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**A calculus of creative expression: The central chapter of
Dañdin's "Kāvyādarśa"**

Eppling, John Frederick, Ph.D.

The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 1989

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A dissertation entitled

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The Central Chapter of Dandin's Kavyadarsa

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University of Wisconsin-Madison in partial fulfillment of
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Major Professor

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Iisha Nilsson
Arthur E. Ernst

Robert M. Bush
Dean, Graduate School

A CALCULUS OF CREATIVE EXPRESSION:
THE CENTRAL CHAPTER OF DANDIN'S KĀVYĀDARŚA

by

JOHN FREDERICK EPPLING

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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The entire threefold world
would become blind darkness
if the light whose name is language
did not shine throughout creation.

Dāṇḍin

[Kāvyādarśa (c. 700)]

Because all objects which we can name or otherwise single out -- the simplest objects of the senses and the most recondite entities that speculation can conjecture, the most abstract constructions of the intellect and the most concrete aims of passion alike -- are projections of man's interests; because the Universe as it is known to us is a fabric whose forms, as we can alone know them, have arisen in and through reflection; and because that reflection, whether made by the intellect in science or by 'the whole soul of man' in poetry, has developed through language -- and, apart from language, can neither be continued nor maintained -- the study of the modes of language becomes, as it attempts to be thorough, the most fundamental and extensive of all inquiries.

I. A. Richards

[Coleridge on Imagination (1934)]

Textual Context

Introduction

The Kāvyādarśa of Daṇḍin is unique, not only in its seminal position among the long and vital tradition of extant texts whose central concern is the explication of kāvya -- the formal and exquisitely refined organization of language whose focus and end is the generation of beauty -- but also in its method of realization, and the range and depth of its impact. Daṇḍin belongs among the ever-elect company of writers accomplished both in the generation and considered analysis of creative literature. Always grounded in practice -- with an emphasis on illustration and open-ended models -- he stands apart from those later writers within the tradition who sought and affirmed respectively varying absolute principles.

Indeed I would hold that the Kāvyādarśa is the single most influential text of the classical Sanskrit tradition -- and perhaps the entire Indian literary tradition -- viewed in a trans-cultural context -- as measured in range of

absorption, and literary and specific commentatorial response. A striking statement no doubt, but just as this work will attempt to move inside a specific text in a close and detailed way, so also will it attempt to step back and step out of the Sanskritic tradition, and consider the scope of textual transmission. For the Kāvyādarśa was to become the "poetic" of choice -- whether in immediate translation or in direct adaptation -- not only throughout Southern India and Śrī Laṅkā, but most especially and strikingly in Tibet. We shall be moving on new ground here, and in surveying this textual response across time in Tibet it is to be hoped that a new and deeper awareness of Tibetan literature and Indic textual influence will be gained.

It is certain that a considered and formal explication of kāvya predated Dāṇḍin -- who may be dated to the latter 7th and early 8th centuries and whose focus of activity was most probably the southeastern city of Kāñcī -- but apart from sections of the Nātyasāstra traditionally attributed to Bharata, it is to the Kāvyādarśa and the Kāvyālaṅkāra of

Bhāmaha that we turn as the earliest extant texts. And however striking the points of comparison and contention between these two works, and however much energy and ink has been squandered in the attempt to establish the temporal priority of the one over the other, I feel that to posit resolution either way is questionable at best.

On the tradition that was to follow Dāṇḍin and Bhāmaha the opinion of Louis Renou is just, "Quel riche domaine est celui de le Poétique sanskrite, tout engagée dans le vif des spéculations, et sans cesse animée par le contact des grandes œuvres littéraires." Yet although he affirms that "on a identifié aujourd'hui plus de huit cents traités de poétique en Sanskrit,"¹ we should realize that the vital extant tradition extends to the mid-17th century, effectively coming to a close with the Rasagaṅgādhara of Jagannātha, and is primarily expressed by up to twenty-five central texts

The essential kāvya sāstras (apart from those works whose focus is drama and theatre) include:

- (1) the Kāvyālaṅkāra of Bhāmaha [7th-8th centuries]
- (2) the Kāvyādarśa of Daṇḍin [7th-8th centuries]
- (3) the Kāvyālaṅkārasūtrāṇi of Vāmana [8th-9th centuries]
- (4) the Kāvyālaṅkārasārasaṅgraha of Udbhaṭa [8th-9th centuries]
- (5) the Kāvyālaṅkāra of Rudraṭa [9th century]
- (6) the Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana [9th century]
- (7) the Kāvyamīmāṃsā of Rājaśekhara [10th century]
- (8) the Vakroktijīvita of Kuntaka [10th-11th centuries]
- (9) the Abhinavabhārati and Kāvyālokalocana of Abhinavagupta [10th-11th centuries]
- (10) the Aucityavicāracarcā and Kavikanthābhārana of Kṣemadendra [11th century]
- (11) the Sarasvatīkanthābhārana and Śrīngāraprakāśa of Bhoja [11th century]
- (12) the Vyaktiviveka of Mahimabhaṭṭa [11th century]
- (13) the Kāvyaprakāśa of Mammaṭa [11th-12th centuries]

- (14) the Alamkārasarvasva of Ruyyaka [12th century]
- (15) the Kāvyānuśāsana of Hemacandra [12th century]
- (16) the Vāgbhaṭālamkāra of Vāgbhaṭa (I.) [12th century]
- (17) the Chandrāloka of Jayadeva [13th century (?)]
- (18) the Kāvyānuśāsana of Vāgbhaṭa (II.) [14th century (?)]
- (19) the Ekāvalī of Vidyādhara [14th century]
- (20) the Pratāparudrayaśobhūṣāna of Vidyānātha [14th century]
- (21) the Sāhityadarpana of Viśvanātha [14th century]
- (22) the Vṛttivārttika, Citramīmāṃsā, and
Kuvalayānanda of Appayya Dīkṣita [16th century]
- (23) the Rasagaṅgādhara of Jagannātha [17th century]

It shall be a fundamental contention of this thesis that the presentation of Daṇḍin and the Kāvyādarśa as found throughout the contemporary literature (by which I mean that written from the latter 19th century forward) --

whether "Western" or Indian -- is frequently marred by misconception and distortion. I regret the frequent polemic tone but there is nothing else for it. As we proceed through Dandin's text, one of our primary concerns then shall be to cut away accumulated detritus. Despite much endeavor the explication of *kāvya* śāstra in contemporary exposition has been generally but poorly served.

For English readers this is most surely seen in the lack of adequate translations. Although a few of the primary texts have been published in English over the last century, with the possible exception of J. L. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan's translation of the Rasādhyāya of the Nātyaśāstra,² these more frequently obscure than clarify. And I should immediately offer that I feel that my own position toward translation is hardly highbrow. That is, as much as I may be sympathetic to and recognize the criticisms expressed in, for example, Henry Heifetz's dissertation "Issues of Literary Translation from Sanskrit and Tamil" (sadly emasculated in publication),³ and

although I would consider a strained or jarring style of translation in the extreme grounds for rejection (and this perhaps can only be pointed to in specific example), there is a wide and grey area into which translation may fall where dismissal is more a matter of personal distaste.

Rather I would hold to -- insofar as such things may be grasped -- a more pedestrian line, and ask of a translation that (1) it be literate (in the literal sense of the word) in the target language; (2) that its stylistic presentation is not one of accumulative distortion; and (3) that it remain within the semantic bounds -- where evident -- of the original. (It is thus that following my own restricted sense of the term I would reject, say, the poems of Ezra Pound's Cathay as "translations" -- but this is not to simultaneously degrade them, nor does it entail a failure to recognize that such "transmutations," or call them what you will, may exist on or reflect (as in this case) an extremely elevated plane of poetical awareness.)

For to focus on the kāvya sāstra texts the element of

informational or procedural "transfer," however frequently illuminated by *kāvya* itself, is central, and the centrality of this message, however obscure at times at the edges, does indeed allow itself to be delimited.

A number of the translations relevant to this work fail at a most fundamental level in their realization of an English that is as often as not sorely pressed. When this is combined with occasional distortions of original "meaning," we have the primary reasons for the continued obscurity of the study of creative language in classical Sanskrit.

The English translations of the Kāvyādarśa to date are cases in point.⁴ That of V. Narayana Iyer may be rejected on the first point alone, with such verses as, for example, "What is called Udara by which all sequence (of words) find their excellence when the sequence (of word) is uttered its excellent quality is clear" (KD [1.76]); or "This decoration of the ear stands in the way of expansion (of

the eye). 'Thus (thinking) probably, by your eye the utpalā flower in your ear is besieged" (KD [2.224]).⁵

Where that of S. K. Belvalkar, even allowing a vocabulary that reflects "Indologese" at its best, displays such a reinforced degree of stylistic distortion that I feel Dandin's message is severely marred. As in, for example, "As if chiselled out of the lunar orb, as if extracted from lotus-interior, is, O slender-bodied one, thy face. . . ." (KD [2.41]); or "The eyes of the deer have no dancing eyebrows and are not through liquor tinged red; this thy pair of eyes however, is adorned with those qualities" (KD [2.191]).⁶

A number of Dandin's verses from the Second Chapter also appear throughout Edwin Gerow's Glossary of Indian Figures of Speech. And here translation occasionally fails -- and sadly when this occurs in sufficient number the remainder, whether justifiably or not, tends to become suspect -- due to excessive semantic distortion. We shall touch on many of these verses not merely in correction, but

in view of the various aspects and questions of translation that may be raised.

The fundamental goal and basis of this work is thus an adequate translation of Dandin's central, highly technical yet revealing Second Chapter. The actual practice followed in the contained translations is based upon a team approach. Throughout I have worked closely with J. Prabhakara Shastry, an Indian *pandit* extremely well-versed in (among other things) *kāvya* and *kāvya sāstra*, and fluent in English. Each verse initially would be pulled apart with an emphasis on resolving questionable word meanings and cultural references. We would then shift to the sense of the verse as a whole -- a sense by no means immediately apparent in every case and which would frequently have to be refined and drawn out through an extended questioning dialectic. I would then proceed to an actual translation. The eventual product would be returned to after a period of time with Shastry scanning for more obvious errors.

In conjunction with translation an attempt has been

made at detailed explication, for a translation of this material alone -- however accurate -- at this temporal and cultural remove would but partially convey the issues involved. The approach here is radically different from the usual methodology. For one should be aware that the standard critical approach to classical Indian literature is one of broad historical sweep, where textual analysis is generally reduced to a summation of content.

We may point to, for example, A History of Sanskrit Literature by A. A. Macdonell (1899); the epical Geschichte der indischen Litteratur in three volumes by Moriz Winternitz (1904-20); the sections on literature by Louis Renou in L'Inde Classique (1953); ; A History of Sanskrit Literature by A. B. Keith (1928); History of Classical Sanskrit Literature by M. Krishnamachariar (1937); A History of Sanskrit Literature: Classical Period by S. N. Dasgupta and S. K. De (1946); and more recently A. K. Warder's Indian Kāvya Literature (1972-) (now in five volumes), and

Siegfried Lienhard's A History of Classical Poetry: Sanskrit-Pali-Prakrit (1984).⁷

The historical approach is also followed in the foremost works more specifically devoted to kāvya sāstra -- P. V. Kane's History of Sanskrit Poetics (1923), S. K. De's History of Sanskrit Poetics (in two volumes) (1923 and 1925), and Edwin Gerow's Indian Poetics (1977). In exception one perhaps might mention V. Raghavan's extensive study of Bhoja's Śrīgāraprakāśa (1963) (though here too the emphasis is more comparative across time), and the exceptional work of Marie-Claude Porcher, as in, for example, Figures de Style en Sanskrit (1978).⁸

Our focus shall rather be on a single text -- although comparative points within the tradition will be drawn, we will move inside and primarily remain within the Kāvyādarśa and attempt to examine in detail what Dāṇḍin is about. This considered appreciation of the text itself will allow us (it is to be hoped) to cut through much of the misconceived generalities which the historical approach

alone has so frequently offered. I would see two pervasive fallacies in the literature that this thesis will attempt to counter.

Among the primary texts of the classical Indian literary critical tradition, one is struck by the variability and indeed individuality of approach which their authors generally display. This is a situation quite otherwise than the interminable commentaries on commentaries stemming from a given and absolute textual authority that one finds in the broader literature as a whole -- "Contrairement à ce qui se passe dans la plupart des disciplines indiennes, la Poétique n'a pas eu un texte de base, un code 'révélé' que tous les ouvrages ultérieurs se seraient efforcés de suivre ou de commenter. . . . De là aussi, par voie de conséquence, une liberté de mouvement qu' on ne retrouve pas au même degré dans les autres branches du savoir."⁹

It is this unusual situation that I would posit underlies one of the most extensive fallacies found in the

contemporary literature: The essentially "revisionist" view that (1) assumes the quest for an absolute, inherent principle of kāvya is the valid critical methodology; (2) that (given this) this was in fact an invariable concern of all the traditional writers, and thus that they may be grouped according to various "theoretical" positions or "schools"; and (3) that this quest was only fully realized by the later Dhvani theorists (as epitomized by Ānandavardhana in the Dhvanyāloka [9th century], and Abhinavagupta in the Kāvyālokalocana [10th-11 centuries]), whose position is thus conceived as the evaluative standard by which all other (and especially earlier) writers are to be judged.

For the lack of an absolute textual authority has generated a tension or unease among many, a circumstance seen by many as essentially aberrant, and the need to bring the kāvya sāstra into equilibrium with the wider spectrum of Indian literature has been one of the prime motivating factors leading to the elevation of absolute principles

that we do indeed find among many of the writers themselves. Yet the force of this continuing circumstance, for it was by no means resolved within the central tradition itself, has also led to a seeming need on the part of many contemporary writers to reinterpret -- in their consequent evaluative elevation and sweeping application of such principles and procedures -- the entire tradition and to project backwards in this light a false equilibrium.

It is thus that we find what I would consider the incorrect presentation of the various *kāvya* śāstras (those explicatory texts whose concern is *kāvya* or the beautiful in literature) as a linear progression from initial somewhat confused stumbling to the complete realization of final truth (a view that thus serves -- in the minds of those who accept it -- to solidify and thus satisfactorily ground what was a quite open situation); and the concomitant classification of the various writers into "schools"

according to their perceived adherence to particular principles or features.

Thus we find, for example, Johannes Nobel projecting upon the exposition of kāvya a conception far more indicative of late 19th century Europe (of Darwin and the "Crystal Palace"):

From the beginning to modern times there has been a steady growth and development. The views of the older works were rejected or modified, one theory has substituted for another, and poetry was regarded from quite different points of view; in short, there was scarcely one theme that did not assume a new aspect in the course of the historical development. Compared with other branches of human knowledge this progress and growth was throughout natural and in accordance with the progressive methods employed in treating abstract matters.¹⁰

Or again Louis Renou, now on the perceived universal "quête de Unite": "La Poétique, envisagée dans son développement historique, s'attachera à déterminer un point central, un principe d'explication permettant de rendre compte de tous les faits. C'est cette même quête de

l'Unité que nous observons dans l'ensemble des systèmes philosophiques. Il s'ensuit que chaque école sera tentée de dévaloriser les explications antérieures pour instaurer un principe nouveau."¹¹

And as Edwin Gerow points outs, "De, Dasgupta, and Keith, the standard Western or Westernized interpreters of Indian poetics, prefer to see all poetics addressed to an abstract genre 'poetry', to the nature of poetry per se, and to account for the variety of poetics in terms of varyingly adequate responses to that problem"

(Glossary/71); "and from De, [we seem to get] a sense that the texts are interesting only insofar as they fulfill some predefined potential of ideal aesthetic 'progress'."¹²

Yet Gerow's own views on the issue are hardly clear. Although seeming to criticize De in the above, he also writes, "The theory of literature that developed on the Indian soil . . . is itself exclusively concerned with purposes and forms of literature, and not at all with its

occasion: it is, in other words, literary philosophy or aesthetics, rather than criticism."¹³

Certainly S. K. De, one of the most respected and prolific writers on kāvya, must yet be approached with caution. We should recognize his tendency to seek "in every author notions of poetic essence" (Glossary/43), and we should be sensitive to statements where presupposition is presented as evaluative absolute, as in, for example: "The Indian theorists have almost neglected perhaps the most important part of their task, viz. a definition of the nature of the subject of a poem as a product of the mind of the poet; this problem is the main issue of Western aesthetics."¹⁴ Yet in either tendency he is hardly alone.

Gerow himself, certainly one of the foremost American scholars in the field, tends I feel to develop logical constructs that may not necessarily have a basis in the text under consideration -- that frequently we again find a, perhaps more subtle, "spin" cast upon the material. And too his presentation is often marred by a style frequently

opaque, a curious academic "philoso-speak." We find in a discussion of the "figures" (*alamkāras*), for example, "The primary characteristic of the figurative universe is not its fixity, but its selectivity. The figures realize the potentialities implicit in the norms of grammar and logic in no set or predetermined archetectonic. . . . Categories considered as genera in a large number of cases are taken as basic, especially when these genera appear to remove the subjacent figures from immediate cross-relevance. . . ." (Glossary/53). (And I fear the words of John Crow Ransom (in regard to the writings of R. P. Blackmur) perhaps apply, "I have nearly always seemed to sense an esoteric effect in his language when he generalizes, which makes him often hard reading, and I have wondered if it did not cover a very real philosophical confusion; for, at any rate, philosophical discourse is explicit, and never esoteric".)¹⁵

Indeed, it seems that the majority of writers on the *alamkāra* theorists frequently tend to hypostasize what are in fact their own projections -- we should be especially

wary when an author moves away from the relevant text itself, whether in interpretation or in judgment.

The immediate danger, however, lies in the concrete distortions that are generated with regard to the Kāvyādarśa, stemming from the misconceived projection of "theory" as central to all writers, and its consequent reification in the form of the various theoretical "schools."

The "classic" position of this approach is perhaps not surprisingly presented by S. K. De, "It is probable that the Rīti school, if we use this term to separate those writers who put an emphasis on rīti as the most important element of poetry, had an independent origin and history, and existed for a long time side by side with the sister schools, which threw into prominence the elements of rasa, alamkāra or dhvani, respectively"; in which schema Dandin "stands midway in his view between the Alamkāra system of Bhāmaha and the Rīti-system of Vāmana." And further, "At the same time there can be no doubt that in theory he allies

himself distinctly with the views of Vāmana" (this last an interesting maneuver considering that Vāmana's views did not exist at Dāṇdin's time).¹⁶

And of course once the legitimacy of the schools was accepted a conceived scholarly endeavor was to align oneself according to one's preference. Thus P. V. Kane mirrors De (albeit with a conclusion that at least hints at the truth), "Dāṇdin's Kāvyādarśa is to some extent an exponent of the Rīti School of Poetics and partly of the Alaṅkāra school. He gives, however, such an exhaustive treatment of Guna and Alaṅkāras that it is not possible to identify him with any particular school."¹⁷

And reflecting a prevalent practice in the secondary literature -- the paraphrasing of one's predecessors without acknowledged attribution --¹⁸ D. K. Gupta affirms, "[Dāṇdin] should be regarded . . . as an alamkāra theorist with the same force with which he is associated with the rīti school. In fact, he affiliates himself to both the schools and it

should be clearly understood that he cannot be linked exclusively with either of the two."¹⁹

I would thoroughly reject such views and their underlying presupposition, and it will thus be one of the central concerns of this work -- the validity of which I feel will be self-evident as we examine the text itself -- to demonstrate that Dandin was not concerned with "theoretical" questions, with "explaining," or with assuming a given position according to the projected tenets of a hypostatized school. And far from thus displaying an envisioned lack of critical awareness, I would posit that Dandin was very much aware of what he was doing in consciously developing a presentation that "shows," that "points to."

For the implications of a circumstance that are commonly passed by cannot be overly stressed. Dandin himself is the only writer of a major kāvya sāstra who was also a major writer of kāvya. A consideration of the best kāvya work in "prose" (gadya) by H. T. Colebrooke, a

pioneering scholar in the Western tradition of Sanskrit studies, reflects a traditional given, "The most celebrated are the Vāsavadattā of Subandhu, the Daśacumāra of Dāṇḍī, and the Kādambarī of Bāṇa."²⁰

Dāṇḍin was intimately concerned and conversant with the generation of kāvya itself -- in marked contrast to contemporary scholars -- as well as with the realm of kāvya sāstra. I am willing to posit (and risk invoking the "intentional fallacy") that he felt that "The experience of poetry like any other experience, is only partially translatable into words"; that "Even the most accomplished of critics can, in the end, only point to the poetry which seems to him to be the real thing."²¹ That Dāṇḍin as a master of language recognized the limitations of language, and perhaps recognized the pursuit of ultimate meanings -- themselves expressed in words -- as essentially academic, an endless web of individual presumption woven by scholars by and primarily for themselves.

The second pervasive misconception found throughout

the contemporary literature that an accurate reading of the Kāvyādarśa will dispel is what I term the "prescriptive fallacy." As with the preceding (and with any number of minor errors) its fundamental cause is the failure to ground oneself in the text itself. We seem to have writers invariably accepting at face value prior summaries of previous writers, themselves often summaries of prior summaries, with the original text left unread, lost one is left to assume in some pre-Cambrian fog.

Again we turn to S. K. De for a model exposition of this view:

The attempts of these exponents of the Alamkāra School are limited to a systematic classification of poetic expression into fixed rhetorical categories; and from this formal treatment their works have the general appearance of technical manuals comprising a collection of definitions, illustrations and empirical canons elaborated for the benefit of the aspiring poet. Poetry is regarded, more or less, as a mechanical series of verbal devices, in which a desirable sense must prevail, and which must be diversified by means of certain tricks of phrasing, which consist of the so-called poetic figures and to which the name Alamkāra is restricted.²²

The misconception that *kāvya* śāstra invariably comprises a collection of "rules" is well-entrenched, and indeed frequently dropped in passing by some of the most perceptive of contemporary writers. Henry Heifetz notes, for example, "The prescriptive rather than evaluative tenor of Sanskrit formal aesthetics. . . ." (and again, that we are invariably dealing with "aesthetics").²³ Or again, as Leonard Nathan writes on Dāṇḍin's elaboration of the *Mahākāvya* (or *Sargabandha*) in the first chapter of the Kāvyādarśa [1.14-20], "Indian critics have tried to set forth the nature and purpose of classical poems and to a great degree have succeeded, though to our modern way of thinking their dicta may seem overly dogmatic."²⁴ Where in fact if he had been reading the actual text -- or a reasonable translation -- rather than a summary by someone else, he would have read Dāṇḍin's concluding verse to this sequence [1.20], one verse among many as we shall see, that explicitly belies this projection of prescribed "dicta": "A *kāvya* although short of some of these features is not

necessarily defective / If the excellence of those employed pleases the wise," that is, the "connoisseur" of literary excellence.

Surely much of this must be seen as a break down in scholarly method and rigor, yet even where the need to approach the text itself is recognized in principle there remains it seems a glaring failure to actually put this need into practice with regard to the *kāvya* śāstras themselves -- a tradition which thus remains opaque to modern literary scholarship and criticism as a whole. I shall close with one of the more striking and recent examples of this failure, offering an indication of how serious this problem is.

Gwendolyn Layne in "Orientalists and Literary Critics" (1982) catalogues the presumptions and failures of Western and Indian scholars, especially concerning the critical assessment of Bāṇa's Kādambarī, and cites at length the practice of repetitive paraphrase (if not plagiarism) from one author to the next.²⁵ She affirms, "Unfortunately there

are no serious literary critics, nor have there been any in the recent history of literary criticism, who practice their craft on Sanskrit Literature."²⁶

With no mention of the śāstra writers themselves we are left in doubt as to what she might mean by "serious critics." A doubt soon dispelled however, when she offers her own approach (as detailed previously in her dissertation (1979)) based on the "Chicago School." For indeed, as she writes in conclusion, if the "Orientalists" would only turn to these "real critics," "they in turn would educate Orientalists in the various methodologies of the discipline of literary criticism (first rule, read the text itself). Since a tradition of literary criticism may not have developed in India, and since the discipline is not known and practiced by Indologist, such a change in the situation could only be for the better."²⁷

Yet what is ultimately clear is that her rejection of the central writers of kāvya śāstra and indeed of the entire tradition does not stem primarily from an apparent

idiosyncratic conception of what literary criticism might be, but -- in quoting in approval Nirad C. Chaudhuri (whose publications on *kāvya* śāstra are nil) -- from a decline into the prescriptive fallacy in its most severe form:

"Sanskrit rhetoric and poetics -- Alamkara or Rasa Sastra as these were called -- were as pretentious as they were arid. . . . The only service that these rhetoricians and analysts rendered to Sanskrit literature was by preserving as illustrations to their categories some gems of lyric poetry, which otherwise might have been lost. Their writings gave Sanskrit literature a bad name as a collection of mere artificial prettiness and far-fetched conceits."²⁸

The acceptance of such distortion, and the obvious lack of familiarity with the Indian critical tradition, indeed reveals that Layne has not followed her own "first rule."

As we work through our text, we shall rather find that Dandin's presentation is anything but prescriptive. That one of the Kāvyādarśa's most distinctive features is a creative openness, with continual indications that -- in the case of the alamkāras -- we have guidelines, models

that may provide the basis for yet further development and variation. That artificial distinctions are to be rejected; that the ultimate source of poetic validation lies not in blind adherence to prescribed rules, but in the acceptance of the "wise," the kavis and refined connoisseurs themselves. It is well to keep Dandin's conclusion to the Kavyādarśa [3.368] firmly in mind: "The Path of alamkāras is thus displayed / Condensing within limits its endless expansion / Practice alone can reveal the fine points / transcending the range of words."

We shall develop our understanding of the Kāvyādarśa then in three sections. The first locates the Central (Second) Chapter within its immediate Textual Context -- our introductory remarks are followed by an extensive consideration, with translation of prominent verses, of Chapters One and Three. Both touch on a number of issues which shall be developed in explication, and present a number of features an awareness of which shall allow us to approach the central section with a degree of background.

The second section is devoted to the translation and explication of the Second Chapter. This is the focused heart of Dāṇḍin's text, what I choose to term a "calculus" of creative expression, and which reflects his contribution -- in elaboration of varieties and illustration -- to the fullest. And in the third section we shall trace the immense impact of the Kāvyādarśa as textual model not only throughout South and Central India and Śrī Laṅkā, but - for the first time in textual detail -- into Tibet.

The Text

The text itself of the Kāvyādarśa is quite well-established, with numerous extant manuscripts available.²⁹ The published editions and translations of the Kāvyādarśa include the following:

[1862] The Kāvyādarśa of Sir Dandin. Edited by Pandit Premachandra Tarkabagisa, with his own commentary entitled Mālinyaproñchanī. Fasc. 1 and 2. Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1862.

[1863] The Kāvyādarśa of Śrī Dandin. Edited with a commentary entitled Mālinyaproñcanī by Premachandra Tarkavāgiśa. Bibliotheca Indica, vol. 40, New Series nos. 30, 33, 38, 39, 41. Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1863. Reprint. Kāvyādarśah Śrī Dandyācāryyaviracitah Śrī Premachandra Tarkavāgiśa Bhāttācārya viracita Mālinyaproñchanī nāmaka tīka sahitah Śrī Bhavadeva

Cat̄cpādhyā yena samskrtaḥ Calcutta: New School Press,
1881. Reprint. Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1981.

[1874] Kāvyādarśa. Śrī-Dandya-ācārya-viracitah. Śrī Jīvānanda-Vidyāsāgara-Bhaṭṭācārya-kṛta-vivṛtisametah
Calcutta: Sarasvati Press, 1874.

[1882] Kāvyādarśa. Edited by Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara Bhaṭṭācārya, with his own commentary known as the Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara tīkā. Calcutta, 1882. 2nd edition. Calcutta, 1890. 4th edition. Calcutta, 1925.

[1890] Dandin's Poetik (Kāvyādarśa). Sanskrit text with German translation by Otto Böhtlingk. Leipzig: Verlag von H. Haessel, 1890.

[1909] Kāvyādarśa (Chapter 2, verses 14-96 only). In Otto Böhtlingk's Sanskrit-Chrestomathie. Edited by Richard Garbe. 1909.

[1910] The Kāvyādarśa of Dandin, with the Commentary of

Taruṇavācaspati, and also with an anonymous incomplete Commentary known as Hṛdayaṅgamā. Edited by M. Rangacharya. Madras: Brahmavādin Press, 1910.

[1919] Dandin's Kāvyādarśa (Chapters 1 and 4).

Edited with translation and Notes by S. Subrahmanya Sastry. Allahabad: National Press, 1919.

[1919] Dandin's Kāvyādarśa: Pariccheda I. Edited with a new Sanskrit Commentary and Notes by S. K. Belvalkar and Rangacharya B. Raddi. Bombay: The Department of Public Instruction, 1919.

[1920] Dandin's Kāvyādarśa: Pariccheda II. Edited with a new Sanskrit Commentary and English Notes by S. K. Belvalkar and Rangacharya B. Raddi. Bombay: The Department of Public Instruction, 1920.

[1920] Kāvyādarśa. English translation of Chapters 1 and 2 by S. K. Belvalkar. Poona, 1920.

[1921] Dandin's Kavyādarśa (Chapter 1). Translated literally into English with full explanatory and critical notes by P. N. Patankar. Indore: City Press, 1921.

[1924] Kavyādarśa of Dandin. Edited with Sanskrit text and English translation by S. K. Belvalkar. Poona: The Oriental Book-Supplying Agency, 1924.

[1925] Kavyādarśa, with the contemporary commentary entitled Kusumapratimā. Edited by Nr̥siṁhadeva Śāstri. Lahore: Mehrchand Lakshmandas, 1925. 2nd edition. Lahore, 1933.

[1929] Kavyādarśa (First Pariccheda), with Commentary by Pandit R. V. Krishnamachariar. Kumbako Nam: Komalamba Press, 1929.

[1930] Kavyādarśa, with the commentary of Vādijaṅghāla. Edited with English translation and Notes by V. Krishnamachariar and V. Hanumanthachar. Madras: Educational Publishing Co., 1930.

[1936] Kāvyādarśa, with the commentaries of Vādijañghāla and Taruṇavācaspati, and a contemporary commentary entitled Mārjanā. Edited by V. Krishnamachari. Tiruvadi: Srinivasa Press, 1936.

[1938] Kāvyādarśa of Dandin. Edited by Vidyābhūsana Pandit Rangacharya Raddi Shastri, with his own commentary entitled Prabhā. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1938. 2nd edition. Poona, 1970.

[1941] Kāvyādarśa, with the anonymous Hṛdayañgamā commentary and the commentaries of Vādijañghāla and Taruṇavācaspati. Edited by D. T. Tatācharya. Bombay, 1941.

[1942] Kāvyādarśa of Dandin. Edited by S. Viswanathan. English notes and translation of the first parichchheda and of the second parichchheda up to the end of the rūpakachakra by C. Sankara Rama Sastri. Madras: Sri Balamanorama Press,

1942. 2nd edition. Madras, 1959. 3rd edition. Madras,
1963.

[1952] Kāvyādarśa, with the commentary of Jīvānanda
Vidyāsāgara. Edited with English translation by V.
Narayana Iyer. Madras: Ramaswamy Sastrulu, 1952. Reprint:
Madras, 1964.

[1957] Kāvyalaksana of Dandin (also known as Kāvyā
darśa), with the Commentary entitled Ratnaśrī by
Ratnaśrījñāna. Edited by Anantalal Thakur and Upendra Jhā.
Darbhanga: Mithila Institute of Post Graduate Studies and
Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1957.

[1958] Kāvyādarśa. Sanskrit and Hindi texts, with the
commentary entitled Prakāśa in Sanskrit and Hindi by
Ramchandra Mishra. Varanasi: Chowkhamba Vidyābhavan, 1958.
2nd edition. Varanasi, 1972.

[1961] Kāvyādarśa, with the commentary entitled

Tarkavāgīśa [?] by Premachandra. 2nd edition. Calcutta: K. Ray, 1961.

[1973] Kāvyādarśa. Sanskrit text with Hindi paraphrase and commentary entitled Sudarśana by Dharmendra Kumāra Gupta. Delhi: Mehrcand Lachmandas, 1973.

We shall be following the Sanskrit of and translating Rangacharya Raddi's second edition (1970) of the Kāvyādarśa, and occasionally referring to his Sanskrit commentary entitled "Prabhā."³⁰ The text appears in three paricchedas or "chapters," which is the norm, with 105 verses to the first, 368 to the second, and 187 to the third. Some editions are found however, with four chapters, a reflection of the division of the usual third chapter with the final section on the dosas or potential "faults" in kāvya now distinct.

The first chapter appears stable, yet the number of verses in the second and third chapters occasionally varys. Variation in the second chapter stems from either the

retention or deletion of any of three verses. Two of these appear in our text at [2.155-56] as varieties of ākṣepa alamkāra. Although Raddi considers these interpolations -- which I too feel is very much the case -- and marks them as such, he retains them. This appears to be a standard practice (whether the editor is aware of their questionable nature or not), and given that the primary reference works (those of P. V. Kane, S. K. De, D. K. Gupta, for example) all mirror Raddi's numbering, to avoid confusion in cross referentiation I have followed suit. In a truly "critical" edition these two verse would most probably be dropped.

The third variable verse appears in our edition as [2.362], and again it is quite possible that we have an interpolation. The question of interpolation will be discussed under the respective verses.

Thus for example, Raddi's edition and the Calcutta edition of Premachandra (1863) include all three of these verses, although marking them as uncertain, and thus give a total of 368 verses in the second chapter. In the edition

of the text reconstructed from, and including, Ratnaśrī's commentary (1957), and in all of the Tibetan editions (which are closely related to the former) none of these verse appear and thus the second chapter in each displays a total of 365 verses.

The third chapter appears stable, although when it is divided variation may occur. Thus in the edition of M. Rangacharya (1910), which is in four chapters, two additional verses appear at the end of what is now the third chapter, and two are added to the fourth chapter, one at the beginning and one in the middle.

The second commentary on and (reconstructed) text of the Kāvyādarśa to which we shall occasionally refer is that of the Ceylonese Buddhist monk Ratnaśrījñāna [c. 900].³¹ S. K. De notes, "The author was a Ceylonese monk who wrote under the patronage of a Rāṣṭrakuṭa king, named Tuṅga, under the overlordship of Rājyapāla of Gauḍa and Magadha (c. 908 a.d.) [the commentary itself states that it was written in the 23rd regnal year of a Rājyapāla]. Authors

quoted, besides Aśvaghosa and Kālidāsa, are Mātrcetā,
 Āryasūra, Kohala, Rāmaśarman, Medhāvirudra, Kambala,
 Harivrddha, Bhāmaha, Bhartr̥mentha, Gunādhya, Mallanāga, and
 Dharmakīrti."³²

The editors of the published edition, Anantalal Thakur and Upendra Jha, have reconstructed the text from Ratnaśrī's commentary, itself based upon a single palm leaf manuscript (with verses [1.1-3] and [3.50-56] missing). They believe the title of Dandin's work to be "Kāvyalaksana" based on a misreading of verse [1.2], a view which is unwarranted and otherwise unsubstantiated.

Ratnaśrī's work is of extreme interest, not only because it is most probably the earliest extant commentary [10th century], but also for its intimate role in the Tibetan transmission and interpretation of the Kāvyadarśa. We shall discuss this in our final section, but we should note now that it is highly probable that Ratnaśrī studied and taught at one (or more) of the northern Buddhist monasteries so central for the transmission of Buddhism

beyond India, and that the text he was following is extremely similar to the Tibetan versions. This text then may very possibly closely reflect the version of the Kāvyādarśa which was first brought into Tibet, or it may be that it was brought in somewhat later and utilized in the revisions of the initial Tibetan translation. It is certain, however, that Ratnaśrī's commentary was utilized by the Tibetans at a very early date. The editors note and affirm

that Ratnaśrī generally agrees with the Tibetan version of the Kāvyalakṣaṇa [the editors attributed title of Dāṇḍin's work]. As our author hails from Ceylon where . . . Dāṇḍin's text was highly popular, it is normally expected that the author should follow the southern text of the Kāvyalakṣaṇa. But the commentary shows that he was influenced by the culture of Magadha [in the North], and the text of Dāṇḍin's work as found there at the time [10th century] was acceptable to him. . . . That the work of Dāṇḍin was popular in Magadha and adjoining regions is proved by quotations from it even in the philosophical works of Vācaspati Miśra. The Tibetan text is also based on manuscripts from the monasteries of Magadha [an assertion for which unfortunately no concrete evidence is provided].³³

Abbreviations and Editions Cited

The following texts are of central importance to our study and are the editions cited within the narrative by the corresponding abbreviations where marked. The initial edition listed is the one cited unless otherwise noted (a following edition is one regularly consulted as well).

Primary Explicative Texts Cited

(RŚ/) Ratnaśrī [10th century]

Kāvyalaksana of Dandin (also known as Kāvyādarśa), with the Commentary entitled Ratnaśrī by Ratnaśrijñāna. Edited by Anantalal Thakur and Upendra Jhā. Darbhanga: Mithila Institute of Post Graduate Studies Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1957.

(RR/) Rangacharya Raddi [20th century]

Kāvyādarśa of Dandin. Edited by Vidyābhūṣana Pandit Rangacharya Raddi Shastri, with his own commentary entitled Prabhā. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1938. 2nd edition. Poona, 1970.

(Notes 1/)

Dandin's Kāvyādarśa: Pariccheda I. Edited with a new Sanskrit Commentary and Notes by S. K. Belvalkar and Rangacharya B. Raddi. Bombay: The Department of Public Instruction, 1919.

(Notes 2/)

Dandin's Kāvyādarśa: Pariccheda II. Edited with a new Sanskrit Commentary and Notes by S. K. Belvalkar and Rangacharya B. Raddi. Bombay: The Department of Public Instruction, 1920.

(Böhtlingk/)

Dandin's Poetik (Kāvyādarśa). Sanskrit text with German translation by Otto Böhtlingk. Leipzig: Verlag von H. Haessel, 1890.

(Glossary/)

Edwin Gerow. A Glossary of Indian Figures of Speech. The Hague: Mouton, 1971.

Primary Texts Cited

NŚ Bharata [2nd-3rd centuries(?)]

The Nātyaśāstra ascribed to Bharata-Muni, vol. 1 (Chapters 1-27). Edited by Manomohan Ghosh. Calcutta: Manisha Granthalaya, 1967.

Nātyasāstra of Bharatamuni, with the Commentary Abhinavabhārati by Abhinavaguptācārya. Edited by M. Ramakrishna Kavi, 2nd rev. edition by K. S. Ramaswami Shastri, vol. 1. (Chapters 1-7), vol. 2 (Chapters 8-18). Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1956.

Bhāṭṭi [6th-7th centuries]

The Bhāṭṭi-kāvya of Bhāṭṭi, with the Commentary (Jayamaṅgalā) of Jayamaṅgalā. Edited by Vināyak Nārāyan Shāstri Joshi and Srinivāsa Venkatrāma Śarmā. Bombay: Nirṇaya Sāgar Press, 1887. 5th edition. Bombay, 1914.

KA Bhāmaha [7th-8th centuries]

Kāvyālaṅkāra of Bhāmahā. Edited with English translation by P. V. Naganatha Sastry, 2nd edition. Delhi: Motilal Banarsiādass, 1970 (1927).

Kāvyālamkāra, with the Udyāna Vṛtti. Edited by D. T. Tatacharya. Tiruvadi, 1934.

KAS Vāmana [8th-9th centuries]

Kāvyālaṅkārasūtrāṇi, with the Kāvyālaṅkāradhenu Sanskrit commentary by Gopendra Tripurahara Bhūpāla. Edited with Hindi translation by Bechana Jhā. Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1971.

KASS Udbhaṭa [8th-9th centuries]

Kāvyālaṅkārasārasaṅgraha of Udbhaṭa, with the Laghuvṛtti commentary of Indurāja. Edited with

introduction and notes by Naryayana Daso Banhatti. 2nd edition. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1982.

KA Rudraṭa [9th century]

Kāvyālaṅkāra (A Treatise on Rhetoric) of Rudraṭa, with the Commentary of Namisādhu. Edited with the Prakāśa Hindi Commentary by Rāmadeva Śukla. Varanasi: The Chowkhamba Vidyabhawan, 1966.

Ānandavardhana [9th century]

Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana. Critically edited Sanskrit text, with revised English translation by K. Krishnamoorthy. Dharwar: Karnatak University, 1974 (1955).

The Dhvanyāloka of Śrī Ānandavardhanāchārya, with the Lochana and Bālapriyā Commentaries by Śrī Abhinavagupta and Panditrāja Sahṛdayatilaka Śrī Rāmaśāraka. Edited by Pandit Pattābhirāma Śāstri. Benares: Chowkhambā Sanskrit Series Office, 1940.

Agni Purāṇa (Alamkāra Section) [c. 900 (?)]

Agni Purāṇa, A Collection of Hindu Mythology and Traditions. Edited by Rajendralala Mitra. Vol. 3 (Chapters 269-382). Calcutta: Bibliotheca Indica, 1879. Reprint. Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1985.

SKA Bhoja [11th century]

Sarasvatīkanṭhabharanālaṅkāraḥ Edited by Viśvanātha
 Bhāttācāryaḥ Vol. 1. Varanasi: Banaras Hindu
 University, 1979.

ŚP Bhoja

Śrīngāraprakāśaḥ Edited by G. R. Josyer. Vol. 2
 (Chapters 9-14). Mysore: Coronation Press, 1963.

KP Mammaṭa [11th-12 centuries]

The Poetic Light: Kāvyaprakāśa of Mammaṭa. Edited with
 an English translation by R. C. Dwivedi. Vol. 1.
 Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1967.

AS Ruyyaka [12th century]

The Alamkārasarvasvam of Rājānaka Ruyyaka. With the
 commentary of Jayaratha. Edited by Mahāmahopādhyāya
 Pandita Durgāprasad and Pāṇḍuraṅga Parab.
 Kāśināthaśarma. Bombay: Nirnaya Sagara Press, 1893.
 Reprint. Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1982.

Notes: Introduction

1. Louis Renou, "La Réflexion sur la Poésie dans L'Inde," in Sanskrit et Culture: L'Apport de l'Inde à la Civilisation Humaine (Paris: Payot, 1950), p. 143.
2. J. L. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan, Aesthetic Rapture: The Rasādhyāya of the Nātyaśāstra, 2 vols. (Poona: Deccan College, 1970).
3. Henry S. Heifetz, "Issues of Literary Translation from Sanskrit and Tamil," Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1983. Heifetz rejects most of the translations to date due to what he perceives as their lack of sensitivity to the rhythm and sound features of the original Sanskrit, but also primarily in their display of a style which he terms "Indologese":

The absence of poetic acumen among partisans of 'the tradition' leads to their assumption that an elevated tone is obtained through stiff academic diction and grammar, copious Latinisms and archaisms, an affection for Victorian and Renaissance inversion, and perhaps such (incorrect) cosmetic issues as an avoidance of contractions. What results is a sort of sentimentalism of elevation, a ragbag of cliches vaguely associated with higher social strata in America or England now or back through the past few hundred years. A genuinely elevated tone in writing is not obtained through superficial decoration but by the over-all management of diction, rhythm, and placement (p. 191).

4. Apart from the translations of V. Narayana Iyer and S.

K. Belvalkar, which themselves are quite rare, three additional yet unavailable prior translations of the Kāvyādarśa, in whole or in part, may be cited:

(1) Dandin's Kāvyādarśa (Chapter 1 and 2), edited with translation and notes by S. Subrahmanya Sastry (Allahabad: National Press, 1919).

(2) Dandin's Kāvyādarśa (Chapter 1), translated literally into English with full explanatory and critical notes by P. N. Patankar (Indore: City Press, 1921).

(3) Kāvyādarśa, edited with English translation and notes by V. Krishnamachariar and V. Hanumanthachar, with the commentary of Vādijañghāla (Madras: Educational Publishing Co., 1930).

5. Dandin, Kāvyādarśa, edited with English translation by V. Narayan Iyer, with the commentary of Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgra (Madras: Ramaswamy Sastrulu, 1952), Reprint (Madras, 1964), p. 41 and p. 146.

6. Dandin, Kāvyādarśa of Dandin, edited with Sanskrit text and English translation by S. K. Belvalkar (Poona: The Oriental Book-Supplying Agency, 1924), p. 16 and p. 31.

7. A. A. Macdonell, A History of Sanskrit Literature, Reprint (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1976 (1899)); Moriz Winternitz, Geschichte der indischen Litteratur, 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1904-20) (for English translation see the bibliography); Louis Renou in Louis Renou and Jean Filliozat, L'Inde Classique, vol. 2 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1953); A. B. Keith, A History of Sanskrit Literature (London: Oxford University Press, 1928); M. Krishnamachariar, History of Classical Sanskrit Literature, 2nd edition, Reprint (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1974 (1937)); S. N. Dasgupta and S. K. De, A History of Sanskrit Literature: Classical Period, 2nd edition (Calcutta:

University of Calcutta, 1975 (1946)); A. K. Warder, Indian Kāvya Literature, vols. 1-5 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsi Dass, 1972-); and Siegfried Lienhard, A History of Classical Poetry: Sanskrit-Pali-Prakrit (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1984).

8. P. V. Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, 3rd edition, Reprint (Delhi: Motilal Banarsi Dass, 1971 (1923)); S. K. De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, 2nd edition, two vols. in one, Reprint (Calcutta: Firma KLM Private, 1976 (1923 and 1925)); Edwin Gerow, Indian Poetics (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1977); V. Raghavan, Bhoja's Śrīngāraprakāśa, 3rd rev. edition (Madras: V. Raghavan, 1978 (1963)); Marie-Claude Porcher, Figures de Style en Sanskrit: Théories des Alamkāraśāstra Analyse de Poèmes de Venkatādhvṛin (Paris: Institut de Civilisation Indienne, 1978).
9. Louis Renou, "La Réflexion sur la Poésie dans L'Inde Ancienne," in Sanskrit et Culture (Paris: Payot, 1950), p. 137.
10. Johannes Nobel, The Foundations of Indian Poetry and their Historical Development (Calcutta: R. N. Seal, 1925), p. 9.
11. Louis Renou, "La Reflexion sur la Poésie dan L'Inde," pp. 138-39.
12. Edwin Gerow, Indian Poetics (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1977), p. 218, n. 2.
13. Edwin, Gerow, Indian Poetics, p. 218.
14. S. K. De in Kuntaka, The Vakrokti-Jīvita, edited by S. K. De, 3rd rev. edition (Calcutta: K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1961), p. xix, n. 19.

15. John Crow Ransom, "Ubiquitous Moralists," The Kenyon Review, 3 (1941), pp. 96-97.
16. S. K. De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, vol.2, Reprint (1976), p. 75 and p. 76.
17. P. V. Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, pp. 89-90.
18. For a critical review of this practice see Gwendolyn L. Layne, "Kādambarī: A Critical Inquiry into a Seventh-Century Sanskrit Narrative," 2 vols., Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1979; and also "Orientalists and Literary Critics: East is East, and West is West, and it is in the Professional Interest of Some to Keep it that Way," The Western Humanities Review, vol. 36, n. 2 (Summer, 1982), pp. 165-75.
19. D. K. Gupta, A Critical Study of Dandin and his Works (Delhi: Meharchand Lachmandas, 1970), p. 184.
20. H. T. Colebrooke, "On Sanskrit and Prākrit Poetry" (1808), in Miscellaneous Essays (1827), Reprint, Essays on History, Literature, and Religions of India, vol. 2 (New Delhi: Cosmo Publications, 1977), p. 134.

