Deporter-in-Chief or Champion-in-Chief? How the Threat of Immigration Enforcement Shapes Latinx Presidential Politician Evaluations[*]

Angela Gutierrez[*] and Marcel Roman[†]

[*]University of Texas-Austin, Mexican American and Latina/o Studies Department

[†]Harvard University, Government Department

August 7, 2024

Abstract

When do threats have political consequences? We present a *Dynamic Threat Ownership* model to illustrate the *temporally conditional* relationship between threat and politician support. We posit mass public members worried about a threat will not be inclined to support particular politicians more than their unthreatened counterparts *until* said politicians *commit* to mitigating the relevant threat and *differentiate* themselves on mitigating the threat vis-a-vis a political opponent. The Latinx population is a test case. We find Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement are not more inclined to support (oppose) Democratic (Republican) presidential politicians until Democratic politicians credibly commit to mitigate the threat of immigration enforcement and/or Republican politicians commit to exacerbating immigration enforcement. 15 representative Latinx surveys (Study 1); daily polls and a regression discontinuity design (Study 2); and three survey experiments (Study 3), one pre-registered, corroborate our model. We provide a general framework for understanding *when* threats inform politician evaluations.

Word Count: 9996 (Excluding Bibliography)

Introduction

When do threats have political consequences? Latinxs are the largest US immigrant-origin group and are disparately exposed to immigration enforcement. 65% of Latinxs are foreign-born or second-generation, 15% are undocumented. 40%+ have undocumented friends or family. While the Latinx population has grown, interior deportations increased 1400% since 1996 (Roman, 2023). The restrictive immigration context undermines Latinx life chances (Amuedo-Dorantes, 2022). These consequences implicate the Latinx community writ large, given their immigrant social ties (Roman et al., 2021).

The threatening context has led some to suggest Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement will support putatively pro-immigrant Democratic presidential politicians (Sanchez and Gomez-Aguinaga, 2017). However, evidence on whether the threat of immigration enforcement motivates Latinx Democratic support is mixed. Other research suggests Latinxs support presidential candidates or incumbents over immigration-irrelevant considerations (Abrajano and Alvarez, 2011; Barreto and Segura, 2014; Corral and Leal, 2020; Ocampo et al., 2021). Moreover, the Democratic Party's failure to reduce deportations at certain moments and legalize undocumented immigrants may have reduced Democratic presidential support among Latinxs (Sanchez, Vargas, et al., 2015; Street et al., 2015).

We reconcile these perspectives and present a *Dynamic Threat Ownership* (*DTO*) model to explain *when* threats to marginalized groups inform support for presidential politicians. Since marginalized groups are underrepresented, and politicians of both parties may prioritize the dominant group's political cleavages, presidential politicians of all partisan stripes may not mitigate or even exacerbate threats affecting marginalized groups. In this temporal context, marginalized group members experiencing a group-specific threat may not believe one candidate or incumbent is preferable or worth supporting more relative to their unthreatened counterparts.[1] However, in temporal contexts where candidates or incumbents make credible

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[1]Group-specific threat refers to a threat disparately affecting a particular group (e.g. immigration enforcement disparately affects Latinxs).

commitments to mitigate the group-specific threat and/or are faced with an opponent who is worse at mitigating or even exacerbates the threat, threatened group members may be more likely to support the politician committing to mitigate the threat.

Latinxs are a *DTO* model test case. Historically, immigration enforcement is a *valence issue*, where presidential politicians of *both parties* increased the threat of deportation for Latinxs (Jones-Correa and De Graauw, 2013). However, recent events, such as Obama's second-term deportation relief commitments,[2] Trump's entry as an anti-immigrant candidate, and Biden's significant deportation reductions, demonstrate increased differentiation between presidential politicians of both parties on immigration enforcement *over time*. Thus, the model implies Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement will increasingly support Democratic presidential politicians over time.

Evidence supports the model. 15 representative Latinx surveys between 2008-2021 and meta-analyses show (Study 1), prior to Obama's second-term deportation relief commitments and Trump's xenophobic political entry, Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement are not more likely to support (oppose) Democratic (Republican) presidential politicians relative to unthreatened Latinxs in a temporal context where Obama follows in George W. Bush's footsteps by increasing interior deportations during his first presidential term. Conversely, after Obama's second-term commitments to provide deportation relief and Trump's political entry, Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement are more likely to support Democratic, relative to Republican, presidential politicians. We also find immigration enforcement threat *has a larger influence on support for Democrats among Latinx Republicans.*

Daily tracking polls (N $\sim$ 1.2 million) and a regression-discontinuity-in-time design show Obama's second-term deportation relief commitments substantially and durably increased Obama's approval among Latinxs regardless of partisanship (Study 2). These findings complement Study 1 by suggesting: a) a causal link between immigration enforcement threat and presidential politician evaluations; b) Obama's second-term commitments were

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[2]i.e. the *Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals* (DACA) expansion, *Deferred Action for Parents of Americans* (DAPA), and the *Priority Enforcement Program* (PEP)

perceptibly credible and motivated support for Democratic presidential politicians among Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement.

Three survey experiments demonstrate Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement are more likely to support politicians committing to mitigate immigration enforcement relative to politicians committing to not dealing with or exacerbating enforcement (Study 3). These experiments complement Study 1 by suggesting: a) the association between the threat of immigration enforcement and support for Democratic presidential politicians in Study 1's cross-sectional surveys are not entirely driven by *sorting* by party or politician preferences but the *priming* of a threatened disposition (Iyengar and Kinder, 2010); b) Study 1's results are driven by shifts in presidential politician commitments to mitigate immigration enforcement instead of unobservable secular trends through controlled manipulation of politician behavior.

We make several contributions. First, the *DTO* model, borrowing insights from the threat (Albertson and Gadarian, 2015; Eadeh and Chang, 2020), issue ownership (Petrocik, 1996), and issue evolution literature (Carmines and Stimson, 1986), offers a general framework for understanding *when* threats inform candidate or incumbent evaluations. While applicable to the broader mass public, the model can especially explain the political behavior of minority groups experiencing group-specific threats increasingly at the forefront of American politics.

Second, we contribute to the Latinx politics literature by demonstrating, contrary to conventional wisdom (Bowler et al., 2006; Gutierrez et al., 2019), immigration enforcement *does not have prefigured political consequences.* Prior research on how immigration enforcement motivates Latinx politician evaluations does not always take temporal shifts in politician commitments to mitigate or exacerbate immigration enforcement into account (Sanchez, Vargas, et al., 2015). Importantly, we show the threat of immigration enforcement only begins to motivate presidential support when politicians become increasingly differentiated or committed on mitigating the threat of immigration enforcement. These findings may explain mixed evidence on whether immigration motivates Latinxs to support particular presidential politicians: because presidential-level elites may have not sufficiently mitigated immigration

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enforcement. Ultimately, our model and evidence answers the call in Fraga et al. (2023), who posit that "future research in Latino politics could examine *how* and *when* immigrant identities are politically consequential."

Third, we demonstrate immigration enforcement threat may generate partisan defection. Research on Latinx Republicans is limited, and it is often assumed they discount immigration (Jones-Correa, Al-Faham, et al., 2018). Yet, Latinx Republicans are important swing state voters,[3] and, to the contrary, our results show immigration enforcement threat plays an outsized role in motivating Latinx Republicans to support Democratic politicians.

The Dynamic Threat Ownership Model

People support politicians that are more effective at handling their important issues (Petrocik, 1996; Egan, 2013), a process known as *issue priming* (Iyengar and Kinder, 2010). Likewise, mass public members worried about a particular threat may support a particular politician if they are perceptibly credible at mitigating the threat, that is, *threat solution ownership*. (Eadeh and Chang, 2020).

However, prior research is missing a treatment of the *temporal dynamics* concerning threat solution ownership and politician evaluations. Some research implies threat ownership among politicians from particular parties is stable, accessible, and due to long-term accumulative events (Merolla and Zechmeister, 2013; Albertson and Gadarian, 2015; Eadeh and Chang, 2020).

Yet, threats may not *always* motivate candidate or incumbent evaluations in a *particular* direction, partisan or otherwise, *over time.* Realignment on politician ownership over mitigating threats is possible. Party candidates or incumbents may overcome a perceptible lack of threat solution ownership by demonstrating individualized competence in threat mitigation (e.g. Bill Clinton on crime) (Holian, 2004), or effectively communicating their

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[3]`https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2022/1021/The-new-swing-vote-Why-more-Latino-voters-are-joining-the-GOP`

platform (Dahlberg and Martinsson, 2015). New events could flip the perceptible competencies of each politician's party when dealing with particular threats (Kuziemko and Washington, 2018). Likewise, the perceived commitment to mitigate certain threats may be increasingly differentiated and polarized between candidates or incumbents of different parties over time, which may motivate threatened mass public members to increasingly support politicians perceptibly more effective at mitigating a threat (Walgrave et al., 2009).

Therefore, we present a *Dynamic Threat Ownership* (*DTO*) model to explain how temporal shifts in threat solution ownership may inform the mass public's politician evaluations. *DTO* has three core propositions. First, politicians garner *support* from threatened mass public members by credibly *committing* to mitigating the relevant threat. Second, politicians will be *preferred* among threatened mass public members vis-a-vis a political opponent if they are perceptibly better, that is, *differentiated*, at committing to mitigating the relevant threat.

"Credible commitments" by politicians to mitigate a threat can take the form of promises, rhetoric, and/or actual policy to ameliorate the relevant threat. Threat mitigation does not necessarily need to be material or tangible (for instance, a decrease in interior deportations). Threat mitigation could simply be rhetorical or based on politician promises. Ultimately, the threatened mass public segments decide if politician actions are "credible commitments" to mitigate the relevant threat by supporting particular politicians.

"Differentiation" is also determined by the mass public's perception: whether a politician is perceptibly better (or worse) at mitigating a particular threat vis-a-vis an opponent is determined by the support the threatened mass public provides to that politician. How much a politician is committed to and differentiated from their opponents on mitigating a threat is a *sliding scale*. Two politicians could mitigate a threat, but one may be perceptibly better at threat mitigation, so that politician may be preferred by threatened mass public members.

Third, being concerned about a particular threat *does not have prefigured consequences on mass support for particular politicians.* In temporal contexts where candidates are not differentiated over threat mitigation, or incumbents are not mitigating a threat, the threatened

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Figure 1: Three *Dynamic Threat Ownership* model temporal contexts.

mass public will not be more likely to prefer or support a particular candidate or incumbent relative to their unthreatened counterparts. Conversely, the same threat may inform candidate or incumbent evaluations in temporal contexts where politicians have differentiated themselves in mitigating the threat or incumbents have increasingly mitigated the threat.

We explicate three temporal contexts illustrating the temporally conditional relationship between individual-level perceived threat and politician evaluations (Figure 1). These are not the only DTO model temporal contexts,[4] but are relevant for understanding the aforementioned test case: how shifts in threat solution ownership affect presidential politician support among Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement.

Assume two politicians, A and B. Some mass public members are threatened by X. In **Temporal Context 1**, A does not credibly commit to mitigating X. B, a political opponent, also does not credibly commit to mitigating X. Therefore, threatened mass public members may not support or prefer A (over B) in office relative to their unthreatened counterparts since A is not perceptibly mitigating X and is not differentiated from B.

In **Temporal Context 2**, A credibly commits to mitigating X. B does not. Thus, threatened mass public members may support or prefer A (over B) relative to their unthreatened counterparts since A is more perceptibly credible at mitigating X relative to B and themselves

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[4]See Section A for an exhaustive set of temporal contexts and empirical expectations.

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in *Temporal Context 1*. Threatened mass public members may also be less likely to support B in isolation, given their comparative lack of commitment to mitigating X, but this relationship may be weak due to the ostensibly neutral position of B.

Temporal Context 3 is similar, but B *exacerbates* the threat. Therefore, threatened mass public members may also support or prefer A (over B) relative to their unthreatened counterparts. Threatened mass public members may also be much less likely to support B in isolation relative to *Temporal Context 2* given their comparative commitment to exacerbating X. Given A commits to mitigating (or not exacerbating) threat X in *Temporal Contexts 2* and *3*, these are contexts where politicians are *differentiated* in mitigating the threat. Therefore, **H1:** *When a politician commits to mitigating a particular threat and is differentiated from their political opponent(s) on mitigating the threat, threatened mass public members will be more likely to support and prefer that politician.*

Our expectation conforms to the *issue evolution* literature (Carmines and Stimson, 1986), which posits temporal shifts in partisan issue ownership motivate shifts in partisan identification. However, our expectation is distinct since we are assessing if threatened dispositions motivate support for particular politicians in response to shifts in threat solution ownership among presidential candidates and/or incumbents over time.

Contextual Account: Latinxs, Immigration Enforcement, and the *DTO* Model

We now explain the temporal contexts where Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement may be more likely to support or prefer particular presidential politicians with an account of presidential immigration enforcement commitments over time.

Reagan, H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and W. Bush (1981-2008)

Historically, presidential politicians from *both* parties are associated with policies and commitments reducing *and* increasing immigration enforcement threat (Street et al., 2015). Reagan

Figure 2: Interior Deportations (y-axis) Over Time (yearly, x-axis)

helped pass the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, legalizing 3 million undocumented *while increasing employment restrictions.* Bill Clinton's 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform Act (IIRIRA) expanded conditions to sustain legal status while increasing interior deportations (Morawetz, 2000). Indeed, deportations increased markedly during Clinton's second term (Figure 2). George W. Bush used Clinton's reforms to implement §287(g) and Secure Communities, which increased Federal cooperation with local police to deport undocumented immigrants (Albert, 2011), subsequently increasing deportations (Figure 2).

The 2008 Election (DTO Model's *Temporal Context 2*)

During the 2008 election, Obama promised to pass comprehensive immigration reform after Bush's failure to pass reform. Obama may have been perceived as less restrictive vis-a-vis Hillary Clinton and John McCain. Clinton did not commit to providing undocumented drivers licenses, which protect them from being arrested and referred to immigration authorities, whereas Obama did (Waslin, 2013). Moreover, Obama's commitment to immigration reform contrasted with McCain's emphasis on border security and backtracking on reform.[5] Obama indicated to prominent Univision TV anchor Jorge Ramos that,[6] "We will have in the first year an immigration bill...I want to move that forward...quickly."[7] Therefore, in the 2008 election's

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[5]https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2008/president/issues/immigration.html

[6]60% of Latinxs know Ramos by name and 65% of Latinxs who know him consider him a community leader (2010 Pew Latino Survey).

[7]https://www.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/07/08/navarrette.obama.promise/index.html

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temporal context, consistent with **H1** and the *DTO* model's *Temporal Context 2* (Figure 1, Panel B), Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement may be inclined to support (and prefer) Obama over Clinton or McCain relative to their unthreatened counterparts.

Before Obama's Second-Term Deportation Relief Commitments and Trump's Entry (2009-Oct. 2014, DTO Model's *Temporal Context 1*)

Post-election, Obama's first-term administration failed to pass immigration reforms *while deporting more people than the entire Bush administration* (Figure 2). Obama is characterized by immigration activists as "deporter-in-chief" (Wallace, 2012).

In this context, consistent with **H1** and the *DTO* model's *Temporal Context 1* (Figure 1, Panel A), the threat of immigration enforcement may not motivate Latinx support for Obama given the absence of differentiation on immigration enforcement vis-a-vis Republican politicians (e.g. the prior Bush administration) and limited effort by Obama to mitigate deportation threat. Indeed, Street et al. (2015) find Obama's aggressive immigration policies made Latinxs politically ambivalent concerning the Democratic party.

Obama backtracks on his initial restrictionism by announcing the *Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals* (DACA) executive action (2012-06-15). DACA provided temporary deportation protection to 1.3 million undocumented youth. However, it was not the large-scale immigration reform activists hoped for.[8] DACA only provided deportation relief for 10%-15% of the undocumented. Instead, DACA was meant to signal to Latinx voters that Obama meant to continue pushing immigration reform in a second term.[9] Additionally, Obama was still committed to not using executive action to stem deportations.[10] Given DACA was the first time a Democratic president provided deportation relief after years of exacerbating immigration enforcement, Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement may not immediately support Obama post-DACA, consistent with prior work suggesting shifts in

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[8]https://www.axios.com/2022/06/15/daca-anniversary-immigration-deportation

[9]https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/16/us/us-to-stop-deporting-some-illegal-immigrants.html

[10]https://www.politico.com/story/2014/03/obama-immigration-reform-104356

issue ownership take time and repeated commitments by politicians from particular parties (Walgrave et al., 2009).

