feeling thermometer."

On this feeling thermometer scale, ratings between 0 and 49 degrees mean that you feel unfavorable and cold (with 0 being the most unfavorable and coldest). Ratings between 51 and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm (with 100 being the most favorable and warmest). A rating of 50 means you have no feelings one way or the other.

1. How would you rate your feelings toward other Brazilians?
Slider 0-100
2. And how would you rate your feelings toward Bolsonaro supporters?
Slider 0-100
3. And your feelings toward Lula supporters?
Slider 0-100
4. How would you rate your feelings toward Bolsonaro?
Slider 0-100
5. And your feelings toward Lula?
Slider 0-100

Brazil's Problems

1. In your opinion, which are the biggest problems Brazil is facing today? Select up to three options:
Access to education; Access to health care; Low economic growth; Corruption; Environmental degradation; Unemployment; Inequality; Weakening of the democratic institutions; Lack of moral values; High taxes; Inflation; Poverty; Intolerance to minorities; Low wages; Criminality.

Trust

1. How much of the time do you think you can trust the Federal Government to do what is right?
Please tell us what you think by moving the slider below.
Slider (0 Never – 10 Always)
2. Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance or would they try to be fair?
Slider (0 Most people would try to take advantage of me – 10 Most people would try to be fair)

3. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with them?

Slider (0 You need to be very careful – 10 Most people can be trusted)

4. Generally speaking, would you say that most politicians can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with them?

Slider (0 You need to be very careful – 10 Most politicians can be trusted)

Concluding Questions

1. Do you feel that the survey was biased?

Yes, it was biased toward the left; Yes, it was biased toward the right; No, it did not feel biased.

2. Please feel free to give us any feedback or impression regarding this survey.

Text entry box.