

Living in the Shadow of Deportation: How Deportation Threat Forestalls Attitudinal Assimilation Among Immigrants and Their Co-Ethnics

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Abstract

Consistent with straight line assimilation theory, prior research demonstrates acculturation generates attitudinal convergence between immigrant group members and host country natives along several policy dimensions, including immigration. However, other perspectives suggest attitudinal convergence is not guaranteed in contexts where immigrant group members experience rebuff from the host country. I reconcile the perspectives and answer the puzzle of persistent pro-immigrant policy preferences among integrated Latinxs. In light of heightened interior immigration enforcement and the increased societal integration of undocumented immigrants in the U.S., I demonstrate perceptibly threatening immigration enforcement contexts forestall attitudinal convergence on immigration policy preferences across 6 nationally representative surveys of Latinxs. Absent deportation threat, Latinx immigration policy attitudes converge with white Anglos. Deportation threat operates net of well-established alternative mechanisms such as discrimination, ethnic context(s), and ethnic identity. These results problematize preexisting conclusions on the political consequences of threat and suggest attitudinal assimilation is not preordained among immigrant group members.

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Introduction

A canonical finding is that immigrant group member attitudes converge with host country natives as they integrate into the national polity via a higher generational status or learning the host country language (Park, 1914; Gordon, 1964; Alba and Nee, 1997).¹ Indeed, prior political science research finds immigrant group member integration produces attitudinal convergence on multiple politically relevant outcomes (Michelson, 2003; Branton, 2007; Citrin et al., 2007), including, immigration policy attitudes (Miller, Polinard, and Wrinkle, 1984; Polinard, Wrinkle, and De La Garza, 1984; Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010). However, another perspective challenges the straight-line hypothesis and posits assimilation is not guaranteed via acculturation.² Rather, assimilation is conditional on host country reception contexts (Portes and Zhou, 1993; Telles and Ortiz, 2008; Pedraza, 2014). Contemporary survey data supports this perspective in the United States. Many acculturated Latinxs support liberal immigration policies at rates commensurate with their less acculturated counterparts (Pedraza, 2014).

I adjudicate between the two perspectives and help answer the puzzle of persistent liberal immigration policy attitudes among acculturated Latinx co-ethnics. I theorize perceptibly threatening immigration enforcement contexts foster rebuff from dominant group norms and motivate continued support of liberal immigration policies as a protective mechanism despite integration. Perceived deportation threat may also forestall attitudinal convergence by undercutting anti-immigrant predispositions motivated by conflict between more or less acculturated Latinxs. I corroborate my theory with 6 nationally representative surveys of Latinxs fielded between 2007-2019. I find perceived deportation threat consistently forestalls

¹A refined version of the straight-line hypothesis suggests immigrant co-ethnics may face hurdles toward assimilation yet still approach an assimilative telos in a linear fashion, otherwise known as the “bumpy line” hypothesis (Gans, 1992).

²Throughout this paper, I use the terms “acculturation” or “integration” interchangeably. Consistent with the measures of acculturation used in the main analyses, acculturation and/or integration references a higher generational status or the internalization of the host country language (i.e. English). Likewise, “attitudinal convergence” or “assimilation” refers to the process by which immigrant group member attitudes become more similar to host country natives as they attain a higher generational status or adopt the host country language.

attitudinal convergence on immigration policy via acculturation. Conversely, acculturated Latinxs who do not perceive deportation threat possess attitudes similar to Anglo whites. Moreover, deportation threat operates net of other well-established alternative mechanisms that may forestall attitudinal convergence such as discrimination, ethnic context(s), and identity maintenance.

This paper makes several contributions. First, contrary to some research suggesting Latinxs may “become white” as they integrate in the United States (Alba, 2016), this paper demonstrates Latinxs may not attitudinally “become white” in the face of perceptibly threatening policy contexts that serve as a referendum on their presence in the United States (Mora and Rodríguez-Muñiz, 2017). Deportation threat frustrates well-established sociological patterns of straight-line assimilation among acculturated Latinxs by facilitating the maintenance of attitudes akin to new immigrants. Additionally, this is the first paper to present evidence explicating deportation threat as a mechanism forestalling attitudinal convergence. Although prior work makes reference to the threat of immigration enforcement to explain attitudinal divergence (Vega and Ortiz, 2018), it has not been explicitly tested. Most prior work has emphasized the role of discrimination or ethnic context to explain attitudinal divergence on immigration policy (Pedraza, 2014), often assuming these mechanisms cue concern over immigration enforcement given its ethno-racialized implementation.³ Explicitly testing the role of deportation threat is important since it a) taps into contemporary concerns among immigrant communities over an increasingly threatening immigration enforcement context and b) circumvents measurement error in previously analyzed measures which may epiphenomenally cue deportation threat.

Second, this paper moves beyond assessing how deportation threat influences health (Novak, Geronimus, and Martinez-Cardoso, 2017; Nichols, LeBrón, and Pedraza, 2018), child development (Dreby, 2015), migrant wages (Fussell, 2011), interactions with various aspects of government bureaucracy (Alsan and Yang, 2018; Muchow and Amuedo-Dorantes, 2020),

³Over 90% of deportations are of Latin American immigrants.

various forms of political engagement (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura, 2001; Pantoja and Segura, 2003; White, 2016; Nichols and Valdéz, 2020), and government trust (Rocha, Knoll, and Wrinkle, 2015). This paper is the first to systematically demonstrate deportation threat also influences immigration policy attitudes among Latinxs, and more specifically, undercuts attitudinal convergence with Anglo whites.

Third, contrary to conventional wisdom, this paper demonstrates deportation threat can be politically consequential for immigrant group members distant from the immigrant experience via what I call a *generalized sense of illegality*. Prior assimilation and/or Latinx politics research assumes acculturated immigrants reduce support for pro-immigrant policy because they are less susceptible to the brunt of restrictive immigration policy and may perceive benefits from undermining new immigration (Newton, 2000; Bedolla, 2003; Jiménez, 2008). However, under certain circumstances, integrative conditions may break down and immigrant group members distal from the immigrant experience may behave more like recent immigrants if they believe they or their proximal social ties are threatened by deportation. Moreover, a political psychological debate remains as to whether threat motivates individuals predisposed to be concerned about the object of threat to shift their political preferences or individuals who are not predisposed to be concerned about the object of the threat (Feldman and Stenner, 1997; Hetherington and Suhay, 2011). This paper provides evidence for the latter perspective by demonstrating threat has stronger political implications for the ostensibly secure.

Fourth, although prior work assesses the determinants of Latinx immigration attitudes, the vast majority of American politics research forefronts Anglo white immigration attitudes instead of those most proximal to the immigrant experience. This is an oversight in light of rising xenophobic rhetoric along with the growth of the Latinx population.⁴ Likewise, most work at the intersection of threat and policy preferences analyzes threats to white people or the American public writ large (e.g. racial demography, terrorism). The emphasis on

⁴Latinxs are now roughly 20% of the U.S. population, accounting for half of all U.S. population growth between 2010-19.

dominant groups who prefer the status quo may lead to faulty theoretical conclusions, such as the well-established association between threat and conservative policy preferences (Jost et al., 2017). By focusing on intra-Latinx opinion, this paper demonstrates strong support for pro-immigrant policy is not preordained among Latinx co-ethnics and preexisting theory on the consequences of threat must account for group position.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews prior research on acculturation and attitudinal convergence. Section 3 develops the concept of a *generalized sense of illegality* among Latinx populations that explains how and why integrated Latinxs may feel threatened by deportation. Section 4 theorizes how deportation threat may forestall attitudinal convergence via acculturation. Section 5 details the research design. Section 6 discusses the empirical results. Section 7 concludes with a discussion on theoretical implications, limitations, and avenues for future work.

Perspectives on Acculturation and Assimilation

Straight-Line Assimilation Theory

Prior research suggests immigrant group members internalize the norms of the dominant group in the host country in order to attain socio-economic status, reduce vulnerability to discrimination, and distance oneself from stigmatized groups (Alba, 2009). Accordingly, *straight-line assimilation theory* suggests immigrant group attitudes converge with the dominant group via acculturative mechanisms such as a higher generational status, learning the host country language, intermarriage, or residential integration (Gordon, 1964). For Latinxs, there is strong evidence immigration policy preferences become more restrictive as a function of generational status and exhibiting English dominance (Miller, Polinard, and Wrinkle, 1984; Polinard, Wrinkle, and De La Garza, 1984; Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010).

Indeed, contemporary survey data demonstrates later Latinx generations possess increasingly restrictive immigration policy preferences, closing the attitudinal gap with Anglo whites.




Figure 1: Acculturation (x-axis, 1G, 2G, 3G+ = 1st, 2nd, and 3rd generation or more Latinxs) is associated with reduced support for liberal immigration policies (y-axis) across multiple surveys. Anglo whites are the last social category on the x-axis, separated by a vertical grey line. All outcomes rescaled between 0-1. Annotations denote mean outcome values and sample size for each social category. 95% bootstrap confidence intervals displayed.

Figure 1 displays support for pro-immigrant policy preferences on the y-axis by level of acculturation on the x-axis (proxied via generational status) across a series of surveys each characterized by a different panel. A dashed vertical line separates the policy opinions of Latinxs from Anglo whites. Across all surveys, acculturation appears to be associated with a decrease in support for pro-immigrant policies. However, despite the conservative trend, Latinxs do not fully converge with Anglo whites across all surveys. These descriptive statistics

raise questions over why Latinxs do not converge, at least by the third+ generation,⁵ and why not all Latinxs who are relatively integrated continue to hold liberal immigration policy preferences.⁶

Contingent Assimilation Theories

Other interventions problematize straight-line theory and may help explain why some acculturated Latinxs persistently hold liberal immigration policy preferences. I call these *contingent assimilation theories*. Generally speaking, contingent assimilation theories posit group-level characteristics and reception contexts mutually determine whether immigrants assimilate across cultural, attitudinal, and socio-economic dimensions (Portes and Zhou, 1993; Pedraza, 2014; Mora and Rodríguez-Muñiz, 2017; Jones, 2019). Several factors such as discrimination, limited intra-group social capital, and economic inequality may forestall assimilative processes such that some later generation immigrant group members continue to possess attributes similar to new immigrants (Portes and Zhou, 1993).

A prominent counter-hypothesis to straight-line theory is that discrimination maintains divergence on multiple dimensions of assimilation between immigrant group co-ethnics and host country natives. Telles and Ortiz (2008) find the absence of socio-economic and attitudinal convergence among later generation Mexican-Americans is due to the racialization of Mexican-Americans as inferior to whites, with downstream consequences on integrative mechanisms such as residential integration, public investment in Mexican-American communities, academic achievement, and a sense of belonging to the American polity. Commensurately, in the realm of immigration preferences, Sanchez (2006) finds Latinxs who perceive discrimination hold less restrictive immigration policy preferences regardless of acculturation level. Likewise, Pedraza (2014) forwards a “two-way street” acculturation theory. Attitudinal convergence necessitates host society acceptance for integrated Latinxs. A perceptibly discriminatory context may foster rebuff against mainstream attitudes among acculturated Latinxs since

⁵The “+” denotes third generation or more (e.g. fourth generation).

⁶For more information on outcome measures used for Figure 1, see Appendix Section A

host society reception does not match integrative expectations.

Other mechanisms may forestall attitudinal convergence. An ethnic geographic context may facilitate liberal immigration policy attitudes either through proximity to immigrants (Bedolla, 2003), or a stronger sense of Latinx group solidarity (Rocha et al., 2011). An ethnic geographic context may also produce selection into exposure to immigration enforcement (Maltby et al., 2020). The pro-immigrant content of ethnic media may also forestall convergence among later-generation Latinxs who consume it (Abrajano and Singh, 2009), in addition to exposing Latinxs to threatening information on immigration enforcement (Zepeda-Millán, 2017). Age cohorts born during and after the civil rights movement’s politicization of Latinx identity may be less inclined to assimilate and adopt mainstream immigration attitudes (Vega and Ortiz, 2018). Moreover, attitudinal convergence may be forestalled by a strong sense of Latinx identity (Binder, Polinard, and Wrinkle, 1997), or accelerated by a strong sense of American identity (Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010).

However, prior insights from various contingent assimilation theories are somewhat limited in explaining the persistent support of liberal immigration policy preferences displayed on Figure 1 among acculturated Latinxs in the contemporary moment. First, most prior assimilation research emphasizes socio-economic or idenitarian outcomes outside the dimension of policy preferences. Second, prior work on the determinants of liberal immigration policy preferences, with some exceptions (Pedraza, 2014), typically does not assess whether such determinants forestall attitudinal assimilation with Anglo whites. Third, prior research on assimilative convergence often identifies the absence/presence of assimilation on multiple dimensions without explicitly testing mechanisms that may undercut/facilitate assimilation.

This paper help resolve the lacuna by providing evidence on how perceptibly threatening immigration enforcement contexts may moderate attitudinal assimilation on immigration policy preferences. Deportation threat has not been explicitly tested as a mechanism that may forestall assimilation despite prior research theorizing restrictive immigration policies may foster rebuff against mainstream norms (Pedraza, 2014; Mora and Rodríguez-Muñiz,

2017; Vega and Ortiz, 2018). Therefore, one contribution of this paper is to explicitly test perceptible deportation threat as an additional mechanism forestalling attitudinal convergence net of known alternative mechanisms. However, before theorizing how threat may forestall attitudinal convergence, an open question is whether acculturated Latinxs distant from the immigrant experience are exposed to deportation threat and may find it politically consequential.

A Generalized Sense of Illegality Among Latinxs

Does deportation threat matter for Latinxs distant from the immigrant experience? I argue large swaths of the Latinx population beyond undocumented immigrants, including relatively acculturated Latinxs, may possess a *generalized sense of illegality* in the contemporary immigration enforcement environment.

