

# How Social Ties with Undocumented Immigrants Motivate Latinx Political Participation

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## Abstract

Prior research suggests social ties with undocumented immigrants among Latinxs may increase political engagement despite constraints undocumented social networks may introduce. We build on prior research and find across six surveys of Latinxs that social ties with undocumented immigrants are reliably associated with collective, identity expressive activities such as protesting, but not activities where immigration may not be immediately relevant, such as voting. Moreover, we assess a series of mechanisms to resolve the puzzle of heightened participation despite constraints. Consistent with prior research at the intersection of anti-immigrant threat and Social Identity Theory, we find Latinxs with strong ethnic identification are more likely to engage in political protest in the presence of social ties with undocumented immigrants, whereas weak identifiers disengage. We rule out alternative mechanisms that could link undocumented social ties with participation including political efficacy, a sense of injustice, linked fate, acculturation, out-group perceptions of immigration status, partisan identity, conducive opportunity structures, pro-sociality, and liberal ideological motivations irrelevant to immigration. Our contribution suggests the reason social ties with undocumented immigrants are not necessarily a hindrance to political engagement among Latinx immigrants and their co-ethnics is because they can draw from identitarian resources to overcome participatory constraints.

# 1 Introduction

How do undocumented social ties motivate political engagement among Latinxs? Undocumented immigrants are increasingly relevant in the social life of the Latinx community. The undocumented population has increased from 3.5 to 10 million between 1990-2017. 70% of the undocumented originate from Latin America. Moreover, the proportion of long-term undocumented immigrants living in the U.S. over 10 years has increased over 80% due to limited options for attaining legal status and higher re-entry costs. At the same time, interior immigration enforcement grew significantly since Clinton-era immigration reforms, bringing fear of deportation from the border to the streets of American cities.<sup>1</sup>

Prior research demonstrates anti-immigrant policies spur political action not only among immigrants, but Latinxs writ large (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura, 2001; Bowler, Nicholson, and Segura, 2006; Barreto et al., 2009; Zepeda-Millán, 2017). This research implicitly assumes Latinxs have ties to the immigrant experience, if not undocumented people. This research also assumes Latinxs are collectively mobilized by political rhetoric and punitive policies targeting undocumented community members. However, little work assesses the consequences of social ties with undocumented immigrants on political behavior directly, and even less identifies mechanisms motivating participation among Latinxs with undocumented social ties.

Drawing on six nationally representative surveys of Latinxs, we demonstrate social ties with undocumented immigrants are consistently associated with collective forms of political participation amenable to facilitating group interests and identity expression, such as protesting. Conversely, undocumented social ties do not motivate individualistic forms of political participation in support of broader agendas, such as voting. We draw on Social Identity Theory to explain why undocumented social ties motivate collective political engagement despite the constraints Latinxs with undocumented social ties may face. We find the mobilizing influence of undocumented social ties is conditional on the strength of Latinx identity. Undocumented social ties compel collective action among high Latinx identifiers who are moved to defend stigmatized subsets of the group, but inhibit participation among low identifiers who may wish to dissociate from the group in the face of proximal threats. Moreover, we find relative to low-identifiers,

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<sup>1</sup>See Appendix Section A, Figure A.2 for plots characterizing the descriptive statistics referenced here.

high-identifiers with undocumented social ties are more likely to support pro-immigrant activism and interpret threats to immigrants as threats to Latinxs writ large.

This paper makes three contributions. First, we explain why Latinxs with undocumented social ties are motivated to engage in political participation despite the marginalization of undocumented immigrants and the spillover effects that follow for their loved ones (Street, Jones-Correa, and Zepeda-Millán, 2017). We posit group identity links undocumented social ties to pro-group engagement. Contrary to conventional wisdom, our paper suggests having an undocumented tie does not hinder engagement if it makes group identity salient. Importantly, we demonstrate identity centrality is the superordinate mechanism driving pro-group participation in the presence of undocumented social ties net of other relevant mechanisms such as acculturation, efficacy, linked fate, perceived injustice, a conducive opportunity structure, and the salience of other social identities.

Second, we contribute to the identity-to-politics literature. Prior research demonstrates policy (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura, 2001; Pantoja and Segura, 2003), rhetorical (Pérez, 2015a; Pérez, 2015b), and geographic context (Bedolla, 2005) can politicize identity. We intervene by explicitly identifying the importance of social context in politicizing identity, with downstream consequences for political engagement.

Third, we add to growing research documenting the political consequences of the expansion of interior immigration enforcement among Latinx communities. An increasingly punitive immigration enforcement context may drive Latinx immigrants and their co-ethnics to reduce contact with government and retreat from political life. We theorize and demonstrate that undocumented social ties are a principle manifestation of a threatening immigration context in the everyday lives of Latinxs, and directly assess the capacity for group identity to condition responses to that threat. Thus, we provide a fuller theorization and exploration of what having undocumented social ties means for the Latinx community.

The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. We review the literature, noting developments in the growth of interior enforcement and the changing nature of the undocumented population. We outline several hypotheses connecting identity, undocumented social ties, and political participation. We then describe our data, before explicating the results. We conclude with a

discussion of limitations and identify several areas for future research.

## 2 Theory

### 2.1 Undocumented social ties in context

In response to a series of policies and proposals criminalizing undocumented immigrants (e.g. Proposition 187 in California and HR 4437), a large body of research examined the consequences of punitive immigration contexts on political engagement Latinxs. Prior evidence suggests these anti-immigrant policies prompted Latinx immigrants and their co-ethnics to naturalize, register, vote, protest, and shift partisan loyalties (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura, 2001; Pantoja and Segura, 2003; Bowler, Nicholson, and Segura, 2006; Barreto et al., 2009; Zepeda-Millán, 2017). This research assumes that Latinxs become politically mobilized in order to protect the undocumented co-ethnics to whom they are connected. However, with some exceptions (Street, Jones-Correa, and Zepeda-Millán, 2017), there is limited research directly examining the influence of undocumented social ties on political engagement, much less *how* social ties motivate political participation.

Confoundingly, prior literature suggests in the current political moment, undocumented social ties may *depress* political participation. First, the contemporary context is much more repressive. Since the 2006 anti-HR 4437 protests, annual deportations increased four-fold, from 96,000 to 364,000 (Section A, Figure A.1). Mandates increasing collaboration between immigration authorities and local law enforcement targeted Latinxs irrespective of citizenship status (Armenta, 2017). The Trump administration precipitated an unprecedented rise in non-criminal immigrant deportations (Capps et al., 2018). As a consequence, over 90% of deportees were Latinx in 2018 despite being only 50% of immigrants and 75% of undocumented immigrants, (TRAC, 2018).<sup>2</sup> It may be this heightened anti-immigrant, anti-Latinx environment diminishes the mobilizing capacity of threat observed in previous periods. Indeed, Zepeda-Millán (2017) indicates increased deportations during the summer of 2006 depressed future

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<sup>2</sup><https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/profile-unauthorized-immigrant-population-united-states>

political participation, writing, “Anti-movement state-sponsored suppression was carried out through...immigration policing by proxy, deportation, and detention, and worksite immigration raids of potential protest participants,” (pg. 146) which engendered enough fear that, “immigrant communities...felt pushed ‘back into the shadows,’” (pg. 160).<sup>3</sup>

Second, anti-immigrant policies reduce Latinx contact with government programs providing socio-economic resources necessary for political engagement (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman, 1995). This dynamic is particularly pronounced among Latinxs with undocumented family members (Yoshikawa, 2011; Flores, 2014; Vargas, 2015; Pedraza, Nichols, and LeBrón, 2017; Alsan and Yang, 2018). Third, having an undocumented family member may result in anxiety along with declines in mental and emotional health (Dreby, 2015; Nichols, LeBrón, and Pedraza, 2018; Vargas and Pirog, 2016; Vargas, Juárez, et al., 2018). These consequences can independently undermine political engagement (Ojeda, 2015). Fourth, a threatening immigration enforcement context via undocumented social ties can undercut trust in government, with deleterious consequences for participation (Rocha, Knoll, and Wrinkle, 2015; Sanchez, Vargas, et al., 2015). Finally, undocumented social ties may provide weak levels of political socialization and transmission to documented Latinx peers since undocumented immigrants are less civically incorporated relative to documented immigrants and may retreat from political life due to fear of deportation (Bandura and Walters, 1977; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers, 2009; Gleeson, 2010; Yoshikawa, 2011; Brown and Bean, 2016).

However, undocumented social ties may motivate *different types* of political participation. Some research finds punitive immigration policies increase turnout (White, 2016; Reny, Wilcox-Archuleta, and Nichols, 2018). These studies, however, do not directly evaluate the effect of having an undocumented social tie. Other research shows undocumented social ties reduce the likelihood of voter registration but increase protest participation (Amuedo-Dorantes and Lopez, 2017; Street, Jones-Correa, and Zepeda-Millán, 2017).

We contend undocumented social ties motivate protest participation, specifically, but not voting. Why? First, and most importantly, protests offer opportunities for collective identity

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<sup>3</sup>Undocumented social ties cue threat. Appendix Section I, Table I.8 shows undocumented social ties are associated with fear of friends or family being deported. The effect of social ties is large, 72% and 73% the sample mean in the LNHIS and CMPS respectively.

expression. Latinxs with undocumented social ties may be inclined to engage in participatory activities amenable to expressions of a collective Latinx, immigrant, identity. Protest participation offers a stronger possibility of engagement with other Latinxs experiencing threat from immigration enforcement via undocumented social ties and allows for engagement on the basis of group-specific interests (Klandermans, 2014). Given protest activity offers a stronger opportunity for identity expression, it may also help Latinxs leverage their identity to overcome the constraints undocumented social ties impose (Miller et al., 1981; Shingles, 1981). We explore and explicitly test identity as a mechanism linking undocumented social ties to protest in the following section. Related to this, protest behavior often targets specific causes (e.g. immigrant rights). Conversely, voters choose candidates with broad electoral platforms. Often, in the context of immigration enforcement, there is no distinction between candidate choices (Jones-Correa and De Graauw, 2013). Therefore, social ties with undocumented immigrants may be more likely to generate protest engagement. Lastly, protesting may be less institutionally risky. Scholars suggest undocumented ties deter voting because punitive immigration enforcement undercuts government trust and heightens the perceived risk of proximal status exposure when registering and voting (Amuedo-Dorantes and Lopez, 2017; Street, Jones-Correa, and Zepeda-Millán, 2017). Thus, we offer the following hypothesis:

- H1: Undocumented social ties will be associated with heightened participation in protest activity, but not voting.

## **2.2 Undocumented social ties and the identity-to-politics link**

Prior research has little to offer in identifying mechanisms linking undocumented social ties to participation despite the constraints undocumented social ties impose. This paper seeks to resolve the lacuna. We theorize the mobilizing effect of undocumented social ties among Latinxs is conditional on group identity. We posit undocumented social ties subject Latinxs to punitive immigration policies that disparately affect Latinxs as a group. Based on this assumption, Social Identity Theory suggests low-identifying Latinxs may distance themselves from their group membership to maintain individual self-esteem (Tajfel et al., 1979; Huddy, 2003). However, high-identifying Latinxs will be motivated to protect the group in order to

maintain the positive distinctiveness of the group (Phinney et al., 2001; Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje, 2002; Mossakowski, 2003; Bedolla, 2005; Lee, 2005; Pérez, 2015a; Pérez, 2015b). Commensurately, high-identifiers may leverage their identity to access social support from other group members in addition to a sense of internal efficacy to overcome the negative consequences of a threatening policy environment (Miller et al., 1981; Utsey et al., 2000; Noh and Kaspar, 2003; van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2013).

We assume high-identifying Latinxs with undocumented social ties take anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric personally. This is not simply because they have undocumented loved ones, but also because characterizations, behaviors, and policies propagated by the dominant group define Latinxs as illegitimate members of the national polity. For example, whites motivated by anti-Latinx, anti-immigrant attitudes, conflate illegality with Latinx immigrants and their co-ethnics writ large (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2017; Flores and Schachter, 2018). These beliefs extend beyond interpersonal interaction and are embedded in state behavior, including the police and social services, often in a discriminatory manner (Sáenz and Manges Douglas, 2015; Armenta, 2017).<sup>4</sup> Not all Latinxs will perceive anti-immigrant rhetoric as anti-Latinx. Indeed, prior research suggests threatening environments may instead lead members to distance themselves from the targeted group (Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje, 2002; Bedolla, 2005). However, a strong group identity may provide a means of coping with discrimination, and individuals may therefore lean into that identity when they feel threatened on racial or ethnic grounds (Phinney et al., 2001; Lee, 2005; Brondolo et al., 2009). Scholars observe this elsewhere in the literature, where Pérez (2015b) finds anti-immigrant rhetoric motivated pro-group behavior among Latinxs regardless of immigration status. Therefore, we contend:

- H2: High-identifying Latinxs with undocumented social ties will be more likely to perceive anti-immigrant sentiment as anti-Latinx sentiment than will low-identifiers with undocumented social ties.

Moreover, as mentioned before, undocumented ties may motivate particular types of political participation via a strong group identity. We posit a strong group identity promotes participation in activities clearly promoting the status of the group. High-identifiers with undocumented social

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<sup>4</sup>In Texas alone, ICE wrongfully placed detainees on 3,500 U.S. *citizens* between 2006-2018 (Bier, 2020).

ties will seek to channel energy to forms of participation, such as protesting, that are expressly collective and speak directly to the relevant threat. Likewise, Latinxs with a strong sense of ethnic identity may think of their individual grievances as group-based, which could motivate collective forms of political engagement (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2013; Banks, White, and McKenzie, 2019). Conversely, high-identifying Latinxs may not privilege voting as a means to further the status of the group and their undocumented co-ethnics. Unlike protesting, voting is an individualistic referendum on a broad spectrum of issues that may or may not be relevant to the threat posed by punitive immigration policy (van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears, 2008; Poletta and Jasper, 2001; van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2013; Klandermans, 2014). To be fair, there may be electoral contexts where punitive immigration policy is highly relevant. In these cases, we might expect heightened voter turnout (e.g. Valenzuela and Michelson, 2016; Barreto, 2010; Fraga, 2016). Generally speaking, however, voting is too broad to assess the identity-to-politics link. Instead, we would expect participation compelled by undocumented ties vis-a-vis a strong group identity to manifest in collective activities, like protesting. Thus:

- H3: High-identifying Latinxs with undocumented social ties will be more likely to engage in pro-immigrant activities other than voting relative to low-identifying Latinxs with undocumented social ties.

Finally, we adjudicate the importance of identity over other mechanisms in the extant Latinx politics literature. The idea group identity motivates political engagement in response to threat is not new (Pérez, 2015a; Pérez, 2015b). However, there is no assessment of the relevance of identity among Latinxs with undocumented social ties. The work closest to this study evaluates the influence of knowing a deportee on protesting conditional on a sense of injustice among Latinxs (Walker, 2020; Walker, Roman, and Barreto, 2020).

We contend perceived injustice is an outgrowth of identity among Latinxs. Research from political psychology finds identity centrality underlies other conceptions of group-based grievances, such as perceived injustice or group efficacy, as a mechanism to participation. van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears (2008) compared the relative performance of group efficacy, perceived injustice, and identity centrality in a meta-analysis of 182 studies. While perceived injustice and efficacy are consistently associated with collective action, these concepts are subordinate



to identity as a participation determinant. Together with recent research demonstrating the importance of identity in shaping Latinx political participation, we hypothesize identity is the primary mechanism motivating participation in the presence of undocumented social ties. Thus:

- H4: Group identity as the mechanism linking undocumented social ties to pro-immigrant political participation will persist net of alternative mechanisms.

## 3 Design

### 3.1 Data

We use six surveys to test our hypotheses. They include: 1) the 2010 Pew National Latino Survey (Pew '10, N = 1,375), 2) the Latino National Health and Immigration Survey (LNHIS '15, N = 1,494), 3) the Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (CMPS '16, N = 3,008), 4) the Latino Decisions Midterm Survey (LDMS '18, N = 406), 5) the Latino Decisions Election Eve poll (LDEE '18, N = 2,643), and 6) the SOMOS UNIDOSUS National Survey of Latinos (SOMOS '20, N = 1,830). Each survey characterizes different Latinx population subsets. Pew '10, LNHIS '15, CMPS '16, and SOMOS '20 represent the national Latinx adult population. LDMS '18 represents Latinx registered voters in 61 competitive congressional districts during the 2018 midterm. LDEE '18 represents the national population of Latinx likely voters. Surveys are weighted to U.S. Census population parameters for the relevant Latinx population subset. Surveys are administered in English or Spanish conditional on respondent preferences.<sup>5</sup>

We first assess the relationship between undocumented social ties and participation before testing our hypotheses regarding Latinx identity (H1). There are two primary outcomes across nearly all surveys: protest and voting. The Pew, CMPS, LDMS, LDEE, and SOMOS surveys ask respondents about retrospective protest participation and are binary indicators.<sup>6</sup> The LNHIS asks respondents about prospective protest participation on a 5 point scale.<sup>7</sup> All surveys ask about

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<sup>5</sup>See Appendix Section C for details on sampling, margin of error, response rates, and weighting for each survey.

<sup>6</sup>See Appendix Section V.1 for details and full item text.

<sup>7</sup>We use the LDEE survey to validate whether self-reported, retrospective protest approximates real-world behavior. Objective measures of pro-immigrant protest activity (see Fisher et al. (2019)) are positively associated with self-reported protest at the individual-level, suggesting self-reported participation is demonstrative of behavior (Appendix Section S).

protest participation generally or in an electoral context except for the Pew '10 survey, which asks specifically about pro-immigrant protest participation. Voting measures are not in the Pew (due to omission) or LDEE survey (respondents in that sample either voted or reported they were certain voters). The CMPS includes a binary retrospective voter file validated voting indicator. The LNHIS, LDMS, and SOMOS surveys include prospective voting measures, measured on 5-point, 5-point, and 10-point scales respectively.<sup>8</sup>

The participation outcomes come with some caveats. Some outcomes are specific to immigration whereas others are generalized or specific to electoral contexts. This could be problematic given our theory posits undocumented social ties motivate pro-immigrant behavior. Although protest offers avenues for pro-immigrant behavior, the content of protests are varied. In this case, our protest outcomes may be conceptually flawed in that they are not measuring the types of protest participation consistent with the theory. We offer evidence generalized protest measures mostly capture pro-group, specifically pro-immigrant, politics. Undocumented social ties are positively associated with retrospective pro-immigration protests in the Pew '10 study, suggesting at least some of the association between generalized protest measures and undocumented social ties is driven by pro-immigrant behavior (Figure 1). Undocumented social ties are associated with pro-immigrant policy preferences but *not immigration-irrelevant liberal policy preferences*, suggesting the primacy of social ties and support for immigrants over ideology (Appendix, Table K.14). Pro-immigrant attitudes are positively associated with the generalized protest measure in the CMPS '16 data, suggesting Latinxs are protesting on the basis of pro-immigrant motivations (Appendix, Table T.27, Models 1-2). Moreover, the LDEE '18 electoral retrospective protest measure is positively associated with objective measures of pro-immigration protests, suggesting electoral protest measures capture participation in actual immigration protests (Appendix Section S). Finally, the results we present and the similarity in effect estimates relative to the distinct outcome types all operate in the same direction, suggesting they capture the same concept despite measurement differences (Figure 1).<sup>9</sup>

The primary independent variable is undocumented social ties. Measurement across surveys

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<sup>8</sup>See Appendix Section V.2 for details on the measurement of voting participation and the full item texts.