Mitt Romney, the Republican 2012 presidential nominee, initially proposed harsh immigration restrictions and a "self-deportation" policy. However, he backtracked on his restrictionism before election day to undercut Obama's potential pro-immigrant advantage.[11] After Romney's loss, the Republican National Committee published an "autopsy" report recommending pushing comprehensive immigration reform in future presidential elections.[12]

After the 2012 election, a bipartisan group of senators and Obama pushed for immigration reform. Obama describes himself as immigration reform's "Champion-in-Chief." Yet, House Republicans refused to bring reform to a vote in 2014 to shield themselves from nativist Tea Party backlash, culminating in Republican House Leader Eric Cantor's election loss.[13] Obama was then criticized by activists for refusing to expand DACA after Republican stonewalling on reform and continued high deportation levels during the midterm elections.

After Obama's Second-Term Deportation Relief Commitments and Trump's Entry (Nov. 2014-, DTO Model's *Temporal Context 3*)

After delays and continued criticism by activists,[14] Obama made his strongest commitment to mitigate the threat of deportation to date. On November 2014, Obama announced three executive actions: a DACA expansion including people living in the U.S. continuously since 2010 instead of 2007; *Deferred Action for Parents of Americans* (DAPA), which would have provided deportation relief for another 4 million undocumented; and the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP), which abolished Secure Communities and mandated Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) prioritize deporting serious criminals (Blumenthal, 2014).

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[11]https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/17/romney-immigration-presidential-debate

[12]https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/rnc-completes-autopsy-2012-loss-calls-inclusion-policy/story?id=18755809

[13]https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2014/08/04/the-real-reason-why-the-house-wont-pass-comprehensive-immigration-reform/

[14]https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/09/obamas-long-immigration-betrayal/379839/

The scope of these executive actions was larger than the 2012 DACA action for several reasons. First, scale. 10 million lived with a DAPA-eligible person.[15] Indeed, the DACA expansion and DAPA would protect 50%, instead of 10-15% under DACA's initial mandates, of the undocumented from deportation.[16] Second, commitments beyond legal regularization. Post-PEP, interior deportations decreased from 405,000 - 325,000 between 2014-2015, similar to pre-Obama levels and the first year-to-year decrease since 2002 (Figure 2). Third, Obama's second-term commitments were more salient than the 2012 DACA announcement. Media coverage on immigration was much larger when Obama expanded DACA in November 2014 than his initial 2012 DACA announcement (Figure C1, Panels A-B). Moreover, Google searches related to DACA and DAPA did not spike during DACA's announcement (2012-06-15). They spiked when DACA was implemented (2012-08-15), but the largest spike was when Obama announced the DACA expansion, DAPA, and PEP in 2014 (Figure C1, Panel C).

Ostensibly, the period immediately after Obama's second-term deportation relief commitments may be analogous to the *DTO* model's *Temporal Context 2*, where an incumbent politician of a particular party makes strong commitments to mitigate immigration enforcement threat, while it is unclear what potential presidential politicians from the other party may do regarding immigration enforcement.

Seven months later (June 2015), there is clarity on what a Republican president may do concerning immigration enforcement. Trump enters the 2016 election as an explicitly xenophobic candidate, promising to roll back Obama's executive deportation relief policies (Finley and Esposito, 2020). Conversely, Hillary Clinton, the Democratic candidate, promises to pass comprehensive immigration reform while strengthening Obama's relief policies.[17] After winning the election, Trump exacerbates the threat of immigration enforcement by implementing several executive restrictionist policies and rolling back Obama's deportation

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[15]https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/unauthorized-immigrants-united-states-stable-numbers-changing-origins

[16]https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/06/22/us/who-is-affected-by-supreme-court-decision-on-immigration.html

[17]https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/donald-trump-hillary-clinton-are-universes-apart-immigration-n641686

relief efforts, including: abrogating PEP by mandating ICE prioritize all undocumented immigrants for deportation irrespective of criminal status (re-implementing Secure Communities); expedited removal, allowing ICE to order the immediate removal of undocumented noncitizens without going through immigration court; ending administrative closure, which Obama used to suspend adjudication of immigration cases involving individuals not deemed priorities for deportation; withdrawing Federal funds from localities mandating their police not engage in immigration enforcement.[18]

Some suggest Obama's second-term deportation relief and Clinton's 2016 commitments to expand upon Obama's policies, coupled with Trump's repudiation of Obama's policy commitments, may have undercut the idea that immigration enforcement is a valence issue and allowed the Democratic Party, at least at the presidential-level, to effectively "own" the issue of reducing the threat of immigration enforcement in the minds of many Latinxs (Sanchez and Gomez-Aguinaga, 2017). Among Latinxs this was likely magnified by repeated attempts by Trump to rescind DACA.[19]

Thus, consistent with **H1** and the *DTO* model's *Temporal Context 3* (Figure 1, Panel C), relative to their unthreatened counterparts, Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement may be *more* likely to support Democratic presidential candidates and/or incumbents after Obama's 2014 second-term deportation relief commitments and Trump's political entry relative to before. Likewise, they may be *less* likely to support Republican presidential candidates and/or incumbents after the announcement of Obama's second-term deportation relief commitments and Trump's political entry.

Finally, after Trump's 2020 election defeat, Biden has fundamentally reshaped interior immigration enforcement. Biden's immigration policy platform condemned targeting *all* undocumented immigrants for deportation, and he announced a deportation pause if elected. On inauguration day, Biden revoked Trump's executive policies to re-implement Secure

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[18]https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/immigration-policy-changes-two-years-trump-administration

[19]https://www.npr.org/2020/06/18/829858289/supreme-court-upholds-daca-in-blow-to-trump-administration

Communities, emphasizing narrowly targeting serious criminal noncitizens. Moreover, he implemented a 100-day deportation moratorium (eventually blocked by a Texas US district judge).[20] Despite Federal court hiccups, interior deportations declined dramatically since Biden's inauguration, to their lowest level since IIRIRA in 1997 (Figure 2).[21] Likewise, in the run-up to the 2024 election, Trump committed to building mass deportation centers and "deporting millions" if he came into office,[22] suggesting Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement may continue to support Democratic presidential politicians relative to restrictionist Republicans.

We recapitulate expectations concerning Latinx support for Democratic presidential politicians. First, Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement may support Obama (over Clinton or McCain) more than their unthreatened counterparts during the 2008 election due to Obama's relatively stronger commitments on mitigating deportation threat (corresponding to the *DTO* model's *Temporal Context 2*). Second, during Obama's first term and the 2012 election, threatened Latinxs may not be more likely to support Obama or Romney given Obama's commitment to maintaining high deportation levels and DACA's relatively small impact (corresponding to the *DTO* model's *Temporal Context 1*). Third, after Obama's extensive second-term deportation relief commitments, Clinton's commitment to extending Obama's policies, and Trump's political entry (plus Biden's extension of Obama-era deportation relief policies), Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement may observe significant differentiation between Democratic and Republican presidential politicians on immigration enforcement and may be more inclined to support Democratic, relative to Republican, politicians (corresponding to the *DTO* model's *Temporal Context 3*). See Table B2 for a summary of temporal contexts and empirical expectations.

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[20]https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/tracking_the_biden_agenda_on_immigration_enforcement_0.pdf

[21]https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/biden-two-years-immigration-record

[22]https://www.voanews.com/a/trump-plans-to-deport-millions-if-he-is-re-elected-says-report/7351479.html

Partisan Defection

The *DTO* model implies the influence of threat from immigration enforcement on support for Democratic politicians may be stronger for Latinx Republicans. Although they may discount information inconsistent with partisan dispositions (Taber and Lodge, 2006), Latinx Republicans threatened by immigration enforcement may seek countervailing information that can shift policy in a way that reduces threat (Gadarian and Albertson, 2014), inducing doubt over whether their party is acting in their best interests (Marcus and MacKuen, 1993). These dynamics may be especially true for marginalized group members, who often prioritize group-specific interests (Davis and Silver, 2004). These insights are also consistent with *issue ownership theory*, which suggests voters defect if opposing party candidates own salient issues (Petrocik et al., 2003); and work showing Latinx Republicans hold weaker partisan loyalties since they are cross-pressured on immigration issues (Geron and Michelson, 2008).[23] Likewise, Latinx Democrats may support Democratic politicians regardless of threatened dispositions concerning immigration enforcement (Geron and Michelson, 2008). Thus, **H2:** *In temporal contexts where Democratic politicians commit to mitigating immigration enforcement threat, the influence of individual-level immigration enforcement threat on support toward Democratic politicians will be stronger among Latinx Republicans.*

Study 1

Study 1 uses 15 cross-sectional bilingual surveys to test **H1-H2**. These are the 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2021 Pew Latino Surveys (N = 2015, 1375, 1220, 1765, 701, 1520, 1001, 2104, 3030, 3375) in addition to the 2012, 2013, and 2021 Latino Advocacy Survey (LAS, N = 2021, 800, 2208), 2016 Collaborative Multi-Racial Post-Election Survey (CMPS '16, N = 3009), and a 2021 Latino Political Survey (LPS '21, N = 1800). The Pew, CMPS, and LAS '21 surveys are nationally representative Latinx samples. LAS '12 is

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[23]For instance, 28%/35% of Latinx Republicans know a deportee/have undocumented friends/family (Author's calculation using Pew Latino Survey and Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey data).

representative of Latinx registered voters in 5 battleground states (FL, VA, CO, NM, AZ). LAS '13 and LPS '21 are representative of national Latinx registered voters. Although target samples differ, results are not sensitive to sample differences (Figure 3). Estimates include weights for representativeness. For more survey methodological details, see Section D.1.

Measuring Presidential Politician Support

We use several dependent variables characterizing presidential candidate preferences and incumbent support. These include vote choice, candidate/incumbent favorability, and incumbent approval (see Section D.2.2 for outcome availability by survey).[24] Given the *DTO* model and our contextual account posits Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement will increasingly support Democratic presidential politicians once they credibly commit to mitigating immigration enforcement, we scale these variables between 0-1 so higher values measure support/opposition for Democratic/Republican politicians (i.e. favorability, approval) or preference for Democratic politicians (i.e. vote choice) (*Democratic support*). Although outcome measures vary by survey, using distinct outcomes undercuts the prospect statistical conclusions are due to measurement (McAvoy, 2008). Moreover, favorability and approval are strongly associated with vote choice, suggesting all outcomes capture a generalized support for Democratic, relative to Republican, politicians (Section D.2.3). The distinct outcomes also operate similarly with respect to the independent variable of interest, implying limited conceptual slippage across outcomes vis-a-vis the theory (Figure 3).

Measuring Immigration Enforcement Threat

Our independent variable is *deportation threat*. We use two *threat* measures. The first is *affective*, asking respondents "regardless of your own immigration or citizenship status, how much, if at all, do you worry that you, a family member, or a close friend could be deported?" Responses are on a 0-3 scale from "not at all" to "a lot." This measure is used in the Pew

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[24]If vote choice is the outcome, the analyzed sample is subset to Latinx registered voters.

'08, '10, '13, '17, '18, '19, '21, and LPS '21 studies. A variant of this measure is in the CMPS '16, asking, "how worried are you that people you know might be detained or deported for immigration reasons." Answers are on a 0-4 scale from "not at all" to "extremely." This measure captures the concept of immigration enforcement exposure, it is correlated with: county-level Secure Communities deportations; knowing undocumented friends/family and deportees; foreign-born status; and immigrant zipcode composition (Figure D3).

The second threat measure is *experiential*, asking about proximal immigration enforcement exposure in the Pew '11, '12, '14, LAS '12, '13, and '21 surveys. The item asks if respondents "personally know someone who has been deported or detained by the Federal Government." Responses are coded 1 for "yes," 0 for "no".

Although knowing a deportee does not necessarily mean someone *feels* threatened, the two measures capture a similar concept given they are strongly associated (Table D7, Models 1-2); operate similarly with respect to *Democratic support* in surveys where they are both available (Table D7, Models 3-6); and account for vicarious exposure to immigration enforcement. We rescale *threat* between 0-1, so we present min-max *threat* coefficients.

Conceptually, *deportation threat* may be a stable disposition in that it primarily develops prior to political socialization for many Latinxs. For immigrants, *deportation threat* may develop immediately after the migratory experience pre-engagement with American politics (Roman, 2023). For acculturated co-ethnics (e.g. second, third-generation+), *threat* may be a function of social and community ties to immigrants, undocumented or otherwise, during pre-adult socialization (Dreby, 2015). Indeed, *deportation threat* possesses characteristics consistent with a stable predisposition. Repeated cross-sectional Pew Latino survey data shows threat is stable across three presidencies with different immigration policies, with only one period being statistically distinct (Figure D4, Panels A-B). Additionally, Latino Immigrant National Survey (LINES) panel data demonstrates *threat* does not shift substantially between two periods when Trump implemented anti-immigrant executive orders (Figure D4, Panel C). Test–retest reliability of *threat* is also like other predispositions developed during pre-adult

socialization, like ideology (Figure D4, Panel D).

Measuring Partisanship

H2 identifies partisanship as a moderator. Three indicators are constructed across all surveys characterizing Democrats, Republicans, and independents. Democrats and Republicans include leaners. However, Pew '17 only includes three-category partisanship. Models assessing the heterogeneous influence of *deportation threat* by partisanship include interactions between *threat* and *independent* or *Republican* indicators (*Democrat* = reference).

Measuring Temporal Contexts

H1-H2 and our contextual account imply individual-level *deportation threat* will be more strongly associated with *Democratic support* when Democratic candidates and/or incumbents commit to mitigating the threat of immigration enforcement and are differentiated from Republican politicians on threat mitigation. We do not directly measure temporal contexts. But, if the *DTO* model and contextual account is supported, *threat* would be unassociated with *Democratic support* in surveys fielded prior to Obama's second-term deportation relief commitments and Trump's political entry (Pew '10-'14, LAS '12, LAS '13, *Temporal Context 1*) with the exception of the 2008 election (Pew '08, *Temporal Context 2*), where we would expect *threat* to be associated with support for Obama but not necessarily Clinton or McCain. Likewise, after Obama's second-term deportation relief commitments and Trump's political entry, *threat* will be associated with *Democratic support* (CMPS '16, Pew '17-'21, LAS '21, LPS '21, *Temporal Context 3*).[25] Consistent with **H2**, *threat* should motivate *Democratic support* particularly among Latinx Republicans during *Temporal Contexts 2* and *3* (but not *1*), so the interaction between *threat* and *Republican* should be *positive*.

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[25]Unfortunately, we do not have survey data between the Pew '14 (September-October 2014) and CMPS '16 (December 2016-February 2017) studies, before Trump's political entry and after Obama's 2014 deportation relief announcement, which would be analogous to the *DTO* model's *Temporal Context 2*. However, we can still more fully test the *DTO* model since the 2008 election is analogous to *Temporal Context 2*

Since several surveys are fielded during *Temporal Contexts 1* and *3*, we derive a survey-adjusted random-effects meta-analytic *threat* coefficient for these contexts to summarize the strength of *threat*'s association with *Democratic support*.[26]

Controls

Models assessing the association between *threat* and *Democratic support* across the 15 surveys adjust for multiple demographic, socio-economic, political, zipcode-level, and county-level covariates in addition to census area fixed effects.[27] The covariates we adjust for are well-established in the preexisting literature as motivations for Latinx evaluations of presidential politicians. See Section D.5 for a full enumeration of controls across surveys in addition to citations of prior literature justifying control covariate inclusion.

Results

Evidence supports **H1** and the *DTO* model.[28] During the 2008 election (*Temporal Context 2*), *threat* is positively associated with Obama vote choice intention ($\beta = 0.15$, p < 0.001) and favorability ($\beta = 0.11$, p < 0.001), but not McCain or Clinton favorability (Figure 3). This is consistent with our contextual account that Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement would be more inclined to support (and prefer) the less restrictionist Obama (vs McCain), but not necessarily more or less likely to favor Clinton or McCain in isolation.

However, post-election, but before Obama's second-term deportation relief commitments and Trump's political entry (*Temporal Context 1*), *threat* is unassociated with *Democratic support*. The meta-analytic survey-adjusted random-effects *threat* coefficient for this temporal context is null and small (-0.01, $p = 0.64$). The exceptions to the general pattern are the negative association between *threat* and Obama approval (Pew '11, '14; $p < 0.10$, $p < 0.05$)

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[26]"Survey-adjusted" means if multiple outcomes characterize *Democratic support* within a survey, we take the within-survey average of the *threat* coefficient across these outcomes for inclusion into the meta-analysis instead of treating each outcome test as an independent study, which artificially reduces SEs.

