Living in the Shadow of Deportation: How Deportation Threat Forestalls Political Assimilation Among Immigrants and Their Co-Ethnics

Marcel F. Roman*

Department of Government, University of Texas-Austin

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Abstract

Prior research demonstrates acculturated co-ethnics of immigrant groups adopt restrictive immigration policy preferences akin to that of host country dominant groups. However, a puzzle remains where acculturated Latinxs in the United States still maintain relatively liberal immigration policy preferences despite their distance from the canonical immigrant archetype (e.g. Spanish-speaking, immigrant). To answer the puzzle, I draw on sociological perspectives and theorize that the increased societal integration of undocumented immigrants in tandem with an expanding interior immigration enforcement apparatus generates a sense of rebuff against Anglo norms among acculturated Latinxs. Using 6 nationally representative Latinx surveys, I corroborate my theory and find perceptibly threatening immigration enforcement contexts forestall the adoption of restrictive immigration policy preferences via acculturation. Absent deportation threat, acculturated Latinxs adopt the immigration preferences of white Anglos. This paper suggests political assimilation is not preordained due to the unique circumstances Latinx immigrants and their acculturated co-ethnics face.

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Introduction

How does immigration enforcement shape Latinx immigration policy preferences? Since the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), the scale of immigration enforcement has increased precipitously. Thresholds for revoking residency were reduced, border enforcement escalated, and interior deportations increased over 1400%. These policies incentivized undocumented migrants to stay in the U.S. for fear of entanglement with immigration authorities via cyclical migration (Massey and Pren, 2012). Thus, the undocumented population increased from 3.5 to 11 million between 1990 to the present. Likewise, the proportion of undocumented people living in the U.S. for over 10 years has increased from 36% to 83% between 1995 and 2017.[1]

Restrictive immigration policies have had profound and disparate consequences on Latinxs, the largest immigrant ethno-racial group in the U.S., who constitute 20% of the population.[2] Over 70% of undocumented immigrants are Latinx, and over 40% of Latinxs know an undocumented friend or family member.[3] Prior research on Latinx communities demonstrates the threat posed by immigration enforcement negatively affects health, (Cruz Nichols, LeBrón, and Pedraza, 2018), child development (Dreby, 2015), wages (Fussell, 2011), social service uptake (Alsan and Yang, 2018), education (Dee and Murphy, 2020), and trust in law enforcement (Dhingra, Kilborn, and Woldemikael, 2021). Politically, the threat of deportation may undercut government trust (Rocha, Knoll, and Wrinkle, 2015), civic incorporation (Brown and Bean, 2016), and motivate pro-immigrant political participation (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura, 2001; White, 2016; Zepeda-Millán, 2017; Roman, Walker, and Barreto, 2021).

Yet, there is less research on how the threat of deportation informs the policy preferences of Latinx immigrants and their acculturated co-ethnics. Prior research demonstrates Latinxs

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[1]See Appendix Section B, Figure B2, Panels A-B

[2]I refer to Latinxs as an "immigrant group" since a majority of Latinxs have direct connections to an immigrant experience. 33% of are foreign-born. Another 33% are second-generation. The remaining third are at least third generation (Gonzalez-Barrera, 2020). Puerto Ricans are excluded from my analysis given their citizenship status, increasing the theoretical precision of my phrasing.

[3]See Appendix Section B, Figure B2, Panels C-D

adopt the political attitudes of the dominant group in the U.S. as they acculturate to the host society (Michelson, 2003; Branton, 2007; Abrajano and Alvarez, 2010; Citrin and Sears, 2014), including restrictive immigration policy preferences (Polinard, Wrinkle, and De La Garza, 1984; Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010). However, consistent with segmented assimilation theory (Portes and Zhou, 1993; Samson, 2014), sociological insights suggest the societal integration of undocumented immigrants in tandem with heightened immigration enforcement may undercut the incorporation of even acculturated Latinxs along socio-economic dimensions (Massey and Pren, 2012; Massey, Durand, and Pren, 2016). Likewise, other research suggests political assimilation on policy preferences, specifically immigration policy, is not preordained among acculturated Latinxs (Telles and Ortiz, 2008; Pedraza, 2014).

This paper seeks to explain the puzzle of persistent liberal immigration policy preferences among acculturated Latinxs despite their distance from the canonical immigrant archetype (e.g. Spanish-speaking, limited legal status, see Jones, Victor, and Vannette (2019)). I theorize the threat of deportation is salient for acculturated Latinxs even with legal protection from deportation. Consequently, deportation threat fosters rebuff against dominant group norms and motivates continued support of liberal immigration policies as a protective mechanism among acculturated Latinxs. Evidence from 6 nationally representative Latinx surveys between 2007-2019 corroborate my theory. The threat of deportation undercuts the adoption of Anglo attitudes on immigration policy via acculturation. Conversely, acculturated Latinxs unthreatened by deportation possess immigration attitudes similar to Anglo whites. I also demonstrate deportation threat operates net of alternative mechanisms that may forestall political assimilation and undercuts assimilation along other political dimensions.

This paper complicates forecasts that Latinxs will adopt the political standards of Anglo whites like other historical immigrant origin groups as they integrate in the U.S. (Alba, 2016). Prior research suggests acculturated Latinxs reduce support for pro-immigrant policy because they are less implicated by restrictive immigration laws and may perceive benefits from undermining new immigration (Gutiérrez, 1995; Bedolla, 2003). Contrary to conventional

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wisdom, this paper demonstrates the threat of deportation frustrates political assimilation *even among acculturated Latinxs* and maintains the distinct immigration preferences of the Latinx community (Mora and Rodríguez-Muñiz, 2017). In summary, accounting for heterogeneous experiences of exposure to an increasingly restrictive immigration enforcement context in tandem with a large undocumented Latinx population helps to illuminate segmented political assimilation over a salient set of policy preferences among the largest immigrant group in the U.S.

Perspectives on Political Assimilation

Immigrant group members adopt the attitudes of the host country's dominant group to increase their social, economic, and political status (Alba and Logan, 1992; Gans, 1992; Alba, 2009). Accordingly, *straight-line assimilation theory* posits the attitudes of immigrant group members converge with the dominant group via acculturative mechanisms such as a higher generational status, learning the dominant language, intermarriage, or residential integration (Gordon, 1964). Politically, Latinxs adopt restrictive immigration policy preferences akin to Anglo whites as a function of generational status and exhibiting English dominance (Polinard, Wrinkle, and De La Garza, 1984; Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010). Despite the conservative trend, Latinx immigration preferences do not fully converge with Anglo whites as they acculturate (Telles and Ortiz, 2008; Pedraza, 2014). Multiple surveys demonstrate that although later generation Latinxs are more restrictive on immigration than their immigrant counterparts, there is still a gap between third+ generation and Anglo white preferences (Appendix Section A.1, Figure A1).[4]

Sociological insights may explain why acculturated Latinxs persistently hold liberal immigration policy preferences. *Segmented assimilation theory* posits group-level characteristics and reception contexts determine whether immigrant co-ethnics assimilate across multiple dimensions (Portes and Zhou, 1993; Waters et al., 2010; Samson, 2014). Discrimination,

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[4] "+" denotes third generation or more (e.g. fourth generation).

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limited intra-group social capital, and economic inequality may undercut assimilative mechanisms such that segments of acculturated immigrant group members still possess attributes similar to new immigrants (Schnittker, 2002; Telles and Ortiz, 2008; Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco, 2009).

Prior research at the intersection of politics and segmented assimilation theorizes racialization and subsequent discrimination sustains liberal immigration preferences among third and fourth generation Mexican-Americans (Telles and Ortiz, 2008). Pedraza (2014) explicitly tests this hypothesis and forwards a "two-way street" acculturation theory to explain how perceived discrimination undercuts political assimilation within the domain of immigration preferences. Consistent with the notion of *reactive ethnicity* (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001), Pedraza (2014) posits a discriminatory context fosters rebuff against Anglo attitudes among acculturated Latinxs since the dominant group's reception of Latinx co-ethnics does not match integrative expectations.

However, absent from the discussion on segmented political assimilation is host country rebuff in the form of immigration enforcement. Prior research on how immigration enforcement undermines assimilation emphasizes socio-economic instead of political outcomes (Massey and Pren, 2012; Massey, Durand, and Pren, 2016). Other research theorizes or provides qualitative evidence immigration enforcement may motivate Latinxs to reject Anglo political norms (Jones, 2019). Yet, there is no explicit and systematic test of whether the contemporary immigration enforcement context undercuts the adoption of Anglo immigration policy preferences among acculturated Latinxs exposed to the threat of deportation.

How Deportation Threat Stops Political Assimilation

How does deportation threat undercut political assimilation among acculturated Latinxs? Prior research suggests deportation threat is more salient for immigrant and/or Spanish-dominant Latinxs relative to acculturated Latinxs. Recent immigrants and Spanish-speakers

are more likely to be targeted by police and immigration authorities (Dreby, 2015; Armenta, 2017), experience insecurity over their legal status (Golash-Boza, 2014), and be subject to discrimination (Fussell, 2011). Indeed, survey evidence suggests perceived deportation threat is higher among Latinxs who are undocumented, legal residents, and even naturalized citizens relative to U.S.-born Latinxs (Asad, 2020).

However, I posit many acculturated Latinxs are exposed to a sense of *illegality*, that is, a "palpable sense of deportability (De Genova, 2004)." This is true regardless of their length of stay, English-language ability, generational status, or legal status. Many acculturated Latinxs are subject to deportation threat via their ties to undocumented immigrants. The 2016 Collaborative Multi-racial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) indicates 44% of Latinxs know an undocumented close friend or family member. Even 30% and 36% of 3rd generation+ and English-speaking Latinxs know an undocumented friend or family member. Acculturated Latinxs are integrated in communities subject to deportation threat. 3rd generation+ Latinxs live in zipcodes that are 20% foreign-born and 10% non-citizen. English-speaking Latinxs live in zipcodes that are 21% foreign-born and 12% non-citizen (12% and 6% for Anglo whites, see Appendix Section B, Figure B2, Panels D-E). These social ties were imperiled after IIRIRA in 1996, which increased interior immigration enforcement via cooperation with local police through programs such as §287(g) and Secure Communities. After IIRIRA, average yearly deportations increased from 19,000 to a staggering 289,000 (Appendix Section B, Figure B2, Panel F).

Acculturated Latinxs with ties to *legal* immigrants are also implicated by deportation threat. After IIRIRA, permanent residents and their proximate social ties (e.g. second and third-generation children) were exposed to draconian rules that stripped away legal status if immigrants were not economically self-sufficient or committed an expansive set of minor crimes (Morawetz, 2000). Likewise, immigrants with liminal legal status such as Temporary Protected Status (TPS) or Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) may have friends and family with legal status concerned about their uncertain legal status (Menjívar, 2006).

Additionally, notions of illegality are ethno-racialized to the point they extend to acculturated Latinxs. Anglo whites conflate the categories "illegal", "immigrant" and "Latino (Flores and Schachter, 2018)," which may be motivated by xenophobic attitudes (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2017). Whites overestimate the proportion of Latinxs they believe are undocumented by 24 percentage points (40% instead of 16%) (Barreto, Manzano, and Segura, 2012). Interpersonally, Latinxs across the acculturative spectrum are hyperaware of their ethno-racialization as "illegal" or "foreign," with downstream consequences on a sense of belonging (Asad, 2017). Awareness of a racialized (il)legal status among citizen Latinxs may be increasingly acute in the post-Trump era (Asad, 2020). Politically, qualitative evidence suggests categorical conflation may motivate pro-immigrant solidarity and concern over the legal status of immigrant co-ethnics in acculturated Latinx social networks (Ochoa, 2004).

Categorical conflation also motivates state-sanctioned behavior. Police may stop citizen Latinxs on the basis of immigration or ID violations (Armenta, 2017). DHS data show Latin American immigrants are "over-deported" relative to their proportion of the undocumented population (Appendix Section B, Figure B2, Panel H). *Even Latinx citizens have been detained by immigration authorities.* ICE wrongfully detained 3,500 citizens in Texas between 2006-2017, 462 citizens in Rhode Island over a 10-year period, and 420 citizens in Florida between 2017-2019 (Cunha, 2019). Thus, illegality does not just affect undocumented immigrants, but many acculturated members of the Latinx community.

I argue the extension of illegality toward acculturated Latinxs may forestall the adoption of conservative immigration preferences similar to Anglo whites. Counter-intuitively, this suggests deportation threat has a stronger influence on liberal immigration preferences among acculturated Latinxs. Prior threat research assumes human beings seek security (Huddy, Feldman, and Weber, 2007). Therefore, Latinxs threatened by deportation may support liberal immigration policies as a protective instinct given their non-dominant group position and the politically conservative nature of the threat (Eadeh and Chang, 2020). However, deportation threat may have a limited marginal influence on the immigration preferences

of Latinxs closer to the immigrant experience since they relatively benefit from an open immigration system and are exposed to draconian immigration rules (Maltby et al., 2020). Conversely, the immigration preferences of acculturated Latinxs have more space to travel in response to deportation threat (Hetherington and Suhay, 2011). Acculturated Latinxs may perceive themselves as prototypically American instead of connected to an immigrant community (Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010). They may dissociate from newer Latinx immigrants due to their stigmatized attributes (Gutiérrez, 1995; Bedolla, 2003; Jiménez, 2008). They may backlash against new Latinx immigrants who critique their inability to maintain ethnic norms (e.g. speaking Spanish) (Bedolla, 2003; Ochoa, 2004). Economic competition, perceived or real, could also generate anti-immigrant sentiment given acculturated Latinxs may compete with new immigrants within similar occupational strata (Gutiérrez, 1995; Ochoa, 2004).

