

# The X Factor: How Group Labels Shape Politics\*

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## Abstract

What are the political consequences of group labels? Group labels are political, but little theory and evidence explains how group labels shape politician evaluations. We present an *Identity-Expansion-Backlash Theory* and posit politicians who use *inclusive* group labels may experience backlash among relevant group members predisposed against newly included or salient group members. Latinos' relationship with "Latinx," a gender-inclusive label, is a theoretical test case. Using several datasets, we find: Latinos are less likely to support politicians who use "Latinx" (Studies 1, 7); Latinos who oppose "Latinx" are less likely to support politicians who used or are associated with "Latinx" (Studies 2-5); Latinos in areas where "Latinx" is more salient are more likely to switch their vote toward Trump between 2016-2020 (Study 6). Consistent with our theory, these statistical patterns are driven by Republican, conservative, and anti-LGBTQ+ Latinos. Our findings have implications for politicians using identity-based appeals.

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# Introduction

What are the political consequences of group labels?<sup>1</sup> The development of group labels is inherently political. Prior research shows contemporary governmental classifications of U.S. ethno-racial groups were informed by a combination of state, non-governmental, and public interests for the purposes of government recognition, access to resources and legally enshrined rights, incentives to develop targeted public policy, and ease of communication to and classification of politically relevant ethno-racial groups (Mora, 2014). However, there is limited theory and empirical evidence on how the usage of particular group labels by politicians shape evaluations of said politicians by not only the general public, but more specifically, the politically relevant groups they are referring to. The usage of particular group labels by politicians may not be a superficial consideration given group labels are not static and shift over time, especially with regard to relevant ethno-racial groups in the United States. Moreover, anecdotal accounts imply group labels, like the newly formulated “BIPOC” (Black, Indigenous, and People of Color), “Latinx,” or “ADOS” (American Descendents of Slavery) are highly politicized,<sup>2</sup> with strong public preferences for particular labels cutting across political lines (Mora et al., 2022; Thompson and Martinez, 2022).

We present an *Identity-Expansion-Backlash Theory* (IEBT) to explain how the use of more *inclusive* group labels by politicians may generate political backlash from relevant group members, particularly, group members who are negatively predisposed toward newly included or salient subgroup members. Consistent with the IEBT, we use five separate representative Latino surveys, one of which is a two-wave panel, (Studies 1-5, combined  $N = 7062$ ) to provide observational evidence that 1) Latinos are less likely to support a politician who uses the phrase “Latinx,” a gender-inclusive group label, in their appeals to

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<sup>1</sup>When referring to a group label, we use quotation marks; however, when we refer to individuals as a part of an ethno-racial group, we do not use quotation marks.

<sup>2</sup>For example, on “BIPOC,” see: <https://www.vox.com/2020/6/30/21300294/bipoc-what-does-it-mean-critical-race-linguistics-jonathan-rosa-deandra-miles-hercules>. On “Latinx,” see: <https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2023/01/26/why-i-hate-term-latinx-opinion>. On “ADOS,” see: <https://abcnews.go.com/US/controversial-group-ados-divides-black-americans-fight-economic/story?id=66832680>.

the Hispanic/Latino community; 2) Latinos who oppose the phrase “Latinx” to describe the broader Latino/Hispanic community are less likely to support Democratic politicians who have used or are associated with “Latinx.” Moreover, we demonstrate these statistical patterns are driven by Republican, conservative and anti-LGBTQ+ Latinos that we may expect to be predisposed against the inclusion of queer and gender minority Latinxs. Moreover, we use a large high-quality opt-in online survey of Latinos ( $N = 7512$ ) after the 2020 election to demonstrate that Latinos who live in areas where “Latinx” is more salient are more likely to vote for Trump in 2020 conditional on negative attitudes toward LGBTQ+ group members (Study 6). Finally, we administer a pre-registered survey experiment using an online opt-in CloudResearch Latino sample (Study 7,  $N = 971$ ) and provide causal evidence Latinos are less likely to support a politician using “Latinx” instead of “Latino” in their appeals to the Latino/Hispanic community. Consistent with Studies 1-6 and the IEBT, the backlash against politicians who use “Latinx” is driven by Latinos who hold negative attitudes toward LGBTQ+ people.

Our theory and evidence make several contributions. First, we offer a general theory for understanding how group labels may affect politician evaluations, particularly among relevant minority ethno-racial group members. U.S. ethno-racial group labels shift over time and are politicized. Newly formulated labels like “BIPOC” and “Latinx” seek to explicitly include and make salient certain population subsets within a broader group category (Black and indigenous people within “people of color,” queer people and gender minorities within “Latinx”). Conversely, other group labels, like “ADOS,” are exclusive of particular group members, such as new immigrants, within another politically relevant group category: Black. Ultimately, politicians who use these different labels can cue a variety of political considerations that may motivate support or backlash among different subsets of the relevant group. We highlight conditions by which the use of inclusive group labels may motivate political backlash against politicians who use them, and offer insights for future extensions and research on the relationship between group labels and politics.

Second, we explain part of the puzzle as to why non-whites are increasingly supportive of Republican party politicians. Prior research shows Black people and Latinos are increasingly voting Republican because of ideological sorting (Fraga et al., 2024; Schuett, 2024); that is, non-white conservatives are no longer supporting (and voting for) Democrats like they used to, but rather, Republicans. Our evidence suggests part of the reason socially conservative Latinos are increasingly supporting the Republican party is because of backlash against LGBTQ+-inclusive appeals by Democratic party politicians. Our evidence is consistent with a nascent literature suggesting negative predispositions toward LGBTQ+ people may motivate non-whites to adopt increasingly conservative political stances despite their marginalized position on the ethno-racial hierarchy (Bonilla and Tillary, 2020).

Third, we extend and complicate prior work on the political consequences of gender-neutral language usage. Prior research shows increasing the salience of gender neutral language generates positive attitudes toward women and LGBTQ+ group members (Pérez and Tavits, 2019; Tavits and Pérez, 2019; Vicuña and Pérez, 2023). However, this research examines the salience of gender neutral language in contexts that are either not politically polarized on the use of gender neutral language or not explicitly cuing partisan politics. Conversely, our evidence shows when (Democratic) politicians—who are usually more pro-LGBTQ+ than their (Republican) political opponents—use gender neutral group labels like “Latinx,” they experience backlash from Latinos who would have otherwise supported Democratic party politicians but are negatively predisposed against LGBTQ+ people. Thus, we demonstrate the increased salience of gender neutral language may not always produce positive attitudinal shifts in service of the political interests of queer people and gender minorities.

## The Identity-Expansion-Backlash Theory

Prior research demonstrates group labels are tethered to politics. The development and adoption of group labels by ingroup members, outgroup members, and governmental entities

is a function of jockeying for government recognition; access to governmental resources and legally enshrined rights; and the necessity of ease of classification and/or communication to relevant groups (Safran, 2008; Mora, 2014). The usage of particular group labels to refer to relevant groups can also shape outgroup evaluations of said groups and policies that implicate those groups' political interests (Merolla et al., 2013; Smith et al., 2018; Sacchi et al., 2021; Denver et al., 2024; Jones, 2024). For example, media references to unauthorized immigrants as "undocumented" as opposed to "illegal" may mitigate the public's stigma toward unauthorized immigrants and motivate support for open immigration policies (Djourelova, 2023). Other research identifies how self- and externally-imposed group labels on part of politicians can affect the evaluations of said politicians by the public (Cluverius et al., 2020). Additionally, other work identifies the political antecedents of public support for particular group labels among relevant group members themselves. For instance, Black people who possess a stronger degree of politicized group consciousness have a preference for self-describing themselves as "African-American" (as opposed to "Black") (Sigelman et al., 2005); and politically liberal, Democratic Latinos with a stronger sense of in-group linked fate are more likely to identify as and support the usage of "Latinx" to refer to Latinos/Hispanics (Mora et al., 2022; Thompson and Martinez, 2022).

However, missing from the preexisting literature is both a theoretical and empirical treatment of the political consequences of the usage of group labels by particular politicians on the relevant group's evaluations of said politicians. Therefore, we synthesize a number of prior theoretical insights and develop an *Identity-Expansion-Backlash Theory* (IEBT) to explain how politically relevant groups may respond to the use of more *inclusive* group labels by politicians. *Inclusive group labels* are group labels that include new group members or make salient an underrepresented segment of the broader group category typically referred to by a preexisting, established, and relatively well-accepted label. Although our forthcoming theoretical and empirical insights do not implicate the consequences of the usage of *exclusive group labels* that exclude segments of a broader group that are included in a well-established

preexisting group label, we discuss how the IEBT and our evidence may inform theoretical and empirical insights on the consequences of exclusive group labels in the paper's conclusion.

To set up a stylized example of the IEBT, assume Politician A is appealing and communicating to a politically relevant group of 10 people. In their appeals, they use a group label that is relatively innocuous and largely accepted by the group. Because of A's effective political communication and policy platform, assume 70% of the group approve of and will vote for A versus their opponent, Politician B.

Now assume A uses an inclusive group label to refer to the politically relevant group that heightens the salience of and is meant to be inclusive of a minority group subset within the broader group. The political consequences of using an inclusive label are unclear. On the one hand, the minority group subset (and their allies within the broader group) may increasingly support A due to their use of inclusive language. But, the marginal returns to inclusive language usage may be minimal if the minority group subset was already predisposed to support A irrespective of A's use of inclusive language and if the minority group subset is a captured electorate since Politician B may be fundamentally against the political rights of the subset (Frymer and Skrentny, 1998; Smith, 2007).

Conversely, assume 40% (4) of the 10 group members are predisposed against inclusivity toward the the newly salient minority group subset. Assume 75% (3) of the 40% (4) of negatively predisposed group members were already not supporting A but supporting and likely voting for B. But, assume 25% (1) of the 40% (4) originally supported A and were going to vote for A but decides to instead support B in response to A's use of inclusive group labels. Thus, politician A experiences political backlash for using a more inclusive label and loses support from 70% to 60% of the politically relevant group.

Importantly, this backlash against A may occur even if A does not explicitly communicate concomitant policy and/or symbolic commitments toward the minority group subset since negatively predisposed group members may implicitly infer these commitments through the use of inclusive language (Haider-Markel et al., 2017). Moreover, consistent with prior

research on how the effects of group labels on the public's evaluations of groups may not be homogeneous (Smith et al., 2018), a core implication of the IEBT is that group members who are predisposed against the inclusion of the minority group subset are the most likely to backlash against A for the use of inclusive group language.

## Test Case: Latinos, “Latinx,” and Democratic Party Politicians


Latinos and their relationship to “Latinx” offer an effective and salient test case for the *Identity-Expansion-Backlash Theory*. “Latinx” is an inclusive group label, more specifically, a gender-inclusive phrase to refer to the Hispanic and/or Latino population. According to a wide array of definitions and interpretations, “Latinx” is meant to explicitly include gender minorities (e.g. transgender, non-binary, gender-nonconforming people) and queer people (e.g. broader segments of the LGBTQ+ community) (García, 2024).

The origins of “Latinx” are unclear. The “X” as a gender-neutral stand-in for an “o” or an “a” has its roots in both U.S. and Latin American feminist movement organizing during the 20th century (Salinas and Lozano, 2021). Some posit the term was developed amongst LGBTQ+ segments of the Latinx community in the 1990s on online chatrooms and listservs.<sup>3</sup> Elizabeth Horan, a professor of literature at Arizona State University, has been cited as the first to use “Latinx” in an academic journal article published in 2004 (Milian, 2017). U.S. Google Search data suggests searches for “Latinx” were detectable as early as 2004.<sup>4</sup> The term became increasingly popular in leftist and academic contexts amongst Latinx and Latino activists and scholars. In the early 2010s, the “X” was used in a Puerto Rican psychology periodical to challenge gender binaries in the Spanish language. In 2014, American Quarterly publishes a special issue (*Las Americas Quarterly*) that, in part, emphasized the potential usage of “Latinx” in both Latin America and the United States (Salinas, 2020). Several activist and university organizations began to adopt “Latinx” in the early-to-mid 2010s as

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<sup>3</sup><https://www.complex.com/life/a/yesenia-padilla/latinx>

<sup>4</sup>[https://www.huffpost.com/entry/why-people-are-using-the-term-latinx\\_n\\_57753328e4b0cc0fa136a159](https://www.huffpost.com/entry/why-people-are-using-the-term-latinx_n_57753328e4b0cc0fa136a159)




**Figure 1: The salience of “Latinx” has increased between 2000-2024.** Panel A characterizes monthly (x-axis) Google search intensity (y-axis). Panel B characterizes yearly (x-axis) Google Scholar hits (y-axis). Panel C characterizes yearly (x-axis) LexisNexis newspaper hits (y-axis). Solid lines characterize actual data, dashed lines characterize loess regressions fit to actual data.

well. Notably, the Chicano Caucus student organization at Columbia University changed their name to the “Chicanx” Caucus in 2015 (Salinas and Lozano, 2021). Other Latino affinity organizations at Pomona College, the University of Maryland, Pitzer, and Seattle University replaced “Latino” in their names with “Latinx” (Logue, 2015).

“Latinx” became nationally salient after the 2016 Pulse massacre against Latinx LGBTQ+ community segments during the Pulse nightclub’s “Latin Night,” where victims, allies, and journalists used “Latinx” to refer to LGBTQ+ segments of the broader Latino/a/x community (Rodriguez, 2022).<sup>5</sup> Since then, the salience of “Latinx” has precipitously increased across a variety of metrics. U.S. Google Search data suggests people are more likely to search for the phrase “Latinx” between 2010-2024, with the average weekly salience of “Latinx”


<sup>5</sup><https://www.npr.org/2016/12/13/503867756/months-after-pulse-shooting-there-is-a-wound-on-the-entire>



**Figure 2: Democratic MCs are significantly more likely to use “Latinx” on social media than Republican MCs.** Reproduced using Pew Research Center data and analyses (Shah, 2020).

being 0.62 on the 0-100 Google Trends scale prior to the Pulse massacre but 34 afterwards (Figure 3, Panel A). Google Scholar data between 2000-2023 suggests the average yearly number of published academic articles using “Latinx” prior to the massacre is 328, but 18,000 afterwards (Panel B). Moreover, LexisNexis data between 2000-2023 suggests the average yearly number of major U.S. newspaper articles using “Latinx” prior to the massacre is 7, but 2300 afterwards (Panel C). Among the Latino population, awareness of “Latinx” has also increased. Pew Research Center survey data demonstrates 23% of Latinos report they

### Vote for 'Ban Latinx Act' Introduced by Maria Salazar (R-FL) During 118th Congress



**Figure 3: At least in Congress, Democratic and Republican politicians are split on opposition to the phrase “Latinx.”** This plot characterizes House roll call votes for the “Reject Latinx Act,” an amendment to an appropriations bill introduced by Maria Salazar (R-FL) that mandates the Federal Government cannot use the phrase “Latinx” to refer to the Latino/Hispanic population. Data are from the House Clerk.

are aware of the phrase “Latinx” in 2019. This statistic increases to nearly 50% by 2023.<sup>6</sup>

As “Latinx” has become increasingly salient through the media, public awareness, and academic usage in the past few years, the label has also become politicized. There is reason to believe that “Latinx” has strong associations with the Democratic Party and Democratic Party politicians. More explicitly, “Latinx,” as a gender-inclusive label, may be perceived as a group label used and supported by the Democratic Party writ large, but also rejected by the Republican Party. On October 2019, while running for president during the Democratic primary, Elizabeth Warren repeatedly referred to Latinos as “Latinx” in her campaign communications and even used the phrase during the first Democratic primary debate in an explicit message to the Latino community.<sup>7</sup> Kamala Harris used “Latinx” to refer to the Latino population in the run-up to the 2020 election.<sup>8</sup> President Joe Biden also explicitly used “Latinx” in a speech concerning Latino COVID-19 vaccine compliance in 2021.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, at the Congressional-level, during the 114th Congress (2015-2017), less than 10% of Democratic congressmembers (MCs) used the phrase “Latinx” to refer

<sup>6</sup><https://www.pewresearch.org/race-and-ethnicity/2024/09/12/latinx-awareness-has-doubled-among-u-s-hispanic-adults/>

<sup>7</sup><https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/05/opinion/latinix-warren-democrats.html>

<sup>8</sup>See: <https://x.com/KamalaHarris/status/1290733001320652801?lang=kn> and see: <https://x.com/VP/status/1283452044167319553>

