

# How Immigration Enforcement Shapes Latinx Candidate Preferences

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## Abstract

Some research suggests the threat posed by immigration enforcement compels Latinxs to support Democratic politicians. Other studies suggest Latinxs support Democrats over immigration-irrelevant factors. We present a *Dynamic Threat Ownership Theory* to illustrate the temporal conditions that compel Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement to support national Democratic politicians. We find Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement are not more inclined to support national Democratic politicians despite restrictionist Republican tendencies until Democratic politicians make perceptibly credible commitments to reduce or not exacerbate the threat of deportation. We also demonstrate the threat of immigration enforcement motivates partisan defection among Latinx Republicans despite the Republican Party's restrictionism. We supplement these findings with plausibly causal evidence showing Democratic policy commitments providing deportation relief increases positive incumbent evaluations. We provide a general theoretical framework for understanding *when* political threats inform the candidate evaluations of marginalized groups.

**Word Count: 11997**

# Introduction

How and when do group-specific threats inform candidate preferences? Latinxs, who compose 20% of the U.S. population and are the largest immigrant-origin group, are disparately exposed to immigration enforcement. 65% of Latinxs are either foreign-born or second-generation, and 15% are undocumented.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, 40% have undocumented friends or family.<sup>2</sup> Concomitantly, while the Latinx population has been growing, the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) heightened border enforcement while increasing permanent residency restrictions and interior deportations by 1400%.<sup>3</sup> Even Latinx citizens are subject to immigration enforcement. Immigration and Customs Enforcement wrongfully detained 3,500 citizens in Texas between 2006-2017, 462 citizens in Rhode Island over a 10-year period, and 420 citizens in Florida between 2017-2019.<sup>4</sup> The increasingly restrictive context has had deleterious consequences on Latinx communities. Evidence shows immigration enforcement undermines health (Cruz Nichols, LeBrón, and Pedraza, 2018; Vargas et al., 2019), child development (Dreby, 2015), wages (Fussell, 2011), social service uptake (Alsan and Yang, 2018), education (Kirksey et al., 2020), and police trust (Dhingra, Kilborn, and Woldemikael, 2021). These consequences not only implicate the undocumented, but the Latinx community writ large given their immigrant social ties (Roman, Walker, and Barreto, 2021).

The threatening context has led many to suggest Latinxs worried about immigration enforcement will support Democratic candidates relative to restrictionist Republicans (Barreto and Collingwood, 2015; Sanchez and Gomez-Aguinaga, 2017).<sup>5</sup> However, the empirical record on whether restrictive immigration contexts inform Latinx candidate preferences is mixed.

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<sup>1</sup><https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/fact-sheet/latinos-in-the-u-s-fact-sheet/>, <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/unauthorized-immigrants-united-states-stable-numbers-changing-origins#:~:text=As%20of%202018%2C%20there%20were,U.S.%20Department%20of%20Homeland%20Security>.

<sup>2</sup>Source: 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey.

<sup>3</sup>Source: DHS interior immigration removal data (Figure A1)

<sup>4</sup><https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/12/opinion/iceraids.html>

<sup>5</sup>Latinxs support national Democratic candidates/incumbents much more than Anglo whites and Latinx Republicans defect to support Democrats more than white Republicans (Figure B2).

An array of research suggests Latinxs prefer candidates on the basis of immigration-irrelevant considerations similar to the general non-Latinx public such as socio-economics, religion, and ideology (Leal et al., 2008; Abrajano and Alvarez, 2011; Barreto and Segura, 2014; Rakich and Thomson-DeVeaux, 2020; Corral and Leal, 2020; Shor, 2021; Ocampo, Garcia-Rios, and Gutierrez, 2021). Moreover, the failure of the Democratic Party to reduce deportations and provide legal status to undocumented immigrants may have reduced support for Democratic politicians among Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement (Sanchez et al., 2015; Street, Zepeda-Millán, and Jones-Correa, 2015).

We reconcile these perspectives and introduce a *Dynamic Threat Ownership Theory* (*DTOT*) to explain *when* salient threats to marginalized groups inform candidate preferences. Since marginalized groups are underrepresented, and parties prioritize the dominant group's political cleavages, available candidates may not effectively address group-specific threats. In this temporal context, marginalized group members experiencing a group-specific threat may not differentiate and believe one candidate is better than the other at ameliorating the threat. Therefore, group-specific threats may not be an *a priori* motivation for supporting a particular candidate or party. However, in temporal contexts where parties and/or candidates make credible commitments to ameliorate (e.g. propose or implement policies that address the threat) or not exacerbate (e.g. do not change an already threatening status quo to an even more threatening context relative to another candidate) group-specific threats, these same threats may begin to inform candidate preferences for threatened marginalized group members.

Latinxs after IIRIRA offer an effective theoretical test case. Historically, immigration enforcement is a valence issue where both parties have increased the threat of deportation for Latinx co-ethnics (Egan, 2013; Jones-Correa and De Graauw, 2013; Massey, 2021). However, recent events, such as Obama's second-term commitment to provide deportation relief to millions of undocumented immigrants in addition to Trump's entry as an explicitly anti-immigrant candidate in 2016, demonstrate there is increasing partisan differentiation on

immigration enforcement.

Evidence from 14 national Latinx surveys supports the *DTOT* (2007-2021). Prior to Obama's attempt to provide deportation relief and Trump's political entry, Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement are not more likely to vote for or support Democratic politicians relative to Latinxs who are not threatened. After Obama attempts to provide deportation relief and Trump enters the 2016 election, Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement are more likely to support and vote for Democratic candidates relative to Republicans. We also find the positive influence of immigration enforcement threat on support for Democrats is *stronger among Latinx Republicans* even though their partisan identity may constrain the adoption of pro-Democratic preferences.

Using high-frequency tracking polls of over 1 million respondents, we also provide plausibly causal evidence a policy announcement reducing the threat of deportation, *Deferred Action for Parents of Americans* (DAPA), increased positive Democratic incumbent evaluations among Latinxs regardless of partisanship. These findings not only establish a causal link between the threat of immigration enforcement and candidate evaluations, but also demonstrate Obama's second-term immigration commitments were important motivations for Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement to support Democratic candidates.

A critical contribution inherent to our study is that it explicates the temporal contexts that condition the relationship between the threat posed by immigration enforcement and candidate preferences among Latinxs. Prior research on how immigration enforcement motivates Latinx candidate evaluations are either smaller scale qualitative inquiries or do not take temporal shifts in partisan ownership over ameliorating threats into account (Michelson, 2005; Sanchez et al., 2015). In contrast, our study demonstrates immigration enforcement does not have a priori consequences for Latinx candidate evaluations until political options effectively ameliorate, or do not exacerbate, the threat.

Moreover, *DTOT*, borrowing insights from the threat and issue ownership literature (Petrocik, 1996; Albertson and Gadarian, 2015; Godefroidt, Eadeh, and Adam-Trojan, 2019;

Eadeh and Chang, 2020; Brandt et al., 2021), offers a general framework for understanding *when* group-specific threats to marginalized groups inform their candidate evaluations. *DTOT* may help explain the political behavior of minority groups experiencing group-specific threats increasingly at the forefront of American politics due to demographic shifts, increased minority representation, and increased polarization over salient threats minority groups experience.

This study also demonstrates, despite partisanship's increasing strength in determining candidate preferences along with mass polarization on immigration (Abramowitz and Webster, 2016; Baker and Edmonds, 2021), immigration enforcement threat may generate partisan defection. Prior research on Latinx Republicans is limited (Jones-Correa, Al-Faham, and Cortez, 2018), and it is often assumed they discount immigration issues (Cadava, 2020). To the contrary, this paper demonstrates immigration enforcement threat plays an outsized role informing Latinx Republican candidate preferences in a Democratic direction, consistent with prior research suggesting threat undermines political predispositions (Davis and Silver, 2004).

Additionally, consistent with *policy feedback* research (Pierson, 1993; Mettler, 2005; Soss and Schram, 2007; Campbell, 2012), this paper teaches us national Latinx incumbent evaluations are responsive to policies *reducing* deportation threat.<sup>6</sup> It is not obvious Latinxs will respond favorably toward incumbents facilitating policies reducing immigration enforcement despite their stronger immigrant ties. This is because of low immigration issue salience (Leal et al., 2008), limited political knowledge (Fraga et al., 2011; Price, 2017), acculturated co-ethnic backlash (Bedolla, 2005), and polarization (Baker and Edmonds, 2021). Yet, consistent with research that Latinxs are politically activated by immigration enforcement (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura, 2001; Pantoja and Segura, 2003), we find commitments to reduce enforcement can measurably increase positive Latinx incumbent evaluations.

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<sup>6</sup>However, prior research examines how *state-level* immigration policies influence *local* incumbent approval (Filindra and Manatschal, 2020).

# Dynamic Threat Ownership Theory

*Issue ownership theory* posits people support candidates that are more effective at handling their important issues (Petrocik, 1996; Egan, 2013). When an issue is salient, the effectiveness of a party or candidate's ability to handle that issue becomes a core motivation for the mass public's candidate preferences, a process known as *issue priming* (Krosnick and Kinder, 1990; Iyengar and Kinder, 2010). Likewise, segments of the mass public worried about a particular threat may support a particular candidate and/or party if they are perceptibly credible at ameliorating the threat (i.e. threat solution ownership). (Merolla and Zechmeister, 2013; Albertson and Gadarian, 2015; Albertson and Gadarian, 2016; Godefroidt, Eadeh, and Adam-Trojan, 2019; Eadeh and Chang, 2020; Brandt et al., 2021). Threat solution ownership can help candidates overcome electoral costs when crises threaten the mass public (Merolla and Zechmeister, 2013). It can also help candidates overcome trait-based stereotypes that otherwise undermine positive evaluations (Albertson and Gadarian, 2016; Holman, Merolla, and Zechmeister, 2016; Holman, Merolla, and Zechmeister, 2017).

However, prior literature is missing a theoretical treatment of the *temporal dynamics* concerning threat ownership and candidate preferences. Prior research assumes partisan ownership over ameliorating particular threats is stable, accessible, and a product of long-term accumulative events (Merolla and Zechmeister, 2013; Albertson and Gadarian, 2015; Godefroidt, Eadeh, and Adam-Trojan, 2019; Eadeh and Chang, 2020). For example, in the U.S., it may be safe to assume, on average, national security threats motivate support for Republican candidates whereas economic threats motivate Democratic support (Merolla and Zechmeister, 2013).

Yet, there is nothing natural about various threats to suggest they should *always* motivate candidate evaluations in a particular partisan direction *over time*. Although Petrocik (1996)'s issue ownership theory implies partisan ownership over ameliorating particular threats is stable (see also Walgrave, Lefevere, and Tresch (2014), Seeberg (2017), and Tresch and Feddersen (2019)), they still posit room for realignment. Certain party candidates may overcome a

perceptible lack of threat solution ownership by demonstrating individualized competence in addressing a threat (e.g Bill Clinton on crime) (Holian, 2004). Candidates may also own solutions to threats typically owned by an opposing party by communicating their policy platform (Dahlberg and Martinsson, 2015). The public can also update national candidate evaluations in response to shifts in their policy commitments while in office (Highton, 2012). Petrocik (1996) calls this a “lease” on another party’s issues. New political events could arise that flip the perceptible competencies of each party to ameliorate particular threats (Kuziemko and Washington, 2018). Moreover, issues not owned by either party (i.e. valence issues), could become polarized in their ownership over time, such that the issue becomes a relevant factor in candidate evaluations (Walgrave, Lefevere, and Nuytemans, 2009; Egan, 2013). Likewise, the perceived capacity to ameliorate certain threats may be increasingly differentiated by partisanship over time, with potential implications for candidate evaluations.

Therefore, we forward a *Dynamic Threat Ownership Theory (DTOT)* to highlight how temporal shifts in threat solution ownership may inform the mass public’s candidate preferences. *DTOT* has two core propositions. First, consistent with research suggesting issue ownership shifts over time (Holian, 2004; Walgrave, Lefevere, and Nuytemans, 2009; Dahlberg and Martinsson, 2015; Kuziemko and Washington, 2018), ownership over the ability to ameliorate a threat may also shift over time among parties and/or candidates. Second, being concerned about a particular threat does not have a priori political consequences. In temporal contexts where candidates are not differentiated over capably addressing a threat, members of the mass public worried about that threat will not support one candidate over another on the basis of the threat. Conversely, the same threat may begin to inform candidate preferences in temporal contexts where one party and/or candidate is perceptibly credible at ameliorating or not exacerbating the threat. *Ameliorating* the threat is to make commitments or implement policies to mitigate the threat. *Not exacerbating* the threat is to not be willing to make the threat worse.

- **H1a: When candidates are not differentiated in their capacity to ameliorate**

**a threat, the threat will not inform candidate preferences.**

- **H1b: When candidates are differentiated in their capacity to ameliorate or not exacerbate a threat, the same threat will inform candidate preferences.**

*DTOT*, while sufficiently generalizable for understanding the broader mass public's behavior, is particularly useful for understanding minority group behavior in the contemporary moment.

Most research on the behavioral consequences of threat focuses on dominant groups or the national population (i.e. Anglo whites) (Jost et al., 2017). Anglo whites are better represented, so their salient threats are more likely to inform candidate preferences since parties/candidates prioritize the dominant group's political cleavages (Broockman, 2014; Griffin, 2014). Consequently, political differentiation and/or agreement on solutions to threats dominant groups face tend to be relatively stable (Petrocik, 1996). Moreover, given political representatives have historically privileged solutions to salient threats to dominant groups (e.g. demographic shifts, socio-cultural threat from immigrants and Black people), all parties and/or candidates may end up exacerbating minority group-specific threats (e.g. policing, immigration enforcement) (Davis and Silver, 2004; Craig and Richeson, 2014; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). Therefore, concerns over group-specific threats may not typically inform minority candidate preferences since both parties are responsible for inaction on, or exacerbating, group-specific threats.

However, *DTOT* may be increasingly relevant in the contemporary period. Minority political power is increasing due to a declining Anglo white population, (Craig and Richeson, 2014), increasing non-white representation (Reingold, Widner, and Harmon, 2020), and polarization among whites over threats non-whites face (e.g. immigration enforcement, racial injustice) (Baker and Edmonds, 2021). This may lead to greater willingness among parties and/or candidates to ameliorate minority group specific threats to win elections. Thus, group-specific threats may be increasingly salient motivations for preferring a particular

**Table 1: Dynamic Threat Ownership Theory Expectations**

<i>Temporal Political Context</i>		<i>Examples and Expectations</i>		
	Party A's Behavior	Party B's Behavior	Latinx Example	Expected behavior of threatened Latinxs
Context 1	Sustain Threatening Status Quo	Sustain Threatening Status Quo	Pre-2nd Obama term	Support neither party's candidate
Context 2	Sustain Threatening Status Quo	Exacerbate Threat	N/A	Support party A candidate
Context 3	Ameliorate Threat	Sustain Threatening Status Quo	Obama's 2nd term	Support party A candidate
Context 4	Ameliorate Threat	Exacerbate Threat	Post-Trump	Support Party A candidate

candidate and/or party among non-whites. In sum, *DTOT* may explain *when* group-specific threats inform minority candidate preferences.

## Context: Latinxs, Immigration Enforcement, and the DTOT

Historically and nationally, both parties are associated with policies and commitments that reduce *and* increase immigration enforcement threat (Street, Zepeda-Millán, and Jones-Correa, 2015). Reagan helped pass the Immigration Reform and Control Act, which provided legal status to 3 million undocumented while increasing employment restrictions. Clinton's immigration reforms expanded the scope of conditions to sustain legal status while increasing interior immigration enforcement (Morawetz, 2000). Bush used Clinton's reforms to implement §287(g) and Secure Communities, which increased Federal cooperation with local police to identify and deport undocumented immigrants. While Obama promised to pass comprehensive immigration reform to regularize millions of undocumented in 2008 after Bush's failure to pass a bill, his first term administration failed to pass reforms while deporting more people than the entire Bush administration (Wallace, 2012). Hence, Obama was often called by immigration activists, "Deporter-in-Chief" (Massey, 2021). In this temporal context (Context 1, see Table 1), immigration enforcement threat may not inform Latinx candidate preferences given the absence of partisan differentiation on alleviating the threat. Indeed, Street, Zepeda-Millán, and Jones-Correa (2015) find Obama's aggressive immigration policies generated political

ambivalence among Latinxs and made them less likely to believe the Democratic Party serves their interests.

However, shifts in the political context may prime Latinxs to support particular candidates on the basis of immigration enforcement concerns. Obama backtracks on his initial restrictiveness after Congressional Republicans refuse to bring immigration reform to a vote during his second term. On November 2014, Obama announced the *Deferred Action for Parents of Americans* (DAPA) executive action during primetime television, which would have provided deportation relief for 4 million undocumented. He also announced the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP), which reduced the scope of Secure Communities (Blumenthal, 2014). DAPA would be highly consequential given an additional 10 million lived in households with a DAPA-eligible person(s).<sup>7</sup> Moreover, post-PEP, interior deportations decreased from 405,000 to 325,000 between 2014-2015 (Figure A1), similar to levels before Obama began his presidency (Context 3, Table 1).

Seven months later, Trump enters the 2016 presidential election as an explicitly xenophobic candidate (Finley and Esposito, 2020). Post-election, Trump implements several restrictionist policies and rolls back Obama's deportation relief policies (Pierce, 2019) (Context 4, Table 1). These commitments may have undercut the perception immigration enforcement is a valence issue and allowed the Democratic/Republican party to "own" decreasing/increasing the threat of deportation (Sanchez and Gomez-Aguinaga, 2017). Since the political context increasingly suggests Democrats unambiguously own the issue of reducing immigration enforcement, Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement may be more likely to support Democratic candidates than prior to partisan differentiation.

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<sup>7</sup><https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/unauthorized-immigrants-united-states-stable-numbers-changing-origins#:~:text=As%20of%202018%2C%20there%20were,U.S.%20Department%20of%20Homeland%20Security>.

## Immigration Enforcement and Partisan Defection

*DTOT* implies Latinx Republicans threatened by immigration enforcement will defect and support Democratic candidates credible at addressing the threat. Indeed, issue ownership theory suggests voters defect if the opposing party owns salient issues (Petrocik, Benoit, and Hansen, 2003). Yet, defection is not guaranteed. Latinx Republicans concerned about immigration enforcement may rationalize away the relative shortcomings of their co-partisan candidates since their partisan commitments may operate as a filter that discounts information inconsistent with their partisan dispositions (Zaller, 1992; Taber and Lodge, 2006).

However, immigration enforcement threat may still undercut partisan predispositions and have a stronger influence motivating Democratic candidate preferences among Latinx Republicans. Generally, Latinx Republicans hold weaker partisan loyalties relative to whites since they are cross-pressured on several dimensions (Geron and Michelson, 2008), particularly on immigration enforcement. 28% of Latinx Republicans know a deportee, and 35% have an undocumented friend or family member (Figure C3, Panels B-C). Latinx Republicans are embedded in immigrant neighborhoods (Figure C3, Panels D-E). The threat literature also suggests immigration enforcement threat may encourage Latinx Republicans to seek countervailing information to ameliorate the threat (Gadarian and Albertson, 2014; Merolla and Zechmeister, 2018), potentially inducing doubt over whether their party is acting in their best interests (Marcus and MacKuen, 1993). These dynamics may be especially true for marginalized group members, who often prioritize group-specific interests in the face of threat (Davis and Silver, 2004).

Additionally, although Democrats may be more likely to support candidates who seek to reduce immigration enforcement (Baker and Edmonds, 2021), Latinx Democrats may support Democratic candidates regardless of immigration enforcement threat due to their own partisan dispositions (i.e. ceiling effects) (Hetherington and Suhay, 2011).

- **H2: Immigration enforcement threat will have a stronger influence among non-co-partisans on support for candidates that own the capacity to amelio-**

rate the threat

## Policy Commitments on Immigration

DTOT suggests Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement will support a particular candidate when candidates differentiate on addressing the threat. However, it is unclear if policies reducing restrictive immigration action increases Latinx incumbent support.

Prior research suggests “policy makes politics” by informing the mass public’s attitudes and political preferences (Campbell, 2012). Policies reducing the threat of deportation may increase incumbent support among Latinxs disparately exposed to immigration enforcement as a matter of self-interest (Hopkins and Parish, 2019). Therefore, Latinxs may be more inclined to support Obama and national Democratic candidates after Obama’s DAPA announcement.

At the same time, Latinxs may not respond to DAPA. The announcement was only a commitment that deportation relief would come in 6 months. Ultimately, relief was disrupted after the Supreme Court sustained an injunction stalling the directive after lawsuits from Republican states. Moreover, DAPA may have not been salient. Some evidence suggests Latinxs do not consider immigration the most important issue and are concerned about similar issues as the general public (Leal et al., 2008; Abrajano and Alvarez, 2011; Barreto and Segura, 2014; Rakich and Thomson-DeVeaux, 2020; Shor, 2021). Latinxs may not “receive the treatment” given they are less attentive to politics. Prior research suggests Latinxs are less politically interested, knowledgeable, and engaged (Neuman and Neuman, 1986; Garza, Falcon, and Garcia, 1996; DeSipio, 1996; Jones-Correa et al., 2007; Fraga et al., 2011; Price, 2017). The immigration issue is also increasingly polarized (Baker and Edmonds, 2021). For Latinx Republicans and potentially independents, this would suggest their partisan disposition (or lack thereof) may rationalize away the positive benefits of DAPA. Indeed, for acculturated Latinxs, the provision of legal status to undocumented immigrants may be perceived as threatening given their stigmatized attributes and (perceived or real) labor

market competition (Gutiérrez, 1995; Bedolla, 2005).

However, other research suggests Latinxs are particularly attentive to immigration politics even if concerned about other issues (Pantoja and Segura, 2003). Political knowledge gaps may be mollified on policies implicating the group (Pérez, 2015). Prior evidence also shows policies implicating immigrants are particularly mobilizing for Latinxs (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura, 2001). Moreover, since non-Democratic Latinxs are still threatened by immigration enforcement and cross-pressured along several dimensions, they may be less susceptible to polarizing backlash (Geron and Michelson, 2008).

- **H3: Policy commitments to reduce immigration enforcement will increase positive Latinx incumbent evaluations.**

## Data and Design

We use 14 surveys to test **H1-H2**. These are the 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2017, 2018, 2019 Pew Latino Surveys ( $N = 2015, 1375, 1220, 1765, 701, 1520, 1001, 2104, 3030$ ) in addition to the 2012, 2013, and 2021 Latino Advocacy Survey (LAS '12,  $N = 2021$ , LAS '13,  $N = 800$ , LAS '21,  $N = 2208$ ), 2016 Collaborative Multi-Racial Post-Election Survey (CMPS '16,  $N = 3009$ ), and a 2021 Latino Political Survey (LPS '21,  $N = 1800$ ). The Pew, CMPS, and LAS '21 surveys are nationally representative Latinx samples. LAS '12 is representative of Latinx registered voters in 5 battleground states (FL, VA, CO, NM, AZ). LAS '13 and LPS '21 are representative of national Latinx registered voters. Although the target sample occasionally differs across surveys, our hypothesized findings are not sensitive to sample differences (Figure 1). All surveys include weights to ensure representative estimates and are administered bilingually. For more sampling, weighting, and error margin details by survey, see Section D.

## Measuring Candidate Preferences

We use several dependent variables characterizing national Democratic candidate preferences (*Democratic preference*). These include presidential vote choice for Democratic candidates, favorability/unfavorability for Democratic/Republican candidates or incumbents, approval/disapproval for Democratic/Republican incumbents, approval/disapproval for the two parties in Congress, favorability for the two parties in Congress, and vote choice for the Democratic congressional ticket (see Section E.1 for outcome availability by survey).<sup>8</sup> Although outcome measures vary by survey, using multiple distinct outcomes undercuts the prospect that statistical conclusions are a function of measurement (Kioussis, 2003; McAvoy, 2008). Moreover, favorability and approval are strongly associated with vote choice, suggesting all outcomes capture a generalized preference for Democratic candidates (Section E.3). Indeed, the distinct candidate preference outcomes operate similarly with respect to the independent variable of interest (Figure 1). Outcomes are rescaled between 0-1 where 1 = support/opposition to Democratic/Republican politicians.

## Measuring Immigration Enforcement Threat

The independent variable is *deportation threat*. We use two *threat* measures. The first is an affective measure asking respondents “Regardless of your own immigration or citizenship status, how much, if at all, do you worry that you, a family member, or a close friend could be deported?” Responses are on a 0-3 scale from “not at all” to “a lot.” This measure is available and used in the Pew ’08, ’10, ’13, ’17, ’18, ’19, and LPS ’21 studies. A variant of this measure is used in the CMPS ’16. The item asks “How worried are you that people you know might be detained or deported for immigration reasons.” Answers are on a 0-4 scale from “not at all” to “extremely.” All measures are rescaled between 0-1. This measure is worded similarly to other measures in preexisting literature analyzing other threats (e.g. terrorism) (Hetherington and Suhay, 2011). This measure captures the concept of exposure to immigration enforcement. It

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<sup>8</sup>If vote choice is the outcome, the analyzed sample is subset to Latinx registered voters.

is correlated with county-level Secure Communities deportations, knowing undocumented friends/family, foreign-born status, knowing a deportee, and immigrant zipcode composition (Figure G5).

