

The Wages of *Latinidad*: How Immigration Enforcement Mitigates Anti-Black Assimilation

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Abstract

Historic accounts posit immigrant ethnic groups adopt the anti-Black attitudes of their Anglo counterparts as they acculturate in the U.S. But contemporary evidence suggests acculturated immigrant ethnic group members may not be more likely to possess anti-Black appraisals and opposite attitudes toward Black socio-political interests. Drawing from *reactive ethnicity* and *segmented assimilation* theory, we posit the threatening contemporary immigration enforcement context may undercut assimilation to Anglo anti-Black attitudes among Latinxs. Using two large nationally representative Latinx surveys, we demonstrate, relative to less acculturated Latinxs, acculturated Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement adopt attitudes concerning Black people and Black political interests akin to Black people while acculturated Latinxs unthreatened by immigration enforcement adopt or maintain attitudes closer to their Anglo counterparts. This paper demonstrates the uniquely threatening contemporary immigration enforcement context may explain why the largest U.S. immigrant-origin group may not adopt quintessential dominant group attitudes via acculturation.

Introduction

Are non-Black Latinxs adopting the anti-Black beliefs of their Anglo counterparts as they acculturate in the U.S.? Consistent with contemporary political science evidence (Branton, 2007; Pedraza, 2014; Citrin and Sears, 2014), historic and empirical accounts suggest previously racialized immigrant origin groups acquired access to the psychic and material benefits of whiteness as they acculturated by intensifying their derogation of Black Americans and adopting dominant group attitudes toward Black people (Warren and Twine, 1997; Ignatiev, 2012; Fouka et al., 2021). However, contemporary evidence demonstrates members of the the largest immigrant ethnic groups (i.e. Latinxs, Asians), are not more inclined to adopt anti-Black beliefs as they acculturate despite incentives to derogate Black people in the U.S. and exposure to anti-Black sending country ideologies (McClain et al., 2006; Ocampo and Flippen, 2021; Tokeshi, 2021).

In light of competing evidence, we explain why some Latinxs are not adopting anti-Black beliefs as they acculturate. We posit the contemporary threatening immigration enforcement context not only affects undocumented immigrants, but even well-acculturated Latinxs (e.g. third-generation, citizen, English-dominant). Consequently, borrowing from *reactive ethnicity* and *segmented assimilation* theory, we theorize acculturated non-Black Latinx co-ethnics threatened by immigration enforcement may feel they or their group are excluded from the host society despite their integrative expectations, motivating rebuff against dominant group attitudes on Black people. Conversely, non-Black Latinx co-ethnics unconcerned over the contemporary threatening immigration enforcement context may feel increasingly inclined to adopt or maintain anti-Black attitudes as they acculturate.

We present theoretically consistent evidence from two large nationally representative Latinx surveys. We find perceptibly threatening immigration enforcement contexts undercut the adoption or maintenance of anti-Black appraisals and relative opposition to Black political interests as non-Black Latinxs acculturate. At the same time, non-Black Latinxs unthreatened by immigration enforcement adopt or maintain attitudes toward Black people and their

political interests more similar to Anglo whites as they acculturate. Our findings operate net of well-established alternative mechanisms for the adoption of pro-Black beliefs among acculturated Latinxs such as discrimination (Richeson and Craig, 2011), Latinx linked fate (McClain et al., 2006; Wilkinson, 2014), intergroup competition (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Wilkinson, 2014), skin color (Wilkinson and Earle, 2013), and intergroup contact (McClain et al., 2006). In sum, acculturated non-Black Latinxs react to perceptibly threatening immigration enforcement contexts by refusing to adopt quintessential dominant group attitudinal norms. But this process is segmented, since some Latinxs who do not feel host society rebuff continue to adopt dominant group attitudes concerning Black people as they acculturate.

We provide a nuanced perspective on how non-Black U.S. immigrants and their co-ethnics negotiate their standing vis-a-vis Black Americans. Compared to historic white ethnic immigrant groups, non-Black Latinxs, even acculturated non-Black Latinxs, are potentially subject to a threatening interior immigration context. Consequently, this study teaches us anti-Black assimilation may not be guaranteed if non-Black Latinxs experience host society rebuff via immigration enforcement. These conclusions are important in light of increased discussions of anti-Blackness within the Latinx community in response to the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement along with open questions over whether ethno-racial demographic shifts will change overall beliefs toward Black people among the non-Black public (Corral, 2020; Beltrán, 2021; Busey and Silva, 2021).¹ Although our evidence suggests prospects for non-Black Latinx solidarity with Black people, we are circumspect about long-term pro-Black belief development among acculturated Latinxs given immigration enforcement is less likely to affect acculturated Latinxs and restrictive policies may be subject to change.

Anti-Black Assimilation Among Immigrant Groups

Straight line assimilation theory posits acculturated immigrant group co-ethnics increasingly adopt dominant group attributes due to cultural exposure and motivations to attain socio-

¹See Section A for evidence the salience of Anti-Blackness among Latinxs is increasing.

economic status while minimizing discrimination (Gordon, 1964; Alba and Nee, 2009). Indeed, prior research shows acculturated immigrant co-ethnics (e.g. citizens, later-generation, English-dominant) adopt the dominant group’s policy preferences (Branton, 2007), idenitarian norms (Citrin and Sears, 2014), and immigration attitudes (Pedraza, 2014).

Likewise, relative to the less acculturated, acculturated non-Black U.S. immigrant co-ethnics may increasingly adopt or maintain anti-Black beliefs. This may be due to heightened host society exposure. Acculturated co-ethnics may increasingly interact with dominant group members with strong(er) anti-Black beliefs (Hjerm et al., 2018), integrate in relatively anti-Black dominant group social networks as they advance socio-economically (Lee and Bean, 2007), be exposed to anti-Black media (Entman, 1990), and experience perceptibly negative interactions with Black Americans (Goldenberg and Saxe, 1996).

Moreover, acculturated non-Black co-ethnics may possess stronger anti-Black beliefs than less acculturated non-Black co-ethnics due to status-seeking. Psychologically, members of immigrant origin groups, although often racialized, may derive a sense of self-worth and group status by dissociating from and derogating Black Americans in a hierarchically anti-Black host society (Tajfel et al., 1979; Yancey et al., 2003; Wilderson, 2018). Materially, dissociation from Blackness may provide access to the benefits of whiteness and protection from the byproducts of anti-Blackness (e.g. easier integration in dominant group social networks, lower levels of employment discrimination, protection from gratuitous policing) (Lee and Bean, 2007). Acculturated co-ethnics, who may be more likely to conceive of themselves as rightful members of the national polity relative to the less acculturated, may be particularly steadfast in the adoption of anti-Black dominant group norms to credibly demonstrate they or their group should be afforded a higher socio-political status in the host society (Warren and Twine, 1997; Roediger et al., 1999; Lee and Bean, 2007; Ignatiev, 2012; Pedraza, 2014).

History is replete with acculturated immigrant co-ethnics exhibiting anti-Black attitudes and/or behaviors to garner social standing. During the Age of Mass Migration (1850-1914)

(Hatton and Williamson, 1998), Irish, Italian and Eastern European immigrant co-ethnics once faced racialization and concomitant discrimination (Lee and Bean, 2007; LaGumina, 2017). However, their acculturated co-ethnics reconfigured their standing as “white” by adopting Anglo norms, shifting political alliances, socially distancing themselves from Black people, and partaking in anti-Black discrimination (Warren and Twine, 1997; Roediger et al., 1999; Lee and Bean, 2007; Luconi, 2011; Ignatiev, 2012; Fouka et al., 2021).

Anti-Black assimilation is not isolated to European immigrant groups. Acculturated Chinese, Arab, and Mexican-Americans during the early-to-mid 20th Century sought to redefine themselves as “white” in part by avoiding political alliances with Black people to ameliorate exposure to societal and institutional discrimination (Han, 2006; Rochmes and Griffin, 2007; Qutami, 2020). In the Latinx context, Felix Tijerina, the president of the assimilationist League of Latin American Citizens (LULAC, 1956-1960), infamously responded to pressure to cooperate with Black Americans in the struggle for civil rights by saying “Let the Negro fight his own battles (Behnken, 2011).” Likewise, contemporary survey evidence suggests attributes that encourage acculturation (e.g. US-born status) among Latinxs are associated with a reduction in support for BLM (Corral, 2020). Qualitative interviews also suggest Latinx immigrants with more experience living in the U.S. increasingly adopt hegemonic anti-Black beliefs and transmit them to new Latinx immigrants (Zamora, 2016).

U.S. immigrants are not blank slates concerning anti-Black appraisals. Latinxs, the largest U.S. immigrant group, have origins in their own anti-Black societies. Latin American countries espouse *mestizaje*, the notion racial mixture will shed the negative attributes of “undesirable” races (e.g. Black and indigenous people) and decrease the salience of racial difference (Flores, 2021). *Mestizaje* informs institutional and social norms. Latin American governments have implemented policies that discriminate against peoples with less or no European ancestry (Hooker, 2005). They also pursued policies that encouraged European migration to “whiten” the population (i.e. *Blanquemento*) (Flores, 2021). At the same time, there is significant societal derogation of Black and indigenous Latin Americans in

tandem with the propagation of color-blind beliefs that downplay the existence of a racialized hierarchy (Patrinos, 2000). Societal and institutional marginalization has secondary consequences. Black and indigenous Latin Americans have worse life chances along multiple dimensions net of socio-economic status (Telles, 2014). Given Latinx immigrants and their acculturated co-ethnics have origins in anti-Black societies, they may be predisposed to hold, maintain, and/or adopt hegemonic anti-Black beliefs as they acculturate to the U.S.

A Reactive Ethnicity Against Anti-Blackness

Although historical and contemporary evidence suggests acculturation is associated with anti-Black beliefs and heightened opposition to Black political interests, other contemporary evidence complicates expectations. Although acculturated contemporary immigrant group members (e.g. Asians, Latinxs) may be more likely to increase their residential and social proximity to Anglo whites relative to less acculturated co-ethnics (e.g. through intermarriage, white neighborhood selection) (Yancey et al., 2003; Alba, 2020), research suggests they may not be increasingly likely to adopt anti-Black appraisals (McClain et al., 2006; Ocampo and Flippen, 2021; Tokeshi, 2021). Moreover, prior evidence finds acculturated immigrant group co-ethnics may not increasingly oppose Black political interests. For instance, relative to the less acculturated, acculturated Latinxs are *more likely* to support Black-targeted affirmative action and government aid (Sears and Savalei, 2006; Krupnikov and Piston, 2016). The competing evidence raises a puzzle. Why are some Latinxs, specifically non-Black Latinxs, not adopting anti-Black appraisals or attitudes opposing Black political interests as they acculturate? We use sociological insights to answer the question.

Segmented assimilation theory posits socio-economic advancement among acculturated immigrant group co-ethnics is conditional on host country reception, intra-group social capital, and economic conditions (Portes and Zhou, 1993). Relevant to this study, prior evidence suggests acculturated immigrant group co-ethnics subject to unfavorable and/or discriminatory reception contexts tend to stagnate socio-economically, whereas immigrant group

co-ethnics welcomed by the host society do better socio-economically as they acculturate (Haller et al., 2011). Likewise, *reactive ethnicity theory* posits hostile anti-immigrant environments may motivate acculturated co-ethnics to develop a politicized group consciousness that seeks to protect the in-group and dissociate from the dominant group’s (i.e. Anglo whites) political commitments (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001; Rumbaut, 2008). Among Latinxs, prior research demonstrates host society rebuff via discrimination shatters integrative expectations and undercuts the adoption of anti-immigrant beliefs akin to Anglo whites among acculturated Latinxs (Telles and Ortiz, 2008; Pedraza, 2014).

Immigration enforcement is a *salient* and *negative* aspect of the host society reception context for Latinxs. Latinxs are 70% first or second-generation.² Thus, most Latinxs have direct connections to the immigrant experience. 40% of Latinxs know an undocumented friend or family member. 30% of third-generation+ Latinxs, arguably acculturated, know an undocumented friend or family member (Figure B2, Panel A). Concomitantly, the undocumented population has grown from 3-12 million between 1993-2016 (Figure B2, Panel B). Over 70% of the undocumented are Latinx.³ Undocumented immigrants are highly integrated in Latinx communities given 66% have lived in the U.S. over 10 years (Figure B2, Panel C). Immigration enforcement has also become increasingly draconian. Interior deportations increased 1400% since the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) (Figure C3). Over 90% of these removals are Latinxs (Asad and Clair, 2018). IIRIRA also increased deportation risk for documented immigrants by increasing the scope conditions for stripping permanent residency (Morawetz, 2000). At the same time, the racialization of Latinxs as “illegal” by political elites and Anglo whites has meant even acculturated Latinxs are subject to immigration enforcement (Massey and Pren, 2012). Notably, ICE wrongfully detained 3,500 *citizens* in Texas between 2006-2017, 462

²<https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/09/24/the-ways-hispanics-describe-their-identity-vary-across-immigrant-generations/>

³See: https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/mpi-unauthorized-immigrants-stablenumbers-changingorigins_final.pdf

Rhode Island citizens over a 10-year period, and 420 Florida citizens between 2017-2019.⁴

The restrictive immigration enforcement context has deleterious consequences on Latinxs. Immigration enforcement undermines health, child development, wages, social service uptake, education, and government trust (Amuedo-Dorantes, 2022). These consequences are not isolated to the undocumented, but even well-acculturated, later-generation, citizen, and English-dominant Latinxs. As the aforementioned statistics suggest, many acculturated Latinxs are embedded in immigrant and/or mixed-status social networks, and may live in fear of separation from close familial, friendship, and community ties (Roman et al., 2021).

In light of an unreceptive host society driven by an expansive immigration enforcement apparatus, we posit a sense of immigration enforcement threat may explain why acculturation is not necessarily associated with adopting anti-Black appraisals and relative opposition to Black political interests among non-Black Latinxs. A restrictive immigration context may be perceived by non-Black Latinxs as a referendum on the host society’s willingness to incorporate their ethnic group. The constraints immigration enforcement threat imposes on movement and socio-economic mobility (Fussell, 2011; Jones, 2012; Alsan and Yang, 2018) may encourage non-Black Latinxs and their acculturated co-ethnics to “no longer believe in the promise of upward mobility through a prism of achievable whiteness (Jones, 2012).” Qualitative accounts suggest threatening immigration policies may motivate non-Black Latinxs to abandon the “American Dream” and perceive the U.S. as a xenophobic, racist, country (Jones, 2012; Zamora, 2018). Likewise, non-Black Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement may question the valorization of whiteness since they may perceive Anglo whites facilitate policies that undercut immigrant rights (Jones, 2012). These feelings may be buttressed by strong, politicized, anti-immigrant beliefs among Anglo whites (Reny et al., 2019), resulting in a generalized rejection of dominant group norms.

Moreover, given immigration enforcement disparately and negatively affects Latinxs, perceptions of immigration enforcement threat may motivate a shared experience of marginal-

⁴<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/12/opinion/iceraids.html>

ization with Black people. Consistent with the *Common In-Group Identity Model* (Gaertner et al., 1993), shared marginalization experiences can encourage cross-group support and political solidarity (Craig and Richeson, 2012), which may also be buttressed by strong support for open immigration policies among Black Americans (Carter et al., 2021).