Illegality is a political status characterized by a “palpable sense of deportability (De Genova, 2004).” Illegality is not immutable, but the byproduct of legal, political, and social behaviors that serve to assign a restricted social status to an influx of Latin American immigrants, mostly from Mexico, in the latter half of the 20th century. The ascription of illegality toward Latinxs is produced via legal and social mechanisms. Legally, restrictions on immigration which disparately implicate Latinx immigrants generate a population without access to legal rights and protection associated with documented status (De Genova, 2004). Socially, dominant group members and elites may propagate beliefs most Latinxs are illegal or prone to criminal activities regardless of attention to legal or generational status (García, 2017). There are a number of reasons illegality extends to integrated and U.S.-born Latinxs. In this paper, I highlight three key explanations.




Figure 2: Deportation threat is salient to the Latinx community. Panel A displays the size of the undocumented population size over time using Pew Research Center estimates (1990-2017). Panel B displays the undocumented population proportion over time using Pew estimates (1995-2017). Panel C displays the undocumented population proportion from various birth regions using Migration Policy Institute estimates. Panel D displays the proportion of Latinxs who know an undocumented close friend or family member across generational status and language-of-interview using CMPS data. Panel E displays the mean Latinx, foreign-born, and non-citizen proportion of the population for CMPS Latinx and Anglo white respondents by generational status. Panel F shows deportation removals over time using Department of Homeland Security (DHS) data (1980-2018). Panel G shows removals over time normalized over the size of the undocumented population using DHS and Pew data (1990-2017). Panel H shows the proportion of deportation removals from a specific region from DHS data tabulated by Asad and Clair (2018) (2005-2014).

Societal Integration of Undocumented Immigrants

The undocumented population is increasingly integrated in the broader Latinx community. The size of the undocumented population has increased up to 11 million in the past 30 years (Figure 2, Panel A). Over 70% of undocumented immigrants are Latinx (Figure 2, Panel C). The undocumented population is not transient, but permanently rooted in the Latinx community. Heightened border militarization in the past 30 years increased the cost of undocumented migration, undercutting cyclical migration patterns and paradoxically incentivizing long-term settlement (Massey, Pren, and Durand, 2016). Now, 83% of the undocumented population has resided in the U.S. over 10 years (Figure 2, Panel B). Indeed, Latinxs across all acculturative dimensions have strong social ties with undocumented immigrants. 44% of all Latinxs report knowing an undocumented close friend or family member in the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS). Even 30% and 36% of 3rd generation+ Latinxs and English-speaking Latinxs respectively report knowing an undocumented close friend or family member (Figure 2, Panel D).

Likewise, Latinxs across all acculturative dimensions are integrated in communities potentially subject to deportation threat. For 1st generation non-citizen and 3rd generation+ Latinxs, the proportion of their zipcode population that is foreign born is 27% and 18% in the CMPS respectively (Figure 2, Panel E). For Spanish and English-speaking Latinxs, it is 29% and 21% (12% for Anglo whites). The mean non-citizen zipcode composition is from 16% to 10% between 1st generation non-citizen and 3rd generation+ Latinx respondents. For Spanish and English speaking Latinxs it is 17% and 12% (6% for Anglo whites). Prior evidence suggests Latinxs living in “ethnic cores,” that is, places with a high density of co-ethnics and immigrants, can maintain a durable ethnicity in the face of mainstream pressure to weaken ethnic ties and practices (Telles and Sue, 2019). Perhaps a byproduct of living in ethnic cores is heightened exposure to deportation threat and its consequences on immigration policy attitude formation.

The Expansion of Immigration Enforcement

Additionally, immigration enforcement policies have become both increasingly restrictive and expansive such that they even implicate well-integrated Latinxs. After the Clinton-era 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), legal non-citizens and their friends and/or family (e.g. second-generation children) have to navigate increasingly draconian rules to avoid legal status revocation such as self-sufficiency requirements and an expanded set of minor crimes that subject legal non-citizens to deportation (Morawetz, 2000; Golash-Boza, 2014). Immigration enforcement has also expanded in terms of scale and space. IIRIRA increased both border and interior enforcement via federal cooperation with local law enforcement through programs such as §287(g). Other mandates, such as Secure Communities, increased data partnerships between federal and local authorities to apprehend undocumented immigrants booked in local jails. Indeed, the mean number of removals increased from 19,000 per year before IIRIRA to 289,000 per year post-IIRIRA (Figure 2, Panel F). In tandem with the increased societal integration of undocumented immigrants and non-citizens, an increasingly restrictive immigration enforcement regime may have downstream consequences on the attitudes of even relatively integrated Latinxs. Likewise, immigrants with liminal legal status such as Temporary Protected Status or Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals may have friends and family who are concerned about their uncertain legal status (Menjívar, 2006).

The Development of an Ethnicized Illegality

Moreover, notions of illegality are ethno-racialized to the point they extend to integrated Latinxs. Anglo whites conflate the categories “illegal”, “immigrant” and “Latino (Flores and Schachter, 2018),” which may be motivated by xenophobic attitudes (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2017; Hopkins, Sides, and Citrin, 2019). Survey evidence suggests whites overestimate the proportion of Latinxs they believe are undocumented by 24 percentage points (40% as opposed to 16%) (Barreto, Manzano, and Segura, 2012). Categorical conflation may not

simply influence interpersonal relations, it may also motivate state-sanctioned behavior, including that of social service agencies and the police, potentially in a discriminatory manner (Sáenz and Manges Douglas, 2015; Armenta, 2017). The disparate impact of categorical conflation on Latinxs may have secondary consequences on which groups bear the brunt of immigration enforcement. DHS data show Latin American immigrants are “over-deported” relative to their proportion of the undocumented population (Figure 2, Panel H). Even Latinx *citizens* have been apprehended or detained by federal immigration authorities. From 2006-2017, ICE wrongfully detained 3,500 U.S. citizens in Texas. In Rhode Island, ICE issued 462 detainers for U.S. citizens over a 10-year period. Likewise, ICE detained 420 citizens in Florida between 2017-2019 (Cunha, 2019).

Regardless of whether discriminatory intent is involved, Latinxs at all acculturation levels appear hyperaware of their ethno-racialization as “illegal” or “foreign” to the national polity,⁷ which may have downstream consequences on acculturative stress (Asad, 2017), health (Asad and Clair, 2018), and a sense of belonging (Del Real, 2019). Moreover, awareness of a racialized (il)legal status among citizen Latinxs may be increasingly acute in a post-Trump political environment (Asad, 2020). In sum, illegality, or the palpable sense of being deported, may not simply just affect undocumented immigrants, but many members of the Latinx immigrant community writ large regardless of their level of integration.

How Deportation Threat Forestalls Assimilation

How and why does deportation threat inform immigration policy preferences and forestall attitudinal convergence among Latinxs? Despite a rich literature on the determinants of liberal immigration policy attitudes and the mechanisms forestalling attitudinal convergence, there is limited research clarifying how deportation threat may motivate policy attitudes and forestall assimilation. This is puzzling given extensive research demonstrating anti-immigrant

⁷The 2016 CMPS suggests Latinxs are acutely aware of categorical conflation. 45%, 59% 39% and 31% of overall, first-generation, second-generation, and third-generation+ Latinxs agree with the notion “anti-immigrant sentiments are really anti-Latino sentiments.”

threat mobilizes Latinxs to engage in pro-immigrant political participation (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura, 2001; Pantoja and Segura, 2003; White, 2016; Zepeda-Millán, 2017).

A basic assumption in the threat literature is that human beings seek a sense of security (Maslow, 1958; Huddy, Feldman, and Weber, 2007). Prior American politics research on threat and policy preferences has typically focused on how a mostly-white public responds to terrorism, immigrants, or non-white groups (Tolbert and Grummel, 2003; Rocha and Espino, 2009; Merolla and Zechmeister, 2009).⁸ Most of this research suggests threat motivates preferences for ideologically conservative policies understood to minimize the threat and maintain security, however defined (e.g. support for civil liberties restrictions, reducing affirmative action) (Davis and Silver, 2004; Huddy et al., 2005; Craig and Richeson, 2014; Jost et al., 2017). Other research suggests the *type* of threat motivates changes in ideological preferences (Eadeh and Chang, 2020), implying deportation threat amongst the Latinx population should increase support for liberal immigration policy positions given their differential vulnerability to deportation on the basis of perceived illegality.

- **H1: Deportation threat is positively associated with liberal immigration policy preferences**

For good reason, prior research suggests deportation threat is more salient for immigrant and/or Spanish-dominant Latinxs. Recent immigrants may be more likely to be targeted by police and immigration authorities (Dreby, 2015; Armenta, 2017), experience insecurity concerning rules over legal status maintenance (Golash-Boza, 2014), and be the subject of discrimination on the basis of illegality (Fussell, 2011). These problems may be exacerbated for Spanish-dominant Latinxs who believe they could be targeted by authorities on the basis of their language (Jones, Victor, and Vannette, 2019). Indeed, deportation threat is higher among Latinxs who are likely undocumented, legal non-citizen immigrants, and even

⁸Group membership is highlighted here since the group’s relationship to the object of the threat will have different consequences on policy opinion (Davis and Silver, 2004; Brader, Valentino, and Suhay, 2008; Pérez, 2015).

naturalized citizens relative to U.S.-born Latinxs (Asad, 2020).⁹ However, deportation threat may have a stronger influence on the maintenance of liberal immigration policy preferences among acculturated Latinxs, forestalling attitudinal convergence with Anglo whites.

First, pro-immigrant policy preferences have more space to travel among integrated Latinxs. Even in the absence of deportation threat, Latinxs closer to the immigrant experience may have a pro-immigrant disposition. A priori, they benefit from a unrestricted immigration system. Moreover, they may be reminded consistently about how their lives are structured by the immigrant experience, motivating pro-immigrant policy attitudes (Maltby et al., 2020). Conversely, although integrated Latinxs may have ties with others closer to the immigrant experience, their distance from the canonical immigrant archetype may make them susceptible to attitudinal pressure from the mainstream or conflict with new immigrants (Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010; Jones, Victor, and Vannette, 2019). Bedolla (2003), borrowing from Social Identity Theory, posits acculturated Latinxs may dissociate from newer Latinx immigrants due to stigma associated with the Spanish-language and stereotypical attributes of less acculturated Latinxs. They also find these dissociative incentives may inform restrictive immigration policy attitudes among integrated Latinxs. Additionally, Jiménez (2008) finds continued immigrant replenishment of Mexican-American communities may generate the basis for cultural conflict over who is prototypically Mexican between new Mexican immigrants and acculturated Mexican-Americans. Economic competition, perceived or real, may also generate conflict between acculturated Latinxs and new immigrants given integrated Latinxs may compete against new immigrants within similar occupational strata (Hood III, Morris, and Shirkey, 1997).

Insights from prior political psychological research suggests threat has a stronger influence on those less predisposed to perceive the threat (Hetherington and Suhay, 2011). For Latinx co-ethnics, attitudes on immigration policy among acculturated Latinxs may have more space to travel than less acculturated Latinxs in the presence of deportation threat due to their

⁹See Section E.2, Table E8, which displays the threat distributions by acculturation. Acculturated Latinxs are less likely to perceive deportation threat.

heightened susceptibility to mainstream pressure and conflict with new immigrants.

Second, threat undermines habitual cues. Prior evidence suggests the emotional substrates of threat increase information-seeking and reduce reliance on internalized norms (Marcus and MacKuen, 1993; Gadarian and Albertson, 2014). Integrated Latinxs may be more likely to perceive themselves as prototypical Americans, predisposing them to hold restrictive immigration policy preferences (Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010). But deportation threat may encourage reflexivity over a perceived sense of integration, encouraging acculturated Latinxs to seek information concerning deportation threat (Gadarian and Albertson, 2014), identify alternative policies to ameliorate the threat (Hetherington and Suhay, 2011), and generate a new set of preferences inconsistent with their relatively mainstream priors (Marcus and MacKuen, 1993; Brader, 2006).¹⁰

Third, deportation threat undermines integrative expectations. Pedraza (2014) posits attitudinal motivations on immigration policy for integrated immigrant co-ethnics are a “two-way street.” Integrated Latinxs are subject to pressure to conform attitudinally with the mainstream, but rebuff from the host society as a result of immigrant group membership undercuts integrative expectations and facilitates attitudinal divergence. Deportation threat, whether personal or through strong proximal social ties (e.g. family, friends), signals rebuff from the American polity since it implies an association with illegality and a reduced sense of belonging. In other words, perceptibly threatening immigration enforcement contexts serve as a referendum on whether Latinxs can be incorporated in the American polity (Mora and Rodríguez-Muñiz, 2017). For integrated Latinxs, the perception they or their proximal social ties are subject to legal exclusion or association with illegality may not correspond to integrative expectations, heightening the weight of deportation threat on immigration policy attitudes relative to less acculturated Latinxs.

¹⁰Prior evidence informed by Affective Intelligence Theory suggests self-reflexivity in response to threat is motivated by anxiety, whereas anger stifles shifts from predispositions (Valentino et al., 2008). Thus, deportation threat should be associated with anxiety net of anger. I find deportation threat motivates anxiety after adjusting for anger and does not motivate anger more than anxiety (Appendix Section E.5, Table E10), suggesting deportation threat facilitates reflexivity.

Therefore, in the absence of a perceptibly threatening immigration enforcement context that implicates relatively integrated Latinxs or their close social ties, we may expect significant differences in the opinions of less and more acculturated Latinxs as a result of attitudinal convergence. Consistent with the straight-line assimilation hypothesis, less acculturated Latinxs will hold liberal immigration policy preferences whereas increasingly acculturated Latinxs will hold increasingly restrictive immigration policy attitudes. However, inconsistent with the straight-line hypothesis, acculturated Latinxs will continue to hold liberal immigration policy preferences similar to their less acculturated counterparts in the presence of a grave threat demanding protection via open immigration policies. Statistically, we may expect a positive interaction coefficient between threat and acculturation with respect to support for liberal immigration policies.