<sup>9</sup><https://www.newsweek.com/joe-biden-saying-latinx-sparks-widespread-mockery-wave-jokes-1604032>


to the Latino/Hispanic population on their social media accounts. By the 116th Congress (2019-2021), *half* (50%) of Democratic MCs used the phrase on social media relative to 0% of Republican MCs (Figure 3, Panel A). Additionally, during the 118th Congress, Maria Salazar, a Republican MC from Florida, introduced the “Ban Latinx Act” to the House (2023), which would have banned the use of “Latinx” in Federal government documents. Nearly all Republican House members voted “yes” to ban “Latinx” whereas nearly all Democratic members voted “no” (Figure 3). At the state-level, the only state government to officially ban the use of “Latinx” in government documents and proceedings is the Republican-controlled state of Arkansas, headed by Republican Governor and former White House Deputy Press Secretary for Donald Trump, Sarah Huckabee Sanders.<sup>10</sup> Finally, public opinion on “Latinx” is also politicized. Among Latinos, younger, liberal, and Democratic Latinos are more likely to support the use of “Latinx” to refer to the Latino/Hispanic population relative to older, conservative, and Republican Latinos (Mora et al., 2022; Thompson and Martinez, 2022).<sup>11</sup>

The intent of “Latinx” as a gender-inclusive phrase, in addition to its’ association with, and usage by, the Democratic party, makes the label’s relationship with Latinos an effective theoretical test case for the *Identity-Expansion-Backlash Theory* (IEBT). Consistent with the IEBT, the Latino population may observe the increased association with and usage of “Latinx” by Democratic party politicians and subsequently shift their evaluations of said politicians on the basis of predispositions toward inclusivity of LGBTQ+ group members within their broader ethno-racial group category. For Latinos positively predisposed toward the inclusion of LGBTQ+ group members, there may be an increase in positive evaluations and support of Democratic party politicians as they use and are associated with the “Latinx” group label. But, given the American two-party system and the Republican party’s strong association with policies that denigrate the rights of LGBTQ+ group members, Latinos positively predisposed toward LGBTQ+ people may be a “captured electorate” that was already going to support Democratic party politicians anyways (Frymer and Skrentny, 1998; Smith, 2007). Conversely,

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<sup>10</sup>Source: <https://www.npr.org/2023/01/13/1148966968/sarah-huckabee-sanders-arkansas-latinx>

<sup>11</sup><https://www.pewresearch.org/race-and-ethnicity/2024/09/12/latinx-awareness-has-doubled-among-u-s-h>



- (a) Scenario where Politician uses established group label      (b) Scenario where Politician uses inclusive group label

**Figure 4: Stylization of the *Identity-Expansion-Backlash* Theory in the Context of Latinos' relationship to "Latinx"**

for Latinos negatively predisposed toward LGBTQ+ group members, there may be a decline in positive evaluations and support of Democratic party politicians as they use and are associated with "Latinx." Given the politician evaluations of Latinos positively predisposed toward LGBTQ+ group members are less likely to marginally shift in response to politicians increasingly using and being associated with "Latinx," we would expect, on average, support for politicians to decline if they use "Latinx," and for this decline in support to be driven by Latinos who are negatively predisposed toward the inclusion of LGBTQ+ group members.


Figure 4 provides a stylized interpretation of this causal process. In Panel A, a politician uses "Latino" to refer to the Latino community, and is assumed to garner 70% of the vote from the Latino population on the basis of their policy platform and effective communications. However, consistent with the IEBT, if the politician shifts to using "Latinx" to refer to the Latino community (Panel B), the politician may not garner a net increase in support from Latinos who are socially liberal and therefore positively predisposed toward LGBTQ+ group members since these Latinos were already going to support the politician. Conversely, socially

conservative Latinos predisposed against LGBTQ+ group members that were originally supporting the politician may withdraw their support (and possibly support other politicians instead), leading to a net decline in overall support for the politician. Thus, we forward the following hypotheses:

- **H1:** Politicians who use “Latinx” will experience more opposition among Latinos than politicians who do not use “Latinx” in their political communications.
- **H2:** Backlash against politicians who use “Latinx” will be concentrated among Latinos who are more negatively predisposed against LGBTQ+ people relative to Latinos who are less negatively predisposed against LGBTQ+ people.

Additionally, another causal process consistent with the spirit of the IEBT could be based on 1) exposure to the inclusive group label (“Latinx”), 2) evaluations of the inclusive group label, and 3) subsequent evaluations of political parties and/or politicians that are associated with the group label on the basis of evaluations of the inclusive group label. However, consistent with the logic of the IEBT, Latinos who negatively evaluate “Latinx,” for whatever reason, may not necessarily reduce their support for Democratic party politicians *on average* despite their association with the inclusive group label. Instead, we may expect Latinos who are particularly steadfast against the inclusion and rights of LGBTQ+ people would be the most likely to reduce their support for Democratic party politicians conditional on their opposition to inclusive group labels. Thus, we forward the following hypotheses:

- **H3:** Latinos who oppose the use of “Latinx” to refer to the Latino/Hispanic population will be less likely to support politicians who have used or are associated with “Latinx” relative to politicians who have not used or are not associated with “Latinx.”
- **H4:** The relationship between opposition to Latinx and opposition to politicians who have used or are associated with “Latinx” will be stronger among Latinos who are more negatively predisposed against LGBTQ+ people.



**Figure 5: Latinos report they are less likely to support a politician or political organization if they use the term “Latinx” to refer to the Hispanic/Latino community.** X-axis characterizes the response category to the question in the plot title within the B&A survey. Y-axis characterizes the proportion of Latinos reporting each response category to the plot title question. Annotation denotes the net support for a politician/political organization if they choose to use the phrase “Latinx.”

## Study 1: B&A Poll


Study 1 uses toplines from a 2021 nationally representative survey of Latino registered voters ( $N = 800$ ) fielded by Bendixen & Amandi,<sup>12</sup> a Latino-specialized polling firm (B&A '21).<sup>13</sup> The B&A poll asked the question: “If a politician or political organization used the term Latinx when discussing the Hispanic or Latina(o) community, are you more or less likely to support them or their position?” Participants could respond with four choices: “no difference in support,” “less likely to support,” “more likely to support,” and “no answer.” The quantity of interest is the difference in the proportion of responses indicating “less likely to support” and “more likely to support,” which is the net change in support (*net support*) the hypothetical politician receives as a function of using “Latinx.”

Figure 5 displays the proportion of respondents who answered the aforementioned question

<sup>12</sup>Data source: <https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000017d-81be-dee4-a5ff-efbe74ec0000>

<sup>13</sup>We use toplines because B&A did not respond to requests to share their raw data. Therefore, we cannot conduct statistical difference tests. We can only descriptively interpret the data.

If a politician or political organization used the term Latinx when discussing the Hispanic or Latina(o) community, are you more likely or less likely to support them or their position?



**Figure 6: Independent and Republican (relative to Democratic) Latinos are more likely to backlash against politicians who use “Latinx” when referring to the Hispanic/Latino community.** X-axis characterizes the response category to the question in the plot title within the B&A survey. Y-axis characterizes the proportion of Latinos reporting each response category to the plot title question. Facets denote survey subset (A = Democrats, B = independents, C = Republicans). Annotation denotes the net support for a politician/political organization if they choose to use the phrase “Latinx.”

across the four choices. The B&A poll shows 30% and 15% of Latinos indicated “less” and “more likely to support.” Thus, consistent with **H1**, *net support* for a politician using “Latinx” declines by 15 percentage points, implying the existence of a backlash against the use of inclusive group labels on average.

Although the B&A toplines do not disaggregate *net support* by explicit measures of negative dispositions toward LGBTQ+ people, they do disaggregate *net support* by three-category partisanship (Democrat, independent, Republican). Prior research establishes Republican and Independent (relative to Democratic) partisanship is strongly associated with negative attitudes toward LGBTQ+ people, including transgender and non-binary people (Jones and Brewer, 2019). Moreover, our own analysis using auxiliary survey data shows Republican and Independent Latinos hold more negative attitudes toward LGBTQ+, transgender, and non-binary people (Figure A1). Therefore, partisanship serves as an effective proxy of negative dispositions toward LGBTQ+ people such that we can use it to test **H2**.

Figure 6 displays net support for a politician using “Latinx” among Democrats (Panel A), independents (B), and Republicans (C). Consistent with **H2**, The decline in *net support* as a result of a politician using “Latinx” among independents (-16) and Republicans (-37) is

much larger than the negligible decline among Democrats (-4).

In sum, these toplines provide tentative evidence in support of the *Identity-Expansion-Backlash Theory* and the notion that politicians who use inclusive group labels may experience political backlash, particularly among relevant group members who are predisposed against inclusivity.

## Studies 2-4: Axios and BSP Surveys

Study 1 is limited for several reasons. First, the question we use to calculate *net support* in the B&A poll possesses an *indeterminate baseline*. Respondents are asked if they are more or less likely to support a politician using “Latinx,” but we do not know what the politician would be using otherwise and how that factors into respondent shifts in support. Second, the question we use to calculate *net support* is a *leading question*. Respondents may be just as likely to support a politician regardless of their use of “Latinx” even if they dislike the use of “Latinx” by politicians because they support the politician for other reasons outside of their use of gender-neutral group labels. This is very difficult to gauge in Study 1 when the only information provided about the politician is their use of “Latinx.” Third, we are unable to conduct statistical tests of our hypotheses since B&A do not make their raw data available.

To this end, we use raw data from three nationally representative Latino surveys and evaluate the relationship between opposition to “Latinx” as a group label and support for Democratic party politicians to statistically test **H3** and **H4**. This empirical strategy allows us to circumvent the indeterminate baseline and leading question problem since respondents in these polls are asked to evaluate real-world politicians who may speak to their interests on dimensions outside the use of, or association with, gender-neutral group labels. If respondents who oppose the use of Latinx as a group label are less likely to support Democratic party politicians net of adjusting for control covariates highly prognostic of politician evaluations (e.g. partisanship, ideology), then it suggests inclusive group labels may have a potent

influence on politician evaluations.

## Data and Design

The three surveys we use are the 2022 Axios-Ipsos-Telemundo Latino poll (Axios '22,  $N = 1005$ ), 2023 Barreto-Segura Partners-UnidosUS Latino Election poll (BSP '23,  $N = 3037$ ), and 2024 Axios-Ipsos-Telemundo Latino poll (Axios '24,  $N = 1012$ ). The Axios polls are representative of the national Latino population, and the BSP poll is representative of Latino registered voters in eight states with large and politically relevant Latino populations (AZ, CA, FL, GA, NC, NV, PA, TX). All surveys are administered bilingually (Spanish/English) to ensure representativeness.

### Outcome: Democratic Support

Broadly construed, the outcome of interest is support for Democratic party politicians (*Democratic support*). As previously mentioned when we described the *Identity-Expansion-Backlash Theory*, we focus on support for Democratic party politicians because the Democratic party may be associated with “Latinx” due to its perceptible support for gender-inclusive group labels. Additionally, many of our outcomes are explicitly measuring support for politicians that have used “Latinx” prior to the fielding of the relevant surveys (e.g. Joe Biden, Kamala Harris).

*Democratic support* is measured differently across surveys. In the Axios '22 survey, *Democratic support* is six different outcomes: 1) *Support Democrats* is an additive index of binary indicators on whether respondents believe the Democratic party a) represents people like them, b) cares about Latino Americans, c) does not take Latino Americans for granted and d) is not prejudiced against Latino Americans;<sup>14</sup> 2) *Biden favorability* is a 7-point scale between “very unfavorable” to “very favorable”; 3) *Harris favorability* is a 7-point scale between “very unfavorable” to “very favorable”; 4) *Trump unfavorability* is a 7-point scale

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<sup>14</sup>Instead of reporting the Democratic party fits these characteristics, respondents can report the “Republican party,” “both equally,” “neither,” or “don’t know.”

between “very favorable” to “very unfavorable”;<sup>15</sup> 5) *GOP Don’t Vote* is a binary indicator if the respondent reports they will *not* vote for a Republican candidate in the upcoming 2022 midterm congressional election (choosing instead to vote for a Democratic candidate, other candidate, to abstain, or reporting “don’t know”); 6) We also generate an additive index of the aforementioned four outcomes in a *Democratic support index*.

In the BSP ’23 survey, *Democratic support* is four outcomes: 1) *Biden vote intention*, a 7-point scale between “will definitely vote for Trump in 2024” to “will definitely vote for Biden in 2024”; 2) *Biden approval*, a 5-point scale between “strongly disapprove” to “strongly approve”;<sup>16</sup> 3) *Harris approval*, a 5-point scale between “strongly disapprove” to “strongly approve”; 4) An additive *Democratic support index* of the aforementioned three outcomes.

In the Axios ’24 survey, *Democratic support* is five outcomes: 1) *Biden favorability* is a 7-point scale between “very unfavorable” to “very favorable”; 2) *Harris favorability* is a 7-point scale between “very unfavorable” to “very favorable”; 3) *Trump unfavorability* is a 7-point scale between “very favorable” to “very unfavorable”; 4) *Trump Don’t Vote* is a binary indicator if the respondent reports they will *not* vote for Trump in the upcoming 2024 presidential election (choosing instead to vote for Biden, another candidate, to abstain, or reporting “don’t know”); 5) An additive *Democratic support index* of the aforementioned four outcomes. All outcome covariates are rescaled between 0-1.

### **Independent Variable: Opposition to “Latinx”**

The independent variable of interest is opposition to Latinx as a label to refer to the Latino/Hispanic population (*oppose Latinx*). *Oppose Latinx* is also measured differently across surveys. In the Axios ’22 and ’24 surveys, *oppose Latinx* is a 4-point scale between “very comfortable” to “not at all comfortable” in response to a question asking respondents how comfortable they are with people using “Latinx” to refer to your race or ethnicity. In the

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<sup>15</sup>Favorability items in the Axios ’22 survey include the option to skip or report “don’t know,” which we code as the midpoint of the favorability scales.

<sup>16</sup>*Approval* and *vote intention* are coded such that “don’t know” is the midpoint response in the respective scales.

BSP '23 survey, *oppose Latinx* is a 5-point scale from “like it a lot” to “strongly dislike it” in response to a question asking respondents how they feel about “Latinx” as a term to refer to people of Latin American ancestry, instead of Hispanic or Latino. *Oppose Latinx* is rescaled between 0-1 across all surveys. Consistent with the *Identity-Expansion-Backlash Theory* and **H3**, we expect *oppose Latinx* to be *negatively* associated with *Democratic support*.

### Moderators: Predispositions Against Inclusivity

Ideally, we could test **H4** directly by measuring negative attitudes toward LGBTQ+ people across all three surveys. However, not all surveys contain measures of negative beliefs toward LGBTQ+ group members. Thus, our moderator of interest is an *anti-LGBT+ index* in the Axios '22 survey but *conservative political ideology* in the BSP and Axios '24 surveys. Although *conservative ideology* does not directly measure negative dispositions toward LGBTQ+ group members, prior research and our own auxiliary analyses of Latino survey data establishes a strong relationship between *conservative ideology* and negative attitudes toward LGBTQ+ group members (Jones and Brewer, 2019) (Figure B2).<sup>17</sup>

The Axios '22 *anti-LGBT+ index* is an additive index of binary indicators measuring respondents' disagreement with the notion that 1) people should be able to decide their own gender identity, 2) teenagers should be able to decide their own gender identity, 3) parents are not committing child abuse by allowing their children to gender transition, 4) they are comfortable around LGBTQ people. *Conservatism* in the BSP '23 survey is a 5-point scale from “very liberal” to “very conservative.” The Axios '24 survey does not include a traditional political ideology scale. Thus, we construct an exhaustive additive *conservatism* index out of the following items: 1) Support for making abortion illegal on a 5-point scale; 2) Opposition to making abortion legal on a 4-point scale; 3) Support for increasing religion in government on a 4-point scale; 4) Opposition to government intervention to ensure equal

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<sup>17</sup>Both a traditional liberal-conservative ideology scale and an index of conservative policy preferences (i.e. substantive conservative ideology) are highly correlated with negative attitudes toward LGBTQ+ group members on Figure B2. This is important since the Axios '24 survey does not include a traditional liberal-conservative ideology scale and, consequently, we use an additive index of conservative policy preferences.

access to opportunity on a 5-point scale; 5) Disagreement with the notion that Latinos face discrimination on a 5-point scale; 6) Support for deporting undocumented immigrants on a 4-point scale; 7) Support for no asylum for immigrant refugees on a 4-point scale. Given the conservatism index ranges from 0-24 and is right-skewed, we generate a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent is above the median value of the scale (9, *conservative*) in order to reduce model dependence and unrealistically large heterogeneous associations.