<sup>9</sup>We do not believe the retrospective nature of our outcomes poses a reverse causality problem. Below, we leverage ascriptive social ties measures less susceptible to reverse causality and find similar results to the main social ties measure.

varies. The Pew survey measure is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent knows a deportee or someone detained for immigration reasons. The LNHIS and CMPS undocumented social ties items are identical. They ask whether the respondent knows someone undocumented among their “family, friends co-workers, and other people they may know.” If the respondent indicates “yes,” they are coded as 1, and 0 otherwise. Therefore, the measure captures both strong (e.g. friends, family) and weaker ties (e.g. co-workers, acquaintances). The LDMS, LDEE, and SOMOS items on undocumented social ties are formatted in a “list all that apply” framework. The LDMS asks respondents to think about “family, friends, co-workers, and people they know” and to check all social ties that apply to their network including family or a “friend/co-worker.” If they choose an option other than “No, do not know anyone undocumented,” social ties are coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. The LDEE asks respondents if they “know anybody who is an undocumented immigrant” and are allowed to indicate in the affirmative for a “family member,” “personal friend,” or “someone I know.” If they indicate yes to any of these categories, social ties are equal to 1 and 0 otherwise. The SOMOS survey asks respondents to think about “people in their family, as well as friends and co-workers” and indicate whether they know someone undocumented that is “in their household,” “in their family,” “a friend,” or “a co-worker.” If they indicate they know someone undocumented, social ties are equal to 1, and 0 otherwise. Although differences in measurement may have theoretical implications that affect the empirical results, we do not find the distinct measures of undocumented social ties produce results significantly different from aggregating all tie types (Figure 1).<sup>10</sup>

Across all surveys, we adjust for a battery of theoretically motivated control covariates accounting for demographic (e.g. foreign-born, Spanish-speaker), socio-economic (e.g. income, education), political (e.g. partisanship, ideology), and contextual factors (e.g. % Latino at zipcode and county-level, the county-level Secure Communities deportation rate per 1,000 foreign-born residents) in addition to state fixed effects.<sup>11</sup> See Appendix Section E, Table E.2

<sup>10</sup>See Appendix Section V.3 for details on the measurement of undocumented social ties and full item texts. We validate if self-reported undocumented ties approximate actual relationships. A reasonable assumption is that undocumented immigrants live in areas with more Latinxs, foreign-born, or non-citizen residents. Figures R.9 and R.10 in Appendix Section R demonstrate respondents who live in areas with more Latinxs, foreign-born people, and non-citizens are more likely to report undocumented ties. Moreover, see Appendix Section F, which assesses the sensitivity of the results to disaggregated social ties measures and alternative coding decisions while discussing the theoretical implications of using various undocumented social ties measures.

<sup>11</sup>The Pew survey does not include controls regarding Secure Communities because the program did not end

for details on control covariate inclusion across surveys.

To test hypotheses H2-H4, which concern the conditional influence of undocumented social ties given identity, we rely on the CMPS. No other survey includes all measures relevant to the question at hand, particularly the identity moderator. The CMPS includes a 4-point identity centrality item asking respondents to indicate how important being Latinx is to their sense of self.<sup>12</sup> We use this item since prior studies demonstrate centrality, as operationalized in the CMPS, motivates pro-group behavior in response to threat (Phinney et al., 2001; Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje, 2002; Lee, 2005; Brondolo et al., 2009; Pérez, 2015a; Pérez, 2015b). Moreover, consistent with our theory, it is associated with several measures of group commitment. Centrality is positively associated with support for liberal immigration policies, immigrant rights activism, and the notion anti-immigrant discrimination is anti-Latinx discrimination (See Appendix, Section M.5). Alternatively, we might evaluate the influence of undocumented social ties on the outcomes of interest conditional on national origin identity centrality. This may be superfluous since national origin and Latinx centrality might capture the same concept. The Pearson's  $\rho$  correlation coefficient for the two measures is 0.8 in the CMPS. Moreover, we replace Latinx centrality with national origin centrality and find using national origin centrality produces similar results to the main estimates using Latinx centrality (Appendix, Section M, Table M.16).<sup>13</sup>

Since we assess the effect of undocumented social ties conditional on Latinx identity, we demonstrate undocumented social ties and Latinx identity are distinct constructs. 20% of lowest Latinx identifiers (1 on the 4 point scale) know someone undocumented. 44% of high Latinx identifiers (4 on the 4 point scale) know someone undocumented. Likewise, 6% of Latinxs without undocumented social ties do not identify at all with other Latinxs and 48% of Latinxs without undocumented social ties hold a strong Latinx identity. 3% of Latinxs with undocumented social ties are lowest identifiers and 63% of Latinxs with undocumented social ties are highest identifiers. Although there are few Latinxs who indicate they are on the lowest

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until November 2014, after the survey was administered.

<sup>12</sup>See Appendix, Section V.4 for full item wording.

<sup>13</sup>The high correlation between Latinx and national origin centrality raises questions over whether our respondents are politically engaged on behalf of Latinxs writ large, or Latinxs who share their national origin. Given the high correlation between the two constructs, we cannot adjudicate between these possibilities.

end of the centrality scale, our main findings are not sensitive to an alternative operationalization of Latinx identity, where we make the highest-identifiers the reference category (see Appendix Section P).

The CMPS also includes two additional outcomes that help test our primary hypotheses: an item measuring agreement with the notion “anti-immigrant sentiment is anti-Latinx sentiment” on a 5 point likert scale, which allows us to test our second hypothesis; and a measure of support for pro-immigrant activism on a 5 point likert scale, which allows us to assess whether high-identifying Latinxs with undocumented ties are more likely to support pro-immigrant political activities relative to weak identifiers (H3). We refer to the outcome assessing whether Latinxs perceive anti-immigrant sentiment as anti-Latinx as the “homogeneity” outcome in the results section. Consistent with our theoretical framework, this outcome measures the extent to which Latinxs are motivated to identify with immigrants and subsequently engage in pro-immigrant political activities. We expect high-identifying Latinxs with undocumented social ties will be inclined to believe anti-immigrant sentiment is an anti-Latinx issue given the ethno-racialization of immigration enforcement and conflation of Latinxs with undocumented immigrants. Likewise, we expect high-identifying Latinxs with undocumented social ties to support pro-immigrant activism. In light of the generalized protest measure in the CMPS, the pro-immigrant activism outcome helps demonstrate Latinx protest behavior on the part of high identifiers with undocumented social ties is motivated by pro-immigrant goals.

We draw on several other measures to test the hypothesis identity centrality is the primary mechanism linking undocumented ties with participation. Linked fate is chief among such mechanisms. Linked fate is less appropriate than centrality because it may not imply group commitment. For example, nativist Latinxs could have linked fate with new Latinx immigrants, but perceive their connection negatively. Indeed, prior evidence suggests linked fate is not inherently tethered to participation or a politicized group consciousness, particularly for Latinxs (McClain et al., 2009; Gay, Hochschild, and White, 2016; Sanchez and Vargas, 2016). Identity centrality is a well-established measure in the social psychology literature in terms of its implications concerning group threat relative to linked fate (Phinney et al., 2001; Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje, 2002; Lee, 2005; Brondolo et al., 2009; Pérez, 2015a; Pérez, 2015b).

Consistent with our reservations, immigrant and Latinx linked fate do not increase participatory behavior among Latinxs with undocumented social ties (Appendix Section M, Table M.16).<sup>14</sup> In addition to presenting models that the moderating effect of identity centrality persists net of linked fate, we replicate our main results among Latinxs with no linked fate and still find centrality serves to motivate pro-group behavior in the presence of undocumented social ties (Appendix Section M.4, Table M.19). Other potential mechanisms addressed include political efficacy, perceived and experienced discrimination, acculturation, perceived immigration status (measured by immigration status and whether one took the survey in Spanish), the presence of conducive opportunity structures, and prosociality.<sup>15</sup>

## 4 Results

Figure 1, Panel A, displays the unconditional effects of undocumented social ties on protest behavior.<sup>16</sup> Across six surveys, undocumented social ties are positively and statistically associated with protesting. The standardized coefficient ranges from 0.2 in the LDEE to 0.6 in the LDMS, adjusting for a full battery of controls. For a clearer sense of the substantive influence, the unstandardized impact of undocumented social ties on the likelihood of protesting in the CMPS is 7 percentage points (pp.). The CMPS protest mean is 10 pp. irrespective of undocumented social ties (population weighted). Thus, the social ties effect is 70% of the mean protest level in the CMPS. We conduct a meta-analysis on the coefficients and corresponding standard errors with a pooled random-effects model and derive a meta-analytic coefficient of 0.3.<sup>17</sup>

Using tools developed by Cinelli and Hazlett (2020), we evaluate model sensitivity to omitted covariates, otherwise known as the “robustness value” (denoted as “RV” on Figure 1, Panel A). This analysis suggests an omitted covariate would need to explain 10-17% of the joint

<sup>14</sup>Moreover, Latinx linked fate, immigrant linked fate, and Latinx identity centrality are distinct constructs. For instance, the Pearson’s  $\rho$  correlation coefficient between Latinx linked fate and Latinx identity centrality is 0.29. The correlation coefficient for immigrant linked fate and Latinx centrality is 0.25. These are modest correlations, suggesting the items do not measure the same underlying construct.

<sup>15</sup>See Appendix Section V.5 for details on items characterizing the mechanisms.

<sup>16</sup>Although we discuss coefficients as “effects,” this is only for the sake of accessibility and readability. Our analysis is observational, so we do not mean to imply the coefficients of interest have a causal interpretation.

<sup>17</sup>Cochran’s Q significance test for heterogeneity on the coefficients from fully specified models is  $p < 0.04$ . This appears driven by the LDMS study and its relatively large coefficient. The meta-analytic estimate without the LDMS is 0.25, yet the Cochran’s Q test is statistically insignificant at  $p < 0.2$ .




Figure 1: Panels A/B characterize the association between undocumented social ties and protest/voting. The x-axis is the standardized undocumented ties coefficient. Meta-analytic estimates are from a pooled random-effects model using the Hartung-Knapp-Sidik-Jonkman method. The red line is the meta-analytic point estimate. Sample size differences between protest and vote outcomes are because the voting item was only asked of registered voters. All estimates are from linear models. 95% confidence intervals displayed from HC2 robust errors.

variation in social ties and protest across the surveys to nullify the undocumented tie coefficients. Drawing on observed benchmark covariates to assess what kinds of covariates obviate the results, we find the undocumented tie coefficient would be nullified by 6x experienced discrimination, 6x perceived discrimination, 9x experienced discrimination, 6x age, 13x Spanish-speaker, and 9x ethnic media consumption in the Pew, LNHIS, CMPS, LDMS, LDEE and SOMOS data respectively. This suggests our coefficients are relatively insulated from omitted variable bias.<sup>18</sup>

Conversely, the association between undocumented ties and voting is statistically and substantively insignificant (Figure 1, Panel B). Across the 4 surveys with voting items, the association between undocumented social ties and voting is always statistically null and the coefficients are not consistently signed in one direction. The LDMS coefficient after adjusting for covariates is positive and almost statistically significant ( $p < 0.10$ ). Given the unadjusted coefficient is close to 0, we do not put much stock in this estimate. The discrepancy could be due to suppression effects, about which we have no theoretical prior, or a statistical artifact after running multiple specifications. Regardless, the meta-analytic standardized coefficient is statistically null. It is important to note the sample size is truncated to the registered voter population when evaluating the association between social ties and voting. We replicate this analysis among the citizen age voting population (CVAP) and derive similar results (Appendix Section G.3, Figure G.3). Likewise, we find the association between undocumented social ties and protest behavior holds among both registered voters and the CVAP (Appendix Section G.1, Figure G.5). In sum, across several surveys spanning different periods, undocumented ties are consistently associated with protesting, but not voting. These findings are consistent with our first hypothesis suggesting protest activity offers better possibilities for pro-immigrant political engagement than does casting a ballot.

## 4.1 Heterogeneity by Latinx identity

We now assess the moderating role of identity centrality on the relationship between undocumented social ties and participation, drawing primarily on the CMPS. Table 1, Panel A, displays the effect of undocumented social ties on belief in the notion anti-immigrant sentiment is

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<sup>18</sup>We did not choose these benchmark covariates arbitrarily. These covariates nullify the effect of undocumented social ties first after incrementally multiplying their explained joint variance in the outcome and social ties.



anti-Latinx sentiment conditional on Latinx identity for a series of regression models with an increasing set of control covariates. Consistent with H2, Model 6, fully specified and including state fixed effects, demonstrates the effect of undocumented social ties is stronger among those higher levels of Latinx identity. Moreover, Latinx identity compensates for a reduction in the belief anti-immigrant sentiment is anti-Latinx sentiment among low identifiers with undocumented social ties. Figure 2, Panel A displays the predicted value of support for the notion anti-immigrant sentiment is anti-Latinx conditional on undocumented social ties and Latinx identity. For high identifiers, undocumented social ties increase belief in anti-immigrant sentiment being anti-Latinx sentiment from 0.65 to 0.75 on the rescaled 0-1 point scale, 36% of the standard deviation. For low identifiers, undocumented social ties decrease the belief anti-immigrant sentiment is anti-Latinx from 0.43 to 0.4 on the 0-1 point scale, equivalent to 11% of the outcome standard deviation.

H3 posits undocumented social ties will be associated with higher participation in pro-immigrant political activities among those who hold a strong Latinx identity. We measure this two ways: participation in protests and support for pro-immigrant activism. Panel B of Table 1 displays the association between undocumented social ties and protest conditional on identity. Consistent with H3, fully specified Model 6 demonstrates the positive influence of undocumented social ties on protest participation is conditional on Latinx identity. Importantly, and consistent with the expectation low-identifiers will disassociate from the group, low-identifying Latinxs disengage from protest activity in the presence of an undocumented tie. However, a high Latinx identity more than compensates for the reduction in protest participation. We simulate the probability of protest conditional on undocumented social ties and Latinx identity (see Figure 2, Panel B). For a high-identifying Latinx, undocumented social ties increase the probability of protest from 13 to 25 pp., a 12 pp. difference. In contrast, for a low-identifying Latinx, undocumented ties decrease likelihood of protesting from 12 to 3 pp., a 9 pp. difference.

We also evaluate the heterogeneous effects of undocumented social ties on support for pro-immigrant activism to further assess H3. Table 1, Panel C, displays heterogeneous effects of undocumented social ties by Latinx identity across a series of models with an increasing number of covariates. The interaction coefficient is positive, suggesting that the effect of undocumented

social ties on support for pro-immigrant activism is stronger among high Latinx identifiers. Figure 2, Panel C displays predicted values of support for pro-immigrant activism conditional on undocumented social ties and Latinx identity. For high identifiers, undocumented social ties increase support for pro-immigrant activism from 0.65 to 0.75 on the rescaled 0-1 point scale, equivalent to 36% of the outcome standard deviation. For low identifiers, undocumented social ties decrease support for pro-immigrant activism from 0.43 to 0.4 on the 0-1 scale, equivalent to 45% of the outcome standard deviation.

Consistent with the unconditional association, identity does not appear to motivate higher rates of voter file validated voting for Latinxs with undocumented social ties. Table 1, Panel A, shows that the effect of social ties on voting does not appear to increase in strength conditional on Latinx identity.<sup>19</sup> The predicted probabilities on Figure 2, Panel D corroborate this conclusion. The difference in the probability of voting in the 2016 election for a high identifying Latinxs with and without undocumented social ties is only 1 percentage point (65-66 pp.). For low identifiers, the difference between those with and without social ties is a relatively large, negative 14 pp. decline (64-48 pp.). Given the large negative effect of social ties for low identifiers on voting, there may be some heterogeneity not detected as statistically meaningful. This may be because of the reduced sample size in evaluating heterogeneity only among registered voters or because social ties do not appear to mobilize high identifiers to vote.

Finally, consistent with H4, we rule out other theoretically motivated mechanisms that may explain the association between undocumented social ties, protest participation, and pro-group attitudes. We assess the conditionality of undocumented social ties using the following measures: linked fate, political efficacy (internal, external, and group), a sense of injustice (proxied by both perceived and experienced discrimination, in keeping with Walker (2020)), acculturation (proxied by generational status in addition to whether the respondent chose to take the survey in Spanish), perceived immigration status (proxied by skin color and whether the respondent believes others misperceive their immigration status), a conducive opportunity structure (whether a political leader, group, or organization attempted to mobilize the respondent to take political action or vote), and pro-sociality (how many neighbors the respondent talks to frequently). We

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<sup>19</sup>Results are similar for voting and protest outcomes if we subset to the citizen voting age population (CVAP) and registered voters (G.2, Table G.5).

Table 1: The influence of undocumented social ties conditional on Latino identity on political participation and pro-group attitudes.