For the kāvya of Dandin see Avantisundarikathā [and Avantisundarikathāśāra], edited by M. Ramakrishna Kavi and S. K. Rāmanātha Sastri (Madras, 1924); Avanti Sundari of Acharya Dandin, edited by K. S. Mahadeva Sastri (Trivandrum: Suranand Kunjan Pillai, 1954); The Daśa Kumāra Charita; or The Adventures of the Ten Princes: A Series of Tales in the Original Sanskrit, edited with introduction by Horace H. Wilson (London: Society for the Publication of Oriental Texts, 1846); Reprint, "Introduction to the Daśa Kumāra Charita," in Essays Analytical, Critical and Philological on Subjects Connected with Sanskrit Literature, vol 1, collected and edited by Reinhold Rost (New Delhi: Asian Educational Services, 1984, 342-79); Dasakumaracharita of

Dandin, revised in one volume by Ganesh Janardan Agashe from the first edition of Buhler and Peterson in two parts, 2nd ed., Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, 10 and 42 (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1919); The Daśakumāracarita of Dandin, translated with introduction by M. R. Kale, 3rd ed., (Bombay, 1925); Reprint, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1966); Daśakumāracaritam: Pūrvapīṭhikā, Sanskrit text with English translation, Introduction and annotation by C. Sankara Rama Sastri, edited by S. Viswanatham (Madras, 1944); Reprint (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978); Dandin's Daśakumāracaritam: Die Abenteuer der zehn Prinzen, Zum ersten Male aus dem Sanskrit ins Deutsche übersetzt von Johann Jakob Meyer (Leipzig: Verlag, 1902); Dandin's Dasha-Kumara-Charita: The Ten Princes, translated by Arthur W. Ryder (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1927); Die Erlebnisse der zehn Prinzen; eine Erzählung Dandins, translated by Walter Ruben (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1952).

- 21 T. S. Eliot, "Introduction" to The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism (London: Faber and Faber, 1980), pp. 17-18.
22. S. K. De, "The Problem of Poetic Expression" (1947), in Some Problems of Sanskrit Poetics, Reprint (Calcutta: Firma KLM, 1981 (1959)), pp. 12-13.
23. Henry Heifetz, "Issues of Literary Translation from Sanskrit and Tamil," Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1983, p. 184.
24. Leonard Nathan, The Transport of Love: The Meghadūta of Kālidāsa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 9.
25. Gwendolyn Layne, "Orientalists and Literary Critics," Western Humanities Review, vol. 36, n. 2 (Summer, 1982), pp. 165-75. 26. Gwendolyn Layne, "Orientalists and Literary Critics," p. 168.

27. Gwendolyn Layne, "Orientalists and Literary Critics," pp. 174-75.
28. Gwendolyn Layne, "Orientalists and Literary Critics," p. 175, n. 21; quoting Nirad C. Chaudhuri, Hinduism: A Religion to Live By (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 218.
29. For a listing of manuscripts of the Kāvyādarśa available in India see the New Catalogus Catalogorum, edited by V. Raghavan and K. Kunjunni Raja, vol. 4 (Madras: University of Madras, 1968), p. 108.
30. Dandin, Kāvyādarśa of Dandin, edited by Pandit Rangacharya Raddi Shastri, with his own commentary entitled Prabhā, 2nd edition (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1970 (1938)).
31. Kāvyalakṣaṇa of Dandin (also known as Kāvyādarśa), with the Commentary entitled Ratnaśrī by Ratnaśrījñāna, edited by Anantalal Thakur and Upendra Jha (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute of Post Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1957).
32. S. K. De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, vol. 1, pp. 71-72.
33. Kāvyalakṣaṇa of Dandin, edited by Anantalal Thakur and Upendra Jha, (1957), p. 17.

Chapter One

Homage to Sarasvatī -- Goddess of Kavis (Poets)

"May all-white Sarasvatī / -- a hamsī among clusters of lotuses -- the faces of Caturmukha / Forever play in the Mānasa lake of my mind" [caturmukhamukhāmbhojavanahamṣa-vadhūrmama | mānase ramatāṁ nityam sarvaśuklā sarasvatī ||]

[1.1]

sarasvatī : Goddess of poets and writers, of speech and music, wife of "Caturmukha," (the "Four-faced One," that is, Brahmā). Sarasvatī appears in Vedic times as the female personification of a powerful northwestern river (since dried). In Rg Veda [2.41.16] she is praised as "Best mother, best of rivers, best of goddesses."¹ From this early association with a clean and life-giving river, she drew the attributes of purity and procreation. Her eventual role as muse, as source and bestower of artistic creativity, would appear to be a logical extension.

The wise king saw before his eyes the goddess Sarasvatī herself, and saluted her with bowed head and folded hands. This conqueror of enemies praised her with reverent words and fell like a log to the ground, saying, 'I have come to you for help! I worship the great chaste goddess who is before me, the divinity of speech, who is without beginning or end. I praise the womb of the world, the excellent Yoginī, the supreme spouse of the Golden Embryo, the three-eyed moon- topped goddess! I honor her who knows supreme bliss, a portion of the highest consciousness, the embodiment of Brahman. Protect me, supreme goddess, who has come to you for refuge!' 2

caturmukha : The "Four-faced One," Brahmā the Creator, who with Viṣṇu the Preserver and Śiva the Destroyer forms the "trimūrti," the essential triad of forces of later Hinduism. Without the sectarian support offered to Viṣṇu and Śiva, the later mythic characteristics of Brahmā reflect a biased manipulation. According to the Śaivites, "Brahmā originally had five heads, each one appearing as he turned to gaze at his newly created daughter-wife, Sarasvatī. The fifth head was destroyed by Śiva (in some accounts cut off by a swipe of Śiva's left thumb nail), who was once annoyed with Brahmā for being presumptuous enough to deny that

deity's superiority; or according to another legend, because he had violated Pārvatī, the wife of Śiva."³

Dandin's Design and the Necessity of Kāvya

"Synthesizing earlier sāstras and examining their practices / We shall present the distinctive character of kāvya to the best of our ability" [pūrvaśāstrāṇī samṛ̥tya prayogānupalakṣya ca | yathāśāmarthyamasmābhīḥ kriyate kāvyalakṣaṇam ||] [1.2].

lakṣaṇa / In this case, "characteristic or distinctive attributes." In varying versions of Vātsyāyana's Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya [prior to 400 a.d.⁴], we find two definitions of lakṣaṇam : (1) "lakṣaṇa is the property that distinguishes the essence of something specifically designated" / uddiṣṭasya tattvavyavacche-dako dharmo lakṣaṇam ; and (2) "lakṣaṇa is the property that distinguishes something specifically designated from other things" / uddiṣṭasyātattvavya-vacchedako dharmo lakṣaṇam.

"One is inclined to translate laksana as 'characteristic trait' rather than as 'definition'. . . . Rather than indicating an exhaustive description of the object to be defined, it focuses on that property that belongs to that object and to no other."⁵

A laksana as "definition" must be free of three errors: (1) ativyāpti / a referential range that is too great, thus including characteristics of things other than that object which one wishes to define; (2) avyāpti / a referential range that is too small, thus excluding elements that should be included in the scope of the definition; and (3) asambhava / a definition that is impossible. "A correct definition [laksana] is negatively defined as one which is free from any of these three faults, and more positively by Vātsyāyana [Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya [1.1.2]] as an attribute which differentiates what is defined from all things other than itself."⁶

"By the grace of languages alone -- those grammatically

analysed by the authorities and the rest -- the way of the world proceeds" [iha śiṣṭānuśiṣṭānām śiṣṭānāmapi sarvathā | vācāmeva prasādena lokayātrā pravartate ||] [1.3].⁷

"The entire threefold world would become blind darkness if the light whose name is language did not shine throughout creation" [idamandhamtamah kṛtsnam jāyeta bhuvanatrayam | yadi śabdāhvayam jyotirāsamsāranna dīpyate ||] [1.4].

"The image of fame of earlier kings reflected in the mirror of literature / See! It does not perish even in their absence" [ādirāja-yaśobimbamādarśam prāpya vāñmayam | teṣāmasaṁnidhānepi na svayam paśya naśyati ||] [1.5].

vāñmayam / as "literature" in the narrower (and more usual) sense, that is, "creative written works (in whatever presented or received form)."

Rājaśekhara writing at a much later date [9th-10th centuries], in the beginning of the second chapter of the Kāvyamimāṃsā understands vāñmaya in a somewhat wider sense:

"Vāñmayam [comprehends] simultaneously both sāstra and kāvya. Since the sāstras precede in time, one should apply oneself to the sāstras before the kāvyas" / iha hi vāñmayamubhayathā sāstram kāvyam ca | sāstrapūrvakatvāt kāvyānām pūrvam sāstresvabhiniviśeta.⁸

Siegfried Lienhard also appears to accept this wider view. "Poetry is of course only one part of all the writing comprehended in the Sanskrit word vāñmaya, which is used in some texts that deal with literature [?] and other writings to include everything that is expressed in words."⁹ And in the Agnipurāna [327.1], we find vāñmaya divided into four "linguistic" components: dhvani/"sound"; varṇa/"letter," "phoneme"; pada/"word"; and vākyā/"sentence." Yet in the immediately following verse [327.2], we have vāñmaya reflecting three primary genres, sāstra, itihāsa, and kāvya. It is perhaps with this in mind that one of our commentators, Ratnaśrī, chose the following analysis: "'vāg' in this case refers to itihāsas, kathās, and so on"/vāgiha itihāsa kathādilakṣaṇā (RŚ/4).

I feel, however, that Dandin in this case is indicating a very special capacity of a very special kind of writing. Our other commentator, Rangacharya Raddi, is closer to the mark: "Vāñmaya is kāvya created through the imagination (pratibhā) of excellent kavis" / vāñmayam satkavipratibhāprasūtam kāvyam (RR/4).

That kāvya should extol the "fame of kings," keeping it ever alive, reflects the activity of but one side of a common, fruitful, symbiotic relationship. The kings or nobility on their part frequently provided the supportive environment that allowed the kavis to focus on their creative task.

To the king of India we unquestionably owe most of the poets of repute; patronage by the king was at once the reward of skill in panegyric and the means of obtaining the leisure for serious composition and a measure of publicity for the works produced. It was the duty of the king to bridge the gulf between wealth and poetic talent, of the poet to save his patron from the night of oblivion which else must assuredly settle on him when his mortal life closed. 10

"It is said by the wise that language properly employed is a wish-yielding cow / Poorly employed it merely conveys the ox-headedness of the user" [gaurgauḥ kāmadughā samyak prayuktā smaryate budhaiḥ | duṣprayuktā punargotvam prayoktuḥ saiva śamsati ||] [1.6].

"Therefore a flaw in kāvya however slight should not be neglected -- A body however beautiful would become ugly through a single blemish" [tadalpamapi nopekṣyam kāvye duṣṭam kathamcana | syādvapuh sundaramapi śvitrenaikena durbhagam ||] [1.7].

"How could one ignorant of the [kāvya] śāstras distinguish between the gunas [the "qualities"] and dosas [the "faults"] ? Is there discrimination for one blind between the perceptions of various colors?" [gunadosāna-śāstrajñah katham vibhajate janah | kimandhasyādhikārosti rūpabhedopalabdhisu ||] [1.8].

The Tradition and Possible Predecessors

"Therefore the learned -- with an eye towards the education of kavis -- have formulated the method of composing kāvyas in the various mārgas" [atah prajānām vyutpattimabhisamdhāya sūrayah | vācām vicitramārgānam nibabandhuḥ kriyāvidhim ||] [1.9].

śāstras: In this verse and the preceding Dāṇḍin is referring to alamkāra or kāvya śāstras, that is, texts which present a formal explication and analysis of kāvya.

This explicit confirmation, and that of the preceding [1.2], of prior kāvya śāstras is clearly of some importance. There are certainly sufficient indications throughout the Kāvyādarśa (mention of "previous authorities," "others," and so on), and in Bhāmaha's Kāvyālaṅkāra, to justify the belief in a number of earlier studies devoted to kāvya. That Dāṇḍin himself drew from these earlier authors and their works is also explicitly stated. At the beginning of the

Second Chapter he writes, "The basis of these postulations / was demonstrated by earlier teachers" [2.2]; and following his list of the artha alamkāras, "Thus the alamkāras of kāvya / described by earlier teachers" [2.7].

As translated by Hari Chand, the anonymous Hṛdayamgama commentary glosses [1.2] of the Kāvyādarśa as: "J'ai réuni et examiné à fond les définitions données par les anciens maîtres, Kāśyapa, Vararuci, etc.; j'ai bien observé les applications chez Kālidāsa, etc.; c'est ainsi que j'ai composé, dans la mesure de mes moyens et de mes facultés, ma propre définition de la poésie" / pūrvesām kāśyapavararuci-prabhṛtīnām ācāryānām laksāṇa-sāstrāṇi saṃhṛtya paryālocya kālidāsaprabhṛtīnām prayogān upalakṣya ca yathāsāmarthyam buddhyanurūpam asmābhīḥ kāvyalakṣanām kriyate (we note that Hari Chand chose to translate "laksāṇa" as "definition," rather than presume that it indicates the title of the text).¹¹ And Vādijaṅghāla in his Śrutānupālinī commentary again mentions Kāśyapa, as well as Brahmadatta and Nandisvāmin as predecessors.

Kāśyapa is unknown except for the rare item. Pāṇini cites a Kāśyapa under Aṣṭādhyāyī [8.4.67]. In later works, the Sinhalese Siyabaslaṅkāra (Svabhāsaṅkāra) of the mid-8th (or possibly the 12th) century, a derivative of the Kāvyādarśa (see under "Sinhalese" within the Transmission section), "begins with homage to Brahma, Śakra, Br̥haspati, the saint Kāśyapa, the excellent Vāmana [or Bhāmaha] Daṇḍin and other masters."¹² The Pañcasāyaka of Nānyadeva in [4.19] mentions Kāśyapa as an authority on erotics, where the Agnipurāṇa considers him an authority on metrics. Abhinavagupta notes that he was a sage that preceded Bharata. And Kallinātha in his commentary on the Samgītaratnākara of Śārṅgadeva [first half of the 13th century] under [2.2.31], quotes three verses attributed to Kāśyapa.¹³

Vararuci, the other "early master" that the Hṛdayamgama mentions, is dated to the time of a Nanda king [4th century B.C.] (predecessors of Candragupta Maurya) by later versions of Guṇadhyā's Bṛhatkathā in their (legendary) presentation

of the origins of Sanskrit grammar.¹⁴ Aśvaghoṣa in the Sūtrālamkāra assigns him to the same period and further cites six verses of Vararuci's addressed to this Nanda king.¹⁵ And Patañjali in the Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇini [4.3.101] mentions a Vārarucakāvya.

As we mentioned above, Dañdin at the beginning of Chapter Two [2.2] again expresses his debt to predecessors in the field: "The basis of these postulations / was demonstrated by earlier teachers" [kiṁtu bījam vikalpānām pūrvācāryaiḥ pra-darśitam]. Our commentators under this verse merely mention, "Medhāvi, Śyāmava, and so on" (RS/67); "Bharata and so on" (RR/112).

Bhāmaha specifically mentions a "Medhāvin" as a predecessor. After listing the seven defects possible in upamā alamkāra [2.39], he notes in [2.40ab], "These seven faults have been mentioned by Medhāvin" [ta eta upamā-dosāḥ sapta medhāvinoditāḥ]. And in [2.88cd] he writes, "In some places utpreksā is called 'samkhyāna' by Medhāvin [samkhyānamiti medhāvinot-preksābhihitā kvacit ||]. Yet as

P. V. Kane points out, Dandin notes in Kāvyādarśa [2.273] that samkhyāna is rather another name for yathāsamkhya alamkāra (as is krama), which leads him to affirm, "Therefore the passage in Bhāmaha's work seems to be corrupt. If we read medhāvī notpreksā etc. then there is a correspondence with Dandin's words, the meaning being 'Medhāvin calls yathāsamkhya by the name samkhyāna and in some places (in some works on alaṅkāra) utpreksā has not been spoken of as an Alamkāra'."¹⁶

And as with Dandin, Bhāmaha collectively and impersonally refers a number of times to earlier (or perhaps contemporaneous) writers: "others"/apare ([1.31], [2.6], [4.6]); anyaih ([2.4]); anye ([3.4], [4.12]); "some"/kaiścit ([2.37]); kecit ([2.93]).

A personal note is added by Rājaśekhara [9th-10th centuries] in his Kāvyamīmāṃsā. He indicates that Medhāvirudra (the presumed long form of the name) was blind from birth: "Yet for those who possess pratibhā ["creative illumination"] even those without sight, [the caravan of

words and ideas] is as though vividly present. It is thus that one hears of kavis blind from birth, Medhāvirudra, Kumāradāsa, and so on."¹⁷

On Kumāradāsa, who was from Śrī Laṅkā, Louis Renou notes, "A poet well known, author of the Jānakīharana (5th - 6th centuries ?). Tradition considers him a contemporary of Kālidāsa. In the last verse of his poem he alludes to a sickness that he had contracted as a child."¹⁸

Namisādhu [mid-11th century] in his tippaṇī ("commentary") on Rudraṭa's Kāvyālaṅkāra mentions a Medhāvirudra under [1.2], along with Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha / nanu daṇḍimedhāvirudra bhāmahādikṛtāni santyevālamkāra-śāstrāṇi.¹⁹ And under [2.2] he notes that "Medhāvirudra and so on" consider "words" (śabda) to have only four categories / eta eva catvārahē śabdavidhā iti . . . tairmedhāvirudra-prabhṛtibhiḥ karma-prava-caniyā noktā bhaveyuh |.²⁰

Yet following [11.24] we again have the name as cited in Bhāmaha. It is thus probable that the full form of the name is "Medhāvirudra."²¹ Here Namisādhu mentions "Medhāvi

and others" in connection with seven defects possible in upamā alamkāra (as does Bhāmaha above). P. V. Kane feels that "the manner in which he deals with this topic suggests that the examples he gives are taken from Medhāvin's work." Yet, having indicated that five of the seven illustrative verses that Namisādhu cites are found in Bhāmaha (as [2.40, 47, 55, 63]), his conclusion is questionable, "if the verses were Bhāmaha's he would have probably so stated. Therefore, Bhāmaha should be taken as quoting five verses from Medhāvin."²² Namisādhu does not just mention Medhāvin alone, but "Medhāvin and others" / *atra ca svarūpopadāne satyapi catvāra iti grahanādyanmedhāviprabhṛtibhiruktam yathā . . . iti saptopamādosāh.* |.²³ We may conjecture that these examples may have been drawn from a work prior to Bhāmaha, but as to whose we have no assurance.

In Bhāmaha's Kāvyālaṅkāra there are further references to possible earlier writers. In [2.19] yamakas ("sound repetitions") and prahelikās ("riddles") are mentioned as occurring in the Acyutottara, attributed to a "Rāmaśarma."²⁴

And again, in [2.58] an example of the defect in upamā known as adhikatva (unbalanced parallelism between upameya and upamāna) is attributed to Rāmaśarma. In the same section [2.47], the example which illustrates the defect asambhava (an improbable comparison) is attributed to a Śakhāvardhana. The Rājamitra appears apparently as a text in [2.45], and again in [3.10] with an example of samāhita alamkāra drawn therefrom.²⁵

Of further works where there is some indication of earlier writers of kāvya sāstra we might add that Pāṇini in Aṣṭādhyāyī [4.3.11] refers to a Nāṭasūtra of Krśāśvin, and in [4.3.110] to a Nāṭasūtra of Śilālin.²⁶ We have previously considered kāvya's mythological origins as presented by Rājaśekhara.²⁷ Yet he also subsequently provides a mythological list of the various originators -- "etres célestes versés dans la science poétique"²⁸ -- of various elements in kāvya, and as such we may consider them as Daṇḍin's "mythological" predecessors. Substantively,

"this entire enumeration reflects the content of 'ancient' poetics prior to dhvani. . . ."²⁹

Thus Sahasrākṣa has transmitted the secret doctrine of the kavi (kavirahasya); Uktigarbha the poetic locutions (auktika < ukti, "a poetical term covering the ensemble of poetical figures"³⁰); Suvarṇanābha the rītis ("styles"); Pracetas³¹ that which concerns ānuprāsika (< anuprāsa); Citrāñgada the yamakas and citas ["vaiegated" poetical expressions presenting a verbal puzzle or pattern, whether of meaning or sound]; Śeṣa the śabda ślesas [where a single verbal string may be variously analysed syllabically, yielding different words]; Pulastyā the vāstavas [alamkāras based on things as they are; one of the four categories of artha alamkāras presented by Rudrāṭa in the Kāvyālaṅkāra [7.9ff.]]; Aupakāyana those alamkāras based upon similarity (aupamya); Pārāśara those based upon atiśaya [poetical exaggeration or "intensity"]; Utathya the artha ślesas [where a single word yields more than one meaning]; Kubera the ubhaya alamkāras [those displaying the manipulation of

both sound and sense]; Kāmadeva the poetical diversions (vainodika) ("Its is here a useful convenience marking the distinction between the body of knowledge taught (the collection of vinoda, which may correspond to the krīda of Kāmasūtra [1.4.42]) and its instructor, 'the God of Love' (Kāmadeva and also the King Kādamba patron of poets and the author of a verse anthology";³² Bharata who described the rūpakas [here "plays"]; Nanikeśvara who promulgated the rasas [the eight or nine purified emotive nodes in kāvya]; Dhiṣaṇa who presented the dosas ("defects") possible in kāvya; Upamanyu who presented the gunas ("qualities")' and Kucamāra who taught the esoterica (aupanisadika) ("without doubt this is based upon the model of the Kāmasūtra . . . which closes with a section on the occult"³³ -- Thus each of these has composed their respective individual texts.³⁴

It should go without saying that a kavi of Dāṇḍin's skill would be well-versed not only in prior śāstras on kāvya, but in prior kāvyas as well. Dāṇḍin himself

provides an extremely valuable survey of authors with whom he was familiar. At the opening of his extended kāvya in gadya ("prosaic") form, the Avantisundari, we find twenty-seven (somewhat fragmentary) verses in praise of kavis that have come before.³⁵

After offering homage to Sarasvatī, Vālmiki, Vyāsa, and kavis in general, Dāṇḍin devotes himself to specific writers. Thus we find: (1) Subandhu (verse 6), associated as minister with King Bindusāra (3rd century b.c.), the son of the great Candragupta Maurya (an earlier Subandhu than the later author of the mahākāvya Vāsavadattā). Patañjali mentions the Vāsavadattā of this Subandhu as an example of an ākhyāyikā (a kāvya in gadya or prose form). (2) Guṇādhya (verse 7), author of the lost Bṛhatkathā, "a work which ranked beside the Mahabhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa as one of the great storehouses of Indian literary art,"³⁶ and which Dāṇḍin explicitly mentions again in [1.38]. (3) Mūladeva (verse 8), the "personification of all trickery," the masterful rogue to whom the Corasūtras (treatises on theft)

are attributed. (4) Śūdraka [4th century a.d. (?)] (verse 9), reputed to have been a king of Ujjain and the author of the plays Mṛcchakatika and Padmaprabhṛtaka. ((5) The name is missing.) (6) Bhāsa (verse 11) [c. 300 a.d.], reputed author of a variety of plays, including those in one act such as the Madhyamavyāyogā, the Dūtaghaṭot-kaca, the Karnabhāra, and the Ūrubhaṅga; the Pañcarātra in three acts; and the longer Bālacarita, Avimāraka, Pratijñāyaugandharāyana, Svapnavāsavadattā, and the fragmentary Cārudatta.³⁷

(7) King Sarvasena [1st half of the 4th century] (verse 12), author of the lost Prākṛta mahākāvya, the Harivijaya. (8) Pravarasena [5th century] (verse 13), author of the Setubandha ("The Building of the Bridge"), also known as the Rāvanavaha ("The Killing of Rāvaṇa"), in Māhārāṣṭrī Prākṛta (and mentioned by Daṇḍin in Kāvyadarśa [1.34]); ((9) The name is missing.) (10) Kālidāsa [4th-5th centuries] (verse 15).

(11) Mentions only one "afflicted in the eye" (verse 16). This may possibly refer to the Sinhalese kavi Kumāradāsa, author of the Jānakiharāṇa, who was born blind (see

above).³⁸ (12) Nārāyaṇa (verse 17), possibly Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa, the author of the play Venīsamhāra -- "peut-être contemporain des drames de Bhavabhūti (on a même présumé le 7e siècle). . . ."³⁹

(13) An incomplete verse praising a "cakravartin of kavis," which "may in all possibly point to the celebrated Bhāravi," author of the Kirātārjunīya.⁴⁰

(14) And finally Bāṇa [7th century], with Daṇḍin and Subandhu, justly considered the "third great master of Sanskrit prose" -- author of the mahākāvya Harsacarita, the incomplete Kādambarī, and presumably the Caṇḍīśataka, a stotra in 102 stanzas praising Caṇḍī (Umā/Pārvati, Śiva's consort); and Mayūra [7th century], with Bāṇa also reputed to have written under the patronage of King Harṣavardhana [606-47 a.d.], and author of the Sūryaśataka, a stotra praising the sun, and the shorter Mayūrāśṭaka in eight stanzas.⁴¹

Notes [1.1] - [1.9]

1. Margaret and James Stutley, Harper's Dictionary of Hinduism (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 270.
2. Kürma Purāna [1.23.13-27], in Classical Hindu Mythology, edited and translated by Cornelia Dimmitt and J. A. B. van Buitenen (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978), p. 241.
3. Benjamin Walker, Hindu World, vol. 1, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1968), p. 165.
4. A. B. Keith, Indian Logic and Atomism (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1921), p. 28.
5. Madeleine Biardeau, "La Définition dans la Pensée Indienne," Journal Asiatique, 245 (1957), p. 372.
6. A. B. Keith, Indian Logic and Atomism, (1921), p. 154. See also Gotama, The Nyāya Sūtras of Gotama, translated by Satīśa Chandra Vidhyābhūṣana (Allahabad, 1913) Reprint (New York: AMS Press, 1974); Gautama, The Nyaya-Darshana: The Sūtras of Gautama and Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, with the Khadyota and Bhāṣyachandra commentaries, edited by Gangānātha Jha and Dhundhirāja Shastri Nyāyopādhyāya (Benares: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1925); Gautama, Nyāya Philosophy: Literal Translation of Gautama's Nyāya-Sūtra and Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya by Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya and Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya, Part 1: First Adhyāya (Calcutta: Indian Studies Past and Present, 1967).
7. Belvalkar and Raddi provide an excellent example of the all too common distorted and quite naive approach to "primitive" languages (and we should note that there is no implication of a hierarchy in Dandin's verse): "The interpretation which we prefer, and according to which the

śistānuśiṣṭā forms of language include Sanskrit, the Prākṛts and in fact all forms that have reached the grammar-stage; the remaining forms (śistānām) comprising all the dialects of the vulgar or the ignorant or the uncivilized people that are not general or consistent or advanced enough to demand a grammatical treatment. In fact even the most primitive and uncivilized man needs some kind of language howsoever crude and unpolished" (Notes 1/4).

8. Rājaśekhara, Kāvyamīmāṃsā of Rājaśekhara, edited by C. D. Dalal and R. A. Sastry, revised and enlarged by K. S. Ramaswami Sastri Siromani, 3rd edition (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1934), p. 2.

9. Siegfried Lienhard, A History of Classical Poetry: Sanskrit-Pali-Prakrit, (1984), p. 1.

10. A. B. Keith, A History of Sanskrit Literature, (1920, pp. 52-53.

11. Hari Chand, Kālidāsa et L'Art Poétique de L'Inde (Paris: Librairie Ancienne Honoré Champion, 1917),, p. 62.

12. Hari Chand, Kālidāsa, p. 62.

13. Cited in S. K. De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, vol. 1, pp. 67-68.

14. See: Somadeva Bhatṭa, Kathāsaritsāgarah (Delhi: Motilal Banarsiādass, 1970), Chapter 1; The Katha sarīt sāgara or Ocean of the Streams of Story, translated by C. H. Tawney, 2nd edition (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1968).

Kṣemendra, The Brihatkathāmañjari of Kṣemendra, edited by Mahāmahopādhyāya Pāṇḍit Śivadatta and Kāśināth Pāṇḍurang Parab, 2nd edition (Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press, 1931), Chapter 1.

15. Aśvaghoṣa, Sūtrālamkāra: Traduit en Francais sur la

version chinoise de Kumārajīva par Edouard Huber. Paris:
Ernest Leroux, 1908, p. 88.

16. P. V. Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, p. 63.
17. Rājaśekhara, Kāvyamīmāṃsā of Rājaśekhara, edited by C. D. Dalal and Pandit R. A. Sastry, third edition (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1934), Chapter 4, p. 12: pratibhāvataḥ punarapaśyato 'pi pratyakṣa iva | yato medhāvirudrakumāra-dāsādayo jātyandhāḥ kavayah śrūyante |.
18. (Rājaśekhara, La Kāvyamīmāṃsā de Rājaśekhara, translated by Nadine Stchoupak and Louis Renou (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1946), p. 58, n. 23).
See: Kumāradāsa, The Jānakiharaṇa of Kumāradāsa, edited by S. Paranavitana and C. E. Godakumbura (Colombo: Sri Lanka Sahitya Mandalaya, 1967).
19. Rudraṭa, Kāvyālaṅkāra (A Treatise on Rhetoric) of Rudraṭa, with the commentary of Namisādhu, edited with the Prakāśa Hindī commentary by Rāmadeva Śukla (Varanasi: The Chowkhamba Vidyabhawan, 1966), under [1.2] p. 3.
20. Rudraṭa, Kāvyālaṅkāra, (1966), under [2.2], p. 20.
21. See: P. V. Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, p. 63.
22. P. V. Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, p. 64.
23. Rudraṭa, Kāvyālaṅkāra [11.24], (1966), p. 361.
24. S. K. De accepts the Acyutottara as a work of Rāmaśarma (History of Sanskrit Poetics, vol. 2, p. 84, n. 18).
25. P. V. Nāganātha Śāstry writes, "Śākhāvardana and his two works." This attribution is not evident from the Kāvyālaṅkāra itself, and I have been unable to find any

substantiation (Bhāmaha, Kāvyālaṅkāra, translated by P. V. Nāganātha Śāstry, second edition (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970), p. xvii).

26. Pāṇini, The Astādhyāyī of Pāṇini, edited and translated by Śrīśa Chandra Vasu, vol. 1 (1891); Reprint (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1962), p. 789.
27. Rājaśekhara, Kāvyamīmāṃsā of Rājaśekhara, (1934), p. 2.
28. Rājaśekhara, La Kāvyamīmamsā de Rājaśekhara, (1946), p. 23.
29. Rājaśekhara, La Kāvyamīmamsā de Rājaśekhara, (1946), p. 26, n. 52.
30. Rājaśekhara, La Kāvyamīmamsā de Rājaśekhara, (1946), p. 23, n. 22.
31. Accepting the reading of Renou rather than pracetāyana in Rājaśekhara, La Kāvyamīmamsā de Rājaśekhara, (1946), p. 23, n. 25.
32. Rājaśekhara, La Kāvyamīmamsā de Rājaśekhara, (1946), p. 25, n. 41.
On the vinodas in kāvya ^@śāstra see: Bhoja's Sarasvatīkanṭhbharana following [5.93].
33. Renou later translates the related word "upaniṣad" as "cause mystérieuse de la poésie." Rājaśekhara, La Kāvyamīmamsā de Rājaśekhara, (1946), p. 26, n. 51 and pp. 61-62.
34. Paraphrasing the French translation of Nadine Stchoupal and Louis Renou in La Kāvyamīmāṃsā de Rājaśekhara, (1946), pp. 23-26.
Rājaśekhara, Kāvyamīmāṃsā of Rājaśekhara, (1934), p. 1:
tatram kavirahasyam sahasrāksah samāmnāsīt

auktikamuktigarbhah ritinirṇayam suvarṇanābhah ānuprāsikam
 pracetāyanah yamakāni citram citrāṅgadah śabdaśeṣam śeṣah
 vāstavam pulastyah aupamyamaupakāyanah atiśayam pārāśarah
 arthaśeṣamutathyah ubhayālañkārikam kuberaḥ vainodikam
 kāmadevah rūpakanirūpanīyam bharataḥ rasādhikārikam
 nandikeśvarah gunaupādānikamupamanyuh aupaniṣadikam
 kucamārah iti tataste pr̥thak pr̥thak svaśāstrāni
 viracayāñcakruh ||.

35. Dandin, Avantisundari, edited by K. S. Mahādeva Śāstri (Trivandrum, 1954), pp. 1-3.

For a discussion on these previous kavis see: M. Ramakrishna Kavi, "Proceedings and Transactions of the Second Oriental Conference," Calcutta, 1922, pp. 193-201.

36. A. B. Keith, History of Sanskrit Literature (London: Oxford University Press, 1920), p. 266.

37. That Bhāsa was the author of all of these plays is open to doubt. See: Louis Renou and Jean Filliozat, L'Inde Classique, vol. 2, (1953), pp. 265-70; and A. B. Keith, The Sanskrit Drama (London: Oxford University Press, 1924), pp. 91-26.

38. M. Ramakrishna Kavi, Avantisundari-Kathā of Dandin, p. 199. See: A. B. Keith, History of Sanskrit Literature, (1920), pp. 119-24.

39. Louis Renou, L'Inde Classique, vol. 2, (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1953), pp. 286-87. See: A. B. Keith, The Sanskrit Drama, pp. 212-19.

40. M. R. Kavi, Avantisundari-Kathā of Dandin, p. 199. Kavi incorrectly considers Bhāravi to be Dandin's grandfather; based upon the Avantisundarikathā this would be Damodhara. Bhāravi was rather a friend of Damodhara.

41. See: Mayūra, The Sanskrit Poems of Mayūra, edited

with the text and translation of Bāṇa's Candīśatāka by G. P. Quakenbos (New York: Columbia University Press, 1917).

C. P. Quakenbos, "The Mayūrāṣṭaka, An Unedited Sanskrit Poem by Mayūra," Journal of the American Oriental Society, 1911, pp. 343-54.

Mayūra, The Sūryaśatāka of Mayūra, with the commentary of Tribhuvanapāla, edited by Pt. Durgāprasād and K. P. Parab (Bombay, 1889), Reprint (Bombay: Nirṇaya Sāgar Press, 1927).

The Nature of Kāvya and its Formulaic Division / On Metre

and the Versaic Form

"And by these [earlier writers] the body and ornaments of kāvyas are shown / Basically the body is a succession of words distinguished with desired meaning" [taiḥ śarīram ca kāvyānām alamkārāśca darśitāḥ | śarīram tāvadīṣṭārthavya-vacchinnā padāvalī ||] [1.10].

"It is classified in a threefold way: Whether stanzaic, prosaic, or their mixture / The stanzaic consists of four padas and is either in vṛtta or jāti" [padyam gadyam ca miśram ca tat tridhaiva vyavasthitam | padyam catuspadī tacca vṛttam jātiriti dvidhā ||] [1.11].

The latter half of Dandin's verse touches on metre or "chandas," a wide-ranging organizational element that extends far beyond kāvyas as such -- "Sanskrit literature is chiefly in verse. The poems and plays, the histories and legends, treatises on law, divinity, astronomy, mathematics, and indeed nearly all literature being in

metre."¹ And keeping in mind the important proviso that "metrical form in poetry is not merely a matter of fixed accentual, quantitative or syllabic patterns but involves the whole issue of how rhythm is articulated in the units of poetry for the communication of meaning and feeling,"² we may proceed to a brief examination.³

A padya ("stanza") consists of four pādas ("quarters"). In a vṛtta padya the metre is determined by the number and position of the syllables (aksaras) in each pāda, and their "weight" -- whether "light"/laghu, where the vowel is short and not followed by more than one consonant; or "heavy"/guru, where the vowel is long, or if short it is followed by two or more consonants (whether in another word or not), or if the syllable contains either an anusvāra or visarga.

Three fundamental classes of vṛtta padyas are distinguished: samavṛtta, where the pādas are all similar; ardhasamavṛtta, where alternate pādas are similar; and viśamavṛtta, where the pādas are all dissimilar. The number of syllables in a given pāda may (theoretically) vary from

one to twenty-six, and each may be (generally) either heavy or light.

It should go without saying that the actual number of syllables found in practice is far less than potentially possible. H. D. Velankar in examining the "prosodial practice" of twenty-eight prominent kavis, found that the anuṣṭubh (eight syllables to the pāda), the upajāti (eleven syllables to the pāda), and the vamśastha (twelve syllables to the pāda) were the most commonly utilized in continued narration within the sections of a stanzaic mahākāvya.⁴

A yati or specified "break" should occur between words or members of a long compound at the end of each pāda, with the break at the half-padya somewhat stronger. In longer metres, breaks may occur at fixed positions within the pādas themselves. For example, in the ubiquitous anuṣṭubh (or śloka) metre -- "as well as being frequently used in Classical poetry, it is the staple metre of Sanskrit epic and of the many didactic works composed in verse"⁵ -- with its eight syllables to the pāda, the fifth syllable should

be light, the sixth heavy, the seventh alternately heavy and light, and the eighth either heavy or light.

In a jāti padya or stanza the metre is determined by "quantity," that is, by the number of "sound instants" or mātrās in a given pāda. The duration of a short vowel is equivalent to one mātrā, that of a long vowel to two mātrās (a mātrā is not equivalent to the classical Greek mora as is occasionally affirmed: a mora only refers to a short syllable, where morae refers to a long syllable). The most prevalent variety of the jāti category is the āryā metre with nine subvarieties (Renou posits sixteen varieties in Sanskrit, twenty-seven in Prākṛt⁶). Thus for example, the variety of the jāti āryā category itself termed āryā should display twelve mātrās in the first and third pādas, eighteen in the second, and fifteen in the fourth.⁷

Jacobi's assertion that "Metrical compositions were originally designed to be sung,"⁸ is perhaps true if we only consider the most basic and accessible metres, especially those of the jāti āryā type which "primitivement"

sans doute était chanté."⁹ Yet the motivating force behind the growth in complexity and length found in the classical Sanskrit metres is most probably to be found in the coordinate and increasingly refined development of kāvya. That "This richness and elaboration of metre, in striking contrast to the comparative freedom of Vedic and epic literature, must certainly have arisen from poetical use; it cannot have been invented for grammatical memorial verses [or for song], for which a simple metre might better suffice."¹⁰

"Its [the stanzaic form's] complete exposition is revealed in the Chandoviciti -- This branch of knowledge is a ship for those wishing to enter the ocean of kāvya"

[chandovicityām sakalastatprapañco nidarśitah | sā vidyā naurvivikṣūṇām gambhīram kāvyasāgaram ||] [1.12].

Although some writers believe that the "Chandoviciti" refers to yet another work of Dandin's¹¹ -- now on metre -- it is far more probable, as P. V. Kane believes, "that the

work Chandoviciti means simply chandas-śāstra . . . and is generally taken as referring to the Vedāṅga on metrics ascribed to Piṅgala.¹² And as the commentator Taruṇavā caspati glosses this verse, "chandahprapañcaśchandovicityām piṅgalanāgena darśitah paryālocaniyah |".¹³

However we should note that a text with this name (as its first and second verses indicate) was found somewhat recently in Central Asia,¹⁴ and which apparently drew from the earlier works of Yāska (one of the early masters of metrics that Piṅgala mentions),¹⁵ and from Piṅgala himself:

[1d] yās(ka) piṅga[l] (asūtr) [e]bhyaḥ / [2.cd] ____ kṛtiḥ
| candovici[t]ih ____ ||.

Enough of the text remains for the editor Dieter Schlingloff to conclude that Halāyudha [10th century], who illustrated with examples and commented upon Piṅgala's sūtras, knew of and utilized this text. And that, contrary to Albrecht Weber's earlier opinion that Halāyudha's examples were either his own or taken from well-known poetical works,¹⁶ it now appears that a large part of his

material was drawn from this text.¹⁷ And in noting a number of contrasts with Bharata's Nātyaśāstra he writes, "Diese Unterschiede machen es unwahrscheinlich die Quelle unseres Textes oder unser Text die des Nātyaśāstra ist."¹⁸

Yet there is really no basis for John Brough, in reviewing Schlingloff's edition, to affirm, "Until now nothing has been known of it [the Chandoviciti] except the name; but the name has long been familiar as that of a work on metrics mentioned in the Kavyadarśa of Daṇḍin. There is no reason to doubt that this is the text to which Daṇḍin referred."¹⁹ The ambiguity remains.

"A detailed description of such stanzaic forms as: Muktaka, Kulaka, Kośa, and Samghāta will not be presented -- These are all categories subsumed by the Sargabandha"

[muktakam kulakam koṣah samghāta iti tādr̥śah |
sargabandhāṁśarūpatvādanuktah padyavistarah ||] [1.13].

muktaka [< *muc /"release," "set free"] : a single

padya "detached" yet self-sufficient. In the Agni Purāṇa [337.36cd] we read: "The muktaka is but a single stanza yet capable of generating poetic beauty among the wise"
 [muktakam śloka ekaikaścamatkārakṣamah satām ||.]

The muktaka compresses the "maximum of poetic message into a limited space," utilizing to the full the syntactical and semantic compression that Sanskrit allows. They may capture the essence of a scene, a moment, or develop multiple layers of meaning that yet interact, semantically expanding outward. "The single stanza of muktaka poetry is without context and, as it is a complete poem, an artistically rounded whole, each part of it shows far greater elaboration than is found in epic stanzas."²⁰

The element of "detachment" reflects the view of the Sargabandha or Mahākāvya, the "great" extended Kāvya, as all-embracing. Lienhard would see this as essentially a late development. "This clearly does not reflect the old designation of short poems; it is rather a product of the later, mistaken conception of a short poem as being really

only a stanza "freed" from its context and of single-stanza poetry on the whole as being a secondary form derived from long poems. . . ."²¹

I am not really sure, however, that one can so easily dismiss (or even apply the question of truth or falsity) to an attitude held throughout the *kāvya* tradition as a "mistaken conception." It is not so much that the muktaka and the other briefer forms are considered "secondary," as it is that the mahākāvya is "considérée tacitement par la théorie indienne comme le kāvya par excellence."²²

Lienhard continues:

In reality, exactly the reverse is true. Long before the rise of *kāvya*, a category of single-stanza poetry, muktaka [What of the "old designation"?], reached maturity and held a key position right from the very beginning in Old and Middle Indian literature. . . . Not only did short poetry influence other genres to a degree that has hardly been realized so far, it also became a living part of the way of life and outlook of those classes who handed down the traditions of poetry, a highly cultivated, largely urban society. Moreover, the finest works of the classical poets have been written in the poetic miniature painting that is the muktaka genre.

An older, authentic and factually correct name for independent stanzas is gāthā [as in Theragāthā/Therīgāthā].²³

I have included Lienhard's statement (as part of the most recent history of kāvya) because it touches on an important issue, and yet contains a number of fallacies that one should be aware of. That kāvya may have developed from the single stanza (that this may be disputed we have noted), and that it appears in these various stanzaic forms hardly invalidates the recognition in the developed tradition that the mahākāvya in its sweep and scope, in its totality that is more than the sum of its stanzaic parts, is the ultimate test and expression of the kavi. This leads us to presumption, and its frequent ensuing companion, projection. One cannot presume to speak of "mistaken conceptions" in contexts that have no relevant bearing: the fact that the single stanza kāvya came to be known as "muktaka" reflects an actuality of development within the tradition. By the very creation of the longer forms the

entire relational position of all other forms changed; they were seen, and quite naturally, in a different light. One cannot presume that a word carries its full etymological weight in an evaluative sense, the focus here is primarily structural as we shall see.

Whenever one reads such signposts over the unknown as "in reality" or "long before the rise of kāvya," one should pause. One cannot assume such assurance. No one knows when kāvya first arose, much less what went on before. One does not know when the "very beginning" was. One has to tread very lightly with such words as "authentic" and "factually correct." Authentic as opposed to what? Is it factually incorrect that a later term comes into play in order to reflect a different "reality"? And if a writer presumes to speak of "finest works," let he or she grant at least a hint of what they mean.

kulaka / a brief kāvya of up to fifteen padyas
(although some would consider five the maximum number²⁴),

where the entire group forms a single syntactical unit construing with a single verb placed either at the beginning or at the end. Dandin's coming description of the mahākāvya [1.15-19] mirrors this type syntactically.

samghāta / a series of padyas greater in number than the kulaka. All are in the same metre and all pertain to a common theme, yet each is now syntactically distinct, capable of standing alone.

kośa (or koṣa) / a "treasure," that is, an extended anthology of individual stanzas or muktakas. These may be by a single kavi or by a number of kavis; the arrangement may be arbitrary, or (more usually) according to a particular principle, such as theme, metre, or even alphabetically (according to the first word of each padya).

The included padyas are "quotations from literary Sanskrit works by known or unknown authors, being either descriptive verses or single poetical verses standing by

themselves in which the poet concisely depicted a single phase of emotion, or a single interesting situation within the limits of a finely finished form."²⁵

The earliest known kośa, and one most probably known to Daṇḍin and thus of some concern, is Hāla's Sattasai (also known as the Gāhakośo, Gāthakośa, or Gāthāsaptaśatī).²⁶ Hāla is often equated with King Śātavāhana, who ruled from the city of Pratiṣṭhāna on the banks of the Godāvari River (in Māhārāṣṭra). The text appears in seven recensions, with the total number of stanzas or gāthās varying from roughly 700 to 1000, with perhaps some 430 believed to be "core verses." All of the gāthās are written in Māhārāṣṭrī Prākṛt (as is Pravarasena's Setubandha, which Daṇḍin mentions in [1.34]), they are undivided with respect to categories, and are most probably drawn from a variety of sources with many added by Hāla himself. Dating is vague, ranging between 200 - 600 AD (perhaps tending toward the former).²⁷

As Hāla himself wrote (and we note the reference to

alamkāras as a distinguishing feature, rather than, as the dhvani revisionists would have us believe, "dhvani" or even "rasa"). "Out of the ten millions of gāthās adorned with alamkāras, seven hundred have been compiled by One Compassionate towards Kavis (kavivatsala), Hāla"

[(transposed into Sanskrit:) sapta śatāni kavivatsalena
koṭayāḥ madhye | hālena viracitāni sālaṅkārāṇāṁ gāthānāṁ ||]
[1.3].²⁸

Sternbach affirms that, "The gāthās, intended to be sung, contain poetry of the highest type. . . . Each gāthā forms a unity in itself and only in some cases two or three gāthās are combined to constitute a song. Not infrequently a gāthā forms an epigram or an aphorism expressing a certain truth in a few words and only rarely a gāthā contains well-rounded narrative verses borrowed from another poem or drama."²⁹ And Keith (who might have been casting a felicitous eye across the rolling Kent countryside) offers a soothing picture, "The prevailing tone is gentle and

pleasing, simple loves set among simple scenes, fostered by the seasons. . . ."³⁰

Well, not quite. Here is Radhagovinda Basak in the introduction to his edition, glossing a few verses on an extremely common theme throughout the text:

The presence of unchaste women in societies cannot be unthinkable, as we find in this treatise mention of unchaste women in various contexts (2.4, 65-66, 3.28, 94-95). As such unchaste women knew the art of enticing chaste ladies to violate their morality, the latter lived in consternation against the activities of unchaste female neighbours (1.36). An unchaste women does not often fail to cite friends who could certify her as possessing good character (2.97). It is curious that unchaste women could easily understand the entry into her house- precincts of her husband or her paramour by the particular barkings of her own dog (7.62). Wanton women often went to meet their lovers through snow-clad sesamum fields (7.93). We read of an unchaste lady of high family to contract secret love with a barber (5.17). We find a description of a wanton woman besmearing her body with the cremation ashes of her paramour (5.8). Under various pretexts unchaste women conceal from their husbands their connection with their paramours (4.1). There is mention of a call of a physician paramour given by an unchaste wife even in presence of her husband, under the pretext of a treatment for a scorpion bite (3.37). Such a bad woman often introduces to her husband her paramour as a person seeking for a

refuge in her house (3.97). This anthology contains description of how harlots succeed in tarnishing the character of young men and fleecing their finance," and so on.³¹

We may assume that Dandin was aware of if not actually familiar with the Gāthāsaptaśatī. In [1.34] he mentions the Setubandha of Pravarasena, also written in Māhārāṣṭri Prākṛt. He was certainly aware of Bāṇa (one of the kavis praised in the opening verses to the Avantisundarī), who refers to Hāla in [1.13cd] of the Harsacarita: "Sātavāhana [Hāla] created a kośa replete with excellent sayings (subhāśitas) of the purest nature like jewels" [viśuddha-jātibhiḥ kośam ratnairiva subhāśitaiḥ ||].