The second *threat* measure asks about proximal immigration enforcement exposure in the Pew '11, '12, '14, LAS '12, '13, and '21 surveys. The item asks if respondents “personally know someone who has been deported or detained by the Federal Government.” Responses are coded 1 for “yes” and 0 for “no”.

Although knowing a deportee does not necessarily mean someone *feels* threatened, the two measures capture a similar concept given they are strongly associated (Table G5, Models 1-2). Moreover, both measures operate similarly with respect to candidate preferences in surveys where they are both available (Table G5, Models 3-6). Not all Latinxs are undocumented or immigrants, so both measures are useful since they account for vicarious exposure to immigration enforcement.

If **H1** is correct, we expect *threat* to be unassociated with *Democrat preference before* Democrats “own” the amelioration of deportation threat. After, we expect *threat* to be positively associated with *Democratic preference*. Given *threat* is scaled between 0-1, we present min/max *threat* coefficients.

## Measuring Partisanship

**H2** identifies partisanship as a moderator. Three indicators are constructed characterizing Democrats, Republicans, and independents. The Democrat and Republican categories include leaners. The Pew '17 survey only includes the three category partisanship item. Thus, independents include leaners for Pew '17. Model specifications assessing the heterogeneous influence of *deportation threat* by partisanship include interactions between *threat* and indicators for whether a respondent is an *independent* or *Republican* (*Democrat* is the reference). If **H2** is correct, we expect a positive and/or larger coefficient for interactions between *threat* and *Republican after* Democrats “own” the amelioration of deportation threat.

## Measuring Temporal Threat Solution Ownership

**H1-H2** and our contextual account imply *threat* will be more strongly associated with *Democratic preference* when national-level candidates differentiate on ameliorating and/or not exacerbating immigration enforcement threat. Therefore, our approach assesses if *threat* is unassociated/associated with *Democratic preference* in temporal contexts where national-level Democratic commitments on reducing immigration enforcement threat is limited/palpable. If our theory and contextual account is empirically valid, *threat* should be unassociated with *Democratic preference* in surveys fielded prior to DAPA and Trump's political entry (Pew '08-'14, LAS '12, LAS '13) and associated with *Democrat preference* in surveys fielded after (CMPS '16, Pew '17-'19, LAS '21, LPS '21). We term the temporal context where Democrats/Republicans make strong(er) commitments to reduce/exacerbate deportation threat as *partisan differentiation*.

Our test is consistent with prior theoretical insights on issue ownership. Issue ownership is typically measured in two dimensions: *associative* (i.e. spontaneous association between an issue and party deriving from “long-term party attention” to said issue) and *competence* (i.e. demonstration of being able to adequately ameliorate a problem) (Egan, 2013; Stubager, 2018). For our inquiry, we focus on the latter, that is, the Democratic/Republican party's national-level competence/incompetence in addressing deportation threat.

Partisan issue ownership is typically measured at the individual-level by asking respondents if they perceive a party is better at “handling” an issue (Egan, 2013). We cannot measure ownership over reducing immigration enforcement at the individual-level since these traditional measures are not consistently available in the surveys at use. However, if *threat* is unassociated with *Democratic preference* in surveys fielded prior to DAPA and Trump's political entry, our theory, contextual account, and empirical strategy is likely valid.

Regardless, empirical evidence demonstrates our approach is valid. First, our **H3** test shows DAPA substantially and persistently increased Obama's job approval among Latinxs, suggesting his commitments fundamentally reshaped how Latinxs understand Democratic

presidencies (Figure 5). Second, Obama’s approval on handling immigration discontinuously increases post-DAPA among Latinxs. Latinx Trump approval on immigration is also particularly low, much less than even Bush (Figure L17).<sup>9</sup> Third, if Democratic politicians “own” reducing deportation threat after DAPA and Trump, then Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement should be more likely to approve/disapprove of Democratic/Republican politicians’ handling of immigration after *partisan differentiation*, but not before. We find evidence confirming our logic (Figure G6). Fourth, the individual-level approach is potentially problematic relative to our contextually informed approach in that perceived issue ownership may be a function of political dispositions rather than objective features of party commitments. We demonstrate this is the case by showing Latinxs who *do not believe* Democrats “own” the issue of “being concerned for Hispanics” relative to those who do are *more likely to support Democratic politicians* if threatened by immigration enforcement (Table G6).

## Controls

Models assessing the association between *threat* and *candidate preferences* across the 14 surveys adjust for multiple covariates. We categorize these into demographic, socio-economic, political, zipcode-level, and county-level controls in addition to census area fixed effects.<sup>10</sup> We adjust for an exhaustive set of covariates well-established in the preexisting literature as motivations for Latinx candidate preferences. These include (but are not limited to): partisanship, ideology (Garcia Bedolla, Alvarez, and Nagler, 2006), immigration issue salience (Barreto and Collingwood, 2015), acculturation (foreign-born status, Spanish interview) (Wong, 2000), perceived discrimination, experienced discrimination (Huddy, Mason, and Horwitz, 2016), denial of anti-Black racism (Alamillo, 2019), general ownership over supporting Latinxs, Latinx identity, American identity (Hickel et al., 2021), national origin (Alvarez and Bedolla, 2003), education (Abrajano, 2005), gender (Welch and Sigelman, 1992), religion (Kosmin and Keysar, 1995), religiosity (Kelly and Kelly, 2005), personal economic situations

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<sup>9</sup>Mean Latinx immigration job approval for Bush, Obama, and Trump was 30%, 49% and 22%.

<sup>10</sup>LAS ’12 analyses use state fixed effects since it only surveys 5 battleground states.

(i.e. income, unemployment, homeownership, prospective, retrospective, and current financial situation) (Abrajano, Michael Alvarez, and Nagler, 2008), and moral values (e.g. gay marriage disapproval, abortion issue salience) (Abrajano, Michael Alvarez, and Nagler, 2008). Importantly, we adjust for selection into deportation threat by adjusting for the logged number of county-level Secure Communities (SC) deportations, the SC deportation rate (deportations per 1000 foreign-born), whether the respondent knows someone undocumented, and whether the respondent knows a deportee (for studies where the psychological measure is available). See Section K for a full enumeration of controls across surveys.

## High-Frequency Approval Data

To test **H3**, we use daily Gallup presidential approval tracking polls between 2/2009-10/2016 ( $N = 1,270,896$ ).<sup>11</sup> The outcome is a binary indicator if a respondent approves of Obama's job (*approval*).

We use a difference-in-differences (DD) and regression discontinuity-in-time (RDiT) design to estimate the DAPA announcement's (*DAPA*) effect on *approval*. The DD design has the advantage of demonstrating *DAPA*'s long-term consequences despite the interruption of deportation relief whereas the RDiT has more plausible identification assumptions for estimating coefficients less likely to be affected by secular differential time trends and/or intervening factors.

Testing **H3** serves two purposes. First, the test provides causal and externally valid evidence on the link between immigration enforcement threat and support for national Democratic politicians. Our **H1-H2** tests are model-based and should not be interpreted as causal. Experimental tests of *deportation threat* exposure may cause harm given the inducement of psychological distress or may be externally invalid given they do not characterize actual immigration policy shifts. Testing the effect of DAPA's announcement, a policy that would have ostensibly reduced deportation threat, on Democratic incumbent approval with

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<sup>11</sup>October 2012 data was not collected by Gallup.

credible design-based assumptions is the next best strategy to ethically and credibly assess the link between deportation threat and support for Democratic politicians. Second, the test serves as a theoretical “manipulation check” for the **H1-H2** model-based results. The **H3** test demonstrates the post-DAPA context was a meaningful shift in Latinx perceptions of Democratic presidential administrations such that Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement may be increasingly primed to support Democratic politicians.

For the DD design, the independent variable is an indicator equal to 1 post-*DAPA* (2014-11-20). We assess the differential effect of *DAPA* on Latinx *approval* relative to whites by interacting *DAPA* with an indicator for *Latinx* self-identification. Blacks are less likely to be foreign-born. Therefore, as a placebo, we interact *DAPA* with *Black* self-identification to rule out secular *approval* trends.<sup>12</sup> Following Kuziemko and Washington (2018), we also evaluate if the baseline DD estimates are robust to adjustments for state fixed effects, demographics (age, gender, marital status), socio-economics (education, income), politics (partisanship, ideology), interactions between *Latinx* and the controls, a *Latinx*-specific time trend, and interview date SE clustering. We also estimate *DAPA*’s effect on *approval* among Latinx Republicans, Democrats, and independents relative to the white population. These estimates help demonstrate partisanship may not be a constraint on positive incumbent evaluations after commitments to reduce immigration enforcement.

The identifying DD assumption is that Latinx *approval* trends would have been similar to whites after DAPA if DAPA did not occur (i.e. parallel trends). This assumption is untestable but plausible. Theoretically, “Parallel Publics” research shows political attitudes between ethno-racial subgroups move in parallel due to common information exposure (Page and Shapiro, 1993). Empirically, we use an event study to show no pre-*DAPA* outcome trend divergence. We interact *Latinx* with monthly indicators 10 months pre/post-*DAPA*, with the before/after 10 month indicator equal to all months before/after. Pre-*DAPA* coefficients should be statistically null if the parallel trends assumption holds.

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<sup>12</sup>Asian and other-race respondents are not included in the analyses due to low *N*.

For the RDiT, we aggregate the tracking poll to the daily level and generate mean *approval* and aforementioned control covariate estimates for Latinxs, their partisan subgroups, whites, and Blacks. Blacks and whites are placebo groups. We present non-parametric mean-squared optimal bandwidth RDiT estimates of *DAPA*'s discontinuous effect on *approval* among these groups (Calonico et al., 2017), with the running variable (days to *DAPA*) to the *n*th polynomial ( $n = 0, 1, 2$ , i.e. difference-in-means, linear, quadratic) and a triangular kernel.

## Results


### When Does Threat Inform Candidate Preferences?

Figure 1 characterizes the association between *threat* and *Democratic preference*.<sup>13</sup> We find evidence for **H1**. Before *partisan differentiation* on immigration enforcement, there is either no association or a negative association between *threat* and *Democratic preference*. After DAPA is announced, there is a consistent, statistically significant, and positive association between *deportation threat* and *Democratic preference*. The standardized meta-analytic pooled random-effects coefficient for study coefficients prior to *partisan differentiation* is null and small (0.01,  $p = 0.55$ ). After *partisan differentiation* over reducing deportation threat, the meta-analytic coefficient is 0.07 and significant ( $p < 0.001$ ). Consistent with the DTOT, a formal coefficient difference test indicates the post-differentiation meta-analytic *threat* coefficient is statistically larger than the pre-differentiation meta-analytic coefficient ( $p < 0.01$ ). See Section J.1 for full regression tables characterizing Figure 1.

There are two exceptions to the pattern. First, there is significant negative association between *threat* and Obama approval in the Pew '11 and '14 surveys ( $p < 0.10$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ) along with Obama vote choice in the Pew '11 survey ( $p < 0.10$ ). These findings are not theoretically inconsistent. In fact, they suggest Obama was perceived as highly restrictionist such that threatened Latinxs reduced their support. These findings are consistent with prior

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<sup>13</sup>For estimation strategy details on testing **H1** and **H2**, see Section H



**Figure 1: Deportation Threat Informs Support for Democratic Candidates/Incumbents After Partisan Differentiation.** The x-axis is survey+year. The y-axis is the threat coefficient. Positive coefficients denote support/opposition to Democratic/Republican politicians. Color denotes survey, outcome. Dashed vertical line denotes pre- and post- partisan differentiation. Annotations are meta-analytic coefficients for the pre- and post-differentiation period. All estimates from fully-specified models. All regressions use population weights. All covariates re-scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust SEs. See Section J.1 for full regression tables.

work suggesting Obama’s continuance of Bush-era interior enforcement reduced the sense the Democratic Party was welcoming to Latinxs (Street, Zepeda-Millán, and Jones-Correa, 2015).

The second exception is during the 2008 election. In the Pew ’08 study, *threat* has a positive association with Obama vote choice and favorability ( $\beta = 0.16$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ;  $\beta = 0.11$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). *Threat* is also associated with McCain unfavorability ( $\beta = 0.06$ ,  $p < 0.10$ ). However, there is no association between *threat* and Clinton favorability.

Why the exception? Obama may have acquired a “lease” on owning the issue of reducing immigration enforcement threat during the 2008 election. Although the last Democratic incumbent implemented restrictive immigration laws (i.e. Bill Clinton), Obama may have been perceptibly less restrictive vis-a-vis both Hillary Clinton and John McCain. For instance, Clinton did not commit to providing drivers licenses to undocumented immigrants whereas Obama did. Licenses protect undocumented immigrants from being arrested and referred to immigration authorities (Waslin, 2013). Moreover, Obama was committed to comprehensive immigration reform whereas McCain emphasized border security. Obama

indicated to prominent Univision TV anchor Jorge Ramos that “We will have in the first year an immigration bill that I strongly support and that I am promising. And I want to move that forward as quickly as possible (Navarette, 2010).”<sup>14</sup> Yet, Figure 1 demonstrates the goodwill Obama received from threatened Latinxs dissipates in later years when it becomes clear he was maintaining Bush-era enforcement. It is not until the 2016 CMPS when threatened Latinxs are more likely to favor Obama.

### Priming or Sorting?

Our theory implies *threat* is *primed* among Latinxs worried about immigration enforcement after *partisan differentiation*. That is, *threat* becomes an increasingly relevant motivation for supporting Democratic over Republican candidates. However, an alternative explanation for the increased association between *threat* and *Democratic preference* post-differentiation is *partisan sorting*. Democratic/Republican Latinxs may adopt a threatened/unthreatened disposition after *partisan differentiation*. Likewise, threatened/unthreatened Latinxs may shift to the Democratic/Republican party, and adopt concomitant candidate preferences. Although we cannot completely rule out sorting as an alternative mechanism given the cross-sectional nature of our Latinx surveys,<sup>15</sup> we present evidence to demonstrate priming is an operative mechanism.

First, in the aggregate, some partisan sorting occurs pre-differentiation but does not motivate candidate preferences pre-differentiation. In 2008, *threat* was similar between Republican (0.50) and Democratic Latinxs (0.47). By 2013, *threat* diverged between Republican (0.34) and Democratic (0.47) Latinxs (Figure G7). Difference-in-difference estimates using repeated Pew Latino Survey cross-sections ('07, '08, '10, '13, and '18) demonstrate partisan sorting on perceiving *threat* occurred pre-differentiation since surveys prior to 2013 demonstrate statistically higher/lower threat levels among Republican/Democratic partisans relative to

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<sup>14</sup>60% of Latinxs know Jorge Ramos by name and 65% of Latinxs who know him consider him a community leader. Source: 2010 Pew Latino Survey.

<sup>15</sup>There are no large, nationally representative Latinx *panel* surveys with deportation threat items. The LINES, which we use to suggestively rule out sorting, is only of Latinx immigrants.


2013 (Figure G8). If sorting was operative, *threat* would be associated with *Democratic preference* in the Pew '13, LAS '13, and Pew '14 studies. It is not (Figure 1).

Second, affective *threat* measures are subject to partisan motivated reasoning. Republican Latinxs may not want to express *threat* when Trump is in power. However, experiential *threat* measures, such as knowing a deportee, are difficult to change on the basis of partisanship because they should not be a function of attitudinal dispositions but rather government immigration enforcement policy.<sup>16</sup> Indeed, while affective threat measures exhibit partisan sorting between 2008-2021 (Figure C3, Panel A), experiential measures do not, Democratic and Republican Latinxs know deportees at the same rate between 2011-2021 (Figure C3, Panel B). Experiential threat measures are not associated with *Democratic preference* in the Pew '11, '12, '14, or LAS '12 survey pre-differentiation but are associated with voting for Biden in the post-differentiation period (LAS '21 Study, Figure 1). Consistent with **H2**, experiential threat is primed even more strongly for Republican Latinxs in the LAS '21 survey (Table J19). These results demonstrate measures of *threat* unlikely to be affected by sorting are associated with *Democratic preference* primarily on the basis of priming post-differentiation.

Third, we use the Latino Immigrant National Election Survey (LINES) to demonstrate Latinx immigrant partisans do not adopt a threatened disposition between the 2016 post-election context and the middle of Trump's first presidential year (McCann and Jones-Correa, 2021), where he implemented a series of restrictive immigration executive orders. These results demonstrate, during an anti-immigrant policy context, Latinx immigrants and immigrant citizens do not adopt threatened dispositions as a function of their partisanship (Table G7). We also demonstrate 2016 Trump vote choice does not motivate the adoption of a threatened disposition (Table G9). Moreover, we use these data to demonstrate a threatened disposition does not motivate partisan switching between the two time periods (Table G8), consistent with prior panel data evidence demonstrating anti-immigrant contexts do not motivate partisan shifts among Latinxs (Hopkins, Kaiser, and Perez, 2021). Indeed, our own

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<sup>16</sup>See Table G4 for threat measure used by survey



**Figure 2: Threat Motivates Partisan Defection, Particularly After Partisan Differentiation.** The x-axis is the meta-analytic random-effects coefficient for the respective covariates (y-axis). Panel A displays meta-analytic estimates from the Pew '08, '10, '11, '12, '13, '14, LAS '12, and LAS '13 studies. Panel B displays the same with the exception of the Pew '08 study. Panel C displays meta-analytic estimates from the CMPS '16, Pew '17, '18, '19, LAS '21, and LPS '21 studies. Positive coefficients denote support/opposition to Democratic/Republican politicians. Meta-analytic coefficients derived from fully-specified models. All estimates from models using survey population weights. All covariates re-scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed.

analysis of cross-sectional aggregate Pew data demonstrates Latinx partisan identity is very stable even after Trump's explicitly anti-immigrant election (Figure F4, Table F3). Therefore, although sorting may partially explain Figure 1, priming is likely operative.

### Does Threat Motivate Partisan Defection?


For brevity, we present meta-analytic coefficients characterizing the heterogeneous influence of *threat* conditional on partisanship before and after *partisan differentiation* (Figure 2). *Threat* minimally undercuts the negative influence of Republican and independent partisanship

on *Democratic preference* before *partisan differentiation*. *Threat* reduces the influence of Republican and independent partisanship by 0.08 and 0.04 ( $p < 0.01, p = 0.31$ ), equivalent to 17% and 14% of the penalty/advantage national Democratic/Republican politicians face from Republican and independent Latinxs (Panel A). Excluding Pew '08, when Obama may have “leased” ownership over reducing deportation threat, *threat* does not statistically reduce the influence of Republican or independent partisanship ( $\beta = 0.04, SE = 0.02, p = 0.09$ , 8% of Republican penalty,  $\beta = 0.02, SE = 0.05, p = 0.67$ , 6% of independent penalty, Panel B). Conversely, consistent with **H1** and **H2**, *threat* substantially relaxes the influence of Republican and independent partisanship by 0.27 and 0.12 after *partisan differentiation* ( $p < 0.001, p < 0.001$ ), equivalent to 54% and 54% of the penalty/advantage national Democratic/Republican politicians face from Republican and independent Latinxs (Panel C). Likewise, for Democrats, *threat* has a statistically null influence on *Democratic preference* before and after *partisan differentiation*. Importantly, and consistent with the DTOT, a formal coefficient difference test shows *threat* reduces the negative influence of Republican and independent partisanship in a statistically larger manner after *partisan differentiation* versus before ( $p < 0.001, p < 0.05$ ).<sup>17</sup> See Section J.2 for regression tables characterizing pre- and post-differentiation estimates that constitute the meta-analytic estimates by survey and outcome.

The meta-analysis is a black box given differences in independent and dependent variable measurement. So we provide an illustrative example comparing registered Latinx vote choice during the 2012 (pre-differentiation) and 2016 (post-differentiation) elections. Pre-differentiation (Pew '12), simulated predicted values show there is no statistical difference in Obama vote intention between unthreatened and threatened Latinx partisans (Figure 3, Panel A). Post-differentiation (CMPS '16), simulated predicted values show threat motivates partisan defection among Republicans while minimally influencing Latinx Democrat and independent vote choice. Unthreatened Republicans report voting for Clinton at 40%, yet

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<sup>17</sup>Difference tests p-values are between pre- and post-differentiation meta-analytic coefficients not excluding the Pew '08 survey



**Figure 3: Illustrative Example Showing Threat Undercuts Partisan Dispositions After Partisan Differentiation.** X-axis is party, y-axis is the predicted value of Obama vote intention (Panel A) and Clinton reported vote (Panel B) among registered Latinxs. Color denotes min/max *deportation threat*. Simulations hold all covariates at means assuming a Latinx respondent from the Western Census Region. 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust SEs.

threatened Republicans report voting for Clinton at 91%, similar to the Democratic average (98%, Panel B).

In sum, consistent with **H1** and the *DTOT*, threat does not have political consequences when both parties agree on exacerbating or not ameliorating the threat. Once parties/candidates differentiate, the same threat motivates candidate preferences. Moreover, immigration enforcement threat plays an outsized role in motivating support/disapproval of Democratic/Republican candidates among threatened Republican and independent Latinxs relative to threatened Democratic Latinxs. Consistent with **H2**, immigration enforcement threat relaxes Latinx partisan dispositions after *partisan differentiation*.


### Robustness Checks

Our **H1-H2** results are robust. They are not due to suppressing pre-differentiation coefficients with controls. Parsimonious models only adjusting for partisanship produce similar estimates (Figures I9 and I10). Our findings are not driven by sample composition. They are the same after dropping non-nationally representative Latinx samples (LAS, LPS, LAS, see Figures I13 and I14). Our findings do not change after removing congressional evaluation

outcomes (Section I.4). Our **H2** results are not a function of aggregating meta-analytic estimates. Table J19 shows prior to *partisan differentiation*, only 3/18 (17%) and 1/18 (6%) coefficients characterizing the heterogeneous influence of *threat* conditional on Republican and independent partisanship are statistically significant. After *partisan differentiation*, 16/17 (94%) and 10/17 (59%) are statistically significant. Omitted variable bias may be of limited concern in **H1**'s test. A sensitivity analysis demonstrates an omitted covariate must be equivalent to between 1x Republican partisanship to 11x ideology for the positive post-differentiation threat coefficients to attenuate to 0 (Table I10) (Cinelli and Hazlett, 2020). These covariates are the most prognostic of joint variation in *threat* and *Democratic preference*. Thus, we believe it is unlikely omitted variable bias completely obviates our results. For **H2**, we account for omitted interaction bias by adjusting for alternative mechanisms that could motivate partisan defection outside *deportation threat*. Across surveys, we adjust for permutations of 22 well-established alternative mechanisms in the literature by interacting each mechanism with the partisanship indicators (Table I11). This is an extreme test, since it saturates our models with multiple interactions and adjusts for *intra-partisan* differences. Our findings do not change (Figure I15). Our findings do not change using traditional partisanship scales (e.g. 3, 5, 7-point) (Figure I16). We use the CMPS '16 to demonstrate *threat*, conditional on control covariates, is unassociated with liberal policy preferences (Table I12). This falsification test suggests secular liberalism outside partisanship and ideology does not explain our results.

## The effect of committing to reduce deportation threat


Commitments to reduce deportation threat increases positive Latinx incumbent evaluations. Figure 4 displays Obama's approval over time by ethno-racial group and party. Obama's approval discontinuously increases among Latinxs and their respective partisan subgroups post-*DAPA* (Panels A, D-F). The increase is a long-term intercept shift. There is no approval shift among whites or Blacks post-*DAPA* (Panels B-C).



**Figure 4: Obama Job Approval (y-axis) Over Time (in days, x-axis)** Vertical dashed line denotes *DAPA* announcement. Solid lines denote loess model fits on each side of the announcement.

DD estimates corroborate Figure 4's descriptive patterns. Figure 5 displays *DAPA*'s differential effect on Latinx Obama approval relative to whites in addition to event study estimates.<sup>18</sup> Importantly, the event study estimates suggest the absence of outcome trend divergence between Latinxs and whites prior to *DAPA* across the samples of interest (Panels A-D), verifying the parallel trends assumption (Table J25). For all Latinxs, Latinx Democrats, Latinx Republicans, and Latinx independents, *DAPA* increased Latinx Obama approval by 7, 6, 5, and 12 percentage points ( $p < 0.001$ ). These effects are large, equivalent to 59%, 35%, 40% and 58% of the mean daily outcome standard deviation pre-*DAPA* for each respective sample. The event study estimates suggest *DAPA*'s effect is temporally persistent, up to the end of the Obama presidency. *DAPA* increases Obama's approval among Blacks by 2 percentage points, but this effect is small and statistically distinguishable from the Latinx

<sup>18</sup>For brevity, we only present DD estimates adjusting for state FE in addition to interactions between the Latinx indicator and demographic, socio-economic, and political covariates. Results do not change conditional on model specification (see Table J20).