- **H2: The liberalizing influence of deportation threat on immigration policy preferences is stronger among more acculturated Latinxs**

Figure 3 displays stylized relationships characterizing different models of attitudinal assimilation. Panel A displays a pattern consistent with the straight-line assimilation model. As immigrants acculturate, they become less supportive of liberal immigration policies. Panel B displays a pattern consistent with straight-line assimilation that we may observe if there is no empirical evidence for H2. Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement may support less restrictive immigration policies at higher rates than unthreatened Latinxs, but attitudinal assimilation still occurs. Panel C displays a pattern consistent with H2 and preexisting theory explicating the contingent nature of immigrant assimilation. In short, deportation threat makes the attitudes of integrated Latinxs more like recent Latinx immigrants, whereas unthreatened Latinxs acquire increasingly conservative immigration policy preferences as they acculturate.




Figure 3: Competing theoretical models on assimilation. X-axis = acculturation level. Y-axis = liberal immigration policy support. Both axes scaled between 0-1. Panel A characterizes the straight-line assimilation model. Panel B characterizes the straight-line assimilation model while disaggregating between Latinxs threatened and unthreatened by immigration enforcement. Panel C is consistent with contingent assimilation theories and the theoretical framework informing H2.

Design

Data

I use 6 nationally representative Latinx surveys to test my hypotheses. The 2007 (N = 1809), 2008 (N = 1822), 2010 (N = 1236), 2018 (N = 1794), and 2019 (N = 2427) Pew Surveys of Latinos (Pew '07, '08, '10, '18, '19) along with the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (N = 2279, CMPS '16).¹¹ All surveys are administered in Spanish conditional on respondent preferences. All Pew surveys before 2019 are cell phone and landline, use stratified sampling to target Latinx residents, use random digit dialing, use multi-stage weighting procedures to ensure adherence to Census Bureau target demographics, and have margins of error at 2.7% (2007), 3.4% (2008), 3.3% (2010), and 3.1% (2018)

¹¹Puerto Ricans are excluded from the analysis given their citizenship status and social distance from undocumented immigrants. Only 3% of Puerto Ricans know an undocumented family member compared to 20% of non-Puerto Rican Latinxs. Nevertheless, the results are similar including Puerto Ricans (Appendix Section H.2, Table H15). I also re-analyze the results subsetting to only Mexicans, given their predominance in post-1965 immigration patterns and their uniquely racialized status (Telles and Ortiz, 2008). The results are also similar and perhaps even stronger (Appendix Section H.1, Table H14).

respectively. The 2019 Pew survey is derived from a national, probability-based online panel of Hispanic adults implemented by Ipsos Public Affairs and is weighted to account for Census target demographics and non-response via raking. The margin of error is 2.9%. The CMPS is internet self-administered, weighted via post-stratification raking to 2015 1-year ACS estimates for age, gender, education, nativity, ancestry and voter registration within the national Latinx population, and has a margin of error of 1%. These surveys are advantageous to test the hypotheses since they all have items on support for various immigration policies and perceived threat of deportation in addition to having large Latinx samples necessary for evaluating heterogeneous effects of deportation threat by acculturation level.¹² Moreover, using multiple surveys to test the hypotheses hedges against the results being a product of statistical artifacts intrinsic to a single survey and may demonstrate the theory is empirically durable across context, samples, and variable measurement.

The main outcomes of interest are liberal immigration policy attitudes. For each survey, items measuring support for liberal immigration policy are aggregated into an additive index. Examples of items include support for stopping immigration raids and not reducing immigration levels.¹³ The additive index may reduce measurement error due to the binary nature of the respective policy outcomes and generates preference variation among a population highly supportive of liberal immigration policies (Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010; Barry et al., 2011).¹⁴ Although the indices do not contain the same items across surveys, effect consistency may suggest deportation threat is relevant across a variety of policies within the immigration domain.¹⁵

To measure deportation threat, respondents are asked across all Pew surveys how much

¹²Given deportation threat or acculturation are not randomly assigned (and are impossible to randomly assign since they are either ascriptive categories or unethically sound to manipulate), it is important to note the term “effect” should not be interpreted causally. “Effect” is used for ease of interpretation. Although I attempt to account for alternative explanations and selection, the paper’s findings are ultimately descriptive.

¹³For an overview of the items characterizing the indices, see Appendix Section B, Table B1

¹⁴I derive deportation threat coefficients for each individual liberal immigration policy item across the 6 surveys. Although not all are statistically significant, none are incorrectly signed (Appendix, Section C, Figure C1).

¹⁵The Pew ’19 outcome is not an index but a binary indicator. There is only 1 immigration policy outcome measuring support for legalizing DACA recipients.

they worry about they, close friends, or family members being deported regardless of their citizenship status on a 0-3 point scale from “Not at all” to “A lot”. For the CMPS, respondents are only asked about proximal deportation threat on a 0-4 point scale from “Not at all worried” to “Extremely worried.” These measures are similar to prior research on the influence of threat on policy attitudes and capture *personal*, as opposed to *sociotropic* threat (Huddy et al., 2005; Huddy, Feldman, and Weber, 2007; Hetherington and Suhay, 2011).¹⁶

Across all surveys, acculturation is an additive index of a generational status scale (0 = 1st, 1 = 2nd, 2 = 3rd+), a binary citizenship measure (0 = non-citizen, 1 = citizen), and a binary measure for whether the respondent decided to take the survey in English. Thus, the acculturation index is from 0-4 (non-citizen Spanish-speaking immigrant to third-generation plus English-speaking citizen). Similar scales have been used in prior studies on Latinx immigration policy attitudes (Branton, 2007; Pedraza, 2014; Pérez, 2015).¹⁷ The English interview and generational status components are reliably associated with gold-standard acculturation scales measuring language proficiency, cultural attachments, geographic integration, and ethnic identification (Cruz et al., 2008).¹⁸ Prior work suggests citizenship is a prerequisite to successful acculturation and is positively associated with civic engagement, access to government benefits, public sector positions, education, language skills, and inter-ethnic contact (Portes and Curtis, 1987; Liang, 1994; Yang, 1994; Maehler, Weinmann, and Hanke, 2019). Moreover, political science research suggests citizenship reduces support for liberal immigration policies among European immigrants (Just and Anderson, 2015). I validate the acculturation index by assessing if it operates consistent with preexisting hypothesization that acculturation is negatively associated with support for liberal immigration policies and find concurring evidence (Appendix Section D.2, Table

¹⁶For exact wording on threat items, see Appendix Section E.1.

¹⁷All scale components are positively associated with each other across surveys (Appendix Section D.1, Table D3). With the exception of the CMPS, they fall within acceptable ranges of reliability (Appendix Section D.1, Table D4).

¹⁸Branton (2007)’s acculturation measure uses a self-reported English-dominance scale instead of the English interview indicator. Cruz et al. (2008) find English interview indicators are good proxies for English dominance. Indeed, English-dominance scales in the 2007 and 2010 Pew surveys are strongly associated with whether the respondent takes the survey in English (Appendix Section D.3).

D5).¹⁹

To ensure sufficient variation for assessing heterogeneous effects, I demonstrate deportation threat and acculturation are not indistinct constructs. As expected, acculturation is negatively correlated with deportation threat. From a low Pearson’s ρ of -0.2 in the Pew ’19 survey, to a high of -0.46 in the Pew ’08 survey, implying a low-to-moderate correlation. Across all surveys, at least 20% of the most acculturated Latinxs (e.g. third-generation+, English-dominant) indicate they are worried “some” or “alot,” up to 31% in the Pew ’18 survey. Likewise, across all surveys, at least 20% of the least acculturated Latinxs (non-citizen immigrants, Spanish-dominant) indicate they are worried “not at all” or “not much,” up to 45% in the Pew ’19 survey. In sum, there are sizable proportions of lower-acculturated Latinxs who do not experience deportation threat and well-acculturated Latinxs who do experience deportation threat.²⁰

I attempt to adjust for an exhaustive set of theoretically motivated control covariates in the main estimates.²¹ At the individual level, these include demographic factors (e.g. acculturation, gender, marital status, Catholicism, national origin) socio-economic factors (e.g. income, education, unemployment, homeownership), and political factors (e.g. partisanship, ideology, experienced discrimination, perceived discrimination, ethnic media consumption). Fully specified models also adjust for zipcode and county-level demographic and socio-economic covariates from the American Community Survey administered the year prior to the survey (e.g. logged median household income, % Latinx, % foreign-born, % non-citizen) along with state fixed effects.²²

¹⁹I use several alternative acculturation measures to ensure the results are not sensitive to coding decisions (Appendix Section I, Table I16). Including an indicator for legal permanent residency status or excluding the citizenship indicator does not change the results (Table I16, Panels A, B). Including an index of English dominance with or without the citizenship indicator, similar to Branton (2007), does not change the results (Panels C, D). The individual components of the acculturation index also moderate the association between deportation threat and support for liberal immigration policy (Panels A-E on Table I17).

²⁰See Appendix Section E.3, Tables E7 and E8 for more information on the correlation between threat and acculturation and the distribution of threat by acculturation level.

²¹To save space, not all controls for each survey are explicated here. See Appendix Section G, Table G12 for a full enumeration of the control covariates used for each survey. See Appendix Section G.2 for inclusion justification of each control covariate.

²²Although the Pew ’07 and Pew ’19 surveys only include Census region fixed effects and do not include

Importantly, the battery of political and county-level factors include a series of covariates that account for selection into deportation threat such as social ties with a deportee (in Pew '10, Pew '19), social ties with an undocumented friend and/or family member (in CMPS '16, Pew '19), being stopped by a law enforcement officer because of immigration status (in Pew '10), the logged county-level total removals via Secure Communities (in CMPS '16, Pew '18),²³ the county-level deportation rate via Secure Communities (# removed for every 1000 foreign-born, in CMPS '16, Pew '18), and the proportion of removals that are “Level 3,” that is, removals of individuals who have only engaged in misdemeanors or petty offenses, as opposed to felonies, suggesting expansive targeting (CMPS '16, Pew '18).²⁴ None of the covariates accounting for deportation threat selection are associated with immigration policy attitudes (conditional on the perceived deportation threat measure). This suggests the psychological component of deportation threat influences attitudes independent of objective immigration enforcement context, consistent with prior work suggesting Latinxs do not need direct contact with immigration enforcement to experience deportation threat and change their behaviors accordingly (Dreby, 2015; Asad, 2017).

Estimation Strategy

I use the following linear model to assess the association between deportation threat and liberal immigration policy preferences:

$$Y_i = \delta_g + \tau threat_i + \sum_{k=1}^k \beta_k X_{czi}^k + \varepsilon_i$$

Y_i is a liberal immigration policy preference index for respondent i . δ_g are geographic fixed effects. $threat_i$ is perceived deportation threat. $\sum_{i=1}^k X_{czi}^k$ are a battery of individual, county (c), and zipcode (z) covariates. ε_i are robust errors. τ is the coefficient of interest. I

county or zipcode covariates.

²³Removal data are from a public records request to ICE.

²⁴County-level deportation factors are not used in surveys prior to 2015 since Secure Communities was ongoing between 2008-2015

use the following model to assess if threat forestalls attitudinal convergence via acculturation:

$$Y_i = \delta_g + \tau^H(threat_i \times acculturation_i) + \beta_1 threat_i + \beta_2 acculturation_i + \sum_{k=1+2}^k \beta_k X_{czi}^k + \varepsilon_i$$

Here, τ^H is the coefficient of interest, characterizing the heterogenous effect of threat conditional on acculturation level. τ and τ^H should be positive if H1 and H2 are confirmed empirically.²⁵

Results

I first assess the association between deportation threat and immigration policy preferences. Figure 4 displays standardized effects of deportation threat with respect to liberal immigration policy attitudes across the 6 surveys, in addition to effects derived from both fixed and random-effects meta-analytic estimates.²⁶ Consistent with H1, deportation threat is positively associated with liberal immigration policy preferences across all surveys ($p < 0.001$ for all estimates except the Pew '19 survey at $p < 0.01$). Meta-analytically, deportation threat has a standardized effect size of 0.17. For comparison, this is as strong as the meta-analytic effect for partisanship (0.17), which is highly prognostic of liberal immigration policy preferences.²⁷

Using tools by Cinelli and Hazlett (2020), I estimate the robustness value (“RV”) for each coefficient, that is, the proportion of the joint variance in the outcome and deportation threat that would need to be explained to reduce the threat coefficients to 0. The RV ranges from 0.12-0.18. These values may be small, but I use observable control covariates as bounds to identify what kinds of covariates would obviate the results. To reduce the effect to 0,

²⁵The main results are re-estimated using ordered logistic regression and are the same (Appendix Section N, Tables N24 and N25).

²⁶For the random-effects meta-analysis, the Cochran’s Q p-value is 0.81, suggesting limited heterogeneity across survey estimates.

²⁷See Appendix Section E.6, Table E.6 for regression tables characterizing the association between deportation threat and immigration policy preferences.




Figure 4: Standardized deportation threat coefficients on liberal immigration policy preferences (y-axis) across surveys (x-axis) and the inclusion of control covariates (color). Vertical grey line separates survey estimates from meta-analytic estimates. Horizontal red line is the random-effects meta-analytic coefficient estimate. Annotations include estimate, standard error, p-value, how much joint outcome and independent variable variation must be explained by an omitted covariate to reduce the coefficient to 0 (“Robustness Value (RV)”), and how large an omitted covariate must be to reduce the coefficient to 0 based on observable bounds. 95% confidence intervals displayed derived from robust standard errors.

there must be an unobservable covariate equivalent to the strength of 2x acculturation, 3x acculturation, 3x acculturation, 7x perceived discrimination, 3x partisan identification and 6x acculturation.²⁸ Given prior literature establishes these covariates as the most prognostic of immigration attitudes and deportation threat among Latinxs (Sanchez, 2006; Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010; Pedraza, 2014; Asad, 2020), the bounding exercise suggests the estimates are relatively insulated from omitted variable bias.

