

The Immigration-to-Reproduction Shift: Latino Population Growth and White Support for Legal Abortion

Tyler T Reny[†], Marcel Roman^{*}, and Benjamin Newman[†]

[‡]Department of Politics and Policy, Claremont Graduate University

^{*}Department of Government, Harvard University

[†]School of Public Policy & Department of Political Science, University of California, Riverside

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Abstract

The literature on White Americans' reaction to demographic change continues to focus on immigration despite the fact that the ethnic diversification of the United States is increasingly driven by non-White births. We extend past research on White backlash against ethnic diversification to the domain of reproductive policy—testing the idea that prejudiced Whites will support abortion in response to growing minority populations as a means of slowing demographic change via non-White reproduction. Using large-N and original surveys of the American public, we find that Whites residing in locales with substantial growth in the Latino population are more supportive of access to legal abortion. This relationship is not observed among non-Whites and is confined to Whites higher in prejudice. We replicate these findings with a series of experiments showing that priming prejudiced Whites to think about Latino population growth increases their support for racially-targeted abortion as well as other reproduction-limiting policies.

“We can’t restore our civilization with somebody else’s babies.”

Representative Steve King, IA-5

“2024 did actually have a slight uptick in births, in America. Bad news. It was just the anchor babies from the illegal immigrants.”

Peachy Keenan, 2025, NatalCon

Introduction

The United States has become more ethnically diverse over the past 40 years, with non-Latino Whites moving from roughly 80% of the population in 1980 down to 57% in 2020. In several states (e.g., CA, MD, NV, NM and TX), the White population during this 40-year period switched from being the majority to a numerical minority, and other states (e.g., AZ, NY, NJ, MD, GA and FL) will soon follow. The ethnic diversification of the United States has been driven by immigration¹ and high birth rates among non-Whites.² At the forefront of this process is the Latino population, which is the largest ethnic minority group in the United States. The majority of the growth of Latinos in the United States between 1980 to 2000 was attributable to annual immigration. However, beginning in the 2000's, annual births of Latinos began outpacing annual immigration and by 2020 most of the growth of the Latino population in the country was due to reproduction.³ A recent census report indicates that, between 2022 to 2023, Latino population growth accounted for roughly 71% of the nation's

¹<https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requested-statistics-immigrants-and-immigration-united-states-2022>

²<https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2012/05/17/explaining-why-minority-births-now-outnumber-white-births/>

³<https://policycommons.net/artifacts/2679432/key-facts-about-us/3702727/>

total growth and was driven primarily by Latino births.⁴ The Latino youth population is visibly at the foreground of shifting racial demographics in America, with the number of Latino students in public school growing in each of the 50 states between 2010 to 2021 and forecast to comprise nearly one-third of all public school enrollment by 2030.⁵ At the same time, the White population began to decline in 2016, with the primary cause being a notable contraction in the White youth population and deaths among Whites outpacing births.⁶

Accompanying these ongoing demographic shifts has been growing concern among White Americans over their loss in numerical, cultural, economic and political dominance (Craig and Richeson, 2014; Craig et al., 2018; Gest et al., 2018). One controversial embodiment of Whites' concern over demographic change is belief in the "Great Replacement": a White nationalist conspiracy theory claiming a clandestine effort by leaders across Western nations to demographically and culturally replace White European populations with non-Whites through international migration and declining White birth rates.^{7,8} This idea has been discussed for years on Fox News⁹ and recent survey data indicates that roughly 30% of Americans—and over half of those identifying with the Republican Party—agree with key features of this conspiracy theory.¹⁰ Focusing specifically on the declining White population, a national survey conducted in 2021 found that 22% of Americans view this decline as a bad thing for society¹¹ and a follow-up survey conducted in 2024 found that 39% of registered voters intending to support Trump viewed White decline as a bad thing.¹² Belief in this conspiracy theory served as a motivating factor for several high-profile public mass shootings

⁴<https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2024/population-estimates-characteristics.html>

⁵<https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/2022/10/11/latino-student-population-us-schools/10426950002/>

⁶https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/brookings_policybriefs_reports/11/

⁷<https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/05/14/nyregion/buffalo-shooting>

⁸<https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2022/05/17/racist-great-replacement-conspiracy-theory-explained>

⁹<https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/05/17/great-replacement-theory-is-ignorant-both-broadly-narrowly/>

¹⁰<https://www.boston.com/news/local-news/2022/10/31/umass-poll-significant-numbers-support-great-replacement-theory-on-immigration/>

¹¹Pew Research Center: American Trends Panel Wave 92, July 2021

¹²Pew Research Center: American Trends Panel Wave 146, April 2024

targeting non-White victims, including the 2015 Charleston church shooting, the 2019 El Paso Walmart shooting, and the 2022 Buffalo supermarket shooting.¹³ These instances of acute anti-minority violence comport with longstanding evidence that exposure to non-White population growth can lead Whites to engage in anti-minority hate crime (Green et al., 1998).

Despite the shift in the source of Latino population growth from immigration to reproduction, the scholarly literature on White backlash to ethnic diversification remains dominated by studies on Whites' opposition to immigration (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015; Branton et al., 2011; Earle and Hodson, 2022; Hopkins, 2010; Maggio, 2023; Newman, 2013) and endorsement of nativist politicians (Hill et al., 2019; Maggio, 2021; Newman et al., 2018; Reny et al., 2019), with little-to-no research exploring possible effects on Whites' preferences over reproductive policies. This omission in the literature is notable given that growth in the Latino population is forecast to continue being driven by births,¹⁴ which would imply a shift in the locus of efforts by Whites to curb demographic change from policies regulating the amount of immigration to those affecting levels of reproduction. Such policies include the ease of access to birth control, sterilization procedures, and legal abortion. In sum, Latino population growth, and the *immigration-to-reproduction shift* in Latino population growth, are predominant forces shaping the nation's ongoing demographic transformation. The research question we ask is: Do these forces factor into White Americans' preferences over reproductive rights and abortion policy?

We find this question particularly salient in light of the June 2022 Supreme Court ruling on *Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization*, which ended the federal constitutional right to abortion in the United States, and the drastic ramping up of political conflict over state-level abortion bans in the wake of this ruling.¹⁵ Initiatives related to abortion and women's reproductive rights appeared on the ballot in 10 states in the 2024 General Election,

¹³<https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2022/05/17/racist-great-replacement-conspiracy-theory-explained>

¹⁴<https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2020/demo/p25-1144.pdf>

¹⁵<https://www.guttmacher.org/2023/01/six-months-post-roe-24-us-states-have-banned-abortion-or-are-likely-do-so-roundup>

and the percent of Democratic voters listing abortion policy as “very important” to their vote increased from 35%¹⁶ to 67%¹⁷ between 2020 and 2024. Following the *Dobbs* decision, prominent media outlets drew an explicit connection between abortion policy and growing minority populations by publicizing a report highlighting the disproportionate effect of abortion bans on the rapidly growing Latina population of childbearing age.¹⁸¹⁹²⁰ The Trump Administration and its allies have been conspicuously pronatalist, stating “We want more babies, to put it nicely,”²¹ and citing plummeting birth rates as the impetus for subsidizing IVF treatments and offering a \$5,000 “baby bonus” to new mothers.²² Critics have pointed out that birth rates are declining among White Americans while increasing among Latinos and suggest that the pronatalism of the Trump Administration is racially coded and tacitly motivated to increase White reproduction.²³

Drawing on public opinion research on abortion and literature on racial threat and demographic change, we develop and empirically test several hypotheses linking Latino population growth, and the immigration-to-reproduction shift, to White Americans’ preferences over policies concerning women’s access to legal abortion. We hypothesize that White Americans will embrace permissive reproductive policies when Latino-driven ethnic diversification is salient, and that this process should be propelled by racially prejudiced Whites most averse to growing ethno-racial diversity and the loss of Whites’ dominant status. Our empirical tests use observational data leveraging subnational differences in Latino population growth to capture variation in the salience of Latino-driven demographic change to White Americans, as well as survey experiments that directly manipulate the salience of Latino population

¹⁶<https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/08/13/important-issues-in-the-2020-election/>

¹⁷<https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/09/09/issues-and-the-2024-election/>

¹⁸<https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/latinas-most-impacted-abortion-bans-study-rcna54793>

¹⁹<https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2022/11/07/latinas-disproportionately-impacted-abortion-bans-study/8265533001/>

²⁰<https://latino.ucla.edu/research/abortion-bans-latinas/>

²¹<https://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-reveals-new-ivf-payment-policy-plan-1946435>

²²<https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-administration/critics-question-trump-baby-bonus-proposal-s-just-completely-bananas-rcna203007>

²³<https://vinnews.com/2025/04/24/the-view-host-claims-trumps-baby-bonus-encourages-white-women-to-have-children/>

growth and reproduction.

Using one of the largest national surveys of the adult American population—the Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape survey ($N=464,679$)—we demonstrate that residing in an area experiencing large growth in the Latino population is associated with heightened support for legal abortion. Critically, concern that this relationship is due to the tendency for people with liberal social views to choose to live in areas experiencing demographic change (i.e., residential selection) is mitigated by the following: first, this relationship is only observed among Whites and is entirely absent for Black, Latino, and Asian respondents; second, this relationship is absent when focusing on Black or Asian population growth; third, local exposure to Latino population growth among Whites is not systematically associated with holding more liberal views on gender-relevant attitudes unrelated to abortion; and fourth, analysis of two national panel surveys finds that holding permissive attitudes on abortion policy does not predict moving among Whites to areas experiencing Latino population growth. Above all, using several measures of racial prejudice, we show that it is only among Whites harboring high levels of prejudice that we observe positive and substantively large relationships between exposure to Latino population growth and support for legal abortion. We replicate these results from the Nationscape survey using another large- N dataset: the 2016-2024 Cooperative Election Study (CES; $N=263,735$).

To address potential doubt about whether Whites exposed to Latino population growth actually think about abortion *as a means of Latino population control*, we accompany our large- N survey findings with an original national survey of White Americans asking respondents to report (1) the level of Latino population growth in their local residential context and (2) their support for Latina access to abortion (and other birth control methods) when explicitly posed as a means of *slowing Latino population growth*. Using these ancillary data, we find that, among prejudiced Whites, those reporting residing in an area with a growing Latino population are more supportive of Latina contraception and abortion as a means of slowing Latino growth. Among Whites low in prejudice, we find no association

between perceived Latino growth and support for contraception and abortion as population control. Critically, we show there is no relationship, regardless of level of prejudice, between perceived local Latino growth and support for White women's access to contraception and abortion. Finally, using two preregistered survey experiments, we demonstrate that, when presenting contraception and abortion as means of slowing population growth, depicting the target women as Latina (versus White) only leads to increased support among the most prejudiced White respondents.

Ethnic Diversity and the Politics of Reproduction

The politics of reproduction encompasses a range of issues, from access to education, contraceptives, and healthcare to maternity leave, government aid to women with dependent children, and policies encouraging reproduction. However, one of the central arenas of political conflict in the domain of reproduction is the abortion-rights movement and policies affecting access to legal abortion. Indeed, a review of research exploring public opinion on reproductive policy finds that the majority of scholarly attention has been given to the legality of abortion (Adamczyk and Valdimarsdóttir, 2018). As such, we focus on abortion policy as an epicenter of past and current conflict within the realm of reproductive politics. With this in mind, we turn to the question of what is known about the factors shaping public opinion on abortion, with an eye toward building testable hypotheses about the impact of exposure to shifting ethno-racial demographics on Whites' abortion policy preferences.

Americans' preferences on abortion policy are a known function of individual-level factors like pre-adult family socialization experiences (Pacheco and Kreitzer, 2016) and adulthood educational attainment, religious identity and beliefs, and views toward the role of women in society (Adamczyk and Valdimarsdóttir, 2018; Jelen and Wilcox, 2003; Osborne et al., 2022). Surprisingly, less is known about how factors operative in people's environment shapes their abortion policy preferences. To the extent research on public opinion on abortion addresses

the political environment, the focus has been on Supreme Court rulings (Brickman and Peterson, 2006; Wlezien and Goggin, 1993), state-level political culture (Cook et al., 1993b), and state and local religious context (Adamczyk and Valdimarsdóttir, 2018; Cook et al., 1993a; Olson, 2019), with little research focusing on racial context and shifting demographics. A handful of studies explore the relationship between White Americans' racial attitudes and their opposition to abortion (Allen and Olson, 2022; Baker et al., 2022; Deckman et al., 2023); however, this work does not theoretically or empirically incorporate Whites' ethno-racial environment. Overall, while the existing literature does not address racial demographics, it does establish an empirical precedent for the relevance of race and the political environment in shaping abortion policy preferences. This, in turn, serves as a basis for extending longstanding theories of group conflict and racial threat to Whites' attitudes on abortion.

Realistic group conflict theory contends that conflict between groups is a product of feelings of threat and antipathy that arise from competition over resources (Jackson, 1993; LeVine and Campbell, 1972). Within this theoretical tradition is a corpus of research focusing on race-relations in the United States and the role of local racial demographics in shaping White Americans' political attitudes and behavior. Referred to as "racial threat" (Key, 1949), the primary hypothesis is that the size of geographically proximate non-White groups will drive Whites' perception of threat and support for anti-minority policies and politicians (Carsey, 1995; Giles and Buckner, 1993; Glaser, 1994). Recent research finds this theorized process to be particularly operative in instances involving drastic changes (i.e., increases or decreases) in the size of a proximate non-White group (Enos, 2016; Hopkins, 2012; Reny and Newman, 2018a), which is consistent with sub-variants of group conflict theory emphasizing the potential for anti-minority violence following the entry or growth of non-Whites in White communities (Green et al., 1998). While originally formulated to explain White-Black relations in the American South, the racial threat hypothesis has been adapted over time to reflect shifting demographic trends in the United States, such as the dramatic influx of immigrants from Mexico and Central America beginning in the 1970s and resultant rapid

growth of the Latino population (Campbell et al., 2006; Citrin et al., 1990; Hopkins, 2010; Newman, 2013). As the non-White group in focus shifted from Black to Latino Americans, the hypotheses tested have been adjusted to reflect key facets of Anglo-Latino relations that may condition the manifestation of threat among Whites, such as the legal status (Hood and Morris, 1998) and level of cultural assimilation (Citrin et al., 1990; Newman et al., 2012a; Rocha and Espino, 2009) of nearby Latino populations.

Given the present juncture of demographic trends in America, where the source of Latino-driven ethnic diversification has shifted from immigration to reproduction, the grounds are ripe for yet another adaptation of longstanding racial threat theory—this time to the domain of reproductive politics and policies affecting access to legal abortion. Drastic growth in Latino populations has been linked to state-level adoption of restrictive immigration laws (Marquez and Schraufnagel, 2013; Newman et al., 2012b; Ybarra et al., 2016) and support among Whites' for anti-immigrant policies (Hopkins, 2010; Newman, 2013) and politicians (Maggio, 2021; Newman et al., 2018; Reny et al., 2019). Underlying these findings is a common presumed mechanism: people support policies that are perceived to mitigate a threat (Huddy et al., 2007; Albertson and Gadarian, 2015; Brandt et al., 2021). In the case of this research, Whites threatened by growing Latino populations are theorized to favor policies believed to curb Latino-driven ethnic diversification. For decades, this policy outlet was immigration, with the locus of White backlash to Latino-driven diversification being support for restrictive immigration policies that would slow the *entry* of Latinos into the nation. However, with the *immigration-to-reproduction* shift in the source of Latino population growth, one outlet of increasing importance may be policies that affect the amount of reproduction among Latinos, such as those shaping the ease of access to legal abortion.

For decades, researchers have proposed voluntarily limiting births as an obvious means to slow population growth (Mumford and Kessel, 1986). With Latino immigration slowing in the 21st century and Latino growth being primarily driven by high birth rates, it stands to reason that the desire to curb Latino growth may lead Whites threatened by Latino growth to oppose

policies that create barriers to the ability of members of the Latino community to limit their own reproduction by averting childbirth. Prior research finds that not all citizens react the same way to contact with immigrant minorities or shifting racial demographics. Individual differences in partisanship (Homola and Tavits, 2018), ideological identification (Brown et al., 2022), and authoritarian orientations (Johnston et al., 2015; Velez and Lavine, 2017) have been found to condition Americans' reactions to contact with immigrants and increasing ethnic diversity. A presumed mechanism underlying these findings is that racial prejudice—or factors highly correlated with it (e.g., partisanship, ideology, authoritarianism)—shapes the likelihood that a member of a dominant ethno-racial group will have an aversive reaction to growing ethnic diversity.

In sum, the evidence indicates that prejudiced Whites are most averse to increasing ethno-racial diversity and most concerned about the loss of Whites' dominant status in American society. By extension, Whites who dislike racial and ethnic minorities should be the most likely to react to minority population growth with a desire to curb the growth. This desire may lead to elevated support for policy tools (e.g., legal abortion) that may curtail mounting ethnic diversity. We therefore hypothesize that White Americans will embrace permissive reproductive policies when Latino-driven ethnic diversification is salient, and that this process will be propelled by racially prejudiced Whites.

Although our hypothesis may be complicated by the fact permissive reproductive policies could also mitigate white births, we posit that the salience of Latino-driven population growth (at the relative expense of the white population) may induce some white people to discount this trade-off in order to mitigate the differentially growing Latino population. The white birth mitigation trade-off may be less tangible to whites for two reasons: 1) statistically, Latina abortion rates are twice as large as white abortion rates,²⁴ suggesting whites may not perceive a white birth mitigation trade-off since permissive reproductive policies differentially repress Latino births and 2) prejudiced whites hold stereotypes that

²⁴See: https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/72/ss/ss7209a1.htm#T6_down

non-whites are differentially more likely to have abortions than white women (Brown-Iannuzzi et al., 2025), implying that prejudiced whites may perceive relatively limited white birth mitigation from permissive reproductive policies, especially in response to Latino-driven ethnic diversification. The stereotype, both perceived and objective, that non-whites get more abortions may be a “generalized ideational concept” that encourages whites to support policy tools to mitigate Latino population growth (Bobo and Massagli, 2001).

Reproductive Policy and (Racialized) Population Control

The feasibility of these predictions hinge on the extent to which abortion is perceived by the general public as a tool for slowing population growth. Prior research probing Americans' views toward interventions to curtail population growth in developing nations offers a critical window suggesting widespread public recognition that access to birth control and legal abortion are usable policy tools to slow population growth. When asked about the reasons for high birth rates in developing nations, 89% of Americans viewed “lack of access to birth control” as an important reason. Given this, it is unsurprising that roughly 70% of Americans reported favoring providing aid for birth control to help reduce population growth in poverty-stricken countries²⁵. In a study soliciting Americans' support for various policy tools to control population growth in developing nations, 85% favored providing free birth control to women and 53% favored making abortions easily available to any women who want them²⁶. It is a longstanding fact that the prevalence of legal abortion is associated with lower population growth rates (Mumford and Kessel, 1986; Tietze, 1975) and the American public evinces considerable awareness of this relationship, at least when considering policy interventions in foreign nations. Indeed, the U.S. federal government has long been involved in attempts to limit population growth in foreign nations. Starting in the late 1960s, USAID aggressively pursued family planning services in foreign nations, funding contraception, advocating for sterilization, and developing new means of self-administered abortion (Lowande and Salinas-

²⁵Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Poll: July 2004

²⁶Gallup News Service Poll: April 1992

Muñiz, 2024). Having established a basis of support for the presumption that Americans make a connection between abortion and population growth, the next set of connections to be addressed are between race, shifting racial demographics, and abortion policy.

The idea that race and shifting demographics play a role in the politics of reproduction is far from new. Forced birth control via eugenic sterilization represents a deplorable chapter in the history of White supremacy in the United States. By the mid 20th century, 32 of the 50 states had eugenics boards overseeing multiple sterilization operations disproportionately targeting non-White populations.²⁷ In response to the growing Civil Rights movement, White supremacists in the American South were particularly supportive of these birth control practices to stop the “black tide which threatens to engulf us”.²⁸ Rates of forced sterilization of Latina women—targeted as immigrants of “undesirable type”—were egregious. In California, where nearly a third (an estimated 20,000) of all documented compulsory sterilizations occurred, doctors frequently targeted Latinas (Novak et al., 2018), often mere minutes from cesarean deliveries (Stern, 2005b). These sterilizations were carried out either without consent or through various forms of coercion (*No Más Bebés* 2016). These forced sterilizations culminated in the 1978 federal class-action lawsuit *Madrigal v. Quilligan*, which led to significant national reforms regarding informed consent for patients, particularly those with limited English proficiency. At the same time, women on the island of Puerto Rico faced among the highest rates of sterilization in the world. Between 1940 and 1970, an estimated third of the women on the island were sterilized (Sotomayor, 2020). The impetus behind these sterilization laws and campaigns were multifaceted, though a central component was limiting the reproduction of groups considered undesirable—those with “deleterious genes” from “degenerate stock”—to the larger national racial project (Stern, 2005a; Reilly, 2015).