Immigration enforcement threat may play an outsized role in undercutting the adoption of anti-Black appraisals and opposite beliefs concerning Black socio-political interests among acculturated non-Black Latinxs (e.g. later-generation, citizen, English-dominant). Relative to unacculturated non-Black Latinxs, acculturated non-Black Latinxs may be hard-pressed to increasingly adopt anti-Black dominant group norms to demonstrate their integration in the host society (Yancey et al., 2003). However, acculturated non-Black Latinxs may be particularly sensitive to threats that implicate their group since they possess integrative expectations the host society would opt to integrate them in light of their acculturated status (Pedraza, 2014). Immigration enforcement threat may shatter integrative expectations and motivate acculturated non-Black Latinxs to refuse the heightened adoption of anti-Black attitudes relative to unacculturated non-Black Latinxs as a means of assimilation. Additionally, unacculturated non-Black Latinxs (e.g. Spanish-dominant non-citizen immigrants) may support Black Americans more than the acculturated regardless of their sense of immigration enforcement threat due to their sense of shared marginalization outside the dimension of immigration enforcement policy (e.g. anti-immigrant rhetoric) (Corral, 2020).

In sum, consistent with *reactive ethnicity* and *segmented assimilation* theory, immigration enforcement threat may motivate a reactive ethnicity against the adoption of relatively anti-Black dominant group norms as non-Black Latinxs acculturate. However, rebuff against dominant group norms may be segmented. Non-Black Latinxs unconcerned with immigration enforcement may increasingly adopt anti-Black attitudes as they acculturate. Thus, **H1a: Non-Black Latinxs *unthreatened* by immigration enforcement will either be *more likely* to adopt or maintain relatively anti-Black attitudes as they acculturate.** **H1b: Non-Black Latinxs *threatened* by immigration enforcement will be *less***

likely to adopt or maintain anti-Black attitudes as they acculturate.

Data and Empirical Strategy

We test our hypothesis with two nationally representative Latinx surveys: the 2016 and 2020 Collaborative Multi-Racial Post-Election Survey (CMPS, $N = 3009, 4016$, fielded 12/03/2016-02/15/2017 and 04/02/2021-08/25/2021). Both surveys are online, self-administered, offered in Spanish, and weighted to adult Latinx population characteristics in the 2015 and 2019 1-year ACS for age, gender, education, nativity, and ancestry. Given non-Black Latinxs may be the most likely to engage in anti-Black assimilation,⁵ we exclude Black Latinxs from our main analyses for a final N of 2538 and 3614.⁶ When possible, we use Black Latinx (CMPS '16 $N = 471$, CMPS '20 $N = 402$), white (CMPS '16 $N = 1213$, CMPS '20 $N = 3002$), and Black non-Latinx (CMPS '16 $N = 3102$, CMPS '20 $N = 4005$) samples to produce outcome benchmark values to compare with non-Black Latinxs along acculturation levels and exposure to immigration enforcement threat. We use two surveys to demonstrate our findings are a) replicable and b) not intrinsic to a particular temporal context or sample, at least between 2016-2020.

The CMPS surveys are the best available to test the hypothesis. Large independent Latinx surveys with sufficient statistical power to assess heterogeneity along acculturation levels are rare. Major political and social science surveys also do not include items on anti-Black attitudes, perceived deportation threat, and acculturation simultaneously (i.e. the ANES, GSS, CES, VSG, Pew Latino Survey(s), the Latino Immigrant National Election Survey, and the Latino National Survey). Moreover, the CMPS surveys also ask the same outcome items of whites and Black non-Latinxs, allowing us to effectively test our hypotheses

⁵Most Latinxs are not Black, only 1.2% identify as such in the 2020 Census. However, our definition of “Black Latinx” is wider, since it allows for an “Afro-Latinx” identification.

⁶We measure Black Latinxs as those who 1) choose “Black” as one of their ethno-racial categories and/or 2) self-identify as “Afro-Latino/a” when asked if they are Afro-Latinx. We validate this indicator by demonstrating it is associated with self-reported skin color darkness and self-reported Black “street race” (Figure D4).

by demonstrating immigration enforcement threat motivates attitudes more similar to whites or Black people as non-Black Latinxs acculturate.

Outcomes

We use two sets of outcomes. First, anti-Black appraisals. These are from the CMPS '20. *Racial resentment* is an index of 4 5-point scale items between “agree strongly” to “disagree strongly.” These items ask if the respondent agrees Blacks should work without special favors, Blacks should try harder to be as well off as whites, disagrees generations of discrimination make upward mobility difficult for Blacks, and disagrees Blacks have gotten less than they deserve. *Racial resentment* was developed to measure anti-Black racism after post-Civil Rights norms against explicit anti-Black prejudice, where whites may instead express anti-Black appraisals by derogating Black people’s claims to government assistance to ameliorate discrimination (Kinder and Sears, 1981). Although some posit *resentment* reflects conservative individualist principles (Carmines et al., 2011), some research demonstrates the measure uniquely motivates policy preferences that help Black people and not other marginalized groups (Kinder et al., 1996; Kinder and Mendelberg, 2000; Rabinowitz et al., 2009; Kam and Burge, 2019). Additionally, other research demonstrates correcting for measurement differences between ideologues on the basis of political principles does not undercut *resentment*’s explanatory power concerning pro-Black policy preferences (Enders, 2021). Moreover, although *racial resentment* may approximate some individualist principles, this does not obviate the scale’s capacity to measure anti-Black attitudes from a *theoretical* perspective. Individualist tenets might be how whites cloak anti-Black prejudice (Bobo et al., 1997). Indeed, Enders (2021) finds white ideological self-identification is associated with *resentment* but not ideological principles (e.g. government spending preferences). Thus, resentful respondents may be concerned not with adherence to individualist tenets writ large, but Black adherence to individualist tenets (Simmons and Bobo, 2018).

Anti-Black stereotype is the difference between whether a respondent believes Blacks

relative to whites are violent instead of peaceful on a 7-point scale. This item is used in prior work as a component of explicit anti-Black prejudice scales, which measure antipathy on the basis of faulty and inflexible generalizations. Prior research shows this measure is associated with policy preferences that negatively affect Black people (e.g. draconian criminal justice policies) (Huddy and Feldman, 2009). Relative to *resentment*, this measure is also associated with anti-Black behavioral discrimination in dictator games (Peyton and Huber, 2021).

Black threat is the difference in two measures. The first asks respondents if Black people “support or threaten” their “vision of American society” on a 7 point scale from “strongly supports” to “strongly threatens.” The second is the same replacing Black people with white people. Prior research suggests the perception Black people are a threat to the integrity of the nation may be concomitant with negative appraisals of Black people along with increased support for maintaining white political dominance (Giles and Evans, 1985). Indeed, our *Black threat* measure, but not perceived threat from Jews or Asians, is associated with *racial resentment* and *anti-Black stereotype* (Table S13).

White residential preference is the difference between white and Black neighborhoods on a 1-6 ranking asking respondents to rate what kinds of majority-group neighborhood they would prefer to live in.⁷ Conjoint experiments show preferences for white over Black neighborhoods are driven by antipathy toward Black people, not in-group affinity, neighborhood quality, crime, and/or home values (Emerson et al., 2001; Krysan et al., 2009). We assess if anti-Black attitudes determine residential preferences net of neighborhood quality concerns. If quality and home value considerations trump antipathy toward Black people, then *racial resentment* and *anti-Black stereotype* should not be correlated with *white residential preference* after adjusting for objective and subjective measures of respondent neighborhood quality. Assuming all individuals want to live in high quality neighborhoods, individuals living in low quality neighborhoods may be more inclined to live in a white relative to black neighborhood since white neighborhoods are perceptibly higher quality. We also adjust

⁷The 6 choices were “white, non-Hispanic,” “Hispanic or Latino,” “Black or African-American,” “Asian-American or Pacific Islander,” “Native American or Native Hawaiian,” “Middle Eastern or North African.”

for Latinx identity importance and homeownership to rule out in-group affinity and home value concerns (assuming homeowners differentially care more about home values, see Fischel (2005)). By a significant margin, *Racial resentment* and *anti-Black stereotype* possess the strongest association with *white residential preference* after adjusting for neighborhood quality, in-group affinity, and homeownership measures (Figure S14), suggesting anti-Black attitudes motivate *white residential preference*.

The second outcome set measures opposition to Black political interests. Consistent with prior literature (Baker and Cook, 2005), we define “opposition to black political interests” as opposing social movements or policies that disparately benefit Black Americans materially, politically, socially, or otherwise. Often, Black people support these interests significantly more than whites (Kinder and Winter, 2001). Thus, we assess non-Black Latinx opposition to the most prominent contemporary pro-Black movement, Black Lives Matter (BLM).

We focus on BLM opposition for several reasons. BLM opposition may be associated with opposition to a “bundle” of pro-Black interests. BLM is not just concerned with police violence, but several issues. The Movement for Black Lives, an umbrella organization connected to BLM and its local chapters, presented a detailed policy platform that “demands investments in the education, health, and safety of Black people, instead of investments in the criminalizing, caging, and harming of Black people.” Indeed, although the CMPS surveys do not ask Latinxs about pro-Black policies, other research suggests BLM support is not merely symbolic, but associated with support for policies that facilitate Black welfare (Boudreau et al., 2022). Likewise, warmth toward BLM is associated with support for Black-targeted affirmative action and government aid among non-Blacks in the ANES (Figure S15). Moreover, evidence suggests BLM protests have ostensibly facilitated Black American welfare. BLM protests increased positive Black appraisals and support for reparations (Curtis, 2022), decreased police killings (Skoy, 2021), increased anti-racist discussion (Dunivin et al., 2022), and increased Democratic vote share (Klein Teeselink and Melios, 2021).

BLM opposition measures if respondents oppose BLM on a 5-point scale between “strongly

support” and “strongly oppose” in the CMPS ’16. In the CMPS ’20, *BLM opposition* is an additive index of two items. The first asks respondents if they “strongly oppose” BLM relative to “strongly support” on a 5-point scale. The second asks respondents if they “strongly disagree” relative to “strongly agree” on a 5-point scale with the notion their ethno-racial group (Latinos) has a responsibility to support BLM. *BLM ineffective* measures if respondents believe BLM is ineffective at achieving its goals. In both the CMPS ’16 and ’20, it is a 5-point scale from “not at all effective/very ineffective” to “very effective.” Although ineffectiveness perceptions are distinct from opposition, they are strongly correlated and prior research shows perceived effectiveness is politically motivated (Corral, 2020).⁸ *Anti-BLM FT* is a reverse coded 0-100 BLM feeling thermometer from the CMPS ’20. *No BLM Protest* is a binary indicator of self-reported non-participation in the 2020 BLM protests from the CMPS ’20. Importantly, *no BLM protest* allows us to measure behavioral (non)commitments to BLM instead of expressive preferences. Although the self-reported nature of the data means some respondents may lie, protest participation is much lower than BLM support, suggesting *no BLM protest* is less driven by expressive preferences. *No BLM Support* is a binary indicator of self-reported non-support via social media from the CMPS ’20. For outcome item wording information, see Section O.

All outcomes are rescaled between 0-1 except *Black threat* and *white residential preference*, which are between -1-1 since they are difference measures. Relevant to the theory, all outcomes are racially polarized. Black people have significantly more positive appraisals of Black people and less opposition to BLM relative to whites. Non-Black Latinxs are always in the middle (Figure E5). Therefore, even if our measures do not perfectly capture anti-Black prejudice or opposition to the Black interests, if our results are consistent with the hypothesis, we can still demonstrate immigration enforcement threat undercuts the adoption or maintenance of racialized attitudes akin to Anglo whites as Latinxs acculturate while motivating the adoption of attitudes akin to Black people.

⁸Pearson’s ρ between *opposition* and *ineffective* in the ’16 and ’20 CMPS is 0.7 and 0.5, a moderate-to-strong correlation.

Measuring Acculturation

Conceptually, acculturation is the adoption of dominant group attributes among immigrant group members (Berry, Sam, et al., 1997).⁹ Acculturation can occur across multiple dimensions, including political attitudes, cultural norms, socio-economic status, and social networks, among others (Cuellar et al., 1995). Acculturation is also heterogenous within groups. Individual immigrant co-ethnics will acculturate at different paces and will adopt dominant group norms along certain dimensions over others (Berry, Sam, et al., 1997). Some argue acculturative dimensions should be directly measured in surveys (Cabassa, 2003). This approach has shortcomings. First, acculturation scales concerning cultural norms, intermarriage, co-ethnic social networks, socio-economic status, and political beliefs are time-intensive and not often available across multiple immigrant group surveys (Cruz et al., 2008). Second, researchers may prefer an acculturation measure that does not directly capture specific assimilation dimensions since such dimensions may be an outcome of interest (e.g. anti-Black attitudes). Instead, researchers may seek acculturation measures that *encourage* assimilation yet allow for the absence of assimilation along specific dimensions among otherwise acculturated immigrant co-ethnics.

Consequently, we measure *acculturation* as an additive index of generational status (0 = 1st generation, 1 = 2nd generation, 2 = 3rd+ generation), English language-of-interview (0 = Spanish, 1 = English), and citizenship (0 = non-citizen, 1 = citizen). Thus, the index is from 0-4 (non-citizen Spanish-speaking immigrant to third-generation+ English-speaking citizen). The index is left-skewed, with 70% and 63% of Latinxs at the top two acculturation levels and 16% and 22% of Latinxs at the bottom two levels in the '16 and '20 CMPS (Figure F6). However, given the large samples, 478 and 888 Latinxs constitute the lower end of the index, sufficient for assessing the influence of acculturation along immigration enforcement threat levels. This proxy acculturation scale is advantageous since it measures factors that

⁹Acculturation may also occur vis-a-vis non-dominant groups (e.g. Black Americans, see Portes and Zhou (1993)). However, this is an empirical question, and prior research suggests acculturated Latinxs usually adopt attitudes more akin to Anglo whites (Branton, 2007; Corral, 2020).

typically encourage the adoption of dominant group attitudes *yet do not guarantee their adoption among all acculturated individuals*. Prior research demonstrates proxy acculturation scales that index language-of-interview and generational status are reliably associated with gold-standard scales measuring specific assimilative dimensions such as language proficiency, cultural attachments, geographic integration, and ethnic identification (Cruz et al., 2008). Similar scales have been used in prior studies on Latinx attitudes within political science and they operate consistent with the original conceptualization of acculturation (Branton, 2007; Pedraza, 2014).¹⁰ Additionally, prior research suggests citizenship is a prerequisite to acculturation and is positively associated with civic integration, education, dominant language skills, and inter-ethnic contact (Liang, 1994; Yang, 1994; Maehler et al., 2019).