Does deportation threat forestall attitudinal convergence?

I now assess whether deportation threat forestalls attitudinal convergence. Table 1 displays heterogeneous effects of deportation threat by acculturation level. Across all surveys (columns 1-6) and adjusting for the full set of control covariates, the negative influence of acculturation on liberal immigration policy attitudes is attenuated when deportation threat is perceptibly

²⁸These bounding covariates are not chosen arbitrarily. These covariates attenuate the threat coefficient to 0 prior to all others in each respective survey study. Thus, they are the most prognostic observed covariates with respect to both threat and liberal immigration policy attitudes.

Table 1: Association between deportation threat and liberal immigration policy attitudes conditional on acculturation

Liberal Immigration Policy Attitudes						
Panel A: No controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.12 [†] (0.06)	0.23*** (0.06)	0.17*** (0.05)	0.09 [†] (0.05)	0.28*** (0.05)	0.24** (0.09)
Threat	0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.02 (0.05)
Acculturation	-0.15*** (0.04)	-0.24*** (0.04)	-0.17*** (0.04)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.20*** (0.04)	-0.18** (0.06)
R ²	0.08	0.17	0.12	0.10	0.14	0.05
N	1809	1822	1236	2279	1794	2427
Panel B: Yes controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.12* (0.06)	0.20*** (0.05)	0.15*** (0.05)	0.09 [†] (0.05)	0.15** (0.05)	0.22* (0.09)
Threat	0.04 [†] (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.06 [†] (0.04)	0.06* (0.03)	0.02 (0.05)
Acculturation	-0.17*** (0.04)	-0.22*** (0.04)	-0.19*** (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.12** (0.04)	-0.16* (0.06)
R ²	0.16	0.32	0.33	0.24	0.32	0.09
N	1809	1822	1236	2276	1794	2427
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Zipcode Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Census Area FE	Y	N	N	N	N	Y
State FE	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Panel A displays coefficients from models with no control covariates. Panel B displays coefficients from models adjusting for a full set of control covariates. Each column characterizes a different survey at use. Geographic covariates below the Census Area level are not available for the Pew 2007 and Pew 2019 surveys. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

high. Given Table 1 displays coefficients based on acculturation and threat measures scaled between 0-1, going from the minimum to maximum of threat appears to nullify attitudinal assimilation via acculturation with respect to immigration policy preferences. These estimates suggest threat makes highly integrated Latinxs internalize attitudes similar to new immigrants with limited English-language capacities.

To get a stronger substantive sense of the heterogeneous effects, I plot predicted values of




Figure 5: Predicted values of support for liberal immigration policies (y-axis) conditional on acculturation (x-axis) and threat (min-max, denoted by color). Simulations are from fully specified models with Census region fixed effects, assuming control covariates at their means and a Latinx respondent from the Western Census region. 95% confidence intervals from robust standard errors displayed.

support for liberal immigration policies conditional on acculturation and deportation threat (Figure 5). Across all studies, there are a few general patterns implied by the predicted values. First, first-generation Spanish-dominant immigrants are highly supportive of liberal immigration policy regardless of perceived deportation threat. Second, for Latinxs without deportation threat, acculturation is negatively associated with support for liberal immigration policy. Third, for Latinxs with a high level of deportation threat, even highly acculturated Latinxs (e.g. third-generation+, English-dominant) hold attitudes on immigration policy similar to first-generation Spanish-dominant Latinxs.

In the Pew '07 survey, Latinxs without perceptions of deportation threat decrease support for liberal immigration policy by -0.17 on the if they are third-generation and English-dominant compared to first-generation and Spanish-dominant. Likewise for Latinxs with the

highest perception of threat, going from the minimum to maximum of the acculturation scale implies a decrease in support for liberal immigration policy by -0.05. The second difference simulating a shift from the minimum to the maximum of the acculturation and deportation threat scales is 0.12, equivalent to 44% of the outcome standard deviation. The second difference for the Pew '08 survey is 0.18, equivalent to 64% of the outcome standard deviation. For the Pew '10 survey, the second difference is 0.16, equivalent to 76% of the outcome standard deviation. The second difference for the CMPS '16 survey is 0.09, equivalent to 38% of the outcome standard deviation. The second difference for the Pew '18 survey is 0.18, equivalent to 67% of the outcome standard deviation. Finally, the second difference for the Pew '19 survey is 0.22, equivalent to 76% of the outcome standard deviation. Consistent with H2, these findings suggest deportation threat is more important in determining liberal immigration policy preferences among integrated Latinxs, forestalling attitudinal convergence and making their attitudes similar to new immigrants.

Robustness Checks

I assess the sensitivity of the results via a number of additional analyses. I attempt to rule out alternative mechanisms that may forestall attitudinal convergence. Prior literature has highlighted the role of discrimination (Sanchez, 2006; Telles and Ortiz, 2008; Pedraza, 2014), Latinx identity (Binder, Polinard, and Wrinkle, 1997), American identity (Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010), ethnic geographic context (Bedolla, 2003; Rocha et al., 2011), ethnic media (Abrajano and Singh, 2009), Latinx age cohort (Vega and Ortiz, 2018), national origin (Mexican + Central American), and socio-economic status (Polinard, Wrinkle, and De La Garza, 1984). I attempt to rule out if attitudinal divergence is a product of these factors in addition to exposure to deportation threat outside of the psychological measure of interest (e.g. knowing a deportee, knowing someone undocumented, exposure to an immigration stop, exposure to county-level immigration enforcement via Secure Communities). This is a strong test, since it saturates the model with interactive terms and accounts for potential omitted

interaction bias. The results are statistically and substantively similar to the main results (Appendix Section J, Table J18).

I conduct several tests to rule out latent liberalism. First, it is important to note partisanship and ideology is unassociated with deportation threat in the 2007 and 2010 Pew surveys, suggesting the empirical dynamic explicated in this paper is not intrinsically tethered to liberal ideology. Second, I use falsification tests on immigration irrelevant policy preferences to rule out liberalism unaccounted for after adjusting for partisanship or ideology. The CMPS includes items on immigration irrelevant policy preferences. Deportation threat is not consistently associated with liberal policy preferences or an index of all policy preferences.²⁹ Including the liberal policy index does not attenuate the first-order association between deportation threat and liberal immigration policy preferences (Appendix Section K, Table K19). Likewise, with the exception of support for not implementing voter ID laws, the $acculturation_i \times threat_i$ effect is statistically insignificant in relation to liberal policy preferences and the liberalism index. Moreover, including an interaction between acculturation and the liberalism index does not attenuate the $acculturation_i \times threat_i$ effect (Appendix Section K, Table K19).³⁰

I attempt to rule out if the results are driven by nativist attitudes. The Pew '07, Pew '08, Pew '10 and CMPS '16 surveys have items measuring the perceived economic and social threat immigrants pose.³¹ I index these measures for each survey.³² After adjusting for nativism in the first set of regression models assessing the first-order association between threat and liberal immigration policy, the results remain the same. I also interact nativism

²⁹In fact, the one statistically significant association is a positive one between threat and support for banning gay marriage, suggesting threat is not constitutive of liberal ideology among Latinxs.

³⁰However, in the Pew '19 survey, deportation threat and its interaction with acculturation appears to be associated with immigration-irrelevant liberalism (Appendix Section K, Table K20). This may be due to ideological sorting on perceived deportation threat in the aftermath of 3 years of Trump's administration. Other surveys are not analyzed since they do not include items measuring immigration irrelevant policy preferences.

³¹In the study of Anglo white opinion on immigration, *nativism* is typically understood as *socio-tropic threat from immigrants*. However, in this paper, socio-tropic threat is measured as deportation threat to the Latinx community.

³²For details on measuring nativism, see Appendix Section L.1

with acculturation in addition to deportation threat to rule out nativism as an alternative mechanism. Although the Pew '07 and CMPS '16 effects for $acculturation_i \times threat_i$ become statistically null, the coefficients are still positive and statistically significant for the Pew '08 and Pew '10 surveys. Moreover, the $acculturation_i \times threat_i$ effect is statistically significant and positive in the Mexican-origin subsample for the Pew '07, Pew '08, and Pew '10 samples. These results suggest, in some cases, deportation threat forestalls acculturation net of nativist predispositions. Although somewhat surprising, prior research suggests deportation threat may be salient to nativist Latinxs because they perceive new immigrants may generate societal and policy backlash to Latinxs writ large without discrimination between old and new generations of Latinxs (Bedolla, 2003; Jiménez, 2008).

I assess whether the results are driven by *socio-tropic* threat, as opposed to the main measure, *personal* threat (e.g. threat to self, immediate social ties). In prior work on threat, particularly with respect to terrorism, socio-tropic threat is measured as perceived threat to the nation (Hetherington and Suhay, 2011). For Latinxs concerned about immigration enforcement, socio-tropic deportation threat may be interpreted as a threat to Latinxs or immigrants writ large. The Pew '07 and Pew '08 surveys include items that may measure socio-tropic threat.³³ I adjust for socio-tropic threat using these surveys in regressions assessing the first-order association between personal deportation threat and liberal immigration policy preferences. I also adjust for the interaction between socio-tropic threat and acculturation to rule out socio-tropic threat as an alternative mechanism forestalling attitudinal convergence. The empirical conclusions remain the same as the main results, and socio-tropic deportation threat appears to have relatively little influence on immigration policy attitudes (Appendix Section M.2, Table M23).

³³See Appendix Section M.1 for details on measuring socio-tropic threat.

Discussion and Conclusion

Despite well-established sociological patterns of attitudinal convergence between acculturated immigrants and host country natives, a puzzle remains where immigration policy attitudes do not always converge. The findings help answer the puzzle and suggest perceptibly threatening immigration enforcement contexts undermine attitudinal assimilation among integrated Latinxs. These empirical conclusions put into context previously unexplored attitudinal dynamics that may arise from a sense of illegality informed by an increasingly restrictive immigration enforcement apparatus, the societal integration of predominantly Latinx undocumented immigrants, and rhetoric conflating Latinxs with an “illegal” status. Moreover, deportation threat appears to forestall attitudinal convergence net of several established alternative mechanisms in preexisting literature, including discrimination, group identity, and various forms of ethnic context. As Latinxs constitute 20% of the American population and the post-Trump context offers a crossroads on immigration policy, these attitudinal dynamics may be increasingly salient in determining the future of Latinx immigration policy preferences.

Contrary to straight-line assimilation theory and prior political science evidence on the subject, this paper teaches us attitudinal assimilation on policy preferences is not guaranteed, but rather conditional on heterogeneous circumstances experienced by members of immigrant-origin groups. However, consistent with straight-line assimilation theory, immigrant group members hold attitudes similar to host country natives in the absence of threats implicating the group. The notion reception contexts may moderate the prospects of assimilation is not new, but most prior research emphasizes socio-economic convergence and does not explicitly test mechanisms that may forestall convergence on policy preferences (Portes and Zhou, 1993; Telles and Ortiz, 2008). This paper is the first to provide systematic evidence assessing how immigration enforcement contexts moderate the prospect of attitudinal assimilation on immigration policy. The findings presented here bolster perspectives that the prospect of assimilation is conditional on reception context, specifically, a perceptibly threatening

immigration enforcement environment (Mora and Rodríguez-Muñiz, 2017). Moreover, these findings strike against new conclusions positing Latinxs will “become white” in norms and practice like other historic immigrant groups (Alba, 2016).

Moreover, this paper problematizes several assumptions concerning threat in the immigration and political psychological literature. The results teach us deportation threat is not only salient for immigrant or undocumented Latinxs, but also citizen, later-generation, and English-speaking Latinxs well integrated in the American polity. Prior deportation threat research tends to focus on less acculturated Latinxs on the (correct) assumption they are differentially exposed to threat. However, if we examine broader Latinx populations, we find deportation threat may be more politically consequential to integrated Latinxs since their distance from the canonical immigrant archetype offers them opportunities to shed commitments to policies benefitting new immigrants. Political psychological research on threat has long debated whether threat has a stronger influence on those more or less predisposed to be concerned over the object of the threat (Feldman and Stenner, 1997; Hetherington and Suhay, 2011). The findings illustrated here, somewhat counter-intuitively, offer support for the notion threat undermines the predispositions of the ostensibly secure.

Likewise, prior threat research tends to focus on dominant groups (e.g. Anglo whites). Examining groups at the hierarchical margins may offer new theoretical insights that challenge well-established findings. Latinxs, hierarchically marginal and concerned about objects of threat that demand liberal policy solutions (as opposed to whites who are hierarchically superior and concerned about objects of threat that demand conservative solutions), will behave in ways that contradict meta-analytic conclusions on the conservative consequences of threat (Jost et al., 2017). Moreover, studying Latinxs by themselves exposes important heterogeneities, such as acculturation level, that help determine what factors maintain commitment to Latinx immigrants outside of operationalizing Latinxs in a binary fashion that demonstrates otherwise high levels of pro-immigrant support. Future research should continue to take the heterogeneity of the group into account in explaining Latinx political

behavior.

Additionally, this paper moves beyond examining how deportation threat motivates Latinx political participation. Surprisingly little work has been done on how deportation threat influences Latinx immigration policy attitudes, much less how deportation threat may forestall attitudinal convergence. This paper explicates deportation threat not only activates political engagement, but motivates the distinct political preferences of the Latinx community.