We note that Bāṇa refers to the text simply as the "kośa." V. V. Mirashi believes that Hāla's anthology was known primarily as the "Gāthākośa" or simply as the "Kośa" down to the 9th century, and cites a number of instances, some of which would fall before Dandin.³²

Following close to Dandin's time is the Vajjälagga (Kośa) by the Śvetāmbara Jaina Jayavallabha.³³ Sternbach

believes its date is not much later than Hāla's work.³⁴

Where M. V. Patwardhan in the introduction to his translation of the text places it between the "broad limits" of 750-1337 A.D.³⁵

The Vajjālagga is also in Māhārāṣṭrī Prākṛt and contains some 1350 gāthās, with perhaps 400 considered to be core verses. Where Hāla's Gāthāsaptaśatī was not divided into various thematic sections, the Vajjālagga is broken into 95 "vajjās." This term (as vrajyā) marking a thematic division became the norm for Sanskrit kośa. As we find in the later Sāhityadarpana [6.565] of Viśvanātha [14th century]: "A kośa is a compilation of independent stanzas (slokas), classified according to vrajyās -- This indeed is exceedingly pleasing" [koṣah ślokasamūhastu syādanyonyāna-pekṣakah | vrajyākrameṇa racitah sa evātimanoramah ||].

The vajjās themselves are grouped into three broad categories according to three (of the four, excluding mokṣa) ends or goals of human life: dharma, kāma (the

majority), and artha (see note 40 under Notes [1.10] - [1.31]). The text does not provide any indication of the various authors.

It is not until the 11th-12th centuries that we have the first (extant) kośa (or subhāṣita samgraha) in Sanskrit, the Subhāṣitaratnakośa of Vidyākara.³⁶ It contains 1739 verses, divided into 50 vrajyās, with perhaps one-third of the verses attributed to specific authors. There are sections on, for example, the Buddha and Bodhisattvas, Śiva and Viṣṇu, the seasons, love and women, the stages of life and times of day, good men and bad, the flattery of kings and the praises of poets.³⁷

We may briefly note three additional and specific stanzaic forms: the yugmaka (yugma, yugala, yugalaka) in two padyas; the sandānitaka (viśeṣaka) in three padyas; and the kapālaka in four padyas.³⁸

And the khandakāvya ("kāvya of a single fragment") which, with its capability of interweaving a focused theme (with secondary variations) and an embracing story line,

may be placed between, say, the samghāta and the more developed mahākāvya.

By this term [the Sanskrit critics] indicate that the type is concerned with any of the subjects assigned to the great kāvya but that it treats of only one or of a small selection of the subjects so assigned. In actual fact the khanda-kāvyas preserved to us from the classical period may be more narrowly characterized. With few exceptions they fall into two categories: messenger-poems (samdeśa-kāvya) and verse- sequences such as the Centuries (śataka).³⁹

The Sargabandha or Mahākāvya

"A Sargabandha is a Mahākāvya / Its distinctive characteristics are: At its beginning there is either benediction, salutation, or a statement of the theme"

[sargabandho mahākāvyamucyate tasya lakṣaṇam | āśir-namaskriyā vastunirdeśo vāpi tanmukham ||] [1.14].

"It is born from stories of the Itihāsas or from other works based upon historical characters / It revolves around the quest for the Four Goals⁴⁰ with a protagonist lofty and noble" [itihāsakathodbhūtamitaradvā sadāśrayam | caturvargaphalāyattam caturodāttanāyakam ||]. [1.15]

itihāsa [< iti (+) ha (+) āsa] / "thus it was."

"A generic name which includes all chronicles, legendary tales, and heroic sages. . . ." (Notes 1/13). It is "history" only in the loose sense that it concerns events believed to have occurred in the past. Presenting such popular material, it is not surprising that the itihāsas

(and the proto-Purāṇas) "were current in the early Vedic period."⁴¹

Yet their status was somewhat equivocal. Not generally included in the Vedas, they share common story elements (the "gambler's lament" [Rg Veda 10.34], for example). In certain later works they are classified as a fifth Veda, as in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad [3.4.1ff.]; and in the Artha Śāstra [1.2ff] we read: "The Sāma Veda, the Rg Veda and the Yajur Veda constitute the trilogy of the Vedas. These, the Atharva Veda, and the Itihāsa Veda (the Veda of history and legends) make up the Vedas.

Phonetics, ritual, grammar, etymology, metrics, and astronomy -- these are the limbs [ancillary branches of knowledge] of the Veda."⁴²

nāyaka /the hero or male protagonist. "Le héros est le personnage principal du drame, celui dont les aventures à la poursuite de l'object qu'il désire forment le sujet de la pièce et qui recueille au dénouement le profit suprême de

l'action. . . . C'est lui qui conduit les événements dans la mesure des forces humaines et de sa volonté. Dans la plupart des genres dramatiques, le héros doit être un modèle presque accompli de vertus.⁴³ And we should be aware that the models of the "hero" and "heroine" explicitly presented in the context of the drama apply in a less structured way to the prosaic and stanzaic forms of kāvya as well.

The Nātyasāstra [34.17-21] distinguishes four types of nāyaka in the play:

(1) dhīroddhata /"noble, firm self-controlled, and haughty." They are "dominated by pride and jealousy; they employ magic, ruse, and so on."⁴⁴ This category generally pertains to gods.

(2) dhīralalita /"noble, self-controlled, firm, and light-hearted." "He does not have any worries, for his friends look after his interest; he loves the fine arts, song, dance and so on; he is devoted to pleasure, and

especially love; and finally he is naturally happy and compassionate."⁴⁵ This category generally pertain to kings.

(3) dhīrodātta /"noble, self-controlled, firm and exalted, superior. "He has a great heart which is never dominated by depression or anger, and so on; a character extremely profound, patient . . . faithful to his promises."⁴⁶ This category generally pertains to generals and ministers.

(4) dhīrapraśāstra /"noble, self-controlled, firm, and calm." "The calm hero differs primarily from the light-hearted hero by reason of his birth, for he is a Brahmin or merchant. . . ."⁴⁷

From Dandin's Daśakumāracarita let us see a few of the nāyaka's attributes revealed in practice.

(1) Bravery and facility at arms:

(Somadatta speaks) "Avoiding the tangled struggle of the hostile hosts, wantonly delighting in my strength of arm, I shot a shower of shafts and struck down my foes.

Then, guiding my splendid chariot-horses toward the enemy king, I swiftly overtook his chariot and cut off his head."⁴⁸

(2) Cunning:

(Puṣpodbhava speaks) 'I received a message from Balachandrika that she was preparing to visit Daruvarman, having been summoned to sport in the love-chamber by this victim caught in the tangling toils of my device. Therefore I deftly affixed to the proper portions of my person the frippery appropriate to a pretty girl. . . .

For just twenty seconds he stood there chattering, and laughing as he talked; then, blind with passion, showed a mind to fondle the sweet maiden's bosom.

My turn had come. Red with wrath, I dashed him headlong from the couch and drubbed him dead with fists and knees and feet.'⁴⁹

(3) Supernatural power:

(Rājavāhana) "Rājavāhana . . . previously instructed in the mechanics of disappearance, floated like a specter into the maidens' apartments."⁵⁰

(4) Virtue:

(Apahāravarman speaks) "Since I desired to bring these gentry to orthodox thinking by revealing the

perishable nature of riches, I resolved to tread the path of scientific thievery."⁵¹

And, allowing for his biased anger, we note King Chandavrman's less than felicitous enunciation of Rājavāhana's qualities: "Aha! Here he is, the friend of Puṣpodbhava, that foreign son of a merchant, that money-mad prig, that husband of Balachandrika who caused my younger brother's death -- damn her! Here he is, the handsome coxcomb, the arrogant artist, who tickles the silly townsfolk with his skill in a pack of juggling tricks, and fools them by shamming the dignity of something superhuman! A bogus robe of virtue outside, and rottenness inside! A mountebank! A quack!"⁵²

nāyikā /the heroine or female protagonist. "The heroine . . . is the one among the female characters who drives or guides the weave of primary events. The character of the heroine does not contribute less than that of the hero in giving to the drama its [']physionomie spéciale[']."⁵³

The Nātyaśāstra [34.25cd-26ab] lists four types:

(1) divyā /a goddess; (2) nṛpapatnī /a queen; (3) kula-strī / a women of high family; and (4) gāṇikā /a courtezan.

These are in turn are characterized according to variations in four attributes (Nātyaśāstra [34.26cd-28]): whether (1) dhīra /"self-controlled," "restrained"; (2) lalitā /"playful," "light-hearted"; (3) udāttā /"exalted," "superior"; or (4) nibhṛtā /"modest." Thus a goddess or queen will display all four attributes; a women of high family will display superiority, exaltedness, and modesty; and a courtezan (or one proficient in all the "skills") will display playfulness and superiority.

We should also be aware of a threefold typology which regularly appears in kāvya, where the nāyikā may be classified according to her physical development and sexual experience: (1) mugdhā /"die Naive" ("Die mugdhā ist noch recht ungeschickt in Liebesdingen, sehr sanft, wo sie zürnen müsste, und überaus verschämt"); (2) madhyā /"die Mittlere"

("Die madhyā ist schon viel anstelliger. In der Liebe ist sie schon erfahrener und auch köperlich ist sie schon mehr entwickelt"); and (3) pragalbhā (praudhā) /"die Leidenschaftliche" ("Die pragalbhā dagegen ist liebesblind und begehrt einen schrankenlosen Liebesgenuss. Sie ist das Weib in der vollen Blüte der Jugend").⁵⁴

From Dandin's Daśakumāracarita we have a description of the nāyikā, indeed a revealing catalogue of many of kāvya's recurring descriptive attributes, a number of which we shall see in the examples of the Kāvyādarśa's second chapter:

She shone, a creation of Love. Yes, Love had fashioned a paragon of women, as if he wished, in wistfull memory of Charm, to image forth this duplicate. He formed her feet from the sweetness of two autumn lilies in his own pleasure pool; the languid grace of her gait from the course of a wanton swan down a long lake in a planted garden; her calves from a quiver's curve; her comely thighs from the shapeliness of two plantain stems by the door of a summer-house; her generous hips from the sweep of conquering chariots; her navel (which seemed an eddy in Ganges' stream) from the semblance of an early-flowering ornamental lotus bud; . . . her breasts from the beauty of two full golden bowls; her arms from the delicacy of vines in a bower; her neck from the symmetry of a conch of victory; her lip, like a bimba fruit, from the

redness of mango flowers that maidens fondly wear above the ear; her sweet smile from the splendor of Love's flower-arrows; her every word from the witchery of the soft song of Love's first messenger, the cuckoo; the breath of her sigh from the gentleness of the southern breeze, leader of all Love's soldiers; her eyes from the pride of two fishes figured on a conquering banner; her brows from the curve of a bow; her face from the spotless enchantment of Love's first friend, the moon; her hair from the similitude of a pet peacock's fan.55

"With description of cities, oceans, mountains, the seasons / the rising of the moon and sun / play among gardens and pools / drinking and festivals of love"
 [nāgarārṇavaśailartucandrārkodayavarṇanaiḥ | udyāna-salilakṛidāmadhupānaratotsvaiḥ ||] [1.16].

"With descriptions of the separation and marriage of lovers / the births of sons / diplomacies, ambassadors, expeditions, battles / and the success of the protagonist"
 [vipralambhairvivāhaśca kumārodayavarṇanaiḥ. | mantradūtāprayāñājināyakābhuyudayairapi ||] [1.17].

"It should be embellished and be not too condensed / endowed with a continuous stream of Rasas and Bhavas / with

sargas not excessively long / possessing melodious metres
 and effective transitions" [alamkṛtamasamksiptam
 rasabhāvanirantaram | sargairanativistīrnaiḥ śravyavṛttaiḥ
 susamdhibhiḥ ||] [1.18].

"With the final metre of each sarga different from all preceding / Such a kāvya displaying a profusion of alamkāras shall be pleasing to the world and endure for yet another eon"⁵⁶ [sarvatra bhinnavṛttāntairupetam lokarañjanam | kāvyam kalpāntarasthāyi jāyate sadalamkṛti || [1.19].

Critical Acceptance as the Essential Criterion --

Not Formulaic Adherence

"A kāvya although short of some of these features is not necessarily defective if the excellence of those employed pleases the wise" [nyūnamapyatra yaiḥ
 kaiścidaṅgaiḥ kāvyam na duṣyati | yadyupattesu sampatti-
 rārādhayati tadvidah ||] [1.20].

The Ākhyāyikā or Kathā

"The prosaic is a succession of words devoid of pādas / Its varieties are two: Ākhyāyikā and Kathā / Of these some affirm that the Ākhyāyika [1.23] should be narrated just by the protagonist / The other by the protagonist or someone else / Here there is no defect in presenting one's own qualities as one proclaims the truth" [1.24] [apādah padasantāno gadyamākhyāyikā kathā | iti tasya prabhedau duau taylorākhyāyikā kila ||] [1.23] nāyakenaiva vācyānyā nāyakenetareṇa vā | svagunāviśkriyādoṣo nātra bhūtārtha-śāmsināḥ ||] [1.24].

"However, the lack of such restriction is actually seen / since in the Ākhyāyikā also there is narration by others / Whether the narrator is the protagonist or someone else / What basis for distinction is this?" [api tvaniyamo dr̥ṣṭastatrāpyanyairudīraṇāt | anyo vaktā svayam̄ veti kīdr̥gvā bhedakāraṇam ||] [1.25].

"If the distinguishing marks of the Ākhyāyikā are

either the vaktra or aparavaktra metre and its division into ucchvāsas / Then in kathās as well -- due to their relevance -- [1.26] / Why not utilize the vaktra or aparavaktra metres just as it already employs the āryā? / And as 'lambha' and so on mark the kathā's divisions / Let 'ucchvāsa' be used as well -- What of it?" [1.27] [vaktram cāparavaktram ca socchvāsatvam ca bhedakam | cihnamākhyāyi-kāyāścet prasañgena kathāsvapi || āryādivat praveśah kim na vaktrāparavaktrayoh | bhedaśca drṣṭo lambhādirucchvāso vāstu kim tataḥ ||].

"Therefore the Kathā and Ākhyāyikā are really one genre marked by two names / And within this any remaining types of prosaic narration will be subsumed" [tat kathākhyāyiketyekā jātiḥ samjñādvayāñkitā | atraiवान्तर-bhaviṣyanti śeṣāścākhyānajātayah ||] [1.28].

"Abduction of virgins, battles, the separations of lovers, triumphs, and so on, are certainly common in Sargabandhas as well -- These are not distinguishing

attributes" [kanyāharanāsamgrāma vipralambhodayādayah | sargabandhasamā eva naite vaiśeṣikā gunāḥ ||] [1.29].

Dāṇḍin specifically rejects a number of points evident in Bhāmaha's Kāvyālaṅkāra [1.25-29]. Bhāmaha maintains, for example, that the ākhyāyikā should be narrated only by the protagonist immediately involved with events, where the kathā should be narrated by some character(s) other than the protagonist; or that the ākhyāyika must present the "abduction of virgins, battles, the separation of lovers, and triumphs" (the Sanskrit in each case here is exactly the same). Dāṇḍin, as a master of the extended prose form himself, rejects a distinction seemingly made for its own sake, with little basis in actual practice. One should be aware, however, that in approaching the secondary literature one will frequently find this artificiality maintained, with the kathā and ākhyāyika presented as clearly defined genres. S. K. De, for example, affirms that "The ākhyāyika was more or less a serious composition dealing generally with facts of actual experience with an autobiographical or

semi-autobiographical interest; while the kathā was essentially a fictitious narrative -- which may sometimes (as Dandin contends) possess an autobiographical form, but whose interest chiefly resides in its invention."⁵⁷

This error is carried to an extreme with A. K. Warder, who not only solidifies these distinctions, and falsely equates them with Western literary genres, but condemns Dandin for not adhering to these misconceived views: "Of Dandin's rather idiosyncratic ideas about literature, particularly that the distinction between history and fiction should not be recognized. . . ."; or speaking of Dandin's "deliberately confounding history and fiction, or biography and novel. . . ."⁵⁸

Again on the Freedom of the Kavi

"A feature realized here through the thought of the kavi is not wrong elsewhere / Among the accomplished what indeed cannot be an opening onto the achievement of their

goals?" [kavibhāvakṛtam cihnamanyatrāpi na duṣyati |
 mukhamiṣṭārthaśaṁsiddhau kiṁ hi na syāt kṛtātmanām ||]
 [1.30].

Mixed Compositions -- The Campū

"Mixed compositions are the nāṭakas and so on / Their detailed treatment is found elsewhere / Another such variety -- abounding in both the prosaic and stanzaic is called campū " [miśrāṇi nāṭakādīni teṣāmanyatra vistaraḥ | gadyapadyamayī kāciccampūrityabhidhīyate || [1.31].

"nāṭakas and so on" /that is, the ten primary types of rūpakas or "plays," "dramas":

(1) the nāṭaka as such: "La comédie héroïque est le type le plus complet de l'oeuvre dramatique."⁵⁹ According to the Nāṭyaśāstra [20.7] it may display "all the vṛttis ("styles") and a number of varied situations" [sarvavṛttiviniṣpannam nānāvasthāsamāśryam ||].

There are four vṛttis (NŚ [6.24cd-25ab]): bhāratī /the

"verbal"; sāttvatī /the "elegant"; kaiśikī /the "graceful"; and ārabhatī /the "vigorous." ("Une variante des rīti [see verses [1.40] ff.] est constituée par les vr̥tti ou 'modes': cette discrimination entre les styles élégant, ordinaire, grossier, émane de la Dramaturgie et n'a été appliquée que secondairement, et non sans gaucheries, à la Poétique."⁶⁰

On the nāṭaka Lévi writes, "Le style doit en être noble et harmonieux; les parties en prose veulent des expressions sans recherche et des composés de peu d'étendue . . . ; les vers, une langue claire et douce."⁶¹ Its title should reflect the subject matter, which should be divided into five to ten acts (āñka). Later self-styled nāṭakas may have less (the Jānakiparinaya of Madhusūdana [18th century] is in four acts) or more ("Il existe même un drame en quatorze acts, sorte de monstre, attribué à Hanumat: le Hanuman-Nāṭaka").⁶²

Its material should be well-known, that is, not invented. It may utilize any number of rasas, yet primarily employs vīra (the "heroic") and śrṅgāra (the

"erotic"). And the protagonist (nāyaka) should have an elevated, superior nature (udātta). "Where the behavior of kings reflected in their joys or sorrows is variously realized through actions displaying the rasas and bhāvas -- This should be known as the 'nāṭaka'" [nr̥patinām yacca ritam nānārasabhbhvaceṣṭitairbahudhā | sukhaduhkhotpattikṛtam tajjñeyam nāṭakam nāma || (NS [20.12]).

(2) the prakarana ("comédie bourgeoise") follows the structure and development of the nāṭaka (NS [20.50]), but now with a plot generated through the creative power of the kavi (kavirātmaśaktyā) (NS [20.48]). The nāyaka may be a brahmin, merchant, minister, officer, or caravan leader (NS [20.51]), "toujours du genre noble et calme." The nāyikā may be of similar status as that of the nāyaka, she may be a courtesan; or two women may appear drawn from each of these two categories.

As with the nāṭaka, the prakarana should have from five to ten acts, and it should possess the various rasas and bhāvas (NS [20.57]). The name of the individual play

may be formed from the name of the nāyaka, the nāyikā, or a conjunction of both.

(3) the samavakāra ("le drame surnaturel") presents the adventures of gods and demons in three acts. It may have up to twelve nāyakas (NŚ [20.64-65]) -- "tous du genre noble et supérieur; chacun d'eux poursuit un object particular qu'il finit par atteindre."⁶³

(4) the ihāmr̥ga displays divine beings in conflict over love (NŚ [20.78]). "It is to abound in vehement Heroes and to have its construction dependent on feminine anger which is to give rise to commotion, excitement and conflict" (NŚ [20.79]).⁶⁴ The vr̥ttis and rasas that apply are the same as in the vyāyoga (NŚ [20.81]) (see below).

(5) the dīma ("le drame fantastique") presents a well-known plot and an exalted nāyaka (NŚ [20.84]). It should have four acts and display the various rasas except śr̥ngāra (the "erotic") and hāsyā (the "comic") (NŚ [20.85]), and display sixteen nāyakas, who may be devas, asuras, rāksasas, bhūtas, yaksas, and nāgas (NŚ [20.87-88]). "La

magie, la sorcellerie, les combats, les fureurs, les éclipses de lune et de soleil contribuent à augmenter l'horreur de l'action."⁶⁵

(6) the vyāyoga ("le spectacle militaire") should have only one act, representing the passage of one day (NŚ [20.90-91]). The single nāyaka should be a well-known (though not divine) royal sage (rājarsi). The action is of battle and conflict, evoking "exciting"/"blazing" rasas (that is, all but śrṅgāra or hāsyā).

(7) the utsṛṣṭikāñka ("l'acte en dehors" or isolated act) has a plot that is usually well-known with non-divine male characters (NŚ [20.94]). It should express karuna (the "compassionate") rasa, be in the bhārati ("verbal") vrtti, and it should concern women in mourning who describe recently completed combat (NŚ [20.95-96]). "Le nom d'acte en dehors est donné à ce genre pour le distinguer de l'acte simple, qui est une des divisions de la comédie héroïque [nātaka]. Certains théoriciens l'entendent: acte en dehors des règles ordinaires."⁶⁶

(8) the prahasana ("la comédie bouffe" or farce) is in one act and should primarily evoke hāsyā rasa. There are two types: śuddah ("pure"), involving comical arguments among ascetics, brahmins, heretics, and so on (NŚ [20.103-4]); and miśra or saṅkīrṇa ("mixed"), involving harem guards, eunuchs, courtezans, "galants," and so on (NŚ [20.105]). "Some popular topic [of scandal] or incident of hypocrisy should be introduced. . . ."⁶⁷

(9) the bhāna ("le monologue") is in one act with a single character who should be either a dhūrta or vīta who relates either his own or another's actions (how much in even the smallest instance translation may reveal of cultural conditioning: A. B. Keith translates this character as "parasite"; Sylvain Lévi as "un bel esprit").

(10) the vīthī ("la guirlande") is also in one act with either one or two characters, who may be of high, middle, or low status. It may evoke any of the rasas (NŚ [20.112-13]) -- "on l'appelle la guirlande, parce qu'elle est composée de parties successives."⁶⁸

campū / The conjunction of the gadya and padya forms (prosaic/stanzaic) in Indian literature certainly goes back to an early date -- "We can safely accept the view that the form is quite old . . . it may be admitted that the prose-poetic form goes back beyond the beginning of the first century b.c... . . ."⁶⁹ It appears, for example, in the early Buddhist avadānas and sūtras, and in the early story collections such as the Pañcatantra.

In passing we may mention the dated "ākhyāna theory" of H. Oldenberg, which postulated that certain of the dialogue hymns of the R̥g Veda represented such a mixed format, originally including prose explanations that were later lost (as in, for example, the following hymns: [1.170, 171], [1.179], [8.91], [8.100], [10.51-53], [10.95], [10.124]).⁷⁰ A. B. Keith, who effectively refutes this theory, summarizes:

We are . . . to conceive of a form of literature which was essentially a mixture of prose and verse, and which was narrative in character. But with the natural liking of people for direct speech, the narrative every now and then took the

dialogue form. . . . And in these passages verse was normally used. It was not necessarily confined to these passages, but it might occur whenever there was a heightening of the interest or of the feeling."⁷¹

And (among various other reasons presented by Keith) I would agree with Sylvain Lévi's polite assessment: "L'hypothèse est ingénieuse, mais elle ne s'impose pas. L'exposition est en général si nette, le dialogue si bien suivi, qu'un commentaire narratif paraîtrait superflu."⁷² Lévi himself would see in the Rg Vedic dialogue hymns "la structure pré-dramatique ou semi-dramatique"⁷³ (following the initial proposition of Max Müller (1869)⁷⁴).

Yet Dandin in speaking of "mixed compositions" is referring to something other than the mere conjunction of anything that might appear in the metrical stanza or the prosaic line. The verses of the early stories do "mark a heightening of the interest, for the verses often contain in summary form the point of the narrative. But . . . the essential nature of the verses is gnomic. . . ."⁷⁵

Displaying a straightforward style that suitably conveys the fabled message, the stories do not fail to entertain and instruct -- "La prose du Pañcatantra est en général aisée, sans raffinements (bien qu'elle utilise à l'occasion quelques effets de style); les versets dont elle s'orne sont plus simples eux aussi que ceux de la poésie gnomique ultérieure."⁷⁶ But we do not have kāvya.

What is clear is that in the earliest extant natyas forward we find a conjunction of the two forms -- as befitting kāvya -- at a more refined level. The prosaic line of dialogue or narrative would seem to be a natural extension of the stories. Its role now is to carry the story forward in a manner that can entertain and capture an audience.

Au témoignage du conte et de la fable s'ajoute par un lien natural celui des portions dialoguées du théâtre. Le dialogue dramatique en prose n'a suivi que d'assez loin la progression vers l'artifice qui marque les portions strophiques. Certes on rencontre, suivant les circonstances de l'action, des passages élaborés. . . . Main en gros, il existe une tradition persistante de style

simple, direct, visant évidemment à reproduire le langage courant. . . ."⁷⁷

The stanzas, however, are nodal points of importance, compressing summation, revelation, the evocation of the appropriate rasa, and so on , into their brief space. "The place of poetry in the drama is extremely important. When a situation calls for the expression of a truth, the evocation of a sentiment, the recollection of a significant event, it calls for poetry. The stanza may be at once narrative and self-contained, but it is always the climax of an episode, however minor."⁷⁸

Across time the theatrical stanzas came increasingly to reflect the more complex and linguistically involved padyas of the mahākāvya and the more restrained forms. That where in the relatively earlier kavis such as Bhāsa and Kālidāsa we find stanzas "qui sont aussi dénuées de recherche que la prose environnante," with Bhavabhūti the "strophe emphatique, grandiloquente, riche en allitérations et en mot rares" makes its appearance.⁷⁹

What exactly Dandin means when he speaks of the campū -- a term of unknown origin -- is unclear. The first extant example is the Nalacampū (Damayantikathā) of Trivikramabhaṭṭa [10th century], which relates in seven ucchvāsas an isolated portion of the story of King Nala and Queen Damayanti.

The reaction of various writers to this work is instructive, a chronological progression of primarily paraphrase yet each with their individual turn. Keith displays the characteristic "block" toward the complex style: "The story is elaborated with the usual defects of long sentences, consisting of epithets heaped on epithets in long compounds, with double meanings, alliterations and jingles complete."⁸⁰

S. K. De, being pulled perhaps in two directions (as is apparent in the approach of a number of Indian scholars educated and productive in the closing decades of the Raj and which is not necessarily worse than certain undiluted variants of either extreme), affirms that the author

believes in the display of verbal complexities after the manner of Bāna and Subandhu, and deliberately, but wearisomely, imitates their interminably descriptive, ingeniously recondite and massively ornamented style. He has a decided talent in this direction, as well as skill in metrical composition, and elegant verses from his campū are culled by the Anthologists, but beyond this ungrudgingly made admission, it is scarcely possible to go further in the way of praise.⁸¹

And Lienhard, who shows a greater degree of openness to the text, notes that it "is written in difficult prose full of erudition and paronomasia. The fact that the stanzas from the Nalacampū are included in various anthologies shows that Trivikrama's poetry won the approval of the critics."⁸²

It should not be surprising then to find, in the case of De and Lienhard, evaluations of the campū as such in consonance with these judgments. For De "The Campū . . . shares the features of both Sanskrit prose and poetry, but the mosaic is hardly of an attractive pattern. . . . The Campū has neither the sinewy strength and efficiency of

real prose, nor the weight and power of real poetry; the prose seeking to copy ex abundanti the brocaded stateliness of the prose Kathā and the verse reproducing the conventional ornateness of the metrical Kavyā.⁸³ Where for Lienhard the "true campū" is a "calculated balance between prose that is as perfect as possible and stanzas in the genuine kāvya style."⁸⁴

On the origins and development of the campū prior to Dāṇḍin we have only speculation. Louis Renou would see the antecedents of the campū in the Buddhist Jātakamālā and perhaps in the inscription of Harīṣeṇa at Allahābad [4th century] -- "sorte de campū épigraphique"-- a panegyric to Samudragupta: "un texte mi-versifié mi en prose, se prétendant un kāvya, qui condense en une seule phrase interminable le généalogie et les mérites du soverain . . . le tout dans une langue pleine d'artifices. . . ."⁸⁵

Both De and Lienhard do agree that the campū developed from the extended gadya kāvya, but again their views of the motivation and processes involved are something else again.

Thus De would see a "disregard for form" arising out of "stress": "Its formlessness, or rather disregard of a strict form, shows that [the campū] developed quite naturally, but haphazardly, out of the prose Kāvya itself, the impetus being supplied by the obvious desire of diversifying the prose form freely by verse as an additional ornament under the stress or the lure of the metrical Kāvya."⁸⁶ Where Lienhard would see "harmony and balance" arising in stately and methodical sequence from the quest for "a new and more difficult form":

In just the same way as the prose novel arose [where above he terms this form the "prose poem" (?)] as a deliberate contrast to metrical kāvya, which was then fully developed, so campū was created when Sanskrit poets had mastered all the fine points and difficulties of prose. Only when the need was felt to find a new and more difficult form of kāvya did poets endeavor to develop a new genre -- campū -- in which both poetry and prose combined to produce a harmonic and balanced whole.⁸⁷

As they say, one tends to see what one wishes to see. I have included these excerpts to once again emphasize the

extreme critical caution with which one must approach this material. At least writers with clearly biased views or perceptible orientations usually tend to judge and evaluate in character; these views will tend to reoccur, albeit perhaps in strange and mysterious shape. Armed with this awareness, the validity or feasibility of a given author's speculations -- usually curiously disguised as absolute truth -- may be weighted.

Given Dandin's awareness of the campū, the fact that the first extant example does not appear until the 10th century hardly allows one to affirm or present such linear, progressive development -- whether unbalanced or harmonious as you wish. Of course, the form that the Nalacampū displays may not be exactly what Dandin had in mind, but what exactly he did is inaccessible. What is clear, however, is that the campū as an established form of kāvya was recognized as such by the latter 7th to early 8th centuries. But that the potentialities of this form were explored at a much earlier date, in the story literature

and in the nātya kāvyas as well. And in this regard I would certainly accept that "it is inadvisable to use the term campū indiscriminately of any mixture of prose and verse or to define as campū works like Ārya Śūra's Jātakamālā or, still less, a book of fables like the Hitopadeśa, as is often done [as, for example, by Louis Renou and A. B. Keith⁸⁸]. Although these books do contain both prose and verse, their authors did not write them as campūs."⁸⁹

I tend to feel that whenever the gadya and padya forms were established in and as kāvya, their mixture -- as kāvya -- in whatever varying degrees would follow soon after.

Notes [1.10] - [1.31]

1. Charles P. Brown, Sanskrit Prosody and Numerical Symbols; Reprint (New Delhi: Asian Publication Services, 1981 (1869), p. v.
2. Hank Heifetz, "Issues of Literary Translation from Sanskrit and Tamil," Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1983, p. 171.
3. See: Vaman Shivaram Apte, "Appendix A: Sanskrit Prosody," in The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Revised and enlarged edition (Poona:, 1957 (1890)); Reprint (Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co., 1978). Charles P. Brown, Sanskrit Prosody and Numerical Symbols (London:, 1869); Reprint (New Delhi: Asian Publication Services, 1981). Michael Coulson, Sanskrit (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1976), pp. 21-22; 249-55. Sheldon I. Pollock, Aspects of Versification in Sanskrit Lyric Poetry (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1977). Louis Renou, "Notions de Métrique," in L'Inde Classique, vol. 2, pp. 713-19. H. D. Velankar, "Prosodial Practice of Sanskrit Poets," Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, vols. 24-25 (1948-49), 49ff.
And also: Edward A. Bloom, et al., "Versification," in The Order of Poetry, pp. 105-38 (New York: The Odyssey Press, 1961). Jean Cohen, "Niveau Phonique: La Versification," in Structure du Langage Poétique, pp. 53-104 (Paris: Flammarion, 1966). Paolo Valesio, "On Poetics and Metrical Theory," Poetics, 2 (1971), 36ff.
4. H. D. Velankar, "Prosodial Practice of Sanskrit Poets," Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 24-25 (1948-49), 50.
5. Michael Coulson, Sanskrit (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1976), 250.

6. Louis Renou, "Notions de Métrique," in L'Inde Classique, vol. 2, p. 717.
7. V. S. Apte, "Appendix A: Sanskrit Prosody," in The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary, p. 11 (of appendix).
8. Hermann Jacobi, "On Indian Metrics," Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, 5 (1891), p. 153.
9. Louis Renou, "Notions de Métrique," p. 716.
10. A. B. Keith, A History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 47.
11. As, for example, Hermann Jacobi, "Miscellen: Die Musterverse der Metriker," Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 40 (1886), p. 100.
12. P. V. Kane, "The Chandovicitti," Indian Actuary, 40 (1911), p. 177. See: The Chandas Śāstra by Śrī Piṅgalanāga, with the commentary Mr̥tasamjīvani by Śrī Halāyudha Bhaṭṭa, edited by Pañdit Kedāranāth, 3rd edition (Bombay: Nirnaya Sāgar Press, 1938 (1908)). And with a German translation, Piṅgala, Das Chandahsūtram des Piṅgala, translated by Albrecht Weber, in Indische Studien, vol. 8: Ueber die Metrik der Inder (Berlin: Harrwitz und Gofsmann, 1863), Reprint (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1973), pp. 157-462.
13. Cited in Hari Chand, Kālidāsa, p. 79.
14. Chandoviciti: Texte zur Sanskritmetrik, edited by Dieter Schlingloff (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1958).
15. See: Piṅgala's Chandas Sūtra [3.30], Albrecht Weber's edition, (1863), p. 243 and pp. 244-47. And as Dieter Schlingloff notes, "Ob dieser Yāska mit dem berühmten Verfasser der Nirukti identisch ist, ist unsicher (Chandoviciti, edited by Dieter Schlingloff, (1958)), p. 20, n. 5.

16. Albrecht Weber, Das Chandahsūtram des Piṅgala, Indische Studien, vol. 8. Reprint (1973), p. 193ff.
17. Chandoviciti, edited by Dieter Schlingloff, (1958), pp. 14-15.
18. Chandoviciti, edited by Dieter Schlingloff, (1958), p. 26.: "These differences make it unlikely that the Nātya-śāstra is the source of our text or that our text is the source of the Nātyaśāstra."
19. John Brough, "Review: Dieter Schlingloff, editor, Chandoviciti, Texte zur Sanskritmetrik (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1958)," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 22 (1959), p. 192.
20. Siegfried Lienhard, History of Classical Poetry, pp. 67-68.
21. Siegfried Lienhard, History of Classical Poetry, p. 75.
22. Louis Renou, "Sur la Structure du Kāvya," Journal Asiatique, 247 (1959), p. 63, n. 3.
23. Siegfried Lienhard, History of Classical Poetry, p. 75.
24. A. B. Keith, A History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 376.
25. Ludwik Sternbach, Subhāṣita, Gnomic and Didactic Literature (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1974), p. 2.
26. Hāla, Das Saptaśatakam des Hāla, edited by Albrecht Weber, Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, vol. 7, no. 4. (Leipzig, 1881); Reprint (Nendeln, Liechtenstein:

Kraus Reprint, 1966). The Prakrit Gāthāsaptaśatī, Compiled by Sātavāhana King Hāla, edited with English translation by Radhagovinda Basak (Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1971).

Albrech Weber. Über das Saptaśatakam des Hāla: Ein Beitrag zur Kenntniss des Prākrit, Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, vol. 5, no. 3. (Leipzig, 1870); Reprint (Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1966). G. Garrez. "Nouvelles et Mélanges: Ueber das Saptaśatakam des Hāla. Ein Beitrag zur Kenntniss des Prākrit, von Albrecht Weber. Leipzig, 1870," Journal Asiatique, 20 (1872), 197-220. Albrecht Weber, Ueber Bhuvanapāla's Commentar zu Hāla's Saptaśatakam, Indische Studien, 16 (Leipzig, 1883); Reprint (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1973), pp. 1-204.

27. A. B. Keith, A History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 224; V. V. Mirashi, "The Date of Gāthāsaptaśatī," Indian Historical Quarterly, 23 (1947), 300-10; Ludwik Sternbach, Subhāśita, Gnomic and Didactic Literature, p. 11.

28. Hāla, The Prākrit Gāthāsaptaśatī, edited and translated by Radhagovinda Basak (Calcutta: The Asiatic Society, 1971), p. 1.

29. Ludwik Sternbach, Subhāśita, Gnomic and Didactic Literature, p. 12.

30. A. B. Keith, A History of Sanskrit Literaure, 224.

31. Hāla, The Prākrit Gāthāsaptaśatī, edited by Radhagovinda Basak (Calcutta: The Asiatic Society, 1971), p. 13.

32. V. V. Mirashi, "The Original Name of the Gāthā saptaśatī," Proceedings and Transactions of All-India Oriental Conference. 13th Session. Nagpur, 1945, 370-74.

33. Jayavallabha, Vajjālaggam: A Prakrit Anthology with Sanskrit Version by Julius Laber (Calcutta: The Royal

Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1944). Jayavallabha, Jayavallabha's Vajjālāggam, with the Sanskrit Commentary of Ratnadeva and English translation by M. V. Patwardhan (Ahmedabad: Prakrit Text Society, 1969).

34. Ludwik Sternbach, Subhāsita, Gnomic and Didactic Literature, p. 14.

35. Jayavallabha, Jayavallabha's Vajjālāggam, with the Sanskrit Commentary of Ratnadeva and English translation by M. V. Patwardhan (Ahmedabad: Prakrit Text Society, 1969), p. xxi.

36. Vidyākara, The Subhāsitaratnakosa, compiled by Vidyākara, edited by D. D. Kosambi and V. V. Gokhale (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957). Daniel H. H. Ingalls, trans., An Anthology of Sanskrit Court Poetry: Vidyākara's Subhāsitaratnakosa (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965); and also, Sanskrit Poetry from Vidyākara's Treasury, Reprint (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972 (1965)).

37. A sketch of the more important Sanskrit kośas would include : Subhāsitaratnakosa of Vidyākara (c. 1100- 1130); Saduktikarnāmrta of Śrīdharaṇḍa (1205); Sūktimuktāvalī of Bhagavata Jalhana (1258); Śārṅga-dharapaddhati of Śārṅgadhara (1363); Subhāsītāvalī of Vallabhadeva (15th century); Subhāsitasudhānīdhi of Sāyaṇa (15th century); Sūktiratnahāra of Sūrya (15th century); Prasannasāhityaratnākara of Nandana (15th century); Padyāvalī of Rūpa Gosvamin (15th-16th centuries); Subhāsītahārāvalī of Harikavi (17th century); Śrṅgārālāpa (1612); Padyaracanā of Lakṣmaṇabhaṭṭa Āñkolakāra (1625-1650); Rasikajīvana of Gadādhara bhāṭṭa (17th century); Sabhyālañkarana of Govindajit (after 1656); Padyavenī of Venīdatta (1644 or 1701); Sūktisundara of Sundaradeva (1644-1710); Padyāmr̥tatarañginī of Haribhāskara (1674); Subhāsītasārasamuccaya (end of the 17th century);

Subhāśitasavaskṛta (?)-Śloka (18th or 19th centuries);
Vidyākaraśasraka of Vidyākara Miśra (19th century).
(Ludwik Sternbach,. Poésie Sanskrite dans les Anthologies et les Inscriptions, Vol. 1 (Paris: College de France Institut de Civilisation Indienne, 1980), pp. xviii-xix.

38. Siegfried Lienhard, History of Classical Poetry, p. 66.

39. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Sanskrit Poetry from Vidyākara's "Treasury," pp. 37-38.

40. caturvarga (or purusārtha)/ The "Four Goals or Ends" of human life:

(1) dharma focuses on harmonious, proper and efficacious order, and on the necessary and correct behavior of the individual or group within this all-embracing scheme of things. In its ultimate sense "Dharma is the foundation of the whole universe. . . . Upon dharma everything is founded" (Taittiriya Āranyaka [10.79]) (V. Raghavan, "The Four Ends of Man," in Sources of Indian Tradition, edited by Wm. Theodore de Bary, vol. 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 244).

It is ultimately personal for it delineates the appropriate means of integration within this order. And it is perhaps the most usual example of a conceptual technical term in Sanskrit that defies translation (and where although any number of writers may remark upon this particular case, the distorted translations of any number of similarly resistant terms are offered). Biardeau most appropriately notes,

Mais il faut rejeter tous les équivalents anglais ou français du terme dharma proposés par les traductions courantes qui cherchent à rapprocher la réalité indienne du lecteur occidental. Ce n'est ni la morale, ni le bien, ni le droit, ni la

justice, ni la loi. C'est l'ordre socio-cosmique, dont on peut dire qu'il est bon simplement dans la mesure où il est nécessaire au maintien de l'existence heureuse du tout constitué par les 'trois-mondes'. . . . (Madeleine Biardeau, "Les Quatre Buts de L'Homme," p. 49).

(2) artha marks the quest for material satisfaction to whatever degree, for mundane necessities or "material advantage, social preferment, wealth, power" (Daniel H. H. Ingalls, "Authority and Law in Ancient India," Supplement No. 17 to the Journal of the American Oriental Society, 1954, p. 1).

(3) kāma is the pursuit of love, physical pleasure, and sensual enjoyment. "Kāma is the enjoyment of appropriate objects by the five senses of hearing, feeling, seeing, tasting and smelling, assisted by the mind together with the soul. The ingredient in this is a peculiar contact between the organ of sense and its object, and the consciousness of pleasure which arises from that contact is called Kāma" (Vātsyāyana, The Kāma Sūtra of Vātsyayana, translated by Sir Richard Burton and F. F. Arbuthnot (New York: Capricorn Books, 1963 (1883), p. 65).

(4) mokṣa is the ultimate goal of final "release" and freedom from all mundane attachment, culminating in a cessation of the cyclic alternation of birth and death.

41. Margaret and James Stutley, Harper's Dictionary of Hinduism, p. 121.

42. V. Raghavan, "The Four Ends of Man," in Sources of Indian Tradition, edited by Wm. Theodore de Bary (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960 (1958)), p. 244.

43. Sylvain Levi, Le Théâtre Indien, vol. 1 (Paris: College de France. 1963), p. 62.
44. Sylvain Lévi, Le Théâtre Indien, vol. 1, pp. 66-67. In the following sketch the French of Sylvain Lévi will generally be translated.
45. Sylvain Lévi, Le Théâtre Indien, vol. 1, p. 64.
46. Sylvain Lévi, Le Théâtre Indien, vol. 1, pp. 65-66.
47. A. B. Keith, The Sanskrit Drama in its Origin, Development, Theory and Practice (London: Oxford University Press, 1924, p. 305.
48. Dandin, Dandin's Dashakumara-charita: The Ten Princes, translated by Arthur W. Ryder (Chicago: The University Press, 1927), p. 32.
49. Dandin, Dandin's Dashakumara-charita, (1927), pp. 42-43.
50. Dandin, Dandin's Dashakumara-charita, (1927), p. 58.
51. Dandin, Dandin's Dashakumara-charita, (1927), p. 80.
52. Dandin, Dandin's Dashakumara-charita, (1927), pp. 60-61.
53. Sylvain Lévi, Le Théâtre Indien, vol. 1, p. 72.
54. Siegfried Lienhard, "Typen der Nāyikā im Indischen Kāvya," Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, 52 (1955), p. 389.
55. Dandin, Dandin's Dashakumara-charita: The Ten Princes, translated by Arthur W. Ryder (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1927), pp. 46-47.

56. kalpa /"eon," a vast measure of time and essential component of the Indic view of human existence as a linear progression of decay and cyclical renewal moving through the four yugas or fundamental ages: krta yuga, "the Golden age, without envy . . . pride, hatred, cruelty or other vices. All people belong to one caste . . . worship one deity, have a single Veda . . . and are, without exception, brāhmins. . . ." ; treta yuga, "its chief virtue is knowledge. The need for sacrifices and rituals begins to be felt, and men now seek reward for their work"; dvāpara yuga, "the main virtue is sacrifice, and only few adhere to duty or truth for its own sake. Disease, misery and calamity begin and the castes come into existence"; and kali yuga (the present age), "true worship and even sacrifice have ceased. . . . Men live to variable ages and few see a century of summers. It is a time of anger, hatred, lust, greed, passion, pride, strife, discord. There is universal viciousness and weakness" (the kali yuga ends in fire and flood, the cycle after a time recommencing with the krta yuga).

According to one of the more common methods of calculation, the duration of all four yugas = 1 mahā yuga = 12,000 "god years" (where one god-year = 360 solar years) = 4,320,000 solar years ; 1,000 mahā yugas = 1 ardha kalpa (one-half of a kalpa) = 4,320,000,000 solar years = 1 day or 1 night of Brahmā. Two ardha kalpas = 1 kalpa = 8,640,000,000 solar years = 1 "day" of Brahmā.