<b>Panel A: Homogeneity</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Social Ties x Latino ID	0.19** (0.07)	0.19** (0.06)	0.19** (0.06)	0.19** (0.06)	0.19** (0.06)	0.19** (0.06)
Social Ties	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.05)	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.11* (0.05)
Latino ID	0.14*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.10** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.10** (0.03)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.09	0.13	0.13	0.16	0.17	0.20
<b>Panel B: Protest</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Social Ties x Latino ID	0.19*** (0.06)	0.20*** (0.05)	0.21*** (0.05)	0.20*** (0.05)	0.20*** (0.05)	0.21*** (0.06)
Social Ties	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.08* (0.04)
Latino ID	0.05 (0.02)	0.05* (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.08	0.09	0.12
<b>Panel C: Pro-Immigrant Activism</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Social Ties x Latino ID	0.12* (0.06)	0.13* (0.06)	0.14* (0.06)	0.14** (0.05)	0.14* (0.05)	0.13* (0.05)
Social Ties	0.02 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)
Latino ID	0.28*** (0.03)	0.27*** (0.03)	0.27*** (0.03)	0.22*** (0.03)	0.22*** (0.03)	0.22*** (0.03)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.18	0.21	0.23	0.29	0.31	0.33
N	3008	3008	3008	3008	3008	3004
<b>Panel D: Vote</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Social Ties x Latino ID	0.17 (0.16)	0.14 (0.14)	0.14 (0.15)	0.13 (0.14)	0.10 (0.14)	0.15 (0.14)
Social Ties	-0.24 (0.14)	-0.14 (0.12)	-0.14 (0.12)	-0.13 (0.12)	-0.11 (0.12)	-0.14 (0.12)
Latino ID	-0.01 (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)	0.04 (0.07)	0.06 (0.07)	0.05 (0.07)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.01	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.13	0.18
N	1439	1439	1439	1439	1439	1430
Demographic Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
State FE	N	N	N	N	N	Y

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$  Each panel characterizes the heterogeneous effects of undocumented social ties by different social identities for different outcomes (A = support for notion anti-immigrant discrimination is anti-Latino discrimination, B = protest participation, C = support for pro-immigrant activism, D = validated voting participation). Model 1 includes no controls. Models 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 add demographic, socio-economic, political, contextual, and state indicator controls respectively. Dropped observations in Model 6 are due to the inclusion of state fixed effects (i.e. where  $N = 1$  for a single state). All estimates are from linear models. All models include population weights. All covariates/outcomes are scaled between 0-1. HC2 robust standard errors are in parentheses.




Figure 2: Predicted values conditional on undocumented social ties and Latinx identity (CMPS). Panel A is the predicted agreement with the notion that anti-immigrant sentiment is anti-Latinx sentiment. Panel B is the predicted protest probability. Panel C is the predicted support for pro-immigrant activism. Panel D is the predicted probability of (validated) voting. The x-axis denotes undocumented social ties. The y-axis is the predicted value. Color denotes Latinx identity (min-max). Annotations denote predicted values. Predicted values are from fully specified models and assume control covariates set at their means and a respondent from California. All estimates are from linear models. All covariates are scaled from 0-1. 95% confidence intervals presented.

also adjust for alternative social identities that may be activated in the presence of undocumented social ties such as partisanship and gender identity (Abrajano, 2010; Dreby, 2012; Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2013).

Even after adjusting for alternative mechanisms, the interaction between undocumented social ties and Latinx identity is still positive and statistically significant for the relevant outcomes (see Appendix Section K.1, Tables K.10, K.11 and K.12). Moreover, we also rule out whether alternative measures of identity may be driving our results. Table M.19 on Appendix Section M.4 demonstrates that replacing Latinx centrality with Latinx linked fate or immigrant linked fate does not produce heterogeneous effects by undocumented social ties. Moreover, conditional on having no linked fate, Latinx centrality still has a moderating influence on undocumented social ties (Appendix Section M.4, Table M.20). In tandem, these results confirm our theoretical expectation centrality is the identity measure best suited to capture Latinx responses to group threat via undocumented social ties.

In summary, these results suggest undocumented social ties motivate pro-group behavior and attitudes conditional on ethnic identity and that identity is the superordinate mechanism driving protest participation. However, strong identity in the presence of undocumented social ties does not motivate behaviors less amenable to promoting ethnic interests, such as voting.<sup>20</sup>

## 4.2 Robustness Checks

We attempt to alleviate three selection concerns. First, prosocial Latinxs may select into relationships with undocumented immigrants and also be more inclined to participate politically. Second, undocumented social ties may have occurred after protest engagement, given the protest measures are retrospective.<sup>21</sup> Third, high-identifiers may seek relationships with undocumented people given their politicized status. We alleviate these concerns by decomposing the social ties measure into two categories, familial and friendship ties, and assess the effects of undocumented ties on the outcomes of interest. The logic is Latinxs with undocumented familial ties will have greater difficulty leveraging their identity, pro-sociality, or political engagement to select into an

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<sup>20</sup>For information on the estimation strategies we use to derive these estimates, see Appendix Section B

<sup>21</sup>The LNHIS '15 uses a prospective protest participation measure. The effect for undocumented social ties using LNHIS data is positive, statistically significant, and nearly identical to the meta-analytic effect (see Figure 1), suggesting the main results are not driven by a reverse causal process.

undocumented social tie given the ascriptive nature of familial relationships. Consistent with the main results, familial and friendship ties with undocumented immigrants operate similarly and are positively associated with protest participation (Appendix Section F.2, Figure F.2). Coefficient similarity between familial and friendship ties suggest factors that plausibly produce selection into friendship and pro-immigrant participation do not drive the association between undocumented ties and pro-group politics.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, for protest and homogeneity (but not voting and support for pro-immigrant activism), the positive effect of both familial and friendship ties is conditional on a strong sense of Latinx identity (Appendix F.4, Table F.3).

We also attempt to alleviate reverse causality concerns between protest and identity. Prior research suggests limited cause for concern. In a meta-analysis of 64 studies assessing the link between identity and protest, van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears (2008) indicate there were, “no significant differences between effect sizes in studies that allowed causal inferences versus those that did not,” suggesting, “the magnitude of these reverse effects is not such that they would entirely invalidate causal inferences drawn from the observations of cross-sectional data (pg. 516).” Moreover, prior work assessing the influence of protest on Latinx identity finds null results (Silber Mohamed, 2013). We replicate Silber Mohamed (2013) using Latino National Survey (LNS) data and find exposure to the 2006 immigration protests does not increase Latinx identity.<sup>23</sup> Although the replication cannot account for direct participation, we adjust the estimation strategy and interact protest exposure with characteristics associated with protest participation in a separate study and still find null results ((Barreto et al., 2009), Appendix Section U, Table U.28). Additionally, we replicate our CMPS results using an alternative measure of Latinx identity in the LNHIS, perceived discrimination against Latinxs and immigrants, which has prospective protest measures less susceptible to reverse causality (see Appendix Section L, Table L.15 and Figure L.7 for details). We derive heterogeneous effects for undocumented social ties similar to our main estimates.

We assess the sensitivity of our results to different scales of the participation outcomes

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<sup>22</sup>We also disaggregate undocumented familial and friendship ties and find familial or friendship ties are not independently associated with voting (Appendix Section F.3, Figure F.4).

<sup>23</sup>If any protest event would increase Latinx identity, it would be the 2006 immigration protests, which had millions of participants across 102 cities and was able to make immigration the “most important issue” amongst the American public at the highest level until July 2018, after Trump’s family separation policy implementation (Appendix Section U, Figure U.12).

(Appendix Section H). We do this to rule out measurement error. All protest participation outcomes are binary with the exception of the LNHIS, which is on a 4 point likert scale from “not at all likely” to “extremely likely.” We generate two new versions of a binary protest indicator in the LNHIS to rule out if undocumented social ties are only motivating political participation among Latinxs on the lower end of the scale. First, we code “extremely likely” equal to 1 and make all other values equal to 0. Second, we code “extremely likely” and “very likely” equal to 1 and make all other values equal to 0. Table H.6 demonstrates recoding the LNHIS outcome does not influence the main results. For voting, the CMPS is a binary retrospective measure whereas the others are likert scales (LNHIS, LDMS, SOMOS). Two outcomes ask how likely the respondent is to vote in the upcoming national election on a 5 point scale (LNHIS, SOMOS). The other asks how likely respondents will vote on a 10 point scale (LDMS). In the main results, the LDMS outcome is recoded as a binary measure equal to 1 if they indicate 10 on the scale. We recode the LDMS measure back to its 0-10 scale and re-evaluate the association between social ties and voting. Likewise, we convert the LNHIS and SOMOS surveys to binary indicators equal to 1 if the respondent puts the highest value of the likert scale on their vote intention. Table H.7 displays coefficient estimates of undocumented social ties with respect to the different voting outcome operationalizations. Consistent with the main results, undocumented social ties have no statistically significant association with self-reported voting behavior.

## **5 Conclusion**

We began this paper with the question: how do undocumented social ties influence Latinx political behavior? While prior work has analyzed the political consequences of a threatening immigration environment, less research explores the consequences of undocumented ties and underlying mechanisms motivating participation. Building on work at the intersection of social identity theory and anti-immigrant threat (Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje, 2002; Pérez, 2015b; Pérez, 2015a), we address this gap and provide evidence Latinx identity is a key mechanism connecting undocumented ties to participatory outcomes net of other theoretically motivated mechanisms.

Drawing on six surveys of Latinxs, we demonstrate undocumented social ties motivate collective forms of political participation amenable to promoting group interests and identity expression but not individualistic forms of political participation. Using a large nationally representative sample of Latinxs with the CMPS, we find that high-identifying Latinxs with undocumented social ties are more likely to perceive anti-immigrant sentiment as anti-Latinx, support pro-immigrant activism, and engage in protest activity. Moreover, consistent with our contention that voting participation offers limited avenues for pro-group expression relative to protest activity, social ties do not motivate voting conditional on Latinx identity. Conversely, consistent with social identity theory, low-identifying Latinxs with undocumented social ties are less likely to engage in protest activity. These findings are robust to several model specifications and hold net of alternative mechanisms.

This paper makes several contributions. First, we answer the call to assess mechanisms motivating pro-group behavior among Latinxs with undocumented social ties (Street, Jones-Correa, and Zepeda-Millán, 2017). We forward Latinx identity as a mechanism to demonstrate *how* and *why* undocumented social ties translate into pro-group behavior despite the participatory constraints undocumented social ties may impose. Second, we contribute to the Latinx identity-to-politics literature, elucidating the importance of social context in addition to geographic, rhetorical, and policy context in politicizing Latinx identity. Third, we contribute to a growing literature focused on the policy feedback effects of the expansion of interior immigration enforcement that disparately targets Latinx communities. While much has been written on how immigrants are criminalized, less is known about the specific social mechanisms that subject Latinx immigrants and their co-ethnics to punitive immigration restrictions.

Our analysis has limitations. While we subject our analyses to several model specifications, sensitivity analyses, and do our best to rule out alternative mechanisms, our data do not permit us to definitively rule out endogeneity. Although randomizing undocumented social ties would be difficult (and perhaps impossible in a familial context), future research may consider conducting short-term contact experiments to assess the causal effect of undocumented social ties on pro-group behavior among Latinxs. Field experiments may also explicate whether short-term contact with undocumented immigrants is sufficient in motivating costly pro-immigrant behaviors.



Likewise, identity salience could be induced experimentally to ascertain the causal effect of undocumented social ties among Latinxs assigned to a high relative to low salience condition. Additionally, future studies on undocumented ties should leverage panel designs to circumvent reverse causality concerns.

Future research should undertake questions of interest this study implicates but cannot explore. Social movement scholars find evidence that pro-group protests can motivate identity. Likewise, participation in pro-immigrant activism may bring otherwise documented Latinxs into contact with undocumented activists, which may have secondary political consequences. Although we provide evidence this reverse causal process may not obviate our results, future work should assess how pro-immigrant protest participation motivates Latinx identity and social networks in the post-Trump era. Another area ripe for further research is the extent to which and how undocumented social ties motivate pro-immigrant participation or attitudes among other non-white groups. Of particular interest are Asian-Americans, the fastest growing ethno-racial subgroup in the U.S. due to immigration, and Black immigrants,<sup>24</sup> who may contend with dual targeting based on both immigration status and anti-Blackness. The intersections of criminal justice, immigration policy, and race(ism) are avenues that increasingly demand scholarly attention.

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<sup>24</sup>This is not to deny the existence of Black Latinxs people in our sample, but to prescribe an explicit focus on both Black Latinx immigrants and their co-ethnics along with non-Latinx Black immigrants.

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# Part

## Appendix

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# A Immigration trends

## A.1 Undocumented population




Figure A.1: Panel A displays Pew Research Center estimates using Census data of the undocumented population over time. Panel B displays Pew Research Center estimates using Census data of the proportion of the undocumented population that has lived in the U.S. more than 10 years. Panel C displays the proportion of the undocumented population from different regional origins using Migration Policy Institute estimates derived from the 2016 5-year ACS. Panel D displays the proportion of Latinos who know someone undocumented in the CMPS and LNHS surveys (DNS = did not respond).



## A.2 Deportations




Figure A.2: Panel A displays data on deportations between 1980-2018 from the 2018 DHS Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. Panel B displays data on the proportion of the undocumented population deported over time in a given year calculated using the DHS statistics and Pew Research Center estimates of the undocumented population.

## B Estimation strategy

We use the following linear model to assess the unconditional association between undocumented social ties and political participation:

$$Y_i = \alpha_s + \tau SocialTies_i + \sum_{k=1}^k \beta^k X_{izc} + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

$Y_i$  is the outcome of interest.  $\alpha_s$  are state fixed effects.  $\tau$  is the partial derivative of undocumented Social Ties and  $SocialTies_i$  is a binary indicator for whether  $i$  has social ties with an undocumented friend or family member.  $\sum_{k=1}^k \beta^k X_{izc}$  are control covariates at the individual, zipcode, and county-level.  $\varepsilon_i$  are HC2 robust errors. We use Equation (1) to assess the effects of undocumented social ties on protest behavior for all six surveys (Pew, LNHIS, CMPS, LDMS, LDEE, SOMOS) and voting behavior for four surveys (LNHIS, CMPS, LDMS, SOMOS). We also use the following linear model to assess the influence of undocumented social ties on pro-group politics conditional on Latinx identity using the CMPS data:

$$Y_i = \alpha_s + \tau(SocialTies_i \times LatinxID_i) + \sum_{k=1}^k \beta^k X_{izc} + \varepsilon_i \quad (2)$$

Interaction linear terms are subsumed in  $\sum_{k=1}^k \beta^k X_{izc}$ .  $\tau$  is the heterogeneous partial derivative of undocumented social ties conditional on Latinx identity ( $SocialTies_i \times LatinxID_i$  in Equation (2)).

## **C Survey Methodology**

### **C.1 Pew 2010**

The 2010 Pew National Survey of Latinxs is a telephone survey conducted by Social Science Research Solutions among a nationally representative sample of 1375 Latinxs respondents ages 18 and older between August 17 to September 19, 2010. Margin of error is plus or minus 3.3 percentage points for the total sample. SSRS used Spanish-speaking interviewers to offer respondents the option of completing the survey in Spanish. Sampling frames included landline and cell phone registries. Sample frames were stratified via a disproportionate stratified design. All telephone exchanges were divided into groups, or strata, based on their concentration of Latinx households. A five stage weighting design was used to ensure an accurate representation of the Latinx population (1. adjustment for those who have both a landline and cell phone, 2. correcting for disproportionalities in the stratification scheme, 3. correcting for likelihood of within-household selection, 4. correcting for the percentage of the Latino population that is cell-only, landline-only, or either, 5. sample balancing to fit 2009 CPS estimates of the Latino population on gender, education, age, region, foreign born status, year of entry into U.S. and Hispanic heritage). The overall response rate was 25% using AAPOR's RR3 formula.

### **C.2 LNHIS 2015**

Latino Decisions surveyed a representative sample of 1494 Latino adults in the United States between January 29th and March 12th, 2015. The sample is a mix of cell phone and landline households along with web surveys. 990 Latinxs were interviewed over the phone. 504 over the internet. Web survey respondents are from a double-opt-in national internet panel randomly selected to participate in the study and weighted to be representative of the Latino population. The survey has an overall margin of error of 2.5% with an AAPOR response rate of 18% for the telephone sample. Sampling is from the 44 states and Puerto Rico, which collectively accounts for 91% of the U.S. Latino adult population. Respondents could choose to be interviewed in either English or Spanish across all modes of data collection. All interviewers were fully bilingual. The full dataset of both phone and web interviews are weighted to match the 2013 Current Population Survey estimates of Latinx adults with respect to age, place of birth, gender, and state.

### **C.3 CMPS 2016**

The CMPS Latinx sample is a subset of a total of 10145 completed interviews collected online in a respondent self-administered format from December 3, 2016 to February 15, 2017. The sample is of Latino adults (N = 3003). The survey (and invitation) was available in English, Spanish, Chinese (traditional and simplified), Korean, and Vietnamese. The sample includes both registered voters (N = 1816) and non-registered adults (N = 1187). The Latino subset is weighted to match the Latino adult population in the 2015 Census ACS 1-year data file for age, gender, education, nativity, ancestry, and voter registration status. Post-stratification raking was used to balance each category within 1% of ACS estimates. Registered voter data are from the national voter registration database email sample, and respondents were randomly selected to participate in the study, and confirmed they were registered to vote before starting the survey. For the non-registered sample, email addresses were randomly selected from the various online panel vendors. 298,159 email addresses were selected and sent invitations to participate in the survey

and 29,489 people accepted the invitation and started the survey, for an effective response rate of 9.9%. Among the 29,489 people who started the survey, 11,868 potential respondents were terminated due to quotas being full, which resulted in 17,621 who were eligible to take the survey of which 10,145 completed the full questionnaire for a cooperation rate of 57.6%. Respondents were given a \$10 or \$20 gift card as compensation for their participation. Non-registered voters were randomly selected from one of six online panels of respondents from Federated, Poder, Research Now, Netquest, SSI, and Prodege, and confirmed that they were not registered to vote before starting the survey. Programming and data collection for the full project were overseen by Pacific Market Research.

## **C.4 LDMS 2018**

The data analyzed are a subset of a larger survey of 2045 registered voters implemented by Latino Decisions in 61 congressional districts deemed most competitive by Cook, CNN, and Crystal Ball. The subset analyzed are all Latino registered voters in the original sample (N = 413). The overall data was weighted to meet 2017 Current Population Survey registered voter parameters for age, gender, education and nativity. The data were then weighted proportionately to match the overall demographics of the 61 most competitive congressional districts, which, for 2018 were 68% white, 15% black, 12% Latino, 4% Asian, and 1% Native American. Respondents were randomly selected for interviews through online panels, verified to be registered to vote and to live in one of the 61 competitive house districts, in order to participate in the survey. The survey was in the field July 5-July 14, 2018.