This study is not without limitations and there is significant room for future research. The study is observational and subject to omitted variable bias. Although I attempt to account for theoretically motivated alternative explanations and robustness to multiple specifications, unobserved endogeneity may otherwise obviate the results. Future research should attempt to assess the causal effect of plausibly exogenous policy changes in the immigration enforcement environment on perceived deportation threat and immigration policy attitudes differentially among integrated Latinxs.³⁴

Additionally, the study is Latinx focused, which may generate scope conditions on the influence of deportation threat relative to other immigrant groups.³⁵ Future research should analyze the influence of deportation threat on Asian immigrant populations, the fastest growing ethno-racial subgroup in the United States, or Black immigrants, who may experience additional threats via anti-Black discrimination.³⁶ Moreover, future research should extend beyond the United States. For instance, Jamaican co-ethnics in the United Kingdom may have experienced a heightened sense of deportation threat in response to the Windrush Scandal, which may shape immigration attitudes and attitudinal assimilation in profound ways.

Likewise, future research should assess whether the attitudinal dynamics explicated

³⁴A tough task, given the paucity of Latinx survey data across both small geographic units and acculturation level. One may also induce deportation threat via survey or field experiments. However, serious ethical considerations need to be taken into account, such that any experiment approximating the characterization of threat measured by the descriptive data may be infeasible.

³⁵I analyze the influence of deportation threat on liberal immigration policy preferences among Asian-Americans in a 2013 Pew Survey (Appendix Section O).

³⁶This is not to deny Black Latinxs in the samples, but to prescribe an explicit focus on both Latinx and non-Latinx Black immigrants.

here extend beyond the third generation. The analysis bundles the third generation with generations after. It is unclear if this leads to over or under-estimation bias for the heterogeneous effects of interest. Although prior evidence suggests 4th generation Mexicans still face disadvantages preventing assimilative convergence (Telles and Ortiz, 2008), it is unclear if deportation threat forestalls attitudinal assimilation among 4th generation populations given their distance from the immigrant experience. A constraint of this project is that Latinx immigrants have not been in the country for multiple generations like earlier European immigrants. The findings should be replicated in the decades to come to assess potential changes in the immigration enforcement environment or attitudinal context.

Moreover, other well-established findings on the link between threat and predispositions should be evaluated among Latinx populations, such as the role of deportation threat in potentially relaxing ideological or partisan predispositions that motivate preferences for restrictive immigration policy.

In summary, the findings appear somewhat pessimistic for Latinx solidarity with new immigrants. In order for relatively integrated Latinxs to support policies that benefit new immigrants, they must endure a threatening immigration enforcement environment. Although this dynamic may have been exacerbated by an increase in deportations since IIRIRA's passage in 1996, immigration policy may be at a crossroads in a post-Trump context. It remains to be seen whether potential reversals in perceptibly threatening policies may generate the conditions for Latinxs to attitudinally assimilate and shed their political commitments to new Latinx immigrants.

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A Motivation Plot

A.1 Outcome measurement

A.1.1 ANES 2008-2016

Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be INCREASED A LOT, INCREASED A LITTLE, LEFT THE SAME as it is now, DECREASED A LITTLE, or DECREASED A LOT? [Equal to 1 and 0 otherwise if respondent DOES NOT indicate “decreased a little” or “decreased a lot.”]

- Increased a lot
- Increased a little
- Left the same as it is now
- Decreased a little
- Decreased a lot

A.1.2 GSS 2000-2018

Do you think the number of immigrants to America nowadays should be... [Equal to 1 and 0 otherwise if respondent DOES NOT indicate “reduced a little” or “reduced a lot”]

- Increased a lot
- Increased a little
- Remain the same as it is
- Reduced a little
- Reduced a lot
- Can’t choose
- No answer

A.1.3 CMPS 2016

Same as the set of measures characterized on Section B. All binary indicators are indexed on a scale from 0-2, rescaled to 0-1 on Figure 1.

A.1.4 CAS 2004

Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased, decreased or left the same as it is now? [Equal to 1 and 0 otherwise if respondent DOES NOT indicate “decreased”]

- Increased
- Decreased
- Left the same
- Don’t Know
- No answer

A.1.5 Pew 2002

The following three items are indexed from 0-2, rescaled between 0-1 on Figure 1.

Do you think there are too many, too few, or about the right amount of immigrants living in the United States today? [Equal to 1 and 0 otherwise if respondent DOES NOT indicate “too many.”]

- Too many
- Too few
- Right amount
- Don’t Know
- Refused

Some people think the United States should allow more Latin Americans to come and work in this country LEGALLY; some people think the US should allow the same number as it does now; and others think it should reduce the number who come and work in this country LEGALLY. Which is closer to your opinion? [Equal to 1 and 0 otherwise if respondent DOES NOT indicate “reduce the number who come to work in this country legally.”]

- Allow more Latin Americans to come and work in this country legally
- Allow the same number as it does now
- Reduce the number who come to work in this country legally
- Don’t know
- Refused

What would you think of a proposal that would give many of the undocumented or illegal (HISPANIC/LATINO) immigrants working in the U.S. a chance to obtain legal status? Is this something you would favor or oppose? [Equal to 1 and 0 otherwise if respondent DOES NOT indicate “oppose.”]

- Favor
- Oppose
- Don’t know
- Refused

B Outcome measurement

Table B1: Outcome items and measurement across surveys.

Survey	Item Text	Choices	Measure
Pew '07	Do you approve or disapprove of workplace raids to discourage employers from hiring undocumented or illegal immigrants?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Approve • 2) Disapprove • 3) Don't Know • 4) Refused 	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 otherwise)
	Do you approve or disapprove of states checking for immigration status before issuing driver's licenses?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Approve • 2) Disapprove • 3) Don't Know • 4) Refused 	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 otherwise)
	Should local police take an active role in identifying undocumented or illegal immigrants, or should enforcement be left mainly to the federal authorities?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Police take active role • 2) Enforcement left to federal authorities • 3) Don't know • 4) Refused 	Binary (1 = Federal authorities, 0 otherwise)
	Do you think there are too many, too few, or about the right amount of immigrants living in the United States today?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Too many • 2) Too few • 3) Right amount • 4) Don't know • 5) Refused 	Binary (1 = not "Too many", 0 otherwise)
Pew '08	Should local police take an active role in identifying undocumented or illegal immigrants, or should enforcement be left mainly to the federal authorities?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Police take active role • 2) Enforcement left to federal authorities • 3) Don't know • 4) Refused 	Binary (1 = Federal authorities, 0 otherwise)
	Do you approve or disapprove of the following immigration enforcement actions: Workplace raids to discourage employers from hiring undocumented or illegal immigrants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Approve • 2) Disapprove • 3) Don't Know • 4) Refused 	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 otherwise)
	Do you approve or disapprove of the following immigration enforcement actions: A requirement that employers check with a federal government database to verify the legal immigration status of any job applicant they are considering hiring	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Approve • 2) Disapprove • 3) Don't Know • 4) Refused 	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 otherwise)
	Do you approve or disapprove of the following immigration enforcement actions: Criminal prosecution of employers who hire undocumented immigrants	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Approve • 2) Disapprove • 3) Don't Know • 4) Refused 	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 otherwise)
	Do you approve or disapprove of the following immigration enforcement actions: Criminal prosecution of undocumented immigrants who are working without authorization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Approve • 2) Disapprove • 3) Don't Know • 4) Refused 	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 otherwise)

	Should an illegal immigrant who graduated from a high school in your state and is accepted to a state public college qualify for the in-state college tuition rate, or shouldn't they?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Should qualify • 2) Should not qualify • 3) Don't Know • 4) Refused 	Binary (1 = Should qualify, 0 otherwise)
Pew '10	Thinking about immigrants who are living in the U.S. (United States) illegally... do you favor or oppose providing a way for illegal immigrants currently in the country to gain legal citizenship if they pass background checks, pay fines and have jobs?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Favor • 2) Oppose • 3) Don't Know • 4) Refused 	Binary (1 = Favor, 0 otherwise)
	As you may know, the state of Arizona recently passed a law that requires police to verify the legal status of someone they have already stopped or arrested if they suspect that the person is in the country illegally. Do you approve or disapprove of Arizona's new law?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Favor • 2) Oppose • 3) Don't Know • 4) Refused 	Binary (1 = Favor, 0 otherwise)
	All things considered, which of these statements comes closer to your own views about immigrants who are in the U.S. illegally — even if none of them is exactly right	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Illegal immigrants should be deported • 2) Illegal immigrants should pay a fine, but not be deported • 3) Illegal immigrants should not be punished • 4) Don't know • 5) Refused 	Binary (1 = Not "should be deported", 0 otherwise)
	Do you approve or disapprove of the following actions aimed at enforcing the nation's immigration laws: Workplace raids	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Approve • 2) Disapprove • 3) Don't know • 4) Refused 	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 otherwise)
	Do you approve or disapprove of the following actions aimed at enforcing the nation's immigration laws: Building more fences on the nation's borders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Approve • 2) Disapprove • 3) Don't know • 4) Refused 	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 otherwise)
	Do you approve or disapprove of the following actions aimed at enforcing the nation's immigration laws: Increasing the number of border patrol agents	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Approve • 2) Disapprove • 3) Don't know • 4) Refused 	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 otherwise)
	Do you approve or disapprove of the following actions aimed at enforcing the nation's immigration laws: A requirement that all U.S. residents carry a national identity card	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Approve • 2) Disapprove • 3) Don't know • 4) Refused 	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 otherwise)
	Should an illegal immigrant who graduated from a high school in your state and is accepted to a state public college qualify for the in-state college tuition rate, or shouldn't they?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Should qualify • 2) Should not qualify • 3) Don't Know • 4) Refused 	Binary (1 = Should qualify, 0 otherwise)

	Should local police take an active role in identifying undocumented or illegal immigrants, or should enforcement be left mainly to the federal authorities?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Police take active role • 2) Enforcement left to federal authorities • 3) Don't know • 4) Refused 	Binary (1 = Federal authorities, 0 otherwise)
	Would you favor changing the Constitution so that the parents must be legal residents of the U.S. in order for their newborn child to be a citizen, or should the Constitution be left as it is?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Favor changing the constitution • 2) Leave constitution as is • 3) Don't Know • 4) Refused 	Binary (1 = not "Favor", 0 otherwise)
CMPS '16	Do you think the millions of undocumented [Mexican (50/50 split)] immigrants in the United States should be eligible for a pathway to citizenship, or do you think we should deport undocumented Mexican immigrants?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Strongly support pathway to citizenship • 2) Somewhat support pathway to citizenship • 3) Strongly support deporting these immigrants • 4) Somewhat support deporting these immigrants 	Binary (1 = Strongly or somewhat support pathway, 0 otherwise)
	Which comes closest to your view about [undocumented/illegal (50/50 split)] immigrants who are already living and working in the U.S.?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) They should be allowed to stay in their jobs and apply for U.S. citizenship • 2) They should be allowed to stay in their jobs, but temporarily • 3) They should be required to leave their jobs and immediately leave the U.S 	Binary (1 = not "immediately leave", 0 otherwise)
	Below is a list of federal government programs. For each one, please indicate whether you would like to see federal spending increased or decreased or stay the same: Tightening border security to prevent [illegal/undocumented (50/50 split)] immigration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Decrease • 2) Increase • 3) Stay the same 	Binary (1 = Decrease, 0 otherwise)
Pew '18	As you may know, many immigrants who came illegally to the U.S. when they were children now have temporary legal status that may be ending. Would you favor or oppose Congress passing a law granting them permanent legal status?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Favor • 2) Oppose 	Binary (1 = Favor, 0 otherwise)
	As you may know, there is a proposal to substantially expand the wall along the U.S. border with Mexico. In general, do you favor or oppose this proposal?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Favor • 2) Oppose 	Binary (1 = Oppose, 0 otherwise)
	Do you think there are too many, too few, or about the right amount of immigrants living in the United States today?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Too many • 2) Too Few • 3) Right amount 	Binary (1 = Not "too many", 0 otherwise)

Pew '19	As you may know, many immigrants who came illegally to the U.S. when they were children now have temporary legal status that may be ending. Would you favor or oppose Congress passing a law granting them permanent legal status?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1) Favor • 2) Oppose 	Binary (1 = Favor, 0 otherwise)
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C Disaggregating outcomes




Figure C1: Coefficients characterizing association between relevant independent variables of interest (x-axis) and disaggregated outcomes that constitute the liberal immigration policy index (y-axis). Panel A displays coefficients for threat. Panel B displays coefficients for the threat x acculturation interaction. Color denotes survey at use, shape denotes whether the outcome is an index. All covariates scaled 0-1. 95% confidence interval from robust standard errors displayed.

D Validating acculturation scale

D.1 Determining reliability

Table D3: Correlation matrices between acculturation scale components across surveys (unweighted)

Pew 2007	Gen. Status	English	Citizen
Gen. Status	1.00	0.59	0.55
English	0.59	1.00	0.47
Citizen	0.55	0.47	1.00
Pew 2008	Gen. Status	English	Citizen
Gen. Status	1.00	0.61	0.58
English	0.61	1.00	0.48
Citizen	0.58	0.48	1.00
Pew 2010	Gen. Status	English	Citizen
Gen. Status	1.00	0.52	0.57
English	0.52	1.00	0.49
Citizen	0.57	0.49	1.00
CMPS 2016	Gen. Status	English	Citizen
Gen. Status	1.00	0.46	0.58
English	0.46	1.00	0.54
Citizen	0.58	0.54	1.00
Pew 2018	Gen. Status	English	Citizen
Gen. Status	1.00	0.65	0.56
English	0.65	1.00	0.58
Citizen	0.56	0.58	1.00
Pew 2019	Gen. Status	English	Citizen
Gen. Status	1.00	0.48	0.36
English	0.48	1.00	0.39
Citizen	0.36	0.39	1.00

Table D4: Cronbach's alpha for acculturation scale across surveys

Pew 2007	Pew 2008	Pew 2010	CMPS 2016	Pew 2018	Pew 2019
0.75	0.77	0.74	0.66	0.77	0.66

D.2 Association with immigration attitudes

Table D5: Acculturation is negatively associated with liberal immigration policy attitudes across surveys

Acculturation Level	Liberal Immigration Policy Index (by survey)					
	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19
Acculturation (0)	0.74	0.81	0.77	0.71	0.83	0.93
Acculturation (1)	0.69	0.79	0.73	0.69	0.81	0.94
Acculturation (2)	0.67	0.68	0.72	0.60	0.80	0.88
Acculturation (3)	0.65	0.66	0.72	0.69	0.78	0.90
Acculturation (4)	0.58	0.60	0.58	0.65	0.69	0.84
Max - Min	-0.17	-0.21	-0.20	-0.06	-0.14	-0.10
Bivariate Regression t-val	-7.77	-11.89	-9.08	-3.17	-6.71	-4.52

D.3 Demonstrating English dominance = English interview

Table D6: The English language interview indicator is a strong proxy for English-language dominance

	English Interview	
	(1)	(2)
English Dominance	0.89*** (0.04)	1.65*** (0.05)
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '10
R ²	0.45	0.64
N	1809	1238

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. All models adjust for generational status, partisanship, income, education and gender.

