

Executive Summary

Part 1: Reconnaissance

Using the initial starter code to verify socket and docker networking working properly, I was able to discover port 5000 on 172.20.0.10 was open.

```
[mar@archlinux port_scanner] (main)$ python main.py 172.20.0.10
[*] Starting port scan on 172.20.0.10
[*] Scanning 172.20.0.10 from port 1 to 10000
[*] This may take a while...
[+] Scan complete!
[+] Found 1 open ports:
    Port 5000: open
```

Figure 1: Basic socket test to find port 5000

After implementing some input handling with `argparse`, CIDR handling with `ipaddress`, and threading, I ran `python main.py --target 172.10.0.0/24 --ports 1-10000 --threads 10000` and got the results below.

```
[+] Scan complete!
[+] Found 6 open ports:
Target 172.20.0.1
    Port 5001: open
Target 172.20.0.10
    Port 5000: open
Target 172.20.0.11
    Port 3306: open
Target 172.20.0.20
    Port 2222: open
Target 172.20.0.21
    Port 8888: open
Target 172.20.0.22
    Port 6379: open
```

Figure 2: Some open ports on the 172.10.0.0/24

Implementing some level of banner grabbing by going through some common probing techniques onto the same subnet and ports on Figure 3. This is ran with all ports 1-65535 to get all ports I'm not certain why 172.20.0.1:2222 appears to allow a socket connection now when Figure 2 doesn't have it open.

Regardless, based on these banners, the services for these ports are

- 172.20.0.1:5001 - http
- 172.20.0.10:5000 - http
- 172.20.0.11:3306 - mysql
- 172.20.0.11:33060 - Unknown
- 172.20.0.20:2222 - ssh
- 172.20.0.21:8888 - http
- 172.20.0.22:6379 - telnet

where the last one knowledge that in `telnet`, `get` is a command and can verify by trying to connect via `telnet`, seen in Figure 4.

```
[+] Scan complete!
[+] Found 8 open ports:
Target 172.20.0.1
  Port 5001: open
    Banner: HTTP/1.1 200 OK
    Server: Werkzeug/3.1.5 Python/3.11.14
    Date: Sat, 07 Feb 2026 21:58:09 GMT
    Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
  Port 2222: open
Target 172.20.0.10
  Port 5000: open
    Banner: HTTP/1.1 200 OK
    Server: Werkzeug/3.1.5 Python/3.11.14
    Date: Sat, 07 Feb 2026 21:58:52 GMT
    Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Target 172.20.0.11
  Port 3306: open
    Banner: J
  8.0.45Zg)At0QW17|gUmysql_native_password
  Port 33060: open
    Banner:
      ?
Target 172.20.0.20
  Port 2222: open
    Banner: SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_8.9p1 Ubuntu-3ubuntu0.13
Target 172.20.0.21
  Port 8888: open
    Banner: HTTP/1.1 200 OK
    Server: Werkzeug/3.1.5 Python/3.11.14
    Date: Sat, 07 Feb 2026 21:59:46 GMT
    Content-Type: application/json
Con
Target 172.20.0.22
  Port 6379: open
    Banner: -ERR wrong number of arguments for 'get' command
```

Figure 3: Banner grabbing on 172.10.0.0/24

```
[mar@archlinux csce413_assignment2] (main)$ telnet 172.20.0.22 6379
Trying 172.20.0.22...
Connected to 172.20.0.22.
Escape character is '^]'.
```

Figure 4: Telnet connection on 172.10.0.22:6379

Connecting to 172.20.0.11:33060 with nc, all I get is the ? as seen in the banner and no other information. I was not able to determine what this service could possibly be.

Accessing the SSH server, credentials are shown when connecting with ssh, I was able to read out the flag FLAG{h1dd3n_s3rv1c3s_n33d_pr0t3ct10n}.

Viewing the website at 172.20.0.10:5000, it suggests going to the route /api/secrets, which returns the flag FLAG{n3tw0rk_tr4ff1c_1s_n0t_s3cur3}. It notes this is the api token.