**Figure 5: Event Study Estimates of the Differential Effect of *DAPA* (y-axis) on Latinx Obama Approval by Month to *DAPA* (x-axis) For Each Latinx Partisan Subgroup.** The pre-*DAPA* month is the reference category (Oct. 2014). Annotations denote the generalized DD effect of *DAPA*. All models adjust for state fixed effects in addition to interactions between the Latinx binary indicator and demographic, socio-economic, and political covariates. 95% CIs derived from interview date clustered robust SEs. See Tables J20 and J25 for regression tables characterizing the DD results.

DD effect (Table J20).<sup>19</sup> Moreover, *DAPA*'s effect on Black approval may be due to a secular trend of increased incumbent support instead of *DAPA*'s immediate effects. This is likely given *DAPA* has no discontinuous effect on Obama's approval with Blacks (Figure 6).<sup>20</sup>

RDiT estimates of *DAPA*'s effect corroborates the DD estimates. First, we demonstrate the demographic, socio-economic, and political composition of the population subsets of interest do not discontinuously change post-*DAPA*, suggesting omitted covariates do not explain joint variation in *DAPA* exposure and approval (i.e. the *continuity assumption*, see Section N.2) (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Second, there appears to be sorting in the sense that the number of Latinxs sampled into the data discontinuously increases post-*DAPA*. However, we believe sorting may not induce bias since the characteristics of the Latinx population remain the same post-*DAPA* (Section N.2, Figures N21, N22, N23). Moreover, we use a “donut-hole” regression discontinuity design that removes observations near the discontinuity most likely subject to sorting. The exercise statistically eliminates sorting while maintaining the same statistical conclusions concerning *DAPA*'s effect (Figure N31).

Figure 6 displays coefficients characterizing *DAPA*'s discontinuous effect on Obama

<sup>19</sup>The Black DD effect is also sensitive to model specifications, sometimes flipping sign (Table J20).

<sup>20</sup>For estimation strategy details on testing **H3**, see Section H

approval among Latinxs, Latinx independents, Latinx Democrats, Latinx Republicans, whites, and Blacks. For brevity, we describe findings where the running variable is to the 1st degree (Panel B). *DAPA* increased Obama approval among all Latinxs, Latinx independents, Latinx Democrats, and Latinx Republicans by 14, 8, 15, and 10 percentage points respectively ( $p < 0.001, 0.05, 0.001, 0.01$ ). Conversely, for Blacks and whites, *DAPA* had 0 effect on Obama approval ( $p = 0.67, p = 0.8$ ), suggesting factors influencing the general population are not motivating the discontinuous increase in Latinx Obama approval (e.g. the 2014 midterm).<sup>21</sup> These estimates are similar across model specifications where the running variable is set to a polynomial of degree 0 and 2 with the exception of Latinx independents, where the *DAPA* effect is statistically insignificant when the running variable is to degree 2 (Panel C).

Our RDiT results are robust. They do not change adjusting for a full set of demographic, socio-economic, and political covariates (Figure N27). They do not change conditional on different kernel and polynomial permutations (Figure N28). They do not change if we subset the data to observations near the discontinuity (Figure N30). Our effect estimates are larger than the vast majority of pre-*DAPA* placebo discontinuities (Figure N29), suggesting our findings are not statistical chance.


In sum, Obama's *DAPA* announcement increased his approval among Latinxs of all partisan stripes. These findings demonstrate commitments to reduce deportation threat can increase Latinx incumbent support. Likewise, these findings demonstrate *DAPA* was a critical juncture that indicated the Democratic Party was increasingly willing to reduce immigration enforcement threat.

## What about DACA?

Our contextual account of national partisan ownership over reducing immigration enforcement threat omits the *Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals* (DACA) executive order announcement by Obama on June 15, 2012. DACA provided deportation relief to immigrants younger

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<sup>21</sup>The *DAPA* effect among Latinxs bucks well-established trends midterm losses are associated with low presidential approval (Erikson, 1988). Thus, the effect occurs *in spite of* a political loss.



**Figure 6: RDiT DAPA Effect Estimates on Obama Approval (x-axis) by Ethno-Racial/Party Subsample (y-axis) and Polynomial Degree (0-2 for Panels A-C).** Annotations denote coefficient estimates and the effective N (based on mean-squared optimal bandwidth selection). 95% CIs displayed derived from robust SEs. See Section N.1 for tabular results.

than 31 who came to the U.S. younger than 16 and have lived in the U.S. since 2007.

However, despite DACA's high-profile nature, we posit it was not the critical juncture that shifted national partisan ownership over reducing immigration enforcement among the Latinx mass public. First, DACA was the first time the Democratic Party provided deportation relief after years of exacerbating the threat of deportation during Clinton's presidency and Obama's first term. Second, DACA was small-scale in comparison to DAPA. 1.7 million undocumented were eligible for the DACA whereas an additional 4 million were eligible for DAPA.<sup>22</sup> Third, fewer Latinxs may have perceived DACA, given it was announced on afternoon television, unlike DAPA's primetime announcement. Fourth, DAPA was a bundled treatment in that it was a supplement to a reduction in interior deportations via the Priority Enforcement Program, so DACA may have been perceived as a weak commitment. Indeed, Google searches related to DACA and/or DAPA do not spike on DACA's announcement day. They do spike when DACA is finally implemented on August 15, 2012, but *the largest spike is during the moment DAPA is announced* (Figure M19). Moreover, media coverage on immigration is

<sup>22</sup><https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2012/08/14/up-to-1-7-million-unauthorized-immigrant-youth-may-benefit-from-new-deportation-rules/>

much larger during DAPA than DACA (Figure M20). Empirical evidence is consistent with our contextual account. *Threat* is not associated with Democratic candidate preferences between 2012-2014 (Figure 1, Table J19). Moreover, DACA does not discontinuously increase Latinx Obama approval (Figure M18).

## Conclusion

We present a *Dynamic Threat Ownership Theory* to explain *when* immigration enforcement threat motivates Latinx candidate preferences. Although some research suggests Latinxs may not use immigration as a factor in their candidate preferences, our evidence shows Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement will be more likely to support particular national politicians in temporal contexts where candidates and/or parties differentiate on commitments to reduce or not exacerbate immigration enforcement.

Our evidence also teaches us there are possibilities for partisan defection among minority groups despite mass polarization. Although research suggests Latinx Republicans discount immigration issues even if they're implicated by immigration enforcement, our findings suggest otherwise. Threatened Latinx Republicans will increasingly cross party lines when the Democratic Party commits to reduce or not exacerbate immigration enforcement. We also provide plausibly causal evidence policy commitments to reduce immigration enforcement can increase positive Democratic incumbent evaluations regardless of partisanship. After Trump garnered Latinx support between 2016-2020, pundits suggested prioritizing immigration may undercut Democratic Latinx support.<sup>23</sup> Our evidence suggests otherwise, and that Democratic politicians may garner Latinx support *regardless of partisanship* by committing to less restrictive immigration policies.

One might think this paper is limited in that it only applies *DTOT* to Latinxs and their relationship with immigration enforcement. This is *necessary*, because testing *DTOT*

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<sup>23</sup><https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2021/03/david-shor-2020-democrats-autopsy-hispanic-vote-midterms-trump-gop.html>

requires multiple datasets over time on hard-to-reach minority populations and contextual group-specific knowledge. However, *DTOT* can certainly be applied to other minority groups. Demographic shifts in addition to increased representation, partisan social sorting, and polarization are putting the threats minority groups face at the center of American politics. Thus, *DTOT* can explain shifts in minority group behavior after parties differentiate on ameliorating minority group-specific threats.

For instance, despite historically imposing draconian criminal justice policies, Democrats have increasingly pushed for criminal justice reforms relative to Republicans, which may prime Black people disproportionately exposed to excessive policing to more strongly support Democrats. The Democratic Party has also sought to backtrack on draconian post-9/11 policies they previously pushed, like the placement of Arab- and Muslim-Americans on no fly lists without explanation. This may prime Arab- and/or Muslim-Americans threatened by such policies to more strongly support Democrats.<sup>24</sup> Likewise, Asian-Americans worried about discrimination may increasingly support Democrats in light of increasing Republican anti-Asian rhetoric post-COVID (Chan, Kim, and Leung, 2021). Future research at the intersection of issue ownership, threat, and minority political behavior should continue to test the *DTOT*'s implications and apply it to other marginalized minority groups.

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<sup>24</sup><https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/bidens-plan-roll-back-discriminatory-counterterrorism-policies>

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# Appendices


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
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## A Interior Deportations Over Time




**Figure A1: Interior Deportations (y-axis) Over Time (x-axis).** Data from Department of Homeland Security

## B Motivation: Latinxs Support Democrats



**Figure B2: Latinxs Strongly Support Democratic Candidates and Latinx Republicans are More Likely to Defect and Support Democratic Candidates than White Republicans.** Panel A displays Democratic presidential vote share (y-axis) for elections between 2008-2020 (x-axis) using Congressional Election Study (CES) data across ethno-racial group. Panel B displays mean job approval (y-axis) for Bush, Obama, and Trump (x-axis) by ethnoracial group using CES data. Panel C displays the proportion of Republicans (y-axis, including leaners) that defect from supporting the Republican presidential candidate between 2008-2020 (x-axis) by ethno-racial group. Panel D displays the proportion of Republicans who approve (y-axis) of Bush, Obama, and Trump (x-axis) by ethno-racial group using CES data. Ethno-racial group denoted by color

## C Salience of Threat for Latinx Republicans



**Figure C3: Both Latinx Democrats and Republicans Are Exposed to The Threat of Immigration Enforcement.** Panel A displays perceptions of deportation threat (y-axis, re-scaled between 0-1) by survey (x-axis) and party (color). Panel B displays the proportion of Latinxs that know a deportee (y-axis) by survey (x-axis) and party (color). Panel C displays the proportion of Latinxs that know a friend or family member that is undocumented (y-axis) by survey (x-axis) and party (color). Panel D displays the average zipcode foreign-born composition (y-axis) of Latinxs by survey (x-axis) and party (color). Panel E displays the average zipcode non-citizen composition (y-axis) of Latinxs by survey (x-axis) and party (color).

## D Survey Data Details

Pew surveys before 2019 are cell phone and landline surveys, use stratified sampling to target Latinx residents, use random digit dialing, use multi-stage weighting procedures to ensure adherence to Census Bureau target demographics, and have margins of error at 3.4% (Pew 2008, fielded June 9, 2008-July 13, 2008), 3.3% (Pew 2010, fielded August 17, 2010-September 19, 2010), 3.6% (Pew 2011, fielded November 9, 2011-December 7, 2011), 3.2% (Pew 2012, fielded September 7, 2012-October 4, 2012), 4.4% (Pew 2013, fielded October 16, 2013-November 3, 2013), 3.2% (Pew 2014, fielded September 11, 2014-October 9, 2014), 3.6% (Pew 2017, fielded December 7, 2016-January 15, 2017), and 3.1% (Pew 2018, fielded July 26, 2018-September 9, 2018) respectively.

The 2019 Pew survey is derived from a national, probability-based online panel of Hispanic adults implemented by Ipsos and is weighted to account for Census target demographics and non-response via raking. The margin of error is 2.9%. It was fielded December 3-December 23, 2019

The LAS '12 (fielded June 12-21, 2012) and LAS '13 (fielded February 15-26, 2013) are cell phone and landline surveys that use post-stratification weighting to derive representative estimates of registered voters in battleground states and at the national-level. The margin of error is 4.9% and 3.5% respectively.

The CMPS (fielded Dec 3, 2016-Feb 15, 2017) is internet self-administered, weighted via post-stratification raking to 2015 1-year ACS estimates for age, gender, education, nativity, ancestry and voter registration within the national Latinx population, and has a margin of error of 1%.

The LAS '21 (fielded March 2021) and LPS '21 (fielded April 19-29, 2021) surveys are mixed-mode phone and web surveys using post-stratification weighting to derive representative estimates of the national Latinx population in addition to the registered Latinx voter population. The margin of error is 2.2% and 2.3% respectively.

The LAS and LPS surveys were implemented by a survey firm focused on Latino public opinion in conjunction with a several Latino political advocacy organizations. The data collector wishes for the organization to remain anonymous. For more details and/or responses to questions concerning the LAS and LPS surveys, please contact the corresponding author at **REDACTED FOR SUBMISSION**

## E Outcome Measures

### E.1 Outcome Availability

### E.2 Outcome Item Measurement

#### E.2.1 Pew 2008

**Presidential Vote Choice.** Now suppose the 2008 presidential election were being held TODAY. If you had to choose between (READ)—who would you vote for? 1) Barack Obama, the Democrat OR 2) John McCain, the Republican. [1 if Obama, 0 otherwise]

**Presidential Candidate Favorability.** Now I'd like your views on some people. As I read some names, please tell me if you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of each person. (First, INSERT NAME) would you say your overall opinion of (INSERT NAME) is very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly UNfavorable, or very UNfavorable? How about (NEXT NAME)? [IF NECESSARY: would you say your overall opinion of (NEXT NAME) is very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly UNfavorable, or very UNfavorable?] a) John McCain b) Hillary Clinton c) Barack Obama d) George W. Bush 1) Very favorable 2) Mostly favorable 3) Mostly Unfavorable 4) Very Unfavorable [Rescaled between 0-1 where 1 = very favorable and 0 = very unfavorable for each candidate]

**Table E1: Candidate Evaluation Outcomes**

Outcome Type	Survey Availability
Presidential Vote Choice	Pew '08, Pew '11, LAS '12, Pew '12, CMPS '16, LAS '21, LPS '21
Presidential Incumbent or Candidate Favorability	Pew '08, LAS '13, CMPS '16, Pew '17, Pew '19, LAS '21
Presidential Incumbent Approval	Pew '10, Pew '11, LAS '12, Pew '13, Pew '14, Pew '18, Pew '19, LAS '21, LPS '21
Congressional Approval	LPS '21
Congressional Favorability	LAS '13
Congressional Vote Choice	Pew '10, Pew '14

### E.2.2 Pew 2010

**Presidential Incumbent Approval.** Overall, do you approve or disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling his job as president? 1) Approve, 2) Disapprove, 3) Don't Know [1 if approve, 0 otherwise]

**Congressional Vote Choice.** If the elections for U.S. Congress were being held TODAY, would you vote for ("the Republican Party's candidate") OR ("the Democratic Party's candidate") for Congress in your district? 1) Democratic Party, 2) Republican Party, 3) Other. [1 if Democratic party, 0 otherwise]

### E.2.3 Pew 2011

**Presidential Vote Choice.** If you had to choose between, (READ LIST), who would you vote for? 1) Barack Obama, the Democrat, 2) Mitt Romney, the Republican. [1 if Barack Obama, 0 otherwise]

**Presidential Incumbent Approval.** Overall, do you approve or disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling his job as president? 1) Approve, 2) Disapprove, 3) Don't Know [1 if approve, 0 otherwise]

### E.2.4 Pew 2012

**Presidential Vote Choice.** If the presidential election were being held TODAY, would you vote for 1) the Democratic ticket of Barack Obama and Joe Biden OR 2) for the Republican ticket of Mitt Romney and Paul? [1 if Obama, 0 otherwise].

### E.2.5 LAS 2012

**Presidential Vote Choice.** If the 2012 election for President was held today and the candidates were [ROTATE: Republican Mitt Romney and Democrat Barack Obama] who would you most likely vote for? [IF CANDIDATE:] Would you say you are certain to vote [ANSWER] or could change your mind? [IF UNDECIDED:] Well, if you had to choose, who would you lean towards? 1) Romney – certain, 2) Romney – not-certain, 3) undecided – lean Romney 4) Obama – certain 5) Obama– not-certain, 6) undecided – lean Obama. [1 if Obama-certain, Obama-not certain, undecided-lean Obama, 0 otherwise]

**Presidential Incumbent Approval.** Generally speaking, do you approve or disapprove of the job Barack Obama is doing as President? Is that 1) Strongly approve 2) Somewhat approve 3) Somewhat disapprove 4) Strongly disapprove [Rescaled 0-1, with 1 = strongly approve and 0 = strongly disapprove]

## E.2.6 Pew 2013

**Presidential Incumbent Approval.** Do you approve or disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling his job as President? 1) Approve, 2) Disapprove. [1 if approve, 0 otherwise]

## E.2.7 LAS 2013

**Presidential Incumbent Favorability.** Now I'd like to ask you about some people who have been mentioned in the news recently. For each, please tell me whether you have heard of the person, and if your impression is very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable. If you have no opinion, or have never heard of the person, just let me know. How about President Barack Obama Do you have a 1) very favorable, 2) somewhat favorable, 3) somewhat unfavorable, or 4) very unfavorable impression of President Barack Obama? [Rescaled 0-1 where 1 = very favorable and 0 = very unfavorable]

**Democratic Congressional Favorability.** Now I'd like to ask you about some people who have been mentioned in the news recently. For each, please tell me whether you have heard of the person, and if your impression is very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable. If you have no opinion, or have never heard of the person, just let me know. How about Democrats in the Congress Do you have a 1) very favorable, 2) somewhat favorable, 3) somewhat unfavorable, or 4) very unfavorable impression of Democrats in the Congress? [Rescaled 0-1 where 1 = very favorable and 0 = very unfavorable]

**Republican Congressional Favorability.** Now I'd like to ask you about some people who have been mentioned in the news recently. For each, please tell me whether you have heard of the person, and if your impression is very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable. If you have no opinion, or have never heard of the person, just let me know. How about Republicans in the Congress Do you have a 1) very favorable, 2) somewhat favorable, 3) somewhat unfavorable, or 4) very unfavorable impression of Republicans in the Congress? [Rescaled 0-1 where 0 = very favorable and 1 = very unfavorable]

## E.2.8 Pew 2014

**Congressional Vote Choice.** If the elections for U.S. Congress were being held TODAY, would you vote for [ “the Republican Party’s candidate” OR “the Democratic Party’s candidate”] for Congress in your district? 1) Republican Party’s candidate, 2) Democratic Party’s candidate. [1 if Democratic Party’s candidate, 0 otherwise]

**Presidential Incumbent Approval.** Do you approve or disapprove of the way Barack Obama is handling his job as President? 1) Approve, 2) Disapprove. [1 if approve, 0 otherwise]

## E.2.9 CMPS 2016

**Presidential Vote Choice** In the election for President of the United States, did you vote for: (rotate list) Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump, Gary Johnson, Jill Stein. 1) Hillary Clinton, 2) Donald Trump, 3) Gary Johnson, 4) Jill Stein, 5) Someone else. [1 if Clinton, 0 otherwise]

**Presidential Incumbent/Candidate Favorability.** Please indicate if you have a favorable view or unfavorable view of each person. If you haven’t heard of them or are unfamiliar with them, that’s fine. A) Barack Obama, B) Hillary Clinton, C) Donald Trump. 1) Very favorable, 2) Somewhat favorable, 3) Somewhat unfavorable, 4) Very unfavorable 5) Not familiar with them [Rescaled 0-1 so 1 = very favorable and 0 = very unfavorable, not familiar = NA]

## E.2.10 Pew 2017

**Presidential Incumbent Favorability.** What kind of president do you think Donald Trump will be - a great, good, average, poor, or terrible president? 1) Great president, 2) Good president, 3) Average president, 4) Poor president, 5) Terrible president. [Rescaled 1-0 where 1 = terrible president and 0 = good president]

### E.2.11 Pew 2018

**Presidential Incumbent Approval.** Do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as President? 1) Approve, 2) Disapprove [1 if approve, 0 otherwise]

### E.2.12 Pew 2019

**Presidential Incumbent Approval.** Do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as President? 1) Approve, 2) Disapprove [1 if approve, 0 otherwise]

**Democratic Candidate Favorability.** Overall, what's your impression of the candidates running for the Democratic presidential nomination? AS A GROUP, would you say the candidates are 1) Excellent, 2) Good, 3) Only fair, 4) Poor. [Rescaled 0-1 where 1 = excellent, 0 = poor]

### E.2.13 LAS 2021

**Presidential Vote Choice.** In the election for President, did you vote for: 1) Joe Biden, the Democratic candidate, 2) Donald Trump, the Republican candidate, 3) Someone else. [1 if Biden, 0 otherwise]

**Presidential Incumbent/Candidate Favorability.** For each of the following people, please indicate whether your overall opinion of them is very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable, or if you have no opinion or haven't heard enough to say. A) President Joe Biden, B) Former President Donald Trump. 1) Very favorable, 2) Somewhat favorable, 3) Somewhat unfavorable, 4) Very unfavorable, 5) Haven't heard enough to say. [Rescaled 0-1 where 1 = very favorable, 0 = very unfavorable. "Haven't heard enough to say" is NA]

**Presidential Incumbent Approval.** Overall, do you approve or disapprove of the way Joe Biden is handling his job as President? 1) Strongly approve, 2) Somewhat approve, 3) Somewhat disapprove, 4) Strongly disapprove. [Rescaled 0-1, where 1 = strongly approve and 0 = strongly disapprove]

### E.2.14 LPS 2021

**Presidential Vote Choice.** Thinking back to the November 2020 presidential election, did you support 1) Joe Biden, the Democratic candidate, 2) Donald Trump, the Republican candidate, 3) Someone else, 4) I did not vote in 2020. [1 if Biden, 0 otherwise. "I did not vote in 2020" is NA]

**Presidential Incumbent Approval (Biden).** Do you approve or disapprove of the job Joe Biden is doing as U.S. President? 1) Strongly approve, 2) Somewhat approve, 3) Somewhat disapprove, 4) Strongly disapprove. [Rescaled 0-1, where 1 = strongly approve, and 0 = strongly disapprove]

**Presidential Incumbent Approval (Harris).** Do you approve or disapprove of the job Kamala Harris is doing as U.S. Vice President? 1) Strongly approve, 2) Somewhat approve, 3) Somewhat disapprove, 4) Strongly disapprove. [Rescaled 0-1, where 1 = strongly approve, and 0 = strongly disapprove]

**Congressional Incumbent Approval (Democrats).** Do you approve or disapprove of the way Democrats in Congress are handling their job? 1) Strongly approve, 2) Somewhat approve, 3) Somewhat disapprove, 4) Strongly disapprove. [Rescaled 0-1, where 1 = strongly approve, and 0 = strongly disapprove]

**Congressional Incumbent Approval (Republicans).** Do you approve or disapprove of the way Republicans in Congress are handling their job? 1) Strongly approve, 2) Somewhat approve, 3) Somewhat disapprove, 4) Strongly disapprove. [Rescaled 0-1, where 1 = strongly approve, and 0 = strongly disapprove]

## E.3 Demonstrating Different Measures Correlate

**Table E2: Favorability and approval measures are associated with vote choice**

	Vote Choice						
	Biden (1)	Biden (2)	Biden (3)	Clinton (4)	Obama (5)	Obama (6)	Obama (7)
Biden App.	0.72*** (0.02)	0.87*** (0.03)					
Trump Fav.			-0.83*** (0.02)				
Clinton Fav.				0.73*** (0.03)			
Obama App.					0.73*** (0.03)	0.43*** (0.03)	
Obama Fav.							0.94*** (0.03)
Survey	LPS '21	LAS '21	LAS '21	CMPS '16	LAS '12	Pew '11	Pew '08
R <sup>2</sup>	0.46	0.47	0.55	0.42	0.51	0.20	0.40
N	1712	1397	1352	1647	2021	1220	1081

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . All models are parsimonious and do not include additional control covariates. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.


## F Partisanship Measure

### F.1 Latinx Partisanship Over Time

**Table F3: Latinx Partisanship is Stable After Partisan Differentiation**

	Democrat ID (1)	Republican ID (2)
Post-Differentiation	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.00	0.00
N	14207	14207

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . Models 1 and 2 outcomes are Democratic and Republican identification (includes leaners on 7 point scale). Datasets used are the Pew '07, '08, '10, '11, '12, '13, '14, '16, and '18 surveys. Post-differentiation is equal to 1 if respondent was interviewed in the Pew '16 and Pew '18 surveys. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.