[27]LAS '12 analyses use state fixed effects since it only surveys 5 battleground states.

[28]For estimation strategy details on testing **H1-H2**, see Section D.6. All figures display 95% CIs with HC2 robust SEs.

Figure 3: Latinxs threatened by deportation are more likely to support Democratic politicians when they commit to mitigating (or not exacerbating) immigration enforcement. The x-axis is survey+year. The y-axis is the *deportation threat* coefficient. Positive coefficients denote support/opposition to Democratic/Republican politicians. Color denotes survey, outcome. From left-to-right, the first dotted vertical line denotes the transition from the 2008 election (*Temporal Context 2*) to the period prior to Obama's second-term deportation relief commitments and Trump's political entry (*Temporal Context 1*). The second dotted vertical line denotes the period after Obama's second-term deportation relief commitments and Trump's political entry (*Temporal Context 3*). Annotations denote random effects meta-analytic coefficients for *Temporal Contexts 1* and *3*.

in addition to Obama vote intention (Pew '11, $p < 0.10$). These exceptions are not *DTO* model-inconsistent. They suggest Obama was perceived as highly restrictionist during a moment where he presided over significant interior deportations, so threatened Latinxs reduced their support. Our findings comport with evidence suggesting Obama's continuance of Bush-era interior enforcement reduced Latinx Democratic favorability (Street et al., 2015).

After Obama's second-term deportation relief commitments and Trump's political entry (*Temporal Context 3*), there is a consistent, significant, and positive association between *threat* and *Democratic support*. The meta-analytic coefficient for this temporal context is 0.1 ($p < 0.001$), 26% of the average outcome standard deviation for all survey outcomes measured during *Temporal Context 3*. Consistent with the *DTO* model, a coefficient difference test indicates the *Temporal Context 3 threat* meta-analytic coefficient is larger than the *Temporal Context 1* meta-analytic coefficient ($p < 0.001$).

19

Figure 4: **Threat motivates partisan defection after Democratic politicians commit to mitigating immigration enforcement.** The x-axis is the meta-analytic random-effects coefficient for the respective covariates (y-axis). Color denotes temporal context. The meta-analytic coefficient for: 1) Temporal Context 1 (Light Grey) uses data from the Pew '10, '11, '12, '13, '14, LAS '12, and LAS '13 surveys; Temporal Context 3 (Black) uses data from the CMPS '16, Pew '17, '18, '19, LAS '21, and LPS '21 surveys. Temporal Context 2 (Dark Grey) uses data from the Pew '08 survey and averages the coefficients across the Pew '08 outcomes. Coefficients from fully-specified models.

Does Threat Motivate Partisan Defection?

For brevity, we present meta-analytic coefficients of the heterogeneous influence of *threat* conditional on partisanship in surveys fielded during *Temporal Contexts 1* and *3*. *Temporal Context 2*'s coefficients are not meta-analytic since they come only from the Pew '08 survey.

Evidence supports **H2** and the *DTO* model. Prior to Obama's second-term deportation relief commitments and Trump's political entry, but after the 2008 election (*Temporal Context 1*), *threat* does not motivate Latinx non-Democrats to increasingly support Democratic presidential politicians (Figure 4). However, *threat* relaxes the negative influence of *Republican* and *independent* identity on *Democratic support* during the 2008 election (*Temporal Context 2*) and after Obama's second-term deportation relief commitments plus Trump's political entry (*Temporal Context 3*, see Figure 4). The substantive influence of *threat* on relaxing

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Partisan Defection As a Function of Deportation Threat is More Likely When Democratic Politicians
May Be Better At Mitigating The Threat of Immigration Enforcement

Figure 5: Illustrative example showing *threat* undermines partisan dispositions in *Temporal Contexts 2-3*, not *1*. X-axis is party, y-axis is the predicted value of Obama vote intention (Panels A-B) and Clinton/Biden reported vote (Panel C/D) among registered Latinxs. Color denotes min/max *threat.* Simulations hold all covariates at means.

Republican and *independent* identity is large, 60% of the *Republican* penalty and 52-80% of the *independent* penalty for Democratic politicians in *Temporal Contexts 2-3*.

The meta-analysis is a black box given independent and dependent variable measurement differences. So, we provide an illustrative example comparing registered Latinx vote choice during the 2012 (*Temporal Context 1*), 2008 (*Temporal Context 2*) and 2016-2020 (*Temporal Context 3*) presidential elections. During *Temporal Context 1*, predicted values show no statistical difference in Obama vote intention between unthreatened and threatened Latinx partisans (Figure 5, Panel A). During the 2008 election (*Temporal Context 2*), predicted values show *threat* motivates partisan defection (Obama vote intention) among Republicans, and increased Obama vote intention among independents, while minimally influencing Latinx Democrat vote intention (Figure 5, Panel B). After Obama's second-term deportation relief commitments and Trump's political entry (*Temporal Context 3*), there is also partisan

defection (Clinton and Biden vote choice) among Republicans and increased *Democratic support* among independents (Figure 5, Panels C-D).

In sum, consistent with **H1** and our contextual account, Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement are not more inclined to support Democratic presidential politicians relative to their unthreatened counterparts until Democratic presidential politicians commit to mitigating the threat of immigration enforcement and/or Republican politicians relatively exacerbate the threat of immigration enforcement. Moreover, consistent with **H2**, the increase in support among threatened Latinxs appears driven by the relaxation of anti-Democratic dispositions among Latinx independents and Republicans.

Did Threatened Latinxs Actually *Perceive* Shifts in Temporal Contexts?

We validate our results by demonstrating *threat* is associated with other theoretically relevant outcomes suggesting threatened Latinxs actually perceived shifts in temporal contexts. Consistent with the *DTO* model and prior research suggesting presidential politicians are the party face (Petrocik, 1996), we may expect Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement will be more likely to believe the Democratic party is better at handling immigration policy than the Republican party (*immigration issue ownership)*; believe Democrats are more concerned for Latinos than Republicans (*Latino issue ownership*); and approve of Democratic presidential politicians handling of immigration policy (*immigration-specific approval*) when Democratic politicians are more committed to mitigating immigration enforcement. Evidence supports these expectations. Meta-analytic estimates show *threat* is positively associated with Democratic *immigration issue ownership* and *Latino issue ownership* in *Temporal Contexts 2* and *3* but not *1* (Figure 6, Panels A-B). Likewise, *threat* is associated with *immigration-specific approval* in *Temporal Context 3*, but not *1* (Figure 6, Panel C). These findings serve as "manipulation checks" and further validate the *DTO* model and our contextual account by suggesting *Temporal Contexts 2* and *3* are moments where threatened Latinxs actually perceived Democratic presidential politicians as better and differentiated at mitigating

A. Democratic Immigration Issue Ownership Outcome

B. Democratic Latino Issue Ownership Outcome

C. Immigration-Specific Approval Outcome

Figure 6: Replicating main results with different outcomes. The x-axis is survey+year. The y-axis is the *threat* coefficient. When relevant, color denotes outcome. Annotations denote random effects meta-analytic coefficients for *Temporal Contexts 1* and *2 & 3* for Panels A-B, *Temporal Context 1* only for Panel C. All covariates re-scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust SEs.

immigration enforcement threat than Republican politicians.

Ruling Out Secular Responsiveness

Our results may be because of secular responsiveness by Democratic politicians to threats Latinxs face outside *deportation threat*. We mitigate this possibility by conducting placebo tests demonstrating other salient threats affecting Latinxs do not motivate *Democratic support* like *deportation threat* conditional on temporal context. Latinxs are socio-economically disadvantaged and disparately exposed to ethno-racial discrimination (Barreto and Segura, 2014). Therefore, we assess if a) Latinxs who report they have a poor financial situation or their financial situation will get worse (i.e. economic threat) or b) Latinxs who report experiencing ethno-racial discrimination are more likely to support/oppose Democratic/Republican politi-

Figure 7: Placebo tests show other salient threats to Latinxs do not operate like *deportation threat*. All covariates re-scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed.

cians. A poor financial situation is uncorrelated with *Democratic support* across *Temporal Contexts 1* and *3* (Figure 7, Panel A). Unlike the *deportation threat* pattern, Latinxs whose financial situation is worsening are less likely to support incumbents, regardless of temporal context or party. Moreover, experiencing ethno-racial discrimination is not correlated with *Democratic support* across all temporal contexts (Figure 7, Panel B). These placebo tests suggest our results are driven by how Latinxs threatened by deportation respond to shifts in politicians' commitments related to immigration enforcement, not secular Democratic politician responsiveness.

Sorting or Priming?

The *DTO* model implies *threat* is *primed* among Latinxs after Democratic politicians mitigate immigration enforcement and differentiate themselves vis-a-vis Republican politicians. That is, *threat* becomes an increasingly relevant motivation for supporting Democratic (over Republican) politicians. However, an alternative explanation for our results is *partisan sorting*. Democratic (Republican) Latinxs may adopt a threatened (unthreatened) disposition after Democratic politicians commit to mitigating immigration enforcement. Likewise, threatened (unthreatened) Latinxs may adopt a Democratic (Republican) partisan identity and concomitant politician evaluations. Although we cannot completely rule out sorting

given our surveys are cross-sectional,[29] we present evidence priming is operative.

First, we stack all surveys with *affective* and *experiential threat* items and assess if partisanship is more strongly associated with *threat* in *Temporal Contexts 2* and *3* relative to *1*. If association strength does not change, sorting may not explain our results since partisans did not adopt a threatened disposition conditional on temporal context. We only identify sorting of affective *threat* in the Pew '18 survey during *Temporal Context 3*, and we do not find sorting with the experiential *threat* measures. Overall, these findings imply our results may not be entirely driven by sorting, but priming (Figure D6, Panels A-B).

Second, we use the LINES panel to demonstrate Latinx immigrant partisans do not adopt a threatened disposition between the 2016 post-election context and the middle of Trump's first presidential year (McCann and Jones-Correa, 2021), where he implemented several restrictive immigration executive orders. These results demonstrate, during an anti-immigrant policy context, Latinx immigrants and immigrant citizens do not adopt threatened dispositions as a function of partisanship (Table D10). We also demonstrate 2016 Trump vote choice does not motivate adopting a (un)threatened disposition (Table D12), suggesting *reverse causality does not explain our results*. Moreover, we use these data to demonstrate a threatened disposition does not motivate partisan switching between the two time periods (Table D11), consistent with prior panel data evidence demonstrating anti-immigrant contexts do not motivate Latinx partisan shifts (Hopkins et al., 2021). Indeed, cross-sectional aggregate Pew data demonstrates Latinx partisan identity is very stable between 2008-2018 despite shifting temporal contexts (Figure D2, Table D5). Therefore, although sorting may partially explain Figure 3, priming is likely operative.

Additional Robustness Checks

Our results are not due to suppressing *Temporal Context 1* coefficients with controls. Parsimonious models adjusting for only partisanship produce similar estimates (Figures D7 and

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[29]There are no large, representative Latinx *panel* surveys with *threat* items across temporal contexts. The LINES, which we use to suggestively rule out sorting, is only of Latinx immigrants.

D8).

Our **H2** results are not a function of aggregating meta-analytic estimates. Table D16 shows 0/9 (0%) and 1/9 (11%) coefficients characterizing the heterogeneous influence of *threat* conditional on *Republican* and *independent* partisanship are statistically significant during *Temporal Context 1*. 19/21 (90%) and 8/21 (38%) coefficients characterizing the heterogeneous influence of *threat* conditional on Republican and independent partisanship are statistically significant during *Temporal Contexts 2-3* (Tables D15, D17).

Omitted variable bias may be limited for our **H1** test. A sensitivity analysis demonstrates an omitted covariate must be equivalent to between 1-7x Republican partisanship for the positive *Temporal Context 3* threat coefficients to attenuate to 0 (Table D14) (Cinelli and Hazlett, 2020). Partisanship is the most jointly prognostic of *threat* and *Democratic support*. Thus, we believe it is unlikely omitted variable bias completely obviates our results.

We use the CMPS to demonstrate *threat*, conditional on controls, is unassociated with liberal policy preferences (Table D18). This falsification test suggests secular liberalism outside partisanship and ideology does not explain our results.

We further rule out reverse causality and the possibility our results are explained by partisan sorting by leveraging Latinx respondents in the Pew '19 survey re-interviewed in the Pew '21 survey. *Threat*, and the conditional association of *threat* by Republican partisanship (in 2019) and Trump approval (in 2019), is associated with Biden approval in 2021 after adjusting for baseline Trump approval in 2019. However, partisanship (in 2019) and Trump approval (in 2019) is <u>not</u> associated with *threat* in 2021 after adjusting for baseline *threat* in 2019 (Section D.9), suggesting *threat* motivates politician evaluations but not the other way around.

Finally, we use the net votes technique clarified by Grimmer et al. (2022) and show the vote intent contribution by threatened (unthreatened) Latinxs for Obama is higher (lower) in *Temporal Context 2* relative to *1* after accounting for shifts in vote intention by threat, turnout intention by threat, and the proportion of threatened Latinxs between *Temporal*

Context 2 and *1* (Section D.14), consistent with **H1**.

Study 2

Study 2 assesses the effect of Obama's second-term deportation relief announcement (*deportation relief*, 2014-11-20), on his approval among Latinxs. Study 2 rectifies two Study 1 shortcomings.

First, the association between *threat* and politician evaluations in Study 1 may be perturbed by omitted variable bias. Given exposing Latinxs experimentally to *deportation threat* is unethical (Lahman et al., 2011), the best strategy for assessing the causal link between *threat* and *Democratic support* is to evaluate the effect of policy commitments ostensibly reducing deportation threat. Study 2 is this strategy, and it mitigates omitted variable bias by assessing the effect of Obama's deportation relief commitments on Latinx approval with a regression-discontinuity-in-time and plausible identification assumptions.

Second, an important assumption inherent to our contextual account and the *DTO* model is that Obama's second-term deportation relief commitments were "perceptibly credible commitments" to mitigate the threat of immigration enforcement such that Latinxs threatened by deportation may be inclined to increasingly support Obama and subsequent Democratic presidential politicians. However, Study 1 cannot support this assumption by itself, we are simply assuming *threat* is primed after Obama's second-term deportation relief commitments, without providing direct evidence supporting our contextual account. If we show Obama's approval substantially increases after his second-term deportation relief commitments, then we can be more confident Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement were primed to support Obama after these commitments and subsequent presidential Democratic politicians who committed to maintaining Obama's immigration approach. In effect, Study 2 serves as a "manipulation check" that Latinxs may have perceived Democratic presidential politicians differently during *Temporal Context 3* relative to *1*.[30]

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[30]To reiterate, the period pre-Trump (2015-06-16), but after Obama's deportation relief commitments

Design

To assess the effect of Obama's *deportation relief* on his approval, we use daily Gallup presidential approval tracking polls between Feb. 2009-Oct. 2016 ($N = 1,270,896$).[31] The outcome is an indicator if a respondent approves of Obama's job (*approval*).

We use a regression discontinuity-in-time (RDiT) design to estimate the effect of Obama's *deportation relief* announcement on *approval. Deportation relief* is an indicator equal to 1 if a Gallup tracking poll respondent is interviewed after 2014-11-20. The RDiT is advantageous vis-a-vis other designs (e.g. difference-in-differences) because it can derive the immediate, discontinuous *deportation relief* effect. Therefore, our coefficients are less likely to be affected by secular differential time trends and/or intervening factors.

We estimate the discontinuous effect of *deportation relief* adjusting and not for controls (age, gender, married, education, income, partisanship, ideology, state, daily respondent count) on *approval* for Latinxs, their partisan subgroups, whites, Black people, and Asians. Whites, Black people, and Asians are placebo groups: *relief* may not shift their *approval* given they are not disparately exposed to immigration enforcement.[32] We present mean-squared optimal bandwidth estimates (Calonico et al., 2017), with the running variable (days to *deportation relief*) to the 1st polynomial and a uniform kernel.

The RDiT identifying assumption is that baseline covariates are smooth at the discontinuity (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). We identify limited covariate imbalance for the Latinx subset (and their partisan subgroups) at the discontinuity (Section E.1), suggesting our *deportation relief* coefficients are insulated from omitted variable bias.

(2014-11-20), is actually analogous to *Temporal Context 2*. But, we do not have Latinx surveys in Study 1 during that time period.

[31]October 2012 data was not collected by Gallup.

[32]Asian undocumented are less likely to be deported whereas Latinxs are "over-deported" relative to their undocumented population proportion (Roman, 2023).

