

Racialized Mass Shootings and Attitudes Towards Targeted Groups

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Abstract

A growing literature finds that mass shooting incidents in the United States have few, if any, lasting consequences for mass political behavior. But when those incidents clearly and indisputably target specific ethno-racial groups, is there evidence that such violence changes perceptions about the targeted group and shifts related policy attitudes? First, using several sources of nation-wide survey data, we consider if and how attitudes about an ethno-racial group change in the aftermath of four mass shooting events targeting Asian, Black, and Latinx Americans between 2015 and 2022. Then, we pursue this question further with a survey experiment and additional consideration for heterogeneous treatment effects. Across all studies, white Americans' attitudes do not substantially change after exposure to news of a mass shooting, regardless of the target. Our findings present a more robust picture of the political aftermath of racially-targeted mass shootings by documenting the deep entrenchment of public opinion surrounding such incidents.

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Introduction

Mass shootings have become a perennial occurrence in the United States, and it is not uncommon that these incidents are driven by racial animus and committed by white supremacist perpetrators.¹ While previous scholars have considered the ways in which mass shootings in the U.S. do – or do not – change policy attitudes and electoral behavior (Barney and Schaffner, 2019; Garcia-Montoya et al., 2022; Hassell et al., 2020; Newman and Hartman, 2019; Rogowski and Tucker, 2019), limited consideration has been given to if and how these incidents of racially-targeted violence may alter views of the targeted group.

Among white Americans, are there measurable changes in attitudes toward targeted racial groups in the aftermath of mass shootings? Or are racial views so entrenched that horrific violence does not shift them, even temporarily? Theoretically, we argue that occupying a dominant role in American society should have implications for if and how white Americans empathize with violence committed against those in marginalized positions. We put forth several competing expectations as to how racially-targeted mass shootings have impacted the attitudes of white Americans, proposing that these mass shootings may elicit apathy, empathy, or hostility. To test these expectations, we first consider multiple mass shootings across the United States that targeted members of historically-marginalized ethno-racial groups: African-Americans in Charleston, SC (2015) and Buffalo, NY (2022); Latinx people in El Paso, Texas (2019), and Asian-Americans in Atlanta, GA (2021). We measure changes in white Americans' attitudes toward the targeted ethnoracial group in the aftermath of each incident, as well as their opinions about policies associated with those groups. We also undertake a survey experiment to measure respondents' reactions to news of a mass shooting, while alternating the racial context of the incident and testing several sources of heterogeneous treatment effects. Across all of our studies we find support for our apathetic

¹We profile several such incidents in this paper. Moving forward, we also intend to consider an August 2023 mass shooting in Jacksonville, Florida that targeted Black Americans.

expectations – white Americans do not express greater empathy toward members of other racial groups after exposure to news of a mass shooting. Nor, however, do they express greater hostility – even when their racial group is the explicit target in our survey experiment.

Broadly, we contribute to a literature which is at odds about the impact of mass shootings on American political behavior. Historically, violence and victimization narratives have been pathways through which marginalized groups have sought to shift white public opinion (Francis, 2014; Hill, 2016). Within these literatures, this work adds crucial complexity. While research has considered why incidents of civilian mass shootings – for example, school shootings – do not place electoral pressure on elected officials (Hassell et al., 2020), we step away from the electoral realm to consider the impact on public opinion. If these incidents are not reshaping the ways in which Americans consider race and gun control, then electoral stagnation around these topics should not be surprising. Tragic, devastating events that are – at times – catalysts for broader change by directing attention towards the concerns and treatment of those who have experienced those tragedies. Acts of violence can be moments to understand and empathize with the victimized. Violence can also reveal underlying tensions, instead eliciting hostility and threat among racial groups in conflict. These are incidents can serve to focus attention on the policy concerns of those who are impacted or the perceived competition that they may represent. Yet, we do not find evidence that racially-targeted mass shootings over the past decade have been impactful on the attitudes that white Americans hold toward members of the targeted groups. If anything, these incidents may serve to temporarily mute or amplify existing racial attitudes without creating substantive change.

Theory & Hypotheses: Apathy, Empathy, or Hostility?

With the 2015 murder of nine Black parishioners, mid-worship, on a summer evening in Charleston, South Carolina, the nation’s attention swiftly turned toward the city and the

legacy of white supremacy that has shaped its streets, monuments, and institutions. The incident's racial layers quickly became apparent. Charleston's Fort Sumter was a crucible for the American Civil War. The targeted Mother Emanuel A.M.E. Church was a home to enslaved revolutionaries. And the perpetrator's championing of white supremacist views, as well as his desire to ignite interracial conflict, left no doubt about his intention to terrorize Black people in Charleston and across the country.²

As it revealed racial conflict, this racially-targeted mass shooting also highlighted issues of symbolic importance to some African-Americans. The incident focused national media attention, temporarily, on symbols of the Confederacy and, in particular, the Confederate flag's place over the South Carolina state capitol. While it appeared that broad public sentiment toward the flag and legacies of the Confederacy soured after the mass shooting,³ it is less apparent if this incident engendered feelings of empathy (or resentment) for African-Americans more widely. In this paper, ask if this mass shooting, and other mass shootings that targeted members of historically-marginalized groups, impact the prosocial attitudes of white Americans?

While a mass shooting's media coverage and perceived severity is undoubtedly influenced by contextual factors like its scale, location, and perceived motivation (Crabtree, 2023), the ways in which an incident impacts the opinions and behaviors outside of a fleeting media cycle is still unclear. Therefore, we set three competing expectations predicting the ways in which mass shootings may impact the prosocial attitudes of white Americans.

Apathy – Civilian mass shootings, of all types, are not uncommon in the United States. Their frequency may speak to a broader, public desensitization to these incidents. Indicative of this, there is evidence of apathy toward and immobility of opinion regarding mass shootings

² "Dylann Roof Said He Wanted To Start A Race War, Friends Say," June 19, 2015. *National Public Radio*.

³ "Before Charleston, Not Many People Wanted To Take Down The Confederate Flag," June 22, 2015. *FiveThirtyEight*. Also see Huffmon et al. (2017).

in their aftermath. First, therefore, we set the expectation of finding no measurable change in white attitudes toward the targeted group after these shootings.

Recent studies have found that mass shooting events have minimal impact on political behavior in the United States. This extends to school shootings and other forms of identity violence, whereby the lasting impact of mass shootings on electoral behaviors (Barney and Schaffner, 2019; Hassell et al., 2020; Garcia-Montoya et al., 2022). Similarly, work in the area of policing has shown that incidents of fatal police violence, regardless of the identity of the victim(s), have little impact on perceptions of police and policing (Crabtree and Yadon, 2022; McGowen and Wylie, 2020; Walker et al., 2020). Specifically, these studies of police violence find that white attitudes about police and policing are stalwart, regardless of a victim's identity. For people of color, however, there is evidence to suggest that their attitudes about police are more malleable when exposed to incidents of police violence (Crabtree and Yadon, 2022; Weitzer, 2002).

Americans do not react at the ballot box to acts of mass civilian violence (Hassell et al., 2020). This is indicative of a broader apathy or neutrality in literature which has considered the aftermath of both civilian and police violence in the United States. In particular, we suggest that racial identities serve as important cues within the context of mass shootings and other forms of violence. The identity of the targeted group, more specifically, has been shown in other contexts to influence the perceived severity of an act of violence, regardless of factors like scale and tactic (Crabtree, 2023). The real-world shootings that we consider in studies 1-4 do not target white Americans and in each instance the perpetrator is white. Given these conditions, there is little indication that the violence itself should be provocative to white Americans, particularly if we consider American society to be hierarchically oriented, with white Americans occupying a dominant position and historically-marginalized groups occupying differing subordinate placements (Blumer, 1958; Sidanius and Pratto, 2001). Sidanius and Pratto (2001), for example, refer to “unofficial terror” as a means by which dominant

groups work to maintain their position atop the racial hierarchy. Viewing racially-targeted mass shootings as a form of unofficial terror suggests that as these incidents reiterate the position of the dominant group, in the process mitigating racial threat among white Americans. This leads to the expectation that white public opinion on policies and groups adjacent to a mass shooting are not impacted in their wake. Thus, we do not expect to find any measurable differences in the prosocial attitudes of whites in the aftermath of racialized mass shootings ($H1_a$).

Empathy – Our second expectation proposes that the prosocial attitudes of white Americans increase in the aftermath of racially-targeted mass shootings. While our first expectation speaks to a normalization of and racial apathy toward mass shootings, our second and third expectations propose that distinctions between racially-targeted mass shootings and other civilian mass shootings may become apparent when considering prosocial attitudes along racial lines.

While some authors assert that Americans are unchanging in their political behavior in the aftermath of mass shootings, others have found evidence to suggest that attitudes, if not actual behavior is malleable. Roman and Thompson (2023), for example, find that attitudes toward the LGBTQ+ community are warmer – though only temporarily – in the wake of the 2016 Pulse Night Club Massacre in Orlando, Florida. Similar to the way in which the Pulse Massacre briefly focused attention on anti-LGBTQ+ sentiments as well as adjacent topics, racially-targeted mass shootings channel attention toward the targeted groups. These incidents highlight the extent to which minority groups have been repressed throughout American history. This is in part through the conversations which emerge in their aftermath. The 2015 mass shooting in Charleston, for example, prompted a national media conversation about symbolism behind the Confederate battle flag, as well as the distinct differences that the symbol holds for white and Black Americans. While white Americans predominantly saw the flag as representing Southern pride, Black Americans overwhelming

regarded it as a symbol of racism.⁴

In comparison to people of color, there is also greater room for movement in prosocial attitudes of white Americans. People of color have more favorable opinions toward and are more empathetic of other people of color and disadvantaged groups in comparison to whites (Sirin et al., 2016; Sirin et al., 2021). Sirin et al. (2016), for example, find that “African-Americans and Latinos have significantly higher levels of group empathy compared to Anglos.” Their group empathy for Arabs, African Americans, and Latinos is also significantly higher than that of white respondents. Among whites, there is more potential for attitudes to change in a positive direction. Therefore, we could expect to see that white pro-social attitudes increase in the aftermath of these incidents ($H1_b$).

When connected to a larger discussion of white supremacy and structural racism, racially-targeted mass shootings represent a pattern of white supremacist violence in the United States. Even if only temporary, an increase in the pro-social attitudes of whites could mark a recognition that these incidents are connected to a broader network and history of white supremacy. Yet, when asked about where responsibility for racially-targeted mass shootings lies or how to classify racially-targeted mass shootings, responses from the general public suggest a more individualized perception. Figure 2 shows that the greatest proportion of respondents surveyed after the 2022 Buffalo mass shooting believed that the incident should be classified as a “violent crime,” “hate crime,” or as an incident motivated by “mental illness.” This is in comparison to classifying the shooting as “terrorism,” which was higher proportionally than only those who were unsure of any classification or did not agree with any provided classification. The popularity of labels and classifications that are indicative of individual onus (e.g., “mental illness” or “hate crime”) rather than those which point to systemic and organized racism and pervasive racist ideology (e.g., “terrorism”) suggest

⁴“Public Opinion on the Confederate Flag and the Civil War” 2015. Roper Center for Public Opinion Research. Also see Huffmon et al. (2017).

that racially-targeted mass shooting may not impact white Americans in the ways predicted by hypothesis 1_b. Rather than revealing obscured structures of white supremacy and white supremacist ideology, racially-targeted mass shooting may instead reveal a looming racial threat in the eyes of white Americans.

Hostility – Therefore, and in contrast to our second expectation, we propose that there is a decrease in white prosocial attitudes in the aftermath of racially-targeted mass shootings, with white Americans expressing greater bias against the targeted group and greater resistance to policies perceived to aid them. These incidents focus attention on marginalized groups, but that attention is not necessarily positive. Rather than increasing prosocial attitudes, these incidents may instead provoke hostility among whites. We propose that racially-targeted mass shootings may dredge up concerns of inter-group competition (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Tajfel and Turner, 2004; Blumer, 1958; Sidanius and Pratto, 2001). In some incidents, this happens explicitly. Perpetrators of mass shootings in Charleston, Buffalo, and El Paso espoused clear white supremacist beliefs and manifestos, while also expressing their desire to ignite violent, interracial conflict. These mass shootings may reflect the perceived threat that these minority, out-groups pose to the dominant position of the white in-group. For example, the 2021 Atlanta mass shooting occurred in the midst of a rise in anti-Asian hate crimes and bias toward Asian-Americans stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic. Similarly, the El Paso mass shooting, notably occurring in a town on the U.S.-Mexico border, may have brought issues of immigration – and threats posed to whites by immigration – to the political forefront. Thus, with an eye toward racial threat that is stirred up around these incidents, we expect that white prosocial attitudes could decrease significantly in the aftermath of racially-targeted mass shootings ($H1_c$).




Figure 1: Attention to Racial Violence Incidents. Panel A is the proportion of white respondents (x-axis) who indicate they followed the Charleston Shooting very or fairly closely relative to not closely relative to other salient stories 8-12 days after the shooting (y-axis) using Kaiser Family Foundation data. Panel B is the proportion of white respondents (y-axis) who were familiar with the recent mass shootings in El Paso, Texas and Dayton, Ohio 2-3 days after the El Paso shooting using Ipsos data. Panel C is the proportion of white respondents (y-axis) who have heard “a lot,” “a little,” or “nothing at all” about the Buffalo shooting 1-3 days after the shooting (x-axis) using YouGov/Economist data.

Studies 1-4: Evidence From 4 Racial Violence Shootings

To test our expectations, we evaluate the consequences of four instances of racialized violence on prosocial attitudes toward targeted groups among whites: a 2015 mass shooting in Charleston, South Carolina (2015-06-17, Study 1), a 2019 mass shooting in El Paso, Texas (2019-08-03, Study 2), a 2021 mass shooting in Atlanta, Georgia (2021-03-16, Study 3), and a 2022 mass shooting in Buffalo, New York (2022-05-14, Study 4). Here, we outline a brief description of each violent event and proceed to discuss our data and empirical strategy.