**Figure F4: Latinx Partisanship (y-axis) Over Time (x-axis).** Data from the Pew '07, '08, '10, '11, '12, '13, '14, '16 and '18 Latino datasets. Black = proportion of Latinxs that are Democrats. Grey = proportion of Latinxs that are Republicans. All estimates use population weights. Dashed vertical line denotes the post-DAPA/Trump period, that is, post-partisan differentiation

## G Deportation Threat Measures

### G.1 Threat Measure Type By Survey

**Table G4: Deportation Threat Measures By Survey**

Threat Measure	Survey Availability
Know Deportee	Pew '11, '12, '14, LAS '12, LAS '13, LAS '21
Worried About Deportation	Pew '08, '10, '13, '17, '18, '19, LPS '21

### G.2 Threat Measurement

**Pew '08, '10, '13, '17, '18, '19, LPS '21** Regardless of your own immigration or citizenship status, how much, if at all, do you worry that you, a family member, or a close friend could be deported? Would you say that you worry a lot, some, not much, or not at all? 1) A lot, 2) Some, 3) Not much, 4) Not at all. [Rescaled between 0-1, where 1 = a lot and 0 = not at all]

**Pew '11, '12, '14, LAS '12, LAS '13, LAS '21.** Do you personally know someone who has been deported or detained by the federal government for immigration reasons in the last twelve months? 1) Yes, 2) No [1 = yes, 0 otherwise]


### G.3 Demonstrating Deportee Exposure = Psychological Threat

**Table G5:** The deportee exposure measure is an effective proxy of the psychological threat measure

	Threat	Threat	App. Trump	App. Trump	Fav. Dems	Fav. Dems
Know Deportee	0.25*** (0.03)	0.33*** (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.04 <sup>†</sup> (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Threat				-0.38*** (0.03)		0.17*** (0.02)
Survey	Pew '10	Pew '19	Pew '19	Pew '19	Pew '19	Pew '19
R <sup>2</sup>	0.07	0.11	0.01	0.12	0.00	0.06
N	1375	2990	2960	2932	2956	2929


Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . All models are bivariate. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

## G.4 Validating Threat Measure



**Figure G5: The Subjective Threat Measure Is Associated With Measures That Characterize Objective Exposure to Deportation Threat.** The x-axis is a proxy for exposure to deportation threat. The y-axis is the predicted value of threat. Each panel characterizes a different regression of the association between a proxy for exposure and perceived deportation threat. Survey at use in parentheses. All covariates scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust errors.

## G.5 Threat Informs Issue Ownership Post-Differentiation



**Figure G6: Threat Is Associated With Perceptions Democratic/Republican Politicians Do A Good/Bad Job Handling Immigration Post-Partisan Differentiation.** X-axis is survey/year, y-axis is the *deportation* threat coefficient. Color denotes survey and outcome. Vertical line denotes post-partisan differentiation period. Annotations denote random effects meta-analytic coefficients of coefficients pre- and post-partisan differentiation.


## G.6 Threat Relaxes Influence of Issue Ownership on Preferences

**Table G6: Threat Relaxes Influence of Perceived Democratic Issue Ownership Over Serving Latinos**

	Vote Obama (1)	Obama (2)	Fav. Obama (3)	App. Trump (5)	App. Trump (6)	App. Trump (7)	App. Trump (8)	Fav. Dems (9)	Fav. Dems (10)	
Threat x Dem. Latino IO	-0.28** (0.10)	-0.17† (0.10)	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.22*** (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.28*** (0.05)	0.15* (0.06)	-0.10* (0.04)	-0.04 (0.05)
Threat x Republican		0.24 (0.15)		0.22** (0.08)		-0.32*** (0.07)		-0.23** (0.08)		0.10† (0.05)
Threat x Independent		0.22 (0.15)		0.03 (0.07)		-0.26*** (0.07)		-0.10 (0.10)		0.08 (0.08)
Threat	0.32*** (0.08)	0.16*** (0.09)	0.08† (0.04)	-0.30*** (0.04)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.33*** (0.05)	-0.17** (0.06)	0.12** (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	
Dem. Latino IO	0.28*** (0.06)	0.18** (0.06)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.06† (0.03)	-0.29*** (0.04)	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.34*** (0.04)	-0.17*** (0.04)	0.23*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.03)
Republican			-0.53*** (0.09)		-0.31*** (0.05)	0.46*** (0.04)		0.46*** (0.05)		-0.17** (0.03)
Independent			-0.33*** (0.10)		-0.03 (0.04)	0.20*** (0.05)		0.13 (0.08)		-0.13** (0.04)
Survey	Pew '08	Pew '08	Pew '08	Pew '08	Pew '18	Pew '18	Pew '19	Pew '19	Pew '19	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.37	0.43	0.22	0.27	0.49	0.56	0.40	0.51	0.29	
N	1142	1142	1864	1864	1895	1895	2925	2925	2924	
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
SES Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	
Census Area Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	


Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , † $p < 0.1$ . All covariates scaled between 0-1. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

## G.7 Threat Over Time By Party



**Figure G7: Latinx Perceived Deportation Threat (y-axis) Over Time (x-axis) By Party (Black = Full Sample, Red = Latinx Republicans, Blue = Latinx Democrats).** Data are from the Pew '07, '08, '10, '13, and '18 Latino datasets. Deportation threat measure is rescaled between 0-1. All estimates use population weights. Dashed vertical line denotes the post-DAPA/Trump period.

## G.8 DD Sorting Estimates



**Figure G8: DD Event Study Coefficients (y-axis) Over Time (x-axis) Demonstrating Latinx Democrats/Republicans Perceive More/Less Deportation Threat After Partisan Differentiation.** Data used are from the Pew '07, '08, '10, '13, and '18 Latino datasets. 2013 is the reference year. Deportation threat is the outcome. The threat measure is rescaled between 0-1. All estimates use population weights. 95% confidence intervals displayed derived from robust standard errors.

## G.9 Demonstrating Absence of Sorting

Here we present estimates demonstrating threatened Latinx immigrants do not sort into different political parties using panel data between Nov. 2016-Jan. 2017 and Jul. 2017-Sep. 2017 from the Latino Immigrant National Election Survey (LINES). Table G8 demonstrates Latinx immigrants writ large (columns 1-3) and Latinx immigrant citizens (columns 4-6) who are threatened by immigration enforcement between Nov 2016-Jan 2017 do not sort into different partisan orientations between the two waves (Nov. 2016-Jan. 2017/Jul. 2017-Sep. 2017). Table G7 shows Latinx immigrants writ large and Latinx immigrant citizens who identify with a particular political party (or independence), are not more inclined to adopt a threatened disposition between the two waves (Nov. 2016-Jan. 2017/Jul. 2017-Sep. 2017). We believe these two sets of analyses provide suggestive evidence that the increased association between threat and candidate preferences we observe in the post-differentiation period are not necessarily a function of partisan sorting, but priming.

**Table G7: Partisanship Does Not Motivate the Adoption of a Threatened Disposition Among Latinx Immigrants**

	$\Delta$ Threat (1)	$\Delta$ Threat (2)	$\Delta$ Threat (3)	$\Delta$ Threat (4)	$\Delta$ Threat (5)	$\Delta$ Threat (6)
Democrat	0.07 (0.04)			-0.05 (0.06)		
Independent		-0.10 (0.05)			-0.03 (0.10)	
Republican			0.01 (0.05)			0.08 (0.07)
Citizen Subset	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
R <sup>2</sup>	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
N	393	393	393	186	186	186

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ .  $\Delta$  denotes the difference in perceived threat from deportation between Waves 2 (Nov 2016-Jan 2017) and 3 (July 2017-Sep 2017) in the Latino Immigrant National Survey (LINES, see McCann and Jones-Correa (2021)). Democrat, Independent, and Republican are binary indicators for identify as such at Wave 2. All estimates include population weights to ensure representativeness. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

**Table G8: Threat Does Not Motivate Partisan Shifts During The Beginning of the Trump Presidency Among Latinx Immigrants**

	$\Delta$ Democrat (1)	$\Delta$ Independent (2)	$\Delta$ Republican (3)	$\Delta$ Democrat (4)	$\Delta$ Independent (5)	$\Delta$ Republican (6)
Threat	0.05 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.03)
Citizen Subset	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
R <sup>2</sup>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
N	399	399	399	191	191	191

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ .  $\Delta$  denotes the difference in partisan identification between Waves 2 (Nov 2016-Jan 2017) and 3 (July 2017-Sep 2017) in the Latino Immigrant National Survey (LINES, see McCann and Jones-Correa (2021)). Threat is the level of perceived deportation threat a respondent feels at Wave 2. All estimates include population weights to ensure representativeness. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

**Table G9: Vote Choice Does Not Determine Shifts in Threatened Dispositions Among Latinx Immigrants**

$\Delta$ Threat	
Voted 4 Trump	-0.02 (0.07)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.00
Num. obs.	183

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ .  $\Delta$  denotes the difference in perceived threat from deportation between Waves 2 (Nov 2016-Jan 2017) and 3 (July 2017-Sep 2017) in the Latino Immigrant National Survey (LINES, see McCann and Jones-Correa (2021)). “Voted 4 Trump” is a binary indicator voting for Trump at Wave 2. All estimates include population weights to ensure representativeness. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

## H Estimation Strategies

### H.1 Testing H1-H2

**Testing H1.** To test **H1**, we use the following estimation strategy for each study:

$$(1) \quad Y_i = \gamma_f + \tau threat_i + c + \varepsilon_i$$

Where  $Y_i$  is a measure of Democratic/Republican preference/opposition for each respondent,  $i$ .  $\gamma_f$  is a fixed effect for each census area,  $f$ .  $threat_i$  is either the level of perceived deportation threat or reported exposure to knowing a deportee for each respondent  $i$ . The summation denotes  $k$  individual-level ( $i$ ), zipcode-level ( $z$ ), and county-level ( $c$ ) covariates.  $\varepsilon_i$  are robust errors. Zipcode and county-level covariates are not included in the estimation strategy for the Pew '11, '12, '14, '17, '19 and LAS '12 studies since they are not available. See Section K for information on which individual, zipcode, and county-level covariates are included for each study. If **H1** is correct,  $\tau$  will be 0 in studies fielded prior to *partisan differentiation* (Pew '08, '10, '11, '12, '13, '14 LAS '12, LAS '13). Conversely,  $\tau > 0$  in studies fielded after *partisan differentiation* (CMPS '16, Pew '17, '18, '19, LAS '21, LPS '21).

**Testing H2.** To test **H2**, we use the following estimation strategy for each study:

$$(2) \quad Y_i = \gamma_f + \tau^{H1}(threat_i \times republican_i) + \tau^{H2}(threat_i \times independent_i)$$

$$(3) \quad + \tau threat_i + \beta^1 republican_i + \beta^2 independent_i + \sum_{k=3}^k \beta^k X_{izc}^k + \varepsilon_i c$$

Equation (2) is the same as (1), but with the inclusion of interaction terms between  $threat_i$  and  $republican_i$  (Republican partisanship) in addition to  $independent_i$  (Independent partisanship). If **H1** and **H2** are correct, then  $\tau^{H1} = 0$ ,  $\tau^{H2} = 0$ , in the studies prior to partisan differentiation (Pew '08, '10, '11, '12, '13, '14 LAS '12, LAS '13), and  $\tau^{H1} > 0$ ,  $\tau^{H2} > 0$ , in the studies after partisan differentiation (CMPS '16, Pew '17, '18, '19, LAS '21, LPS '21).

**Meta-analytic estimates.** For **H1** and **H2**, we present Hartung-Knapp random effects meta-analytic estimates to provide a parsimonious summarization of the coefficients for studies fielded prior to partisan differentiation (Pew '08, '10, '11, '12, '13, '14 LAS '12, LAS '13) and after partisan differentiation (CMPS '16, Pew '17, '18, '19, LAS '21, LPS '21). We implement our meta-analyses using the `meta` package in  $\mathbb{R}$ .

## H.2 Testing H3

To evaluate the differential effect of *DAPA* on Latinx Obama approval, we use the following difference-in-differences estimation strategy:

$$(4) \quad \begin{aligned} Approval_{it} = & \gamma_s + \tau^L (Latinx_i \times DAPA_t) + \beta_1 Latinx_i + \beta_2 DAPA_t \\ & + \tau^B (Black_i \times DAPA_t) + \beta_3 Black_i + \sum_{k=1}^k \beta_{k+3} X_{it}^k + \varepsilon_{it} \end{aligned}$$

Where  $approval_{it}$  is approval for respondent  $i$  interviewed on the date  $t$ ,  $\gamma_s$  is an indicator for state  $s$ ,  $Latinx_i$  is an indicator for whether respondent  $i$  identifies as Latinx,  $Black_i$  is an indicator for whether respondent  $i$  identifies as Black,  $DAPA_t$  is an indicator for whether the interview date  $t$  is on or after November 20, 2014.  $\sum_{k=1}^k \beta_{k+3} X_{it}^k$  is a vector of  $k$  control covariates for age, gender, marital status, education, income, partisanship ideology, interactions between *Latinx* and the controls and a *Latinx*-specific time trend for respondents  $i$  on interview date  $t$ .  $\varepsilon$  are interview-date clustered standard errors (these are varied in robustness checks, see Table J20, for brevity, we present results from column 5 in the main text). If **H3** is true,  $\tau^L$  would be positive. Given low intra-group foreign-born rates,  $\tau^B$  should be null or at the very least smaller than  $\tau^L$ . Estimates for  $\tau^L$  are displayed on the annotations for Figure 5.

We also conduct a monthly event study using the following estimation strategy to verify the parallel trends assumption:

$$(5) \quad \begin{aligned} Approval_{itm} = & \gamma_s + \sum_{j=-10, \neq -1}^{10} \tau^{L,j} (Latinx_i \times \delta_m^j) + \beta_1 Latinx_i + \sum_{j=-10, \neq -1}^{10} \sigma \delta_m^j \\ & + \sum_{j=-10, \neq -1}^{10} \tau^{B,j} (Black_i \times \delta_m^j) + \beta_2 Black_i + \sum_{k=1}^k \beta_{k+3} X_{it}^k + \varepsilon_{it} \end{aligned}$$


Where  $\delta_m^j$  are monthly indicators for respondents interviewed  $j$  months before and after the month *DAPA* is implemented (November 2014). When  $j = -10$ ,  $\delta$  is equal to ten months prior to *DAPA* and all months prior. Likewise, when  $j = 10$ ,  $\delta$  is equal to ten months after *DAPA* and all months after.  $j \neq -1$ , since the indicator for the month prior to *DAPA* is the reference category. If the parallel trends assumption is true at the same time **H3** is true, then  $\tau^{L,j < 0}$  should be statistically null and  $\tau^{L,j \geq 0}$  should be positive. For the most part,  $\tau^{B,j}$  should be statistically null since *DAPA* is unlikely to affect Black people.

To estimate the regression discontinuity-in-time, we use the `rdrobust()` package by Calonico et al. (2017) in R to derive non-parametric mean-squared optimal bandwidth estimates of the discontinuous effect of *DAPA* on approval among Latinxs and their partisan subgroups. We present models where the running variable is set to the 0th, 1st, and 2nd degree (i.e. difference-in-means, linear fit, quadratic fit) and the kernel near the discontinuity is triangular.

# I H1/H2 Robustness Checks


## I.1 Parsimonious Re-Analysis

### I.1.1 Test of H1



**Figure I9: Deportation Threat Informs Support for Democratic Candidates/Incumbents After Partisan Differentiation (Parsimonious Covariate Adjustment).** The x-axis is survey+year. The y-axis is the threat coefficient. Positive coefficients denote support/opposition for Democratic/Republican politicians. Color denotes survey and outcome. Dashed vertical line denotes pre- and post- partisan differentiation. Annotations are meta-analytic coefficients for the pre- and post-differentiation period. All estimates from parsimonious models adjusting for only Republican and independent partisanship. All regressions use representative population weights. All covariates re-scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust standard errors.

### I.1.2 Test of H2



**Figure I10: Deportation Threat Motivates Partisan Defection, Particularly After Partisan Differentiation.** The x-axis is the meta-analytic random-effects coefficient for the respective covariates (y-axis). Panel A displays meta-analytic estimates from the Pew '08, '10, '11, '12, '13, '14, LAS '12, and LAS '13 studies. Panel B displays the same with the exception of the Pew '08 study. Panel C displays meta-analytic estimates from the CMPS '16, Pew '17, '18, '19, LAS '21, and LPS '21 studies. Positive coefficients denote support/opposition for Democratic/Republican politicians. Meta-analytic coefficients from models without covariate adjustment. All estimates from models using representative survey population weights. All covariates re-scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed. Coefficient difference tests for the Threat x GOP and Threat x Independent coefficient pre- and post-differentiation are statistically significant at  $p < 0.001$  and  $p = 0.02$ .

## I.2 Sensitivity Analyses


**Table I10: Sensitivity Analysis Of Deportation Threat Across Post-Differentiation Studies**

Outcome	Survey	Threat Robustness Value	Bound
Clinton Vote	CMPS '16	0.10	4x GOP ID
Clinton Favorability	CMPS '16	0.10	6x GOP ID
Trump Favorability	CMPS '16	0.07	1x GOP ID
Obama Favorability	CMPS '16	0.07	1x GOP ID
Trump Favorability	Pew '17	0.19	1x GOP ID
Trump Approval	Pew '18	0.17	3x GOP ID
Trump Approval	Pew '19	0.15	4x GOP ID
Dem. Candidate Favorability	Pew '19	0.07	1x GOP ID
Biden Vote	LPS '21	0.07	7x GOP ID
Biden Vote	LAS '21	0.06	3x Ideology
Biden Approval	LAS '21	0.06	4x Ideology
Harris Approval	LAS '21	0.06	4x Ideology
Democrat Approval	LAS '21	0.07	5x Ideology
Republican Approval	LAS '21	0.09	11x Ideology

Note: The “robustness value” is the amount of joint variation in outcome and independent variable that must be explained for the *threat* coefficient to be reduced to zero. The bound is how many times large the most prognostic covariate of the joint outcome and independent variable would have to be to reduce the *threat* coefficient to zero.


## I.3 Removing Non-Nationally Representative Samples

### I.3.1 Test of H1



**Figure I11: Deportation Threat Informs Support for Democratic Candidates/Incumbents After Partisan Differentiation (Excluding Non-Nationally Representative Samples).** The x-axis is survey+year. The y-axis is the threat coefficient. Positive coefficients denote support/opposition to Democratic/Republican politicians. Color denotes survey and outcome. Dashed vertical line denotes pre- and post- partisan differentiation. Annotations are meta-analytic coefficients for the pre- and post-differentiation period. All estimates from fully-specified models. All regressions use representative population weights. All covariates re-scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust standard errors.


### I.3.2 Test of H2



**Figure I12: Deportation Threat Motivates Partisan Defection, Particularly After Partisan Differentiation (Excluding Non-Nationally Representative Samples).** The x-axis is the meta-analytic random-effects coefficient for the respective covariates (y-axis). Panel A displays meta-analytic estimates from the Pew '08, '10, '11, '12, '13, '14. Panel B displays the same with the exception of the Pew '08 study. Panel C displays meta-analytic estimates from the CMPS '16, Pew '17, '18, '19, and LAS '21 studies. Positive coefficients denote support/opposition for Democratic/Republican politicians. Meta-analytic coefficients derived from models without covariate adjustment. All estimates from models using representative survey population weights. All covariates re-scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed. Coefficient difference tests for the Threat x GOP and Threat x Independent coefficient pre- and post-differentiation are statistically significant at  $p < 0.001$  and  $p = 0.22$ .


## I.4 Removing Congressional Evaluation Outcomes

### I.4.1 Test of H1



**Figure I13: Deportation Threat Informs Support for Democratic Candidates/Incumbents After Partisan Differentiation (Excluding Congressional Evaluation Outcomes).** The x-axis is survey+year. The y-axis is the threat coefficient. Positive coefficients denote support/opposition to Democratic/Republican politicians. Color denotes survey and outcome. Dashed vertical line denotes pre- and post- partisan differentiation. Annotations are meta-analytic coefficients for the pre- and post-differentiation period. All estimates from fully-specified models. All regressions use representative population weights. All covariates re-scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust standard errors.

## I.4.2 Test of H2



**Figure I14: Deportation Threat Motivates Partisan Defection, Particularly After Partisan Differentiation (Excluding Congressional Evaluation Outcomes).** The x-axis is the meta-analytic random-effects coefficient for the respective covariates (y-axis). Panel A displays meta-analytic estimates from the Pew '08, '10, '11, '12, '13, '14, LAS '12, and LAS '13 studies. Panel B displays the same with the exception of the Pew '08 study. Panel C displays meta-analytic estimates from the CMPS '16, Pew '17, '18, '19, LAS '21, and LPS '21 studies. Positive coefficients denote support/opposition for Democratic/Republican politicians. Meta-analytic coefficients derived from models without covariate adjustment. All estimates from models using representative survey population weights. All covariates re-scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed. Coefficient difference tests for the Threat x GOP and Threat x Independent coefficient pre- and post-differentiation are statistically significant at  $p < 0.01$  and  $p = 0.06$ .


## I.5 Ruling Out Alternative Mechanisms Relaxing Partisanship

### I.5.1 List of Alternative Mechanisms

**Table I11:** List of Alternative Mechanisms


Alternative Mechanism	Survey Availability	Literature Justifying Adjustment
Acculturation (Foreign-Born, Spanish Interview)	Pew '08, '10, '11, '12, '13, '14, '17, '18, '19 LAS '13, CMPS '16, LAS '21, LPS '21	DeSipio and Uhlamer (2007), Nuño (2007)
American Identity	CMPS '16, Pew '18	Basler (2008), Hickel et al. (2021)
Latino Identity	CMPS '16, Pew '18, LAS '21, LPS '21	Stokes-Brown (2006), Jackson (2011), Hickel et al. (2021)
Linked Fate	CMPS '16, Pew '19	Escaleras, Kim, and Wagner (2019)
Perceived Discrimination	Pew '08, Pew '10, CMPS '16	Huddy, Mason, and Horwitz (2016) and Berry, Cepuram, and Garcia-Rios (2020)
Experienced Discrimination	Pew '08, Pew '10, CMPS '16, Pew '18, Pew '19	Huddy, Mason, and Horwitz (2016)
Geographic Context (% Foreign-Born, % Latino, % Non-citizen)	Pew '08, Pew '10, LAS '13, CMPS '16, Pew '18, LAS '21, LPS '21	Barreto (2005)
Knowing Deportee	Pew '10, Pew '19	Sanchez et al. (2015)
Sociotropic Country Satisfaction	Pew '08, Pew '10, Pew '11, Pew '12, Pew '13, CMPS '16, Pew '17, Pew '19	Kinder and Kiewiet (1981)
Personal/Egocentric Satisfaction	Pew '13	Johnston et al. (2005)
Nativism	Pew '08, Pew '10, Pew '13, CMPS '16, Pew '19	Reny, Collingwood, and Valenzuela (2019)
Political Interest	Pew '08, Pew '10, Pew '11, Pew '12, Pew '13, LAS '13, CMPS '16, Pew '19	Nuño (2007), but this is meant to rule out the possibility that Republicans are defecting simply because of being politically interested/knowledgeable in immigration policy changes and/or actions taken by presidential administrations, not necessarily because they are threatened.
Current Economic Situation	Pew '18, Pew '19	Abrajano, Michael Alvarez, and Nagler (2008)
Prospective Economic Situation	Pew '18, Pew '19	Abrajano, Michael Alvarez, and Nagler (2008)
Mexican Identity	CMPS '16, Pew '17, Pew '18, Pew '19, LAS '21, LPS '21	Garcia-Rios, Pedraza, and Wilcox-Archuleta (2019)
Immigration = Important Issue	Pew '08, Pew '10, Pew '11, LAS '12, Pew '12, LAS '13, Pew '14, CMPS '16	Barreto and Collingwood (2015)
Immigration-Irrelevant Issues (e.g. Iraq, Jobs, Crime, Cost of Living, Education, Environment, Afghanistan, Health Care, Budget, Taxes, War, Moral Values, Government Debt, Middle East Conflict, Political Polarization, COVID)	Pew '08, '10, '11, '12, '13, '14' 17' 18, LAS '12, LAS '13,	Abrajano, Michael Alvarez, and Nagler (2008)
Retrospective Group (Latino) Situation	Pew '08, Pew '10, Pew '11, Pew '18, Pew '19	Mutz and Mondak (1997)
Ethnic Media Consumption	Pew '08, Pew '10, CMPS '16, LAS '21, LPS '21	Barreto et al. (2008)
Unemployment	Pew '08, Pew '10, Pew '11, Pew '12, Pew '13, CMPS '16, Pew '17, Pew '18	Conover, Feldman, and Knight (1986)
Catholicism	Pew '08, '10, '11, '12, '14, '17, '18, '19 LAS '13, CMPS '16	Lee and Pachon (2007), Leal (2007), Higgins (2014)
Evangelicalism	Pew '08, '10, '11, '12, '18, LAS '13, CMPS '16	Leal (2007)
Social Conservatism (e.g. Abortion MIP, Support for Banning Gay Marriage)	CMPS '16, LAS '21, LPS '21	Abrajano, Michael Alvarez, and Nagler (2008)

## I.5.2 Reanalysis Adjusting for Multiple Interactions



**Figure I15: Deportation Threat Motivates Partisan Defection, Particularly After Partisan Differentiation, Adjusting for Alternative Mechanisms That Motivate Partisan Defection.** The x-axis is the meta-analytic random-effects coefficient for the respective covariates (y-axis). Panel A displays meta-analytic estimates from the Pew '08, '10, '11, '12, '13, '14, LAS '12, and LAS '13 studies. Panel B displays the same with the exception of the Pew '08 study. Panel C displays meta-analytic estimates from the CMPS '16, Pew '17, '18, '19, LAS '21, and LPS '21 studies. Positive coefficients denote support/opposition to Democratic/Republican politicians. Meta-analytic coefficients derived from fully-specified models that include interactions between partisanship and other factors that may motivate partisan defection. All estimates from models using representative survey population weights. All covariates re-scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed. Coefficient difference tests for the Threat x GOP and Threat x Independent coefficient pre- and post-differentiation are statistically significant at  $p < 0.001$  and  $p = 0.46$ .