Yet, deportation threat may undercut the conservative predispositions of acculturated Latinxs, bringing their immigration preferences in line with new Latinx immigrants and away from Anglo political standards. Prior evidence suggests threat increases information-seeking and reduces reliance on predispositional norms (Marcus and MacKuen, 1993). Perceived deportation threat may encourage acculturated Latinxs to question their sense of integration in the national polity despite their distance from the immigrant experience (Pedraza, 2014). Deportation threat, whether personal or proximal (e.g. via familial or friendship ties), signals rebuff from the American polity since it implies an association with illegality and a reduced sense of belonging (Mora and Rodríguez-Muñiz, 2017). Reactive ethnicity theory suggests acculturated Latinxs may reject the political norms of the dominant group in light of their entanglement with immigration enforcement (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001). Consequently, acculturated Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement may seek information concerning immigration policy (Gadarian and Albertson, 2014), identify alternative policies to amelioriate the threat (Hetherington and Suhay, 2011), and generate a new set of preferences inconsistent with their relatively conservative priors (Brader, 2006).

Therefore, consistent with segmented assimilation theory, Latinxs experience heterogeneous political trajectories conditional on their exposure to threatening immigration enforcement contexts. Acculturated Latinxs threatened by immigration enforcement will continue to hold immigration policy preferences similar to their new immigrant counterparts. Otherwise, acculturated Latinxs unthreatened by immigration enforcement will adopt increasingly conservative immigration preferences akin to those of Anglo whites.

Data and Empirical Strategy

I use 6 nationally representative Latinx surveys to test my hypothesis. The 2007 (N = 1809), 2008 (N = 1822), 2010 (N = 1236), 2018 (N = 1794), and 2019 (N = 2427) Pew Latino Surveys (Pew '07, '08, '10, '18, '19) along with the 2016 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (N = 2279, CMPS '16).[5] All surveys are administered in Spanish conditional on respondent preferences. Pew surveys before 2019 are cell phone and landline, use stratified sampling to target Latinx residents, use random digit dialing, use multi-stage weighting procedures to ensure adherence to Census Bureau target demographics, and have margins of error at 2.7% (2007), 3.4% (2008), 3.3% (2010), and 3.1% (2018) respectively. The 2019 Pew survey is derived from a national, probability-based online panel of Hispanic adults implemented by Ipsos and is weighted to account for Census target demographics and non-response via raking. The margin of error is 2.9%. The CMPS is internet self-administered, weighted via post-stratification raking to 2015 1-year ACS estimates for age, gender, education, nativity, ancestry and voter registration within the national Latinx population, and has a margin of error of 1%. These surveys are advantageous to test the hypothesis since they have large Latinx samples to evaluate the heterogeneous influence of deportation threat by acculturation levels. Moreover, multiple surveys reduce the risk results are a statistical artifact intrinsic to a single survey and may demonstrate the theory is durable across samples and measurement.

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[5]Although I exclude Puerto Ricans from the analysis due to their citizenship, the results are similar including them (Appendix Section J.2, Table J15). I also re-analyze the results subsetting to Mexicans, given their predominance in post-1965 immigration. The results are similar. (Appendix Section J.1, Table J14).

Outcome

Immigration policy preferences are an important dimension of political assimilation among Latinxs. Open immigration is fundamentally related to ethnic interests since over 60% of Latinxs are either immigrants or second-generation. On average, Latinxs are more supportive of open immigration laws relative to Anglo whites (Telles and Ortiz, 2008). Supporting open immigration policies may suggest support for the most stigmatized subsets of the ethnic group (Ochoa, 2004). Historically, prior to the Chicanx movement, many acculturated Mexican-Americans would attempt to garner acceptance among Anglos by denigrating immigrant co-ethnics and supporting immigration restrictions (Gutiérrez, 1995). A core conflict between Chicanx and assimilationist activists was the question of labor solidarity with new Mexican immigrants (Ochoa, 2004). More recently, some Latinxs voted for California's Proposition 187, which barred undocumented immigrants from social services, on the basis undocumented immigrants take resources from Latinx-American communities and increase Anglo stigma against Latinxs writ large (Bedolla, 2003). The 2020 general election exhibited similar conflicts, where many acculturated Latinxs supported Trump despite his explicitly anti-immigrant rhetoric and policies (Medina, 2020).

Therefore, the main outcome of interest characterizing political assimilation for each study is an additive index of binary items measuring *support for liberal immigration policies*.[6] The indices across the surveys include support for: not reducing immigration levels (Pew '07, '18), stopping immigration raids (Pew '07, '08, '10), preventing police doing immigration enforcement (Pew '07, '08, '10), reducing border enforcement (Pew '10, '19, CMPS '16), a pathway to citizenship (Pew '10, CMPS '16), preventing employment checks (Pew '07, '08), preventing prosecution of employers hiring undocumented immigrants and undocumented employees (Pew '08), in-state tuition for undocumented students (Pew '08, '10), not increasing deportations (Pew '10, CMPS '16), drivers licenses for undocumented immigrants (Pew '07),

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[6]I use "liberal" to refer to less restrictive immigration policies since public support for immigration is increasingly polarized where the political left/right supports open/restrictive immigration policies (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2017).

not implementing a national identity card (Pew '10), maintaining *jus soli* for newborns of undocumented immigrants (Pew '10), and providing legal status to undocumented immigrants brought to the U.S. as children (Pew '18, '19). For item wording details, see Appendix Section C.

The additive index may reduce measurement error due to the binary nature of the individual outcomes and generates preference variation among a population highly supportive of liberal immigration policies (Barry et al., 2011). Although the indices do not contain the same items across surveys, consistency in associations of interest may suggest deportation threat motivates support for a wide variety of immigration policies.[7] Regardless, the main results are similar examining the outcomes independently (Appendix, Section D, Figure D3).

Deportation Threat

To measure *deportation threat*, respondents are asked across all Pew surveys how much they worry about they, close friends, or family members being deported regardless of their citizenship status on a 0-3 scale from "Not at all" to "A lot". Therefore, the measure captures threat to oneself and important social ties. Measuring deportation exposure via close social ties is important given many acculturated Latinxs are embedded in social networks with undocumented immigrants. For the CMPS, respondents are only asked about proximal deportation threat on a 0-4 scale from "Not at all worried" to "Extremely worried." These measures are similar to others in well-established research on threat and policy attitudes (Huddy, Feldman, and Weber, 2007; Hetherington and Suhay, 2011).[8]

An alternative threat measure may be socio-tropic instead of personal threat. In the context of deportation threat, socio-tropic threat may be measured as the degree to which Latinxs perceive there are high levels of deportations against the Latinx community writ large. Socio-tropic measures are available in the Pew '07 and '08 surveys (see Appendix Section

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[7]The Pew '19 outcome is a binary indicator. There is only 1 immigration policy outcome measuring support for legalizing DACA recipients.

[8]For exact wording on threat items, see Appendix Section F.1.

P.1 for details). Consistent with prior research demonstrating personal threats supersede socio-tropic threats (Hetherington and Suhay, 2011), socio-tropic threat does not appear to influence liberal immigration preferences nor the adoption of conservative preferences conditional on acculturation (Appendix Section P.2, Table P23).

Since the deportation threat measure is subjective and psychological, I validate if the measure is associated with objective measures that approximate deportation threat. The deportation threat measure is positively associated with higher levels of county-level Secure Communities deportations, % foreign-born (zipcode-level), % non-citizen (zipcode-level), and self-reported measures of whether a respondent knows someone undocumented or a deportee. These findings suggest the subjective measure captures the concept of exposure to immigration enforcement (see Appendix Section F.4).

Acculturation

Conceptually, *acculturation* is the degree to which immigrant groups adopt dominant host country group attributes in addition to the maintenance of their own group's attributes as they interact with the dominant group (Berry, Sam, et al., 1997). Acculturation can also occur vis-a-vis non-dominant groups (e.g. Black Americans, see Portes and Zhou (1993)). However, given later generation and English-speaking Latinxs adopt political attitudes more akin to Anglo whites (Branton, 2007; Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010), I refer to acculturation as the process of adopting dominant group norms. Acculturation is multi-dimensional, it includes political attitudes, cultural norms, socio-economic status, and integration in dominant social networks, among other factors (Cuellar, Arnold, and Maldonado, 1995). Acculturation is also heterogeneous within groups. Co-ethnics of an immigrant group will experience different trajectories in adopting the standards of the dominant group (Berry, Sam, et al., 1997).

Some argue specific dimensions of acculturation should be measured in surveys (Cabassa, 2003). There are shortcomings to this approach. First, acculturation scales concerning cultural norms, intermarriage, co-ethnic social networks, socio-economic status, and political beliefs

are time-intensive and are therefore not often available across multiple surveys of immigrant groups (Cruz et al., 2008). Second, researchers may prefer an acculturation measure that does not directly capture specific dimensions of assimilation since such dimensions may be an outcome of interest (e.g. immigration preferences). Instead, researchers may seek acculturation measures that *encourage* assimilation yet allow for the absence of assimilation along specific dimensions among immigrant co-ethnics with sustained host society interaction.

Consequently, I measure acculturation with an additive index of generational status (0 = 1st generation, 1 = 2nd generation, 2 = 3rd+ generation), English language-of-interview (0 = Spanish, 1 = English), and citizenship (0 = non-citizen, 1 = citizen) across all 6 surveys. Thus, the index is from 0-4 (non-citizen Spanish-speaking immigrant to third-generation+ English-speaking citizen).[9] This proxy acculturation scale is advantageous since it measures factors that typically encourage the adoption of dominant group attitudes yet do not guarantee their adoption among all acculturated individuals. Prior research demonstrates proxy acculturation scales that index language-of-interview along with generational status are reliably associated with gold-standard scales measuring specific assimilative dimensions such as language proficiency, cultural attachments, geographic integration, and ethnic identification (Cruz et al., 2008). Similar scales have been used in prior studies on Latinx immigration policy attitudes within political science and they operate consistent with the original conceptualization of acculturation (Branton, 2007; Pedraza, 2014).[10] Additionally, prior research suggests citizenship is a prerequisite to acculturation and is positively associated with civic integration, education, dominant language skills, inter-ethnic contact, and restrictive immigration preferences (Portes and Curtis, 1987; Liang, 1994; Yang, 1994; Just and Anderson, 2015; Maehler, Weinmann, and Hanke, 2019).

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[9]All scale components are positively associated with each other across surveys (Appendix Section E.1, Table E3). With the exception of the CMPS, they fall within acceptable ranges of reliability (Appendix Section E.1, Table E4).

[10]Branton (2007)'s acculturation measure uses an English-dominance scale instead of an English interview indicator. Cruz et al. (2008) find English interview indicators are proxy for English dominance. English-dominance scales in the 2007 and 2010 Pew surveys are strongly associated with English-interview indicators (Appendix Section E.4).

I validate the acculturation scale by demonstrating it is associated with multiple dimensions of assimilation. The scale is linearly associated with conservative immigration policy preferences across all surveys (Appendix Section E.2, Table E5). Moreover, consistent with Gordon (1964), who characterizes 7 dimensions of assimilation, the index is positively associated with reduced ethnic identity salience (cultural assimilation), a stronger sense of American identity relative to Latinx identity (identification assimilation), self-categorization as American instead of Latinx (identification assimilation), higher education (structural assimilation), higher income (structural assimilation), living in areas with less Latinxs and immigrants (structural assimilation), and a higher probability of marriage with a non-Latinx (martial assimilation, see Appendix Section E.3).[11] Therefore, the acculturation index reliably measures the concept of assimilation to dominant group attributes.

To ensure sufficient variation for assessing the heterogeneous influence of acculturation by levels of deportation threat, I demonstrate deportation threat and acculturation are not indistinct constructs. As expected, acculturation is negatively correlated with deportation threat. From a low Pearson's ρ of -0.2 in the Pew '19 survey, to a high of -0.46 in the Pew '08 survey, implying a low-to-moderate correlation. Across all surveys, at least 20% of the most acculturated Latinxs (e.g. third-generation+, English-dominant) indicate they are worried "some" or "alot," up to 31% in the Pew '18 survey. Likewise, across all surveys, at least 20% of the least acculturated Latinxs (non-citizen immigrants, Spanish-dominant) indicate they are worried "not at all" or "not much," up to 45% in the Pew '19 survey. In sum, there are sizable proportions of unacculturated Latinxs who do not experience deportation threat and well acculturated Latinxs who do experience deportation threat.[12]

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[11]I use alternative acculturation indices to ensure the results are not sensitive to coding decisions (Appendix Section K, Table K16). Including an indicator for residency status or excluding the citizenship indicator does not change the results (Table K16, Panels A, B). Including an English dominance index with or without the citizenship indicator does not change the results (Panels C, D). The scale's individual components also moderate the association between threat and support for liberal immigration policy (Panels A-E on Table K17).