Although the *anti-LGBT+ index* and *conservatism* are positively correlated with *oppose Latinx*, they are not measuring the same concept. In the Axios '22 survey, 42% of those who are “not at all” or “not very” comfortable with “Latinx” are below the median level of the *anti-LGBT+ index* while 43% of those who are “very” or “somewhat” comfortable with “Latinx” are above the median *anti-LGBT+ index* level. Likewise, 43% of those above the median *anti-LGBT+ index* level are “very” or “somewhat” comfortable with “Latinx” while 42% of those below the median *anti-LGBT+ index* level are “not very” or “not at all” comfortable with “Latinx.” In the BSP '23 survey, 35% of those who dislike “Latinx” are self-described political liberals while 32% of those who like “Latinx” are political conservatives. Likewise, 32% of self-described political conservatives like “Latinx” while 37% of self-described political liberals dislike “Latinx.” In the Axios '24 survey, 47% of those who uncomfortable with “Latinx” are below the median *conservatism* index level while 44% of those who are comfortable with “Latinx” are above the median *conservatism* index level. Likewise, 37% of Latinos who are above the median *conservatism* index are comfortable with “Latinx” while 57% of Latinos who are below the median *conservatism* index are uncomfortable with “Latinx.” Indeed, the Pearson’s  $\rho$  correlation coefficients between *oppose Latinx* and the *anti-LGBT+ index*; *conservatism*, across the three surveys, ranges between 0.07-0.21, which prior research establishes may be a substantively “weak” correlation (Schober et al., 2018). In sum, there are sizeable proportions of the Latino population who like Latinx but are predisposed against inclusivity vis-a-vis the LGBTQ+ community and sizeable proportions of the Latino population who dislike Latinx but are predisposed toward inclusivity vis-a-vis the LGBTQ+

community (and vice-versa), allowing us sufficient statistical power to effectively assess the heterogeneous relationship between *oppose Latinx* and *Democratic support* conditional on predispositions toward LGBTQ+ inclusivity.


If **H4** is supported, the association between *oppose Latinx* and *Democratic support* will be more strongly negative for respondents who are more anti-LGBT and conservative relative to respondents who are pro-LGBT and not conservative. All moderators are rescaled between 0-1.

## Controls

Across all three surveys, we adjust for a permutation of several covariates likely prognostic of *Democratic support* and *oppose Latinx* identified in prior literature: age, woman (Mora et al., 2022), national origin (Cisneros, 2016), Catholic, Evangelical (Higgins, 2014), religiosity (Valenzuela, 2014), Spanish-dominance (Uhlauer and Garcia, 2005), US-born (Alvarez and Bedolla, 2003), unemployed (Grafstein, 2005), college-education (Corral and Leal, 2020; Thompson and Martinez, 2022), income (Rhodes et al., 2017), partisanship, ideology (Alvarez and Bedolla, 2003; Mora et al., 2022; Fraga et al., 2024), perceptions of anti-Latino discrimination, experiences of anti-Latino discrimination (Huddy et al., 2016; Thompson and Martinez, 2022), and census area fixed effects. See Table B1 for details on which control covariates are included in models for particular studies/surveys. All control covariates are rescaled between 0-1.

## Meta-Analysis

Given we assess the association between *oppose Latinx* and *Democratic support* across three surveys to test **H3**, we estimate a study-adjusted Hartung-Knapp random effects meta-analytic estimate characterizing the association between *oppose Latinx* and *Democratic support* across the Axios '22, BSP '23, and Axios '24 surveys. In the meta-analysis, we standardize all outcomes to ensure coefficient scale consistency across the studies. The Hartung-Knapp



**Figure 7: *Oppose Latinx* is negatively associated with *Democratic support*.** All covariates scaled between 0-1 with exception of the outcomes, which are mean-standardized. 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust SEs.

random effects meta-analytic approach produces conservative confidence intervals in the presence of inter-study coefficient heterogeneity (IntHout et al., 2014). “Study-adjusted” means we average the *oppose Latinx* coefficients (and their standard errors) within each study for inclusion into the meta-analysis. This ensures each outcome test is not treated as an independent study, which could artificially reduce the standard error for the meta-analytic *oppose Latinx* coefficient estimate.

## Results

Figure 7 characterizes the association between *oppose Latinx* and *Democratic support* across the Axios '22, BSP '23, and Axios '24 surveys.<sup>18</sup> For brevity, we interpret the association between *oppose Latinx* and the *Democratic support index*. Consistent with **H3** and the *Identity-Expansion-Backlash* theory, *oppose Latinx* is negatively associated with the *Democratic support index* in the Axios '22 ( $\beta = -0.18$ ,  $SE = 0.07$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ), BSP '23 ( $\beta = -0.30$ ,  $SE = 0.05$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ), and Axios '24 surveys ( $\beta = -0.13$ ,  $SE = 0.07$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ). The

<sup>18</sup>For details on estimation strategies used in Studies 2-4, see Section B.3.


random-effects meta-analytic *oppose Latinx* coefficient estimate is -0.23 standard deviations ( $SE = 0.05$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). In sum, we find modest evidence suggesting Latinos who oppose the use of gender-neutral inclusive labels to refer to their ethnic group are less likely to support Democratic party politicians who have either used or are associated with the inclusive label.

### Heterogeneity by Predispositions Against Inclusivity

Figure 8 characterizes the association between *oppose Latinx* and *Democratic support* conditional on predispositions against the inclusivity of LGBTQ+ people. Across the three surveys, Latinos who oppose the use of Latinx are not more or less likely to support Democratic politicians if they do not hold anti-LGBT+ beliefs and are not politically conservative. Conversely, and consistent with **H4** and the spirit of the *Identity-Expansion-Backlash Theory*, Latinos who are predisposed against the inclusion of LGBTQ+ people (those who hold anti-LGBT+ beliefs and are politically conservative), are less likely to support Democrats conditional on opposing the use of Latinx. The min-max associations between *oppose Latinx* and the *Democratic support index* for Latinos predisposed against LGBTQ+ inclusion is substantively large, equivalent to 68%, 59% and 32% of the *Democratic support index* standard deviation for the Axios '22, BSP '23, and Axios '24 surveys respectively. In sum, opposition to inclusive group labels does not necessarily motivate backlash against Democratic party politicians who are associated with the label. The backlash against Democratic party politicians as a function of opposition to Latinx is wholly concentrated among Latinos who are particularly negatively predisposed toward the inclusion of LGBTQ+ group members.

### Robustness Checks

We assess the robustness of our results. The negative association between *oppose Latinx* and *Democratic support* may be a function of generalized opposition to other well-established and/or politicized group labels that is correlated with opposition against the usage of “Latinx” instead of opposition against the usage of “Latinx” independently. We conduct placebo




**Figure 8: The association between *oppose Latinx* and *Democratic support* is stronger among anti-LGBT+ and conservative Latinos.** All covariates scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust SEs. Note: outcomes are not standardized in this Figure, hence the coefficient scale differences vis-a-vis Figure 7.

tests using the Axios '22 and '24 surveys assessing the association between opposition to “Latino,” “Hispanic,” “National-Origin-American,”<sup>19</sup> “POC (People of Color),” “BIPOC (Black, Indigenous, and People of Color),” and *Democratic support*. We find the association between opposition to these group labels and *Democratic support* (and their association conditional on anti-LGBT+ attitudes and conservatism) is statistically null (Tables B2-B5), suggesting our results are not a function of opposition to other relevant and politicized group labels that may be associated with the Democratic party (e.g. “BIPOC”).

*Oppose Latinx* may be associated with less *Democratic support* because of unobservable factors correlated with both the likelihood of opposing the usage of Latinx and support for Democratic party politicians. To this end, we conduct a critical falsification test in the BSP '23 survey and assess the association between *Oppose Latinx* and whether or not respondents have always supported candidates that are Democratic *in prior elections*.<sup>20</sup> Given “Latinx” was not salient until very recently, the association between *oppose Latinx* and support for political candidates that are Democratic *in previous elections* before the upcoming 2024

<sup>19</sup>For instance, if the respondent reports they are of Mexican descent, then they would be asked in the survey how comfortable they are with the group label “Mexican-American.”

<sup>20</sup>Specifically, support for Democrats in prior elections is measured with an item asking respondents “Thinking back to previous elections, whether you voted or not, how would you describe the candidates you supported?” Response options are from “I always, or almost always support Republican candidates” to “I always, or almost always support Democratic candidates” on a 0-4 scale.



**Figure 9: *Oppose Latinx* is negatively associated with *Democratic support* in the present, but not *Democratic support* in the past before “Latinx” was more salient.** All covariates scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust SEs.

election should be relatively weak or statistically null,<sup>21</sup> implying that Latinos who oppose Latinx are not inherently predisposed to support Democrats less for reasons outside of their feelings concerning inclusive group labels. Indeed, we find *oppose Latinx* is not associated with support for political candidates in previous elections (Figure 9), suggesting our results are driven by backlash motivated by the increased usage of and association with “Latinx” among Democratic party politicians in the last few years, not the adoption of negative attitudes toward “Latinx” as a function of partisan identity and/or politician preferences.

## Study 5: Pew Latino Panel

Studies 2-4 are limited since the results may be driven by reverse causality. Support for Democratic party politicians may motivate the adoption of preferences for gender-inclusive group labels, especially if respondents are following party cues in the form of Democratic party usage of the phrase “Latinx.” To this end, we construct a Latino panel survey using

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<sup>21</sup>Although Latinx was relatively salient in the 2020 election, the association between *oppose Latinx* and *prior Democratic support* should still be relatively muted since Latinx was not a salient phrase in the elections prior to 2020.

common identifiers from two Latino surveys (2019, 2021) and assess if opposition to “Latinx” recorded in 2019 is negatively associated with approval of Biden’s job as president in 2021 adjusting for Trump’s job approval in 2019. The panel data allows us to evaluate changes in the same attitude (presidential job approval) between two time periods as a function of opposition to the phrase “Latinx” net of the shift in presidential politicians, mitigating reverse causality concerns.

## Data and Design

We use two nationally representative Pew Latino surveys fielded in 2019 ( $N = 3030$ ) and 2021 ( $N = 3375$ ). Pew Latino poll respondents are derived from the Pew American Trends Panel, a multimode, probability-based survey panel made up of roughly 10,000 adults who are selected at random from across the entire United States.<sup>22</sup> Since Pew derives its’ respondents from this panel several times for its polls, the same respondents may be in two different polls. To generate a two-wave panel dataset of Latinos with common covariates, we identify Latino respondents interviewed in *both* the 2019 and 2021 Pew Latino surveys using the common identifier in both Pew surveys (“QKEY”). This process yielded a final panel survey of 1208 Latinos interviewed between 2019 and 2021. The final panel survey is compositionally distinct from the 2019 Pew survey in that it is more Democratic (66% vs. 60%), younger (1.2 vs. 1.4 on the 0-3 age scale), more woman (57% to 53%), and more college-educated (42% vs. 35%). However, given the Pew panel contains characteristics that are more supportive of the phrase “Latinx” and less likely to disapprove of Democratic politicians (Mora et al., 2022), the sample may be advantageous in that it provides a conservative test of our hypotheses.

The outcome of interest is presidential job *approval*. In 2019, Trump’s job approval was measured. In 2021, Biden’s job approval was measured. *Approval* a scale from 0-3 between “strongly disapprove” to “strongly approve” concerning the incumbent president’s job. In this study, we are interested in evaluating the net relationship between opposition to “Latinx”

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<sup>22</sup>For more details, see <https://www.pewresearch.org/the-american-trends-panel/>

and Biden approval in 2021 adjusting for Trump approval in 2019. Although the outcomes are not necessarily equivalent comparisons since the 2019 *approval* measure concerns Trump while the 2021 *approval* measure concerns Biden, they are highly (negatively) correlated with one another.<sup>23</sup>

The independent variable of interest is opposition to the use of “Latinx” to describe the Hispanic or Latino population (*oppose Latinx*), a binary indicator equal to 1 if a respondent responds “no” to a question asking whether “Latinx should be used to describe the Hispanic or Latino population,” 0 if a respondent indicates “yes.” Importantly, the *oppose Latinx* question was only asked of respondents who indicated “yes” (as opposed to “no”) in response to whether they “heard of the term Latinx.” Thus, our analysis is limited to the 30% of the sample that has heard of the phrase “Latinx” ( $N = 362$ ).<sup>24</sup> On the one hand, limiting our analysis to the subset of the sample that has heard of “Latinx” is advantageous, because self-reported indication of whether “Latinx” should be used to refer to the group is more likely to be genuine attitudinal judgement. On the other hand, a caveat of Study 5 is that we can only draw statistical conclusions that characterize the attitudes of a smaller proportion of the Latino public. The subset of the Latino population that knows about “Latinx” is less approving of Trump (18% vs. 31%), younger (0.9 vs. 1.4 on the 0-3 age scale), more woman (61% vs. 55%), more Democratic (77% vs. 61%), and more college-educated (54% vs. 36%) than the subset that does not know about “Latinx.” Again, this is a Latino population subset that is likely more supportive of the phrase “Latinx” and less likely to disapprove of Democratic politicians, and thus, provides a conservative test of our hypotheses (Mora et al., 2022). If **H3** is supported, we expect *oppose Latinx* to be negatively associated with Biden approval in 2021 adjusting for Trump approval in 2019.

A key limitation of our panel analysis is that we do not have data on opposition to “Latinx” in the 2021 Pew Latino survey data. Thus, we can only assess if opposition to “Latinx”

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<sup>23</sup>Pearson’s  $\rho = -0.48$ , equivalent to three-fourths of the correlation between Republican partisanship (in 2019) and Trump approval (in 2019) (.63) despite the two-year lag.


<sup>24</sup>Our results are not sensitive to including the full sample and statistically adjusting for knowledge of “Latinx.” (Table C6)

motivates a shift in presidential job approval (net of the change in presidents) between 2019 and 2021, not whether presidential job approval motivates a shift in opposition to Latinx between 2019 and 2021 (which would help us identify the possibility of a reverse causal process working in tandem with our causal process of interest). However, it is important to note that Trump's *approval* in 2019 is *not* related to *oppose "Latinx"* in 2019 (Figure C4). Thus, any relationship between *oppose Latinx* and *approval* of Biden in 2021 is likely to be a function of shifts in the extent to which Latino individuals who oppose "Latinx" are willing to support Democratic party politicians (as opposed to Republican party politicians), not shifts in the extent to which Latino individuals predisposed toward Democrats are likely to adopt positive attitudes toward "Latinx" as a phrase to describe the group.

To test **H4**, we assess whether the association between *oppose Latinx* in 2019 and Biden *approval* in 2021 is moderated by three possible predispositions against the inclusivity of LGBTQ+ people that we can measure in the Pew survey data: 1) political *conservatism* (in 2019); 2) *Republican* partisanship (in 2019); and 3) Trump *approval* (in 2019). Given the Pew 2019 survey does not include a liberal-conservative ideology question, we measure political conservatism in a substantive manner similar to Study 4 (Axios '24). *Conservatism* (in 2019) is measured as an additive index of: 1) support for less gun restrictions; 2) support not raising minimum wage; 3) support for the notion that government is doing too many things better left to businesses and individuals; 4) rejection of government-run health care; and 5) support for the notion that immigrants are a burden on the country. *Republican* is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent identifies as a Republican in 2019,<sup>25</sup> 0 otherwise. Trump *approval* is equal to 1 if the respondent approves of Trump's job, 0 otherwise. Trump approval is an appropriate proxy for anti-LGBTQ+ predispositions. Auxiliary evidence using a large Latino sample subset from the 2020 Nationscape survey demonstrates approval for Trump is strongly associated with negative beliefs toward LGBTQ+ group members (Figure C3). Likewise, to reiterate, substantive political *conservatism* and *Republican* partisanship

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
<sup>25</sup>Including Independents who lean Republican.



**Figure 10: *Oppose Latinx* in 2019 is not statistically negatively associated with Biden approval in 2021 adjusting for Trump approval in 2019.** The y-axis is predicted Biden approval (in 2021), the x-axis is whether the respondent opposes “Latinx” to refer to the Latino population. Simulations are from a fully-specified model with control covariates held at their means. All covariates scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust SEs.

is also strongly associated with negative beliefs toward LGBTQ+ group members (Figures A1, B2). In sum, we evaluate if the shift in presidential approval between 2019 and 2021 is conditional on the baseline (2019) level of *conservatism*, *Republican*, and Trump *approval* to test **H4**.

Like Studies 2-4, we adjust for a number of controls (measured in 2019) that may be prognostic of both *oppose Latinx* and *approval*: age, woman (Mora et al., 2022), national origin (Cisneros, 2016), Catholic (Higgins, 2014), Spanish-dominance (Uhlauer and Garcia, 2005), US-born (Alvarez and Bedolla, 2003), college-education (Corral and Leal, 2020; Thompson and Martinez, 2022), experiences of anti-Latino discrimination (Huddy et al., 2016; Thompson and Martinez, 2022), partisanship, conservatism (Alvarez and Bedolla, 2003; Mora et al., 2022; Fraga et al., 2024), and census region fixed effects. All covariates are rescaled between 0-1.



**Figure 11: But, *Oppose Latinx* in 2019 is negatively associated with Biden approval in 2021 *conditional* on Republican partisanship and Trump approval in 2019.** Panels A-C characterize predicted values of Biden approval (in 2021, y-axis) conditional on *Oppose Latinx* (in 2019, x-axis) and conservatism, Republican identity, adn Trump approval respectively (denoted by color). Panels D-F characterize the marginal influence of *Oppose Latinx* on Biden approval (y-axis) conditional on conservatism, Republican identity, and Trump approval respectively (x-axis). All covariates scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust SEs.