We validate the *acculturation* index by demonstrating it is associated with multiple assimilation dimensions among non-Black Latinxs (Figure I8). Consistent with Gordon (1964), who characterizes 7 assimilation dimensions in their seminal text, the index is associated with a heightened/reduced sense of American/Latinx identity (Panels A-D, identification assimilation), reductions in both perceived and experienced discrimination (Panels E-H, reception assimilation), higher income (Panels K-L, structural assimilation), higher education (Panels M-N, structural assimilation), living in areas with less Latinxs, Black people, and immigrants (Panels Q-X, structural assimilation) and marrying white people (Panels I-J, marital assimilation). Therefore, *acculturation* reliably measures the concept of assimilation to dominant group attributes. These associations imply acculturated non-Black Latinxs may have high expectations the host society would incorporate them. Moreover, consistent with mixed evidence on the link between *acculturation* and the adoption of anti-Black attitudes, *acculturation* is not consistently associated with anti-Black beliefs, suggesting the possibility for heterogenous adoption of attitudes toward Black people as Latinxs acculturate (Figure H7). For the purposes of our analyses, we re-scale *acculturation* between 0-1.

¹⁰Branton (2007)’s acculturation measure uses an English-dominance scale instead of an English interview indicator. Cruz et al. (2008) find English interview indicators are a proxy for English dominance. The CMPS surveys do not include English dominance scales, but we use a 2019 Pew Latino Survey to demonstrate the English interview indicator is strongly correlated with English dominance.

Measuring Immigration Enforcement Threat

Immigration enforcement threat is measured from an item in the '16 and '20 CMPS asking respondents about their perceived *deportation threat*. The CMPS '16 asks respondents “how worried are you that people you know might be detained or deported for immigration reasons?” from “not at all worried” to “extremely worried” on a 5-point scale. The CMPS '20 asks respondents “how worried, if at all, are you that someone you know could be detained or deported for immigration reasons?” on a 4-point scale from “not at all” to “a lot.” These measures do not measure personal exposure to immigration enforcement, but proximal exposure via social ties. Given acculturated Latinxs are not necessarily directly exposed to immigration enforcement, this is an appropriate measure of *deportation threat* for understanding how perceptibly threatening immigration contexts undercut anti-Black assimilation among acculturated Latinxs. We rescale *threat* between 0-1

The measure captures the concept (Figure J9). Non-Black Latinxs who perceive *deportation threat* live in areas with more county-level Secure Communities deportations (Panels A-B), know undocumented friends or family (Panels C-D), know deportees (Panel E), and live in immigrant zipcode contexts (Panels F-I).

Given we are interested in assessing the heterogeneous influence of *acculturation* on anti-Black attitudes conditional on *deportation threat* levels, we demonstrate *threat* and *acculturation* are not indistinct constructs. In the '16 and '20 CMPS, *acculturation* is negatively correlated with *deportation threat*, but the Pearson’s ρ correlation coefficient is moderate-to-weak ($\rho = -0.4, -0.17$). In the CMPS '16, 32% of the most acculturated non-Black Latinxs (i.e. third-generation+, English-dominant, citizen) are “extremely,” “very,” and “somewhat” worried about people they know being detained or deported. Conversely, 30% of the least acculturated non-Black Latinxs are “a little” or “not at all” worried about people they know being detained or deported. Again, in the CMPS '20, 24% of the most acculturated non-Black Latinxs are worried “a lot” or “some” that someone they know could be detained or deported and 54% of the least acculturated non-Black Latinxs are worried “not much” or

“not at all” that someone they know could be detained or deported. In sum, there are sizable proportions of unacculturated Latinxs who do not experience deportation threat and well acculturated Latinxs who do experience threat.

Controls

In addition to using our independent understanding of the literature to choose control covariates, we use a principled search criteria on Google Scholar to find articles on Latinx attitudes toward Black people or their interests to identify controls to adjust for.¹¹ Given the literature is relatively small, this search helped us identify a relatively comprehensive list of covariates that explain anti-Black beliefs or opposite attitudes toward Black socio-political interests among Latinxs (See Table L2 for a literature catalog).

To this end, we adjust for a large set of demographic, socio-economic, political, zip-code, and county covariates in addition to census area fixed effects that could jointly explain anti-Black attitudes, *threat*, and *acculturation*. Demographic covariates include: gender, skin color, age, marital status, catholic, national origin, having a Black spouse, the perceived proportion of one’s neighborhood that is Black, the perceived proportion of one’s church that is Black. Socio-economic covariates include: income, education, unemployment, homeownership, retrospective economic evaluations, personal economic evaluations, socio-tropic economic evaluations, Latinx economic evaluations. Political covariates include: experienced discrimination, perceived discrimination against Latinxs and Black people, partisanship, ideology, perceived political competition vis-a-vis Black people,¹² Latino identity centrality, American identity centrality, political interest, Latinx linked fate, and belief in an immigrant work ethic. Geographic covariates include the logged total population (zip, county), % Latino (zip, county), % Black (zip, county), % foreign-born (zip, county), % unemployed (zip, county), logged median household income (zip, county), and objective

¹¹For more information on how we conducted this search, see Section K

¹²This is measured by the difference in the extent to which Latinxs perceive Hispanic men or women congressional candidates will represent their interests minus perceptions Black men or women congressional candidates will represent their interests.

economic competition measures between Black people and Latinxs (zip).¹³ We also adjust for *deportation threat* selection by controlling for knowing an undocumented friend and/or family member, knowing a deportee, the logged number of county-level Secure Communities deportations, and the rate of county-level Secure Communities deportations (deportations per 1,000 foreign-born). See Table M3 for control covariate availability by survey.

For brevity, we do not discuss all included covariates. But we want to note that we adjust for every, or at least a proxy of each, explanation for pro-Black beliefs among Latinxs specifically on Table L2. We also want to highlight key controls that serve as prominent alternative explanations for anti/pro-Black beliefs among Latinxs. First, adjusting for perceived Latinx discrimination is critical since a prominent alternative explanation for pro-Black Latinx beliefs is that perceived anti-Latinx marginalization generates a sense of commonality that serves as a basis for cross-group support (Craig and Richeson, 2012; Adida et al., 2016). Second, we adjust for Latinx linked fate which prior literature has repeatedly established as an antecedent to pro-Black support (McClain et al., 2006; Gomez-Aguinaga et al., 2021). Third, we adjust for skin color, which has been found to be associated with pro-Black beliefs among Latinxs (Wilkinson and Earle, 2013). Fourth, we condition on contextual measures capturing poor economic conditions (% unemployed, logged median household income, at the zip and county level), which could serve as a basis for perceived economic competition with Black Americans and reduce support for pro-Black political commitments (Wilkinson, 2014).

Estimation Strategy

We use the following linear model to test **H1**:

$$Y_i = \gamma_g + \beta_1(\text{acculturation}_i \times \text{threat}_i) + \beta_2\text{acculturation}_i + \beta_3\text{threat}_i + \sum_{k=1}^k \beta_{k+3}^k X_{icz}^k + \varepsilon_i$$

Y_i is an outcome of interest for respondent i , γ_g are census area (g) fixed effects, *acculturation*

¹³Our measure of objective economic competition follows the example of Gay (2006), where we interact the proportion of a respondent’s zipcode population that is Black with the difference in poverty and education rates between Black people and Latinxs.

is the *acculturation* index, *threat* is the *deportation threat* scale, and $\sum_{k=1}^k \beta_{k+3}^k X_{izc}^k$ are k control covariates at the respondent (i), county (c), and zipcode (z) level. We run models with and without controls to demonstrate no suppression effects.

Since all covariates are rescaled between 0-1, β_1 , the interaction coefficient for *acculturation* and *threat*, is a *second difference*. β_1 characterizes the difference in the difference of going from the minimum to the maximum of *acculturation* among non-Black Latinxs with the *highest threat level* and the difference of going from the minimum to the maximum of *acculturation* among non-Black Latinxs with the *lowest threat level*. If **H1** is true, β_1 will be negative, which suggests *threat* is more strongly associated with reduced anti-Black attitudes among more acculturated non-Black Latinxs. In sum, *threat* either reduces the adoption of or undercuts the maintenance of relatively anti-Black beliefs as non-Black Latinxs acculturate.

Our model-based design is ideal to test the hypothesis. Experimental designs pose several challenges. First, external validity and weak effects. *Threat* may be difficult to manipulate in short-term experimental settings since, for Latinxs, it is likely the result of predispositional pre-adult experiences rooted in strong social relationships with undocumented immigrants or national immigration policy (see Figure J9, Panels A, C-E), both of which cannot be randomized. The notion threat is a function of predispositional, pre-adult experiences among Latinxs is well-established in qualitative literature (Dreby, 2015). Consistent with the notion *threat* is predispositional for Latinxs, aggregate, cross-sectional, Pew Latino Survey data demonstrates *threat* is highly stable across three presidencies with vastly different immigration policy approaches (2007-2018, Figure N10, Panels A-B), with only one time period being statistically different than the first time period *threat* was recorded. Panel data from the Latino Immigrant National Survey also demonstrates *threat* doesn't shift substantially between two time periods when Trump implemented several anti-immigrant executive orders (e.g. banning sanctuary cities, the Muslim Ban, rolling back DAPA (see Figure N10, Panels C-D). Our own attempt to experimentally trigger *threat* among acculturated Latinxs in a survey failed (Section P), providing more support for the notion *threat* is predispositional.

Second, ethics. Experiments sufficiently powerful to generate a sense of *threat* may veer on unethical given the risk of traumatizing undocumented Latinxs, who occupy a marginalized societal position (Lahman et al., 2011). Third, feasibility. Our quantity of interest is an interaction with *acculturation*, a bundle of ascriptive characteristics that cannot be randomized like generational status. Even if we could cue *threat* experimentally, we would still be interested in a heterogeneous effect that is subject to selection bias like a model-based design. Additionally, evaluating variation in threatening and/or permissive immigration policies across geographic space using available surveys may not effectively answer the research question (e.g. assessing the effect of Secure Communities, see White (2016)). Repeated cross-section and/or panel data over time with large Latinx samples across acculturation levels and small geographies with consistently asked comprehensive measures of anti-Black attitudes do not exist given most survey research prioritizes nationally representative samples.

Consequently, we opt for a model-based approach that 1) engages in a principled attempt to catalogue and adjust for all preexisting explanations of Latinx pro-Black attitudes and 2) rules out alternative explanations by adjusting for multiple interactions between acculturation and theoretically relevant explanations for Latinx pro-Black attitudes and 3) acknowledges our coefficient of interest cannot possess a definitively causal interpretation.

Results

We find evidence for **H1** along the dimension of anti-Black appraisals. The second difference of *threat* conditional on *acculturation* after covariate adjustment is negative and significant for the *racial resentment* ($\beta_1 = -0.05$, $SE = 0.03$, $p < 0.10$), *anti-Black stereotype* ($\beta_1 = -0.13$, $SE = 0.05$, $p < 0.01$), *Black threat* ($\beta_1 = -0.11$, $SE = 0.04$, $p < 0.01$), and *white residential preference* outcomes ($\beta_1 = -0.28$, $SE = 0.08$, $p < 0.001$, see Table Q5, Panel B), equivalent to 21%, 44%, 36%, and 53% of the respective outcome standard deviations.

Figure 1 characterizes these second differences with predicted values. For non-Black Latinxs at the lowest *threat* level, anti-Black appraisals either remain constant or decrease




Figure 1: Predicted Values Demonstrating Deportation Threat (minimum/maximum, denoted by color) Undercuts the Adoption or Maintenance of Relatively Anti-Black Beliefs (y-axis) via Acculturation (x-axis) Among Non-Black Latinxs. Panels A, B, C, and D characterize predicted values for the *resentment*, *stereotype*, *Black threat*, and *residential preference* outcomes. Dashed lines denote ethno-racial group means (Black = white, dark grey = Black Latinx, light grey = non-Latinx Black. 95% CIs from HC2 robust SEs displayed.

slightly as *acculturation* increases. However, for non-Black Latinxs at the highest *threat* level, *acculturation* is consistently and more strongly associated with lower anti-Black appraisals.

We also find evidence for **H1** for outcomes characterizing opposition to Black political interests. The second difference of *threat* conditional on acculturation is negative and significant for the *oppose BLM* (CMPS '16: $\beta_1 = -0.17$, $SE = 0.05$, $p < 0.01$, CMPS '20: $\beta_1 = -0.15$, $SE = 0.04$, $p < 0.01$), *BLM ineffective* (CMPS '16: $\beta_1 = -0.17$, $SE = 0.07$, $p < 0.05$, CMPS '20: $\beta_1 = -0.14$, $SE = 0.05$, $p < 0.01$), *anti-BLM FT* ($\beta_1 = -0.12$, $SE = 0.06$, $p < 0.10$), *BLM no protest* ($\beta_1 = -0.17$, $SE = 0.06$, $p < 0.01$), and *BLM no support* ($\beta_1 = -0.20$, $SE = 0.07$, $p < 0.01$) outcomes, equivalent to 58%, 50%, 55%, 46%, 34% 42% and 59% of the outcome standard deviations (Table Q6, Panel B).

Figure 2 displays predicted values of the outcomes characterizing opposition to Black political interests along *threat* and *acculturation*. Unthreatened non-Black Latinxs increasingly oppose BLM and adopt attitudes more similar to Anglo whites as they acculturate. Conversely, threatened non-Black Latinxs increasingly support BLM as they acculturate and adopt attitudes more similar to Black people (Panel A, C). Unthreatened non-Black Latinxs increasingly believe BLM is ineffective and move attitudinally closer to Anglo whites as they acculturate. Threatened non-Black Latinxs instead maintain beliefs that BLM is effective




Figure 2: Predicted Values Demonstrating Deportation Threat Undercuts the Adoption or Maintenance of Opposition to Black Political Interests (y-axis) via Acculturation (x-axis) Among Non-Black Latinxs. Panels A and C are predicted values for the *oppose BLM* outcome. Panels B and D are the same for the *BLM ineffective* outcome. Panels E, F, and G do the same for the *anti-BLM FT*, *no BLM protest*, and *BLM no support* outcomes. Dashed lines denote ethno-racial group means (Black = white, dark grey = Black Latinx, light grey = Black). 95% CIs from HC2 robust SEs displayed.

similar to Black people as they acculturate (Panels B, D).

The *anti-BLM FT*, *no BLM protest*, and *no BLM support* outcomes follow a similar pattern (Panels E, F, G). Unthreatened non-Black Latinxs maintain relative coldness toward BLM, relative levels of BLM protest non-participation, and relative levels of no support for BLM protests akin to Anglo whites as they acculturate. Conversely, threatened non-Black Latinxs are increasingly warm toward BLM, participatory in BLM protests, and supportive of BLM protests at levels more akin to Black Latinxs and Black non-Latinxs as they acculturate.

In sum, consistent with **H1a**, non-Black Latinxs unthreatened by immigration enforcement either increasingly adopt or continue to maintain anti-Black attitudes proximate to Anglo whites as they acculturate. Yet, consistent with **H1b**, non-Black Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement adopt attitudes toward Black people and their interests that are more similar to their Black counterparts as they acculturate.