[12]See Appendix Section F.3, Tables F7 and F8 for more information on the correlation between threat and acculturation and the distribution of threat by acculturation level.

Controls

I adjust for an exhaustive set of theoretically motivated control covariates in the main estimates. These include demographic covariates such as age, gender, marital status, religion, and national origin. Socio-economic covariates such as income, education, unemployment, homeownership. Political covariates such as partisanship, ideology, experienced discrimination, perceived discrimination, Latinx identity centrality, American identity centrality, ethnic media consumption, social ties with undocumented friends/family, social ties with a deportee, being stopped due to an immigration violation. County-level covariates such as the logged total population, population density, % Latinx, % foreign-born, % non-citizen, logged median household income, % college, % unemployed, the logged number of deportations via Secure Communities, the proportion of deportations that are for minor misdemeanors, and the number of Secure Communities deportations normalized over the size of the foreign-born population. And, zipcode-level covariates that are the same in terms of measurement and availability as the county-level covariates with the exception of covariates related to Secure Communities deportations. Not all surveys include the entire set of aforementioned covariates. See Appendix Section I, Table I12, for an enumeration of covariate availability across surveys. Moreover, for all surveys, I adjust for state fixed effects, with the exception of the Pew '07 and '19 surveys, where I adjust for Census area fixed effects in the absence of data on state of residence. For brevity, see Appendix Section I.2 for descriptions on why each covariate was included in the models for each respective survey study.

Importantly, fully-specified models include a series of covariates that account for selection into deportation threat such as social ties with a deportee (Pew '10, '19), social ties with an undocumented friend and/or family member (CMPS '16, Pew '19), being stopped by a law enforcement officer because of immigration status (Pew '10), the logged county-level total removals via Secure Communities (in CMPS '16, Pew '18),[13] the county-level deportation rate via Secure Communities (# removed for every 1000 foreign-born, in CMPS '16, Pew '18),

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[13]Removal data are from a public records request to ICE.

Table 1: Deportation threat sustains liberal immigration policy attitudes among acculturated Latinxs

	Liberal Immigration Policy Attitudes					
Panel A: No controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.12†	0.23***	0.17***	0.09†	0.28***	0.24**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.09)
Threat	0.09***	0.09***	0.03	0.13***	0.06*	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Acculturation	−0.15***	−0.24***	−0.17***	−0.05	−0.20***	−0.18**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)
R^2	0.08	0.17	0.12	0.10	0.14	0.05
N	1809	1822	1236	2279	1794	2427
Panel B: Yes controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.12*	0.20***	0.15***	0.09†	0.15**	0.22*
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.09)
Threat	0.04†	0.03	0.01	0.06†	0.06*	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Acculturation	−0.17***	−0.22***	−0.19***	−0.04	−0.12**	−0.16*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.06)
R^2	0.16	0.32	0.33	0.24	0.32	0.09
N	1809	1822	1236	2276	1794	2427
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Zipcode Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Census Area FE	Y	N	N	N	N	Y
State FE	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N

Note: ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$, $^\dagger p < 0.1$. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

and the proportion of removals that are "Level 3," that is, removals of individuals who have only engaged in misdemeanors or petty offenses, as opposed to felonies, suggesting expansive targeting (CMPS '16, Pew '18).

Results

Does deportation threat forestall the adoption of conservative immigration preferences among acculturated Latinxs? Table 1 characterizes the heterogeneous influence of acculturation by

deportation threat. All covariates are re-scaled between 0-1 for the analysis. Across all surveys (columns 1-6) and adjusting for the full set of control covariates, going from the minimum to maximum of threat appears to nullify political assimilation via acculturation with respect to immigration policy preferences. These estimates suggest threat makes acculturated Latinxs internalize attitudes similar to new immigrants with limited English-language capacities.[14]

To get a stronger substantive sense of the heterogeneous influence of acculturation by deportation threat, I plot predicted values of support for liberal immigration policies conditional on acculturation and deportation threat (Figure 1). Across all studies, there are a few general patterns consistent with the theory. First, first-generation Spanish-dominant immigrants are highly supportive of liberal immigration policy regardless of perceived deportation threat. Second, for Latinxs without deportation threat, acculturation is negatively associated with liberal immigration preferences. Third, acculturated Latinxs (e.g. third-generation+, English-dominant) with a high level of deportation threat still hold immigration policy attitudes similar to first-generation, Spanish-dominant Latinxs.

In the Pew '07 survey, Latinxs without perceived deportation threat decrease support for liberal immigration policy by -0.17 if they are third-generation and English-dominant compared to first-generation and Spanish-dominant. Likewise, for Latinxs with the highest perception of threat, going from the minimum to maximum of the acculturation scale implies a decrease in support for liberal immigration policy by -0.05. The second difference simulating a shift from the minimum to the maximum of the acculturation and deportation threat scales is 0.12, equivalent to 44% of the outcome standard deviation. The second difference for the Pew '08 survey is 0.18, 64% of the outcome standard deviation. For the Pew '10 survey, the second difference is 0.16, 76% of the outcome standard deviation. The second difference for the CMPS '16 survey is 0.09, 38% of the outcome standard deviation. The second difference for the Pew '18 survey is 0.18, 67% of the outcome standard deviation. Finally, the second difference for the Pew '19 survey is 0.22, 76% of the outcome standard deviation. These

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[14]Deportation threat is directly associated with liberal immigration policy preferences across all surveys (see Appendix Section G, Figure G7).

Figure 1: Predicted values of support for liberal immigration policies (y-axis) conditional on acculturation (x-axis) and threat (min-max, denoted by color). Simulations are from fully specified models with Census region fixed effects, assuming control covariates at their means and a respondent from the Western Census region. 95% confidence intervals from robust standard errors displayed.

findings suggest deportation threat is more salient in determining liberal immigration policy preferences among acculturated Latinxs, forestalling political assimilation and making their attitudes similar to new Latinx immigrants.

Does deportation threat forestall assimilation on other dimensions?

Since assimilation is multi-dimensional, one may be interested if deportation threat undercuts assimilation to other Anglo white attitudinal and cultural standards. Thus, I assess if deportation threat forestalls a sense of *American identity* and maintains *ethnic salience* in the form of importance attached to Latinx cultural practices. These outcomes comport with two key assimilation dimensions Gordon (1964) identifies in his seminal text: *identification*

Table 2: Deportation threat forestalls assimilation on dimensions outside immigration preferences

	U.S. Centrality	U.S. Pride	U.S. Categorization	Ethnic Salience
Panel A: No controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Threat x Acculturation	$-0.12^{\dagger}$	-0.33^{***}	-0.44^{***}	0.22^{**}
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Threat	-0.07	0.12^{*}	0.08^{*}	$0.08^{\dagger}$
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Acculturation	0.27^{***}	0.42^{***}	0.47^{***}	-0.24^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
R^2	0.13	0.11	0.16	0.11
N	2279	1794	2427	2427
Panel B: Yes controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Threat x Acculturation	-0.15^{*}	-0.31^{***}	-0.43^{***}	0.23^{**}
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Threat	0.04	0.15^{**}	0.12^{**}	0.05
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Acculturation	0.31^{***}	0.41^{***}	0.48^{***}	-0.21^{***}
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
R^2	0.25	0.22	0.20	0.19
Num. obs.	2276	1794	2427	2427
Survey	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19	Pew '19
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	N	N
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	N	N
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
State FE	Y	Y	N	N

Note: $^{***}p < 0.001$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

assimilation (feeling bonded to the dominant culture) and *cultural assimilation* (adopting host society customs).

A strong sense of American identity is a fundamental Anglo attitudinal norm. Although liberal multicultural interpretations of American identity do not preclude maintaining an ethnic identity (Schildkraut, 2007), the absence of a strong American identity among Latinxs may suggest they feel the liberal interpretation of American identity has failed to incorporate them (Rodriguez, Schwartz, and Krauss Whitbourne, 2010). Prior evidence also suggests, implicitly and explicitly, an American identity is strongly associated with Anglo white people

and norms (Devos and Banaji, 2005; Zou and Cheryan, 2017). Indeed, whites have a stronger sense of American identity (Rodriguez, Schwartz, and Krauss Whitbourne, 2010). Moreover, Latinxs tend to have a stronger sense of American identity as they acculturate (Citrin and Sears, 2014). Additionally, a strong sense of American identity among Latinxs is also associated with Anglo political norms such as opposing new immigration and supporting Republican candidates (Hickel Jr et al., 2020). Given perceived deportation threat suggests Latinxs understand they or their social ties are institutionally excluded from the U.S., we may expect deportation threat to similarly undercut the adoption of an American identity among acculturated Latinxs.

The CMPS '16, Pew '18, and Pew '19 surveys include American identity measures. The CMPS includes a centrality scale from 0-3. The Pew '18 includes a pride scale from 0-3. These measures are indications of psychological investment in the host country (Leach et al., 2008). Since investment in an American identity does not preclude an ethnic identity, I measure the difference between American centrality (or pride) and Latinx centrality (or pride) (Hickel Jr et al., 2020). The Pew '19 survey includes a binary relative categorization measure of American identity, where respondents can choose to identify as an "American" (coded 1) instead of "Latino/Hispanic" or their national origin group (coded 0).[15]

Ethnic salience is based on a Pew '19 item asking respondents how important they believe various cultural practices are to being Latinx, that is: speaking Spanish, participating in Hispanic cultural celebrations, wearing attire that represents Hispanic heritage or origin, socializing with other Hispanics, having both parents of Hispanic heritage or descent, having a Spanish last name, and being Catholic. Respondents can choose that these cultural practices are essential to being Hispanic, not essential but important to being Hispanic, and not important to being Hispanic. I generate an additive index of whether respondents did not choose that each cultural practice was not important to being Hispanic from 0-7. These cultural practices suggest an absence of acculturation to the norms and cultural practices of

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[15]See Appendix Section L.1 for more details on American identity item wording.

Figure 2: Predicted values of alternative assimilation measures (y-axis) conditional on acculturation (x-axis) and threat (min-max, denoted by color). Simulations are from fully specified models with Census region fixed effects, assuming control covariates at their means and a respondent from the Western Census region. 95% confidence intervals from robust standard errors displayed.

Anglo whites along with a continued attachment to the cultural practices of Latinxs (Gordon, 1964).[16]

Table 2, Panel B displays the heterogeneous influence of the acculturation scale conditional on deportation threat with the inclusion of a full set of control covariates. All covariates are scaled between 0-1 with the exception of centrality and pride, which are scaled between -1 to 1 since they are the difference between American centrality/pride and Latinx centrality/pride. For the CMPS, acculturation appears to increase American identity relative to Latinx identity by 0.31 on the -1 to 1 scale. However, an increasing sense of American identity is attenuated by 0.15 for acculturated Latinxs at the maximum level of perceived deportation threat ($p < 0.05$, Model 1). The Pew '18 and '19 studies are corroborative. American pride increases by 0.42

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[16]See Appendix Section L.2 for details on ethnic salience item wording.

from the minimum to maximum of the acculturation scale. Yet, this increase is attenuated for acculturated Latinxs at the maximum level of threat by 0.33 ($p < 0.001$, Model 2). American self-categorization increases by 47 percentage points for the most acculturated Latinxs relative to the least acculturated. However, going from the minimum to the maximum of threat attenuates the influence of acculturation on American self-categorization by 44 percentage points ($p < 0.001$, Model 3). Moreover, ethnic salience decreases by 0.21 from the minimum to maximum of the acculturation scale. Again, threat reverses the influence of acculturation by increasing ethnic salience by 0.23 for the most acculturated Latinxs ($p < 0.01$, Model 4).

Figure 2 displays predicted probabilities of American centrality (Panel A), pride (Panel B), categorization (Panel C), and ethnic salience (Panel D). Visually, it is clear the adoption of an American identity via acculturation in Panels A-C is attenuated by deportation threat such that acculturated Latinxs identify more with their ethnic identity like their new immigrant, Spanish-speaking counterparts. Moreover, ethnic salience is just as strong as unacculturated Latinxs for acculturated Latinxs threatened by deportation. Conversely, acculturated Latinxs unthreatened by deportation shed the importance they attach to Latinx cultural norms.

Robustness Checks

I rule out alternative mechanisms that may forestall political assimilation on immigration preferences. Prior literature finds discrimination (Pedraza, 2014), Latinx identity (Binder, Polinard, and Wrinkle, 1997), American identity (Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010), ethnic geographic context (Bedolla, 2003), ethnic media (Abrajano and Singh, 2009), age cohort (Vega and Ortiz, 2018), national origin (Mexican + Central American), and socio-economic status (Polinard, Wrinkle, and De La Garza, 1984) sustains pro-immigrant policy preferences among Latinxs. I rule out if the maintenance of open immigration preferences among acculturated Latinxs is a product of these factors in addition to exposure to the objective deportation threat measures (e.g. knowing a deportee/undocumented immigrant, exposure to an immigration stop, exposure to Secure Communities deportations). This is

a strong test, since it saturates the model with interactive terms and accounts for omitted interaction bias. The results are similar to the main results (Appendix Section M, Table M18).