The relevance of race is also evident when focusing on voluntary contraceptives and abortion. From the onset of the American birth control movement in the 1900s, impassioned

²⁷<https://www.pbs.org/independentlens/blog/unwanted-sterilization-and-eugenics-programs-in-the-united-states/>

²⁸<https://www.mississippifreepress.org/12782/the-troubling-past-of-forced-sterilization-of-black-women-and-girls-in-mississippi-and-the-south>

claims were made by leaders of all races about the racial ramifications of birth control. Against the backdrop of declining birth rates among native-born Whites, Former President Theodore Roosevelt wrote an article in 1911 in the New York City based weekly family magazine, *The Outlook*, expressing “contempt for the woman who shirks her primal and most essential duty,” and denouncing the use of contraceptives among educated White women, or what he termed “good stock Americans,” as “race suicide” (Tone, 2002). These historical moments highlight that abortion policy preferences among Whites are seemingly malleable and shaped by salient changes in the size of Whites vis-a-vis non-White groups and by the ethno-racial groups envisioned as recipients of abortions.

The early 20th-century concept of “race suicide” has re-emerged in the contemporary White nationalist conspiracy theory known as the “Great Replacement,” which is gaining traction across the Western world. Modern White nationalist leaders speak explicitly about the role of reproduction in shaping national demography. Tom Metzger, a former Grand Dragon of the Ku Klux Klan, openly articulated the importance of a reproduction strategy for securing a White future in the United States, stating: “Very little abortion should be tolerated among our white race, while at the same time, abortion and birth control should be promoted as a powerful weapon in the limitation of non-White birth... Covertly invest in non-White areas, invest in ghetto abortion clinics. Help to raise money for free abortions in primarily non-White areas” (Kaplan, 2000). These views are echoed by Greg Johnson, a prominent White supremacist and editor of the White nationalist webzine *Counter-Currents*. In a widely-circulated essay on abortion, Johnson argues that the practice should be tolerated in multiracial democracies because it delays the point at which White Americans become a numerical minority. As he writes, “in the case of abortion, the Left has worked fanatically to institute and maintain a form of mass murder that actually works in our demographic favor. It also works in our favor culturally: since liberals and anti-natalists abort more of their offspring than conservatives and pro-natalists, abortion shrinks the white Left as well as its non-white voting blocs.” Reader responses to this essay reinforce this racialized logic.

One commenter notes, “In a multi-racial society, abortion helps to keep Whites from being completely swamped. I hate to see Whites having abortions, but if other races want to do it then that’s up to them. The evil of our society being over-run and destroyed far outweighs the evil of legalized abortion, in my opinion” (Johnson, 2016).

Such views are by no means limited to explicitly White supremacist forums or fringe White nationalist ideologies. Rather, narratives surrounding the “Great Replacement” and the role of reproduction in shaping the nation’s demographic future have become increasingly common across mainstream websites and widely-used social media platforms. Discussions on X (formerly Twitter), Quora, and Reddit frequently feature debates that echo demographic anxieties and racially contingent views on fertility, abortion, and population growth. Even brief searches on these platforms reveal the normalization of replacement rhetoric and the central role of racialized reproductive politics. We include examples in Table 1 below. These ideas have diffused into the consciousness of the mass public. Survey data reveal that a substantial share of Americans endorse core tenets of the “Great Replacement” conspiracy theory. For instance, approximately 23% of White Americans view the projected shift—whereby Black, Latino, and Asian Americans are expected to comprise the majority of the U.S. population by 2050—as a negative development. Nearly half (46%) of White respondents believe that a majority-minority America will undermine traditional American customs and values.²⁹ And many Americans, especially prejudiced Americans, openly express that they think Latinos have too many children. A 2014 survey fielded by the National Hispanic Media Coalition found that 57% of White, and 86% of prejudiced White, Americans agreed that “have too many children” describes Hispanics or Latinos “very” or “somewhat” well (see Figure C3), a sentiment expressed openly by a speaker at Donald Trump’s Madison Square Garden rally in 2024.³⁰ Beyond its link to racialized views toward reproduction, belief in the “Great Replacement” was found to be correlated with support for the January 6th insurrection and anti-democratic practices like overturning election results (Barreto et al., 2023).

²⁹Pew Research Center, 2019

³⁰<https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy9jj2g75q4o>

Table 1: Example Commentary from Social Media and Original Survey Data

Source	Sample Quotes
Reddit	<p>”There is no real good solution. Unless we ban abortion for just whites and asians and let hispanics and blacks abort innocent children, that is.”</p> <p>”Joke’s on you, I support abortion and don’t support rapid population growth in minorities.”</p> <p>”I am all for the right to chose for non whites”</p> <p>”That’s why we need to encourage more abortion. Blacks abort at 4-5x the rate that White women do. We need to push abortion hard to the Latino, African, and Muslim Americans. Abortion should be free and easily accessible...for blacks, Indians/Pakis, and Chinese. It should be completely outlawed for Whites and Japanese.</p>
X	<p>I support 100% free and unfettered access to abortion for Blaques and Hispanics.</p> <p>”I think abortion should be legal for any woman as long as she is not white. Minorities deserve their rights to abortion. What is your opinion?”</p> <p>”Why can’t we have a grand bargain on abortion: no abortions for Whites but let everyone get them at any stage before birth, with them being free for Blacks?”</p> <p>”If women of color would rather abort their children than give them birth, why do whites worry about being replaced, rather than just sitting back and allowing non-whites to dwindle their own numbers?”</p>
Quora	<p>”Abortion for white women should be illegal. Abortion for minorities in America should be required if not strongly encouraged.”</p> <p>”I was thinking about how necessary it is to have more babies. Especially white people so the foundation of the country remains the same. We need more whites and to eliminate immigration completely.”</p> <p>”I think latinas typically have too many children as is, even when it’s not reasonable or affordable for them. It would serve them well to regularly take contraception and be able to terminate unwanted pregnancies.”</p> <p>”The population of non-Whites will continue to rise if we don’t cease the promoting of their reproduction and cultures. Far too many illegal, and legal immigrants have come into this country. Their population is beginning to grow to a point of rivalling the White population, and all the while, Whites are taught to not care. We are taught that we shouldn’t prioritize the survival of our race and culture, in a world that openly wants the extinction of the White race. I don’t like abortion for Whites. For non-Whites however, I see it as a means to an end.”</p> <p>”We need to limit how much the foreign people can reproduce. I would not be opposed to no citizens being sterilized permanently. White people are being replaced and it needs to be stopped.”</p>
Original Survey 2025	

Original survey data we collected in 2025 using an adult sample benchmarked to national demographics ($n = 990$, July 2025) via CloudResearch Connect provide further evidence of diffuse support for central tenets of “Great Replacement” ideology. In our survey, 51% of respondents reported that the prospect of the White population becoming a minority would change the nation’s “culture and way of life.” Additionally, 24% agreed that this demographic shift is being intentionally engineered by political elites to “replace” native-born Americans with immigrants. These changes are not viewed neutrally: 33% of respondents agreed that demographic transformation will “import conflict from other countries,” and 17% believed it will make it more difficult to “maintain law and order.” Even more explicit views on racialized reproduction emerged in responses to an open-ended question embedded in another of our surveys ($N=1,483$, July 2025) also collected via CloudResearch Connect (see Appendix F).³¹ Following a battery of questions measuring support for reproduction-limiting population control methods for either Latinas or White women—we asked respondents to explain, in their own words, why they answered as they did. The bottom portion of Table 1 presents a selection of illustrative responses. These responses reveal that many of our respondents view reproductive health through an explicitly racialized lens. Attitudes about reproduction are clearly conditioned on the race of the beneficiaries: respondents frequently expressed enthusiasm for limiting abortion for White women while explicitly supporting it for Latinas. In sum, core elements of the “Great Replacement” conspiracy theory are not restricted to fringe discourse but are endorsed by a substantial segment of the American public, potentially shaping attitudes toward reproductive policy in meaningful and systematic ways.

Overview of Data and Methods

The immigration-to-reproduction shift in the source of Latino-led ethnic diversification of America, the imminent transition of the United States from a majority White to non-White nation, and the persisting relevance of race and racial demographics to the politics

³¹This is the same survey used for our conceptual replication and our second survey experiment.

of reproduction, each provide strong impetus for scholarship on White backlash to turn its attention to reproductive policy. The primary expectations we seek to test are that White Americans will embrace permissive reproductive policies when Latino-driven ethnic diversification is salient, and that this process will be propelled by racially prejudiced Whites. We test these expectations across three empirical studies.

Our first study employs secondary analyses of large-N survey data and leverages existing subnational differences in Latino population growth throughout the United States to capture variation in the salience of Latino-driven demographic change to White Americans. National level processes (e.g., ethno-racial demographic change) do not necessarily unfold uniformly across the nation; instead, they tend to manifest more in some regions or localities and less in others. This is the case with nationwide economic trends, such as economic downturns (Hall et al., 2021; Healy and Lenz, 2017) and growing income inequality (Newman, 2020), as well as Latino population growth (Newman and Velez, 2014b). This offers researchers a natural opportunity to leverage spatial differences in Latino growth to capture variation in the salience of Latino-driven demographic change to White Americans. Prior research demonstrates that people are aware of the demographic characteristics of their surrounding residential environment (Newman et al., 2015b) and that a wide range of people's political beliefs, policy preferences, and behaviors are shaped by personal experiences rooted in their local residential context (Egan and Mullin, 2012; Nathan and Sands, 2023). As such, we take advantage of heterogeneity in Latino population growth at the local level to capture Whites' exposure to Latino-led demographic change and test whether such exposure is systematically related to preferences over abortion policy.

Our second study presents a conceptual replication using an original national survey that adds value by using a subjective, but more direct, measure of local exposure to Latino growth. In addition to using an alternative independent variable, our second study increased the specificity of our dependent variable by soliciting preferences over abortion when explicitly cast as a means of slowing race-specific population growth. As the outcome variables in

our first study do not explicitly position abortion as a means of population control, our second study offers a direct test of whether any observed relationship between exposure to Latino growth and abortion policy attitudes holds when abortion is explicitly framed as a means of slowing the growth of specific ethno-racial groups. Our second study also expands measured outcomes beyond abortion by soliciting views on contraception. Finally, our third study complements our observational tests with two pre-registered survey experiments that directly manipulated the salience of Latino population growth by varying the ethnicity of the women (Latina versus Anglo-White) in questions soliciting support for access to abortion and contraception as means of slowing race-specific population growth.

Study 1: Large-N Survey Data

Our first empirical test uses the Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape survey (Tausanovitch and Vavreck, 2021; Tausanovitch et al., 2019)³². The Nationscape (NS) is one of the largest surveys of the American public, with a total sample of nearly half a million adults ($N = 494,796$). The NS was fielded between July 2019-January 2021 in 77 weekly sample waves. The managed samples were provided by Lucid, a market research platform operating an online survey respondent exchange. The NS samples match national quotas for age, gender, race, ethnicity, region, income, and education. All respondents in the NS took the survey online. For the purpose of our analysis, we focus on the $N = 314,000$ respondents identifying as non-Latino White, and strategically use the responses of Black ($N = 50,860$), Latino ($N = 66,923$), and Asian ($N = 20,100$) respondents for comparison purposes.

To measure preferences on abortion, we rely on three questions appearing in all weekly NS waves. Respondents were presented with the following three policy positions: 1) never permit abortion, 2) permit abortion in cases other than rape, incest, or when the woman's life is in danger, and 3) permit late-term abortion. These are common abortion policy preference outcomes in the literature (Jelen and Wilcox, 2003). For each position, respondents were

³²<https://www.voterstudygroup.org/data/nationscape>

asked to indicate whether they agree, disagree or were unsure, and we recoded these items to range from (0) to (1) with (0.5) equal to “Unsure” and (1) always being the pro-abortion stance. The dependent variable in our analysis is an additive index of these three recoded items, which we label the *Legal Abortion Index*. For ease of interpretation of regression results, we rescaled this index to range from 0 to 1 (mean=0.55, sd=0.31), with higher values indicating greater support for unrestricted, legal abortion. We document in Appendix Table B1 our results running our model on scale items separately and show that our findings do not depend on our choice of coding “unsure” responses as a neutral middle category.

Our analyses employ county as the operative unit for measuring respondents’ local context.³³ The NS contains respondents from $N = 3,056$ counties, or 97% of the 3,142 total U.S. counties listed in the 2015-2019 American Community Survey. This near-complete coverage of counties far exceeds what is obtained using smaller N surveys (e.g., ANES or GSS). Prior scholarship demonstrates that Americans are aware of the ethno-racial composition of their counties (Velez and Wong, 2017; Newman et al., 2015a) and are particularly attuned to over-time changes in county-level Latino populations (Newman and Velez, 2014a). Counties thus constitute a theoretically and empirically validated level of aggregation for capturing individuals’ local demographic environments, including their immediate residences and neighborhoods as well as most work, consumer, and recreational activities. This said, we demonstrate in Figure C1 that our findings hold when using zip-code instead of county to measure respondents’ local context. Using the 2005-2009 and 2015-2019 American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year data files, we first calculated the proportion of the total population within a respondent’s county that are Latino in 2005-2009 and 2015-2019, and then subtract the 2005-2009 estimates for each from their corresponding 2015-2019 estimates to capture the 10-year change in population.³⁴ The resulting variable is labeled $\Delta \% \text{ Latino}$ (mean=0.03,

³³The NS includes each respondents’ zip code of residence and we cross-walked each zip code to its corresponding county using HUD’s 2021 zip to county crosswalk (see <https://www.huduser.gov/apps/public/uspscrosstalk/home>). Zip codes are restricted and are not included in the replication file. Access to zip codes requires permission by NS principle investigators.

³⁴Our use of a 10-year window is consistent with prior research (Hopkins, 2010; Newman, 2013; Reny, 2017) and our results are robust to both shorter and longer time spans (Table B2).

$sd=0.02$, $min=-0.12$, $max=0.23$). We repeat this procedure with Black and Asian populations to generate change variables for these ethno-racial groups for comparison purposes. All demographic change variables were rescaled to range between 0 and 1.

The NS includes several distinct measures of Whites' animus toward ethno-racial minorities. Our first measure captures a key facet of overt or "old fashioned" racism (OFR) involving a desire for social distance between the races: Whites' opposition to interracial marriage and dating (Virtanen and Huddy, 1998; Tesler, 2013). The NS includes items asking respondents if they "prefer my close relatives marry spouses from their same race" and "think it's alright for whites and Blacks to date each other." The response options range from (1)-"Strongly agree" to (5)-"Strongly disagree." We created an additive index of the two items (with the marriage item reverse coded), labeled *OFR*, and rescaled it to range between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating increasing opposition to interracial relations. Our second measure captures Whites' feelings toward Latinos relative to their own group, which is a common measure of racial prejudice (Acharya et al., 2016; Reny and Newman, 2021). Respondents reported their favorability toward Whites and Latinos on a scale ranging from (1)-"Very unfavorable" to (5)-"Very favorable." We subtracted the Latino from the White favorability score and label the resulting variable *White-Latino Favorability*, with higher values indicating increasingly greater favor toward Whites vis-a-vis Latinos. *White-Latino Favorability* may not simply measure outgroup antipathy (Brewer, 1999), otherwise known as "outgroup hate." *White-Latino Favorability* may also measure ethnocentric ingroup favoritism (Kinder and Kam, 2010), an increasingly relevant phenomena among whites that prior research demonstrates explains white support for policies mitigating non-white population growth (e.g. restricting immigration) (Jardina, 2019).³⁵ Our third measure is *Racial Resentment* (Kinder and Sears, 1981), which is based on respondents' agreement with the statements "Irish, Italian, and Jewish ethnicities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should

³⁵Using proxies for white group consciousness or white identity that Jardina uses (Jardina, 2019) (e.g. pgs 67 and 247) we find weak-to-mixed evidence that the relationship between local Latino population growth and support for legal abortion is moderated by white identity, suggesting that antipathy toward the outgroup, not favoritism for the in-group, is the predominant moderator (see Table B3).

do the same without any special favors” and “Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.”³⁶ Response options for these items were the same as those for *ORF*, and we generated an additive scale with higher values indicating greater racial resentment. Although *Racial Resentment* explicitly relates to attitudes toward Black people, and half of the *ORF* scale refers to Black people, prior research demonstrates anti-Black attitudes are intimately linked with anti-Latino prejudice (Mora and Paschel, 2020). We used multiple indicators of prejudice to reflect variation in the preferred measurement of this construct (Huddy and Feldman, 2009) and to assess the consistency of findings across different measures.

Our analytic strategy involved using multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models that adjusted for an extensive set of individual and “pretreatment” contextual confounders³⁷ potentially predictive of Latino population growth and attitudes on abortion. All models included adjustments for respondent education, income, age, gender, evangelicalism, partisanship, and ideology, as well as 2005-2009 ACS 5-year estimates of county Latino population, total population, median household income, % college educated, % unemployed, and population density. Given the potential relevance of local political culture to Americans’ abortion attitudes, all models adjust for county % Republican of the two-party vote share in the 2008 Presidential Election (Algara and Amlani, 2021). We include missingness dummies for variables with missing values (e.g. income, partisanship, ideology, evangelicalism). For ease of interpretation, we rescaled all non-binary independent variables to range from 0 to 1. All models include fixed effects for weekly survey wave and robust standard errors clustered at the county-level. See Appendix A.1 for more information about question wording and variable measurement.

³⁶While racial resentment is typically measured using a 4-item scale, the NS survey only included these two items.


³⁷By “pretreatment” we mean contextual variables measured in 2005-2009, at the beginning of the time window where we measure Latino population growth (i.e., our “treatment”).

Results

We begin by examining the relationship between county-level growth in the Latino population—binned into deciles—and support for legal abortion among White, Black, Latino, and Asian American respondents. As illustrated in Panel A of Figure 1, among White respondents, we observe a clear, primarily monotonic increase in mean support for legal abortion as local Latino population growth rises. Among Black, Latino, and Asian American respondents, the relationship is neither statistically nor substantively significant. These patterns—which are not dependent on model specification—provide initial evidence consistent with our theoretical expectations, suggesting that demographic change may shape abortion attitudes specifically among White Americans. Turning to our fully specified models (controlling for individual and contextual confounders, including survey-wave fixed effects, and using clustered standard errors), Panel B of Figure 1 displays predicted *Legal Abortion Index* values moving $\Delta \% Latino$ from its observed minimum to maximum values, holding all else equal, for White, Black, Latino, and Asian respondents (see Table B4 for full results). Focusing on Whites, we see that moving across the x-axis from counties with contracting to expanding Latino populations is associated with a notable increase in support for legal abortion. The estimated coefficient for $\Delta \% Latino$ is statistically significant ($\beta=0.10$, $p < 0.001$) and substantively meaningful—representing 31% of the outcome standard deviation. To put this relationship in context, the association between $\Delta \% Latino$ and the *Legal Abortion Index* is equivalent to 63% of the outcome’s association with *partisanship* and 61% of the outcome’s association with evangelicalism, two highly prognostic control covariates.

In contrast, the results for Black, Latino, and Asian respondents in Panel B of Figure 1 again reveal no relationship of local exposure to Latino population growth to abortion policy preferences. The estimated coefficients for $\Delta \% Latino$ for the Black, Latino, and Asian sample are small and statistically insignificant: 0.00 ($p = 0.96$), -0.02 ($p = 0.55$), and -0.04 ($p = 0.44$). We view these as theory-affirming null results given that the theorized process operative in shaping Whites’ reactions to Latino population growth (e.g., feelings of threat to

(A) Mean Abortion Support by County Δ % Latino Decile



(B) The Influence of Latino Population Growth on Abortion Preference




Figure 1: Local Exposure to Latino Population Growth and Abortion Policy Preferences. Panel A presents mean values of the *Legal Abortion Index* (y-axis) along decile values of Δ % Non-White (x-axis) for White (A), Black (B), Latino (C) and AAPI (D) respondents with bootstrapped 95% CIs. Panel B presents predicted values of the *Legal Abortion Index* (y-axis) along values of Δ % Latino (x-axis) for White (A), Black (B), Latino (C) and AAPI (D) respondents, holding control covariates at their mean. Annotations denote min-max influence of Δ % Latino. 95% CIs displayed derived from cluster robust SEs. Rugs indicate distribution of raw data. Source: Nationscape.

Whites' dominant status) are less applicable to subordinate non-White groups. Additionally, we report in Figure C2 that changes in the size of local Black or Asian populations are not significantly associated with increased White support for abortion. The unique association between Whites' abortion attitudes and Latino growth accords with the status of Latinos as the largest non-Anglo group at the forefront of demographic change in the U.S. and the documented depiction of Latinos as a threat in media and elite discourse. This unique relationship also comports with the immigration-to-reproduction shift in Latino population growth and prior research illustrating that Latinos are viewed as "having too many children"

(Reny and Manzano, 2016) (see Figure C3). As Latino population growth should be uniquely salient to White Americans, and the growth of these other ethno-racial groups relatively less salient, we view these results as useful theoretical placebo checks.