## Results

Inconsistent with **H3**,<sup>26</sup> we find *Oppose Latinx* in 2019 is negatively associated with Biden approval in 2021 (adjusting for Trump approval in 2019), but not statistically significantly ( $\beta = 0.004$ ,  $SE = 0.04$ ,  $p = 0.92$ ) (Figure 10). However, consistent with **H4** and the *Identity-Expansion-Backlash Theory*, the first-order relationship masks heterogeneity by predispositions correlated with negative attitudes toward the inclusion of LGBTQ+ people. Although *Oppose Latinx* is not negatively associated with Biden approval among conservative Latinos (relative to non-conservative Latinos) (Figure 11, Panels A, D), *Oppose Latinx* is negatively and statistically significantly associated with Biden approval in 2021 among

<sup>26</sup>See Section C.4 for the estimation strategies we use in Study 5.

Republican and Trump-approving Latinos (Figure 11, Panels B-C, E-F). The negative *oppose Latinx* coefficients for Republican and Trump approving Latinos are substantively large, 72% and 111% of the Biden *approval* outcome standard deviation respectively ( $\beta = -0.27$ ,  $SE = 0.12$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ;  $\beta = -0.42$ ,  $SE = 0.15$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ). In sum, consistent with Studies 1-4, the panel data demonstrate opposition to the use of “Latinx” to describe Latinos generates backlash against Democratic party politicians who may be associated with “Latinx” among segments of the Latino population predisposed against the inclusion of LGBTQ+ group members.

## Study 6: Nationscape

A limitation of Studies 1-5 is that they characterize statistical relationships constrained to the survey context as opposed to relationships between attitudes toward Democratic party politicians and real-world manifestations of the salience of the phrase “Latinx” and concomitant backlash to the new group label. Self-reported opposition to “Latinx” may be highly politically motivated as opposed to a genuine process of exposure to the phrase, the development of evaluations of the phrase, and the adoption of subsequent evaluations toward politicians that may be associated with the phrase among the Latino public. To circumvent this problem in Study 6, we merge a large sample of the Latino population with geocoded data measuring digital trace behavior approximating how salient “Latinx” is in particular areas (specifically, the domestic market area, DMA) before the 2020 presidential election. We then evaluate the association between how salient “Latinx” is in particular DMAs pre-election and self-reported vote choice in the 2020 election. Unlike Studies 1-5, Study 6 allows us to assess the real-world consequences of exposure to “Latinx” outside the inducement of survey questions on prospective self-reported behavior that is less subject to reverse causality and post-hoc political rationalizations to oppose “Latinx.”

## Data and Design

In Study 6, we use post-election data from the UCLA+Democracy Fund Nationscape survey (NS), a large survey fielded continuously between July 2019-January 2021 and implemented by LUCID (now Cint). The sample is high-quality. Repeat respondents are removed and the survey is weighted to match Census demographic targets for gender, census region, age, household language, foreign-born status, and income, generating similar response marginals to gold-standard nationally representative surveys (Tausanovitch et al., 2019). Since we are interested in how Latinos voted in response to the salience of “Latinx,” we subset the data to Latino respondents interviewed after the 2020 general election ( $N = 7512$ ). Unlike other surveys that may provide a large Latino sample post-2020 election (e.g. the 2020 Cooperative Election Study), the NS is advantageous since it includes explicit measures of negative affect toward LGBTQ+ community members, allowing for a more precise test of **H4**.

The dependent variable is change in the self-reported vote for Trump in the presidential election between 2016 to 2020 ( $\Delta$  *Trump vote*).  $\Delta$  *Trump vote* is the difference in two binary indicators characterizing the retrospective vote for Trump in 2016 and 2020. For 2016, the binary indicator is equal to 1 if the respondent reports “Donald Trump” in response to a question asking “...think back to the 2016 Presidential election...who did you vote for?” as opposed to “Hillary Clinton,” “Gary Johnson,” “Jill Stein,” “Someone else,” “Did not vote, but was eligible,” “Was not eligible to vote,” and “Don’t recall.” For 2020, the binary indicator is equal to 1 if the respondent reports “Donald Trump” in response to a question asking “who did you vote for?” as opposed to “Joe Biden,” “something else,” “I abstained,” “I don’t recall.” For both 2016 and 2020, respondents are also coded as zero if they are unregistered to vote. Thus, the zeros in both the 2016 and 2020 Trump vote measures includes those who did not turn out to vote nor are registered. This is advantageous for two reasons. First, including non-voters and non-registrants in the denominator for the Trump vote mitigates the possibility our results may be a product of sample bias by conditioning on Latino registrants or voters (Grimmer et al., 2022). Second, prior research demonstrates part

of the reason the proportion of Latinos who voted for Trump increased between 2016-2020 is precisely because of new Latino voters and registrants who did not vote (and therefore did not vote for Trump) in 2016 but voted in 2020 (Equis, 2018). Although our outcome measure is self-reported, we provide evidence our outcome approximates behavioral vote choice. We merge individual and county-level information on change in the vote for Trump between 2016-2020 from the NS Latino subset with county-level administrative data on the percentage point vote shift toward Trump between 2016-2020 and find self-reported shifts in the vote for Trump are correlated with the percentage point vote shift toward Trump in the administrative data (Figure D5).  $\Delta$  *Trump vote* is measured between -1-1.<sup>27</sup>

The independent variable is *Latinx salience*, a score normalized between 0-100 at the domestic market area-level (DMA)<sup>28</sup> of cross-DMA Google Search interest in the term “Latinx” three months prior to the 2020 election.<sup>29</sup> Prior research demonstrates Google Search interest data is valid at identifying substantively and theoretically justified differences in topic salience across geographies and time (Stephens-Davidowitz, 2014; Mavragani et al., 2018). We validate our cross-DMA *Latinx salience* measure by evaluating its association with other theoretically motivated DMA-level covariates. If our measure is accurately capturing DMA-level interest, and therefore exposure to “Latinx,” then *Latinx salience* should be associated with the DMA-level Latino population proportion (% *Latino*), the college-educated population proportion (% *college*), and proportion of voters who voted Democratic in the prior presidential election (2016, % *Democrat*). This is because Latinos may possess a differential interest in a phrase that characterizes them and non-Latinos in DMAs with more Latinos may be more interested in how to accurately describe Latinos/Hispanics. Likewise, prior survey research demonstrates college-educated, Democratic-identifying, and liberal members of the public are more likely to know about the phrase “Latinx” (Thompson and Martinez, 2022; Mora et al., 2022;

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<sup>27</sup>-1 = voted for Trump in 2016 but did not in 2020, 0 = did not switch vote for Trump or not between 2016-2020, 1 = voted for Trump in 2020 but did not in 2016.

<sup>28</sup>In the NS, there are 205 DMAs Latinos reside in.

<sup>29</sup>Since *Latinx salience* is cross-DMA, Google normalizes the search interest data such that 100 = highest cross-DMA interest in “Latinx” and 0 = lowest cross-DMA interest in “Latinx.”

Noe-Bustamante et al., 2024). Indeed, we find that cross-DMA *Latinx salience* is positively associated with DMA-level *% Latino*, *% college*, and *% Democrat*, strongly suggesting our measure is capturing the concept of interest and exposure to the phrase “Latinx” amongst internet users across the respective DMAs (Figure D6).

To test **H2**, the key moderator of interest is *LGBT unfavorability*, a binary indicator equal to 1 if a respondent reports they are “somewhat” or “very” unfavorable toward gays and lesbians as opposed to “favorable” or “have not heard enough.” *LGBT unfavorability* captures the concept of being negatively predisposed toward the inclusion of LGBTQ+ group members and gender minorities. Prior research establishes generalized unfavorability toward LGBTQ+ community segments is strongly associated with other measures of implicit and explicit bias against a wide array of LGBTQ+ group members (gays, lesbians, and transgender people) in addition to support for policies that denigrate the political rights of LGBTQ+ group members (Roman and Thompson, 2024).

We also adjust for a number of individual-level control covariates prior research identifies as potentially correlated with increased voting toward Trump amongst the Latino population such as: age, gender (Mora et al., 2022), US-born status (Alvarez and Bedolla, 2003), national origin (Cisneros, 2016), Spanish language dominance (Uhlauer and Garcia, 2005), evangelicalism (Higgins, 2014; Valenzuela, 2014), college-educated (Corral and Leal, 2020; Thompson and Martinez, 2022), income (Rhodes et al., 2017), partisanship, ideology (Alvarez and Bedolla, 2003; Mora et al., 2022; Fraga et al., 2024), turnout ('20), registration ('20) (Equis, 2018); and DMA-level control covariates such as: total population, *% Latino*, *% college-educated*, *% Democrat* (vote share for Clinton in 2016), median household income. All covariates are rescaled between 0-1 with the exception of  $\Delta$  *Trump vote*, scaled between -1-1.

**Table 1: *Latinx Salience* Motivates Vote-Switching Toward Trump Conditional on *LGBT Unfavorability***


	$\Delta$ Trump Vote ('20-'16)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Latinx Salience x LGBT Unfav.		0.19** (0.07)		0.18** (0.06)
Latinx Salience	0.06 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)
LGBT Unfavorability		-0.10* (0.04)		-0.09* (0.04)
Controls?	N	N	Y	Y
R <sup>2</sup>	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.04
Num. obs.	7512	7512	7512	7512
N Clusters	205	205	205	205

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ , DMA-clustered HC2 robust SEs in parentheses

## Results

Table 1 characterizes the association between *Latinx salience* and  $\Delta$  *Trump vote* conditional on and without *LGBT unfavorability* adjusting and not for control covariates. Inconsistent with **H3**, we do not find *Latinx salience* is associated with  $\Delta$  *Trump vote* without and with covariate adjustment in a statistically significant manner (Models 1, 3).

However, like in Study 5, the first-order association between *Latinx salience* and  $\Delta$  *Trump Vote* masks important heterogeneous associations. Consistent with **H4** and the *Identity-Expansion-Backlash Theory*, the association between *Latinx salience* and  $\Delta$  *Trump vote* is positive and statistically significant for Latinos who report unfavorable toward LGBT people (Covariate-adjusted estimate:  $\beta = 0.18$ ,  $SE = 0.07$ ,  $p < 0.01$ , see Figure 12, Panel B), but statistically null for Latinos who do NOT report unfavorable views toward LGBT people (covariate-adjusted estimate:  $\beta = -0.01$ ,  $SE = 0.05$ ,  $p = 0.83$ , see Figure 12, Panel B), with and without covariate adjustment (Models 2, 4). Figure 12, Panel A characterizes predicted values that visually illustrate the results. For Latinos that are NOT unfavorable toward LGBT people, there is no shift in  $\Delta$  *Trump Vote* conditional on *Latinx salience*. Conversely,



**Figure 12: *Latinx Salience* is associated with self-reported vote shifts toward Trump among Latinos unfavorable toward LGBT people.** Panel A characterizes predicted values of  $\Delta$  Trump Vote (y-axis) conditional on Latinx Salience (x-axis) and LGBT unfavorability (denoted by color). All controls held at their means. Panel B characterizes the marginal influence of Latinx Salience (y-axis) by LGBT unfavorability (x-axis). 95% CIs displayed from HC2 DMA-clustered robust SEs.

for Latinos that are unfavorable toward LGBT people, they are less likely to report voting for Trump in 2020 relative to 2016 conditional on living in an area where “Latinx” is less salient. But, Latinos unfavorable toward LGBT people are more likely to self-report voting for Trump in 2020 relative to 2016 conditional on living in an area where “Latinx” is highly salient. In sum, consistent with the *Identity-Expansion-Backlash Theory*, the heightened salience of “Latinx” appears to motivate Latinos who are predisposed against LGBT people to switch their vote to Republican presidential candidates at the expense of Democratic candidates.

## Robustness Checks

We assess the sensitivity of the results. We conduct a placebo test and evaluate if *Latinx salience* is more strongly positively associated with  $\Delta$  Trump vote among non-Latinos who are unfavorable toward LGBTQ+ people. We do not find *Latinx salience* motivates voting for Trump among non-Latinos unfavorable toward LGBT people, suggesting our results are characterizing a phenomena inherent to Latino evaluations of presidential politicians (Table D8).

We rule out if our results are driven by the co-occurring cross-DMA Google search salience of other group labels (i.e. “Hispanic,” “Latino”) and search terms associated with other

politically salient ethno-racial groups, particularly during the 2020 election (i.e. “Black Lives Matter”). The salience of “Hispanic,” “Latino,” and “Black Lives Matter” is not associated with  $\Delta$  *Trump vote* conditional on *LGBT unfavorability* among Latinos (Table D9), suggesting our results are not driven by backlash against the salience of general group labels that are not explicitly inclusive of queer and gender minority Latinxs or the salience of other non-white ethno-racial groups.

We rule out if our results are driven by a generalized antipathy toward minority groups as opposed to antipathy toward LGBT people in light of higher levels of *Latinx salience*. The interaction between *Latinx salience* and unfavorability toward Black people, Latinos, Asians, Muslims, and Jews is statistically null, implying the association between Latinx salience and  $\Delta$  *Trump Vote* is driven *specifically* by unfavorability toward LGBT people (Table D10).

We also rule out if our results are driven by an unobserved factor that motivates Latinos who are unfavorable toward LGBT people and live in areas where “Latinx” is more salient to shift their vote toward Republican presidential candidates. To do this, we conduct a temporal placebo test evaluating the association between *Latinx salience* in the three months pre-2020 election conditional on *LGBT unfavorability* and the self-reported change in voting for the Republican presidential candidate between 2012 to 2016. Given “Latinx” was not as salient between the 2012 and 2016 election like it was between the 2016 and 2020 election, we should expect *Latinx salience* in the three months pre-2020 election to have a statistically null relationship with the self-reported change in the Republican vote between 2012 to 2016 conditional on *LGBT unfavorability*. Indeed, we find that the interaction between *Latinx salience* and *LGBT unfavorability* is statistically null and in the opposite substantive direction when the outcome is change in the self-reported Republican vote between 2012-2016 (Table D11). This evidence implies our results are not driven by unobserved factors correlated with the cross-DMA salience of “Latinx” and vote-switching for Republican politicians.

Our results are not driven by a single DMA. The coefficient for the interaction between *Latinx salience* and *LGBT unfavorability* is statistically significant and positive after leaving

out respondents from each DMA in the NS Latino subsample (Figure D8).

Our results are also not driven by the temporal domain for the *Latinx salience* measure. The coefficient for the interaction between *Latinx salience* and *LGBT unfavorability* is significant and positive using a measure of DMA-level *Latinx salience* 6 months and 12 months prior to the election (Figure D9).

Our results are not driven by, at least, intra-state spatial dependence across DMAs. Adjusting for state fixed effects does not change our results (Section D.12).

Our results are not driven by the linearity assumption in our regression models (Hainmueller et al., 2019). The coefficient for the interaction between *LGBT unfavorability* and the second and third terciles (relative to the first tercile) in addition to the second-fourth quartiles (relative to the first quartile) of the continuous *Latinx salience* measure is positive and statistically significant (Table D12).

Finally, we treat *LGBT unfavorability* as a moderator, but unfavorability toward LGBT community members may be a function of exposure to “Latinx,” inducing post-treatment bias in our estimates. We rule this out by demonstrating *LGBT unfavorability* is not associated with *Latinx salience* (Table D14).

## Study 7: Preregistered Survey Experiment

A limitation across Studies 1-6 is the inability to draw strict causal claims between how Latinos evaluate politicians who use the term “Latinx” relative to “Latino.” Therefore, we experimentally manipulate a hypothetical political candidates’ use of “Latinx” and evaluate Latinos’ support for said candidates to test **H1**. We also assess whether Latinos’ evaluate politicians who use “Latinx” more negatively conditional on anti-LGBTQ+ attitudes to test **H2**.<sup>30</sup> We find support for both hypotheses. Hypothetical candidates speaking to the Latino community were penalized for using the term “Latinx” relative to candidates who did not use “Latinx” and this relationship is moderated by anti-LGBTQ+ attitudes.

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<sup>30</sup>This study was preregistered with OSF. See Appendix E.1 for preregistration materials.