I rule out latent liberalism. First, it is important to note partisanship and ideology is unassociated with deportation threat in the 2007 and 2010 Pew surveys, suggesting the empirical dynamic explicated in this paper is not intrinsically tethered to liberal ideology (Appendix Section F.5). Second, I use falsification tests on immigration irrelevant policy preferences to rule out liberalism unaccounted for after adjusting for partisanship or ideology. The CMPS includes items on immigration irrelevant policy preferences. Deportation threat is not consistently associated with liberal policy preferences or an index of all policy preferences.[17] Including the liberal policy index does not attenuate the first-order association between threat and liberal immigration policy preferences (Appendix Section N, Table N19). Likewise, with the exception of support for not implementing voter ID laws, the influence of threat conditional on acculturation is statistically insignificant in relation to liberal policy preferences and the liberalism index. Moreover, including an interaction between acculturation and the liberalism index in the model does not attenuate the heterogenous influence of acculturation conditional on threat (Appendix Section N, Table N19).[18]

I rule out if the results are driven by nativism. The Pew '07, '08, '10 and CMPS '16 surveys have items measuring the perceived economic and social threat immigrants pose.[19] I index these measures for each survey.[20] I interact nativism with acculturation in addition to deportation threat to rule out nativism as an alternative mechanism. Although the influence of acculturation conditional on deportation threat becomes statistically null for the Pew '07

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[17]The one statistically significant association is a positive one between threat and support for banning gay marriage, suggesting threat is not constitutive of liberal ideology among Latinxs.

[18]However, in the Pew '19 survey, deportation threat and its interaction with acculturation appears to be associated with immigration-irrelevant liberalism (Appendix Section N, Table N20). This may be due to ideological sorting on perceived deportation threat in the aftermath of Trump's administration.

[19]In the study of Anglo white opinion on immigration, *nativism* is typically understood as *socio-tropic threat from immigrants*. However, in this paper, socio-tropic threat is deportation threat to the Latinx community.

[20]For details on measuring nativism, see Appendix Section O.1

and CMPS '16 surveys, the heterogeneous influence of acculturation conditional on threat is still positive and statistically significant for the Pew '08 and Pew '10 surveys. Moreover, attenuation in statistical significance may be the result of post-treatment conditioning. Nativism is partially a byproduct of acculturation (Knoll, 2012). Thus, adjusting for nativism adjusts for a mechanism motivated by acculturation that encourages restrictive immigration policy preferences. Indeed, deportation threat undermines the conservative influence of nativism on restrictive preferences in the Pew '07 and CMPS studies. Additionally, the heterogenous influence of acculturation conditional on deportation threat is statistically significant and positive in the Mexican-origin subsample for the Pew '07, '08, and '10 samples. These results suggest, in some cases, deportation threat forestalls assimilation net of nativism. Where it does not, threat undermines the influence of nativist predispositions on restrictive preferences. It may be surprising that nativist Latinxs would feel threatened by deportation. However, prior evidence suggests Latinxs concerned about their status in the U.S. may be inclined to adopt nativist attitudes to positively distinguish themselves from new immigrant co-ethnics (Bedolla, 2003).

Discussion and Conclusion

This paper explains how immigration enforcement shapes Latinx immigration policy preferences. Although acculturated Latinxs adopt immigration preferences akin to Anglo whites, many acculturated Latinxs maintain political commitments similar to their new immigrant co-ethnics. This paper answers the puzzle of persistent liberal immigration preferences by demonstrating deportation threat is still salient for acculturated Latinxs and undercuts the adoption of Anglo political standards on immigration policy. Moreover, deportation threat operates net of alternative mechanisms that may forestall political assimilation and undercuts both identification and cultural assimilation.

Importantly, this paper teaches us political assimilation among Latinx immigrants and

their co-ethnics is not guaranteed, but rather conditional on heterogeneous circumstances experienced by members of immigrant origin groups. Although prior research establishes the prospect of assimilation is conditional on reception context (Portes and Zhou, 1993; Telles and Ortiz, 2008), sociological work on immigration enforcement tends to focus on assimilation along socio-economic dimensions while political science work has not explicitly tested how immigration enforcement may undercut political assimilation (Massey and Pren, 2012; Pedraza, 2014). This paper is the first to systematically demonstrate perceptibly threatening immigration enforcement contexts undercut political assimilation via acculturation among Latinx co-ethnics. In contrast to many historic immigrant groups, contemporary Latinx co-ethnics contend with sustained undocumented migration, several rounds of border reinforcement, the long-term social integration of undocumented immigrants with limited civil rights, unprecedented interior immigration enforcement, and the ethno-racialized conflation of Latinx group membership with an "illegal" status. These unique circumstances of illegality in addition to their expansive net help explain why even well acculturated Latinxs have not adopted Anglo political standards on immigration policy, American identity, and attachments to ethnic culture. In summary, this paper problematizes new conclusions positing Latinxs will "become white" in norms and practice like other historic immigrant groups (Citrin and Sears, 2014; Alba, 2016).

This study is not without limitations. The study is observational and subject to omitted variable bias despite my attempt to account for alternative explanations and multiple specifications. Future research should attempt to assess the causal effect of plausibly exogenous immigration policy changes on perceived deportation threat and immigration policy attitudes differentially among acculturated Latinxs. This is difficult, given the paucity of Latinx survey data across small geographic units and acculturation levels. One could also experimentally induce deportation threat. However, these interventions raise serious ethical considerations such that any experiment approximating the characterization of threat in this descriptive data may be infeasible.

Additionally, the focus on Latinxs may undercut the generalizability of the theoretical framework. Although Latinxs are the largest U.S. immigrant ethnic group, future research should analyze the influence of deportation threat on Asian immigrant populations,[21] the fastest growing U.S. ethno-racial subgroup, or Black immigrants, who also contend with anti-Black discrimination.[22] Moreover, future research should extend beyond the U.S. For instance, Jamaican co-ethnics in the United Kingdom may have experienced a heightened sense of deportation threat in response to the Windrush Scandal, which may shape political assimilation in profound ways.

Likewise, future research should assess if the attitudinal dynamics explicated here extend beyond the third generation. The analysis bundles the third generation with generations after due to data limitations. It is unclear if bundling leads to over or under-estimation bias for the conditional influence of deportation threat. Although prior evidence suggests 4th generation Mexicans do not fully adopt Anglo political attitudes (Telles and Ortiz, 2008), it is unclear if deportation threat forestalls political assimilation among 4th generation+ Latinxs given their significant distance from the immigrant experience. Future research should replicate the findings with an explicit identification of 4th generation+ populations. Likewise, the findings should be replicated in the decades to come as the proportion of later-generation Latinxs grows. The influence of threat may differ as the Latinx population becomes increasingly acculturated.

Moreover, future research should examine if deportation threat relaxes other politically salient predispositions. For instance, deportation threat may relax the influence of ideological or partisan predispositions on support for restrictive immigration policies. Or, deportation threat may relax partisan predispositions on support for co-partisan candidates.

Finally, although this paper suggests the contemporary immigration enforcement context maintains support for policies benefiting new immigrants among acculturated Latinx co-

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[21] I analyze how deportation threat shapes immigration preferences among Asian-Americans in a 2013 Pew Survey. See results and discussion on Appendix Section R.

[22] This is not to deny Black Latinxs in the samples, but to prescribe an explicit focus on both Latinx and non-Latinx Black immigrants.

ethnics, the findings are ultimately pessimistic for the sustainability of Latinx solidarity with new immigrants. In order for acculturated Latinxs to support policies that benefit new immigrants, they must endure a threatening immigration enforcement context. If a threatening context dissipates, then the prospect for solidarity may dematerialize as well. Although the contemporary context is still quite threatening, immigration policy is at a crossroads in a post-Trump context. It remains to be seen whether potential reversals in perceptibly threatening immigration policies may generate the conditions for Latinxs to politically assimilate further and shed their commitments to newer Latinx immigrants.

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Appendices

Contents

A Motivation Plot

A.1 Acculturation = Restrictive Immigration Preferences

Figure A1: Acculturation (x-axis, 1G, 2G, 3G+ = 1st, 2nd, and 3rd generation or more Latinxs) is associated with reduced support for liberal immigration policies (y-axis) across multiple surveys. Anglo whites are the last social category on the x-axis, separated by a vertical grey line. All outcomes rescaled between 0-1. Annotations denote mean outcome values and sample size for each social category. 95% bootstrap confidence intervals displayed.

A.2   Outcome measurement

A.2.1   ANES 2008-2016

Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be INCREASED A LOT, INCREASED A LITTLE, LEFT THE SAME as it is now, DECREASED A LITTLE, or DECREASED A LOT? [Equal to 1 and 0 otherwise if respondent DOES NOT indicate "decreased a little" or "decreased a lot."]

- Increased a lot

- Increased a little

- Left the same as it is now

- Decreased a little

- Decreased a lot

A.2.2   GSS 2000-2018

Do you think the number of immigrants to America nowadays should be... [Equal to 1 and 0 otherwise if respondent DOES NOT indicate "reduced a little" or "reduced a lot"]

- Increased a lot

- Increased a little

- Remain the same as it is

- Reduced a little

- Reduced a lot

- Can't choose

- No answer

A.2.3   CMPS 2016

Same as the set of measures characterized on Section C. All binary indicators are indexed on a scale from 0-2, rescaled to 0-1 on Figure A1.

A.2.4   CAS 2004

Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased, decreased or left the same as it is now? [Equal to 1 and 0 otherwise if respondent DOES NOT indicate "decreased"]

- Increased

- Decreased

- Left the same

- Don't Know

- No answer

A.2.5   Pew 2002

The following three items are indexed from 0-2, rescaled between 0-1 on Figure A1.

Do you think there are too many, too few, or about the right amount of immigrants living in the United States today? [Equal to 1 and 0 otherwise if respondent DOES NOT indicate "too many."]

- Too many

- Too few

- Right amount

- Don't Know

- Refused

Some people think the United States should allow more Latin Americans to come and work in this country LEGALLY; some people think the US should allow the same number as it does now; and others think it should reduce the number who come and work in this country LEGALLY. Which is closer to your opinion? [Equal to 1 and 0 otherwise if respondent DOES NOT indicate "reduce the number who come to work in this country legally."]

- Allow more Latin Americans to come and work in this country legally

- Allow the same number as it does now

- Reduce the number who come to work in this country legally

- Don't know

- Refused

What would you think of a proposal that would give many of the undocumented or illegal (HISPANIC/LATINO) immigrants working in the U.S. a chance to obtain legal status? Is this something you would favor or oppose? [Equal to 1 and 0 otherwise if respondent DOES NOT indicate "oppose."]

- Favor

- Oppose

- Don't know

- Refused

B Illegality Plot

Figure B2: Deportation threat is salient to the Latinx community. Panel A displays the size of the undocumented population size over time using Pew Research Center estimates (1990-2017). Panel B displays the undocumented population proportion over time using Pew estimates (1995-2017). Panel C displays the undocumented population proportion from various birth regions using Migration Policy Institute estimates. Panel D displays the proportion of Latinxs who know an undocumented close friend or family member across generational status and language-of-interview using CMPS data. Panel E displays the mean Latinx, foreign-born, and non-citizen proportion of the population for CMPS Latinx and Anglo white respondents by generational status. Panel F shows deportation removals over time using Department of Homeland Security (DHS) data (1980-2018). Panel G shows removals over time normalized over the size of the undocumented population using DHS and Pew data (1990-2017). Panel H shows the proportion of deportation removals from a specific region from DHS data tabulated by Asad and Clair (2018) (2005-2014).

C   Outcome measurement

Table C1: Outcome items and measurement across surveys.