The results in Figure 1 hold when including survey weights (Table B5), state and region fixed effects (Table B6), additional controls such as changes in county-level presidential vote share (Table B7), latitude and longitude to account for potential spatial autocorrelation (Table B8), other measures of religion and religiosity (Table B9), sexism (Table B10), adjusting for shifts in other contextual covariates (Table B11), and using an ordered logit model (Table B12). When we adjust for shifts in other contextual covariates, we account for increases in the total population, population density, and socio-economically lower populations (i.e. the lower-income, non-college educated, and unemployed). Thus, the relationship between $\Delta \% \text{ Latino}$ and the *Legal Abortion Index* is unlikely to be driven by alternative explanations such as population pressure, classism, or people seeking to reduce low socio-economic populations *in general*, but rather, people seeking to reduce low socio-economic populations that are *specifically Latino*. Additionally, our findings are not driven by influential outliers (Table B13) nor by incorrect assumptions of linearity in the relationship between $\Delta \% \text{ Latino}$ and the *Legal Abortion Index*: Table B14 demonstrates that the results hold when the independent variable is re-operationalized using median, tercile, or quartile splits. We also assessed the sensitivity of our results to unobserved confounding (Cinelli and Hazlett, 2020) and found that, for the estimated association between $\Delta \% \text{ Latino}$ and the *Legal Abortion Index* to be rendered null, an omitted confounder would need to be more than six times as prognostic as either evangelical identification or ideological self-placement—two of the strongest observed predictors of abortion attitudes (see Table B15). Given the implausibility of such an unmeasured variable, our sensitivity analysis suggests that our results are relatively insulated from omitted variable bias. Last, we demonstrate in Figure C4 that, when disaggregating $\Delta \% \text{ Latino}$ into Latino foreign-born growth (i.e.,




Figure 2: The Influence of Latino Population Growth on Abortion Policy Preferences Conditional on Whites’ Ethno-Racial Attitudes. Panels A-C characterize predicted values of the Legal Abortion Index (y-axis) along shifts in relative county Latino population (x-axis) for white respondents at the minimum (grey) and maximum (black) of Old-Fashioned Racism, Racial Resentment, and White-Latino Favorability respectively. 95% CIs displayed from robust SEs. Source: Nationscape.

immigration) and non-foreign-born growth (i.e., “natural increase”)³⁸, our results are driven by native-born Latino growth and not immigration. This ancillary finding is consistent with the immigration-to-reproduction shift serving as the salient demographic process extending the impact of Latino growth beyond Whites’ immigration policy preferences to their views on reproductive policy.

Figure 2 presents the results from moderation analyses exploring the relationship of county Latino growth to abortion policy preferences conditional on different indicators of White respondents’ levels of racial prejudice. Across three distinct measures of prejudice—with one specific to Latinos (e.g., *White-Latino Favorability*)—we observe a striking consistency of results: Whites high in prejudice are driving the previously observed relationship between $\Delta\% \text{ Latino}$ and the *Legal Abortion Index*. The interaction between $\Delta\% \text{ Latino}$ and *ORF* ($\beta = 0.10$, $SE = 0.05$, $p < 0.10$), *White-Latino Favorability* ($\beta = 0.26$, $SE = 0.07$, $p < 0.001$), and *Racial Resentment* ($\beta = 0.26$, $SE = 0.06$, $p < 0.001$) are each positive and statistically significant at at least $p < 0.10$ (see Table B18).³⁹ When focusing on Whites lowest on each

³⁸This may also include internal migration of non-foreign-born Latinos

³⁹Corroborating nulls in Figure 1, we similarly show that a relationship between $\Delta\% \text{ Black or Asian}$ and

prejudice measure, we observe statistically insignificant and/or substantively small changes in support for legal abortion associated with county-level Latino growth. The results in Figure 2 strongly align with theoretical expectations. What is more, they allow us to adjudicate between competing interpretations of the observed relationship between $\Delta \% \text{ Latino}$ and the *Legal Abortion Index* among Whites in Figure 1. For example, one alternative account is that greater support for abortion in contexts of Latino growth reflects not racialized Malthusianism but rather racialized paternalism, whereby abortion is supported as a means of assisting non-Whites perceived as incapable of helping themselves in order to improve their lives (Moore, 2020). Were the latter mechanism at work, we would expect the positive association between $\Delta \% \text{ Latino}$ and the *Legal Abortion Index* to be most pronounced among Whites low in prejudice.⁴⁰ The absence of such a pattern weighs against this paternalism account. We further find no evidence that prejudiced non-whites are more likely to support abortion in response to growth in their local Latino populations (see Tables B20-B21), implying threats to white demographic dominance specifically are driving our results. Importantly, the results in Figure 2 hold when implementing the check on linear interaction models recommended by Hainmueller et al. (2019) (see Figure C5). Furthermore, we conducted a robustness check to ensure that our moderation effects hold while controlling for interactions between $\Delta \% \text{ Latino}$ and individual-level covariates correlated with prejudice (e.g., partisanship and evangelicalism). While controlling for these additional interactions weakens the interaction term in our *ORF* model, we find that the *Racial Resentment* and *White-Latino Favorability* interactions remain statistically significant and substantively large (see Table B22).

CES Replication

To assess the replicability of our findings, we reproduced our core analyses with data from another widely used representative large-N survey: the Cooperative Election Study (CES)

support for abortion similarly doesn't emerge even for those highest in prejudice. See Table B19.

⁴⁰But see Rabinowitz (1988) and Woodward (2001), who provide historical evidence that prejudice may be associated with paternalism.

(Ansolabehere et al., 2025). We pooled CES data from the 2016, 2017, 2018, 2020, and 2022 waves, yielding a combined sample of N=263,735. Wave choice is not arbitrary. These waves are the only with abortion policy preference and racial attitude questions. We also pool these waves to increase sample size for sufficient cross-county geographic variation on $\Delta \% Latino$. The CES *legal abortion index* outcome is an additive index of four binary pro-abortion policy items within each wave (see Appendix D for more details). Within wave, $\Delta \% Latino$ is county-level $\% Latino$ the year before each wave was fielded (e.g. $\% Latino$ in 2021 for the 2022 wave) subtracted by $\% Latino$ in 2009 using Census ACS data, and the moderator is a *Racism Index* measuring several attitudes that characterize antipathy toward non-Whites (see Appendix D). Also within each CES wave, we rescaled the *Legal Abortion Index*, $\Delta \% Latino$, and the *Racism Index* between 0-1. We analyzed the CES data using the same contextual and individual controls as in the Nationscape analysis, and included fixed effects for CES survey-year and robust county-clustered standard errors. We present the results from this replication analysis in Figure D6. We find that the results presented in Figures 1 and 2 replicate using the CES: county Latino population growth is positively associated with support for legal abortion among Whites but not among non-Whites (Figure D6, Panels A and B). This relationship is statistically and substantively most pronounced among Whites highest in the *racism index* (Figure D6, Panel C). Our CES replication findings are also robust to adjusting for three additional dimensions of individual-level religiosity measured across the CES waves we analyze (Figure D9). The findings from this replication mitigate concern that our results are artifacts of the Nationscape sample, its specific outcome question wording, or its temporal context.

Addressing Residential Selection Bias

One concern with contextual analyses such as ours is residential selection bias (Hedman and Ham, 2012). It is possible that our findings are due to Whites who hold more permissive stances on abortion choosing to reside in areas experiencing diversity gains (i.e., Latino

population growth). This process could be the result of a direct preference for racially diverse settings or a predilection for non-racial characteristics of residential areas that are correlated with growing diversity. In this subsection, we highlight a series of findings, and offer new analyses, that greatly mitigate concern over residential selection in generating our results. In sum, the analyses we bring to bear implies Whites do not reside in Latino diversifying areas because of their political commitments on abortion, consistent with prior work suggesting residential selection is primarily driven by other factors independent of politics or even race/ethnicity (e.g. amenities, crime, transportation quality, schools) (Mummolo and Nall, 2017).

First, the possibility that left-right political orientations predict selection into diversifying contexts underscores the need to account for such orientations in the analysis. All models presented above include controls for respondent partisanship, ideology, and county-level partisan vote preferences, which helps to reduce concern that the estimated coefficients for county $\Delta \% Latino$ merely reflect underlying political orientations. Moreover, the results in Figure 2 indicate that the positive association between Latino population growth and support for legal abortion only emerges among Whites highest in racial prejudice—a group more likely to hold conservative, rather than liberal, views on abortion (Strawbridge et al., 2025).

Second, we draw readers' attention to the results presented in Figure 1, Panels B-D, which reveal little-to-no relationship of Latino growth to abortion policy preferences among non-White respondents. While there may be some differences across racial and ethnic groups in the factors shaping the choice of residence, there is little *a priori* theoretical reason to expect that the orientations (e.g., openness to experience, novelty-seeking, liberalism) leading Whites to gravitate toward residential spaces experiencing growing diversity would not also lead Black, Latino and Asian Americans with similar orientations to residing in comparable residential contexts. In other words, if the findings for Whites in Figure 1 are due to liberals selecting into diversifying settings, we should observe at least some trace of this for non-Whites as well. Yet, we do not, which provides a powerful piece of evidence

against residential selection as an alternative explanation for the results for Whites.

Third, we assess the specificity of our findings by re-estimating the model from Figure 1, Panel A, using a set of gender-related attitudinal outcomes from the Nationscape (NS) survey that are unrelated to abortion policy. These outcomes include measures of hostile sexism, favorability toward prominent liberal female politicians (Elizabeth Warren and Kamala Harris), and perceptions of gender-based discrimination. If Whites holding progressive views on gender select into areas undergoing ethno-racial demographic change, we would expect $\Delta \% Latino$ to be associated with lower levels of sexism, greater favorability toward liberal female leaders, and heightened recognition of discrimination against women. Yet, as shown in Appendix Table B23, we find no consistent evidence of such a pattern. Changes in Latino population shares ($\Delta \% Latino$) are statistically unrelated to most indicators of gender liberalism, with the sole exception being perceived gender discrimination, which shows a statistically significant but modest association ($\beta = 0.056$, $p = 0.028$). A meta-analysis pooling the coefficients across the four models yields a null estimate (0.026, 95% CI: [-0.029, 0.082]). The fact that exposure to Latino growth among Whites is associated with more liberal views on abortion but not liberal shifts in gender-related views unconnected to reproduction suggests against selection as the process generating our main findings. It also serves as a critical validity check given that our theoretical framework positions these gender-related views unconnected to reproduction as treatment-irrelevant outcomes (i.e., our theory does not predict exposure to Latino growth will affect these other outcomes).

Fourth, we sought to provide a direct test of whether Whites' more strongly favoring legal abortion select into residential settings experiencing growth in Latino populations. We utilized three panel surveys of American adults each containing sizable samples of Whites: (1) the 2010-2014 Cooperative Election Study Panel Survey (CES; $N = 7,993$ Whites), (2) the 2011-2016 Voter Study Group Panel (VSG; $N = 1,221$ Whites) and (3) the 2020-2022 CES Panel (CES; $N = 7,710$ Whites). Each panel includes the county of residence for respondents for each survey wave, enabling us to identify those moving to different counties between the

first and last wave. Using these data, we test for evidence of a relationship between Whites' support for legal abortion in the first survey wave and their moving to counties experiencing more Latino growth relative to their county of residence in the first wave. We use a simple cross-lagged approach assessing the association between $\Delta \% Latino$ between 2000-2010 (or 2010-2020 for the 2020-2022 CES panel) for the county reported in the final wave and support for legal abortion in the first wave after adjusting for $\Delta \% Latino$ between 2000-2010 (or 2010-2020) for the county reported in the first wave. We implement this approach for two CES and VSG subsets: (1) all White respondents, and (2) White respondents who moved between the first and final waves. Figure 3 reports the association between support for legal abortion and selection into increasingly Latino counties (see Table E28 for full results). For both the full sample of Whites and the subsample of White movers, the legal abortion support coefficients are statistically null and substantively zero. These findings suggest support for legal abortion does not motivate selection into increasingly Latino neighborhoods among Whites, which lessens our concern that the results in Figure 1 are driven by residential selection.

Finally, if residential selection was entirely driving our results, we would expect the association between $\Delta \% Latino$ and support for legal abortion to be significantly attenuated among long-term white residents within a county. Our 2016-2022 CES replication data allow us to identify respondents who have lived in their address or city of residence for 5 years or more (i.e. long-term residents).⁴¹ We subset our CES replication analysis to long-term residents and find the association between $\Delta \% Latino$ and support for legal abortion is substantively unchanged (Figure D8), implying residential selection plays little role in explaining the relationship between $\Delta \% Latino$ and support for legal abortion.

⁴¹The Nationscape does not allow us to identify long-term residents




Figure 3: Support for Legal Abortion and Selection into Increasingly Latino Counties. The x-axis is the dataset used for the analysis. The y-axis is the coefficient for attitudes characterizing support for legal abortion in 2010, 2011, and 2022 for the CES 2010-2014, VSG, and CES 2020-2022 surveys respectively. The outcome of interest is the change in the proportion of the population that is Latino between 2000-2010 (or 2010-2020 for the CES 2020-2022 data) for counties that respondents report living in for 2014 (CES 2010-2014), 2016 (VSG), and 2022 (CES 2020-2022). 95% CIs displayed derived from robust SEs. Source: 2010-14 CES, 2020-22 Panel Surveys, and 2011-2016 VSG Panel Survey.

Study 2: Original Survey Data

While the results in the previous sections conform to a range of theoretical expectations, they do not provide direct evidence that White respondents are thinking about their support for abortion in terms of curbing Latino population growth. Moreover, our previous analysis measures exposure to Latino population growth using an objective, contextual measure. An alternative approach would involve directly measuring receipt of the “treatment” by asking respondents about perceived Latino population growth in their area of residence. To address these issues, we collected original survey data including questions allowing us to conduct a conceptual replication of the previous analysis using more explicit measures of exposure to the “treatment” and our outcomes of interest.

We recruited a non-probability opt-in sample of adult Americans via Cloud Research’s Connect Platform in July 2025 that rendered $N = 1,483$ non-Latino Whites (see Appendix F). Although the survey is unrepresentative, prior research demonstrates online opt-in surveys

produce correlations between variables that are consistent with nationally representative probability surveys even if point estimates on respondent characteristics do not correspond (Pasek, 2016). We measured exposure to Latino population growth by asking respondents: “Focusing specifically on the Hispanic/Latino population in the local area where you live, over the past 10 years has the Hispanic/Latino population in the area where you live increased, stayed about the same, or decreased?” Response options for this item ranged from (1)-“Decreased a lot” to (5)-“Increased a lot”. Although our Latino population growth measure in Study 2 is perceptual instead of based on objective Census data like in Study 1, prior evidence suggests people are aware of demographic changes in their local area (Velez and Wong, 2017). Moreover, if empirical patterns in Study 2 replicate those in Study 1, then we can be confident our perceptual measure of Latino growth is valid. For our dependent variables, we constructed a question explicitly positioning abortion as a means of race-specific population control. Respondents were randomly assigned to receive one of two versions of the question that varied whether the referenced women were Latina or White. The question read as follows:

The following are some ways that have been proposed to help slow [Latino/White] population growth in the United States. Please select if you favor or oppose each of the following:

1. Making abortions more easily available to [Latina/White] women who want them
2. Providing [Latina/White] women subsidized access to various forms of birth control and contraception
3. Providing [Latina/White] women subsidized access to sterilization procedures for those who want them (e.g., tubal sterilization)

Half of the sample received the above question and listed items referencing Latina women, and the other half received the question and items referencing White women. While our

primary focus is on support for abortion, we included these other outcomes to determine if our findings extend beyond abortion to contraception. Response options for these items ranged from (1)-“Strongly oppose” to (6)-“Strongly favor.” For this analysis, we first analyze the half of the sample that received the version of the question referencing Latina women; we then follow with an analysis of the other half that received the version of the question referencing White women. Akin to our analysis in Figure 2, we assess the association between perceived local Latino growth and support for abortion (as a means of population control) conditional on prejudice. We created an additive scale from the same two Old-Fashioned Racism (*ORF*) items used in NS (dating and marriage) for our measure of prejudice (but with “black” replaced by “non-white” on the dating question).⁴² We adjust for several control covariates, including age, gender, education, income, partisanship, and ideology. We rescaled our independent and dependent variables to range between 0 and 1.

Figure 4 characterizes the association between perceived local Latino population growth and White support for reproductive policies framed as population control targeted toward Latinas (Panels A and B) and toward White women (Panels C and D) (See Tables B24-B25 for full results). In Panel A, we find a positive association between perceived local Latino growth and support for permissive reproductive policies targeted at Latinas as a means of Latino population control. While the results substantively mirror those in Figure 1 and are consistent with theoretical expectations, they are not statistically significant—likely the result of the study being underpowered relative to the Nationscape dataset. Looking at Panel B, the results are similarly consistent with theoretical expectations and closely mirror Figure 2. Among the most prejudiced White respondents, perceived local Latino population growth is strongly positively associated with support for abortion as a tool of population control for Latinas: moving from a perceived decline (0) to the largest perceived increase (1) corresponds to a 0.47-point increase in support for abortion (Cohen’s $d = 1.32$). By contrast, among the least prejudiced Whites, perceived local Latino growth is unrelated to abortion

⁴²As shown in Table B24, results look identical using White-Latino favorability scale as an alternate measure of prejudice.




Figure 4: Perceived Local Population Growth and Support for Abortion as a Means of Population Control. The y-axis characterizes predicted values for favoring various reproductive policies as population control for Latina (panels A and B) and White women (Panels C and D). The x-axis characterizes perceptions of local Latino population growth which ranges from "Decreased a lot" (0) to "Increased a lot" (1). Shades denote the lowest and highest levels of old-fashioned racism. 95% CIs displayed from robust SEs. Source: Cloud Research Connect Survey July 2025.

attitudes. Importantly, this pattern extends beyond abortion to other policies that would limit Latina reproduction. Among highly prejudiced Whites, perceived increases in local Latino population are associated with increases in support for subsidized contraception for Latinas (0.49 points, $d = 1.64$) and for Latina sterilization (0.60 points, $d = 2.0$).

The lower panels of Figure 4 provides further theory-consistent evidence: perceived shifts in the local Latino population are unrelated, or negatively related, to support for abortion and contraception when these policies are framed as targeting White women, regardless of respondents' levels of prejudice. Taken together, these findings both replicate and help to contextualize the Nationscape results in Study 1. They indicate that the psychological mechanism at work is not a generalized commitment to gender liberalism or an expression of racial paternalism, but rather a racialized Malthusianism—an effort to curtail Latina reproduction and Latino population growth in the midst of perceived demographic change.

Study 3: Experimental Evidence

The previous studies offer consistent observational evidence of a systematic connection between Latino-led demographic change and reproductive policy preferences among White Americans, particularly those high in prejudice. These studies leveraged local differences in actual or perceived Latino population growth to capture the salience of Latino-driven ethnic diversification. While we took care to demonstrate the robustness of these results to omitted variable and selection bias, there is value added in assessing whether our findings hold when experimentally manipulating the salience of Latino population growth. If our theoretical framework is correct, prejudiced White Americans should increase their support for abortion in response to a stimulus that primes Latino, relative to White, population growth. To test this, we fielded two preregistered survey experiments⁴³ designed to assess whether exposure to information about Latino demographic expansion increases support for population-limiting

⁴³Pre-registrations for both experiments are posted at OSF and the anonymized links can be found in Appendix F.

and racially-targeted reproductive policies among racially prejudiced Whites.

Both experiments were embedded in surveys fielded with Cloud Research Connect, the first between March 24-25, 2024 ($N = 1,134$ White adults, *March 2024 Survey*) and the second on July 17, 2025 ($N = 1,483$ White adults, *July 2025 Survey*).⁴⁴ Again, like in Study 2, although these surveys are unrepresentative online opt-in non-probability surveys, prior research demonstrates heterogeneous treatment effects produced by experimental stimuli in non-probability samples corresponds to heterogeneous effects in representative surveys (Coppock et al., 2018). Thus, the heterogeneous treatment effect estimates presented in Study 3 may reasonably generalize to the national population.

Prior to the experimental portion of the survey, all participants in both surveys completed a block of standard demographic items and measures of prejudice including *ORF* (*March 2024* and *July 2025* surveys) and *White-Latino Favorability* (*July 2025* only). We rely on *ORF* for our main analyses and show in the Appendix that the moderation effects look substantively identical using *White-Latino favorability*. After completing these items, participants were randomly assigned to treatment or control conditions. Our manipulation involved presenting participants with a prompt about population growth and the role of abortion and contraception in slowing population growth and randomly varying whether the question referenced Latina (treatment group) versus White (control group) women.⁴⁵ This question was the exact same question appearing in Study 2,⁴⁶ which enables us to estimate the effect of priming Latino (versus White) population growth on White participants' support for permissive reproductive policies.

One may be concerned our experimental primes are unrealistic in that they induce respondents to think about *racially disparate* reproductive policies that may not characterize real-world reproductive policies that are not explicitly racially disparate. However, given

⁴⁴This second survey provided the data used in Study 2; however, for that analysis, we did not estimate the average treatment effect of the question wording manipulation, which we estimate for Study 3.