Alternative Explanations

We rule out several prominent alternative explanations established in preexisting literature that could explain why non-Black Latinxs adopt pro-Black attitudes as they acculturate. We highlight the alternative mechanisms, and then engage in statistical adjustments to account for them. 1) Impression management via acculturation. Acculturated Latinxs may be more knowledgeable on U.S. liberal racial norms and therefore more likely to support Black people (Goldenberg and Saxe, 1996). Prior research implies more educated acculturated Latinxs should be more likely to adopt pro-Black attitudes given they are more capable of impression management (Sears and Savalei, 2006). 2) Discrimination. Prior research shows perceived discrimination against Latinxs among Latinxs motivates pro-Black beliefs due to shared marginalization experiences (Richeson and Craig, 2011). Other research shows cross-group empathy is a function of discriminatory experiences (Sirin et al., 2016). 3) Linked Fate. Prior studies show Latinx linked fate is associated with positive Black appraisals (McClain et al., 2006; Wilkinson, 2014). 4) Skin Color. Prior work suggests darker-skinned Latinxs may be more likely to experience rebuff from the host society and therefore feel socially proximate to Black people (Wilkinson and Earle, 2013). 5) Intergroup Competition. Prior research suggests acculturated non-Black Latinxs may increasingly adopt anti-Black attitudes if they feel they are in economic and/or political competition with Black people (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Wilkinson, 2014). To account for these alternative explanations, we adjust for interactions between survey measures that approximate these alternative explanations and *acculturation*. Adjusting for interactions between *acculturation* and 1) education, 2) perceived and experienced discrimination, 3) linked fate, 4) skin color, and 5) intergroup competition does not change our empirical conclusions. The interaction between *threat* and *acculturation* is still negative and statistically significant at least at the $p < 0.10$ level for 43 out of 45 outcome/mechanism tests (Section R).

We also rule out several other alternative explanations while interacting *all* possible alternative mechanisms with *acculturation*, an extreme test since it adjusts for differences among

Latinxs along all possible alternative mechanisms *within* each *acculturation* level. In addition to the 5 aforementioned alternative mechanisms, we also adjust for interactions between *acculturation* and measures approximating 1) intergroup contact (McClain et al., 2006), 2) political interest (to further rule out social desirability), 3) objective measures of deportation threat (e.g. knowing someone undocumented, living in a county with more Secure Communities deportations), 4) living in predominantly immigrant contexts, 5) American identity (Gomez-Aguinaga et al., 2021), 6) Latinx identity, 7) partisanship, and 8) belief in immigrant work ethic (Wilkinson, 2014). With the exception of the *racial resentment* and *no BLM support* outcome, the interaction between *threat* and *acculturation* is still statistically significant and negative (Section R.2).

Additional Robustness Checks

Results do not change if we include Black Latinxs in the analysis (Section S.4). Results do not change excluding Puerto Ricans, who are citizens and ostensibly protected from deportation (Section S.5). We provide evidence to suggest our findings are not a function of secular conservative ideological principles. We conduct a falsification test by assessing the association between *threat* and the interaction between *threat* and *acculturation* with an ideology scale (Table S18, Columns 5-6), liberal policy preferences irrelevant to Black interests (Table S18, Columns 1-4), immigrant work ethic beliefs, and protestant work ethic beliefs (Table S19). The associations are null, suggesting our findings are not driven by secular conservative principles, but anti-Black attitudes. We rule out if our findings are a function of a generalized affinity toward marginalized groups. Thus, we assess the association between *threat*, and the *threat/acculturation* interaction, with outcomes characterizing negative attitudes toward women, Muslims, and LGBTQ+ while adjusting for controls (Table S20). With one exception, we find statistically null associations. Importantly, one outcome assesses LGBTQ+ activism opposition. The null association between our independent variables of interest and LGBTQ+ activism opposition suggests our BLM opposition findings

are not due to opposition to anti-systemic social movements, but *Black* social movements.

Given *acculturation* is a categorical index, one may be concerned about non-linear influences of *acculturation* conditional on *threat*. Re-estimating our results using a factorized *acculturation* scale demonstrates non-Black Latinxs from “higher” acculturation categories are more likely to hold pro-Black beliefs conditional on *threat*, suggesting limited non-linear *acculturation* influence (Tables S21, S22). Our estimates are not sensitive to *acculturation* measurement choice. We re-estimate our results interacting the index components with *threat* (i.e. generational status, English interview language, citizenship). We also re-estimate our results using an index excluding the citizenship indicator. Coefficients characterizing these interactions are consistently negative and statistically significant (Table S23). Self-reported BLM protest (non)participation may be motivated by social desirability instead of actual participation. We cannot fully rule out social desirability, but self-reported participation is associated with objective protest participation intensity within a respondent’s county, increasing confidence respondents actually participated (Figure S16).

Discussion and Conclusion

Historic accounts and straight line assimilation theory suggest immigrant group members increasingly derogate Black people and oppose their interests as they acculturate. However, other research finds acculturation is not associated with the adoption or maintenance of anti-Black beliefs. Our findings explain the puzzle of relatively pro-Black beliefs among acculturated Latinxs, members of the *largest* contemporary U.S. immigrant group. We show threatening reception contexts, specifically in the form of a uniquely expansive and intense immigration enforcement apparatus, undercut the prospect of anti-Black assimilation.

Our findings are important in light of the growing Latinx population in addition to increased attention to anti-Blackness within the Latinx community. Prior research posits demographic shifts that reduce the relative position of Anglo whites do not necessarily mean the non-Black public will increasingly support Black people and their interests. Some have

raised concerns acculturation may result in social distancing from Black people along with sustained opposition to the political interests of Black people among Latinxs, with long term ramifications for racial equality and undercutting anti-Black racism (Yancey et al., 2003; Alba, 2020). These concerns are valid, but insights from *reactive ethnicity* and *segmented assimilation* theory suggest Latinxs may possess different assimilative trajectories along the dimension of anti-Black beliefs. A key contribution inherent to this paper is that we demonstrate some otherwise acculturated Latinxs will not follow the path of historic immigrant group members in light of exposure to a highly salient form of host society rebuff.

This paper has some limitations. First, pro-Black attitudes among threatened acculturated Latinxs may not reflect behavioral commitments. Although the protest participation outcome slightly mitigates this concern, respondents could still lie about participation. Future research should evaluate the association between *acculturation*, *threat*, and more externally valid anti-Black behavioral outcomes (e.g. dictator games). Second, generalizability. Although Latinxs are currently the largest U.S. immigrant origin group, Asian-Americans are the next largest and fastest growing. We focus on Latinxs to ensure theoretical precision given immigrant group differences and because Latinxs are disparately exposed to immigration enforcement. However, our theory can still travel to other immigrant groups. Future research should assess if mechanisms of rebuff *intrinsic to the Asian-American experience* undercut the adoption of attitudes toward other groups similar to Anglo whites. Third, this paper cannot further disaggregate Latinxs beyond the third+ generation. Perhaps *threat* matters for third-generation Latinxs, but not fourth generation Latinxs or beyond. Future research should develop more precise *acculturation* measures in addition to re-testing the theory as the immigrant Latinx population proportion continues to decline.¹⁴

Finally, we are not optimistic about the implications of our findings for solidarity between non-Black Latinxs and Black people. Perceived immigration enforcement threat decreases as non-Black Latinxs acculturate. Thus, in the long-run, the most acculturated Latinxs will be

¹⁴See: <https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2015/09/15/the-impact-of-slowing-immigration-foreign-born-diverse-origins>

less implicated by immigration enforcement. Additionally, our findings rest on a sustained restrictive immigration context. If immigration policy becomes open, commitments to Black people and their interests among acculturated non-Black Latinxs may become weaker.

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Appendices

Contents

A The Salience of Anti-Blackness Within Latinx Communities is Increasing	3
B Illegality and Latinxs	5
C Interior Deportations Over Time	6
D Validating Black Latinx Indicator	6
E Demonstrating Racial Polarization	7
F Acculturation Distributions	8
G Demonstrating English Interview = English Dominance Proxy	8
H Acculturation Is Not Consistently Associated With Anti-Black Beliefs	9
I Acculturation Index Measures Assimilation	10
J Validating Deportation Threat	11
K Identifying Articles Via Google Scholar	12
L Control Covariates Identified in Preexisting Research on Latinx Attitudes Toward Black People	13
M Control Covariates by Survey	14
N Threat Over Time	15
O Key Survey Items	16

O.1	Deportation Threat	16
O.2	Outcomes	16
P	Failure of Experimental Manipulation	18
P.1	Design Details and Results	18
P.2	Experimental Treatments	19
P.2.1	Control	19
P.2.2	Treatment	20
P.3	Balance Tests	21
Q	Regression Tables	22
Q.1	Anti-Black Appraisal Outcomes	22
Q.2	Opposition to Black Interests Outcome	23
R	Ruling Out Alternative Mechanisms	24
R.1	Established Mechanisms	24
R.2	Accounting For All Mechanisms Simultaneously	28
S	Robustness Checks	29
S.1	Ruling Out Alternative Residential Preference Motivations	29
S.2	Validating <i>Black Threat</i> Measure	30
S.3	Validating BLM Thermometer Measure	30
S.4	Including Black Latinxs	31
S.5	Excluding Puerto Ricans	32
S.6	Ruling Out Secular Liberalism	33
S.7	Ruling out “Conservative Principles”	34
S.8	Ruling Out Secular Support For Marginalized Groups	35
S.9	Factorizing Acculturation Scale	37
S.10	Alternative Acculturation Specifications	38

S.11 Validating BLM Protest Measure	39
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A The Salience of Anti-Blackness Within Latinx Communities is Increasing

Mediacloud Data: Digital media articles that include the following search terms: (antiblack AND "latino") OR (antiblackness AND "latino") OR (anti-black AND "latino") OR (anti-blackness AND "latino")

Google Scholar Data: Google scholar academic articles that include the following terms: ("anti-blackness" AND "latinos") OR ("anti-black" AND "latinos")

YouTube Data (Pero Like): Cumulative views of video, "What Afro-Latinos Want You To Know," a video on anti-Black discrimination within Latino communities by the "Pero Like" channel, with 1.3 million current subscribers (as of April 2022). Data on historic views from Wayback Machine.

YouTube Data (The Grapevine): Cumulative views of video, "THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BLACK AND LATIN X COMMUNITY," a video on Black and Latinx relations by "The Grapevine" channel, with 201,000 current subscribers (as of April 2022). Data on historic views from Wayback Machine.




Figure A1: The Salience of Anti-Blackness In Latinx Communities is Increasing. Panel A characterizes the count of daily digital articles between 2011-2022 (x-axis) that includes terms related to anti-Blackness and Latinos (y-axis). Data are from Mediocloud. Panel B characterizes the number of Google Scholar hits that include terms related to anti-Blackness and Latinos (y-axis) at the yearly level (x-axis) between 2000-2021. Panel C characterizes the cumulative number of YouTube views of the video titled “What Afro-Latinos Want You To Know” (y-axis) over time (x-axis) using Wayback Machine data. Panel D characterizes the cumulative number of YouTube views of the video titled “THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BLACK AND LATIN X COMMUNITY” (y-axis) over time (x-axis) using Wayback Machine data.

B Illegality and Latinxs




Figure B2: The Undocumented Population is Integrated in the Latinx Community. Panel A displays the proportion of different Latinx subsamples (x-axis) who know an undocumented friend or family member (y-axis) (CMPS data). Panel B displays the size of the undocumented population (y-axis, in millions) between 1990-2017 (x-axis). Panel C displays the proportion of the undocumented population that has lived in the United States over 10 years (y-axis) over time between 1995-2017 (x-axis). Panel D displays the median number of years an undocumented immigrant has lived in the United States (y-axis) over time between 1995-2017 (x-axis). Data from Panels B-D are from the Pew Research Center.

C Interior Deportations Over Time




Figure C3: Interior Deportations (y-axis) Over Time (x-axis). Data from Department of Homeland Security

D Validating Black Latinx Indicator




Figure D4: The Black Latinx Indicator Is Theoretically Sound. The x-axis is the coefficient, the y-axis is the covariate. Panels A and B use '16 and '20 CMPS data (all Latinxs). The outcome is the Black Latinx indicator. Skin color = self-reported skin color darkness. Each panel characterizes an independent regression model. Black street race = self-reported perceived race by others on the street. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust SEs.

E Demonstrating Racial Polarization




Figure E5: The Outcomes Are Racially Polarized. The x-axis is the ethno-racial category, the y-axis is the outcome average for each ethno-racial category. Each panel is a different outcome. Positive y-axis values = anti-Black appraisal or opposition to Black political interests. *BLM ineffective* is not available for whites in the CMPS '16. All covariates rescaled between 0-1 with the exception of *anti-Black stereotype*, *residential preference*, and *black threat* outcomes.

F Acculturation Distributions




Figure F6: Acculturation Index Distribution. The x-axis is the acculturation index value, the y-axis is the number of Latinx respondents at each acculturation index value. Panels A and B use data from the '16 and '20 CMPS.

G Demonstrating English Interview = English Dominance Proxy

Table G1: English Interview Indicator Proxies for English Dominance

English Dominance	
English Interview	0.30*** (0.01)
R ²	0.39
N	2989

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. Data from the 2019 Pew Latino Survey. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

The English dominance index is an additive index of the following items in the 2019 Pew Latino Survey:

How well, if at all, would you say you can carry on a conversation in SPANISH, both understanding and speaking? 1) Very well, 2) Pretty Well 3) Just a little, 4) Not at all [Max = Not at all]

How well, if at all, would you say you can read a newspaper or book in SPANISH? 1) Very well, 2) Pretty Well 3) Just a little, 4) Not at all [Max = Not at all]

How well, if at all, would you say you can carry on a conversation in ENGLISH, both understanding and speaking? 1) Very well, 2) Pretty Well 3) Just a little, 4) Not at all [Max = Very well]

How well, if at all, would you say you can read a newspaper or book in ENGLISH? 1) Very well, 2) Pretty Well 3) Just a little, 4) Not at all [Max = Very well]

H Acculturation Is Not Consistently Associated With Anti-Black Beliefs




Figure H7: Acculturation Is Not Consistently Associated With the Adoption of Anti-Black Appraisals Nor Attitudes Opposing Black Political Interests Among Non-Black Latinxs. The x-axis is the acculturation scale we outline in Section . The y-axis is the predicted level of agreement with an anti-Black appraisal or opposition to Black political interests. Each panel is a separate outcome. Survey at use denoted on panel title. All covariates rescaled between 0-1 (with the exception of *anti-Black stereotype*, *Black threat*, and *white residence* between -1-1). All predicted values are from a bivariate regression. 95% CIs displayed derived from HC2 robust standard errors.

I Acculturation Index Measures Assimilation




Figure I8: The Acculturation Index is Associated With Several Dimensions of Assimilation. Each panel denotes a separate outcome (survey) at use. The x-axis is the acculturation scale. The y-axis is the predicted value of the outcome at use. Respondents in these analyses are non-Black Latinxs. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed.

J Validating Deportation Threat




Figure J9: Covariates That Should Motivate a Sense of *Deportation Threat* are Associated With The Deportation Threat Measure. Each panel denotes a separate independent variable (survey) at use. The x-axis is the the independent variable denoted by the panel title. The y-axis is the predicted value of *deportation threat*. Respondents in these analyses are non-Black Latinxs. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed.

K Identifying Articles Via Google Scholar

We use a principled Google Scholar search strategy to find articles that identify variables that motivate higher appraisals of Black people and higher levels of support for Black socio-political interests among Latinxs.

First, we conduct three distinct searches on Google Scholar. The following searches are:

1. (race AND attitudes AND latino) OR (race AND attitudes AND hispanic)
2. (anti-black AND latino) OR (anti-black AND hispanic)
3. (black AND latino AND relations) OR (black AND latino AND relations)

Second, we look at articles that correspond to the first 20 pages of each search.