Curling these http services, at 172.20.0.21:8888, it appears to be some sort of api route. Here it says that there's a flag route that also needs a token with hint to intercept network traffic, which is likely referring to the flag I got noted to be api token. Based on this description, it likely for part 2 regarding analyzing network traffic.

```
{
  "authentication": {
    "alternative": "?token=<token> query parameter",
    "header": "Authorization: Bearer <token>",
    "hint": "The token can be found by intercepting network traffic...",
    "type": "Bearer token"
  },
  "endpoints": [
    {
      "description": "API information",
      "method": "GET",
      "path": "/"
    },
  ]}
```

```
{
  "description": "Health check",
  "method": "GET",
  "path": "/health"
},
{
  "description": "Get flag (requires authentication)",
  "method": "GET",
  "path": "/flag"
},
{
  "description": "Get secret data (requires authentication)",
  "method": "GET",
  "path": "/data"
}
],
"message": "This is a hidden API service. Authentication required.",
"port": 8888,
"service": "Secret API Server",
"status": "running",
"version": "1.0"
}
```

To show that domain names work, I set up running the python script within a docker container so it can resolve the domain names, which are the container names in the network. This can be seen in Figure 5.

```
[mar@archlinux port_scanner] (main)$ make run args='--target webapp --ports 1-10000 --threads 10000'
docker run --network csce413_assignment2_vulnerable_network --rm port_scanner --target webapp --ports 1-10000 --threads 10000
[*] Starting port scan on webapp
[*] This may take a while...
[*] Scanning webapp from port 1 to 10000

[+] Scan complete!
[+] Found 1 open ports:
Target: webapp
  Port 5000: open
    Banner: HTTP/1.1 200 OK
    Server: Werkzeug/3.1.5 Python/3.11.14
    Date: Sat, 07 Feb 2026 21:35:33 GMT
    Content-Type: text/html; charset=ut
```

Figure 5: Domain name resolution of `webapp`

To summarize,

- 172.20.0.1:5001 - http using Werkzeug/3.1.5 with Python 3.11.14 (Flask server)
- 172.20.0.10:5000 - http using Werkzeug/3.1.5 with Python 3.11.14 (Flask server). Has corresponding flag FLAG{n3tw0rk_tr4ff1c_1s_n0t_s3cur3}
- 172.20.0.11:3306 - mysql
- 172.20.0.11:33060 - Unknown
- 172.20.0.20:2222 - ssh with OpenSSH 8.9 on Ubuntu. Has corresponding flag FLAG{h1dd3n_s3rv1c3s_n33d_pr0t3ct}

- 172.20.0.21:8888 - http using Werkzeug/3.1.5 with Python 3.11.14 (Flask server)
- 172.20.0.22:6379 - telnet

Part 2: MITM Attack

As suggested by the instructions, I determine the network id of my docker network to be 286b60758bd5 and thus ran the command `sudo tcpdump -i br-286b60758bd5 -A -s 0 'port 3306'`. This command listens to this bridge and looks for packets with information about port 3306, which from recon only the mysql server has open. Running this and looking at the website on `localhost:5001`, I went to the api routes `/api/users` and `/api/secrets` and can see that these packets are being sent in plaintext, as seen in Figure 6. Log can be seen in `mitm/tcpdump_mysql.txt`. As intended in this assignment, the flags are consider

```

16:50:53.921237 IP webapp.51776 > 172.20.0.11.mysql: Flags [P.], seq 188:316, ack 112, win 63, options [nop,nop,TS val 4018265024 ecr 390117219], length 128
E...@.0.0...K{...?X.....
@.c|.....
SELECT id, secret_name, secret_value, description
FROM secrets
WHERE id = 1

16:50:53.921482 IP 172.20.0.11.mysql > webapp.51776: Flags [P.], seq 112:520, ack 316, win 64, options [nop,nop,TS val 390117219 ecr 4018265024], length 408
E...@.0.0...OY.....
@.c|.....
def.userdb.secrets.secrets.id.id?.....B...@....def.userdb.secrets.secrets.secret_name.secret_name.....B...def.userdb.secrets.secrets.secret_value.secret_value
.....@....def.userdb.secrets.secrets.description.description.....}....1      api_token#FLAG{n3tw0rk_tr4ffic_1s_n0t_s3cur3}API authentication token for secret se
rvices - MITM attack will reveal this!.....