2015 Charleston Shooting

On June 17, 2015, 9PM EST, a white gunman shot and killed 9 Black people during a Bible Study at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina. Emanuel AME is one of the oldest U.S. Black churches. The gunman deliberately targeted Emanuel AME since it is a historic center for civil rights organizing.⁵

⁵ “Affidavits spell out chilling case against Dylann Roof.” June 19, 2015. *USA Today*.

The gunman espoused racial hatred in a website manifesto he published before the shooting, verbally during the shooting, and in a journal he wrote from jail afterward.⁶ His website displayed several white supremacist emblems. The perpetrator was eventually convicted of 33 Federal hate crime and murder charges, in addition to 9 counts of murder in state court.⁷

The shooting was a salient event. Charleston Mayor Joseph Riley, South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley, and President Barack Obama all condemned the shooting the day after.⁸ Eighteen 2016 presidential election candidates, Republicans and Democrats, expressed reactions through various media and addresses.⁹ *The Daily Show's* Jon Stewart delivered a monologue condemning the attack the night after.¹⁰

Consistent with the notion the shooting was salient and the mass public perceived it, Mediacloud data show there was a discontinuous increase in online news articles regarding the Charleston shooting and hate crimes the moment of the shooting (Figure 7, Panels A-B, Figure 8, Panels A-B). Additionally, Google searches for information regarding the Charleston shooting and hate crimes precipitously increased the moment of the shooting (Figure 6, Panels A-B). Important to our research design, Google searches for information and online articles related to the shooting and hate crimes are not increasing prior to the event, suggesting the Charleston shooting was an unanticipated event. Moreover, nearly 80% of whites interviewed 8-12 days after the shooting reported they were following the shooting closely (Figure 1, Panel A), statistically more than other salient events at the time (e.g. same-sex marriage decision, the 2016 election, the Obamacare court decision).

Although media reports suggest political elites disagreed on how to frame the event,

⁶ "The 2 Degrees of Separation Between Dylann Roof and the Republican Party." June 22, 2015. *The Nation*.

⁷ "Victim's dad warns Dylann Roof: 'Your creator . . . he's coming for you.'" January 11, 2017. CNN.

⁸ "9 people killed in shooting at black church in Charleston, S.C." June 17, 2015. CBC.; "Obama On Charleston Shooting: 'This Type Of Mass Violence Does Not Happen In Other Advanced Countries.'" June 18, 2015. *Huffington Post*.

⁹ "U.S. presidential candidates react to South Carolina church shootings." June 18, 2015. Reuters.

¹⁰ "Watch Jon Stewart's Heartbreaking Charleston Shooting Monologue." June 19, 2015. *Rolling Stone*.




Figure 2: Perceptions of Violence as Racialized. Panel A characterizes the proportion of whites (y-axis) who perceived the Charleston shooting as a hate crime using CNN data. Panel B characterizes the proportion of whites who think “Racism, White Nationalism” is responsible for mass shootings in the United States in Ipsos data fielded 2-3 days after the El Paso shooting. Panel C characterizes the proportion of whites (y-axis) who think the recent shootings in Atlanta were motivated by anti-Asian bias in the Amerispeak COVID Bias Survey sponsored by Enns and Schuldt. Panel D characterizes the proportion of whites (y-axis) who would classify the mass shooting as a hate crime (among other things) (x-axis) in YouGov/Economist data.

with Democrats espousing gun control and identifying systemic white supremacy as a core motivation for the shooting, and Republicans emphasizing mental illness and the violence as a “random act,”¹¹ 86% of whites thought the shooting was a racially-motivated hate crime (Figure 2, Panel A).

Given the perpetrator’s website included several white supremacist emblems (e.g. the

¹¹ “Predictably, Democrats, Republicans Don’t Agree On Charleston Causes, Solutions.” June 19, 2015. NPR.

Confederate flag), the shooting raised debate over whether South Carolina should fly the Confederate battle flag on state grounds.¹² An online petition with 370,000 signatures encouraged the flag's removal. Obama, Mitt Romney, and Jeb Bush called for the flag's removal. On June 22, South Carolina Governor Haley and Senators Lindsey Graham and Tim Scott called for the flag to be removed by the state legislature. Eventually, the South Carolina senate voted to remove the Confederate flag from display. On June 23, several major retailers (e.g. Walmart, Amazon, Sears, eBay) announced plans to stop selling Confederate flags.¹³ Consistent with $H1_b$, prior research demonstrates the white mass public reduced support for flying the Confederate flag in South Carolina between two surveys administered before and after the shooting (Huffmon et al., 2017). However, there is limited research on whether the shooting may have elicited prosocial attitudes toward Black people among whites. Consistent with $H1_a$, support for the flag's removal may be symbolic, and not concomitant with reductions in negative attitudes toward Black people after the shooting among whites.

2019 El Paso Shooting

On August 3, 2019, 10:30 AM MST, a white gunman, shot and murdered 23 individuals in a Wal-Mart in El Paso, Texas. This mass shooting is notable for our purposes because the perpetrator chose this location with the explicit intent of targeting Mexicans, Mexican-Americans, and people of Hispanic-descent, and the media narrative after the shooting also emphasized this framing of the incident.¹⁴ El Paso's location at the physical Mexican-American border also emphasized the perpetrator's stated desire to stymie what he called the "Hispanic invasion of Texas" in a manifesto he wrote prior to the shooting. In February

¹² "Charleston Shooting Reignites Debate About Confederate Flag." June 19, 2015. *New York Times*.

¹³ "Walmart, Amazon, Sears, eBay to stop selling Confederate flag merchandise." June 24, 2015. CNN.

¹⁴ "El Paso Walmart Shooting Suspect Pleads Not Guilty." October 10, 2019. NPR.

2023, the perpetrator pled guilty to federal hate crime charges and is awaiting sentencing.¹⁵

The event was highly salient and interpreted as ethno-racial violence. President Trump, Obama, El Paso U.S. Representative Escobar, Texas Senator Ted Cruz, Beto O'Rourke, and Texas Governor Greg Abbott all condemned the shooting. Two days after the shooting, Trump indicated “in one voice, our nation must condemn racism, bigotry, and white supremacy. These sinister ideologies must be defeated. Hate has no place in America.” At the same time, “#WhiteSupremacistInChief” was the number one trending Twitter topic the day after the shooting as some pointed out Crusius’ manifesto contained anti-immigrant rhetoric similar to Trump’s speeches. Many Democratic party members criticized Trump’s anti-immigrant rhetoric in the wake of the shooting, including several 2020 presidential candidates. Although some Republicans emphasized mental illness or violent video games as responsible for the shooting, many, including Trump, George P. Bush, the Texas Land Commissioner, and Ted Cruz, spoke of the need to combat white supremacist terrorism.

Auxiliary evidence suggests the event was salient and perceived as ethno-racial violence among the mass public. The number and proportion of online news articles related to the El Paso shooting and hate crimes discontinuously increased after the shooting (Figure 7, Panels C-D, Figure 8, Panels C-D). Google searches for information related to the El Paso shooting and hate crimes precipitously increased in an unanticipated manner immediately after the shooting (Figure 6, Panels C-D).¹⁶ Indeed, a representative Ipsos poll fielded 2-3 days post-shooting indicated 70% of whites were “familiar” with the mass shootings in El Paso and Dayton, Ohio.¹⁷ The same poll indicates 65% of whites attributed the cause of the

¹⁵“Man who killed 23 at El Paso Walmart pleads guilty to hate crimes.” February 8, 2023.. The Texas Tribune.

¹⁶In 2019, Google search intensity for information related to hate crimes was at its highest on February-March due to the Jussie Smollett hate crime scandal (see: <https://www.bbc.com/news/newsbeat-47317701>). However, information-seeking concerning hate crimes decreases between April-July, suggesting our design is examining the consequences of relatively unanticipated information concerning ethno-racial violence.

¹⁷In Dayton, another mass shooting, not ethno-racially targeted, occurred 13 hours after the El Paso shooting.

shooting(s) to “racism, white nationalism.”

2021 Atlanta Spa Shooting

On March 16, 2021, 4:50PM EST, a gunman shot and killed 8 people, 6 of which were Asian women, at three separate spas or massage parlors in and around Atlanta, Georgia. Unlike the Charleston or El Paso shootings, however, the motivation for the violence is less clear. The gunman was taken into custody, and told police that he targeted establishments where he previously paid for sex because he was motivated by a sex addiction at odds with his Christianity. The gunman denied the victims’ race played a role in the killings.

However, despite the stated intentions of the shooter, segments of the media and political establishment interpreted the violence as a racially-motivated hate crime. Korean media sources indicated one of the spa managers that witnessed the shooting indicated the shooter said “I’m going to kill all the Asians.” President Biden, Vice President Kamala Harris, and several Democratic politicians immediately condemned the attack as a hate crime.¹⁸ Three days after the shooting, Biden gave a speech condemning rising hate crimes during the COVID-19 pandemic against Asian-Americans and declared his support for the proposed COVID-19 Hate Crimes Act, which passed Congress a month later. The South Korean foreign minister met with Secretary of State Blinken to discuss the shooting and U.S. government anti-hate crime efforts on March 19. *Stop AAPI Hate*, a prominent initiative supported by several pro-Asian social justice organizations declared that racism should not be ruled out despite the shooters stated intention. Some commentators also noted that the fact most of the shooter’s victims were Asian women, who have experienced a history of sexual fetishization, may be grounds for understanding the event as a hate crime.

¹⁸The shootings took place in two jurisdictions, and so the gunman faced charges in both. He pled guilty to four murder charges in Cherokee County, Georgia and was sentenced to life in prison. In Fulton County, he is awaiting trial on charges that include murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and domestic terrorism, which include hate crime enhancements.

The Atlanta shooting was a salient event. Google searches and online media coverage related to the shooting precipitously increased the moment of the shooting (Figure 6, Panel E; Figure 7, Panels E-F). There is also some evidence that the mass public perceived the shooting as a hate crime. Online media coverage on hate crimes also precipitously increased post-shooting (Figure 8, Panels E-F). Google searches for hate crimes increase precipitously post-shooting (Figure 6, Panel F). Moreover, 29% of the white mass public perceived the shooting as an anti-Asian hate crime (Figure 2, Panel C). However, to the extent that the white mass public may adopt prosocial attitudes in response to violence against racialized groups toward racialized groups, the effects of the Atlanta shooting may be weaker given a smaller proportion of whites perceived the Atlanta shooting as racially motivated relative to the Charleston and El Paso shootings.

2022 Buffalo Shooting

The most recent racially-targeted mass shooting we consider took place on May 14, 2022, 2:30PM EST, in Buffalo, New York. In that incident, the perpetrator murdered 10 individuals in a grocery store, the majority of whom were African-American. The attack was pre-meditated months in advance, and he noted that he chose the location for the shooting because its ZIP code had the "highest percentage of Black people close enough to where he lived in Conklin, New York."¹⁹ Similar to the mass shootings in Charleston and El Paso, the perpetrator actively sought out a location that he knew would communicate a larger message. The public at-large appears to have seen the animus within that message. Figure 2, Panel D shows that 51% of white respondents in a YouGov/Economist survey fielded immediately after the shooting said they would classify the attack as a "hate crime." In the time since, the perpetrator has pled guilty to charges of murder and to the charge of "domestic terrorism

¹⁹"Buffalo grocery store mass shooter willing to plead guilty to federal charges if death penalty off the table, attorneys say." December 9, 2022. CNN.

motivated by hate.”²⁰ He stands charged with hate crime enhancements in Federal court.²¹ The event was salient. Google searches related to the shooting and hate crimes precipitously increased in an unanticipated manner the moment of the shooting (Figure 6). Online media coverage of the shooting and hate crimes also increased in a discontinuous, unanticipated manner post-shooting.

Data and Design

To test our hypotheses and the effects of these racialized violent incidents on white attitudes toward targeted groups, we use a variety of datasets. To assess the effects of the Charleston shooting on prosocial attitudes toward Black people (Study 1), we use the Project Implicit Race Implicit Association Test (PI-RIAT) survey from January-December 2015.²² The PI-RIAT is an online survey of individuals who self-select to take an implicit association test on race in addition to answering explicit questions related to race. We subset the raw data to white U.S. adult residents who completed the survey. 354 whites take the survey each day on average. Although the PI-RIAT is not representative, prior research suggests external stimuli produces similar effects in unrepresentative samples relative to representative samples (Coppock, 2019). Nevertheless, we weight the PI-RIAT sample to census quotas for age, college-education, and gender from the 2015 American Community Survey (ACS). The dependent variables of interest are the *D-score*, *ethnocentrism*, and *bias*. The *D-score* measures the degree to which respondents make more negative/positive associations with Black/white people. *Ethnocentrism* is based on two feeling thermometers measuring warmth toward Black and white people. We take the difference between the white and Black thermometer to measure differential warmth towards whites relative to Black people. *Bias*

²⁰In New York state, this is a hate crime enhancement for crimes that involve at least one death and the attempted murder of at least four other people. See: New York Law Section 490.28.

²¹“Buffalo Gunman Sentenced to Life in Emotional and Dramatic Hearing.” February 15, 2023. *The New York Times*.

²²<https://osf.io/52qx1/>

is based on a measure in the PI-RIAT explicitly asking respondents “how much do they prefer European-Americans people to African-Americans” on a scale from “I strongly prefer African Americans to European Americans” to “I strongly prefer European-Americans to African-Americans.” All outcomes are rescaled between 0-1. The independent variable of interest is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent was interviewed after June 17, 2015, the moment of the Charleston shooting.