## I.6 Using Alternative Partisanship Measure



**Figure I16: Deportation Threat Motivates Partisan Defection, Particularly After Partisan Differentiation, Using Partisanship Scale (1 = Strongest Republican Identifier Category).** The x-axis is the meta-analytic random-effects coefficient for the respective covariates (y-axis). Panel A displays meta-analytic estimates from the Pew '08, '10, '11, '12, '13, '14, LAS '12, and LAS '13 studies. Panel B displays the same with the exception of the Pew '08 study. Panel C displays meta-analytic estimates from the CMPS '16, Pew '17, '18, '19, LAS '21, and LPS '21 studies. Positive coefficients denote support/opposition to Democratic/Republican politicians. Meta-analytic coefficients derived from fully-specified models that include interactions between partisanship and other factors that may motivate partisan defection. All estimates from models using representative survey population weights. All covariates re-scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed. A coefficient difference test for the Threat x PID interaction pre- and post-differentiation is statistically significant at  $p < 0.001$ .

**Note:** We use different partisanship scales for each survey based on availability. Pew '17 uses a 3-point partisanship scale. Pew '08, '10, '11, '12, '14, '17, '18, '19, LAS '12, LAS '21, and LPS '21 use a 5-point partisanship scale. CMPS '16 and LAS '14 use a 7-point partisanship scale.

## I.7 Falsification Tests

**Table I12: Threat is not associated with secular liberalism conditional on control covariates**

Panel A: All Latinxs	Ban SSM (1)	Resolve Climate (2)	Obamacare (3)	Increase Taxes (4)	Voter ID (5)
Threat	0.05 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.05 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.31	0.26	0.18	0.16	0.14
N	3009	3009	3009	3009	3009
Panel B: Reg. Latinxs	Ban SSM (1)	Resolve Climate (2)	Obamacare (3)	Increase Taxes (4)	Voter ID (5)
Threat	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.06 (0.04)	0.04 (0.02)	-0.08* (0.03)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.44	0.38	0.25	0.26	0.28
N	1659	1659	1659	1659	1659
Survey	CMPS '16	CMPS '16	CMPS '16	CMPS '16	CMPS '16
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
SES Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . The outcomes for Models 1-5 characterize 4 point likert measures of support for banning same-sex marriage, passing legislation to resolve climate change, Obamacare, increasing taxes on the wealthy, and instituting voter ID laws. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

# J Regression Tables

## J.1 Influence of Threat on Candidate Preferences

### J.1.1 Pre-Differentiation

**Table J13: Threat Does Not Inform Candidate Preferences Prior to Partisan Differentiation (Part 1)**

	Vote Obama (1)	Fav. Obama (2)	Fav. Bush (3)	Fav. McCain (4)	Fav. Clinton (5)	App. Obama (6)	Vote Dem (7)	App. Obama (8)	Vote Obama (9)
Threat	0.10*** (0.05)	0.11*** (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.12 (0.06)
Woman	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.06 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.06 (0.02)	-0.06 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
Age	-0.44*** (0.10)	-0.13* (0.06)	0.04 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.07)	0.06 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.11)	0.20 (0.12)	0.18 (0.13)	-0.12 (0.20)
Foreign-Born	0.07* (0.04)	0.08*** (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.06)
Spanish Interview	-0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.02)	0.06* (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)	-0.08 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.07)	0.02 (0.05)
Married	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.06)
Mexican	0.18*** (0.04)	0.08** (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.08 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.05 (0.07)
Puerto Rican	0.12* (0.06)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.07)	0.07 (0.09)
Cuban	-0.00 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.23* (0.08)	-0.10 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.12)
Dominican	0.12* (0.10)	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.09)	0.02 (0.04)	0.20* (0.08)	-0.09 (0.09)	0.00 (0.08)	0.00 (0.11)
Salvadorean	0.18* (0.09)	0.02 (0.04)	0.04 (0.08)	0.01 (0.09)	0.04 (0.04)	0.11 (0.04)	-0.11 (0.10)	-0.09 (0.10)	-0.14 (0.13)
Catholic	0.00 (0.04)	0.05 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.05)	0.00 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.07)
Religious ID								0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)
Income	1.08 (0.78)	0.32 (0.50)	-1.04 (0.65)	-0.11 (0.64)	-0.67 (0.58)	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)	0.05 (0.12)
Education	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.06 (0.00)	-0.11* (0.00)	-0.04 (0.00)	-0.05 (0.00)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	-0.14 (0.06)
Unemployed	0.08* (0.04)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.06)
Homeowner							0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.00)
Ethnic Media	0.06 (0.11)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.11** (0.04)	0.01 (0.09)	0.01 (0.12)	-0.06 (0.13)	0.05 (0.16)
Republican	0.54*** (0.04)	0.23** (0.02)	0.23** (0.03)	0.24*** (0.03)	0.21** (0.03)	0.24*** (0.04)	-0.25*** (0.05)	-0.25*** (0.05)	-0.51*** (0.06)
Independent	-0.34*** (0.05)	-0.06** (0.02)	0.05 (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.03)	-0.18*** (0.04)	-0.59** (0.05)	-0.15** (0.05)	-0.33*** (0.07)
Ideology							0.00 (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)	0.00 (0.10)
Know Deportee							-0.06 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.07)	0.00 (0.07)
Experience Discrim.	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)
Perceive Discrim.	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.17** (0.03)	-0.07 (0.03)	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.33* (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.04 (0.06)
Nativism	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.06)	0.00 (0.07)
MIP (Immigration)	-0.00 (0.08)	-0.00 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.05)	0.00 (0.06)	0.05 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.06)	0.05 (0.08)
MIP (Jobs)	0.03 (0.06)	0.06 (0.03)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.11** (0.04)	0.08 (0.07)	0.09 (0.07)	0.16* (0.07)	-0.03 (0.13)
MIP (Cost of Living)	0.19 (0.07)	0.07* (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)	0.00 (0.09)
MIP (Budget)						-0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.04 (0.06)
MIP (Taxes)						0.00 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	0.00 (0.06)
MIP (Educ.)						0.24*** (0.07)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.07)
MIP (Healthcare)						-0.04 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)
MIP (Crime)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.08* (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)
MIP (Environment)						0.00 (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)	0.00 (0.09)
MIP (Ineq.)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.05 (0.06)
MIP (Afghanistan)						-0.01 (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)	0.00 (0.09)
Retrospective Eval. (Group)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.10*** (0.04)	-0.04 (0.06)
Sociotropic Satisfaction	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.04 (0.02)	0.10** (0.02)	0.10** (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.10** (0.04)	0.24*** (0.04)	0.12* (0.06)
Political Interest	0.24*** (0.06)	0.07 (0.04)	0.08 (0.04)	0.08 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.09 (0.04)	0.09 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.06)
West	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.07** (0.01)	-0.04 (0.01)	-0.04 (0.01)	0.09** (0.01)	-0.03 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
North East	0.09 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.05)	0.13 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	0.05 (0.08)
North Central	-0.05 (0.07)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.09** (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	0.13 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	0.08 (0.08)
Log(Pop.) (Zip)	0.21 (0.21)	0.14 (0.13)	-0.02 (0.16)	-0.29 (0.17)	0.24 (0.17)	-0.34 (0.14)	0.05 (0.14)	0.05 (0.14)	0.05 (0.24)
Pop. Dens. (Zip)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.11)	-0.24 (0.17)	0.40* (0.17)	-0.02 (0.17)	-0.04 (0.17)	-0.20 (0.17)	-0.62* (0.25)	0.00 (0.25)
% Latino (Zip)	-0.11 (0.12)	-0.00 (0.07)	0.11 (0.09)	0.12 (0.10)	0.20* (0.08)	0.44** (0.16)	-0.10 (0.16)	-0.00 (0.16)	-0.00 (0.25)
% Foreign (Zip)	-0.22 (0.22)	-0.16 (0.16)	-0.09 (0.17)	-0.09 (0.18)	-0.09 (0.17)	-0.09 (0.17)	-0.09 (0.17)	-0.18 (0.17)	-0.00 (0.28)
% Non-Citizen (Zip)	0.81* (0.41)	-0.16 (0.20)	-0.10 (0.23)	0.18 (0.26)	-0.13 (0.21)	0.13 (0.41)	-0.15 (0.49)	0.41 (0.49)	0.41 (0.50)
% College (Zip)	-0.13 (0.14)	0.10 (0.09)	0.19 (0.11)	0.12 (0.12)	-0.19 (0.11)	0.38 (0.16)	-0.38 (0.16)	-0.12 (0.16)	0.00 (0.35)
% Unemp. (Zip)	-0.27 (0.21)	0.11 (0.15)	0.24 (0.17)	0.25 (0.20)	0.05 (0.17)	-0.01 (0.21)	-0.01 (0.21)	0.02 (0.20)	0.02 (0.39)
Log(MHHH) (Zip)	-0.34 (0.24)	-0.16 (0.14)	-0.08 (0.14)	-0.09 (0.14)	-0.09 (0.14)	-0.09 (0.24)	-0.09 (0.24)	0.08 (0.24)	0.08 (0.34)
Pop. Dens. (County)	-0.49* (0.18)	-0.27* (0.12)	-0.02 (0.18)	-0.28 (0.18)	-0.06 (0.12)	-0.06 (0.17)	-0.06 (0.17)	0.11 (0.28)	0.11 (0.38)
% Latino (County)	0.16 (0.16)	-0.00 (0.12)	-0.21 (0.16)	-0.00 (0.15)	-0.13 (0.15)	-0.16 (0.16)	-0.16 (0.16)	-0.27 (0.16)	-0.27 (0.21)
% Unemp. (County)	0.56* (0.25)	0.07* (0.14)	-0.08 (0.19)	0.47 (0.19)	-0.18 (0.16)	-0.47 (0.20)	-0.47 (0.20)	-0.27 (0.22)	-0.27 (0.22)
Log(MHHH) (County)	2.69 (1.32)	1.01 (0.91)	-0.01 (1.16)	-0.25 (1.18)	1.03 (1.03)	0.42 (0.27)	0.13 (0.26)	0.13 (0.26)	0.13 (0.36)
Survey	Pew '08	Pew '08	Pew '08	Pew '08	Pew '08	Pew '10	Pew '10	Pew '11	Pew '11
R <sup>2</sup>	0.41	0.25	0.22	0.16	0.21	0.22	0.48	0.20	0.25
N	1142	1864	1882	1787	1892	1175	817	1220	557

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . All covariates scaled between 0-1. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

**Table J14: Threat Does Not Inform Candidate Preferences Prior to Partisan Differentiation (Part 2)**

	Note Obama (1)	App. Obama (2)	Note Obama (3)	App. Obama (4)	Fav. Obama (5)	Fav. Dem. (6)	Fav. GOP (7)	App. Obama (8)	Note Dem. (9)
Threat	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.00 (0.04)	0.10 (0.06)	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.08* (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Woman	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.04)	0.04 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)		
Age	-0.17* (0.08)	-0.14 (0.10)	-0.29* (0.09)	0.15 (0.14)	0.06 (0.08)	0.06 (0.10)	-0.18 (0.04)	0.21* (0.09)	0.06 (0.08)
Foreign-Born	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)
Spanish Interview	-0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.01)	0.01 (0.07)	0.07 (0.01)	0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.02)
Married	0.01 (0.02)	-0.09 (0.03)	-0.14 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Mexican	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)
Puerto Rican	0.07 (0.10)	0.15** (0.15)	0.06 (0.15)	0.02 (0.11)	0.08 (0.11)	0.10 (0.11)	-0.09 (0.07)	0.06 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.08)
Cuban	0.05 (0.04)	0.04 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.07)	0.03 (0.10)	-0.08 (0.11)	-0.01 (0.11)	-0.01 (0.12)	-0.07 (0.07)	0.00 (0.06)
Dominican	0.00 (0.10)	0.01 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.07)	0.18 (0.10)	0.10 (0.06)	0.11 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.10)	0.12 (0.10)	-0.08 (0.09)
Salvadoran	-0.02 (0.06)	0.01 (0.08)	0.02 (0.11)	0.02 (0.11)	0.04 (0.08)	0.04 (0.11)	0.02 (0.11)	-0.11 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.06)
Catholic	-0.01 (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.07 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.08** (0.03)
Evangelical	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)		
Religiosity			-0.01 (0.06)						
Religious ID			0.00 (0.06)						
Income	-0.57 (0.45)	-0.39 (0.53)	0.06 (0.74)	-0.44 (0.70)	2.25** (2.77)	0.01 (0.69)	0.47 (0.84)	-0.10 (-0.26)	
Education	-0.38 (0.85)	-0.76 (0.96)	-0.10 (0.10)	0.01 (0.09)	0.05 (0.09)	-0.23 (0.17)	0.02 (0.13)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)
Unemployed	-0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.08)	0.02 (0.11)	0.02 (0.11)	0.04 (0.08)	0.00 (0.11)	0.00 (0.11)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)
Republican	-0.76*** (0.03)	-0.60*** (0.04)	-0.66*** (0.04)	-0.32*** (0.06)	-0.63*** (0.05)	-0.58*** (0.06)	0.50*** (0.07)	-0.15*** (0.04)	-0.53** (0.04)
Independent	-0.53** (0.05)	-0.35*** (0.05)	-0.54** (0.06)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.25** (0.07)	-0.45** (0.08)	0.08 (0.06)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.48** (0.04)
Know Undocumented						-0.02 (0.04)	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.10* (0.04)	
Latino ID			-0.01 (0.03)					0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Nativism			-0.03 (0.09)						
MIP (Immigration)	0.09** (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	0.07 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.07)	0.11* (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)
MIP (Immigration, 2)						0.01 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	
MIP (Economy)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.09 (0.05)							
MIP (Jobs)	0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.05)	0.06 (0.09)	0.02 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.06)	0.00 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.02 (0.05)
MIP (Budget)			0.03 (0.04)						
MIP (Taxes)			-0.03 (0.04)						
MIP (Debt)			0.03 (0.06)						
MIP (Educ.)	-0.07 (0.08)	0.08 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.06)	-0.16 (0.13)	0.06 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.08)	0.00 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)
MIP (Healthcare)	-0.11 (0.09)	-0.08 (0.09)	0.03 (0.05)	0.14 (0.08)	0.04 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.10)	-0.16 (0.10)	0.04 (0.05)	0.09* (0.04)
MIP (Moral Values)	0.00 (0.07)	-0.11 (0.12)		-0.12 (0.11)	-0.12 (0.14)	-0.16 (0.13)	0.10 (0.03)	0.13* (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
MIP (Middle East Conflict)								-0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
MIP (War on Terror)	0.22*** (0.06)	0.17* (0.08)		-0.52* (0.25)	-0.41 (0.31)	-0.10 (0.15)	0.11** (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	
Retrospective Eval. (Group)							0.11** (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	
Sociotropic Satisfaction	0.10*** (0.03)	0.31*** (0.05)					0.32*** (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	
Egocentric Satisfaction		0.21** (0.06)							
Political Interest	0.12** (0.04)	0.06 (0.07)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)		
Dem IO Latinos			0.03 (0.06)				0.15*** (0.03)	0.32*** (0.04)	
West	-0.00 (0.03)	0.02 (0.05)	0.05 (0.06)	0.08 (0.05)	-0.09 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.00 (0.03)		
North East	0.15** (0.06)	0.03 (0.08)	0.03 (0.05)	0.04 (0.07)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.08)	0.07 (0.06)		
North Central	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.09)	0.08 (0.06)	0.16* (0.08)	-0.14 (0.08)	0.13* (0.07)	0.01 (0.06)		
Arizona	0.05 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)							
Colorado	0.08* (0.03)	0.07 (0.03)							
Virginia	0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)							
Log(Pop.) (Zip)				-0.27 (0.23)	0.23 (0.27)	-0.06 (0.31)			
Pop. Dens. (Zip)				0.05 (0.22)	-0.16 (0.25)	0.21 (0.32)			
% Latino (Zip)				0.01 (0.12)	0.14 (0.18)	0.28 (0.19)			
% Foreign (Zip)				0.32 (0.32)	-0.43 (0.32)	-0.03 (0.32)			
% Non-Citizen (Zip)				-0.22 (0.29)	0.46 (0.32)	-0.29 (0.35)			
% College (Zip)				0.17 (0.19)	0.26 (0.23)	0.00 (0.22)			
% Unemp. (Zip)				0.39* (0.37)	0.04 (0.20)	-0.08 (0.20)			
Log(MHHI) (Zip)				-0.17 (0.29)	-0.51 (0.35)	0.50 (0.38)			
Log(Pop.) (County)				0.13 (0.25)	0.35 (0.30)	0.35 (0.31)			
Pop. Dens. (County)				0.01 (0.21)	0.38 (0.23)	-0.01 (0.27)			
% Latino (County)				0.14 (0.17)	-0.13 (0.23)	-0.36 (0.24)			
% Foreign (County)				-0.41 (0.34)	0.01 (0.41)	-0.72 (0.39)			
% Non-Citizen (County)				0.34 (0.33)	-0.03 (0.41)	0.60 (0.39)			
% College (County)				-0.07 (0.26)	-0.34 (0.28)	0.19 (0.29)			
% Unemp. (County)				-0.31 (0.26)	-0.25 (0.26)	0.27 (0.27)			
Log(MHHI) (County)				0.63 (0.49)	-4.40 (0.40)	-0.69 (0.43)			
Survey	LAS '12	LAS '12	Pew '12	Pew '13	LAS '13	LAS '13	Pew '14	Pew '14	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.55	0.39	0.44	0.31	0.47	0.37	0.27	0.24	0.53
N	2021	2021	1203	621	800	800	1520	1041	

\*\*\*p < 0.001, \*\*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05.

Note: \*\*\*p < 0.001, \*\*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05. All covariates scaled between 0-1. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

### J.1.2 Post-Differentiation

**Table J15: Threat Informs Candidate Preferences After Partisan Differentiation (Part 1)**

	Vote Clinton (1)	Fav. Clinton (2)	Fav. Trump (3)	Fav. Obama (4)	Fav. Trump (5)	App. Trump (6)	App. Trump (7)	Fav. Dem. (8)
Threat	0.24** (0.08)	0.31*** (0.08)	-0.22** (0.08)	0.22** (0.08)	-0.48*** (0.09)	-0.38*** (0.06)	-0.34*** (0.07)	0.20* (0.09)
Woman	0.04 (0.05)	-0.12 (0.05)	-0.12 (0.05)	-0.12 (0.05)	-0.12 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.09 (0.05)
Age	0.07 (0.13)	1.09*** (0.13)	-0.45** (0.17)	0.45** (0.17)	-0.20 (0.22)	0.44** (0.15)	0.05 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.10)
Foreign-Born	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)	0.12 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.06)	0.16* (0.08)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)	0.05 (0.07)
Spanish Interview	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.06)	0.05 (0.07)
Married	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.06)
Mexican	0.02 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.07 (0.07)	0.07 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	0.06 (0.08)
Puerto Rican	0.09 (0.08)	0.04 (0.08)	-0.16 (0.08)	0.16 (0.08)	-0.13 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.11)
Cuban	-0.22 (0.12)	-0.16 (0.09)	0.20 (0.12)	-0.20 (0.12)	0.16 (0.10)	0.17** (0.07)	-0.17 (0.09)	-0.17 (0.09)
Dominican	-0.01 (0.14)	-0.01 (0.11)	-0.01 (0.11)	-0.01 (0.11)	-0.12 (0.13)	-0.12 (0.14)	-0.12 (0.14)	-0.09 (0.16)
Salvadoran	0.10 (0.12)	0.05 (0.14)	0.01 (0.12)	-0.01 (0.12)	0.01 (0.12)	0.01 (0.12)	0.02 (0.12)	-0.19 (0.15)
Catholic	0.06 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.04)	0.07 (0.05)
Evangelical	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.13 (0.07)	-0.13 (0.07)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)
Religiosity	0.08 (0.09)	0.06 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)	0.05 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.11)
Income	0.17 (0.09)	0.02 (0.10)	-0.12 (0.10)	0.12 (0.10)	0.31 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.09)
Education	-0.02 (0.13)	-0.02 (0.11)	-0.02 (0.11)	-0.02 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.37)	0.05 (0.08)	0.05 (0.08)	-1.47 (0.86)
Unemployed	0.02 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.07)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.00 (0.07)	0.00 (0.12)	0.00 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.05)
Homeowner								-0.07 (0.05)
Ethnic Media	0.16 (0.14)	0.13 (0.14)	-0.36 (0.15)	0.36 (0.15)	0.88*** (0.76**)	0.88*** (0.78***)	-0.66*** (0.78***)	
Republican	-1.69** (0.09)	-0.78** (0.07)	0.74** (0.08)	-0.74** (0.08)	0.76** (0.11)	0.78*** (0.06)	-0.66*** (0.07)	
Independent	-0.22** (0.10)	-0.22** (0.10)	-0.22** (0.10)	-0.22** (0.10)	0.22** (0.11)	0.22** (0.07)	-0.22** (0.09)	
Ideology	0.29** (0.09)	0.47** (0.11)	-0.22 (0.11)	0.22 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.11)	-0.07 (0.11)
Know Deportee							-0.06 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.07)
Know Undocumented	-0.43** (0.05)	-0.42** (0.05)	0.10 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.06)	
Log(Deportations + 1)	0.03 (0.21)	0.03 (0.20)	0.26 (0.19)	-0.26 (0.19)	0.20 (0.21)	0.20 (0.21)	0.20 (0.21)	
Deportation Rate (per 1000 foreign)	10.23 (4.87)	-10.69 (1.31)	0.08 (1.70)	-0.08 (1.70)	-0.08 (0.99)	-0.08 (0.99)	-0.08 (0.99)	
% Level 3 Deportations	0.13 (0.03)	0.07 (0.27)	0.11 (0.25)	-0.11 (0.25)	0.11 (0.25)	-0.08 (0.25)	-0.08 (0.25)	
Experience Discrim.	0.03 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)
Pervasive Discrim.	0.29** (0.10)	-0.29** (0.09)	-0.29** (0.10)	-0.29** (0.10)	-0.29** (0.10)	-0.29** (0.10)	-0.29** (0.10)	
Latino ID	0.07 (0.11)	-0.12 (0.09)	-0.11 (0.11)	0.11 (0.11)	-0.11 (0.11)	-0.16 (0.07)	-0.16 (0.07)	-0.16 (0.10)
American ID	-0.02 (0.10)	-0.11 (0.09)	0.15 (0.10)	-0.15 (0.10)	-0.15 (0.10)	-0.00 (0.10)	-0.00 (0.10)	-0.00 (0.10)
Linked Fate	-0.04 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.08 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.11)	-0.08 (0.11)	-0.07 (0.11)
Nativism	0.58** (0.10)	-0.58** (0.09)	-0.20* (0.10)	0.76** (0.10)	-0.76** (0.09)	0.56** (0.09)	0.56** (0.09)	0.56** (0.10)
MIF (Immigration)	-0.13** (0.06)	-0.10 (0.06)	0.10 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.06)	0.36** (0.11)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.15 (0.05)	0.22** (0.08)
MIF (Economy)	-0.13** (0.08)	0.04 (0.08)	0.13 (0.12)	-0.13 (0.12)	0.19 (0.12)	-0.08 (0.12)	-0.08 (0.12)	-0.07 (0.12)
MIF (Jobs)	-0.09 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	0.14* (0.05)	-0.14* (0.05)	0.14* (0.05)	0.14* (0.05)	0.14* (0.05)	
MIF (Taxes)	-0.15** (0.08)	-0.16** (0.07)	0.13 (0.07)	-0.13 (0.07)	0.13 (0.07)	-0.28* (0.07)	-0.28* (0.07)	
MIF (Educ.)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.09)	0.12 (0.09)	-0.12 (0.09)	0.12 (0.09)	-0.28* (0.13)	-0.28* (0.13)	
MIF (Healthcare)	-0.10 (0.05)	0.10 (0.05)	0.13* (0.06)	-0.13* (0.06)	0.00 (0.11)	0.00 (0.11)	0.00 (0.11)	
MIF (Abortion)	-0.13** (0.08)	0.04 (0.08)	0.13 (0.12)	-0.13 (0.12)	0.13 (0.12)	-0.08 (0.12)	-0.08 (0.12)	
MIF (Moral Values)						0.14 (0.15)		
MIF (Race)						0.15* (0.08)		
MIF (Polarization)						0.14 (0.07)		
MIF (National Security)					-0.02 (0.11)			
Support Banning Gay Marriage	-0.10 (0.10)	-0.16* (0.07)	0.22** (0.08)	-0.22** (0.08)	-0.20** (0.11)	-0.22** (0.07)	-0.11* (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)
Retrospective Eval. (Group)					-0.20** (0.07)	-0.20** (0.04)	-0.11* (0.05)	0.03 (0.06)
Sociotropic Satisfaction					0.30** (0.07)	0.72*** (0.06)	0.41** (0.06)	0.17** (0.06)
Egotropic Econ. Situation					0.07 (0.08)	0.07 (0.05)	0.07 (0.06)	0.03 (0.05)
Egotropic Prospective Econ.					0.05 (0.04)			
Kids Future Econ. Situation					0.00 (0.04)	0.00 (0.05)		
Political Interest	-0.21 (0.11)	-0.07 (0.09)	0.35*** (0.09)	-0.35*** (0.09)	-0.35*** (0.09)	-0.35*** (0.07)	-0.35*** (0.10)	
West	0.06 (0.07)	-0.19* (0.07)	-0.04 (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.09* (0.05)	-0.11 (0.06)	0.03 (0.07)
North East	0.12 (0.09)	0.07 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.11)	0.03 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.11)	0.02 (0.07)	-0.20** (0.07)	-0.09 (0.09)
North Central	0.04 (0.08)	-0.15 (0.08)	-0.09 (0.08)	0.09 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.12)	0.03 (0.08)	0.03 (0.10)	0.11 (0.12)
Log(Pop.) (Zip)	0.13 (0.43)	-0.11 (0.40)	-0.05 (0.40)	0.05 (0.40)	-0.05 (0.40)	-0.05 (0.40)	-0.05 (0.40)	-0.05 (0.40)
Pop. Dens. (Zip)	0.62 (0.64)	0.80 (0.46)	-0.17 (0.47)	0.17 (0.47)	0.17 (0.51)	-0.17 (0.51)	-0.17 (0.51)	-0.24 (0.47)
% Latino (Zip)	-0.10 (0.23)	0.26 (0.23)	0.05 (0.23)	-0.05 (0.23)	-0.05 (0.23)	-0.18 (0.23)		
% Foreign (Zip)	-0.38 (0.37)	0.09 (0.41)	-0.71 (0.42)	0.71 (0.42)	0.08 (0.42)	0.08 (0.42)	0.08 (0.42)	0.08 (0.42)
% Non-Citizen (Zip)	0.25 (0.43)	0.39 (0.44)	-0.28 (0.44)	0.28 (0.44)	-0.28 (0.44)	-0.28 (0.44)	-0.28 (0.44)	-0.27 (0.44)
% College (Zip)	-0.12 (0.21)	0.69* (0.21)	-0.40 (0.21)	0.40 (0.21)	-0.48* (0.21)	-0.48* (0.21)	-0.48* (0.21)	-0.48* (0.21)
% Unemp. (Zip)	0.28 (0.22)	0.57* (0.23)	-0.28 (0.25)	0.28 (0.25)	-0.28 (0.25)	-0.28 (0.25)	-0.28 (0.25)	-0.21 (0.25)
Log(MHHH) (Zip)	-0.02 (0.46)	-0.17 (0.47)	-0.01 (0.51)	0.01 (0.51)	-0.01 (0.51)	-0.01 (0.51)	-0.01 (0.51)	0.03 (0.51)
Log(Pop.) (County)	0.45 (0.50)	0.40 (0.43)	-0.27 (0.48)	0.27 (0.48)	-0.27 (0.48)	-0.27 (0.48)	-0.27 (0.48)	-0.27 (0.48)
Pop. Dens. (County)	-0.76 (0.48)	-0.52 (0.41)	0.27 (0.42)	-0.27 (0.42)	0.27 (0.42)	0.27 (0.42)	0.27 (0.42)	0.02 (0.42)
% Latino (County)	0.11 (0.32)	0.20 (0.31)	-0.32 (0.32)	0.32 (0.32)	-0.32 (0.32)	-0.32 (0.32)	-0.32 (0.32)	0.26 (0.32)
% College (County)	0.34 (0.37)	0.41 (0.36)	0.84 (0.34)	-0.84 (0.34)	-0.84 (0.34)	-0.84 (0.34)	-0.84 (0.34)	-0.36 (0.34)
% Non-Citizen (County)	-0.23 (0.50)	0.17 (0.43)	-0.50 (0.48)	0.50 (0.48)	-0.50 (0.48)	-0.50 (0.48)	-0.50 (0.48)	0.19 (0.48)
% Foreign (County)	0.84* (0.25)	-0.02 (0.25)	0.21 (0.21)	-0.21 (0.21)	0.21 (0.21)	-0.21 (0.21)	0.21 (0.21)	0.44 (0.21)
% Unemp. (County)	0.32 (0.37)	0.18 (0.36)	-0.05 (0.34)	0.05 (0.34)	0.05 (0.34)	0.05 (0.34)	0.05 (0.34)	0.26 (0.34)
Log(MHHH) (County)	-0.29 (2.17)	-0.29* (1.99)	2.35 (2.53)	-2.35 (2.53)	2.35 (2.53)	-2.35 (2.53)	2.35 (2.53)	0.32 (0.53)
Survey	CMPF '16	CMPF '16	CMPF '16	CMPF '16	Pew '17	Pew '18	Pew '19	Pew '19
R <sup>2</sup>	0.55	0.35	0.36	0.36	0.26	0.54	0.48	0.27
N	1659	2033	2924	2924	896	1895	2925	2924