E Validating and investigating deportation threat

E.1 Threat measurement

E.1.1 Pew 2007-2019

Regardless of your own immigration or citizenship status, how much, if at all, do you worry that you, a family member, or a close friend could be deported? Would you say that you worry a lot, some, not much, or not at all?

- A lot
- Some
- Not much
- Not at all

E.1.2 CMPS 2016

How worried are you that people you know might be detained or deported for immigration reasons?

- Extremely worried
- Very worried
- Somewhat worried
- A little worried
- Not at all worried

E.2 Threat distributions




Figure E2: Distribution (y-axis) of deportation threat (x-axis) across surveys. Annotations denote N within each threat level and the corresponding marginal in parentheses. Each panel denotes a separate survey.

E.3 Distinctiveness of threat and acculturation

Table E7: Correlation coefficients between deportation threat and acculturation scale

Survey	Pearson's Rho	Kendall's Tau	Spearman's Rho
Pew '07	-0.41	-0.33	-0.40
Pew '08	-0.46	-0.38	-0.45
Pew '10	-0.42	-0.34	-0.41
CMPS '16	-0.26	-0.23	-0.27
Pew '18	-0.26	-0.22	-0.27
Pew '19	-0.20	-0.17	-0.20

Table E8: Distribution of threat by acculturation across surveys

Survey	Acculturation	Not at all (Not at all worried)	Not much (A little worried)	Some (Somewhat worried)	A lot (Very worried)	— (Extremely Worried)	N
Pew '07	Acculturation (0)	0.15	0.11	0.24	0.49		761
	Acculturation (1)	0.27	0.12	0.20	0.40		419
	Acculturation (2)	0.34	0.15	0.25	0.26		202
	Acculturation (3)	0.53	0.15	0.16	0.17		248
	Acculturation (4)	0.65	0.14	0.11	0.10		179
Pew '08	Acculturation (0)	0.13	0.07	0.19	0.61		729
	Acculturation (1)	0.22	0.12	0.18	0.47		424
	Acculturation (2)	0.39	0.11	0.21	0.29		194
	Acculturation (3)	0.51	0.13	0.17	0.19		243
	Acculturation (4)	0.62	0.13	0.16	0.09		232
Pew '10	Acculturation (0)	0.15	0.08	0.22	0.55		375
	Acculturation (1)	0.24	0.09	0.23	0.44		287
	Acculturation (2)	0.35	0.12	0.18	0.35		188
	Acculturation (3)	0.48	0.15	0.14	0.22		202
	Acculturation (4)	0.69	0.08	0.11	0.11		194
CMPS '16	Acculturation (0)	0.21	0.09	0.20	0.19	0.31	202
	Acculturation (1)	0.23	0.10	0.17	0.23	0.27	229
	Acculturation (2)	0.43	0.09	0.25	0.13	0.10	357
	Acculturation (3)	0.27	0.14	0.27	0.15	0.16	528
	Acculturation (4)	0.53	0.10	0.19	0.09	0.09	1173
Pew '18	Acculturation (0)	0.20	0.12	0.33	0.35		484
	Acculturation (1)	0.28	0.13	0.30	0.29		322
	Acculturation (2)	0.35	0.15	0.21	0.30		227
	Acculturation (3)	0.36	0.14	0.22	0.28		387
	Acculturation (4)	0.56	0.13	0.20	0.11		374
Pew '19	Acculturation (0)	0.24	0.21	0.24	0.31		420
	Acculturation (1)	0.34	0.19	0.24	0.23		638
	Acculturation (2)	0.49	0.17	0.21	0.13		548
	Acculturation (3)	0.41	0.19	0.22	0.18		589
	Acculturation (4)	0.57	0.15	0.18	0.10		232

E.4 Correlates of deportation threat

Table E9: Correlates of deportation threat

	Deportation Threat					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	-0.25*** (0.06)	-0.39*** (0.06)	-0.33*** (0.08)	-0.41*** (0.06)	-0.34*** (0.06)	-0.19*** (0.04)
Woman	0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Married	0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)
Mexican/Central Am.	0.03 (0.03)	0.10** (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.05* (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)
Income	-0.12** (0.05)	-2.42*** (0.70)	-0.19** (0.06)	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.12** (0.04)	
Education	-0.16*** (0.04)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.11** (0.04)
Unemployed	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	
US Born	-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.15*** (0.03)	-0.22*** (0.04)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.03)
English	-0.18*** (0.03)	-0.17*** (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)
% Non-citizen (zip)		0.16* (0.08)	0.08 (0.10)	-0.00 (0.07)	0.11 (0.07)	
% Non-citizen (county)		-0.09 (0.06)	0.02 (0.07)	0.13* (0.05)	0.00 (0.07)	
Log(Deportations + 1)				-0.00 (0.04)	-0.12* (0.05)	
Deportation Rate				-0.34 (0.25)	0.04 (0.11)	
Know Deportee			0.18*** (0.03)			0.24*** (0.03)
Know Undocumented				0.26*** (0.02)		0.16*** (0.02)
Perceived Discrim.	0.21*** (0.04)	0.12*** (0.04)	0.19*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.04)		
Experienced Discrim.	0.09*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.08** (0.03)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.36*** (0.03)	
Ethnic Media		0.09 (0.05)	0.16* (0.07)	0.08* (0.04)		
Partisanship	0.03 (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.24*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)
Ideology			0.02 (0.04)	0.06 (0.03)		
Latino ID				0.09* (0.03)	0.08 (0.05)	
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19
R ²	0.24	0.32	0.29	0.42	0.25	0.25
N	1809	1822	1238	2279	1794	2427

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

E.5 Deportation threat and emotional correlates

Table E10: Threat does not motivate anger more than anxiety

	Anxiety	Anxiety - Anger
Threat	0.12*** (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
R ²	0.44	0.09
N	2768	2768
Survey	CMPS '16	CMPS '16
Anger Control	Y	N
Demographic Controls	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y
State FE	Y	Y

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. Anxiety and anger are CMPS '16 items asking respondents "During the 2016 election season, how often did you feel the following?" with an inquiry on being "Afraid?" and "Angry?" All covariates rescaled between 0-1. Thus, the anxiety - anger measure is scaled between -1 to 1. All models are fully specified. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

E.6 Association between threat and immigration preferences

Table E11: Association between deportation threat and liberal immigration policy attitudes

	Liberal Immigration Policy Attitudes					
Panel A: No controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat	0.25*** (0.03)	0.36*** (0.03)	0.29*** (0.04)	0.28*** (0.03)	0.32*** (0.03)	0.19*** (0.04)
R ²	0.06	0.13	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.03
N	1809	1822	1238	2279	1794	2427
Panel B: Yes controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat	0.14*** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.19*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.04)
R ²	0.16	0.31	0.31	0.24	0.31	0.08
Num. obs.	1809	1822	1236	2276	1794	2427
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Zipcode Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Census Area FE	Y	N	N	N	N	Y
State FE	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. Geographic controls below the Census Area are not available for the Pew 2007 and Pew 2019 surveys. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

F Descriptive plots characterizing heterogeneous influence of threat by acculturation




Figure F3: Association between acculturation and liberal immigration policy attitudes conditional on deportation threat across surveys. X-axis = acculturation scale. Y-axis = liberal immigration policy index. Solid line = linear fit to bivariate association. Dashed line = average on policy index conditional on acculturation category. Color denotes level of perceived deportation threat.

G Control Covariates

G.1 List

Table G12: Control covariate inclusion in fully specified models by survey

Survey	Controls
Pew '07	Acculturation, Age, Age (Missing), Woman, Married, Mexican, Salvadorean, Dominican, Cuban, Income, Education, Education (Missing), Unemployed, Partisanship (5pt), Perceived Discrimination, Experienced Discrimination, Census Region FE
Pew '08	Acculturation, Age, Age (Missing), Woman, Married, Catholic, Mexican, Salvadorean, Dominican, Cuban, Income, Income (Missing), Education, Education (Missing), Unemployment, Partisanship (5pt), Experienced Discrimination, Perceived Discrimination, Ethnic Media Consumption, Log(Total Pop. + 1) (Zip), Pop. Density (Zip), % Latino (Zip), % Foreign (Zip), % Non-citizen (Zip), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (Zip), % College (Zip), % Unemployment (Zip), Log(Total Pop. + 1) (County), Pop. Density (County), % Latino (County), % Foreign (County), % Non-citizen (County), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (County), % College (County), % Unemployed (County), State FE
Pew '10	Acculturation, Age, Age (Missing), Woman, Married, Mexican, Dominican, Salvadorean, Cuban, Income, Income (Missing), Education, Education (Missing), Unemployed, Homeowner, Partisanship (5pt), Ideology (5pt), Ideology (Missing), Experienced Discrimination, Perceived Discrimination, Ethnic Media Consumption, Know Deportee, Immigration Stop, Log(Total Pop. + 1) (Zip), Pop. Density (Zip), % Latino (Zip), % Foreign (Zip), % Non-citizen (Zip), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (Zip), % College (Zip), % Unemployment (Zip), Log(Total Pop. + 1) (County), Pop. Density (County), % Latino (County), % Foreign (County), % Non-citizen (County), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (County), % College (County), % Unemployed (County), State FE
CMPS '16	Acculturation, Age, Age (Missing), Woman, Married, Skin Color, Catholic, Mexican, Dominican, Cuban, Salvadorean, Income, Income (Missing), Education, Unemployed, Homeowner, Partisanship (7pt), Ideology (5pt), Ideology (Missing), Perceived Discrimination, Experienced Discrimination, Know Undocumented, Latinx identity, American identity, Log(Total Pop. + 1) (Zip), Pop. Density (County), % Latino (Zip), % Foreign (Zip), % Non-citizen (Zip), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (Zip), % College (Zip), % Unemployment (Zip), Log(Total Pop. + 1) (County), Pop. Density (County), % Latino (County), % Foreign (County), % Non-citizen (County), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (County), % College (County), % Unemployed (County), Log(Total Removals + 1), % Level 3 Removals, Removal Rate, State FE
Pew '18	Acculturation, Age, Age (Missing), Woman, Married, Catholic, Mexican, Dominican, Salvadorean, Cuban, Income, Income (Missing), Education, Education (Missing), Unemployed, Homeowner, Experienced Discrimination, Partisanship (5pt), Latinx identity, American identity Log(Total Pop. + 1) (Zip), Pop. Density (County), % Latino (Zip), % Foreign (Zip), % Non-citizen (Zip), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (Zip), % College (Zip), % Unemployment (Zip), Log(Total Pop. + 1) (County), Pop. Density (County), % Latino (County), % Foreign (County), % Non-citizen (County), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (County), % College (County), % Unemployed (County), Log(Total Removals + 1), % Level 3 Removals, Removal Rate, State FE
Pew '19	Acculturation, Age, Age (Missing), Woman, Married, Catholic, Mexican, Dominican, Salvadorean, Cuban, Education, Education (Missing), Experienced Discrimination, Partisanship (5pt), Know Undocumented, Know Deportee, Census Region FE

Blue: demographic controls. Green: socio-economic controls. Red: political controls. Purple: county-level controls. Orange: zipcode-level controls.

G.2 Justification

G.2.1 Demographic covariates

Age: May be associated with length of stay in the United States, a measure of acculturation (Abraído-Lanza et al., 2006). Moreover, older Latinxs may be more established in the United States, and therefore perceive lower levels of deportation threat, as reflected in the regression table characterizing the correlates of deportation threat (Section E.4, Table E9). Older Latinxs may have also migrated to the US prior to key points where undocumented immigrants were regularized (e.g. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986).

Gender: Women may be more likely to perceive risks related to immigration enforcement (Gustafsson, 1998). Moreover, a competing theoretical perspective suggests men may perceive deportation threat more given immigration enforcement disproportionately targets men. However, women may perceive deportation threat more because they are more likely to be concerned about consequences related to the loss of a male breadwinner (Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2013).

Marriage: Marriage may offer protection from deportation threat through status regularization, which can influence both threat and support for pro-immigrant policies (Menjívar and Lakhani, 2016). Moreover, marriage may increase deportation threat since marriage implies a loss of strong familial ties through immigration enforcement (Schueths, 2012). Marriage may also motivate conservatism, generating restrictive immigration policy attitudes among Latinxs (Kingston and Finkel, 1987).

National Origin: Binary indicators for Mexican, Salvadorean, Dominican, and Cuban national origin are included in the fully specified regression models. These are the 4 largest Latinx national origin groups (Excluding Puerto Ricans, who, if included in the analysis, would make up the 5 largest national origin groups. Recall that Puerto Ricans are excluded from the analysis because they possess American citizenship.). Prior evidence suggests some national origin groups are more likely to support liberal immigration policies by virtue of their proximity to the immigrant experience (e.g. Mexicans, Central Americans) (Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010). In some of the surveys, Mexican/Central-American national origin appears to be positively associated with deportation threat (Section E.4, Table E9).