## Experimental Design

To causally test our hypotheses, we design a six-condition vignette experiment fielded to U.S. Latino respondents on CloudResearch. The vignette includes a speech by a hypothetical Democratic<sup>31</sup> politician to their Latino constituents.<sup>32</sup> The experiment manipulates whether the politician uses the term “Latinx” or “Latino” when speaking to their Latino constituents. We also manipulate the politician’s gender (e.g., woman or man) and their ethnoracial background (e.g., Anglo-White or Latino) by altering the name of the politician. “John Smith” and “Mary Smith” represented the White male and female politicians while “Juan Rodríguez” and “Maria Rodríguez” represented the Latino male and female politicians.<sup>33</sup>

We include a set of pre-treatment measures to assess respondent socio-demographic characteristics, as well as heterogeneity in support for politicians using “Latino” versus “Latinx.” These include our main theoretical mechanism, anti-LGBTQ attitudes, as well as measures which capture backlash to identity expansion identified in the literature including respect for the Spanish language, anti-intellectualism, *machismo*, and membership prototypicality. Our main dependent variables include questions related to how respondents evaluated the candidate including: 1) candidate favorability, 2) support for the candidate, 3) how well the candidate represents the respondent, and 4) likelihood that they would want to vote for the candidate.<sup>34</sup> All response options have been rescaled between zero and one with higher values corresponding to one and lower values corresponding to zero. This allows both for ease of interpretation, and allows us to observe the maximum effects for our models. We also include an open-ended response where we ask respondents to send a message to the candidate. Finally, we include some attention checks throughout the survey, one pre-treatment, and

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<sup>31</sup>We do not randomize party-of-politician to ensure external validity. Republican politicians never use “Latinx” in an appeal to Latinos, see Figure 3

<sup>32</sup>This speech was developed using ChatGPT for a politician speaking to their constituents. We then edited the result to fit the needs of the experimental design. More information, including vignette text, is available in Appendix E.2.

<sup>33</sup>Rodriguez is the second-most common surname for Latinos while Smith is the most common surname for whites according to the 2010 Census.

<sup>34</sup>Question wording and response options are available in Appendix E.3.

three to evaluate attention to the treatment. These three include identifying whether the politician used the term “Latino” or “Latinx,” the politicians race, and the politicians gender. We do not remove those who failed any attention checks (Kane, 2024). Ninety-three percent of respondents successfully completed the attention check related to whether the politician used the phrase “Latino” or “Latinx.”<sup>35</sup>

## Sample

The experiment was fielded using CloudResearch, a voluntary opt-in survey research platform, from July 15 - 20, 2024 for a total of 974 respondents in English only. We restricted invitation to respondents who had already indicated to be of Hispanic or Latino background; however, the respondents do not know that they are a part of a targeted demographic. To confirm that respondents are Hispanic or Latino, we ask whether the respondent identifies as being or having ancestry from Latin America immediately after they consent to the study. We did not choose to offer self-categorization as Hispanic or Latino, because we wanted to maintain internal validity in the study; if we used the term “Latino,” it may have confused respondents in the conditions when the politician uses the term “Latinx.”

Overall, our sample was slightly younger, more educated, and more politically liberal relative to the national averages.<sup>36</sup> However, these characteristics would bias against our findings, given Studies 1-6 indicate an association between conservatism and backlash against the term “Latinx.” As such, we are not concerned about any sample characteristics deviating from national benchmarks.


## Results

Figure 13, presents results for **H1**. The panel on the left presents the effect of the politician using the term “Latinx” when referring to their constituents relative to using the term

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<sup>35</sup>All attention checks provided in Appendix E.3.

<sup>36</sup>See Appendix E.5 for additional demographic characteristics relative to national benchmarks.




**Figure 13: The “Latinx” treatment reduces positive evaluations of hypothetical Democratic politicians.** Y-axis is outcome, x-axis is the “Latinx” treatment coefficient. Annotations denote effect size. All covariates scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust SEs.

“Latino”. The y-axis presents the dependent variables associated with the respondents evaluations of the candidate, as well as the index of those measures. The x-axis plots the treatment coefficient for the condition in which the candidate uses the word “Latinx” relative to the candidate using the word “Latino” ( $x = 0$ ). Here, we see statistically significant effects ( $p < 0.05$ ) across all dependent variables and the indexed item. That is, Latino respondents rated the candidate less favorable, less likely to say the candidate represented people like them, were less supportive, and less likely to vote for the candidate which used the term “Latinx” relative to the term “Latino.” As such, we reject our null hypothesis that there is no difference in candidate evaluations based on the use of the term “Latinx” relative to “Latino.” Although our design varies the race and gender of the politician, we did not hypothesize nor do we find any statistically significant differences by these characteristics.<sup>37</sup>

It is important to recognize, however, that Latino respondents were still *overall* supportive of the candidate. The subplot on the right, plots the predicted values for both conditions.

<sup>37</sup>These analyses can be found in Tables E30 and E31 in Appendix E.6.



**Figure 14: The “*Latinx*” treatment has a stronger negative effect on political evaluations among Latinos who hold anti-LGBTQ+ attitudes.** Y-axis is the marginal effect of the “*Latinx*” for respondents at the minimum and maximum level of the *anti-LGBTQ+ index*. Annotations denote effect size. All covariates scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust SEs.

Here, the x-axis includes the dependent variables, including the indexed value, whereas the y-axis plots the predicted values. The black lines indicate the treatment condition when the candidate uses the term “Latinx” whereas the grey line indicates the treatment condition when the candidate uses the term “Latino.” We see that across both conditions, respondents are overall supportive of the candidate. Every outcome scores above 50%. This fits with our theoretical argument that although most Latinos will still be supportive of the candidate, the candidate’s average evaluation will decrease when they use the term “Latinx.”

Figure 14, presents our analyses for our second hypothesis. We show that our results presented above are moderated by anti-LGBTQ+ attitudes. The panel on left, plots the results of support for the candidate (indexed) on the y-axis by the index of the anti-LGBTQ+ questions on the x-axis. The treatment where the candidate uses the term “Latinx” is displayed in black, whereas the “Latino” treatment is in gray. Here we see respondents with more anti-LGBTQ+ attitudes (e.g., higher values) are less likely to support the candidate when they use the term “Latinx” relative to when they use the term “Latino.” The panel on the right plots the marginal effects. Here, the y-axis is the marginal effect of the “Latinx”

treatment relative to the “Latino” treatment on support for the candidate (indexed). The x-axis presents the minimum versus the maximum levels of the anti-LGBTQ+ attitudinal questions indexed. We see that respondents with the highest levels of anti-LGBTQ+ index are statistically significantly more likely to negatively evaluate the candidate when they use the term “Latinx” relative to when the candidate uses the term “Latino” ( $p < 0.05$ ). The overall effect of the use of “Latinx” by the politician among anti-LGBTQ+ Latinos is 0.72 standard deviations of the indexed politician evaluations. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis of **H2**, finding that holding negative attitudes about the LGBTQ+ community is associated with increased backlash against politicians using the term “Latinx.”<sup>38</sup>

## Conclusion

We present an *Identity-Expansion-Backlash Theory* to assess the political consequences of inclusive group labels on politician evaluations. Across 7 studies, we identify evidence consistent with our theoretical implications. We demonstrate Democratic party politicians who either use or are associated with the gender-inclusive phrase “Latinx” are less likely to garner support from Latinos who are predisposed against the inclusion of LGBTQ+ group members. Likewise, the usage of and association with “Latinx” does not seem to increase support for Democratic party politicians among segments of the Latino public who are positively predisposed toward LGBTQ+ people, suggesting Latinos who are “allies” toward the LGBTQ+ community are a “captured electorate” for the Democratic party in light of the Republican party’s denigration of LGBTQ+ political rights.

Our theory and evidence teaches us group labels can have profound consequences on politician evaluations. Group labels can cue considerations related to the distribution of political resources and/or representation. Inclusive group labels may politically alienate group members who are predisposed against the inclusivity of newly included or salient

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<sup>38</sup>We find no additional heterogeneity when considering the race and gender of the candidate along with the term they used to refer to the Latino community. These analyses can be found in Tables E32 through E38 in Appendix E.6.

group members. For instance, Black Americans may dislike the use of phrases like “people of color” to refer to them since it perceptibly broadens the scope of who is being discussed and represented, potentially undercutting an explicit focus on Black political interests (Pérez, 2021).<sup>39</sup> Conversely, future research should evaluate the consequences of *exclusive* group labels, which may politically alienate members of a broader group. For example, the Republican party’s use of “Latino-American” to refer to their Latino supporters may alienate Latino non-citizens who Latinos who believe non-citizens should also be worthy of political representation.<sup>40</sup> Likewise, the use of “ADOS” to refer to Black Americans may alienate Black immigrants who are concerned the phrase is an indication that their interests are not worth being represented.<sup>41</sup> This is all to say, the political impact of group labels is not inherent to Latinos and their relationship to “Latinx.” Labels like “BIPOC,” “POC,” “Latino-American,” “African-American,” “Middle Eastern and North African” (MENA), and “Chicano/a/x” can cue a wide array of concerns over the scope of group membership among members of the public that are being referred to by these labels. As new labels are formulated in a moment historically characterized by strong public investment in group identities (Hopkins et al., 2024), understanding the political consequences of group labels is critical to understanding the present and future of American political behavior.

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<sup>39</sup><https://hbr.org/2021/12/does-the-term-poc-help-us-or-hurt-us>

<sup>40</sup><https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/latinos-trump-rebrands-launch-latino-americans-trump-rcna155708>

<sup>41</sup><https://ibw21.org/commentary/understanding-ados-movement-hijack-black-identity-weaken-black-unity/>

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# Appendices


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## A Study 1


### A.1 Partisanship = Associated with Anti-LGBTQ+ Beliefs



**Figure A1: Partisanship is strongly associated with anti-LGBTQ+ beliefs.** Panels A-C denote survey of Latinos at use (Nationscape '20 subset, Axios '22, CloudResearch '24). Y-axis is an anti-LGBTQ+ attitude index. For the Nationscape '20 Latino subset, the anti-LGBTQ+ index is constructed from an additive index of two binary items where respondents report if they 1) have unfavorable views toward LGBT people and 2) oppose having trans people serve in the military. For the Axios '22 Latino survey, the anti-LGBTQ+ index is constructed from an additive index of disagreement with the notion that 1) people should be able to decide their own gender identity, 2) teenagers should be able to decide their own gender identity, 3) parents are not committing child abuse by allowing their children to gender transition, 4) they are comfortable around LGBTQ people. For the CloudResearch '24 survey, the anti-LGBTQ+ index is constructed from an additive index of 1) a 6-point scale of unfavorability toward Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer people, 2) a 6-point scale of favorability toward straight and cisgender people, 3) a 6-point scale of agreement with the notion LGBTQ people are undermining American culture, 4) a 6-point scale of agreement with the notion that the values and beliefs of LGBTQ people regarding moral and religious issues are not compatible with the beliefs and values of most Americans, and 5) a 6-point scale of agreement with the notion that the values and beliefs of LGBTQ people regarding social relations are not compatible with the beliefs and values of most Americans. All covariates scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust SEs.

## B Studies 2-4

### B.1 Ideology = Associated with Anti-LGBTQ+ Beliefs



**Figure B2: Both Liberal-Conservative ideology and a substantive ideology index of conservative policy preferences are strongly associated with anti-LGBTQ+ beliefs.** Panels A-C denote survey of Latinos at use in addition to independent variable of interest (Nationscape '20 subset, CloudResearch '24). Y-axis is an anti-LGBTQ+ attitude index. For the Nationscape '20 Latino subset, the anti-LGBTQ+ index is constructed from an additive index of two binary items where respondents report if they 1) have unfavorable views toward LGBT people and 2) oppose having trans people serve in the military. For the CloudResearch '24 survey, the anti-LGBTQ+ index is constructed from an additive index of 1) a 6-point scale of unfavorability toward Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer people, 2) a 6-point scale of favorability toward straight and cisgender people, 3) a 6-point scale of agreement with the notion LGBTQ people are undermining American culture, 4) a 6-point scale of agreement with the notion that the values and beliefs of LGBTQ people regarding moral and religious issues are not compatible with the beliefs and values of most Americans, and 5) a 6-point scale of agreement with the notion that the values and beliefs of LGBTQ people regarding social relations are not compatible with the beliefs and values of most Americans. Panels A and C characterize the association between a typical ideology scale (e.g. strong liberal to strong conservative) and anti-LGBTQ+ beliefs. Panel B characterizes the association between an index of conservative policy preferences (substantive ideology) and anti-LGBTQ+ beliefs. Substantive ideology is an index of binary indicators measuring: 1) support for building a wall; 2) disagreement with a Carbon Tax; 3) disagreement with background checks for gun purchases; 4) disagreement with increasing taxes; 5) agreement with getting rid of estate tax; 6) disagreement with increasing taxes on the rich; 7) disagreement with free college; 8) agreement with never allowing abortion; 9) agreement with not allowing abortions under certain conditions; 10) disagreement with allowing late term abortion; 11) disagreement with single-payer health insurance; 12) disagreement with a public option for health insurance; 13) disagreement with increasing subsidies for private health care; 14) disagreement with a pathway to citizenship; 15) disagreement with a pathway to citizenship for DREAMers; 16) agreement with increasing deportations; 17) disagreement with banning guns; 18) disagreement with banning assault rifles. All covariates scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust SEs.

## B.2 Control Covariates

**Table B1: Control Covariates Across Surveys**

Covariate	Axios '22	BSP '23	Axios '24	Literature Justification
Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Mora, Perez, Vargas (2022)
Gender	Yes	Yes	Yes	Mora, Perez, Vargas (2022)
National Origin	Yes	Yes	Yes	Cisneros (2016)
US-Born	No	Yes	No	Alvarez and Bedolla (2005)
Catholic	No	Yes	Yes	Higgins (2014)
Evangelical	No	Yes	Yes	Higgins (2014)
Religiosity	No	No	Yes	Valenzuela (2014)
Spanish-speaker	Yes	Yes	Yes	Uhlener and Garcia (2005)
College-educated	Yes	Yes	Yes	Alvarez and Bedolla (2005); Corral and Leal (2020); Thompson and Martinez (2022)
Income	Yes	Yes	Yes	Rhodes, Schaffner, and McElwee (2017); Mora, Perez, Vargas (2022)
Unemployed	Yes	No	Yes	Grafstein (2005)
Experienced Discrimination	Yes	No	No	Huddy and Mason (2016); Thompson and Martinez (2022)
Perceived Discrimination	No	No	Yes	Huddy and Mason (2016); Thompson and Martinez (2022)
Anti-LGBTQ+ Beliefs	Yes	No	No	Swank (2020); Mora, Perez, Vargas (2022); Thompson and Martinez (2022)
Census Area FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Alvarez and Bedolla (2005)

Note: “Yes” denotes a particular control covariate is included in the analysis for each respective survey.

### B.3 Estimation Strategies

Unlike Studies 1 and 6, we do not evaluate the effect of a politician using the phrase “Latinx” on support for said politician. Instead, we evaluate the association between opposition to Latinx and support for politicians who have either used “Latinx” to describe the Latino/Hispanic population or are members of parties that are strongly associated with the usage of the phrase “Latinx.” Therefore, to provide evidence in support of the spirit of **H1**, we estimate the following linear model:

$$(1) \quad Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 OpposeLatinx_i + \sum_{k=1}^k \beta_{k+1} X_i^k + \varepsilon_i$$

Where  $Y_i$  is a measure of *Democratic support* for respondent  $i$ .  $OpposeLatinx_i$  is the respondent’s self-reported opposition to the use of the phrase “Latinx” to describe the Latino/Hispanic population,  $\sum_{k=1}^k \beta_{k+1} X_i^k$  are  $k$  control covariates, and  $\varepsilon_i$  are robust errors. If **H1** is supported,  $\beta_1$ , the quantity of interest, will be *negative*.

To assess if the association between *oppose Latinx* and *Democratic support* is heterogeneous by predispositions against LGBTQ+ people, we estimate the following linear model:

$$(2) \quad Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1(OpposeLatinx_i \times \gamma_i) + \beta_2 OpposeLatinx_i + \beta_3 \gamma_i + \sum_{k=1}^k \beta_{k+3} X_i^k + \varepsilon_i$$

Where  $\gamma_i$  is a measure of negative predispositions toward LGBTQ+ people and/or inclusivity. In the Axios ’22 survey, it is the *anti-LGBT index*, and in the BSP ’23 and Axios ’24 surveys, it is a measure of political conservatism. If the spirit of **H2** is supported, we expect *oppose Latinx* to be more strongly negatively associated with *Democratic support* among respondents higher in  $\gamma$ . Thus,  $\beta_1$  in Equation 2 is expected to be *negative* if **H2** is supported.