To assess the effects of the El Paso shooting on prosocial attitudes towards Latinxs (Study 2), we use the UCLA + Democracy Fund Nationscape survey (NS) fielded between July 2019-April 2021.²³ We subset the data to white adults. Unlike the PI-RIAT, the survey was implemented by LUCID, who recruited online respondents to meet Census representative quotas. The data and analyses include population weights for gender, census region, ethnicity, race, age, language, birth country, household income, metropolitan status, and Trump vote. 667 whites take the survey each day on average. The dependent variables of interest are: *Latino unfavorability*, a measure of feeling unfavorable towards Latinos from “very favorable” to “very unfavorable”; *undocumented unfavorability*, a measure of feeling unfavorable towards undocumented immigrants from “very favorable” to “very unfavorable”; *separation*, a measure of agreement with the notion that children should be separated from their parents when parents could be prosecuted for immigration violations; *merit*, a measure of agreement with shifting from a family to a merit-based immigration; *require citizenship*, a measure of agreement with requiring citizenship to wire money to another country; *no pathway*, a measure of disagreement with creating a path to citizenship for all undocumented immigrants; *no DREAM*, a measure of disagreement with creating a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants brought here as children; *deportations*, a measure of agreement with deporting all undocumented immigrants. Although many of the outcomes in the NS deal with attitudes toward immigrants and policies related to their political rights, the white

²³<https://www.voterstudygroup.org/nationscape>

mass public may adopt prosocial attitudes toward immigrants given the perpetrator in the El Paso shooting was motivated by anti-Latinx, anti-immigrant beliefs and the Latinx population an immigrant population. All outcomes are rescaled between 0-1. The independent variable of interest is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent was interviewed after August 3, 2019, the moment of the El Paso shooting.

To assess the effects of the Atlanta spa shooting on prosocial attitudes towards Asians (Study 3), we use the Project Implicit Asian Implicit Association Test (PI-AIAT) survey from January-December 2015.²⁴ Like the PI-RIAT, the PI-AIAT is an online survey of individuals self-selecting to take an implicit association test on anti-Asian bias in addition to answering explicit questions related to evaluations of Asians. We subset the raw data to white U.S. adult residents who completed the survey. 63 whites take the survey each day on average. We weight the PI-AIAT sample to census quotas for age, college-education, and gender from the 2015 American Community Survey (ACS). The dependent variables of interest are the anti-Asian *D-score*, *ethnocentrism*, and *bias*. The anti-Asian *D-score* measures the degree to which respondents make more negative/positive associations with Asian/European people. *Ethnocentrism* is based on two feeling thermometers measuring warmth toward Asian-American and European-American people. We take the difference between the European-American and Asian-American thermometer to measure differential warmth towards Europeans-Americans relative to Asian-American people. *Bias* is based on a measure in the PI-RIAT explicitly asking respondents “how much do they prefer European-Americans people to African-Americans” on a scale from “I strongly prefer African Americans to European Americans” to “I strongly prefer European-Americans to African-Americans.” All outcomes are rescaled between 0-1. The independent variable of interest is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent was interviewed after March 16, 2021, the moment of the Atlanta shooting.

²⁴<https://osf.io/52qx1/>

To assess the effects of the Buffalo shooting on prosocial attitudes toward Black people, we conduct a preregistered data processing and analysis (Study 4).²⁵ Like Study 1, we use the Project Implicit Race Implicit Association Test (PI-RIAT) survey from January-December 2022. We subset the raw data to white U.S. adult residents who completed the survey. 434 whites take the survey each day on average. The outcomes are the same as Study 1. The independent variable of interest is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent was interviewed after May 14, 2022.

Estimation Strategy

We use the following linear model for all studies:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{shooting}_i + \sum_{k=1}^k \beta^{k+1} X_i^k + \varepsilon_i$$

Where Y_i is an outcome of interest for respondent i , D_i is an indicator equal to one if respondent i takes the survey *post-shooting*. $\sum_{k=1}^k \beta^{k+1} X_i^k$ are k control covariates for gender, age, college-education, state of residence (Texas, Pennsylvania, New York, California, Florida), ideology, and religiosity for Studies 1, 3-4; gender, age, evangelicalism, foreign-born, college-education, income, employment, union, ideology, partisanship, and state of residence for Study 2. ε_i are robust errors. For the purposes of consistency and brevity, we present standardized estimates for β_1 . Given our outcomes are coded so that lower values suggest prosocial beliefs, if $\beta_1 < 0$, then that is evidence the shootings motivate prosocial beliefs.

Our estimation strategy is consistent with an unexpected-event-during-survey design (UESD). We compare respondents exposed to a context where a racialized shooting occurred to respondents not exposed to a context where a shooting occurred. Given each survey is fielded for a long time period, we present post-*shooting* coefficients that are 1)

²⁵See <https://osf.io/5bwz6> for the pre-analysis plan.




Figure 3: Changes in Prosocial Attitudes Toward Targeted Groups After Ethno-Racial Violence. The x-axis is the study, the y-axis is the standardized *post-violence* coefficient. Color denotes the outcome of interest. 95% CIs displayed derived from HC2 SEs.

using at least 5 days before and after the shooting and 2) are the most statistically balanced between pre- and post-*shooting* respondents on baseline covariates. Given the media and mass public immediately discussed and sought information on each shooting (Figures 6, 7, 8), the number of respondents 5 days before and after each shooting are large (Study 1 N: 2010, Study 2 N: 5867, Study 3 N: 841, Study 4 N: 3726), and there is high statistical balance on covariates for the samples we use following these decision rules (Study 1: 6 days, 0/17 baseline covariates imbalanced; Study 2: 6 days, 1/26 baseline covariates imbalanced; Study 3: 6 days 0/16 baseline covariates imbalanced, Study 4: 5 days 3/17 covariates imbalanced), we feel confident in our approach. However, we present alternative bandwidth estimates and demonstrate they are similar to the statistical and substantive conclusions of our main estimates.

Results

Figure 3 displays the standardized effects of the Charleston, El Paso, Atlanta, and Buffalo shootings. Across the board, the shootings have a statistically insignificant effect on attitudes toward targeted groups, consistent with the notion the white mass public is apathetic to violence perpetrated against marginalized groups ($H1_a$).

The findings are robust. The results do not change using alternative bandwidth samples (Figures 13, 18, 19, 23, 27). The null results are not a function of pre-treatment secular trends. To rule out pre-treatment secular attitudinal trends, we compare the effect of being interviewed the number of post-treatment days for each study immediately before the shooting relative to the number of post-treatment days beforehand. For the most part, the placebo estimates are statistically null across the studies (Tables 1, 5, 6, 14, 18). Moreover, there is limited heterogeneity across a number of covariates in response to the racialized shootings, suggesting that the white mass public responded in a homogeneous manner (Tables 4, 10, 21, 17).

Study 5: Evidence from a Survey Experiment

Introduction and Hypotheses

While we establish the high salience of mass shootings Charleston, El Paso, Atlanta, and Buffalo, we cannot establish, without doubt, that survey respondents were aware of these instances of racial violence. Therefore, we undertake a supplemental survey experiment guaranteeing that respondents are exposed to information about mass shootings. This study also allows us to isolate the impact of altering the incident's targeted group and test for heterogeneous effects of treatment. We return to our initial, competing expectations. Evidence of an apathy among white respondents is demonstrated by a lack of measurable shifts in

prosocial attitudes after exposure to news of a racialized mass shooting ($H1_a$). Support for our empathetic hypothesis is found if white respondents express greater prosocial attitudes after exposure to news of a racialized mass shooting ($H1_b$). A decrease in prosocial attitudes after exposure to this news supports our hostility hypothesis ($H1_c$).

Study Design

The survey experiment was fielded in November 2023 to 1,266 white, American respondents through the online survey platform Lucid Theorem.²⁶ Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions. Three treatment conditions took the form of a news article describing a mass shooting occurring outside the city of Cincinnati. In these three treatment conditions, the mass shooting was described as a “random” incident, with no clear target (we refer to this as the “non-racial” condition), or as a “racist” incident that explicitly targeted white or black people. A fourth control condition made no mention of violence or race and instead discussed the implications of 2023 having the hottest summer on record. Each article, as it was shown to respondents, can be found in the appendix (Figures 28, 29, 30, 31). The distribution of white respondents across conditions is balanced. Sample demographics and the distribution of respondents across conditions can be found in the appendix (Tables 22 and 23).

Our dependent variables of interest include several measures of public opinion: support for tougher federal *gun control* regulation, support for increased *hate crime penalties*, and support for *reparations and welfare policies* concerning Black Americans. We measure support for gun control using a single item which asked respondents the degree to which they believe the government should make it easier or harder for people to buy a gun (five-point scale). Our hate crime measure asked respondents how much they support increasing penalties for hate crimes in the United States (five-point scale). Support for reparations and

²⁶<https://osf.io/e27tx>

welfare is measured through a four item battery using a five-point scale to directly ask respondents about their degree of support for reparations to black Americans, social service programs, teaching about race in schools, and affirmative action in hiring and education ($\alpha = 0.85$). The text of these questions can be found in the appendix. Our survey instrument also included several attention and manipulation checks. Our findings are robust when sub-setting to only respondents who correctly answered these questions – we discuss these robustness checks in greater detail below.

Results

Main Treatment Effects

We test our competing hypotheses – apathy, empathy, or hostility – and gauge if exposure to a fictional news story about a mass shooting – random or racialized – shifts the public opinion of white respondents in comparison to the control condition. We gauge significance by a p-value of 0.05. All values have been re-scaled between 0-1. Full models are presented in the appendix.

Do white respondents shift their policy preferences in response to reading about a mass shooting? Does the target of that mass shooting influence their perception of these policies? As shown in Figure 4, respondents in our treatment conditions do not express policy preferences that are significantly different from those expressed by respondents in the control condition. Further, we find that preferences for these policies are also statistically indistinguishable across treatment conditions. These findings are robust to the inclusion of several demographic factors: age, gender, education, income, partisanship, and ideology.

Attention and Manipulation Checks – While our previous studies establish that each incident considered was a highly salient event, undertaking a survey experiment allows us to ensure that respondents are exposed to information about a mass shooting. Our survey




Figure 4: Effect of Exposure to News of a Mass Shooting on Whites' Attitudes. Treatment conditions are noted along the x-axis. The y-axis shows coefficients in comparison to the control condition. Shown with 95% confidence intervals. Positive values indicate greater prosocial beliefs.

experiment included one attention check (pre-treatment) and two manipulation checks (post-treatment). Eighty-one percent of respondents passed the initial attention check ($n=1,026$). Ninety percent of respondents passed the factual manipulation check asking them to confirm the topic of the treatment article ($n=1,143$).²⁷ Our findings are robust when excluding respondents who failed the initial attention check (Figure 32). They are also robust when excluding respondents who failed the factual manipulation check (Figure 33).

These findings support our apathetic hypothesis ($H1_a$) and are aligned with the findings

²⁷“What was the topic of the article you read?” Four response options: an act of violence, competition between social media companies, climate change, popular summer movies.

of our previous studies. White respondents do not express discernible shifts in their policy preferences when exposed to news of a mass shooting targeting Black people. Nor do we find that they shift their policy preferences in response to news of any mass shooting – whether it is described as a random mass shooting or an incident targeting other white people. Yet, the question of heterogeneous treatment effects within the white mass public remains. Our experimental design allows us to test for these effects, and in the next section, we consider several additional variables of interest.

Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

We set several expectations about the moderating effects of pre-treatment variables. Viewing these variables as indicative of our hostility, empathy, and apathetic expectations, we consider the relationship between *racial resentment*, *group empathy*, and *racial apathy* and treatment conditions. First, we expect that more racially resentful respondents will express less prosociality after exposure to the black treatment condition in comparison to the white and non-racial conditions ($H2_a$). Racial resentment is measured using a battery of four questions designed to detect “symbolic racism” (Kinder and Sears, 1981; Kinder and Sanders, 1996) ($\alpha = 0.62$). Respondents expressed the degree to which they agreed or disagreed (on a five-point scale) with statements like “Blacks should try to work their way up without any special favors.” Higher values indicate greater racial resentment.

Second, we expect that white respondents who are more empathetic will express more prosociality after exposure to the black treatment condition in comparison to the non-racial and white conditions ($H2_b$). We engage an established measure of *group empathy* that asks respondents to describe how often they feel empathy toward members of other ethno-racial groups (Sirin et al., 2021). Respondents answered four questions that gauged the frequency with which they, among other items, “try to better understand people of other racial or ethnic groups by imagining how things look from their perspective” ($\alpha = 0.87$). Higher

values indicate greater group empathy.

Our third measure of interest is *racial apathy* (Forman, 2004). We expect that white respondents with a higher degree of racial apathy express less prosociality after exposure to the black treatment condition in comparison to the non-racial and white treatment conditions (H_{2c}). To measure racial apathy, we use a single-item that asks respondents “How much do you personally care or not about equality between different racial groups?” Respondents answered on a five point scale, spanning from “not at all” to “a great deal.” Responses have been recoded so that higher values indicate greater racial apathy.

Figure 5 shows the marginal effects of each treatment condition on our outcome variables. We use the non-racial condition as our baseline point of comparison, given that our hypotheses concern comparisons between treatment conditions.²⁸

Respondents who are more racially resentful express significantly less support for stricter gun control laws, less support for increasing hate crime penalties, and less support for reparations and welfare policies. This is regardless of their treatment condition. There are significant differences in marginal effects across treatment conditions. While we do find that increasing racial resentment is negatively associated with support for our dependent variables, we find no heterogeneous effects of treatment (Tables 25, 27, 29).

Group empathy is also a significant moderator of all three items. Respondents with higher levels of group empathy express greater support for stricter gun control laws. However, note that responses are not statistically discernible in the non-racial condition when moving from the lowest to the highest levels of group empathy. Group empathy is also a strong moderator of respondents’ support for increased hate crime penalties and reparations and welfare policies. Yet, once again, there are no statistical differences in marginal effects of group empathy when comparing across conditions.