Catholic: Catholic Latinxs may be more supportive of liberal immigration policy preferences given the Catholic Church’s outspoken pro-immigration reform views (Valenzuela, 2014). Likewise, Catholic Latinxs are more likely to be compelled to engage in pro-immigrant political activism, which may jointly influence liberal immigration policy preferences and deportation threat (Barreto et al., 2009).

Skin Color: Skin color may make one susceptible to immigration enforcement or policing via racial profiling, which may increase perceived deportation threat (Romero, 2006).

G.2.2 Socio-economic covariates

Income: Prior evidence suggests higher income Latinxs may be less supportive of liberal immigration policies (Polinard, Wrinkle, and De La Garza, 1984; Bedolla, 2003). Although

one may think lower income Latinxs would be less likely to support liberal immigration policies due to competition, this is not supported by prior evidence (Newton, 2000; Jiménez, 2008; Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010). For the most part, rejection of liberal immigration policies appears to be a function of assimilation via economic attainment.

Education: A plethora of prior evidence suggests education is associated with more support for immigrants (Chandler and Tsai, 2001; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Cavaille and Marshall, 2019). Education could be associated with higher support for immigrants via economic or social channels. However, most evidence on the link between education and immigration attitudes analyzes attitudes among dominant groups. Other research examining Latinxs finds no association between education and immigration policy preferences (Binder, Polinard, and Wrinkle, 1997; Newton, 2000; Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010).

Unemployment: Evidence on the link between unemployment and immigration attitudes is mixed. Some evidence finds contextual measures of unemployment are associated with individual-level support for pro-immigrant policies (Markaki and Longhi, 2013). Other research suggests unemployment increases opposition to immigrants (Palmer, 1996). However, for Latinxs, the preexisting evidence appears to suggest both contextual and individual-level unemployment has no influence on immigration policy attitudes (Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010).

Homeowner: In the immigrant assimilation literature, homeownership is understood as a substrate of assimilation (Alba and Logan, 1992; McConnell and Marcelli, 2007).

G.2.3 Political covariates

Partisanship: Prior evidence suggests a strong association between partisanship and immigration policy attitudes. Immigration attitudes have also influenced partisan switching in recent years (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2017).

Ideology: Prior evidence suggests a strong association between conservative ideology and restrictive immigration policy attitudes, particularly in the U.S. context (Citrin and Sides, 2008).

Perceived discrimination (against Latinxs): Prior evidence suggests perceived discrimination is associated with pro-immigrant attitudes among Latinxs (Sanchez, 2006). Other research also suggests perceived discrimination forestalls attitudinal assimilation on immigration policy attitudes (Pedraza, 2014). Perceived discrimination also appears to be associated with deportation threat (Section E.4, Table E9), perhaps as a function of how illegality is conflated with the Latinx population writ large as a basis for discrimination (Flores and Schachter, 2018).

Experienced discrimination: Prior evidence suggests experienced discrimination is associated with pro-immigrant attitudes among Latinxs (Tucker, 2020).

Ethnic media: Prior evidence suggests ethnic media consumption among Latinxs is associated with pro-immigrant attitudes (Abrajano and Singh, 2009). It may also cue Latinxs

into possible immigration enforcement threats (Zepeda-Millán, 2017). Indeed, in two of the 6 surveys, ethnic media consumption appears to be positively associated with deportation threat (Section E.4, Table E9).

Knowing a deportee: Whether one knows a deportee may influence deportation threat. It either cues in the prospect of oneself being deported or friends/family being deported. In all surveys with an item measuring personal contact with a deportee, knowing a deportee is highly prognostic of deportation threat (Section E.4, Table E9).

Knowing someone undocumented: Whether one knows someone undocumented (friends/family in both the CMPS and Pew 2019 surveys) may influence deportation threat given the increasingly restrictive immigration enforcement environment. It may also influence pro-immigrant attitudes via contact and the development of common interests (Cadenas et al., 2018). In all surveys with an item measuring contact with undocumented immigrants, knowing someone undocumented is highly prognostic of deportation threat (Section E.4, Table E9).

Immigration stop: Whether one is stopped by immigration officers may induce deportation threat via contact with the immigration enforcement apparatus. Moreover, it may induce support for liberal immigration policies given some respondents may want less restrictive policies to ensure reprieve from possible harassment on part of immigration agents.

Latino identity: Prior evidence suggests the strength of identification with the ethnic group among Latinxs is positively associated with positive attitudes toward immigrants (Binder, Polinard, and Wrinkle, 1997; Sanchez, 2006; Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010; Serrano-Careaga and Huo, 2019; Wallace and Zepeda-Millán, 2020). Moreover, Latinx identity may be associated with increased deportation threat, given high group identifiers appear to be more sensitive to anti-group threats (Sellers and Shelton, 2003; Pérez, 2015).

American identity: Prior evidence suggests the strength of identification with the ethnic group among Latinxs is positively associated with positive attitudes toward immigrants (Binder, Polinard, and Wrinkle, 1997; Sanchez, 2006; Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010; Serrano-Careaga and Huo, 2019; Wallace and Zepeda-Millán, 2020). Moreover, Latinx identity may be associated with increased deportation threat, given high group identifiers appear to be more sensitive to anti-group threats (Sellers and Shelton, 2003; Pérez, 2015).

G.2.4 Contextual covariates

% Latino/Foreign-Born/Non-Citizen: Prior evidence suggests ethnic contexts increase support for liberal immigration policies among Latinxs (Rocha et al., 2011; Telles and Sue, 2019). However, the acculturation level of the context needs to be taken into account. Places with less acculturated Latinxs (e.g. foreign-born, non-citizens) may have individuals who are more likely to support liberal immigration policies relative to places with more acculturated Latinxs yet are still predominantly ethnic contexts (Bedolla, 2003). Moreover, places with more Latinxs and/or immigrants may be more subject to deportation threat via immigration enforcement actions or a societal concern over a precarious legal status (Maltby et al., 2020).

Median Household Income/Unemployed/% College: Prior evidence suggests Latinxs from higher resourced contexts may be less supportive of liberal immigration policy preferences (Bedolla, 2003). Higher resourced areas may also be less subject to deportation threat since they're less likely to be targeted by immigration enforcement authorities.

Secure Communities Removals/Removal Rate/% Level 3 Removals: Deportation threat may be induced by Secure Communities removals and deportations. If level 3 removals occur at a higher rate (e.g. removals of people who have committed minor crimes), that may increase a sense of injustice that motivates pro-immigrant behavior (Walker, Roman, and Barreto, 2020).

H Alternative samples

H.1 Mexicans only

Table H14: Association between deportation threat and liberal immigration policy attitudes conditional on acculturation (Mexicans only)

Liberal Immigration Policy Attitudes						
Panel A: No controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.32*** (0.06)	0.23** (0.07)	0.27*** (0.05)	0.11 [†] (0.06)	0.27*** (0.06)	0.25* (0.12)
Threat	0.02 (0.03)	0.10** (0.04)	−0.00 (0.03)	0.11* (0.05)	0.06* (0.03)	0.02 (0.07)
Acculturation	−0.24*** (0.04)	−0.24*** (0.05)	−0.22*** (0.03)	−0.07 [†] (0.04)	−0.20*** (0.04)	−0.17* (0.08)
R ²	0.13	0.18	0.18	0.11	0.14	0.05
N	1196	1220	833	1500	1197	946
Panel B: Yes controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.30*** (0.06)	0.17** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.05)	0.10 [†] (0.06)	0.11 [†] (0.06)	0.25* (0.12)
Threat	−0.01 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	−0.02 (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)	0.07 [†] (0.04)	−0.01 (0.08)
Acculturation	−0.22*** (0.04)	−0.20*** (0.05)	−0.21*** (0.04)	−0.07 [†] (0.04)	−0.11* (0.05)	−0.16 [†] (0.08)
R ²	0.18	0.32	0.35	0.26	0.34	0.11
N	1196	1220	833	1500	1197	946
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Zipcode Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Census Area FE	Y	N	N	N	N	Y
State FE	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Panel A displays coefficients from models with no control covariates. Panel B displays coefficients from models adjusting for a full set of control covariates. Each column characterizes a different survey at use. Geographic covariates below the Census Area level are not available for the Pew 2007 and Pew 2019 surveys. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

H.2 Including Puerto Ricans

Table H15: Association between deportation threat and liberal immigration policy attitudes conditional on acculturation (including Puerto Ricans)

Liberal Immigration Policy Attitudes						
Panel A: No controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.08 (0.06)	0.18*** (0.05)	0.16*** (0.05)	0.08 [†] (0.04)	0.20*** (0.05)	0.26** (0.08)
Threat	0.09*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.08** (0.03)	0.02 (0.05)
Acculturation	-0.15*** (0.03)	-0.23*** (0.04)	-0.17*** (0.03)	-0.05 [†] (0.03)	-0.15*** (0.03)	-0.19*** (0.06)
R ²	0.09	0.16	0.13	0.10	0.11	0.06
N	1961	1975	1347	2768	2002	2675
Panel B: Yes controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.09 [†] (0.05)	0.15** (0.05)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.08 [†] (0.05)	0.10* (0.04)	0.22** (0.08)
Threat	0.05* (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	0.01 (0.05)
Acculturation	-0.15*** (0.03)	-0.19*** (0.03)	-0.17*** (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.17** (0.05)
R ²	0.16	0.32	0.34	0.21	0.29	0.11
N	1961	1975	1347	2768	2002	2675
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Zipcode Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Census Area FE	Y	N	N	N	N	Y
State FE	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Panel A displays coefficients from models with no control covariates. Panel B displays coefficients from models adjusting for a full set of control covariates. Each column characterizes a different survey at use. Geographic covariates below the Census Area level are not available for the Pew 2007 and Pew 2019 surveys. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

I Using alternative acculturation measures

Table I16: Re-estimating main results using alternative measures of acculturation (part 1)

Panel A: Index (No citizenship)	Liberal Immigration Policy					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.12* (0.06)	0.17** (0.06)	0.13** (0.05)	0.10* (0.05)	0.18*** (0.05)	0.19* (0.09)
R ²	0.16	0.32	0.34	0.21	0.31	0.09
N	1809	1822	1236	2276	1794	2427
Panel B: Index (with LPR)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.13* (0.06)	0.21** (0.06)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.14* (0.06)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.24* (0.10)
R ²	0.16	0.32	0.33	0.21	0.31	0.09
N	1809	1822	1236	2276	1794	2427
Panel C: Index (w/ English-dominance)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.21** (0.08)	— (—)	0.16* (0.07)	— (—)	— (—)	0.39** (0.13)
R ²	0.17	—	0.33	—	—	0.09
N	1809	—	1236	—	—	2427
Panel D: Index (w/ English-dom., LPR)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.21** (0.08)	— (—)	0.17* (0.07)	— (—)	— (—)	0.39** (0.13)
R ²	0.17	—	0.33	—	—	0.09
N	1809	—	1236	—	—	2427
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. All models are fully specified. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table I17: Re-estimating main results using alternative measures of acculturation (part 2)

Liberal Immigration Policy						
Panel A: Generational Status	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x 2nd Gen.	-0.07 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.07 [†] (0.04)	0.04 (0.07)
Threat x 3rd Gen.	0.16** (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	0.08 [†] (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.20*** (0.04)	0.20* (0.10)
R ²	0.17	0.31	0.33	0.24	0.33	0.09
N	1809	1822	1236	2276	1794	2427
Panel B: US Born	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x US Born	0.07 [†] (0.04)	0.11* (0.04)	0.11** (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.08* (0.04)	0.09 (0.06)
R ²	0.15	0.31	0.32	0.24	0.31	0.09
N	1809	1822	1238	2276	1794	2427
Panel C: English	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x English	0.06 (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.09** (0.03)	0.08 [†] (0.04)	0.09* (0.04)	0.14* (0.06)
R ²	0.15	0.31	0.32	0.24	0.32	0.09
N	1809	1822	1238	2276	1794	2427
Panel D: Citizenship	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Citizenship	0.05 (0.04)	0.14*** (0.04)	0.09** (0.03)	0.07 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.14* (0.07)
R ²	0.14	0.31	0.32	0.24	0.31	0.09
N	1809	1822	1238	2276	1794	2427
Panel E: Fully Specified Components	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x 2nd Gen.	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.09)
Threat x 3rd Gen.	0.16* (0.07)	-0.03 (0.07)	0.06 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.05)	0.20*** (0.05)	0.08 (0.11)
Threat x English	0.01 (0.05)	0.11* (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.05 (0.06)	0.04 (0.05)	0.11 (0.07)
Threat x Citizen	-0.02 (0.04)	0.08 [†] (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.06 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.09 (0.08)
R ²	0.17	0.32	0.34	0.24	0.34	0.10
N	1809	1822	1236	2276	1794	2427
Panel F: Fully Specified Components 2	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x US. Born	0.08 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	0.09 [†] (0.05)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.07 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.08)
Threat x English	0.02 (0.05)	0.09* (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.05 (0.06)	0.07 (0.05)	0.11 [†] (0.07)
Threat x Citizen	-0.03 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.06 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.05)	0.09 (0.08)
R ²	0.16	0.32	0.33	0.24	0.32	0.10
N	1809	1822	1238	2276	1794	2427
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. All models are fully specified. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

J Ruling out alternative mechanisms

Table J18: Acculturation is forestalled by deportation threat net of alternative mechanisms