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . All covariates scaled between 0-1. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

**Table J16: Threat Informs Candidate Preferences After Partisan Differentiation (Part 2)**

	Vote Biden (1)	Fav. Trump (2)	Fav. Biden (3)	App. Biden (4)	Vote Biden (5)	App. Biden (6)	App. Harris (7)	App. Dems (8)	App. GOP (9)
Threat	0.14* (0.06)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.06)	0.07 (0.06)	0.13* (0.06)	0.15* (0.06)	0.13* (0.06)	0.13** (0.06)	0.23** (0.07)
Woman	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.05)
Age	0.02 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.07)	0.08 (0.07)	0.08 (0.07)	0.11 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.08)
Foreign-Born	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.12 (0.06)	0.21** (0.07)	0.15* (0.07)	-0.06 (0.05)	0.03 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	0.05 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)
Spanish Interview	0.05 (0.07)	0.06 (0.07)	0.12 (0.07)	0.14* (0.07)	0.07 (0.06)	0.11 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.07)
Married	-0.05 (0.05)	0.13* (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)
Mexican	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.07)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.05)	-0.18** (0.06)
Puerto Rican	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.09 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.07)	0.00 (0.07)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.17** (0.08)
Cuban	-0.04 (0.13)	0.01 (0.13)	-0.34* (0.14)	-0.23 (0.14)	-0.15 (0.08)	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.21* (0.09)	-0.09 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.09)
Dominican	-0.07 (0.12)	-0.22 (0.11)	0.06 (0.14)	0.14 (0.13)	0.19 (0.14)	0.14 (0.12)	-0.01 (0.13)	0.11 (0.12)	0.05 (0.15)
Salvadoran	0.16 (0.16)	-0.09 (0.15)	-0.08 (0.13)	0.16 (0.14)	0.16 (0.16)	0.02 (0.15)	-0.19 (0.16)	-0.03 (0.16)	-0.32 (0.17)
Income	-0.06 (0.11)	0.05 (0.11)	-0.17 (0.11)	-0.13 (0.11)	-0.16* (0.07)	0.06 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.08)	0.03 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.09)
Education	-0.06 (0.09)	0.15 (0.09)	-0.09 (0.10)	-0.08 (0.10)	0.07 (0.08)	0.01 (0.08)	0.16* (0.08)	0.08 (0.08)	0.24** (0.09)
Homeowner	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	0.07 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.05)
Ethnic Media	-0.11 (0.09)	-0.23** (0.08)	-0.36** (0.09)	-0.24** (0.09)	0.11 (0.06)	0.25** (0.07)	0.26** (0.07)	0.23*** (0.07)	0.16* (0.07)
Republican	-1.81*** (0.07)	1.46*** (0.06)	1.37*** (0.07)	-1.33*** (0.08)	1.37*** (0.06)	-1.01*** (0.07)	-0.04*** (0.07)	-0.07*** (0.06)	0.83*** (0.07)
Independent	-0.56*** (0.08)	0.45*** (0.06)	-0.64*** (0.05)	-0.53*** (0.06)	-0.81* (0.07)	-0.54*** (0.06)	-0.61*** (0.06)	-0.69*** (0.06)	0.07 (0.06)
Ideology					0.60*** (0.08)	0.63*** (0.09)	0.61*** (0.09)	0.56*** (0.09)	-0.32*** (0.09)
Log(Deportations + 1)	-0.03 (0.18)	-0.03 (0.22)	0.25 (0.25)	-0.25 (0.23)	0.05 (0.35)	-0.31 (0.34)	-0.04 (0.36)	-0.32 (0.36)	0.32 (0.36)
Deportation Rate (per 1000 foreign)	-0.51 (0.70)	0.55 (0.51)	-0.15 (0.51)	-0.10 (0.50)	-1.43 (0.83)	0.99 (0.98)	-1.27*** (0.29)	-0.86* (0.40)	-0.47 (0.39)
% Level 3 Deportations	0.14 (0.26)	-0.21 (0.27)	-0.14 (0.25)	0.40 (0.23)	-0.13 (0.26)	-0.08 (0.28)	-0.09 (0.26)	0.39 (0.28)	-1.01*** (0.28)
Latino ID	0.12 (0.12)	-0.01 (0.10)	0.19 (0.10)	0.22* (0.10)	0.14 (0.07)	0.11 (0.07)	0.12 (0.07)	0.12 (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)
MIP (Economy)	-0.08 (0.10)	0.03 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.10)	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)	0.02 (0.07)	0.11 (0.07)
MIP (Jobs)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)	0.05 (0.07)
MIP (Educ.)	0.03 (0.07)	0.01 (0.07)	0.01 (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)	0.09 (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)	0.07 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.06)
MIP (Healthcare)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.12* (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	-0.11 (0.06)
MIP (Abortion)	-0.26 (0.18)	0.14 (0.13)	-0.07 (0.13)	-0.02 (0.14)	-0.06 (0.10)	-0.19 (0.12)	-0.05 (0.13)	-0.12 (0.11)	-0.06 (0.12)
MIP (COVID)	0.19*** (0.05)	-0.19*** (0.05)	0.25*** (0.05)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.08 (0.04)	0.14** (0.05)	0.13** (0.05)	0.12** (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)
Know Person w/COVID	-0.10 (0.07)	0.04 (0.08)	0.04 (0.08)	0.00 (0.08)	0.00 (0.08)	0.00 (0.08)	0.00 (0.08)	0.00 (0.08)	0.00 (0.08)
Know Person Died w/COVID	0.13* (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.05)					
West	0.02 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	0.08 (0.07)
North East	-0.02 (0.08)	0.02 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.10 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.11)	-0.01 (0.10)	0.02 (0.10)	-0.20 (0.11)
North Central	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.17 (0.09)	0.08 (0.11)	0.12 (0.12)	0.07 (0.11)	-0.18 (0.15)	-0.12 (0.11)
Log(Pop.) (Zip)	-0.50 (0.40)	0.27 (0.36)	-0.04 (0.36)	-0.22 (0.36)	0.06 (0.39)	0.06 (0.32)	-0.41 (0.31)	-0.01 (0.32)	-0.62 (0.36)
Pop. Dens. (Zip)	0.32 (0.31)	-0.24 (0.42)	0.66 (0.43)	0.83 (0.46)	0.50** (0.19)	0.06 (0.21)	0.32 (0.23)	0.14 (0.20)	0.17 (0.23)
% Latino (Zip)	0.60* (0.23)	-0.08 (0.20)	0.47 (0.22)	0.04 (0.26)	0.07 (0.18)	0.21 (0.20)	0.23 (0.20)	0.23 (0.21)	0.57** (0.21)
% Foreign (Zip)	-0.53 (0.54)	0.37 (0.58)	-0.65 (0.55)	-0.33 (0.56)	0.10 (0.47)	-0.42 (0.55)	0.30 (0.52)	0.32 (0.51)	-0.01 (0.57)
% Non-Citizen (Zip)	-0.37 (0.85)	-0.91 (0.82)	-0.16 (0.76)	-0.53 (0.86)	-0.71 (0.47)	-0.08 (0.52)	-0.04 (0.49)	-0.56 (0.49)	-0.17 (0.61)
% College (Zip)	0.12 (0.23)	-0.10 (0.26)	0.07 (0.24)	0.12 (0.23)	-0.08 (0.17)	-0.20 (0.19)	-0.15 (0.19)	-0.15 (0.18)	0.35 (0.19)
% Unemp. (Zip)	0.39 (0.24)	-0.15 (0.24)	-0.13 (0.24)	0.26 (0.24)	-0.07 (0.29)	0.00 (0.30)	0.00 (0.31)	0.45 (0.29)	0.21 (0.34)
Log(MHHI) (Zip)	0.08 (0.35)	-0.14 (0.38)	0.04 (0.32)	0.19 (0.34)	-0.16 (0.36)	0.01 (0.34)	0.37 (0.35)	-0.10 (0.36)	0.21 (0.37)
Log(Pop.) (County)	0.38 (0.48)	-0.22 (0.53)	-0.45 (0.57)	0.78 (0.56)	-0.20 (0.77)	0.32 (0.77)	0.08 (0.82)	-0.70 (0.81)	
Pop. Dens. (County)	0.10 (0.27)	0.15 (0.34)	0.07 (0.38)	-0.22 (0.41)	-0.12 (0.30)	0.85 (0.74)	-0.68 (1.21)	0.68 (0.50)	-0.28 (0.63)
% Latino (County)	-0.69* (0.30)	0.21 (0.31)	0.51* (0.30)	-0.23 (0.32)	-0.16 (0.29)	-0.42 (0.29)	-0.30 (0.28)	-0.59 (0.30)	-1.09** (0.31)
% Foreign (County)	-0.18 (0.57)	0.46 (0.52)	-0.19 (0.52)	-0.23 (0.52)	-0.74 (0.52)	-0.69 (0.56)	-0.30 (0.54)	-0.78 (0.55)	-0.78 (0.59)
% Non-Citizen (County)	0.26 (0.46)	-0.31 (0.45)	0.50 (0.43)	0.32 (0.43)	0.79 (0.51)	1.05* (0.50)	0.62 (0.49)	0.94 (0.50)	1.08* (0.55)
% College (County)	-0.37 (0.33)	-0.23 (0.29)	-0.03 (0.29)	0.59 (0.30)	-0.02 (0.24)	0.22 (0.26)	0.09 (0.26)	0.16 (0.26)	-0.53 (0.29)
% Unemp. (County)	-0.80 (0.41)	0.22 (0.36)	0.06 (0.36)	0.30 (0.35)	0.17 (0.31)	0.16 (0.30)	0.07 (0.31)	-0.32 (0.31)	-0.13 (0.33)
Log(MHHI) (County)	0.87 (2.66)	1.31 (2.10)	0.28 (2.18)	-2.77 (2.40)	2.65 (2.07)	3.68 (2.11)	0.50 (2.23)	-0.14 (2.23)	0.34 (2.41)
Survey	LAS '21	LAS '21	LAS '21	LAS '21	LPS '21	LPS '21	LPS '21	LPS '21	LPS '21
R <sup>2</sup>	0.58	0.39	0.40	0.36	0.51	0.36	0.34	0.34	0.20
N	1397	2070	2084	2208	1682	1764	1764	1764	1764

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . All covariates scaled between 0-1. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

## J.2 Heterogenous Influence of Threat by Partisanship

**Table J17: Deportation threat generates defections from supporting Republican candidates among Republican Latinxs after partisan differentiation on reducing or exacerbating deportation threat**

Panel A: Pre-Differentiation	Vote Obama (1)	Fav. Obama (2)	Fav. Bush (3)	Fav. McCain (4)	Fav. Clinton (5)	App. Obama (6)	Vote Dems (7)	App. Obama (8)	Vote Obama (9)	App. Obama (10)	Vote Obama (11)	App. Obama (12)	Vote Obama (13)	App. Obama (14)	Fav. Dem (15)	Fav. GOP (16)	Fav. Obama (17)	App. Dem (18)
Threat x GOP	0.32* (0.14)	0.25** (0.08)	-0.01 (0.11)	-0.12 (0.11)	0.28** (0.09)	0.17 (0.10)	0.06 (0.10)	0.18 (0.11)	0.06 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.11)	0.17 (0.11)	0.03 (0.11)	0.04 (0.11)	-0.09 (0.09)	0.05 (0.11)	0.05 (0.08)	0.03 (0.07)
Threat x Ind.	0.30* (0.14)	0.06 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.09)	0.05 (0.11)	0.07 (0.09)	0.16 (0.10)	0.14 (0.12)	0.06 (0.10)	-0.48** (0.19)	-0.05 (0.11)	-0.17 (0.11)	0.30* (0.14)	0.11 (0.12)	-0.16 (0.15)	-0.04 (0.16)	-0.22 (0.12)	0.01 (0.08)	0.03 (0.08)
Threat	0.05 (0.05)	0.05 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.12* (0.06)	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.07)	0.03 (0.07)	0.02 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	-0.10* (0.04)	-0.01 (0.05)
GOP	-0.59*** (0.09)	-0.33*** (0.05)	0.17** (0.06)	0.21*** (0.06)	-0.31*** (0.05)	-0.30*** (0.06)	-0.60** (0.05)	-0.29** (0.05)	-0.53*** (0.07)	-0.75*** (0.03)	-0.58*** (0.04)	-0.65** (0.04)	-0.39*** (0.04)	-0.64*** (0.04)	-0.60*** (0.04)	0.54*** (0.04)	-0.22*** (0.04)	-0.65*** (0.04)
Ind.	-0.39*** (0.09)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.09* (0.05)	-0.26*** (0.05)	-0.64** (0.05)	-0.16** (0.05)	-0.25** (0.05)	-0.51*** (0.06)	-0.29*** (0.06)	-0.63*** (0.06)	-0.13* (0.07)	-0.18* (0.07)	-0.43*** (0.07)	0.17 (0.09)	-0.19*** (0.05)	-0.65*** (0.04)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.42	0.27	0.22	0.18	0.23	0.22	0.48	0.20	0.26	0.55	0.39	0.45	0.32	0.47	0.37	0.28	0.22	0.45
N	1142	1864	1882	1787	1892	1175	817	1220	557	2021	2021	1203	621	800	800	1520	1041	
Survey	Pew '08	Pew '10	Pew '10	Pew '11	Pew '11	LAS '12	LAS '12	Pew '12	Pew '12	Pew '13	LAS '13	LAS '13	Pew '14	Pew '14				
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
SES Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	Y	Y	Y	NA	NA
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Panel B: Post-Differentiation	Vote Clinton (1)	Fav. Clinton (2)	Fav. Trump (3)	Fav. Obama (4)	Fav. Trump (5)	App. Trump (6)	App. Trump (7)	Dems (8)	Vote Biden (9)	Fav. Biden (10)	Fav. Biden (11)	App. Biden (12)	App. Biden (13)	Vote Biden (14)	App. Biden (15)	App. Harris (16)	App. Dems (17)	App. GOP (18)
Threat x GOP	0.50*** (0.09)	0.27*** (0.06)	-0.28*** (0.07)	0.21*** (0.05)	-0.28** (0.09)	-0.35*** (0.06)	-0.31*** (0.06)	0.13* (0.05)	0.31*** (0.07)	-0.20*** (0.06)	0.17** (0.06)	0.28*** (0.06)	0.26*** (0.06)	0.35*** (0.07)	0.39*** (0.07)	0.29*** (0.07)	-0.12 (0.07)	
Threat x Ind.	0.17 (0.12)	0.17** (0.06)	-0.10 (0.05)	0.07 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.28*** (0.06)	-0.19* (0.06)	0.11 (0.08)	0.14* (0.07)	-0.08 (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)	0.21** (0.04)	0.15* (0.04)	0.25*** (0.04)	0.16* (0.04)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)	
Threat	0.00 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.09** (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.06* (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.15*** (0.04)	
GOP	-0.59*** (0.04)	-0.37*** (0.03)	0.34*** (0.03)	-0.26** (0.03)	0.34*** (0.02)	0.51*** (0.03)	0.53*** (0.03)	-0.24** (0.02)	-0.82*** (0.03)	0.60*** (0.03)	-0.50*** (0.03)	-0.49** (0.03)	-0.73*** (0.03)	-0.58*** (0.03)	-0.60*** (0.04)	-0.58*** (0.04)	0.45*** (0.04)	
Ind.	-0.20*** (0.06)	-0.23*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)	-0.08*** (0.02)	0.10* (0.04)	0.25*** (0.05)	0.22* (0.08)	-0.22** (0.04)	-0.26*** (0.04)	0.19** (0.03)	-0.20*** (0.03)	-0.18** (0.02)	-0.46*** (0.02)	-0.31** (0.04)	-0.40*** (0.04)	-0.41*** (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.57	0.36	0.37	0.37	0.27	0.55	0.49	0.28	0.60	0.40	0.41	0.38	0.52	0.38	0.36	0.35	0.20	
N	1659	2933	2924	2924	896	1895	2925	2924	1397	2070	2084	2208	1682	1764	1764	1764	1764	
Survey	CMPS '16	Pew '17	Pew '18	Pew '19	Pew '19	LAS '21	LAS '21	LAS '21	LAS '21	LPS '21	LPS '21	LPS '21	LPS '21					
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
SES Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NA	Y	NA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	NA	Y	NA	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . Panel A = assessment of partisan defection using surveys pre-Trump, Panel B = assessment of partisan defection using surveys post-Trump. All covariates rescaled between 0-1 for interpretation. See Section J.3 for coefficients on all control covariates. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

### J.3 Heterogenous Influence of Threat by Partisanship (Full Table)

### J.3.1 Pre-Differentiation

Table J18: Deportation threat does not generate defections from supporting Republican candidates among Republican Latinxs before partisan differentiation on reducing or exacerbating deportation threat

	Vote	Obama	Bush	Fox	Bad	McCain	Clinton	Fox	App.	Obama	Vote	App.	Obama	Obama	Bush	Fox	Bad	GOP	Rep.	App.	Obama	Demo
	Obamas	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	Obamas	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
Thrust x GOF	0.04	0.04	-0.02	-0.01	-0.12	-0.26*	0.17	0.06	-0.04	-0.03	0.04	-0.03	-0.03	0.03	0.17	0.04	-0.04	0.04	0.04	-0.03	0.04	-0.05
Thrust x Bad	0.04	0.04	0.13	0.13	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.09	0.00	0.00	0.11	0.04	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.07
Thrust x Ind	0.04	0.04	0.07	0.09	0.11	0.09	0.10	0.12	0.10	0.12	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.15	0.14	0.12	0.08	0.08	0.08
Thrust	0.04	0.04	0.07	0.09	0.11	0.09	0.10	0.12	0.10	0.12	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.15	0.14	0.12	0.08	0.08	0.08
GOF	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
Ind	0.05	0.05	-0.05	-0.05	0.04	-0.11	-0.13	-0.10	-0.07	-0.06	-0.27	-0.07	-0.27	-0.07	-0.29	-0.07	-0.19	-0.07	-0.17	-0.07	-0.17	-0.07
Dem	-0.39*	-0.05	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	-0.04	-0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	-0.13*	-0.13*	-0.13*	-0.13*	-0.13*
Women	-0.09	-0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
Age	0.47**	-0.14*	-0.07	-0.04	0.04	-0.16	-0.21	-0.17	-0.16	-0.17	-0.18*	-0.18*	-0.18*	-0.18*	-0.19	-0.19	-0.19	-0.19	-0.19	-0.19	-0.19	-0.19
Foreign Born	0.07	0.08**	0.04	0.02	0.07*	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
Spanish	-0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
Married	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.07	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
Catholic	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
Evangelical	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
Bilgehater	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Belgian	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Belgian ID	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Mexican	0.03**	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Puerto Rican	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
Calvin	0.01	-0.01	-0.07	-0.07	-0.07	0.03	0.02	-0.18	-0.18	-0.18	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05
Dominican	0.00	0.08*	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	-0.07	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
Salvadoran	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.11	-0.12	-0.12	-0.12	-0.12	-0.12	-0.12	-0.12	-0.12	-0.12	-0.12
Income	0.08	0.04	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09
Education	0.78	0.36	0.66	0.64	0.58	0.58	0.58	0.58	0.58	0.58	0.61	0.41	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45
Employed	0.06	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
Unemployed	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
Homosexual	-0.03	-0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
Natives	-0.03	-0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
Political Interest	-0.22*	-0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
Retrospective Group State	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
Country Satisfaction	-0.09**	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05
Personal Satisfaction	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
Experienced Discrimination	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04
Perceived Discrimination	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Latinx ID	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
Know Deportee																						
Know Undocumented																						
Eduke Media	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MIP (Male)	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MIP (Female)	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
MIP (Health Care)	0.00	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04
MIP (Cust of Living)	0.10	0.07	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
MIP (Budget)	0.07	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
MIP (Taxes)	0.10	0.07	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
MIP (Jobs)	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
MIP (Environment)	0.00	-0.04	-0.07	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06
MIP (Immigration), 2	0.00	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05
MIP (Crime)	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
MIP (Moral Values)	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
MIP (Afghanistan)	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
MIP (Iraq)	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
MIP (War)	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
West	-0.05	0.00	-0.07	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
North Central	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
South East	0.07	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
South West	0.07	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
Arctics	0.16	0.12	0.0																			