Figure 5 shows that support for all three policy outcomes decreases as respondents report

²⁸Our findings are robust when using the control condition as the baseline point of comparison.

higher levels of racial apathy. Once again, these marginal effects are not statistically different across condition. As Tables 27 and 29 show, racial apathy is the only moderating variable with a significant interaction between our treatment conditions. The interaction between the white condition and greater racial apathy sees white respondents reporting the a higher degree of support for increased hate crime penalties comparison to the non-racial condition ($p<0.02$). White respondents reporting greater racial apathy are also more supportive of reparations and welfare policies in the black treatment condition in comparison to the non-racial condition ($p<0.01$).

Ideology and Partisanship – We also consider potential heterogeneous effects of partisan affiliation or political ideology when comparing across treatment conditions. We find that ideology and partisanship are both moderators of our dependent variables. Support for all three dependent variables increases significantly among respondents who self-identify themselves as liberals and democrats. Yet, once again, these traits do not result in significantly different marginal effects within treatment condition (Figure 34).

While racial resentment, group empathy, and racial apathy do moderate the degree to which respondents supported tougher gun control, increased hate crime penalties, and reparations and welfare policies, we find little effect of treatment condition on those outcomes. In each instance, we expected to find that the black treatment condition might reveal distinctions among our white respondents. We find little evidence that this is the case. As with our initial studies, exposure to news of a mass shooting – racialized or random – has a statistically insignificant effect on respondents' policy attitudes. These findings are consistent with studies 1-4 and are also consistent with the expectation that the white mass public is apathetic in response to violence against historically-marginalized groups ($H1_a$).

These findings also allow us to elaborate on the degree to which the white public is apathetic to mass shootings – racialized or not. The inclusion of racialized scenarios allows us to conclude that the racial identities of the targeted group are not a driving factor in




Figure 5: Marginal Effects of Condition on Support for Gun Control, Increased Hate Crime Penalties, and Reparations/Welfare by Racial Resentment (Row 1), Group Empathy (Row 2), and Racial Apathy (Row 3). 95% confidence intervals.

how white respondents perceive the urgency or importance of prosocial policy changes. For the most part, their responses are stagnant, regardless of the context of the mass shooting. More specifically, the treatment condition itself does not have a significant effect on the degree of support that respondents expressed for prosocial policies. Nor does the interaction of treatment condition with racial resentment, group empathy, racial apathy, ideology, nor partisanship yield statistically significant marginal effects when comparing within treatment conditions. That is, a white-targeted mass shooting is no more provocative than a mass shooting directed against Black people nor more provocative than a mass shooting without racial connotations. White respondents are no more empathetic – or hostile – when their own racial group is victimized. These findings further support our apathetic hypothesis ($H1_a$) and point to an entrenchment of white racial attitudes.

Conclusion

While, anecdotally, expressions of grief, empathy, and outrage in the media may suggest that racially-targeted mass shootings elicit changes in prosocial attitudes toward the targeted groups, our findings provide evidence to the contrary. Rather than finding that these mass shootings evoke empathy or hostility, our observational and experimental results suggest that racially-targeted mass shootings are not impactful on the public opinion of white Americans. These mass shootings may serve as focusing events, directing attention toward discussions of racial prejudice, the Second Amendment, or toward symbolic political spaces, but they do not signal monumental shifts in attitudes. As others have found a limited or null impact of mass shootings on electoral behavior, we also find that neither media focus on these events nor direct exposure to this news is enough to elicit changes in attitudes about gun control, hate crime policy, and reparations and welfare. These incidents might, instead, temporarily amplify (or stifle) entrenched beliefs (though not changing them), while taking the guise of

racial apathy.

Our work contributes to literature on mass shootings, political behavior, and public opinion in the United States with its focus on race and racialized violence. Distinct from much of the literature on the impact of mass shootings on American politics, this paper provides a nuanced consideration of mass shooting events by analyzing them with attention to racial identity, as well as through observational and experimental research designs. There is substantial literature to suggest that the views white Americans hold about violence and conflict are not only different from, but are also and more entrenched than those held by people of color. Our findings align with this literature. Our work also points to the on-going need for more nuanced and dis-aggregated study of mass shootings. Considering where these mass shootings happen, who they target, and what motivates them may provide a foundation for understanding a lack of widespread electoral and non-electoral political participation in their aftermath.

There is further disaggregation to be done, and this points to several areas for future consideration. First, though the responses of people of color have not been the focus of this paper, their attitudes (and variation in their attitudes) warrant a great deal of further study. Group Empathy Theory “posits that minority group members find it easier to cognitively imagine themselves in the position of a person being unfairly treated due solely to their race/ethnicity, even when that person is from a different racial/ethnic group” (Sirin et. al. 2016, 895). This leads us to imagine that people of color have more prosocial responses to racially-targeted mass shootings against other marginalized groups. Specifically, we believe that the responses of whites and people of color (African Americans, in particular) to these racially-targeted mass shootings should not be identical. Where we have observed the lack of response among white Americans, we would expect to find greater prosociality among people of color in the aftermath of these events.

Finally, this paper speaks more broadly to mobilization and issue framing, and reiterates

a lesson of history – a strategy of changing hearts and minds may be less fruitful and tougher to achieve than expected. As leaders of anti-lynching efforts learned in the early-20th century, even in the face of horrific, white supremacist violence, white attitudes toward the targeted are deeply entrenched (Francis, 2014; Hill, 2016). We do not find evidence that racially-targeted mass shootings substantially increase hostility toward the targeted groups, which suggests that these events do not incite the interracial conflict that many of the perpetrators hoped to ignite. Yet, our results also suggest that it should not be taken for granted that tragedies elicit sympathetic or empathetic responses toward the targeted group, even if that group is of shared racial identity.

A Treatment Reception

A.1 Google Trends




Figure 6: Google Search Intensity Over Time. Panels A, C, E, and G display the Google Search intensity for the phrases “Shooting” and “Charleston”; “Shooting” and “El Paso”; “Shooting” and “Atlanta”; and “Shooting” and “Buffalo” for the years 2015, 2019, 2021, and 2022 respectively. Panels B, D, F and H display the Google Search intensity for the phrase “hate crime” for the years 2015, 2019, 2021, and 2022 respectively.

A.2 Mediablog

A.2.1 Media Coverage of Shooting Incident(s)




Figure 7: Online Media Coverage of Shooting Incidents Over Time. Panels A, C, E, and G display the count of online articles related to the search phrases: “Shooting” and “Charleston”; “Shooting” and “El Paso”; “Shooting” and “Atlanta”; and “Shooting” and “Buffalo” for the years 2015, 2019, 2021, and 2022 respectively. Panels B, D, F and H display the proportion of online articles related to the aforementioned search phrases relative to all online articles.

A.2.2 Media Coverage of Hate Crime




Figure 8: Online Media Coverage of Hate Crimes Over Time. Panels A, C, E, and G display the count of online articles related to the search phrase “hate crime” for the years 2015 (Charleston), 2019 (El Paso), 2021 (Atlanta), and 2022 (Buffalo) respectively. Panels B, D, F and H display the proportion of online articles related to the “hate crime” search phrase relative to all online articles.

A.3 BrandWatch – Social Media Engagement




Figure 9: Online Social Media Engagement Over Time. Panels A, B, and C show the evolution of mentions across social media platforms for the phrases “Shooting” and “El Paso”; “Shooting” and “Atlanta”; and “Shooting” and “Buffalo” for the years 2019, 2021, and 2022 respectively.

B Study 1: Charleston Shooting

B.1 Descriptive Statistics




Figure 10: Outcomes Over Time. The x-axis is the date, the y-axis is the outcome value for the *D-score*, *ethnocentrism*, and *bias*. The dashed vertical line denotes the moment the Charleston Shooting occurred. The solid line characterizes a loess line fit on each side of the moment the shooting occurred. Data from 50 days before and after the shooting are displayed.

B.2 Covariate Balance Across Bandwidths




Figure 11: Assessing Covariate Balance Between Respondents Surveyed Before and After the Charleston Shooting (1-25 day bandwidth samples). X-axis is the *shooting* coefficient from separate regression models across balance covariates (y-axis). Titles denote bandwidth sample, sample size, and level of imbalance (# covariates imbalanced / # of covariates). Grey coefficients are statistically insignificant, black otherwise. All covariates rescaled between 0-1, 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust SEs.




Figure 12: Assessing Covariate Balance Between Respondents Surveyed Before and After the Charleston Shooting (26-50 day bandwidth samples). X-axis is the *shooting* coefficient from separate regression models across balance covariates (y-axis). Titles denote bandwidth sample, sample size, and level of imbalance (# covariates imbalanced / # of covariates). Grey coefficients are statistically insignificant, black otherwise. All covariates rescaled between 0-1, 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust SEs.

B.3 Alternative Bandwidths




Figure 13: Effect of Charleston Shooting on Anti-Black Attitudes. X-axis is the bandwidth sample (in days). Y-axis is the *shooting* coefficient. Title denotes outcome. Black coefficients adjust for covariates, grey otherwise. All covariates rescaled between 0-1, 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust SEs.

B.4 Temporal Placebo

Table 1: Temporal Placebo Tests

	D-Score (1)	Ethnocentrism (2)	Bias (3)	D-Score (4)	Ethnocentrism (5)	Bias (6)
Placebo	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.02 (0.01)
Woman	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)
College	0.02 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Religious	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01* (0.00)	-0.05*** (0.01)
Age (25-34)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Age (35-44)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Age (45-54)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Age (55-64)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.02* (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)
Age (65+)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
Liberal	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)
Conservative	0.00 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.02)
Texas	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)
Pennsylvania	-0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)
New York	-0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)
California	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
Florida	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
South Carolina	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.05)
Pre-Shooting Placebo	5 days	5 days	5 days	6 days	6 days	6 days
R ²	0.04	0.08	0.08	0.04	0.07	0.07
Num. obs.	2005	1992	1982	2277	2255	2244

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

B.5 Assessing Sorting

Table 2: Assessing Sorting After the Charleston Shooting

	# of Respondents	
	(1)	(2)
(Intercept)	174.80*** (18.61)	174.17*** (15.21)
Shooting	52.40 (28.94)	65.67* (26.80)
Bandwidth	5 day	6 day
R ²	0.29	0.38
Num. obs.	10	12

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. HC2 robust SEs in parentheses.

Table 3: Re-Analyzing Effects of Charleston Shooting Adjusting For Sorting

	D-Score (1)	Ethnocentrism (2)	Bias (3)	D-Score (4)	Ethnocentrism (5)	Bias (6)
Shooting	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
# Respondents	0.00* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Woman	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)
College	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)
Religious	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01** (0.00)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01* (0.00)	-0.02 (0.01)
Age (25-34)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Age (35-44)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Age (45-54)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Age (55-64)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)
Age (65+)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.02* (0.01)	0.02 (0.03)
Liberal	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02 (0.01)
Conservative	0.02 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.02)
Texas	0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.04* (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)
Pennsylvania	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
New York	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)
California	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.02*** (0.01)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.03 (0.02)
Florida	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.06 (0.05)
South Carolina	-0.04 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.10* (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.11* (0.04)
Bandwidth	5 day	5 day	5 day	6 day	6 day	6 day
R ²	0.06	0.08	0.12	0.06	0.07	0.11
Num. obs.	1983	1978	1962	2453	2447	2427

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. All covariates scaled between 0-1 except the count of respondents. HC2 Robust SEs in parentheses.

B.6 Assessing Heterogeneity

Table 4: Assessing Heterogeneous Effects of Charleston Shooting

Het. Effect	SE	p-value	Outcome	Moderator	Sample
0.00	0.02	0.89	D-Score	Woman	5 days
0.00	0.01	0.93	D-Score	Age	5 days
-0.01	0.02	0.47	D-Score	College	5 days
-0.04	0.02	0.05	D-Score	Liberal	5 days
0.05	0.03	0.03	D-Score	Conservative	5 days
-0.00	0.05	0.99	D-Score	South Carolina	5 days
-0.00	0.01	1.00	Ethnocentrism	Woman	5 days
-0.00	0.00	0.64	Ethnocentrism	Age	5 days
-0.00	0.01	0.81	Ethnocentrism	College	5 days
0.00	0.01	0.56	Ethnocentrism	Liberal	5 days
0.00	0.01	0.86	Ethnocentrism	Conservative	5 days
0.09	0.05	0.06	Ethnocentrism	South Carolina	5 days
-0.01	0.03	0.71	Bias	Woman	5 days
0.01	0.01	0.32	Bias	Age	5 days
-0.02	0.02	0.28	Bias	College	5 days
0.00	0.02	0.88	Bias	Liberal	5 days
0.04	0.04	0.30	Bias	Conservative	5 days
0.20	0.08	0.02	Bias	South Carolina	5 days
-0.00	0.02	0.97	D-Score	Woman	6 days
0.00	0.01	0.59	D-Score	Age	6 days
-0.02	0.02	0.42	D-Score	College	6 days
-0.03	0.02	0.12	D-Score	Liberal	6 days
0.06	0.03	0.03	D-Score	Conservative	6 days
-0.00	0.05	0.92	D-Score	South Carolina	6 days
0.00	0.01	0.55	Ethnocentrism	Woman	6 days
-0.00	0.00	0.64	Ethnocentrism	Age	6 days
-0.01	0.01	0.52	Ethnocentrism	College	6 days
0.00	0.01	0.78	Ethnocentrism	Liberal	6 days
0.00	0.01	0.62	Ethnocentrism	Conservative	6 days
0.10	0.05	0.03	Ethnocentrism	South Carolina	6 days
0.00	0.03	0.90	Bias	Woman	6 days
0.01	0.01	0.31	Bias	Age	6 days
-0.01	0.02	0.48	Bias	College	6 days
0.02	0.02	0.53	Bias	Liberal	6 days
0.03	0.04	0.49	Bias	Conservative	6 days
0.22	0.08	0.01	Bias	South Carolina	6 days

All covariates rescaled between 0-1. HC2 Robust SEs presented.