Survey	Item Text	Choices	Measure
Pew '07	Do you approve or disapprove of workplace raids to discourage employers from hiring undocumented or illegal immigrants?	• 1) Approve • 2) Disapprove • 3) Don't Know • 4) Refused	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 otherwise)
	Do you approve or disapprove of states checking for immigration status before issuing driver's licenses?	• 1) Approve • 2) Disapprove • 3) Don't Know • 4) Refused	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 otherwise)
	Should local police take an active role in identifying undocumented or illegal immigrants, or should enforcement be left mainly to the federal authorities?	• 1) Police take active role • 2) Enforcement left to federal authorities • 3) Don't know • 4) Refused	Binary (1 = Federal authorities, 0 otherwise)
	Do you think there are too many, too few, or about the right amount of immigrants living in the United States today?	• 1) Too many • 2) Too few • 3) Right amount • 4) Don't know • 5) Refused	Binary (1 = not "Too many", 0 otherwise)
Pew '08	Should local police take an active role in identifying undocumented or illegal immigrants, or should enforcement be left mainly to the federal authorities?	• 1) Police take active role • 2) Enforcement left to federal authorities • 3) Don't know • 4) Refused	Binary (1 = Federal authorities, 0 otherwise)
	Do you approve or disapprove of the following immigration enforcement actions: Workplace raids to discourage employers from hiring undocumented or illegal immigrants	• 1) Approve • 2) Disapprove • 3) Don't Know • 4) Refused	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 otherwise)
	Do you approve or disapprove of the following immigration enforcement actions: A requirement that employers check with a federal government database to verify the legal immigration status of any job applicant they are considering hiring	• 1) Approve • 2) Disapprove • 3) Don't Know • 4) Refused	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 otherwise)
	Do you approve or disapprove of the following immigration enforcement actions: Criminal prosecution of employers who hire undocumented immigrants	• 1) Approve • 2) Disapprove • 3) Don't Know • 4) Refused	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 otherwise)
	Do you approve or disapprove of the following immigration enforcement actions: Criminal prosecution of undocumented immigrants who are working without authorization	• 1) Approve • 2) Disapprove • 3) Don't Know • 4) Refused	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 otherwise)

	Should an illegal immigrant who graduated from a high school in your state and is accepted to a state public college qualify for the in-state college tuition rate, or shouldn't they?	1) Should qualify 2) Should not qualify 3) Don't Know 4) Refused	Binary (1 = Should qualify, 0 otherwise)
Pew '10	Thinking about immigrants who are living in the U.S. (United States) illegally... do you favor or oppose providing a way for illegal immigrants currently in the country to gain legal citizenship if they pass background checks, pay fines and have jobs?	1) Favor 2) Oppose 3) Don't Know 4) Refused	Binary (1 = Favor, 0 otherwise)
	As you may know, the state of Arizona recently passed a law that requires police to verify the legal status of someone they have already stopped or arrested if they suspect that the person is in the country illegally. Do you approve or disapprove of Arizona's new law?	1) Favor 2) Oppose 3) Don't Know 4) Refused	Binary (1 = Favor, 0 otherwise)
	All things considered, which of these statements comes closer to your own views about immigrants who are in the U.S. illegally — even if none of them is exactly right	1) Illegal immigrants should be deported 2) Illegal immigrants should pay a fine, but not be deported 3) Illegal immigrants should not be punished 4) Don't know 5) Refused	Binary (1 = Not "should be deported", 0 otherwise)
	Do you approve or disapprove of the following actions aimed at enforcing the nation's immigration laws: Workplace raids	1) Approve 2) Disapprove 3) Don't know 4) Refused	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 otherwise)
	Do you approve or disapprove of the following actions aimed at enforcing the nation's immigration laws: Building more fences on the nation's borders	1) Approve 2) Disapprove 3) Don't know 4) Refused	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 otherwise)
	Do you approve or disapprove of the following actions aimed at enforcing the nation's immigration laws: Increasing the number of border patrol agents	1) Approve 2) Disapprove 3) Don't know 4) Refused	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 otherwise)
	Do you approve or disapprove of the following actions aimed at enforcing the nation's immigration laws: A requirement that all U.S. residents carry a national identity card	1) Approve 2) Disapprove 3) Don't know 4) Refused	Binary (1 = Disapprove, 0 otherwise)
	Should an illegal immigrant who graduated from a high school in your state and is accepted to a state public college qualify for the in-state college tuition rate, or shouldn't they?	1) Should qualify 2) Should not qualify 3) Don't Know 4) Refused	Binary (1 = Should qualify, 0 otherwise)

	Should local police take an active role in identifying undocumented or illegal immigrants, or should enforcement be left mainly to the federal authorities?	• 1) Police take active role • 2) Enforcement left to federal authorities • 3) Don't know • 4) Refused	Binary (1 = Federal authorities, 0 otherwise)
	Would you favor changing the Constitution so that the parents must be legal residents of the U.S. in order for their newborn child to be a citizen, or should the Constitution be left as it is?	• 1) Favor changing the constitution • 2) Leave constitution as is • 3) Don't Know • 4) Refused	Binary (1 = not "Favor", 0 otherwise)
CMPS '16	Do you think the millions of undocumented [Mexican (50/50 split)] immigrants in the United States should be eligible for a pathway to citizenship, or do you think we should deport undocumented Mexican immigrants?	• 1) Strongly support pathway to citizenship • 2) Somewhat support pathway to citizenship • 3) Strongly support deporting these immigrants • 4) Somewhat support deporting these immigrants	Binary (1 = Strongly or somewhat support pathway, 0 otherwise)
	Which comes closest to your view about [undocumented/illegal (50/50 split)] immigrants who are already living and working in the U.S.?	• 1) They should be allowed to stay in their jobs and apply for U.S. citizenship • 2) They should be allowed to stay in their jobs, but temporarily • 3) They should be required to leave their jobs and immediately leave the U.S	Binary (1 = not "immediately leave", 0 otherwise)
	Below is a list of federal government programs. For each one, please indicate whether you would like to see federal spending increased or decreased or stay the same: Tightening border security to prevent [illegal/undocumented (50/50 split)] immigration	• 1) Decrease • 2) Increase • 3) Stay the same	Binary (1 = Decrease, 0 otherwise)
Pew '18	As you may know, many immigrants who came illegally to the U.S. when they were children now have temporary legal status that may be ending. Would you favor or oppose Congress passing a law granting them permanent legal status?	• 1) Favor • 2) Oppose	Binary (1 = Favor, 0 otherwise)
	As you may know, there is a proposal to substantially expand the wall along the U.S. border with Mexico. In general, do you favor or oppose this proposal?	• 1) Favor • 2) Oppose	Binary (1 = Oppose, 0 otherwise)
	Do you think there are too many, too few, or about the right amount of immigrants living in the United States today?	• 1) Too many • 2) Too Few • 3) Right amount	Binary (1 = Not "too many", 0 otherwise)

Pew '19	As you may know, many immigrants who came illegally to the U.S. when they were children now have temporary legal status that may be ending. Would you favor or oppose Congress passing a law granting them permanent legal status?	• 1) Favor • 2) Oppose	Binary (1 = Favor, 0 otherwise)

D   Disaggregating outcomes

Figure D3: Coefficients characterizing association between relevant independent variables of interest (x-axis) and disaggregated outcomes that constitute the liberal immigration policy index (y-axis). Panel A displays coefficients for threat. Panel B displays coefficients for the threat x acculturation interaction. Color denotes survey at use, shape denotes whether the outcome is an index. All covariates scaled 0-1. 95% confidence interval from robust standard errors displayed.

E Validating acculturation scale

E.1 Determining reliability

Table E3: Correlation matrices between acculturation scale components across surveys (unweighted)

Pew 2007	Gen. Status	English	Citizen
Gen. Status	1.00	0.59	0.55
English	0.59	1.00	0.47
Citizen	0.55	0.47	1.00
Pew 2008	Gen. Status	English	Citizen
Gen. Status	1.00	0.61	0.58
English	0.61	1.00	0.48
Citizen	0.58	0.48	1.00
Pew 2010	Gen. Status	English	Citizen
Gen. Status	1.00	0.52	0.57
English	0.52	1.00	0.49
Citizen	0.57	0.49	1.00
CMPS 2016	Gen. Status	English	Citizen
Gen. Status	1.00	0.46	0.58
English	0.46	1.00	0.54
Citizen	0.58	0.54	1.00
Pew 2018	Gen. Status	English	Citizen
Gen. Status	1.00	0.65	0.56
English	0.65	1.00	0.58
Citizen	0.56	0.58	1.00
Pew 2019	Gen. Status	English	Citizen
Gen. Status	1.00	0.48	0.36
English	0.48	1.00	0.39
Citizen	0.36	0.39	1.00

Table E4: Cronbach's alpha for acculturation scale across surveys

Pew 2007	Pew 2008	Pew 2010	CMPS 2016	Pew 2018	Pew 2019
0.75	0.77	0.74	0.66	0.77	0.66

E.2 Association with immigration attitudes

Table E5: Acculturation is negatively associated with liberal immigration policy attitudes across surveys

Acculturation Level	Liberal Immigration Policy Index (by survey)					
	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19
Acculturation (0)	0.74	0.81	0.77	0.71	0.83	0.93
Acculturation (1)	0.69	0.79	0.73	0.69	0.81	0.94
Acculturation (2)	0.67	0.68	0.72	0.60	0.80	0.88
Acculturation (3)	0.65	0.66	0.72	0.69	0.78	0.90
Acculturation (4)	0.58	0.60	0.58	0.65	0.69	0.84
Max - Min	-0.17	-0.21	-0.20	-0.06	-0.14	-0.10
Bivariate Regression t-val	-7.77	-11.89	-9.08	-3.17	-6.71	-4.52

E.3 Demonstrating Scale Captures Concept

Figure E4: The acculturation scale (x-axis) is associated with multiple dimensions of assimilation (y-axis). Acculturation is associated with reduced identity salience (Panel A), higher levels of American identity relative to ethnic identity (Panel B), a higher rate of American self-categorization relative to ethnic self-categorization (Panel C), higher education (Panel D), higher income (Panel E), living in a more co-ethnic/immigrant zipcode context (Panels F-H), and lower rates of co-ethnic marriage (Panel I). Predicted values displayed on the y-axis are from bivariate regressions. Panel A uses Pew '19 data, Panels B-I use CMPS '16 data. All covariates rescaled between 0-1 with the exception of the American - Ethnic ID measure, which is scaled between -1 (strong identification with the ethnic group, no identification with the United States) and 1 (strong identification with the United States, no identification with the ethnic group). 95% confidence intervals displayed derived from robust standard errors. Zipcode clustered standard errors displayed for Panels F-H.

E.4 Demonstrating English dominance = English interview

Table E6: The English language interview indicator is a strong proxy for English-language dominance

	English Interview	
	(1)	(2)
English Dominance	0.89***	1.65***
	(0.04)	(0.05)
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '10
R^2	0.45	0.64
N	1809	1238

Note: ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$. All models adjust for generational status, partisanship, income, education and gender.

F Validating deportation threat measure

F.1 Threat measurement

F.1.1 Pew 2007-2019

Regardless of your own immigration or citizenship status, how much, if at all, do you worry that you, a family member, or a close friend could be deported? Would you say that you worry a lot, some, not much, or not at all?

- A lot

- Some

- Not much

- Not at all

F.1.2 CMPS 2016

How worried are you that people you know might be detained or deported for immigration reasons?

- Extremely worried

- Very worried

- Somewhat worried

- A little worried

- Not at all worried

F.2   Threat distributions

Figure F5: Distribution (y-axis) of deportation threat (x-axis) across surveys. Annotations denote N within each threat level and the corresponding marginal in parentheses. Each panel denotes a separate survey.

F.3 Distinctiveness of threat and acculturation

Table F7: Correlation coefficients between deportation threat and acculturation scale

Survey	Pearson's Rho	Kendall's Tau	Spearman's Rho
Pew '07	-0.41	-0.33	-0.40
Pew '08	-0.46	-0.38	-0.45
Pew '10	-0.42	-0.34	-0.41
CMPS '16	-0.26	-0.23	-0.27
Pew '18	-0.26	-0.22	-0.27
Pew '19	-0.20	-0.17	-0.20

Table F8: Distribution of threat by acculturation across surveys

Survey	Acculturation	Not at all (Not at all worried)	Not much (A little worried)	Some (Somewhat worried)	A lot (Very worried)	— (Extremely Worried)	N
Pew '07	Acculturation (0)	0.15	0.11	0.24	0.49		761
	Acculturation (1)	0.27	0.12	0.20	0.40		419
	Acculturation (2)	0.34	0.15	0.25	0.26		202
	Acculturation (3)	0.53	0.15	0.16	0.17		248
	Acculturation (4)	0.65	0.14	0.11	0.10		179
Pew '08	Acculturation (0)	0.13	0.07	0.19	0.61		729
	Acculturation (1)	0.22	0.12	0.18	0.47		424
	Acculturation (2)	0.39	0.11	0.21	0.29		194
	Acculturation (3)	0.51	0.13	0.17	0.19		243
	Acculturation (4)	0.62	0.13	0.16	0.09		232
Pew '10	Acculturation (0)	0.15	0.08	0.22	0.55		375
	Acculturation (1)	0.24	0.09	0.23	0.44		287
	Acculturation (2)	0.35	0.12	0.18	0.35		188
	Acculturation (3)	0.48	0.15	0.14	0.22		202
	Acculturation (4)	0.69	0.08	0.11	0.11		194
CMPS '16	Acculturation (0)	0.21	0.09	0.20	0.19	0.31	202
	Acculturation (1)	0.23	0.10	0.17	0.23	0.27	229
	Acculturation (2)	0.43	0.09	0.25	0.13	0.10	357
	Acculturation (3)	0.27	0.14	0.27	0.15	0.16	528
	Acculturation (4)	0.53	0.10	0.19	0.09	0.09	1173
Pew '18	Acculturation (0)	0.20	0.12	0.33	0.35		484
	Acculturation (1)	0.28	0.13	0.30	0.29		322
	Acculturation (2)	0.35	0.15	0.21	0.30		227
	Acculturation (3)	0.36	0.14	0.22	0.28		387
	Acculturation (4)	0.56	0.13	0.20	0.11		374
Pew '19	Acculturation (0)	0.24	0.21	0.24	0.31		420
	Acculturation (1)	0.34	0.19	0.24	0.23		638
	Acculturation (2)	0.49	0.17	0.21	0.13		548
	Acculturation (3)	0.41	0.19	0.22	0.18		589
	Acculturation (4)	0.57	0.15	0.18	0.10		232