Third, we identify any paper that is about Latinx support for Black people's political interests and/or Latinx attitudes on Black people.

Fourth, we identify any factors that determine higher or lower support for Black people's political interests and/or higher or lower appraisals of Black people among Latinxs.

L Control Covariates Identified in Preexisting Research on Latinx Attitudes Toward Black People

Table L2: Prior Explanations for Positive Attitudes Toward Black People and Their Political Interests Among Latinxs Specifically

Explanation	Direction	Specific Outcome(s)	Papers(s)
Latino Linked Fate	+	Black/Latinx Commonality	Wilkinson 2014; Gomez-Aguinaga et al. 2021
	–	Negative Black Appraisals	McClain 2006
	+	Support For Black-Targeted Aid	Sears and Savalei 2006
	+	Support For Black-Targeted Affirmative Action	Sears and Savalei 2006
	+	Perceived Anti-Black Discrimination	Hurwitz et al 2015
Latino Identity	+	Black/Latinx Commonality	Kaufmann 2003a; Gomez-Aguinaga et al. 2021
	+	Black Affirmative Action Support	Salinas 2020
Neighborhood Latino	%	Anti-Black Stereotypes	Oliver and Wong 2003
	+	Affirmative Action Support	Elizondo and Crosby 2004
Income	+	Racial Resentment	Rhodes et al. 2017
Political Interest	+	Black/Latinx Commonality	Gomez-Aguinaga et al 2021
General Contact	+	Anti-Black Prejudice	Van Laar et al 2005
Neighborhood Contact	+	Black Neighborhood Pref.	Charles 2007
	–	Black School Pref.	Fairlie 2002
Friendship Contact	+	Perceived Black/Latinx Commonality	Wilkinson 2014
Afro-Latinx ID	+	Perceived Black Commonality	Nicholson et al 2005
Skin Tone	+	Perceived Black/Latinx Commonality	Chavez-Dueñas et al 2014; Wilkinson 2014
Economic Threat	–	Perceived Black/Latinx Commonality	Wilkinson 2014
	+	Perceived Black/Latinx Competition	Carey et al 2016
Political Competition	–	Black Candidate Support	Kaufmann 2003b
Discrimination	+	Perceived Black/Latinx Commonality	Sanchez 2008; Wilkinson 2014
	–	Negative Black Appraisals	Craig and Richeson 2011
	+	Black Candidate Support	Adida et al 2016
	+	Black-Targeted Aid	Sears and Savalei 2006
	+	Black-Targeted Affirmative Action	Sears and Savalei 2006
Immigrant Work Ethic	+	Generalized Anti-Black Beliefs	Wilkinson 2014

M Control Covariates by Survey

Table M3: Included Control Covariates By Survey

Control Covariate	CMPS '16 Availability	CMPS '20 Availability
Gender	✓	✓
Skin Color	✓	✓
Age	✓	✓
Married	✓	✓
Catholic	✓	✓
National Origin	✓	✓
Black Spouse	✓	✓
Perceived NHood % Black	✓	✗
Perceived Church % Black	✓	✗
Income	✓	✓
Education	✓	✓
Unemployed	✓	✓
Homeownership	✓	✓
Retrospective Econ. Evaluations	✓	✗
Personal Econ. Evaluations	✗	✓
Socio-tropic Econ. Evaluations	✗	✓
Latinx Econ. Evaluations	✗	✓
Experienced Discrimination	✓	✓
Perceived Discrimination	✓	✓
Partisanship	✓	✓
Ideology	✓	✓
Perceived Political Competition	✓	✓
Latino Identity Centrality	✓	✓
American Identity Centrality	✓	✓
Political Interest	✓	✓
Latinx Linked Fate	✓	✓
Immigrant Work Ethic Beliefs	✗	✓
Total Population (Zipcode)	✓	✓
Total Population (County)	✓	✓
% Latino (Zipcode)	✓	✓
% Latino (County)	✓	✓
% Black (Zipcode)	✓	✓
% Black (County)	✓	✓
% Foreign-Born (Zipcode)	✓	✓
% Foreign-Born (County)	✓	✓
% Unemployed (Zipcode)	✓	✓
% Unemployed (County)	✓	✓
Median HH Income (Zipcode)	✓	✓
Median HH Income (County)	✓	✓
Black/Latino Economic Competition (Zipcode)	✓	✓
Know Undocumented	✓	✓
Know Deportee	✗	✓
SC Deportations (County)	✓	✓
SC Deportation Rate (County)	✓	✓

N Threat Over Time




Figure N10: Deportation Threat is Relatively Stable Over Time. Panel A displays levels of self-reported *deportation threat* in the '07, '08, '10, '13, and '18 Pew Latino Surveys. Panel B characterizes period effects for the level of *threat* in the '08, '10, '13, and '18 Pew Latino Surveys relative to the '07 Pew Latino survey. Panel C displays self-reported *threat* in the Nov '16-Jan '17 and Jul '17-Sep '17 waves of the Latino National Immigrant Survey (LINES) Panel. Annotation denotes Jul '17-Sep '17 period effect, which is near zero. Panel D is the Pearson's ρ correlation coefficient (y-axis) for *threat*, ideology, and partisanship (x-axis) between the Nov '16-Jan '17 and Jul '17-Sep '17 LINES waves. Although test-retest reliability is seemingly low for *threat*, it is *relatively* high given the 6 month gap between waves and the fact *threat* is similar in reliability to ideology and approaches the reliability of partisanship, two measures that are understood as stable in preexisting literature. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed derived from HC2 robust standard errors.

In the Pew Latino surveys, *deportation threat* is measured using the following 4-point likert scale, rescaled from 0-1 such that “a lot” is the maximum and “not at all” is the minimum: Regardless of your own immigration or citizenship status, how much, if at all, do you worry that you, a family member, or a close friend could be deported? Would you say that you 1) worry a lot, 2) some, 3) not much, or 4) not at all?. In the LINES, *threat* is measured using the following 5-point likert scale, rescaled from 0-1 such that “extremely worried” is the maximum and “not at all worried” is the minimum: How worried are you that a close friend or family member may be deported? 1) Extremely worried, 2) very worried, 3) moderately worried, 4) a little worried, 5) or not at all worried

O Key Survey Items

O.1 Deportation Threat

Deportation Threat (CMPS '16): How worried are you that people you know might be detained or deported for immigration reasons? 1) Extremely worried, 2) Very worried, 3) Somewhat worried, 4) A little worried, 5) Not at all worried (Coded between 0-1, where maximum = extremely worried)

Deportation Threat (CMPS '20): How worried, if at all, are you that someone you know could be detained or deported for immigration reasons? 1) A lot, 2) Some, 3) Not much, 4) Not at all (Coded between 0-1, where maximum = a lot)

O.2 Outcomes

Black Threat (CMPS '20): Here is a list of groups in society. For each group, please indicate if you think they support or threaten your vision of American society; Black people. 1) Strongly supports, 2) Supports, 3) Supports a little, 4) Neither supports nor threatens, 5) Threatens a little, 6) Threatens, 7) Strongly threatens. (Rescaled between 0-1 where maximum = strongly threatens).

White Residential Preference (CMPS '20): If you could live anywhere, in any type of community, please rank from 1 (top choice) to 6 (last choice) the racial or ethnic make up of the neighborhood you would prefer. While it might be somewhat mixed, a neighborhood in which a majority are: [ranking widget, each item is ranked 1 – 6] 1) White, non-hispanic, 2) Hispanic or Latino, 3) Black or African American, 4) Asian American or Pacific Islander, 5) Native American or Native Hawaiian, 6) Middle Eastern or North African

BLM Opposition (CMPS '16): From what you have heard about the Black Lives Matter movement, do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose the Black Lives Matter movement activism? (rescaled between 0-1 so strongly oppose = maximum)

BLM Ineffective (CMPS '16): How effective do you think the Black Lives Matter movement will be in helping Blacks achieve equality in this country—very effective, somewhat effective, not too effective or not at all effective? (rescaled between 0-1 to not at all effective = maximum)

BLM Opposition 1 (CMPS '20): Based on everything you have heard or seen, how much do you support or oppose the Black Lives Matter movement? 1) Strongly support, 2) Somewhat support, 3) Neither support nor oppose, 4) Somewhat oppose, 5) Strongly oppose (rescaled so strongly opposed = maximum, added with BLM Opposition 2 and rescaled between 0-1)

BLM Opposition 2 (CMPS '20): How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Latinos have a responsibility to support the Black Lives Matter Movement.

1) Strongly agree, 2) Somewhat agree, 3) Neither agree nor disagree, 4) Somewhat disagree, 5) Strongly disagree (rescaled so strongly disagree = maximum, added with BLM Opposition 1 and rescaled between 0-1)

BLM Ineffective (CMPS '20): Regardless of your own participation in such events, how effective do you think protests and demonstrations are in bringing change on each of the following issues: Support for Black Lives. 1) Very effective, 2) Somewhat effective, 3) Neither effective nor ineffective, 4) Somewhat ineffective, 5) Very ineffective. (Rescaled between 0-1 so very effective = maximum)

No BLM Protest (CMPS '20): Over the past year, did you participate in a Black Lives Matter protest or a protest against police brutality? 1) Yes, 2) No (Coded where 1 = No)

No BLM Support (CMPS '20): Thinking about the issue of police violence and the Black Lives Matter movement, besides attending an event, did you ever engage on social media, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram or other websites either in support of BLM, in support of police, or to discuss the issue in general? (Allow multiple) 1) No, I did not engage online on this issue at all, 2) Yes, I engaged in support of BLM, 3) Yes, I engaged in support of police, 4) Yes, I engaged in general on the issue (Coded where 1 = did not indicate “engaged in support of BLM”)

P Failure of Experimental Manipulation

P.1 Design Details and Results

Table P4: An Experimental Manipulation of Threat Failed

	Threat
Threat Treatment	-0.05 (0.04)
R ²	0.11
N	276

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. Model includes pre-treatment covariate adjustment for age, woman, foreign-born, Mexican national origin, income, Democratic partisanship, Republican partisanship, and ideology. The results do not change excluding covariates. These results are excluded for brevity. All covariates rescaled between 0-1.

To assess if survey experimental interventions could cue a sense of *deportation threat* among acculturated Latinxs, we ran a two-arm survey experiment on Latinx undergraduates from a large West Coast public university ($N = 276$) in Spring 2021.¹⁵ This sample is of particular interest given it is a highly acculturated sample. For example, the sample is mostly U.S.-born (82%), higher than the U.S.-born proportion in the national Latinx population (66%). Since the theory in the main text is primarily concerned with how threat undercuts the adoption of anti-Black attitudes among acculturated Latinxs, the experiment serves as an effective theoretical test case for whether survey experimental cues could generate a sense of *deportation threat* among acculturated Latinxs.

Prior to treatment, we asked respondents about their demographic, socio-economic, and political attributes. We adjust for these pre-treatment covariates (age, woman, foreign-born, Mexican national origin, income, partisanship, and ideology).¹⁶ We randomly expose respondents to either a control or treatment vignette. The control vignette is a news story concerning the threat of alcoholism to undergraduate student performance (Figure P11). The treatment vignette is a news story concerning the threat of immigration enforcement, including the threat of immigration enforcement agencies operating on college campuses (Figure P12). We discuss the threat of immigration enforcement operating on college campuses to more strongly cue a sense of deportation threat among the sample, which is composed of undergraduate students. We attempted to keep the control and treatment vignettes similar in length, sentence structure, threatening descriptions in order to isolate the effects of inducing threat from immigration enforcement as opposed to a generalized sense of threat.

Post-treatment, respondents were asked a “manipulation check” question. This item is similar to the *deportation threat* measures in the main text. The item asks “Regardless of your own immigration or citizenship status, how worried or unworried are you that you, a family member, or a close friend could be deported?” The respondent can respond with 7 responses on a scale from “very worried” to “very unworried.” We rescale the item from 0-1 where the maximum is “very worried.” Table P4 displays the effect of the treatment vignette meant to cue *deportation threat* on the self-reported deportation threat item. The effect of the threatening treatment on the manipulation check item is nearly 0 and incorrectly signed. This suggests that the absence of a treatment effect is not simply a function of limited statistical power in light of our small sample size. This also suggests that survey experimental cues may be too weak to generate a sense of *deportation threat* among acculturated Latinxs, consistent with our theory that *threat* is very difficult to shift since it is a function of large policy changes and strong social ties with undocumented immigrants, not short-term experimental cues.

¹⁵The study was approved by the UCLA Institutional Review Board (IRB #21-000559)

¹⁶Balance tests demonstrate there is limited statistically significant covariate imbalance between respondents in the treatment and control conditions. There is only imbalance on ideology, which we adjust for, in addition to all other covariates (see Figure P13).

P.2 Experimental Treatments

P.2.1 Control

Reports Uncover Growing Risk of Alcoholism Among College Students

- *Associated Press (AP)*



Photo Credit: Matthew Vaughn

WASHINGTON (AP)— Nearly every college student has been impacted by alcohol use during their academic career – even if they have never drank themselves. For instance, a person can witness a friend’s drinking pattern worsening over time, gradually taking over their life.

Excessive alcohol consumption can take a toll on a student’s academics. Drinking may even become a priority over attending classes, completing homework and studying for exams. An estimated one in every four college students admit to having poor grades or other academic problems because of their drinking behavior.

College students who participate in frequent drinking activities are also more likely to develop a dependency on alcohol later in life. Although alcoholism typically results from years of drinking, it can also happen during periods of heavy and frequent drinking during college. Bad drinking habits in college can evolve into other issues, like alcoholism, in the future.

Figure P11: Control Condition Vignette.

P.2.2 Treatment

Reports Uncover Growing Risk of Immigration Customs & Enforcement Officers Detaining College Students

- Associated Press (AP)



Photo Credit: Matthew Vaughn

WASHINGTON (AP) – While many hoped for change under the Biden administration, recent reports reveal many of the wide-reaching Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) policies for deporting immigrants remain. ICE officers are being encouraged to cast a wide net in finding immigrants, investigating family members, and even friends of immigrants. The vast majority of immigrants detained and deported are Latino, constituting over 95% of removals.

Among these policies include partnerships with universities & increased ICE presence on college campuses. ICE has been increasingly focusing its efforts on targeting college students, in particular with sting operations such as the University of Farmington where ICE created a fake university to lure students into arrest for visa fraud.

Many of these operations, while allegedly targeting undocumented immigrants, detained and deported thousands of legal residents and hundreds of U.S citizens. Not only are immigrant students at risk but any Latino person ICE officers may suspect of being an immigrant. Reporters uncovered several stories of U.S Latino students being detained by ICE despite their U.S citizenship. Even those who provided legal documentation proving the contrary were arrested for suspicion of falsifying documents.

Figure P12: Treatment Condition Vignette.

P.3 Balance Tests




Figure P13: Balance Between Treatment and Control Conditions in Experiment. X-axis is the coefficient for the treatment condition. The y-axis is the covariate. Each estimate is from a separate regression model where the left hand side is the balance covariate and the right hand side is the experimental treatment. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed derived from HC2 robust standard errors.