## **C.5 LDEE 2018**

Latino Decisions completed 9400 interviews with Latinx, Black, AAPI, Native and white registered voters who had already voted early or were certain to vote in the November 6, 2018 general election. Interviews were conducted through a combination of cell phone and landline telephone with live callers and self completed online. Latinx voters were given an opportunity to complete their interview in their language of choice at the start of the interview. Respondents were randomly selected from a statewide, or districtwide sample frame, giving all voters an equal opportunity to be selected for interviews. Respondents were reached on landline and cell phone-only households, from October 31 to November 5, 2018 and interviews averaged 14 minutes in length. Voters were pre-screened based on their vote history in previous midterm elections, and date of registration to include a mix of new registrants and first-time voters as well as those who had confirmed vote history in 2010 and 2014 midterms, or newer voters who first voted in 2016 and even newer registrants who were first-time voters in 2018. Respondents were asked if they had already voted early, and if not, if they were 100% certain they would vote on November 6, and approximately half of voters indicated they had already voted early, while half were Election Day precinct voters. The interview for any respondent who was not certain was terminated. Using this same methodology in 2014, 92% of the interviewed sample was subsequently confirmed (validated) as having voted when examining official vote records, with no meaningful deviation from reported totals. For individual states, a minimum of 400 interviews were completed to provide state-specific reliable estimates and carry an overall margin of error of 4.9% for each racial group. For the 70-district congressional district battleground sample, 600 total interviews were conducted per each racial group for a total of 2,400 interviews. Final data were compared to known census estimates for demographic profiles of voters and weighted to be representative within each state or congressional district.

## **C.6 SOMOS 2020**

Latino Decisions interviewed n=2644 Latino adults nationwide from May 10-16, 2020. Respondents answers questions on their cell phone or landline with live callers, or via online self-responses through text or email invitations. Respondents were all randomly selected and lists deduped so each respondent only had one opportunity to be included. The invitation and survey were both available in English or Spanish. Final data were weighted to the Census ACS most recent estimates for Latino adults nationwide and weights were included to balance demographics for age, gender, education and region.

## D Summary Statistics

Table A.1: Summary statistics of covariates and survey availability

Covariate	Survey Availability	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum	Missing
Protest	Pew '10	0.15	0.36	0	1.00	0
	LNHIS '15	1.06	1.30	0.00	4.00	25
	CMPS '16	0.12	0.32	0	1	0
	LDMS '18	0.21	0.40	0	1	0
	LDEE '18	0.13	0.34	0	1	0
	SOMOS '20	0.18	0.38	0	1	0
Vote	LNHIS '15	3.00	1.20	0	4	533
	CMPS '16	0.68	0.47	0.00	1.00	1569.00
	LDMS '18	0.48	0.50	0	1	0
	SOMOS '20	3.16	1.24	0	4	579
Undocumented Social Ties	Pew '10	0.31	0.46	0	1	0
	LNHIS '15	0.58	0.49	0	1	0
	CMPS '16	0.38	0.48	0	1	0
	LDMS '18	0.48	0.50	0	1	0
	LDEE '18	0.49	0.50	0	1	0
	SOMOS '20	0.41	0.49	0	1	0
Age	Pew '10	43.13	16.48	18	92	34
	LNHIS '15	45.86	16.99	18	98	68
	CMPS '16	37.38	14.00	18	96	5
	LDMS '18	38.02	14.25	18	75	1
	LDEE '18	47.85	17.19	18	118	104
	SOMOS '20	41.50	17.34	18	97	137
Age (Refused)	Pew '10	0.02	0.16	0	1	0
	LNHIS '15	0.05	0.21	0	1	0
	CMPS '16	0.00	0.04	0	1	0
	LDEE '18	0.03	0.18	0	1	9
	SOMOS '20	0.07	0.26	0	1	0
Woman	Pew '10	0.47	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.00
	LNHIS '15	0.62	0.49	0.00	1.00	0.00
	CMPS '16	0.68	0.47	0.00	1.00	0.00
	LDMS '18	0.70	0.46	0.00	1.00	0.00
	LDEE '18	0.55	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.00
	SOMOS '20	0.57	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.00
Foreign	Pew '10	0.60	0.49	0.00	1.00	0.00
	LNHIS '15	0.43	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.00
	CMPS '16	0.24	0.43	0.00	1.00	0.00
	LDMS '18	0.81	0.39	0.00	1.00	0.00
	LDEE '18	0.08	0.27	0.00	1.00	0.00
	SOMOS '20	0.48	0.48	0.00	1.00	0.00
Spanish Speaker	Pew '10	0.41	0.49	0.00	1.00	0.00
	LNHIS '15	0.36	0.48	0.00	1.00	0.00
	CMPS '16	0.12	0.33	0.00	1.00	0.00
	LDMS '18	0.12	0.33	0.00	1.00	0.00
	LDEE '18	0.41	0.49	0.00	1.00	0.00
	SOMOS '20	0.49	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.00
Mexican	Pew '10	0.61	0.49	0.00	1.00	0.00
	LNHIS '15	0.55	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.00
	CMPS '16	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.00
	LDMS '18	0.43	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.00
	LDEE '18	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.00
	SOMOS '20	0.45	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.00
Puerto Rican	Pew '10	0.08	0.27	0.00	1.00	0.00
	LNHIS '15	0.10	0.31	0.00	1.00	0.00
	CMPS '16	0.16	0.37	0.00	1.00	0.00
	LDMS '18	0.11	0.31	0.00	1.00	0.00
	LDEE '18	0.10	0.31	0.00	1.00	0.00
	SOMOS '20	0.10	0.30	0.00	1.00	0.00
Cuban	Pew '10	0.05	0.22	0.00	1.00	0.00
	LNHIS '15	0.04	0.20	0.00	1.00	0.00
	CMPS '16	0.05	0.22	0.00	1.00	0.00
	LDMS '18	0.09	0.29	0.00	1.00	0.00
	LDEE '18	0.08	0.27	0.00	1.00	0.00
	SOMOS '20	0.04	0.21	0.00	1.00	0.00
Dominican	Pew '10	0.03	0.17	0.00	1.00	0.00
	LNHIS '15	0.03	0.17	0.00	1.00	0.00
	CMPS '16	0.04	0.19	0.00	1.00	0.00
	LDEE '18	0.01	0.12	0.00	1.00	0.00
	SOMOS '20	0.05	0.21	0.00	1.00	0.00
Salvadorean	Pew '10	0.04	0.21	0.00	1.00	0.00
	LNHIS '15	0.03	0.16	0.00	1.00	0.00
	CMPS '16	0.01	0.12	0.00	1.00	0.00
	LDMS '18	0.02	0.15	0.00	1.00	0.00
	LDEE '18	0.02	0.14	0.00	1.00	0.00
	SOMOS '20	0.02	0.15	0.00	1.00	0.00
Married	Pew '10	0.49	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.00
	LNHIS '15	0.51	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.00
	CMPS '16	0.40	0.49	0.00	1.00	0.00
	SOMOS '20	0.45	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.00
Skin Color	CMPS '16	2.23	1.30	0.00	9.00	0.00
Education	Pew '10	2.37	1.84	0.00	6.00	23.00
	LNHIS '15	7.64	16.81	0.00	98.00	0.00
	CMPS '16	2.98	1.15	0.00	5.00	0.00
	LDMS '18	3.22	1.05	0.00	5.00	0.00
	LDEE '18	2.98	1.50	0.00	6.00	54.00
	SOMOS '20	2.05	1.50	0.00	5.00	0.00
Education (Refused)	Pew '10	0.02	0.13	0.00	1.00	0.00
	LDEE '18	0.02	0.14	0.00	1.00	0.00

Table A.1: Summary statistics of covariates and survey availability

Covariate	Survey Availability	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum	Missing
Income	Pew '10	2.73	2.18	0.00	8.00	308.00
	LNHS '15	1.97	1.81	0.00	6.00	319.00
	CMPS '16	4.58	3.29	1.00	12.00	241.00
	LDMS '18	2.46	1.73	0.00	6.00	1.00
	SOMOS '20	1.65	1.46	0.00	5.00	265.00
Income (Ref)	Pew '10	0.22	0.42	0.00	1.00	0.00
	LNHS '15	0.21	0.41	0.00	1.00	0.00
	CMPS '16	0.08	0.27	0.00	1.00	0.00
	SOMOS '20	0.14	0.35	0.00	1.00	0.00
Unemployed	Pew '10	0.39	0.49	0.00	1.00	0.00
	CMPS '16	0.14	0.35	0.00	1.00	0.00
Homeowner	Pew '10	0.43	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.00
	CMPS '16	0.38	0.49	0.00	1.00	0.00
Party ID	LNHS '15	2.69	1.88	0.00	5.00	0.00
	CMPS '16	3.30	1.52	0.00	5.00	0.00
	LDMS '18	1.42	0.96	0.00	3.00	1.00
	LDEE '18	3.45	1.61	0.00	5.00	0.00
	SOMOS '20	4.17	2.35	0.00	8.00	0.00
Democrat	Pew '10	0.36	0.48	0.00	1.00	0.00
Republican	Pew '10	0.12	0.32	0.00	1.00	0.00
Party (Oth.)	Pew '10	0.24	0.43	0.00	1.00	0.00
	LNHS '15	0.25	0.43	0.00	1.00	0.00
	CMPS '16	0.08	0.26	0.00	1.00	0.00
	LDMS '18	0.09	0.29	0.00	1.00	1.00
	LDEE '18	0.04	0.21	0.00	1.00	0.00
	SOMOS '20	0.15	0.36	0.00	1.00	0.00
Ideology (Liberal)	CMPS '16	0.34	0.48	0.00	1.00	0.00
Ideology (Conservative)	CMPS '16	0.18	0.39	0.00	1.00	0.00
Ideology (DNR)	CMPS '16	0.11	0.31	0.00	1.00	0.00
Ideology	Pew '10	2.47	1.86	0.00	8.00	0.00
	LNHS '15	2.24	2.00	0.00	6.00	0.00
Ideology (Ref)	Pew '10	0.10	0.30	0.00	1.00	0.00
	LNHS '15	0.32	0.47	0.00	1.00	0.00
Ethnic Media	CMPS '16	1.72	1.09	0.00	5.00	0.00
	SOMOS '20	1.85	1.09	0.00	3.00	0.00
Experienced Discrimination	Pew '10	0.33	0.47	0.00	1.00	0.00
	LNHS '15	0.36	0.48	0.00	1.00	0.00
	CMPS '16	0.52	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.00
Latino ID	CMPS '16	2.33	0.85	0.00	3.00	0.00
Perceived Discrimination	LNHS '15	1.13	0.76	0.00	2.00	0.00
	Pew '10	11.80	5.02	0.00	16.09	0.00
	LNHS '15	13.81	1.54	8.10	16.12	505.00
	CMPS '16	13.74	1.43	7.87	16.12	69.00
	LDMS '18	13.67	1.30	8.22	16.13	0.00
	LDEE '18	14.03	1.40	6.62	16.13	324.00
	SOMOS '20	13.88	1.45	7.22	16.13	407.00
% Latino (County)	Pew '10	31.84	24.78	0.00	98.33	0.00
	LNHS '15	42.39	23.09	0.64	95.68	505.00
	CMPS '16	32.23	20.23	0.31	98.71	69.00
	LDMS '18	33.53	21.59	1.84	86.51	0.00
	LDEE '18	37.38	19.39	0.51	95.50	324.00
	SOMOS '20	31.94	18.43	0.28	99.18	407.00
% Foreign (County)	Pew '10	19.69	14.47	0.00	51.07	0.00
	LNHS '15	23.96	12.10	0.57	51.51	505.00
	CMPS '16	20.11	11.47	0.32	51.65	69.00
	LDMS '18	20.69	13.40	1.50	52.94	0.00
	LDEE '18	22.04	12.46	0.19	52.94	324.00
	SOMOS '20	20.73	12.40	0.24	52.94	407.00
% Noncitizen (County)	Pew '10	11.40	7.89	0.00	26.21	0.00
	LNHS '15	13.37	6.08	0.22	24.28	0.00
	CMPS '16	10.85	5.80	0.11	24.36	69.00
	LDMS '18	10.68	6.19	0.66	30.82	0.00
	LDEE '18	11.43	5.59	0.00	31.13	324.00
	SOMOS '20	10.72	5.64	0.02	30.82	407.00
Log(Median HH Income, County)	Pew '10	9.30	3.79	0.00	11.57	0.00
	LNHS '15	10.85	0.24	10.16	11.73	505.00
	CMPS '16	10.92	0.23	10.12	11.72	69.00
	LDMS '18	10.98	0.24	10.18	11.77	0.00
	LDEE '18	10.93	0.19	10.12	11.77	324.00
	SOMOS '20	10.98	0.23	10.17	11.77	407.00
% College (County)	Pew '10	23.26	12.53	0.00	58.30	0.00
	LNHS '15	27.32	9.58	7.51	75.09	505.00
	CMPS '16	30.83	10.82	8.22	72.88	69.00
	LDMS '18	31.04	9.75	7.62	60.66	0.00
	LDEE '18	28.60	7.52	7.20	60.69	324.00
	SOMOS '20	32.49	9.93	7.62	74.13	407.00
Enforcement Rate (County)	LNHS '15	0.14	0.16	0.00	0.99	505.00
	CMPS '16	0.12	0.38	0.00	16.08	69.00
	LDMS '18	0.10	0.09	0.00	0.60	1.00
	LDEE '18	0.15	0.36	0.00	16.30	324.00
	SOMOS '20	0.13	0.54	0.00	19.76	407.00
Log(Population, Zipcode)	Pew '10	8.86	3.70	0.00	11.62	0.00
	LNHS '15	10.48	0.82	5.26	11.65	508.00
	CMPS '16	10.42	0.74	4.01	11.65	40.00
	LDMS '18	10.40	0.73	5.08	11.69	0.00
	LDEE '18	10.35	0.85	4.88	11.69	316.00
	SOMOS '20	10.43	0.83	5.05	11.69	408
% Latino (Zipcode)	Pew '10	39.54	31.47	0.00	98.32	0.00
	LNHS '15	57.79	29.31	0.00	99.52	508.00
	CMPS '16	37.77	27.20	0.00	100.00	40.00
	LDMS '18	35.87	27.24	1.03	97.41	0.00
	LDEE '18	41.25	26.37	0.00	99.25	316.00

Table A.1: Summary statistics of covariates and survey availability

Covariate	Survey Availability	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum	Missing
	SOMOS '20	38.63	26.74	0.00	98.94	408
Log(Total SC Deportations)	LNHIS '15	4.66	4.04	0.00	10.48	0.00
	CMPS '16	6.84	2.56	0.00	10.48	0.00
	LDMS '18	6.89	2.23	0.00	10.48	1.00
	LDEE '18	7.14	2.63	0.00	10.48	0.00
	SOMOS '20	4.84	2.99	0.00	10.48	0.00
% Level 3 Deportations	LNHIS '15	0.16	0.14	0.00	0.71	0.00
	CMPS '16	0.25	0.10	0.00	1.00	0.00
	LDMS '18	0.26	0.09	0.00	0.51	3.00
	LDEE '18	0.25	0.10	0.00	1.00	17.00
	SOMOS '20	0.19	0.12	0.00	1.00	0.00
% Noncitizen (Zipcode)	LNHIS '15	17.57	10.40	0.00	46.97	508.00
	CMPS '16	12.09	8.74	0.00	48.76	40.00
	LDMS '18	11.17	8.51	0.00	46.68	0.00
	LDEE '18	12.27	8.37	0.00	46.68	316.00
	SOMOS '20	12.30	8.74	0.00	46.68	408
% Foreign (Zipcode)	LNHIS '15	28.39	16.29	0.00	74.64	508.00
	CMPS '16	21.90	14.52	0.00	74.33	40.00
	LDMS '18	21.48	15.63	0.71	75.35	0.00
	LDEE '18	23.08	14.73	0.00	75.35	316.00
	SOMOS '20	22.63	15.26	0.00	76.17	408
Log(Median HH Income, Zipcode)	LNHIS '15	10.65	0.49	0.00	12.12	508.00
	CMPS '16	10.83	0.37	9.38	12.10	40.00
	LDMS '18	10.97	0.38	9.62	12.15	0.00
	LDEE '18	10.86	0.53	0.00	12.15	316.00
	SOMOS '20	10.89	0.47	0.00	12.43	408
% College (Zipcode)	LNHIS '15	18.32	12.47	0.00	83.80	508.00
	CMPS '16	26.40	15.37	0.87	85.72	40.00
	LDMS '18	30.18	16.53	3.51	83.49	0.00
	LDEE '18	27.13	15.78	0.00	82.60	316.00
	SOMOS '20	28.30	16.85	3.40	88.95	408
Missing Zipcode	LNHIS '15	0.34	0.47	0.00	1.00	0.00
	CMPS '16	0.01	0.11	0.00	1.00	0.00
	LDEE '18	0.11	0.31	0.00	1.00	0.00
	SOMOS '20	0.22	0.42	0.00	1.00	0.00
Missing County	LNHIS '15	0.34	0.47	0.00	1.00	0.00
	CMPS '16	0.02	0.15	0.00	1.00	0.00
	LDEE '18	0.11	0.32	0.00	1.00	0.00
	SOMOS '20	0.22	0.42	0.00	1.00	0.00



## E Control Covariate Inclusion

Table E.2: Control covariate inclusion in fully specified models by survey

Survey	Covariates
Pew '10	Age, Age (Ref), Woman, Foreign, Spanish Speaker, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadorean, Married, Education, Education (Ref), Income, Income (Ref), Unemployed, Homeowner, Democrat, Republican, Party (Oth.), Ideology, Ideology (Ref), Experienced Discrimination, Log(Population, County), % Latino (County), % Foreign (County), % Noncitizen (County), Log(Median HH Income, County), % College (County), Log(Population, Zipcode), % Latino (Zipcode)
LNHS '15	Age, Age (Ref), Woman, Foreign, Spanish Speaker, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadorean, Married, Education, Income, Income (Ref), Party ID, Party (Oth.), Ideology, Ideology (Ref), Experienced Discrimination, Perceived Discrimination, Log(Total SC Deportations), % Level 3 Deportations, Log(Population, County), % Latino (County), % Noncitizen (County), % Foreign (County), Log(Median HH Income, County), % College (County), Missing County, Enforcement Rate (County), Log(Population, Zipcode), % Latino (Zipcode), % Noncitizen (Zipcode), % Foreign (Zipcode), Log(Median HH Income, Zipcode), % College (Zipcode), Missing Zipcode
CMPS '16	Age, Age (Ref), Woman, Foreign, Spanish Speaker, Skin Color, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadorean, Married, Education, Income, Income (Ref), Unemployed, Homeowner, Party ID, Party (Oth.), Ideology (Liberal), Ideology (Conservative), Ideology (DNR), Ethnic Media, Experienced Discrimination, Latino ID, Log(Total SC Deportations), % Level 3 Deportations, Log(Population, County), % Latino (County), % Noncitizen (County), % Foreign (County), Log(Median HH Income, County), % College (County), Enforcement Rate (County), Missing County, Log(Population, Zipcode), % Latino (Zipcode), % Noncitizen (Zipcode), % Foreign (Zipcode), Log(Median HH Income, Zipcode), % College (Zipcode), Missing Zipcode.
LDMS '18	Age, Woman, Foreign, Spanish Speaker, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Salvadorean, Education, Income, Party ID, Party (Oth.), Log(Total SC Deportations), % Level 3 Deportations, Log(Population, County), % Latino (County), % Noncitizen (County), % Foreign (County), Log(Median HH Income, County), % College (County), Enforcement Rate (County), Log(Population, Zipcode), % Latino (Zipcode), % Noncitizen (Zipcode), % Foreign (Zipcode), Log(Median HH Income, Zipcode), % College (Zipcode)
LDEE '18	Age, Age (Ref), Woman, Foreign, Spanish Speaker, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadorean, Education, Education (Ref), Party ID, Party (Oth.), Log(Total SC Deportations), % Level 3 Deportations, Log(Population, County), % Latino (County), % Noncitizen (County), % Foreign (County), % College (County), Log(Median HH Income, County), Enforcement Rate (County), Missing County, Log(Population, Zipcode), % Latino (Zipcode), % Noncitizen (Zipcode), % Foreign (Zipcode), % College (Zipcode), Log(Median HH Income, Zipcode), Missing Zipcode
SOMOS '20	Age, Age (Ref), Woman, Foreign, Spanish Speaker, Married, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Salvadorean, Education, Income, Income (Ref), Party ID, Party (Oth.), Ethnic Media, Log(Total SC Deportations), % Level 3 Deportations, Log(Population, County), % Latino (County), % Noncitizen (County), % Foreign (County), % College (County), Log(Median HH Income, County), , Missing County, Enforcement Rate (County), Log(Population, Zipcode), % Latino (Zipcode), % Noncitizen (Zipcode), % Foreign (Zipcode), % College (Zipcode), Log(Median HH Income, Zipcode), Missing Zipcode.