## B.4 Placebo Tests

### B.4.1 Axios '22

**Table B2: Opposition to Latinx Undercuts Support for the Democratic Party, Not Other Salient Labels (Axios '22)**

	Democratic Support Index					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Oppose Latinx	-0.05** (0.02)					
Oppose Latino		-0.04 (0.03)				
Oppose Hispanic			-0.04 (0.03)			
Oppose Origin				-0.03 (0.02)		
Oppose BIPOC					-0.04 (0.02)	
Oppose POC						-0.01 (0.02)
Controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
R <sup>2</sup>	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48
Num. obs.	1005	1005	1005	1005	1005	1005

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$

**Table B3: Opposition to Latinx Undercuts Support for the Democratic Party Conditional on Anti-LGBT+ Attitudes, Not Other Salient Labels (Axios '22)**

	Democratic Support Index					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Oppose Latinx x Anti-LGBTQ	-0.22** (0.07)					
Oppose Latino x Anti-LGBTQ		-0.09 (0.09)				
Oppose Hispanic x Anti-LGBTQ			-0.12 (0.10)			
Oppose Origin x Anti-LGBTQ				-0.13 (0.09)		
Oppose BIPOC x Anti-LGBTQ					-0.04 (0.07)	
Oppose POC x Anti-LGBTQ						-0.05 (0.07)
Oppose Latinx	0.02 (0.03)					
Oppose Latino		-0.01 (0.05)				
Oppose Hispanic			0.00 (0.04)			
Oppose Origin				0.02 (0.04)		
Oppose BIPOC					-0.02 (0.03)	
Oppose POC						0.01 (0.03)
Anti-LGBTQ Index	-0.14** (0.05)	-0.25*** (0.04)	-0.25*** (0.04)	-0.24*** (0.04)	-0.24*** (0.05)	-0.25*** (0.05)
Controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
R <sup>2</sup>	0.49	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48
Num. obs.	1005	1005	1005	1005	1005	1005

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$

### B.4.2 Axios '24

**Table B4: Opposition to Latinx Undercuts Support for Democratic Politicians, Not Other Salient Labels (Axios '24)**

	Democratic Support Index						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Oppose Latinx	-0.04 <sup>†</sup> (0.02)						
Oppose Latine		-0.04 <sup>†</sup> (0.02)					
Oppose Latino			0.01 (0.01)				
Oppose Hispanic				-0.00 (0.01)			
Oppose Origin					0.01 (0.01)		
Oppose BIPOC						0.00 (0.01)	
Oppose POC							-0.01 (0.01)
Controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
R <sup>2</sup>	0.52	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.51	0.51	0.52
Num. obs.	1012	1012	1012	1012	1012	1012	1012

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; <sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$

**Table B5: Opposition to Latinx Undercuts Support for Democratic Politicians Conditional on Ideology, Not Other Salient Labels (Axios '24)**

	Democratic Support Index						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Oppose Latinx x Ideology	-0.10*						
	(0.05)						
Oppose Latine x Ideology		-0.03					
		(0.04)					
Oppose Latino x Ideology			0.02				
			(0.02)				
Oppose Hispanic x Ideology				0.01			
				(0.02)			
Oppose Origin x Ideology					0.01		
					(0.02)		
Oppose BIPOC x Ideology						-0.02	
						(0.02)	
Oppose POC x Ideology							-0.02
							(0.01)
Oppose Latinx	0.01						
	(0.03)						
Oppose Latine		-0.03					
		(0.03)					
Oppose Latino			0.00				
			(0.01)				
Oppose Hispanic				-0.01			
				(0.01)			
Oppose Origin					0.01		
					(0.01)		
Oppose BIPOC						0.01	
						(0.01)	
Oppose POC							0.01
							(0.01)
Ideology	-0.16***	-0.21***	-0.23***	-0.23***	-0.23***	-0.17***	-0.18***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Controls?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
R <sup>2</sup>	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.52	0.52
Num. obs.	1012	1012	1012	1012	1012	1012	1012

\*\*\*p < 0.001; \*\*p < 0.01; \*p < 0.05; †p < 0.1

# C Study 5


## C.1 Re-Analysis With Full Sample

**Table C6:** *Oppose Latinx* is associated with Biden approval (in 2021) conditional on Trump approval (in 2019)

	Biden Approval ('21)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Oppose Latinx ('19) x Conservatism ('19)		-0.02 (0.27)		
Know Latinx ('19) x Conservatism ('19)		0.07 (0.25)		
Oppose Latinx ('19) x Republican ('19)			-0.31* (0.12)	
Know Latinx ('19) x Republican ('19)			0.25* (0.11)	
Oppose Latinx ('19) x Approve Trump ('19)				-0.33** (0.12)
Know Latinx ('19) x Approve Trump ('19)				0.19† (0.11)
Oppose Latinx ('19)	-0.00 (0.04)	0.00 (0.11)	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)
Know Latinx ('19)	-0.06† (0.03)	-0.08 (0.10)	-0.08* (0.03)	-0.07* (0.03)
Republican ('19)	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.27*** (0.04)	-0.28*** (0.04)	-0.16** (0.04)
Approve Trump ('19)	-0.25*** (0.03)			-0.24** (0.03)
Age	0.09** (0.03)	0.08* (0.03)	0.08* (0.03)	0.09** (0.03)
Woman	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Married	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Spanish Interview	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
US-Born	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Catholic	0.03 (0.02)	0.04† (0.02)	0.03† (0.02)	0.03† (0.02)
Mexican	0.04 (0.03)	0.05† (0.03)	0.04† (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Salvadoran	0.00 (0.05)	0.01 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	0.01 (0.05)
Cuban	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)
Puerto Rican	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Dominican	0.06† (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.06† (0.03)
College	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Exp. Discrimination	-0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Democrat	0.02 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
Northeast	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
Midwest	0.12* (0.05)	0.11* (0.05)	0.12* (0.05)	0.13* (0.05)
South	0.07* (0.03)	0.05† (0.03)	0.05† (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.24	0.20	0.20	0.25
Num. obs.	1208	1208	1208	1208


\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; † $p < 0.1$

## C.2 Association Between Trump Approval and Anti-LGBTQ+ Beliefs



**Figure C3: Trump approval is strongly associated with anti-LGBTQ+ beliefs.** Data is from the Latino Nationscape '20 subset. Y-axis is an anti-LGBTQ+ attitude index. For the Nationscape '20 Latino subset, the anti-LGBTQ+ index is constructed from an additive index of two binary items where respondents report if they 1) have unfavorable views toward LGBT people and 2) oppose having trans people serve in the military. The x-axis is approval for Trump from “strongly disapprove” to “strongly approve.” All covariates scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust SEs.

### C.3 Baseline Relationship Between *Oppose Latinx* and Trump Approval ('19)



**Figure C4: *Oppose Latinx* in 2019 is not negatively associated with Trump approval in 2019** The y-axis is predicted Trump approval (in 2019), the x-axis is whether the respondent opposes “Latinx” to refer to the Latino population. Simulations are from a fully-specified model with control covariates held at their means. All covariates scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust SEs.

## C.4 Estimation Strategies

Unlike Studies 1 and 6, we do not evaluate the effect of a politician using the phrase “Latinx” on support for said politician. Instead, we evaluate the association between opposition to Latinx and support for politicians who have either used “Latinx” to describe the Latino/Hispanic population or are members of parties that are strongly associated with the usage of the phrase “Latinx.” Therefore, to provide evidence in support of the spirit of **H1**, we estimate the following linear model:

$$(1) \quad \text{ApproveBiden}_{i,2021} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{OpposeLatinx}_{i,2019} + \beta_2 \text{ApproveTrump}_{i,2019} \\ + \sum_{k=1}^k \beta_{k+2} X_{i,2019}^k + \varepsilon_i$$

Where  $\text{ApproveBiden}_{i,2021}$  is a measure of approval for Joe Biden in 2021 for respondent  $i$ .  $\text{OpposeLatinx}_{i,2019}$  is the respondent’s self-reported opposition to the use of the phrase “Latinx” to describe the Latino/Hispanic population in 2019,  $\text{ApproveTrump}_{i,2019}$  is the respondent’s approval for Donald Trump in 2019 for respondent  $i$ ,  $\sum_{k=1}^k \beta_{k+2} X_i^k$  are  $k$  control covariates, and  $\varepsilon_i$  are robust errors. If **H1** is supported,  $\beta_1$ , the quantity of interest, will be *negative*.


To assess if the association between *oppose Latinx* and Biden *approval* is heterogeneous by predispositions against the inclusion of LGBTQ+ people, we estimate the following linear model:

$$(2) \quad \text{ApproveBiden}_{i,2021} = \alpha + \beta_1 (\text{OpposeLatinx}_{i,2019} \times \gamma_{i,2019}) + \beta_2 \text{OpposeLatinx}_{i,2019} \\ + \beta_3 \gamma_{i,2019} + \sum_{k=1}^k \beta_{k+3} X_{i,2019}^k + \varepsilon_i$$

Where  $\gamma_i$  is a measure of negative predispositions toward LGBTQ+ people and/or inclusivity (in Study 5, this is *conservatism*; *Republican identity*; and *Trump approval* in 2019). If the spirit of **H2** is supported, we expect *oppose Latinx* to be more strongly negatively associated with Biden *approval* among respondents higher in  $\gamma$ . Thus,  $\beta_1$  in Equation 2 is expected to be *negative* if **H2** is supported.


## D Study 6

### D.1 Validating Vote Shift Outcome




**Figure D5: Individual-level  $\Delta$  *Trump Vote* from the NS (y-axis) is associated with  $\Delta$  % *Trump* at the county-level (x-axis) from administrative data.** All covariates are at their original scaling on this figure. Annotation is from a bivariate linear model characterizing the association between county-level  $\Delta$  % *Trump* and individual-level  $\Delta$  *Trump vote* with HC2 robust standard errors. County-level data is from the Dave Leip Election Atlas. To ensure consistency in measurement,  $\Delta$  % *Trump* at the county-level is the number of votes for Trump normalized over the intra-county adult population since  $\Delta$  *Trump Vote* also includes NS respondents who may become citizens, registrants, or voters between 2016-2020 to vote for Trump.

## D.2 Validating Latinx Salience Measure



**Figure D6: Validating the *Latinx Salience* measure.** All covariates are at their original scaling on this figure. Annotation denotes bivariate association between independent variable on x-axis and *Latinx salience* on y-axis. Estimates are weighted by DMA population size.

### D.3 Descriptive Statistics



**Figure D7: Descriptive statistics characterizing the relationship between Latinx Salience and  $\Delta$  *Trump Vote*. All covariates are scaled between 0-1**

## D.4 Regression Table

**Table D7: Latinx Salience Motivates Vote-Switching Toward Trump Conditional on LGBT Unfavorability**

	$\Delta$ Trump Vote ('20-'16)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Latinx Salience x LGBT Unfav.	0.19** (0.07)		0.18** (0.06)	
Latinx Salience	0.06 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)
LGBT Unfavorability		-0.10* (0.04)		-0.09* (0.04)
Age			-0.07 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)
Woman			0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
US-Born			-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Mexican			0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Cuban			-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Puerto Rican			0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Spanish-Speaker			0.03* (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)
Evangelical			-0.03 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
College-Educated			-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Income			-0.04 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)
Partisanship			0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)
Ideology			-0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Turnout ('20)			0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)
Registered ('20)			-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)
Total Pop. (DMA)			0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)
% Latino (DMA)			-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)
% College (DMA)			0.01 (0.17)	-0.01 (0.17)
MHHI (DMA)			-0.07 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.08)
% Democrat ('16, DMA)			0.01 (0.08)	0.01 (0.08)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.04
Num. obs.	7512	7512	7512	7512
N Clusters	205	205	205	205

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$

## D.5 Non-Latino Placebo

**Table D8:** The relationship between *Latinx Salience* and  $\Delta$  *Trump Vote* conditional on *LGBT unfavorability* is null for non-Latinos

	$\Delta$ Trump Vote ('20-'16) (1)
Latinx Salience x LGBT Unfav.	0.03 (0.02)
Latinx Salience	0.05* (0.02)
LGBT Unfavorability	-0.02 (0.01)
Age	-0.21*** (0.02)
Woman	0.04*** (0.01)
US-Born	-0.04*** (0.01)
Mexican	
Cuban	
Puerto Rican	
Spanish-Speaker	-0.03* (0.02)
Evangelical	-0.03** (0.01)
College-Educated	-0.05*** (0.01)
Income	-0.07*** (0.01)
Partisanship	0.12*** (0.01)
Ideology	0.04** (0.01)
Turnout ('20)	0.18*** (0.01)
Registered ('20)	-0.06*** (0.01)
Total Pop. (DMA)	0.00 (0.00)
% Latino (DMA)	-0.10** (0.03)
% College (DMA)	-0.10 (0.07)
MHHI (DMA)	-0.02 (0.03)
% Democrat ('16, DMA)	-0.03 (0.04)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.06
Num. obs.	47201
N Clusters	209

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$

## D.6 Other Group Salience Placebos

**Table D9:** The salience of other relevant identity groups does not motivate vote-switching toward Trump conditional on *LGBT Unfavorability*

	$\Delta$ Trump Vote ('20-'16) (1)
Latinx Salience x LGBT Unfav.	0.23** (0.07)
Latino Salience x LGBT Unfav.	-0.19 (0.14)
Hispanic Salience x LGBT Unfav.	0.00 (0.00)
BLM Salience x LGBT Unfav.	-0.00 (0.00)
Latinx Salience	-0.01 (0.07)
BLM Salience	-0.04 (0.06)
LGBT Unfavorability	0.03 (0.12)
Age	-0.06 (0.04)
Woman	0.04*** (0.01)
US-Born	-0.02 (0.01)
Mexican	0.02 (0.02)
Cuban	-0.01 (0.03)
Puerto Rican	0.03 (0.03)
Spanish-Speaker	0.03 (0.01)
Evangelical	-0.02 (0.01)
College-Educated	-0.03 (0.02)
Income	-0.04 (0.02)
Partisanship	0.09*** (0.02)
Ideology	-0.01 (0.03)
Total Pop. (DMA)	0.00* (0.00)
% Latino (DMA)	-0.08 (0.08)
% College (DMA)	-0.04 (0.18)
MHHI (DMA)	-0.06 (0.08)
% Democrat ('16, DMA)	0.07 (0.12)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.04
Num. obs.	7512
N Clusters	205

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$

## D.7 Irrelevant Group Placebo

**Table D10: Placebo test demonstrating *Latinx Salience* does not prime other negative attitudes toward LGBTQ+-irrelevant groups**

	$\Delta$ Republican Vote ('16-'12)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Latinx Salience x Black Unfav.	-0.02 (0.12)				
Latinx Salience x Latino Unfav.		0.06 (0.11)			
Latinx Salience x Asian Unfav.			0.12 (0.10)		
Latinx Salience x Muslim Unfav.				-0.02 (0.08)	
Latinx Salience x Jewish Unfav.					-0.11 (0.13)
Latinx Salience	0.03 (0.06)	0.02 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.04 (0.06)
Black Unfavorability	0.01 (0.06)				
Latino Unfavorability		-0.03 (0.06)			
Asian Unfavorability			-0.03 (0.05)		
Muslim Unfavorability				-0.01 (0.04)	
Jewish Unfavorability					0.07 (0.06)
Age	-0.07 <sup>†</sup> (0.04)	-0.07 <sup>†</sup> (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.07 <sup>†</sup> (0.04)
Woman	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
US-Born	-0.02 <sup>†</sup> (0.01)	-0.02 <sup>†</sup> (0.01)	-0.02 <sup>†</sup> (0.01)	-0.02 <sup>†</sup> (0.01)	-0.02 <sup>†</sup> (0.01)
Mexican	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Cuban	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Puerto Rican	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Spanish-Speaker	0.03* (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)
Evangelical	-0.03 <sup>†</sup> (0.01)	-0.02 <sup>†</sup> (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.02 <sup>†</sup> (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)
College-Educated	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Income	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Partisanship	0.09** (0.02)	0.09** (0.02)	0.09** (0.02)	0.09** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)
Ideology	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)
Turnout ('20)	0.10** (0.02)	0.10** (0.02)	0.10** (0.02)	0.09** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)
Registered ('20)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)
Total Pop. (DMA)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)
% Latino (DMA)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
% College (DMA)	-0.01 (0.17)	-0.01 (0.17)	-0.01 (0.17)	0.00 (0.17)	-0.00 (0.17)
MHHI (DMA)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.08)
% Democrat ('16, DMA)	0.05 (0.10)	0.05 (0.10)	0.04 (0.10)	0.05 (0.10)	0.05 (0.10)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
Num. obs.	7512	7512	7512	7512	7512
N Clusters	205	205	205	205	205

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ;  $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$

## D.8 Falsification Test (2016-2012)

**Table D11: Latinx Salience Does Not Motivate Vote-Switching Toward the Republican Presidential Candidate Conditional on LGBT Unfavorability Between 2012-2016 Among Latinos**

	$\Delta$ Republican Vote ('16-'12) (1)
Latinx Salience x LGBT Unfav.	−0.18 (0.11)
Latinx Salience	0.12 (0.07)
LGBT Unfavorability	0.13* (0.06)
Age	0.05 (0.06)
Woman	−0.01 (0.02)
US-Born	0.02 (0.02)
Mexican	0.00 (0.03)
Cuban	−0.04 (0.04)
Puerto Rican	−0.02 (0.05)
Spanish-Speaker	−0.03 (0.03)
Evangelical	−0.01 (0.03)
College-Educated	−0.04 (0.04)
Income	−0.00 (0.03)
Partisanship	0.18*** (0.05)
Ideology	−0.02 (0.04)
Registered ('20)	0.08** (0.02)
Total Pop. (DMA)	−0.00 (0.00)
% Latino (DMA)	0.04 (0.09)
% College (DMA)	−0.43 (0.31)
MHHI (DMA)	0.34* (0.16)
% Democrat ('16, DMA)	−0.22 (0.13)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.06
Num. obs.	3357
N Clusters	187


\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$

## D.9 Leave 1 Out



**Figure D8: The relationship between *Latinx Salience* and  $\Delta$  *Trump Vote* is not driven by a single domestic market area.** The x-axis is an index from 1-205 characterizing all 205 Domestic Market Areas in the Nationscape Latino sample. Each coefficient estimate (y-axis) characterizes the association between *Latinx Salience* and  $\Delta$  *Trump Vote* conditional on control covariates after dropping one of the 1-206 Domestic Market Areas in the data (a leave-one-out exercise). All covariates are scaled between 0-1.