⁴⁵We dropped $N=11$ from the *March 2024* survey and $N=15$ respondents from the *July 2025* survey that failed an attention check, though their inclusion has no impact on the findings.

⁴⁶The July 2025 Survey analyzed in this section is the same dataset used in Study 2

that we have observed in our qualitative analysis of open-ended survey responses and social media data that many whites organically develop and hold complex attitudes on permissive reproductive policies that target non-whites but not whites (see Table 1), we believe our experiment is characterizing a real-world attitudinal phenomenon that is even being capitalized on by political-economic elites like Elon Musk, who has repeatedly communicated about the threat posed by the relative decline in white fertility vis-a-vis non-white population growth.⁴⁷

The outcomes were the same as appeared in Study 2, with participants asked: “The following are some ways that could help slow [Latino/White] population growth in the United States. Please indicate whether you favor or oppose each of the following policies”:

(1) “Making abortions more easily available to [Latina/White] women who want them”; (2) “Providing [Latina/White] women subsidized access to various forms of birth control and contraception”; and (3) “Providing [Latina/White] women subsidized access to sterilization procedures for those who want them (e.g., tubal sterilization).” We analyzed the outcomes both individually and as a composite additive index of policy support. We rescaled all outcome variables to range from 0 to 1. All models were estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) with robust standard errors and we interacted *ORF* with our treatment indicator using models with control variables to increase precision.⁴⁸ Full pre-registered results can be found in Appendix F.

In Figure 5, we graphically present the results of the treatment for each individual outcome as well as the combined additive index, moderated by levels of old-fashioned racism, from our covariate-adjusted models for both experiments. We show that respondents low (minimum) in racial prejudice express consistently high support for all three reproductive policies—abortion, contraception, and sterilization—regardless of treatment condition. Support among those higher (maximum) in prejudice, however, appears to be much more contingent on the condition they are assigned to. Those in the “White” condition exhibit low support for all three policies. However, among high-prejudice individuals, exposure to the “Latina” condition produces

⁴⁷See: <https://bsky.app/profile/lorak.bsky.social/post/3m72b2w6ias2r>

⁴⁸Results without covariate adjustment are less precise but substantively identical. See Appendix F.


increases in policy support. We display the corresponding marginal effects for each treatment relative to control for those higher and lower prejudice in the bottom plots of panels A-B with 90 and 95% confidence intervals.

In the first experiment (i.e., *March 2024*), we show that those assigned to the “Latina” condition and at the maximum level of racial prejudice are 0.11 points more supportive of abortion (Cohen’s $d = 0.32$, $p < 0.10$), 0.14 points more supportive of contraception access ($d = 0.58$, $p < 0.05$), 0.15 points more supportive of sterilization access ($d = 0.51$, $p < 0.05$), and 0.14 points higher on the additive index of policy support ($d = 0.52$, $p < 0.05$) than the control condition. Surprisingly, we see a drop in support for sterilization among lower-prejudice respondents exposed to the Latina prime. This is likely a reaction rooted in knowledge of the eugenics-based sterilization policy that disproportionately affected women of color in the United States. See Table F32 for full Experiment 1 results.

The results are substantively identical and significantly stronger in our second experiment (i.e., *July 2025*, see Figure 5, Panel B). Compared to their counterparts in the “White” condition, those assigned to the “Latina” condition and at the maximum level of old-fashioned racism are 0.27 points more supportive of abortion (Cohen’s $d = 0.74$, $p < 0.001$), 0.34 points more supportive of contraception access ($d = 1.14$, $p < 0.001$), 0.34 points more supportive of sterilization access ($d = 1.07$, $p < 0.001$), and 0.32 points higher on the additive index of policy support ($d = 1.07$, $p < 0.001$). These results indicate a striking divergence in treatment effects conditional on racial prejudice, with high-prejudice respondents demonstrating heightened support for population-limiting policies when they are framed as targeting Latina women and lower-prejudice individuals less likely to express support for both contraception and sterilization, again suggesting increased sensitivity to historical and contemporary use of these policies to limit the reproduction of this group. See Table F39 for full Experiment 2 results.

In Appendix F, we report a series of preregistered robustness checks across both experiments. First, we show that our main results are substantively identical when we present

(A) Experiment 1: March 2024



(B) Experiment 2: July 2025




Figure 5: Predicted values of support for reproductive policy outcomes in Latina versus White treatment conditions conditional on racial prejudice in two experiments with corresponding marginal effects plots. The y-axis characterizes predicted mean support for each policy outcome or the marginal effect of treatment by prejudice. 90% and 95% CIs displayed from robust SEs. These results were estimated with covariate adjustment. Models without covariate adjustment can be found in Appendix F. Source: Cloud Research Connect Surveys March 2024 and July 2025.

results without covariate adjustment (Appendix Tables F32 and F39). Moreover, the effects are nearly identical or strengthen when we substitute a differential in favorability toward “poor Whites” versus “poor Latinos” as the moderator—intended to capture class-coded racial animus (Appendix Table F40) or use instead our White-Latino favorability scale as our measure of prejudice (Appendix Table F41). We also address the possibility that our primary measure of racial prejudice may be proxying for generalized opposition to reproduction among lower-income populations. Appendix Table F42 demonstrates no evidence of moderation by affect toward the middle class, wealthy individuals, or by class-based resentment, operationalized as the differential in sympathy and resentment toward poor people and rich people. While we observe a statistically significant interaction with favorable affect toward the poor ($\beta = -0.04, p < 0.01$), the effect is substantively negligible. Crucially, we find no evidence that affect toward “poor Whites” moderates the treatment effect. If the observed treatment heterogeneity were primarily driven by class-based concerns about reproduction, we would expect similar moderation by class cues when the target group is white. In fact, in a set of pre-registered tests for Experiment 1, we show that our treatment effects are driven by white people who are unfavorable toward the Latino poor, *not the white poor or the poor in general* (Appendix Table F36). The absence of moderation by general or non-racialized class cues strengthens our interpretation that the results are fundamentally racial rather than class-based in nature.

Finally, we rule out omitted interaction bias from partisanship and ideology. In Experiment 2, we show the heterogeneous effect of the “Latina” condition by old-fashioned racism is robust to adjusting for interactions between the “Latina” condition and both partisanship and ideology (Table F43). These results suggest our heterogeneous effects are not driven by partisanship, ideology, or the correlation between these factors and old-fashioned racism.

Conclusion

A perennial feature of American politics is backlash among the Anglo-White core (Aguirre and Turner, 2010) to large-scale episodes of ethno-racial demographic change. These episodes have included backlash against Irish, Jewish, and Italian immigrants in the 19th century (Higham, 2002; Jacobson, 1999), Asian immigrants in the early 20th century (Gaines and Cho, 2004), and Black migration out of the American South to Northeastern (Boustan, 2010) and Western states (Reny and Newman, 2018b). Beginning in the 1970s, immigration from Mexico and Central America took center stage, with Latino population growth serving as the new driver of demographic change. With this came a new round of White backlash largely directed toward immigration policy, including symbolic “Official English” laws (Schildkraut, 2001), tightening the southern border (Chiricos et al., 2014), and heightened interior workplace enforcement (Newman et al., 2012b). In this article, we explore the political consequences of the most recent large-scale trend in America’s ongoing demographic transformation: the *immigration-to-reproduction* shift in Latino population growth.

Our findings suggest this shift may direct the perennial forces of White backlash in American society toward a policy outlet that is novel in terms of recent backlash history but firmly rooted in historical precedent: reproductive policy. Using a blend of large-N and original survey data, as well as pre-registered survey experiments, we offer strong and consistent evidence that prejudiced White Americans react to Latino population growth with heightened support for permissive abortion (and contraception) policies. The findings we present are robust to alternative modeling choices and operationalizations of key variables, replicate across data sources, are seemingly not attributable to residential selection, and hold across different methods of capturing the salience of Latino-led demographic change to White Americans. Among the American public, racial and religious conservatism tend to be correlated (Deckman et al., 2023) and attitudes on abortion exhibit relative stability over time (Jelen and Wilcox, 2003). Given this, our findings are all the more notable in that they illustrate the power of a potent treatment—ethno-racial demographic change—in potentially

shifting relatively rigid socio-political attitudes.

Our findings also suggest that racialized Malthusianism provides a useful framework for understanding how demographic change shapes political conflict in the United States. Whereas classical Malthusianism located danger in the prospect of overpopulation straining material resources, its racialized variant underscores anxieties about the reproduction of outgroups and the resulting erosion of ingroup dominance. As a consequence, reproductive politics becomes a terrain of racial contestation, with abortion, contraception, and related policies understood not only in moral or gendered terms, but also as mechanisms with ethno-racial demographic consequences. This perspective highlights the deep entanglement of racial threat and reproductive governance in American political development. Prior work demonstrates that increases in minority population size generate fears of political or economic competition (Key, 1949). Racialized Malthusianism extends this logic by focusing on reproduction: The concern is not simply minority presence or mobilization in the present, but their capacity to generate future generations who may reshape the racial and political order. This logic resonates with contemporary “Great Replacement” narratives and connects to a longer history of racialized population control, including efforts to restrict or promote fertility in ways that reinforce racial hierarchies (Roberts, 1997; Bridges, 2011).

Our research and findings illuminate several avenues for future research. First, future research could extend our findings analyzing opinions reported in surveys to observed behavior in the real-world using state and local ballot measures on abortion. Such measures afford an opportunity to assess if exposure to Latino population growth is associated with elevated pro-choice vote shares among White voters. In 2022 alone, after the *Dobbs* Supreme Court decision, there were 6 ballot measures addressing abortion in Kansas, California, Kentucky, Michigan, Montana and Vermont. However, it is important to note that data on these ballot measures is typically aggregate (e.g. precinct-level), whereas our study allows for an individual-level assessment of the link between ethno-racial change and abortion attitudes. Second, while our research focuses on abortion and contraception as highly salient arenas of

reproductive policy, future research could assess the link between demographic shifts and other facets of reproductive politics, such as funding for sex education or maternity leave. Finally, future research could explore whether our findings extend beyond the United States to other immigrant-receiving nations with sizable immigrant communities with increasing birth rates.

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A Data Details

A.1 Nationscape

Nationscape is a survey consisting of nearly half a million interviews conducted between July 2019 and January 2021, covering the final year of Donald Trump's presidency, 2020 U.S. presidential nominating contests, COVID-19 pandemic, Black Lives Matter movement, 2020 presidential campaign, election, and its aftermath, including the insurrection at the U.S. Capitol on January 6th, 2020, and the inauguration of Joe Biden as the 45th president of the United States. The survey began on July 10, 2019, and includes interviews with roughly 6,100 people per week. The sample is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population. Sample for Nationscape is provided by Lucid, a market research platform operating an online exchange for survey respondents. Nationscape samples match a set of representative demographic quotas on age, gender, race/ethnicity, region, income, and education. Respondents are sent from Lucid directly to survey software operated by the Nationscape team. All respondents take the survey online and must complete an attention check before taking the survey. The survey is conducted in English (Tausanovitch and Vavreck, 2021; Tausanovitch et al., 2019).

A.1.1 Moderator Items

- **Old Fashioned Racism 1 (Marriage):** I prefer that my close relatives marry spouses from their same race. 1) Strongly agree, 2) Somewhat agree, 3) Neither agree nor disagree, 4) Somewhat disagree, 5) Strongly disagree
- **Old Fashioned Racism 2 (Dating):** I think it's alright for blacks and whites to date each other. 1) Strongly agree, 2) Somewhat agree, 3) Neither agree nor disagree, 4) Somewhat disagree, 5) Strongly disagree
- **Racial Resentment 1:** Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors. 1) Strongly agree 2) Somewhat agree 3) Neither agree nor disagree 4) Somewhat disagree 5) Strongly disagree
- **Racial Resentment 2:** Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class. 1) Strongly agree 2) Somewhat agree 3) Neither agree nor disagree 4) Somewhat disagree 5) Strongly disagree
- **White Feeling Thermometer:** Here are the names of some groups that are in the news from time to time. How favorable is your impression of each group: Whites. 1) Very favorable 2) Somewhat favorable 3) Somewhat unfavorable 4) Very unfavorable
- **Latino Feeling Thermometer:** Here are the names of some groups that are in the news from time to time. How favorable is your impression of each group: Latinos. 1) Very favorable 2) Somewhat favorable 3) Somewhat unfavorable 4) Very unfavorable

A.1.2 Outcome Items

- **Never Permit Abortion:** We'd like to know whether you agree or disagree with each of the following policies: Never permit abortion. 1) Agree 2) Disagree 3) Not sure
- **Permit Abortion in Certain Cases:** We'd like to know whether you agree or disagree with each of the following policies: Permit abortion in cases other than rape, incest, or when the woman's life is in danger. 1) Agree 2) Disagree 3) Not sure
- **Permit Late-Term Abortion:** We'd like to know whether you agree or disagree with each of the following policies: Permit late term abortion. 1) Agree 2) Disagree 3) Not sure

These items are combined into an additive index intended to approximate a latent attitude toward legal abortion. The items are moderately correlated, and the standardized Cronbach's alpha for the scale is $\alpha = 0.58$. Although this level of internal consistency is lower than is typically desired for psychometric scales, it likely reflects the limited number of abortion-attitude items available in the Nationscape survey. We therefore treat the index as an appropriate, albeit noisy, proxy for underlying abortion attitudes. As a robustness check of this modeling choice, Table B1 reports results using the individual items separately.

A.1.3 Other Items (robustness checks and control variables)

- **Low Sexism scale:** additive scale of four sexism items (below) recoded such that higher values indicate lower levels of sexism and rescaled between 0 and 1. Mean = 0.69. Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.59$.
 1. Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with the following statements?: I would be more comfortable having a man as a boss than a woman. 1) Strongly agree 2) Somewhat agree 3) Neither agree nor disagree 4) Somewhat disagree 5) Strongly disagree
 2. Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with the following statements?: Women are just as capable of thinking logically as men. 1) Strongly agree 2) Somewhat agree 3) Neither agree nor disagree 4) Somewhat disagree 5) Strongly disagree
 3. Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with the following statements?: Increased opportunities for women have significantly improved the quality of life in the United States. 1) Strongly agree 2) Somewhat agree 3) Neither agree nor disagree 4) Somewhat disagree 5) Strongly disagree
 4. Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with the following statements?: Women who complain about harassment often caus more problems than they solve. 1) Strongly agree 2) Somewhat agree 3) Neither agree nor disagree 4) Somewhat disagree 5) Strongly disagree
- **Favorability Warren:** How favorable is your impression of the following candidate: Elizabeth Warren 1) Very favorable 2) Somewhat favorable 3) Somewhat unfavorable 4) Very unfavorable 5) Haven't heard enough. Rescaled to range between 0 and 1.

- **Favorability Harris:** How favorable is your impression of the following candidate: Kamala Harris 1) Very favorable 2) Somewhat favorable 3) Somewhat unfavorable 4) Very unfavorable 5) Haven't heard enough. Rescaled to range between 0 and 1.
- **Discrimination Women:** How much discrimination is there in the United States today against: women 1) A great deal 2) A lot 3) A moderate amount 4) A little 5) None at all. Rescaled to range between 0 and 1.
- **Discrimination Whites:** How much discrimination is there in the United States today against: white people 1) A great deal 2) A lot 3) A moderate amount 4) A little 5) None at all. Rescaled to range between 0 and 1.
- **Black Feeling Thermometer:** Here are the names of some groups that are in the news from time to time. How favorable is your impression of each group: Blacks. 1) Very favorable 2) Somewhat favorable 3) Somewhat unfavorable 4) Very unfavorable. Rescaled to range between 0 and 1.
- **Asian Feeling Thermometer:** Here are the names of some groups that are in the news from time to time. How favorable is your impression of each group: Asians. 1) Very favorable 2) Somewhat favorable 3) Somewhat unfavorable 4) Very unfavorable. Rescaled to range between 0 and 1.
- **Income:** What is your current annual household income before taxes? Recoded into dummies: Income less than or equal to \$25,000, Income between \$25,001 and less than or equal to \$50,000, Income between \$50,001 and less than or equal to \$85,000, and Income missing. Omitted category is income over \$85,000.
- **College:** What is the highest level of education you have completed? Recoded such that respondents who answered "College degree (such as B.A., B.S.)" or above received a (1) and all others a (0).
- **Age:** What is your age? Rescaled to range between 0 and 1.
- **Female:** What is your gender? Recoded such that 1=female and 0=all others.
- **Party ID:** Recoded answers to 3 part branching party ID question (e.g. from ANES) with final recoded responses ranging from Strong Democrat (0) to Strong Republican (7). Rescaled to range between 0 and 1.
- **Ideology:** In general, how would you describe your own political viewpoint? 1) very liberal 2) liberal 3) moderate 4) conservative 5) very conservative 6) Not sure (recoded to 3). Rescaled to range between 0 and 1.
- **Evangelical:** Would you describe yourself as a born-again or evangelical Christian? 1) yes 0) no.
- **Catholic:** What is your present religion? 1) If they chose Catholic 0) anything else.
- **Longitude and Latitude:** Based on longitude and latitude of each respondents county of residence (centroid of county).

A.1.4 Census measured and other contextual variables

- **Δ % Latino (Black / Asian) (2019-2009):** Change in county-level percent Latino (Black / Asian) from 5-yr ACS file in 2015-2019 and 2005-2009. Rescaled to range between 0 and 1.
- **% Latino (Black / Asian) (2009):** County-level percent Latino (Black / Asian) from 5-yr ACS file in 2005-2009. Rescaled to range between 0 and 1.
- **Total Pop (2009):** County-level total population from 5-yr ACS file in 2005-2009. Rescaled to range between 0 and 1.
- **Median Household Income (2009):** County-level median household income from 5-yr ACS file in 2005-2009. Rescaled to range between 0 and 1.
- **% College (2009):** County-level proportion of eligible adults with bachelor's degree or higher from 5-yr ACS file in 2005-2009. Rescaled to range between 0 and 1.
- **% Unemployed (2009):** County-level proportion of eligible unemployed individuals (16+) from 5-yr ACS file in 2005-2009. Rescaled to range between 0 and 1.
- **% Population Density (2009):** County-level population density from 5-yr ACS file in 2005-2009. Rescaled to range between 0 and 1.
- **% McCain (2008):** County-level McCain vote from Amlani and Algara (2021) (<https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/DGUMFI>). Rescaled to range between 0 and 1.
- **Evangelical Adherents (2020):** Estimated count of county-level evangelical adherents. Rescaled to range between 0 and 1. Data based on the Religious Congregations and Membership Study and are collected by representatives of the Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies (ASARB).
- **Catholic Adherents (2020):** Estimated count of county-level evangelical adherents. Rescaled to range between 0 and 1. Data based on the Religious Congregations and Membership Study and are collected by representatives of the Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies (ASARB).
- **Total Adherents Major Religions (2020):** Estimated count of county-level adherents of all major religions. Rescaled to range between 0 and 1. Data based on the Religious Congregations and Membership Study and are collected by representatives of the Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies (ASARB).
- All corresponding zip code measured variables are from 2007-2011 and 2015-2019 ACS files (zip code data is available no earlier than 2011 for the 5-yr ACS files).

B Regression Tables

B.1 Disaggregating Outcome Scale

Table B1: Association Between Latino Population Growth and Support for Legal Abortion (Alternate Operationalizations of Outcome)

	Legal Abortion Items				
	Never	Conditions	Late	Scale	Drop DK
Δ % Latino ('19-'09)	0.08 (0.05)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	0.12*** (0.03)	
% Latino ('09)	0.03 (0.02)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.01)	
Total Pop ('09)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	
MHHI ('09)	0.04** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	
% College ('09)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.01)	
% Unemployed ('09)	0.03 (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	
Pop. Density ('09)	-0.21*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.09*** (0.01)	
% McCain ('08)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)	
College	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.04*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	
Inc<25k	-0.06*** (0.00)	-0.04*** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.04*** (0.00)	
Inc 25k-50k	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	
Inc 50k-85k	-0.01* (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	
Inc Missing	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)	0.01* (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	
Female	0.02*** (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	-0.06*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	
Age	0.18*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.00)	-0.16*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)	
Party ID (R)	-0.15*** (0.00)	-0.17*** (0.00)	-0.15*** (0.00)	-0.17*** (0.00)	
PID Miss	-0.11*** (0.03)	-0.08** (0.03)	0.07** (0.02)	-0.08* (0.04)	
Ideology (C)	-0.24*** (0.01)	-0.35*** (0.01)	-0.34*** (0.01)	-0.33*** (0.01)	
Ideo Miss	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	
Evangelical	-0.24*** (0.00)	-0.19*** (0.00)	-0.07*** (0.00)	-0.19*** (0.00)	
Evangelical Miss	-0.15*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)	
Wave FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Drop DK	N	N	N	Y	
Racial/Ethnic Group	White	White	White	White	
N Clusters	3016	3017	3017	2972	
Num. obs.	311519	312156	311747	201129	
Adj. R ²	0.21	0.19	0.18	0.34	

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Note: robust county clustered SEs in parentheses. Columns 1-3 present results from scale items separately. Column 4 presents results from outcome where scale items recode "don't know" as missing rather than as a neutral middle category.