F.4 Demonstrating Measure Captures Concept

Figure F6: The psychological measure of deportation threat captures objective measures of the concept. The number of county-level Secure Communities removals (Panel A), the proportion of the respondent's zipcode that is foreign-born (Panel B), the proportion of the respondent's zipcode that is non-citizen (Panel C), and whether the respondent either knows an undocumented immigrant or deportee (Panels D and E) is positively associated with deportation threat. Predicted value of deportation threat are from bivariate regressions. Panels A-D use CMPS '16 data, Panel E uses Pew '10 data. 95% confidence intervals displayed with robust standard errors displayed. Standard errors are clustered at the county-level for Panel A and zipcode-level for Panels B-C

F.5   Correlates of deportation threat

Table F9: Correlates of deportation threat

	Deportation Threat					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	−0.25***	−0.39***	−0.33***	−0.41***	−0.34***	−0.19***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Woman	0.02	−0.02	−0.01	0.01	0.09***	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Married	0.01	0.04	0.01	−0.01	0.04	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Mexican/Central Am.	0.03	0.10**	0.01	0.05*	0.02	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Income	−0.12**	−2.42***	−0.19**	−0.09*	−0.12**	
	(0.05)	(0.70)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	
Education	−0.16***	−0.08	−0.10	−0.02	−0.06	−0.11**
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Unemployed	−0.04	−0.02	0.02	−0.03	−0.03	
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
US Born	−0.12***	−0.15***	−0.22***	−0.07***	−0.07**	−0.11***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
English	−0.18***	−0.17***	−0.02	−0.08**	−0.08**	−0.06*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
% Non-citizen (zip)		0.16*	0.08	−0.00	0.11	
		(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.07)	
% Non-citizen (county)		−0.09	0.02	0.13*	0.00	
		(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)	
Log(Deportations + 1)				−0.00	−0.12*	
				(0.04)	(0.05)	
Deportation Rate				−0.34	0.04	
				(0.25)	(0.11)	
Know Deportee			0.18***			0.24***
			(0.03)			(0.03)
Know Undocumented				0.26***		0.16***
				(0.02)		(0.02)
Perceived Discrim.	0.21***	0.12***	0.19***	0.16***		
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)		
Experienced Discrim.	0.09***	0.13***	0.08**	0.08***	0.36***	
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	
Ethnic Media		0.09	0.16*	0.08*		
		(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.04)		
Partisanship	0.03	0.13***	0.04	0.11***	0.24***	0.18***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Ideology			0.02	0.06		
			(0.04)	(0.03)		
Latino ID				0.09*	0.08	
				(0.03)	(0.05)	
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19
R^2	0.24	0.32	0.29	0.42	0.25	0.25
N	1809	1822	1238	2279	1794	2427

Note: ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

F.6 Deportation threat and emotional correlates

Table F10: Threat does not motivate anger more than anxiety

	Anxiety	Anxiety - Anger
Threat	0.12***	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)
R^2	0.44	0.09
N	2768	2768
Survey	CMPS '16	CMPS '16
Anger Control	Y	N
Demographic Controls	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y
State FE	Y	Y

Note: ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$. Anxiety and anger are CMPS '16 items asking respondents "During the 2016 election season, how often did you feel the following?" with an inquiry on being "Afraid?" and "Angry?" All covariates rescaled between 0-1. Thus, the anxiety - anger measure is scaled between -1 to 1. All models are fully specified. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

F.7 Association between threat and immigration preferences

Table F11: Association between deportation threat and liberal immigration policy attitudes

	Liberal Immigration Policy Attitudes					
Panel A: No controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat	0.25***	0.36***	0.29***	0.28***	0.32***	0.19***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
R^2	0.06	0.13	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.03
N	1809	1822	1238	2279	1794	2427
Panel B: Yes controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat	0.14***	0.17***	0.15***	0.18***	0.19***	0.15***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
R^2	0.16	0.31	0.31	0.24	0.31	0.08
Num. obs.	1809	1822	1236	2276	1794	2427
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Zipcode Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Census Area FE	Y	N	N	N	N	Y
State FE	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N

***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$. Geographic controls below the Census Area are not available for the Pew 2007 and Pew 2019 surveys. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

G Unconditional association between deportation threat and liberal immigration preferences

Figure G7: Standardized deportation threat coefficients on liberal immigration policy preferences (y-axis) across surveys (x-axis) and the inclusion of control covariates (color). Vertical grey line separates survey estimates from meta-analytic estimates. Horizontal red line is the random-effects meta-analytic coefficient estimate. Annotations include estimate, standard error, p-value, how much joint outcome and independent variable variation must be explained by an omitted covariate to reduce the coefficient to 0 ("Robustness Value (RV)"), and how large an omitted covariate must be to reduce the coefficient to 0 based on observable bounds. 95% confidence intervals displayed derived from robust standard errors.

H   Descriptive plots characterizing heterogeneous influence of threat by acculturation

Figure H8: Association between acculturation and liberal immigration policy attitudes conditional on deportation threat across surveys. X-axis = acculturation scale. Y-axis = liberal immigration policy index. Solid line = linear fit to bivariate association. Dashed line = average on policy index conditional on acculturation category. Color denotes level of perceived deportation threat.

I Control Covariates

I.1 List

Table I12: Control covariate inclusion in fully specified models by survey

Survey	Controls
Pew '07	Acculturation, Age, Age (Missing), Woman, Married, Mexican, Salvadorean, Dominican, Cuban, Income, Education, Education (Missing), Unemployed, Partisanship (5pt), Perceived Discrimination, Experienced Discrimination, Census Region FE
Pew '08	Acculturation, Age, Age (Missing), Woman, Married, Catholic, Mexican, Salvadorean, Dominican, Cuban, Income, Income (Missing), Education, Education (Missing), Unemployment, Partisanship (5pt), Experienced Discrimination, Perceived Discrimination, Ethnic Media Consumption, Log(Total Pop. + 1) (Zip), Pop. Density (Zip), % Latino (Zip), % Foreign (Zip), % Non-citizen (Zip), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (Zip), % College (Zip), % Unemployment (Zip), Log(Total Pop. + 1) (County), Pop. Density (County), % Latino (County), % Foreign (County), % Non-citizen (County), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (County), % College (County), % Unemployed (County), State FE
Pew '10	Acculturation, Age, Age (Missing), Woman, Married, Mexican, Dominican, Salvadorean, Cuban, Income, Income (Missing), Education, Education (Missing), Unemployed, Homeowner, Partisanship (5pt), Ideology (5pt), Ideology (Missing), Experienced Discrimination, Perceived Discrimination, Ethnic Media Consumption, Know Deportee, Immigration Stop, Log(Total Pop. + 1) (Zip), Pop. Density (Zip), % Latino (Zip), % Foreign (Zip), % Non-citizen (Zip), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (Zip), % College (Zip), % Unemployment (Zip), Log(Total Pop. + 1) (County), Pop. Density (County), % Latino (County), % Foreign (County), % Non-citizen (County), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (County), % College (County), % Unemployed (County), State FE
CMPS '16	Acculturation, Age, Age (Missing), Woman, Married, Skin Color, Catholic, Mexican, Dominican, Cuban, Salvadorean, Income, Income (Missing), Education, Unemployed, Homeowner, Partisanship (7pt), Ideology (5pt), Ideology (Missing), Perceived Discrimination, Experienced Discrimination, Know Undocumented, Latinx identity, American identity, Log(Total Pop. + 1) (Zip), Pop. Density (County), % Latino (Zip), % Foreign (Zip), % Non-citizen (Zip), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (Zip), % College (Zip), % Unemployment (Zip), Log(Total Pop. + 1) (County), Pop. Density (County), % Latino (County), % Foreign (County), % Non-citizen (County), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (County), % College (County), % Unemployed (County), Log(Total Removals + 1), % Level 3 Removals, Removal Rate, State FE
Pew '18	Acculturation, Age, Age (Missing), Woman, Married, Catholic, Mexican, Dominican, Salvadorean, Cuban, Income, Income (Missing), Education, Education (Missing), Unemployed, Homeowner, Experienced Discrimination, Partisanship (5pt), Latinx identity, American identity Log(Total Pop. + 1) (Zip), Pop. Density (County), % Latino (Zip), % Foreign (Zip), % Non-citizen (Zip), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (Zip), % College (Zip), % Unemployment (Zip), Log(Total Pop. + 1) (County), Pop. Density (County), % Latino (County), % Foreign (County), % Non-citizen (County), Log(Median Household Income + 1) (County), % College (County), % Unemployed (County), Log(Total Removals + 1), % Level 3 Removals, Removal Rate, State FE
Pew '19	Acculturation, Age, Age (Missing), Woman, Married, Catholic, Mexican, Dominican, Salvadorean, Cuban, Education, Education (Missing), Experienced Discrimination, Partisanship (5pt), Know Undocumented, Know Deportee, Census Region FE

Blue: demographic controls. Green: socio-economic controls. Red: political controls. Purple: county-level controls. Orange: zipcode-level controls.

I.2   Justification

I.2.1   Demographic covariates

Age: May be associated with length of stay in the United States, a measure of acculturation (Abraído-Lanza et al., 2006). Moreover, older Latinxs may be more established in the United States, and therefore perceive lower levels of deportation threat, as reflected in the regression table characterizing the correlates of deportation threat (Section F.5, Table F9). Older Latinxs may have also migrated to the US prior to key points where undocumented immigrants were regularized (e.g. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986).

Gender: Women may be more likely to perceive risks related to immigration enforcement (Gustafsod, 1998). Moreover, a competing theoretical perspective suggests men may perceive deportation threat more given immigration enforcement disproportionately targets men. However, women may perceive deportation threat more because they are more likely to be concerned about consequences related to the loss of a male breadwinner (Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2013).

Marriage: Marriage may offer protection from deportation threat through status regularization, which can influence both threat and support for pro-immigrant policies (Menjívar and Lakhani, 2016). Moreover, marriage may increase deportation threat since marriage implies a loss of strong familial ties through immigration enforcement (Schueths, 2012). Marriage may also motivate conservatism, generating restrictive immigration policy attitudes among Latinxs (Kingston and Finkel, 1987).

National Origin: Binary indicators for Mexican, Salvadorean, Dominican, and Cuban national origin are included in the fully specified regression models. These are the 4 largest Latinx national origin groups (Excluding Puerto Ricans, who, if included in the analysis, would make up the 5 largest national origin groups. Recall that Puerto Ricans are excluded from the analysis because they possess American citizenship.). Prior evidence suggests some national origin groups are more likely to support liberal immigration policies by virtue of their proximity to the immigrant experience (e.g. Mexicans, Central Americans) (Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010). In some of the surveys, Mexican/Central-American national origin appears to be positively associated with deportation threat (Section F.5, Table F9).

Catholic: Catholic Latinxs may be more supportive of liberal immigration policy preferences given the Catholic Church's outspoken pro-immigration reform views (Valenzuela, 2014). Likewise, Catholic Latinxs are more likely to be compelled to engage in pro-immigrant political activism, which may jointly influence liberal immigration policy preferences and deportation threat (Barreto et al., 2009).

Skin Color: Skin color may make one susceptible to immigration enforcement or policing via racial profiling, which may increase perceived deportation threat (Romero, 2006).

I.2.2   Socio-economic covariates

Income: Prior evidence suggests higher income Latinxs may be less supportive of liberal immigration policies (Polinard, Wrinkle, and De La Garza, 1984; Bedolla, 2003). Although

one may think lower income Latinxs would be less likely to support liberal immigration policies due to competition, this is not supported by prior evidence (Newton, 2000; Jiménez, 2008; Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010). For the most part, rejection of liberal immigration policies appears to be a function of assimilation via economic attainment.

Education: A plethora of prior evidence suggests education is associated with more support for immigrants (Chandler and Tsai, 2001; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Cavaille and Marshall, 2019). Education could be associated with higher support for immigrants via economic or social channels. However, most evidence on the link between education and immigration attitudes analyzes attitudes among dominant groups. Other research examining Latinxs finds no association between education and immigration policy preferences (Binder, Polinard, and Wrinkle, 1997; Newton, 2000; Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010).

Unemployment: Evidence on the link between unemployment and immigration attitudes is mixed. Some evidence finds contextual measures of unemployment are associated with individual-level support for pro-immigrant policies (Markaki and Longhi, 2013). Other research suggests unemployment increases opposition to immigrants (Palmer, 1996). However, for Latinxs, the preexisting evidence appears to suggest both contextual and individual-level unemployment has no influence on immigration policy attitudes (Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010).

Homeowner: In the immigrant assimilation literature, homeownership is understood as a substrate of assimilation (Alba and Logan, 1992; McConnell and Marcelli, 2007).

I.2.3 Political covariates

Partisanship: Prior evidence suggests a strong association between partisanship and immigration policy attitudes. Immigration attitudes have also influenced partisan switching in recent years (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2017).

Ideology: Prior evidence suggests a strong association between conservative ideology and restrictive immigration policy attitudes, particularly in the U.S. context (Citrin and Sides, 2008).