Figure 8: Approval (y-axis) over time (in days, x-axis) among Latinxs and their partisan subgroups.

Results

Consistent with the spirit of the *DTO* model and our contextual account, descriptive statistics suggest Obama's *deportation relief* commitments increased Obama's approval among Latinxs of all partisan stripes (Figure 8). The increase appears to be a *long-term intercept shift.*

Covariate-adjusted RDiT estimates corroborate Figure 8. Obama's *deportation relief* commitments discontinuously increased his *approval* by 16, 14, 17, and 10 percentage points among Latinxs and Latinx Democrats, Independents, and Republicans (Figure 9, Panel A), equivalent to a *large* 0.61-1.3 standardized increase in pre-*relief approval.* Effect estimates do not change without controls, increasing confidence our coefficients are causally identified.

Importantly, consistent with **H2**, even Latinx Republican *approval* increases post-*deportation relief,* suggesting Democratic politicians can facilitate partisan defection by committing to deportation threat mitigation.

Deportation relief did not increase white, Black, or Asian *approval,* suggesting factors influencing the general population are not motivating the discontinuous increase in Latinx *approval* (e.g. the 2014 midterm).

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Figure 9: Obama's second-term deportation relief commitments increased his approval among Latinxs. Panel A shows RDiT *deportation relief* effect estimates (y-axis) for ethno-racial/partisan subgroups (x-axis). Panel B shows the association between Latinx (vs. white) identification and *approval* (y-axis) for monthly Gallup poll subsamples between January 2014-September 2015 (Jan. 2014/Sep. 2015 include all data before/after). First vertical line denotes Obama's *relief* announcement. 95% CIs displayed from robust SEs.

We conduct an ancillary exercise assessing the bivariate association between Latinx (vs. white) self-identification and *approval* for monthly Gallup tracking poll subsets between Jan. 2014-Sep. 2015 (Figure 9, Panel B). Consistent with **H1**, Latinxs, who are disparately threatened by deportation relative to whites, increasingly approve of Obama *post-deportation relief*, supporting the *DTO* model implication that threatened mass public segments are increasingly primed to support politicians committed to mitigating relevant threats.

In sum, Study 2 demonstrates Obama's second-term deportation relief commitments causally increased his approval among Latinxs of all partisan stripes. Importantly, Study 2 suggests Obama's second-term deportation relief commitments were a *critical juncture* indicating to the Latinx public that Democratic presidential politicians were perceptibly credible at mitigating immigration enforcement threat. These findings may explain why *deportation threat* is more prognostic of *Democratic support* in surveys after Obama's deportation relief commitments in Study 1.

Robustness Checks

An alternative account is that DACA's announcement (2012-06-15) or implementation (2012-08-15) was the juncture priming Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement to support

Democratic presidential politicians. However, our contextual account posits DACA may have not initially primed threatened Latinxs to support Obama because shifts in ownership on threat mitigation take time and repeated commitments on part of politicians. We do not find that DACA's announcement and/or implementation increased Obama's approval among Latinxs (Section E.2), suggesting Obama's second-term deportation relief commitments (i.e. the DACA expansion, DAPA, and PEP) were the critical juncture priming Latinxs threatened by deportation to support Democratic presidential politicians.

Our RDiT estimates are robust to different kernel and polynomial specifications (Section E.3); subsetting the data to observations near the discontinuity (Section E.4); a "donut-hole" re-estimation removing close-to-discontinuity observations to rule out anticipatory effects (Section E.7); and sorting (Section E.5). Our RDiT estimates are larger than nearly all pre-*relief* placebo discontinuities (Section E.6), implying our findings are not statistical chance. Finally, our RDiT effects are not local to the discontinuity. Replicating Study 2 with a difference-in-differences and event study approach shows the *deportation relief* effect is *persistent* until the end of the Gallup poll (2016-10-30) (Section E.8). Consistent with Study 1, these persistent effects further suggest Obama's second-term deportation relief commitments were the key juncture motivating Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement to support Democratic presidential politicians.

Study 3

Study 1 has two additional shortcomings Study 3 aims to address. First, we cannot entirely rule out *sorting* as an alternative explanation for Study 1's results instead of our theorized explanation: *priming*. Second, Study 1 relies on implicit assumptions that Latinxs *perceive* presidential politicians are committing to mitigating and/or exacerbating immigration enforcement when they take a survey at particular moments. However, the temporal contexts in which respondents take surveys are noisy and include bundled political signals outside of

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politicians' commitments to mitigate immigration enforcement. Therefore, Study 1's results may be an artifact instead of systematic evidence supporting the *DTO* model.

Study 3 attenuates these shortcomings by exposing Latinxs to hypothetical temporal contexts concerning politicians' commitments to mitigate immigration enforcement, which *prevents sorting over time*; and varies a controlled temporal political context which, albeit hypothetical, would increase confidence in Study 1 if there is consistency in the attitudes of Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement in response to shifts in politician commitments between Studies 1 and 3

Design

Study 3 consists of three survey experiments manipulating a hypothetical politician's commitment to mitigate the threat of immigration enforcement and assessing support for said politician conditional on individual-level *deportation threat* among Latinxs.

Experiments 1 (2012, N = 2021) and 2 (2013, N = 800) manipulate a hypothetical politician's threat solution ownership, that is, their commitment to *exacerbate* or *mitigate* immigration enforcement (two experimental conditions). Experiment 3 (2023, preregistered, N = 3037) adds an experimental condition where a hypothetical politician commits to *do nothing* to mitigate immigration enforcement (three conditions).[33] Unlike Experiment 1, Experiment 2 asks party-of-politician-specific outcome items and Experiment 3 randomizes party-of-politician. If **H1** is supported, the association between *deportation threat* and *politician support* would be *negative* in the *exacerbate* condition, *null* in the *do nothing* condition, and *positive* in the *mitigate* condition, such that the *threat* coefficient will be $\beta_{exacerbate} < \beta_{do\ nothing} < \beta_{mitigate}$ (see Section F.1 for more design details on the three experiments). Respondent characteristics are balanced across conditions for all experiments (Figure F17).

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[33]Experiment 3 is pre-registered at the Open Science Framework registry. Download anonymous pre-analysis plan for Experiment 3 here: `https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Ni2yaogoaqAlaA9__odG5XFLC_bk0uU8/view?usp=sharing`

Figure 10: Marginal effect of deportation threat (y-axis) on politician support by threat solution ownership condition (x-axis). 95% CIs displayed from robust HC2 SEs (respondent-clustered for Experiment 2).

Results

Study 3 supports **H1**. In Experiment 1, *deportation threat* is negatively associated with *politician support* if the hypothetical politician *exacerbates* immigration enforcement, but positively associated with *politician support* if the politician *mitigates* immigration enforcement threat (Figure 10, Panel A). Experiment 2 shows this pattern replicates regardless of party-of-politician (Figure 10, Panel B).

Experiment 3's results are more nuanced but ultimately *DTO* model-consistent (Figure 10, Panel C). Generally, Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement prefer politicians who mitigate immigration enforcement rather than exacerbate it regardless of party-of-politician. But, Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement are not more or less likely to prefer a Republican politician exacerbating immigration enforcement, but more likely to prefer a Democratic politician exacerbating immigration enforcement. A plausible explanation for this discrepancy is that Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement are willing to support a Democratic politician who exacerbates immigration enforcement relative to a Republican politician doing the same because they may be perceived as a relatively lesser evil in implementing restrictive immigration policy. Regardless, across all experiments and consistent with the *DTO* model, the results illustrate support among threatened Latinxs is increasing for politicians that ostensibly possess higher levels of threat solution ownership.

Finally, an ancillary test supports **H2**. In Experiment 3, we subset our analysis to

Figure 11: Deportation threat has a stronger influence on support for Democratic politicians who commit to mitigating immigration enforcement among Latinx Republicans (Experiment 3). 95% CIs displayed from robust HC2 SEs.

Latinxs evaluating a Democratic politician because party-of-politician is randomized.[34] In Experiment 3, the positive association between *threat* and support for a *Democratic* politician *mitigating* immigration enforcement is *stronger among Latinx Republicans* (Figure 11),[35] further suggesting Democratic politicians can garner support from Latinx Republicans threatened by immigration enforcement by committing to mitigating the threat.

Conclusion

We present a *Dynamic Threat Ownership* model to explain *when* threats motivate mass support (opposition) for politicians. Using the case of Latinxs and immigration enforcement, our theory and evidence suggests that threatened mass public segments will not be more inclined to support (oppose) a politician until said politician commits to mitigating (exacerbating) the relevant threat and differentiates themselves vis-a-vis political opponents. In summary, our model explicates the political consequences of threats experienced by the mass public are temporally conditional on the shifting commitments of political elites.

Although applicable to the general public, the *DTO* model is an especially useful framework

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[34]We replicate this ancillary analysis using Experiment 2's data since there are separate party-of-politician outcomes. See Section F.3 for details.

[35]The triple interaction between *threat*, the *mitigate* condition, and Republican individual-level partisanship is positive and statistically significant (Table F19, Model 2).

for *broadly* understanding the connection between threats and politician support among marginalized groups. Most threat research focuses on dominant groups (i.e. Anglo whites) (Jost et al., 2017). Anglo whites are better represented, so their salient threats are more likely to inform their politician evaluations since candidates, incumbents, or parties prioritize the dominant group's political cleavages (Griffin, 2014). Anglo white representation is magnified by their outsized proportion of the electorate relative to non-whites. Moreover, given political representatives have historically privileged solutions to threats faced by Anglos, parties, candidates, and incumbents may end up exacerbating minority group-specific threats since Anglos may have a preference for exacerbating these threats (e.g. discriminatory policing, immigration enforcement) (Davis and Silver, 2004; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). Indeed, the majority of Anglos, including white independents and occasionally white Democrats, are restrictive on interior immigration enforcement relative to the average Latinx (Roman, 2023). Therefore, concerns over group-specific threats do not typically inform candidate or incumbent evaluations since politicians of *both* parties are often responsible for inaction on or exacerbation of threats to minorities.

However, the *DTO* model may be increasingly relevant. Minority political power is increasing due to a declining Anglo population, increased non-white representation (Reingold et al., 2020), and party polarization over minority issues (e.g. race, immigration) (Ollerenshaw and Jardina, 2023). This may lead to a greater willingness among politicians or parties to mitigate minority group-specific threats or differentiate themselves from politicians or parties who are not sufficiently mitigating (or exacerbating) a minority group-specific threat to win elections. Thus, group-specific threats may be increasingly salient motivations for supporting a particular politician among non-whites.

Our model and evidence also teach us that there are possibilities for partisan defection among minority groups despite polarization. Although research suggests Latinx Republicans discount immigration, our findings suggest otherwise. Threatened Latinx Republicans will cross party lines when the Democratic Party commits to mitigating immigration enforcement.

After Trump garnered Latinx support between 2016-2020, pundits suggested prioritizing immigration may undercut Democratic Latinx support.[36] Other evidence evaluating Latinx vote choice between 2016-2020 questions the impact of immigration enforcement threat but posits that Latinx politics scholars must understand *when* threats become politically relevant (Fraga et al., 2023). Our evidence provides a nuanced perspective. Democratic politicians can garner support from threatened Latinxs *regardless of partisanship* by committing to less restrictive immigration policies. But they will not garner support from threatened Latinxs if they are not differentiated from Republican politicians on interior enforcement.

One might think our analysis is limited since it only applies the *DTO* model to Latinxs. This is *necessary* because testing *DTO* requires multiple datasets over time on hard-to-reach minority populations and contextual group-specific knowledge. However, future research should extend the *DTO* to other minority groups since our theory is generalizable beyond Latinxs. For instance, the Democratic Party has backtracked on draconian post-9/11 policies they previously pushed (e.g. placing Arab- and Muslim-Americans on no fly lists without explanation). This may prime Arab- and/or Muslim-Americans threatened by such policies to more strongly support Democrats.[37] Likewise, Asian-Americans worried about discrimination may increasingly support Democrats after Republican anti-Asian rhetoric post-COVID (Chan et al., 2021). At the city-level, reform-minded Democratic politicians have entered the political arena and sought to restrain the police, which may motivate Black voters threatened by excessive policing to support reformist, over establishment, Democrats.[38]

Future research should also assess if the *DTO* model predicts other outcomes beyond politician evaluations, such as political mobilization. Consistent with the model, prior research on opportunity structures implies minorities will be more inclined to participate politically if they can support politicians who mitigate their salient threats (Nichols and Valdéz, 2020).

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[36] https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2021/03/david-shor-2020-democrats-autopsy-hispanic-vote-midterms-trump-gop.html

[37] https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/bidens-plan-roll-back-discriminatory-counterterrorism-policies

[38] https://thetriibe.com/2023/04/cook-county-states-attorney-kim-foxx-wont-seek-re-election-next-year-chicago/

Moreover, a shortcoming of our model is that we do not take into account endogenous shifts in the mass public's threat perception as a result of shifts in threat solution ownership. If a politician commits to threat mitigation, the mass public may feel less threatened, which may produce a new equilibrium where the still-threatened feel like the politician has not done enough threat mitigation and therefore threat perceptions will still be unassociated with politician support. Our model currently assumes threat perceptions are stable regardless of temporal context, which is supported by empirical evidence (Figure D3), but future research should extend the DTO model theoretically and empirically to account for endogenous shifts in mass threat perception conditional on the threat solution ownership of elites.

Finally, the DTO model implies a number of combinations of temporal contexts that could generate different types of behaviors among threatened mass public members (see Section A). We have only tested three temporal contexts in the context of Latinxs' relationship with immigration enforcement, which raises several questions. What if all politicians commit to mitigating (exacerbating) a threat? Can the threatened mass public distinguish between different commitments to mitigate (exacerbate) a threat and assess who is *better* at mitigating (exacerbating) a threat? What thresholds must be met in order for the threatened mass public to perceive a commitment as "credible" enough to support a particular politician? Are promises/rhetoric *always* sufficient? When is actual policy or shifts in tangible, material conditions necessary? Future research should expand on the DTO model and test further implications in order to fully characterize the temporally conditional relationship between threats and politics.

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Appendices

Contents

A   DTO Model: Temporal Contexts and Expectations

Table A1: Stylization of Dynamic Threat Ownership Model's Temporal Contexts and Empirical Expectations

Temporal Context	Politician A Action	Politician B Action	Effect of Perceived Individual-Level Threat on Politician A Support	Effect of Perceived Individual-Level Threat on Politician B Support	Effect of Perceived Individual-Level Threat on Preferences for Politician A over B
Temporal Context 1	Do nothing to mitigate threat	Do nothing to mitigate threat	No effect	No effect	No effect
Temporal Context 2	Commit to mitigating threat	Do nothing to mitigate threat	Positive Effect	No effect	Positive effect
Temporal Context 3	Commit to mitigating threat	Commit to exacerbating threat	Positive Effect	Negative effect	Positive effect
Temporal Context 4	Do nothing to mitigate threat	Commit to mitigating threat	No effect	Positive effect	Negative effect
Temporal Context 5	Commit to exacerbating threat	Commit to mitigating threat	Negative effect	Positive effect	Negative effect
Temporal Context 6	Commit to mitigating threat	Commit to mitigating threat	Positive effect	Positive effect	No effect
Temporal Context 7	Commit to exacerbating threat	Commit to exacerbating threat	Negative effect	Negative effect	No effect
Temporal Context 8	Do nothing to mitigate threat	Commit to exacerbating threat	No effect	Negative effect	Positive effect
Temporal Context 9	Commit to exacerbating threat	Do nothing to mitigate threat	Negative effect	No effect	Negative effect

B   DTO Model: Real-World Temporal Contexts and Observable Implications

Table B2: Observable Implications of the *Dynamic Threat Ownership* (DTO) Model

	Real-World Temporal Context (and *DTO* model analogue)			
	2008 Election (*Temporal Context 2*)	Obama's First Term, 2012 Election, Before Obama's Second-Term Deportation Relief Commitments (*Temporal Context 1*)	After Obama's Second Term Deportation Relief Commitments Before Trump's Political Entry (*Temporal Context 2*)	After Trump's Political Entry (*Temporal Context 3*)
Relative to Latinxs Unthreatened by Immigration Enforcement, Latinxs Threatened by Immigration Enforcement Will...	1) Support Obama More	1) Not Support and/or Oppose Obama More	1) Support Obama More	1) Support Democratic Politicians More (i.e. Obama, Clinton, Biden)
	2) Not Support and/or Oppose McCain More	2) Not Support and/or Oppose Romney More		2) Oppose Trump More
	3) Not Support and/or Oppose Clinton More			

1

C   Salience of Immigration, DACA, and DAPA Over Time

Figure C1: Media and Google Search Attention to Immigration, DACA, and DAPA. Panels A-B characterize the number (Panel A) and number of articles normalized over the total number of articles related to "immigration" (Panel B, y-axis) over time (x-axis). Dashed vertical lines from left to right denote DACA announcement, DACA implementation, and DAPA announcement. Data on count of digital articles from Mediacloud. Panel C characterizes Google Search trends related to "DACA" and "DAPA" (y-axis, denoted by color) over time (x-axis).