B.2 Varying Time Windows for Change

Table B2: Association Between Latino Population Growth and Support for Legal Abortion (Alternate Operationalizations of Change Window)

	Legal Abortion Index	
	(1)	(2)
% Latino ('19-'00)	0.09*** (0.01)	
% Latino ('19-'11)		0.11** (0.03)
% Latino ('00)	0.05*** (0.01)	
Total Pop ('00)	0.03** (0.01)	
MHHI ('00)	0.02 (0.01)	
% College ('09)	0.09*** (0.01)	
% Unemployed ('00)	-0.05** (0.02)	
Pop. Density ('00)	-0.06*** (0.01)	
% Bush ('00)	-0.08*** (0.01)	
% Latino ('11)		0.05*** (0.01)
Total Pop ('11)		0.02* (0.01)
MHHI ('11)		0.04*** (0.01)
% College ('11)		0.11** (0.01)
% Unemployed ('11)		0.07*** (0.02)
Pop. Density ('11)		-0.07*** (0.01)
% McCain ('08)		-0.05*** (0.01)
College	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02** (0.00)
Inc<25k	-0.05*** (0.00)	-0.05*** (0.00)
Inc 25k-50k	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)
Inc 50k-85k	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)
Inc Missing	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)
Female	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Age	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)
Party ID (R)	-0.16*** (0.00)	-0.16*** (0.00)
PID Miss	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Ideology (C)	-0.29*** (0.01)	-0.29*** (0.01)
Ideo Miss	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Evangelical	-0.17*** (0.00)	-0.17*** (0.00)
Evangelical Miss	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)
Wave FE	Y	Y
Racial/Ethnic Group	White	White
N Clusters	3016	3017
Num. obs.	310163	310239
Adj. R ²	0.29	0.29

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Note: robust county clustered SEs in parentheses.

B.3 In-Group Love or Out Group Hate?

Table B3: Association Between Latino Population Growth and Support for Legal Abortion by White Identity

	Legal Abortion Index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
$\Delta \%$ Latino ('19-'09)	0.03 (0.03)	0.06* (0.02)	0.07** (0.03)
Wht Fav	-0.07*** (0.02)		
Wht Fav Miss	-0.15*** (0.04)		
$\Delta \%$ Latino * Wht Fav	0.09* (0.04)		
$\Delta \%$ Latino * Wht Fav Miss	0.25** (0.09)		
Lat Unfav		-0.08*** (0.02)	
Lat Unfav Miss		-0.03 (0.04)	
$\Delta \%$ Latino * Lat Unfav		0.13** (0.04)	
$\Delta \%$ Latino * Lat Unfav Miss		0.08 (0.09)	
Discrim Wht			-0.08*** (0.02)
Discrim Wht Miss			-0.04 (0.04)
$\Delta \%$ Latino * Discrim Wht			0.08 (0.05)
$\Delta \%$ Latino * Discrim Wht Miss			0.01 (0.09)
% Latino ('09)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
Total Pop ('09)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
MHHI ('09)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
% College ('09)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)
% Unemployed ('09)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)
Pop Density ('09)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)
% McCain ('08)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)
College	0.02** (0.00)	0.02** (0.00)	0.02** (0.00)
Inc<25k	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)
Inc 25k-50k	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)
Inc 50k-85k	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Inc Missing	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)
Female	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Age	0.03*** (0.00)	0.03*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)
Party ID (R)	-0.16*** (0.00)	-0.16*** (0.00)	-0.15*** (0.00)
PID Miss	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)
Ideology (C)	-0.30*** (0.01)	-0.31*** (0.01)	-0.30*** (0.01)
Ideo Miss	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)
Evangelical	-0.16*** (0.00)	-0.17*** (0.00)	-0.16*** (0.00)
Evangelical Miss	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)
Wave FE	Y	Y	Y
N Clusters	3016	3016	3016
Num. obs.	310163	310163	310163
Adj. R ²	0.31	0.31	0.31

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Note: robust county clustered SEs in parentheses. We find that the moderated association between Δ Latino and support for legal abortion is positive and statistically significant using just White favorability item but the effect is 44% smaller than the moderating effect of Latino unfavorability. We further find no evidence that perceived anti-white discrimination, a measure of white identity used by Jardina (2019), moderates the relationship between Latino population growth and support for legal abortion. These findings, together with the strong moderating results for other forms of prejudice (e.g. old-fashioned racism and racial resentment) in Table B18, suggest that prejudice toward the outgroup is the predominant moderator for the relationship between local demographic change and support for legal abortion.

B.4 First Order Results by Race

Table B4: Association Between Latino Population Growth and Support for Legal Abortion (By Ethno-Racial Splits)

	Legal Abortion Index					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Δ % Latino ('19-'09)	0.17** (0.05)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.05)
% Latino ('09)	0.01 (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.04 (0.02)	
Total Pop ('09)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	
MHHI ('09)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05** (0.01)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	
% College ('09)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.03 (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	0.08** (0.03)	
% Unemployed ('09)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.01 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	-0.10 (0.08)	
Pop. Density ('09)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	
% McCain ('08)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.07** (0.02)	
College	0.03*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.03*** (0.00)	0.02** (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	
Inc<25k	-0.04*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.05*** (0.00)	-0.04*** (0.00)	-0.06** (0.01)	
Inc 25k-50k	-0.02** (0.00)	-0.02** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.04** (0.01)	
Inc 50k-85k	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.01)	
Inc Missing	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	
Female	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.01* (0.00)	
Age	0.04*** (0.00)	0.03*** (0.00)	0.04*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	
Party ID (R)	-0.15*** (0.00)	-0.16*** (0.00)	-0.12*** (0.01)	-0.12*** (0.00)	-0.15*** (0.01)	
PID Miss	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.06 (0.05)	
Ideology (C)	-0.28*** (0.00)	-0.31** (0.01)	-0.16*** (0.01)	-0.24*** (0.01)	-0.25*** (0.01)	
Ideo Miss	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)	
Evangelical	-0.15*** (0.00)	-0.17*** (0.00)	-0.09*** (0.00)	-0.13*** (0.00)	-0.14*** (0.01)	
Evangelical Miss	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.02)	
Wave FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ethnicity/Race Subset	All	All	White	Black	Latino	Asian
N Clusters	3056	3055	3016	1756	2287	1286
Num. obs.	458766	458679	310163	49726	65722	22638
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.26	0.31	0.09	0.16	0.19

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Note: robust county clustered SEs in parentheses.

B.5 Survey Weights

Table B5: First Order Association Between Latino Population Growth and Support for Legal Abortion (w/ Survey Weights)

	Legal Abortion Index
Δ % Latino ('19-'09)	0.11*** (0.03)
% Latino ('09)	0.05** (0.01)
Total Pop ('09)	0.03** (0.01)
MHHI ('09)	0.04** (0.01)
% College ('09)	0.09*** (0.01)
% Unemployed ('09)	0.03 (0.03)
Pop. Density ('09)	-0.07*** (0.01)
% McCain ('08)	-0.06*** (0.01)
College	0.02** (0.00)
Inc<25k	-0.05*** (0.00)
Inc 25k-50k	-0.02*** (0.00)
Inc 50k-85k	-0.01*** (0.00)
Inc Missing	-0.03*** (0.00)
Female	-0.01*** (0.00)
Age	0.03*** (0.01)
Party ID (R)	-0.16*** (0.00)
PID Miss	-0.02 (0.03)
Ideology (C)	-0.29*** (0.01)
Ideo Miss	-0.03 (0.02)
Evangelical	-0.17*** (0.00)
Evangelical Miss	-0.06*** (0.01)
Wave FE	Y
Racial/Ethnic Group	White
Survey Weights	Y
N Clusters	3016
Num. obs.	310163
Adj. R ²	0.29

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Note: robust county clustered SEs in parentheses. Survey weights.

B.6 State and Region FEs

Table B6: First Order Association Between Latino Population Growth and Support for Legal Abortion

	Legal Abortion Index	
	(1)	(2)
Δ % Latino ('19-'09)	0.06** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)
% Latino ('09)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Total Pop ('09)	0.01** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
MHHI ('09)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
% College ('09)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)
% Unemployed ('09)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)
Pop. Density ('09)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)
% McCain ('08)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)
College	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)
Inc<25k	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)
Inc 25k-50k	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)
Inc 50k-85k	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Inc Missing	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Female	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Age	0.02*** (0.00)	0.03*** (0.00)
Party ID (R)	-0.16*** (0.00)	-0.16*** (0.00)
PID Miss	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)
Ideology (C)	-0.31*** (0.01)	-0.31*** (0.01)
Ideo Miss	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)
Evangelical	-0.17*** (0.00)	-0.17*** (0.00)
Evangelical Miss	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)
Wave FE	Y	Y
State FE	Y	N
Region FE	N	Y
Racial/Ethnic Group	White	White
Model	State FE	Region FE
N Clusters	3016	3016
Num. obs.	310163	309762
Adj. R ²	0.31	0.31

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Note: robust county clustered SEs in parentheses. Model 1 includes state fixed effects and model 2 region fixed effects.

B.7 Change in Political Context

Table B7: First Order Association Between Latino Population Growth and Support for Legal Abortion

	Legal Abortion Index
Δ % Latino ('19-'09)	0.09*** (0.02)
% Latino ('09)	0.03** (0.01)
Total Pop ('09)	0.01 (0.01)
MHHI ('09)	0.05*** (0.01)
% College ('09)	0.05** (0.01)
% Unemployed ('09)	0.02 (0.02)
Pop. Density ('09)	-0.07*** (0.01)
% McCain ('08)	-0.08*** (0.01)
Δ % GOP Vote ('16-'08)	-0.05*** (0.01)
College	0.02*** (0.00)
Inc<25k	-0.03*** (0.00)
Inc 25k-50k	-0.02*** (0.00)
Inc 50k-85k	-0.01*** (0.00)
Inc Missing	-0.01*** (0.00)
Female	-0.01*** (0.00)
Age	0.03*** (0.00)
Party ID (R)	-0.16*** (0.00)
PID Miss	-0.05* (0.02)
Ideology (C)	-0.31*** (0.01)
Ideo Miss	-0.03* (0.01)
Evangelical	-0.17*** (0.00)
Evangelical Miss	-0.07*** (0.01)
Wave FE	Y
Racial/Ethnic Group	White
N Clusters	3016
Num. obs.	310163
Adj. R ²	0.31

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Note: robust county clustered SEs in parentheses.

B.8 Accounting for Spatial Autocorrelation

Table B8: First Order Association Between Latino Population Growth and Support for Legal Abortion

	(Legal Abortion Index)
% Latino ('19-'09)	0.08** (0.03)
% Latino ('09)	0.03* (0.01)
Total Pop ('09)	0.01 (0.01)
MHHI ('09)	0.04** (0.01)
% College ('09)	0.09*** (0.01)
% Unemployed ('09)	0.03 (0.02)
Pop. Density ('09)	-0.08*** (0.01)
% McCain ('08)	-0.07*** (0.01)
College	0.02*** (0.00)
Inc<25k	-0.03*** (0.00)
Inc 25k-50k	-0.02*** (0.00)
Inc 50k-85k	-0.01*** (0.00)
Inc Missing	-0.01*** (0.00)
Female	-0.01*** (0.00)
Age	0.03*** (0.00)
Party ID (R)	-0.16*** (0.00)
PID Miss	-0.04* (0.02)
Ideology (C)	-0.31*** (0.01)
Ideo Miss	-0.03* (0.01)
Evangelical	-0.17*** (0.00)
Evangelical Miss	-0.07*** (0.01)
Lat	-0.00 (0.00)
Long	0.00* (0.00)
Lat ²	0.00 (0.00)
Long ²	0.00* (0.00)
Wave FE	Y
Racial/Ethnic Group	White
Model	Lat/Long
N Clusters	3014
Num. obs.	310128
Adj. R ²	0.31

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Note: robust county clustered SEs in parentheses.

B.9 Accounting for Additional Religion / Religiosity Controls

Table B9: First Order Association Between Latino Population Growth and Support for Legal Abortion

	(Legal Abortion Index)		
Δ % Latino ('19-'09)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.02)
% Latino ('09)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)
Total Pop ('09)	0.02** (0.01)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)
MHHI ('09)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
% College ('09)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)
% Unemployed ('09)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)
Pop Density ('09)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)
% McCain ('08)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)
College	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)
Inc<25k	-0.04*** (0.00)	-0.04** (0.00)	-0.04*** (0.00)
Inc 25k-50k	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)
Inc 50k-85k	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Inc Missing	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)
Female	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Age	0.04*** (0.00)	0.04*** (0.00)	0.04*** (0.00)
Party ID (R)	-0.16*** (0.00)	-0.16*** (0.00)	-0.16*** (0.00)
PID Miss	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)
Ideology (C)	-0.30*** (0.00)	-0.30*** (0.00)	-0.30*** (0.00)
Ideo Miss	-0.03 (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)
Evangelical	-0.17*** (0.00)	-0.17*** (0.00)	-0.17*** (0.00)
Evangelical Miss	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)
Catholic	-0.06*** (0.00)	-0.06*** (0.00)	-0.06*** (0.00)
Catholic Miss	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)
Evangelical Adherents	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Catholic Adherents	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Total Adherents Major Relig		-0.05*** (0.01)	
Wave FE	Y	Y	Y
N Clusters	3016	2849	2849
Num. obs.	310163	308029	308029
Adj. R ²	0.32	0.32	0.32

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Note: robust county clustered SEs in parentheses. Models 1-3 add additional religion (Catholic) and contextual religiosity controls (Evangelical, Catholic, and Total Adherents). Data on county-level religiosity (total number of adherents) comes from Social Explorer and are based on the Religious Congregations and Membership Study and are collected by representative of the Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies (ASARB). Although our measure of religiosity is a geographic proxy, this is only because the Nationscape survey does not include individual-level measures of religiosity.

B.10 Control for Sexism

Table B10: First Order Association Between Latino Population Growth and Support for Legal Abortion

	Legal Abortion Index
Δ % Latino ('19-'09)	0.10*** (0.02)
% Latino ('09)	0.05*** (0.01)
Total Pop ('09)	0.02* (0.01)
MHHI ('09)	0.05*** (0.01)
% College ('09)	0.08*** (0.01)
% Unemployed ('09)	0.04 (0.02)
Pop Density ('09)	-0.06*** (0.01)
% McCain ('08)	-0.07*** (0.01)
College	0.02*** (0.00)
Inc<25k	-0.03*** (0.00)
Inc 25k-50k	-0.02*** (0.00)
Inc 50k-85k	-0.01*** (0.00)
Inc Missing	-0.01*** (0.00)
Female	-0.02*** (0.00)
Age	0.03*** (0.00)
Party ID (R)	-0.14*** (0.00)
PID Miss	-0.03 (0.02)
Ideology (C)	-0.29*** (0.01)
Ideo Miss	-0.02 (0.01)
Evangelical	-0.16*** (0.00)
Evangelical Miss	-0.06*** (0.01)
Sexism (low)	0.16*** (0.01)
Wave FE	Y
N Clusters	3014
Num. obs.	307560
Adj. R ²	0.32

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Note: robust county clustered SEs in parentheses. Sexism scale is an additive scale of four sexism likert items in the Nationscape survey (`gender_attitudes_logical`, `gender_attitudes_complain`, `gender_attitudes_maleboss`, and `gender_attitudes_opportunity`) and has been coded such that higher values indicate lower levels of sexism before being rescaled between 0-1. `gender_attitudes_logical` is coded from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree” in response to “Women are just as capable of thinking logically as men.” `gender_attitudes_complain` is coded from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” in response to “Women who complain about harassment often cause more problems than they solve.” `gender_attitudes_maleboss` is coded from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” in response to “I would be more comfortable having a man as a boss than a woman.” `gender_attitudes_opportunity` is coded from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” in response to “increased opportunities for women have significantly improved the quality of life in the United States.”

B.11 Control for Change in Other Covariates

Table B11: First Order Association Between Latino Population Growth and Support for Legal Abortion

	Legal Abortion Index
Δ % Latino ('19-'09)	0.10*** (0.02)
% Latino ('09)	0.03* (0.01)
Δ Pop ('19-'09)	0.33* (0.13)
Total Pop ('09)	-0.32* (0.13)
Δ MHHI ('19-'09)	-0.05 (0.03)
MHHI ('09)	0.10** (0.03)
Δ % College ('19-'09)	0.06* (0.02)
% College ('09)	0.09** (0.02)
Δ % Unemployed ('19-'09)	-0.18 (0.13)
% Unemployed ('09)	-0.15 (0.13)
Δ Pop Density ('19-'09)	0.24 (0.54)
Pop. Density ('09)	-0.30 (0.54)
Δ % R Pres ('16-'08)	-0.04*** (0.01)
% McCain ('08)	-0.08*** (0.01)
College	0.02** (0.00)
Inc<25k	-0.03*** (0.00)
Inc 25k-50k	-0.02*** (0.00)
Inc 50k-85k	-0.01*** (0.00)
Inc Missing	-0.01*** (0.00)
Female	-0.01*** (0.00)
Age	0.03** (0.00)
Party ID (R)	-0.16*** (0.00)
PID Miss	-0.04* (0.02)
Ideology (C)	-0.31*** (0.01)
Ideo Miss	-0.03* (0.01)
Evangelical	-0.17*** (0.00)
Evangelical Miss	-0.07*** (0.01)
Wave FE	Y
Racial/Ethnic Group	White
N Clusters	3016
Num. obs.	310163
Adj. R ²	0.31

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Note: robust county clustered SEs in parentheses.

B.12 Ordered Logit Model

Table B12: First Order Association Between Latino Population Growth and Support for Legal Abortion

	Legal Abortion Index
$\Delta \%$ US-Born Latino ('19-'09)	0.57*** (0.07)
% Latino US-Born ('09)	0.37*** (0.04)
Total Pop ('09)	0.11*** (0.03)
MHHI ('09)	0.26*** (0.04)
% College ('09)	0.63*** (0.04)
% Unemployed ('09)	0.27*** (0.08)
Pop Density ('09)	-0.58*** (0.03)
% McCain ('08)	-0.44*** (0.03)
College	0.18*** (0.01)
Inc<25k	-0.23*** (0.01)
Inc 25k-50k	-0.12*** (0.01)
Inc 50k-85k	-0.07*** (0.01)
Inc Missing	-0.11*** (0.02)
Female	-0.06*** (0.01)
Age	0.19*** (0.02)
Party ID (R)	-1.07*** (0.01)
PID Miss	-0.37** (0.12)
Ideology (C)	-2.20*** (0.02)
Ideo Miss	-0.20* (0.08)
Evangelical	-1.10*** (0.01)
Evangelical Miss	-0.46*** (0.04)
Covar Missingness Dummies	Y
Num. obs.	310163

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Note: robust county clustered SEs in parentheses.

B.13 Trimming Outlier Observations

Table B13: First Order Association Between Latino Population Growth and Support for Legal Abortion

	Legal Abortion Index				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Δ % Latino ('19-'09) Trim 99	0.03*** (0.01)				
Δ % Latino ('19-'09) Trim 97.5		0.03*** (0.01)			
Δ % Latino ('19-'09) Trim 95			0.03*** (0.01)		
Δ % Latino ('19-'09) Trim 92.5				0.03*** (0.00)	
Δ % Latino ('19-'09) Trim 90					0.03*** (0.01)
% Latino ('09)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
Total Pop ('09)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
MHHI ('09)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)
% College ('09)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)
% Unemployed ('09)	0.04 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)
Pop. Density ('09)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)
% McCain ('08)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)
College	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)
Inc<25k	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)
Inc 25k-50k	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)
Inc 50k-85k	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Inc Missing	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)
Female	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Age	0.03*** (0.00)	0.03*** (0.00)	0.03*** (0.00)	0.03*** (0.00)	0.03*** (0.00)
Party ID (R)	-0.16*** (0.00)	-0.16*** (0.00)	-0.16*** (0.00)	-0.16*** (0.00)	-0.16*** (0.00)
PID Miss	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)
Ideology (C)	-0.31*** (0.01)	-0.31*** (0.01)	-0.31*** (0.01)	-0.31*** (0.01)	-0.31*** (0.01)
Ideo Miss	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)
Evangelical	-0.17*** (0.00)	-0.17*** (0.00)	-0.17*** (0.00)	-0.17*** (0.00)	-0.17*** (0.00)
Evangelical Miss	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)
Wave FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Racial/Ethnic Group	White	White	White	White	White
N Clusters	2947	2856	2771	2612	2482
Num. obs.	307879	304057	297900	291060	283524
Adj. R ²	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Note: robust county clustered SEs in parentheses. Models drop observations at the upper and lower ends of the distribution of the IV. For example for the Δ % Latino ('19-'09) Trim 99 variable, we recode observations above 99.5th and below 0.5th percentile as missing before rescaling the variable to range between 0 and 1 and re-running our model.