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , † $p < 0.1$ . All covariates rescaled between 0-1 for interpretability. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

### J.3.2 Post-Differentiation

Table J19: Deportation threat generates defections from supporting Republican candidates among Republican Latinxs after partisan differentiation on reducing or exacerbating deportation threat

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . All covariates rescaled between 0-1 for intepretability. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

## J.4 DD Estimates

**Table J20: DD estimates characterizing differential effect of DAPA announcement on Latinx approval for Barack Obama**

	Obama Approval [0-1]						
Panel A: Full	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
DAPA x Latinx	0.082*** (0.003)	0.082*** (0.003)	0.066*** (0.002)	0.074*** (0.002)	0.074*** (0.004)	0.063*** (0.003)	0.063*** (0.006)
DAPA x Black	0.025*** (0.003)	0.021*** (0.003)	0.022*** (0.002)	0.023*** (0.002)	0.023*** (0.003)	-0.033*** (0.003)	-0.033*** (0.005)
N	1270896	1270896	1270892	1270892	1270892	1270892	1270892
R <sup>2</sup>	0.117	0.135	0.445	0.451	0.451	0.455	0.455
Panel B: Democrat	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
DAPA x Latinx	0.069*** (0.004)	0.069*** (0.004)	0.056*** (0.003)	0.058*** (0.003)	0.058*** (0.005)	0.041*** (0.004)	0.041*** (0.008)
DAPA x Black	0.025*** (0.003)	0.021*** (0.003)	0.023*** (0.002)	0.023*** (0.002)	0.023*** (0.003)	-0.033*** (0.003)	-0.033*** (0.005)
N	1218446	1218446	1218442	1218442	1218442	1218442	1218442
R <sup>2</sup>	0.140	0.158	0.480	0.480	0.480	0.485	0.485
Panel C: Republican	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
DAPA x Latinx	0.049*** (0.005)	0.050*** (0.005)	0.039*** (0.004)	0.055*** (0.004)	0.055*** (0.007)	0.038*** (0.006)	0.038** (0.012)
DAPA x Black	0.025*** (0.003)	0.021*** (0.003)	0.023*** (0.002)	0.023*** (0.002)	0.023*** (0.003)	-0.034*** (0.003)	-0.034*** (0.005)
N	1189141	1189141	1189137	1189137	1189137	1189137	1189137
R <sup>2</sup>	0.116	0.136	0.475	0.478	0.478	0.482	0.482
Panel D: Independent	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
DAPA x Latinx	0.121*** (0.005)	0.121*** (0.005)	0.113*** (0.004)	0.121*** (0.004)	0.121*** (0.008)	0.119*** (0.006)	0.119*** (0.012)
DAPA x Black	0.025*** (0.003)	0.021*** (0.003)	0.023*** (0.002)	0.023*** (0.002)	0.023*** (0.003)	-0.033*** (0.003)	-0.033*** (0.005)
N	1188105	1188105	1188101	1188101	1188101	1188101	1188101
R <sup>2</sup>	0.116	0.135	0.469	0.470	0.470	0.474	0.474
State FE	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Controls	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Interactions	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Latinx Trend	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
Survey Day CSE	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . Panels A-D characterize DD estimates for the full Latinx sample, Latinx Democrat sample, Latinx Republican sample, and Latinx independent sample. All estimates include population weights to ensure representativeness. Robust standard errors in parentheses. See Section J.5 for full tables characterizing control covariate coefficients.

## J.5 DD Estimates (Full Table)

### J.5.1 Full Sample

**Table J21: DD estimates characterizing differential effect of DAPA announcement on Latinx approval for Barack Obama (Full Latinx Sample)**

	Obama Approval [0-1]						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
DAPA x Latinx	0.082*** (0.003)	0.082*** (0.003)	0.066*** (0.002)	0.074*** (0.002)	0.074*** (0.004)	0.063*** (0.003)	0.063*** (0.006)
DAPA x Black	0.025*** (0.003)	0.021*** (0.003)	0.022*** (0.002)	0.023*** (0.002)	0.023*** (0.003)	-0.033*** (0.003)	-0.033*** (0.005)
DAPA	-0.022*** (0.001)	-0.021*** (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.001)	-0.016*** (0.001)	-0.016*** (0.002)	0.074*** (0.001)	0.074*** (0.003)
Latinx	0.214*** (0.001)	0.211*** (0.002)	0.122*** (0.001)	0.277*** (0.004)	0.277*** (0.007)	0.278*** (0.005)	0.278*** (0.008)
Black	0.488*** (0.002)	0.507*** (0.002)	0.267*** (0.001)	0.259*** (0.001)	0.259*** (0.002)	0.221*** (0.002)	0.221*** (0.004)
Woman		0.007*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)
Married			-0.018*** (0.001)	-0.020*** (0.001)	-0.020*** (0.001)	-0.021*** (0.001)	-0.021*** (0.001)
College				0.049*** (0.001)	0.051*** (0.001)	0.051*** (0.001)	0.050*** (0.001)
Income				0.013*** (0.002)	0.032*** (0.002)	0.032*** (0.002)	0.036*** (0.002)
Conservative					-0.102*** (0.001)	-0.109*** (0.001)	-0.109*** (0.001)
Liberal						-0.111*** (0.001)	-0.111*** (0.001)
Democrat						0.413*** (0.001)	0.413*** (0.001)
Republican							0.409*** (0.003)
Latinx x Age							-0.132*** (0.001)
Latinx x Woman							-0.132*** (0.001)
Latinx x Married							-0.132*** (0.001)
Latinx x College							-0.132*** (0.001)
Latinx x Income							-0.132*** (0.001)
Latinx x Conservative							-0.132*** (0.001)
Latinx x Liberal							-0.132*** (0.001)
Latinx x Democrat							-0.132*** (0.001)
Latinx x Republican							-0.132*** (0.001)
N	1270896	1270896	1270892	1270892	1270892	1270892	1270892
R <sup>2</sup>	0.117	0.135	0.445	0.451	0.451	0.455	0.455
State FE	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Latinx Trend	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
Survey Day CSE	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . All estimates include population weights to ensure representativeness. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

### J.5.2 Democrat Sample

**Table J22: DD estimates characterizing differential effect of DACA announcement on Latinx approval for Barack Obama (Latinx Democrat Sample)**

	Obama Approval [0-1]						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
DAPA x Latinx	0.069*** (0.004)	0.069*** (0.004)	0.056*** (0.003)	0.058*** (0.003)	0.058*** (0.005)	0.041*** (0.004)	0.041*** (0.008)
DAPA x Black	0.025*** (0.003)	0.021*** (0.003)	0.023*** (0.002)	0.023*** (0.002)	0.023*** (0.003)	-0.033*** (0.003)	-0.033*** (0.005)
DAPA	-0.022*** (0.001)	-0.021*** (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.001)	-0.016*** (0.001)	-0.016*** (0.002)	0.074*** (0.001)	0.074*** (0.003)
Latinx	0.379*** (0.002)	0.371*** (0.002)	0.037*** (0.002)	-0.015** (0.005)	-0.015 (0.009)	-0.018** (0.006)	-0.018 (0.009)
Black	0.488*** (0.001)	0.508*** (0.001)	0.259*** (0.001)	0.260*** (0.001)	0.260*** (0.002)	0.221*** (0.002)	0.221*** (0.004)
Woman			0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)
Married			-0.018*** (0.001)	-0.020*** (0.001)	-0.020*** (0.001)	-0.021*** (0.001)	-0.021*** (0.001)
College			0.052*** (0.001)	0.051*** (0.001)	0.051*** (0.001)	0.051*** (0.001)	0.051*** (0.001)
Income			0.033*** (0.002)	0.032*** (0.002)	0.032*** (0.002)	0.037*** (0.002)	0.037*** (0.002)
Conservative			-0.104*** (0.001)	-0.110*** (0.001)	-0.110*** (0.001)	-0.111*** (0.001)	-0.111*** (0.001)
Liberal			0.084*** (0.001)	0.092*** (0.001)	0.092*** (0.001)	0.093*** (0.001)	0.093*** (0.001)
Democrat			0.415*** (0.001)	0.413*** (0.001)	0.413*** (0.003)	0.409*** (0.001)	0.409*** (0.003)
Republican			-0.135*** (0.001)	-0.131*** (0.001)	-0.131*** (0.003)	-0.132*** (0.001)	-0.132*** (0.003)
Latinx x Age			0.040*** (0.008)	0.040** (0.013)	0.036*** (0.008)	0.036*** (0.013)	
Latinx x Woman			0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.004)	0.005 (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)	
Latinx x Married			0.025*** (0.003)	0.025*** (0.005)	0.024*** (0.003)	0.024*** (0.005)	
Latinx x College			0.024*** (0.004)	0.024*** (0.005)	0.023*** (0.004)	0.023*** (0.005)	
Latinx x Income			0.044*** (0.006)	0.044*** (0.010)	0.043*** (0.006)	0.043*** (0.009)	
Latinx x Conservative			0.077*** (0.003)	0.077*** (0.006)	0.078*** (0.003)	0.078*** (0.006)	
Latinx x Liberal			-0.060*** (0.003)	-0.060*** (0.005)	-0.061*** (0.003)	-0.061*** (0.005)	
N	1270896	1270896	1270892	1270892	1270892	1270892	1270892
R <sup>2</sup>	0.140	0.158	0.480	0.480	0.480	0.485	0.485
State FE	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Latinx Trend	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
Survey Day CSE	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . All estimates include population weights to ensure representativeness. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

### J.5.3 Republican Sample

**Table J23: DD estimates characterizing differential effect of DAPA announcement on Latinx approval for Barack Obama (Latinx Republican Sample)**

	Obama Approval [0-1]						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
DAPA x Latinx	0.049*** (0.005)	0.050*** (0.005)	0.039*** (0.004)	0.055*** (0.004)	0.055*** (0.007)	0.038*** (0.006)	0.038** (0.012)
DAPA x Black	0.025*** (0.003)	0.021*** (0.003)	0.023*** (0.002)	0.023*** (0.002)	0.023*** (0.003)	-0.034*** (0.003)	-0.034*** (0.005)
DAPA	-0.022*** (0.001)	-0.021*** (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.001)	-0.016*** (0.001)	-0.016*** (0.002)	0.074*** (0.001)	0.074*** (0.003)
Latinx	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.234*** (0.002)	0.616*** (0.007)	0.616*** (0.013)	0.613*** (0.008)	0.613*** (0.016)
Black	0.488*** (0.001)	0.508*** (0.001)	0.257*** (0.001)	0.260*** (0.001)	0.260*** (0.002)	0.221*** (0.002)	0.221*** (0.004)
Woman			0.003*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)
Married			-0.020*** (0.001)	-0.020*** (0.001)	-0.020*** (0.001)	-0.021*** (0.001)	-0.021*** (0.001)
College			0.047*** (0.001)	0.051*** (0.001)	0.051*** (0.001)	0.051*** (0.001)	0.051*** (0.001)
Income			0.014*** (0.002)	0.032*** (0.002)	0.032*** (0.002)	0.036*** (0.002)	0.036*** (0.002)
Conservative			-0.110*** (0.001)	-0.110*** (0.001)	-0.110*** (0.001)	-0.111*** (0.001)	-0.111*** (0.001)
Liberal			0.094*** (0.001)	0.092*** (0.001)	0.092*** (0.001)	0.093*** (0.001)	0.093*** (0.001)
Democrat			0.415*** (0.001)	0.413*** (0.001)	0.413*** (0.003)	0.409*** (0.001)	0.409*** (0.003)
Republican			-0.128*** (0.001)	-0.131*** (0.001)	-0.131*** (0.003)	-0.132*** (0.001)	-0.132*** (0.003)
Latinx x Age			-0.396*** (0.012)	-0.396*** (0.021)	-0.398*** (0.012)	-0.398*** (0.021)	
Latinx x Woman			0.020*** (0.004)	0.020** (0.007)	0.020*** (0.004)	0.020** (0.007)	
Latinx x Married			-0.010* (0.004)	-0.010 (0.008)	-0.011** (0.004)	-0.011** (0.008)	
Latinx x College			-0.144*** (0.005)	-0.144*** (0.007)	-0.144*** (0.005)	-0.144*** (0.007)	
Latinx x Income			-0.404*** (0.008)	-0.404*** (0.015)	-0.406*** (0.008)	-0.406*** (0.015)	
Latinx x Conservative			0.022*** (0.004)	0.022** (0.008)	0.021*** (0.004)	0.021** (0.008)	
Latinx x Liberal			0.024*** (0.005)	0.024* (0.011)	0.023*** (0.005)	0.023* (0.011)	
N	1270896	1270896	1270892	1270892	1270892	1270892	1270892
R <sup>2</sup>	0.140	0.158	0.480	0.480	0.480	0.485	0.485
State FE	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Latinx Trend	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
Survey Day CSE	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . All estimates include population weights to ensure representativeness. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

#### J.5.4 Independent Sample

**Table J24: DD estimates characterizing differential effect of DAPA announcement on Latinx approval for Barack Obama (Latinx Independent Sample)**

	Obama Approval [0-1]						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
DAPA x Latinx	0.121*** (0.005)	0.121*** (0.005)	0.113*** (0.004)	0.121*** (0.004)	0.121*** (0.008)	0.119*** (0.006)	0.119*** (0.012)
DAPA x Black	0.025*** (0.003)	0.021*** (0.003)	0.023*** (0.002)	0.023*** (0.002)	0.023*** (0.003)	-0.033*** (0.003)	-0.033*** (0.005)
DAPA	-0.022*** (0.001)	-0.021*** (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.001)	-0.016*** (0.001)	-0.016*** (0.002)	0.074*** (0.001)	0.074*** (0.003)
Latinx	0.097*** (0.003)	0.094*** (0.003)	0.188*** (0.002)	0.245*** (0.007)	0.245*** (0.014)	0.254*** (0.008)	0.254*** (0.016)
Black	0.488*** (0.001)	0.508*** (0.001)	0.259*** (0.001)	0.260*** (0.001)	0.260*** (0.002)	0.221*** (0.002)	0.221*** (0.004)
Woman			0.005*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)
Married			-0.019*** (0.001)	-0.020*** (0.001)	-0.020*** (0.001)	-0.021*** (0.001)	-0.021*** (0.001)
College			0.051*** (0.001)	0.051*** (0.001)	0.051*** (0.001)	0.051*** (0.001)	0.051*** (0.001)
Income			0.027*** (0.002)	0.032*** (0.002)	0.032*** (0.002)	0.036*** (0.002)	0.036*** (0.002)
Conservative			-0.102*** (0.001)	-0.110*** (0.001)	-0.110*** (0.001)	-0.111*** (0.001)	-0.111*** (0.001)
Liberal			0.090*** (0.001)	0.092*** (0.001)	0.092*** (0.001)	0.093*** (0.001)	0.093*** (0.001)
Democrat			0.415*** (0.001)	0.413*** (0.001)	0.413*** (0.003)	0.409*** (0.001)	0.409*** (0.003)
Republican			-0.134*** (0.001)	-0.131*** (0.001)	-0.131*** (0.003)	-0.132*** (0.001)	-0.132*** (0.003)
Latinx x Age				-0.152*** (0.012)	-0.152*** (0.024)	-0.153*** (0.012)	-0.153*** (0.024)
Latinx x Woman				0.028*** (0.003)	0.028*** (0.007)	0.026*** (0.003)	0.026*** (0.007)
Latinx x Married				0.024*** (0.004)	0.024** (0.007)	0.022*** (0.004)	0.022** (0.007)
Latinx x College					-0.050*** (0.007)	-0.050*** (0.012)	-0.049*** (0.007)
Latinx x Income					-0.161*** (0.010)	-0.161*** (0.020)	-0.157*** (0.010)
Latinx x Conservative					0.150*** (0.004)	0.150*** (0.009)	0.148*** (0.004)
Latinx x Liberal					-0.036*** (0.005)	-0.036*** (0.010)	-0.037*** (0.005)
N	1188105	1188105	1188101	1188101	1188101	1188101	1188101
R <sup>2</sup>	0.116	0.135	0.469	0.470	0.470	0.474	0.474
State FE	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Latinx Trend	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
Survey Day CSE	N	N	N	N	Y	N	Y

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . All estimates include population weights to ensure representativeness. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

## J.6 Event Study Estimates

**Table J25: Event Study Estimates**

	Obama Approval [0-1]			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Latinx x DAPA (-10m)	0.04 (0.02)*	0.05 (0.02)*	0.06 (0.03)*	-0.00 (0.03)
Latinx x DAPA (-9m)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Latinx x DAPA (-8m)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.09 (0.04)*	-0.01 (0.05)
Latinx x DAPA (-7m)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
Latinx x DAPA (-6m)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)
Latinx x DAPA (-5m)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
Latinx x DAPA (-4m)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.08 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)
Latinx x DAPA (-3m)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Latinx x DAPA (-2m)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.04)
Latinx x DAPA (0m)	0.05 (0.03)*	0.03 (0.04)	0.09 (0.04)*	0.05 (0.04)
Latinx x DAPA (+1m)	0.14 (0.02)***	0.12 (0.03)***	0.15 (0.04)***	0.15 (0.04)***
Latinx x DAPA (+2m)	0.12 (0.02)***	0.12 (0.03)***	0.08 (0.04)	0.15 (0.04)***
Latinx x DAPA (+3m)	0.12 (0.02)***	0.09 (0.03)**	0.15 (0.04)***	0.12 (0.04)**
Latinx x DAPA (+4m)	0.12 (0.02)***	0.08 (0.03)**	0.11 (0.04)**	0.17 (0.04)***
Latinx x DAPA (+5m)	0.11 (0.02)***	0.11 (0.03)***	0.11 (0.04)**	0.10 (0.04)*
Latinx x DAPA (+6m)	0.09 (0.02)***	0.07 (0.03)*	0.12 (0.04)**	0.09 (0.04)*
Latinx x DAPA (+7m)	0.08 (0.02)***	0.08 (0.03)*	0.11 (0.04)**	0.04 (0.04)
Latinx x DAPA (+8m)	0.08 (0.02)***	0.06 (0.03)*	0.10 (0.04)*	0.08 (0.04)
Latinx x DAPA (+9m)	0.09 (0.02)***	0.10 (0.03)***	0.13 (0.04)***	0.03 (0.04)
Latinx x DAPA (+10m)	0.11 (0.02)***	0.10 (0.02)***	0.11 (0.03)***	0.12 (0.03)***
Black x DAPA (-10m)	-0.05 (0.01)***	-0.05 (0.01)***	-0.05 (0.01)***	-0.05 (0.01)***
Black x DAPA (-9m)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (-8m)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (-7m)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (-6m)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (-5m)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (-4m)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (-3m)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (-2m)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (0m)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (+1m)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (+2m)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (+3m)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (+4m)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Black x DAPA (+5m)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (+6m)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (+7m)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (+8m)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (+9m)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (+10m)	-0.03 (0.01)**	-0.03 (0.01)**	-0.03 (0.01)**	-0.03 (0.01)**
Latinx Sample	Full	Democrat	Republican	Independent
N	1270892	1218442	1189137	1188101
R <sup>2</sup>	0.45	0.48	0.48	0.47
State FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y
Survey Day CSE	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . Binary indicators for months pre/post-DAPA are denoted as -m/+m. The month prior to DAPA is the reference category. All specifications include control covariates, state fixed effects, interactions between the controls and the Latinx binary indicator. All estimates include population weights to ensure representativeness. Survey day cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. For coefficients on control covariates, see Section J.7

## J.7 Event Study Estimates (Full Table)

**Table J26: Event Study Estimates (w/ Control Coefficients)**

	Obama Approval [0-1]			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Latinx x DAPA (-10m)	0.04 (0.02)*	0.05 (0.02)*	0.06 (0.03)*	-0.00 (0.03)
Latinx x DAPA (-9m)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Latinx x DAPA (-8m)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.09 (0.04)*	-0.01 (0.05)
Latinx x DAPA (-7m)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
Latinx x DAPA (-6m)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)
Latinx x DAPA (-5m)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
Latinx x DAPA (-4m)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.08 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)
Latinx x DAPA (-3m)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)
Latinx x DAPA (-2m)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.04)
Latinx x DAPA (0m)	0.05 (0.03)*	0.03 (0.04)	0.09 (0.04)*	0.05 (0.04)
Latinx x DAPA (+1m)	0.14 (0.02)***	0.12 (0.03)***	0.15 (0.04)***	0.15 (0.04)***
Latinx x DAPA (+2m)	0.12 (0.02)***	0.12 (0.03)***	0.08 (0.04)	0.15 (0.04)***
Latinx x DAPA (+3m)	0.12 (0.02)***	0.09 (0.03)**	0.15 (0.04)***	0.12 (0.04)**
Latinx x DAPA (+4m)	0.12 (0.02)***	0.08 (0.03)**	0.11 (0.04)**	0.17 (0.04)***
Latinx x DAPA (+5m)	0.11 (0.02)***	0.11 (0.03)***	0.11 (0.04)**	0.10 (0.04)*
Latinx x DAPA (+6m)	0.09 (0.02)***	0.07 (0.03)*	0.12 (0.04)**	0.09 (0.04)*
Latinx x DAPA (+7m)	0.08 (0.02)***	0.08 (0.03)*	0.11 (0.04)**	0.04 (0.04)
Latinx x DAPA (+8m)	0.08 (0.02)***	0.06 (0.03)*	0.10 (0.04)*	0.08 (0.04)
Latinx x DAPA (+9m)	0.09 (0.02)***	0.10 (0.03)***	0.13 (0.04)***	0.03 (0.04)
Latinx x DAPA (+10m)	0.11 (0.02)***	0.10 (0.02)***	0.11 (0.03)***	0.12 (0.03)***
Black x DAPA (-10m)	-0.05 (0.01)***	-0.05 (0.01)***	-0.05 (0.01)***	-0.05 (0.01)***
Black x DAPA (-9m)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (-8m)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (-7m)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (-6m)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (-5m)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (-4m)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (-3m)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (-2m)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (0m)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (+1m)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (+2m)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (+3m)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (+4m)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Black x DAPA (+5m)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (+6m)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (+7m)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (+8m)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (+9m)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Black x DAPA (+10m)	-0.03 (0.01)***	-0.03 (0.01)***	-0.03 (0.01)***	-0.03 (0.01)***
Latinx	0.24 (0.02)***	-0.05 (0.02)*	0.56 (0.03)***	0.25 (0.03)***
Black	0.30 (0.01)***	0.30 (0.01)***	0.30 (0.01)***	0.30 (0.01)***
Age	-0.04 (0.00)***	-0.04 (0.00)***	-0.04 (0.00)***	-0.04 (0.00)***
Woman	0.00 (0.00)**	0.00 (0.00)**	0.00 (0.00)**	0.00 (0.00)**
Married	-0.02 (0.00)***	-0.02 (0.00)***	-0.02 (0.00)***	-0.02 (0.00)***
College	0.05 (0.00)***	0.05 (0.00)***	0.05 (0.00)***	0.05 (0.00)***
Income	0.03 (0.00)***	0.03 (0.00)***	0.03 (0.00)***	0.03 (0.00)***
Conservative	-0.11 (0.00)***	-0.11 (0.00)***	-0.11 (0.00)***	-0.11 (0.00)***
Liberal	0.09 (0.00)***	0.09 (0.00)***	0.09 (0.00)***	0.09 (0.00)***
Democrat	0.41 (0.00)***	0.41 (0.00)***	0.41 (0.00)***	0.41 (0.00)***
Republican	-0.13 (0.00)***	-0.13 (0.00)***	-0.13 (0.00)***	-0.13 (0.00)***
Latinx x Age	-0.12 (0.01)***	0.04 (0.01)**	-0.40 (0.02)***	-0.15 (0.02)***
Latinx x Woman	0.02 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)	0.02 (0.01)**	0.03 (0.01)***
Latinx x Married	0.01 (0.00)***	0.02 (0.00)***	-0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)**
Latinx x College	-0.04 (0.00)***	0.02 (0.00)***	-0.14 (0.01)***	-0.05 (0.01)***
Latinx x Income	-0.13 (0.01)***	0.04 (0.01)***	-0.40 (0.02)***	-0.16 (0.02)***
Latinx x Conservative	0.06 (0.00)***	0.08 (0.01)***	0.02 (0.01)**	0.15 (0.01)***
Latinx x Liberal	-0.03 (0.00)***	-0.06 (0.00)***	0.02 (0.01)*	-0.04 (0.01)***
Latinx x Democrat	-0.15 (0.00)***			
Latinx x Republican	0.04 (0.01)***			
Latinx Sample	Full	Democrat	Republican	Independent
N	1270892	1218442	1189137	1188101
R <sup>2</sup>	0.45	0.48	0.48	0.47
State FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Survey Day CSE	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . Binary indicators for months pre/post-DAPA are denoted as -m/+m. The month prior to DAPA is the reference category. All specifications include control covariates, state fixed effects, interactions between the controls and the Latinx binary indicator. All estimates include population weights to ensure representativeness. Survey day cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.