D   Study 1

D.1   Survey Data Details

Pew surveys before 2019 are cell phone and landline surveys, use stratified sampling to target Latinx residents, use random digit dialing, use multi-stage weighting procedures to ensure adherence to Census Bureau target demographics, and have margins of error at 3.4% (Pew 2008, fielded June 9, 2008-July 13, 2008), 3.3% (Pew 2010, fielded August 17, 2010-September 19, 2010), 3.6% (Pew 2011, fielded November 9, 2011-December 7, 2011), 3.2% (Pew 2012, fielded September 7, 2012-October 4, 2012), 4.4% (Pew 2013, fielded October 16, 2013-November 3, 2013), 3.2% (Pew 2014, fielded September 11, 2014-October 9, 2014), 3.6% (Pew 2017, fielded December 7, 2016-January 15, 2017), and 3.1% (Pew 2018, fielded July 26, 2018-September 9, 2018) respectively.

The 2019 (fielded Dec. 3-23, 2019) and 2021 (fielded Mar. 15-28, 2021) Pew surveys are from a national, probability-based online panel of Hispanic adults implemented by Ipsos and are weighted to account for Census target demographics and non-response via raking. The margins of error are 2.9%, 2.8%.

The LAS '12 (fielded June 12-21, 2012) and LAS '13 (fielded February 15-26, 2013) are cell phone and landline surveys that use post-stratification weighting to derive representative estimates of registered voters in battleground states and at the national-level. The margins of error are 4.9%, 3.5%.

The CMPS (fielded Dec 3, 2016-Feb 15, 2017) is internet self-administered, weighted via post-stratification raking to 2015 1-year ACS estimates for age, gender, education, nativity, ancestry and voter registration within the national Latinx population, and has a margin of error of 1%.

The LAS '21 (fielded March 2021) and LPS '21 (fielded April 19-29, 2021) surveys are mixed-mode phone and web surveys using post-stratification weighting to derive representative estimates of the national Latinx population in addition to the registered Latinx voter population. The margins of error are 2.2%, 2.3%.

The LAS and LPS surveys were implemented by a survey firm focused on Latino public opinion in conjunction with several Latino political advocacy organizations. The data collector wishes for the organization to remain anonymous. For more details and/or responses to questions concerning the LAS and LPS surveys, please contact the corresponding author at **REDACTED FOR SUBMISSION**

D.2   Outcome Measures

D.2.1   Outcome Availability

Table D3: Candidate and/or Incumbent Evaluation Outcomes

Outcome Type	Survey Availability
Presidential Vote Choice	Pew '08, Pew '11, LAS '12, Pew '12, CMPS '16, LAS '21, LPS '21
Presidential Incumbent or Candidate Favorability	Pew '08, LAS '13, CMPS '16, Pew '17, Pew '19, LAS '21
Presidential Incumbent Approval	Pew '10, Pew '11, LAS '12, Pew '13, Pew '14, Pew '18, Pew '19, LAS '21, LPS '21, Pew '21

D.2.2   Outcome Measurement

Pew 2008: Presidential Vote Choice. Now suppose the 2008 presidential election were being held TODAY. If you had to choose between (READ)—who would you vote for? 1) Barack Obama, the Democrat OR 2) John McCain, the Republican. [1 if Obama, 0 otherwise]

Pew 2008: Presidential Candidate Favorability. Now I'd like your views on some people. As I read some names, please tell me if you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of each person. (First, INSERT NAME) would you say your overall opinion of (INSERT NAME) is very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly UNfavorable, or very UNfavorable? How about (NEXT NAME)? [IF NECESSARY: would you say your overall opinion of (NEXT NAME) is very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly UNfavorable, or very UNfavorable?] a) John McCain b) Hillary Clinton c) Barack Obama d) George W. Bush 1) Very favorable 2) Mostly favorable 3) Mostly Unfavorable 4) Very Unfavorable [Rescaled between 0-1 where 1 = very favorable and 0 = very unfavorable for each candidate]

Pew 2010: Presidential Incumbent Approval. Overall, do you approve or disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling his job as president? 1) Approve, 2) Disapprove, 3) Don't Know [1 if approve, 0 otherwise]

Pew 2011: Presidential Vote Choice. If you had to choose between, (READ LIST), who would you vote for? 1) Barack Obama, the Democrat, 2) Mitt Romney, the Republican. [1 if Barack Obama, 0 otherwise]

3

Pew 2011: Presidential Incumbent Approval. Overall, do you approve or disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling his job as president? 1) Approve, 2) Disapprove, 3) Don't Know [1 if approve, 0 otherwise]

Pew 2012: Presidential Vote Choice. If the presidential election were being held TODAY, would you vote for 1) the Democratic ticket of Barack Obama and Joe Biden OR 2) for the Republican ticket of Mitt Romney and Paul? [1 if Obama, 0 otherwise].

Pew 2012: Presidential Vote Choice. If the 2012 election for President was held today and the candidates were [ROTATE: Republican Mitt Romney and Democrat Barack Obama] who would you most likely vote for? [IF CANDIDATE:] Would you say you are certain to vote [ANSWER] or could change your mind? [IF UNDECIDED:] Well, if you had to choose, who would you lean towards? 1) Romney – certain, 2) Romney – not-certain, 3) undecided – lean Romney 4) Obama – certain 5) Obama– not-certain, 6) undecided – lean Obama. [1 if Obama-certain, Obama-not certain, undecided-lean Obama, 0 otherwise]

Pew 2012: Presidential Incumbent Approval. Generally speaking, do you approve or disapprove of the job Barack Obama is doing as President? Is that 1) Strongly approve 2) Somewhat approve 3) Somewhat disapprove 4) Strongly disapprove [Rescaled 0-1, with 1 = strongly approve and 0 = strongly disapprove]

LAS 2012: Vote Choice. 4. If the 2012 election for President was held today and the candidates were [ROTATE: Republican Mitt Romney and Democrat Barack Obama] who would you most likely vote for? 1) Romney – certain 2) Romney – not-certain 3) undecided – lean Romney 4) Obama – certain 5) Obama– not-certain 6) undecided – lean Obama 7) Undecided/don't know [1 if Obama certain, not certain, or lean Obama, 0 otherwise]

Pew 2013: Presidential Incumbent Approval. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling his job as President? 1) Approve, 2) Disapprove. [1 if approve, 0 otherwise]

LAS 2013: Presidential Incumbent Favorability. Now I'd like to ask you about some people who have been mentioned in the news recently. For each, please tell me whether you have heard of the person, and if your impression is very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable. If you have no opinion, or have never heard of the person, just let me know. How about President Barack Obama Do you have a 1) very favorable, 2) somewhat favorable, 3) somewhat unfavorable, or 4) very unfavorable impression of President Barack Obama? [Rescaled 0-1 where 1 = very favorable and 0 = very unfavorable]

Pew 2014: Presidential Incumbent Approval. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling his job as President? 1) Approve, 2) Disapprove. [1 if approve, 0 otherwise]

CMPS 2016: Presidential Vote Choice In the election for President of the United States, did you vote for: (rotate list) Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump, Gary Johnson, Jill Stein. 1) Hillary Clinton, 2) Donald Trump, 3) Gary Johnson, 4) Jill Stein, 5) Someone else. [1 if Clinton, 0 otherwise]

CMPS 2016: Presidential Incumbent/Candidate Favorability. Please indicate if you have a favorable view or unfavorable view of each person. If you haven't heard of them or are unfamiliar with them, that's fine. A) Barack Obama, B) Hillary Clinton, C) Donald Trump. 1) Very favorable, 2) Somewhat favorable, 3) Somewhat unfavorable, 4) Very unfavorable 5) Not familiar with them [Rescaled 0-1 so 1 = very favorable and 0 = very unfavorable, not familiar = NA]

Pew 2017: Presidential Incumbent Favorability. What kind of president do you think Donald Trump will be - a great, good, average, poor, or terrible president? 1) Great president, 2) Good president, 3) Average president, 4) Poor president, 5) Terrible president. [Rescaled 1-0 where 1 = terrible president and 0 = good president]

Pew 2018: Presidential Incumbent Approval. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as President? 1) Approve, 2) Disapprove [1 if approve, 0 otherwise]

Pew 2019: Presidential Incumbent Approval. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as President? 1) Approve, 2) Disapprove [1 if approve, 0 otherwise]

Pew 2019: Democratic Candidate Favorability. Overall, what's your impression of the candidates running for the Democratic presidential nomination? AS A GROUP, would you say the candidates are 1) Excellent, 2) Good, 3) Only fair, 4) Poor. [Rescaled 0-1 where 1 = excellent, 0 = poor]

LAS 2021: Presidential Vote Choice. In the election for President, did you vote for: 1) Joe Biden, the Democratic candidate, 2) Donald Trump, the Republican candidate, 3) Someone else. [1 if Biden, 0 otherwise]

LAS 2021: Presidential Incumbent/Candidate Favorability. For each of the following people, please indicate whether your overall opinion of them is very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable, or if you have no opinion or haven't heard enough to say. A) President Joe Biden, B) Former President Donald Trump. 1) Very favorable, 2) Somewhat favorable, 3) Somewhat unfavorable, 4) Very unfavorable, 5) Haven't heard enough to say. [Rescaled 0-1 where 1 = very favorable, 0 = very unfavorable. "Haven't heard enough to say" is NA]

LAS 2021: Presidential Incumbent Approval. Overall, do you approve or disapprove of the way Joe Biden is handling his job as President? 1) Strongly approve, 2) Somewhat approve, 3) Somewhat disapprove, 4) Strongly disapprove. [Rescaled 0-1, where 1 = strongly approve and 0 = strongly disapprove]

LPS 2021: Presidential Vote Choice. Thinking back to the November 2020 presidential election, did you support 1) Joe Biden, the Democratic candidate, 2) Donald Trump, the Republican candidate, 3) Someone else, 4) I did not vote in 2020. [1 if Biden, 0 otherwise. "I did not vote in 2020" is NA]

LPS 2021: Presidential Incumbent Approval (Biden). Do you approve or disapprove of the job Joe Biden is doing as U.S. President? 1) Strongly approve, 2) Somewhat approve, 3) Somewhat disapprove, 4) Strongly disapprove. [Rescaled 0-1, where 1 = strongly approve, and 0 = strongly disapprove]

LPS 2021: Presidential Incumbent Approval (Harris). Do you approve or disapprove of the job Kamala Harris is doing as U.S. Vice President? 1) Strongly approve, 2) Somewhat approve, 3) Somewhat disapprove, 4) Strongly disapprove. [Rescaled 0-1, where 1 = strongly approve, and 0 = strongly disapprove]

D.2.3 Demonstrating Different Outcome Measures Correlate

Table D4: Favorability and approval measures are associated with vote choice

	Biden (1)	Biden (2)	Biden (3)	Clinton (4)	Obama (5)	Obama (6)	Obama (7)
				Vote Choice			
Biden App.	0.72*** (0.02)	0.87*** (0.03)					
Trump Fav.			−0.83*** (0.02)				
Clinton Fav.				0.73*** (0.03)			
Obama App.					0.73*** (0.03)	0.43*** (0.03)	
Obama Fav.							0.94*** (0.03)
Survey	LPS '21	LAS '21	LAS '21	CMPS '16	LAS '12	Pew '11	Pew '08
R²	0.46	0.47	0.55	0.42	0.51	0.20	0.40
N	1712	1397	1352	1647	2021	1220	1081

Note: ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$. Models do not include additional control covariates. HC2 robust SEs in parentheses.

D.3 Partisanship Measure

D.3.1 Latinx Partisanship Over Time


Figure D2: Latinx partisanship (y-axis) over time (x-axis). Data from the Pew '07, '08, '10, '11, '12, '13, '14, '16 and '18 Latino datasets. Black = proportion of Latinxs that are Democrats. Grey = proportion of Latinxs that are Republicans. All estimates use population weights. Dashed vertical line denotes the post-DAPA/Trump period, that is, post-partisan differentiation

Table D5: Partisanship is Stable Across Temporal Contexts

	Democrat ID (1)	Republican ID (2)
Temporal Context 2	0.02	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Temporal Context 3	−0.02	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)
R^2	0.00	0.00
N	14207	14207

Note: $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$. Models 1 and 2 outcomes are Democratic and Republican identification (includes leaners on 7 point scale). Datasets used are the Pew '08, '10, '11, '12, '13, '14, '16, and '18 surveys. Temporal Context 2 is equal to 1, 0 otherwise if the respondent was interviewed in the Pew '08 survey. Temporal Context 3 is equal to 1, 0 otherwise, if the respondent was interviewed in the Pew '16 and Pew '18 surveys. Temporal Context 1 is the reference category, which is equal to 1 if the respondent was interviewed in the Pew '10, '11, '12, '13, and '14 surveys. HC2 robust SEs in parentheses.

D.4   Deportation Threat Measures

D.4.1   Threat Measure Type By Survey

Table D6: Deportation Threat Measures By Survey

Threat Measure	Survey Availability
Know Deportee	Pew '11, '12, '14, LAS '12, LAS '13, LAS '21
Worried About Deportation	Pew '08, '10, '13, '17, '18, '19, LPS '21

D.4.2   Threat Measurement

Pew '08, '10, '13, '17, '18,' 19, LPS '21 Regardless of your own immigration or citizenship status, how much, if at all, do you worry that you, a family member, or a close friend could be deported? Would you say that you worry a lot, some, not much, or not at all? 1) A lot, 2) Some, 3) Not much, 4) Not at all. [Rescaled between 0-1, where 1 = a lot and 0 = not at all]

Pew '11, '12, '14, LAS '12, LAS '13, LAS '21. Do you personally know someone who has been deported or detained by the federal government for immigration reasons in the last twelve months? 1) Yes, 2) No [1 = yes, 0 otherwise]

D.4.3   Demonstrating Deportee Exposure = Psychological Threat

Table D7: The deportee exposure measure is an effective proxy of the psychological threat measure

	Threat	Threat	App. Trump	App. Trump	Fav. Dems	Fav. Dems
Know Deportee	0.25***	0.33***	−0.12***	−0.00	0.04†	−0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Threat				−0.38***		0.17***
				(0.03)		(0.02)
Survey	Pew '10	Pew '19	Pew '19	Pew '19	Pew '19	Pew '19
R^2	0.07	0.11	0.01	0.12	0.00	0.06
N	1375	2990	2960	2932	2956	2929

Note: $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$. All models are bivariate. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

D.4.4   Validating Threat Measure

Figure D3: **The Subjective Threat Measure Is Associated With Measures That Characterize Objective Exposure to Deportation Threat.** The x-axis is a proxy for exposure to deportation threat. The y-axis is the predicted value of threat. Each panel characterizes a different regression of the association between a proxy for exposure and perceived deportation threat. Survey at use in parentheses. All covariates scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust errors.

D.4.5   Threat = Stable

Figure D4: **Deportation Threat is Relatively Stable Over Time.** Panel A displays levels of self-reported deportation threat in the '07, '08, '10, '13, and '18 Pew Latino Surveys. Panel B characterizes period effects for the level of threat in the '08, '10, '13, and '18 Pew Latino Surveys relative to the '07 Pew Latino survey. Panel C displays self-reported threat in the Nov '16-Jan '17 and Jul '17-Sep '17 waves of the Latino National Immigrant Survey (LINES) Panel. Importantly, Trump implemented a number of anti-immigrant executive orders between these two time periods including the DAPA rescission, Muslim Ban, and banning sanctuary cities. Annotation denotes Jul '17-Sep '17 period effect, which is near zero. Panel D is the Pearson's correlation coefficient (y-axis) for threat, ideology, and partisanship (x-axis) between the Nov '16-Jan '17 and Jul '17-Sep '17 LINES waves. Although test-retest reliability is seemingly low for threat, it is relatively high given the 6 month gap between waves and the fact threat is similar in reliability to ideology and approaches the reliability of partisanship, two measures that are understood as stable in preexisting literature. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed derived from HC2 robust standard errors.