Blue: demographic controls. Green: socio-economic controls. Red: political controls. Purple: county-level controls. Orange: zipcode-level controls.

## F Disaggregation by type of social tie

### F.1 Discussion and interpretation

Here we disaggregate the undocumented social ties measures in all surveys with the exception of the Pew 2010 survey by *type* of social tie, that is, whether the social tie is familial, friendship-based, or perhaps a weaker tie (e.g. co-worker, acquaintance).<sup>25</sup>

The LNHIS 2015, CMPS 2016, LDMS 2018, LDEE 2018 and SOMOS 2020 surveys allow for different types of disaggregation based on their specific measures of undocumented social ties. The LNHIS 2015 and CMPS 2016 surveys ask respondents after they initially indicate whether they know someone undocumented if the person they know is a family member, a friend, or both in addition to allowing the respondent to not answer the question. We generate two different sets of disaggregated social ties measures from this item. The first set of measures are binary indicators exclusive of one another based on the strongest social tie. That is, a familial social ties indicator if the respondent knows an undocumented family member *OR* an undocumented family member and an undocumented friend in addition to a friendship social ties indicator if the respondent only knows an undocumented friend. We also construct an indicator equal to 1 if the respondent does not know or refuses to provide information of the type of social tie they have with an undocumented immigrant.

The second set of measures are not exclusive, but rather allow for overlap in the type of tie the respondent has. For instance, a respondent could have familial and friendship ties with undocumented immigrants. Therefore, they would be coded as 1 for the familial and friendship ties measures, whereas in the previous measure they would only be coded as 1 for the familial ties measure. The first set of measures help to determine if social ties are driven by the strongest type of relationship an individual has with an undocumented immigrant and helps alleviate potential collinearity problems between the familial and friendship ties measures.<sup>26</sup> Regardless, we analyze both sets of measures to assess the sensitivity of the disaggregated social ties coefficients with respect to the outcomes of interest.

The LDMS 2018 social ties measure is based on an item asking respondents to check all conditions that apply in terms of their social ties with undocumented immigrants, that is, whether they know someone in their family that is undocumented, whether they have a friend or co-worker that is undocumented, and whether they do not know anyone who is undocumented. We code this item into two sets of measures. The first set is exclusive based on the strongest social tie and includes binary indicators for whether the respondent knows an undocumented family member *OR* undocumented friend and whether the respondent knows an undocumented friend only. The second set of measures is not exclusive, and is a binary indicator for whether a respondent knows an undocumented family member and whether the respondent knows an undocumented friend (even if they know an undocumented family member). Importantly, this survey groups friendship ties with coworker ties.

The LDEE 2018 and SOMOS 2020 disaggregated social ties items are similar to the LDMS 2018 survey in that they have a “check all that apply” structure. In the LDEE, the respondent can indicate if they have familial, friendship, or acquaintance ties. In the SOMOS survey, the respondent can indicate if they have familial, friendship, or co-worker ties. We generate two sets of measures for each of these surveys again, one where the strongest tie is exclusive of others,

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<sup>25</sup>The Pew 2010 survey is excluded from the disaggregation analysis since the deportation contact measure does not allow for disaggregation by type of social tie.

<sup>26</sup>For instance, 70% of those with undocumented familial ties have undocumented friendship ties in the 2016 CMPS.

and one where overlap in ties is allowed.

We disaggregate the social ties measures for a number of reasons. First, disaggregation helps rule out reverse causality. For instance, Latinxs who engage in protest participation may come into Social Ties with undocumented immigrants through activist networks. Moreover, high-identifying Latinxs who are engaging in protest activity may select into relationships with undocumented immigrants since they are a politicized subset of the Latinx group category whose marginalized status may demand significant political investments on part of other group members. Familial social ties, with the exception of ties via marriage, are more likely to be ascriptive and unperturbed by reverse causal dynamics with respect to the outcome of interest. In short, one cannot choose the family they belong to. If we can demonstrate familial social ties operate in a similar manner to the broader social ties measure used in the main text of the paper and that social ties short of family operate similarly to familial social ties, it not only suggests reverse causality is not inducing significant bias in our main estimates (conditional on the set of control covariates), it also demonstrates friendship ties are not affected by reverse causal dynamics since other covariates in the model adjust for potential external motivations to select into friendships with undocumented immigrants (e.g. ideology, partisanship).

Second, disaggregation of the social ties measure may provide theoretical insights on what types of undocumented social ties may motivate political participation or attitudes capturing pro-group politics. For instance, familial ties may have a stronger influence on the outcomes of interest given their relative social significance over friendship and other weaker ties (e.g. co-worker, acquaintance) (Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers, 2009). Alternatively, weaker ties may still have an important influence on our outcomes of interest given they can provide a confluence of information regarding the status of the group that could motivate pro-group political engagement (e.g. an individual with multiple weak ties to undocumented immigrants) (Granovetter, 1973).

Figure F.3 displays coefficients (y-axis) with and without control covariates (denoted by color) of various types of undocumented social ties (denoted by shape) by survey (x-axis). Coefficients from the different types of social ties are from the same model conditional on the inclusion/exclusion of control covariates. Panel A displays coefficient estimates using social ties measures that are exclusive, Panel B displays coefficient estimates using social ties measures that allow for overlap between distinct types of social ties. Across all surveys, familial and friendship ties appear to be positively associated with protest participation using the ties measures without overlap (Panel A). Social ties that are unknown or not specified have an indeterminate association with protest participation. In the LNHIS, there appears to be no association between unknown undocumented social ties and protest participation. Conversely, in the CMPS, unknown social ties appear to be associated with protest participation.<sup>27</sup> Additionally, acquaintance ties are not associated with protest participation in the LDEE survey but co-worker ties are positively associated with protest participation in the SOMOS survey, suggesting weak ties have a lesser influence on protest participation.

Figure F.3, Panel B displays coefficients allowing for overlap in social ties. Many of the coefficients across all studies become attenuated, likely due to collinearity between friendship and familial ties. Using the overlap measures, familial social ties are positively associated

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<sup>27</sup>It is important to note 3.2% of the sample in the CMPS has unknown undocumented social ties whereas 0.8% of the LNHIS sample has unknown undocumented social ties. Although the proportion of unknown undocumented social ties is relatively small across both surveys, there is a 300% increase in unknown undocumented social ties in the CMPS relative to the LNHIS. It is possible the increase in unknown undocumented social ties is driven by respondents seeking to protect their undocumented social ties, particularly after the election of Donald Trump. If unknown social ties are more salient in the presence of a threatening political context, that may explain why unknown social ties are positively associated with protest participation in the CMPS but not the LNHIS. However, this is simply speculation.

with protest participation with the exception of the CMPS. Meta-analytically, familial social ties has a fairly large influence on protest participation and is statistically larger than the influence of undocumented friendship ties on protest participation (a standardized coefficient of 0.32). Undocumented friendship ties are not consistently associated with increased protest participation. Statistically significant and positive coefficients are derived from the CMPS and LDEE surveys only. Meta-analytically, friendship social ties has a relatively small influence on protest participation (a standardized coefficient of 0.11).

We also analyze the association between distinct social tie measures and voting participation on Figure F.4. Consistent with the main results, we find all kinds of undocumented social ties are typically unrelated to voting participation. Meta-analytically, both undocumented familial and undocumented friendship ties are unassociated with voting behavior. This is true regardless of whether we use the overlap or non-overlapping measures of undocumented social ties.

Finally, we evaluate whether the influence of disaggregated undocumented social ties is moderated by identity with respect to our outcomes of interest. Table F.3 displays heterogeneous effects of disaggregated undocumented social tie types by Latinx identity using the social tie measures that are not overlapping. Consistent with the main results, the effect of familial, friendship, and unknown undocumented social ties on protest is stronger among high identifying Latinxs (Panel A). Likewise, all social tie types do not have stronger effects on voting conditional on Latinx identity (Panel B). Inconsistent with the main results, disaggregation of tie types attenuates the conditional association between social ties and support for pro-immigrant activism (Panel C). However, undocumented social ties have a stronger effect on support for the notion anti-immigrant discrimination is anti-Latinx discrimination among high Latinx identifiers (Panel D). Interestingly, when we replicate these analyses using the overlapping measures of undocumented social ties, most of the heterogeneous effects become statistically insignificant (Table F.3). We do not believe these estimates completely obviate the disaggregated results displayed on Table F.3. These findings are likely the result of multicollinearity, given 47% of those with undocumented friendship ties have undocumented familial ties and 72% of those with undocumented familial ties have undocumented friendship ties when the different social tie measures are overlapping. There appears to be limited data to model the influence of overlapping undocumented social ties in addition to their conditional influence by Latinx identity.

## F.2 Association between undocumented social ties and protest




Figure F.3: Standardized coefficients (y-axis) characterizing association between types of undocumented social ties (shape) and protest participation across surveys (x-axis). Color denotes inclusion/exclusion of control covariates in model producing coefficient estimates. Panel A characterizes coefficients from measures of undocumented social ties that are mutually exclusive with respect to the strongest social tie. Panel B characterizes coefficients from measures of undocumented social ties that overlap with one another given the possibility for multiple types of undocumented social ties. All coefficient estimates per survey are from the same regression model conditional on the inclusion/exclusion of control covariates. All estimates from linear regression models with population weights. Meta-analytic estimates derived from a pooled random-effects model using the Hartung-Knapp-Sidik-Jonkman method. Pew Hispanic Survey omitted from estimates given the inability to disaggregate by familial and friendship social ties.

### F.3 Association between undocumented social ties and voting




Figure F.4: Standardized coefficients (y-axis) characterizing association between types of undocumented social ties (shape) and voting participation across surveys (x-axis). Color denotes inclusion/exclusion of control covariates in model producing coefficient estimates. Panel A characterizes coefficients from measures of undocumented social ties that are mutually exclusive with respect to the strongest social tie. Panel B characterizes coefficients from measures of undocumented social ties that overlap with one another given the possibility for multiple types of undocumented social ties. All coefficient estimates per survey are from the same regression model conditional on the inclusion/exclusion of control covariates. All estimates from linear regression models with population weights. Meta-analytic estimates derived from a pooled random-effects model using the Hartung-Knapp-Sidik-Jonkman method. Pew Hispanic Survey omitted from estimates given the inability to disaggregate by familial and friendship social ties.

## F.4 Heterogeneity by identity

Table F.3: Assessing heterogeneity of undocumented social ties by identity disaggregated by tie type (e.g. familial, friendship, no overlap)

<b>Panel A: Protest</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Social Ties (Family) x Latino ID	0.16* (0.07)	0.16* (0.07)	0.18* (0.08)	0.17* (0.08)	0.17* (0.08)	0.16* (0.08)
Social Ties (Friend) x Latino ID	0.20* (0.08)	0.21** (0.08)	0.23** (0.08)	0.22** (0.08)	0.21** (0.08)	0.23** (0.08)
Social Ties (Unknown) x Latino ID	0.41* (0.19)	0.41* (0.18)	0.45* (0.19)	0.42* (0.19)	0.43* (0.19)	0.45* (0.18)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.09	0.10	0.13
N	3008	3008	3008	3008	3008	3004
<b>Panel B: Vote</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Social Ties (Family) x Latino ID	0.18 (0.29)	0.05 (0.28)	0.02 (0.28)	0.03 (0.27)	0.02 (0.27)	0.01 (0.26)
Social Ties (Friend) x Latino ID	0.15 (0.18)	0.20 (0.18)	0.19 (0.19)	0.19 (0.18)	0.16 (0.17)	0.24 (0.17)
Social Ties (Unknown) x Latino ID	0.14 (0.41)	0.07 (0.43)	0.11 (0.44)	0.12 (0.44)	0.08 (0.42)	0.17 (0.41)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.02	0.08	0.09	0.10	0.13	0.18
N	1439	1439	1439	1439	1439	1430
<b>Panel C: Immigrant Activism</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Social Ties (Family) x Latino ID	0.09 (0.09)	0.10 (0.08)	0.07 (0.08)	0.14 (0.08)	0.14 (0.08)	0.13 (0.08)
Social Ties (Friend) x Latino ID	0.16* (0.08)	0.16* (0.08)	0.12 (0.08)	0.14* (0.07)	0.13 (0.07)	0.11 (0.07)
Social Ties (Unknown) x Latino ID	-0.01 (0.21)	0.04 (0.19)	0.02 (0.19)	0.06 (0.18)	0.07 (0.17)	0.05 (0.17)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.19	0.22	0.23	0.29	0.31	0.33
N	3008	3008	3008	3008	3008	3004
<b>Panel D: Homogeneity</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Social Ties (Family) x Latino ID	0.27** (0.10)	0.28** (0.09)	0.27** (0.10)	0.31*** (0.09)	0.31*** (0.09)	0.32*** (0.09)
Social Ties (Friend) x Latino ID	0.12 (0.09)	0.12 (0.08)	0.11 (0.09)	0.11 (0.08)	0.10 (0.08)	0.08 (0.08)
Social Ties (Unknown) x Latino ID	0.07 (0.15)	0.09 (0.15)	0.08 (0.15)	0.10 (0.15)	0.12 (0.15)	0.13 (0.15)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.09	0.13	0.14	0.17	0.18	0.20
N	3008	3008	3008	3008	3008	3004
Demographic Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
State FE	N	N	N	N	N	Y

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . All covariates rescaled between 0-1. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table F.4: Assessing heterogeneity of undocumented social ties by identity disaggregated by tie type (e.g. familial, friendship, overlap)

<b>Panel A: Protest</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Social Ties (Family) x Latino ID	0.06 (0.10)	0.05 (0.10)	0.06 (0.10)	0.06 (0.10)	0.06 (0.10)	0.04 (0.10)
Social Ties (Friend) x Latino ID	0.11 (0.08)	0.11 (0.08)	0.11 (0.08)	0.12 (0.08)	0.12 (0.08)	0.13 (0.08)
Social Ties (Unknown) x Latino ID	0.38* (0.19)	0.38* (0.18)	0.41* (0.19)	0.40* (0.19)	0.41* (0.19)	0.42* (0.18)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.08	0.09	0.12
N	3008	3008	3008	3008	3008	3004
<b>Panel B: Vote</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Social Ties (Family) x Latino ID	0.05 (0.25)	-0.11 (0.25)	-0.11 (0.25)	-0.12 (0.25)	-0.11 (0.25)	-0.17 (0.24)
Social Ties (Friend) x Latino ID	0.22 (0.17)	0.25 (0.17)	0.25 (0.17)	0.24 (0.17)	0.21 (0.16)	0.28 (0.16)
Social Ties (Unknown) x Latino ID	0.16 (0.41)	0.09 (0.43)	0.14 (0.44)	0.13 (0.44)	0.09 (0.42)	0.18 (0.41)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.02	0.08	0.09	0.10	0.13	0.18
N	1439	1439	1439	1439	1439	1430
<b>Panel C: Immigrant Activism</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Social Ties (Family) x Latino ID	-0.01 (0.10)	0.01 (0.10)	0.01 (0.09)	0.05 (0.09)	0.05 (0.09)	0.06 (0.09)
Social Ties (Friend) x Latino ID	0.11 (0.07)	0.11 (0.07)	0.12 (0.07)	0.12 (0.06)	0.11 (0.06)	0.10 (0.06)
Social Ties (Unknown) x Latino ID	-0.02 (0.21)	0.03 (0.19)	0.04 (0.19)	0.05 (0.18)	0.06 (0.17)	0.05 (0.17)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.18	0.21	0.23	0.29	0.31	0.33
N	1439	1439	1439	1439	1439	1430
<b>Panel D: Homogeneity</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Social Ties (Family) x Latino ID	0.22 (0.12)	0.22 (0.12)	0.22 (0.12)	0.25* (0.11)	0.27* (0.11)	0.28** (0.11)
Social Ties (Friend) x Latino ID	0.04 (0.09)	0.06 (0.08)	0.07 (0.08)	0.07 (0.08)	0.05 (0.08)	0.04 (0.08)
Social Ties (Unknown) x Latino ID	0.06 (0.15)	0.08 (0.15)	0.08 (0.15)	0.09 (0.16)	0.11 (0.15)	0.12 (0.15)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.09	0.13	0.14	0.17	0.18	0.20
N	3008	3008	3008	3008	3008	3004
Demographic Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
State FE	N	N	N	N	N	Y

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . All covariates rescaled between 0-1. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.