Q Regression Tables

Q.1 Anti-Black Appraisal Outcomes

Table Q5: Deportation Threat Undercuts the Maintenance of Relative Anti-Black Appraisals via Acculturation Among Non-Black Latinxs

	Racial Resentment	Stereotype	Black = Threat	White Residential Pref.
Panel A: No Controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Acculturation x Threat	−0.16*** (0.03)	−0.22*** (0.05)	−0.20*** (0.05)	−0.42*** (0.08)
Acculturation	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.06* (0.02)	−0.03 (0.02)	−0.04 (0.04)
Threat	−0.03 [†] (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.05 (0.05)
R ²	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06
N	3614	3614	3614	3614
Panel B: Yes Controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Acculturation x Threat	−0.05 [†] (0.03)	−0.13** (0.05)	−0.11** (0.04)	−0.28*** (0.08)
Acculturation	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.05 [†] (0.03)	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.09* (0.04)
Threat	−0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.05)
R ²	0.46	0.20	0.23	0.18
N	3614	3614	3614	3614
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. Panel A characterizes coefficient estimates without adjusting for control covariates. Panel B characterizes coefficient estimates after adjusting for demographic, socio-economic, political, and contextual covariates in addition to census area fixed effects. All covariates rescaled between 0-1 for interpretability. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

Q.2 Opposition to Black Interests Outcome

Table Q6: Deportation That Undercuts Opposition to Black Political Interests via Acculturation Among Non-Black Latinxs

	Oppose BLM	BLM Ineffective	Anti-BLM FT	Oppose BLM	BLM Ineffective	BLM No Protest	BLM No Support
Panel A: No Controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Acculturation x Threat	-0.17** (0.05)	-0.26*** (0.08)	-0.26*** (0.05)	-0.26*** (0.04)	-0.20*** (0.04)	-0.22*** (0.05)	-0.30*** (0.05)
Acculturation	0.05 (0.03)	0.21*** (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)	0.07** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)
Threat	-0.12** (0.04)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.11** (0.03)	-0.10** (0.03)
R ²	0.08	0.11	0.04	0.09	0.05	0.07	0.07
N	2538	2171	3614	3614	3614	3614	3614
Panel B: Yes Controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Acculturation x Threat	-0.17** (0.05)	-0.17* (0.07)	-0.12 [†] (0.06)	-0.15** (0.05)	-0.14** (0.05)	-0.17** (0.06)	-0.20** (0.07)
Acculturation	0.08* (0.04)	0.16*** (0.05)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.04 [†] (0.02)	0.10*** (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.03)
Threat	0.03 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.06)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)
R ²	0.31	0.28	0.30	0.43	0.23	0.20	0.25
N	2538	2171	3614	3614	3614	3614	3614
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. Panel A characterizes coefficient estimates without adjusting for control covariates. Panel B characterizes coefficient estimates after adjusting for demographic, socio-economic, political, and contextual covariates in addition to census area fixed effects. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

R Ruling Out Alternative Mechanisms

R.1 Established Mechanisms

Here we present tables characterizing coefficients of the *acculturation* and *threat* interaction for our outcomes of interest including adjustments to account for alternative mechanisms. Each mechanism/outcome category adds additional covariate interactions with *acculturation* to the model in addition to the full set of control covariates that we explicate in the main text. Bolded lines in the table characterize the coefficients of interest (that is, the interaction between *threat* and *acculturation*).

Table R7: Threat Undercuts The Adoption of or Maintenance of Anti-Black Beliefs As Non-Black Latinxs Acculturate Net of Established Alternative Mechanisms (Part 1)

Dataset	Outcome	Mechanism	Name	Coef.	SE	pval
CMPS '16	Oppose BLM	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Threat	-0.175	0.055	0.001
CMPS '16	Oppose BLM	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Education	-0.041	0.083	0.624
CMPS '16	BLM Ineffective	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Threat	-0.181	0.072	0.012
CMPS '16	BLM Ineffective	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Education	-0.093	0.106	0.380
CMPS '16	Oppose BLM	Discrimination	Acculturation x Threat	-0.108	0.058	0.061
CMPS '16	Oppose BLM	Discrimination	Acculturation x Perceived Discrim.	-0.079	0.086	0.360
CMPS '16	Oppose BLM	Discrimination	Acculturation x Experienced Discrim.	-0.112	0.043	0.009
CMPS '16	BLM Ineffective	Discrimination	Acculturation x Threat	-0.137	0.079	0.083
CMPS '16	BLM Ineffective	Discrimination	Acculturation x Perceived Discrim.	-0.055	0.113	0.630
CMPS '16	BLM Ineffective	Discrimination	Acculturation x Experienced Discrim.	-0.060	0.055	0.275
CMPS '16	Oppose BLM	Linked Fate	Acculturation x Threat	-0.149	0.055	0.007
CMPS '16	Oppose BLM	Linked Fate	Acculturation x Linked Fate	-0.073	0.043	0.090
CMPS '16	BLM Ineffective	Linked Fate	Acculturation x Threat	-0.157	0.077	0.043
CMPS '16	BLM Ineffective	Linked Fate	Acculturation x Linked Fate	-0.045	0.060	0.456
CMPS '16	Oppose BLM	Skin Color	Acculturation x Threat	-0.170	0.054	0.002
CMPS '16	Oppose BLM	Skin Color	Acculturation x Skin Color	-0.071	0.085	0.407
CMPS '16	BLM Ineffective	Skin Color	Acculturation x Threat	-0.166	0.074	0.026
CMPS '16	BLM Ineffective	Skin Color	Acculturation x Skin Color	-0.127	0.122	0.300
CMPS '16	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Threat	-0.160	0.056	0.004
CMPS '16	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income	0.148	0.092	0.109
CMPS '16	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income (Refused)	-0.017	0.062	0.782
CMPS '16	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Unemployed	-0.082	0.052	0.114
CMPS '16	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Retro. Econ Worse	0.037	0.043	0.387
CMPS '16	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x % Unemployed (Zip)	-0.001	0.008	0.947
CMPS '16	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x % Unemployed (County)	0.016	0.269	0.952
CMPS '16	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Political Competition	0.114	0.086	0.185
CMPS '16	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Latinx College Advantage	1.179	1.089	0.279
CMPS '16	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Latinx Poverty Advantage	0.469	1.821	0.797
CMPS '16	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Threat	-0.163	0.077	0.033
CMPS '16	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income	0.007	0.125	0.958
CMPS '16	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income (Refused)	-0.042	0.069	0.547
CMPS '16	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Unemployed	-0.131	0.082	0.111
CMPS '16	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Retro. Econ Worse	0.046	0.058	0.432
CMPS '16	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x % Unemployed (Zip)	0.007	0.009	0.455
CMPS '16	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x % Unemployed (County)	-0.494	0.326	0.129
CMPS '16	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Political Competition	0.182	0.115	0.115
CMPS '16	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Latinx College Advantage	-1.952	1.375	0.156
CMPS '16	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Latinx Poverty Advantage	3.085	2.062	0.135

Table R8: Threat Undercuts The Adoption of or Maintenance of Anti-Black Beliefs As Non-Black Latinxs Acculturate Net of Established Alternative Mechanisms (Part 2)

Dataset	Outcome	Mechanism	Name	Coef.	SE	pval
CMPS '20	Racial Resentment	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Threat	-0.048	0.028	0.091
CMPS '20	Racial Resentment	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Education	-0.022	0.038	0.566
CMPS '20	Stereotype	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Threat	-0.124	0.047	0.009
CMPS '20	Stereotype	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Education	0.112	0.061	0.064
CMPS '20	Black Threat	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Threat	-0.124	0.044	0.005
CMPS '20	Black Threat	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Education	-0.117	0.056	0.037
CMPS '20	White Res. Pref.	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Threat	-0.269	0.077	0.001
CMPS '20	White Res. Pref.	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Education	0.095	0.104	0.362
CMPS '20	Anti-BLM FT	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Threat	-0.107	0.051	0.037
CMPS '20	Anti-BLM FT	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Education	0.091	0.067	0.173
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Threat	-0.099	0.038	0.009
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Education	0.043	0.049	0.376
CMPS '20	BLM Ineffective	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Threat	-0.110	0.043	0.011
CMPS '20	BLM Ineffective	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Education	0.032	0.060	0.597
CMPS '20	BLM No Protest	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Threat	-0.094	0.047	0.046
CMPS '20	BLM No Protest	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Education	-0.007	0.060	0.908
CMPS '20	BLM No Support	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Threat	-0.106	0.050	0.033
CMPS '20	BLM No Support	Social Desirability	Acculturation x Education	0.111	0.062	0.074
CMPS '20	Racial Resentment	Discrimination	Acculturation x Threat	-0.042	0.030	0.157
CMPS '20	Racial Resentment	Discrimination	Acculturation x Perceived Discrim.	-0.087	0.033	0.009
CMPS '20	Racial Resentment	Discrimination	Acculturation x Experienced Discrim.	0.027	0.022	0.223
CMPS '20	Stereotype	Discrimination	Acculturation x Threat	-0.121	0.048	0.012
CMPS '20	Stereotype	Discrimination	Acculturation x Perceived Discrim.	-0.130	0.058	0.026
CMPS '20	Stereotype	Discrimination	Acculturation x Experienced Discrim.	0.016	0.035	0.651
CMPS '20	Black Threat	Discrimination	Acculturation x Threat	-0.071	0.046	0.117
CMPS '20	Black Threat	Discrimination	Acculturation x Perceived Discrim.	-0.168	0.048	0.000
CMPS '20	Black Threat	Discrimination	Acculturation x Experienced Discrim.	-0.048	0.032	0.133
CMPS '20	White Res. Pref.	Discrimination	Acculturation x Threat	-0.251	0.079	0.002
CMPS '20	White Res. Pref.	Discrimination	Acculturation x Perceived Discrim.	-0.163	0.093	0.082
CMPS '20	White Res. Pref.	Discrimination	Acculturation x Experienced Discrim.	-0.006	0.061	0.925
CMPS '20	Anti-BLM FT	Discrimination	Acculturation x Threat	-0.111	0.053	0.036
CMPS '20	Anti-BLM FT	Discrimination	Acculturation x Perceived Discrim.	-0.043	0.056	0.449
CMPS '20	Anti-BLM FT	Discrimination	Acculturation x Experienced Discrim.	0.004	0.039	0.911
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Discrimination	Acculturation x Threat	-0.092	0.038	0.017
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Discrimination	Acculturation x Perceived Discrim.	-0.097	0.044	0.027
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Discrimination	Acculturation x Experienced Discrim.	0.008	0.028	0.780
CMPS '20	BLM Ineffective	Discrimination	Acculturation x Threat	-0.102	0.043	0.019
CMPS '20	BLM Ineffective	Discrimination	Acculturation x Perceived Discrim.	-0.050	0.053	0.342
CMPS '20	BLM Ineffective	Discrimination	Acculturation x Experienced Discrim.	-0.012	0.033	0.726
CMPS '20	BLM No Protest	Discrimination	Acculturation x Threat	-0.084	0.047	0.077
CMPS '20	BLM No Protest	Discrimination	Acculturation x Perceived Discrim.	-0.051	0.060	0.389
CMPS '20	BLM No Protest	Discrimination	Acculturation x Experienced Discrim.	-0.007	0.036	0.836
CMPS '20	BLM No Support	Discrimination	Acculturation x Threat	-0.078	0.052	0.131
CMPS '20	BLM No Support	Discrimination	Acculturation x Perceived Discrim.	-0.108	0.061	0.075
CMPS '20	BLM No Support	Discrimination	Acculturation x Experienced Discrim.	-0.067	0.041	0.098
CMPS '20	Racial Resentment	Linked Fate	Acculturation x Threat	-0.038	0.029	0.179
CMPS '20	Racial Resentment	Linked Fate	Acculturation x Linked Fate	-0.044	0.036	0.228
CMPS '20	Stereotype	Linked Fate	Acculturation x Threat	-0.139	0.047	0.003
CMPS '20	Stereotype	Linked Fate	Acculturation x Linked Fate	0.023	0.058	0.690
CMPS '20	Black Threat	Linked Fate	Acculturation x Threat	-0.114	0.045	0.012
CMPS '20	Black Threat	Linked Fate	Acculturation x Linked Fate	0.005	0.054	0.923
CMPS '20	White Res. Pref.	Linked Fate	Acculturation x Threat	-0.273	0.078	0.000
CMPS '20	White Res. Pref.	Linked Fate	Acculturation x Linked Fate	-0.030	0.095	0.754
CMPS '20	Anti-BLM FT	Linked Fate	Acculturation x Threat	-0.120	0.052	0.021
CMPS '20	Anti-BLM FT	Linked Fate	Acculturation x Linked Fate	0.025	0.060	0.673
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Linked Fate	Acculturation x Threat	-0.101	0.038	0.007
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Linked Fate	Acculturation x Linked Fate	-0.013	0.044	0.770
CMPS '20	BLM Ineffective	Linked Fate	Acculturation x Threat	-0.113	0.044	0.010
CMPS '20	BLM Ineffective	Linked Fate	Acculturation x Linked Fate	0.000	0.052	0.998
CMPS '20	BLM No Protest	Linked Fate	Acculturation x Threat	-0.085	0.049	0.080

Table R9: Threat Undercuts The Adoption of or Maintenance of Anti-Black Beliefs As Non-Black Latinxs Acculturate Net of Established Alternative Mechanisms (Part 3)