B.14 Assessing Appropriateness of Linearity Assumptions

Table B14: First Order Association Between Latino Population Growth and Support for Legal Abortion

	Legal Abortion Index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Δ % Latino (Median Split)	0.01*** (0.00)		
Δ % Latino (Tercile 2)		0.01** (0.00)	
Δ % Latino (Tercile 3)		0.02*** (0.00)	
Δ % Latino (Quartile 2)			0.01* (0.00)
Δ % Latino (Quartile 3)			0.01*** (0.00)
Δ % Latino (Quartile 4)			0.02*** (0.00)
% Latino ('09)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
Total Pop ('09)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
MHHI ('09)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
% College ('09)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)
% Unemployed ('09)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)
Pop. Density ('09)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)
% McCain ('08)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07** (0.01)
College	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)
Inc<25k	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)
Inc 25k-50k	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02** (0.00)
Inc 50k-85k	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Inc Missing	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Female	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Age	0.03*** (0.00)	0.03*** (0.00)	0.03*** (0.00)
Party ID (R)	-0.16*** (0.00)	-0.16*** (0.00)	-0.16*** (0.00)
PID Miss	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)
Ideology (C)	-0.31*** (0.01)	-0.31*** (0.01)	-0.31*** (0.01)
Ideo Miss	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)
Evangelical	-0.17*** (0.00)	-0.17*** (0.00)	-0.17*** (0.00)
Evangelical Miss	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)
Wave FE	Y	Y	Y
Racial/Ethnic Group	White	White	White
Model	Median	Terciles	Quartiles
N Clusters	3016	3016	3016
Num. obs.	310163	310163	310163
Adj. R ²	0.31	0.31	0.31

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Note: robust county clustered SEs in parentheses. Lowest value of each split omitted as base-category.

B.15 Sensitivity Analysis

Table B15: Sensitivity Bounds for Δ % Latino under Benchmark Confounders

Benchmark	$R^2_{dz.x}$	$R^2_{yz.dx}$	Adj. Est.	Adj. SE	Adj. t	95% CI
6x Ideology	0.0001	0.3258	0.0429	0.0068	6.33	[0.0296, 0.0562]
6x Evangelical	0.0002	0.3876	0.0182	0.0065	2.82	[0.0055, 0.0308]

Note: Results from `sensmakr` package in R. A confounder six times as strongly related to the outcome as ideology (partial $R^2 = 0.33$) would attenuate the coefficient to 0.043 ($t = 6.33$), still highly significant. A confounder six times as strong as evangelical identity (partial $R^2 = 0.39$) would reduce the coefficient to 0.018 ($t = 2.82$), a still statistically significant finding. Thus, while the estimates may be formally fragile in terms of robustness values, benchmarking suggests that only unobserved confounders many times stronger than the strongest observed covariates such as ideology or religion would fully explain away the effect. We cannot think of an unobserved confounder that would be this powerful.

B.16 Population Density

Table B16: Association Between Latino Population Growth and Support for Legal Abortion by Population Density Splits

	Legal Abortion Index	
	(1)	(2)
Δ % Latino ('19-'09)	0.09** (0.03)	0.11** (0.04)
% Latino ('09)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)
Total Pop ('09)	0.03** (0.01)	0.08 (0.05)
MHHI ('09)	0.04* (0.02)	0.08*** (0.01)
% College ('09)	0.04 (0.03)	0.10*** (0.01)
% Unemployed ('09)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.07** (0.02)
% McCain ('08)	-0.04** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)
College	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)
Inc<25k	-0.04*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)
Inc 25k-50k	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)
Inc 50k-85k	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Inc Missing	-0.01** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)
Female	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)
Age	0.02** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.00)
Party ID (R)	-0.15*** (0.00)	-0.16*** (0.00)
PID Miss	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
Ideology (C)	-0.30*** (0.01)	-0.32*** (0.00)
Ideo Miss	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Evangelical	-0.17*** (0.00)	-0.16*** (0.00)
Evangelical Miss	-0.09*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)
Wave FE	Y	Y
Pop Density	Higher	Lower
N Clusters	286	2730
Num. obs.	155197	154966
Adj. R ²	0.28	0.31

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Note: robust county clustered SEs in parentheses. Population density split at median observed value for white respondents in Nationscape data.

B.17 Partisanship

Table B17: Association Between Latino Population Growth and Support for Legal Abortion by Partisanship

	Legal Abortion Index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Δ % Latino ('19-'09)	0.04 (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.04)
% Latino ('09)	0.06** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.03 (0.02)
Total Pop ('09)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.04* (0.02)
MHHI ('09)	0.01 (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.02)
% College ('09)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.02)
% Unemployed ('09)	0.05 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)
Pop. Density ('09)	-0.12*** (0.02)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)
% McCain ('08)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.09*** (0.01)
College	0.04*** (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)
Inc<25k	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.04*** (0.00)
Inc 25k-50k	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.01)
Inc 50k-85k	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)
Inc Missing	0.01** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.02** (0.01)
Female	0.00 (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)
Age	0.02** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
Ideology (C)	-0.30*** (0.01)	-0.32*** (0.01)	-0.32*** (0.01)
Ideo Miss	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.03)
Evangelical	-0.17*** (0.00)	-0.16*** (0.00)	-0.16*** (0.00)
Evangelical Miss	-0.09*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.04** (0.01)
Wave FE	Y	Y	Y
Partisan Group	Democrat	Republican	Independent
N Clusters	2677	2950	2571
Num. obs.	118090	144140	47933
Adj. R ²	0.18	0.17	0.13

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Note: robust county clustered SEs in parentheses. Partisan categories include leaners.

B.18 Heterogeneity By Racial Attitudes

Table B18: Association Between Latino Population Growth and Support for Legal Abortion by Prejudice

	Legal Abortion Index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Δ % Latino ('19-'09)	0.07** (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)
OFR Scale	-0.10*** (0.02)		
OFR Miss	0.11* (0.04)		
Δ % Latino * OFR	0.10 (0.05)		
Δ % Latino * OFR Miss	-0.30** (0.11)		
Wht-Lat Fav		-0.19*** (0.03)	
Wht-Lat Fav Miss		-0.20*** (0.04)	
Δ % Latino * Wht-Lat Fav		0.27*** (0.07)	
Δ % Latino * Wht-Lat Fav Miss		0.34*** (0.08)	
Racial Resentment			-0.24*** (0.03)
RR Miss			-0.18*** (0.05)
Δ % Latino * RR			0.26*** (0.06)
Δ % Latino * RR Miss			0.18 (0.13)
% Latino ('09)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
Total Pop ('09)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
MHHI ('09)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
% College ('09)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)
% Unemployed ('09)	0.05* (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)
Pop Density ('09)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)
% McCain ('08)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)
College	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)
Inc<25k	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)
Inc 25k-50k	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)
Inc 50k-85k	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Inc Missing	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)
Female	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Age	0.04*** (0.00)	0.03*** (0.00)	0.05*** (0.00)
Party ID (R)	-0.15*** (0.00)	-0.15*** (0.00)	-0.14*** (0.00)
PID Miss	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)
Ideology (C)	-0.30*** (0.01)	-0.30*** (0.01)	-0.28*** (0.01)
Ideo Miss	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Evangelical	-0.16*** (0.00)	-0.16*** (0.00)	-0.16*** (0.00)
Evangelical Miss	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)
Wave FE	Y	Y	Y
N Clusters	3016	3016	3016
Num. obs.	310163	310163	310163
Adj. R ²	0.31	0.31	0.32

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Note: robust county clustered SEs in parentheses.

B.19 Heterogeneity By Racial Attitudes (Black and Asian Growth)

Table B19: Association Between Black and Asian Population Growth and Support for Legal Abortion by Prejudice

	Legal Abortion Index					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Δ % Black ('19-'09)	-0.08* (0.03)		-0.06 (0.05)		-0.09* (0.04)	
Δ % Asian ('19-'09)		-0.00 (0.02)		-0.05 (0.03)		-0.04 (0.03)
% Black ('09)	-0.00 (0.01)		-0.00 (0.01)		-0.01 (0.01)	
% Asian ('09)		0.09 (0.06)		0.10 (0.06)		0.09 (0.06)
ORF	-0.11*** (0.03)	-0.03** (0.01)				
ORF Missing	-0.13 (0.07)	-0.00 (0.02)				
RR			-0.15*** (0.03)	-0.14*** (0.01)		
RR Miss			-0.23** (0.08)	-0.11*** (0.03)		
Wht-Blk Fav				-0.10* (0.04)		
Wht-Blk Fav Miss				-0.13 (0.06)		
Wht-Api Fav					-0.10*** (0.01)	
Wht-Api Fav Miss					-0.06*** (0.02)	
Total Pop ('09)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)
MHHI ('09)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)
% College ('09)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)
% Unemployed ('09)	0.06* (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
Pop Density ('09)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)
% McCain ('08)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)
College	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)
Ine<25k	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)
Ine 25k-50k	-0.10*** (0.00)	-0.02** (0.00)	-0.02** (0.00)	-0.02** (0.00)	-0.02** (0.00)	-0.02** (0.00)
Ine 50k-85k	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Ine Missing	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)
Female	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Age	0.04*** (0.00)	0.04*** (0.00)	0.05*** (0.00)	0.05*** (0.00)	0.05*** (0.00)	0.03*** (0.00)
Party ID (R)	-0.15*** (0.00)	-0.15*** (0.00)	-0.14*** (0.00)	-0.14*** (0.00)	-0.15*** (0.00)	-0.15*** (0.00)
PID Miss	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)
Ideology (C)	-0.30*** (0.01)	-0.30*** (0.01)	-0.28*** (0.01)	-0.28*** (0.01)	-0.30*** (0.01)	-0.30*** (0.01)
Ideo Miss	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)
Evangelical	-0.16*** (0.00)	-0.16*** (0.00)	-0.16*** (0.00)	-0.16*** (0.00)	-0.17*** (0.00)	-0.16*** (0.00)
Evangelical Miss	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)
Δ % Black * ORF	0.10 (0.06)					
Δ % Black * ORF Miss	0.20 (0.13)					
Δ % Asian * ORF		-0.10** (0.03)				
Δ % Asian * ORF Miss		-0.05 (0.06)				
Δ % Black * RR		0.03 (0.06)				
Δ % Black * RR Miss		0.24 (0.15)				
Δ % Asian * RR			0.02 (0.03)			
Δ % Asian * RR Miss			0.01 (0.08)			
Δ % Black * Wht-Blk Fav				0.10 (0.08)		
Δ % Black * Wht-Blk Fav Miss				0.15 (0.12)		
Δ % Asian * Wht-Api Fav					0.01 (0.04)	
Δ % Asian * Wht-Api Fav Miss					-0.01 (0.05)	
Wave FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ort Miss Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N Clusters	3016	3016	3016	3016	3016	3016
Num. obs.	310163	310163	310163	310163	310163	310163
Adj. R ²	0.31	0.31	0.32	0.32	0.31	0.31

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Note: robust county clustered SEs in parentheses. All models are White respondents only.

Table B20: Association Between Latino Population Growth and Support for Legal Abortion by Prejudice (Black Respondents)

	Legal Abortion Index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Δ % Latino ('19-'09)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.10)	0.01 (0.07)
OFR Scale	-0.09* (0.04)		
OFR Miss	-0.08 (0.06)		
Δ % Latino * OFR	0.05 (0.10)		
Δ % Latino * OFR Miss	0.16 (0.16)		
Blk-Lat Fav		-0.07 (0.07)	
Blk-Lat Fav Miss		-0.02 (0.07)	
Δ % Latino * Blk-Lat Fav		0.11 (0.16)	
Δ % Latino * Blk-Lat Fav Miss		-0.05 (0.15)	
Racial Resentment			-0.16** (0.05)
RR Miss			-0.07 (0.08)
Δ % Latino * RR			-0.01 (0.13)
Δ% Latino * RR Miss			-0.09 (0.19)
% Latino ('09)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Total Pop ('09)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
MHHI ('09)	0.05** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)
% College ('09)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
% Unemployed ('09)	0.02 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
Pop Density ('09)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)
% McCain ('08)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)
College	0.03*** (0.00)	0.03*** (0.00)	0.03*** (0.00)
Inc<25k	-0.04*** (0.00)	-0.05*** (0.00)	-0.04*** (0.00)
Inc 25k-50k	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)
Inc 50k-85k	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)
Inc Missing	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)
Female	0.01** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)
Age	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
Party ID (R)	-0.12*** (0.01)	-0.13*** (0.01)	-0.11*** (0.01)
PID Miss	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Ideology (C)	-0.16*** (0.01)	-0.16*** (0.01)	-0.15*** (0.01)
Ideo Miss	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Evangelical	-0.08*** (0.00)	-0.09*** (0.00)	-0.08*** (0.00)
Evangelical Miss	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)
Wave FE	Y	Y	Y
N Clusters	1756	1756	1756
Num. obs.	49726	49726	49726
Adj. R ²	0.10	0.09	0.11

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Note: robust county clustered SEs in parentheses. Black respondents only.

Table B21: Association Between Latino Population Growth and Support for Legal Abortion by Prejudice (Asian Respondents)

	Legal Abortion Index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Δ % Latino ('19-'09)	-0.04 (0.07)	0.07 (0.13)	0.21 (0.11)
OFR Scale	-0.15 (0.08)		
OFR Miss	0.23 (0.12)		
Δ % Latino * OFR	0.03 (0.18)		
Δ % Latino * OFR Miss	-0.65* (0.29)		
Asian-Lat Fav		0.10 (0.10)	
Asian-Lat Fav Miss		0.09 (0.12)	
Δ % Latino * Asian-Lat Fav		-0.20 (0.24)	
Δ % Latino * Asian-Lat Fav Miss		-0.27 (0.30)	
Racial Resentment		0.00 (0.08)	
RR Miss		-0.04 (0.17)	
Δ % Latino * RR		-0.44* (0.19)	
Δ % Latino * RR Miss		-0.19 (0.41)	
% Latino ('09)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)
Total Pop ('09)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
MHHI ('09)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
% College ('09)	0.09** (0.03)	0.08** (0.03)	0.08** (0.03)
% Unemployed ('09)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.09 (0.08)
Pop Density ('09)	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
% McCain ('08)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.06*** (0.02)
College	0.01* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Inc<25k	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.06*** (0.01)
Inc 25k-50k	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)
Inc 50k-85k	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)
Inc Missing	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)
Female	0.00 (0.00)	0.01* (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)
Age	0.08*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.01)
Party ID (R)	-0.14*** (0.01)	-0.15*** (0.01)	-0.13*** (0.01)
PID Miss	0.09 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)
Ideology (C)	-0.23*** (0.01)	-0.25*** (0.01)	-0.21*** (0.01)
Ideo Miss	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Evangelical	-0.13*** (0.01)	-0.14*** (0.01)	-0.14*** (0.00)
Evangelical Miss	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)
Wave FE	Y	Y	Y
N Clusters	1286	1286	1286
Num. obs.	22638	22638	22638
Adj. R ²	0.20	0.19	0.20

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Note: robust county clustered SEs in parentheses. Asian respondents only.

B.20 Accounting for Omitted Interaction Bias

Table B22: Association Between Latino Population Growth and Support for Legal Abortion by Prejudice

	Legal Abortion Index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Δ % Latino ('19-'09)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.04)
OFR Scale	-0.08** (0.02)		
OFR Miss	0.11* (0.05)		
Δ % Latino * OFR	0.06 (0.06)		
Δ % Latino * OFR Miss	-0.31** (0.11)		
Wht-Lat Fav		-0.17*** (0.03)	
Wht-Lat Fav Miss		-0.19*** (0.04)	
Δ % Latino * Wht-Lat Fav		0.22** (0.07)	
Δ % Latino * Wht-Lat Fav Miss		0.31*** (0.09)	
Racial Resentment			-0.22*** (0.03)
RR Miss			-0.17** (0.06)
Δ % Latino * RR			0.20** (0.07)
Δ % Latino * RR Miss			0.14 (0.13)
Δ % Latino * PID	0.12* (0.05)	0.11* (0.05)	0.08 (0.05)
Δ % Latino * PID Miss	0.07 (0.34)	-0.03 (0.35)	0.02 (0.35)
Δ % Latino * Evang	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Δ % Latino * Evang Miss	-0.05 (0.14)	-0.06 (0.14)	-0.08 (0.13)
Party ID (R)	-0.20*** (0.02)	-0.20*** (0.02)	-0.17** (0.02)
PID Miss	-0.07 (0.14)	-0.03 (0.14)	-0.05 (0.14)
Evangelical	-0.16*** (0.01)	-0.16*** (0.01)	-0.16*** (0.01)
Evangelical Miss	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)
% Latino ('09)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
Total Pop ('09)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
MHHI ('09)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
% College ('09)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.08** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)
% Unemployed ('09)	0.05* (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)
Pop Density ('09)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.07** (0.01)
% McCain ('08)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.06** (0.01)
College	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)
Inc<25k	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)
Inc 25k-50k	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02** (0.00)
Inc 50k-85k	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Inc Missing	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02** (0.00)
Female	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Age	0.04*** (0.00)	0.03*** (0.00)	0.05*** (0.00)
Ideology (C)	-0.30*** (0.01)	-0.30*** (0.01)	-0.28** (0.01)
Ideo Miss	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
Wave FE		Y	Y
N Clusters	3016	3016	3016
Num. obs.	310163	310163	310163
Adj. R ²	0.31	0.31	0.32

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Note: robust county clustered SEs in parentheses.

B.21 Gender-Related Outcomes

Table B23: Association Between Latino Population Growth and Support for Other Gender-Related Outcomes

	Gender-Related Attitudes			
	Sexism (low)	Fav Warren	Fav Harris	Discrim Women
Δ % Latino ('19-'09)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.05 (0.06)	0.03 (0.04)	0.06* (0.03)
% Latino ('09)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.02** (0.01)
Total Pop ('09)	-0.02*** (0.00)	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.00)
MHHI ('09)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.03 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)
% College ('09)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
% Unemployed ('09)	0.03* (0.01)	-0.06* (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)
Pop Density ('09)	-0.12*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.00)
% McCain ('08)	0.02*** (0.00)	-0.06*** (0.01)	-0.07*** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
College	0.02*** (0.00)	0.04*** (0.00)	0.04*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)
Inc<25k	-0.03*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)
Inc 25k-50k	-0.01*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)
Inc 50k-85k	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Inc Missing	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.03*** (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)
Female	0.06*** (0.00)	0.03*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.04*** (0.00)
Age	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.05*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.10*** (0.00)
Party ID (R)	-0.09*** (0.00)	-0.43*** (0.01)	-0.49*** (0.01)	-0.10*** (0.00)
PID Miss	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.11* (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)
Ideology (C)	-0.09*** (0.00)	-0.36*** (0.01)	-0.29*** (0.01)	-0.20*** (0.00)
Ideo Miss	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)
Evangelical	-0.04*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.03*** (0.00)
Evangelical Miss	-0.07*** (0.00)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
Wave FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
N Clusters	3016	2871	2894	3017
Num. obs.	310314	129920	147332	310246
Adj. R ²	0.15	0.45	0.45	0.11

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Note: robust county clustered SEs in parentheses. Meta-analysis of four coefficients yields pooled estimate of 0.026 (95%CI:[-0.029,0.082]).

B.22 Conceptual Replication Tables

Table B24: Association Between Latino Population Growth and Support Reproductive Policies (Latina)

	Reproductive Policies (Latina)							
	Abortion		Contraception		Sterilization		Scale	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
(Intercept)	1.07*** (0.06)	1.36*** (0.13)	0.97*** (0.05)	1.06*** (0.12)	0.95*** (0.06)	1.03*** (0.15)	1.00*** (0.05)	1.15*** (0.11)
Lat Change Local	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.50** (0.19)	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.21 (0.16)	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.23 (0.20)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.31* (0.16)
OFR	-0.34 (0.19)		-0.39* (0.19)		-0.49* (0.21)		-0.41* (0.17)	
Lat Change Local * OFR	0.52 (0.28)		0.57* (0.24)		0.71* (0.27)		0.60** (0.23)	
Wht-Lat Fav		-0.72** (0.26)		-0.31 (0.25)		-0.36 (0.31)		-0.46* (0.23)
Lat Change Local * Wht-Lat Fav		1.13** (0.37)		0.50 (0.34)		0.54 (0.41)		0.72* (0.31)
PID 5 (R)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)
Ideology (C)	-0.46*** (0.07)	-0.46*** (0.07)	-0.27*** (0.05)	-0.27*** (0.05)	-0.31*** (0.06)	-0.30*** (0.06)	-0.34*** (0.05)	-0.34*** (0.05)
Age	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)
Female	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)
College	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Income	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Adj. R ²	0.35	0.35	0.16	0.15	0.12	0.11	0.26	0.25
Num. obs.	739	739	739	739	739	739	739	739
RMSE	0.28	0.27	0.25	0.25	0.29	0.29	0.23	0.23

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Note: Robust SEs in parentheses. Outcomes measure support for policies for "Latinas" specifically.