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D.4.6 Threat Over Time By Party

Figure D5: **Latinx Perceived Deportation Threat (y-axis) Over Time (x-axis) By Party (Black = Full Sample, Red = Latinx Republicans, Blue = Latinx Democrats).** Data are from the Pew '07, '08, '10, '13, and '18 Latino datasets. Deportation threat measure is rescaled between 0-1. All estimates use population weights. Dashed vertical line denotes the post-DAPA/Trump period.

D.5 Control Covariates by Survey

We adjust for an extensive set of covariates well-established in the preexisting literature as motivations for Latinx evaluations of presidential politicians. These include (but are not limited to): partisanship, ideology (Garcia Bedolla et al., 2006), immigration issue salience (Barreto and Collingwood, 2015), acculturation (foreign-born status, Spanish interview) (Wong, 2000), perceived discrimination, experienced discrimination (Huddy et al., 2016), denial of anti-Black racism (Alamillo, 2019), general ownership over supporting Latinxs, Latinx identity, American identity (Hickel et al., 2021), national origin (Alvarez and Bedolla, 2003), education (Abrajano, 2005), gender (Welch and Sigelman, 1992), religion (Kosmin and Keysar, 1995), religiosity (Kelly and Kelly, 2005), personal economic situations (i.e. income, unemployment, homeownership, prospective, retrospective, and current financial situation) (Abrajano et al., 2008), and moral values (e.g. gay marriage disapproval, abortion issue salience) (Abrajano et al., 2008). Importantly, we adjust for selection into *deportation threat* by adjusting for the logged number of county-level Secure Communities (SC) deportations, the SC deportation rate (deportations per 1000 foreign-born), whether the respondent knows someone undocumented, and whether the respondent knows a deportee (for studies where the psychological measure is available).[39] See Table D8 for a full enumeration of controls across surveys.

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[39]We do not adjust for SC deportations for pre-2014 surveys since the SC program is ongoing then.

Table D8: Control Covariates by Survey

Survey	Controls
Pew '08	Woman, Age, Age (Missing), Foreign Born, Spanish, Married, Catholic, Evangelical, Religiosity, Religiosity (Missing) Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran, Income, Income (Missing), Education, Unemployment, Ethnic Media, Republican, Independent, Nativism, Most Important Issue (Immigration), Retrospective Situation (Group), Political Interest, Most Important Issue (Iraq), Most Important Issue (Jobs), Most Important Issue (Crime), Most Important Issue (Cost of Living), Experienced Discrimination, Perceived Discrimination, Perceived Discrimination (Missing), Perceived Discrimination (Missing 2), Sociotropic Satisfaction, Log(Population + 1) (Zipcode) Population Density (Zipcode), % Latino (Zipcode), % Foreign (Zipcode), % Non-citizen (Zipcode), % College (Zipcode), % Unemployment (Zipcode), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (Zipcode), Log(Population + 1) (County), Population Density (County), % Latino (County), % Foreign (County), % Non-Citizen (County), % College (County), % Unemployment (County), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (County), Census Region (West) Census Region (North Central), Census Region (Northeast)
Pew '10	Woman, Age, Age (Missing), Foreign Born, Spanish, Evangelical, Religiosity, Religiosity (Missing) Married, Catholic, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran, Income, Income (Missing), Education, Unemployment, Homeowner, Ideology, Ideology (Missing), Republican, Independent, Nativism, Most Important Issue (Immigration), Most Important Issue (Education), Most Important Issue (Jobs), Most Important Issue (Health Care), Most Important Issue (Afghanistan), Most Important Issue (Environment), Most Important Issue (Budget), Retrospective Situation (Group), Political Interest, Experienced Discrimination, Perceived Discrimination, Ethnic Media, Know Deportee, Sociotropic Satisfaction, Log(Population + 1) (Zipcode), Population Density (Zipcode), % Latino (Zipcode), % Foreign (Zipcode), % Non-citizen (Zipcode), % College (Zipcode), % Unemployment (Zipcode), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (Zipcode), Log(Population + 1) (County), Population Density (County), % Latino (County), % Foreign (County), % Non-Citizen (County), % College (County), % Unemployment (County), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (County), Census Region (West) Census Region (North Central) Census Region (Northeast)
Pew '11	Woman, Age, Age (Missing), Foreign Born, Spanish, Evangelical, Religious Identity Centrality, Religious Identity Centrality (Missing), Religiosity, Religiosity (Missing) Married, Catholic, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran, Income, Income (Missing), Education, Unemployment, Homeowner, Ideology, Ideology (Missing), Republican, Independent, Most Important Issue (Immigration), Most Important Issue (Immigration, Missing), Most Important Issue (Education), Most Important Issue (Jobs), Most Important Issue (Health Care), Most Important Issue (Budget), Most Important Issue (Taxes), Retrospective Situation (Group), Political Interest, Sociotropic Satisfaction, Census Region (West) Census Region (North Central), Census Region (Northeast)
LAS '12	Foreign Born, Spanish, Age, Age (Missing), Married, Catholic, Evangelical, Woman, Mexican, Dominican, Puerto Rican, Salvadoran, Cuban, Religious Identity Centrality, Religious Identity Centrality (Missing), Religiosity, Religiosity (Missing), Income, Income (Missing), Education, Education (Missing), Republican, Independent, Most Important Issue (Immigration), Most Important Issue (Jobs), Most Important Issue (Economy), Most Important Issue (Education), Most Important Issue (Health Care), Most Important Issue (War), Most Important Issue (Moral Values), Arizona, Colorado, Virginia
Pew '12	Woman, Age, Age (Missing), Foreign Born, Spanish, Married, Catholic, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran, Income, Income (Missing), Education, Unemployment, Independent, Republican, Most Important Issue (Immigration), Most Important Issue (Education), Most Important Issue (Jobs), Most Important Issue (Health Care), Most Important Issue (Budget), Most Important Issue (Taxes), Political Interest, Sociotropic Satisfaction, Census Region (West) Census Region (North Central) Census Region (Northeast)
Pew '13	Woman, Age, Age (Missing), Foreign Born, Spanish, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran, Education,, Most Important Issue (Jobs), Most Important Issue (Health Care), Most Important Issue (Education), Most Important Issue (Government Debt), Republican, Independent, Nativism, Political Interest, Sociotropic Satisfaction, Personal Satisfaction, Most Important Issue (Immigration), Census Region (West), Census Region (North Central), Census Region (Northeast)
LAS '13	Woman, Age, Foreign Born, Spanish, Married, Catholic, Evangelical, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran, Education, Income, Income (Missing), Republican, Independent, Political Interest, Most Important Issue (Immigration), Most Important Issue (Jobs), Most Important Issue (Education), Most Important Issue (Health Care), Most Important Issue (War), Most Important Issue (Moral Values), Know Undocumented, Log(Population + 1) (Zipcode), Population Density (Zipcode), % College (Zipcode), % Foreign (Zipcode), % Latino (Zipcode), % Non-citizen (Zipcode), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (Zipcode), Log(Population + 1) (County), Population Density (County), % Latino (County), % College (County), % Foreign (County), % Non-Citizen (County), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (County), % Unemployment (County), Census Region (West), Census Region (North Central), Census Region (Northeast), Census Region (Missing)
Pew '14	Foreign Born, Spanish, Married, Age, Age (Missing), Income, Income (Missing), Catholic, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran, Unemployment, Education, Education (Missing), Republican, Independent, Democratic, Sociotropic Satisfaction, Democrats Concerned About Latinos, Most Important Issue (Immigration), Most Important Issue (Immigration, Missing), Retrospective Situation (Group), Most Important Issue (Education), Most Important Issue (Jobs), Most Important Issue (Health Care), Most Important Issue (Middle East Conflict), Latino Identity Centrality, Census Region (West), Census Region (Northeast), Census Region (North Central)

Blue: demographic controls. Green: socio-economic controls. Red: political controls. Purple: county-level controls. Orange: zipcode-level controls.

Table D9: Control Covariates by Survey (Continued)

Survey	Controls
CMPS '16	Woman, Age, Foreign Born, Spanish, Married, Catholic, Evangelical, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran, Religiosity, Religiosity (Missing), Income, Income (Missing), Education, Unemployment, Republican, Independent, Nativism, Political Interest, Ideology, Ideology (Missing), Experienced Discrimination, Perceived Discrimination, Know Undocumented, Latino Identity Centrality, Latino Linked Fate, American Centrality, Ethnic Media, Ethnic Media (Missing), Most Important Issue (Jobs), Most Important Issue (Education), Most Important Issue (Health Care), Most Important Issue (Taxes), Most Important Issue (Abortion), Gay Marriage Support, Log(Population + 1) (Zipcode), Population Density (Zipcode), % College (Zipcode), % Foreign (Zipcode), % Unemployment (Zipcode), % Latino (Zipcode), % Non-citizen (Zipcode), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (Zipcode), Log(Population + 1) (County), Population Density (County), % Latino (County), % College (County), % Foreign (County), % Non-Citizen (County), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (County), % Unemployment (County), Log(Total Deportations + 1), % Level 3 Removals, Deportations per 10,000 Foreign-Born, Census Region (West) Census Region (North Central) Census Region (Northeast)
Pew '17	Woman, Age, Age (Missing), Foreign Born, Catholic, Income, Income (Missing), Education, Unemployment, Independent, Republican, Most Important Issue (Immigration), Most Important Issue (Missing), Retrospective Situation (Group), Sociotropic Satisfaction, Most Important Issue (Health Care), Most Important Issue (National Security), Most Important Issue (Economy), Most Important Issue (Education), Census Region (West) Census Region (North Central) Census Region (Northeast)
Pew '18	Woman, Age, Age (Missing), Foreign Born, Spanish, Evangelical, Married, Catholic, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran, Income, Income (Missing), Education, Unemployment, Homeowner, Identity Centrality, American Centrality, Independent, Republican, Most Important Issue (Immigration), Retrospective Situation (Group), Experienced Discrimination, Retrospective Economic Situation, Retrospective Economic Situation (Missing), Prospective Economic Situation, Most Important Issue (Economy), Most Important Issue (Other), Most Important Issue (Racism), Most Important Issue (Political Polarization), Most Important Issue (Moral Values), Sociotropic Satisfaction, Log(Population + 1) (Zipcode), Population Density (Zipcode), % College (Zipcode), % Foreign (Zipcode), % Non-citizen (Zipcode), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (Zipcode), % Unemployment (Zipcode), % Latino (Zipcode), Log(Population + 1) (County), Population Density (County), % Latino (County), % College (County), % Foreign (County), % Non-Citizen (County), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (County), % Unemployment (County), Log(Total Deportations + 1), % Level 3 Removals, Deportations per 10,000 foreign-born, Census Region (West) Census Region (North Central) Census Region (Northeast)
Pew '19	Woman, Age, Age (Missing), Foreign Born, Spanish, Married, Catholic, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran, Education, Republican, Independent, Nativism, Most Important Issue (Immigration), Retrospective Situation (Group), Political Interest, Experienced Discrimination, Know Deportee, Sociotropic Satisfaction, Retrospective Economic Situation, Prospective Economic Situation (Kids), Census Region (West) Census Region (North Central), Census Region (Northeast)
LAS '21	Woman, Age, Foreign Born, Spanish, Married, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran, Education, Income, Income (Missing), Homeowner, Republican, Independent, Ethnic Media, Identity Centrality, COVID Exposure, Know COVID Death, Most Important Issue (COVID), Most Important Issue (Health Care), Most Important Issue (Economy), Most Important Issue (Education), Most Important Issue (Abortion), Log(Population + 1) (Zipcode), Population Density (Zipcode), % College (Zipcode), % Foreign (Zipcode), % Latino (Zipcode), % Non-citizen (Zipcode), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (Zipcode), % Unemployment (Zipcode), Log(Population + 1) (County), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (County), Population Density (County), % Latino (County), % College (County), % Foreign (County), % Non-Citizen (County), % Unemployment (County), % Level 3 Deportations, Log(Total Deportations + 1), Deportations per 10,000, Census Region (West) Census Region (North Central), Census Region (Northeast)
Pew '21	Woman, Age, Spanish, Foreign Born, Catholic, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran, Education, Republican, Independent, experienced discrimination, know undocumented, Sociotropic Satisfaction, Retrospective Economic Situation, Prospective Economic Situation Census Region (West) Census Region (North Central) Census Region (Northeast)
LPS '21	Woman, Age, Spanish, Foreign Born, Married, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran, Education, Income, Homeowner, Republican, Independent, Ideology, Latino Identity Centrality, Ethnic Media, Most Important Issue (COVID), Most Important Issue (Health Care), Most Important Issue (Jobs), Most Important Issue (Economy), Most Important Issue (Education), Most Important Issue (Abortion), Log(Population + 1), Population Density (Zipcode), % College (Zipcode), % Foreign (Zipcode), % Latino (Zipcode), % Non-citizen (Zipcode), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (Zipcode), % Unemployment (Zipcode), Log(Population + 1) (County), Population Density (County), % Latino (County), % College (County), % Foreign (County), % Non-Citizen (County), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (County), % Unemployment (County), Log(Total Deportations + 1), % Level 3 Deportations, Deportations per 10,000 foreign-born, Census Region (West) Census Region (North Central) Census Region (Northeast)

Blue: demographic controls. Green: socio-economic controls. Red: political controls. Purple: county-level controls. Orange: zipcode-level controls.

D.6 Estimation Strategies

Testing H1. To test **H1**, we use the following estimation strategy for each survey study:

$$(1) \qquad Y_i = \gamma_f + \tau threat_i + \sum_{k=1}^{k} \beta_k X_{izc}^k + \varepsilon_i$$

Where Y_i is a measure of *Democratic* (Republican) *support* (opposition) for each respondent, i. γ_f is a fixed effect for each census area, f. $threat_i$ is either the level of perceived deportation threat or reported exposure to knowing a deportee for respondent i. The summation denotes k individual-level (i), zipcode-level (z), and county-level (c) covariates. ε_i are robust errors. Zipcode and county-level covariates are not included in the estimation strategy for the Pew '11, '12, '14, '17, '19 and LAS '12 studies since they are not available. See Section D.5 for information on which individual, zipcode, and county-level covariates are included for each study.

If **H1** is supported, τ will be 0 in studies fielded during *Temporal Context 1* (Pew '10, '11, '12, '13, '14; LAS '12, LAS '13). Conversely, $\tau > 0$ in studies fielded in *Temporal Contexts 2* (Pew '08) and *3* (CMPS '16, Pew '17, '18, '19, LAS '21, LPS '21).

Testing H2. To test **H2**, we use the following estimation strategy for each study:

$$(2) \qquad Y_i = \gamma_f + \tau^{H1}(threat_i \times republican_i) + \tau^{H2}(threat_i \times independent_i)$$
$$+ \tau threat_i + \beta^1 republican_i + \beta^2 independent_i + \sum_{k=1}^{k} \beta_{k+3} X_{izc}^k + \varepsilon_i$$

Equation (2) is the same as (1), but with the inclusion of interaction terms between $threat_i$ and $republican_i$ (Republican partisanship) in addition to $independent_i$ (independent partisanship). If **H1 and H2** are correct, then $\tau^{H1} = 0$, $\tau^{H2} = 0$, in the studies fielded during *Temporal Context 1* (Pew '08, '10, '11, '12, '13, '14 LAS '12, LAS '13), and $\tau^{H1} > 0$, $\tau^{H2} > 0$, in studies fielded during *Temporal Contexts 2* (Pew '08) and *3* (CMPS '16, Pew '17, '18, '19, LAS '21, LPS '21).

Meta-analytic estimates. For **H1** and **H2**, we present Hartung-Knapp random effects meta-analytic estimates to provide a parsimonious summarization of the coefficients for studies fielded prior to partisan differentiation (Pew '08, '10, '11, '12, '13, '14 LAS '12, LAS '13) and after partisan differentiation (CMPS '16, Pew '17, '18, '19, LAS '21, LPS '21). We implement our meta-analyses using the `meta` package in $\mathbb{R}$.

D.7 Ruling Out Sorting

A. Partisan Sorting Into a Threatened Disposition Appears Temporary in Temporal Context 3 (Affective Threat Outcome)

B. Partisan Sorting Into Experiencing Threat is Limited (Experiential Threat Outcome)

Figure D6: Partisans do not sort into a threatened disposition. Panel A characterizes the association between partisanship and affective *deportation threat* (y-axis) in each survey relative to the Pew '13 survey (x-axis, hence no CI's for the Pew '13 survey). Panel B characterizes the association between partisanship and experential *deportation threat* (i.e. knowing a deportee) in each survey relative to the Pew '14 survey, hence no CIs for the Pew '14 survey. All covariates re-scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed.