C Study 2: El Paso Shooting

C.1 Descriptive Statistics




Figure 14: Outcomes Over Time. The x-axis is the date, the y-axis is the value for the *Latino unfavorability* and *undocumented unfavorability* outcomes. The dashed vertical line denotes the moment the El Paso Shooting occurred. The solid line characterizes a loess line fit on each side of the moment the shooting occurred. Data from 16 days before and 50 days after the shooting are displayed.




Figure 15: Outcomes Over Time. The x-axis is the date, the y-axis is the value for the *separation*, *merit*, *require citizenship*, *no citizenship pathway*, *no DREAM citizenship*, and *deportations* outcomes. The dashed vertical line denotes the moment the El Paso Shooting occurred. The solid line characterizes a loess line fit on each side of the moment the shooting occurred. Data from 16 days before and 50 days after the shooting are displayed.

C.2 Covariate Balance Across Bandwidths




Figure 16: Assessing Covariate Balance Between Respondents Surveyed Before and After the El Paso Shooting (1-25 day bandwidth samples). X-axis is the *shooting* coefficient from separate regression models across balance covariates (y-axis). Titles denote bandwidth sample, sample size, and level of imbalance (# covariates imbalanced / # of covariates). Grey coefficients are statistically insignificant, black otherwise. All covariates rescaled between 0-1, 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust SEs.




Figure 17: Assessing Covariate Balance Between Respondents Surveyed Before and After the El Paso Shooting (26-50 day bandwidth samples). X-axis is the *shooting* coefficient from separate regression models across balance covariates (y-axis). Titles denote bandwidth sample, sample size, and level of imbalance (# covariates imbalanced / # of covariates). Grey coefficients are statistically insignificant, black otherwise. All covariates rescaled between 0-1, 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust SEs.

C.3 Alternative Bandwidths




Figure 18: Effect of El Paso Shooting on Anti-Latino, Anti-Immigrant Attitudes. X-axis is the bandwidth sample (in days). Y-axis is the *shooting* coefficient. Title denotes outcome. Black coefficients adjust for covariates, grey otherwise. All covariates rescaled between 0-1, 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust SEs.




Figure 19: Effect of El Paso Shooting on Anti-Immigrant Policy Preferences. X-axis is the bandwidth sample (in days). Y-axis is the *shooting* coefficient. Title denotes outcome. Black coefficients adjust for covariates, grey otherwise. All covariates rescaled between 0-1, 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust SEs.

C.4 Temporal Placebo

Table 5: Temporal Placebo Tests (Part 1)

	Unfav. (Latino) (1)	Unfav. (Undoc.) (2)	Unfav. (Latino) (3)	Unfav. (Undoc.) (4)
Placebo	-0.03 (0.01)	-0.04* (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Woman	0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
College	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03* (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)
Age (25-34)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.07** (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.06** (0.02)
Age (35-44)	0.04 (0.02)	-0.06* (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)
Age (45-54)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Age (55-64)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Liberal	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.13*** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.14*** (0.02)
Conservative	0.02 (0.02)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.14*** (0.02)
Texas	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Pennsylvania	-0.00 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.07* (0.03)
New York	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)
California	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.07** (0.02)	-0.07** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)
Florida	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)
Pre-Shooting Placebo	5 days	5 days	6 days	6 days
R ²	0.06	0.26	0.06	0.26
Num. obs.	5792	5809	6678	6700

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table 6: Temporal Placebo Tests (Part 2)

	Separation (1)	Merit (2)	Require Citizenship (3)	No Pathway (4)	No DREAM (5)	Deportations (6)	Separation (7)	Merit (8)	Require Citizenship (9)	No Pathway (10)	No DREAM (11)	Deportations (12)
Placebo	0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Woman	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.11** (0.04)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.11** (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)
College	-0.05 (0.04)	0.08 (0.04)	-0.09* (0.05)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.08* (0.04)	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)
Age (25-34)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.13 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	-0.10** (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.08* (0.03)
Age (35-44)	0.00 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.04 (0.05)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Age (45-54)	-0.00 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.07)	0.03 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.06)	0.00 (0.07)	0.04 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
Age (55-64)	0.04 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)	0.05 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
Liberal	0.01 (0.04)	0.08 (0.05)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.14** (0.05)	-0.07** (0.05)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)
Conservative	0.17*** (0.05)	0.13** (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.19*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.12* (0.05)	0.09 (0.05)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.19*** (0.03)
Texas	0.02 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.09)	0.00 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.08 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.08)	0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Pennsylvania	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.07)	0.03 (0.08)	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.08)	0.08 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)
New York	0.05 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.06)	0.06 (0.07)	-0.00 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)
California	0.05 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.06)	0.04 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.08* (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.06)	0.08 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.07* (0.03)
Florida	0.03 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.07)	0.05 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.06)	0.01 (0.07)	0.09 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Pre-Shooting Placebo	5 days	5 days	5 days	5 days	5 days	5 days	6 days	6 days	6 days	6 days	6 days	6 days
R ²	0.19	0.10	0.13	0.14	0.09	0.22	0.17	0.09	0.14	0.14	0.09	0.22
Num. obs.	1912	1880	1835	5845	5851	5845	2219	2207	2150	6738	6746	6739

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

C.5 Assessing Sorting

Table 7: Assessing Sorting After the El Paso Shooting

	# of Respondents	
	(1)	(2)
(Intercept)	511.40** (131.30)	551.67*** (114.52)
Shooting	316.10 (203.69)	220.93 (175.15)
Bandwidth	5 day	6 day
R ²	0.26	0.15
Num. obs.	9	11

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. HC2 Robust SEs in parentheses

Table 8: Re-Analyzing Results Adjusting For Sorting, (Part 1)

	Unfav. (Latino) (1)	Unfav. (Undoc.) (2)	Unfav. (Latino) (3)	Unfav. (Undoc.) (4)
Shooting	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
# Respondents	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)
Age (25-34)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)
Age (35-44)	0.04 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Age (45-54)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Age (55-64)	0.04 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Woman	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)
Evangelical	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Foreign-Born	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
College	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.04** (0.01)
Income (15-29K)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)
Income (30-49K)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Income (50-79K)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)
Income (80-99K)	0.02 (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.10*** (0.03)
Employed	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.01)
Union	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)
Liberal	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.13*** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.14*** (0.02)
Conservative	-0.01 (0.02)	0.15*** (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.15*** (0.02)
Democrat	-0.05*** (0.02)	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.11*** (0.02)
Republican	0.01 (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)
Texas	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.02)
Pennsylvania	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)
New York	-0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)
California	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.06** (0.02)
Florida	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Bandwidth	5 day	5 day	6 day	6 day
R ²	0.05	0.29	0.06	0.29
Num. obs.	5800	5817	7092	7109

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Table 9: Re-Analyzing Results Adjusting For Sorting (Part 2)

	Separation (1)	Merit (2)	Require Citizenship (3)	No Pathway (4)	No DREAM (5)	Deportations (6)	Separation (7)	Merit (8)	Require Citizenship (9)	No Pathway (10)	No DREAM (11)	Deportations (12)
Shooting	0.04 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
# Respondents	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Woman	-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.17*** (0.04)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.03)	-0.11** (0.03)	-0.16** (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.04** (0.01)	-0.05** (0.02)
College	-0.02 (0.04)	0.08* (0.04)	-0.12** (0.04)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.08* (0.04)	-0.13*** (0.04)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.10*** (0.02)
Income (15-29K)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.08)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.07)	0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
Income (30-49K)	-0.10 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.07)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.07)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)
Income (50-79K)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.07)	0.02 (0.07)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.06)	0.03 (0.07)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Income (80-99K)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.07)	0.03 (0.08)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.07 (0.06)	0.06 (0.08)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.00 (0.04)
Income (100K)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.07)	0.05 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	0.04 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.05 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)
Age (25-34)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.17** (0.06)	-0.06 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.20** (0.06)	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.06 (0.03)
Age (35-44)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.11 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)
Age (45-54)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.07)	0.01 (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.05* (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Age (55-64)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	0.05 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	0.05 (0.03)	0.04 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)
Liberal	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.10* (0.05)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)
Conservative	0.19*** (0.05)	0.13* (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.20*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.22*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.12** (0.04)	0.11* (0.04)	0.20*** (0.05)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.22*** (0.03)
Texas	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.08)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.07)	0.02 (0.04)	0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Pennsylvania	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.01 (0.07)	0.05 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.07 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.07)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.02)	0.05 (0.04)
New York	0.00 (0.06)	0.08 (0.08)	0.08 (0.08)	0.01 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.02 (0.06)	0.07 (0.07)	0.05 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)
California	0.03 (0.06)	0.20** (0.08)	0.06 (0.06)	0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.05)	0.18** (0.07)	0.08 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Florida	-0.03 (0.07)	0.02 (0.07)	0.15* (0.07)	0.08 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.09 (0.07)	0.05 (0.06)	0.01 (0.04)	0.04 (0.03)
Bandwidth	5 day	5 day	5 day	5 day	5 day	5 day	6 day	6 day	6 day	6 day	6 day	6 day
R ²	0.20	0.13	0.18	0.13	0.08	0.24	0.20	0.12	0.17	0.14	0.09	0.23
Num. obs.	1846	1896	1843	5827	5831	5826	2273	2327	2248	7128	7134	7126

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

C.6 Assessing Heterogeneity

Table 10: Assessing Heterogenous Effects of El Paso Shooting (Part 1)

Het. Effect	SE	p-value	Outcome	Moderator	Sample
-0.06	0.02	0.00	Unfavorability (Latinos)	Woman	5 days
-0.06	0.02	0.00	Unfavorability (Latinos)	Age	5 days
-0.06	0.02	0.00	Unfavorability (Latinos)	College	5 days
0.00	0.02	0.83	Unfavorability (Latinos)	Conservative	5 days
0.00	0.01	0.83	Unfavorability (Latinos)	Liberal	5 days
0.00	0.01	0.83	Unfavorability (Latinos)	Democrat	5 days
0.00	0.02	0.82	Unfavorability (Latinos)	Republican	5 days
0.01	0.01	0.60	Unfavorability (Latinos)	Political Interest	5 days
0.00	0.01	0.84	Unfavorability (Latinos)	Fox News	5 days
0.00	0.01	0.82	Unfavorability (Latinos)	Texas	5 days
-0.13	0.02	0.00	Unfavorability (Undocumented)	Woman	5 days
-0.13	0.02	0.00	Unfavorability (Undocumented)	Age	5 days
-0.13	0.02	0.00	Unfavorability (Undocumented)	College	5 days
-0.02	0.02	0.34	Unfavorability (Undocumented)	Conservative	5 days
-0.02	0.02	0.35	Unfavorability (Undocumented)	Liberal	5 days
-0.02	0.02	0.34	Unfavorability (Undocumented)	Democrat	5 days
-0.02	0.02	0.33	Unfavorability (Undocumented)	Republican	5 days
-0.01	0.02	0.42	Unfavorability (Undocumented)	Political Interest	5 days
-0.01	0.02	0.37	Unfavorability (Undocumented)	Fox News	5 days
-0.02	0.02	0.34	Unfavorability (Undocumented)	Texas	5 days
0.00	0.04	0.95	Separation	Woman	5 days
0.00	0.04	0.92	Separation	Age	5 days
0.01	0.04	0.85	Separation	College	5 days
0.04	0.04	0.29	Separation	Conservative	5 days
0.04	0.04	0.30	Separation	Liberal	5 days
0.04	0.04	0.30	Separation	Democrat	5 days
0.04	0.04	0.33	Separation	Republican	5 days
0.03	0.04	0.38	Separation	Political Interest	5 days
0.04	0.04	0.22	Separation	Fox News	5 days
0.04	0.04	0.27	Separation	Texas	5 days
-0.04	0.05	0.41	Merit	Woman	5 days
-0.04	0.05	0.42	Merit	Age	5 days
-0.04	0.05	0.41	Merit	College	5 days
0.04	0.05	0.45	Merit	Conservative	5 days
0.04	0.05	0.45	Merit	Liberal	5 days
0.04	0.05	0.46	Merit	Democrat	5 days
0.04	0.05	0.45	Merit	Republican	5 days
0.03	0.05	0.53	Merit	Political Interest	5 days
0.03	0.05	0.49	Merit	Fox News	5 days
0.03	0.05	0.49	Merit	Texas	5 days

Table 11: Assessing Heterogenous Effects of El Paso Shooting (Part 2)