Table B25: Association Between Latino Population Growth and Support Reproductive Policies (White)

	Reproductive Policies (White)							
	Abortion		Contraception		Sterilization		Scale	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
(Intercept)	1.06*** (0.06)	1.00*** (0.13)	1.03*** (0.06)	0.95*** (0.13)	1.01*** (0.06)	1.05*** (0.15)	1.03*** (0.06)	1.00*** (0.12)
Lat Change Local	-0.05 (0.07)	0.15 (0.17)	-0.05 (0.07)	0.18 (0.18)	-0.08 (0.07)	0.07 (0.22)	-0.06 (0.06)	0.13 (0.17)
OFR	-0.17 (0.17)		-0.19 (0.19)		-0.19 (0.20)		-0.18 (0.17)	
Lat Change Local * OFR	0.03 (0.22)		-0.05 (0.26)		-0.09 (0.25)		-0.04 (0.22)	
Wht-Lat Fav		0.10 (0.26)		0.20 (0.26)		-0.06 (0.30)		0.08 (0.25)
Lat Change Local * Wht-Lat Fav		-0.40 (0.34)		-0.52 (0.37)		-0.38 (0.42)		-0.43 (0.34)
PID 5 (R)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)
Ideology (C)	-0.56*** (0.06)	-0.56*** (0.06)	-0.36*** (0.06)	-0.39*** (0.06)	-0.37*** (0.06)	-0.36*** (0.06)	-0.43*** (0.05)	-0.44*** (0.05)
Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Female	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)
College	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Income	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)
Adj. R ²	0.50	0.50	0.34	0.33	0.34	0.34	0.45	0.44
Num. obs.	739	739	739	739	739	739	739	739
RMSE	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.28	0.28	0.24	0.24

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05

Note: Robust SEs in parentheses. Outcomes measure support for policies for "White women" specifically.

C Additional Figures

C.1 Zipcode Replication




Figure C1: The Influence of Zipcode Latino Population Growth on Abortion Policy Preferences Conditional on Whites' Ethno-Racial Attitudes. Panels A-C characterize predicted values of the Legal Abortion Index (y-axis) along shifts in relative zipcode non-White population (x-axis) for white respondents at the minimum (grey) and maximum (black) of Old-Fashioned Racism, White-Latino Favorability, and Racial Resentment respectively. 95% CIs displayed from robust SEs clustered at zipcode level. Note that baseline year changes from 2009 to 2011 for this analysis because the 2007-2011 ACS is the first year that zipcode level estimates are available in Social Explorer.

C.2 Contextual Growth of Other Groups




Figure C2: Local Exposure to Latino, Black, Asian and Foreign-Born Population Growth and Abortion Policy Preferences Among White Respondents. Panels present predicted values of the *Legal Abortion Index* (y-axis) across county change in Latino (A), Black (B), Asian (C), and Foreign-Born (D) populations (x-axis) for White respondents. Annotations denote min-max influence of $\Delta\%$ Latino, $\Delta\%$ Black, $\Delta\%$ Asian, and $\Delta\%$ FB. 95% CIs displayed derived from robust SEs.

C.3 Latinos "Have Too Many Children"




Figure C3: Anti-Latino Prejudice and How Well the Statement "Latinos Have Too Many Children" Describes the Group. Means with 95% CIs for each level of anti-Latino prejudice in White sample. Prejudice operationalized as additive index of agreement with negative Latino stereotypes (lazy, unintelligent, unpatriotic, criminal). Labels indicate percent of white respondents in each group who indicated that they thought the phrase "Latinos have too many children" described the group "Very well" or "somewhat well". Data from 2012 National Hispanic Media Coalition survey. For more see <https://www.chicano.ucla.edu/files/news/NHMCLatinoDecisionsReport.pdf>.

C.4 Disaggregating $\Delta \% Latino$




Figure C4: Disaggregating $\Delta \% Latino$ into Latino US-born and foreign-born growth. Predicted support for abortion with 95% CIs across range of $\Delta \% Latino$ (US-Born) in Panel A and $\Delta \% Latino$ (Foreign-born) in Panel B. Source: Nationscape.

C.5 Interflex Plots




Figure C5: interflex binning estimator diagnostics. As a diagnostic check, we estimated nonparametric binning models (via the `interflex` package) to examine the functional form of the interaction between $\Delta \% \text{ Latino}$ and our three measures of prejudice. The binning procedure partitions the moderator into discrete bins and estimates the marginal effect of $\Delta \% \text{ Latino}$ within each bin, relaxing the assumption of linearity. Across bins, the estimated marginal effects varied smoothly in a manner consistent with a linear trend; we did not observe systematic deviations that would warrant a more flexible specification.

D Replication with CES

Outcome measurement: The legal abortion index is an additive index of four binary outcomes that measure support for always allowing abortion in addition to opposition to: prohibiting abortion in all circumstances or after 20 weeks; employer abortion prohibition in insurance plans; Federal prohibitions on spending toward abortion. See Table D26 for more outcome measurement details and specific question wording.

Moderator measurement: Within wave, the moderator is a *racism index* measuring several attitudes that characterize antipathy toward non-whites. *Racism* is not measured exactly the same across all waves. Each CES wave measures attitudes that are some combination of items from the FIRE racism scale (DeSante and Smith, 2020) or racial resentment scale. Within each wave, we index these attitudes in an additive manner. As mentioned early in Study 1, although the racial resentment scale directly measures attitudes toward Black people, prior evidence demonstrates the scale is intimately linked to negative attitudes toward immigrant groups like Latinos (Mora and Paschel, 2020). See Table D27 for *racism index* measurement details and component availability across waves.⁴⁹ Despite differences in intra-wave *racism index* measurement across waves, we demonstrate the different intra-wave *racism index* measures appear to capture the same concept since they are reliably correlated with the same individual-level socio-demographic and political covariates across waves (see Figure D7). That is, respondents high on the *racism index* mostly tend to be women, more educated, higher-income, evangelical, and conservative across each CES wave.

Analysis: We replicate our main findings using pooled CES data to increase sample size. Results are nearly identical to our Nationscape finding across the board. The only difference we uncover is a substantively small positive association (first-difference = 0.057) between county-level $\Delta \% \text{ Latino}$ and support for legal abortion for those lower in prejudice, though the association is significantly stronger among those higher in the *racism index* (first-difference = 0.132), a difference of 0.08 95%CI [0.01, 0.14].

⁴⁹Although DeSante and Smith (2020) indicate the FIRE scale should not be summed in an additive index, this is only if you believe the components have differential effects on different outcomes. We believe whites who believe racism is isolated, deny white structural advantages, are fearful of other races, and are not angry that racism exists may be the kinds of whites who are antipathic toward a growing non-white population. Indeed, since we find the summed index moderates $\Delta \% \text{ Latino}$ in the CES, our assumption is empirically valid even if it is against the general prescription of DeSante and Smith (2020).

D.1 CES Results




Figure D6: Replication of Main Results with Pooled CES data 2016-2022. Panel (A) shows bivariate results by decile of county-level Δ % Latino for White and non-White respondents. Panel (B) shows predicted support for legal abortion among white respondents and non-white respondents in fully controlled models holding all other covariates at their means (controls: county-level % Latino (2009), total population (2009), population density (2009), median household income (2009), % unemployed (2009), % college (2009), % McCain (2008), individual-level age, gender, college-education, income, partisanship, ideology, evangelical, racism index). Panel (C) shows results for the models where we interact prejudice with Δ % Latino and present predicted support for abortion across the full hypothetical ranges of Δ % Latino. We accompany this figure with a first-difference plot to show the full magnitude of the change in support for abortion moving Δ % Latino from its minimum to maximum values for those higher and lower in prejudice.

D.2 CES Outcome Measurement Across Waves

Table D26: Outcome Item Availability Across CES Waves

Survey Item	In CES 2016?	In CES 2017?	In CES 2018?	In CES 2020?	In CES 2022?
Always Allow: "Always allow a woman to obtain an abortion as a matter of choice" (binary, 1 = support, 0 = oppose)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Oppose 20th: "Prohibit all abortions after the 20th week of pregnancy" (binary, 1 = oppose, 0 = support)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Oppose Employer: "Allow employers to decline coverage of abortions in insurance plans" (binary, 1 = oppose, 0 = support)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Oppose Prohibit: "Prohibit the expenditure of funds authorized or appropriated by federal law for any abortion" (binary, 1 = oppose, 0 = support)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Oppose Illegal: "Make abortions illegal in all circumstances" (binary, 1 = oppose, 0 = support)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: "Y" denotes that a survey item is included in a particular survey wave ("yes"). "N" denotes that a survey item is NOT included in a particular survey wave ("no")

D.3 CES Moderator Measurement Across Waves

Table D27: Moderator (Racism) Item Availability Across CES Waves

Survey Item	In CES 2016?	In CES 2017?	In CES 2018?	In CES 2020?	In CES 2022?
Angry: "I am angry racism exists" (5pt, strongly agree to strongly disagree)	Y	Y	N	N	N
Advantage: "White people have advantages because of the color of their skin" (5pt, strongly agree to strongly disagree)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Fearful: "I often find myself fearful of other races" (5pt, strongly disagree to strongly agree)	Y	Y	N	N	N
Isolated: "Racial problems in the US are rare, isolated situations" (5pt, strongly disagree to strongly agree)	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Special Favors: "Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors" (5pt, strongly disagree to strongly agree)	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Generations: "Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class" (5pt, strongly agree to strongly disagree)	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Deserve: "Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve" (5pt, strongly agree to strongly disagree)	N	N	Y	N	N
Try Hard: "It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough, if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites" (5pt, strongly disagree to strongly agree)	N	N	Y	N	N

Note: "Y" denotes that a survey item is included in a particular survey wave ("yes"). "N" denotes that a survey item is NOT included in a particular survey wave ("no")

D.4 CES Moderator Validation




Figure D7: The *racism index* is reliably associated with particular individual-level socio-demographic and political covariates. The x-axis is the univariate association with the *racism index* for each individual-level covariate on the y-axis. All covariates are scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed from robust SEs. Source: CES.

D.5 CES Results, Subsetting To Long-Term Residents




Figure D8: The relationship between $\Delta\%$ Latino and support for legal abortion is robust to subsetting the CES data to long-term residents. These panels show predicted support for legal abortion among white (left-panel) respondents and non-white (right-panel) respondents in fully controlled models holding all other covariates at their means (controls: county-level % Latino (2009), total population (2009), population density (2009), median household income (2009), % unemployed (2009), % college (2009), % McCain (2008), individual-level age, gender, college-education, income, partisanship, ideology, evangelical, racism index). The CES data used for these analyses are subset to respondents who have lived in either their current address or city for 5 years or more. All covariates are scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed from robust SEs. Source: CES.

D.6 CES Results, Adjusting For Religiosity




Figure D9: The relationship between $\Delta \%$ Latino and support for legal abortion is robust to adjusting for 3 additional measures of religiosity. These panels show predicted support for legal abortion among white (left-panel) respondents and non-white (right-panel) respondents in fully controlled models holding all other covariates at their means (controls: county-level % Latino (2009), total population (2009), population density (2009), median household income (2009), % unemployed (2009), % college (2009), % McCain (2008), individual-level age, gender, college-education, income, partisanship, ideology, evangelical, racism index, religious importance, church attendance, prayer frequency). Unlike Figure D6, Panel B, the results in this Figure adjust for three different measures of individual religiosity. The three measures are 1) religious importance: how much a respondent indicates religion is important to them from “not at all important” to “very important”; 2) church attendance: how often a respondent indicates they attend religious services from “never” to “more than once a week”; 3) frequency of prayer: how often a respondent reports they pray from “never” to “several times a day.” All covariates are scaled between 0-1. 95% CIs displayed from robust SEs. Source: CES.

E Ruling Out Residential Selection

E.1 Panel Datasets (CES and VSG)

Table E28: Permissive Abortion Attitudes Do Not Determine Selection Into Counties That Are Increasingly Latino

	Change Latino Pop T2-T1					
	(CES)	(CES)	(VSG)	(VSG)	(CES)	(CES)
(Intercept)	0.04*** (0.00)	0.42*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.00)	0.42*** (0.02)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)
Abortion Attitudes T1	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Change % Latino ('00-'10)	0.92*** (0.01)	0.23*** (0.03)				
Abortion Attitudes T1 Missing			-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)		
Change % Latino ('00-'11)				0.90*** (0.01)	0.22*** (0.04)	
Change % Latino ('10-'20)					0.93*** (0.01)	0.23*** (0.05)
Racial/Ethnic Group	White	White	White	White	White	White
Movers Only	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Waves	14-'10	14-'10	16-'11	16-'11	22-'20	22-'20
Adj. R ²	0.86	0.06	0.82	0.05	0.87	0.05
Num. obs.	9422	838	6438	832	7710	618
RMSE	0.02	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.01	0.02

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

All data are from the CES 2010-2014, VSG 2011-2016, and CES 2020-2022 panels. Outcome measured as change in county Latino population across panel 2014-2010 (CES), 2016-2011 (VSG) and 2020-2022 (CES). Covariates characterizing the change in Latino population at the county level is change in the proportion of the county population between 2000 to 2010 (CES 14-'10), 2000 and 2011 (VSG), or 2010 and 2020 (CES 22-'20). Abortion attitudes measured in Wave 1 of each panel. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

F Experiments

F.1 Experiment 1: March 2024

We fielded our first experiment with Cloud Research Connect between March 24-25, 2024 ($N=1,134$ white adults). We pre-registered our design here at <https://tinyurl.com/4c7drxy2>. The design features two experimental treatment arms. In the first, respondents were exposed to either an implicit Latina or White prime or an explicit Latina or White prime, as outlined in the manuscript. The design and cell sample sizes are portrayed in Figure F11. We present only the explicit treatment in the manuscript. The IRB at REDACTED INSTITUTION FOR REVIEW deemed our experiment was exempt from review. Respondents were provided with information concerning the purpose of the study before they partook in the study, consistent with principles of informed consent.

The implicit treatment images were paired with a textual introduction which read: "The United States population has grown by nearly 50% over the last 20 years. This means that in communities throughout the United States there is increased demand for limited resources like affordable housing, clean water, transportation, healthcare, and quality education. A significant contributor to population growth over the past decade was reproduction and high birth rates." This text was split across three screens each with an accompanying image presented in randomized order.

This text was followed by the measurement of our explicit treatment which was embedded in our DVs: "The following are some ways that could help slow [Latino/White] population growth in the United States. Please indicate whether you favor or oppose each of the following policies": (1) "Making abortions more easily available to [Latina/White] women who want them"; (2) "Providing [Latina/White] women subsidized access to various forms of birth control and contraception"; and (3) "Providing [Latina/White] women subsidized access to sterilization procedures for those who want them (e.g., tubal sterilization)."

Table F29 presents sample statistics for the Connect sample dropping the 11 respondents removed who failed the attention check.

In the following section we present results of our pre-registered analyses. To summarize, while we find results for our "explicit" treatment, the other "implicit" treatment failed to have effects on attitudes. This could be for a variety of reasons, including the fact that pictures of Latino families may be too weak of a treatment to cognitively link the group to subsequent policies, that images in survey experiments taken on cellphones or tablets might be too small or brief to delivery a strong "dose," or that pictures may introduce other information into the experiment that is not properly controlled for. For example, images of seemingly happy families might elicit compassion/care norms that counteract threat-based reactions.

Tables F31 and F32 show our conditional average treatment effects for both implicit and explicit treatments. Table F33, F34, and F35 show results for fully interacted treatments, implicit CATEs for just those in the explicit control condition, and explicit CATEs for just those in the implicit control condition.

Table F36 shows pre-registered results where we evaluate if the effect of the explicit treatment on the additive index of reproductive policy support is driven by class-based attitudes instead of racial attitudes. Inconsistent with the notion that the explicit treatment is driven by class-based attitudes, the effect of the explicit treatment is not heterogeneous by unfavorability toward the poor, unfavorability toward the rich, and unfavorability toward poor whites. However, crucially, the effect of the explicit treatment is heterogeneous by unfavorability toward the *Latino poor*. Specifically, white respondents in Experiment 1 are more inclined to support abortion, contraception, and sterilization for Latinas (relative to white women) conditional on negative attitudes toward the Latino poor, not negative attitudes toward the poor in general.

Table F37 shows pre-registered tests where we evaluate if the interaction between the explicit treatment and old-fashioned racism where the outcome is the additive index of reproductive policy support is robust to adjusting for the interaction between the explicit treatment and alternative mechanisms that may motivate support for reproduction such as attitudes toward the rich or poor, evangelicism, partisanship, and ideology. The positive and statistically significant interaction coefficient between the explicit treatment and old-fashioned racism is robust to adjusting for interactions between the explicit treatment

(A) Latino Images



(B) White Images



Figure F10: Images used in experiment 1. Respondents in the implicit treatment condition saw the three Latino family pictures in random order together with text. Respondents in the control condition saw the three White family pictures in random order together with the text.

and unfavorability toward the rich, unfavorability toward the poor, and evangelical group membership (Models 1-4). However, the interaction coefficient between the explicit treatment and old-fashioned racism becomes statistically insignificant after adjusting for the interaction between the explicit treatment and partisanship (higher values = Republican-identifying) in addition to the interaction between the explicit treatment and ideology (higher values = conservative-identifying, Models 5-6). We do not believe this is dispositive evidence that our results are not driven by racial attitudes, but rather ideology and partisanship, for two reasons. First, preexisting evidence demonstrates racial attitudes shape partisanship and ideology, so adjusting for the interaction between the treatment and both partisanship and ideology may attenuate the interaction effect between the treatment and old-fashioned racism since partisanship and ideology are downstream products (i.e. mediators) of racial attitudes (Sidanius et al., 1996; Kuziemko and Washington, 2018). Second, if treatment effect heterogeneity by old-fashioned racism is actually driven by partisanship and ideology, we should be able to replicate the null interaction effect between old-fashioned racism and the same treatment in Experiment 2 after adjusting for the interaction between partisanship, ideology, and the treatment. However, in Experiment 2, the same explicit treatment has a heterogeneous effect on an additive index of support for contraception policies conditional on old-fashioned racism net of adjusting for interactions between the treatment and both partisanship and ideology (Table F43). Therefore, we do not think the results on Table F37, Models 5-6 fundamentally discount our argument that racial attitudes play a role in shaping support for reproductive policy. **Experiment 2 clearly shows that the effect of the explicit treatment conditional on old-fashioned racism is net of the interaction between the treatment, partisanship, and ideology.**

Figure F11: Design of Experiment 1: March 2024

	White (Exp)	Latina (Exp)
White (Imp)	N = 282	N = 283
Latina (Imp)	N = 288	N = 292

Note: Cell sizes for explicit (column) and implicit (rows) treatment and control conditions.

Table F29: Sample Statistics Cloud Research Connect March 2024

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Age	41.17	12.94	19	79
Female	0.45	0.50	0	1
Evangelical	0.14	0.35	0	1
College	0.54	0.50	0	1
Income	5.97	5.97	1	11
Republican	0.22	0.22	0	1
Democrat	0.62	0.62	0	1
Ideology (C)	0.39	0.39	0	1
Old-Fashioned Racism	0.22	0.22	0	1

Note: Sample statistics for Cloud Research Experiment fielded in March 2024. Ideology and old-fashioned racism have been recoded to range between 0-1. All other variables are dichotomous or use original measured values (age).

Table F30: Experiment 1: Reduced Form Treatment Effects

	Abortion	Contraception	Sterilization	Scale
(Intercept)	0.66*** (0.02)	0.82*** (0.01)	0.73*** (0.02)	0.74*** (0.01)
Implicit Treat	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Explicit Treat	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Controls?	N	N	N	N
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00
Num. obs.	1134	1134	1134	1134
RMSE	0.35	0.24	0.29	0.26

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; · $p < 0.1$

Note: average treatment effects from experiment 1. Robust standard errors. Models presented without controls.

Table F31: Experiment 1: Implicit CATEs With and Without Controls

	Abortion	Abortion	Contraception	Contraception	Sterilization	Sterilization	Scale	Scale
(Intercept)	0.76*** (0.02)	0.94*** (0.03)	0.87*** (0.02)	0.91*** (0.02)	0.80*** (0.02)	0.89*** (0.03)	0.81*** (0.02)	0.91*** (0.02)
Implicit Treat	0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
OFR Scale	-0.47*** (0.07)	-0.13* (0.06)	-0.23*** (0.06)	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.34*** (0.06)	-0.12† (0.06)	-0.35*** (0.06)	-0.11* (0.05)
Implicit Treat X OFR Scale	-0.15 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.12 (0.09)	-0.08 (0.09)	-0.13 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.07)
Explicit Treat	0.04* (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.03† (0.01)	0.02† (0.01)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Age	-0.12** (0.04)		0.03 (0.03)			-0.03 (0.04)		-0.04 (0.03)
Woman	0.00 (0.02)		0.02 (0.01)			0.04* (0.02)		0.02 (0.01)
Evangelical	-0.20*** (0.03)		-0.03 (0.02)			-0.02 (0.03)		-0.09*** (0.02)
College	0.03 (0.02)		0.00 (0.01)			-0.02 (0.02)		0.00 (0.01)
Income	0.07** (0.03)		0.05* (0.02)			0.04 (0.03)		0.05* (0.02)
Party ID	-0.13*** (0.03)		0.01 (0.03)			-0.01 (0.03)		-0.04 (0.03)
Ideology	-0.46*** (0.04)		-0.30*** (0.04)			-0.36*** (0.05)		-0.37*** (0.04)
Adj. R ²	0.13	0.43	0.07	0.18	0.09	0.20	0.12	0.34
Num. obs.	1134	1132	1134	1132	1134	1132	1134	1132
RMSE	0.33	0.26	0.23	0.22	0.28	0.26	0.24	0.21

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; †p < 0.1

Note: Implicit conditional average treatment effects from experiment 1. Robust standard errors. Models presented with and without controls.