Dataset	Outcome	Mechanism	Name	Coef.	SE	pval
CMPS '20	BLM No Protest	Linked Fate	Acculturation x Linked Fate	-0.050	0.055	0.358
CMPS '20	BLM No Support	Linked Fate	Acculturation x Threat	-0.105	0.051	0.040
CMPS '20	BLM No Support	Linked Fate	Acculturation x Linked Fate	-0.069	0.063	0.279
CMPS '20	Racial Resentment	Skin Color	Acculturation x Threat	-0.048	0.028	0.090
CMPS '20	Racial Resentment	Skin Color	Acculturation x Skin Color	0.042	0.053	0.428
CMPS '20	Stereotype	Skin Color	Acculturation x Threat	-0.139	0.047	0.003
CMPS '20	Stereotype	Skin Color	Acculturation x Skin Color	0.117	0.105	0.269
CMPS '20	Black Threat	Skin Color	Acculturation x Threat	-0.116	0.044	0.008
CMPS '20	Black Threat	Skin Color	Acculturation x Skin Color	0.084	0.085	0.328
CMPS '20	White Res. Pref.	Skin Color	Acculturation x Threat	-0.283	0.077	0.000
CMPS '20	White Res. Pref.	Skin Color	Acculturation x Skin Color	0.135	0.154	0.379
CMPS '20	Anti-BLM FT	Skin Color	Acculturation x Threat	-0.111	0.051	0.030
CMPS '20	Anti-BLM FT	Skin Color	Acculturation x Skin Color	-0.131	0.105	0.211
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Skin Color	Acculturation x Threat	-0.099	0.038	0.009
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Skin Color	Acculturation x Skin Color	-0.127	0.091	0.165
CMPS '20	BLM Ineffective	Skin Color	Acculturation x Threat	-0.109	0.042	0.010
CMPS '20	BLM Ineffective	Skin Color	Acculturation x Skin Color	-0.099	0.088	0.261
CMPS '20	BLM No Protest	Skin Color	Acculturation x Threat	-0.094	0.047	0.047
CMPS '20	BLM No Protest	Skin Color	Acculturation x Skin Color	0.011	0.115	0.925
CMPS '20	BLM No Support	Skin Color	Acculturation x Threat	-0.123	0.050	0.014
CMPS '20	BLM No Support	Skin Color	Acculturation x Skin Color	0.155	0.121	0.199
CMPS '20	Racial Resentment	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Threat	-0.050	0.028	0.075
CMPS '20	Racial Resentment	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income	-0.007	0.037	0.850
CMPS '20	Racial Resentment	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income (Refused)	0.006	0.047	0.897
CMPS '20	Racial Resentment	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Unemployed	-0.048	0.026	0.072
CMPS '20	Racial Resentment	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Pers. Econ Worse	-0.011	0.051	0.832
CMPS '20	Racial Resentment	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Socio. Econ Worse	0.148	0.053	0.005
CMPS '20	Racial Resentment	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Group Econ Worse	-0.004	0.023	0.850
CMPS '20	Racial Resentment	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x % Unemployed	-0.084	0.129	0.515
CMPS '20	Racial Resentment	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Political Competition	0.069	0.069	0.318
CMPS '20	Racial Resentment	Intergroup Competition	Latinx Poverty Advantage	0.181	0.500	0.717
CMPS '20	Stereotype	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Threat	-0.127	0.048	0.008
CMPS '20	Stereotype	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income	0.012	0.060	0.836
CMPS '20	Stereotype	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income (Refused)	-0.005	0.076	0.949
CMPS '20	Stereotype	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Unemployed	-0.002	0.046	0.967
CMPS '20	Stereotype	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Pers. Econ Worse	-0.001	0.093	0.989
CMPS '20	Stereotype	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Socio. Econ Worse	-0.043	0.096	0.653
CMPS '20	Stereotype	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Group Econ Worse	-0.019	0.039	0.626
CMPS '20	Stereotype	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x % Unemployed	-0.124	0.178	0.485
CMPS '20	Stereotype	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Political Competition	0.014	0.113	0.904
CMPS '20	Stereotype	Intergroup Competition	Latinx Poverty Advantage	0.627	0.886	0.480
CMPS '20	Black Threat	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Threat	-0.110	0.044	0.013
CMPS '20	Black Threat	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income	-0.024	0.059	0.679
CMPS '20	Black Threat	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income (Refused)	0.095	0.068	0.166
CMPS '20	Black Threat	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Unemployed	-0.087	0.045	0.053
CMPS '20	Black Threat	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Pers. Econ Worse	0.062	0.091	0.494
CMPS '20	Black Threat	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Socio. Econ Worse	0.080	0.090	0.375
CMPS '20	Black Threat	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Group Econ Worse	0.010	0.037	0.784
CMPS '20	Black Threat	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x % Unemployed	-0.523	0.167	0.002
CMPS '20	Black Threat	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Political Competition	0.072	0.109	0.510
CMPS '20	Black Threat	Intergroup Competition	Latinx Poverty Advantage	1.192	0.794	0.133
CMPS '20	White Res. Pref.	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Threat	-0.282	0.078	0.000
CMPS '20	White Res. Pref.	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income	-0.027	0.108	0.802
CMPS '20	White Res. Pref.	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income (Refused)	-0.042	0.128	0.743
CMPS '20	White Res. Pref.	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Unemployed	-0.052	0.078	0.505
CMPS '20	White Res. Pref.	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Pers. Econ Worse	-0.046	0.153	0.765
CMPS '20	White Res. Pref.	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Socio. Econ Worse	0.005	0.150	0.973
CMPS '20	White Res. Pref.	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Group Econ Worse	-0.020	0.069	0.777
CMPS '20	White Res. Pref.	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x % Unemployed	0.473	0.337	0.161
CMPS '20	White Res. Pref.	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Political Competition	-0.021	0.182	0.907

Table R10: Threat Undercuts The Adoption of or Maintenance of Anti-Black Beliefs As Non-Black Latinxs Acculturate Net of Established Alternative Mechanisms (Part 4)

Dataset	Outcome	Mechanism	Name	Coef.	SE	pval
CMPS '20	White Res. Pref.	Intergroup Competition	Latinx Poverty Advantage	0.724	1.541	0.639
CMPS '20	Anti-BLM FT	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Threat	-0.128	0.051	0.012
CMPS '20	Anti-BLM FT	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income	-0.080	0.066	0.227
CMPS '20	Anti-BLM FT	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income (Refused)	0.007	0.079	0.927
CMPS '20	Anti-BLM FT	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Unemployed	-0.024	0.051	0.637
CMPS '20	Anti-BLM FT	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Pers. Econ Worse	-0.025	0.098	0.802
CMPS '20	Anti-BLM FT	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Socio. Econ Worse	0.197	0.103	0.056
CMPS '20	Anti-BLM FT	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Group Econ Worse	-0.046	0.041	0.259
CMPS '20	Anti-BLM FT	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x % Unemployed	-0.490	0.241	0.042
CMPS '20	Anti-BLM FT	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Political Competition	0.028	0.124	0.820
CMPS '20	Anti-BLM FT	Intergroup Competition	Latinx Poverty Advantage	-0.391	0.945	0.679
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Threat	-0.101	0.038	0.007
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income	-0.002	0.050	0.967
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income (Refused)	0.006	0.058	0.920
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Unemployed	-0.046	0.036	0.200
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Pers. Econ Worse	0.054	0.081	0.501
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Socio. Econ Worse	0.015	0.088	0.865
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Group Econ Worse	-0.047	0.031	0.134
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x % Unemployed	-0.471	0.158	0.003
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Political Competition	0.069	0.090	0.443
CMPS '20	Oppose BLM	Intergroup Competition	Latinx Poverty Advantage	-0.383	0.660	0.562
CMPS '20	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Threat	-0.123	0.043	0.004
CMPS '20	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income	-0.012	0.064	0.848
CMPS '20	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income (Refused)	-0.021	0.075	0.777
CMPS '20	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Unemployed	0.013	0.040	0.751
CMPS '20	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Pers. Econ Worse	0.020	0.088	0.820
CMPS '20	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Socio. Econ Worse	0.174	0.086	0.043
CMPS '20	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Group Econ Worse	-0.056	0.035	0.115
CMPS '20	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x % Unemployed	-0.192	0.184	0.297
CMPS '20	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Political Competition	0.190	0.098	0.052
CMPS '20	BLM Ineffective	Intergroup Competition	Latinx Poverty Advantage	-0.196	0.807	0.808
CMPS '20	BLM No Protest	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Threat	-0.095	0.047	0.044
CMPS '20	BLM No Protest	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income	0.052	0.070	0.460
CMPS '20	BLM No Protest	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income (Refused)	0.012	0.083	0.883
CMPS '20	BLM No Protest	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Unemployed	-0.032	0.047	0.494
CMPS '20	BLM No Protest	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Pers. Econ Worse	0.064	0.100	0.527
CMPS '20	BLM No Protest	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Socio. Econ Worse	0.039	0.095	0.682
CMPS '20	BLM No Protest	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Group Econ Worse	0.005	0.042	0.897
CMPS '20	BLM No Protest	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x % Unemployed	-0.266	0.190	0.161
CMPS '20	BLM No Protest	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Political Competition	-0.188	0.106	0.075
CMPS '20	BLM No Protest	Intergroup Competition	Latinx Poverty Advantage	0.931	0.920	0.312
CMPS '20	BLM No Support	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Threat	-0.122	0.050	0.015
CMPS '20	BLM No Support	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income	0.065	0.077	0.400
CMPS '20	BLM No Support	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Income (Refused)	-0.086	0.084	0.305
CMPS '20	BLM No Support	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Unemployed	-0.052	0.050	0.302
CMPS '20	BLM No Support	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Pers. Econ Worse	0.048	0.095	0.615
CMPS '20	BLM No Support	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Socio. Econ Worse	0.151	0.092	0.101
CMPS '20	BLM No Support	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Prospective Group Econ Worse	0.019	0.044	0.665
CMPS '20	BLM No Support	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x % Unemployed	-0.327	0.229	0.153
CMPS '20	BLM No Support	Intergroup Competition	Acculturation x Political Competition	-0.207	0.116	0.075
CMPS '20	BLM No Support	Intergroup Competition	Latinx Poverty Advantage	0.982	0.912	0.281

R.2 Accounting For All Mechanisms Simultaneously

Table R11: Deportation Threat Undercuts the Maintenance of Relative Anti-Black Appraisals via Acculturation Among Non-Black Latinxs Even After Adjusting For Interactions Between Acculturation and Multiple Alternative Mechanisms

	Racial Resentment	Stereotype	Black = Threat	White Residential Pref.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Acculturation x Threat	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.11 [†] (0.05)	−0.10 [†] (0.05)	−0.20* (0.09)
Acculturation	−0.19** (0.07)	0.08 (0.13)	0.13 (0.12)	−0.14 (0.20)
Threat	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.00 (0.04)	−0.00 (0.03)	−0.01 (0.06)
R ²	0.48	0.21	0.24	0.19
N	3610	3610	3610	3610
Acculturation Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. Panel A characterizes coefficient estimates without adjusting for control covariates. Panel B characterizes coefficient estimates after adjusting for demographic, socio-economic, political, and contextual covariates in addition to census area fixed effects. All covariates rescaled between 0-1 for interpretability. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table R12: Deportation That Undercuts Opposition to Black Political Interests via Acculturation Among Non-Black Latinxs Even After Adjusting For Interactions Between Acculturation and Multiple Alternative Mechanisms

	Oppose BLM	BLM Ineffective	Anti-BLM FT	Oppose BLM	BLM Ineffective	BLM No Protest	BLM No Support
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Acculturation x Threat	-0.16*	-0.16†	-0.12*	-0.10*	-0.10*	-0.11*	-0.09
	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Acculturation	0.06	0.23	-0.12	-0.10	0.22†	-0.09	-0.10
	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Threat	0.02	-0.02	0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
R ²	0.34	0.31	0.31	0.44	0.25	0.22	0.26
N	2538	2171	3610	3610	3610	3610	3610
Acculturation Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$. Panel A characterizes coefficient estimates without adjusting for control covariates. Panel B characterizes coefficient estimates after adjusting for demographic, socio-economic, political, and contextual covariates in addition to census area fixed effects. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

S Robustness Checks

S.1 Ruling Out Alternative Residential Preference Motivations




Figure S14: Anti-Black Attitudes Are More Strongly Associated With White Residential Preference than Alternative Motivations for White Residential Preference. The y-axis is the covariate, the x-axis is the coefficient. Estimates from a single regression model where *white residential preference* is the outcome. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed derived from HC2 robust standard errors.

S.2 Validating *Black Threat* Measure

Table S13: The *Black Threat* Measure Proxies for Anti-Black Appraisals

	Racial Resentment (1)	Anti-Black Stereotype (2)
Black Threat	0.34*** (0.01)	0.42*** (0.02)
Asian Threat	-0.04 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)
Jewish Threat	-0.08** (0.03)	-0.08* (0.04)
R ²	0.22	0.20
N	3614	3614

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

S.3 Validating BLM Thermometer Measure




Figure S15: Warmth Toward BLM is Strongly Associated with Pro-Black Policy Preferences Among Non-Black Respondents (ANES 2020). The y-axis is the covariate, the x-axis is the coefficient. Estimates from a single regression model where support for preferential hiring of Black people (Panel A) and support for government aid to Blacks (Panel B) is the outcome. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed derived from HC2 robust standard errors.

S.4 Including Black Latinxs

Table S14: Deportation Threat Undercuts the Maintenance of Relative Anti-Black Appraisals via Acculturation Among All Latinxs

	Racial Resentment	Stereotype	Black Threat	White Residential Pref.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Acculturation x Threat	−0.05* (0.03)	−0.11* (0.04)	−0.12** (0.04)	−0.25*** (0.07)
Acculturation	−0.00 (0.02)	−0.05* (0.03)	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.11** (0.04)
Threat	−0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.05)
R ²	0.45	0.18	0.22	0.19
N	4016	4016	4016	4016
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$. All models adjust for demographic, socio-economic, political, and contextual covariates in addition to census area fixed effects. All covariates rescaled between 0-1 for interpretability. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table S15: Deportation threat Undercuts Opposition to Pro-Black Political Interests via Acculturation Among All Latinxs

	Oppose BLM	BLM Ineffective	Anti-BLM FT	Oppose BLM	BLM Ineffective	BLM No Protest	BLM No Support
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Acculturation x Threat	−0.17*** (0.05)	−0.22** (0.07)	−0.13** (0.05)	−0.11** (0.04)	−0.12** (0.04)	−0.13** (0.05)	−0.12* (0.05)
Acculturation	0.07* (0.03)	0.15*** (0.04)	−0.00 (0.03)	0.04* (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	−0.00 (0.02)	−0.09*** (0.03)
Threat	0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)	−0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.01 (0.03)
R ²	0.31	0.25	0.29	0.42	0.21	0.21	0.23
N	3009	2593	4016	4016	4016	4016	4016
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$. All models adjust for demographic, socio-economic, political, and contextual covariates in addition to census area fixed effects. All covariates rescaled between 0-1 for interpretability. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

S.5 Excluding Puerto Ricans

Table S16: Deportation Threat Undercuts the Maintenance of Relative Anti-Black Appraisals via Acculturation Among non-Black Latinxs (Excluding Puerto Ricans)

	Racial Resentment	Stereotype	Black = Threat	White Residential Pref.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Acculturation x Threat	-0.06 [†] (0.03)	-0.14** (0.05)	-0.12** (0.05)	-0.29*** (0.08)
Acculturation	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.10* (0.05)
Threat	-0.00 (0.02)	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.06)
R ²	0.35	0.17	0.22	0.17
N	3138	3138	3138	3138
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. All models adjust for demographic, socio-economic, political, and contextual covariates in addition to census area fixed effects. All covariates rescaled between 0-1 for interpretability. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table S17: Deportation threat Undercuts Opposition to Pro-Black Political Interests via Acculturation Among non-Black Latinxs (Excluding Puerto Ricans)

	Oppose BLM	BLM Ineffective	Anti-BLM FT	Oppose BLM	BLM Ineffective	BLM No Protest	BLM No Support
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Acculturation x Threat	-0.17** (0.06)	-0.18* (0.08)	-0.13* (0.05)	-0.10** (0.04)	-0.11* (0.04)	-0.09 [†] (0.05)	-0.11* (0.05)
Acculturation	0.08* (0.04)	0.16*** (0.05)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.02)	0.11*** (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.03)
Threat	0.03 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.06)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.06 [†] (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
R ²	0.31	0.29	0.29	0.42	0.23	0.21	0.25
N	2215	1894	3138	3138	3138	3138	3138
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. All models adjust for demographic, socio-economic, political, and contextual covariates in addition to census area fixed effects. All covariates rescaled between 0-1 for interpretability. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

S.6 Ruling Out Secular Liberalism

Table S18: Threat Does Not Motivate the Adoption of Race-Irrelevant Liberal Attitudes Nor Does It Do So More Strongly Among Acculturated Latinxs

	Ban SSM	Obamacare	Taxes	Climate	Ideology	Ideology
Panel A: No Interaction	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat	-0.06 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.08 (0.07)
R ²	0.26	0.19	0.18	0.27	0.20	0.50
N	2538	2538	2538	2538	2538	3614
Panel B: Interaction	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Acculturation x Threat	0.04 (0.07)	0.02 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)	0.01 (0.07)	0.01 (0.16)
Acculturation	0.07 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	0.08 (0.09)
Threat	-0.08 (0.05)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.06)	0.08 (0.12)
R ²	0.26	0.19	0.18	0.27	0.20	0.50
N	2538	2538	2538	2538	2538	3614
Sample	CMPS '16	CMPS '16	CMPS '16	CMPS '16	CMPS '16	CMPS '20
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. Ban SSM = support banning gay marriage, Obamacare = support not repealing Obamacare, Taxes = support taxes on wealthy, Climate = support for laws to combat climate change, Ideology = 7 point liberal/conservative scale. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. HC2 robust SEs in parentheses.