D.8 LINES Analysis

Here we present estimates demonstrating threatened Latinx immigrants do not sort into different political parties using panel data between Nov. 2016-Jan. 2017 and Jul. 2017-Sep. 2017 from the Latino Immigrant National Election Survey (LINES). Table D11 demonstrates Latinx immigrants (columns 1-3) and Latinx immigrant citizens (columns 4-6) who are threatened by immigration enforcement between Nov 2016-Jan 2017 do not sort into different partisan identities between the two waves (Nov. 2016-Jan. 2017/Jul. 2017-Sep. 2017). Table D10 shows Latinx immigrants writ large and Latinx immigrant citizens who identify with a particular political party (or independence), are not more inclined to adopt a threatened disposition between the two waves (Nov. 2016-Jan. 2017/Jul. 2017-Sep. 2017). We believe these two sets of analyses provide suggestive evidence that the increased association between threat and politician support we observe in *Temporal Contexts 2* and *3* relative to *1* are not necessarily a function of partisan sorting, but priming.

Table D10: Partisanship Does Not Motivate the Adoption of a Threatened Disposition Among Latinx Immigrants

	Δ Threat (1)	Δ Threat (2)	Δ Threat (3)	Δ Threat (4)	Δ Threat (5)	Δ Threat (6)
Democrat	0.07 (0.04)			−0.05 (0.06)		
Independent		−0.10 (0.05)			−0.03 (0.10)	
Republican			0.01 (0.05)			0.08 (0.07)
Citizen Subset	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
R²	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
N	393	393	393	186	186	186

Note: ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$. Δ denotes the difference in perceived threat from deportation between Waves 2 (Nov 2016-Jan 2017) and 3 (July 2017-Sep 2017) in the Latino Immigrant National Survey (LINES, see McCann and Jones-Correa (2021)). Democrat, Independent, and Republican are binary indicators for identifying as such at Wave 2. All estimates include population weights to ensure representativeness. HC2 robust SEs in parentheses.

Table D11: Threat Does Not Motivate Partisan Shifts During The Beginning of the Trump Presidency Among Latinx Immigrants

	Δ Democrat (1)	Δ Independent (2)	Δ Republican (3)	Δ Democrat (4)	Δ Independent (5)	Δ Republican (6)
Threat	0.05	−0.04	−0.01	0.02	0.03	−0.06
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Citizen Subset	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
R^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
N	399	399	399	191	191	191

Note: ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$. Δ denotes the difference in partisan identification between Waves 2 (Nov 2016-Jan 2017) and 3 (July 2017-Sep 2017) in the Latino Immigrant National Survey (LINES, see McCann and Jones-Correa (2021)). Threat is the level of perceived deportation threat a respondent feels at Wave 2. All estimates include population weights to ensure representativeness. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table D12: Vote Choice Does Not Determine Shifts in Threatened Dispositions Among Latinx Immigrants

	Δ Threat
Voted 4 Trump	−0.02
	(0.07)
R^2	0.00
Num. obs.	183

Note: ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$. Δ denotes the difference in perceived threat from deportation between Waves 2 (Nov 2016-Jan 2017) and 3 (July 2017-Sep 2017) in the Latino Immigrant National Survey (LINES, see McCann and Jones-Correa (2021)). "Voted 4 Trump" is a binary indicator of voting for Trump at Wave 2. All estimates include population weights to ensure representativeness. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

D.9 Pew 2019-2021 Panel Analysis

Table D13: Pew 2019-2021 Panel Data Shows Threat in Time t Motivates Biden Approval in Time $t+1$ Adjusting for Trump Approval (Models 1-3) But Partisanship, Trump Approval, and the Interaction Between Partisanship/Trump Approval and Threat Do Not Motivate a Threatened Disposition in $t+1$ (Models 4-6)

	Biden Approval ('21)			Threat ('21)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat ('19) x Independent ('19)		0.21			−0.18	
		(0.15)			(0.19)	
Threat ('19) x Republican ('19)		0.26**			−0.10	
		(0.09)			(0.12)	
Threat ('19) x Approve Trump ('19)			0.38**			−0.20
			(0.13)			(0.16)
Threat ('19)	0.08†	0.01	−0.05	0.30***	0.33***	0.36***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Approve Trump ('19)	−0.25***	−0.23***	−0.38***	−0.03	−0.04	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Independent ('19)	0.04	−0.07	0.05	−0.12	−0.02	−0.12
	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Republican ('19)	−0.08†	−0.18**	−0.07	−0.00	0.04	−0.01
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
R^2	0.17	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.20	0.20
Num. obs.	1154	1154	1154	1154	1154	1154

Note: ***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$; †$p < 0.1$. All models adjust for foreign-born, Spanish-speaker, age, national origin, married, woman, catholic, college-education, knowing someone undocumented, partisanship, experienced discrimination, census area fixed effects. We produced this panel by identifying respondents with the same Pew American Trends Panel unique identifier in the Pew 2019 and Pew 2021 Latino surveys. This is why the number of observations in this panel analysis is much smaller than the additive number of observations in the cross-sectional samples of the Pew 2019 and 2021 Latino surveys.

D.10   Parsimonious Re-Analysis

Figure D7: Threat motivates partisan defection after Democratic politicians commit to mitigating immigration enforcement (parsimonious re-analysis). The x-axis is the meta-analytic random-effects coefficient for the respective covariates (y-axis). Color denotes temporal context. The meta-analytic coefficient for: 1) Temporal Context 1 (Light Grey) uses data from the Pew '10, '11, '12, '13, '14, LAS '12, and LAS '13 surveys; Temporal Context 3 (Black) uses data from the CMPS '16, Pew '17, '18, '19, LAS '21, and LPS '21 surveys. Temporal Context 2 (Dark Grey) uses data from the Pew '08 survey and averages the coefficients across the Pew '08 outcomes. Coefficients derived from models that only adjust for partisanship. 95% CIs displayed.


Figure D8: Threat motivates partisan defection after Democratic politicians commit to mitigating immigration enforcement (parsimonious re-analysis). The x-axis is the meta-analytic random-effects coefficient for the respective covariates (y-axis). Color denotes temporal context. The meta-analytic coefficient for: 1) Temporal Context 1 (Light Grey) uses data from the Pew '10, '11, '12, '13, '14, LAS '12, and LAS '13 surveys; Temporal Context 3 (Black) uses data from the CMPS '16, Pew '17, '18, '19, LAS '21, and LPS '21 surveys. Temporal Context 2 (Dark Grey) uses data from the Pew '08 survey and averages the coefficients across the Pew '08 outcomes. Coefficients derived from models only adjusting for partisanship. 95% CIs displayed.

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D.11 Sensitivity Analyses

Table D14: Sensitivity Analysis Of Deportation Threat Across *Temporal Context 3* Studies

Outcome	Survey	Threat Robustness Value	Bound
Clinton Vote	CMPS '16	0.10	4x GOP ID
Clinton Favorability	CMPS '16	0.10	6x GOP ID
Trump Favorability	CMPS '16	0.07	1x GOP ID
Obama Favorability	CMPS '16	0.07	1x GOP ID
Trump Favorability	Pew '17	0.19	1x GOP ID
Trump Approval	Pew '18	0.17	3x GOP ID
Trump Approval	Pew '19	0.15	4x GOP ID
Dem. Candidate Favorability	Pew '19	0.07	1x GOP ID
Biden Vote	LPS '21	0.07	7x GOP ID
Biden Approval	Pew '21	0.08	2x GOP ID
Biden Vote	Univ. '21	0.06	3x Ideology
Biden Approval	Univ. '21	0.06	4x Ideology
Harris Approval	Univ. '21	0.06	4x Ideology

Note: The "robustness value" is the amount of joint variation in outcome and independent variable that must be explained for the *threat* coefficient to be reduced to zero. The bound is how many times large the most prognostic covariate of the joint outcome and independent variable would have to be to reduce the *threat* coefficient to zero.

D.12 Non-Meta-Analytic Heterogeneity

Table D15: Deportation threat generates defection from supporting Republican politicians among Republican Latinxs in Temporal Context 2 (2008 Election)

	Vote Obama	Fav. Obama	Fav. Bush	Fav. McCain	Fav. Clinton
Threat x GOP	0.32*	0.25**	−0.01	−0.12	0.28**
	(0.14)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.09)
Threat x Ind.	0.30*	0.06	−0.07	0.05	0.07
	(0.14)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.09)
Threat	0.05	0.05	−0.00	−0.05	−0.06
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
GOP	−0.59***	−0.33***	0.17**	0.21***	−0.31***
	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Ind.	−0.39***	−0.05	0.03	−0.04	−0.09*
	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Temporal Context	2	2	2	2	2
Survey	Pew '08	Pew '08	Pew '08	Pew '08	Pew '08
Controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
R^2	0.42	0.27	0.22	0.18	0.23
Num. obs.	1142	1864	1882	1787	1892

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table D16: Deportation threat does not generate defection from Republican politicians among Republican Latinxs in Temporal Context 1 (After 2008 Election, Prior to Obama's Second Term Deportation Relief Commitments)

	App. Obama	App. Obama	Vote Obama	Vote Obama	App. Obama	Vote Obama	App. Obama	Fav. Obama	App. Obama
Threat x GOP	0.17	0.18	0.06	−0.03	−0.05	−0.03	0.17	0.02	0.05
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.15)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Threat x Ind.	0.16	0.06	−0.48**	−0.05	−0.17	0.30*	0.11	−0.20	0.01
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.19)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.08)
Threat	−0.04	−0.12*	−0.09	−0.03	−0.01	−0.03	0.02	0.04	−0.10*
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.04)
GOP	−0.30***	−0.29***	−0.53***	−0.75***	−0.58***	−0.65***	−0.39***	−0.64***	−0.22***
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Ind.	−0.26***	−0.16**	−0.25**	−0.51***	−0.29***	−0.63***	−0.13*	−0.16	−0.19***
	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.05)
Temporal Context	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Survey	Pew '10	Pew '11	Pew '11	LAS '12	LAS '12	Pew '12	Pew '13	LAS '13	Pew '14
Controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
R²	0.22	0.20	0.26	0.55	0.39	0.45	0.32	0.47	0.22
Num. obs.	1175	1220	557	2021	2021	1203	621	800	1520

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Table D17: Deportation threat generates defection from Republican politicians among Republican Latinxs in Temporal Context 3 (After Obama's Second Term Deportation Relief Commitments, Trump's Political Entry)

	Vote Clinton	Fav. Clinton	Fav. Trump	Fav. Obama	Fav. Trump	App. Trump	App. Trump	Fav. Dems	Vote Biden	Fav. Trump	Fav. Biden	App. Biden	App. Biden	Vote Biden	App. Biden	App. Harris
Threat x GOP	0.50***	0.28***	−0.28***	0.21***	−0.28**	−0.35***	−0.32***	0.13*	0.31***	−0.20***	0.17**	0.28***	0.48***	0.26***	0.35***	0.39***
	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Threat x Ind.	0.17	0.17**	−0.10	0.07	−0.07	−0.28***	−0.20*	0.11	0.14*	−0.08	−0.03	0.06	0.06	0.21***	0.15*	0.25***
	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Threat	0.01	0.03	−0.01	0.01	−0.09**	−0.03	−0.06*	0.01	−0.04	0.04	−0.02	−0.05	−0.03	−0.04	−0.04	−0.07
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
GOP	−0.59***	−0.38***	0.34***	−0.26***	0.34***	0.51***	0.53***	−0.24***	−0.82***	0.60***	−0.50***	−0.49***	−0.60***	−0.73***	−0.58***	−0.60***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Ind.	−0.20***	−0.23***	0.10***	−0.08***	0.10***	0.25***	0.23**	−0.22***	−0.26***	0.18***	−0.20***	−0.18***	−0.32***	−0.47***	−0.31***	−0.40***
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Temporal Context	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Survey	CMPS '16	CMPS '16	CMPS '16	CMPS '16	Pew '17	Pew '18	Pew '19	Pew '19	LAS '21	LAS '21	LAS '21	LAS '21	Pew '21	LPS '21	LPS '21	LPS '21
Controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
R²	0.57	0.36	0.37	0.37	0.27	0.55	0.49	0.28	0.60	0.40	0.41	0.38	0.35	0.52	0.38	0.36
Num. obs.	1659	2933	2924	2924	896	1895	2916	2916	1397	2070	2084	2208	3277	1682	1764	1764

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

D.13   Falsification Tests

Table D18: Threat is not associated with secular liberalism conditional on control covariates

Panel A: All Latinxs	Ban SSM (1)	Resolve Climate (2)	Obamacare (3)	Increase Taxes (4)	Voter ID (5)
Threat	0.05	0.02	0.05	−0.01	−0.04
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
R²	0.31	0.26	0.18	0.16	0.14
N	3009	3009	3009	3009	3009
Panel B: Registered Latinxs	Ban SSM (1)	Resolve Climate (2)	Obamacare (3)	Increase Taxes (4)	Voter ID (5)
Threat	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.04	−0.08*
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Survey	CMPS '16	CMPS '16	CMPS '16	CMPS '16	CMPS '16
Controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
R²	0.44	0.38	0.25	0.26	0.28
N	1659	1659	1659	1659	1659

Note: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. The outcomes for Models 1-5 characterize 4 point likert measures of support for banning same-sex marriage, passing legislation to resolve climate change, Obamacare, increasing taxes on the wealthy, and instituting voter ID laws. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

## D.14 Net Vote Difference Analysis

Figure D9: Net votes among threatened (unthreatened) Latinxs increases (decreases) in Temporal Context 2 relative to Temporal Context 1. This plot demonstrates that threatened segments of the Latinx mass public were more likely to intend to vote for Obama in 2008 (when he was a new candidate making strong commitments to mitigate interior immigration enforcement) versus 2012 (when he was "deporter-in-chief"). Conversely, Latinxs that are unthreatened by immigration enforcement were less likely to support Obama in 2008 versus 2012, suggesting that part of the reason *threat* is a relevant dimension of support for Democratic candidates among the Latinx mass public is because the unthreatened also contribute significant votes toward Republicans when Democratic politicians have stronger commitments to mitigate immigration enforcement. The estimates here use the net votes approach clarified by Grimmer et al. (2022), which accounts for compositional shifts between 2012 and 2008 regarding a) vote intention for Obama versus McCain/Romney, b) turnout intention, and c) the proportion of Latinxs who are threatened or unthreatened in 2008 and 2012. Unthreatened Latinxs are those who report they are threatened by immigration enforcement "not at all" or "not much" in response to the affective threat measure we outline in Study 1's "Measuring Immigration Enforcement Threat" section. Threatened Latinxs are those who report they are threatened by immigration enforcement "some" or "a lot" in response to the affective threat measure. Data used for these estimates comes from the 2008 and 2012 Pew Latino surveys, which are the only surveys with consistent measures of turnout and vote choice in this paper (and therefore where the net votes technique is appropriate). Estimates are population-weighted. 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals displayed (1000 replicates).

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E   Study 2

## E.1   RDiT Balance Tests

Figure E10: RDiT coefficients characterizing the effect of the DAPA announcement (x-axis) on non-approval covariates (y-axis), Latinx sample. Panels denote Latinx sample (All Latinxs, Latinx Democrats, Latinx Independents, Latinx Republicans). All estimates use mean-squared optimal bandwidth selection, a uniform kernel, and a running variable to the 1st degree (days to *deportation relief*). All covariates rescaled between 0-1. 95% confidence intervals displayed derived from robust SEs.

E.2   Assessing DACA Effect

Figure E11: Effect of June 2012 DACA announcement and August 2012 DACA implementation on Obama's approval. X-axis is the independent variable (DACA announcement, DACA implementation). Y-axis is the discontinuous RDiT effect of the respective independent variable (polynomial = 1, uniform kernel, mean-squared optimal bandwidth selection). 95% CIs displayed derived from robust SEs.

E.3 Alternative RDiT Specifications

Figure E12: Alternative RDiT specifications. X-axis is the Latinx subset. Y-axis is the RDiT coefficient using mean-squared optimal bandwidth selection (Calonico et al., 2017). Color denotes kernel, polynomial specification. Shape denotes inclusion/exclusion of controls. 95% CIs displayed derived from robust SEs.

E.4 Estimates Near Discontinuity

Figure E13: *Deportation relief* RDiT coefficient estimates near discontinuity for each Latinx sample X-axis is sample bandwidth (in days) and y-axis is the *deportation relief* RDiT Coefficient. All RDiT estimates use a polynomial degree set to 1 and a uniform kernel. 95% CIs displayed derived from robust SEs.