## D.10 Alternative Salience Measures



**Figure D9: The relationship between *Latinx Salience* and  $\Delta$  *Trump Vote* is robust to alternative temporal domains for measuring *Latinx Salience*.**

## D.11 Robustness to Binning

**Table D12: Robustness to binning *Latinx Salience***

	$\Delta$ Trump Vote ('20-'16)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Latinx Salience (2) x LGBT Unfav.	0.04 (0.03)	0.10** (0.04)	0.10* (0.04)
Latinx Salience (3) x LGBT Unfav.		0.06† (0.04)	0.13** (0.05)
Latinx Salience (4) x LGBT Unfav.			0.09* (0.04)
Latinx Salience (2)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Latinx Salience (3)		-0.01 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)
Latinx Salience (4)			-0.03 (0.03)
LGBT Unfavorability	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.09* (0.03)
Age	-0.07† (0.04)	-0.07† (0.04)	-0.07† (0.04)
Woman	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.05** (0.01)
US-Born	-0.02† (0.01)	-0.02† (0.01)	-0.02† (0.01)
Mexican	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)
Cuban	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Puerto Rican	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Spanish-Speaker	0.03† (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)
Evangelical	-0.02† (0.01)	-0.02† (0.01)	-0.02† (0.01)
College-Educated	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Income	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)
Partisanship	0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.09** (0.02)
Ideology	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Turnout ('20)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.09** (0.02)
Registered ('20)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)
Total Pop. (DMA)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)
% Latino (DMA)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.05)
% College (DMA)	0.02 (0.17)	-0.01 (0.18)	0.01 (0.17)
MHHI (DMA)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.08)
% Democrat ('16, DMA)	0.08 (0.09)	0.06 (0.09)	0.08 (0.10)
Bin	Median	Tercile	Quartile
R <sup>2</sup>	0.04	0.04	0.04
Num. obs.	7512	7512	7512
N Clusters	205	205	205

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; † $p < 0.1$

## D.12 Robustness to State Fixed Effect Inclusion

**Table D13: Robustness to the inclusion of state fixed effects**

	$\Delta$ Trump Vote ('20-'16) (1)
Latinx Salience x LGBT Unfav.	0.20*** (0.06)
LGBT Unfavorability	-0.10** (0.03)
Age	-0.05 (0.04)
Woman	0.04*** (0.01)
US-Born	-0.01 (0.01)
Mexican	0.02 (0.02)
Cuban	-0.02 (0.03)
Puerto Rican	0.04 (0.03)
Spanish-Speaker	0.03 <sup>†</sup> (0.01)
Evangelical	-0.02 <sup>†</sup> (0.01)
College-Educated	-0.03 (0.02)
Income	-0.03 (0.02)
Partisanship	0.08** (0.02)
Ideology	-0.00 (0.03)
Turnout ('20)	0.09*** (0.02)
Registered ('20)	-0.03* (0.01)
Total Pop. (DMA)	0.00** (0.00)
% Latino (DMA)	0.07 (0.08)
% College (DMA)	0.33 (0.35)
MHHI (DMA)	-0.07 (0.12)
% Democrat ('16, DMA)	-0.18 (0.12)
State FE	Y
R <sup>2</sup>	0.08
Num. obs.	7512
N Clusters	205

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; <sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$

## D.13 Ruling Out Post-Treatment Bias

**Table D14:** *Latinx Salience* is unassociated with *LGBT unfavorability*

	LGBT Unfavorability (1)
Latinx Salience	0.00 (0.06)
Age	0.06 (0.07)
Woman	-0.10*** (0.02)
US-Born	-0.01 (0.02)
Mexican	0.01 (0.02)
Cuban	-0.00 (0.04)
Puerto Rican	-0.01 (0.04)
Spanish-Speaker	-0.02 (0.03)
Evangelical	0.15*** (0.02)
College-Educated	0.02 (0.02)
Income	-0.03 (0.02)
Partisanship	0.09** (0.03)
Ideology	0.13*** (0.03)
Turnout ('20)	0.01 (0.03)
Registered ('20)	-0.03 (0.03)
Total Pop. (DMA)	0.00 (0.00)
% Latino (DMA)	0.04 (0.07)
% College (DMA)	0.08 (0.19)
MHHI (DMA)	-0.06 (0.11)
% Democrat ('16, DMA)	-0.09 (0.11)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.07
Num. obs.	7553
N Clusters	205

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$

## E Study 7: Survey Experiment

### E.1 Preregistration

We preregistered our research questions, experimental design, and key measures at the Open Science Framework. The de-identified preregistration can be found [here](#).

### E.2 Experimental Design

We employ a  $2 \times 2 \times 2$  experimental design which manipulates the candidates' race (e.g., Anglo-White or Latino) and gender (e.g., man or woman). We also manipulate whether the candidate uses the term "Latino" or "Latinx" when referring to their Latino constituents. The treatments were partially developed by ChatGPT using text from a White House briefing on President Biden's economic development plan for the Latino community (The White House, 2023) and asking it to produce a one paragraph appeal by a politician to the Latino community. From this output we adjusted accordingly to fit the needs of our experiment. We have included the vignette used in the experiment below.

*My name is [John Smith/Mary Smith/Juan Rodríguez/Maria Rodríguez]. As your representative, I take pride in servicing the [Latino/Latinx] community, and I urge you to consider the significant strides I have made in helping to revitalize the economic integrity of [Latino/Latinx] communities. We are witnessing tangible progress: record low [Latino/Latinx] unemployment, expanded health-care access to [Latino/Latinx] people, increased entrepreneurship opportunities for [Latino/Latinx] people, and substantial investments in infrastructure and education for [Latino/Latinx] communities. Together, I have helped facilitate unprecedented milestones, from reducing [Latino/Latinx] child poverty to closing the digital divide. With your support, I can continue on this trajectory, and help ensure equitable prosperity for all [Latino/Latinx] people and build a brighter future for generations to come. Vote for me and a better tomorrow.*

### E.3 Measures

**Table E15:** Machismo

Question	Response Options (Values)
Men are superior to women.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● Strongly disagree (0)</li><li>● Disagree (0.2)</li><li>● Somewhat disagree (0.4)</li><li>● Somewhat agree (0.6)</li><li>● Agree (0.8)</li><li>● Strongly agree (1)</li></ul>
In a family, a father's wish is law.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● Strongly disagree (0)</li><li>● Disagree (0.2)</li><li>● Somewhat disagree (0.4)</li><li>● Somewhat agree (0.6)</li><li>● Agree (0.8)</li><li>● Strongly agree (1)</li></ul>
The birth of a male child is more important than a female child.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● Strongly disagree (0)</li><li>● Disagree (0.2)</li><li>● Somewhat disagree (0.4)</li><li>● Somewhat agree (0.6)</li><li>● Agree (0.8)</li><li>● Strongly agree (1)</li></ul>
A man should be in control of his wife.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● Strongly disagree (0)</li><li>● Disagree (0.2)</li><li>● Somewhat disagree (0.4)</li><li>● Somewhat agree (0.6)</li><li>● Agree (0.8)</li><li>● Strongly agree (1)</li></ul>
It is important for women to be beautiful.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● Strongly disagree (0)</li><li>● Disagree (0.2)</li><li>● Somewhat disagree (0.4)</li><li>● Somewhat agree (0.6)</li><li>● Agree (0.8)</li><li>● Strongly agree (1)</li></ul>
The bills should be in the man's name.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● Strongly disagree (0)</li><li>● Disagree (0.2)</li><li>● Somewhat disagree (0.4)</li><li>● Somewhat agree (0.6)</li><li>● Agree (0.8)</li><li>● Strongly agree (1)</li></ul>

**Table E16:** LGBT+ Attitudes

Question	Response Options (Values)
How unfavorable or favorable do you feel toward the following groups? ... Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Queer People.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● Very unfavorable (0)</li><li>● Unfavorable (0.2)</li><li>● Somewhat Unfavorable (0.4)</li><li>● Somewhat Favorable (0.6)</li><li>● Favorable (0.8)</li><li>● Strongly Favorable (1)</li></ul>
How unfavorable or favorable do you feel toward the following groups? ... Straight and Cisgender people.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● Very unfavorable (0)</li><li>● Unfavorable (0.2)</li><li>● Somewhat Unfavorable (0.4)</li><li>● Somewhat Favorable (0.6)</li><li>● Favorable (0.8)</li><li>● Strongly Favorable (1)</li></ul>
LGBTQ people are undermining American culture.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● Strongly disagree (0)</li><li>● Disagree (0.2)</li><li>● Somewhat disagree (0.4)</li><li>● Somewhat agree (0.6)</li><li>● Agree (0.8)</li><li>● Strongly agree (1)</li></ul>
The values and beliefs of LGBTQ people regarding moral and religious issues are not compatible with the beliefs and values of most Americans.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● Strongly disagree (0)</li><li>● Disagree (0.2)</li><li>● Somewhat disagree (0.4)</li><li>● Somewhat agree (0.6)</li><li>● Agree (0.8)</li><li>● Strongly agree (1)</li></ul>
The values and beliefs of LGBTQ people regarding social relations are not compatible with the beliefs and values of most Americans.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● Strongly disagree (0)</li><li>● Disagree (0.2)</li><li>● Somewhat disagree (0.4)</li><li>● Somewhat agree (0.6)</li><li>● Agree (0.8)</li><li>● Strongly agree (1)</li></ul>

**Table E17:** Group Prototypicality

Question	Response Options (Values)
I fear that in 40 years, it won't be clear what it means to be a member of my ethnic group.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● Strongly disagree (0)</li><li>● Disagree (0.2)</li><li>● Somewhat disagree (0.4)</li><li>● Somewhat agree (0.6)</li><li>● Agree (0.8)</li><li>● Strongly agree (1)</li></ul>
I believe that there will always be a place for me in my ethnic group's community.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● Strongly disagree (0)</li><li>● Disagree (0.2)</li><li>● Somewhat disagree (0.4)</li><li>● Somewhat agree (0.6)</li><li>● Agree (0.8)</li><li>● Strongly agree (1)</li></ul>
I fear that in 40 years time, the type of person I am will not represent what it means to be a member of my ethnic group.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● Strongly disagree (0)</li><li>● Disagree (0.2)</li><li>● Somewhat disagree (0.4)</li><li>● Somewhat agree (0.6)</li><li>● Agree (0.8)</li><li>● Strongly agree (1)</li></ul>

**Table E18:** Anti-Intellectualism

Question	Response Options (Values)
How much do you disagree or agree with the following statements ... Academics are often pretentious in the way that they talk and write.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● Strongly disagree (0)</li><li>● Disagree (0.2)</li><li>● Somewhat disagree (0.4)</li><li>● Somewhat agree (0.6)</li><li>● Agree (0.8)</li><li>● Strongly agree (1)</li></ul>
... Most experts just don't have much common sense.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● Strongly disagree (0)</li><li>● Disagree (0.2)</li><li>● Somewhat disagree (0.4)</li><li>● Somewhat agree (0.6)</li><li>● Agree (0.8)</li><li>● Strongly agree (1)</li></ul>
... Public schools and universities fill young people's heads with all kinds of nonsense.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● Strongly disagree (0)</li><li>● Disagree (0.2)</li><li>● Somewhat disagree (0.4)</li><li>● Somewhat agree (0.6)</li><li>● Agree (0.8)</li><li>● Strongly agree (1)</li></ul>
... I'd rather put my trust in the wisdom of ordinary people than the opinion of experts and intellectuals.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● Strongly disagree (0)</li><li>● Disagree (0.2)</li><li>● Somewhat disagree (0.4)</li><li>● Somewhat agree (0.6)</li><li>● Agree (0.8)</li><li>● Strongly agree (1)</li></ul>

**Table E19:** Spanish Language

Question	Response Options (Values)
How much do you disagree or agree with the following statements ... The influence of English on the Spanish language has gone too far.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● Strongly disagree (0)</li><li>● Disagree (0.2)</li><li>● Somewhat disagree (0.4)</li><li>● Somewhat agree (0.6)</li><li>● Agree (0.8)</li><li>● Strongly agree (1)</li></ul>
... The Spanish language should not be significantly modified with American influence.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● Strongly disagree (0)</li><li>● Disagree (0.2)</li><li>● Somewhat disagree (0.4)</li><li>● Somewhat agree (0.6)</li><li>● Agree (0.8)</li><li>● Strongly agree (1)</li></ul>

**Table E20:** Candidate Evaluations

Question	Response Options (Values)
How favorable or unfavorable do you feel toward the political candidate you just read about?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Very favorable (0)</li><li>• Favorable (0.2)</li><li>• Somewhat favorable (0.4)</li><li>• Somewhat unfavorable (0.6)</li><li>• Unfavorable (0.8)</li><li>• Very unfavorable (1)</li></ul>
How much do you support or oppose the political candidate you just read about?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Strongly support (0)</li><li>• Support (0.2)</li><li>• Somewhat support (0.4)</li><li>• Somewhat oppose (0.6)</li><li>• Oppose (0.8)</li><li>• Strongly oppose (1)</li></ul>
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "The political candidate you just read about represents people like you."	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Strongly agree (0)</li><li>• Agree (0.2)</li><li>• Somewhat agree (0.4)</li><li>• Somewhat disagree (0.6)</li><li>• Disagree (0.8)</li><li>• Strongly disagree (1)</li></ul>
If you were voting in an election, how likely would you be to vote for the political candidate you just read about?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Very likely (0)</li><li>• Likely (0.2)</li><li>• Somewhat likely (0.4)</li><li>• Somewhat unlikely (0.6)</li><li>• Unlikely (0.8)</li><li>• Very unlikely (1)</li></ul>
Imagine you were writing a letter to the political candidate you just read about. What would you say to them about their message to you?	[Open-ended]

## E.4 Attention Checks

We had a series of attention checks throughout the survey—one pre-treatment and three to evaluate respondents' attention to the survey. Ninety-eight percent of respondents correctly answered the pre-treatment attention check, which was written as follows:

*Now, we would like to get a sense of your general preferences.*

*Most modern theories of decision making recognize that decisions do not take place in a vacuum. To demonstrate that you've read this much, just go ahead and select both pink and green among the alternatives below, no matter what your favorite color is. Yes, ignore the question and select both of these options.*

*What is your favorite color?*

- White*
- Black*
- Green*
- Pink*
- Blue*
- Something else*

To check respondents' attention of the vignette, we ask three questions related to the candidates race, gender, and the phrase used to refer to the Latino community. First, we asked respondents whether the candidate used the term “Latino” or “Latinx.” Ninety-three percent of respondents correctly identified the phrase that the candidate had used in their respective treatment. The attention check question is as follows:

*What phrase did the political candidate use to talk to the population they were appealing to?*

- Latino*
- Latinx*
- Hispanic*

Next, we asked respondents' attention to the race of the candidate. Mary and John are coded as White and Maria and Juan are coded as Latino/Hispanic. The attention check question is as follows:

*What was the race of the political candidate?*

- White*
- Latino/Hispanic*

- *Black*

Only three respondents indicated any of the politicians were Black. One indicated John Smith was Black, one indicated Juan Rodriguez was Black, and one indicated Mary Smith was Black. This suggests no systematic confusion over whether one candidate was coded as Black relative to the other candidates. Even so, only 75% of respondents correctly identified the race of the respondents relative to the treatment in which they were assigned. Overall, respondents coded Maria and Juan as Latino/Hispanic; however, there was significant variation in how responded racially coded Mary and John. Only one individual coded Juan as White and three individuals coded Maria as White. However, 103 individuals coded John as Latino/Hispanic and 133 coded Mary as Latino/Hispanic. The difference in means between the proportion identifying John as White ( $\bar{x} = 0.13$ ) versus Latino ( $\bar{x} = 0.10$ ) was not statistically significant ( $\delta = 0.03$ ;  $p = 0.16$ ). There was also no statistically significant differences between the proportion identifying Mary as White ( $\bar{x} = 0.12$ ) versus Latino ( $\bar{x} = 0.14$ ;  $\delta = 0.02$ ;  $p = 0.20$ ).

Given these results, we thought it important to consider whether respondents identified the candidate's race differently based on whether the candidate used the word "Latino" versus "Latinx." However, we found no evidence that individuals identified Mary or John differently based on whether they used the term "Latino" or "Latinx." Ultimately, given that there are many individuals who can be racially White and ethnically Hispanic or Latino, it may have been the case that respondents thought the candidate was of Hispanic or Latino background because of the fact that they were focused on issues pertaining to the Hispanic/Latino community.