S.7 Ruling out “Conservative Principles”

Table S19: Threat Does Not Motivate the Adoption of Conservative Principles Nor Does It Do So More Strongly Among Acculturated Latinxs

Panel A: No Interaction	Immigrant Work Ethic (1)	Protestant Work Ethic (2)
Threat	−0.02 (0.01)	−0.02 (0.01)
R ²	0.23	0.27
N	3611	3611
Panel B: Interaction	Immigrant Work Ethic (1)	Protestant Work Ethic (2)
Acculturation x Threat	−0.04 (0.03)	−0.01 (0.03)
Acculturation	−0.03 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Threat	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.02)
R ²	0.23	0.27
N	3611	3611
Demographic Controls	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	Y

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. All models adjust for demographic, socio-economic, political, and contextual covariates in addition to census area fixed effects. All covariates rescaled between 0-1 for interpretability. All estimates use CMPS '20 data. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

Immigrant Work Ethic is an additive index (rescaled between 0-1) of the following items with 5 responses from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree:” 1) Most people who want to get ahead can make it if they are willing to work hard (max = strongly agree). 2) It is possible to start out poor in this country, work hard, and become well-off (max = strongly agree). 3) Government should provide income support to those who try to provide for themselves but who cannot adequately do so? (max = strongly disagree) 4) It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes? (max = strongly disagree)

Protestant Work Ethic is an additive index of the following items with 4 responses from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree” rescaled between 0-1. 1) If you earn a lot of money, you should give most of it away and live modestly (max = strongly disagree). 2) People should be allowed to compete to ensure the best person wins (max = strongly agree), 3) I’ve benefited from working hard, so there’s no reason others can’t. (max = strongly agree). 4) A problem with government social programs is that they get in the way of personal freedom (max = strongly agree).

S.8 Ruling Out Secular Support For Marginalized Groups

Table S20: Association Between Threat, and Threat Interacted With Acculturation, With Attitudes Toward Marginalized Groups Without Explicit Reference to Blackness

	Oppose LGBTQ+ Activism	Sexism Scale 1	Sexism Scale 2	Muslim Resentment
Panel A: No Interaction	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Threat	0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
R ²	0.33	0.34	0.20	0.18
N	2538	3614	3614	3614
Panel B: w/ Interaction	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Threat x Acculturation	-0.08 (0.06)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.08* (0.04)
Acculturation	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Threat	0.06 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)
R ²	0.33	0.34	0.20	0.18
N	2538	3614	3614	3614
Survey	CMPS '16	CMPS '20	CMPS '20	CMPS '20
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

Oppose LGBTQ+ activism is based on an item in the 2016 CMPS asking “How strongly do you support or oppose gay, lesbian, and bisexual rights activism?” with response options for 1) Strongly support, 2) Somewhat support, 3) Neither support or oppose, 4) Somewhat oppose, 5) Strongly oppose. Rescaled between 0-1 such that 1 = strongly oppose and 0 = strongly support.

Sexism scale 1 is based on an index of three items. The first item asks respondents if they “agree with the following: in the best kind of government, about half of all elected officials would be women.” The second asks if they agree with whether “men make better political leaders than women do.” The third asks if they agree “discrimination against women is no longer a problem in the U.S. The responses are 1) strongly agree, 2) somewhat agree, 3) neither agree nor disagree, 4) somewhat disagree, and 5) strongly disagree. The first item is rescaled where strongly disagree is the maximum, and the second and third items are rescaled where strongly agree is the maximum. The items are added to one another in an additive index, and are rescaled between 0-1.

Sexism scale 2 is based on an index of 6 items. 1) “Many women interpret innocent remarks or acts as being sexist,” 2) “Most women fail to appreciate fully all that men do

for them,” 3) “Women seek to gain power by getting control over men,” 4) “Once a woman gets a man to commit to her, she tries to put him on a tight leash,” 5) “Women should be cherished and protected by men,” 6) “Men are incomplete without women.” Responses are 1) agree strongly, 2) agree somewhat, 3) neither agree nor disagree, 4) disagree somewhat, 5) disagree strongly. All items are rescaled so that “agree strongly” is the maximum. These items are added to one another in an additive index, and are rescaled between 0-1.

Muslim resentment is based on an index of 4 items. 1) “Most Muslims integrate successfully into American culture,” 2) “Most Muslim Americans reject jihad and violence,” 3) “Most Muslim Americans are not terrorists,” 4) “Muslim Americans do a good job of speaking out against Islamic terrorism.” Responses are 1) Strongly disagree, 2) Somewhat disagree, 3) Neither agree nor disagree, 4) Somewhat agree, 5) Strongly agree. All items are rescaled such that “strongly disagree” is the maximum. These items are added to one another in an additive index, and are rescaled between 0-1.

S.9 Factorizing Acculturation Scale

Table S21: Deportation Threat Undercuts the Maintenance of Relative Anti-Black Appraisals via Acculturation Among non-Black Latinxs (w/ Factorized Acculturation Scale)

	Racial Resentment	Stereotype	Black = Threat	White Residential Pref.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Acculturation (1) x Threat	0.01 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.19* (0.10)
Acculturation (2) x Threat	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.10)
Acculturation (3) x Threat	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.10* (0.05)	-0.09 [†] (0.05)	-0.28*** (0.08)
Acculturation (4) x Threat	-0.06 (0.03)	-0.15** (0.05)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.31*** (0.09)
R ²	0.36	0.18	0.22	0.17
N	3614	3614	3614	3614
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. Linear terms for acculturation and threat are omitted to save space. All models adjust for demographic, socio-economic, political, and contextual covariates in addition to census area fixed effects. All covariates rescaled between 0-1 for interpretability. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table S22: Deportation threat Undercuts Opposition to Pro-Black Political Interests via Acculturation Among non-Black Latinxs (w/ Factorized Acculturation Scale)

	Oppose BLM	BLM Ineffective	Anti-BLM FT	Oppose BLM	BLM Ineffective	BLM No Protest	BLM No Support
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Acculturation (1) x Threat	0.05 (0.08)	-0.15 (0.11)	0.06 (0.07)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.12* (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)
Acculturation (2) x Threat	-0.24** (0.08)	-0.35*** (0.10)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)
Acculturation (3) x Threat	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.19 [†] (0.10)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.12** (0.04)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)
Acculturation (4) x Threat	-0.17** (0.06)	-0.31*** (0.09)	-0.12* (0.06)	-0.11* (0.04)	-0.12** (0.05)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)
R ²	0.32	0.30	0.29	0.42	0.23	0.21	0.25
N	2538	2171	3614	3614	3614	3614	3614
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. Linear terms for acculturation and threat are omitted to save space. All models adjust for demographic, socio-economic, political, and contextual covariates in addition to census area fixed effects. All covariates rescaled between 0-1 for interpretability. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

S.10 Alternative Acculturation Specifications

Table S23: Alternative Acculturation Specifications

Specification	Coefficient	SE	p-value	Outcome	Survey
US-Born x Threat	-0.09	0.04	0.03	Oppose BLM	CMPS '16
Citizen x Threat	-0.15	0.05	0.00	Oppose BLM	CMPS '16
English x Threat	-0.14	0.05	0.01	Oppose BLM	CMPS '16
Second Gen x Threat	-0.06	0.06	0.33	Oppose BLM	CMPS '16
Third Gen x Threat	-0.12	0.04	0.01	Oppose BLM	CMPS '16
New Acculturation x Threat	-0.16	0.05	0.00	Oppose BLM	CMPS '16
US-Born x Threat	-0.08	0.05	0.13	BLM Ineffective	CMPS '16
Citizen x Threat	-0.18	0.07	0.01	BLM Ineffective	CMPS '16
English x Threat	-0.20	0.08	0.01	BLM Ineffective	CMPS '16
Second Gen x Threat	-0.04	0.07	0.55	BLM Ineffective	CMPS '16
Third Gen x Threat	-0.15	0.06	0.01	BLM Ineffective	CMPS '16
New Acculturation x Threat	-0.14	0.07	0.05	BLM Ineffective	CMPS '16
US-Born x Threat	-0.03	0.02	0.10	Racial Resentment	CMPS '20
Citizen x Threat	-0.02	0.03	0.37	Racial Resentment	CMPS '20
English x Threat	-0.05	0.02	0.05	Racial Resentment	CMPS '20
Second Gen x Threat	-0.02	0.02	0.32	Racial Resentment	CMPS '20
Third Gen x Threat	-0.05	0.03	0.06	Racial Resentment	CMPS '20
New Acculturation x Threat	-0.07	0.03	0.01	Racial Resentment	CMPS '20
US-Born x Threat	-0.09	0.03	0.00	Stereotype	CMPS '20
Citizen x Threat	-0.05	0.04	0.19	Stereotype	CMPS '20
English x Threat	-0.10	0.04	0.01	Stereotype	CMPS '20
Second Gen x Threat	-0.08	0.04	0.03	Stereotype	CMPS '20
Third Gen x Threat	-0.12	0.04	0.00	Stereotype	CMPS '20
New Acculturation x Threat	-0.17	0.04	0.00	Stereotype	CMPS '20
US-Born x Threat	-0.07	0.03	0.03	Black Threat	CMPS '20
Citizen x Threat	-0.02	0.04	0.62	Black Threat	CMPS '20
English x Threat	-0.13	0.03	0.00	Black Threat	CMPS '20
Second Gen x Threat	-0.06	0.04	0.11	Black Threat	CMPS '20
Third Gen x Threat	-0.08	0.04	0.04	Black Threat	CMPS '20
New Acculturation x Threat	-0.16	0.04	0.00	Black Threat	CMPS '20
US-Born x Threat	-0.21	0.05	0.00	White Residential Preference	CMPS '20
Citizen x Threat	-0.09	0.06	0.14	White Residential Preference	CMPS '20
English x Threat	-0.26	0.06	0.00	White Residential Preference	CMPS '20
Second Gen x Threat	-0.21	0.06	0.00	White Residential Preference	CMPS '20
Third Gen x Threat	-0.22	0.07	0.00	White Residential Preference	CMPS '20
New Acculturation x Threat	-0.35	0.07	0.00	White Residential Preference	CMPS '20
US-Born x Threat	-0.08	0.03	0.02	Anti-BLM FT	CMPS '20
Citizen x Threat	-0.03	0.04	0.46	Anti-BLM FT	CMPS '20
English x Threat	-0.08	0.04	0.08	Anti-BLM FT	CMPS '20
Second Gen x Threat	-0.05	0.04	0.20	Anti-BLM FT	CMPS '20
Third Gen x Threat	-0.14	0.04	0.00	Anti-BLM FT	CMPS '20
New Acculturation x Threat	-0.16	0.05	0.00	Anti-BLM FT	CMPS '20
US-Born x Threat	-0.07	0.03	0.00	Oppose BLM	CMPS '20
Citizen x Threat	-0.08	0.03	0.01	Oppose BLM	CMPS '20
English x Threat	-0.04	0.03	0.18	Oppose BLM	CMPS '20
Second Gen x Threat	-0.05	0.03	0.06	Oppose BLM	CMPS '20
Third Gen x Threat	-0.11	0.03	0.00	Oppose BLM	CMPS '20
New Acculturation x Threat	-0.10	0.04	0.00	Oppose BLM	CMPS '20
US-Born x Threat	-0.07	0.03	0.01	BLM Ineffective	CMPS '20
Citizen x Threat	-0.09	0.03	0.01	BLM Ineffective	CMPS '20
English x Threat	-0.08	0.04	0.02	BLM Ineffective	CMPS '20
Second Gen x Threat	-0.07	0.03	0.04	BLM Ineffective	CMPS '20
Third Gen x Threat	-0.08	0.04	0.03	BLM Ineffective	CMPS '20
New Acculturation x Threat	-0.10	0.04	0.02	BLM Ineffective	CMPS '20
US-Born x Threat	-0.06	0.03	0.06	BLM No Protest	CMPS '20
Citizen x Threat	-0.05	0.04	0.25	BLM No Protest	CMPS '20
English x Threat	-0.08	0.04	0.04	BLM No Protest	CMPS '20
Second Gen x Threat	-0.06	0.04	0.12	BLM No Protest	CMPS '20
Third Gen x Threat	-0.08	0.04	0.09	BLM No Protest	CMPS '20
New Acculturation x Threat	-0.11	0.05	0.02	BLM No Protest	CMPS '20
US-Born x Threat	-0.13	0.04	0.00	BLM No Support	CMPS '20
Citizen x Threat	-0.04	0.04	0.32	BLM No Support	CMPS '20
English x Threat	-0.03	0.04	0.42	BLM No Support	CMPS '20
Second Gen x Threat	-0.14	0.04	0.00	BLM No Support	CMPS '20
Third Gen x Threat	-0.11	0.05	0.02	BLM No Support	CMPS '20
New Acculturation x Threat	-0.15	0.05	0.00	BLM No Support	CMPS '20
US-Born x Threat	-0.03	0.01	0.07	Don't Defund	CMPS '20
Citizen x Threat	-0.01	0.02	0.71	Don't Defund	CMPS '20
English x Threat	-0.04	0.02	0.02	Don't Defund	CMPS '20
Second Gen x Threat	-0.01	0.02	0.39	Don't Defund	CMPS '20
Third Gen x Threat	-0.04	0.02	0.01	Don't Defund	CMPS '20
New Acculturation x Threat	-0.06	0.02	0.01	Don't Defund	CMPS '20

Note: Each specification is from a separate fully-specified regression model with the exception of the estimates for *SecondGeneration* × *Threat* and *ThirdGeneration* × *Threat*, which are from the same model. The “New Acculturation” index excludes citizenship status. HC2 robust standard errors presented.

S.11 Validating BLM Protest Measure




Figure S16: Objective Protest Measures Are Associated With Self-Reported BLM Protest Participation. Panel A is the association between the BLM protest rate (x-axis, number of protests normalized over county population, then multiplied by 10,000 inhabitants) and self-reported BLM protest participation (y-axis, $\beta = 1.06$, $SE = .61$, $p < 0.10$). Panel B is the association between the logged BLM protest rate (x-axis) and self-reported BLM protest participation (y-axis, $\beta = 0.86$, $SE = .42$, $p < 0.05$). All covariates scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed derived from HC2 robust standard errors clustered at the county-level. Protest data are from ACLED (see <https://acleddata.com/data-export-tool/>).