Brahmā lives for one hundred of his "years" (the present Brahmā apparently being now 51). His death sets off an apocolypse embracing the universe, the mahā pralaya/"great chaos," which destroys all gods, demons, and the whole cosmos." A period of emptiness, wherein chaotic energy is gradually dissapated, follows equivalent to a lifetime of Brahmā's, at the end of which another Brahmā appears -- "And so the cycles are continued, ceaselessly and without end" (This sketch of time and its divisions is drawn from Benjamin Walker, Hindu World, vol. 1, pp. 6-8).

Margaret and James Stutley comment (with that

wonderful English touch for understatement), "Owing to the development of two separate time-systems, attempts to coordinate them has led to some confusion over the division and duration of the successive periods of the world's existence" (Margaret and James Stutley, Harper's Dictionary of Hinduism, p. 139).

57. S. K. De, "The Ākhyāyikā and the Kathā in Classical Sanskrit," Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, London Institution, 3 (1923-25), p. 512.
58. A. K. Warder, Indian Kāvya Literature, vol. 4, (1983). p. 165; and "Classical Literature," in A Cultural History of India, edited by A. L. Basham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 185.
59. Sylvain Lévi, Le Théâtre Indien, vol. 1, (1890), p. 140.
60. Louis Renou, "La Réflexion sur la Poésie dans L'Inde," in Sanskrit et Culture: L'Apport de l'Inde à la Civilisation Humaine (Paris: Payot, 1950), p. 140.
61. Sylvain Lévi, Le Théâtre Indien, vol. 1, (1890), pp. 140-45.
62. Sylvain Lévi, Le Théâtre Indien, vol. 1, (1890), pp. 140-41.
63. Sylvain Lévi, Le Théâtre Indien, vol. 1 (1890), p. 143.
64. Bharata, The Nātyaśāstra, translated by Manomohan Ghosh, vol. 1, rev. second edition (Calcutta: Manisha Granthalaya, 1967 (1951)), p. 366.

65. Sylvain Lévi, Le Théâtre Indien, vol. 1, (1890), p. 143.
66. Sylvain Lévi, Le Théâtre Indien, vol. 1, (1890), p. 145.
67. Bharata, The Nātyaśāstra, translated by Manomohan Ghosh, vol. 1, (1967), p. 370.
68. Sylvain Lévi, Le Théâtre Indien, vol. 1, (1890), p. 144.
69. A. B. Keith, History of Sanskrit Literature, (1920), p. 985.
70. H. Oldenberg, "Das altindische ākhyāna, mit besondrer Rücksicht auf das Suparnākhyāna," Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 37 (1883), pp. 54-86; "Ākhyāna-Hymnen im R̥gveda," Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 39 (1885), pp. 52-90.
71. A. B. Keith, "The Vedic Akhyana and the Indian Drama," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1911, p. 983.
72. Sylvain Lévi, Le Théâtre Indien, vol. 1 (1890), p. 307.
73. Sylvain Lévi, Le Théâtre Indien, vol. 1 (1890), pp. 301-8.
74. Louis Renou, L'Inde Classique, vol. 1 (1947), p. 260.
75. A. B. Keith, "The Vedic Akhyana and the Indian Drama," (1911), pp. 984-85.
76. Louis Renou, L'Inde Classique, vol. 2 (1954), p. 240.

77. Louis Renou, Histoire de la Langue Sanskrite (Lyon: Editions IAC, 1956), pp. 150-51.
78. J. A. B. van Buitenen, "Classical Drama: Background and Types," in The Literatures of India, (1974), p. 89.
79. Louis Renou, Histoire de la Langue Sanskrite, (1956), p. 161.
80. A. B. Keith, History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 333.
81. S. K. De, "The Campū," The Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute, 1 (1943), p. 58.
82. Siegfried Lienhard, A History of Classical Poetry, p. 267.
83. S. K. De, "The Campū," (1943), p. 57.
84. Siegfried Lienhard, A History of Classical Poetry, p. 266.
85. Louis Renou, L'Inde Classique, vol. 2, (1953), p. 203.
86. S. K. De, "The Campu," ((1943), p. 56.
87. Siegfried Lienhard, A History of Classical Poetry, p. 266.
88. Louis Renou, L'Inde Classique, vol. 2, (1953), p. 258; A. B. Keith, History of Sanskrit Literature, (1920), p. 332; M. K. Suryanarayana Rao, "Origin and Development of Campūs," in Felicitation Volume Presented to V. V. Mirashi, pp. 175-88, edited by G. T. Deshpande, et al. (Nagpur: Vidarbha Samshodhan Mandal, 1965); and so on.
89. Siegfried Lienhard, A History of Classical Poetry, (1984), p. 265.

Language and Kāvya

"The authorities declare that literature is alternately fourfold -- whether in Sanskrit, Prākṛta / and similarly in Apabhramṣa or a mixture" [tadetadvāñmayam bhūyah samskr̥tam prākṛtam tathā | apabhramṣaśca misram cetyāhurāryāścaturvidham ||]. [1.32]

"Sanskrit is the language of the gods / later employed by great sages / The classification of Prākṛta is threefold: Indirectly derived; directly borrowed; or indigenous" [samskr̥tam nāma daivī vāganvākyatā maharṣibhiḥ | tadbhavastatsamo deśityanekah prākṛtakramah || [1.33].

Daṇḍin would seem to be giving "Prākṛta" a rather wide sense. And it is unclear if he is referring (as he seems to be) to the various Prākṛtic dialects, or to the origins of the Prākṛtic lexicon. As the previous verse [1.32] shows, he is not writing of the Prākṛta vernaculars, but of Prākṛta as a vehicle for literature. Although I reject the use of the term "artificial," Jules Bloch is most probably correct

in seeing an increasing divergence between the "literary" Prākṛtas and the vernaculars:

Prakrit literature was, from the start, a relatively learned production and continued till a very late date, becoming more and more artificial. It is not yet dead, any more than Sanskrit. It is easy to imagine that its deviation from the tongues in general currency became more and more noticeable. Normally the forms of the words could be taken from the Sanskrit, source of all culture, but gradually words of ungrammatical meaning or appearance had, as in Sanskrit, slipped in among them.¹

This divergence would imply not only that these Prākṛtas would have to be consciously learned (as with Sanskrit), but also that they would become more of an "object" of study, amenable to this type of analysis. "The term desī is applied to those words in Prakrit which are derived from no Sanskrit equivalent. The number of such words which can be explained out of Dravidian or some other source is comparatively small and will probably always remain so. . . . On the whole classical Sanskrit avoids

such words, but a number are incorporated, and in particular the Jain writers have adopted a fair number."²

Yet this group is perhaps more accurately seen as a catch-all category, where the status of an individual word may primarily depend on the etymological expertise (or creativity) of the individual(s) actually doing the categorizing:

The Indians include under the Deśya or Deśī class very heterogeneous elements. They consider all such words to belong to this class that they cannot trace back to Sanskrit either in form or in meaning. It depends upon their knowledge of Sanskrit and ability in etymologising that some of them call a word to be Deśya, while others include it either among the tatsamas ["directly borrowed"] or among the tadbhavas ["indirectly derived"]. So we have many words that are classed as Deśī, even though they go back to genuine Sanskrit roots, simply because they do not have closely corresponding Sanskrit words. . . .³

In Bharata's Nātyaśāstra, for example, we find a threefold classification similar to that of Dandin's, but with different names, and appearing to pertain to words

(śabdas): [18.3] "One should realize that this [recitation of prākṛt] is threefold in theatrical practice: samāna śabda [tatsama]; vibhraṣṭa [tadbhava]; and deśī" [trividha m
tacca vijñeyam nātyayoge samāsataḥ | samānaśabdām vibhraṣṭam
deśigatamathāpi ca ||]. That we are presented with equivalents of Dāṇḍin's three categories is expressed by Luigia Nitti-Dolci in his comments on Bharata's verse, "Les noms ordinaires des trois catégories de mots respectives sont chez les grammairiens tatsama, tadbhava et deśya."⁴

Recent writers have understood these three terms to pertain primarily to the word borrowing of "modern Indo-Aryan." Thus J. F. Staal, for example, sees these as: (1) tadbhava / "words which have developed from Sanskrit via Middle Indo-Aryan into Modern Indo-Aryan; (2) tatsama / "words which are borrowed directly from Sanskrit"; and (3) deśī / "words of Indian but non-Indo-Aryan origin."⁵

Thomas Burrow, however (in light of Dāṇḍin's verse), would seem to be incorrect in rejecting the tatsama category of Prākṛta word incorporation: "An important new

feature in the modern languages, as opposed to the earlier Middle-Indo Āryan, was the introduction, on an extensive scale, of Sanskrit loanwords. In Prākrit, even at the Apabhramśa stage, words might in fact be derived from Sanskrit, but they always appeared disguised as Prākrit by the operation of phonetic rules."⁶

"The speech of Mahārāṣṭra is known as the best Prākṛta / Its nature is seen in such texts as the Setubandha -- an ocean of jewels of beautiful expressions" [mahārāṣṭrāśrayāṁ bhāṣāṁ prakṛṣṭāṁ prākṛtāṁ viduh | sāgarah süktiratnānāṁ setubandhādi yanmayam || [1.34].

The specific basis for the elevation of Māhārāṣṭrī as the "best" (prakṛṣṭa) of Prākṛtas is unresolved. Two viewpoints are generally held. Richard Pischel considers Māhārāṣṭrī to be linguistically closer than any of the other Prākṛtas to Sanskrit, the "perfected" standard, and thus proportionately superior. This basis "is explained by the fact that Māhārāṣṭrī is considered to be nearest to

Sanskrit. When the Indians speak simply about Prākrit, they almost always thereby mean Māhārāṣṭrī. According to them, Māhārāṣṭrī has the credit of being the basis of the other Prākrit languages [he cites the Prākṛtasarvasva of Mārkaṇḍeya Kavīndra], and in the manuals written by the native grammarians Māhārāṣṭrī occupies the first place.⁷ He notes that the Prākṛtaprakāśa of Vararuci, one of the oldest Prākṛta grammarians, devotes nine chapters to Māhārāṣṭrī, and but one to each of the three other Prākṛtas examined (Śaurasenī, Māgadhī, and Paiśācī).

Alternately, Luigia Nitti-Dolci, citing this verse in support, affirms that "Dāṇḍin does not consider giving a linguistic classification: Māhārāṣṭrī is the best Prākṛt because it is the one that has the richest literature. As for the explanation that Māhārāṣṭrī was the best Prākṛt because it was closer to Sanskrit, it is frankly unacceptable; no Indian grammarian has ever expressed such a heresy. On the contrary, Śaurasenī was for them, as for us, closer to the source. . . ."⁸

Although not questioning the importance of Māhārāṣṭri, he notes that Vararuci considers Sanskrit to be the basis of Śaurasenī (Prākṛtaprakāśa [12.2]), and Śaurasenī to be the basis of both Paiśācī [10.2], and Māgadhi [11.2]. Nitti-Dolci stumbles, however, in his interpretation of Daṇḍin, and provides yet another example of mistranslation either generating or stemming from a predisposed position. He translates Kāvyādarśa [1.34] as: "They consider that the best prākṛt is the language spoken in the Mahārāṣṭra country: an ocean of beautiful expressions -- such pearls! -- in which the Setubandha and other poems have been composed."⁹

The mistranslation lies in applying the "ocean of beautiful expressions" to Māhārāṣṭri, thus giving greater stress than is warranted to his position. One could infer that Daṇḍin considers Māhārāṣṭri to be the "best" of Prākṛtas due to the existence of such examples as the Setubandhu and other such literary works, but there is no certainty.¹⁰

Setubandha / The Setubandha ("The Building of the Bridge") or Rāvanavaha ("The Killing of Ravana"), also called in manuscripts the Daśamuhavaho or Rāmasetu, is written as Dāṇḍin indicates in Māhārāṣṭrī Prākrta and in the style of a padya mahākāvya. It is divided into fifteen āśvāsas (or chapters) running to 1362 stanzas, and exists in two primary recensions.¹¹

The text relates the tale of Rāma and his monkey army, their glorious bridge spanning the ocean to Śrī Laṅkā, their fight and victory over Rāvaṇa and his demon hordes, and the eventual rescue of Sītā. It is usually attributed to a Pravarasena, who is in all probability the Vākāṭaka King Pravarasena II [5th century] (and who may have written the work with the assistance of Kālidāsa, though this is highly speculative).¹² I would tend to disagree with those scholars who believe that the author of the Setubandha was rather a King Pravarasena of Kashmir.¹³

"Śauraseni, Gaudī, Lāṭī and others similar / Come to

mind when one says 'Prākrta'" [śaurasenī ca gaudī ca lāṭī
cānyā ca tādrśī | yāti prākṛtamityevam vyavahāreṣu samnidhim
||] [1.35].

"In kāvyas the speech of cowherders and so on is referred to as 'Apabhramśa' / In śāstras however anything other than Sanskrit is called Apabhramśca" [ābhīrādigirah
kāvyeśvapabhramśa iti smṛtāḥ | śāstreṣu samskr̥tādanyad
apabhramśatayoditam ||] [1.36].

"Sargabandhas and so on are in Sanskrit. . . Nāṭakas and so on employ a mixture [of Sanskrit, Prākṛt, and Apabhramśa" [samskr̥tam sargabandhādi . . . | . . . nāṭakādi tu miśrakam ||] [1.37].

"A kathā is composed in any spoken language (bhāṣā) and in Sanskrit. . . ." [kathā hi sarvabhāṣābhīḥ samskr̥tena ca badhyate |] [1.38ab].

Notes [1.32] - [1.38]

1. Jules Bloch, Indo-Aryan: From the Vedas to Modern Times, English edition revised by the author and translated [from the French] by Alfred Master (Paris: Librairie D'Amérique et D'Orient, 1965), p. 20.
2. Thomas Burrow, The Sanskrit Lanuage, 3rd rev. edition (London: Faber and Faber, 1973 (1955)), p. 57.
3. Richard Pischel, A Grammar of the Prākrit Languages, translated from the German by Subhadra Jhā, 2nd rev. edition (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981), pp. 7-8.
4. Luigia Nitti-Dolci, Les Grammairiens Prakrits, (Paris: Libraire D'Amerique et D'Orient, 1938), p. 70, n. 6.
5. J. F. Staal, "Sanskrit and Sanskritization," Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 22, n. 3 (1963), pp. 261-75.
6. Thomas Burrow, "Ancient and Modern Languages," in A Cultural History of India, edited by A. L. Basham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 166.
7. Richard Pischel, A Grammar of the Prākrit Languages, p. 1.
8. From the French of Luigia Nitti-Dolci, Les Grammairiens Prakrits, p. 2.
9. From the French of Luigia Nitti-Dolci, Les Grammairiens Prakrits, p. 2.
10. It is curious that Siegfried Lienhard also mistranslates this verse, arriving at yet another reading and one that again provides presumed evidence for a preconceived view. One of Lienhard's central assumptions is that the individual stanza is essentially the source or

ground for all later developments in kāvya. His mistranslation is thus used to support the view that even in the sargabandha the stanza is "the centre of interest to poet and reader or listener" (Siegfried Lienhard, A History of Classical Poetry, p. 160).

Thus, although correctly having the Setubandha as the focus in the second half of the verse, he incorrectly translates sāgarah sūktiratnānam as "a sea of jewel-stanzas" (p. 161, n. 5). I feel that "su (+) ukti" simply means "beautiful" or "well-turned expressions", rather than indicating the padya (stanzaic) form as such.

11. (1) Rāvanavaha oder Setubandha: Prākrt und Deutsch Herausgegeben, by S. Goldschmidt, 2 vols. (Strassburg and London, 1880 and 1884). (2) Edited by Pt. Śivadatta and K. P. Parab (Bombay: Nirṇaya Sāgar Press, 1895).

12. See: S. K. Aiyangar, "The Vākāṭakas and their Place in the History of India," Annals of the Bhandarkar Institute, Poona, 5 (1925), pp. 31-54.

K. S. Ramaswami Shastri, "King Pravarasena and Kālidāsa," Proceedings and Transactions of the Seventh All-India Oriental Conference, Baroda (12/1933) (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1935), pp. 99-108. Shastri's article floating along in a logical wonderland, provides a wonderful circular argument in support of the view: "The validity of the tradition which is recorded by a recent commentator [Rāmadāsabhūpati, writing some 300 years previously], and which seems to contradict the statement of early authors such as Dandin, Bāṇa and Kṣemendra, cannot be questioned, because in reality the work was attributed to Pravarasena by Kālidāsa at the request of Vikramāditya" [as recorded by a recent commentator].

V. Raghavan, "Kālidāsa's Kuntaleśvara Dautyā," in B. C. Law Volume, edited by D. R. Bhandarkar, et al., Part 3 (Poona: The Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1946), pp. 191-97. V. V. Mirashi, "The Vākāṭaka Chronology," Indian Historical Quarterly, 24 (1948), pp. 148-55. A. D.

Pusalker, "Identity and Date of Pravarasena, the Author of the Setubandha," Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bombay, 31 and 32 (1956-57), pp. 212-17.

13. Eugeniusz Sluszkiewicz, for example, states, "le Rāvaṇavaha ou Setubandha épopée prākrite composée par Pravarasena II du Cachemire ou par un poète de sa cour. . ." ("La Rāvaṇavaha et le Rāmāyaṇa," Rocznik Orientalistyczny, 16 (1950), p. 545); or most recently with Siegfried Lienhard, "King Pravarasena II was probably the successor of King Māṭṛgupta" of Kashmir (A History of Classical Poetry, (1984), p. 197).

The Ten Gunas (or "Qualities") and the Mārgas (or "Styles")

It is essential to realize that Dandin's conception of alamkāra goes beyond his extensive, "figurative" presentation. That paralleling the "conceptual" or artha alamkāras of the Second Chapter, and the "phonemic" or śabda alamkāras of the Third, we have a third category whose members are at once more specific in their range of application and yet more vague in their mode of operation. That just as the artha and śabda alamkāras are applicable to both of the primary (and extreme) "modes" or mārgas of literary expression -- and thus "general"/sādhārana -- so the guna alamkāras and their transformations may be considered "specific"/viśiṣṭa to a particular mode.

Dandin's presentation of the ten gunas or "qualities" and their transformations as characteristic of either the Vaidarbha (that is, "Southern") or Gauḍīya (that is, "Eastern") mārgas ("paths," "styles") comprises most of the Kāvyādarśa's first chapter. The discussion is initiated in

[1.40]: "The mārgas are manifold / with branches mutually
and subtly distinct / Among these the Vaidarbha and the
Gauḍīya -- distinct extremes / shall be described"

[astyaneko girāṁ mārgah sūkṣmabhedah parasparam | tatra
vaidarbhagaudīyau varṇyete prasphuṭān-tarau ||].

"śleṣa prasāda samātā mādhurya sukumāratā / arthavyakti
udāratva ojas kānti and samādhi" [śleṣah prasādah samatā
mādhuryam sukumāratā | arthavyaktirudāratvamojāḥkānti
samādhayah ||] [1.41].

"These ten gunas are traditionally accepted as the
life breaths of the Vaidarbha path / Transpositions of
these are often seen in the Gauḍa mode" [iti vaidarbha-
mārgasya prāṇā daśa gunāḥ smṛtāḥ | eṣāṁ viparyayāḥ prāyo
drśyate gauḍavartmani ||] [1.42].

Viparyaya ("transposition") is taken by some to mean
"opposite," but our analysis of these two mārgas in
relation to the gunas will only support this reading
perhaps in two or three cases. Upon examining the

characteristics of the Gaudiya style it is clear that viparyaya does not mean strictly "opposite" [$< \underline{vi} (+) \underline{pari}$ ($+)$ $\ast \underline{i}$ / "reverse," "opposite of"]; but also "transposition," "alteration of." S. K. De considers that viparyaya "does not mean vaiparītya or contrariety (as the Hṛdayamgama commentary takes it), but athātva or divergence."¹

Mārga (literally, "path" or "way") is frequently translated as "style," with the Vaidarbha and the Gaudiya thus assumed to represent kāvya's two primary and distinct styles. "The denseness and elaborateness which Dāṇḍin associates with the Gaudi rīti, the relative simplicity and directness of the Vaidarbhi rīti are constant poles in the best Sanskrit writing. . . ."² The very vagueness of "style" does indeed allow it to approximate "mārga." Here we have a not quite technical term where the degree of conceptual overlapping is perhaps sufficient to allow translation, but we should be aware of the limitations. Very loosely, "style" generates two broad connotations:

style as the distinctive and (perhaps) unique expression of a given writer (de Buffon's "Le style c'est l'homme même); and style as a "characteristic mode of construction and expression" (nicely marked by De Quincey as "the management of language"). S. K. De's objection to this presumed equivalence reduces style to but one of these senses: "It should be observed that the term Riti [which De, among others, rather loosely considers interchangeable with mārga³] is hardly equivalent to the English word 'style,' by which it is often rendered but in which there is always a distinct subjective valuation."⁴

With the rejection of "style" envisioned only in its "subjective" sense, De's conception of mārga as "objective" follows with seemingly inescapable -- however illusionary -- logic. Thus rīti becomes "the outward presentation of [kāvya] called forth by a harmonious combination of more or less fixed literary 'excellences' [guṇas] ."⁵

And we should be wary of placing too much emphasis upon Dāṇḍin's usage of "mārga" as a technical term. Further

paralleling "style" with its somewhat indeterminate sense, it is really more of a convenient pointer to a conceived way of doing things. Dāṇḍin readily interchanges words whose connotations are fundamentally the same. In [1.42], for example, we find the "vaidarbha mārga" but the "gauḍa vatman" (vatman similarly meaning "path" or "way"); or again in [1.50], where the Gaudīya is referred to as "the path of kāvya pertaining to the East"/paurastyā kāvyapaddhatih |.

It is the Vaidarbha mārga then that Dāṇḍin sees displaying -- as its "life breaths" -- the ten guṇas, and is thus presumed to be a favored standard. Alternately (and perhaps just as evident as the Vaidarbha in practice), the Gaudīya style "often"/prāyas -- not exclusively -- displays what may be considered "transpositions" (viparyayāḥ). "The word prāyas . . . is important in this connection. The characteristics of these two types of poetry often differ but sometimes they agree. The Gauḍa Mārga sometimes presents opposites of and deviations from

the excellences prevailing in the Vaidarbha, but qualities [gunas] such as Samādhi, Arthavyakti, Audārya, Mādhurya and Ojas are more or less common to both the Mārgas."⁶

There is a further and not necessarily correct conclusion which might be drawn given a conception of guna as "excellence": "If it is asked what constitutes the essential characteristics of the Gauda Mārga, we cannot reasonably answer that the opposites of these excellences (which would really be Dosas or faults) do it. . . ."⁷ A transposition of a given guna does not -- necessarily -- entail fault. Dāṇdin, whatever we might infer of his own stylistic preference, certainly views the Gaudiya style as a valid mode of kāvya. As Gerow remarks, "The importance of the gunas lies in their service as characteristics, as 'plus-features,' of poetry whose alternative is not necessarily non-poetry. In other words, the contrary of a guna may be and usually is another feature whose presence marks another kind of poetry."⁸ Let us consider then Dāṇdin's elucidation of the ten gunas.

(1) [1.43-44] śliṣṭa (ślesa) /"compactness":

"Śliṣṭa [ślesa] is devoid of looseness / This laxity is marked by a profusion of non-aspirated syllables (alpaprāna-aksara)" [śliṣṭamasprṣṭaśaithilyamalpa-prāṇākṣarottaram | śithilam. . . . ||] [1.43]. These are "Unaspirated letters which require little effort in pronouncing, or more technically, the first [k / c / ṭ / t̪ / p] and third [g / j / ḍ / d / b] (non-conjunct) letters of each varga, and the semivowels [y / r / l / v] and nasals [ñ / ṱ / ḡ / n / m], the rest being mahāprāna syllables."⁹ As in, for example, [1.43cd] "mālatīmāla lolālikalilā" ("The garland of Mālatī flowers covered with swarming bees").

"This is accepted by the Gaudas in light of anuprāsa ("sound manipulation") [anuprāsadhiyā gaudaistadistiṣṭam |] [1.44ab]. Thus [ślesa] "to the Gaudas is a preferable excellence of diction inasmuch as it gives more scope to alliteration [anuprāsa]."¹⁰ "And [it is accepted by the

Vaidarbhas due to the density of construction" [bandha-gauravāt | vaidarbhair. . . . ||] [1.44bc].

(2) [1.45-46] prasāda /"clarity," "lucidity":
"[A phrase] possessing prasāda displays a meaning
commonly known . . ." [prasādavat prasiddhārtham . . .
|] [1.45a].

"The Gaudīyas accept even [words] not commonly known /
whose meanings reflect their etymology" [vyutpannamiti
gaudīyairnātirūḍhamapīṣyate |] [1.46ab].

As Belvalkar and Raddi comment, "Its requires a very
great self-restraint . . . not to let one's learning in the
sāstras unseasonably intrude itself into poetry" (Notes
1/45).

(3) [1.47-50] samatā/ "smoothness":
"Sama [samatā] is the absence of disparity in syllabic
collocations / These constructions are soft (mrdu), harsh
(sphuta), or in-between (madhyama) as their bases are an
ordering of letters that themselves are soft, harsh, or in-
between" [samam̄ bandhesvavisamam̄ te mr̄dusphut̄amadhyam̄-

māh | bandhā mṛdusphuṭonmiśravarṇavinyāsayonayah ||] [1.47].

As in, for example, (harsh:) spardhate ruddhamaddhairyo / (soft:) vararāmāmukhānilaiḥ ("The Malaya breeze blocking my courage competes with the breath from the mouth of that choice lady") [1.49cd].

"Not considering this disparity / and with an eye to a show of meanings and alamkāras / The path ["paddhatih" rather than "mārga" is employed] of Eastern kāvya [the Gaudīya] has grown" [ityanālocya vaisamyamarthālamkāraḍambarau | avekṣamānā vavṛdhē paurastyā kāvyapad-dhatih ||] [1.50]. "The Gaudas, we are told, admit such compositions (even though they lack uniformity) for the sake of richness of ideas and Alamkāras. . . ."¹¹

(4) [1.51-68] mādhurya/ "elegance," "sweetness": "Madhura [mādhura] reflects the possession of rasa / and rasa exists in both sound (vāk) and sense (vastu) / [Rasa] through which the connoisseur becomes drunk / like the bee through honey" [madhuram rasavadvāci vastunyapi

rasasthitih | yena mādyanti dhīmanto madhuneva madhuvratāḥ
 || [1.51].

Dāṇḍin's conception of rasa within the guṇas is quite specific and should be distinguished from that of rasa in its more usual technical role (see under [2.279]): "It appears that Dāṇḍin means by the term Rasa in the mādhurya guṇa to connote the absence of vulgarity . . . and does not contemplate the inclusion of Rasa in the technical sense."¹²

This is clearly indicated during his later presentation of rasavat alamkāra where he remarks in [2.292]: "Rasa was presented in the context of mādhurya guṇa / as the absence of vulgarity in expression / Yet here the fact that the words display rasa / stems from the eight rasas themselves." Yet its range of meaning here is probably somewhat wider. Dāṇḍin's presentation of mādhurya guṇa, the role that rasa (in this vague alternate sense) plays, its relationship to anuprāsa (repetition of sound patterns), and the rationale for the latter's inclusion

here rather than among the śabda alamkāras are ample grounds for bemusement.

We might add that Daṇḍin's inclusion of vāk and vastu in this verse is his only explicit acknowledgement of a distinction between śabda/"sound" and artha/"sense" within the guṇas -- a distinction formally developed later by Vāmana and incorporated within the tradition from that point onwards.

Daṇḍin basically categorizes mādhurya from the perspective of both vāk rasa or "sound," and vastu rasa or "meaning" - the commentator Tarunavācaspati glosses vāk rasa as "śabda mādhurya" (under KD [1.52]), and vastu rasa as artha mādhurya" (under KD [1.62]).¹³ In [1.52-60] we have verses concerned with the realization of mādhurya through sound, in this case, through anuprāsa.

"Whatever one experiences as similar in sound -- / a juxtaposition of words displaying this feature / and possessed of anuprāsa / generates rasa" [yayā

kayācicchrutyā yat samānamanubhūyate | tadrūpā hi padāsattih
sānuprāsā rasāvahā || [1.52].

Daṇḍin distinguishes two varieties of anuprāsa (and thus of vāk rasa), śruti anuprāsa and varṇāvṛtti anuprāsa. Anuprāsa is usually treated by later authors as one of the primary sabda alamkāras. Given that Daṇḍin (or again, perhaps the ambient tradition from which he drew) would choose to include it among the guṇas, it is clear that anuprāsa is seen as one of the most evident and important variables that may serve to distinguish mārga as such.

Anuprāsa is generally translated as "alliteration," and although here the technical correspondence is close, the English term does not cover one of the two primary usages of the term (for Daṇḍin). And also, once having used "alliteration" in this sense, one will be left rather up in the air when attempting to translate (if one feels it necessary) its near relative, yamaka (as reflected, for example, in Gerow's "cadence"). The conceptions of both of

these terms are quite straightforward, and again I feel less distortion will occur if we stay with their actual names.

In verse [1.52] and the immediate verses following, Dandin is concerned with śruti anuprāsa, that is, the repetition of sounds categorized according to their place of physical articulation (sthāna). There are five primary sthānas,¹⁴ and thus five groups or "vargas" into which consonants or vyañjanas (requiring a vowel to be pronounced), and vowels or svaras (which do not require any other letter to be pronounced) are divided. The five vargas are: kanthya (guttural), tālavya (palatal), mūrdhanya (cerebral), dantya (dental), and oṣṭhya (labial).

Dandin provides an example in [1.53] (which I have broken into pādas):

- (1) eṣa RāJa YaDā Lakṣmīṁ
- (2) pRāptavān bRāhmaṇapriyah
- (3) TaDāPraBHṛTi DHarmaSya
- (4) LokeSminnuTSavobhavat

("When this king -- dear to brahmins -- realized prosperity / From then on there was a festival of dharma in the world").

Śruti anuprāsa is thus displayed in the first pāda by the repetition of [ṣ] and [r] as mūrdhanya consonants, by [j] and [y] as tālavya consonants, and by [d] and [l] as dantya consonants; in the second by [r] and [n] as mūrdhanya consonants; in the third by [t], [d], [dh], and [s] as dantya consonants, and by [p] and [bh] as oṣṭhya consonants; and in the fourth by [t], [l], and [s] as dantya consonants. Obviously the English "alliteration" does not cover this primary usage (the semantic fit is too small), nor would "repetition" be appropriate (the fit is too large).

Daṇḍin then draws in the attitude of the practitioners themselves to this aspect of mādhurya guna: "This [śruti anuprāsa] is not respected by the Gaudas / although anuprāsa is dear to them / Due to the presence of anuprāsa / This is generally accepted by the Vaidarbhas" [itīdam

nādṛtam gaudairanuprāsastu tatpriyah | anuprāsādapi prāyo
vaidarbhairidamipsitam ||] [1.54].

P. C. Lahiri comments, "It involves an economy of effort in articulation, and thereby gives a special pleasure to the Vaidarbhas, who avoid, for fear of incurring monotony, mere varṇānuprāsa [1.55ff.] or the alliteration consisting of repetition of similar [the same] letters."¹⁵

Alternately, varṇavṛtti anuprāsa is the repetition of identical, isolated letters, and may be accomplished either by letters in two different pādas (pāda varṇavṛtti), or between letters in the same word or different words within the same pāda (pada varṇavṛtti).

"Varṇavṛttianuprāsa (the "repetition of letters") whether at the level of the pādas ("quarter-verses"), or at that of the pada ("word") is anuprāsa provided there is sufficient juxtaposition of sounds [such that the latter sound] arouses the impression (samskāra) left by the previous [sound]" [varṇavṛttiranuprāsah pādesu ca padeṣu ca | pūrvānubhavasamskārabodhini yadyadūratā ||] [1.55].

Varnāvrtti anuprāsa between pādas is illustrated in

[1.56]:

- (1) caNDre śaranniśottamse
- (2) kuNDastabakavibhrame
- (3) NDranīlanibham lakṣma
- (4) saNDadhātyalinah śriyam

("That mark like a saphire on the moon -- the crown ornament of the autumn night displaying the brilliance of bunches of Kunda flowers -- has the charm of the bumblebee"). Here the conjunct [-nd-] in each pāda marks anuprāsa.

Where varnāvrtti anuprāsa at the level of the pada or word is illustrated in the following [1.57]:

- (1) Cāru Cāndramasambhīru
- (2) BimBam paśyaitadambare
- (3) ManMano ManMathākrāntam
- (4) NirDayam haNtumuDyatam

("Timid one! See this delightful lunar disc / arisen in the sky to mercilessly torture my mind / laid low by love").

And in the first-half of [1.59] we have an example of anuprāsa involving excessive "harshness" (pārusya):

(1) smarah KHarah KHalah Kāntah

(2) Kāyah Kopaśca nah Krśah

Here there is excessive use of the visarga [-ḥ], which is considered to be hard, as well as a number of repetitions of [k] and [kh], both of which are harsh.

Where in the second-half we find excessive "slackness" (śaithilya):

(3) cYuto MāNodhiko RāGo

(4) MoHo JātosaVo Gatāḥ

Now the visarga is replaced by the "soft" vowel [o] and joined by number of soft consonants, [y], [m], [n], [r], [g], [h], [j], and [v]. And as Dandin points out in [1.60], such extremes of anuprāsa are not

employed by the "Southerners" (dāksinātyas), that is, by the Vaidarbas.

Thus in a general sense both mārgas accept mādhurya guṇa from the perspective of vāk rasa (śabdamādhurya). The Vaidarbas favor its realization through śruti anuprasa and reject excessively harsh or loose collocations. The Gaudiyas, however, favor varṇa anuprāsa provided there is an effective balance, that is, with the repetitive letters neither too close nor too far apart.

Before presenting vastu rasa, Daṇḍin briefly mentions yamaka. Yamaka as with anuprāsa involves repetition, but repetition rather of units or groups of letters. [1.61]:

"Repetition involving groups of letters is known as yamaka, but as it is not exclusively sweet (madhura) it will be covered later" (in [3.1-76]) [āvṛttim varṇasamghā tagocarām yamakām viduh | tattu naikāntamadhuramataḥ paścā dvidhāsyate ||] [1.61]. As a basis for distinction this is certainly vague -- again we have repetition and what we are to understand by "madhura" is not at all clear. As a śabda

alamkāra, yamaka is more structured in its varied, predesigned patterning, and thus perhaps more amenable to general use irrespective of the individual mārga.

In verses [1.62-68] on the second primary category of mādhurya guṇa, vastu rasa (or "artha mādhurya") we are concerned with the sense conveyed, or more specifically, with the degree of elevation and the avoidance of mundane vulgarity that kāvya demands.

"Surely every alamkāra sprinkles rasa upon the meaning / Even so, just the absence of vulgarity carries this burden to a large extent" [kāmam sarvopyalamkāro rasamarthe niśīncati | tathāpyagrāmyataivainam bhāram vahati bhūyasā ||] [1.62].

"Vulgarity (grāmyatā) results from stating the opposite of what is refined. . . ." [grāmyatā . . . sā samyetarakīrtanāt ||] [1.65ab]. Dāṇḍin offers examples with alternatives, upon which P. C. Lahiri comments, "In 1.63-67 two kinds of indecorous expression are distinguished. The proposal in 1.63 is direct and therefore vulgar; in 1.64 it

is reached by implication and therefore taken as quite decorous. In 1.66 words are used which, if united together, give rise to a new word in Sanskrit by combination, which conveys a vulgar meaning. In 1.67 the words used, possessing more than one meaning, give rise to an undesirable and indecorous suggestion.¹⁶ As this attempt at refined or polished expression lies at the heart of kāvya it is not surprising that "Even in both the mārgas such [vulgar examples preceding] are not praised" [evamādi na śamsanti mārgayorubhayorapi ||] [1.67cd] .

As Belvalkar and Raddi conclude: "All definitions of mādhurya from Bharata downwards agree in regarding it as a subtle quality which one can feel but which defies all analysis. . . . Vāgbhaṭa [II./14th century] in his Kāvyānuśāsana tells us that mādhurya is what causes the heart to melt in joy (yatha ānandamandam mano dravati)" (Notes 1/47-48).

(5) [1.69-72] sukumāratā/ "tenderness," "softness": "[A phrase] that abounds in non-harsh letters is

considered to reflect *sukumāra* / Yet the defect of looseness (*śaithilya*) in syllabic collocations -- where all [letters] are soft -- has been shown" [*anīṣṭhurākṣara-prāyam* *sukumāramiheṣyate* | *bandhaśaithilyadoṣopi darśitah sarvakomale* ||] [1.69].

Dāṇḍin has previously indicated [1.43] "looseness" as the *viparyaya* (and here we may accept the meaning "opposite") of *śleṣa* *guṇa* -- "where all letters are soft (*komala*) -- that is, where there is a profusion or excess of non-aspirated syllables (*alpaprāṇa* *akṣara*). And concrete examples of both "harshness" (*pārusya*) and "looseness" (*śaithilya*) have been offered in [1.59].

Sukumāratā, as with *śleṣa* *guṇa*, is generated and marked by vocalic balance. The elements for each, although to a degree overlapping, may yet be distinguished:

"*Sukumāratā* might have a chance of being confused with *śleṣa*. To meet such an objection the commentator Tarkavāgīśa remarks (under KD [1.69]) that the admixture of *alpaprāṇa* and *mahāprāṇa* syllables constitutes *śleṣa*, whereas

sukumāratā consists in tenderness as a total effect arising from the admixture of soft (komala) and harsh (parusa) letters.¹⁷ With the balance in slesa tipped by an excess of non-aspirated consonants we have "looseness"; with an excess of strong or harsh consonants the balance of sukumāratā fails and we have "harshness."

And just as the Gaudīyas employ a degree of looseness in view of anuprāsa, so they admit what might be seen as an excessive element of harshness: "Whereas the Vaidarbhas accept Sukumāratā in which expressions consisting of unharsh vocables generally predominate, the Gaudas have an eye to a 'glaring composition,' and consequently they do not mind if their poetry involves harsh vocables requiring much strain for pronouncing them."¹⁸

(6) [1.73-75] arthavyakti /"explicit meaning":
 "Arthavyakti reflects the absence of conjecture over the meaning" [arthavyaktiraneyatvamarthasya] [1.73ab].

"Even both the mārgas do not think much of such a

phrase [a preceding example of neyatva or "opaqueness" expressed in [1.74]] / For certainly an idea that leaps beyond the principles of words is unfortunate" [nedṛśam bahu manyante mārgayorubhaylorapi | na hi pratītiḥ subhagā śabdanyāyavilaṅghini ||] [1.75].

(7) [1.76-79] udāratvam (udāra) /"magnificence": "When [a phrase] is expressed a quality of magnificence is perceived -- This is termed Udāra / The path of kāvya has a protector in this" [utkarṣavān gunah kaścid yasminnukte pratīyate | tadudārāhvayam tena sanāthā kāvyapaddhatih ||] [1.76].

And further, "Some accept that [phrases] displaying praiseworthy (ślāghya) attributes reflect udāra" [ślāghyairviśeṣaṇairyuktamudāram kaiścidiṣyate |] [1.79ab].

And as arthavyakti is accepted by both the Vaidarbha and Gaudīya, so "we can take it that this Gunā is entertained in both types of poetry in the absence of any mention of the corresponding characteristics prevalent in the Gauḍa mode."¹⁹

(8) [1.80-84] ojas /"power," "intensity":

"Ojas [stems from] an abundance of compounds / This is the life of the prose form (gadya) / Yet even in verse (padya) / it is the singular refuge of the non-Southerners [the Gaudīyas]" [ojaḥ samāsabhūyastvametadgadyasya jīvitam | padyepyadākṣinātyānāmidamekam parāyñam ||] [1.80].

"It displays a number of varieties / through the profusion, lack and mixture / of either heavy or light syllables. . . ." [tad gurūṇām laghūnām ca bāhulyālpatva-miśraṇaiḥ | uccāvacaprakāram tad dr̥syamākhyāyikādiṣu ||] [1.81abc].

"Thus even in verse / the Easterners [Gaudīyas] employ phrases abounding in ojas / But the others [Vaidarbhas] desire ojas / in phrases where it is harmonious and captivating" [iti padyepi paurastyā badhnantyojasvinīrgirah | anye tvanākulam hr̥dyamicchantyojo girām yathā ||] [1.83].

"Ojas is one of the key-words of Indian culture. The general idea expressed by this word is that of power, or . . . of 'power substance,' of a vital and magnetic energy

present in beings, in phenomena or things. . . . Ojas is inherent in literary compositions rich in lofty and sonorous words, with a stringent and compact rhythm, bound together in long compounds. . . ."²⁰

With ojas guna the usual roles have been somewhat altered. Both of the primary styles employ it, but it is especially characteristic of the Gaudīyas: "Ojas is particularly a characteristic excellence with the Gauda poets, who use it to any degree in any composition, while the Vaidarbhas employ it with greater discretion. . . ."²¹

(9) [1.85-92] kānti /"grace":

"Kāvya possessing kānti -- an element seen even in statements of fact (vārtā) and descriptions (varṇanā) -- without transgressing conventional meaning / is precious to all the world" [kāntam̄ sarvajagatkāntam̄ laukikārthā natikramāt | tacca vārtābhidhāneṣu varṇanāsvapi dr̄syate ||] [1.85].

In the introduction to Dañdin's first alamkāra, svabhāvokti [2.8-13], we shall consider vārtā -- its

relationship to poetic language and the confusion surrounding it -- at some length. At this point it is important to recognize that there is no contradiction. As Dandin comments after presenting two examples, "These are certainly quite plausible / yet are polished through distinguished expression (viśesa-ākhyāna) [iti sambhāvyamevaitadviśesākhyānasamskr̥tam |] [1.88ab]. It is not the case that vārtā somehow appears as kāvya simply because kānti may be involved. Kāvya reflects the organic integration of a number of elements, a reality quite easy to forget as we practice the illusionary surgery of analysis.

The practice of the Vaidarbas and the Gaudīyas again diverge, and in Dandin's verses marking this distinction note that there is no mention of fault. If accepted by the connoisseurs of kāvya, a distinctive and perhaps unusual linguistic feature may serve to mark a given style:

"The learned take pleasure in meaning being excessively superimposed apparently transcending the conventional -- no

one else" [lokātīta ivātyarthamadhyāropya vivakṣitah |
yorthastenātitusyanti vidagdhā netare janāḥ ||] [1.89].

And following two examples Dandin writes: "These reflect exaggeration (atyukti) which is favored by the Gaudas / But the way described previously [kānti as such, 1.85-87] is the essence of the other path [the Vaidarbhas]" [idamatyuktirityuktametadgaudopalālitam | prasthānam
prākprāṇitam tu sāramanyasya vartmanah ||] [1.92].

(10) [1.93-100] samādhi /"transfer":

"Where a kavi -- observing conventional limits -- appropriately transfers (ādhīyate) a distinctive feature (dharmah) of one thing to another -- This is considered samādhi" [anyadharmastatonyatra lokasimānurodhinā |
samyagādhīyate yatra sa samādhiḥ smṛto yathā ||] [1.93].

In the following verses three types of "transfer" are found: (1) transfer of an action (kriyā adhyāsa) [1.94]; (2) transfer of a word in a figurative or "secondary" sense (gauna vrtti) [1.95-97ab]; and (3) the simultaneous transfer of a number of features (yugapadnaika dharmāṇam

adhyāsah) [1.97cd-99]. "This is the well-known guna termed samādhi -- the essence (sarvasva) of kāvya / Every group of kavis -- without exception --/ accepts this" [tadetat kāvyasarvasvam̄ samādhirnām̄ yo gunah̄ | kavisārthah̄ samagropi tamenamanugacchati ||] [1.100].

The kavis' ability to transfer, to shift levels of meanings, to imagine one thing as though displaying the actions or possessing the attributes of another thing, must certainly be one of the most pervasive elements of creative expression (if not, as many would posit, of language and thought). Samādi guna appears closely related to the extremely common artha alamkāra "rūpaka" [2.66-96], whose distinctive feature is the "transfer of form." In view of the above types of transfer that samādhi entails, and in consideration of what rūpaka entails (as we shall see) we might speculate on the grounds of their differentiation. As S. K. De comments, "It is quite possible that from Dañdin's point of view, the difference between the samādhi guna and the rūpaka alamkāra may consist in the fact that in

the Guṇa there is a transference only of the qualities or actions of one thing to another, while in the Alamkāra either one dharmin [the "possessor"] itself is substituted for another, or the new dharma [that "possessed"] entirely supplants the existing dharma."²²

Danḍin concludes this section with an explicit recognition of the infinite possibilities stemming from the individual, creative predilections of the poet -- yet again a counter to those who would freeze the mārgas (and much else) as "prescriptions":

"Thus the two Paths are distinguished through a description of their individual natures / Yet of further subvariations -- displayed by the individual kavis -- it's impossible to speak" [iti mārgadvayam bhinnam tatsvarūpanirūpanāt | tadbhedāstu na śakyante vaktum pratikavi sthitāḥ] [1.101].

"The difference in sweetness -- of sugar cane, milk, brown sugar, and so on -- is great / Yet even by Sarasvati

it cannot be described" [ikṣuksīrgudādīnāṁ mādhuryasyān-taram mahat | tathāpi na tadākhyātum sarasvatyāpi śakyate ||] [1.102].

Notes [1.40] - [102]

1. S. K. De, "A Note on the Gaudi Riti," in Some Problems of Sanskrit Poetics, Reprint (Calcutta: Firma KLM, 1981 (1959)), p. 62, n. 2.
2. Henry S. Heifetz, "Issues of Literary Translation from Sanskrit and Tamil," p. 202.
3. The "rīti of Vāmana is not interchangeable with Dāṇḍin's "mārga." Vāmana (KAS [1.2.6]) elevates and focuses on rīti as "the soul of kāvya"/rītirātmā kāvyasya. Dāṇḍin's usage of the term mārga is really quite loose; mārga rather providing a somewhat general context for the primary play of the various alamkāras.
4. S. K. De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, vol. 2, 2nd edition ; Reprint, 1976, p. 92.
5. S. K. De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, vol. 2, p. 92.
6. Prakash C. Lahiri, Concepts of Riti and Guna in Sanskrit Poetics in their Historical Development (Dacca: The University of Dacca, 1937), p. 63, n. 12.
7. Prakash C. Lahiri, Concepts of Riti and Guna in Sanskrit Poetics, p. 60.
8. Edwin Gerow, Indian Poetics, p. 23.
9. P. C. Lahiri, Concepts of Riti and Guna, p. 63.
10. P. C. Lahiri, Concepts of Riti and Guna, p. 64.
11. P. C. Lahiri, Concepts of Riti and Guna, p. 66.
12. S. K. De, History, vol. 2, Reprint 1976, p. 110.