Perceived discrimination (against Latinxs): Prior evidence suggests perceived discrimination is associated with pro-immigrant attitudes among Latinxs (Sanchez, 2006). Other research also suggests perceived discrimination forestalls attitudinal assimilation on immigration policy attitudes (Pedraza, 2014). Perceived discrimination also appears to be associated with deportation threat (Section F.5, Table F9), perhaps as a function of how illegality is conflated with the Latinx population writ large as a basis for discrimination (Flores and Schachter, 2018).

Experienced discrimination: Prior evidence suggests experienced discrimination is associated with pro-immigrant attitudes among Latinxs (Tucker, 2020).

Ethnic media: Prior evidence suggests ethnic media consumption among Latinxs is associated with pro-immigrant attitudes (Abrajano and Singh, 2009). It may also cue Latinxs

into possible immigration enforcement threats (Zepeda-Millán, 2017). Indeed, in two of the 6 surveys, ethnic media consumption appears to be positively associated with deportation threat (Section F.5, Table F9).

Knowing a deportee: Whether one knows a deportee may influence deportation threat. It either cues in the prospect of oneself being deported or friends/family being deported. In all surveys with an item measuring personal contact with a deportee, knowing a deportee is highly prognostic of deportation threat (Section F.5, Table F9).

Knowing someone undocumented: Whether one knows someone undocumented (friends/family in both the CMPS and Pew 2019 surveys) may influence deportation threat given the increasingly restrictive immigration enforcement environment. It may also influence pro-immigrant attitudes via contact and the development of common interests (Cadenas et al., 2018). In all surveys with an item measuring contact with undocumented immigrants, knowing someone undocumented is highly prognostic of deportation threat (Section F.5, Table F9).

Immigration stop: Whether one is stopped by immigration officers may induce deportation threat via contact with the immigration enforcement apparatus. Moreover, it may induce support for liberal immigration policies given some respondents may want less restrictive policies to ensure reprieve from possible harassment on part of immigration agents.

Latino identity: Prior evidence suggests the strength of identification with the ethnic group among Latinxs is positively associated with positive atttiudes toward immigrants (Binder, Polinard, and Wrinkle, 1997; Sanchez, 2006; Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010; Serrano-Careaga and Huo, 2019; Wallace and Zepeda-Millán, 2020). Moreover, Latinx identity may be associated with increased deportation threat, given high group identifiers appear to be more sensitive to anti-group threats (Sellers and Shelton, 2003; Pérez, 2015).

American identity: Prior evidence suggests the strength of identification with the ethnic group among Latinxs is positively associated with positive atttiudes toward immigrants (Binder, Polinard, and Wrinkle, 1997; Sanchez, 2006; Rouse, Wilkinson, and Garand, 2010; Serrano-Careaga and Huo, 2019; Wallace and Zepeda-Millán, 2020). Moreover, Latinx identity may be associated with increased deportation threat, given high group identifiers appear to be more sensitive to anti-group threats (Sellers and Shelton, 2003; Pérez, 2015).

I.2.4   Contextual covariates

% Latino/Foreign-Born/Non-Citizen: Prior evidence suggests ethnic contexts increase support for liberal immigration policies among Latinxs (Rocha et al., 2011; Telles and Sue, 2019). However, the acculturation level of the context needs to be taken into account. Places with less acculturated Latinxs (e.g. foreign-born, non-citizens) may have individuals who are more likely to support liberal immigration policies relative to places with more acculturated Latinxs yet are still predominantly ethnic contexts (Bedolla, 2003). Moreover, places with more Latinxs and/or immigrants may be more subject to deportation threat via immigration enforcement actions or a societal concern over a precarious legal status (Maltby et al., 2020).

Median Household Income/Unemployed/% College: Prior evidence suggests Latinxs from higher resourced contexts may be less supportive of liberal immigration policy preferences (Bedolla, 2003). Higher resourced areas may also be less subject to deportation threat since they're less likely to be targeted by immigration enforcement authorities.

Secure Communities Removals/Removal Rate/% Level 3 Removals: Deportation threat may be induced by Secure Communities removals and deportations. If level 3 removals occur at a higher rate (e.g. removals of people who have committed minor crimes), that may increase a sense of injustice that motivates pro-immigrant behavior (Walker, Roman, and Barreto, 2020).

J Alternative samples

J.1 Mexicans only

Table J14: Association between deportation threat and liberal immigration policy attitudes conditional on acculturation (Mexicans only)

	Liberal Immigration Policy Attitudes					
Panel A: No controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.32***	0.23**	0.27***	0.11†	0.27***	0.25*
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.12)
Threat	0.02	0.10**	−0.00	0.11*	0.06*	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.07)
Acculturation	−0.24***	−0.24***	−0.22***	−0.07†	−0.20***	−0.17*
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)
R^2	0.13	0.18	0.18	0.11	0.14	0.05
N	1196	1220	833	1500	1197	946
Panel B: Yes controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.30***	0.17**	0.24***	0.10†	0.11†	0.25*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.12)
Threat	−0.01	0.05	−0.02	0.06	0.07†	−0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)
Acculturation	−0.22***	−0.20***	−0.21***	−0.07†	−0.11*	−0.16†
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.08)
R^2	0.18	0.32	0.35	0.26	0.34	0.11
N	1196	1220	833	1500	1197	946
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Zipcode Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Census Area FE	Y	N	N	N	N	Y
State FE	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N

Note: ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$, $^\dagger p < 0.1$. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

J.2 Including Puerto Ricans

Table J15: Association between deportation threat and liberal immigration policy attitudes conditional on acculturation (including Puerto Ricans)

	Liberal Immigration Policy Attitudes					
Panel A: No controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.08	0.18***	0.16***	0.08†	0.20***	0.26**
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.08)
Threat	0.09***	0.10***	0.04	0.13***	0.08**	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Acculturation	−0.15***	−0.23***	−0.17***	−0.05†	−0.15***	−0.19***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)
R^2	0.09	0.16	0.13	0.10	0.11	0.06
N	1961	1975	1347	2768	2002	2675
Panel B: Yes controls	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.09†	0.15**	0.15***	0.08†	0.10*	0.22**
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.08)
Threat	0.05*	0.04	0.00	0.07*	0.07*	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Acculturation	−0.15***	−0.19***	−0.17***	−0.04	−0.09**	−0.17**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
R^2	0.16	0.32	0.34	0.21	0.29	0.11
N	1961	1975	1347	2768	2002	2675
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Zipcode Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Census Area FE	Y	N	N	N	N	Y
State FE	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N

Note: ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$, †$p < 0.1$. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Panel A displays coefficients from models with no control covariates. Panel B displays coefficients from models adjusting for a full set of control covariates. Each column characterizes a different survey at use. Geographic covariates below the Census Area level are not available for the Pew 2007 and Pew 2019 surveys. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

K   Using alternative acculturation measures

Table K16: Re-estimating main results using alternative measures of acculturation (part 1)

	Liberal Immigration Policy					
Panel A: Index (No citizenship)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.12*	0.17**	0.13**	0.10*	0.18***	0.19*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.09)
R^2	0.16	0.32	0.34	0.21	0.31	0.09
N	1809	1822	1236	2276	1794	2427
Panel B: Index (with LPR)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.13*	0.21**	0.19***	0.14*	0.19***	0.24*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.10)
R^2	0.16	0.32	0.33	0.21	0.31	0.09
N	1809	1822	1236	2276	1794	2427
Panel C: Index (w/ English-dominance)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.21**	—	0.16*	—	—	0.39**
	(0.08)	(—)	(0.07)	(—)	(—)	(0.13)
R^2	0.17	—	0.33	—	—	0.09
N	1809	—	1236	—	—	2427
Panel D: Index (w/ English-dom., LPR)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.21**	—	0.17*	—	—	0.39**
	(0.08)	(—)	(0.07)	(—)	(—)	(0.13)
R^2	0.17	—	0.33	—	—	0.09
N	1809	—	1236	—	—	2427
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19

Note: ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$, †$p < 0.1$. All models are fully specified. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table K17: Re-estimating main results using alternative measures of acculturation (part 2)

	Liberal Immigration Policy					
Panel A: Generational Status	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x 2nd Gen.	−0.07	0.02	0.04	−0.01	−0.07†	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)
Threat x 3rd Gen.	0.16**	0.06	0.08†	0.06	0.20***	0.20*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.10)
R^2	0.17	0.31	0.33	0.24	0.33	0.09
N	1809	1822	1236	2276	1794	2427
Panel B: US Born	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x US Born	0.07†	0.11*	0.11**	0.04	0.08*	0.09
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)
R^2	0.15	0.31	0.32	0.24	0.31	0.09
N	1809	1822	1238	2276	1794	2427
Panel C: English	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x English	0.06	0.15***	0.09**	0.08†	0.09*	0.14*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)
R^2	0.15	0.31	0.32	0.24	0.32	0.09
N	1809	1822	1238	2276	1794	2427
Panel D: Citizenship	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Citizenship	0.05	0.14***	0.09**	0.07	0.03	0.14*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)
R^2	0.14	0.31	0.32	0.24	0.31	0.09
N	1809	1822	1238	2276	1794	2427
Panel E: Fully Specified Components	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x 2nd Gen.	−0.07	−0.04	0.03	−0.07	−0.07	−0.07
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.09)
Threat x 3rd Gen.	0.16*	−0.03	0.06	−0.00	0.20***	0.08
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.11)
Threat x English	0.01	0.11*	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.11
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Threat x Citizen	−0.02	0.08†	0.03	0.06	−0.05	0.09
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.08)
R^2	0.17	0.32	0.34	0.24	0.34	0.10
N	1809	1822	1236	2276	1794	2427
Panel F: Fully Specified Components 2	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x US. Born	0.08	0.02	0.09†	−0.03	0.07	−0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.08)
Threat x English	0.02	0.09*	0.02	0.05	0.07	0.11†
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Threat x Citizen	−0.03	0.05	0.02	0.06	−0.07	0.09
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.08)
R^2	0.16	0.32	0.33	0.24	0.32	0.10
N	1809	1822	1238	2276	1794	2427
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19

Note: ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$, $^\dagger p < 0.1$. All models are fully specified. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

L   Alternative Outcomes

L.1   American Identity

American Centrality (CMPS '16): How much is being American an important part of how you see yourself?

- Very important

- Somewhat important

- Not very important

- Not at all important

Latinx Centrality (CMPS '16): How much is being Hispanic or Latino an important part of how you see yourself?

- Very important

- Somewhat important

- Not very important

- Not at all important

American Pride (Pew '18): I am proud to be an American

- Completely agree

- Mostly agree

- Mostly disagree

- Completely disagree

Latinx Pride (Pew '18): I am proud to be Hispanic/Latino

- Completely agree

- Mostly agree

- Mostly disagree

- Completely disagree

American Self-Categorization (Pew '19): People sometimes use different terms to describe themselves. In general, which ONE of the following terms do you use to describe yourself MOST OFTEN?

- National origin answer

- Hispanic or Latino

- American

L.2 Ethnic Salience

Ethnic Salience (Pew '19: How important is each of the following to what being Hispanic means to you? a) Speaking Spanish, b) Participating or attending Hispanic cultural celebrations, c) Wearing attire that represents your Hispanic heritage or origin, d) Socializing with other Hispanics, e) Having both parents of Hispanic heritage or descent, f) Having a Spanish last name, e) Being Catholic

- Essential part of what being Hispanic means to me

- Important, but not essential

- Not an important part of what being Hispanic means to me

M   Ruling out alternative mechanisms

Table M18: Acculturation is forestalled by deportation threat net of alternative mechanisms

	Liberal Immigration Policy Index					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Acculturation x Threat	0.13*	0.16**	0.13*	0.09†	0.12*	0.27**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.10)
Acculturation x Experienced Discrim.	0.09†	−0.09†	−0.01	0.07*	0.03	0.08
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Acculturation x Perceived Discrim.	−0.02	0.02*	0.05	0.01		
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.06)		
Acculturation x Latino ID				0.18**	0.19†	
				(0.07)	(0.10)	
Acculturation x American ID				−0.08	−0.28***	
				(0.07)	(0.06)	
Acculturation x % Latino (Zip)		−0.00	−0.20	−0.01	0.07	
		(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.14)	
Acculturation x % Non-citizen (Zip)		0.10	0.26	−0.10	0.20	
		(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.16)	(0.19)	
Acculturation x % Latino (County)		0.04	0.15	0.02	−0.22	
		(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.17)	
Acculturation x % Non-citizen (County)		−0.02	−0.18	0.10	0.21	
		(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.19)	
Acculturation x Ethnic Media		0.26†	0.26*	−0.09		
		(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.07)		
Acculturation x WWII Cohort	0.18*	−0.07	0.06	0.02	0.32**	
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.11)	
Acculturation x Mex/CA	0.01	0.01	−0.01	−0.04		0.01
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)		(0.07)
Acculturation x Income	−0.13	−0.07	−0.10	0.10	−0.01	
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.08)	
Acculturation x Education	0.07	−0.04	0.08	0.04	0.15†	0.18†
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.11)
Acculturation x Unemployed	−0.04	0.04	−0.03	0.07	−0.04	
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	
Acculturation x Know Deported			−0.03			−0.19*
			(0.04)			(0.09)
Acculturation x Know Undocumented				−0.05		−0.01
				(0.04)		(0.07)
Acculturation x Immigration Stop			0.10			
			(0.07)			
Acculturation x Deportation Rate				−1.69	0.36	
				(1.35)	(1.41)	
Acculturation x Log(Deportations + 1)				0.16†	−0.14	
				(0.08)	(0.10)	
Acculturation x % Level 3 Deportations				−0.27	0.03	
				(0.18)	(0.12)	
R²	0.17	0.34	0.35	0.26	0.35	0.10
Num. obs.	1809	1822	1236	2276	1794	2427
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Zipcode Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Census Area FE	Y	N	N	N	N	Y
State FE	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N