```

Figure 6: Some of the tcpdump packets caught

sensitive and thus can obtain sensitive data through packet sniffing.

To use this in conjunction with the info obtained in recon to get the third flag, I constructed a curl command with credentials to query for the flag.

```
curl 172.20.0.21:8888/flag \
-H "Authorization: Bearer FLAG{n3tw0rk_tr4ffic_1s_n0t_s3cur3}"
```

Obtaining the flag, `FLAG{p0rt_kn0ck1ng_4nd_h0n3yp0ts_s4v3_th3_d4y}`.

Discussion on Real World Impacts

Plaintext traffic is generally considered not secure and same here with MySQL traffic being plaintext. This can allow people to do this packet sniffing/MITM attack to obtain information about the database through the queries such as table/column names. Similarly, the results of the query can be sensitive such as social security numbers (possibly only masked), hashed passwords, FERPA data like grades, HIPPA like medical data, etc.

Part 3: Security Fixes

Port Knocking

To complete this task, I looked over the files to determine what needs to be done. It appears the `knock_client.py` appears more or less complete and the main focus is `knock_server.py`. In particular, it appears I also need to start a service on the protected port. After messing around with several things, I decided that just a socket of my own creation would be the simplest as the container is a python container and messing around with configs would be a pain.

The following is a very simple TCP socket that sends Success upon connecting and then closes the connection.

```

with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as server:
    try:
        server.bind(('0.0.0.0', protected_port))
        server.listen(5)

    while True:
        conn, addr = server.accept()
        with conn:
            logger.info("Successful connection with %s", addr)
            conn.send(b"Success")

    except Exception as e:
        logger.error("Failed to start service:", e)

```

Since this is blocking, I ran this within a separate thread

```
t = threading.Thread(target=start_service, args=(args.protected_port,), daemon=True)
t.start()
```

I went to verify this connection works with nc and demo.sh showing connected. I wanted then to make sure I am blocking the port from being accessed normally. Looking into iptables, I had all packets be DROP when trying to access the protected port and added it as a function to add to the iptables. Again, verifying that I no longer can connect, I noticed it hangs with nc and demo.sh. I decided to change the timeout to be 2 seconds for nc in the demo.sh file.

For implementing the knocking, after looking into ways to implement a port knocking, I determine that using UDP would be simpler with select helping reduce load. I just verify this works with printing connections before continuing writing the implementing handling the sequence of knocks.

Port knocking seems a bit esoteric way to secure a port, but certainly adds the security of “need to know” to be able to connect to a port as brute forcing for if a port is open becomes more difficult. However, in terms of computation, it now has a bunch of other ports open listening, which is a bit wasteful of resources. I’m pretty sure firewalls are usually the way to handle this properly by making sure only certain networks can access certain ports, which I think is probably good enough usually. Though, port knocking certainly adds more layers of protection, which is good for security.

Honeypot

I decided to use an ssh honeypot since the suggested tools are for ssh. I used paramiko to implement a basic ssh server that always rejects login attempts, and verify that ssh does in fact connect and it looks like a normal ssh connection. However, when I connected again, my host complained that the rsa key changed, which is unusual.

Remediation Recommendations

Conclusion

```
[mar@archlinux honeypot] (main)$ ssh test@172.20.0.30
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
@    WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED!      @
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!
Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!
It is also possible that a host key has just been changed.
The fingerprint for the RSA key sent by the remote host is
SHA256:Kbel9U1yvylKq94TnNKbdqudDV+KI0RFLIQGAH8EXJE.
Please contact your system administrator.
Add correct host key in /home/mar/.ssh/known_hosts to get rid of this message.
Offending RSA key in /home/mar/.ssh/known_hosts:71
Host key for 172.20.0.30 has changed and you have requested strict checking.
Host key verification failed.
```

Figure 7: Warning from ssh about changed rsa key