**Table E21:** Difference in Mean Racial Identification of John and Mary by Term Used

Term used:			
	"Latino"	"Latinx"	Difference in Means (p-value)
Identified John as White	0.06	0.06	0.00 (0.92)
Identified John as Latino	0.05	0.05	0.00 (0.61)
Identified Mary as White	0.05	0.06	-0.01 (0.18)
Identified Mary as Latino	0.07	0.07	0.00 (0.78)

Finally, we asked respondents' attention to the gender of the candidate. Mary and Maria are coded as women and John and Juan are coded as men. Ninety-seven percent of respondents correctly identified the gender of the candidate relative to the treatment condition in which they were assigned. The attention check question is as follows:

*What was the gender of the political candidate?*

- *Male*
- *Female*

## E.5 Respondent Demographics

Here we assess the demographic characteristics of the respondents relative to the 2020 American National Election Study (ANES). This allows us to capture how similar our sample

was relative to national averages based on sociodemographic characteristics *as well as* on political beliefs such as ideology and partisanship. Overall, we believe our sample closely matches the ANES. The notable exceptions are that our sample is slightly more educated and younger than the national average for Latino Americans.

Table E22, below, includes the educational attainment of our sample, relative to the ANES. Our sample is more educated than the national average for those who are Hispanic or Latino. Whereas 11% of the ANES sample did not graduate from high school, only 1% of our respondents did not finish high school. Moreover, 18% of the ANES sample had a four-year degree, 36% of our sample had a four-year degree. However, in terms of high school graduates, associate degree holders, and post-graduate degree holders, our sample closely aligned with the national averages.

**Table E22:** Educational Attainment

Education	ANES	Sample
Did not graduate from high school	0.11	0.01
High school graduate	0.20	0.13
Some college, but no degree	0.23	0.26
2-year college degree	0.16	0.12
4-year college degree	0.18	0.36
Post-graduate degree (MA, MBA, MD, JD, PhD, etc.)	0.13	0.12

Table E23, below, includes household income. Overall, our sample aligns with the national averages among Latino Americans. Our sample had slightly fewer individuals making \$20,000 or fewer relative to the national average and slightly more individuals making between \$60,000 - \$99,999 than the national averages. However, our sample closely matched the proportion making between \$20,000 - \$59,999 and \$100,000 or more.

**Table E23:** Household Income

Income	ANES	Sample
Less than \$20,000	0.18	0.08
\$20,000 - \$59,999	0.36	0.35
\$60,000 - \$99,999	0.23	0.32
\$100,000 or more	0.23	0.25

Table E24, below, shows that our sample was relatively balanced among respondents who identified as men and woman relative to the national averages for Latinos in the ANES sample. Moreover, while we offered an option for non-binary gender identification, the ANES did not provide this option.

**Table E24:** Gender

Gender	ANES	Sample
Man	0.47	0.48
Woman	0.53	0.50
Non-binary	NA	0.03

Table E25, below, shows that our sample was much younger relative to the national averages in the ANES. Overall, 86% of our sample was 44 years of age or younger, whereas these age cohorts made up only 56% of the ANES population. Moreover, 42% of the ANES sample were aged 45 or more whereas those age cohorts only made up 14% of our sample. Thus, our sample was overall younger relative to the national average.

**Table E25:** Age Group

Age	ANES	Sample
18 - 29	0.24	0.40
30 - 44	0.34	0.46
45 - 64	0.30	0.13
65 or older	0.12	0.01

Table E26, below, shows that our sample was also a bit more politically liberal relative to national averages. Whereas the ANES asks ideology as a seven-item question, we ask ideology as a five-item question. As such, we combine these into a three-item table, instead. Moreover, whereas 22% of the Latino sample in the ANES said they had not thought much about the question, we did not include that as a response option. Overall, 56% of our sample identified as liberal, whereas only 27% of the Latinos in the ANES sample identified as such. However, the number of moderates and conservatives were more closely matched between our sample and the ANES.

**Table E26:** Ideology

Ideology	ANES	Sample
Liberal	0.27	0.56
Moderate	0.27	0.23
Conservative	0.24	0.19
Haven't thought much about this	0.22	NA
None of these	NA	0.02

Table E27, below, shows the breakdown of partisanship in our sample relative to the national average among Latino Americans. We find that our sample is overall, closely matched with the ANES. Most of our respondents identified as Democrats, whereas fewer identified as Republican. The largest difference between our sample and the national benchmark was that 16% of our sample identified as pure Independents while this group constituted 23% of the ANES sample.

**Table E27:** Partisanship

Partisanship	ANES	Sample
Strong Democrat	0.26	0.26
Democrat	0.18	0.25
Lean Democrat	0.14	0.13
Independent	0.23	0.16
Lean Republican	0.01	0.06
Republican	0.07	0.07
Strong Republican	0.13	0.07

Table E28, below, shows that our sample included mostly individuals who were born in the United States. Whereas the national average among Latinos in the ANES sample was 72%, 89% of our sample were born in the United States.

**Table E28:** Born in the United States

US Born	ANES	Sample
No	0.28	0.11
Yes	0.72	0.89

Table E29, below, displays the primary country that the respondent are from or trace their ancestry from. A majority of the respondents were from Mexico, with the second most from Puerto Rico.

**Table E29:** Primary Country of Ancestry or Origin

Country	n
Argentina	19
Bolivia	4
Brazil	16
Chile	8
Colombia	32
Costa Rica	7
Cuba	60
Dominican Republic	41
Ecuador	11
El Salvador	29
Guatemala	19
Honduras	16
Mexico	502
Nicaragua	11
Other Country (Please specify)	5
Panama	16
Peru	20
Puerto Rico	125
Spain/Spanish	38
Uruguay	1
Venezuela	15

## E.6 Supplemental Analyses

**Table E30:** Support for Candidate Across Term Used by Candidate

Candidate	”Latino”	”Latinx”	p-value
Juan	Latino	Latinx	0.020
Mary	Latino	Latinx	0.014
John	Latino	Latinx	0.013
Maria	Latino	Latinx	0.014

**Table E31:** Support for Candidate Across Candidates by Term Used

Term used	Candidate 1	Candidate 2	p-value
”Latino”	Juan	Mary	0.832
	Juan	John	0.088
	Juan	Maria	0.949
	Mary	John	0.092
	Mary	Maria	0.764
	John	Maria	0.064
”Latinx”	Juan	Mary	0.981
	Juan	John	0.070
	Juan	Maria	0.931
	Mary	John	0.058
	Mary	Maria	0.947
	John	Maria	0.053

### All Conditions Moderated by Socio-demographic Characteristics

We also test whether there was heterogeneity in the treatment by socio-demographic characteristics such as educational attainment (see Table E32), income (see Table E33), gender identity (see Table E34), age (see Table E35), political ideology (see Table E36), partisanship (see Table E37), and whether the respondent was born in the United States (see Table E38). Overall, we see no instance of consistent moderation by any demographic characteristic. Again, our main analyses focuses on the use of the terms “Latino” relative to “Latinx,” whereas these analyses also consider the race and gender of the candidate in addition to the use of either the term “Latino” or “Latinx.”

**Table E32:** Moderation by Respondent's Educational Attainment

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Politician Evaluation Indexed
Latino x Juan	0.039 (0.082)
Latino x Maria	0.072 (0.082)
Latino x Mary	0.046 (0.085)
Latinx x John	−0.009 (0.088)
Latinx x Juan	0.027 (0.086)
Latinx x Maria	0.070 (0.081)
Latinx x Mary	0.019 (0.079)
Education	0.028 (0.094)
Latino x Juan x Education	0.024 (0.125)
Latino x Maria x Education	−0.025 (0.127)
Latino x Mary x Education	0.004 (0.128)
Latinx x John x Education	−0.124 (0.132)
Latinx x Juan x Education	−0.084 (0.134)
Latinx x Maria x Education	−0.144 (0.124)
Latinx x Mary x Education	−0.069 (0.123)
Constant	0.650*** (0.060)
Observations	974
R <sup>2</sup>	0.039
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.024
Residual Std. Error	0.250 (df = 958)
F Statistic	2.580*** (df = 15; 958)

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.1; \*\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*\*p&lt;0.01

**Table E33:** Moderation by Respondent's Income

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Politician Evaluation Indexed
Latino x Juan	0.092 (0.091)
Latino x Maria	−0.024 (0.085)
Latino x Mary	−0.088 (0.088)
Latinx x John	−0.059 (0.087)
Latinx x Juan	0.054 (0.091)
Latinx x Maria	0.033 (0.085)
Latinx x Mary	−0.033 (0.089)
Income	−0.006 (0.021)
Latino x Juan x Income	−0.012 (0.030)
Latino x Maria x Income	0.028 (0.028)
Latino x Mary x Income	0.050* (0.030)
Latinx x John x Income	−0.010 (0.029)
Latinx x Juan x Income	−0.027 (0.031)
Latinx x Maria x Income	−0.017 (0.028)
Latinx x Mary x Income	0.004 (0.029)
Constant	0.683*** (0.061)
Observations	974
R <sup>2</sup>	0.045
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.030
Residual Std. Error	0.249 (df = 958)
F Statistic	3.013*** (df = 15; 958)

Note:

\*p&lt;0.1; \*\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*\*p&lt;0.01

**Table E34:** Moderation by Respondent's Gender

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Politician Evaluation Indexed
Latino x Juan	0.040 (0.044)
Latino x Maria	0.098** (0.046)
Latino x Mary	0.050 (0.047)
Latinx x John	−0.080* (0.047)
Latinx x Juan	−0.053 (0.047)
Latinx x Maria	−0.049 (0.046)
Latinx x Mary	−0.092** (0.044)
Woman	0.061 (0.048)
Non-Binary	0.012 (0.127)
Latino x Juan x Woman	0.029 (0.066)
Latino x Maria x Woman	−0.082 (0.065)
Latino x Mary x Woman	−0.004 (0.066)
Latinx x John x Woman	−0.028 (0.067)
Latinx x Juan x Woman	0.050 (0.066)
Latinx x Maria x Woman	0.046 (0.065)
Latinx x Mary x Woman	0.144** (0.065)
Latino x Juan x Non-Binary	0.194 (0.193)
Latino x Maria x Non-Binary	0.002 (0.279)
Latino x Mary x Non-Binary	−0.116 (0.194)
Latinx x John x Non-Binary	0.040

	(0.172)
Latinx x Juan x Non-Binary	0.103
	(0.218)
Latinx x Maria x Non-Binary	0.090
	(0.165)
Latinx x Mary x Non-Binary	0.025
	(0.193)
Constant	0.638***
	(0.033)
Observations	971
R <sup>2</sup>	0.079
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.056
Residual Std. Error	0.246 (df = 947)
F Statistic	3.508*** (df = 23; 947)

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Table E35:** Moderation by Respondent's Age

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Politician Evaluation Indexed
Latino x Juan	−0.245** (0.121)
Latino x Maria	−0.007 (0.106)
Latino x Mary	−0.142 (0.123)
Latinx x John	−0.111 (0.108)
Latinx x Juan	−0.239** (0.109)
Latinx x Maria	−0.080 (0.109)
Latinx x Mary	−0.146 (0.111)
Age	−0.006** (0.002)
Latino x Juan x Age	0.009*** (0.003)
Latino x Maria x Age	0.002 (0.003)
Latino x Mary x Age	0.006 (0.004)
Latinx x John x Age	0.001 (0.003)
Latinx x Juan x Age	0.006** (0.003)
Latinx x Maria x Age	0.002 (0.003)
Latinx x Mary x Age	0.004 (0.003)
Constant	0.852*** (0.080)
Observations	974
R <sup>2</sup>	0.055
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.040
Residual Std. Error	0.248 (df = 958)
F Statistic	3.708*** (df = 15; 958)

*Note:*

\*p&lt;0.1; \*\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*\*p&lt;0.01

**Table E36:** Moderation by Respondent's Ideology

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Politician Evaluation Indexed
Latino x Juan	0.013 (0.064)
Latino x Maria	0.015 (0.061)
Latino x Mary	−0.033 (0.061)
Latinx x John	−0.033 (0.068)
Latinx x Juan	0.024 (0.070)
Latinx x Maria	0.005 (0.064)
Latinx x Mary	−0.043 (0.061)
Somewhat liberal	−0.052 (0.058)
Moderate	−0.140** (0.068)
Somewhat conservative	−0.196** (0.085)
Very conservative	−0.213 (0.145)
None of these	−0.213 (0.145)
Latino x Juan x Somewhat liberal	0.068 (0.083)
Latino x Maria x Somewhat liberal	0.054 (0.078)
Latino x Mary x Somewhat liberal	0.136* (0.082)
Latinx x John x Somewhat liberal	−0.034 (0.086)
Latinx x Juan x Somewhat liberal	−0.034 (0.089)
Latinx x Maria x Somewhat liberal	0.044 (0.082)
Latinx x Mary x Somewhat liberal	0.0004 (0.081)
Latino x Juan x Moderate	0.081 (0.093)

Latino x Maria x Moderate	0.071 (0.091)
Latino x Mary x Moderate	0.153* (0.092)
Latinx x John x Moderate	0.055 (0.096)
Latinx x Juan x Moderate	-0.006 (0.096)
Latinx x Maria x Moderate	-0.048 (0.092)
Latinx x Mary x Moderate	0.042 (0.088)
Latino x Juan x Somewhat conservative	0.101 (0.111)
Latino x Maria x Somewhat conservative	0.064 (0.114)
Latino x Mary x Somewhat conservative	0.104 (0.111)
Latinx x John x Somewhat conservative	-0.202* (0.114)
Latinx x Juan x Somewhat conservative	-0.017 (0.119)
Latinx x Maria x Somewhat conservative	-0.058 (0.111)
Latinx x Mary x Somewhat conservative	0.150 (0.114)
Latino x Juan x Very conservative	-0.002 (0.174)
Latino x Maria x Very conservative	-0.034 (0.175)
Latino x Mary x Very conservative	-0.060 (0.185)
Latinx x John x Very conservative	-0.013 (0.175)
Latinx x Juan x Very conservative	-0.139 (0.170)
Latinx x Maria x Very conservative	-0.064 (0.174)
Latinx x Mary x Very conservative	0.060 (0.173)
Latino x Juan x None of these	NA NA
Latino x Maria x None of these	0.452 (0.282)
Latino x Mary x None of these	0.175

	(0.226)
Latinx x John x None of these	-0.183 (0.206)
Latinx x Juan x None of these	0.168 (0.195)
Latinx x Maria x None of these	0.024 (0.193)
Latinx x Mary x None of these	0.010 (0.226)
Constant	0.746*** (0.046)
Observations	973
R <sup>2</sup>	0.153
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.111
Residual Std. Error	0.238 (df = 926)
F Statistic	3.647*** (df = 46; 926)

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Table E37:** Moderation by Respondent's Party Identification (Higher Values = More Republican)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Politician Evaluation Indexed
Latino x Juan	0.070 (0.046)
Latino x Maria	0.045 (0.044)
Latino x Mary	0.031 (0.045)
Latinx x John	−0.045 (0.046)
Latinx x Juan	0.018 (0.047)
Latinx x Maria	0.045 (0.045)
Latinx x Mary	−0.076* (0.044)
Republicanness	−0.269*** (0.081)
Latino x Juan x Republicanness	−0.014 (0.108)
Latino x Maria x Republicanness	0.040 (0.107)
Latino x Mary x Republicanness	0.070 (0.107)
Latinx x John x Republicanness	−0.080 (0.106)
Latinx x Juan x Republicanness	−0.045 (0.104)
Latinx x Maria x Republicanness	−0.150 (0.104)
Latinx x Mary x Republicanness	0.181* (0.105)
Constant	0.747*** (0.033)
Observations	974
R <sup>2</sup>	0.156
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.143
Residual Std. Error	0.234 (df = 958)
F Statistic	11.825*** (df = 15; 958)

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Table E38:** Moderation by whether Respondent was Born in the US

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Politician Evaluation Indexed
Latino x Juan	−0.024 (0.096)
Latino x Maria	0.074 (0.091)
Latino x Mary	0.046 (0.093)
Latinx x John	−0.104 (0.085)
Latinx x Juan	−0.033 (0.096)
Latinx x Maria	0.076 (0.096)
Latinx x Mary	−0.010 (0.085)
Born in US	−0.021 (0.064)
Latino x Juan x Born in US	0.089 (0.102)
Latino x Maria x Born in US	−0.018 (0.097)
Latino x Mary x Born in US	0.005 (0.100)
Latinx x John x Born in US	0.019 (0.092)
Latinx x Juan x Born in US	0.014 (0.102)
Latinx x Maria x Born in US	−0.102 (0.102)
Latinx x Mary x Born in US	−0.013 (0.091)
Constant	0.683*** (0.059)
Observations	974
R <sup>2</sup>	0.038
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.023
Residual Std. Error	0.250 (df = 958)
F Statistic	2.552*** (df = 15; 958)

Note: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01