13. Cited by P. C. Lahiri, in Concepts of Rīti and Guna, p. 67.
14. The vocalic sthānas are: kanṭha/"throat"; tālu/"palate"; mūrdhan/"top of the palate"; danta/"teeth"; oṣṭha/"lips"; kanṭha-tālu/"throat and palate"; kanṭha-oṣṭha/"throat and lips"; danta-oṣṭha/"teeth and lips"; nāsika/"nose"; and uras/"chest."
15. P. C. Lahiri, Concepts of Rīti and Guna pp. 68-69.
16. P. C. Lahiri, Concepts of Rīti and Guna, p. 71, n. 33.
17. P. C. Lahiri, Concepts of Rīti and Guna, p. 72.
18. P. C. Lahiri, Concepts of Rīti and Guna, p. 73.
19. P. C. Lahiri, Concepts of Rīti and Guna p. 75, n. 38.
20. Paolo Daffina, "Review: Jan Gonda, Ancient Indian ojas, Latin augos, and the Indo-european nouns in -es -os (Utrecht: N. V. A. Ousthock's Uitgevers, 1952), in East and West, 5 (1954), pp. 142, 143.
21. P. C. Lahiri, Concepts of Rīti and Guna, p. 77.
22. S. K. De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, vol. 2, 2nd edition, Reprint 1970 (1960), pp. 81-82.

The Kavi and the Generation of Kāvya

"Natural creative imagination / Extensive flawless erudition / Vigorous application -- These are the cause of the excellence that is kāvya " [naisargikī ca pratibhā śrutam ca bahunirmalam | amandaścābhivyogosyāḥ kāraṇam kāvyasampadah ||] [1.103].

"Even if there is not marvelous creative imagination -- endowed with qualities stemming from impressions of previous births -- Speech worshipped with erudition and application will certainly grant a degree of favor" [na vidyate yadyapi pūrvavāsanāguṇānubandhi pratibhānam-adbhutam | śrutenā yatnena ca vāgupāsitā dhruvam karotyeva kamapyanugraham ||] [1.104].

"Therefore those wishing fame should continuously and strenuously serve Sarasvatī with sloth cast aside / For although poetic skill be slight those who make the effort may yet sport in the gatherings of the wise" [tadaśtat-andrairaniśam sarasvatī śramādupāsyā khalu kīrtimipsubhiḥ |

krśe kavitvepi janāḥ krtaśramā vidagdhagoṣṭhiṣu vihartum-
iśate || [1.105].

The "fullness," "wealth," "excellence" (sampada) which the best kāvya displays stems from the conjunction and integration of three factors: pratibhā ("creative imagination"), śruta ("erudition"), and abhiyoga ("application").

Pratibhā [< prati (+) bhā] /"to shine upon; come into sight, present oneself to,' but also 'to appear to the mind, to flash upon the thought, occur to, become clear or manifest'. . . . It usually denotes 'a sudden thought . . . , a quick understanding or insight,' then also 'presence of mind, wit, genius,' 'boldness, audacity,' 'fancy, imagination'."¹

Pratibhā appears in early Buddhist literature in one sense as "eloquence," "fluency in improvisation." In the Aṅguttara Nikāya [3.195] "The brahman Piṅgiyāni sees the Buddha approaching in all the brilliance of his superhuman

beauty and at this sight is seized with enthusiasm; he cries out: 'O Bhagavat, I am inspired! O Sugatā I am inspired!' 'Then may you be inspired,' responded the master."²

In the yoga system of Patañjali "pratibhā is synonymous with an aspect of Prajñā. It is said to be the supreme faculty of omniscience which is evolved through a continued practice of concentration on the self, not in its absolute and transcendent nature, but as appearing in the form of the phenomenal ego. . . . It is, so to speak, the vision of the many as reflected in the mirror of the one. . . ."³

Pratibhā retained these shades of meaning upon its incorporation into kāvya śāstra as the primary term used to mark the basis or source of kāvya within the kavi.⁴ "Si la vicchitti fait la poésie, c'est la pratibhā qui fait le poète. La pratibhā est un don naturel qui participe du génie, de l'inspiration et de l'imagination."⁵

Its essentially ineffable nature hardly dissuaded

attempts to delineate it. "Cette inspiration, qui par sa fantaisie même semble défier l'analyse, les critiques indiens ont pourtant cherché à la définir."⁶ Or if not in every writer's case to attempt a definition, certainly to indicate its importance.

Daṇḍin's position is essentially generous. This "creative imagination" alone it would seem is not sufficient to generate kāvya at its best. Through extensive learning -- of kāvyas, kāvya sāstras, and all ancillary disciplines -- the medium of its expression is tempered and given depth; through application and practice it is honed and perfected. And further we find that pratibhā is innate, "natural" (naisargikī),⁷ and "endowed with qualities stemming from impressions (vāsanās) of previous births" -- it is seen as developing across time, beyond the boundaries of any given limited lifetime.

When by the false notions of associations of body and soul there is the feeling of a concrete individual as "I," it is called ahamkāra. When there is reflective thought associated with the memory of the past and the anticipations of the

future, it is called citta. When the activity is taken in its actual form as motion or action towards any point, it is called karma. When, leaving its self-contained state, it desires anything, we have kalpanā. When the citta turns itself to anything previously seen or unseen, as being previously experienced, we have what is called memory (smṛti). When certain impressions are produced in a very subtle, subdued form, dominating all other inclinations, as if certain attractions or repulsions to certain things were really experienced, we have the root inclinations (vāsanā).⁸

One of the older commentators on the Kāvyādarśa

Tarunavācaspati glosses, "'Natural inspiration' (naisargikī pratibhā) indicates the origin of this gift: 'natural inspiration' is an intelligence which is refined thanks to the effect of knowledge acquired when instructing itself in previous existences."⁹ And we may note Lienhard's comments, "It is an acquired faculty gained by merit of acts (karman) performed in previous existences which have influenced the poet's mind in such a way that they have left behind a residue of latent mental impressions (samskāra) which has matured in his present life to genuine, innate pratibhā."¹⁰

Yet even if pratibhā should be lacking, Dandin avows that wide learning and diligent application will "certainly grant a degree of favor," which will allow one to participate in and to enjoy "the gatherings of the wise," the practitioners and connoisseurs of kāvya. He is not saying that "poetic talent, even when it is not innate, can be acquired to a certain extent."¹¹

Poetic "talent" falls within the realm of pratibhā -- one is born with it (or perhaps more correctly re-born with it). With learning and practice one might achieve a semblance of kāvya, and might be able to speak of it intelligently, but this is not to be equated with the "excellence that is kāvya" as such.

Vāmana [8th-9th centuries] stresses the importance of pratibhā in the Kāvyālaṅkāra [1.3.16]: "Pratibhāna [pratibhā] is the 'seed' of the kavi's creativity [literally, "kavi-ness"]" /kavitvabijam pratibhānam. He continues, "The 'seed' of the kavi's creativity is a distinctive samskāra [an "impression" (of prior experience)]

derived from previous births. Without the seed, kāvya cannot arise; if then effected, it would only be grounds for laughter" [kavitvasya bījam. . . . | janmāntarāgata-samskāraviśeṣah kaścit | yasmādvinā kāvyam na niśpadyate niśpannam vā hāsyā 'yatanam syāt ||].

This centrality of pratibhā [or for some, the synonymous "śakti"] remained throughout the tradition. Rājaśekhara [10th century] writes with flourish in the Kāvyamīmāṃsā [chapter 4], "Pratibhā is that which causes the mass of words, the caravan of meanings, the weave of alamkāras, the styles [mārgas] of expression and such similar things to blaze in the spirit" (and we note his use of mārga as with Daṇḍin, rather than rīti) [ā śabdagrāmam-arthasārthamalañkāratantramuktimārgamanyadapi tathāvidham-adhihṛdayam pratibhāsayati sā pratibhā |].¹²

And Abhinavagupta in the Dhvanyālokalocana, under [1.6] of Ānandavardhana's Dhvanyāloka, writes: "Pratibhā is a wisdom capable of creating novel things. It is distinguished by the capacity to create all forms of rasa,

brilliance, beauty, kāvya. The sage [Bharata] designated it as 'the interior disposition of the kavi'" [*pratibhā apūrvavastunirmāṇakṣamā prajñā | tasyā višeṣo rasāveśa-vaiśadya saundaryam kāvyanirmāṇakṣamatvam | yadāha munih kaverantargatam bhāvam iti |.*¹³

Bhāmaha's view is perhaps stricter, but I do not feel in opposition to Dāṇḍin's. In Kāvyālaṅkāra [1.5] we have: "Even a fool is capable of learning sāstra from the teachings of master / But kāvya is born -- perhaps -- in those who possess pratibhā" [*gurūpadeśādhyetum sāstram jaḍadhiyo 'pyalam | kāvyam tu jāyate jātu kasyacitpratibhā vataḥ ||*]. Bhāmaha then would consider pratibhā a necessary rather than a sufficient cause for the creation of kāvya. He then expatiates on what he sees as additionally necessary, and what I feel we may subsume within Dāṇḍin's śruta ("erudition," "learning").

"Words, metres, meanings, kathās based on itihāsas, worldly convention, the arts and various skills -- These are considered the foundation of kāvya" [*śabdaśchandobhi-*

dhānārthā itihāsā śrayāḥ kathāḥ | loko yuktih kalāśceti
mantavyā kāvyavaikhari ||] (KA [1.9]).

"Familiarizing oneself with words and meanings,
learning from masters versed in these, examining other
compositions -- one should then devote oneself to the
creation of kāvya" / śabdābhidheye vijñāya kṛtvā tad-
vidupāsanam | vilokyānyanibandhāṁśca kāryāḥ kāvyakriyādarah
||] (KA [1.10]).

The would-be kavi must devote him- or herself to all
of the language skills (grammar, metrics, lexicology and
etymology, phonetics, and so on); the associated sāstras
(such as kāmaśāstra ("erotics"), arthaśāstra ("statecraft,"
"economic polity"), nyāyaśāstra ("logic"), dharmaśāstra
(law, ritual, religious and social duties)); and the sixty-
four kalās or "arts and skills."

Among the kalās we find, for example: singing (gītam);
playing of instruments (vādyam); dance (nṛtyam); drawing
and painting (ālekhym); also the making of ear-ornaments
(karnapattrabhāgāḥ); and perfumes (gandhayuktih); the

proper arrangement of jewels and adornments (bhūṣanayojanam) ; the making of garlands and wreaths (mālyagrathana-vikalpāḥ) ; magic and illusion (aindrajālāḥ) ; and the knowledge of omens (nimittajñānam) ; carpentry (takṣanam) ; and building (vāstuvidyā) ; knowledge of coins and precious stones (rūpyaratnaparīksā) ; culinary skills (vicitraśākayūṣabhaḥkṣyavikārakriyā) ; the preparation of juices, liquors and spirits (pānakarasarāgāsavayojanam) ; organizing cock, quail and ram fights (meṣakukkuṭalācaka-yuddhavidhiḥ) ; dice-play (ākarsakrīdā) ; word games in verse (pratimālā) ; and spontaneous kāvya (mānasī kāvyakriyā) ; knowledge of the various languages of foreigners (mlecchitavikalpāḥ) ; and the regional dialects (deśabhāṣāvijñānam) ; and (overlapping with the sāstras) such skills as) lexicography (abhidhānakośa) ; prosody (chandojñānam) ; and even the composition of kāvya replete with alamkāras (kriyākalpah) ; and so on.¹⁴

Thorough familiarity with worldly, conventional knowledge was expected; and with the various literary

stories (kathās) based on the itihāsas; the Purāṇas; the Mahābhārata and Rāmāyaṇa; and of course with other kāvyas and kāvya sāstras.

And somewhat later, Rudraṭa in the Kāvyālaṅkāra mirrors Dandin's three fundamental factors (in [1.14]): sakti (pratibhā), vyutpatti (śrutam), and abhyāsa (abhiyoga). And in [1.18-19] discusses just how wide the range of the kavi's learning should be: "In a restricted sense, vyutpatti refers to the discrimination of what is appropriate or inappropriate, due to the knowledge of prosody, grammar, the arts and skills, world affairs, words and meanings. But in a wider sense, is there anything other than this? In this world there is no topic or expression that may not be an element of kavya -- Thus this is complete knowledge" [chandavyākaraṇakalālokasthitipadapadārthavijñānāt | yuktāyuktaviveko vyutpattiriyam samāsena || vistaratastu kimanyattata iha vācyam na vācakam loke | na bhavati yatkāvyāṅgam sarvajñatvam tato 'nyaisā ||.

Where Abhinavagupta, now in his commentary on the

Ghatakarpakāvya (and utilizing the same terminology as Rudraṭa), subsumes vyutpatti (śrutam) within the śakti (pratibhā) of the kavi: "The (imaginative) power (śakti) of the kavi is certainly the most important thing. This indeed is known as the erudition that transcends the world. For there is no other erudition [of value] apart from the (imaginative) power of the kavi" [kavīnām śaktir eva baliyasī sā eva lokottarā vyutpattirityabhidhīyate na tu anyā kaviśakter vyutpattir nāma kācit ||].¹⁵

And finally we seem to return to Dandin yet some five centuries later with Vāgbhaṭa (I., the son of Soma) [12th century] who writes in his Vāgbhatālañkāra [1.3]: "Inspiration makes the poet; instruction adorns him; practice gives him facility: it is these which mark the best of poets" [ratibhākāraṇām tasya vyutpattistu vibhūṣaṇām | bhr̥śotpattikṛd abhyāsa ityādyakavisamkathā ||].¹⁶

Notes [1.103] - [1.105]

1. Jan Gonda, "Pratibhā," in The Vision of the Vedic Poets (The Hague: Mouton, 1963), p. 318.
2. Hari Chand, Kālidāsa et L'Art Poétique de L'Inde (Paris: Librairie Ancienne Honore Champion, 1917), p. 65.
From the Aṅguttara Nikāya, Part 3: Pañcaka Nipāta and Chakka Nipāta, edited by E. Hurdy (London, 1897); Reprint (London: Pāli Text Society, 1958), p. 239: paṭibhāti mām bhagavā paṭibhāti mām sugata ti paṭibhātu tam piṇgiyāni ti bhagavā avoca.
3. Gopinath Kaviraj, "The Doctrine of Pratibhā in Indian Philosophy," Annals of the Bhandarkar Institute, 5 (1924), p. 6.
4. Note: Siegfried Lienhard's assertion (A History of Classical Poetry, (1984), p. 309, n. 1) that "This [pratibhā] is the most common term, but Dandin and Vāmana use pratibhāna. . . ." is incorrect -- Dandin uses [1.103] pratibhā.
5. Hari Chand, Kālidāsa, p. 65.
6. Hari Chand, Kālidāsa, p. 66.
7. And again Lienhard is incorrect (A History of Classical Poetry, (1984), p. 311), in stating "Dandin, Rudrata, Rājaśekhara and others let it clearly be understood that acquired pratibhā is definitely inferior to natural talent." There is no "acquired" pratibhā for Dandin -- by its very nature it is "natural."
8. Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), p. 239.

9. Cited in Hari Chand, Kālidāsa, p. 67: pūrva janmakṛtavidyāyāsotpannajñānajanitasamskāratāgatā yā buddhiḥ sā naisargikī pratibhā.
10. Siegfried Lienhard, A History of Classical Poetry, (1984), p. 311.
11. Siegfried Lienhard, A History of Classical Poetry, p. 311.
12. Rājaśekhara, Kāvyamīmāṃsā, Chapter 4, p. 11.
13. Ānandavardhana, The Dhvanyāloka of Śrī Ānandavar-danāchārya, with the Lochana and Bālapriyā commentaries by Śrī Abhinavagupta and Pandit Śrī Mahādeva Śāstri (Benares: Chowkhambā Sanskrit Series Office, 1940), pp. 92-93.
14. See: Vātsyāyana, Kāmasūtram, edited by Devduttā Śāstri (Varanasi: The Chowkhamā Sanskrit Series Office, 1964), pp. 83-84. Louis Renou and Jean Filiozat, L'Inde Classique, vol. 2, (1953), Appendix 11. The Kama Sutra of Vatsyayana, translated by Sir Richard Burton and F. F. Arbuthnot, edited by W. G. Archer, Reprint (New York: Capricorn Books, 1963 (1883)), pp. 70-74.
15. The Ghāṭakarpakāvya, with the commentary by Abhinavagupta, edited by Madhusudan Kaul Shastri (Srinagar: The Mercantile Press, 1945), p. 21. Cited in J. L. Masson, "When is a Poem Artificial?" -- A Note on the Ghāṭakarpara-vivṛti," Journal of the American Oriental Society, 95 (1975), pp. 265-65.
16. As cited in Hari Chand, Kālidāsa, p. 66.

Chapter Three

Yamaka or Variations of "Phonemic Repetition"

"Yamaka is the repetition of groups of letters -- contiguous or discontiguous / Its range pertains to the initial, medial, and final parts of pādas" [avyapetavya-petātmā vyāvṛttirvarṇasamḥateḥ | yamakam tacca pādānāmādi-madhyāntagocaram !!] [3.1].

"The varieties of yamakas may appear in one of the four pādas [of the conventional padya or "stanza"], in all, or in any combination: in the beginning; middle; end; the middle and end; the middle and beginning; the beginning and end; and throughout" [ekadvitracatuspādayamakānām vikalpanāḥ | ādimadhyāntamadhyāntamadhyādyādyantasarvataḥ !!] [3.2].

"These varieties -- arising from such combinations -- are both easy and difficult to compose / From among them a few will be shown" [atyantabahavasteśāmbhedāḥ sambhedayo-

nayah | sukarā duskarāścaiva darśyante tatra kecana ||]

[3.3].

Dandīn develops a highly structured evolving pattern of sound or phonemic repetition, progressing in a series of increasingly complex steps. Essentially we have two modes of progression. Given our initial pattern we will progress horizontally, where each new variation operates within the given framework, with all other elements but the varying feature held constant. When the logical possibilities of this mode have been demonstrated, we jump vertically a short distance without breaking contact with the general forward line of progression, with new parameters explicitly announced. One should keep in mind that although these patterns may be abstractly sketched, they are realized in language -- we really have an incredibly detailed, acrobatic demonstration of what the Sanskrit language is capable of in this regard.

Dandīn now proceeds to illustrate the various and

numerous permutations that yamaka may display. In our first series (to [3.18]) the elemental unit is a single, "contiguous" (avyapeta) repetition, not of individual letters as in anuprāsa [1.51-68], but of groups of letters. Initially we have three variable features: (1) the repetitive block may occur in any of the four pādas ; (2) it may occur in either the initial, medial, or final position within that given pāda; and (3) the number of distinct blocks may vary from one to four.

Thus in [3.4] we have a single block in initial position in the first pāda: (1) mānena mānena sakhi ("Oh friend! With this anger, let there not be. . . ."). Alternately, the block may be placed in (2) the initial position in the second pāda / madano madano . . . | [3.5]; (3) in the third / caturam caturam . . . [3.6]; and (4) in the fourth / rahitai(r)-ahitai(s) . . . || [3.7].

These variations may be abstractly sketched, where a single capital letter stands for a specific group or block of letters -- [AA _____], for example, would represent

mānena mānena placed in initial pāda position -- with the stanza broken into the four pādas.

[3.4] [AA____ / ____ / ____ / ____]

[3.5] [____ / AA____ / ____ / ____]

[3.6] [____ / ____ / AA____ / ____]

[3.7] [____ / ____ / ____ / AA____]

Maintaining the same initial position within the pāda, the number of repetitive blocks may be increased. Two now distinct blocks might appear, for example, in the first and second pādas [3.8]; in the first and third pādas [3.9]; in the first and fourth pādas [3.10]; in the second and third pādas [[3.11]]; in the second and fourth pādas [3.12]; in the third and fourth pādas [3.13], and so on.

[3.8] [AA____ / BB____ / ____ / ____]

[3.9] [AA____ / ____ / BB____ / ____]

[3.10] [AA____ / ____ / ____ / BB____]

[3.11] [____ / AA____ / BB____ / ____]

[3.12] [____ / AA____ / ____ / BB____]

[3.13] [____ / ____ / AA____ / BB____]

Extending the process a third repetitive block may appear:

[3.14] [AA____ / BB____ / CC____ / ____]

[3.15] [AA____ / BB____ / ____ / CC____]

[3.16] [AA____ / ____ / BB____ / CC____]

[3.17] [____ / AA____ / BB____ / CC____]

And logically concluding this series, contiguous, distinctive repetitive groups in initial position may appear in all four pādas:

[3.18] [AA____ / BB____ / CC____ / DD____]

Yet the repetitive elements forming a contiguous pair may be "discontiguous" (vyapeta), introducing a fourth variable modality. Thus maintaining the initial pāda position, we may have a given group of letters in the first pāda repeated in the second, as in [3.20] (1) madureñadrśam

māṇam (2) madhureṇa sugandhinā | ("Spring with but the sweet and fragrant [Sahakāra shoots will turn] the anger of the doe-eyed ones [into fading sound]").

[3.20] [A____ / A____ / ____ / ____]

And varying only which pādas the repeated elements appear in, five additional possibilities are generated:

[3.21] [A____ / ____ / A____ / ____]

[3.22] [A____ / ____ / ____ / A____]

[3.23] [____ / A____ / A____ / ____]

[3.24] [____ / A____ / ____ / A____]

[3.25] [____ / ____ / A____ / A____]

Alternately, as a fifth variable feature, the number of repetitions of the one element may be increased (maintaining all other features constant):

[3.26] [A____ / A____ / A____ / ____]

Their positions may vary:

[3.27] [A____ / ____ / A____ / ____]

[3.28] [____ / A____ / A____ / A____]

And their number may extend to all four pādas:

[3.29] [A____ / A____ / A____ / A____]

As in [3.8] a new and distinct repetitive block may be introduced, yet which is now, extending the current pattern, composed of two discontiguous, identical elements:

[3.30] [A____ / A____ / B____ / B____]

[3.31] [A____ / B____ / A____ / B____]

[3.32] [A____ / B____ / B____ / A____]

Daṇḍin initiates yet a third series, "There is also a variety [of yamaka] whose form is both contiguous and discontiguous" / avyapetavyapetātmā vikalpopyasti [3.33cd].

That is, repetition is considered from two perspectives simultaneously. Again, as in the first series, we have a block consisting of two adjacent elements [AA], which are

thus "contiguous." Yet our perspective also shifts to this block as a whole, which itself is repeated -- the two blocks themselves are thus considered "discontiguous." We have moved vertically, but Dāṇḍin now immediately adds an additional feature to this paradigm -- two pairs of repeating blocks:

[3.34] [AA____ / AA____ / BB____ / BB____]

Dāṇḍin's Sanskrit example thus reads:

- (1) sālam sālambakalikā
- (2) sālam sālam na vīksitum
- (3) nālinālinabakulā
- (4) nālī nālikinirapi

Varying this sequence we have (note that we are still in pāda initial position):

[3.35] [AA____ / BB____ / BB____ / AA____]

And filling out the template with but one repeated block:

[3.36] [AA____ / AA____ / AA____ / AA____]

Dan̄din now shifts and varies a feature that has thus far remained constant -- position within the pāda.

"Such is the way of yamaka's varieties in pāda initial position / In this same way other yamakas may be formulated"
 [iti pādādiyamakavikalpasyedr̄śī gatih | evameva vikalpyāni
 yamakānītarānyapi ||] [3.37].

"For fear of over elaboration there is no intention to exhaustively describe these varieties / Rather some of those considered difficult to compose will now be described" [na prapañcabhayādbhedāḥ kārtṣyenākhyātum-
 īhitāḥ | duṣkarābhimatā ye tu varṇyante tetra kecana ||]
 [3.38].

Maintaining the same previous paradigm, although reducing it to one block, Dan̄din now shifts to pāda medial position:

[3.39] [_AA_ / _AA_ / _AA_ / _AA_]

These blocks may be broken up with the repetitive block itself thus discontiguous:

[3.40] [_A_A_ / _A_A_ / _A_A_ / _A_A_]

One element in each separated pair may be dropped and again these may shift, now to final position (mirroring [3.29]):

[3.41] [____A / ____A / ____A / ____A]

Maintaining the same paradigm, each element may be doubled (mirroring [3.39] with a contiguous/discontiguous pattern), but with the identical blocks now in final position:

[3.42] [____AA / ____AA / ____AA / ____AA]

And mirroring the pattern developed from [3.39], the elements of each pair may be separated, one remaining in pāda final position, one moving to the medial position:

[3.43] [_A_A / _A_A / _A_A / _A_A]

These elements, maintaining their positions, may be doubled yet again:

[3.44] [_AA_AA / _AA_AA / _AA_AA / _AA_AA]

Or mirroring [3.43], the elements of a single pair may be separated, now in initial and medial positions:

[3.45] [A_A_ / A_A_ / A_A_ / A_A_]

Again these may be doubled, as in [3.44], but now only half of the immediately preceding positions are held constant. We thus have separated identical blocks in initial and final pāda position in pādas one and three, and in initial and medial position in pādas two and four:

[3.46] [AA_AA / AA_AA_ / AA_AA / AA_AA_]

Danḍin again alternates patterns, returning to single separated repetitive elements (mirroring [3.43]), although

now in pāda initial and final position:

[3.47] [A A / A A / A A / A A]

And again these may be doubled, holding pāda position constant:

[3.48] [AA_AA / AA_AA / AA_AA / AA_AA]

We may return to single elements, yet adding a third in each pāda, thus logically completing the patterns of [3.45] and [3.47]:

[3.49] [A_A_A / A_A_A / A_A_A / A_A_A]

And once again each of these may be doubled in place, completing and concluding this series:

[3.50] [AA_AA_AA / AA_AA_AA / AA_AA_AA]

Dandīn's example (and it should go without saying that although sound is repeated the meaning in each case is not) of this more difficult pattern is:

- (1) kālakālagalakālakālamukhakālakāla-
- (2) kālakālapanakālakālaghanakālakāla-
- (3) kālakālasitakālakā lalanikālakāla-
- (4) kālakālagatu kālakāla kalikālakāla

("Oh You who fulfill like the Embellisher of Alakā [Kubera], You seasons of seasons, You capable of embellishing all buds / Let those beautiful women -- with heads embellished with black curls, dark as the neck of the Destroyer of Time [Śiva], as a swarm of bees, as the black-faced monkies, as Kāla [God of Death], as Time, as the black-clouded season which causes the black-headed ones [Peacocks] to cry out -- embrace me!")

Samdasta Yamaka

Daṇḍin now introduces and provides but a single example for samdasta yamaka, that is, where repetitive sound elements are (literally) "bitten or held between the teeth."

"The position of samdaṣṭa yamaka is the end and the beginning of two pādas / Although this is included in the preceding it is mentioned here independently" [samdaṣṭaya-makasthānamantādī pādayordvayoh | uktāntargatamapyetat svātantryenātra kīrtyate ||] [3.51]. Elements thus meet only at the boundaries of two pādas.

Daṇḍin's example displays three distinct pairs of single elements:

[3.52] [____A / A____B / B____C / C____]

Samudga Yamaka

In Daṇḍin's third mode of yamaka , samudga, the repeated element is extended to the pāda as a whole.

"Samudga is repetition involving one-half [of a stanza, that is two pādas] / Its varieties are three" [ardhābhyaśah samudgah syādasya bhedāstrayo matāh |] [3.53ab].

We may have two pairs of matching pādas:

[3.54] [____ / / ____ /]

[3.55] [____ / ____ / /]

[3.56] [____ / / / ____]

Pāda Abhyāsa or the "Repetition of Pādas"

Yet the repetition of pādas need not be restricted to two distinct pairs. "And further, the repetition of pādas (pādābyāsa) of numerous variations will be illuminated with examples" [pādābhyaśopyanekātmā vyajyate sa nidarśanaiḥ ||] [3.53cd]. Thus the number of identical pādas may extend to three, with varying placement within the stanza:

[3.57] [____ / ____ / ___ /]

[3.58] [____ / ___ / ____ /]

[3.59] [____ / ___ / / ____]

[3.60] [___ / ____ / ____ /]

[3.61] [___ / ____ / / ____]

[3.62] [___ / / ____ / ____]

[3.63] [____ / ____ / ____ / ___]

[3.64] [____ / ____ / ___ / ____]

[3.65] [_ _ _ / ____ / ____ / ____]

Or to the extreme of four:

[3.66] [____ / ____ / ____ / ____]

"The repetition of a pāda once, twice, thrice is thus illustrated" [sakṛdadvistriśca yobhyāsaḥ pādasyaivam pradarśitah ||] [3.67ab].

Śloka Abhyāsa or "Stanzaic Repetition"

At the level of the entire pāda, repetition may extend to the entire śloka (padya) or stanza. That is, two contiguous ślokas may be phonemically identical -- and with the further stipulation that their meanings must be related.

"The repetition of ślokas whose meanings are related is considered śloka abhyāsa" [ślokadvayam tu yuktārtham ślokābhyāsaḥ smṛto yathā ||] [3.67cd]. Thus two contiguous

stanzas appear identical, whose meanings although related yet vary:

[3.68] [____ / ____ / /]

[3.69] [____ / ____ / /]

Mahā Yamaka

"Four identical pādas within which repetition is seen is termed mahā yamaka -- This is the highest formulation of yamaka" [ekākāracatuspādam tanmahāyamakāhvayam | tatrāpi drśyatebhyāsaḥ sā parā yamakakriyā ||] [3.70]. Each pāda as a whole is identical, yet now each may be broken evenly into two matching halves -- we have a stanza composed of eight identical groups of letters:

[3.71] [AA / AA / AA / AA]

Thus in Dāṇḍin's example the pāda "samānayāsamānayā" is repeated four times ("Unequaled one! Unite me with this lady -- angry, without compare -- whose measured distress

is equal [to my own] yet who is not without splendor and style") .

Samsṛsti or the "Combination of Yamakas"

Dandin gives a single example in [3.72] of what may be considered samsṛsti yamaka, that is, the display of a number of specific types of yamaka. This stanza thus presents an avyapeta/vyapeta ("contiguous"/"discontiguous") yamaka in the first pāda; three distinct vyapeta yamakas in each of the three following pādas; and three distinct samdaṣṭa ("bitten") yamakas at the three pāda boundaries.

This pattern is realized in the Sanskrit verse as:

- (1) dharādharākāradharā dharābhujāṁ
- (2) bhujā mahīṁ pātumahīnavikramāḥ
- (3) kramāt sahante sahasā hatārayo
- (4) rayoddhurā mānadhurāvalambināḥ

Which we may abstract and picture as:

- (1) [AA ____ AAB
- (2) BC ____ CD
- (3) DE ____ DF
- (4) F_G__G__]

Pratiloma Yamaka or "Repetition in Reverse"

"The yamaka displaying repetition in reverse /
 involving either a pāda, one-half of or an entire śloka /
 is considered -- due to the reversal -- pratiloma" [āvṛttih
 prātilomyena pādārdhaślokagocarā | yamakam pratilomatvāt
 pratilomamiti smṛtam ||] [3.73].

We now move yet another step up in complexity. In pratiloma (literally, "against the hair"; "against the grain") yamaka the first pāda read backwards -- right-to-left, syllable by syllable, with the syllables themselves unchanged -- will generate the second pāda (as read left-to-right); and the second pāda read backwards will generate the first. The same relationship holds for the third and

fourth pādas. The pattern displayed in Dañdin's Sanskrit example in [3.74] is:

- (1) yāmatāśca kṛtāyāsā
- (2) sā yātā kṛśatā mayā
- (3) ramanārakatā testu
- (4) stutetākaraṇāmara

Thus in reading, for example, the first pāda backwards, we would not read it letter by letter (āsāyātīrkaśātamāy), but rather syllable by syllable, which would generate the second pāda (sā yā kṛi śa tā ma yā).

With the individual numbers marking a complete pāda, and with the pointers indicating which direction one should read to equalize the two pādas, we might graphically represent this pattern as follows:

[3.74] [< (1) = (2) >
 (1) > = < (2)

$\langle (3) = (4) \rangle$

$(3) \rangle = \langle (4)]$

And the focus might shift to the level of the half-stanza, where a reading of the first-half (first two pādas) -- right-to-left, syllable by syllable -- will generate the second-half of the stanza (the last two pādas); and similarly for the reverse:

[3.75] [$\langle (1)(2) = (3)(4) \rangle$

$(1)(2) \rangle = \langle (3)(4)]$

And carrying the process to its logical extreme, our focus may extend to the entire stanza. Now with two adjacent stanzas, reading the first right-to-left, syllable by syllable, will generate the complete following stanza, as read left-to-right, syllable by syllable -- and again the reverse holds:

[3.76] and [3.77]

[$\langle (1234) = (5678) \rangle$

$(1234) \rangle = \langle (5678)]$

Dus̄kara Śabda Alamkāras -- Those "Difficult to Construe"

(1) Gomūtrikā or "Cow Piss"

"Having syllables of the same form in both half-stanzas, but with a gap [of differing syllables] in between -- This -- difficult to compose -- the wise call "gomūtrikā" [varṇānāmekarūpatvam yattvekāntaramardhayoh | gomūtriketi tat prāhurduṣkaram tadvido yathā ||] [3.78].

With the picturesque gomūtrikā or "cow piss," we again have repetition, the medium -- the range of syllables that may be employed -- is open, and once again we have attempted conformity to a predetermined syllabic "potentially," but now we move another step further. The syllabic arrangement itself is now but a means to a preconceived "pictoral" template. As a cow urinating when walking will create a zig-zag pattern in the dust, so in gomūtrikā with the two half-stanzas aligned vertically, beginning with either initial letter, one must be able to generate alternately each of the half-stanzas when

proceeding in a "zig-zag" fashion. And this given that every other pair of vertically aligned syllables (beginning with the first) will be the same.

Graphically displaying Dāṇḍin's example in [3.79] might make this somewhat clearer:

Pādas (1) and (2)

ma	da	no	ma	di	rā	kṣī	ṇā	ma	pā	ṅgā
2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2

Pādas (3) and (4)

ma	de	no	ya	di	tat	kṣī	ṇa	ma	na	ṅgā
1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1

Each of the two half-stanzas are aligned vertically, syllable by syllable. We note that beginning with the first column, in every other column forward, both syllables are identical. Between them we have a "gap" of differing syllables. Thus reading from the lower initial syllable, if we proceed in a zig-zag fashion following the "1's" we

will generate the first half-stanza; similarly, following the "2's" we have the second half-stanza.

(2) Ardhabrahma or the "Half-Rotation" /

Saravatobhadra or the "Full-Rotation"

"They call it Ardhabrahma if there is one-half (ardha) rotation (bhramana) of the stanza / If there is complete (sarvatas) rotation it is considered Saravatobhadra" [prā-hurardhabhramam nāma ślokārdhabhramanam yadi | tadistam sarvatobhadram bhramanam yadi sarvataḥ ||] [3.80].

(3) Ardhabrahma

There would appear to be three possible interpretations of ardhabrahma. In each case the first step is to align the four pādas of the given stanza vertically. One view (as that of the commentator Premachandra Tarkabāgīśa¹) would be to then create a matching "block" and, while leaving the first in place, turn this duplicate "one-half" (that is, 180 degrees along the horizontal axis, and 180 degrees along the vertical axis) and then place it underneath (we

might say that the original stanza is turned upside-down and rolled over left-to-right).

Dandīn's example in [3.81] laid out in this manner, would be thus represented:

(1) ma no bha va ta va nī kam̄

(2) no da yā ya na mā ni nī

(3) bha yā da me yā mā mā vā

(4) va ya me no ma yā na ta

(4) ta na ya ma no me ya va

(3) vā mā mā yā me da yā bha

(2) nī ni mā na ya yā da no

(1) kam̄ nī va ta va bha no ma

We may note then, that given this pattern we have four ways of generating the original stanza: (1) from the top left, forward left-to-right down the four rows; (2) from the bottom right, right-to-left up the four rows; (3) from the top left, top-to-bottom across to the right four

columns; and (4) from the bottom right, bottom-to-top and across to the left four columns.

The second method (as presented by Gerow, Glossary/179) is easier to conceptualize. Now we have only have the original stanza arranged in four horizontal rows:

(1)	ma	no	bha	va	ta	va	nī	kam
(2)	no	da	yā	ya	na	mā	ni	nī
(3)	bha	yā	da	me	yā	mā	mā	vā
(4)	va	ya	me	no	ma	yā	na	ta

From the top left, we read in essentially a large counter-clockwise spiral, down the first column on the left, up the last column on the right; down the second column from the left, up the second column from the right, and so on. Following this movement we generate one reading of the original stanza.

Yet we may also consider that ardhabrahma involves the following. The four pādas of the original stanza are again

stacked vertically. When this is done we find that if we begin at the top left and move down we generate only one-half of the first pāda; and further we cannot do a complete reversal -- we must skip to the top of the second column and move down again to generate the first-half of the second pāda and so on to the right until but the first-half of each pāda appears. At this point we repeat the process but from the bottom right, moving up each column proceeding to the left, generating the second-half of each of the original four pādas in order as we go. We are limited to but a "half-reversal" in our movements, and can but generate one-half of a pāda as we proceed.

(3) Sarvatobhadra

With sarvatobhadra Premachandra again generates a second block of four pādas, but there is really no sense of logical extension from the preceding. In Gerow's case there is no mention of a "complete" helical movement, rather of "a verse, having the same number of lines as

syllables, which can be read backwards and forwards both vertically and horizontally" (Glossary/189).

Let us lay out in four rows stacked vertically the pādas of Dandīn's example of sarvatobhadra presented in [3.82]:

(1)	sā	mā	yā	mā	mā	yā	mā	sā
(2)	mā	rā	nā	yā	yā	nā	rā	mā
(3)	yā	nā	vā	rā	rā	vā	nā	yā
(4)	mā	yā	rā	mā	mā	rā	yā	mā

With sarvatobhadra we have "complete" movement, that is, we have the same cyclical movement as in ardhabrahmā -- down the first column, up the last, and so on -- but now we may also generate the original four pādas through a corresponding reverse helical movement. Thus, beginning at the top right syllable we proceed down that column, then up the first column on the left, down the second column in from the right, and so on.

And from another perspective, where in ardhabrahma we

were capable of only generating one-half of a pāda by moving down a given column, now we may do a complete reversal -- moving down and then immediately back up in each of the first four columns from the left will yield the four original pādas; where moving down and then immediately back up in the first four columns from the right will yield the original four pādas yet with each in reverse syllabic order.

Niyama or "Phonemic Restriction"

We have seen in the preceding the extreme variations in the four pāda stanza that may be achieved in Sanskrit given any number of "formatting" constraints. Hardly content to rest here, kavis sought the challenge of composing when the medium itself was constrained.

"The restriction of vowels, sthānas, or consonants to four or less is considered difficult to achieve -- These will now be shown / Otherwise a stanza is easy to compose"

[yah svarasthānavarnānāṁ niyamo duṣkarosvasau |
iṣṭaścatuhprabhṛtyeṣa darśyate sukaraḥ parah ||] [3.83].

That is, one must compose a stanza given a specific restriction (niyama) on either the number of svaras ("vowels"), sthānas (physical points of verbal articulation), or varnas (literally, "letters"; "consonants").² If the number allowed for the given category is five or more, the task is considered "easy" (sukara) -- four or less are considered another matter (duṣkara).

Dandin presents a series of twelve examples, four for each category of niyama, as follows:

(1) Svara or "Vowel Restriction"

[3.84] Restriction to four vowels: [ā / ī / ō / ē].

In this case, each of the four pādas displays only one of these four vowels.

[3.85] Restriction to three vowels: [a / i / u].

[3.86] Restriction to two vowels: [ī / ē]

(With [ī] appearing alone in the first two pādas, [ē] appearing alone in the last two pādas).

[3.87] Restriction to one vowel: [ā].

(2) Sthāna or "Articulatory Restriction"

[3.88] Restriction to four sthānas: [danta ("teeth" / tālu ("palate") / mūrdhan ("top of the palate") / kanṭha ("throat")].

[3.89] Restriction to three sthānas: [danta / tālu / kanṭha].

[3.90] Restriction to two sthānas: [danta / kanṭha].

[3.91] Restriction to one sthāna: [kanṭha].

(3) Varna or "Consonant Restriction"

(Where the vowel added to realize the consonants does not itself appear to be restricted.)

[3.92] Restriction to four consonants: [r / g / k / m].

[3.93] Restriction to three consonants: [d / n / v].

[3.94] Restriction to two consonants: [r / s].

[3.95] Restriction to one consonant: [r].

We might add that Daṇḍin provides an excellent example of sthāna niyama in Chapter One of his Daśakumāracarita. The entire chapter is written without employing any labial (osthya) letters -- reflecting the state of the protagonist Mantragupta's lips, sore from excessive love play.

Prahelikā or the "Riddle"

Dandin follows his various types of duskara śabda alamkāras, which focus essentially on the syllable -- whether in restriction (niyama), or in selective arrangement in the service of a preconceived pattern of reading movement (gomūtrika) and/or repetition (ardha-bhrama and sarvatobhadra) -- with an entirely new category.

"Thus in the path of those duṣkara varieties a method is demonstrated / The method of the varieties of Prahelikā will now be explained" [iti duṣkaramārgopi kaśvidādarśitah kramah | prahelikāprakārāṇām punaruddiṣyate gatiḥ ||] [3.96]. The prahelikā is a "riddle" or "literary puzzle," a question and answer happily couched in resolvable ambiguity.

Evident throughout Indian literature, riddles appear in the Vedas as brahmodya or brahmavadya "désigne dans le rituel védique un échange de questions et de réponses entre les participants du culte, échange qui se situe à certaines

moments essentiels de la liturgie."³ And even here their entertainment value is evident, "[The Brahmans] employ a very interesting form of poetic riddle or charade to enliven the mechanical and technical progress of the sacrifice by impressive intellectual pyrotechnics."⁴

As Dandin continues, "Prahelikās are useful in the entertainments of playful gatherings [of literary connoisseurs] (gosthīs) / for private conversation between those familiar with these when in public / and for the confusion of others" [kṛīdāgoṣṭhīvinodesu tajjñair-ākīrṇamantranē | paravyāmohane cāpi sopayogāḥ prahelikāḥ ||] [3.97].

Dandin itemizes sixteen varieties of prahelikā, yet it is extremely important to note the verses immediately preceding his various examples. [3.106] "These are the sixteen prahelikās indicted by previous teachers / yet fourteen other defective (dusta) prahelikās were also taught by them" [etāḥ ṣodaśa nirdiṣṭāḥ pūrvacāryaiḥ prahelikāḥ | duṣṭaprahelikāścānyāstairadhītāścaturdaśa ||]

[3.106]. "We however -- assuming the defects to be innumerable -- shall speak only of the good ones / The defective ones will be left without characterization "
 [dosānaparisamkhyeyān manyamānā vayam punah | sādhvīr-
 evābhidhāsyāmastā duṣṭā yāstvalakṣaṇāḥ ||] [3.107]. Once again, we have evidence of an active earlier formal tradition from which Daṇḍin drew.

And we should be aware that the various varieties of prahelikā involve an array of patterned technique and structure that goes beyond what we may causually take the "riddle" to be. That "although riddle poetry belongs to

the short form of kāvya and, frequently being composed on the spur of the moment, has often not been preserved, there can be no doubt that it was one of the most popular forms of Indian lyrical poetry. In many respects it conformed to the requirements of kāvya: it was written in many different metres, some of them difficult, it made use of an unusual vocabulary comprehensible only to the connoisseur and, like so many other poems, it was two-dimensional in that behind the meaning first perceived, in this case the question, there lay a second, hidden meaning in the poem; the answer, which the reader or listener had to decipher for himself.⁵

Daṇḍin's sixteen varieties of prahelikā are the following:

(1) samāgatā / "Where meaning is hidden through the coalescence of words" [āhuḥ samāgatāṁ nāma gūḍhārthā padasamādhinā |] [3.98ab], with an example in [3.108].

(2) vañcita / "Where there is deception through a word whose usual denotation is other [than that intended]" [vañcitānyatra rūḍhena yatra śabdena vañcanā ||] [3.98cd], with an example in [3.109].

Daṇḍin's first two varieties of prahelikā reflect his two primary categories of ślesa alamkāra [2.310-22]. In samāgatā, bhinnā ślesa is involved. The ease of word "coalescence" in Sanskrit may easily be employed to create an intentional ambiguity. Here a unitary string of syllables may be variously broken up, yielding respectively varying meanings.

With vañcita prahelikā, abhinnā ślesa is displayed. Now the words as such are clearly integral, but a given

word may express more than one meaning. In each case, "hesitation between two meanings, both of them possible, at first tends to throw the hearer off. But secondary factors allow him to choose between the two and, in case of multiple meanings, to determine a hierarchy."⁶

(3) vyutkrāntā /"creates confusion through the employment of [related words] excessively separated" [vyutkrāntātivyavahitaprayogānmohakāriṇī |] [3.99ab], with an example in [3.110]. Ludwik Sternbach comments, "Today, this would not be considered as a riddle sensu stricto but as . . . not well construed and because of that difficult to understand. The difficulty in understanding . . . depends on using wit and intelligence and therefore it was considered in ancient India as a riddle."⁷

In vyutkrāntā prahelikā there is really only one correct interpretation. Through separating words which would otherwise be ordered quite closely (to aid the understanding), confusion arises.

(4) pramuṣitā / "Where the succession of words contains a meaning difficult to understand" [sā syāt pramuṣitā yasyām durbodhārthā padāvalī ||] [3.99cd], with an example in [3.111]. As in the preceding vyutkrāntā, confusion arises. Yet now it is due to the employment of rare and obscure words, to an unusual semantic presentation rather than an unusual syntactic arrangement.