## K Control Covariates by Survey

Table K27: Control Covariates by Survey

Survey	Controls
Pew '08	Woman, Age, Age (Missing), Foreign Born, Spanish, Married, Catholic, Evangelical, Religiosity, Religiosity (Missing) Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran, Income, Income (Missing), Education, Unemployment, Ethnic Media, Republican, Independent, Nativism, Most Important Issue (Immigration), Retrospective Situation (Group), Political Interest, Most Important Issue (Iraq), Most Important Issue (Jobs), Most Important Issue (Crime), Most Important Issue (Cost of Living), Experienced Discrimination, Perceived Discrimination, Perceived Discrimination (Missing), Perceived Discrimination (Missing 2), Sociotropic Satisfaction, Log(Population + 1) (Zipcode), Population Density (Zipcode), % Latino (Zipcode), % Foreign (Zipcode), % Non-citizen (Zipcode), % College (Zipcode), % Unemployment (Zipcode), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (Zipcode), Log(Population + 1) (County), Population Density (County), % Latino (County), % Foreign (County), % Non-Citizen (County), % College (County), % Unemployment (County), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (County), Census Region (West) Census Region (North Central), Census Region (Northeast)
Pew '10	Woman, Age, Age (Missing), Foreign Born, Spanish, Evangelical, Religiosity, Religiosity (Missing) Married, Catholic, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran, Income, Income (Missing), Education, Unemployment, Homeowner, Ideology, Ideology (Missing), Republican, Independent, Nativism, Most Important Issue (Immigration), Most Important Issue (Education), Most Important Issue (Jobs), Most Important Issue (Health Care), Most Important Issue (Afghanistan), Most Important Issue (Environment), Most Important Issue (Budget), Retrospective Situation (Group), Political Interest, Experienced Discrimination, Perceived Discrimination, Ethnic Media, Know Deportee, Sociotropic Satisfaction, Log(Population + 1) (Zipcode), Population Density (Zipcode), % Latino (Zipcode), % Foreign (Zipcode), % Non-citizen (Zipcode), % College (Zipcode), % Unemployment (Zipcode), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (Zipcode), Log(Population + 1) (County), Population Density (County), % Latino (County), % Foreign (County), % Non-Citizen (County), % College (County), % Unemployment (County), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (County), Census Region (West) Census Region (North Central) Census Region (Northeast)
Pew '11	Woman, Age, Age (Missing), Foreign Born, Spanish, Evangelical, Religious Identity Centrality, Religious Identity Centrality (Missing), Religiosity, Religiosity (Missing) Married, Catholic, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran, Income, Income (Missing), Education, Unemployment, Homeowner, Ideology, Ideology (Missing), Republican, Independent, Most Important Issue (Immigration), Most Important Issue (Immigration, Missing), Most Important Issue (Education), Most Important Issue (Jobs), Most Important Issue (Health Care), Most Important Issue (Budget), Most Important Issue (Taxes), Retrospective Situation (Group), Political Interest, Sociotropic Satisfaction, Census Region (West) Census Region (North Central), Census Region (Northeast)
LAS '12	Foreign Born, Spanish, Age, Age (Missing), Married, Catholic, Evangelical, Woman, Mexican, Dominican, Puerto Rican, Salvadoran, Cuban, Religious Identity Centrality, Religious Identity Centrality (Missing), Religiosity, Religiosity (Missing), Income, Income (Missing), Education, Education (Missing), Republican, Independent, Most Important Issue (Immigration), Most Important Issue (Jobs), Most Important Issue (Economy), Most Important Issue (Education), Most Important Issue (Health Care), Most Important Issue (War), Most Important Issue (Moral Values), Arizona, Colorado, Virginia
Pew '12	Woman, Age, Age (Missing), Foreign Born, Spanish, Married, Catholic, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran, Income, Income (Missing), Education, Unemployment, Independent, Republican, Most Important Issue (Immigration), Most Important Issue (Education), Most Important Issue (Jobs), Most Important Issue (Health Care), Most Important Issue (Budget), Most Important Issue (Taxes), Political Interest, Sociotropic Satisfaction, Census Region (West) Census Region (North Central)
Pew '13	Woman, Age, Age (Missing), Foreign Born, Spanish, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran, Education, Most Important Issue (Jobs), Most Important Issue (Health Care), Most Important Issue (Education), Most Important Issue (Government Debt), Republican, Independent, Nativism, Political Interest, Sociotropic Satisfaction, Personal Satisfaction, Most Important Issue (Immigration), Census Region (West), Census Region (North Central), Census Region (Northeast)
LAS '13	Woman, Age, Foreign Born, Spanish, Married, Catholic, Evangelical, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran, Education, Income, Income (Missing), Republican, Independent, Political Interest, Most Important Issue (Immigration), Most Important Issue (Jobs), Most Important Issue (Education), Most Important Issue (Health Care), Most Important Issue (War), Most Important Issue (Moral Values), Know Undocumented, Log(Population + 1) (Zipcode), Population Density (Zipcode), % College (Zipcode), % Foreign (Zipcode), % Latino (Zipcode), % Non-citizen (Zipcode), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (Zipcode), % Unemployed (Zipcode), Log(Population + 1) (County), Population Density (County), % Latino (County), % College (County), % Foreign (County), % Non-Citizen (County), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (County), % Unemployment (County), Census Region (West), Census Region (North Central), Census Region (Northeast), Census Region (Missing)
Pew '14	Foreign Born, Spanish, Married, Age, Age (Missing), Income, Income (Missing), Catholic, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran, Unemployment, Education, Education (Missing), Republican, Independent, Democratic, Sociotropic Satisfaction, Democrats Concerned About Latinos, Most Important Issue (Immigration), Most Important Issue (Immigration, Missing), Retrospective Situation (Group), Most Important Issue (Education), Most Important Issue (Jobs), Most Important Issue (Health Care), Most Important Issue (Middle East Conflict), Latino Identity Centrality, Census Region (West), Census Region (Northeast), Census Region (North Central)


Blue: demographic controls. Green: socio-economic controls. Red: political controls. Purple: county-level controls. Orange: zipcode-level controls.

**Table K28: Control Covariates by Survey (Continued)**

Survey	Controls
CMPS '16	Woman, Age, Foreign Born, Spanish, Married, Catholic, Evangelical, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran, Religiosity, Religiosity (Missing), Income, Income (Missing), Education, Unemployment, Republican, Independent, Nativism, Political Interest, Ideology, Ideology (Missing), Experienced Discrimination, Perceived Discrimination, Know Undocumented, Latino Identity Centrality, Latino Linked Fate, American Centrality, Ethnic Media, Ethnic Media (Missing), Most Important Issue (Jobs), Most Important Issue (Education), Most Important Issue (Health Care), Most Important Issue (Taxes), Most Important Issue (Abortion), Gay Marriage Support, Log(Population + 1) (Zipcode), Population Density (Zipcode), % College (Zipcode), % Foreign (Zipcode), % Unemployment (Zipcode), % Latino (Zipcode), % Non-citizen (Zipcode), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (Zipcode), Log(Population + 1) (County), Population Density (County), % Latino (County), % College (County), % Foreign (County), % Non-Citizen (County), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (County), % Unemployment (County), Log(Total Deportations + 1), % Level 3 Removals, Deportations per 10,000 Foreign-Born, Census Region (West) Census Region (North Central) Census Region (Northeast)
Pew '17	Woman, Age, Age (Missing), Foreign Born, Catholic, Income, Income (Missing), Education, Unemployment, Independent, Republican, Most Important Issue (Immigration), Most Important Issue (Missing), Retrospective Situation (Group), Sociotropic Satisfaction, Most Important Issue (Health Care), Most Important Issue (National Security), Most Important Issue (Economy), Most Important Issue (Education), Census Region (West) Census Region (North Central) Census Region (Northeast)
Pew '18	Woman, Age, Age (Missing), Foreign Born, Spanish, Evangelical, Married, Catholic, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran, Income, Income (Missing), Education, Unemployment, Homeowner, Identity Centrality, American Centrality, Independent, Republican, Most Important Issue (Immigration), Retrospective Situation (Group), Experienced Discrimination, Retrospective Economic Situation, Retrospective Economic Situation (Missing), Prospective Economic Situation, Most Important Issue (Economy), Most Important Issue (Other), Most Important Issue (Racism), Most Important Issue (Political Polarization), Most Important Issue (Moral Values), Sociotropic Satisfaction, Log(Population + 1) (Zipcode), Population Density (Zipcode), % College (Zipcode), % Foreign (Zipcode), % Non-citizen (Zipcode), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (Zipcode), % Unemployment (Zipcode), % Latino (Zipcode), Log(Population + 1) (County), Population Density (County), % Latino (County), % College (County), % Foreign (County), % Non-Citizen (County), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (County), % Unemployment (County), Log(Total Deportations + 1), % Level 3 Deportations, Deportations per 10,000 foreign-born, Census Region (West) Census Region (North Central) Census Region (Northeast)
Pew '19	Woman, Age, Age (Missing), Foreign Born, Spanish, Married, Catholic, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran, Education, Republican, Independent, Nativism, Most Important Issue (Immigration), Retrospective Situation (Group), Political Interest, Experienced Discrimination, Know Deportee, Sociotropic Satisfaction, Retrospective Economic Situation, Prospective Economic Situation (Kids), Census Region (West) Census Region (North Central) Census Region (Northeast)
LAS '21	Woman, Age, Foreign Born, Spanish, Married, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran, Education, Income, Income (Missing), Homeowner, Republican, Independent, Ethnic Media, Identity Centrality, COVID Exposure, Know COVID Death, Most Important Issue (COVID), Most Important Issue (Health Care), Most Important Issue (Economy), Most Important Issue (Education), Most Important Issue (Abortion), Log(Population + 1) (Zipcode), Population Density (Zipcode), % College (Zipcode), % Foreign (Zipcode), % Latino (Zipcode), % Non-citizen (Zipcode), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (Zipcode), % Unemployment (Zipcode), Log(Population + 1) (County), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (County), Population Density (County), % Latino (County), % College (County), % Foreign (County), % Non-Citizen (County), % Unemployment (County), % Level 3 Deportations, Log(Total Deportations + 1), Deportations per 10,000, Census Region (West) Census Region (North Central), Census Region (Northeast)
LPS '21	Woman, Age, Spanish, Foreign Born, Married, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadoran, Education, Income, Homeowner, Republican, Independent, Ideology, Latino Identity Centrality, Ethnic Media, Most Important Issue (COVID), Most Important Issue (Health Care), Most Important Issue (Jobs), Most Important Issue (Economy), Most Important Issue (Education), Most Important Issue (Abortion), Log(Population + 1), Population Density (Zipcode), % College (Zipcode), % Foreign (Zipcode), % Latino (Zipcode), % Non-citizen (Zipcode), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (Zipcode), % Unemployment (Zipcode), Log(Population + 1) (County), Population Density (County), % Latino (County), % College (County), % Foreign (County), % Non-Citizen (County), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (County), % Unemployment (County), Log(Total Deportations + 1), % Level 3 Deportations, Deportations per 10,000 foreign-born, Census Region (West) Census Region (North Central) Census Region (Northeast)

Blue: demographic controls. Green: socio-economic controls. Red: political controls. Purple: county-level controls. Orange: zipcode-level controls.

## L Immigration Policy Approval Over Time




**Figure L17: Immigration Policy Approval Over Time.** Panel A characterizes presidential immigration policy approval (y-axis) among Latinxs and non-Latinxs over time (survey field date, x-axis). Panel B characterizes the difference between Latinxs and non-Latinxs on immigration policy approval (y-axis) over time (x-axis). Vertical lines denote presidency onset and immigration policy announcements (i.e. DACA/DAPA). Color denotes ethno-racial group (black = Latinx, grey = non-Latinx). All estimates are weighted to ensure representatives. See Table L29 for information on data and surveys at use to construct plots.

**Table L29: Immigration Policy Approval Information on Survey, Interview Date Onset, and Number of Latinos**

Survey, Date	N (Non-Latino)	N (Latino)	Survey, Date	N (Non-Latino)	N (Latino)
abc, 2004-01-15	962	44	gallup, 2013-08-07	1870	189
gallup, 2005-01-07	985	23	pew, 2013-10-30	1817	186
abc, 2005-01-12	931	55	cbs, 2014-03-20	987	110
abc, 2005-08-25	943	49	abc, 2014-05-29	901	101
pew, 2005-10-12	1884	122	cnn, 2014-05-29	941	62
gallup, 2005-12-09	971	32	gallup, 2014-06-05	921	106
abc, 2005-12-15	922	56	cbs, 2014-07-29	918	426
gallup, 2006-01-20	971	35	gallup, 2014-08-07	947	85
abc, 2006-01-23	919	52	pew, 2014-08-20	1361	140
pew, 2006-02-01	1411	91	abc, 2014-09-04	896	105
abc, 2006-04-06	942	54	cnn, 2014-09-05	954	60
cbs, 2006-04-06	851	48	cbs, 2014-09-12	917	92
gallup, 2006-04-07	960	44	abc, 2014-10-09	926	80
pew, 2006-04-07	1407	94	cnn, 2014-11-21	975	70
cbs, 2006-04-28	682	37	pew, 2014-12-03	1335	172
gallup, 2006-04-28	980	31	abc, 2014-12-11	899	101
cbs, 2006-05-04	1192	49	cbs, 2015-01-09	910	91
abc, 2006-05-11	1002	71	cnn, 2015-02-12	1113	86
gallup, 2006-06-09	970	32	cbs, 2015-02-13	917	89
cbs, 2006-06-10	629	30	pew, 2015-05-12	1754	248
pew, 2006-06-14	1406	95	cnn, 2015-05-29	973	52
abc, 2007-04-12	1076	43	cnn, 2015-06-26	1119	75
pew, 2007-04-18	1442	66	cnn, 2015-08-13	933	68
cbs, 2007-05-18	1073	59	cnn, 2015-09-17	949	57
abc, 2007-05-29	1112	65	cnn, 2015-11-27	936	84
cbs, 2007-06-26	795	41	pew, 2015-12-08	1354	146
gallup, 2008-02-11	967	40	cnn, 2015-12-17	958	60
abc, 2009-04-21	1002	56	cbs, 2016-01-07	1168	108
pew, 2009-10-28	1844	156	cnn, 2016-02-24	937	64
cnn, 2009-10-30	974	44	pew, 2016-04-12	1743	265
pew, 2010-01-06	1374	130	cnn, 2016-04-28	934	67
cnn, 2010-03-19	980	50	cnn, 2016-06-16	931	70
pew, 2010-04-21	1463	83	cnn, 2016-07-13	944	69
pew, 2010-05-06	933	61	cnn, 2016-07-29	941	62
abc, 2010-06-03	936	57	cnn, 2016-09-01	938	63
pew, 2010-06-16	1670	132	cnn, 2016-09-28	1392	109
cnn, 2010-07-16	1165	303	cnn, 2016-10-20	939	78
gallup, 2010-08-05	956	57	cnn, 2017-01-12	926	74
pew, 2011-01-06	937	81	cnn, 2017-02-02	912	90
cnn, 2011-01-21	972	40	pew, 2017-02-07	1162	341
gallup, 2011-05-12	927	97	cbs, 2017-02-17	1142	138
pew, 2011-11-09	1821	180	cbs, 2017-03-25	971	117
cnn, 2012-01-11	965	56	cnn, 2017-04-22	941	68
cnn, 2012-02-10	967	59	cbs, 2017-08-03	979	132
cnn, 2012-06-28	1434	83	cnn, 2017-08-03	923	95
abc, 2012-07-05	943	60	cnn, 2017-09-17	962	91
gallup, 2012-08-09	929	83	abc, 2017-09-18	877	105
cnn, 2012-08-22	1002	53	cbs, 2017-09-21	1082	120
cnn, 2012-09-25	NA	601	cnn, 2017-10-12	921	100
cnn, 2012-09-28	961	52	cnn, 2017-11-02	921	100
cnn, 2013-01-14	778	36	cnn, 2018-01-14	893	112
cbs, 2013-02-06	1069	79	cnn, 2018-02-20	925	91
gallup, 2013-02-07	921	94	cnn, 2018-05-02	904	111
pew, 2013-02-13	1355	149	cnn, 2018-06-14	915	97
cnn, 2013-04-05	950	62	cnn, 2018-08-09	900	102
abc, 2013-04-11	907	96	cnn, 2018-09-06	904	99
cbs, 2013-04-24	907	58	cnn, 2018-10-04	900	109
cbs, 2013-05-13	938	84	cnn, 2018-11-01	1349	169
abc, 2013-05-16	913	88	cnn, 2018-11-08	623	54
gallup, 2013-06-01	1386	143	cnn, 2018-12-06	917	98
cnn, 2013-06-11	955	59	abc, 2019-04-22	866	95
pew, 2013-06-12	1366	146	abc, 2019-06-28	894	92
abc, 2013-07-18	896	106	npr, 2021-03-22	1204	104
cbs, 2013-07-18	964	72			


## M Assessing DACA

### M.1 Effect of DACA on Latinx Approval




**Figure M18: RDiT Estimates of DACA Announcement’s (left-panel) and DACA Implementation’s (right-panel) Effect on Latinx Obama Approval.** The x-axis denotes size of RDiT coefficient, and the y axis is the Latinx sample. Annotations denote coefficient estimates and the effective N (based on mean-squared optimal bandwidth selection). All estimates use a triangular kernel. 95% CIs displayed derived from robust standard errors.

### M.2 Google Search Trends



**Figure M19: Google Search Trends of DACA and DAPA From 1/1/2012 to 1/20/2015.** The x axis denotes time, and the y axis shows the number of hits. While the search trends are higher for DACA relative to DAPA, we find that the number of hits increased the most for both terms after DAPA was announced.

### M.3 Media Coverage Trends



**Figure M20: ‘immigration’-related Digital Articles Between 1/1/2012 to 2/1/2015.** The x-axis denotes time, and the y-axis shows the number of articles (panel A) and the number of articles normalized over the total number of articles (panel B). Dashed vertical lines from left to right denote DACA announcement, DACA implementation, and DAPA announcement. Data on count of digital articles from Mediablog.

## N RDiT Design


### N.1 Regression Tables

**Table N30:** Table Characterizing RDiT Estimates

Sample	Degree	RDiT Coef.	SE	p-val
Latinx	Difference-in-Means	0.13	0.02	0.00
Latinx	Linear	0.14	0.02	0.00
Latinx	Quadratic	0.11	0.02	0.00
Latinx Ind.	Difference-in-Means	0.14	0.03	0.00
Latinx Ind.	Linear	0.08	0.04	0.02
Latinx Ind.	Quadratic	0.01	0.05	0.75
Latinx Dem.	Difference-in-Means	0.15	0.02	0.00
Latinx Dem.	Linear	0.15	0.03	0.00
Latinx Dem.	Quadratic	0.17	0.03	0.00
Latinx GOP	Difference-in-Means	0.11	0.03	0.00
Latinx GOP	Linear	0.10	0.03	0.00
Latinx GOP	Quadratic	0.09	0.04	0.03
Black	Difference-in-Means	0.00	0.01	0.92
Black	Linear	-0.01	0.02	0.67
Black	Quadratic	-0.01	0.02	0.63
White	Difference-in-Means	0.00	0.01	0.97
White	Linear	-0.00	0.01	0.80
White	Quadratic	-0.00	0.01	0.58


## N.2 Balance Tests

### N.2.1 Latinx Sample




**Figure N21: RDIT coefficients characterizing the effect of the DAPA announcement (x-axis) on non-approval covariates (y-axis), Latinx sample.** All estimates use mean-squared optimal bandwidth selection and a triangular kernel. Panels A-D characterize estimates where the running variable (days to DAPA) is to the 0, 1, 2, and 3rd degree. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. Color denotes statistical significance (black = stat. sign, grey = otherwise). 95% confidence intervals displayed derived from robust standard errors.

### N.2.2 Latinx Independent Sample




**Figure N22: RDIT coefficients characterizing the effect of the DAPA announcement (x-axis) on non-approval covariates (y-axis), Latinx independent sample.** All estimates use mean-squared optimal bandwidth selection and a triangular kernel. Panels A-D characterize estimates where the running variable (days to DAPA) is to the 0, 1, 2, and 3rd degree. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. Color denotes statistical significance (black = stat. sign, grey = otherwise). 95% confidence intervals displayed derived from robust standard errors.

### N.2.3 Latinx Democrat Sample




**Figure N23: RDiT coefficients characterizing the effect of the DAPA announcement (x-axis) on non-approval covariates (y-axis), Latinx Democrat sample.** All estimates use mean-squared optimal bandwidth selection and a triangular kernel. Panels A-D characterize estimates where the running variable (days to DAPA) is to the 0, 1, 2, and 3rd degree. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. 95% confidence intervals displayed derived from robust standard errors.

### N.2.4 Latinx Republican Sample




**Figure N24: RDiT coefficients characterizing the effect of the DAPA announcement (x-axis) on non-approval covariates (y-axis), Latinx Republican sample.** All estimates use mean-squared optimal bandwidth selection and a triangular kernel. Panels A-D characterize estimates where the running variable (days to DAPA) is to the 0, 1, 2, and 3rd degree. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. 95% confidence intervals displayed derived from robust standard errors.

## N.2.5 Black Sample




**Figure N25: RDIT coefficients characterizing the effect of the DAPA announcement (x-axis) on non-approval covariates (y-axis), Black sample.** All estimates use mean-squared optimal bandwidth selection and a triangular kernel. Panels A-D characterize estimates where the running variable (days to DAPA) is to the 0, 1, 2, and 3rd degree. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. Color denotes statistical significance (black = stat. sign, grey = otherwise). 95% confidence intervals displayed derived from robust standard errors.

## N.2.6 White Sample




**Figure N26: RDIT coefficients characterizing the effect of the DAPA announcement (x-axis) on non-approval covariates (y-axis), white sample.** All estimates use mean-squared optimal bandwidth selection and a triangular kernel. Panels A-D characterize estimates where the running variable (days to DAPA) is to the 0, 1, 2, and 3rd degree. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. Color denotes statistical significance (black = stat. sign, grey = otherwise). 95% confidence intervals displayed derived from robust standard errors.

### N.3 Reestimation w/Covariate Adjustment




**Figure N27: RDiT Estimates of *DAPA*'s Effect on Obama Job Approval (x-axis) by Ethno-Racial/Party Subsample (y-axis) and Running Variable Polynomial (0-2 for Panels A-C) using Triangular Kernel and Adjusting for Control Covariates (woman, married, catholic, college-educated, income, ideology, Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, New Mexico, Texas). Annotations denote coefficient estimates and the effective N (based on mean-squared optimal bandwidth selection). 95% CIs displayed derived from robust standard errors.**

## N.4 Alternative Kernels




**Figure N28: RD<sub>iT</sub> Estimates of *DAPA*'s Effect on Obama approval (x-axis) by Ethno-Racial/Party Subsample (y-axis) and Running Variable Polynomial Using Uniform (Panels A-C) and Epanechnikov (Panels D-F) kernel. Annotations denote coefficient estimates and the effective N (based on mean-squared optimal bandwidth selection). 95% confidence intervals displayed derived from robust standard errors.**

## N.5 Temporal Placebo Tests




**Figure N29: Temporal Placebo Tests Characterizing the Distribution of “Fake” Pre-Treatment Temporal Discontinuity Effects on Obama’s Approval.** The vertical line characterizes the size of the true coefficient. Annotations denote the proportion of placebo coefficients (in absolute value) that the real coefficient is larger than. Panels A-C characterize placebo coefficient distributions for the Latinx sample where the running variable is to the 0, 1, and 2nd degrees. Panels D-F, G-I, and J-L do the same for the Latinx independent, Latinx Democrat, and Latinx Republican samples.

## N.6 Estimates Near Discontinuity



**Figure N30: DAPA RDiT Coefficient Estimates Near Discontinuity for Each Latinx Subsample.** Each panel characterizes a different Latinx subsample and running variable degree. X-axis is bandwidth (in days) and y-axis is the DAPA RDiT Coefficient. 95% CIs displayed derived from robust SEs.

## N.7 Donut Hole RDiT



**Figure N31: Donut Hole DAPA RDiT Coefficient Estimates (y-axis) by Number of Days Cut Near Discontinuity (x-axis).** Each panel characterizes a different Latinx subsample and running variable degree. Color denotes the presence of sorting. 95% CIs displayed derived from robust SEs.