E.5 Sorting

A McCrary density test demonstrates there is a statistically marginal ($p < 0.10$) increase in "sorting" for the Latinx sample (i.e. an increase in the number of Latinxs taking the Gallup tracking poll post-deportation relief). However, sorting does not pose an identification problem because: 1) sorting is inconsequential in this context, the aforementioned balance tests suggest Latinx characteristics post-deportation relief are similar to those pre-deportation relief despite the increase in the raw count of Latinx respondents Section E.1; 2) our RDiT estimates with controls on Figure 9 adjust for the daily count of Latinx respondents without significant changes in deportation relief coefficient estimate

E.6 Temporal Placebo Tests

Figure E14: Temporal placebo tests characterizing the distribution of "fake" pre-treatment temporal discontinuity effects on Obama's approval. The dotted vertical line characterizes the size of the true coefficient. Annotations denote the proportion of placebo coefficients (in absolute value) that the real coefficient is larger than. Each panel characterizes a different Latinx subsample. All RDiT estimates use a polynomial degree set to 1 and a uniform kernel.

E.7 Donut Hole RDiT

Figure E15: "Donut-hole" RDiT estimates (y-axis) after removing a certain number of days before and after the discontinuity (x-axis). Each panel characterizes a different Latinx subsample. All RDiT estomates use a polynomial degree set to 1 and a uniform kernel, along with mean-squared optimal bandwidth selection (Calonico et al., 2017). 95% CIs derived from robust SEs.

## E.8 Difference-in-Differences Replication

Figure E16: Difference-in-differences and event study estimates characterizing the differential effect of *deportation relief* among Latinxs (relative to whites) on Obama's *approval*. From left to right, top 4 panels characterize the differential effect of deportation relief on Latinxs (relative to whites) for all Latinxs, Democratic Latinxs, Independent Latinxs, and Republican Latinxs. Annotations denote the generalized difference-in-differences (non-event study) estimates of *deportation relief*. Bottom 4 panels characterize the differential effect of deportation relief on Black people (relative to whites). Each column of panels are from the same event study model. Time to treatment (in months, x-axis) characterizes binary indicators for month of interview (indicators characterizing 10 months before/after deportation relief include all months after 10 months before/after deportation relief). The reference category for assessing the differential effect of *deportation relief* on Latinx and Black *approval* is the month prior to deportation relief (October 2014), hence no confidence intervals. 95% CIs displayed derived from robust interview date-clustered SEs.

F Study 3

F.1 Sample and Design Details

F.1.1 Experiment 1

Experiment 1 is embedded in the 2012 Latino Advocacy Survey (LAS '12) in Study 1 (N = 2021, see Section D.1 for survey methodological details). It is a split sample experiment (2 conditions) where respondents are exposed to a question about a whether they'd support an anti-immigrant (*exacerbate* condition) or pro-immigrant (*mitigate* condition) candidate ostensibly committed to reducing the threat of deportation.

Experimental Conditions: Respondents are asked the following question: Let's say one of the candidates had a plan to improve the economy that you supported, and on the immigration issue the candidate said.... [*MITIGATE* CONDITION]

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"America is a nation of immigrants, we need to treat immigrants with respect and dignity and help them become part of America instead of attacking them." **OR** [*EXACERBATE* CONDITION] "illegal immigrants are a threat to America who have committed a crime, we can never support amnesty for illegals. Would that statement make you more likely to support the candidate, less likely to support the candidate, or would you not care what they said about immigration if you agreed with their plan for the economy?

Outcome: Respondents can report the following answers to the questions associated with each condition: 1) more likely to support, 2) less likely to support, 3) don't care what they say. We code the outcome, *politician support*, from 0-2, where "more likely to support" is 2, "don't care" is 1, and "less likely to support" is 0. We re-scale the outcome between 0-1.

Moderator: We assess the heterogeneous influence of *deportation threat* on *politician support* by the *mitigate* and *exacerbate* conditions. In the LAS '12 survey, *deportation threat* is based on the *experiential* question: Do you know of any person or family who has faced detention or deportation for immigration reasons? The respondent can answer: 1) Yes, 2) No. The variable is coded 1 if the respondent puts "yes," 0 otherwise.

Controls: In our regression models, we adjust for age, college-education, woman, US-born status, English language-of-interview, national origin (Mexican, Cuban, Dominican, Puerto Rican, Salvadoran), and partisanship in order to account for chance imbalance across the experimental conditions.

Estimation: We use a linear model to estimate the heterogeneous association between *threat* and *politician support* by experimental condition:

$$PoliticianSupport_i = \alpha + \beta_1 mitigate_i \times threat_i + \beta_2 mitigate_i + \beta_3 threat_i + \sum_{k=1}^{k} \beta_{k+3} X_{izc}^k + \varepsilon_i$$

Where $PoliticianSupport_i$ is support for the hypothetical politician, $mitigate_i$ is the threat solution ownership condition where a hypothetical politician commits to *mitigate* immigration enforcement (as opposed to a condition where a hypothetical politician commits to *exacerbating* immigration enforcement), $threat_i$ is whether a respondent knows a person or family member who has faced detention or deportation, $\sum_{k=4}^{k} \beta_k X_{izc}^k$ are k control covariates, ε_i are robust errors. β_1 is the coefficient of interest, and should be *positive* if **H1** is supported.

F.1.2 Experiment 2

Experiment 2 is embedded in the 2013 Latino Advocacy Survey (LAS '13) in Study 1 (N = 800, see Section D.1 for survey methodological details). All respondents in Experiment 2 are exposed to two split sample experiments that have two conditions each. In the first split sample experiment, respondents are exposed to a question where respondents evaluate a hypothetical *Republican* candidate whose party commits to *mitigating* immigration enforcement OR *exacerbating* immigration enforcement. In the second split sample experiment, respondents are exposed to a question where respondents evaluate a hypothetical *Democratic* candidate whose party commits to *mitigating* immigration enforcement OR *exacerbating* immigration enforcement. In both split sample experiments, respondents are asked to evaluate their level of support for the hypothetical candidate. We duplicate the respondents in Experiment 2 such that the responses to the first split sample experiment are stacked on top of the responses of the second split sample experiment, with an additional variable generated for party-of-politician (we use respondent-clustered SEs in the estimation strategy specified below to prevent artificial deflation of SEs).

Experimental Conditions: Respondents are asked the following question: Would you be more or less likely to vote for a [Republican]/[Democratic] candidate in the future if [Republicans]/[Democrats] take a leadership role in [*MITIGATE* CONDITION: passing comprehensive immigration reform including a pathway to citizenship]/[*EXACERBATE* CONDITION: blocking comprehensive immigration reform or work to block the option for a pathway to citizenship], or would it have no impact on your vote?

Outcome: Respondents can then report the following answers to the questions associated with each condition: 1) more likely to support, 2) less likely to support, 3) don't care what they say. We code the outcome, *politician support*, from 0-2, where "more likely to support" is 2, "don't care what they say" is 1, and "less likely to support" is 0. We rescale the outcome from 0-1.

Moderator: We assess the heterogeneous influence of *deportation threat* on *politician support* by the *mitigate* and *exacerbate* conditions. In the LAS '13 survey, *deportation threat* is based on the *experiential* question: Do you know of any person or family who has faced detention or deportation for immigration reasons? The respondent can answer: 1) yes, know of someone, 2) No do not know anyone. The variable is coded 1 if the respondent puts "yes," 0 otherwise.

Controls: In our regression models, we adjust for age, college-education, woman, US-born status, English language-of-interview, national origin (Mexican, Cuban, Dominican, Puerto Rican, Salvadoran), and partisanship in order to account for chance imbalance across the experimental conditions.

Estimation: We use a linear model to estimate the heterogeneous association between *threat* and *politician support* by experimental condition:

$$PoliticianSupport_i = \alpha + \beta_1 mitigate_i \times threat_i + \beta_2 DemocratPolitician_i \times threat_i +$$

$$\beta_3 mitigate_i + \beta_4 threat_i + \beta_5 DemocratPolitician_i + \sum_{k=1}^{k} \beta_{k+5} X_{izc}^k + \varepsilon_i$$

Where $PoliticianSupport_i$ is support for the hypothetical politician, $mitigate_i$ is the threat solution ownership condition where a hypothetical politician's party commits to *mitigate* immigration enforcement (as opposed to a condition where a hypothetical politician's party commits to *exacerbating* immigration enforcement), $DemocratPolitician_i$ is a binary indicator if the respondent is evaluating a Democratic party politician, $threat_i$ is whether a respondent knows a person or family member who has faced detention or deportation, $\sum_{k=6}^{k} \beta_k X_{izc}^k$ are k control covariates, ε_i are respondent-clustered robust errors. β_1 is the coefficient of interest, and should be *positive* if **H1** is supported.

F.1.3   Experiment 3

Experiment 3 is embedded in a new survey that we did not use for Study 1, the 2023 Latino Political Survey (LPS), which was fielded on October 2023 (N = 3037). The survey is a mixed-mode phone and web survey of Latinx registered voters using post-stratification weighting to derive representative estimates of the Latinx registered voter population by age, gender, education and region. The margin of error is 1.9%. Experiment 3 is pre-registered at the Open Science Framework registry. Download files at this link: `https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Ni2yaogoaqAlaA9__odG5XFLC_bk0uU8/view?usp=sharing` for an anonymous copy of the pre-analysis plan.

Experimental Conditions: Respondents are exposed to the following 2x3 split sample experiment: Thinking about the 2024 presidential election, are you more likely or less likely to support the [Democratic/Republican] presidential candidate if they [support/take no position on/oppose] a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants. Party-of-politician (2 conditions: Democratic and Republican) is randomized in addition to threat solution ownership (3 conditions: support = *mitigate* condition; take no position on = *do nothing* condition; oppose = *exacerbate* condition).

Outcome: Respondents can then report the following answers to the questions associated with each condition specified above: 1) Much more likely to support, 2) Somewhat more likely to support, 3) Somewhat less likely to support, 4) Much less likely to support. We scale the outcome from 0-3 where 0 = "much less likely to support" and 3 = "much more likely to support." The outcome is rescaled between 0-1.

Moderator: We assess the heterogeneous influence of *deportation threat* on *politician support* by the experimental conditions. In the LPS '23 survey, *deportation threat* is based on the *affective* question: Regardless of your own immigration or citizenship status, how much, if at all, do you worry that a family member, or a close friend could be detained or deported for immigration reasons? The respondent can answer: 1) A lot, 2) Some, 3) Not much, and 4) Not at all. The variable is scaled between 0 and 3 where 0 = "not at all" and 3 = "a lot." The moderator is rescaled between 0-1.

Controls: In our regression models, we adjust for age, college-education, woman, US-born status, English language-of-interview, national origin (Mexican, Cuban, Dominican, Puerto Rican, Salvadoran), and partisanship, in order to account for chance imbalance across the experimental conditions.

Estimation: We use a linear model to estimate the heterogeneous association between *threat* and *politician support* by experimental condition:

$$PoliticianSupport_i = \alpha + \beta_1 mitigate_i \times threat_i + \beta_2 exacerbate_i \times threat_i +$$

$$\beta_3 DemocratPolitician_i \times threat_i + \beta_4 mitigate_i + \beta_5 exacerbate_i +$$

$$\beta_6 threat_i + \beta_7 DemocratPolitician_i + \sum_{k=1}^{k} \beta_{k+7} X_{izc}^k + \varepsilon_i$$

Where $PoliticianSupport_i$ is support for the hypothetical presidential politician, $mitigate_i$ is the threat solution ownership condition where a hypothetical politician commits to *mitigate* immigration enforcement (by supporting a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants), $exacerbate_i$ is the threat solution ownership condition where a hypothetical politician commits to *exacerbating* immigration enforcement (by opposing a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants). The reference experimental condition is if a politician *does nothing* to mitigate immigration enforcement. $DemocratPolitician_i$ is a binary indicator if the respondent is evaluating a Democratic party politician, $threat_i$ is the extent to which a respondent feels worried they or their family members will be deported, $\sum_{k=8}^{k} \beta_k X_{izc}^k$ are k control covariates, ε_i are robust errors. β_1 and β_2 are the coefficients of interest, and should be *positive* and *negative* respectively if **H1** is supported.

F.2 Balance Tests

Figure F17: Balance Between Experimental Conditions (Experiments 1-3).

## F.3 Testing H2 (Experiments 2 and 3)

Figure F18: Deportation threat has a stronger influence on support for Democratic politicians who commit to mitigating immigration enforcement among Latinx Democrats versus independents and Republicans (Experiment 2). 95% CIs displayed from robust HC2 SEs.

When it comes to assessing the heterogeneous influence of *threat* by the threat solution ownership experimental conditions across Experiments 2 and 3, *threat* appears to motivate more support for Democratic politicians if they are characterized as mitigating immigration enforcement in Experiment 3 but not Experiment 2 (See Table F19 and Figure F18). On balance, we interpret the results from both Experiments 2 and 3 as partial support for **H2**, but we take time to explain why this discrepancy in results across the two experiments exists in the following paragraphs.

There are a couple of differences between Experiments 2 and 3 that could explain the differences in results concerning the test of **H2**. First, temporal context. Experiment 2 was fielded in 2013, whereas Experiment 3 was fielded in 2023, a ten year difference. This paper suggests that the Democratic party, at least at the presidential-level, has increasingly "owned" the issue of mitigating the threat of immigration enforcement between these two time periods, especially since 2023 is a moment *after* Obama's second-term deportation relief commitments and the political entry of Donald Trump, an explicitly anti-immigrant candidate. Therefore, Latinx Republicans threatened by immigration enforcement who may be less inclined to support Democrats may have felt the hypothetical Democratic politician who is committing to mitigate the threat of immigration enforcement did not reflect reality in 2013, but did reflect reality in 2023, and were therefore inclined to support the hypothetical Democratic politician in 2023.

Table F19: Threat is More Strongly Associated With Support for Democratic Politicians Mitigating Immigration Enforcement Among Latinx Republicans in Experiment 3, But Not Experiment 2

	Politician Support for Democratic Politician	
	(1)	(2)
Mitigate Threat x Threat x Republican	−0.12	0.32*
	(0.11)	(0.14)
Mitigate Threat x Threat x Independent	−0.08	0.05
	(0.13)	(0.13)
Exacerbate Threat x Threat x Republican		0.03
		(0.16)
Exacerbate Threat x Threat x Independent		−0.05
		(0.15)
Mitigate Threat x Threat	0.16**	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.07)
Mitigate Threat x Republican	−0.27***	−0.31***
	(0.07)	(0.07)
Mitigate Threat x Independent	−0.27**	−0.05
	(0.10)	(0.07)
Threat x Republican	0.11	0.09
	(0.08)	(0.11)
Threat x Independent	0.07	0.15
	(0.09)	(0.10)
Mitigate Threat	0.39***	0.24***
	(0.03)	(0.04)
Exacerbate Threat		−0.04
		(0.05)
Threat	−0.08	0.09
	(0.05)	(0.06)
Republican	−0.04	
	(0.05)	
Independent	0.01	−0.19***
	(0.07)	(0.05)
Control Condition	Exacerbate Threat	Do Nothing
Experiment	2	3
Controls?	Y	Y
R²	0.33	0.20
Num. obs.	800	1519

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Second, treatment differences. Experiment 2 asks respondents if they would support a Democratic politician if their party takes a leadership role in passing comprehensive immigration reform. Experiment 3 asks respondents if they would support a Democratic presidential candidate if they support a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants. Experiment 2 does not explicitly indicate the politician in question "commits to a leadership role in passing comprehensive immigration reform," but rather, that their party will "commit to a leadership role in passing comprehensive immigration reform." Therefore, Experiment 2 does not explicitly indicate the politician in question has ownership over mitigating the threat of immigration enforcement by taking leadership on comprehensive immigration reform, whereas Experiment 3 explicitly indicates the politician in question supports a pathway to legalization for undocumented immigrants. The implied ownership in Experiment 2 may have undermined the impetus for Republican Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement to support a Democratic politician ostensibly mitigating the threat of immigration enforcement versus the explicit ownership in Experiment 3. These treatment differences also suggest we should privilege the results of Experiment 3, since the treatments in Experiment 3 are more explicitly about threat solution ownership.

On balance, we believe Experiment 3's results are more convincing and should be privileged because it was fielded during a temporal context where the treatments are more likely to match reality and the treatment is more explicitly about politician ownership concerning mitigating the threat of immigration enforcement.

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