## G Using different voter subsamples

### G.1 Social ties and protest association




Figure G.5: Association between undocumented social ties and protest using different subsamples. Panel A characterizes the association between undocumented social ties and protest for Latino registered voters. Panel B characterizes the association between undocumented social ties and protest for the Latino citizen voting age population (CVAP). The x-axis is the standardized coefficient of undocumented social ties. The y-axis is the survey at use. Shape denotes the inclusion/exclusion of control covariates. Each coefficient estimate is from a separate model using a different survey and/or fully saturated specification. The meta-analytic estimates are derived from a pooled random-effects model using the Hartung-Knapp-Sidik-Jonkman method. The red-dashed line characterizes the meta-analytic point estimate. In-plot annotations denote the size of the coefficient and the sample size. 95% confidence intervals displayed are derived from HC2 robust errors.

## G.2 Heterogeneity

Table G.5: Heterogeneous effects of undocumented social ties by Latinx identity for different samples of Latinx (registered voters, CVAP)

<b>Panel A: Registered Voters</b>	Protest	Vote	Immigrant Activism	Anti-Imm = Anti-Latino
Social Ties x Latino ID	0.14 <sup>†</sup> (0.08)	— (—)	0.06 (0.10)	0.16* (0.08)
Social Ties	−0.06 (0.06)	— (—)	−0.04 (0.06)	−0.12 <sup>†</sup> (0.07)
Latino ID	0.04 (0.05)	— (—)	0.30*** (0.04)	0.12* (0.05)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.19	—	0.40	0.25
N	1434	—	1434	1434
<b>Panel B: CVAP</b>	Protest	Vote	Immigrant Activism	Anti-Imm = Anti-Latino
Social Ties x Latino ID	0.21*** (0.06)	0.11 (0.08)	0.14* (0.06)	0.19** (0.06)
Social Ties	−0.10* (0.04)	−0.10 (0.07)	−0.08 (0.05)	−0.13** (0.05)
Latino ID	0.02 (0.03)	−0.01 (0.04)	0.22*** (0.03)	0.10** (0.03)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.14	0.32	0.30	0.16
N	2622	2622	2622	2622
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
State FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , <sup>†</sup>  $p < 0.1$ . All models are fully specified. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Each panel characterizes the heterogeneous effects of undocumented social ties for different Latinx subsamples (Panel A = registered voters, Panel B = citizen voting age population (CVAP)). The outcomes for Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 are protest, voting, support for pro-immigrant activism, and agreement with the notion anti-immigrant discrimination is really anti-Latinx discrimination. All covariates are rescaled between 0-1 for interpretability. All models use HC2 robust standard errors.

### G.3 Voting analysis (CVAP sample)




Figure G.6: Association between undocumented social ties and voting using citizen voting age subsamples. The x-axis is the standardized coefficient of undocumented social ties. The y-axis is the survey at use. Shape denotes the inclusion/exclusion of control covariates. Each coefficient estimate is from a separate model using a different survey and/or fully saturated specification. The meta-analytic estimates are derived from a pooled random-effects model using the Hartung-Knapp-Sidik-Jonkman method. The red-dashed line characterizes the meta-analytic point estimate. In-plot annotations denote the size of the coefficient and the sample size. 95% confidence intervals displayed are derived from HC2 robust errors.

## H Using alternative DV operationalizations

### H.1 Protest

Table H.6: Alternative Protest DV (LNHIS '15)

	Protest Alt 1	Protest Alt 2
Social Ties	0.03* (0.02)	0.08** (0.02)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.11	0.15
N	1469	1469
Survey	LNHIS	LNHIS
Demographic Controls	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y
State FE	Y	Y

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table H.6 displays coefficient estimates of undocumented social ties with respect to two different protest outcomes adjusting for a full set of control covariates in the LNHIS. The first protest outcome recodes the 4-point likert scale of protest intention used in the main results for the LNHIS to a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent indicates they are “extremely likely” to participate in a rally, march, demonstration, or protest (4 on the scale, Model 1). The second protest outcome recodes the 4-point likert scale of protest intention used in the main LNHIS results to a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent indicates they are “extremely” or “very” likely to participate in a rally, march, demonstration, or protest (4 and 3 on the scale, Model 2).

## H.2 Voting

Table H.7: Alternate Vote DV

	Vote (Binary)	Vote (10pt)	Vote (Binary)
Social Ties	0.03 (0.04)	−0.02 (0.05)	−0.03 (0.04)
Survey	LNHIS	LDMS	SOMOS
R <sup>2</sup>	0.22	0.17	0.21
N	961	409	1251
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y
State FE	Y	Y	Y

Note: \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ . All covariates rescaled between 0-1. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table H.7 displays coefficient estimates of undocumented social ties with respect to alternative operationalizations of self-reported voting behavior adjusting for a full set of control covariates across the LNHIS, LDMS, and SOMOS studies. The LNHIS estimates (Model 1) recode the 5-point voting intention likert scale to a binary measure equal to 1 if the respondent indicates they are “extremely likely” to vote, the highest on the scale. The LDMS estimates (Model 2) recode the binary voting variable to a 10-point likert scale, which was the original operationalization. The scale is recoded between 0-1 by dividing the original 10 point scale by its maximum. The SOMOS estimates (Model 3) recode the 5-point likert scale to a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent indicates they are “almost certain they will vote,” the highest value on the vote intention scale. The coefficient estimates are statistically null, similar to the main results displayed on Figure 1. These results suggest the findings are not sensitive to specific operationalizations of the dependent variable.

# I Demonstrating undocumented social ties = sense of threat

Table I.8: Association between social ties with undocumented immigrants and fear of proximal deportation

	Threat			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Social Ties	0.36*** (0.03)	0.28*** (0.03)	0.37*** (0.02)	0.26*** (0.02)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.18	0.33	0.27	0.43
N	1494	1494	3008	3008
Survey	LNHIS '15	LNHIS '15	CMPS '16	CMPS '16
Demographic Controls	N	Y	N	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	N	Y	N	Y
Political Controls	N	Y	N	Y
County Controls	N	Y	N	Y
Zipcode Controls	N	Y	N	Y
State FE	N	Y	N	Y

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . Models alternate between the exclusion/inclusion of a full set of control covariates. Models 1-2 assess the association between undocumented social ties and fear of proximal deportation in the LNHIS '15 data. Models 3-4 assess the association between undocumented social ties and fear of proximal deportation in the CMPS '16 data. All estimates use population weights. All covariates rescaled between 0-1 for interpretability. HC2 standard errors in parentheses.

## J Unconditional association between undocumented social ties and pro-group outcomes

Table J.9: Unconditional association between undocumented social ties and pro-group outcomes

	Pro-immigrant Activism (1)	(2)	Anti-Imm. = Anti-Latino (3)	(4)
Social Ties	0.15*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.10	0.34	0.07	0.21
N	3008	3008	3008	3008
Demographic Controls	N	Y	N	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	N	Y	N	Y
Political Controls	N	Y	N	Y
County Controls	N	Y	N	Y
Zipcode Controls	N	Y	N	Y
State FE	N	Y	N	Y

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . Models alternate between the exclusion/inclusion of a full set of control covariates. Models 1-2 assess the association between undocumented social ties support for pro-immigrant activism. Models 3-4 assess the association between undocumented social ties and agreement with the notion anti-immigrant discrimination is anti-Latinx discrimination. All estimates use population weights. All covariates rescaled between 0-1 for interpretability. HC2 standard errors in parentheses.

## **K Accounting for alternative mechanisms**

Here, we account for alternative mechanisms. Importantly, we adjust for interactions between undocumented social ties and alternative social identities that may also be primed in addition to Latinx identity. The two social identities we adjust for are partisan identity and gender identity. We include the partisan identity interaction given the relative incorporation of Latinx immigrants in the Democratic party and the fact the Democratic party tends to be relatively pro-immigrant. Therefore, Latinxs who are strong Democratic identifiers may be compelled to fight on behalf of undocumented immigrants in the presence of social ties.

Moreover, we adjust for the heterogeneous effect of undocumented social ties conditional on gender identity centrality.<sup>28</sup> Gender identity may be relevant to both Latinx men and women with undocumented social ties. Men are disproportionately vulnerable to immigration enforcement (Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2013). Likewise, undocumented status may have a gendered impact on women, who, often by virtue of their care-taking status in a patriarchal context, are disparately exposed to restrictions on access to social services and the potential loss of male breadwinners in a punitive immigration environment (Dreby, 2012). Additionally, adjusting for heterogeneous partial derivatives of social ties by other social identities accounts for pro-sociality as a potential confounder (Gay, Hochschild, and White, 2016).

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<sup>28</sup>Gender identity centrality is measured on a 4 point scale from “Very important” to “Not at all important” in response to a question that asks “How important is your gender identity to you?”



## K.1 Alternative sources of heterogeneity

### K.1.1 Protest outcome

Table K.10: Adjusting for alternative mechanisms and sources of heterogeneity (protest outcome)

	Protest						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Social Ties x Latino ID	0.19** (0.07)	0.14* (0.06)	0.19** (0.06)	0.18** (0.06)	0.16** (0.06)	0.18** (0.06)	0.15* (0.06)
Social Ties x Gender ID	0.06 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)
Social Ties x Party ID	0.19* (0.08)	0.16* (0.08)	0.20* (0.08)	0.18* (0.08)	0.21** (0.08)	0.18* (0.08)	0.20** (0.07)
Social Ties x Internal Efficacy	0.04 (0.06)						0.04 (0.06)
Social Ties x External Efficacy	-0.15 <sup>†</sup> (0.08)						-0.14 <sup>†</sup> (0.08)
Social Ties x Group Efficacy	-0.05 (0.07)						-0.03 (0.07)
Social Ties x Perceived Discrim.		0.07 (0.06)					0.05 (0.06)
Social Ties x Experienced Discrim.		0.06 (0.04)					0.04 (0.04)
Social Ties x 2nd Gen.			-0.05 (0.05)				-0.03 (0.05)
Social Ties x 2.5 Gen.			0.11 <sup>†</sup> (0.06)				0.09 (0.06)
Social Ties x 3rd Gen.			0.05 (0.05)				0.04 (0.05)
Social Ties x Spanish			-0.05 (0.06)				-0.02 (0.05)
Social Ties x Skin Color				-0.53 (0.44)			-0.67 (0.42)
Social Ties x Skin Color <sup>2</sup>				1.15 <sup>†</sup> (0.67)			1.30* (0.65)
Social Ties x Perceived Immigration Status				-0.02 (0.05)			-0.05 (0.05)
Social Ties x Mobilization					0.12* (0.06)		0.10 <sup>†</sup> (0.06)
Social Ties x Prosociality						0.05 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.17	0.14	0.19
N	3004	3004	3004	3004	3004	3004	3004
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$  All models are fully specified, linear terms are omitted. The outcome for all models is protest participation. Model 1 adjusts for heterogeneity of social ties by distinct forms of political efficacy. Model 2 adjusts for heterogeneity of social ties by proxies for a sense of injustice (experienced and perceived discrimination against Latinos). Model 3 adjusts for heterogeneity of social ties by measures of acculturation (immigrant generation and whether the respondent chose to take the survey in Spanish). Model 4 adjusts for heterogeneity of social ties by perceived immigration status on part of the dominant group. Model 5 adjusts for heterogeneity of social ties by a conducive opportunity structure motivated by community mobilization. Model 6 adjusts for heterogeneity of social ties by prosociality (measured with an item asking how many neighbors the respondent frequently speaks to). Model 7 adjusts for all the aforementioned sources of potential heterogeneity in a fully saturated specification. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. All models use HC2 robust standard errors.

### K.1.2 Pro-immigrant activism outcome

Table K.11: Adjusting for alternative mechanisms and sources of heterogeneity (pro-immigrant activism outcome)

	Pro-Immigrant Activism						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Social Ties x Latino ID	0.14** (0.05)	0.10 <sup>†</sup> (0.05)	0.12* (0.05)	0.13* (0.05)	0.13* (0.05)	0.13* (0.05)	0.09 (0.05)
Social Ties x Gender ID	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.04)
Social Ties x Party ID	0.01 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)
Social Ties x Internal Efficacy	-0.06 (0.05)						-0.07 (0.05)
Social Ties x External Efficacy	0.07 (0.05)						0.08 (0.05)
Social Ties x Group Efficacy	-0.00 (0.05)						0.02 (0.05)
Social Ties x Perceived Discrim.		0.08 (0.05)					0.08 (0.05)
Social Ties x Experienced Discrim.		0.02 (0.03)					0.02 (0.03)
Social Ties x 2nd Gen.			-0.08* (0.04)				-0.06 (0.04)
Social Ties x 2.5 Gen.			0.00 (0.05)				-0.00 (0.05)
Social Ties x 3rd Gen.			-0.09* (0.04)				-0.08* (0.04)
Social Ties x Spanish			0.02 (0.04)				0.02 (0.04)
Social Ties x Skin Color				-0.17 (0.22)			-0.21 (0.24)
Social Ties x Skin Color <sup>2</sup>				0.10 (0.37)			0.16 (0.43)
Social Ties x Perceived Immigration Status				0.01 (0.04)			0.02 (0.04)
Social Ties x Mobilization					-0.04 (0.03)		-0.03 (0.03)
Social Ties x Prosociality						0.00 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.35	0.37	0.35	0.34	0.35	0.34	0.39
N	3004	3004	3004	3004	3004	3004	3004
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$  All models are fully specified, linear terms are omitted. The outcome for all models is support for pro-immigrant activism. Model 1 adjusts for heterogeneity of social ties by distinct forms of political efficacy. Model 2 adjusts for heterogeneity of social ties by proxies for a sense of injustice (experienced and perceived discrimination against Latinos). Model 3 adjusts for heterogeneity of social ties by measures of acculturation (immigrant generation and whether the respondent chose to take the survey in Spanish). Model 4 adjusts for heterogeneity of social ties by perceived immigration status on part of the dominant group. Model 5 adjusts for heterogeneity of social ties by a conducive opportunity structure motivated by community mobilization. Model 6 adjusts for heterogeneity of social ties by prosociality (measured with an item asking how many neighbors the respondent frequently speaks to). Model 7 adjusts for all the aforementioned sources of potential heterogeneity in a fully saturated specification. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. All models use HC2 robust standard errors.

### K.1.3 Homogeneity outcome

Table K.12: Adjusting for alternative mechanisms and sources of heterogeneity (homogeneity outcome)

	Anti-Immigrant Discrimination = Anti-Latino Discrimination						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Social Ties x Latino ID	0.18** (0.07)	0.17* (0.07)	0.20** (0.07)	0.20** (0.07)	0.20** (0.07)	0.20** (0.07)	0.15* (0.07)
Social Ties x Gender ID	0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
Social Ties x Party ID	-0.13* (0.06)	-0.14* (0.06)	-0.12 <sup>†</sup> (0.07)	-0.11 <sup>†</sup> (0.07)	-0.11 <sup>†</sup> (0.06)	-0.12 <sup>†</sup> (0.07)	-0.12 <sup>†</sup> (0.06)
Social Ties x Internal Efficacy	0.05 (0.06)						0.02 (0.06)
Social Ties x External Efficacy	-0.07 (0.06)						-0.07 (0.06)
Social Ties x Group Efficacy	0.07 (0.06)						0.10 (0.07)
Social Ties x Perceived Discrim.		0.11 <sup>†</sup> (0.06)					0.07 (0.06)
Social Ties x Experienced Discrim.		-0.02 (0.03)					-0.03 (0.03)
Social Ties x 2nd Gen.			-0.11* (0.05)				-0.10* (0.04)
Social Ties x 2.5 Gen.			-0.02 (0.06)				-0.03 (0.06)
Social Ties x 3rd Gen.			-0.03 (0.04)				-0.04 (0.04)
Social Ties x Spanish			-0.01 (0.05)				-0.02 (0.05)
Social Ties x Skin Color				-0.16 (0.32)			-0.19 (0.32)
Social Ties x Skin Color <sup>2</sup>				0.16 (0.41)			0.19 (0.44)
Social Ties x Perceived Immigration Status				0.10* (0.05)			0.08 <sup>†</sup> (0.05)
Social Ties x Mobilization					-0.05 (0.04)		-0.05 (0.04)
Social Ties x Prosociality						-0.06 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.22	0.24	0.22	0.22	0.23	0.22	0.26
N	3004	3004	3004	3004	3004	3004	3004
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$  All models are fully specified, linear terms are omitted. The outcome for all models is agreement with the notion that anti-immigrant discrimination is really anti-Latino discrimination. Model 1 adjusts for heterogeneity of social ties by distinct forms of political efficacy. Model 2 adjusts for heterogeneity of social ties by proxies for a sense of injustice (experienced and perceived discrimination against Latinos). Model 3 adjusts for heterogeneity of social ties by measures of acculturation (immigrant generation and whether the respondent chose to take the survey in Spanish). Model 4 adjusts for heterogeneity of social ties by perceived immigration status on part of the dominant group. Model 5 adjusts for heterogeneity of social ties by a conducive opportunity structure motivated by community mobilization. Model 6 adjusts for heterogeneity of social ties by prosociality (measured with an item asking how many neighbors the respondent frequently speaks to). Model 7 adjusts for all the aforementioned sources of potential heterogeneity in a fully saturated specification. All models use HC2 robust standard errors.

## K.2 Assessing efficacy as a mechanism

Table K.13: Assessing the association between social ties with undocumented immigrants and distinct forms of political efficacy

	External Efficacy (1)	Internal Efficacy (2)	Group Efficacy (3)
Social Ties	−0.00 (0.05)	0.11 (0.07)	0.09 (0.08)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.12	0.12	0.15
N	3004	3004	3004
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y
State FE	Y	Y	Y

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$  All models are fully specified. The outcome for Model 1 is external efficacy. The outcome for Model 2 is internal efficacy. The outcome for Model 3 is group-based efficacy. All covariates are rescaled between 0-1. All models use HC2 robust standard errors.