Het. Effect	SE	p-value	Outcome	Moderator	Sample
-0.10	0.05	0.05	Require Citizenship	Woman	5 days
-0.10	0.05	0.05	Require Citizenship	Age	5 days
-0.10	0.05	0.05	Require Citizenship	College	5 days
-0.04	0.05	0.40	Require Citizenship	Conservative	5 days
-0.04	0.05	0.39	Require Citizenship	Liberal	5 days
-0.04	0.05	0.40	Require Citizenship	Democrat	5 days
-0.04	0.05	0.39	Require Citizenship	Republican	5 days
-0.04	0.05	0.32	Require Citizenship	Political Interest	5 days
-0.04	0.04	0.38	Require Citizenship	Fox News	5 days
-0.04	0.05	0.40	Require Citizenship	Texas	5 days
-0.07	0.02	0.00	No Pathway	Woman	5 days
-0.07	0.02	0.00	No Pathway	Age	5 days
-0.07	0.02	0.00	No Pathway	College	5 days
-0.01	0.02	0.57	No Pathway	Conservative	5 days
-0.01	0.02	0.57	No Pathway	Liberal	5 days
-0.01	0.02	0.57	No Pathway	Democrat	5 days
-0.01	0.02	0.58	No Pathway	Republican	5 days
-0.01	0.02	0.61	No Pathway	Political Interest	5 days
-0.01	0.02	0.61	No Pathway	Fox News	5 days
-0.01	0.02	0.57	No Pathway	Texas	5 days
-0.01	0.02	0.41	No DREAM	Woman	5 days
-0.01	0.02	0.41	No DREAM	Age	5 days
-0.01	0.02	0.42	No DREAM	College	5 days
0.00	0.02	0.94	No DREAM	Conservative	5 days
0.00	0.02	0.95	No DREAM	Liberal	5 days
0.00	0.02	0.94	No DREAM	Democrat	5 days
0.00	0.02	0.94	No DREAM	Republican	5 days
0.00	0.02	0.87	No DREAM	Political Interest	5 days
0.00	0.02	0.90	No DREAM	Fox News	5 days
0.00	0.02	0.94	No DREAM	Texas	5 days
-0.08	0.02	0.00	Deportations	Woman	5 days
-0.08	0.02	0.00	Deportations	Age	5 days
-0.08	0.02	0.00	Deportations	College	5 days
0.03	0.02	0.19	Deportations	Conservative	5 days
0.03	0.02	0.20	Deportations	Liberal	5 days
0.03	0.02	0.19	Deportations	Democrat	5 days
0.03	0.02	0.19	Deportations	Republican	5 days
0.03	0.02	0.18	Deportations	Political Interest	5 days
0.03	0.02	0.18	Deportations	Fox News	5 days
0.03	0.02	0.20	Deportations	Texas	5 days

Table 12: Assessing Heterogenous Effects of El Paso Shooting (Part 3)

Het. Effect	SE	p-value	Outcome	Moderator	Sample
-0.06	0.02	0.00	Unfavorability (Latinos)	Woman	6 days
-0.06	0.02	0.00	Unfavorability (Latinos)	Age	6 days
-0.06	0.02	0.00	Unfavorability (Latinos)	College	6 days
-0.00	0.01	0.99	Unfavorability (Latinos)	Conservative	6 days
-0.00	0.01	1.00	Unfavorability (Latinos)	Liberal	6 days
0.00	0.01	1.00	Unfavorability (Latinos)	Democrat	6 days
0.00	0.01	0.98	Unfavorability (Latinos)	Republican	6 days
0.01	0.01	0.67	Unfavorability (Latinos)	Political Interest	6 days
0.00	0.01	0.97	Unfavorability (Latinos)	Fox News	6 days
-0.00	0.01	0.99	Unfavorability (Latinos)	Texas	6 days
-0.14	0.02	0.00	Unfavorability (Undocumented)	Woman	6 days
-0.14	0.02	0.00	Unfavorability (Undocumented)	Age	6 days
-0.14	0.02	0.00	Unfavorability (Undocumented)	College	6 days
-0.02	0.02	0.15	Unfavorability (Undocumented)	Conservative	6 days
-0.02	0.02	0.16	Unfavorability (Undocumented)	Liberal	6 days
-0.02	0.02	0.15	Unfavorability (Undocumented)	Democrat	6 days
-0.02	0.02	0.14	Unfavorability (Undocumented)	Republican	6 days
-0.02	0.02	0.22	Unfavorability (Undocumented)	Political Interest	6 days
-0.02	0.02	0.15	Unfavorability (Undocumented)	Fox News	6 days
-0.02	0.02	0.15	Unfavorability (Undocumented)	Texas	6 days
-0.00	0.03	0.92	Separation	Woman	6 days
-0.00	0.03	0.95	Separation	Age	6 days
0.00	0.03	0.98	Separation	College	6 days
0.01	0.03	0.70	Separation	Conservative	6 days
0.01	0.03	0.72	Separation	Liberal	6 days
0.01	0.03	0.70	Separation	Democrat	6 days
0.01	0.03	0.73	Separation	Republican	6 days
0.01	0.03	0.84	Separation	Political Interest	6 days
0.01	0.03	0.69	Separation	Fox News	6 days
0.01	0.03	0.65	Separation	Texas	6 days
-0.05	0.04	0.28	Merit	Woman	6 days
-0.05	0.04	0.29	Merit	Age	6 days
-0.05	0.04	0.29	Merit	College	6 days
0.02	0.04	0.66	Merit	Conservative	6 days
0.02	0.04	0.64	Merit	Liberal	6 days
0.02	0.04	0.65	Merit	Democrat	6 days
0.02	0.04	0.67	Merit	Republican	6 days
0.01	0.04	0.80	Merit	Political Interest	6 days
0.01	0.04	0.78	Merit	Fox News	6 days
0.02	0.04	0.65	Merit	Texas	6 days

Table 13: Assessing Heterogenous Effects of El Paso Shooting (Part 4)

Het. Effect	SE	p-value	Outcome	Moderator	Sample
-0.08	0.05	0.11	Require Citizenship	Woman	6 days
-0.08	0.05	0.10	Require Citizenship	Age	6 days
-0.08	0.05	0.10	Require Citizenship	College	6 days
-0.05	0.04	0.20	Require Citizenship	Conservative	6 days
-0.05	0.04	0.20	Require Citizenship	Liberal	6 days
-0.05	0.04	0.20	Require Citizenship	Democrat	6 days
-0.06	0.04	0.19	Require Citizenship	Republican	6 days
-0.06	0.04	0.16	Require Citizenship	Political Interest	6 days
-0.06	0.04	0.17	Require Citizenship	Fox News	6 days
-0.05	0.04	0.20	Require Citizenship	Texas	6 days
-0.07	0.02	0.00	No Pathway	Woman	6 days
-0.07	0.02	0.00	No Pathway	Age	6 days
-0.07	0.02	0.00	No Pathway	College	6 days
-0.00	0.02	0.89	No Pathway	Conservative	6 days
-0.00	0.02	0.90	No Pathway	Liberal	6 days
-0.00	0.02	0.90	No Pathway	Democrat	6 days
-0.00	0.02	0.92	No Pathway	Republican	6 days
-0.00	0.02	0.90	No Pathway	Political Interest	6 days
-0.00	0.02	0.88	No Pathway	Fox News	6 days
-0.00	0.02	0.90	No Pathway	Texas	6 days
-0.02	0.02	0.35	No DREAM	Woman	6 days
-0.02	0.02	0.36	No DREAM	Age	6 days
-0.02	0.02	0.36	No DREAM	College	6 days
0.01	0.02	0.57	No DREAM	Conservative	6 days
0.01	0.02	0.58	No DREAM	Liberal	6 days
0.01	0.02	0.57	No DREAM	Democrat	6 days
0.01	0.02	0.55	No DREAM	Republican	6 days
0.01	0.02	0.52	No DREAM	Political Interest	6 days
0.01	0.02	0.59	No DREAM	Fox News	6 days
0.01	0.02	0.58	No DREAM	Texas	6 days
-0.08	0.02	0.00	Deportations	Woman	6 days
-0.08	0.02	0.00	Deportations	Age	6 days
-0.07	0.02	0.00	Deportations	College	6 days
0.01	0.02	0.59	Deportations	Conservative	6 days
0.01	0.02	0.59	Deportations	Liberal	6 days
0.01	0.02	0.59	Deportations	Democrat	6 days
0.01	0.02	0.59	Deportations	Republican	6 days
0.01	0.02	0.59	Deportations	Political Interest	6 days
0.01	0.02	0.61	Deportations	Fox News	6 days
0.01	0.02	0.59	Deportations	Texas	6 days

D Study 3: Atlanta Spa Shooting

D.1 Descriptive Statistics




Figure 20: Outcomes Over Time. The x-axis is the date, the y-axis is the outcome value for the *D-score*, *ethnocentrism*, and *bias*. The dashed vertical line denotes the moment the Atlanta Spa Shooting occurred. The solid line characterizes a loess line fit on each side of the moment the shooting occurred. Data from 50 days before and after the shooting are displayed.

D.2 Covariate Balance Across Bandwidths




Figure 21: Assessing Covariate Balance Between Respondents Surveyed Before and After the Atlanta Spa Shooting (1-25 day bandwidth samples). X-axis is the *shooting* coefficient from separate regression models across balance covariates (y-axis). Titles denote bandwidth sample, sample size, and level of imbalance (# covariates imbalanced / # of covariates). Grey coefficients are statistically insignificant, black otherwise. All covariates rescaled between 0-1, 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust SEs.




Figure 22: Assessing Covariate Balance Between Respondents Surveyed Before and After the Atlanta Spa Shooting (26-50 day bandwidth samples). X-axis is the *shooting* coefficient from separate regression models across balance covariates (y-axis). Titles denote bandwidth sample, sample size, and level of imbalance (# covariates imbalanced / # of covariates). Grey coefficients are statistically insignificant, black otherwise. All covariates rescaled between 0-1, 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust SEs.

D.3 Alternative Bandwidths




Figure 23: Effect of Atlanta Spa Shooting on Anti-Asian Attitudes. X-axis is the bandwidth sample (in days). Y-axis is the *shooting* coefficient. Title denotes outcome. Black coefficients adjust for covariates, grey otherwise. All covariates rescaled between 0-1, 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust SEs.

D.4 Temporal Placebo

Table 14: Temporal Placebo Tests

	D-Score (1)	Ethnocentrism (2)	Bias (3)	D-Score (4)	Ethnocentrism (5)	Bias (6)
Placebo	0.02 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)
Woman	-0.02 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)
College	-0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.02 (0.01)
Religious	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)
Age (25-34)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Age (35-44)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Age (45-54)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Age (55-64)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.04* (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.03* (0.02)
Age (65+)	0.10*** (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.03 (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)
Liberal	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Conservative	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)
Texas	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
Pennsylvania	0.01 (0.03)	0.02* (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.02* (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)
New York	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.03* (0.02)
California	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.05** (0.02)
Florida	0.02 (0.05)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.03)
Pre-Shooting Placebo	6 days	6 days	6 days	7 days	7 days	7 days
R ²	0.10	0.10	0.07	0.10	0.08	0.05
Num. obs.	915	910	897	1119	1113	1096

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

D.5 Assessing Sorting

Table 15: Assessing Sorting After the Atlanta Spa Shooting

	# of Respondents	
	(1)	(2)
(Intercept)	69.50*** (11.30)	73.57*** (10.38)
Shooting	36.67 (23.53)	38.57 (21.16)
Bandwidth	6 day	7 day
R ²	0.20	0.22
Num. obs.	12	14

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. HC2 Robust SEs in parentheses

Table 16: Re-Analyzing Results Adjusting For Sorting

	D-Score (1)	Ethnocentrism (2)	Bias (3)	D-Score (4)	Ethnocentrism (5)	Bias (6)
Shooting	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
# Respondents	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Woman	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.03** (0.01)
College	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Religious	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)
Age (25-34)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Age (35-44)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
Age (45-54)	0.04* (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.04** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)
Age (55-64)	0.06** (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.06** (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Age (65+)	0.07** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.03)	0.07*** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.04 (0.02)
Liberal	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.04 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.04* (0.02)
Conservative	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.04* (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.03 (0.02)
Texas	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
Pennsylvania	0.04 (0.04)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.10 (0.07)	0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.11 (0.07)
New York	0.01 (0.04)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)
California	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)
Florida	0.03 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.07 (0.05)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Georgia	0.05* (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)
Bandwidth	6 day	6 day	6 day	7 day	7 day	7 day
R ²	0.08	0.04	0.17	0.08	0.03	0.14
Num. obs.	1050	1049	1032	1296	1290	1272

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

D.6 Assessing Heterogeneity

Table 17: Assessing Heterogenous Effects of Atlanta Spa Shooting

Het. Effect	SE	p-value	Outcome	Moderator	Sample
0.02	0.03	0.52	D-Score	Woman	6 days
0.01	0.01	0.20	D-Score	Age	6 days
0.03	0.03	0.20	D-Score	College	6 days
-0.01	0.03	0.77	D-Score	Liberal	6 days
0.02	0.03	0.48	D-Score	Conservative	6 days
-0.05	0.05	0.33	D-Score	Georgia	6 days
-0.01	0.01	0.46	Ethnocentrism	Woman	6 days
-0.00	0.00	0.72	Ethnocentrism	Age	6 days
-0.00	0.01	0.76	Ethnocentrism	College	6 days
0.02	0.01	0.15	Ethnocentrism	Liberal	6 days
-0.04	0.02	0.06	Ethnocentrism	Conservative	6 days
-0.02	0.03	0.44	Ethnocentrism	Georgia	6 days
-0.02	0.02	0.38	Bias	Woman	6 days
-0.01	0.01	0.07	Bias	Age	6 days
0.00	0.02	0.97	Bias	College	6 days
-0.00	0.02	1.00	Bias	Liberal	6 days
-0.00	0.03	0.98	Bias	Conservative	6 days
0.01	0.03	0.75	Bias	Georgia	6 days
0.02	0.02	0.34	D-Score	Woman	7 days
0.01	0.01	0.16	D-Score	Age	7 days
0.03	0.02	0.19	D-Score	College	7 days
-0.00	0.02	0.85	D-Score	Liberal	7 days
0.02	0.02	0.50	D-Score	Conservative	7 days
-0.06	0.05	0.26	D-Score	Georgia	7 days
-0.01	0.01	0.37	Ethnocentrism	Woman	7 days
-0.00	0.00	0.67	Ethnocentrism	Age	7 days
-0.01	0.01	0.31	Ethnocentrism	College	7 days
0.01	0.01	0.60	Ethnocentrism	Liberal	7 days
-0.03	0.01	0.06	Ethnocentrism	Conservative	7 days
-0.02	0.02	0.40	Ethnocentrism	Georgia	7 days
-0.02	0.02	0.31	Bias	Woman	7 days
-0.01	0.01	0.05	Bias	Age	7 days
-0.01	0.02	0.73	Bias	College	7 days
-0.00	0.02	0.93	Bias	Liberal	7 days
-0.00	0.02	1.00	Bias	Conservative	7 days
0.02	0.03	0.40	Bias	Georgia	7 days

All covariates rescaled between 0-1. HC2 Robust SEs presented.