(5) samānarūpā / "The one strewn with words employed with indirect (gauṇa) meanings" [samānārūpā gaunārthā-ropitairgrathitā padaiḥ ||] [3.100ab], with an example in [3.112]. Going beyond the literal meanings of a number of the words actually presented, the solution of samānarūpā is to be found in the realization of various indirect or figurative meanings. Samānarūpā is an extension of the previous [3.98cd] vañcita prahelikā, where but a single word is to be taken in a secondary or figurative sense. Clearly the focus is upon artha ("meaning") rather than upon śabda ("sound" or the phonemic entity) in such varieties as

vañcitā, pramusitā and samānarūpā. Indeed Marie-Claude Porcher would see samānarūpā reflecting atiśayokti alamkāra [2.214-20]:

The classification of the metaphorical process within the prahelikā should not overshadow the fact that this same process gives rise to the figure of speech atiśayokti. . . . Thus [this] prahelikā does not differ -- linguistically from the figure of speech atiśayokti, which belongs to the arthālaṅkāra. The disappearance of one term of the comparison [a beautiful woman is compared to a creeper or vine in the example of [3.112] casts a doubt in the mind of the reader and results in an enigma: thus the process itself has been classified as a part of the prahelikā.⁸

(6) parusā / "With a word etymologically derived merely due to the existence of grammatical rules (laksana)" [parusā lakṣaṇāstitvamātravyutpāditaśrutih ||] [3.100cd], with an example in [3.113]. Now the solution of the prahelikā lies in the correct application of derivational grammatical rules to a given word -- whose usual meaning is evident -- generating a second meaning which the speaker or writer wishes to convey. In the example [3.113], "surāḥ"

clearly means "gods," yet through the application of Pāṇinian rules [3.1.21] and [3.1.134] the additional and desired meaning of "drinkers," "drunkards" is revealed.⁹

(7) samkhyātā / "Where enumeration (sam-khyāna) is the cause of perplexity" [samkhyātā nāma samkhyānam yatra vyāmohakāraṇam |] [3.101ab], with an example in [3.114]. Although clues are given, the solution now depends upon the correct application of enumerated attributes. The example for this prahelikā is held to be evidence for Daṇḍin's habitation in the South: "There is a city with a nasal (nāsikya) in the middle / embellished on the sides with [a total of] four letters / Wherein there are kings whose names have eight letters" [nāsikyamadhyā paritaścatur-varṇavibhūṣitā | asti kācitpurī yasyāmaṣṭavarṇāhvayānṛpāḥ ||] [3.114]. The city is thus Kāñcī and with Pallavaḥ as the name of its kings.¹⁰

(8) prakalpitā / "Where the meaning of a sentence (vākyā) appears other [than what one intends]" [anyathā

bhāsate yatra vākyārthah sā prakalpitā || [3.101cd], with an example in [3.115]. The focus is now on the meaning conveyed at the sentence level. A word appears to be ambiguous, but the context of the whole indicates the correct solution. In the example [3.115] the word "vrddhe" (as the vocative of vrddhā) would initially lead one to assume that the verse is addressed to an "old woman" -- in conflict with the male speaker's evident physical agitation, one "waiting with stumbling words, bowed head, pathetic glance, and trembling" [*girā skhalantyā namreṇaśirasā dīnayā drśā | tiṣṭhantamapi sotkampam vrddhe mām nānukampase ||*]. Yet vrddhā may also refer to the goddess of wealth Laks̄mi, and given the context this sense should be selected.¹¹

(9) nāmāntaritā / "Where in regard to a name there is the postulation of various meanings" [*sā nāmāntaritā yasyām nāmni nānārthakalpanā |*] [3.102ab], with an example in [3.116]. Again we have multiple possible meanings, yet

now resolution of ambiguity rests on the correct identification of a specific nominal or "name." [3.116] "Oh You of unsteady eyes! Something well-known on the earth (pārthivah) is at first called a king (rājā) and eternal / But this one is neither a king nor eternal" [ādau rājetyadhīrākṣi pārthivah kopi gīyate | sanātanaśca naivāsau rājā nāpi sanātanah ||]. From this one should infer that the alternate reading of pārthivah, "one born from the earth" or "tree" is correct. And combining disparate elements explicit albeit "hidden" in the verse -- [rājā (+) (sana-) tanas] -- the name of a particular tree, the Rājātana, is found.

(10) nibhṛtā / "The one that has another meaning concealed (nibhṛta) in words that touch on common attributes (dharmaś)" [nibhṛtā nibhṛtānyārthā tulya-dharmaśprśā girā ||] [3.102cd], with an example in [3.117]. The denial of what one would initially assume to be the subject of a series of attributes leads to the inference of

the correct subject -- and the reinterpretation of the attributes to respectively correspond.

As Gerow notes (Glossary/212), nibhṛtā may be compared to samānarūpa [3.100ab, 112]. Here we have a series of "hidden" attributes, "adjectival comparability"; in the latter a "similarity of form," or "nominal comparability."

(11) samānaśabda / "The one realized through synonyms (paryāya) of the words actually expressed" [samāna-śabdopanyastaśabdaparyāyasādhitā |] [3.103ab], with an example in [3.118]. One must now derive appropriate synonyms for certain explicit words, and apply them to the verse as a whole.

We find in the example [3.118], "Sweet speaker! That of yours whose name is 'non-earth' (a-bhūmi) [bhūmi = dharā > adhara = "lower lip"] / which has conquered that whose name is 'extensive hair' (pra-krṣṭa-keśa) [keśa = vāla > pravāla = "tender bud"]. . . ." That is, "That lower lip of yours, which has conquered the tender bud [the lower lip

is similar in shape to the tender bud yet conquers it
surpassing beauty] now generates a great desire in me"

[jitaprakṛṣṭakeśākhyo yastavābhūmisāhvayah | sa māmadya
prabhūtotkam karoti kalabhāṣīṇī ||].

As nāmāntaritā prahelikā [3.102ab, 116] focused on the correct resolution of homonyms, now success depends upon the correct identification of synonyms.

(12) sammūḍhā / "Where perplexity appears despite a meaning directly stated" [sammūḍhā nāma yā sāksānnir-diṣṭārthāpi mūḍhaye ||] [3.103cd], with an example in [3.119]. In the previous vyutkrāntā prahelikā [3.99ab, 110] confusion arises from syntactical displacement. In sammūḍhā the evident meaning makes little sense.

In the first half-stanza of Dāṇḍin's example [3.119], two lovers on a bed turn away from each other out of anger.

Yet the second-half reads, "Lying down in a similar way out of passion they freely kissed [each other's] mouths"
[śayaniye parāvṛttya śayitau kāmina॒ krudhā | tathaiva

śayitau rāgat svairam mukhamacumbatām ||]. Following the action of the first-half, "Lying down in a similar way" would initially seem to indicate that they again "turned away." Yet given the contradiction, "in a similar way" may simply mean "again they turned over."

(13) parihārikā / "Whose form is a succession [of words] from the combination of which another word is derived" [yogamālātmikā nāma yā syāt sā parihārikā |] [3.104ab], with an example in [3.120]. In pramusitā prahelikā [3.99cd, 111] the meaning of obscure words must be found. Parihārikā is similar -- now a continuous string of words, conjoined through compounding, is in fact a series of epithets which (1) must be correctly broken up, and (2) the meaning must be correctly grasped.

(14) ekacchannā / "Where the dependent (āśrita) is evident and the basis of dependence (āśraya) is hidden" [ekacchannāśritam vyaktam yasyāmāśrayagopanam ||] [3.104cd], with an example in [3.121]. Here but part of a

subsuming whole is directly provided as a clue. Yet further, the "whole" is present as well -- but one step removed. This is clarified by the example in [3.121].

"This hand (hasta) of something which is not human (āmanusya) never touches a weapon nor a women's breasts / Yet surely it is not without fruit" [na sprśatyāyudham jātu na strīṇāṁ stanamandalam | amanusyasya kasyāpi hastoyam na kilāphalah ||]. "Fruit" is provided as the dependent part (āśrita). Given this and the further clues of the verse, one might recognize that a synonym of amanusya ("not human") is "gandharva" (a celestial being). And this combined with hasta ("hand") would indeed generate "gandharvahasta," a specific species of tree, the Eranḍa -- thus the "basis of dependence" (āśraya).

Ekacchannā prahelikā thus not only incorporates a specific type of relationship (part/whole) in varying degrees of exposure, but it also utilizes a technique that we have seen in samānaśabda [3.103ab] -- pointing to a "hidden" element through explicitly including a relevant synonym (paryāya).

(15) ubhayacchannā / "Where there is concealment of both [the dependent (āśrita) and the basis of dependence (āśraya)]" [sa bhavedubhayacchannā yasyāmubhayagopanam |] [3.105ab], with an example in [3.122]. Ubhayacchannā ("with both hidden") merely extends the process of the preceding.

In the example [3.122] we find, "Who (kah) joining along with whom (kena) participate in all actions but if seen together at the time of eating one of them is cast away?" [kena kah saha sambhūya sarvakāryeṣu sam-nidhim | labdhvā bhojanakāle tu yadi dr̥ṣṭo nirasyate ||]. Given the clues provided, one might see the synonyms of or double meanings reflected by the words kah/kena. Kah itself may mean (among other things) "head" or "hair"; with kena then seen as simply the instrumental singular pronoun. Alternately, kah could be taken as a synonym of "keśah" or "hair" (the one "joining along with"), with kena specifically marking the instrumental singular as synonym of "mastaka" or "with the head."

The Ten Dosas or "Faults" and their Positive Transformations

The final section of Dandin's Third Chapter is devoted to an exposition of the ten dosas or "faults" that may mar kāvya and thus inhibit the proper generation of śobhā.

Dandin at the beginning of the Kāvyādarśa [1.7] stresses the extreme importance of avoiding defects: "Therefore a flaw in kāvya however slight should not be neglected -- A body however beautiful would become ugly through a single blemish."

The importance of avoiding and eliminating dosas in kāvya is indeed a constant element throughout the literature. "Whatever controversy might have existed amongst theorists of different ages and schools regarding the character and relative importance of . . . [the] embellishing elements in their theory of poetry, they have all agreed upon one fundamental point, namely, . . . they have insisted upon the avoidance . . . of Dosas or poetic flaws. . . ."¹²

Although we grant the above, we should further immediately note that there has hardly been an equality of opinion, for the "Theorists themselves have hardly concurred with regard to the nature and scope of the individual Doṣas -- their classification, number and nomenclature, and their relationship with other poetic factors."¹³ A doṣa for one writer might be a guna or "excellence" for another. Thus perhaps the most important point to realize is that a doṣa as such is not necessarily absolute -- one of the most distinctive features of Daṇdin's presentation is his indication of how, with an alternate situation or desired effect, a doṣa may be transformed into a positive factor.

Daṇdin lists the ten doṣas in [3.125-26ab], and remarks before proceeding with his presentation, "There are only ten doṣas -- These should be avoided by the wise" [iti doṣā daśaivaite varjyāḥ kāvyeṣu sūribhīḥ ||] [3.126cd]. "Whether a deficiency in pratijñā, hetu, or drṣṭānta is a doṣa or not -- The analysis of this is

generally difficult / What's the use of merely touching upon it?" [*pratijñāhetudṛṣṭāntahānirdośo na vetyasau | vicārah karkaśah prāyastenāliḍhena kim phalam ||*] [3.127].

Dandīn is referring here to those who would apparently pass somewhat lightly over a consideration of faults in logical reasoning. Specifically, this entails deficiencies in the nyāya or -- etymologically -- the "argument that leads one to the establishment of intended meaning."¹⁴ And the commentator Vātsyāyana writes under Nyāya Sūtra [1.1.1], "What then is this nyāya? Nyāya is the examination of an object with the help of the instruments of valid knowledge (pramāṇas)."¹⁵

"Nyāya" also refers to the structured and formal logical argument which comprises the five following components (according to the Nyāya Sūtra) -- three of which Dandīn mentions above, and all of which then must be free of fault:

(1) pratijñā (Nyāya Sūtra [1.1.33]) / "The statement

of what is to be proved" (sādya nirdeśah); the thesis or probandum.

(2) hetu [1.1.34-35] / The basis for the establishment of the thesis "through similarity or dissimilarity of the subject [pakṣa] with the instance,"¹⁶ that is, the example (udāharana).

(3) udāharana [1.1.36-37] / The exemplification or example which is an instance (drṣṭānta -- the term Daṇḍin employs) "similar or dissimilar to the subject either possessing its characteristics or being opposite to it in nature." Drṣṭānta is defined in [1.1.25] as "An object with regard to which the layman and expert hold the same opinion" [laukikaparīksakānām yasminnarthe buddhisāmyam sa drṣṭāntah |].

(4) upanaya [1.1.38] / "Application is the proposition which characterises the subject as 'this is similar' (tathā) or as 'this is not similar' (na tathā) according to the nature of the instance cited."¹⁷

(5) nigamana [1.1.39] / The conclusion, a restatement

of the thesis prefaced by the statement of the reason (hetu).

Some would take Dāṇḍin's verse [3.127] as a direct reference to Bhāmaha's discussion of logic and its possible defects in Chapter Five of the Kāvyālaṅkāra. Given the fifth chapter's first verse, one's speculations are easily led in this direction, "Now the fault of a deficiency in the pratijñā, hetu and so on will be described / It will be brief and according to [the tenets of] nyāya -- The purpose is to indicate but an idea of these" [atha pratijñā-hetvādihīnam duṣṭam ca varnyate | samāsena yathānyāyam tanmātrārtha pratītaye ||] (KA [5.1]). As A. K. Warder remarks, "Bhāmaha . . . proposes to compose kāvya in the guise of logical propositions and arguments based on experience. There must be verisimilitude, probability and agreement with both reason and the ways of the world" (although Bhāmaha viewing kāvya as a "guise" for logical proposition is surely overstated).¹⁸

Dāṇḍin devotes the remainder of Chapter Three to a

presentation of the ten *dosas*, their definitions and potentialities for transformation:

(1) *apārtha* [3.128-30] / "The one considered to be collectively void of meaning is *apārtha* / This is defective except in the exclamations of the insane, the intoxicated, and children" [samudāyārthaśūnyam tadapārthamitīṣyate | unmattamattabālānāmukteranyatra dusyati ||] [3.128].

As in, for example, "The ocean is being drunk by devas / I am afflicted with old age / These clouds are thundering / Airāvāṇa is dear to Indra" [samudrah pīyate devair-ahamasmi jarāturaḥ | amī garjanti jīmūtā harerairāvāṇah priyah ||] [3.129]. There is no semantic coherence or connection between these four *pādas* -- the verse as a whole is "void of meaning."

(2) *vyartha* [3.131-34] / "Where there is inconsistency between earlier and later sections in either a single sentence or a text / Due to displaying contradictory meaning. . . ." [ekavākye prabandhe vā pūrvāparāhatam | viruddhārthatayā vyarthamiti doṣesu paṭhyate ||] [3.131].

Yet "There is a certain state displayed by the mind when deeply preoccupied / wherein even an expression whose meaning is contradictory would be accepted" [asti kācid-avasthā sā sābhisaṅgasya cetasaḥ | yasyāṁ bhavedabhimatā viruddhārthāpi bhāratī ||] [3.133].

As in, for example, "How is desire for another's wife worthy of me -- a noble man? / Oh when can I drink from her shining lips?" [paradārābhilāśo me kathamāryasya yujyate | pibāmi tarakām tasyāḥ kadā nu daśanacchadam ||] [3.134].

In the initial section of the verse a man is aware of feelings improper for one of such noble birth; "but in the next moment his mind is peculiarly engrossed by the overpowering influence of passion which drowns the logical sense and moral propriety."¹⁹ When such seemingly contradictory expressions stem from such a mind as this, from one deeply engrossed or preoccupied due to an overpowering emotion there is not necessarily a flaw.

(3) ekārtha [3.135-38] / "If what is stated earlier is stated again / With reference to either meaning or the

words without any difference. . . ." [aviśeṣena pūrvoktam
yadi bhūyopi kīrtyate | arthataḥ śabdato vāpi tadekārtham
matam yathā ||] [3.135].

As in, for example, "These deep water-bearers, possessors of lightning, thunderous ones -- with a color like her curls -- cause longing in that longing girl" [utkāmum-
manayantete bālāṁ tadalakatviṣah | ambhodharāstaditvanto
gambhīrāḥ stanayitnavah ||] [3.136].

Ekārtha then refers to excessive repetition. In our example the senses of utkam ("one with longing") and ud-
manayanti ("these causing longing") both overlap. And further, ambhas-dharāḥ ("water-bearers"), taditvantah ("possessors of lightning"), and stanayitnavah ("thunderous ones") are all epithets for "clouds." Yet "If one wishes to express an excess of compassion and so on / Then even repetition is not a fault -- Rather this is an embellishment" [anukampādyatiśayo yadi kaścidvivakṣyate | na doṣah
punaruktopi pratyuteyamalamkriyā ||] [3.137].

(4) sasamśaya [3.139-43] / "If words employed for

the sake of precision cause doubt / This is certainly a fault. . . ." [*nirṇayārtham* prayuktāni samśayam janayanti cet | vacāṁsi doṣa evāsau sasamśaya iti smṛtah ||] [3.139]. Yet "If this is sometimes employed with the intention [of presenting] doubt itself then it would surely be an embellishment -- There is no fault in this case. . . ." [*īdrśam* samśayāyaiva yadi jātu prayujyate | syādalāmkaṛa evāsau na doṣastatra tadyathā ||] [3.141].

As in, for example, "I see her / That faultless lady possessed by disease born of love / not born of love / Captured by that hard-hearted death / season -- What's the point of us [entertaining] hope for her?" [*paśyāmyan-añgajātañkalañghitām* tāmaninditām | kālenaiva kāthoreṇa grastām kim nastadāśayā ||] [3.142]. Ambiguity here arises from the usage of [an-añga-ja], which may mean either "born of love (anāñgaja) or "not born of love" (an-añgaja); and of [kālena], which may mean either "by death" (that is, "love"), or "by that ((hot) season." Yet there is no fault in this case, for as Daṇḍin explains, "Whether his

lady is afflicted by love or scorched by heat / A female messenger has teasingly spoken words creating uncertainty in order to confuse the young lover" [kāmārtā gharmataptā vetyaniścayakaram vacah | yuvānamākulikartumiti dūtyāha narmanā ||] [3.143].

(5) apakrama [3.144-47] / "If a later formulation referring to items is not made in sequential conformity with their prior formulation. . . ." [uddeśānuguṇorthānāmanūddeśo na cet kṛtaḥ | apakramābhidhānam tamdoṣamā- cakṣate budhāḥ ||] [3.144].

As in, for example, "Those responsible for the maintenance, creation and destruction of the worlds . . . / May these - Śambhu [Śiva], Nārāyaṇa [Viṣṇu] and Ambhoja [Brahmā] -- protect you!" [sthitinirmāṇasamṝahetavo jagatāmamī | śambhunārāyanāmbhojayonayah pālayantu vah ||] [3.145]. In conformity with the first formulation here -- the roles of maintenance, creation, and destruction -- the latter formulation of the gods responsible should rather be: Viṣṇu, Brahmā, and Śiva.

"But if an effort -- the cause of one clearly realizing the relationship involved -- is made [by the kavi] / Then the wise declare that even transgressing the order in not a fault" [*yatnah sambandhavijñānahetukopikṛto yadi | kramalañghanamapyāhuḥ sūrayo naiva dūṣanam ||*] [3.146].

As in, for example, "Leaving one's relatives, leaving one's body, and leaving one's country -- In these three the first and the last excessive distress / The middle but a momentary fever" [*bandhut্যāgastanutyāgo deśatyāga iti triṣu | ādyantāvāyatakleśau madhyamah kṣaṇikajvarah ||*] [3.147].

(6) śabdahīna [3.148-51] / "In the usage of words when the path between a rule and its range of application is not discernible / and when unacceptable to the authorities (śiṣṭa) this is Śabdahīna / Yet when acceptable to the authorities this is not defective" [*śabdahīnamanālakṣyalakṣyalakṣaṇapaddhatih | padaprayogośiṣṭeṣṭah śiṣṭeṣṭastu naduṣyati ||*] [3.148].

Clearly ungrammatical usage is a flaw. Yet what at

first may seem unacceptable may indeed be permissible for those whose knowledge of language runs deep. As in, for example, "The breeze coming off the southern mountain makes the Mango trees shine with gently trembling buds and shoots" [dakṣinādrerupasaran mārutaścūtapādapān | kurute lalitādhūtapravālāñkuraśobhinah ||] [3.150].

In this case we have what might initially appear to be two grammatical faults: (1) In upa-saran [vartamāne krdanta < *sr̥], the verbal root [*sr̥] should be replaced by the verbal root [*dhāu] in the present participle form (according to Pāṇini [7.3.78]). But this should only apply when [*sr̥] means "quick moving," "running." As here "slow movement" is meant, upasaran is acceptable.

And (2) Where a verbal root may take both ātmanepada and parasmaipada endings, such as the root [*kr̥] here > kurute, the ātmanepada form should be used if the one benefiting from or acting as the recipient of that verbal action is the agent itself; if not then the parasmaipada form should be employed. In this case one would initially

assume that kurute -- having an ātmanepada ending -- is incorrect since the agent of the action, the "breeze," is affecting others. But as it turns out, if the agent is insentient -- as here -- this rule does not apply. It is well to heed Dandin's following remark, "Cases such as these appear as solecisms to those whose minds are too lazy to see into the vastness of the sūtras -- And these do not relinquish beauty" [ityādiśāstramāhātmyadarśanālasa-cetasām | upabhāṣaṇavadbhati na ca saubhāgyamujjhati ||] [3.151].

(7) yatibhraṣṭa [3.152-55] / "A break between words whose position is specified is known as yati / A deviation from this -- jarring to the ear -- is yatibhraṣṭa" [ślokesu niyatasthānam padacchedam yatim viduh | tadapetam yatibhraṣṭam śravaṇodvejanam yathā ||] [3.152].

An example follows in [3.153] which is in the mandā-krāntā metre. This displays a "samavṛtta" padya where the number and position of syllables in each pāda are equivalent. It has seventeen syllables to the pāda and is

represented by the following ganas: [ma / bha / na / ta / ta / ga / ga], that is, [_ _ _ _ u u u u u _ _ u _ _ u _ _]; and with yatis or "specified word breaks" after the fourth, tenth, and seventeenth syllable of each pāda (further breaks may occur, but the above are mandatory). Yet here we find that a word breaks occur in the first pāda after the fifth and eighth syllables; in the second pāda after the fifth and seventh syllables; in the third pāda after the fifth and seventh syllables again; and in the fourth pāda after the fourth, which is correct, and after the seventh. It is not that these breaks are necessarily incorrect, but that, with the exception of the first position in the fourth pāda, the word breaks specified by yati do not occur and thus we have fault.

(8) bhinnavṛtta [3.156-58] / "A deficiency or excess of syllables / Improper placement of heavy and light syllables -- This is bhinnavṛtta / This doṣa is truly censured" [varṇānāṁ nyūnatādhikye gurulaghvayathā-
sthitiḥ | tatra tadbhinnavṛttam syādeṣa doṣah sunindi-

tah ||] [3.156]. Again, a syllable where the vowel is long [ā / ī / ū / ṣ̥ / e / ai / o / au], or where the vowel is short but followed by either an anusvāra (-ṁ), visarga (-ḥ), or a consonant cluster is considered guru or "heavy." A syllable where the vowel is short [a / i / u / ṣ], and not otherwise qualified is laghu or "light." And further, the last syllable of any pāda may be considered long or short -- regardless of its natural length -- depending on the demands of the given metre.

Daṇḍin's examples display both aspects of bhinnavṛtta.

In [3.157], in the common anuṣṭubh metre with eight syllables to the pāda, we find that the first two pādas are deficient by one syllable, where the last two pādas have one extra syllable. In [3.158] the first pāda is in the indravajrā metre which consists of eleven syllables to the pāda, with the following gaṇas: [ta / ta / ja / ga / ga]. A single pāda in this metre would then be [_ _ u _ _ u u _ u _ _]. Yet now the second syllable is short [da] when

it should be long, and thus we have the improper placement of a light syllable.

(9) visandhi [3.159-61] / "'I do not intend to speak quickly' -- The failure to combine words [properly resulting from this intention] is visandhi / But not where the cause [of hiatus] is due to pragṛhya and so on" [na samhitāṁ vivakṣāmityasamdhānam padeṣu yat | tadvisamdhīti nirdiṣṭāṁ na pragṛhyādihetukam ||] [3.159]. With "pragṛhya" there is an exemption to the usual sandhi rules, and thus the absence of what would otherwise be a fault. As Pāṇini specifies [1.1.11-19] this involves (a) [i/ī], [u/ū], and [e] when appearing as dual endings; (b) the [i] of the pronoun amī; and (c) the vowels of particles (of a single vowel) or of interjections. And further in Aṣṭādhyāyī [6.1.125] he notes, "Pluta and pragṛha vowels are not altered when followed by [another] vowel," where "pluta" vowels [8.2.82-108] are "protracted vowels possessed of three mātrās," that is, they take longer to pronounce than the regular long (dīrgha) vowels.

In [3.160] we have an example with the word "calatā [(m.) (intr.) vartamāne kṛdanta] /"moving," separated from the immediately following aṅganā- /"beautiful women" -- these should be combined. In the following example [3.161] the dvandva compound in the nominative dual māna-īrsye /"anger and jealousy" is separated from the adjacent iha /"here" -- yet "This kind of hiatus is accepted by the wise" [mānerṣye iha śiryete strināṁ himartau priye | āsu rātriśviti prajñairāmnātām vyastamīdrśam ||] [3.161].

(10) deśādivirodhī [3.162-85] / That is, "deśa," "kāla," "kalā," "loka," "nyāya," and "āgama" virodhī. "Deśa ["place"] refers to mountains, forests, kingdoms, and so on / Kāla ["time"] refers to night, day, and the seasons / The Kalās [the "skills"] are dance, song and so on -- the bases of kāma and artha" [deśodrivanarāṣṭrādiḥ kālo rātrīmdivartavaḥ | nr̥tyagītaprabhṛtayah kalāḥ kāmārtha-samśrayāḥ ||] [3.162]. "The behavior of mobile and immobile beings is termed Loka / Nyāya refers to the branches of knowledge based upon reasoning / And Śruti along with Smṛti

are Āgama"²⁰ [carācarānām bhūtānām pravṛttirlokaśamjñitā | hetuvidyātmako nyāyah sasmṛtiḥ śrutiरāgamah ||] [3.163].

"If something is presented which is not in accord with what is established regarding each of these -- due to an error of the kavi. . . ." [teṣu teṣvayathārūḍham yadi kiṁcit pravartate | kaveḥ pramādaddesādivirodhityetad-ucyate ||] [3.164]. This doṣa thus subsumes all forms of contradiction ("virodha") between what is evident in a verse and what is conventionally established in a number of areas. Daṇḍin lays out the following specific types:

(1) deśa virodhi [3.165-66] / "contradiction with respect to place." As in, for example, "The Chola domains are the lands along the banks of the Kāverī river / dark with the black Aguru trees. . . ." [colāḥ kālāguruśyāma- kāverītirabhūmayah ||] [3.166ab]. Yet at the probable time of Daṇḍin's writing, at the height of Pallava rule, the Cholas no longer controlled the banks of the Kāverī River, nor do Aguru trees grow along its bank.

(2) kāla virodhi [3.167-169ab] / "contradiction with

respect to time." As in, for example, "The Padminī wakes-up at night / The Kumudvatī blooms during the day / Spring displays the blossomed Nicula / And summer has but cloud days" [padminī naktamunnidrā sphuṭatyahni kumudvatī | madhurutphullaniculo nidāgho meghadurdinah ||] [3.167]. In actuality, the "Padminī" opens during the day; the "Kumudvatī" blooms at night; the "Nicula" grass blossoms during the rainy season; and the "Summer days" are hot and clear.

(3) kalā virodhī [3.169cd-171] / "contradiction with respect to the "skills." As in, for example, "The underlying bhāvas of the vīra and śṛṅgāras rasas are Anger (krodha) and Wonder (vismaya) / The bhinna mārga proceeds filled with the seven notes" [vīraśṛṅgārayorbhāvau sthāyinau krodhavismayau | pūrṇasaptasvarah soyam bhinnamārgah pravartate ||] [3.170].

In kalā virodhī we have contradiction with respect to any of the sixty-four kalās or "skills." Thus the underlying bhāva of vīra or the "heroic" rasa is not

"anger" but rather "resolve" (utsāha) ; the underlying bhāva of śrṅgāra or the "erotic" rasa is not "wonder" but rather "love" (rati). Similarly, now with respect to classical Indian music, the "bhinna mārga" ("broken path") utilizes but one of the seven svaras or "notes" (śadja [sa] / risabha [ri] / gāndhāra [ga] / madhyama [ma] / panchama [pa] / dhaivata [dha] / and niṣāda [ni]) -- not all seven.

"In this way let contradiction within the sixty-four kalās be properly imagined / Their character will become clear in the kalā pariccheda" [ittham kalācatuhṣaṣṭi-virodhah sādhu nīytām | tasyāḥ kalāparicchede rūpamāvir-bhaviṣyati] [3.171]. This verse has been taken by some as evidence for a fourth, lost chapter to the Kāvyādarśa ("pariccheda" as "chapter"). Yet pariccheda also means simply "section," "division" in general, and Daṇḍin may be referring here to the various sections of other works that present the various kalās. And too the kalās, especially those concerned with music and the visual arts, are not considered formally within the extant central kāvya

sāstra texts -- but are rather found elsewhere in close association with the exposition of drama, the theatre, musical theory, and so on.

(4) loka virodhī [3.172-173ab] / "contradiction with respect to conventional knowledge." As in, for example, "The elephant has a wavy mane / The horse has sharp horns / The Eranḍa tree has great strength / The Khadira tree is without strength" [ādhūtakesaḥ hastī tiksṇaśrṅgas-turaṅgamah | gurusāroyamerando nihsārah khadiradrumah ||] [3.172]. Loka virodhī is a dōṣa stemming from error with respect to conventional, "worldly" (loka) knowledge. Just as the physical form of the elephant and the horse are well-known, so would the Eranḍa ("Castor Oil") "tree" be recognized as more or less a large shrub, hardly renowned for strength. Where the Khadira tree, on the contrary, has great strength, being used for the tips of ploughshares, sword handles, pestles, the axle-pins of chariots, and so on. "According to the Aitreya Brāhmaṇa he who desires heaven ought to make his sacrificial post of Khadira wood.

In the Aśvamedha yajña [sacrifice] of Daśaratha [a reference to the Ādikāṇḍa of the Rāmāyaṇa, 14th sarga] Khadira wood was used in making a sacrificial post."²¹

(5) nyāya virodhi [3.173cd-176ab] / "contradiction with respect to reasoning." "Contradiction with respect to the branches of knowledge that are based upon reasoning (hetu) will now be shown" [virodho hetuvidyāsu nyāyākhyāsu nidarsyate ||] [3.173cd]. As in, for example, "The Sugata [Buddha] indeed spoke truly [in affirming] that the samskāras are imperishable / Surely its so / For that Cakora-eyed lady remains in my heart even now" [satyamevāha sugataḥ samskārānavaṇīśvarān | tathāhi sā cakorakṣī sthitaivādyāpi me hr̥di ||] [3.174].

samskāras / memory or mental impressions, especially those of previous states of reincarnation. In Buddhism, a mental construction or image held to be real (unlike a mirage) though in actuality without any true, inherent existence.

cakora / a bird said to feed on moonbeams, and whose beautiful eyes are said to turn red at the sight of poisoned food.

Yet in truth the reasoning of the Sugata on the "imperishability" of the samskāras is quite otherwise: "The Tathāgata proclaims the truth (dharma) from the Middle Position: Conditioned by ignorance (avidyā) are the constructions (samskāras); the stopping of the constructions is from the utter fading away and stopping of this ignorance. . . ." (Samyuttanikāya [2.17]).²² And as Bechan Jhā points out, drawing from the Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha of Madhava Āchārya, "The Buddhist's supposition is that all things are momentary (sarvam kṣanikam) and all things are transient (sarvam anityam)."²³

(6) āgama virodhi [3.176cd-178] / "contradiction with respect to āgama, that is here, "scripture" (śruti and smṛti (see above). Āgama virodhi involves a contradiction with respect to either śruti or smṛti. In [3.177] a violation of

the injunctions invoked by śruti is expressed -- a violation of the proper sacrificial sequence, where the vaiśvānara birth rite is being performed without the performance of the agnyādhāra ceremony.

In [3.178] Daṇḍin provides an example of fault arising from a contradiction with smṛti: "Although not undergoing the upanayana rite he studied the Vedas with his teacher / A crystal -- naturally pure -- does not require further refinement" [asāvanupanītopi vedānadhijage guroḥ | svabhāvaśuddhaḥ sphatiko na samskāramapekṣate ||] [3.178]. Where according to the smṛti teachings, the performance of the upanayana rite is mandatory before one commences the study of the Vedas.

In the closing verses of the doṣa section (and of the text itself) [3.179-85], Daṇḍin offers a number of exceptions where, as we have seen for all the preceding doṣas, such contradiction need not be a defect given the specific situation. "Through the skill of the kavi all of

these contradictions may sometimes go beyond being considered faults / And enter the path of qualities (gunas) "
 [virodhah sakalopyesa kadacit kavikauosalat | utkramya
 dosagananam gunavithim vigahate ||] [3.179].

In [3.181] we have an exception to kala virodhi: "A harsh wind -- harbinger of the destruction of kings -- is shaking the pollen from the Kadamba flowers and the buds from the Saptacchada trees" [rājñām vināśapiśunaścacāra kharamārutah | dhunvan kadambarajasā saha saptacchadod-gamān ||] [3.181]. Autumn is the time for military expeditions and battle, a season whose implication in the first two pādas of this verse is thus reinforced with the "buds from the Saptacchada trees" -- a tree that blooms only in the Autumn season. The anomaly or contradiction here lies with the "pollen from the Kadamba flowers," which should normally blossom only in the rainy season. Yet the tone of this verse is a grim foreboding reflecting the outset of a military campaign, stemming from the negative omens marked by a "harsh wind" and plants blooming out of

season -- contradictions that appropriately develop the situation and which are thus acceptable.

And in [3.183], for example, we have an exception to loka virodhi: "A lover tormented with the distress of being separated from his beloved / counts fire colder than moonbeams" [aindavādarcīṣah kāmī śiśiram havyavāhanam | abalāvirahakleśavihvalo gaṇayatyayam ||] [3.183]. To emphasize the intensity of the suffering stemming from separation, the kavi contradicts conventional knowledge of the world -- any warmth from fire has died, a fire now felt as colder than -- as traditionally considered -- moonbeams.

Notes [3.1] - [3.185]

1. Dandin, The Kāvyādarśa of Śrī Dandin, edited with a commentary by Premachandra Tarkabāgiśa (Calcutta, 1863); Reprint (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1981), pp. 377-78.
2. Siegfried Lienhard's approximation of "niyama" is thus incorrect: "The second of the two main types of citra poetry (literally, "variegated"; "difficult to compose") is that limiting the number of phonetic classes employed. . . . In this sort of poem the author uses as many vowels as he wishes, but limits the choice of consonants to one, two, or only a few classes" (History of Classical Poetry, p. 157). As we see in Dandin's presentation, "restriction" applies to vowels and the points of articulation as well as to the consonants.
3. Louis Renou, "Sur la Notion de Brahman," Journal Asiatique, 237 (1947), p. 22.
4. Maurice Bloomfield, The Religion of the Veda (N. Y.: G. P. Putman's Sons, 1908), p. 215.
5. Siegfried Lienhard, History of Classical Poetry, pp. 150-51.
6. Marie-Claude Porcher, "On Prahelikā," in Ludwik Sternbach Felicitation Volume, edited by J. P. Sinha, vol. 1 (Lucknow: Akhila Bharatiya Sanskrit Parishad, 1979), p. 326.
7. Ludwik Sternbach, Indian Riddles: A Forgotten Chapter in the History of Sanskrit Literature (Hoshiarpur: Vishveshvaranand Vedic Research Institute, 1975), p. 41.
8. Marie-Claude Porcher, "On Prahelikā," p. 328.

9. Marie-Claude Porcher, "On Prahelikā," p. 327 and n. 6.
10. Porcher's and Sternbach's analyses would appear doubtful. They take nṛpā(h) ("kings") as singular and consider it to refer to a king "Puṇḍraka" [?]. (Marie-Claude Porcher, "On Prahelikā," p. 329; and Ludwik Sternbach, Indian Riddles, p. 44.)
11. I would question Gerow's analysis of this example [3.115]: "Vṛddhā is not a pun [ślesa], for Lakṣmī bears that epithet in approximately the sense of 'the fully developed one.' The conundrum [Gerow's term for prahelikā] plays only on the legitimate connotations of the one word" (Glossary/213). Regardless of the etymologically derived meaning of vṛddhā, it stands as a "name" for Lakṣmī and thus is distinct from the nominalized "old woman." I would think that we have something other than connotations. We shall see in a number of Dandin's examples of ślesa alamkāra that he considered this play between "nominal/Name" an instance of one word having more than one meaning and thus a legitimate instance of ślesa.
12. P. C. Lahiri, Concepts of Riti and Guna in Sanskrit Poetics in their Historical Development (Dacca: The University of Dacca, 1937), pp. 1-2.
13. P. C. Lahiri, Concepts of Riti and Guna in Sanskrit Poetics, p. 3.
14. Anant Lal Thakur, "Members of an Indian Syllogism," in Ludwik Sternbach Felicitation Volume, edited by J. P. Sinha, part 1 (Lucknow: Akhila Bharatiya Sanskrit Parishad, 1979), p. 615.
15. Gautama, Nyāya: Gautama's Nyāya Sūtra with Vātsyāyana's Commentary, trans. by Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya (Calcutta: Indian Studies, 1982), p. 4.

16. Anant Lal Thakur, "Members of an Indian Syllogism," p. 615.

17. Gautama, Nyāya Sūtra, translated by Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya, (1982), p. 44.

18. A. K. Warder, Indian Kāvya Literature, vol. 1 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1972), p. 85.

19. Bechan Jhā, Concept of Poetic Blemishes in Sanskrit Poetics (Varanasi: The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Office, 1965), p. 61.

20. śruti (literally, "heard") / The sacred literature held to have been "heard" by the ancient ṛsis, divinely revealed at the time of the world's creation. These include the four Vedas -- Rg, Yajur, Sāma, and Atharva -- and their primary categories -- Samhitā, Brāhmaṇa, Āranyaka, and Upanisad.

smṛti (literally, "remembered") / A group of texts "remembered" or passed on as traditional lore rather than divinely inspired. They include:

(1) sūtras (literally, "thread") / manuals of instruction in the form of prose aphorisms on ritual, law, and scriptural exegesis. These in turn include texts on: śrauta / community ritual; grhya / domestic ritual; dharma / law both religious and civil; śulva / the skills necessary in the building of altars (architecture, geometry, mathematics); pratisākhya / the pronunciation of the Vedas; and vyākaraṇa / language and grammar.

(2) śāstras / post-Vedic compilations in verse explicating a given subject, often an explanation of an earlier sūtra. Such as, for example: the Dharmaśāstras, the Arthaśāstra of Kautilya, the Kāmaśāstra of Vātsyāyana,

the Nītiśāstras, and indeed the various kāvya śāstras (the nātyaśāstras and the alamkāraśāstras).

(3) the Mahābhārata and Rāmāyaṇa

(4) the eighteen major and the eighteen minor Purāṇas

(5) the various Tantras, and so on.

āgama (literally, "what has come (down)") / non-Vedic religious texts; a traditional doctrine or discipline.

21. B. C. Law, "Ancient Indian Flora," Indian Culture, vol. 15, n. 4 (1948-49), p. 132.

22. Padmanabh S. Jaini, "Śramaṇas: Their Conflict with Brāhmaṇical Society," in Chapters in Indian Civilization, edited by Joseph W. Elder, , rev. edition, vol. 1 (Joseph W. Elder, 1970), p. 65.

23. Bechan Jhā, Concept of Poetic Blemishes, p. 68.

See Madhava Āchārya, The Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha, translated by E. B. Cowell and A. E. Gough, 6th edition (Varanasi: The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1961 (1894)).

The Verses of the Second Chapter

An Enumeration with English and Sanskrit Titles

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[Alamkāralakṣaṇam]

2.2 The Intention of the Writer

[Granthakaruḥ Āśayah]

2.3 Indicating the Distinction between the Alamkāras

Previously Discussed and Those about to be
Discussed

[Uktavakṣyamāṇālamkārabhedanirūpaṇam]

2.4- The Thirty-Five (Artha) Alamkāras.

2.7

2.8 Definition of Svabhāvokti Alamkāra

[Svabhāvoktyalamkāralakṣaṇam]

2.9 Example of the Svabhāvokti of Genus

[Jāti Svabhāvoktyudāharanam]

2.10 Example of the Svabhāvokti of Action

[Kriyā Svabhāvoktyudāharanam]

2.11 Example of the Svabhāvokti of Attribute

[Guṇa Svabhāvoktyudāharanam]

2.12 Example of the Svabhāvokti of an Individual

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2.13 Conclusion to Svabhāvokti Alambāra

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2.14 Definition of Upamā alambāra

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2.15 The Upamā of Attribute

[Dharma Upamā]

2.16 The Upamā of Objects

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2.17 The Upamā of Transposition

[Viparyāsa Upamā]

2.18 The Upamā of Reciprocity

[Anyonya Upamā]

2.19 The Upamā of Restriction

[Niyama Upamā]

2.20 The Upamā of Non-Restriction

[Aniyama Upamā]

2.21 The Upamā of Conjunction

[Samuccaya Upamā]

2.22 The Upamā of Intensity

[Atiśaya Upamā]

2.23 The Upamā of Imagination

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2.24 The Upamā of the Wondrous

[Adbhuta Upamā]

2.25 The Upamā of Confusion

[Moha Upamā]

2.26 The Upamā of Doubt

[Saṃśaya Upamā]

2.27 The Upamā of Resolution

[Nirṇaya Upamā]

2.28 The Upamā of Multiple Embrace

[Śleṣa Upamā]

2.29 The Upamā of the Uniform

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2.30 The Upamā of Depreciation

[Nindā Upamā]

2.31 The Upamā of Appreciation

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2.32 The Upamā involving a Wish to Express

[Ācikhyāsā Upamā]

2.33 The Upamā of Rivalry

[Virodha Upamā]

2.34 The Upamā of Negation

[Pratiṣedha Upamā]

2.35 The Upamā of Flattery

[Catu Upamā]

2.36 The Upamā Expressing the Actual

[Tattvākhyāna Upamā]

2.37 The Upamā of the Unique

[Asādhāraṇa Upamā]

2.38 The Upamā of the Non-Existent

[Abhūta Upamā]

2.39 The Upamā of the Inconceivable

[Asaṁbhāvita Upamā]

2.40 The Upamā of the Multiple

[Bahu Upamā]

2.41 The Upamā of Transformation

[*Vikriyā Upamā*]

2.42 The Upamā of the Interwoven

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2.43 The Upamā of Complete Expressions

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2.44 Example of the Upamā of Complete Expressions: I.

[*Vākyārtha Upamodāharanam: I.*]

2.45 Example of the Upamā of Complete Expressions: II.

[*Vākyārtha Upamodāharanam: II.*]

2.46 The Upamā of Parallel Objects

[*Prativastu Upamā*]

2.47 Example of the Upamā of Parallel Objects

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2.48 The Upamā of Equalization

[Tulyayoga Upamā]

2.49 Example of the Upamā of Equalization

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2.50 The Upamā of Cause

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2.51 Exceptions to Faults in Upamās

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2.52 Examples of Exceptions to Faults in Gender and

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[Liṅgavacanadosāpavadodāharanāni]

2.53 Examples to Exceptions to Faults in Inferiority/

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2.54 Conclusion to Exceptions to Faults in Upamās /

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2.55 Examples of Faults in Upamās

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2.56 Conclusion to Faults in Upamās

[Upamādoṣopasam̄hārah̄]

2.57- Particles, Words, and Expressions Indicating

2.65 Similarity in Upamās

[Upamāsādr̄syā sūcinaḥ śabdāḥ]

2.66 Definition of Rūpaka Alamkāra / Examples of the

Compounded Rūpaka

[Rūpakālam̄kāralakṣaṇam / Samasta

Rūpakodāharan̄āni]

2.67 Example of the Uncompounded Rūpaka

[Asamasta Rūpakodāharan̄am]

2.68 Specification of the Compounded and Uncompounded
Rūpaka / The Compounded/Uncompounded Rūpaka

[Samastavyastayoḥ Rūpakayoḥ Nirdeśah /
Samastavyasta Rūpakaṁ]

2.69 Example of the Complete Rūpaka

[Sakala Rūpakodāharanam]

2.70 Explication of the Example of the Complete Rūpaka

[Sakala Rūpakodāharanāsvarūpaprakāśanam]

2.71 Example of the Rūpaka of Attributes

[Avayava Rūpakodāharanam]

2.72 Explication of the Example of the Rūpaka of
Attributes

[Avayava Rūpakodāharanāsvarūpaprakāśanam]

2.73 Example of the Rūpaka of the Aggregate

[Avayavi Rūpakodāharanam]

2.74 The Explication of the Example of the Rūpaka of

the Aggregate

[Avayavi Rūpakodāharanāsvarūpaprakāśanam]

2.75 Example of the Rūpaka of One-Attribute

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2.76 The Rūpaka of One-Attribute

[Eka aṅga Rūpakam]

2.77 The Rūpaka of Congruity

[Yukta Rūpakam]

2.78 The Rūpaka of Incongruity

[Ayukta Rūpakam]

2.79 The Rūpaka of the Uneven

[Viṣama Rūpakam]

2.80 Example of the Rūpaka of the Uneven

[Viṣama Rūpakodāharanam]

2.81 Example of the Rūpaka of Attribution

[Saviśeṣaṇa Rūpakodāharanam]

2.82 **Exlication of the Example of the Rūpaka of Attribution**

[Saviśeṣaṇa Rūpakodāharanāśvarūpaprakāśanam]

2.83 **Example of the Rūpaka of the Incongruous**

[Viruddha Rūpakodāharanam]

2.84 **Exlication of the Example of the Rūpaka of the Incongruous**

[Viruddha Rūpakodāharanāśvarūpaprakāśanam]

2.85 **Example of the Rūpaka of Cause**

[Hetu Rūpakodāharanam]

2.86 **Exlication of the Example of the Rūpaka of Causality**

[Hetu Rūpakodāharanāśvarūpaprakāśanam]

2.87 **The Rūpaka of Multiple Embrace**

[Śliṣṭa Rūpakam]

2.88 **The Rūpaka of Similarity and the Rūpaka of**

Disparity

[Upamā Rūpakam Vyatireka Rūpakam ca]

2.89 Example of the Rūpaka of Similarity

[Upamā Rūpakodāharanam]

2.90 Example of the Rūpaka of Disparity

[Vyatireka Rūpakodāharanam]

2.91 The Rūpaka of Denial

[Ākṣepa Rūpakam]

2.92 The Rūpaka of Rationalization

[Samādhāna Rūpakam]

2.93 The Rūpaka of Transference

[Rūpaka Rūpakam]

2.94 Example of the Rūpaka Concealing the Actual

[Tattvāpahnava Rūpakodāharanam]

2.95 Explication of the Example of the Rūpaka

Concealing the Actual

[Tattvāpahnava Rūpakodāharanāsvarūpa-
prakāśanam]

2.96 Conclusion to Upamā and Rūpaka Alamkāras

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2.97 Definition of Dīpaka alamkāra

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2.98 Example of the Dīpaka of Genus (in Initial
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2.99 Example of the Dīpaka of Action (in Initial
Position)

[Kriyā (Ādi) Dīpakodāharanām]

2.100 Example of the Dīpaka of Attribute (in Initial
Position)

[Gunā (Ādi) Dīpakodāharanām]

2.101 Example of the Dīpaka of an Individual (in
Initial Position)

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2.102 The Explicit Indication of the Initial, Medial, and
Final Positions of Dīpaka

[Ādimadyānta Dīpakasūcanam]

2.103 Example of the Dīpaka of Genus (in Medial
Position)

[Jāti (Madhya) Dīpakodāharanam]

2.104 Example of the Dīpaka of Action (in Medial
Position)

[Kriyā (Madhya) Dīpakodāharanam]

2.105 Example of the Dīpaka of Genus (in Final Position)

[Jāti (Anta) Dīpakodāharanam]

2.106 Example of the Dīpaka of Action (in Final
Position)

[Kriyā (Anta Dīpakodāharanam]

2.107 Example of the Interwoven Dīpaka

[Mālā Dīpakodāharanam]

2.108 The Interwoven Dīpaka

[Mālā Dīpakam]

2.109 Example of the Dīpaka of Opposite Meanings

[Viruddha Artha Dīpakodāharanam]

2.110 The Dīpaka of Opposite Meanings

[Viruddha Artha Dīpakam]

2.111 Example of the Dīpaka of Uniform Meaning

[Eka Artha Dīpakodāharanam]

2.112 The Dīpaka of Uniform Meaning

[Eka Artha Dīpakam]

2.113 Example of the Dīpaka of Multiple Embrace

[Śliṣṭa Artha Dīpakodāharanam]

2.114 Explication of the Example of Dīpaka of Multiple

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[Śliṣṭa Artha Dīpakam]

2.115 Conclusion to Dīpaka Alāmkāra

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2.116 Definition of Āvṛtti Alāmkāra

[Āvṛttyalāmkāralakṣaṇam]

2.117 Example of the Āvṛtti of Sense

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2.118 Example of the Āvṛtti of Word

[Pada Āvṛttyudāharanam]

2.119 Example of the Āvṛtti of Both Sense and a Word

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2.120 Definition of Ākṣepa alāmkāra

[Ākṣepālāmkāralakṣaṇam]

2.121 Example of the Ākṣepa of the Past

[Vṛtta Ākṣepodāharanam]

2.122 The Ākṣepa of the Past

[Vṛtta Ākṣepah]

2.123 Example of the Ākṣepa of the Present

[Vartamāna Ākṣepodāharanam]

2.124 The Ākṣepa of the Present

[Vartamāna Ākṣepah]

2.125 Example of the Ākṣepa of the Future

[Bhaviṣyat Ākṣepodāharanam]

2.126 The Ākṣepa of the Future

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2.127 Example of the Ākṣepa of Attribute

[Dharma Ākṣepodāharanam]

2.128 The Ākṣepa of Attribute

[Dharma Ākṣepah]

2.129 Example of the Ākṣepa of the Basis of Attribution

[Dharmin Ākṣepodāharaṇam]

2.130 The Ākṣepa of the Basis of Attribution

[Dharmin Ākṣepah]

2.131 Example of the Ākṣepa of Efficient Cause

[Kāraṇa Ākṣepodāharaṇam]

2.132 The Ākṣepa of Efficient Cause

[Kāraṇa Ākṣepah]

2.133 Example of the Ākṣepa of Effect

[Kārya Ākṣepodāharaṇam]

2.134 The Ākṣepa of Effect

[Kārya Ākṣepah]

2.135 Example of the Ākṣepa through Permission

[Anujñā Ākṣepodāharaṇam]

2.136 The Ākṣepa through Permission

[Anujñā Ākṣepah]

2.137 Example of the Ākṣepa through Authority

[Prabhetva Ākṣepodāharanam]

2.138 The Ākṣepa through Authority

[Prabhetva Ākṣepah]

2.139 Example of the Ākṣepa through Indifference

[Anādara Ākṣepodāharanam]

2.140 The Ākṣepa through Indifference

[Anādara Ākṣepah]

2.141 Example of the Ākṣepa of Benediction

[Āśīrvacana Ākṣepodāharanam]

2.142 The Ākṣepa through Benediction

[Āśīrvacana Ākṣepah]

2.143 Example of the Ākṣepa through Harshness

[Parusa Ākṣepodāharanam]

2.144 The Ākṣepa through Harshness

[Parusa Ākṣepah]

2.145 Example of the Ākṣepa through Counsel

[Ācivya Ākṣepodāharanam]

2.146 The Ākṣepa through Counsel

[Sācivya Ākṣepah]

2.147 Example of the Ākṣepa through Effort

[Yatna Ākṣepodāharanam]

2.148 The Ākṣepa through Effort

[Yatna Ākṣepah]

2.149 Example of the Ākṣepa through Control of Another

[Paravaśa Ākṣepodāharanam]

2.150 The Ākṣepa through Control of Another

[Paravaśa Ākṣepah]

2.151 Example of the Ākṣepa through an Impossible

Expedient

[Upāya Ākṣepodāharanam]

2.152 The Ākṣepa through an Impossible Expedient

[Upāya Ākṣepah]

2.153 Example of the Ākṣepa through Anger

[Roṣa Ākṣepodāharanam]

2.154 The Ākṣepa through Anger

[Roṣa Ākṣepah]

2.155- Interpolations

2.156

2.157 Example of the Ākṣepa of Compassion

[Anukroṣa Ākṣepodāharanam]

2.158 The Ākṣepa of Compassion

[Anukroṣa Ākṣepah]

Note: The following three varieties are in what I believe to be the more accurate order; the numbering of Rangacharya Raddi's text is yet retained.