Table F32: Experiment 1: Explicit CATEs With and Without Controls

	Abortion	Abortion	Contraception	Contraception	Sterilization	Sterilization	Scale	Scale
(Intercept)	0.78*** (0.02)	0.95*** (0.03)	0.89*** (0.02)	0.94*** (0.02)	0.83*** (0.02)	0.92*** (0.03)	0.84*** (0.02)	0.94*** (0.02)
Explicit Treat	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.05 [†] (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
OFR Scale	-0.59*** (0.07)	-0.20** (0.06)	-0.36*** (0.06)	-0.19** (0.06)	-0.49*** (0.06)	-0.27** (0.06)	-0.48*** (0.06)	-0.22*** (0.05)
Explicit Treat X OFR Scale	0.06 (0.10)	0.09 (0.08)	0.14 [†] (0.08)	0.15* (0.07)	0.18* (0.09)	0.20* (0.09)	0.13 [†] (0.08)	0.15* (0.07)
Implicit Treat	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Age	-0.12** (0.04)		0.03 (0.03)		-0.03 (0.04)		-0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
Woman		0.00 (0.02)		0.02 (0.01)		0.04* (0.02)		0.02 (0.01)
Evangelical	-0.20*** (0.03)		-0.03 (0.02)		-0.02 (0.03)		-0.02 (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.02)
College		0.03 (0.02)		0.00 (0.01)		-0.02 (0.02)		0.00 (0.01)
Income	0.07** (0.03)		0.05* (0.02)		0.04 (0.03)		0.05* (0.02)	
Party ID	-0.13*** (0.03)		0.01 (0.03)		-0.01 (0.03)		-0.01 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
Ideology	-0.46*** (0.04)		-0.31*** (0.04)		-0.36*** (0.05)		-0.38*** (0.04)	
Adj. R ²	0.12	0.43	0.07	0.18	0.09	0.21	0.12	0.34
Num. obs.	1134	1132	1134	1132	1134	1132	1134	1132
RMSE	0.33	0.26	0.23	0.22	0.28	0.26	0.24	0.21

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; [†] $p < 0.1$

Note: Explicit conditional average treatment effects from experiment 1. Robust standard errors. Models presented with and without controls.

Table F33: Experiment 1: Fully Interacted Treatments (Without Controls)

	Abortion	Abortion	Contraception	Contraception	Sterilization	Sterilization	Scale	Scale
(Intercept)	0.65*** (0.02)	0.77*** (0.03)	0.81*** (0.02)	0.90*** (0.02)	0.73*** (0.02)	0.84*** (0.02)	0.73*** (0.02)	0.83*** (0.02)
Implicit	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.02)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)
Explicit	0.05 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	0.04† (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.08* (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)
Implicit*Explicit	-0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	0.06 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)
OFR		-0.54*** (0.09)		-0.40*** (0.09)		-0.48*** (0.08)		-0.47*** (0.08)
Implicit*OFR		-0.10 (0.14)		0.08 (0.11)		-0.04 (0.13)		-0.02 (0.11)
Explicit*OFR		0.12 (0.14)		0.32** (0.10)		0.27* (0.12)		0.24* (0.10)
Implicit*Explicit*OFR		-0.11 (0.20)		-0.35* (0.15)		-0.16 (0.18)		-0.21 (0.15)
Controls?	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.12	0.00	0.08	-0.00	0.09	-0.00	0.13
Num. obs.	1134	1134	1134	1134	1134	1134	1134	1134
RMSE	0.35	0.33	0.24	0.23	0.29	0.28	0.26	0.24

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; † $p < 0.1$

Note: Robust standard errors displayed in parentheses.

Table F34: Experiment 1: Implicit CATEs Conditional on Subset of Explicit Treatment

	Abortion	Abortion	Contraception	Contraception	Sterilization	Sterilization	Scale	Scale
(Intercept)	0.65*** (0.02)	0.77*** (0.03)	0.81*** (0.02)	0.90*** (0.02)	0.73*** (0.02)	0.84*** (0.02)	0.73*** (0.02)	0.83*** (0.02)
Implicit	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.02)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)
OFR		-0.54*** (0.09)		-0.40*** (0.09)		-0.48*** (0.08)		-0.47*** (0.08)
Implicit*OFR		-0.10 (0.14)		0.08 (0.11)		-0.04 (0.13)		-0.02 (0.11)
Controls?	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Adj. R ²	-0.00	0.12	0.00	0.09	-0.00	0.12	-0.00	0.14
Num. obs.	566	566	566	566	566	566	566	566
RMSE	0.36	0.34	0.25	0.24	0.30	0.28	0.28	0.26

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; † $p < 0.1$

Note: Implicit conditional average treatment effects from experiment 1 subsetting to just those who answered DVs about white women (e.g. explicit treatment = 0). Robust standard errors. Models presented without controls.

Table F35: Experiment 1: Explicit CATEs Conditional on Subset of Implicit Treatment

	Abortion	Abortion	Contraception	Contraception	Sterilization	Sterilization	Scale	Scale
(Intercept)	0.65*** (0.02)	0.77*** (0.03)	0.81*** (0.02)	0.90*** (0.02)	0.73*** (0.02)	0.84*** (0.02)	0.73*** (0.02)	0.83*** (0.02)
Explicit	0.05 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	0.04 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.08* (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)
OFR		-0.54*** (0.09)		-0.40*** (0.09)		-0.48*** (0.08)		-0.47*** (0.08)
Explicit*OFR		0.12 (0.14)		0.32** (0.10)		0.27* (0.12)		0.24* (0.10)
Controls?	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Adj. R ²	0.00	0.09	0.00	0.07	-0.00	0.07	-0.00	0.10
Num. obs.	561	561	561	561	561	561	561	561
RMSE	0.34	0.33	0.24	0.23	0.29	0.28	0.26	0.25

***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; `p < 0.1

Note: Explicit conditional average treatment effects from experiment 1 subsetting to just those who received pictures of white women (e.g. implicit treatment = 0). Robust standard errors. Models presented without controls.

F.2 Experiment 2: July 2025

We fielded our second experiment with Cloud Research Connect on July 17, 2025 (N=1,483 white adults). We pre-registered our design here at <https://tinyurl.com/mkrtn9ur>. This time we only included an explicit treatment condition with one treatment (Latina, N=740) and one control (White, N=743). The IRB at REDACTED INSTITUTION FOR REVIEW deemed our experiment was exempt from review. Respondents were provided with information concerning the purpose of the study before they partook in the study, consistent with principles of informed consent.

The treatment mirrored the explicit treatment from the first experiment minus the embedded implicit image treatment. In other words, respondents started by reading the introductory text: "The United States population has grown by nearly 50% over the last 20 years. This means that in communities throughout the United States there is increased demand for limited resources like affordable housing, clean water, transportation, healthcare, and quality education. A significant contributor to population growth over the past decade was reproduction and high birth rates."

This text was followed by the measurement of our explicit treatment which was embedded in our DVs: "The following are some ways that could help slow [Latino/White] population growth in the United States. Please indicate whether you favor or oppose each of the following policies": (1) "Making abortions more easily available to [Latina/White] women who want them"; (2) "Providing [Latina/White] women subsidized access to various forms of birth control and contraception"; and (3) "Providing [Latina/White] women subsidized access to sterilization procedures for those who want them (e.g., tubal sterilization)."

In the following section we again present results of all of our pre-registered analyses. As we show in the manuscript, we find strongly confirmatory results for all of our pre-registered hypotheses. Table F38 presents sample statistics for the Connect sample with the

Table F36: Experiment 1: Class-Based Placebos

	Scale	Scale	Scale	Scale
(Intercept)	0.94*** (0.03)	0.82*** (0.04)	0.91*** (0.03)	0.95*** (0.03)
Explicit Treat	-0.02 (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.04 [†] (0.03)
Unfav. Poor	-0.04 (0.05)			
Unfav. Rich		0.13*** (0.04)		
Unfav. Poor Whites			0.04 (0.04)	
Unfav. Poor Latinos				-0.08 (0.05)
Explicit Treat X Unfav Poor	0.11 (0.07)			
Explicit Treat X Unfav Rich		-0.10 [†] (0.05)		
Explicit Treat X Unfav Poor Whites			0.00 (0.06)	
Explicit Treat X Unfav Poor Latinos				0.16* (0.07)
Implicit Treat	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Age	-0.00 [†] (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 [†] (0.00)
Woman	0.03* (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)
Evangelical	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.02)
College	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Income	0.00* (0.00)	0.01** (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)
Party ID	-0.05 [†] (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.05 [†] (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)
Ideology	-0.42*** (0.04)	-0.38*** (0.04)	-0.42*** (0.04)	-0.41*** (0.04)
Adj. R ²	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33
Num. obs.	1130	1130	1131	1131
RMSE	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; [†] $p < 0.1$

Note: Outcome for all models is the scale of the abortion, contraception, and sterilization outcome. Robust SEs in parentheses.

Table F37: Experiment 1: Accounting for omitted interaction bias

	Scale	Scale	Scale	Scale	Scale
(Intercept)	0.84*** (0.04)	0.94*** (0.02)	0.94*** (0.02)	0.95*** (0.02)	0.96*** (0.02)
Explicit Treat X OFR	0.13 [†] (0.07)	0.13 [†] (0.07)	0.14* (0.07)	0.08 (0.07)	0.05 (0.08)
Explicit Treat X Unfav Rich	-0.09 [†] (0.05)				
Explicit Treat X Unfav Poor		0.07 (0.07)			
Explicit Treat X Evangelical			0.02 (0.04)		
Explicit Treat X Party ID				0.10** (0.04)	
Explicit Treat X Ideology					0.18** (0.05)
Explicit Treat	0.03 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.06** (0.02)
OFR	-0.22*** (0.05)	-0.22*** (0.06)	-0.22*** (0.05)	-0.18*** (0.06)	-0.17** (0.06)
Unfav Rich	0.13*** (0.04)				
Unfav Poor		0.01 (0.05)			
Implicit Treat	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Age	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)
Woman	0.02 [†] (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Evangelical	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.10*** (0.03)	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.02)
College	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Income	0.06** (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)
Party ID	-0.05 [†] (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
Ideology	-0.34*** (0.04)	-0.38*** (0.04)	-0.38*** (0.04)	-0.38*** (0.04)	-0.46*** (0.05)
Adj. R ²	0.35	0.34	0.34	0.35	0.35
Num. obs.	1130	1130	1132	1132	1132
RMSE	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; [†] $p < 0.1$

13 respondents removed who failed the attention check.

Table F38: Sample Statistics Cloud Research Connect July 2025

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Age	42.62	13.26	18	82
Female	0.53	0.50	0	1
Evangelical	0.14	0.35	0	1
College	0.58	0.49	0	1
Income	0.54	0.54	0	1
Republican	0.32	0.32	0	1
Democrat	0.59	0.59	0	1
Ideology (C)	0.41	0.41	0	1
Old-Fashioned Racism	0.20	0.21	0	1
White-Latino Fav Diff	0.49	0.13	0	1

Note: Sample statistics for Cloud Research Experiment fielded in July 2025. Ideology, old-fashioned racism, and our White-Latino favorability differential have been recoded to range between 0-1. All other variables are dichotomous or retain their original scale (age).

Tables F31 and F32 show our conditional average treatment effects for both implicit and explicit treatments. Table F33, F34, and F35 show results for fully interacted treatments, implicit CATEs for just those in the explicit control condition, and explicit CATEs for just those in the implicit control condition.

Table F39: Experiment 2: CATEs (OFR) With and Without Controls

	Abortion	Abortion	Contraception	Contraception	Sterilization	Sterilization	Scale	Scale
(Intercept)	0.77*** (0.02)	1.00*** (0.03)	0.86*** (0.01)	0.96*** (0.03)	0.82*** (0.01)	0.95*** (0.03)	0.82*** (0.01)	0.97*** (0.03)
Treat Latina	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)
OFR Scale	-0.77*** (0.06)	-0.20*** (0.05)	-0.64*** (0.05)	-0.30*** (0.05)	-0.68*** (0.05)	-0.34*** (0.05)	-0.70*** (0.05)	-0.28*** (0.05)
Treat Latina X OFR Scale	0.33*** (0.09)	0.28*** (0.07)	0.41*** (0.08)	0.38*** (0.07)	0.46*** (0.08)	0.43*** (0.07)	0.40*** (0.07)	0.37*** (0.06)
Age		-0.00*** (0.00)		-0.00 (0.00)		-0.00 (0.00)		-0.00* (0.00)
Woman		0.02 (0.01)		0.07*** (0.01)		0.07*** (0.01)		0.05*** (0.01)
College		0.01 (0.02)		-0.01 (0.01)		-0.03* (0.02)		-0.01 (0.01)
Income		0.01 (0.02)		-0.01 (0.02)		-0.02 (0.02)		-0.00 (0.02)
Party ID		-0.18*** (0.03)		-0.08** (0.03)		-0.05* (0.03)		-0.11*** (0.02)
Ideology		-0.51*** (0.05)		-0.31*** (0.04)		-0.35*** (0.04)		-0.39*** (0.04)
Adj. R ²	0.15	0.43	0.13	0.27	0.11	0.23	0.15	0.37
Num. obs.	1483	1480	1483	1480	1483	1480	1483	1480
RMSE	0.33	0.27	0.28	0.26	0.30	0.28	0.27	0.24

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; · $p < 0.1$

Note: conditional average treatment effects from experiment 2 using old-fashioned racism as moderator. Robust standard errors. Models presented with and without controls. Controls include party ID, ideology, age, gender, education, and income.

Table F40: Experiment 2: CATEs (Poor White - Poor Lat Fav) Without Controls

	Abortion	Contraception	Sterilization	Scale
(Intercept)	1.15*** (0.08)	1.10*** (0.06)	1.14*** (0.06)	1.13*** (0.06)
Treat Latina	-0.27* (0.12)	-0.26** (0.09)	-0.39*** (0.09)	-0.31*** (0.09)
Poor Wht-Lat Fav	-1.09*** (0.17)	-0.76*** (0.13)	-0.95*** (0.13)	-0.93*** (0.13)
Treat Latina X Poor Wht-Lat Fav	0.67** (0.24)	0.62** (0.19)	0.83*** (0.19)	0.71*** (0.18)
Adj. R ²	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.04
Num. obs.	1491	1491	1491	1491
RMSE	0.35	0.30	0.32	0.29

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Note: conditional average treatment effects from experiment 2 using the Poor White - Poor Latino favorability differential as moderator. Robust standard errors. Models presented without controls.

Table F41: Experiment 2: CATEs (Wht-Lat Fav) With and Without Controls

	Abortion	Abortion	Contraception	Contraception	Sterilization	Sterilization	Scale	Scale
(Intercept)	1.17*** (0.04)	1.10*** (0.04)	1.13*** (0.04)	1.07*** (0.04)	1.15*** (0.04)	1.13*** (0.04)	1.15*** (0.04)	1.10*** (0.04)
Treat Latina	-0.20*** (0.06)	-0.18*** (0.05)	-0.19*** (0.05)	-0.18*** (0.05)	-0.30*** (0.06)	-0.30*** (0.05)	-0.23*** (0.05)	-0.22*** (0.05)
Wht-Lat Fav	-1.14*** (0.08)	-0.27*** (0.07)	-0.83*** (0.08)	-0.30*** (0.08)	-0.98*** (0.08)	-0.47*** (0.09)	-0.98*** (0.08)	-0.34*** (0.07)
Treat Latina X Wht-Lat Fav	0.52*** (0.13)	0.46*** (0.11)	0.49*** (0.11)	0.40*** (0.10)	0.65*** (0.12)	0.63*** (0.11)	0.55*** (0.11)	0.51*** (0.09)
Age	-0.00*** (0.00)		-0.00* (0.00)		-0.00** (0.00)		-0.00** (0.00)	
Woman	0.02 (0.01)		0.07** (0.01)		0.07*** (0.02)		0.06*** (0.01)	
College	0.01 (0.02)		-0.01 (0.01)		-0.04* (0.02)		-0.01 (0.01)	
Income	0.01 (0.02)		-0.01 (0.02)		-0.01 (0.02)		-0.00 (0.02)	
Party ID	-0.19*** (0.03)		-0.09*** (0.03)		-0.06* (0.03)		-0.11*** (0.02)	
Ideology	-0.52*** (0.05)		-0.33*** (0.04)		-0.35*** (0.04)		-0.40*** (0.04)	
Adj. R ²	0.12	0.43	0.09	0.25	0.09	0.23	0.12	0.36
Num. obs.	1483	1480	1483	1480	1483	1480	1483	1480
RMSE	0.34	0.27	0.29	0.26	0.31	0.28	0.28	0.24

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; . $p < 0.1$

Note: conditional average treatment effects from experiment 2 using the White-Latino favorability differential as moderator. Robust standard errors. Models presented with and without controls. Controls include party ID, ideology, age, gender, education, and income.

Table F42: Experiment 2: CATEs for Class-Based Placebo Moderators Without Controls

	Reproduction Scale						
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
(Intercept)	0.87*** (0.06)	0.76*** (0.04)	0.94*** (0.03)	0.77*** (0.05)	0.93*** (0.02)	0.75*** (0.04)	0.85*** (0.04)
Treat Latina	0.09 (0.08)	0.29*** (0.05)	0.01 (0.03)	0.22*** (0.06)	0.02 (0.02)	0.07 (0.05)	0.11* (0.05)
FT Middle Class	0.01 (0.01)						
Treat X FT Middle Class	-0.01 (0.02)						
FT Black		0.20*** (0.05)					
Treat X FT Black		-0.37*** (0.06)					
FT Rich			-0.02* (0.01)				
Treat X FT Rich			0.01 (0.01)				
FT Poor				0.03** (0.01)			
Treat X FT Poor				-0.04** (0.01)			
Resent Poor					-0.13* (0.06)		
Treat X Resent Poor					0.06 (0.08)		
Resent Rich						0.19*** (0.05)	
Treat X Resent Rich						-0.06 (0.07)	
FT Poor White							0.01 (0.01)
Treat X FT Poor White							-0.02 (0.01)
Age	-0.10** (0.03)	-0.10** (0.03)	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.11** (0.03)	-0.11** (0.03)	-0.09** (0.03)	-0.10** (0.03)
Woman	0.06*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)
College	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Income	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Party ID	-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.12*** (0.02)	-0.12*** (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.11*** (0.02)
Ideology	-0.42*** (0.03)	-0.41*** (0.03)	-0.39*** (0.04)	-0.41*** (0.04)	-0.40*** (0.04)	-0.39*** (0.04)	-0.42*** (0.03)
Adj. R ²	0.35	0.37	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.36	0.35
Num. obs.	1487	1487	1492	1492	1490	1479	1488
RMSE	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$

Note: conditional average treatment effects from experiment 2 using the a variety of class-based affect moderators where higher values are coded to indicate positive affect. Robust standard errors.

Table F43: Experiment 2: Accounting for omitted interaction bias

	Reproduction Scale				
(Intercept)	0.90*** (0.05)	0.96*** (0.03)	0.96*** (0.02)	0.97*** (0.02)	0.98*** (0.02)
Treat Latina X OFR	0.34*** (0.07)	0.38*** (0.07)	0.33*** (0.07)	0.21* (0.08)	0.18* (0.09)
Treat Latina X Unfav Poor	-0.02 (0.01)				
Treat Latina X Unfav Rich		-0.01 (0.01)			
Treat Latina X Evangelical			-0.09* (0.04)		
Treat Latina X Party ID				0.09* (0.04)	
Treat Latina X Ideology					0.13* (0.06)
Treat Latina	0.03 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)
OFR	-0.26*** (0.05)	-0.29*** (0.05)	-0.20*** (0.05)	-0.16** (0.05)	-0.15** (0.05)
Unfav Poor	0.01 (0.01)				
Unfav Rich		-0.01 (0.01)			
Age	-0.08* (0.03)	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.12** (0.04)	-0.13*** (0.04)	-0.13*** (0.04)
Woman	0.05*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
Evangelical			-0.15*** (0.03)		
College	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Income	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Party ID	-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.17*** (0.03)	-0.23*** (0.04)	-0.18*** (0.03)
Ideology	-0.39*** (0.04)	-0.37*** (0.04)	-0.46*** (0.04)	-0.51*** (0.05)	-0.58*** (0.05)
Adj. R ²	0.37	0.37	0.47	0.44	0.44
Num. obs.	1479	1479	1479	1480	1480
RMSE	0.24	0.24	0.26	0.27	0.27

*** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; † $p < 0.1$

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