Note: ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$, †$p < 0.1$. All covariates scaled between 0-1. All models are fully specified. Each column characterizes a different survey at use. Geographic covariates below the Census Area level are not available for the Pew 2007 and Pew 2019 surveys. Coefficients of interest are bold. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

N Ruling out alternative ideological considerations

N.1 CMPS '16

Table N19: Association between threat and immigration-irrelevant outcomes (CMPS '16)

	Gay Marriage	Climate	Obamacare	Tax Rich	Voter ID	Liberalism Index	Immigration Index
Panel A: No Interaction	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Threat	0.08**	0.01	0.05†	−0.01	−0.03	−0.02	0.11***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
R^2	0.23	0.28	0.19	0.18	0.10	0.29	0.24
N	2276	2276	2276	2276	2276	2276	2276
Panel B: Interaction	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Threat x Acculturation	−0.08	−0.04	0.01	0.03	−0.20***	−0.03	0.09†
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
R^2	0.23	0.28	0.19	0.18	0.11	0.29	0.25
N	2276	2276	2276	2276	2276	2276	2276
Liberalism Index Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$, †$p < 0.1$. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Panel A displays the unconditional association between threat and immigration irrelevant outcomes. Panel B displays the association between the threat/acculturation interaction and immigration irrelevant outcomes. The first outcome is support for banning gay marriage. The second outcome is support for climate change legislation. The third outcome is support for Obamacare. The fourth outcome is support for taxing the rich. The fifth outcome is support for restrictive voter ID laws. The sixth outcome is an index of the immigration-irrelevant liberal policy outcomes. The seventh outcome is the liberal immigration policy index. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

N.2 Pew '19

Table N20: Association between threat and immigration-irrelevant outcomes (Pew '19)

	Min. Wage	Health Care	Guns	Liberalism Index	Support DACA
Panel A: No Interaction	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Threat	0.05	0.15***	0.08**	0.08***	0.08*
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
R^2	0.10	0.15	0.18	0.22	0.13
N	2407	2427	2393	2376	2376
Panel B: Interaction	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Threat x Acculturation	0.07	0.23*	0.15*	0.13*	0.16
	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.10)
R^2	0.10	0.15	0.19	0.23	0.14
N	2407	2427	2393	2376	2376
Liberalism Index Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Census Region FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$, †$p < 0.1$. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Panel A displays the unconditional association between threat and immigration irrelevant outcomes. Panel B displays the association between the threat/acculturation interaction and immigration irrelevant outcomes. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

O   Accounting for nativism

O.1   Measuring nativism

For the Pew '07 survey, nativism is an index of two survey items. The first asks respondents to indicate whether "Illegal immigrants help the economy by providing low cost labor" or "Illegal immigrants hurt the economy by driving wages down" is closer to their view. This is measured as a binary indicator equal to 1 if they indicate illegal immigrants hurt the economy. The second item asks respondents to give their opinion on the effect of the growing number of undocumented immigrants on Latinos living in the U.S. They can say it is a "positive development," a "negative development," or "has had no impact one way or the other." This item is measured as a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent indicates undocumented immigration is a "negative development." The two binary indicators are added up to generate a nativism index.

For the Pew '08 survey, the nativism measure is built from a single item asking respondents whether they think "immigrants increase, reduce, or have no effect on crime in your community." The measure is a binary indicator equal to 1 if they indicate immigrants increase crime in their community.

For the Pew '10 survey, nativism is an additive index built from 3 items. The first asks respondents if they believe "immigrants strengthen our country because of their hard work and talents," "immigrants are a burden because they take our jobs, housing and health care," or "neither." It is measured as a binary indicator equal to 1 if they indicate "immigrants are a burden." The second asks respondents if they believe the effect of undocumented immigration on Latinos already living in the U.S. is "positive," "negative," or "has had no effect." The item is measured as a binary indicator equal to 1 if they indicate undocumented immigration's effect is "negative." The third item asks respondents if they believe one of the reasons immigrants come to the U.S. illegally is to have a child in the U.S. The measure is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the respondent indicates "Yes."

For the CMPS '16 survey, the nativism measure is built from a single item asking respondents on a 4-point likert scale whether they agree "immigrants take jobs, housing and healthcare away from people born in the U.S."

O.2 First-order association

Table O21: Association between threat and liberal immigration policy preferences (adjusting for nativism)

	Liberal Immigration Policy			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Threat	0.08***	0.11***	0.06***	0.10***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Nativism	−0.23***	−0.11***	−0.16***	−0.17***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
R^2	0.21	0.33	0.35	0.28
N	1809	1822	1236	2276
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
State FE	N	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	N	N	N

Note: ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

O.3 Heterogeneity

Table O22: Association between threat and liberal immigration policy preferences (adjusting for nativism)

	Liberal Immigration Policy			
Panel A: Full Sample	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Threat x Acculturation	0.05	0.17**	0.12*	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Nativism x Acculturation	−0.15†	−0.20**	−0.11	−0.13*
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Threat x Nativism	0.14†	0.00	0.11	0.20**
	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Acculturation	−0.07*	−0.16***	−0.13**	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Threat	0.03	0.04	−0.01	0.05
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Nativism	−0.20***	−0.03	−0.15*	−0.16**
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)
R^2	0.22	0.35	0.37	0.30
N	1809	1822	1236	2276
Panel B: Mexicans Only	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Threat x Acculturation	0.21***	0.14*	0.20***	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Nativism x Acculturation	−0.03	−0.22**	−0.11	−0.18*
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)
Threat x Nativism	0.23**	0.00	0.07	0.20*
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Acculturation	−0.13**	−0.14**	−0.15**	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Threat	−0.02	0.06	−0.03	0.06
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Nativism	−0.30***	−0.03	−0.10	−0.12
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
R^2	0.25	0.36	0.38	0.33
N	1196	1220	833	1498
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
State FE	N	Y	Y	Y
Census Area FE	Y	N	N	N

Note: ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$. All covariates scaled between 0-1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

P Accounting for socio-tropic threat

P.1 Measuring socio-tropic threat

The Pew '07 measure asks if respondents have observed "more efforts to discourage undocumented or illegal immigration" in their local community in the past year. The measure is converted to a binary indicator equal to 1 if they indicate "more efforts" instead of "no change" or "fewer efforts." The Pew '08 measure asks if respondents perceive there has been "an increase, decrease, or no change in the number of immigration enforcement actions around the country aimed at undocumented immigrants." The measure is converted to a binary indicator equal to 1 if a respondent indicates there has been an "increase."

P.2 Adjusting for socio-tropic threat

Table P23: Accounting for socio-tropic threat

	Liberal Immigration Policy			
Personal Threat	0.09***	0.05*	0.11***	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Socio-Tropic Threat	0.01	0.03	0.03*	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Personal Threat x Acculturation		0.12*		0.20***
		(0.06)		(0.06)
Socio-tropic Threat x Acculturation		−0.06		0.01
		(0.05)		(0.04)
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '08
R^2	0.15	0.16	0.31	0.32
N	1809	1809	1822	1822
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zipcode Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
State FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$. All covariates scaled between 0-1. All models are fully specified. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Q   Using ordered logistic regression

Q.1   First-order association

Table Q24: Replicating unconditional influence of threat using ordered logistic regression

| | Liberal Immigration Policy | | | | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat	0.65***	0.83***	0.68***	1.41***	1.17***	1.29***
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.21)
AIC	4851.63	5550.94	4710.40	4123.87	3465.04	1600.55
BIC	4988.86	5781.69	4924.95	4380.89	3680.46	1722.23
Log Likelihood	-2400.81	-2733.47	-2313.20	-2017.94	-1693.52	-779.28
Deviance	4801.63	5466.94	4626.40	4035.87	3387.04	1626.11
N	1789	1797	1222	2544	1851	2427
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19
Model	OLogit	OLogit	OLogit	OLogit	OLogit	Logit
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Zipcode Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$. Census Area FE used to ensure identification.

Q.2   Heterogeneity

Table Q25: Replicating conditional influence of threat using ordered logistic regression

| | Liberal Immigration Policy | | | | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Threat x Acculturation	0.94**	1.25***	1.58***	1.33***	1.75***	1.81***
	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.37)	(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.55)
Threat	0.32	0.37*	−0.02	0.65**	0.36	0.48
	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.32)
Acculturation	−1.17***	−1.45***	−1.77***	−0.64**	−1.30***	−1.11***
	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.27)	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.26)
AIC	4844.66	5537.34	4693.48	4108.43	3441.76	1595.45
BIC	4987.38	5773.58	4913.13	4371.29	3662.71	1722.92
Log Likelihood	-2396.33	-2725.67	-2303.74	-2009.21	-1680.88	-775.72
Deviance	4792.66	5451.34	4607.48	4018.43	3361.76	1615.02
N	1789	1797	1222	2544	1851	2427
Survey	Pew '07	Pew '08	Pew '10	CMPS '16	Pew '18	Pew '19
Model	OLogit	OLogit	OLogit	OLogit	OLogit	Logit
Demographic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Socio-Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Zipcode Controls	N/A	Y	Y	Y	Y	N/A
Census Area FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$. Census Area FE used to ensure identification.

R   Asian-American replication

Table R26: Replicating influence of deportation threat among Asian-American survey sample

	Liberal Immigration Policy			
Threat	0.07	0.11**	0.13**	0.12*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Acculturation		0.09**	0.11**	0.09**
		(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Threat x Acculturation			−0.14	−0.02
			(0.10)	(0.10)
R^2	0.01	0.16	0.03	0.16
Num. obs.	802	802	802	802
Controls	N	Y	N	Y

Note: $***p < 0.001$, $**p < 0.01$, $*p < 0.05$. All models adjust for age, gender, national origin, education, and partisanship. Regression weights included to approximate the national Asian-American population. Robust standard errors in parentheses

Here, I present estimates characterizing the influence of deportation threat on liberal immigration policy preferences among a sample of Asian-Americans from the Pew 2013 Asian-American survey (N = 802). Liberal immigration policy preferences are an additive index of binary indicators capturing approval for 1) increasing the number of temporary work visas for agriculture and food industry workers, 2) not increasing enforcement of immigration laws at U.S. borders, 3) increasing the number of temporary work visas for highly skilled workers, 4) creating a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants if they meet certain requirements, and 5) not decreasing legal immigration into the United States.

Deportation threat is the same as the measure used in the Pew Latino surveys. However, acculturation is measured differently. The Asian-American survey does not ask about whether parents are born in the United States. Therefore, I cannot identify Asian-Americans who are third-generation or more. I can only identify who is foreign-born. Moreover, I use an item measuring whether English is the only language spoken at home for the respondent as a stand-in for language-of-interview. I construct an additive index of citizenship status, whether the respondent is US-born, and whether the respondent speaks only English at home to measure acculturation.

In all estimates characterizing the influence of deportation threat using the 2013 Asian-American survey, I adjust for age, gender, national origin (binary indicators for Indian, Chinese, Filipino, and Japanese), education, and partisanship.

Table R26 displays the unconditional and conditional association between deportation threat and liberal immigration policy preferences. After adjusting for control covariates, namely, acculturation, deportation threat is prognostic of liberal immigration policy preferences. These findings corroborate the first-order association displayed in the main text for Latinxs. However, deportation threat does not appear to have a stronger influence on motivating liberal immigration policy preferences among more acculturated Asian-Americans.

The absence of heterogenous effects may be because acculturation appears to motivate *more liberal* attitudes among Asian-Americans. For Latinxs, deportation threat forestalls a process engendering conservative attitudes. However, for Asian-Americans, acculturation is not an intrinsically conservative process that must be forestalled by deportation threat. This interpretation of the null result begs the question: Why does acculturation generate liberal preferences among Asian-Americans but conservative preferences among Latinxs? Perhaps "forever foreigner" stereotypes along with potentially more visible phenotypical markers that serve as the basis for discrimination make it more difficult for integrated Asian-Americans to distance themselves politically from new immigrants (Zhou, 2004; Lee and Kye, 2016). Moreover, new Asian immigrant cohorts may be relatively conservative on immigration policy since they tend to be of a higher socio-economic status who migrated legally and therefore do not perceive a connection with other immigrants (Park, 2020). Prior evidence corroborates these theoretical insights, with more acculturated Asian-Americans being more likely to support liberal immigration policies and the Democratic party (Kuo, Malhotra, and Mo, 2017; Park, 2020).

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