## K.3 Ruling out alternative ideological motivations

Table K.14: Association between undocumented social ties, liberal policy attitudes, and pro-immigrant attitudes

<b>Panel A: Non-Immigration Issues</b>	Gay Marriage (1)	Climate (2)	Taxes (3)	Voter ID (4)	Obamacare (5)	Death Penalty (6)	Index (7)
Social Ties	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.00 (0.02)	−0.00 (0.02)	−0.00 (0.01)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.19	0.23	0.12	0.09	0.11	0.14	0.13
N	3004	3004	3004	3004	3004	3004	3004
<b>Panel B: Immigration Issues</b>	Citizenship 1 (1)	Citizenship 2 (2)	Undoc. Leave (3)	Positive Impact (4)	Decrease Border (5)	Take Resources (6)	Index (7)
Social Ties	0.01 (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	−0.01 (0.01)	0.04 <sup>†</sup> (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.02)	0.07*** (0.01)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.12	0.18	0.09	0.15	0.11	0.20	0.26
N	3004	3004	3004	3004	3004	3004	3004
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , <sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$ . All models are fully specified. Panel A characterizes outcomes that measure liberal preferences irrelevant to immigration. Panel B characterizes outcomes related to liberal immigration attitudes. Panel A, Model 1 characterizes the association between undocumented social ties and opposition to Gay Marriage. Panel A, Model 2 characterizes the association between undocumented social ties and support for climate change policy. Panel A, Model 3 characterizes the association between undocumented social ties and support for higher taxes on the wealthy. Panel A, Model 4 characterizes the association between undocumented social ties and support for Voter ID laws. Panel A, Model 5 characterizes the association between undocumented social ties and support for Obamacare. Panel A, Model 6 characterizes the association between undocumented social ties and the death penalty. Panel A, Model 7 characterizes the association between social ties and an additive index of the aforementioned items (recoded so that positive = more liberal). Panel B, Models 1 and 2, is the association between social ties and support for a pathway to citizenship. Panel B, Model 3, is the association between social ties and support for the notion undocumented people should leave the United States. Panel B, Model 4 is the association between social ties and support for the notion immigrants have a positive impact on the economy in the respondent's state. Panel B, Model 5 is the association between social ties and support for decreasing border spending. Panel B, Model 6 is the association between social ties and support for the notion immigrants take resources away from people living in the U.S. Panel B, Model 7 is the association between social ties and an index of the aforementioned outcomes (recoded so positive = more liberal). All covariates rescaled between 0-1 for interpretability. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

## L Replicating heterogeneity by Latinx identity for prospective outcome in LNHIS

To alleviate concerns the heterogeneous effects of undocumented social ties conditional on Latinx identity derived from the CMPS are from a reverse causal process where Latinx people become high-identifiers in response to prior protest participation, we estimate the heterogeneous effect of undocumented social ties by perceived discrimination against Latinx people in the LNHIS '15 study with a prospective protest measure. Before we discuss these heterogeneous effects, we must justify why we believe assessing heterogeneity of undocumented social ties by perceived discrimination replicates the main results, which assess heterogeneity by Latinx identity centrality.

Table L.15: Horse-racing heterogeneity by Latinx identity with heterogeneity by perceived discrimination against Latinx people (CMPS '16)

	Protest		Anti-Imm = Anti-Latino		Pro-Immigrant Activism	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Social Ties x Latino PD	0.15* (0.06)	0.11 <sup>†</sup> (0.06)	0.10* (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.08 <sup>†</sup> (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)
Social Ties x Latino ID		0.17** (0.06)		0.16** (0.06)		0.10 <sup>†</sup> (0.05)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.12	0.13	0.21	0.23	0.32	0.36
N	3008	3008	3008	3008	3008	3008
Alternative Social ID Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , <sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$ . All models are fully specified and use CMPS '16 data. Models 1-2 assess the heterogeneous effects of undocumented social ties by perceived discrimination against Latinx and Latinx identity with respect to the protest participation outcome. Models 3-4 assess the heterogeneous effects of undocumented social ties with respect to the outcome measuring agreement with the notion anti-immigrant discrimination is anti-Latinx discrimination. Models 5-6 assess the heterogeneous effects of undocumented social ties with respect to the outcome measuring support for pro-immigrant activism. Each model alternates between the exclusion/inclusion of the  $SocialTies_i \times LatinoID_i$  interaction. Estimates use population weights. All covariates rescaled between 0-1 to ensure interpretability. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

Although perceived discrimination may measure concepts outside of ethnic identification, such as a sense of injustice (Walker, 2020), we believe the heterogeneous influence of undocumented social ties by perceived discrimination is primarily driven by identity for two reasons. The first is theoretical. Social identity theory suggests high group identifiers may be more sensitive to group threats and are therefore inclined to perceive discrimination as a defense mechanism to maintain the positive distinctiveness of the group. This assumption is corroborated by several studies in social psychology (Sellers and Shelton, 2003; Heatherton, 2003; Castillo et al., 2006). Moreover, the link between identity and perceived discrimination may be endogenous, since group members may draw on group resources to maintain self-esteem in the face of threat (Branscombe, Schmitt, and Harvey, 1999; Oskooii, 2018). The second reason is empirical. Estimates for the interaction between undocumented social ties and perceived discrimination against Latinx people are positive and statistically significant with respect to all outcomes of interest without adjusting for the interaction between social ties and Latinx

identity using CMPS '16 data (see Table L.15). However, after including the interaction between undocumented social ties and Latinx identity, the coefficient for the perceived discrimination x social ties interaction becomes statistically insignificant, suggesting perceived discrimination motivates participation among those with undocumented social ties primarily via its association with identity centrality. Therefore, perceived discrimination may possess a moderating influence on undocumented social ties since it appears to approximate identity importance.




Figure L.7: Simulated predicted values of protest outcome conditional on undocumented social ties and perceived discrimination against Latinx people using data from the LNHIS '15. Model is fully specified. Simulations assume a Latinx from California with all other covariates held at their means. The x-axis denotes undocumented social ties. The y-axis is the predicted value of the 0-4 point protest intention scale. Color denotes whether the respondent perceives high or low discrimination against Latinx people and immigrants.

Figure L.7 displays predicted values of protest activity conditional on undocumented social ties and perceived discrimination against Latinx using LNHIS data (assuming a Latinx from California and with all other covariates held at their means). These predicted values suggest our proxy for Latinx identity, perceived Latinx discrimination, operates similarly to Latinx identity centrality in the CMPS with respect to protest activity despite the prospective nature of the protest outcome (the coefficient for Latinx perceived discrimination  $\times$  undocumented social ties in the LNHIS is statistically significant at  $p < 0.01$ ). For Latinx people with low perceived discrimination (low identifiers), undocumented social ties insignificantly increases protest intention from 0.82 to 0.87 on the 0-4 point scale. Conversely, for Latinx people with high perceived discrimination (high identifiers), undocumented social ties increases protest intention from 0.82 to 1.47 on the 0-4 point scale, a 0.65 point difference equivalent to 50% of the outcome standard deviation. We believe these results suggest Latinx identity has a moderating influence on both *prospective* protest behavior in addition to retrospective protest behavior, alleviating concerns the main estimates are the product of reverse causality between identity and protest participation.

## M Heterogeneity by different identity measures

### M.1 Using different identity measures in place of Latino ID

Table M.16: Heterogeneous effects of undocumented social ties conditional on different Latinx identity measures.

<b>A. National Origin ID</b>	Protest	Vote	Immigrant Activism	Anti-Imm = Anti-Latino
Social Ties x National Origin ID	0.20*** (0.05)	0.08 (0.13)	0.12* (0.05)	0.11* (0.05)
Social Ties	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.11)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)
National Origin ID	-0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.07)	0.20*** (0.03)	0.09** (0.03)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.12	0.17	0.32	0.19
<b>B. Linked Fate</b>	Protest	Vote	Immigrant Activism	Anti-Imm = Anti-Latino
Social Ties x Latinx Linked Fate	0.08 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.09)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.04)
Social Ties	0.05 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.07** (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)
Latinx Linked Fate	0.01 (0.03)	0.06 (0.06)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.11	0.17	0.28	0.18
<b>C. Immigrant Linked Fate</b>	Protest	Vote	Immigrant Activism	Anti-Imm = Anti-Latino
Social Ties x Immigrant Linked Fate	0.04 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.11)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)
Social Ties	0.06* (0.03)	0.00 (0.07)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)
Immigrant Linked Fate	0.07* (0.03)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.19*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.11	0.17	0.30	0.19
N	3004	1430	3004	3004
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
State FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . All models are fully specified. Each panel characterizes the heterogeneous effects of undocumented social ties by different measures of identity (Panel A = national origin centrality, Panel B = Latinx linked fate, Panel C = immigrant linked fate). The outcomes for Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 are protest, voting, support for pro-immigrant activism, and agreement with the notion anti-immigrant discrimination is really anti-Latinx discrimination. All covariates rescaled between 0-1 for interpretability. All models use HC2 robust standard errors.

## M.2 Evaluating both Latino and national origin ID in same models

Table M.17: Evaluating both Latinx and national origin identity centrality

	Protest	Vote	Immigrant Activism	Anti-Imm = Anti-Latino
Social Ties x National Origin ID	0.14 <sup>†</sup> (0.08)	-0.07 (0.21)	0.10 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.08)
Social Ties x Latino ID	0.09 (0.08)	0.20 (0.22)	0.05 (0.09)	0.23* (0.09)
Social Ties	-0.10* (0.04)	-0.12 (0.12)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.11* (0.05)
Latino ID	0.07 (0.05)	0.07 (0.12)	0.16*** (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)
National Origin ID	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.11)	0.07 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.12	0.18	0.33	0.20
N	3008	1439	3008	3008
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
State FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , <sup>†</sup>  $p < 0.1$



### M.3 Assessing the correlation between different identity measures

Table M.18: Pearson's Rho Correlation Coefficients between identity measures

	Latinx ID	National Origin ID	Latinx LF	Immigrant LF
Latinx ID	1.00	0.81	0.29	0.25
National Origin ID	0.81	1.00	0.25	0.24
Latinx LF	0.29	0.25	1.00	0.53
Immigrant LF	0.25	0.24	0.53	1.00

### M.4 Demonstrating the influence of identity centrality among Latinxs with no linked fate

Table M.19: Evaluating the influence of undocumented social ties conditional on Latinx identity among those with no Latinx linked fate

	Protest	Vote	Immigrant Activism	Anti-Imm = Anti-Latino
Social Ties x Latino ID	0.17* (0.07)	0.28 (0.18)	0.15 <sup>†</sup> (0.08)	0.16* (0.08)
Social Ties	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.21 (0.16)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.06)
Latino ID	-0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.09)	0.22*** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.04)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.18	0.35	0.38	0.29
N	1268	599	1268	1268
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
State FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , <sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$

Table M.20: Evaluating the influence of undocumented social ties conditional on Latinx identity among those with no immigrant linked fate

	Protest	Vote	Immigrant Activism	Anti-Imm = Anti-Latino
Social Ties x Latino ID	0.22* (0.10)	0.15 (0.26)	0.14 (0.09)	0.14 (0.09)
Social Ties	-0.13* (0.06)	-0.13 (0.21)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.07)
Latino ID	-0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.12)	0.20*** (0.05)	0.09* (0.04)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.20	0.33	0.43	0.32
N	919	420	919	919
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
State FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ , † $p < 0.1$

## M.5 Demonstrating centrality = pro-group commitment

Table M.21: Association between Latinx identity centrality and measures of pro-group commitment

	Immigration Index	Imm. Rights Activism	Anti-Imm. = Anti-Lat.
Latinx ID	0.22*** (0.02)	0.27*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.31	0.32	0.19
Num. obs.	3008	3008	3008
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y
State FE	Y	Y	Y

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$

## N Excluding Spanish-identifying respondents

Table N.22: Heterogeneous effects of undocumented social ties by different social identities (excluding Spanish-identifying).

<b>Panel A. Protest</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Social Ties x Latino ID	0.17** (0.06)	0.18** (0.06)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.18*** (0.05)	0.19*** (0.06)
Social Ties	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.04)
Latino ID	0.06* (0.02)	0.07* (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.08	0.09	0.12
<b>Panel B. Imm. Activism</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Social Ties x Latino ID	0.11 (0.06)	0.12* (0.06)	0.13* (0.06)	0.13* (0.05)	0.13* (0.05)	0.12* (0.05)
Social Ties	0.03 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)
Latino ID	0.29*** (0.03)	0.28*** (0.03)	0.27*** (0.03)	0.22*** (0.03)	0.22*** (0.03)	0.22*** (0.03)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.18	0.22	0.23	0.29	0.31	0.33
<b>Panel C. Homogeneity</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Social Ties x Latino ID	0.19** (0.07)	0.19** (0.07)	0.19** (0.07)	0.20** (0.06)	0.19** (0.06)	0.19** (0.06)
Social Ties	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.06)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.12* (0.06)	-0.11* (0.05)
Latino ID	0.14*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.10** (0.03)	0.10** (0.03)	0.10** (0.03)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.09	0.13	0.14	0.16	0.17	0.20
N	2766	2766	2766	2766	2766	2766
Demographic Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
State FE	N	N	N	N	N	Y

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$  Each panel characterizes the heterogeneous effects of undocumented social ties by different social identities for different outcomes (A = protest participation, B = support for pro-immigrant activism, C = agreement with the notion anti-immigrant discrimination is anti-Latino discrimination). Model 1 includes no control covariates. Model 2 includes demographic controls. Model 3 includes socio-economic controls. Model 4 includes political controls. Model 5 includes county and zipcode contextual covariates. Model 6 includes state fixed effects. All covariates rescaled between 0-1 for interpretability. All models use HC2 robust standard errors. The 4 dropped observations in Model 6 are due to the inclusion of state fixed effects (i.e. respondents from states where they are the single individual sampled from that state).

## O Assessing heterogeneity by binned identity measure

Table O.23: Heterogeneous effects of undocumented Social Ties by different social identities (with Latino identity binned).

<b>Panel A. Protest</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Social Ties x Latino ID (1)	0.00 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.04)	0.00 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)
Social Ties x Latino ID (2)	0.06 (0.03)	0.08* (0.04)	0.08* (0.04)	0.07 (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)	0.09 (0.05)
Social Ties x Latino ID (3)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.16** (0.05)
Social Ties	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.04)	−0.04 (0.04)
Latino ID (1)	0.06* (0.02)	0.06* (0.02)	0.06* (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
Latino ID (2)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Latino ID (3)	0.06** (0.02)	0.07** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.09	0.09	0.12
N	3008	3008	3008	3008	3008	3004
<b>Panel B. Imm. Activism</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Social Ties x Latino ID (1)	−0.00 (0.11)	−0.02 (0.11)	−0.02 (0.10)	0.02 (0.10)	0.03 (0.10)	0.05 (0.10)
Social Ties x Latino ID (2)	0.02 (0.09)	0.01 (0.09)	0.01 (0.09)	0.02 (0.08)	0.03 (0.08)	0.04 (0.08)
Social Ties x Latino ID (3)	0.09 (0.09)	0.08 (0.09)	0.09 (0.09)	0.10 (0.08)	0.11 (0.08)	0.11 (0.08)
Social Ties	0.06 (0.09)	0.04 (0.09)	0.04 (0.08)	0.00 (0.08)	−0.00 (0.08)	−0.01 (0.08)
Latino ID (1)	0.18*** (0.05)	0.17*** (0.05)	0.17*** (0.05)	0.14** (0.05)	0.14** (0.05)	0.13** (0.05)
Latino ID (2)	0.26*** (0.04)	0.25*** (0.05)	0.24*** (0.05)	0.20*** (0.04)	0.20*** (0.05)	0.19*** (0.05)
Latino ID (3)	0.33*** (0.04)	0.32*** (0.05)	0.31*** (0.05)	0.26*** (0.04)	0.25*** (0.05)	0.26*** (0.05)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.18	0.22	0.23	0.29	0.31	0.33
N	3008	3008	3008	3008	3008	3004
<b>Panel C. Homogeneity</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Social Ties x Latino ID (1)	−0.07 (0.13)	−0.07 (0.13)	−0.07 (0.12)	−0.05 (0.12)	−0.05 (0.13)	−0.04 (0.12)
Social Ties x Latino ID (2)	0.06 (0.11)	0.05 (0.11)	0.06 (0.11)	0.06 (0.11)	0.05 (0.11)	0.06 (0.11)
Social Ties x Latino ID (3)	0.12 (0.11)	0.12 (0.11)	0.12 (0.11)	0.13 (0.11)	0.13 (0.11)	0.13 (0.11)
Social Ties	0.01 (0.11)	−0.03 (0.11)	−0.03 (0.11)	−0.05 (0.11)	−0.05 (0.11)	−0.05 (0.11)
Latino ID (1)	0.13** (0.05)	0.13** (0.05)	0.13** (0.05)	0.11* (0.05)	0.11* (0.04)	0.11* (0.05)
Latino ID (2)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.14** (0.04)	0.14** (0.04)	0.11** (0.04)	0.11** (0.04)	0.11** (0.04)
Latino ID (3)	0.18*** (0.04)	0.18*** (0.04)	0.17*** (0.04)	0.14** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.04)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.09	0.13	0.14	0.16	0.17	0.20
N	3008	3008	3008	3008	3008	3004
Demographic Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
State FE	N	N	N	N	N	Y

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . Each panel characterizes the heterogeneous effects of undocumented social ties by Latino for different outcomes (A = protest participation, B = support for pro-immigrant activism, C = agreement with the notion anti-immigrant discrimination is anti-Latino discrimination). Model 1 includes no control covariates. Model 2 includes demographic controls. Model 3 includes socio-economic controls. Model 4 includes political controls. Model 5 includes county and zipcode contextual covariates. Model 6 includes state fixed effects. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. All models use HC2 robust standard errors. The 4 dropped observations in Model 6 are due to the inclusion of state fixed effects (i.e. respondents from states where they are the single individual sampled from that state). Interactions of social ties with other social identities are omitted.

## P Assessing heterogeneity by binary identity measure




Figure P.8: Distribution of Latino identity (CMPS 2016)

To rule out if the results assessing the heterogeneity of undocumented social ties by Latinx identity are driven by a relatively small number of low identifiers that are numerically inconsequential,<sup>29</sup> we generate a binary measure of Latinx identity equal to 1 if the respondent indicates Latinx identity is a “very important” part of how they see themselves as opposed to “somewhat important,” “not very important,” or “not at all important.” In this case, we assess if the influence of undocumented social ties with respect to the outcomes of interest is stronger among the 1606 Latinxs who indicate their identity is “very important” relative to 1402 who do not.