E Study 4: Buffalo Shooting

E.1 Descriptive Statistics




Figure 24: Outcomes Over Time. The x-axis is the date, the y-axis is the outcome value for the *D-score*, *ethnocentrism*, and *bias*. The dashed vertical line denotes the moment the Buffalo Shooting occurred. The solid line characterizes a loess line fit on each side of the moment the shooting occurred. Data from 50 days before and after the shooting are displayed.

E.2 Covariate Balance




Figure 25: Assessing Covariate Balance Between Respondents Surveyed Before and After the Buffalo Shooting (1-25 day bandwidth samples). X-axis is the *shooting* coefficient from separate regression models across balance covariates (y-axis). Titles denote bandwidth sample, sample size, and level of imbalance (# covariates imbalanced / # of covariates). Grey coefficients are statistically insignificant, black otherwise. All covariates rescaled between 0-1, 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust SEs.




Figure 26: Assessing Covariate Balance Between Respondents Surveyed Before and After the Buffalo Shooting (26-50 day bandwidth samples). X-axis is the *shooting* coefficient from separate regression models across balance covariates (y-axis). Titles denote bandwidth sample, sample size, and level of imbalance (# covariates imbalanced / # of covariates). Grey coefficients are statistically insignificant, black otherwise. All covariates rescaled between 0-1, 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust SEs.

E.3 Alternative Bandwidths




Figure 27: Effect of Buffalo Shooting on Anti-Black Attitudes. X-axis is the bandwidth sample (in days). Y-axis is the *shooting* coefficient. Title denotes outcome. Black coefficients adjust for covariates, grey otherwise. All covariates rescaled between 0-1, 95% CIs displayed from HC2 robust SEs.

E.4 Temporal Placebo

Table 18: Temporal Placebo Tests

	D-Score (1)	Ethnocentrism (2)	Bias (3)
Placebo	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Woman	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
College	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Religious	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Age (25-34)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Age (35-44)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Age (45-54)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Age (55-64)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Age (65+)	0.03* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)
Liberal	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Conservative	0.03*** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
Texas	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)
Pennsylvania	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)
New York	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)
California	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)
Florida	0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)
Pre-Shooting Placebo	5 days	5 days	5 days
R ²	0.05	0.04	0.04
Num. obs.	3763	3694	3628

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

E.5 Assessing Sorting

Table 19: Assessing Sorting After the Buffalo Shooting

# of Respondents	
(Intercept)	398.00*** (25.19)
Shooting	-50.80 (88.55)
Bandwidth	5 day
R ²	0.04
Num. obs.	10

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$. HC2 Robust SEs in parentheses

Table 20: Re-Analyzing Results Adjusting For Sorting

	D-Score (1)	Ethnocentrism (2)	Bias (3)
# Respondents	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Woman	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)
College	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)
Religious	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Age (25-34)	-0.02* (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Age (35-44)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Age (45-54)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Age (55-64)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Age (65+)	0.03* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.03 (0.02)
Liberal	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Conservative	0.01 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
Texas	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)
Pennsylvania	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)
New York	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.03 (0.02)
California	-0.04** (0.01)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Florida	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)
Bandwidth	5 day	5 day	5 day
R ²	0.04	0.04	0.04
Num. obs.	3721	3666	3610

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

E.6 Assessing Heterogeneity

Table 21: Assessing Heterogenous Effects of Charleston Shooting

Het. Effect	SE	p-value	Outcome	Moderator	Sample
0.02	0.01	0.08	D-Score	Woman	5 days
-0.00	0.00	0.13	D-Score	Age	5 days
-0.04	0.01	0.00	D-Score	College	5 days
-0.00	0.01	0.63	D-Score	Liberal	5 days
-0.01	0.01	0.59	D-Score	Conservative	5 days
-0.02	0.02	0.48	D-Score	New York	5 days
-0.00	0.01	1.00	Ethnocentrism	Woman	5 days
0.00	0.00	0.19	Ethnocentrism	Age	5 days
-0.01	0.01	0.13	Ethnocentrism	College	5 days
-0.01	0.01	0.43	Ethnocentrism	Liberal	5 days
0.00	0.01	0.62	Ethnocentrism	Conservative	5 days
0.00	0.02	0.87	Ethnocentrism	New York	5 days
0.00	0.01	0.70	Bias	Woman	5 days
0.00	0.00	0.62	Bias	Age	5 days
0.01	0.01	0.51	Bias	College	5 days
0.00	0.01	0.68	Bias	Liberal	5 days
-0.01	0.01	0.60	Bias	Conservative	5 days
0.00	0.03	0.93	Bias	New York	5 days

F Study 5: Survey Experiment

F.1 Sample Distribution and Demographics

Table 22: Distribution of White Respondents across Treatment Conditions

Control	314
Non-Racial	323
Black	298
White	331
Total	1,266

Table 23: White Sample Demographics

Number of Respondents	1,266
Percent Female	55%
Percent with College Degree	42%
Average Age	48
Average Income	\$50,000 - \$59,999
Partisanship	Democrat - 28 % Independent - 33% Republican - 40%
Ideology	Liberal - 27% Moderate - 37% Conservative - 36%

F.2 Survey Instrument

1. **Racial Identity** Which of the following best describes your race/ethnicity? Choose all that apply. (White, Hispanic or Latino/a, Black or African American, American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, Other)
2. **Racial Resentment** – How much do you agree with the following statements: (Strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree)
 - Blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
 - Blacks must try harder to get ahead.
 - Blacks should work their way up without any special favors.
 - Generations of slavery and discrimination make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.
3. **Group Empathy** For each item below, please indicate how well it describes you. Please read each item carefully and answer as honestly as you can. (Not often at all, not too often, Somewhat often, Very often, Extremely often)
 - How often would you say that you have tender, concerned feelings for people from another racial or ethnic group who are less fortunate than you?
 - How often would you say you try to better understand people of other racial or ethnic groups by imagining how things look from their perspective?
 - When you see someone being taken advantage of due to their race or ethnicity, how often do you feel protective toward them?
 - Before criticizing somebody from another racial or ethnic group, how often do you try to imagine how you would feel if you were in their place?

4. **Group Apathy** How much do you personally care or not about equality between different racial groups? (Not at all, a little, a moderate amount, a lot, a great deal)
5. **Attention Check** People are very busy these days and do not have much time to follow what goes on in the government. We are testing whether or not people read questions. To show that you have read this much, please answer both "extremely important" and "very important." (Not at all important, Slightly important, Moderately important, Very important, Extremely important)
6. **Partisanship** Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, or an Independent? (Democrat, Republican, Independent)
7. **Ideology** Below is a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale? (Extremely liberal, Liberal, Slightly Liberal, Moderate/Middle of the Road, Slightly Conservative, Conservative, Extremely Conservative)
8. **Manipulation Check** What was the topic of the article you read? (An act of violence, Competition between social media companies, Climate change, Popular summer movies)
9. **Gun Control** Do you think the federal government should make it more difficult for people to buy a gun than it is now, make it easier for people to buy a gun, or keep these rules about the same as they are now? (Much more difficult, Somewhat more difficult, Keep rules about the same, Somewhat easier, Much easier)
10. **Reparations/Welfare** To what degree would you support the following policies? (Strongly support, Somewhat support, Neither support nor oppose, Somewhat oppose, Strongly oppose)

- Reparations to Black Americans to address inequities created by generations of racism.
- Shifting some funds from local police departments to local social service agencies and urban community centers.
- Developing a federal standard in education, ensuring that kindergarten through high school students learn more about racial inequality and racism.
- Ensuring affirmative action in jobs and universities to mitigate racial discrimination against Black people.

11. **Increased Hate Crime Penalties** How much do you support increasing penalties for hate crimes in the United States? (Not at all, a little, a moderate amount, a lot, a great deal)

F.3 Treatment Articles

NATION

Record-breaking inferno: 2023 marks the hottest summer in U.S. history

Jordan Hillman
USA TODAY

Published 12:41 p.m. ET July 20, 2023



The United States is weathering an unprecedented and scorching summer, with 2023 earning the title of the hottest summer on record. From coast to coast, Americans have endured relentless heatwaves, raging wildfires, and soaring energy demands, raising concerns about the changing climate.


Throughout the country, temperatures reached record-breaking highs, surpassing the triple-digit mark in numerous cities. Phoenix, Arizona and Las Vegas, Nevada have sizzled under triple-digit temperatures for days on end. In states such as California, Texas, and Florida, records for consecutive days of extreme heat were shattered, pushing people and infrastructure to their limits.

As the mercury spiked, so did the number of heat-related emergencies. Hospitals were inundated with patients suffering from heat exhaustion and heatstroke. Public health authorities issued warnings to vulnerable populations, urging them to stay hydrated and seek shelter from the blistering sun.

The heat's impact has extended beyond human health. The country witnessed a surge in wildfire activity, with vast areas of forests falling prey to the flames. From the Pacific Northwest to the Southeast, firefighters and emergency responders battled to contain the infernos that devoured homes, displaced communities, and ravaged natural landscapes.

The sweltering temperatures also strained the nation's energy infrastructure. As air conditioners worked overtime to provide reprieve, power grids struggled to meet the escalating electricity demands. Residents faced rolling blackouts and energy conservation advisories, underscoring the urgent need for sustainable and resilient energy systems.

As the summer of 2023 winds down, this record-breaking inferno should serve as a clarion call for immediate action. From individual choices to comprehensive national policies, it is evident that the time for climate action is now. Our planet's future, and that of future generations, depends on our united efforts to combat the rising temperatures and safeguard the environment.



Amid record-breaking temperatures, infrastructure failures have plagued the country.



Figure 28: Survey Experiment's Control Condition as Shown to Respondents.

Police: Shooting suspect said that he targeted community center in attack

Jordan Hillman
USA TODAY

Published 10:28 a.m. ET Feb. 17, 2023



A gunman opened fire Thursday night at a community center outside of Cincinnati, killing six people before briefly fleeing. The shooting was an act of random violence, police said.

The suspect surrendered to police several blocks away. He was arrested and transported to the Cincinnati Police Department's headquarters, where he agreed to speak about the incident. It was there that the suspect confessed that he planned the rampage ahead of time with the intention of targeting people there.

During a Thursday night press conference, a police spokesman noted that the suspect entered the building earlier in the evening and then ultimately killed six people. Four others were wounded, but survived. No identifying information about the suspect was given.

Several hours afterward, a group of local leaders gathered a few blocks from where the shooting occurred and held an impromptu news conference. A member of the City Council said she had not been made aware of any manifesto or motivation to explain the shooting.

"This is senseless violence," she said. "You've got a guy clearly wanting to hurt people. That's a choice. He chose to go into that building and harm those people. That's a choice."

City officials did not release information about the victims and did not say how many people were in the building during the shooting. Hospital officials declined to comment.

This story is still developing.



Mourners left flowers and candles at a memorial outside of the community center on Friday morning. *Jordan Hillman/USA Today*

Figure 29: Survey Experiment's Non-Racial Condition as Shown to Respondents.

NATION

Police: Shooting suspect said that he targeted black people in attack

Jordan Hillman
USA TODAY

Published 10:28 a.m. ET Feb. 17, 2023



A gunman opened fire Thursday night at a community center outside of Cincinnati, killing six people before briefly fleeing. The shooting was an act of anti-black violence, police said.

The suspect surrendered to police several blocks away. He was arrested and transported to the Cincinnati Police Department's headquarters, where he agreed to speak about the incident. It was there that the suspect confessed that he planned the anti-black rampage ahead of time with the intention of targeting black people.

During a Thursday night press conference, a police spokesman noted that the suspect entered the building earlier in the evening and then ultimately killed six people. Four others were wounded, but survived. No identifying information about the suspect was given.

Several hours afterward, a group of local leaders gathered a few blocks from where the shooting occurred and held an impromptu news conference. A member of the City Council said she had been made of aware of an anti-black manifesto written by the shooter.

"This is racist violence," she said. "What else could it be? You've got a guy clearly wanting to hurt black people. That's a choice. He chose to go into that building and harm those people. That's a choice."

City officials did not release information about the victims and did not say how many people were in the building during the shooting. Hospital officials declined to comment.

This story is still developing.



Mourners left flowers and candles at a memorial outside of the community center on Friday morning. *Jordan Hillman/USA Today*

Figure 30: Survey Experiment's Black-Targeted Condition as Shown to Respondents.

NATION

Police: Shooting suspect said that he targeted white people in attack

Jordan Hillman
USA TODAY

Published 10:28 a.m. ET Feb. 17, 2023



A gunman opened fire Thursday night at a community center outside of Cincinnati, killing six people before briefly fleeing. The shooting was an act of anti-white violence, police said.

The suspect surrendered to police several blocks away. He was arrested and transported to the Cincinnati Police Department's headquarters, where he agreed to speak about the incident. It was there that the suspect confessed that he planned the anti-white rampage ahead of time with the intention of targeting white people.

During a Thursday night press conference, a police spokesman noted that the suspect entered the building earlier in the evening and then ultimately killed six people. Four others were wounded, but survived. No identifying information about the suspect was given.

Several hours afterward, a group of local leaders gathered a few blocks from where the shooting occurred and held an impromptu news conference. A member of the City Council said she had been made aware of an anti-white manifesto written by the shooter.

"This is racist violence," she said. "What else could it be? You've got a guy clearly wanting to hurt white people. That's a choice. He chose to go into that building and harm those people. That's a choice."

City officials did not release information about the victims and did not say how many people were in the building during the shooting. Hospital officials declined to comment.

This story is still developing.



Mourners left flowers and candles at a memorial outside of the community center on Friday morning.
Jordan Hillman/USA Today

Figure 31: Survey Experiment's White-Targeted Condition as Shown to Respondents.