2.161 Example of the Ākṣepa of Regret

[Anuśaya Ākṣepodāharanam]

2.162 The Ākṣepa of Regret

[Anuśaya Ākṣepah]

2.163 Example of the Ākṣepa of Doubt

[Saṃśaya Ākṣepodāharanam]

2.164 The Ākṣepa of Doubt

[Saṃśaya Ākṣepah]

2.159 Example of the Ākṣepa of Multiple Embrace

[Śliṣṭa Ākṣepodāharanam]

2.160 The Ākṣepa of Multiple Embrace

[Śliṣṭa Ākṣepah]

2.165 Example of the Ākṣepa through Analogous

Corroboration

[Artha antara Ākṣepodāharanam]

2.166 The Ākṣepa through Analogous Corroboration

[Artha antara Ākṣepah]

2.167 Example of the Ākṣepa with Cause

[Hetu Ākṣepodāharaṇam]

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2.363 Indicating that Śleṣa Adds Beauty to All

Alamkāras and the Twofold Division of Vāñmaya

[Śleṣasya Sarvālamkāraśobhādhāyakatāyā ca
Vāñmayasya Dviprakārakatāyā sūcanam]

2.364 Definition and Explication of Bhāvika Alamkāra

[Bhāvikālamkāralakṣaṇapratipakṣanaca]

2.365 Explication of Bhāvika Alamkāra

[Bhāvikālamkārapratipakṣanam]

2.366 Explication of Bhāvika Alamkāra

[Bhāvikālamkārapratipakṣanam]

2.367 The Acceptance of the Saṃdhyaṅgas, Vṛttyaṅgas,

Lakṣaṇas and so on as Alamkāras

[Saṃdhyaṅgavṛttyaṅgalakṣaṇādīnām Alamkāratayā
Iṣṭatvam]

2.368 Conclusion to the Second Chapter

[Dvitīyah Pariccheda Upasamhārah]

The Central Text

2.1 Definition of Alamkāra

Features creating the beauty of kāvya

are called alamkāras.

Even today they are being postulated --

Who could completely describe them?

Alamkāralaksanam :

kāvyaśobhākārān dharmānalamkārān pracakṣate

te cādyāpi vikalpyante kastān kārtsnyena vakyati

dharmān /"features," "properties," yet also overlapping with "qualities."

karān /literally, "makers," "causers" of śobhā.

śobhā [< *śubh /"shine," "be bright"] /"splendid";
"splendor", "brilliance," "beauty."

"In all languages the concept of brightness is close to that of beauty and words originally designating the one are often applied to the other. In Sanskrit almost any verb meaning 'shines,' carries with it the connotation 'is beautiful'."¹ We also note in the viśesyanighnavarga of the Amarakosa of Amarasimha [3.1.52], śobhanam appearing among a group of twelve words corresponding to "beautiful":

sundaram ruciram cāru suṣumam sādhu śobhanam | kāntam
manoharam rucyam manojñam mañjulam |.²

Yet the situation is far more complex than this. Daniel Ingalls notes that there is no single word in Sanskrit that corresponds to the English word "beauty," rather there are "over a hundred words and phrases which in one or more instances of use are equivalent to one or more applications of the English word."³ He delineates six major categories: (1) Beauty as affecting the physical senses; (2) Beauty as affecting the mind and heart; (3) Beauty as power or supremacy; (4) Beauty as light or splendor; (5) Beauty as wealth, glory, majesty; and (6) Beauty in motion;

Beauty that excites or entices. Again, no one term or category stands above the others.

Beyond the fine tuning of semantic association we note other distinctions. Indian usage is more concrete, specific. Within the sentence itself where "a word for beauty is regularly accompanied by a reference direct or indirect, to the object considered to be beautiful"; and there is very often a general tendency to avoid referring to "an objective class of the beauteous."⁴ Rather an objective statement will be conjoined with a subjective reaction on the part of the poet:

His words for beauty are words for something he himself reacts to and that would be impossible without the reaction. Indeed, the very same word is sometimes used for both power and reaction. Since beauty is conceived of so subjectively it is also thought of, by most Sanskrit authors at least, as multifarious, residing in many objects, appealing in different ways to many men. And so it is not permanent.⁵

Perhaps we may agree with Ingalls that, in general terms, this distinction is a reflection of the tendency in

Western civilization to view the world in diametric, mutually exclusive terms; that with the tendency to categorize absolutely there is an equally strong tendency to reify absolutely. We may doubt that beauty exists "apart from the men on whom it works," yet unlike Ingalls I would follow this logic through, for it is equally dubious to refer to "truth" as "unitary and permanent."⁶

This discussion touches upon an important point. Much has been made of the lack of individuality in characterization and expression, of the "distancing" of the author in Sanskrit *kāvya*, yet here we see that the distinguishing mark of *kāvya* for Dāṇḍin, śobhā, is seen primarily in human (or personified) relationships, subjectively. These relationships may fit conventional forms, yet within there is stress on a specific human element in a specifically human world. In Western literature form and/or content comes to reflect an increasingly greater stress on overt individual expression, an emphasis on authorial presence; yet within, this

expression is often contingent on relationships with terms or objective concepts reified as meta-human and thus seen as somehow more "real." How elevated are Shelley's "A poem is the very image of life expressed in its eternal truth,"⁷ or Keats' "Beauty is truth, truth beauty,"⁸ but what, in truth, are they talking about?

2.2 The Intention of the Writer

The basis of these postulations

was demonstrated by earlier teachers --

Our effort lies in critically improving just this.

Granthakaruh Āśayah :

kimtu bijam vikalpanam pūrvacāryaiḥ pradarśitam
tadeva parisam̄skartumayamasmatpariśramah

bījam : bījam sāmānyataḥ sarvatra vartamānam mūlam / "a fundamental characteristic which is universally present throughout [its range of application]" (RR/112).

vikalpānām : "The divisions of the alamkāras into jāti, upamā, rūpaka, and so on" (RŚ/67); "the particular alamkāras" (RR/112).

pūrvacāryaiḥ : "Those who defined or established the characteristics of kāvya: Medhāvi, Śyāmava, and so on" / pūrvacāryaiścirantanaiḥ kāvyalakṣaṇakāraih medhāviśyāmavā di[prabhṛti]bhiḥ pradarśitam nirdiṣṭam. . . . | (RŚ/67); "Bharata and so on" (RR/112).

parisamskartum [tumanta < pari (+) sam (+) *skr] : viśadīkartum [cvi pratyaya] / "to make clear, evident" (RR/113); [prati (+) sam (+) *skr / "to restore"] (RŚ/67).

2.3 Indicating the Distinction between the Alamkāras

Previously Discussed and Those About to be Discussed

Some alamkāras were mentioned previously

distinguishing the mārgas.

Another group of alamkāras -- applicable to all

will now be described.

Uktavakṣyamānālamkārabhedanirūpanam :

kāścīnmārgavibhāgārthamuktāḥ prāgapyalamkriyāḥ

sādhāraṇamalamkārajātamanyat pradarśyate

kāḥ cit . . . alamkriyāḥ : kecidalaṅkārāḥ ślesa-
 prasādāyah na sarvāḥ / "Some alamkāras, ślesa, prasādā and so
 on, not all" (RS/68); but kāścit śrutyānuprāsavṛtty-
 anuprāsayamakādayah | alamkriyāḥ śabdālamkārāḥ / "Some --

śrutyānuprāsa, vṛtty anuprāsa, yamaka and so on -- that is śabda alamkāras" (RR/114).

Ratnaśri thus -- correctly -- indicates the previously described [1.40-102] ten gunas/"qualities" to which Dandin now refers. Rangacharya Raddi would seem to be considering alamkāra only in Dandin's restricted sense of the word -- as "figure." He thus mentions only those previous elements that may conceivably be considered given this interpretation -- the śabda or "sound" alamkāras, whose focus is phonemic manipulation (as presented in Dandin's third chapter). This reading is dubious and ignores Dandin's subsuming, embracing sense of alamkāra as actually presented in his definition [2.1].

sādhāranam /"common," "universal": vaidarbhādiṣu sarvamārgesu /"the Vaidarbha and so on, that is, all the mārgas" (RS/68); but ubhayamārgasamānam | gaudavaidarbha /"common to both the mārgas, that is, the Gauḍa and Vaidarbha" (RR/114).

alamkāra jātam anyat / "another group of alamkāras":
artha alamkāras / "conceptual alamkāras" (RŚ/68).

Yet we should be aware that Dandin also considers the sabda alamkāras presented in Chapter Three, and all other features which he includes within this concept, such as the elements drawn primarily from the drama, the samdhyañgas, vṛtyañgas, lakṣaṇas and so on (as expressed in [2.367]), "applicable to all" the mārgas.

2.4 The Thirty-Five Artha Alamkāras

svabhāvākhyāna, upamā, rūpaka, dīpaka, āvṛti,

ākṣepa, arthāntaranyāsa, vyatireka, vibhāvanā,

svabhāvākhyānamupamā rūpakam dīpakāvṛti

ākṣeporthāntaranyāso vyatireka vibhāvanā

2.5

samāsa, atiśaya, utpreksā, hetu, sūksma, lava, krama,

preyas, rasavat, ūrjasvi, paryāyokta, samāhita,

samāsātiśayotpreksā hetuh sūksmo lavah kramah

preyo rasavadūrjasvi paryāyoktam samāhitam

2.6

udātta, apahnuti, śleṣa, viśeṣa, tulyayogitā,

virodha, aprastutastotra, vyājastuti, nidarśana,

udāttapahnutisleṣaviśeṣastulyayogitā

virodhāprastutastotre vyājastutinidarśane

2.7

sahokti, parivṛtti, āśis, samkīrna, and bhāvika --

Thus the alamkāras of literary compositions

described by earlier teachers.

sahoktiḥ parivṛttyāśīḥ samkīrṇamatha bhāvikam

iti vācāmalamkārā darśitāḥ pūrvasūribhiḥ

vācām : kāvyānām sambandhinah (RS/69) ; kāvyānām /

"pertaining to kāvyas" (RR/115).

pūrva sūribhiḥ : -ācāryaiḥ . . . kāvyālaṅkārakāraiḥ/

"earlier teachers who wrote of (or created) the alamkāras of
kāvya -- Rāmaśarma and so on" (RS/69) (see the Introduction,
under The Tradition and Possible Prede-cessors).

Notes: [2.1] - [2.7]

1. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, , "Words for Beauty in Classical Sanskrit Poetry," in Indological Studies in Honor of W. Norman Brown (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1962), p. 100. Ingalls cites further examples from the Subhāśitaratnakosa : rājati / rājate, verses [338, 320, 507]; virājate, verse [623]; bhāti, verses [473, 302]; cakāsti, verse [385]; rucira, verse [267] (pp. 100-101).
2. Amarasiṁha, Amarakoṣa. [3.1.52], chap. 3 (Vārāṇasī: Caukhambhā Saṁskṛta Saṁsthāna, 1977), p. 10
3. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, "Words for Beauty," p. 87.
4. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, "Words for Beauty," p. 87.
5. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, "Words for Beauty," p. 107.
6. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, "Words for Beauty," p. 107.
7. Percy B. Shelley, "A Defense of Poetry," in Criticism: The Major Texts, edited by Walter J. Bate, enlarged ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Javanovich, 1970), p. 431.
8. John Keats, "Ode to a Grecian Urn," in An Introduction to Poetry, edited by Louis Simpson (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), p. 220.

2.8 Definition of Svabhāvokti Alamkāra

Graphically revealing the essence of objects

in their various states --

Svabhāvokti or Jāti the first alamkāra.

For example:

Svabhāvoktyalamkāralakṣanam :

nānāvastham padārthānām rūpām sāksādvivṛṇvati

svabhāvoktiśca jātiścetyādyā sālamkṛtiryathā

nānāvastham [< nāna / "various, not just one thing"

(+) avasthām : daśā / "state," "condition" (RŚ/69)].

padārthānām /literally, "the meaning of a word," yet also, "verbal referent," that is, the things (as shown in the next four verse examples) to which words refer:

vastūnām jātikriyāguṇadravyānām / "[revealing the

characteristic] nature of objects through jāti, kriyā,
guna and dravya" (RŚ/69).

rūpam : svabhāvam (RŚ/69).

vivṛnvatī [(f.) vartamāne kṛdanta < vi (+) *vr̥] :

prakāśayanti (RŚ/69); darśayanti (RR/116).

ca . . . ca : "This alamkṛti [alamkāra] has two names:
 svabhāvokti and jāti" (RR/115).

Svabhāvokti appears, appropriately, as the first of Dāṇḍin's thirty-five artha alamkāras. Its nature is highly distinctive, an alamkāra whose essential procedure is so sufficiently marked and so central to any consideration of the process of figuration within language, that it is not surprising that we find its status and role subjects of debate, its presentation frequently floundering in confusion.

As we see in Dāṇḍin's definition, "svabhāvokti" and "jāti" are synonymous titles. And further, as svabhāvokti literally means "an expression (ukti) pertaining to

fundamental or essential natures (svabhāvas)," so we also see as synonymous Dandin's usage of svabhāva-akhyānam in his listing of the alamkāras beginning in [2.4] (and its later appearance as svarūpa [svabhāva] alamkāra in the Agni Purāṇa [343.2cd, 3cd-4]). We may dismiss Daniel Ingalls' chronological distinction: "The term characterization (jāti) which our anthologist [Vidyākara (latter half of the 11th century), compiler of the Subhāṣitaratnakosa] applies to this section [jātivrajyā, section 35, verses 1148-92] is used in the older works on poetics where more modern discussions use the term svabhāvokti, 'speaking of the thing as it is'."¹ It is not until Rudraṭa [9th century] that this alamkāra appears distinctly as jāti. It is probable, however, that this alamkāra was known as either svabhāvokti or jāti from an early date. That it should be termed svabhāvokti will be self-evident from our discussion; that it should also be known as jāti leaves room for speculation.

Jāti's sense here may primarily reflect etymological

origins: from the verbal root *jan /"be born," "arise," and thus "the presence or presentation of things as they arise or are"; or it may refer to a "genus" or "class," a concept embracing "the general characteristics that delineate a class."² Yet more abstractly, jāti may refer to "the notion of generality which is present in the several individual objects of the same kind."³ Jāti was certainly imbued with these connotations at an early date by the grammarians, marking one of the primary groupings into which the meanings of words fall (connotations similarly reflected in the sāmanya category of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika). No doubt drawing on these fundamental meanings, jāti came to refer to a species of muktaka, that is, self-contained kāvya of a single stanza that in general "paints miniature pictures and scenes, or . . . carefully builds up a description of a single theme"⁴ mentioned by Daṇḍin in [1.13]). The correspondence between jāti as alamkāra and jāti as genre would then be close:

The poetic basis of the figure is probably to be sought in the genre called jāti: short verses, extremely condensed yet full of minute detail, each one attempting to seize the instantaneous totality of a certain event, or an individual as wholly characteristic of a genus. . . . Here the charm lies precisely in the completeness of the description within the limits imposed by the verse, and not on any figurative usage (Glossary/324-25).

We might qualify this correspondence, however, by noting that jāti as the title of a specific category of short "detached" kāvya does not appear in the literature until rather late. Its appearance in the 11th century compilation, the Subhāsitaratnakosa, for example, is certainly well after the established usage of jāti as an alamkāra. Yet if indeed "several hundred years elapsed between early muktaka poetry and the oldest preserved critical works,"⁵ this would not necessarily preclude the existence of such a genre -- perhaps termed jāti, perhaps not -- at an early date.

Jāti first appears with literary connotations in the introductory verses [1.8] of the Harsacarita of Bāṇa (first

half of the 7th century).⁶ Bāṇa comments on the difficulty of including within a single composition a number of positive and desired elements: "Subjects (or meanings) that are fresh, jātis that are not vulgar or trite, ślesas [or the alamkāra of "multiple embrace," the embrace of more than one meaning or more than one referent by a single word] that are not too obscure, rasa [literally, "flavor"; the rarified emotive tone] that is strikingly evident, and language that is elegant" [navo 'rtho jātiragrāmyā śleṣo 'kliṣṭah sphuṭo rasah | vikatāksara bandhaśca kṛtsnamekatra durlabham || .

In conjunction with śleṣa (alamkāra) one might presume that jāti similarly marks a distinct alamkāra, but this is uncertain. It is just as plausible that Bāṇa's usage refers to jāti as genre, a distinctive type of concise yet striking descriptive scene. For Raghavan to conclude from this instance that "we first catch a glimpse of Svabhāvokti in. . . .," or that "Jāti is the old name of Svabhāvokti"⁷ is questionable (the source presumably of Ingall's misconception cited above).

In accepting that Bāṇa's usage of jāti is uncertain, we cannot but hesitate in accepting as valid Raghavan's initial assumptions. A small point perhaps, but as we consider the various explications available in the secondary literature, we shall begin to appreciate the absolute need for a critical approach based primarily on the texts themselves. For just as inadequate translations have cast an aura of obscurity over the study of classical Indian kāvya, so discussions that pass for responsible analyses quite frequently mask rather tenuous reasonings in the guise of absolute conclusions.

The Rāvanavadha of Bhatṭi [6th-7th centuries (?)], commonly known as the Bhatṭikāvya, presumably provides the first textual instance of svabhāvokti alamkāra.⁸ We must immediately realize that, as this is a textbook of Sanskrit grammar and, to a lesser degree, of alamkāra sāstra presented as a mahākāvya, Bhatṭi provides no direct explication of what exactly he is illustrating. One must turn to the commentaries, primarily the comparatively old

Jayamaṅgalā commentary [loosely ascribed to the 9th to 11th centuries],⁹ or that of Mallinātha [latter half of the 14th century]. Turning to the analyses of the verses illustrating the various alamkāras it is thus perhaps not too surprising that confusion reigns.

Mallinātha sees svabhāvokti in [10.43], where the Jayamaṅgalā sees atiśayokti alamkāra; G. G. Leonardi considers that this verse primarily reflects svabhāvokti, or "less probably" atiśayokti.¹⁰ Mallinātha sees svabhāvokti again, now in [10.51], and C. Hooykaas agrees;¹¹ the Jayamaṅgalā, however, sees samāhita alamkāra. In [10.46] Mallinātha sees atiśayokti, and G. G. Leonardi tentatively concurs;¹² the Jayamaṅgalā, however, sees an alamkāra that it terms vārtā, and C. Hooykaas apparently agrees.¹³

Raghavan, although recognizing the confusion between these commentaries,¹⁴ writes: "We find Bhatṭi illustrating a figure called vārtā" (in [10.46]); and again, "In Bhatṭi, the word Svabhāvokti is absent. There is only vārtā. . . ."¹⁵ That the verse in question ([10.46])

involves "description"¹⁶ apparently, of itself, justifies the rather amazing conclusion: "This shows that vārtā is meant as a synonym of Jāti or Svabhāvokti and that in the pre-Bhāmaha literature, Svabhāvokti was recognized by some, some called it Jāti and still others vārtā. Bhātṭī must be taken as calling it vārtā."¹⁷ S. K. De, although hardly so sweeping, similarly concludes: "Bhātṭī . . . adds hetu and vārtā. . . . Bhātṭī does not recognize svabhāvokti. . ." " ¹⁸ Without explicit acknowledgment, both writers present the view of the Jayamañgalā commentary -- a work written at least 150-200 years after the Bhātṭikāvyam -- that verse [10.46] illustrates an alamkāra called vārtā. In actuality, we can only presume that Bhātṭī included such an alamkāra as svabhāvokti -- exactly where and exactly what he would have termed it we have no way of knowing.

For Raghavan and De to accept and present, without qualification, the existence in the Bhātṭikāvyam of an alamkāra that is only specifically cited as such in a later commentary is questionable. But what is remarkable here is

that both either miss or ignore the rather clear evidence that the Jayamaṅgalā's very attribution of vārtā as an alamkāra is suspect. Raghavan in particular has the evidence laid out before him on his own pages. He recognizes not only that the Jayamaṅgalā "closely follows Bhāmaha [7th-8th centuries] whose text alone it quotes," but that it specifically considers that Bhāmaha's verse mentioning vārtā [2.87] is in fact "a verse on an alamkāra called vārtā."¹⁹ Yet Bhāmaha, as I feel that we shall see, did not consider vārtā an alamkāra, the extreme probability of which Raghavan -- within the context of this immediate discussion -- clearly acknowledges: "Bhāmaha kept vārtā and Svabhāvokti separate. The latter, he refers to as an Alamkāra and illustrates. The former, he refers to with derision as a name for insipid detailing of some facts, for expressions devoid of striking deviation [vakrokti]."²⁰ The existence of an alamkāra called vārtā, and its attribution to Bhātti is based upon a commentary that clearly misinterprets its own primary influence -- a

conclusion is accepted whose premise is clearly seen to be false.

When we turn to the evaluations of the first definitive appearance of svabhāvokti in the literature, in Bhāmaha's Kāvyālaṅkāra [2.93-94],²¹ we again meet rather unwarranted confusion and contradiction. P. V. Naganatha Sastry, in the introduction to his translation of the Kāvyālaṅkāra, affirms that "Bhāmaha's predilection for a 'twist in meaning' [vakrokti] was so great that he discards svabhāvokti as a figure. . . ."²²

S. K. De on the one hand similarly considers that "svabhāvokti . . . is not acceptable to Bhāmaha who refuses to acknowledge svabhāvokti as a poetic figure at all";²³ yet elsewhere we find the modified position that that in fact "[svabhā-vokti] is mentioned but apparently disfavored by Bhāmaha."²⁴

And although Edwin Gerow avers that "De states the case much too categorically and mistranslates [Bhāmaha] also. . . ." (Glossary/42, n. 97), we see that his own position

runs the gamut from ambivalence, through acceptance, to rejection. Thus an initial ambivalence, "Bhāmaha, the earliest writer in the figurative tradition proper, is already not quite sure of the credentials of svabhāvokti" (Glossary/42); is followed by affirmation, "To deny poetic status to svabhāvokti . . . neither [Bhāmaha or Dandin] is willing to do" (Glossary/47); and finally complete rejection, "The oldest writer, Bhāmaha, specifically objects to this figure on the ground that it does not involve vakrokti or the figurative turn of phrase essential in any poetry" (Glossary/324).

This degree of contradiction would seem to signal a confused textual position, but Bhāmaha's text is quite clear and we are left with the unfortunate conclusion that the confusion resides rather in the minds of our critics.

Bhāmaha comments on svabhāvokti in verse [2.93]: "Some consider that svabhāvokti is an alamkāra -- where the essence of objects in their [various] states is described" [svabhāvuktiralañkāra iti kecitpracaksate | 'rthasya

tadavasthatvam svabhāvo 'bhihito yathā ||]. A single example follows in [2.94], describing the actions of a child keeping stray cattle from the fields.

Bhāmaha includes svabhāvokti, though perhaps with a degree of personal hesitation. We recognize the ambivalence marked by "some"/kecit, an ambivalence seemingly reinforced by svabhāvokti alamkāra's position almost as an appendage at the end of the second chapter. An inferred personal ambivalence should not, however, be equated with textual obscurity. D. K. Gupta's conclusion would appear just: "Bhāmaha, though indifferent towards the figure on account of his peculiar viewpoint, defines it evidently in deference to its traditional prominence" (though we should add in qualification that Bhāmaha's "peculiar," or rather distinctive, "viewpoint," however probable, is yet an inferred assumption).²⁵

Vakrokti (literally, "speech that is crooked or twisted") refers to the creative and artistic "twisting" of

language, the direct manipulation of linguistic structure, of associated and layered meaning, as a primary means of achieving that striking resonance of total effect that distinguishes the alamkāra. The importance of vakrokti in kāvya is explicitly and repeatedly noted by Bhāmaha in a manner that would allow one to infer that he held it to be a (if not the) pervasive and distinguishing element.

Svabhāvokti appears definitely but once, and not as representative of a pervasive element, but as a distinct, and perhaps somewhat hesitantly admitted alamkāra. Concluding a series of verses categorizing kāvya according to the type of composition,²⁶ Bhāmaha remarks [1.30cd], "Surely all of these divisions are sanctioned [as kāvya] when possessing expressions characterized as vakra ('twisted')" [yuktam vakrasvabhāvoktyā sarvamevitadisyate ||]. And again [1.36cd], "An expression where sound or meaning is marked as vakra is considered an alamkāra ('ornament') of language" [vakrābhidheyaśabdoktiristiṣṭā vācāmalañkṛtiḥ ||].

Gerow certainly overstates the case when he affirms, "The occasion for . . . [Bhāmaha's] malaise is the obvious opposition in terms between svabhāvokti and vakrokti. . ." (Glossary/42). Obvious to whom? His affirmation may perhaps be ultimately traced to an acceptance of D. T. Tatacharya's analysis of [1.30cd] cited above, whose edition of the Kāvyālaṅkāra he was following.²⁷ As Raghavan points out, Tatacharya's breakdown of the compound vakrasvabhāvoktyā in [1.30cd] into vakrokyā and svabhāvoktyā is a "forced interpretation," and that "consequently Tatacharya holds that Bhāmaha . . . like Daṇdin, classified vāñmaya [literary expression] into two classes: Svabhāvokti and Vakrokti. Tatacharya says: 'As is shown above, in Bhāmaha's view, all the Alāmkāras other than the one Svabhāvokti, are governed by the Vakrokti principle.' This is Daṇdin's view, not Bhāmaha's."²⁸ That Bhāmaha would balance svabhāvokti with vakrokti, given that svabhāvokti appears but once in the entire text as a rather begrudgingly admitted alāmkāra,

is suspect. That this is not quite Dandin's view we shall presently consider.

Gerow's acceptance of Tatacharya's misreading was perhaps facilitated by a tendency to project and affirm personally abstracted logical constructs. Yet in this case what I feel is a textual misinterpretation is further marred by inconsistency in presentation. Initially, we are to presume that Bhāmaha views svabhāvokti and vakrokti as rather general elements in "obvious opposition." Yet in his own reading of verse [1.30] a further error allows him to present this opposition as evident now only in a specific, limited context. Gerow not only accepts that vakrasvabhāvoktyā refers to both svabhāvokti and vakrokti, but further considers that the preceding sarvam . . . etat / "all of these" refers strictly to the category of anibaddha ("unconnected") compositions mentioned in the first line (anibaddham punargāślokamātrādi tatpunah | [1.30ab]). Multiple misreadings allow him to affirm that Bhāmaha "does . . . in discussing the poetic genre anibaddha (isolated

verses not bound together by any continuing theme or story), admit the desirability of both vakrokti and svabhāvokti" (Glossary/43). The last line of [1.30] concludes, rather, a coherent section spanning a number of verses: sarvam logically applies to "all" that relevantly precedes.

It is far more reasonable to infer, upon analysis of the text, that Bhāmaha conceived of a rather loose contrast between mundane linguistic usage, vārtā, and the language of kāvya, primarily marked in his interpretation by the element of vakrokti. In [2.86cd] Bhāmaha rejects hetu (KD [2.235-60]), sūksma (KD [2.260-64]), and leśa (KD [2.265-72]) as alamkāras "since there is no integration of vakrokti within their composite meanings" [samudāyābhidheyasya vakroktyanabhidhānataḥ ||]. In the following verse [2.87] we read: "'The sun has departed for Asta mountain / 'The moon is shining' / 'The birds are returning home' -- / Are such lines kāvyas? / These are termed vārtā" [gato

'astamarko bhātīnduryānti vāsāya pakṣinah | ityevamādi kim
kāvyam vārttāmenām pracakṣate ||.

Although Dandin considers these statements verbatim in Kāvyādarśa [2.244-46] as instances of jñāpaka hetu alamkāra, we find an instance of the term vārtā in the First Chapter. It appears in his elucidation of kānti [1.85-92] (literally, "brilliance," "grace," "proportion"), one of the ten gunas or "qualities of literary style": "Kāvya possessing kānti / an element seen even in statements of fact (vārtā) and description (varṇanā) / without transgressing conventional meaning / is precious to all the world" [kāntam sarvajagatkāntam laukikārthānatikramat | tacca vārtābhidhāneṣu varṇanāsvapi dr̥syate ||] [1.85]. To which one of our commentators on the Kāvyādarśa adds: "Reports of ordinary events (vārtā), that is, statements concerned with worldly behavior"/vārtāyā laukikopacāra-vacanasya abhidhānāni (RR/92).

Raghavan goes to some length to demonstrate that the two verses of Bhāmaha's [2.86-87] are to be read together,

thus proving that vārtā itself is not to be taken as an alamkāra. Whatever the probability of such a conjoined reading, his demonstration is unnecessary in light of the rather clear correspondence between the usual sense of the term and its sense in [2.87], and given that this sense is again reflected in Daṇḍin. He does so, however, to refute the misconception among various writers that Bhāmaha in fact considers vārtā to be an alamkāra -- the ultimate source, through the Jayamaṅgalā commentary, of the correlate misconception that vārtā appears as an alamkāra in Bhaṭṭi. (That Raghavan fails to see his own logical inconsistency in accepting the existence of vārtā as an alamkāra in Bhaṭṭi, as based upon the later Jayamaṅgalā commentary which itself commits this very error, we have seen above.)

Thus we find, for example, P. V. Kane noting, "In II.87 he [Bhāmaha] refers to some people speaking of vārtā as an alamkāra and giving as an instance of it the words. . . .";²⁹ or S. K. De, taking both [2.86] and [2.87] in conjunction, writing, "Bhāmaha mentions but rejects

prahelikā,³⁰ and compounding his error in attributing a vārtā alamkāra to Dāṇḍin, "With Bhāmaha, he [Dāṇḍin] alludes to vārtā, which is apparently illustrated by Bhaṭṭi, but which disappears from later Poetics"³¹ (a "disappearance" certainly facilitated by its probable prior non-existence). And D. K. Gupta, writing later than Raghavan, curiously rejects vārtā as a figure in Dāṇḍin, but accepts it as such in Bhāmaha (and Bhaṭṭi), "This vārtā should not be confused with the figure of that name in Bhaṭṭi (X.45 [46]) or Bhāmaha (II.87)."³²

We may accept, however, that for both Bhāmaha (and Dāṇḍin), vārtā reflects "what the ordinary speaker and writer does. Poverty of poetic power, absence of a wizard-force with words, a sense of bare necessity, parsimony in expression, a sense of sufficiency, an anxiety to state the bald truth with absolute fidelity to facts -- these produce a kind of expression which is a bare statement of things as they are."³³

Vakrokti for Bhāmaha is yet a pervasive element, and

although somewhat overstated, it would seem reasonable to accept S. K. De's conclusion: "It seems, therefore, that Bhāmaha regards vakrokti not as an alamkāra but as a characteristic mode of expression which underlies all alamkāras and which thus forms an essential element of Poetry itself. . . ."³⁴ It is not until the period following Dāṇḍin that we see its range of application narrowed. As authors moved away from a consideration of kāvya as a linguistic phenomena thus grounded in language, to the view of kāvya as grounded in a rather nebulous psychological phenomena based on rasa, vakrokti declined in importance.

Vāmana [8th-9th centuries] (KAS [4.3.8]), for example, used the term vakrokti to refer to a specific (artha) alamkāra, one whose sense, however, was yet more or less general, denoting "a particular mode of metaphorical expression based on lakṣanā" or "transferred sense."³⁵ For Rudraṭa [9th century] (KA [2.14-17]), vakrokti refers to a very specific (śabda) alamkāra, where a following

expression indirectly illuminates a secondary meaning inherent in an immediately preceding expression. With the exception of Kuntaka [10th-11th centuries] whose Vakroktijīvita elevated Bhāmaha's sense of vakrokti, later writers essentially followed Rudraṭa.

It is clear, then, that svabhāvokti alamkāra was formulated and widely accepted as such by Bhāmaha's time. We may reasonably infer that Bhāmaha himself drew a broad distinction between two fundamental modes of language: language as normally used in the world, "ordinary" and conventional, a mode subsumed by the term vārtā; and language manipulated and "twisted" in the service of literary beauty, the primary, distinguishing characteristic (for Bhāmaha) of kāvya, a mode subsumed by the term vakrokti.

At the end of our chapter [2.363], moving towards the conclusion of his elaborate presentation of the artha alamkāras, Dāṇḍin presents one of his most illuminating and vital statements: "Kāvya has a two-fold division:

Svabhāvokti and Vakrokti" [bhinnam dvidhā svabhāvoktir-vakroktiśceti vāñmayam ||].

Dandīn accepts then not only vakrokti as a primary element of kāvya, but -- in balance -- svabhāvokti as well.

And here we should immediately consider the possibility that "the element of svabhāvokti must be distinguished from the figure bearing that name . . . because the term svabhāvokti, when it is employed in juxtaposition to as wide a concept as vakrokti must necessarily connote a similarly pervasive sense."³⁶ We may, however, shift our focus slightly. Svabhāvokti alamkāra is distinctive precisely because it does epitomize a linguistic mode or element that may be seen in relative balance to that connoted by the term vakrokti. When Dandīn writes that "Kāvya has a two-fold division," it would seem probable that he is considering both svabhāvokti and vakrokti as distinctive approaches in the presentation of kāvya. It would then seem reasonable to infer that the "element" connotated by "svabhāvokti" may float

free from the svabhāvokti alamkāra. As I feel we shall see upon completion of our study, to hold that this element "must necessarily connote a similarly pervasive sense" as that of vakrokti is open to doubt.

We may thus move away from the extreme positions that Dāṇḍin "seems to distinguish [svabhāvokti] from the rest of the alamkāras" (Glossary/324), or alternately, that Dāṇḍin considers vakrokti "a collective for all poetic figures with the exception of svabhāvokti,"³⁷ and consider that the element epitomized by svabhāvokti alamkāra may indeed be evident elsewhere.³⁸

Dāṇḍin has no doubt over the status of svabhāvokti as an alamkāra. Marking its distinctive nature -- for to whatever and varying degree we may grant its presence among the other alamkāras, we should recognize within it the absence of vakrokti -- he places svabhāvokti in initial position. Yet both its position and Dāṇḍin's use of the word ādyā (which can mean "primary" or "foremost," as well as "first") has misled. D. K. Gupta is surely over-zealous:

"Dandin's predilection for svabhāvokti, which he calls the primary figure, is more than evident."³⁹ Raghavan, although initially correct, also misleads: "Nor is the attribute ādyā alamkṛtiḥ applied by Dandin to svabhāvokti a sign of his partiality for it. The attribute only means that in the field of poetic expression where Vakrokti rises gradually, Svabhāvokti stands first or at the bottom involving the least vakratā. . . ."⁴⁰ The "attribute only means" that svabhāvokti is the first in position -- whatever we further infer is tenuous. We may grant that svabhāvokti is distinctive and that this distinctiveness partially lies in a marked absence of Vakrokti, but it is unreasonable to infer that "Vakrokti rises gradually" (as though it could be measured), and thus to assume the existence of a correspondingly ordered or relative scale among alamkāras.

The essence of svabhāvokti (literally, "the expression of svabhāvas or 'true natures'") lies in "graphically or directly (sāksāt) revealing," that is, "exactly through the

employment of overt description, not through the suggestive power of words"/añjasā abhidhānavyāpārena na tu sāmarthyāt (RŚ/69); describing "as though vivid and immediate to the senses"/pratyaksamiva (RR/116), or "klar vor Augen" (Böhtlingk/20). This marks its fundamental distinction from those alamkāras where the element of vakrokti predominates. Svabhāvokti presents directly, "vividly" and "graphically," the "true form or nature" (rūpam) of objects both "inanimate and animate"/sthāvarajaṅgamānām (RR/115), that is, "a specific characteristic nature or form whose properties are distinctive"/svarūpaviśesam asādhāranadharman (RR/116). Yet not merely objects as such, but objects in their "various states" (avastham), their " various modes revealed through genre or class (jāti), a distinctive feature or quality (guna), an action (kriyā), or a specific individual (dravya) "/jātiguṇakriyādravya vaśena vividhaprakāram (RR/115).

It should be evident that what exactly it is that sets svabhāvokti apart as an alamkāra -- aside from the negative

recognition that it lacks any evident degree of vakrokti -- is difficult to isolate, much less to specify. Given the extent of misconception that we have seen among critics with relatively straightforward material, it is hardly surprising that a similar result ensues from a task perhaps inherently impossible. Thus, for example, S. K. De writes: "Though, formally, the expression of the svabhāvokti may not differ from a statement or description in common life, there is still a substantial difference. For the poet . . . sees or conceives the very same thing not in the same way as common people. . . . For the poet the object has no connexion with his or anybody's interests . . . he has a vision of the thing in its true nature."⁴¹

Leaving aside the obvious question over what effect poetry can possibly have if its subject has "no connexion" with the interests of the reader (much less with the poet's), we might well ponder what possible relationship the poet's "vision of the thing in its true nature," an assumed and completely unverifiable "event" in the poet's mind, has

with the physical presence of lines on the page.

This is an excellent example of the perhaps more than occasional critical tendency to shuttle in and out of a writer's mind in the presumed explication of an objective discourse or poem, back and forth between words on the page and another's "thoughts" or "intentions," as though the ontological status of both were equally verifiable. All that we have is what is "formally" before us -- what we presume that this tells us necessarily of another's subjective state is of specious validity. If formally there is no difference between svabhāvokti and the statements of common life, we are left with no difference at all.

Gerow affirms that "svabhāvokti is not to be taken as synonymous with 'literal' or direct discourse, but rather as a cover term for the poetic possibilities implied by conventional language" (Glossary/47). Given that svabhāvokti is an alamkāra, that it should not be confused with literal discourse or vārtā is obvious; and to specify that svabhāvokti alone reflects "the poetic possibilities

implied by conventional language," is to ignore that, indeed, all kāvya -- whether marked by svabhāvokti or vakrokti -- is a working out of the possibilities inherent in ordinary language. However meaningless this loose approximation may be, Gerow elsewhere distorts what is otherwise evident in the texts themselves: "A type of vakrokti called svabhāvokti is, as it were, vakra only in the secondary sense -- that of the manner of its comprehension. . . ." (Glossary/47); and again, "What is implicit in Dāṇḍin -- that svabhāvokti is a category of figures which employ conventionality in a sense which can be called vakra. . . ." (Glossary/48). As with S. K. De, we drift away from linguistic fact into the nebulous world of psychological evaluation, of "comprehension," in the unjustified attempt to merge two poetic elements that are, especially for Dāṇḍin, clearly procedurally and fundamentally distinct. It is certainly not the case that Dāṇḍin equates or subordinates svabhāvokti to the element of vakrokti.

Is there anything affirmative that we can say? It would seem that Dandin considers svabhāvokti and vakrokti two balanced procedures, fundamental to the generation of the alamkāras, that are utilized towards the same end -- the creation of that distinctive "brilliance" or "beauty" (sobhā) that he affirms to be the hallmark of kāvya. It is not just that "svabhāvokti presents the subject in itself, whereas vakrokti 'bends' or 'deflects' the discourse from the subject to some object of comparison."⁴² "Svabhāvokti possesses charm only when it contains something special or striking in its expression, and it is this strikingness of expression which brightens up the natural form of an object."⁴³ And it is not just that svabhāvokti "brightens up" the subject presented, but that it reveals the vital, essential aspects "graphically" and "vividly." The subject is presented "in itself," directly, but isolated and captured in an intensity of language that may be validly distinguished from the direct reportage of conventional usage, as well as from the creative "twisting" that marks

Dāṇdin's other principle element of kāvya, vakrokti. The element of comparison, although certainly of great importance, is not sufficient in itself to encompass the range of means that vakrokti reflects.

Svabhāvokti and vakrokti may perhaps be essentially seen as linguistic procedures in the service of "revelation," elevating a given subject in intensity, revealing it in a more striking and thus more "meaningful" way. Through svabhāvokti we confront the subject stripped of the inessential, elevated and forced before us; through vakrokti the journey towards revelation is indirect but no less forceful -- the subject but temporarily submerged in comparison, in "word-play," in the manipulation of meaning and structure, to reappear revealed in an intensity thus achieved through expansion and delayed recognition. It is a measure of Dāṇdin's skill and fitting that only at the end of the chapter, upon completion of his examination of the artha alamkāras themselves, when they may be most appropriately considered are these two elements declared.

Daṇdin distinguishes four varieties of svabhāvokti alamkāra, based upon the four "states" or "conditions" through which objects may be linguistically presented. It would appear valid that his categories of jāti (genus), guṇa (attribute), kriyā (action), and dravya (individual) "are based on the four-fold classification of word usage or behavior (śabda-pravṛtti) of the grammarians";⁴⁴ or the "four-fold samketa of words recognized by the grammarians" (Notes 2/74). Within the critical tradition itself, Daṇdin's source is specifically affirmed: both Mukula [9th-10th centuries] in the Abhidhāvṛttimātrikā, and Mammata [11th-12th centuries] in the Śabdavyāpāraparicaya indicate that Daṇdin's four categories stem directly from Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya (c 150 B.C.).⁴⁵ Whether drawn specifically from Patañjali or not, the influence of the Mahābhāṣya was great, and the relevant lines are of interest (under [1.2.1]): "The 'expressive function' or the function of a word as its relation to the sense"⁴⁶ is four-fold: words in relation to genus (jāti); words in relation to

attribute (guna); words in relation to action (kriyā); and words in relation to proper names (yadrcchā)" [catusṭayī-śabdānām pravṛttih | jātiśabdā gunaśabdāḥ kriyāśabdā yadrcchāśabdāśca. . . . ||].⁴⁷

It should go without saying that the writers on kāvya were well-versed in, among other things, the classical grammatical or linguistic tradition. The rather artificial separation of "poetics" from "linguistics" reflects a Western approach -- to study kāvya without a thorough grounding in its medium of expression was not seriously considered. It is not surprising, therefore, to see Patañjali's four categories reflected in Bhāmaha (KA [6.21]), appropriately amidst a discussion of language: "Due to their classification as either dravya, kriyā, jāti, or guna, words are of four kinds. Others would include words such as 'dittha' and so on, terming them 'proper names' (yadrcchāśabda)" [dravyakriyājātiguṇabhedātte ca caturvidhāḥ | yadrcchāśabdāmityanye ditthādim pratijānate ||. And again, for example, in Mammaṭa (KP [110-111ab]),

although within the context of virodha alamkāra.

We might note that Dāṇḍin as well as Bhāmaha include dravya rather than Patañjali's yadrcchā, as one of the four categories; yet where Bhāmaha recognizes the literal distinction (thus dravya here should perhaps be taken in its fundamental meaning as "substance," "matter"), Dāṇḍin's usage of dravya as "proper name" is synonymous in meaning with yadrcchā.