Table P.24 demonstrates that those who are steadfast in their Latinx identity are more motivated to hold pro-group attitudes and engage in pro-group political participation relative to those who are relatively tepid in identifying with their ethno-racial identity. Consistent with the main results, social ties with undocumented immigrants are more likely to be associated with perceptions that anti-immigrant discrimination is anti-Latinx discrimination, protest behavior, and support for pro-immigrant activism when Latinx identity is high. Conversely, the influence of undocumented social ties conditional on Latinx identity is not associated with voting behavior.

<sup>29</sup>For instance, there are only 146 Latinxs who indicate being Latinx is “not at all important” to how they see themselves, the lowest value on the Latino identity scale in the 2016 CMPS (Figure P.8).

Table P.24: Conditional coefficients of undocumented social ties by Latinx identity using binary recoding of Latinx identity

	Anti-Imm. = Anti-Lat.	Protest	Activism	Vote
Social Ties x Highest ID	0.09** (0.03)	0.09** (0.04)	0.06* (0.03)	-0.01 (0.07)
Social Ties	0.00 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.06)
Highest ID	0.04* (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.04 (0.04)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.19	0.12	0.31	0.18
N	3008	3008	3008	1439
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
State FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ . All displayed covariates rescaled between 0-1. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

## Q Accounting for omitted interaction bias

Table Q.25: Accounting for omitted interaction bias

<b>Panel A: Protest</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)
Social Ties x Latino ID	0.18** (0.06)	0.17*** (0.05)	0.15* (0.06)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.20	0.19	0.23
N	3004	3004	3004
<b>Panel B: Immigrant Activism</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)
Social Ties x Latino ID	0.10 (0.05)	0.13* (0.06)	0.13* (0.06)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.39	0.38	0.42
N	3004	3004	3004
<b>Panel C: Homogeneity</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)
Social Ties x Latino ID	0.18** (0.07)	0.16** (0.06)	0.17* (0.07)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.26	0.26	0.29
N	3004	3004	3004
Social Ties Interactions	Y	N	Y
Identity Interactions	N	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y
State FE	Y	Y	Y

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . Each panel characterizes the heterogeneous effects of undocumented social ties by Latino for different outcomes (A = protest participation, B = support for pro-immigrant activism, C = agreement with the notion anti-immigrant discrimination is anti-Latino discrimination). All models include demographic controls, socio-economic controls, political controls, county controls, zipcode controls, and state fixed effects. Model 1 includes interactions between the control covariates, alternative mechanism covariates, and undocumented social ties. Model 2 includes interactions between the control covariates, alternative mechanism covariates, and identity. Model 3 includes interactions between the control covariates, alternative mechanism covariates, and both identity and undocumented social ties. State fixed effects are included in each model, but are not interacted with identity or social ties. Instead, region fixed effects are interacted with identity and/or social ties in order to ensure model identification. All covariates rescaled between 0-1. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

## R Validating undocumented social ties measure




Figure R.9: Predicted probabilities of undocumented social ties by county-level context (CMPS '16).




Figure R.10: Predicted probabilities of undocumented social ties by zipcode-level context (CMPS '16).



## S Validating self-reported protest measure




Figure S.11: Predicted probabilities of individual-level protest participation by county-level protest activity (LDEE '18). Panel A displays the simulated association between a binary measure for whether there was a protest in a respondent's county and their self-reported protest activity. Panel B displays the simulated association between the log of a count of pro-immigrant protests (plus 1 to ensure identification) at the county-level and self-reported protest activity. Panel C displays the association between the log of the pro-immigrant protest rate (number of protests normalized over total county population, plus 1 to ensure identification) at the county-level and self-reported protest activity. 95% confidence intervals displayed.

Table S.26: Association between measures of county-level protest activity and self-reported protest participation (LDEE '18).

	Self-reported retrospective protest														
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Immigration Protest	0.03 (0.02)														
Log(Immigration Protests + 1)		0.02* (0.00)													
Log(Immigration Protest Rate + 1)			0.01** (0.00)												
Log(Protest Size Sum High + 1)				0.01* (0.00)											
Log(Protest Size Sum Low + 1)					0.01* (0.00)										
Log(Protest Size Sum Avg + 1)						0.01* (0.00)									
Log(Protest Size Mean High + 1)							0.01 (0.00)								
Log(Protest Size Mean Low + 1)								0.01 (0.00)							
Log(Protest Size Mean Avg + 1)									0.01 (0.00)						
Log(Protest Size Rate Sum High + 1)										0.00* (0.00)					
Log(Protest Size Rate Sum Low + 1)											0.01* (0.00)				
Log(Protest Size Rate Sum Avg + 1)												0.00* (0.00)			
Log(Protest Size Rate Mean High + 1)													0.01 (0.00)		
Log(Protest Size Rate Mean Low + 1)														0.01* (0.00)	
Log(Protest Size Rate Mean Avg + 1)															0.01* (0.00)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
N	2535	2535	2535	2535	2535	2535	2535	2535	2535	2531	2531	2531	2531	2531	2531

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . Models 1-15 have the same self-reported protest participation outcome. All models use the 2018 Latino Decisions Election Eve poll. All models are bivariate associations. Model 1 characterizes the association between a binary indicator for whether there was a pro-immigrant protest in a respondent's county and their self-reported protest participation. The association between the binary protest measure and self-reported protest is statistically significant at  $p < 0.10$ . Model 2 characterizes the association between a logged measure of the count of immigration protests (plus 1 to ensure identification) in a respondent's county and their self-reported protest participation. Model 3 characterizes the association between a logged measure of the rate of immigration protests (the count of protests normalized over the county-level total population, that quantity multiplied by 100000, plus 1 to ensure identification) in a respondent's county and their self-reported protest participation. HC2 robust standard errors clustered by county in parentheses. Model 4 is the association between a logged measure of the sum of pro-immigrant protest participants between February 2017 and October 2018 (high estimate from the Crowd Counting Consortium (CCC), plus 1 to ensure identification). Model 5 is the association between a logged measure of the sum of pro-immigrant protest participants between February 2017 and October 2018 (low estimate from the CCC, plus 1 to ensure identification). Model 6 is the association between a logged measure of the sum of pro-immigrant protest participants between February 2017 and October 2018 (average of high and low estimate from the CCC, plus 1 to ensure identification). Model 7 is the association between a logged measure of the average pro-immigrant protest participants between February 2017 and October 2018 (high estimate from the CCC, plus 1 to ensure identification). Model 8 is the association between a logged measure of the average pro-immigrant protest participants between February 2017 and October 2018 (low estimate from the CCC, plus 1 to ensure identification). Model 9 is the association between a logged measure of the average pro-immigrant protest participants between February 2017 and October 2018 (average of high and low estimate from the CCC, plus 1 to ensure identification). Model 10 is the association between a logged measure of the sum of pro-immigrant protest participants between February 2017 and October 2018 normalized over the total population at the county-level (high estimate from the Crowd Counting Consortium (CCC), plus 1 to ensure identification). Model 11 is the association between a logged measure of the sum of pro-immigrant protest participants between February 2017 and October 2018 normalized over the total population at the county-level (low estimate from the CCC, plus 1 to ensure identification). Model 12 is the association between a logged measure of the sum of pro-immigrant protest participants between February 2017 and October 2018 normalized over the total population at the county-level (average of high and low estimate from the CCC, plus 1 to ensure identification). Model 13 is the association between a logged measure of the mean of pro-immigrant protest participants between February 2017 and October 2018 normalized over the total population at the county-level (high estimate from the Crowd Counting Consortium (CCC), plus 1 to ensure identification). Model 14 is the association between a logged measure of the mean of pro-immigrant protest participants between February 2017 and October 2018 normalized over the total population at the county-level (low estimate from the CCC, plus 1 to ensure identification). Model 15 is the association between a logged measure of the mean of pro-immigrant protest participants between February 2017 and October 2018 normalized over the total population at the county-level (average of high and low estimate from the CCC, plus 1 to ensure identification). HC2 robust standard errors clustered at county-level reported in parentheses.

## T Demonstrating protest participation = pro-immigrant behavior

Table T.27: Pro-immigrant attitudes and policy preferences, along with support for pro-immigrant activism, are associated with protest participation

	Protest			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Pro-Immigrant Attitudes	0.18*** (0.04)	0.11** (0.04)		
Pro-Immigrant Activism			0.20*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)
Liberal Attitudes		-0.04 (0.07)		-0.05 (0.07)
Democrat		0.13** (0.04)		0.13*** (0.04)
Liberal		0.07** (0.02)		0.07** (0.02)
Demographic Controls	N	Y	N	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	N	Y	N	Y
Political Controls	N	Y	N	Y
County Controls	N	Y	N	Y
Zipcode Controls	N	Y	N	Y
State FE	N	Y	N	Y
R <sup>2</sup>	0.06	0.12	0.06	0.12
N	3008	3008	3008	3008

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . “Pro-immigrant attitudes” is an additive index of items measuring support for a pathway to citizenship, support for the notion undocumented immigrants should not be forced to leave the United States, support for the notion immigrants have a positive impact on the economy in the respondent’s state, support for decreasing border spending, and rejection of the notion immigrants take resources away from people living in the United States. “Liberal attitudes” is an additive index of items measuring support for gay marriage, climate change policy, higher taxes on the wealthy, Obamacare and rejection of the death penalty and voter ID laws. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

## U Accounting for reverse causality between protest participation and identity




Figure U.12: Most important issue over time among American public, January 2001-July 2018 (Gallup).

Table U.28: Partial derivative of protest exposure on Latinx identity centrality (LNS 2006 data)

	Latino Identity					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Protest	−0.00 (0.02)	−0.03 (0.04)	−0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.08 (0.06)
Protest x Catholic		0.03 (0.05)				
Protest x Spanish			0.04 (0.05)			
Protest x Foreign				−0.05 (0.05)		
Protest x Mexican					−0.02 (0.05)	
Protest x Age						−0.00 (0.00)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
N	8634	8634	8634	8634	8634	8634

Note: \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$ . Protest is a binary indicator equal to 1 for interview dates after April 1, 2006. The outcome for all models is Latino identity centrality. All models adjust for age, whether the respondent chose to be interviewed in Spanish, foreign-born status, catholicism, married status, national origin, income, education, unemployment status, union membership, partisan identification, and ideology. Linear terms omitted. Estimates use population weights. HC2 robust standard errors in parentheses.

## **V Survey Items**

### **V.1 Protest**

#### **V.1.1 Pew 2010**

**In the United States in the past year have you participated in any protests or demonstrations to support immigrations rights, or not?**

- 1) Yes
- 2) No
- 8) Don't know
- 9) Refused

#### **V.1.2 LNHIS 2015**

**In the future, how likely are you to do any of the following: Participate in a rally march, demonstration or protest**

- 1) Extremely likely
- 2) Very likely
- 3) Moderately likely
- 4) A little likely
- 5) Not at all likely
- 88) (Not read) Don't know
- 99) (Not read) Refused

#### **V.1.3 CMPS 2016**

**In the last twelve months, have you: Attended a protest march, demonstration, or rally?**

- 1) Yes
- 2) No

#### **V.1.4 LDMS 2018**

**In the past year and a half, have you taken part in any political protests, marches, or demonstrations?**

- 1) Yes
- 2) No

### **V.1.5 LDEE 2018**

**Finally, please indicate if you have done any of the following activities related to the 2018 Election: Attended a protest or demonstration against someone or an issue**

- 1) Yes
- 2) No

### **V.1.6 SOMOS 2020**

**Finally, please indicate if you have done any of the following activities related to the 2020 primary or general elections: Attended a protest or demonstration against someone or an issue**

- 1) Yes
- 2) No

## **V.2 Voting**

### **V.2.1 LNHIS 2015**

**In the future, how likely are you to do any of the following: Vote in the next local, state, or national election? (Ask only of registered voters)**

- 1) Extremely likely
- 2) Very likely
- 3) Moderately likely
- 4) A little likely
- 5) Not at all likely
- 88) (Not read) Don't know
- 99) (Not read) Refused

### **V.2.2 CMPS 2016**

**(IF REGISTERED VOTER) This year a lot of people said they did NOT vote in the election, because they were just too busy, not that interested in politics, or frankly don't like their choices. How about you? Would the official vote records for (INSERT STATE) indicate that you voted in 2016 election, or like many people, did you skip this one?**

- 1) Yes, I voted
- 2) No, I did NOT vote

### **V.2.3 LDMS 2018**

**Thinking about the election for Congress and other state offices in November 2018, how likely are you to vote on a scale between 0 and 10, where 0 means you definitely do not want to vote, and 10 means you are 100 % certain you will vote, and 5 means you are 50-50 or a maybe.**

- 1) 0
- 2) 1
- 3) 2
- 4) 3
- 5) 4
- 6) 5
- 7) 6
- 8) 7
- 9) 8
- 10) 9
- 11) 10

### **V.2.4 SOMOS 2020**

**(IF REGISTERED VOTER) Thinking ahead to the November 2020 Presidential election, what would you say the chances are that you will vote in the presidential election and other state offices**

- 1) Almost certain I will vote
- 2) Probability will vote
- 3) Chances are 50-50
- 4) Probably will NOT vote
- 5) Certain I will not vote

## **V.3 Undocumented Social Ties**

### **V.3.1 Pew 2010**

**Do you personally know someone who has been deported or detained by the federal government for immigration reasons in the last 12 months?**

- 1) Yes
- 2) No
- 3) Don't know
- 4) Refused

### **V.3.2 LNHIS 2015**

**Now take a moment to think about all the people in your family, your friends, coworkers, and other people you know. This is completely anonymous and no personal information will be shared. Do you happen to know somebody who may be an undocumented immigrant?**

- 1) Yes
- 2) No
- 3) Don't know
- 4) Refused

**(IF ABOVE = 1) Is that a family member or a friend, who is undocumented, or do you know both?**

- 1) Yes, family
- 2) Yes, friend / other
- 3) Both
- 88) Don't Know
- 99) Refused

### **V.3.3 CMPS 2016**

**Now take a moment to think about all the people in your family, your friends, co-workers, and other people you know. Do you happen to know somebody who is an undocumented immigrant? This is completely anonymous, and just for a simple demographic analysis.**

- 1) Yes
- 2) No
- 3) Don't Know

**(IF ABOVE = 1) Is that a family member or a friend, who is undocumented, or do you know both?**

- 1) Family member
- 2) A friend
- 3) Both
- 4) Don't know



### **V.3.4 LDMS 2018**

**Now take a moment to think about all the people in your family, your friends, co-workers, and other people you know. Do you know anyone who is an undocumented immigrant? This is completely anonymous, and just for a simple demographic analysis. Check all that apply**

- 1) Yes, someone in my family
- 2) Yes, a friend or co-worker
- 3) No, do not know anyone who is undocumented

### **V.3.5 LDEE 2018**

**Do you know anybody who is an undocumented immigrant? (ALLOW MULTIPLE)**

- 1) Yes, a family member
- 2) Yes, a personal friend
- 3) Yes, someone else I know
- 4) No, I don't know anyone who is undocumented
- 5) Don't know
- 6) Refused

p

### **V.3.6 SOMOS 2020**

**Thinking about the people in your family as well as your friends and co-workers. Do you happen to know someone who is an undocumented immigrant?**

- 1) Yes – someone in my household
- 2) Yes – someone in my family
- 3) Yes – a friend
- 4) Yes – a co-worker
- 5) No – I don't know anyone undocumented

## **V.4 Identity**

### **V.4.1 CMPS 2016**

**Latinx Identity Centrality: How much is being Latino or Latino-American an important part of how you see yourself?**

- 1) Very important
- 2) Somewhat important
- 3) Not very important
- 4) Not at all important

**Latinx Linked Fate 1: Do you think what happens generally to Latino people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?**

- 1) Yes
- 2) No

**Latinx Linked Fate 2: [If Latinx Linked Fate = Yes] Will it affect you:**

- 1) A lot
- 2) Some
- 3) Not very much

**Immigrant Linked Fate: What happens generally to immigrants in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?**

- 1) A lot
- 2) Some
- 3) Not very much
- 4) Not at all

## **V.5 Alternative Mechanisms**

### **V.5.1 CMPS 2016**

**Internal Efficacy: How much do you agree or disagree with the statement: Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.**

- 1) Strongly agree
- 2) Agree
- 3) Neither agree nor disagree
- 4) Disagree

- 5) Strongly disagree

**External Efficacy: How much of the time do you trust the Federal government in Washington D.C. to do what is right?**

- 1) Just about always
- 2) Most of the time
- 3) Only sometimes
- 4) Never at all

**Group Efficacy: How much can [HISPANICS/LATINOs] like you influence the outcome of elections?**

- 1) A great deal
- 2) A lot
- 3) Some
- 4) A little
- 5) Not at all


**Perceived discrimination: How much discrimination is there in the United States today against each of the following groups? Latinos.**

- 1) A lot
- 2) Some
- 3) A little
- 4) None at all
- 5) Don't know

**Experienced discrimination: Have you ever been treated unfairly or personally experienced discrimination because of your race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, being an immigrant, religious heritage or having an accent?**

- 1) Yes
- 2) No

### Scale of Skin Color Darkness



**Skin Color:** As you know, people display a wide variety of physical characteristics. One of these is skin color. Displayed below is a skin color scale that ranges from 1 to 10. The 10 shades of skin color are represented by a hand of identical form, but differing in color. Which hand shown below comes closest to your skin color?

**Perceived Immigration Status:** How accurately do you think non-HISPANIC/LATINO people can guess your immigration status, such as if you are a citizen, non-citizen, U.S. born or foreign-born?

- 1) Extremely accurately
- 2) Very accurately
- 3) Moderately accurately
- 4) Slightly accurately
- 5) Not accurately at all

**Mobilization 1:** Is there any political leader or any group or organization that you think looks out for your concerns, even if you are not a member of the organization?

- 1) Yes
- 2) Yes

**Mobilization 2:** (If above = yes), Did this leader or someone in authority in the group ever suggest that you personally take some other action on a political issue or in an election?

- 1) Yes
- 2) No

**Prosociality:** How often do you talk with or visit with your nearest neighbors?

- 1) Never
- 2) Once a year or less
- 3) Several times a year
- 4) Once a month

- 5) Several times a month
- 6) Once a week
- 7) Several times a week
- 8) Just about everyday

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