F.4 Full Models

Table 24: Support for Gun Control

	(1) Gun Control	(2) Gun Control	(3) Gun Control
Non-racial	0.02 (0.90)	0.02 (1.10)	0.04 (1.95)
Black	-0.01 (-0.46)	0.00 (0.25)	0.01 (0.54)
White	0.00 (0.15)	0.02 (0.94)	0.02 (1.29)
Democrat		0.10*** (5.58)	0.08*** (4.33)
Age		0.12*** (5.46)	0.06** (2.74)
Ideology		0.28*** (9.31)	0.20*** (6.69)
Gender		0.05*** (3.86)	0.03* (2.39)
Education		0.02 (0.75)	0.00 (0.12)
Income		0.01 (0.45)	0.00 (0.00)
Racial Importance			0.07** (3.16)
Racial Resentment			-0.16*** (-4.06)
Group Empathy			-0.04 (-1.19)
SDO			-0.16*** (-4.28)
Racial Apathy			-0.10*** (-3.70)
Violence Justification			-0.05*** (-5.93)
Stereotype Endorsement			-0.11 (-1.64)
Media Attention			0.01 (0.25)
Constant	0.70*** (46.55)	0.42*** (15.15)	0.87*** (10.48)
Observations	1266	1251	1245

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 25: Support for Gun Control with Interactions

	(1) Gun Control	(2) Gun Control	(3) Gun Control	(4) Gun Control	(5) Gun Control	(6) Gun Control
Black	-0.00 (-0.05)	0.02 (0.34)	-0.09 (-1.42)	-0.10 (-1.68)	-0.03 (-0.79)	-0.00 (-0.06)
White	-0.05 (-0.85)	-0.01 (-0.22)	-0.07 (-1.19)	-0.07 (-1.20)	-0.02 (-0.55)	0.00 (0.11)
Racial Resentment	-0.38*** (-5.29)	-0.17* (-2.40)				
Black × Racial Resentment	-0.05 (-0.46)	-0.07 (-0.71)				
White × Racial Resentment	0.07 (0.65)	0.01 (0.14)				
Democrat		0.09*** (4.10)		0.10*** (4.64)		0.09*** (4.32)
Age		0.13*** (4.84)		0.11*** (4.43)		0.11*** (4.18)
Ideology		0.22** (6.06)		0.26*** (7.41)		0.23*** (6.72)
Gender		0.05*** (3.34)		0.05** (3.19)		0.05** (3.09)
Education		0.02 (0.62)		0.02 (0.72)		0.02 (0.65)
Income		0.00 (0.16)		-0.00 (-0.02)		-0.01 (-0.21)
Group Empathy			0.13 (1.95)	0.02 (0.27)		
[1em] Black × Group Empathy			0.11 (1.10)	0.14 (1.52)		
White × Group Empathy			0.09 (1.00)	0.10 (1.22)		
Racial Apathy					-0.26*** (-5.22)	-0.14** (-2.83)
Non-racial × Racial Apathy					0.00 (.)	0.00 (.)
Black × Racial Apathy					0.01 (0.20)	-0.03 (-0.42)
White × Racial Apathy					0.01 (0.21)	-0.02 (-0.25)
Constant	0.91*** (23.72)	0.56*** (11.07)	0.64*** (14.25)	0.45*** (9.49)	0.82*** (35.34)	0.54*** (14.09)
Observations	951	939	951	939	952	940

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 26: Support for Stronger Hate Crime Policies

	(1) Hate Crime Policy	(2) Hate Crime Policy	(3) Hate Crime Policy
Non-racial	-0.04 (-1.60)	-0.03 (-1.21)	-0.00 (-0.23)
Black	-0.03 (-1.14)	-0.01 (-0.62)	0.02 (0.76)
White	-0.02 (-0.65)	-0.00 (-0.18)	0.01 (0.58)
Democrat		0.12*** (5.50)	0.08*** (4.25)
Age		0.18*** (7.09)	0.17*** (6.94)
Ideology		0.18*** (5.19)	0.08* (2.37)
Gender		0.02 (1.48)	-0.00 (-0.14)
Education		0.01 (0.36)	-0.03 (-1.01)
Income		0.07* (2.50)	0.04 (1.37)
Racial Importance			0.05* (2.25)
Racial Resentment			-0.04 (-0.95)
Group Empathy			0.29*** (7.13)
SDO			0.01 (0.23)
Racial Apathy			-0.24*** (-7.71)
Violence Justification			-0.02* (-2.41)
Stereotype Endorsement			-0.07 (-0.87)
Media Attention			-0.00 (-0.02)
Constant	0.71*** (41.98)	0.43*** (13.35)	0.52*** (5.71)
Observations	1265	1250	1244

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 27: Support for Stronger Hate Crime Policy with Interactions

	(1) Hate Crime Policy	(2) Hate Crime Policy	(3) Hate Crime Policy	(4) Hate Crime Policy	(5) Hate Crime Policy	(6) Hate Crime Policy
Black	0.03 (0.49)	0.03 (0.55)	0.01 (0.19)	-0.00 (-0.05)	-0.01 (-0.23)	-0.00 (-0.05)
White	-0.05 (-0.78)	-0.03 (-0.59)	0.04 (0.63)	0.02 (0.37)	-0.03 (-0.95)	-0.03 (-1.07)
Racial Resentment	-0.35*** (-4.27)	-0.23** (-2.80)				
Black × Racial Resentment	-0.04 (-0.31)	-0.04 (-0.36)				
White × Racial Resentment	0.14 (1.29)	0.11 (1.02)				
Democrat		0.07** (2.88)		0.07** (3.15)		0.06** (2.63)
Age		0.21*** (7.18)		0.21*** (7.69)		0.19*** (7.10)
Ideology		0.13** (3.23)		0.13*** (3.56)		0.09* (2.45)
Gender		0.02 (0.84)		-0.00 (-0.15)		0.00 (0.13)
Education		0.02 (0.66)		-0.01 (-0.24)		-0.00 (-0.03)
Income		0.08* (2.30)		0.05 (1.67)		0.06 (1.81)
Group Empathy			0.52*** (7.24)	0.45*** (6.56)		
Black × Group Empathy			0.02 (0.18)	0.05 (0.47)		
White × Group Empathy			-0.02 (-0.25)	-0.00 (-0.02)		
Racial Apathy					-0.53*** (-10.58)	-0.48*** (-9.36)
Black × Racial Apathy					0.09 (1.23)	0.07 (1.02)
White × Racial Apathy					0.16* (2.32)	0.15* (2.26)
Constant	0.84*** (19.42)	0.53*** (9.10)	0.35*** (7.53)	0.17*** (3.35)	0.87*** (36.57)	0.66*** (16.29)
Observations	950	938	950	938	951	939

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 28: Support for Reparations and Welfare

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Non-racial	0.02 (0.72)	0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.52)
Black	-0.00 (-0.19)	-0.01 (-0.35)	0.00 (0.23)
White	0.00 (0.06)	0.02 (0.86)	0.02 (1.17)
Democrat		0.11*** (6.65)	0.07*** (4.42)
Age		-0.15*** (-7.53)	-0.08*** (-4.34)
Ideology		0.38*** (14.07)	0.23*** (8.99)
Gender		0.05*** (3.77)	0.03** (2.60)
Education		-0.02 (-0.61)	-0.03 (-1.45)
Income		-0.02 (-0.79)	-0.02 (-1.22)
Racial Importance			0.05** (2.78)
Racial Resentment			-0.47*** (-14.12)
Group Empathy			0.07* (2.25)
SDO			0.05 (1.61)
Racial Apathy			-0.15*** (-6.48)
Violence Justification			0.01 (1.73)
Stereotype Endorsement			-0.09 (-1.49)
Media Attention			-0.09*** (-3.95)
Constant	0.52*** (34.17)	0.39*** (14.93)	0.77*** (10.60)
Observations	1263	1248	1242

t statistics in parentheses* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 29: Support for Reparations and Welfare with Interactions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Black	-0.02 (-0.51)	-0.01 (-0.19)	0.03 (0.42)	0.04 (0.74)	-0.08* (-2.47)	-0.06* (-2.30)
White	-0.03 (-0.57)	0.00 (0.10)	-0.03 (-0.55)	0.01 (0.16)	-0.02 (-0.80)	0.01 (0.35)
Racial Resentment	-0.78*** (-13.02)	-0.54*** (-9.12)				
Black × Racial Resentment	0.02 (0.19)	0.00 (0.03)				
White × Racial Resentment	0.04 (0.43)	0.01 (0.14)				
Democrat		0.08*** (4.44)		0.11*** (5.91)		0.10*** (5.38)
Age		-0.10*** (-4.66)		-0.14*** (-6.18)		-0.15*** (-6.87)
Ideology		0.25*** (8.43)		0.36*** (11.89)		0.33*** (11.21)
Gender		0.03* (2.48)		0.03* (1.99)		0.03* (2.01)
Education		-0.05* (-2.01)		-0.03 (-1.20)		-0.03 (-1.28)
Income		-0.02 (-1.03)		-0.04 (-1.42)		-0.04 (-1.43)
Group Empathy			0.34*** (5.22)	0.23*** (4.09)		
Black × Group Empathy			-0.06 (-0.64)	-0.07 (-0.82)		
White × Group Empathy			0.03 (0.37)	0.01 (0.15)		
Racial Apathy					-0.41*** (-8.72)	-0.28*** (-6.84)
Black × Racial Apathy					0.18** (2.77)	0.16** (2.86)
White × Racial Apathy					0.04 (0.68)	0.02 (0.34)
Constant	0.92*** (28.83)	0.73*** (17.69)	0.32*** (7.48)	0.28*** (6.66)	0.69*** (31.39)	0.55*** (16.74)
Observations	948	936	948	936	949	937

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 30: Support for Climate Change Policies

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Climate Change	Climate Change	Climate Change
Non-racial	-0.05 (-1.95)	-0.06* (-2.57)	-0.04 (-1.92)
Black	-0.08** (-3.10)	-0.07** (-3.27)	-0.05* (-2.46)
White	-0.05 (-1.82)	-0.03 (-1.26)	-0.02 (-0.78)
Democrat		0.17*** (8.02)	0.13*** (6.36)
Age		0.04 (1.63)	0.06* (2.29)
Ideology		0.35*** (10.29)	0.24*** (6.93)
Gender		0.03 (1.74)	0.01 (0.54)
Education		0.11*** (3.55)	0.07* (2.51)
Income		0.02 (0.84)	0.00 (0.14)
Racial Importance			0.09*** (3.46)
Racial Resentment			-0.19*** (-4.25)
Group Empathy			0.17*** (4.05)
SDO			-0.06 (-1.39)
Racial Apathy			-0.18*** (-5.74)
Violence Justification			0.01 (0.80)
Stereotype Endorsement			-0.04 (-0.46)
Media Attention			-0.00 (-0.13)
Constant	0.59*** (32.98)	0.27*** (8.49)	0.41*** (4.45)
Observations	1266	1251	1245

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 31: Support for Climate Change Policies with Interactions

	(1) Climate Change	(2) Climate Change	(3) Climate Change	(4) Climate Change	(5) Climate Change	(6) Climate Change
Black	-0.03 (-0.53)	-0.02 (-0.26)	0.05 (0.67)	0.06 (0.92)	-0.06 (-1.66)	-0.04 (-1.20)
White	0.04 (0.60)	0.09 (1.50)	-0.04 (-0.55)	-0.01 (-0.19)	-0.02 (-0.68)	0.01 (0.32)
Racial Resentment	-0.57*** (-7.04)	-0.26** (-3.16)				
Black × Racial Resentment	0.01 (0.11)	-0.01 (-0.05)				
White × Racial Resentment	-0.06 (-0.49)	-0.12 (-1.12)				
Democrat		0.13*** (5.39)		0.14*** (5.96)		0.13*** (5.61)
Age		0.06* (1.97)		0.04 (1.43)		0.02 (0.86)
Ideology		0.27*** (6.83)		0.31*** (8.33)		0.28*** (7.47)
Gender		0.01 (0.81)		0.00 (0.21)		0.01 (0.35)
Education		0.09* (2.54)		0.08* (2.41)		0.08* (2.47)
Income		0.02 (0.77)		0.01 (0.29)		0.01 (0.34)
Group Empathy			0.46*** (6.02)	0.33*** (4.61)		
Black × Group Empathy			-0.11 (-1.01)	-0.12 (-1.17)		
White × Group Empathy			0.07 (0.69)	0.07 (0.71)		
Racial Apathy					-0.50*** (-9.11)	-0.34*** (-6.57)
Black × Racial Apathy					0.12 (1.54)	0.08 (1.19)
White × Racial Apathy					0.09 (1.22)	0.05 (0.73)
Constant	0.82*** (18.98)	0.39*** (6.92)	0.25*** (5.03)	0.07 (1.30)	0.72*** (28.19)	0.42*** (10.19)
Observations	951	939	951	939	952	940

t statistics in parentheses

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

F.5 Manipulation Check Variations

F.5.1 Attention Check




Figure 32: Effect of Exposure to News of a Mass Shooting on Prosocial Outcomes. Findings are Robust to Inclusion of Only Respondents Passing the Attention Check. Treatment conditions are noted along the x-axis. The y-axis shows coefficients in comparison to the control condition. Shown with 95% confidence intervals. Positive values indicate greater prosocial beliefs.

F.5.2 Factual Manipulation Check




Figure 33: Effect of Exposure to News of a Mass Shooting on Prosocial Outcomes. Findings are Robust to Inclusion of Only Respondents Passing the Manipulation Check. Treatment conditions are noted along the x-axis. The y-axis shows coefficients in comparison to the control condition. Shown with 95% confidence intervals. Positive values indicate greater prosocial beliefs.

F.5.3 Ideology and Partisanship




Figure 34: Marginal Effects of Condition on Support for Gun Control, Increased Hate Crime Penalties, and Reparations/Welfare by Ideology (Row 1) and Partisanship (Row 2). Shown with 95% confidence intervals.