	Liberal Immigration Policy Index					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Acculturation x Threat	0.13*	0.16**	0.13*	0.09 [†]	0.12*	0.27**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.10)
Acculturation x Experienced Discrim.	0.09 [†]	-0.09 [†]	-0.01	0.07*	0.03	0.08
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Acculturation x Perceived Discrim.	-0.02	0.02*	0.05	0.01		
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.06)		
Acculturation x Latino ID				0.18**	0.19 [†]	
				(0.07)	(0.10)	
Acculturation x American ID				-0.08	-0.28***	
				(0.07)	(0.06)	
Acculturation x % Latino (Zip)		-0.00	-0.20	-0.01	0.07	
		(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.14)	
Acculturation x % Non-citizen (Zip)		0.10	0.26	-0.10	0.20	
		(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.16)	(0.19)	
Acculturation x % Latino (County)		0.04	0.15	0.02	-0.22	
		(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.17)	
Acculturation x % Non-citizen (County)		-0.02	-0.18	0.10	0.21	
		(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.19)	
Acculturation x Ethnic Media		0.26 [†]	0.26*	-0.09		
		(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.07)		
Acculturation x WWII Cohort	0.18*	-0.07	0.06	0.02	0.32**	
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.11)	
Acculturation x Mex/CA	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.04		0.01
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)		(0.07)
Acculturation x Income	-0.13	-0.07	-0.10	0.10	-0.01	
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.08)	
Acculturation x Education	0.07	-0.04	0.08	0.04	0.15 [†]	0.18 [†]
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.11)
Acculturation x Unemployed	-0.04	0.04	-0.03	0.07	-0.04	
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	
Acculturation x Know Deported			-0.03			-0.19*
			(0.04)			(0.09)
Acculturation x Know Undocumented				-0.05		-0.01
				(0.04)		(0.07)
Acculturation x Immigration Stop			0.10			
			(0.07)			
Acculturation x Deportation Rate				-1.69	0.36	
				(1.35)	(1.41)	
Acculturation x Log(Deportations + 1)				0.16 [†]	-0.14	
				(0.08)	(0.10)	
Acculturation x % Level 3 Deportations				-0.27	0.03	
				(0.18)	(0.12)	
R ²	0.17	0.34	0.35	0.26	0.35	0.10
Num. obs.	1809	1822	1236	2276	1794	2427
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Zipcode Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Census Area FE	Y	N	N	N	N	Y
State FE	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. All covariates scaled between 0-1. All models are fully specified. Each column characterizes a different survey at use. Geographic covariates below the Census Area level are not available for the Pew 2007 and Pew 2019 surveys. Coefficients of interest are bold. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

K Ruling out alternative ideological considerations

K.1 CMPS '16

Table K19: Association between threat and immigration-irrelevant outcomes (CMPS '16)

	Gay Marriage	Climate	Obamacare	Tax Rich	Voter ID	Liberalism Index	Immigration Index
Panel A: No Interaction	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Threat	0.08** (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.05 [†] (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)
R ²	0.23	0.28	0.19	0.18	0.10	0.29	0.24
N	2276	2276	2276	2276	2276	2276	2276
Panel B: Interaction	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Threat x Acculturation	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	0.01 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	-0.20*** (0.05)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.09 [†] (0.05)
R ²	0.23	0.28	0.19	0.18	0.11	0.29	0.25
N	2276	2276	2276	2276	2276	2276	2276
Liberalism Index Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Panel A displays the unconditional association between threat and immigration irrelevant outcomes. Panel B displays the association between the threat/acculturation interaction and immigration irrelevant outcomes. The first outcome is support for banning gay marriage. The second outcome is support for climate change legislation. The third outcome is support for Obamacare. The fourth outcome is support for taxing the rich. The fifth outcome is support for restrictive voter ID laws. The sixth outcome is an index of the immigration-irrelevant liberal policy outcomes. The seventh outcome is the liberal immigration policy index. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

K.2 Pew '19

Table K20: Association between threat and immigration-irrelevant outcomes (Pew '19)

	Min. Wage	Health Care	Guns	Liberalism Index	Support DACA
Panel A: No Interaction	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Threat	0.05 (0.03)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.08** (0.03)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.08* (0.03)
R ²	0.10	0.15	0.18	0.22	0.13
N	2407	2427	2393	2376	2376
Panel B: Interaction	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Threat x Acculturation	0.07 (0.07)	0.23* (0.11)	0.15* (0.08)	0.13* (0.05)	0.16 (0.10)
R ²	0.10	0.15	0.19	0.23	0.14
N	2407	2427	2393	2376	2376
Liberalism Index Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Census Region FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Panel A displays the unconditional association between threat and immigration irrelevant outcomes. Panel B displays the association between the threat/acculturation interaction and immigration irrelevant outcomes. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

L Accounting for nativism

L.1 Measuring nativism

For the Pew '07 survey, nativism is an index of two survey items. The first asks respondents to indicate whether “Illegal immigrants help the economy by providing low cost labor” or “Illegal immigrants hurt the economy by driving wages down” is closer to their view. This is measured as a binary indicator equal to 1 if they indicate illegal immigrants hurt the economy. The second item asks respondents to give their opinion on the effect of the growing number of undocumented immigrants on Latinos living in the U.S. They can say it is a “positive development,” a “negative development,” or “has had no impact one way or the other.” This item is measured as a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent indicates undocumented immigration is a “negative development.” The two binary indicators are added up to generate a nativism index.

For the Pew '08 survey, the nativism measure is built from a single item asking respondents whether they think “immigrants increase, reduce, or have no effect on crime in your community.” The measure is a binary indicator equal to 1 if they indicate immigrants increase crime in their community.

For the Pew '10 survey, nativism is an additive index built from 3 items. The first asks respondents if they believe “immigrants strengthen our country because of their hard work and talents,” “immigrants are a burden because they take our jobs, housing and health care,” or “neither.” It is measured as a binary indicator equal to 1 if they indicate “immigrants are a burden.” The second asks respondents if they believe the effect of undocumented immigration on Latinos already living in the U.S. is “positive,” “negative,” or “has had no effect.” The item is measured as a binary indicator equal to 1 if they indicate undocumented immigration’s effect is “negative.” The third item asks respondents if they believe one of the reasons immigrants come to the U.S. illegally is to have a child in the U.S. The measure is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent indicates “Yes.”

For the CMPS '16 survey, the nativism measure is built from a single item asking respondents on a 4-point likert scale whether they agree “immigrants take jobs, housing and healthcare away from people born in the U.S.”

L.2 First-order association

Table L21: Association between threat and liberal immigration policy preferences (adjusting for nativism)

	Liberal Immigration Policy			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Threat	0.08*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)
Nativism	-0.23*** (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.16*** (0.03)	-0.17*** (0.02)
R ²	0.21	0.33	0.35	0.28
N	1809	1822	1236	2276
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
State FE	N	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	N	N	N

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

L.3 Heterogeneity

Table L22: Association between threat and liberal immigration policy preferences (adjusting for nativism)

Panel A: Full Sample	Liberal Immigration Policy			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Threat x Acculturation	0.07 (0.06)	0.17** (0.05)	0.13** (0.04)	0.05 (0.05)
Nativism x Acculturation	-0.20** (0.07)	-0.20*** (0.05)	-0.16* (0.08)	-0.15** (0.06)
Threat	0.05* (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.07* (0.04)
Nativism	-0.12** (0.04)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.04)
R ²	0.22	0.35	0.37	0.29
N	1809	1822	1236	2276
Panel B: Mexicans Only	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Threat x Acculturation	0.23*** (0.06)	0.14* (0.06)	0.21*** (0.05)	0.05 (0.06)
Nativism x Acculturation	-0.15 (0.09)	-0.23*** (0.06)	-0.15 (0.08)	-0.22** (0.07)
Threat	-0.00 (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.08 (0.05)
Nativism	-0.15** (0.05)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.06)
R ²	0.24	0.36	0.38	0.32
N	1196	1220	833	1498
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
State FE	N	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	N	N	N

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

M Accounting for socio-tropic threat

M.1 Measuring socio-tropic threat

The Pew '07 measure asks if respondents have observed “more efforts to discourage undocumented or illegal immigration” in their local community in the past year. The measure is converted to a binary indicator equal to 1 if they indicate “more efforts” instead of “no change” or “fewer efforts.” The Pew '08 measure asks if respondents perceive there has been “an increase, decrease, or no change in the number of immigration enforcement actions around the country aimed at undocumented immigrants.” The measure is converted to a binary indicator equal to 1 if a respondent indicates there has been an “increase.”

M.2 Adjusting for socio-tropic threat

Table M23: Accounting for socio-tropic threat

	Liberal Immigration Policy			
Personal Threat	0.09*** (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)
Socio-Tropic Threat	0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Personal Threat x Acculturation		0.12* (0.06)		0.20*** (0.06)
Socio-tropic Threat x Acculturation		-0.06 (0.05)		0.01 (0.04)
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '08
R ²	0.15	0.16	0.31	0.32
N	1809	1809	1822	1822
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
State FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. All covariates scaled between 0-1. All models are fully specified. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

N Using ordered logistic regression

N.1 First-order association

Table N24: Replicating unconditional influence of threat using ordered logistic regression

	Liberal Immigration Policy					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat	0.65*** (0.12)	0.83*** (0.12)	0.68*** (0.14)	1.41*** (0.16)	1.17*** (0.14)	1.29*** (0.21)
AIC	4851.63	5550.94	4710.40	4123.87	3465.04	1600.55
BIC	4988.86	5781.69	4924.95	4380.89	3680.46	1722.23
Log Likelihood	-2400.81	-2733.47	-2313.20	-2017.94	-1693.52	-779.28
Deviance	4801.63	5466.94	4626.40	4035.87	3387.04	1626.11
N	1789	1797	1222	2544	1851	2427
Survey Model	Pew '07 OLogit	Pew '08 OLogit	Pew '10 OLogit	CMPS '16 OLogit	Pew '18 OLogit	Pew '19 Logit
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Zipcode Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. Census Area FE used to ensure identification.

N.2 Heterogeneity

Table N25: Replicating conditional influence of threat using ordered logistic regression

	Liberal Immigration Policy					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.94** (0.32)	1.25*** (0.32)	1.58*** (0.37)	1.33*** (0.32)	1.75*** (0.35)	1.81*** (0.55)
Threat	0.32 (0.16)	0.37* (0.17)	-0.02 (0.22)	0.65** (0.24)	0.36 (0.21)	0.48 (0.32)
Acculturation	-1.17*** (0.20)	-1.45*** (0.22)	-1.77*** (0.27)	-0.64** (0.21)	-1.30*** (0.24)	-1.11*** (0.26)
AIC	4844.66	5537.34	4693.48	4108.43	3441.76	1595.45
BIC	4987.38	5773.58	4913.13	4371.29	3662.71	1722.92
Log Likelihood	-2396.33	-2725.67	-2303.74	-2009.21	-1680.88	-775.72
Deviance	4792.66	5451.34	4607.48	4018.43	3361.76	1615.02
N	1789	1797	1222	2544	1851	2427
Survey Model	Pew '07 OLogit	Pew '08 OLogit	Pew '10 OLogit	CMPS '16 OLogit	Pew '18 OLogit	Pew '19 Logit
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Zipcode Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. Census Area FE used to ensure identification.

O Asian-American replication

Table O26: Replicating influence of deportation threat among Asian-American survey sample

	Liberal Immigration Policy			
Threat	0.07 (0.03)	0.11** (0.03)	0.13** (0.05)	0.12* (0.04)
Acculturation		0.09** (0.03)	0.11** (0.04)	0.09** (0.04)
Threat x Acculturation			-0.14 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.10)
R ²	0.01	0.16	0.03	0.16
Num. obs.	802	802	802	802
Controls	N	Y	N	Y

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. All models adjust for age, gender, national origin, education, and partisanship. Regression weights included to approximate the national Asian-American population. Robust standard errors in parentheses

Here, I present estimates characterizing the influence of deportation threat on liberal immigration policy preferences among a sample of Asian-Americans from the Pew 2013 Asian-American survey ($N = 802$). Liberal immigration policy preferences are an additive index of binary indicators capturing approval for 1) increasing the number of temporary work visas for agriculture and food industry workers, 2) not increasing enforcement of immigration laws at U.S. borders, 3) increasing the number of temporary work visas for highly skilled workers, 4) creating a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants if they meet certain requirements, and 5) not decreasing legal immigration into the United States.

Deportation threat is the same as the measure used in the Pew Latino surveys. However, acculturation is measured differently. The Asian-American survey does not ask about whether parents are born in the United States. Therefore, I cannot identify Asian-Americans who are third-generation or more. I can only identify who is foreign-born. Moreover, I use an item measuring whether English is the only language spoken at home for the respondent as a stand-in for language-of-interview. I construct an additive index of citizenship status, whether the respondent is US-born, and whether the respondent speaks only English at home to measure acculturation.

In all estimates characterizing the influence of deportation threat using the 2013 Asian-American survey, I adjust for age, gender, national origin (binary indicators for Indian, Chinese, Filipino, and Japanese), education, and partisanship.

Table O26 displays the unconditional and conditional association between deportation threat and liberal immigration policy preferences. After adjusting for control covariates, namely, acculturation, deportation threat is prognostic of liberal immigration policy preferences. These findings corroborate the first-order association displayed in the main text for Latinxs. However, deportation threat does not appear to have a stronger influence on motivating liberal immigration policy preferences among more acculturated Asian-Americans.

The absence of heterogeneous effects may be because acculturation appears to motivate *more liberal* attitudes among Asian-Americans. For Latinxs, deportation threat forestalls a process engendering conservative attitudes. However, for Asian-Americans, acculturation is not an intrinsically conservative process that must be forestalled by deportation threat. This interpretation of the null result begs the question: Why does acculturation generate liberal preferences among Asian-Americans but conservative preferences among Latinxs? Perhaps “forever foreigner” stereotypes along with potentially more visible phenotypical markers that serve as the basis for discrimination make it more difficult for integrated Asian-Americans to distance themselves politically from new immigrants (Zhou, 2004; Lee and Kye, 2016). Moreover, new Asian immigrant cohorts may be relatively conservative on immigration policy since they tend to be of a higher socio-economic status who migrated legally and therefore do not perceive a connection with other immigrants (Park, 2020). Prior evidence corroborates these theoretical insights, with more acculturated Asian-Americans being more likely to support liberal immigration policies and the Democratic party (Kuo, Malhotra, and Mo, 2017; Park, 2020).

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