It would appear that, strictly, Gerow is incorrect in affirming that "Dāṇḍin gives four examples of svabhāvokti, as the description emphasizes one of the four metaphysical categories. . . ." (Glossary/325). The "metaphysical" (though, hardly, as they were considered "real") categories (padārtha) are the primary contribution of the Vaiśeṣika system (viśeṣa/"distinguishing marker"),⁴⁸ and are seven rather than four in number.⁴⁹ Yet as ordinary existence in the world is primarily categorized through language, the padārthas are fundamentally the broad groupings of things

to which words refer -- language as the vehicle of thought (and divine expression) is again the touchstone.⁵⁰

The Vaiśeṣika appears as a coherent and complete system in the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra of Kanāda. A. K. Warder, acknowledging the difficulty of specific dating, would yet place it, "though not by much," after Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya (thus perhaps 1st century B.C. to 1st century A.D.).⁵¹

That the system existed to a degree before this time, with elements influencing or influenced by the "grammarians" is probable. Jāti, for example, appears some twenty-three times in Pāṇini in the sense of "genus" or "species" (with one exception) and, although not the exact term used by the Vaiśeṣika (sāmanya), its appearance yet allows one to conclude that "the śiṣṭa, 'men of culture' at the time of Pāṇini were already familiar with the principles of a logic more or less developed."⁵² Whatever the degree of early interaction and relative borrowing, it would certainly appear that Dandin's four categories were drawn, if not directly from Patañjali, then from the grammatical and

linguistic tradition in which he was so influential.

And what of the relationship between the four categories and svabhāvokti alamkāra? That Dandin developed the four varieties based on this relationship, rather than drawing them from a pre-existent tradition, we can only assume. We may speculate, however, on a probable motivation for their integration.

That the four categories reflect the "four-fold samketa of words" we have noted above. Samketa refers to the relationship of word and meaning as conventional, based on agreement (the view of the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas), rather than due to any inherent power within the word itself (the view of the Mīmāṃsakas). This agreement may be established through divine will (iśvarecchā) and is thus permanent (the view of the early Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas) -- samketa viewed as permanently established is known as abhidhā. There were those, however, who held that this agreement could also be established by the will of man (icchāmātra) and thus be impermanent (the

view of the later Naiyāyikas) -- samketa in this light is termed paribhāṣa. What is of immediate relevance is that "in both cases [abhidhā and paribhāṣa] the relation between word and meaning is direct."⁵³ Where the relationship of word and meaning is based on "the similarity or contiguity of the actual intended sense with the original primary sense" it is considered indirect, and is thus referred to as lakṣana or gaunī.⁵⁴

There is thus no question of a word meaning -- within the context of the four categories -- anything other than its "primary" meaning. That is, the element of "suggestion" -- and thus of vakrokti -- is precluded. The logical connection between svabhāvokti alamkāra, where the essence of things is displayed through selective, essential, primary meanings, and a schema that categorizes those primary meanings, is clear.

We may consider one final point. Some would hold that "in presenting the famous four-fold division of words, Patañjali recognized in jāti ('genus') the foremost of the

four 'causes [or 'bases'] of production (of words)'.⁵⁵

Jāti as such may have become the first to have been associated with the intensity of "description" embodied by svabhāvokti alamkāra; standing alone it may have become synonymous with svabhāvokti at an early date. Alternately, it is not inconceivable that all four categories could have existed as varieties, with jāti as the initial term standing in for all four in abbreviation. This is not to preclude the possibility, of course, that jāti may itself have been the first name for this specific mode to which the name svabhāvokti as alamkāra could have been later applied. Again, we have only our speculations.

After Dāṇḍin, svabhāvokti alamkāra though generally accepted, is frequently reduced in scope. Udbhaṭa (KASS [3.5],⁵⁶ for example, restricts its content to "the 'caprices' (hevāka) of young animals, and so on, in their respective actions" [kriyāyāṁ sampravṛttasya hevākānāṁ nibandhanam | kasyacinmṛgadimbhādēḥ svabhāvoktirudāhṛtā ||].

Rudraṭa (KA [7.9])⁵⁷ divides the artha alamkāras into four groups: vāstava ("real," "true"); aupamya ("similarity," "comparison"); atiśaya ("artistic exaggeration"); and ślesa (literally, "conjunction"; "word-play"). Vāstava involves "the description of the true nature of objects, rich in meaning and directly presented, without the element of comparison, artistic exaggeration, or 'word-play'" [*vāstavamiti tajjñeyam kriyate vastusvarūpakathanam yat | puṣṭārthamaviparitam nirupamanatiśayamaśleṣam ||*].

Jāti alamkāra (KA [7.30-33]) (=svabhāvokti) thus falls within vāstava, and it is probable that "Rudraṭa . . . develops his category vāstava within the tradition of the much discussed figure svabhāvokti. . . ." (Glossary/42).⁵⁸ "Systematic deviation" (vakrokti) as the "idea of figuration itself" is an assumption that can only be attributed to Bhāmaha, an idea explicitly developed much later by Kuntaka in his Vakroktijīvita [10th-11th centuries]. Dāṇḍin, as we have seen, explicitly widens the

concept of "figuration" in balancing the elements of vakrokti and svabhāvokti. Rudraṭa, in drawing a distinction between vāstava and the remaining categories (marked by vakrokti), would thus seem to be reflecting Dandin's two principle elements of literary expression.

Rudraṭa's definition of jāti alamkāra (KA [7.30]) more specifically appears to echo Dandin: "A description, recognizable and grounded in the world [literally, "well known for a long time in the world"/loke ciraprasiddham], of the states (avasthāna), action (kriyā) and so on, of objects as they are" [samsthānāvasthānakriyādi yadyasya yādr̥śam bhavati | loka ciraprasiddham tatkathanamananyathā jāti ||].

He further adds [7.31], however, that "In the behavior, appropriate in time and condition, of children, innocent women, timid animals, or people of ordinary status, there is a distinctive beauty" [śiśumugdhayuvatikātaratir-yaksambhrāntahinapātrāṇām | sā kālāvasthocitaceṣṭāsu višeṣato ramyā ||]. Two examples follow, vividly capturing

children at play [7.32] and the behavior of a young bride with her husband [7.33].

We may further note the appearance of svabhāvokti alamkāra as svarūpa in the Agni Purāna [343.2a, 3cd-4], where, drawing from Bhoja,⁵⁹ the "essential nature" (svarūpa) is presented as either "innate" (nija) and thus constant, or "adventitious" (āgantuka) and thus occasional. Mammata (KP [10.111cd]),⁶⁰ however, would appear to be drawing from, although slightly expanding, the more limited, earlier interpretation of Udbhaṭa: "Svabhāvokti describes the specific actions and forms of the young, and so on" [svabhāvoktistu ḍimbhādeḥ svakriyārūpavarṇanam ||]. Thus we see not only the description of actions (kriyā), as in Udbhaṭa, but "forms" (rūpa) as well; not only the young of animals (mṛga-ḍimba), but "young" (ḍimba) in general.

Notes: [2.8]

1. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, trans., Sanskrit Poetry from Vidyākara's Treasury (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 232.
2. V. Raghavan, "History of Svabhāvokti in Sanskrit Poetics," in Studies on Some Concepts of the Alamkāra Śāstra, rev. edition (Madras: The Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1973 (1942)), p. 104.
3. S. Lienhard, A History of Classical Poetry: Sanskrit -Pali-Prakrit, A History of Indian Literature, vol. 3, fasc. 1. (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1984), p. 71.
4. S. Lienhard, A History of Classical Poetry, p. 71.
5. S. Lienhard, A History of Classical Poetry, p. 68.
6. Bāṇa, The Harschacarita of Bāṇabhaṭṭa, Text of ucchvāsas 1-8, edited by P. V. Kane, 2nd edition (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1965).
7. V. Raghavan, "History of Svabhāvokti," p. 103.
8. Bhaṭṭi, Bhaṭṭikāvyam, with the Jayamañgalā commentary (Bombay: Nirṇaya Sāgar Press, 1887).
9. P. V. Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, 3rd edition (1961); Reprint (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971), p. 77.
10. Bhaṭṭi., Bhaṭṭikāvyam, trans. by G. G. Leonardi (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972), p. 104.
11. C. Hooykaas, "On Some Arthālaṅkāras in the Bhaṭṭikāvya

X," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, London University, 20 (1957), p. 360.

12. G. G. Leonardi, trans., Bhāttikāvyam, p. 105.
13. C. Hooykaas, "On Some Arthālaṅkāras," p. 361.
14. V. Raghavan, "History of Svabhāvokti," p. 107, n. 1.
15. V. Raghavan, "History of Svabhāvokti," pp. 107, 108.
16. Bhātti., Bhāttikāvyam [10.46]: "[Mount Mahendra] with its roots planted in the serpent's abode, touching the gods'world with its hundreds of peaks, filling the quarters with its so ! extensive flanks, with its pleasant thickets of trees laden with fruit and flowers" [viśadharanilaye nivīṣṭamūlam śikharaśataih parimṛṣṭadevelokam | ghanavipulanitambapūritāśam phalakusumācitavrksaramyakuñjam ||] (Translated by C. A. Rylands, in C. Hooykaas, "On Some Arthālamkāras," p. 354)
17. V. Raghavan, "History of Svabhāvokti," p. 107.
18. S. K. De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, vol. 1, 2nd rev. ed. (Calcutta: K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1960), p. 53.
19. V. Raghavan, "History of Svabhāvokti," p. 108.
20. V. Raghavan, "History of Svabhāvokti," p. 109.
21. Bhāmaha, Kāvyālaṅkāra of Bhāmaha, edited with English translation and notes by P. V. Naganatha Sastry, 2nd edition (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970).
22. P. V. Naganatha Sastry, Kāvyālaṅkāra of Bhāmaha, p. xv.

23. S. K. De, Introduction to The Vakrokti-Jīvita: A Treatise on Sanskrit Poetics by Rājānaka Kuntaka, edited by S. K. De, 3rd rev. ed. (Calcutta: K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1961), p. xx.
24. S. K. De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, vol. 1, pp. 53-54.
25. D. K. Gupta, A Critical Study of Dandin and his Works (Delhi: Meharchand Lachhmandas, 1970), p. 201.
26. The compositional divisions of kāvya that Bhāmaha considers in the Kāvyālaṅkāra are: (1) mahākāvya [1.19-23]; (2) nāṭaka [1.24]; (3) ākhyāyika [1.25-28ab]; (4) kathā [1.28cd-29]; and (5) anibaddha [1.30ab].
27. Bhāmaha, Kāvyālaṅkāra, with the Udyāna Vṛtti, edited by D. T. Tatacharya (Tiruvadi, 1934).
28. V. Raghavan, "History of Svabhāvokti," p. 113.
29. P. V. Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, p. 82.
30. That Bhāmaha rejects prahelikā is also certainly open to debate. See: Kāvyālaṅkāra [2.19].
31. S. K. De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, vol. 2, p. 86.
32. D. K. Gupta, A Critical Study of Dandin, n. 1, p. 158.
33. V. Raghavan, "History of Svabhāvokti," p. 103.
 Raghavan offers this strictly as a definition of "to adopt Bāṇa's language, grāmyā jātih," that is, jāti as "ordinary or vulgar," which he equates with vārtā (p. 106). He contradicts himself, however, for the only usage of jāti that he presents is jāti as alamkāra. Whether we consider

that Bāṇa's usage of jāti refers to jāti as alamkāra or jāti as genre, there is no basis for inferring that jāti in the opposite of Bāṇa's phrase (jāti grāmya) refers to jāti as vārtā.

34. S. K. De, Introduction to The Vakrokti-Jīita, p. xviii.

35. S. K. De, Introduction to The Vakrokti-Jīvita, p. xxiv.

36. D. K. Gupta, A Critical Study of Dāṇdin, p. 191.

37. S. K. De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, vol. 1, p. 84.

As D. K. Gupta points out, this view was initially presented by the Hṛdayamgama commentary (D. K. Gupta, A Critical Study of Dandin, p. 191, n. 3). This would appear to be De's source.

38. According to D. K. Gupta, the element of svabhāvokti would appear to be conspicuous in Dāṇdin's conception of, for example, hetu [2.235-60], sūksma [2.260-64], leśa [2.265-72], āśis [2.357], yathāsamkhya [2.273-74], preyas [2.275-79], and bhavika [2.364-66] alamkāras (D. K. Gupta, A Critical Study of Dandin, p. 191).

39. D. K. Gupta, A Critical Study, p. 193.

40. V. Raghavan, "History of Svabhāvokti," pp. 112-13.

41. S. K. De, Introduction to The Vakrokti-Jīvita, p. xx., n. 19.

42. Susan Tripp, "The Genres of Classical Sanskrit Literature," Poetics, 10 (1981), p. 219.

43. Kāvyalakṣana of Dandin (also known as Kāvyadarśa), edited by Anantalal Thakur and Upendra Jha, with the commentary entitled Ratnaśrī by Ratnaśrījñāna (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute of Post Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Language, 1957), p. 69. Translated by D. K. Gupta, A Critical Study, p. 190.
44. Dandin, Kāvyadarśa, Sanskrit text with Hindi paraphrase and commentary entitled Sudarśana by Dharmendra Kumāra Gupta (Delhi: Mehrcand Lachmandas, 1973), p. 87:
padārth ke cār rūp vaiyākaranō kī cār prakār kī
śabdapravṛtti kī dhāraṇā par ādhārit hai.
45. Cited in S. K. De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, vol. 2, p. 146, n. 8. Patañjali, The Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali, edited by F. Kielhorn, 3rd rev. edition by K. V. Abhyankar (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1962).
46. K. Kunjunni Raja, Indian Theories of Meaning (Madras: The Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1963), p. 24: a gloss on the word (pra)vṛtti.
47. Yadrcchā [< yā (+) icchā] /literally, "by the force of one's desire or will," (P. V. Naganatha Sastry, Kāvyālaṅkāra of Bhāmaha, p. 118); "artificial names," that is, "proper names."
48. The Vaiśeśikas are usually considered in affiliation with the Naiyāyikas or "those who espouse logic (nyāya)."
The Nyāya-Vaiśeśika are considered one of the darśanas or primary Hindu philosophical systems. The others are: Yoga, Sāṃkhya, Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, and Uttara Mīmāṃsā (Vedānta).
49. The seven padārthas of the Vaiśeśika systems are: dravya, "substance," "matter"; guna, "quality"; karman, "action"; sāmanya, "class," that is, general properties yet considered real that collectively distinguish a number of

individuals (or "particulars"); viśesa, the "distinctive mark" qualifying the individual or particular within a class; samavāya, "inherence," allowing a relationship between the categories (karman inheres within dravya, for example); and abhāva, "non-existence" or "negation."

50. It is highly probable that the enumeration of the categories "began with the analysis of simple sentences of subject-predicate form" (J. F. Staal, "Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika," Philosophies of India, Lecture Notes, University of California, Berkeley, 1972).

51. A. K. Warder, Outline of Indian Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarsi Dass, 1971), p. 107.

52. Yutaka Ojihara, "Jāti 'genus' et deux definitions pré-patañjaliennes" (1967), in A Reader on the Sanskrit Grammarians, edited by J. F. Staal (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1972), p. 424: "Les śiṣṭa, 'hommes de culture' de l'époque de Pāṇini étaient déjà familiers avec des éléments de logique plus ou moins élaborée."

53. K. Kunjunni Raja, Indian Theories of Meaning, p. 24.

54. K. Kunjunni Raja, Indian Theories of Meaning, see pp. 19-25.

55. Yutaka Ojihara, "Jāti 'genus' et deux definitions pré-patañjaliennes," p. 425.

56. Udbhaṭa, The Kāvyālaṅkāra Saṅgraha by Udbhata Bhatta, with the commentary of Pratīhārendurāja, edited by Mangesh Rāmkṛishṇa Telang, 2nd edition (Bombay: Nirṇaya Sāgar Press, 1928).

57. Rudrāṭa, Kāvyālaṅkāra (A Treatise on Rhetoric) of Rudrāṭa, with the commentary of Namisādhu, edited with the

Prakāśa Hindī commentary by Rāmadeva Śukla. Vidyābhavan Rāṣṭrabhāṣā Granthamālā, 136 (Varanasi: The Chowkhamba Vidyabhawan, 1966).

58. That Gerow should also believe that vāstava, since it (literally) refers to the "real" or "natural," "would appear to contradict the idea of figuration itself, which is predicated on the notion of systematic deviation from the norms of real utterance" reflects, however, his own position (Glossary/42). Gerow's translation of Rudraṭa's verse (KA [7.10]) stems from or reflects this misconception: pūṣṭa-artha is not simply "pregnant of sense," but sense that is "rich and well developed," "intense"; aviparīta is not specifically "ironical," but refers to language that is "untwisted" and thus indicates that vāstava cannot involve vakrokti, which is displayed in various ways by alamkāras falling into Rudraṭa's other three general categories.

59. For an extensive discussion see V. Raghavan, "Bhoja and Svabhāvokti," Bhoja's Śrīngāra Prakāśa (Madras: V. Raghavan, 1963), pp. 132-37.

60. Mammata, The Poetic Light: Kāvyaprakāśa of Mammata, trans. by R. C. Dwivedi with Sanskrit text,. 2 vols. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1967 and 1970).

2.9 Example of the Svabhāvokti of Genus

Beaks reddish and curved

Wings green and soft

Throats tri-colored and striped --

These are parrots of charming speech.

Jāti Svabhāvoktyudāharanam :

tundairātāmrakutilaiḥ pakṣairharitakomalaiḥ

trivarṇarājibhiḥ kanṭhairete mañjugirah śukāḥ

trivarna: sita asita lohita /"white, black, red"

RŚ/69); nīla rakta dhūsara /"dark blue, red, grey"

(RR/117).

girah [(f.) (pl.) < gīr] /"speech," "language."

Jāti svabhāvokti takes as its subject a distinct genus

or class, "graphically revealing" its "essence" through the judicious selection and presentation of identifying and vital characteristics thus qualifying the individual members. Although we have the presentation of attributes, we are not concerned strictly with description. The characteristics displayed must be those essential for inclusion within the superordinate genus -- it is the genus that is illuminated and revealed.

In our example, it is not just that the individual members have "beaks" and "wings" -- signaling the general, rather nebulous category of "birds" -- but beaks "reddish and curved" and wings "green and soft." Their throats are distinctively striped in three colors (though as we see from our commentators, there is some confusion over just which specific colors these are), and their voices (literally, "language") "charming" in mimicry. All qualifying and essential attributes that together reveal "parrots" as a distinct genus.

2.10 Example of the Svabhāvokti of Action

Throat sweet-sounding within

Eyes rolling

Fluttering

Lustful

The dove kisses his lover.

Kriyā Svabhāvoktyudāharanam :

kalavaṇitagarbheṇa kaṇthenāghūrniteksaṇah

pārāvataḥ paribhramya riramsuścumbati priyām

āghūrnita [< ā (+) *ghūrn / "rotate," "roll about,"
"be agitated"]: bhramita (RS/70).

riramsuh [sannanta < *ram] / "wishing to make
love"]: rantukāmah (RS/70).

In kriyā svabhāvokti we turn to the revelation of action (kriyā). In a sense we draw on the element of jāti, for it is not just any action, but action characteristic of and attributable to an agent readily identifiable. Again the subject must be captured through essential, qualifying attributes, and now with the focus on a specific action, attributes that themselves tend to take the form of actions.

In kāvya, numerous and varied are the correlates for the erotic drawn from the natural world. Our subject now is involved in the action of "kissing," yet the specific kissing of a dove "wishing to make love." The intensity of this central action is strengthened against a background of relevant and distinctive ancillary (and presumably simultaneous) movements. "Cooing," with "eyes rolling," anxiously "fluttering" -- all overtly marking his lust -- the dove proceeds in kissing his lover.

2.11 Example of the Svabhāvokti of Attribute

Bristling the hair of the limbs

Kindling bliss in the mind

Closing the eyes --

This touch of a lover proceeds . . .

Gunā Svabhāvoktyudāharanam :

badhnannañgesu romāñcam kurvan manasi nirvṛtim

netre cāmīlayanneṣa priyāsparśah pravartate

In contrast to the other three varieties, guna svabhāvokti does not focus on a specific, superordinate subject -- whether genus, action, or individual -- but rather brings to the fore the very means that the other varieties employ in their presentation: a series of vivid, correlate attributes.

"This touch of a lover" hardly displays the recognized specific coherence necessary to qualify as a genus, nor as a nominal (sparśa) is it strictly considered an action, and neither of course does it mark a specific individual. A basis, an integrating element is essential, but the "subject" now serves as a backdrop for its correlate and distinctive attributes. The attributes of a women's "touch" -- whether "Bristling the hair of the limbs, "Kindling bliss in the mind, or Closing the eyes" -- are thus centrally presented as a series of effects on a fortunate recipient.

We might add that the power of the lover's touch is stressed by giving the three attributes a causative force, while their simultaneity of effect is underlined by their realization as vartamāñe kṛdantas ("present pariciples"):
badhan, kurvan, āmilayan (the last a true nijanta ("causative") from [ā (+) *mīl]).

2.12 Example of the Svabhāvokti of an Individual

Blue on the throat

Skull in hand

Crescent moon as a diadem

Matted hair shining red --

Vṛṣadhvajah appeared.

Dravya Svabhāvokyudāharanam :

kanṭhekaḥ karasthena kapālenenduśekharaḥ

jatābhīḥ snigdhatāmrābhirāvīrāśidvṛṣadhvajah

vṛṣadhvajah: "He whose banner (dhvaja), or rather
 whose emblem on his banner, is the bull (vṛṣah)" (RR/118),
 that is, one of the "1008" names of Śiva. The poet
 contributes to and draws from a wealth of epithets, whose

choice is often metrically determined yet frequently, in sounding a particular connotation, in reflecting a particular attribute or action, serving to deepen the resonance of a given context.

Śiva may variously appear, for example, as Nilakanṭha / "the Blue-throated," Candraśekhara / "the Moon-crested," Trilocana / "the Three-eyed," Kapālin / "the Skull-bearer," Gangādhara / "the Bearer of the Gāṅgā"; in reflecting notable actions, as Kāmaghna / "the Slayer of Kāma," Tripurāri / "the Enemy of Tripura"; as ascetic or yogin, Sthānu / "the Firm," Mahāyogin / "Great yogin"; in reflecting his "auspicious" modes, as (the usual) Śiva, Śamkara, Śambhu, Mahādeva / "Great god"; and in reflecting his "fierce" mode, as Hara / "the Seizer," Aghora / "the Horrible."¹

We note the bull's connotations of power and fertility, and further the bull Nandin as Śiva's mount; the bull "with which, perhaps, in a totemistic past Śiva himself was identical."²

kanṭhe kālah: "who is blue on the throat, a mark of

the kālakūṭa [poison]" (RŚ/71). With Mount Mandara for a stick and the serpent Vāsuki for a mixing rope, with gods and demons at either end, the ocean was churned for the nectar of immortality. Vāsuki first spit forth the fatal kālakūṭa poison -- neutralized in one draught by Śiva yet forever marking his throat.

karasthena kapālena /"with skull in hand": "The blessed blue and red lord with knotted hair emitted from himself Lālabhairava to hold the skull of Brahmā. 'You will perform penance,' he said, 'in order to destroy evil and benefit creation. As my agent, you shall go begging throughout the world, skull in hand'."³

jatābhiḥ snigdhatāmrābhiḥ /"matted hair shining and red": "May Śiva's matted hair protect you: / its color blending with the lightning flame / that flashes from the hollow of his forehead-eye; / its heavy locks encircled / by the winding tendrils of his snakes; / within, the fair young moon -- . . ."⁴

In dravya svabhāvokti a specific individual is illuminated, captured, through essential and characteristic features. Śiva, whose iconography is an amalgam hinting of roots in a far distant past yet interwoven with elements drawn from complex mythologies, is conjured with minimal yet vital brush strokes.

2.13 Conclusion of Svabhāvokti Alamkāra

Such is the description of essential nature revealed through Genus Action Attribute Individual -- This alone reigns supreme among śāstras Yet even among kāvyas it is desired.

Svabhāvoktyupasamḥārah :

jātikriyāguṇadravyasvabhāvākhyānamidrśam
śāstresvasyaiva sāmrājyam kāvyeṣvapyetadīpsitam

svabhāva-ākhyānam: "svabhāvākhyānam" appears as the first alamkāra in Dandin's list beginning with verse [2.4]. Svabhāva-ukti and svabhāva-ākhyānam /the "expression or description of an object's essential or true nature" are thus synonymous. It thus could be taken literally in the present verse as a technical name, "svabhāvākhyānam," and thus we might have, "Such is svabhāvākhyānam. . . ." I have rather opted for a descriptive presentation of the term in this instance, reinforcing its distinctive process in its concluding verse.

śāstresu: ānvīksikyādisu vidyāsthānesu /"Among the branches of knowledge, logic and so on" (RŚ/71); nyāya-vyākaranāvedāntādiśāstresu /"Among the śāstras of logic, grammar, the Vedānta, and so on" (RR/118).

sāmrājyam: prādhānyam /"supremacy," "predominance" (RŚ/71) (RR/118).

In light of our initial discussion, Dandin's closing lines are of interest and certainly apt. And just as

previously we attempted to clarify a number of misconceptions over svabhāvokti's relationship to vakrokti -- the relationship between, fundamentally, poetic intensity or "strikingness" achieved through the presentation of word and meaning as either direct and immediate, or indirect and suggestive -- so we must briefly cut through yet lingering confusion prior to any concluding clarity.

D. K. Gupta, for example, projects an undue emphasis into this verse, a misconstrued emphasis that itself follows misconceived meaning. Gupta would limit the referential range of Dandin's sāresu/"among sāstras," considering it to mean kāvyasātriya granthoñ meñ, that is, "texts or sāstras pertaining to kāvya.⁵ Integrating his prior interpretation of ādyā, appearing in Dandin's initial verse on svabhāvokti [2.8], as "primary," "foremost" (rather than as simply "first in position") with his current assumption that Dandin's distinction of sāstra/kāvya in fact refers to "poetics"/"poetry," allows him to affirm in conclusion, "[Svabhāvokti] is the primary (ādyā) figure which occupies

the supreme place both in poetry and poetics. . . .";⁶ and yet further, "[This verse] signifies the essentiality, and not merely the desirability of the figure in poetry."⁷

And where, as I believe, Gupta elevates svabhāvokti to an unwarranted degree, we see V. Raghavan, on the contrary, affirming that in this verse "Dandin uses the word svabhāvokti or jāti loosely when he says: sāstresvasyaiva sāmrājyam; he refers here to vārtā only."⁸

Either position is extreme. I feel that the meaning of Dandin's concluding lines is clear as it stands, and that it tends to affirm the validity of conclusions drawn in our introductory discussion. There is no reason to assume that Dandin's usage of "sāstras" refers to anything other than "expository texts," texts as a general type concerned with the direct and immediate exposition (which is not to preclude that they might assume a metrical form) of, as both of our commentators indicate, the "branches of knowledge." Nor can we seriously accept that Dandin considered the usage of svabhāvokti among sāstras

"loosely," as a form of vārtā or mundane report. It is probable, however, that what "reigns supreme among sāstras" is not svabhāvokti as alamkāra (which would be a disjunctive mixture of forms at the least), rather svabhāvokti as a fundamental and primary principle of "literary expression." Svabhāvokti as such, where word and meaning are immediate, where there is least opportunity for confusion, would logically be essential in the direct presentation of meaning that characterizes the sāstra. That just as svabhāvokti as method may be utilized in the service of "intensity" of description, signaling svabhāvokti alamkāra, so it may be utilized -- with no contradiction -- in the vivid and "intense" presentation of expository meaning. And that "it is desired (ipsitam) among kāvyas" -- whether we view svabhāvokti as concrete alamkāra or as fundamental principle -- in balance with vakrokti as essential to "literary expression," is certainly clear.

Notes: [2.9] - [2.13]

1. See: Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Sanskrit Poetry, pp. 55-61; John Dowson, A Classical Dictionary of Hindu Mythology and Religion, "Śiva," pp. 296-300; Cornelia Dimmitt and J. A. B. van Buitenen, Classical Hindu Mythology, pp. 148-218; Wendy O'Flaherty, Hindu Myths, pp. 116-74; and Margaret Stutley and James Stutley, Harper's Dictionary of Hinduism, pp. 279-280.
2. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, trans., Sanskrit Poetry from Vidyākara's Treasury (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 69.
3. Cornelia Dimmitt and J. A. B. van Buitenen, Classical Hindu Mythology (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978), p. 207.
4. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Sanskrit Poetry, a poem by Bhavabhūti, section 4, no. 44., p. 63.
5. Daṇḍin, Kāvyādarśa, Sanskrit text with Hindi paraphrase and a commentary entitled Sudarśana by Dharmendra Kumāra Gupta (Delhi: Meharchand Lachhmandas, 1973), p. 87.
6. D. K. Gupta, A Critical Study of Dandin and his Works, (Delhi: Meharchand Lachhmandas, 1970), p. 200.
7. D. K. Gupta, A Critical Study, p. 192, n. 7.
8. V. Raghavan, "The History of Svabhāvokti in Sanskrit Poetics," in Studies on Some Concepts of the Alambāra Śāstra, rev. edition (Madras: The Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1973), p. 106.

2.14 Definition of Upamā Alamkāra

Where -- variously -- similarity

is clearly seen --

There is the alamkāra called Upamā.

Its scope will now be described.

Upamālamkāralakṣaṇam :

yathākathamcit sādrśyam yatrodbhūtam pratīyate

upamā nāma sā tasyāḥ prapañcoyam pradarśyate

Upamā, "Where -- variously -- similarity is clearly seen," is one of the most fundamental and important of alamkāras and one that assumes a primary position throughout the tradition. As svabhāvokti alamkāra embodies one of Dandin's two primary modes inherent in kāvya, so upamā alamkāra displays perhaps the most basic features of

the other, vakrok̥ti or "twisted" language. And just as svabhāvok̥ti alamkāra thus stands somewhat apart, so upamā alamkāra may be considered to initiate the varieties to follow, all of which in varying ways manipulate language to a degree that marks them as distinct from the prosaic, "literal" norm.

And we should offer the caveat before proceeding that the dangers of translative "overreach" and uncritical acceptance-- especially in the case of primarily conceptual concepts -- are clearly demonstrated in the presumed and commonly stated equivalence of "upamā" and "simile" (and the corresponding presentation of "rūpaka" as "metaphor"). The association is false and the reasons may be clearly and briefly stated.

In the world of figuration in English "metaphor" resides as primary and dominant (albeit considering the term at large, given its contemporary cachet and accommodation to whatever idiosyncratic usage, one would be hard pressed to offer any meaning); "simile" is a restricted subspecies,

with the comparison invariably and specifically marked by, for example, "like" or "as." In the realm of alamkāra -- in light of the presumed translative equivalence -- there is a not only reversal of perceived importance, but a lack of correspondence at the operative level. Upamā is considered central throughout the tradition, subsuming rūpaka as a restricted subspecies -- "Upamā itself \ -- with difference obscured -- \ is called Rūpaka" (KD [2.66]). And as we shall immediately see in Dāṇḍin's extensive exposition to follow, upamā is hardly restricted to the invariable employment of explicit markers of comparison.

Given the acceptance of upamā -- its variations and near transformations -- as the most pervasive and evident of alamkāras (as indeed the comparative function may be held to be integral to language itself) it is not surprising that its appearance in practice is contemporaneous with the earliest extant instances of poetry and poetic analysis. The word "upamā" itself appears throughout the Rg Veda ([1.31.15], [1.113.15], [2.124.2],

[8.29.9], [8.69.13]), as do a number of related terms.¹ As Belvalkar and Raddi note, "It is usual to derive the word upamā from upa (+) *mā, "to measure," in the sense of what approximates another in measure, dimension, quality, and so on; but in the Rg Veda the word seems to have been connected with the adjective upama in the sense of 'highest' . . . or 'preeminent'. . . . The influence of the one in determining the evolution of the meaning of the other is undeniable" (Notes 2/78). We may cite, for example, [1.31.15cd] where upamā primarily denotes "similarity": "The person who keeps the choicest foods in his house, and with them entertains his guests, in fact, performs a sacrifice of life, which has the likeness of heaven" [svāduksadmā yo vasatau syonakrjjīvayājam yajate sopamā divah ||].² And alternately, we note its appearance in Rg Veda [1.113.15cd] where it assumes the sense of "highest": "The dawn of today has appeared as the last one of the countless mornings that have gone by, but she is the first among the brilliant dawns that are to come"

[īyusīnām upamā śaśvatīnām vibhātīnāmm̄ prathamoṣā vyaśvit
||].³

Although, in all probability, "upamā" as cited does not refer to "alamkāra" as such at this stage, we certainly do find any number of examples of what may be considered basic upamās evident throughout the Vedas. Indeed the subject of "figuration" in the Vedas -- focusing primarily on upamā -- has come under a degree of scrutiny.⁴ H. D. Velankar, for example, has thoroughly examined the "similes" of the Fourth Maṇḍala of the Rg Veda (finding some 150), of the Fifth Maṇḍala (finding some 180), and of the Atharvaveda (finding some 325, excluding those transferred from the Rg Veda).⁵ His analysis is of interest, especially in view of the hundreds of years separating the Vedas from the first extant indications of formal poetic theory.

In considering the upamās in the Rg Veda we must initially recognize that Velankar employs the four-fold componential structure that we may assume was held to be

integral to upamā from an early date (and whose actual evolution we shall trace below). In its full or "complete"/pūrṇa form an upamā thus displays: (1) the sādhārana dharma or the attribute(s) applicable to both (2) the upameya ("that to be compared" or "that which is worthy of comparison"), the subject or "tenor" of the comparison "through which the [upamā] is related to the literal or outward sequence of ideas which constitute the framework of the poem. . . ." (Glossary/142); (3) the upamāna ("that which is being compared" or "the means of comparison"), the object or "vehicle" of the comparison "introduced to concentrate attention on the essentials of aspect or behavior" (Glossary/142); and (4) the vācaka śabda or dyotaka, the "illuminating" word or particle which explicitly marks the comparison.

In categorizing the upamās of the Fourth and Fifth Maṇdalas of the Rg Veda, Velankar remarks, "The Vedic Upamā is usually a simple affair. It has its four parts, that is, the Upameya, the Upamāna, the particle of comparison and

the Common term or the words expressive of the common property."⁶ Although all four components are usually expressed, this need not be the case -- elision generates variation. And further, "the object of the poet's description is the Upameya alone and the Upamāna is introduced only for exalting the Upameya."⁷ As we shall see with Daṇḍin, another approach to variation lies in moving beyond this early, usual practice, to the manipulation of the relative status between upameya and upamāna.

Velankar sees essentially four structures: (1) Compound upamās displaying all four fundamental components: "one principal and one or more subordinate upamānas and upameyas, a single common attribute, and either na or (more commonly) iva as the comparative particle. As in [4.32.16bc]: "May you joyfully accept our hymns, as one longing for a wife accepts a lovely bride" [jçayāse giraśca naḥ | vadhuṣyuriva yoṣanām. ||]."⁸ In this case tvam ("you," implicitly marked by the grammar) would be the principal upameya; vadhuṣyu ("one longing for a wife") the principal

upamāna; girah ("hymns") the subsidiary upamāna; josayāse ("joyfully") the common property; and iva the comparative particle.

(2) Compound upamās partially expressed, where either an upameya or upamāna is dropped, again with either na or iva as the comparative particle. As in [4.5.1bd]: "He who shines mightily [Agni] supports [the heaven or his smoke] as a pillar supports the wall" [r̥hadbhāḥ upastabhāyadupamīna rodhāḥ].⁹ Here Agni would be the principal upameya, the "pillar" the principal upamāna, "heaven"/"smoke" the inferred subsidiary upameya, and the "wall" the subsidiary upamāna.

(3) Simple upamās, that is, those displaying a single upameya and a single upamāna, yet with the upamāna further qualified; and again with either na or iva. As in [4.4.1a]: "Spread out your light like a broad net"/kṛṇusva pājah prasitīm na prthvīm.¹⁰

(4) Simple upamās with a simple (unqualified) upamāna,

again with either na or iva. As in [4.6.5c]: "His flames dash forward like horses"/dravantyasya vājino na śokāḥ.¹¹

We may additionally add that the sādhāraṇa dharma in nearly every case appears as an action, thus serving as a fulcrum between balanced expressions. A "complete" compound Vedic upamā according to Velankar might thus be sketched:

Principal <u>Upameya</u>	(+)	Subsidiary <u>Upameya</u>
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(is like)	[Common Action]	(is like)
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Principal <u>Upamāna</u>	(+)	Subsidiary <u>Upamāna</u>
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Given this evident degree of perceived and repetitive structure it would certainly appear that the poets of the Vedas were consciously aware of their linguistic craft. We do find, moreover, the occasional verse reflexively touching upon the act of composition. In [7.32.13ab], for example, poets are counselled to "Chant a hymn that is comprehensive / not too short, well-uttered / well-arranged, and graceful / well-decorated" [mantramakharvam sudhitam]

supeśasam dadhāta yajñiyesvā |].¹² And we may consider a paean to the poetic art : "When men of wisdom create through their intellect verse after winnowing [words] as barley grains are sifted through a winnowing basket, then men of equal knowledge recognize meaning . . . -- in their verses blessed fortune resides" [saktumiva tita unā punanto yatra dhīrā manasā vācamakrata | atrā sakhyāḥ sakhyāni jānate bhadraisām lakṣmīrnihitādhi vāci ||] [10.71.2].¹³

The existence of an early theory of poetics during the Vedic period cannot be denied with absolute certainty. The usual view is expressed by H. R. Diwekar: "During the vedic epoch, which was truly [']un âge de création poétique, ['] the art of the alamkāra already existed, although the theory was not yet developed. When the [']vagues de la créaction['] retired and when the created works became the objects of scientific studies -- it is then that the theories were born."¹⁴

Where the position of S. K. De may be considered

extreme: "There is nothing unusual in this use of the general idea of similitude, which need not be interpreted as having a particular speculative significance. . . . There is no indication of a dogma, much less of a theory, of Poetics in Vedic times. . . . For between this unconscious employment of figures of speech and the conscious formulation of a definite system, there must necessarily be a long step."¹⁵

Granted that we have no extant evidence of a formal theory, but to hold that the Vedic poets had merely a "general idea of similitude" or that we find but the "unconscious employment of figures of speech" in the Vedas is untenable.

Yet just as suspect is the view that poets operate in an ethereal vacuum, carried along on "vagues de la création." (And surely to attribute the poetic art to "divine revelation" only compounds the obfuscation.) I would affirm rather that in the Vedas we see inspiration very much aware of the means of its transmission. That an

awareness of linguistic craft was already quite evolved and that this presupposes -- simultaneously -- a degree of critical reflection. That although during this early period we do not have in all probability an elaborated critical analysis, we most probably do have an articulated poetic methodology in consonance with the level of poetic craft that we do in fact observe.

And too one must always be aware that looming behind the received literature from India's past are any number of texts that might have been but for the varagies of historical transmission. Throughout the secondary material concerning the Indian poetic tradition this obvious consideration is frequently implicitly (and occasionally explicitly) dismissed, and in the quest for reassurring certainty the progression of received literature is presumed to reflect the totality of what once was. Even with what we have at hand we must always be aware of the possibility that a given term, doctrine, or theory presented in a given text presses upon us from an unknown source. That during these

early stages we are on quite uncertain ground and can only indicate what we do find and orientate our speculations accordingly.

In Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyi (5th or 6th century B.C.)¹⁶ various technical terms associated with upamā appear. We find, for example, upamita ([2.1.56]); upamāna ([2.1.55], [3.1.10], [3.2.79], [3.4.45]/, [5.4.97], [5.4.137]); sāmānya ([2.1.55], [2.1.56], [8.1.74]); and upamā ([2.3.72]). In [2.1.55] the role of the upamāna is expressed: "[Words serving as] the vehicle/means of a comparison (upamānas) [form tatpuruṣa compounds] with words indicating a distinctive property which they have in common [with the focus or subject (here upamita) of the comparison] [upamāna ni sāmānyavacanaiḥ ||]. As in the example ghaṇaśyamakṛṣṇah /"Kṛṣṇa who is dark [as] a cloud."¹⁷ Where [2.1.56] indicates the role of the upamita (upameya): "[Words serving as] the subject/focus of a comparison [form tatpuruṣa compounds] with words such as 'tiger' and so on [serving as upamānas], where words indicating a distinctive

property which they have in common are not employed"

[upamitam vyāghrādhibhiḥ sāmānyāprayoge ||]. As in the example purusavyāgrah /"A man [like] a tiger."¹⁸ We should note that strictly speaking we do not yet see all four of the traditional, fundamental components of upamā. Pāṇini employs upamita rather than the later and standard upameya.¹⁹ And the word upamā itself [2.3.72] yet denotes -- as in the Vedas -- "similarity."²⁰

It is in the Nirukta of Yāska²¹ that we find the first formal mention and categorization of upamā as a recognized linguistic device. Yāska's date is uncertain though in all probability he is to be placed after Pāṇini and prior to Patañjali (2nd century B.C.), and thus approximately in the 3rd or 4th century B.C.²²

The Nirukta is essentially a commentary on the anonymous and certainly early Vedic glossary, the Nighantu, which Yāska [1.1] refers to as "a traditional list that has been handed down"/samāmnāyah samāmnātah |.²³ The Nighantu [3.13] lists twelve phrases from the Vedas that include

words or particles that denote similarity -- all of which are termed upamā. We have, for example, idamiva; idam yathā/"like this"; agnirna ye/"who are like Agni"; tadvat/"like that"; tadrūpah /"having the same form"; and tadvarnah /"having the same color."²⁴ The word "upamā" now seems to mark a class of items rather than being one of many terms that may denote "similarity." From marking a class of words or particles that each denote similarity, it would be a short step to come to indicate the process through which similarity itself is expressed.

In Nirukta [3.13] upamā in fact clearly appears denoting a distinctive linguistic procedure that expresses comparison. Yāska begins, "And now the upamās"/athāta upamāḥ , and then proceeds to cite a definition of upamā, but one attributed to a previous writer named Gārgya: "Gārgya [defines upamā] thusly: 'What is not that, is similar to that'" [yadatattatsadrśamiti gārgyāḥ ||].²⁵ That is, where similarity is expressed between two similar objects. Given that this same Gārgya is mentioned in the

Aṣṭādhyāyī,²⁶ and even granting that the ultimate validity of Yāska's attribution can never be known, I yet feel that it is safe to assume that prior to both Pāṇini and Yāska, and thus earlier than say the 5th century B.C., upamā did indeed exist as a recognized and regularly employed feature of language. But we must immediately add that in granting this there is no assurance that upamā was elevated, either during that earlier period or at the time of Yāska, as a distinctive feature of poetic language.

For P. V. Kane to consider that "the earliest extant definition of any figure of speech is perhaps that of Upamā . . . contained in the Nirukta of Yāska";²⁷ or for S. K. De to contend that "the definition . . . undoubtedly establishes a very early, but more or less definite, conception of the poetic upamā" is premature.²⁸ Leaving aside any speculation over the degree of early awareness of poetic craft, upamā yet appears within works devoted to broad linguistic concerns -- What do these Vedic terms mean? How does the Sanskrit language work?

It would appear that we may trace a progression given the material at hand. Upamā in the Vedas (and Pāṇini) as a word denoting "similarity"; in the Nighantu as a class-word referring to the particles and words that may convey the presence of similarity; its definition by Gārgya -- a grammarian -- as a distinct feature of language; and its analysis by Yāska, a writer concerned with etymology and again grammar. We cannot yet definitively assume that the "peculiarities" of poetic speech had come under formal, analytical scrutiny.

Yāska [3.13] follows Gārgya's definition with what is the earliest extant analysis of the process of linguistic comparison termed upamā: "To something that possesses a superior attribute or is well known [upamāna], we compare another thing that possesses an inferior attribute or is less well-known [upameya]". [jyāyasā vā gunena prakhyāta tamena vā kanīyāmsam vāprakhyātam vopamimīte |].²⁹ Yet this is immediately qualified [3.13]: "On the other hand, something superior [may be compared] with something

inferior" [thāpi kaniyasā jyāyāmsam]. As in, for example, Rg Veda [10.4.6] where the two arms that tightly grasp the sticks which generate the sacred fire are compared to two thieves who tightly hold their victims (Nirukta [3.14]); or Rg Veda [10.40.2] where the Aśvins³⁰ are compared to a widow sleeping with her husband's brother (Nirukta, [3.15]).

Yāska then presents a number of sub-types of upamā, a loose classification that is nevertheless based upon both "structural" and "contextual" considerations. "'Yathā' [indicates] karma upamā [comparison involving an action] [3.15]. . . . The letter ā is an upasarga and as such it has been previously described; it has also been observed where the sense is that of an upamā [3.16]. . . .³¹ Bhūta upamā [comparison involving an animate being].³² As in 'You approached us as a ram' / meso bhūto 'bhi yannayah [3.16]. . . . Rūpa upamā [comparison involving a similar form or appearance] [3.16]. . . . And thā [may denote a upamā] [3.16]. . . . Vat [indicates] siddha upamā [comparison

where the upamāna is 'well-established and known to surpass every other object in a particular quality or action. . .

.³³ As in 'Like a brāhmaṇa'/brāhmaṇā iva, yet also 'Like an oaf'/vṛpalā iva [3.16]" (iva being apparently an alternative for vat).

Of special interest is the last variety, which may be seen as essentially structural: "Now luptā/'elliptical' or artha/'inferred' upamāna is declared" ([3.18]); an elliptical upamāna devoid of comparative particles where the relevance of the comparison is inferred. Thus "'lion,' 'tiger' in a positive sense; 'dog,' 'crow' in a negative sense" [simho vyāghra iti pūjāyām | śvākāka iti kutsāyām |] [3.18]. As in the Rg Veda, we have the element of elision, one that very probably "foreshadows the later distinction between pūrṇa [/"incomplete"] and luptā [/"elliptical" upamāna]." ³⁴ This specific type of elision results in a form that is later reflected and amplified by the distinct rūpaka alamkāra.³⁵

Yāska's Nirukta reveals that the concept of upamāna -- and an embryonic rūpaka -- were established at an early

date. At this stage upamā would seem to denote a rather loose spectra of linguistic usages involving comparison. As H. R. Diwekar points out, "It is easy to see that the subdivisions are not completely logical. But what interests us is that [writers] had already begun to define upamā and to subdivide it."³⁶ But again, the upamā that is being presented is not the upamā elaborated in the alamkāra tradition -- we have no poetic focus. For H. R. Diwekar to then conclude, "Thus the theory of alamkāra had begun. . . . There is no doubt regarding the existence of the term upamā in a [']stylistique['] sense. . . .",³⁷ I would consider untenable.

Moving forward to Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya (2nd century B.C.),³⁸ an analysis of Pāṇini's sūtras and Kātyāyana's Pāṇinean vārttikas, we find a brief discussion of upamā's components. He examines sūtra [2.1.55] of the Aṣṭādhyāyī, upamānāni samānyavacanaiḥ, and poses the questions, "What are upamānas? Is the upamāna identical with or different from the upameya? What does it matter?" [kāni punar

upamānāni | kiṁ yadevopamānam tadevopameyamāhosvidanyad
evopamānamanyad-upameyam | kiṁ cātah |].³⁹

Before considering his answers we should immediately note the appearance of the word "upameya": "The word upameya was well-established by the time of Patañjali who, as far as we know, seems to have been the first to have employed it in his commentary to [Pāṇini's] sūtra [2.1.55]."⁴⁰ Patañjali continues [under 2.1.55]: "If the upamāna and upameya are identical what is the purpose of an upamā such as 'A cow like a cow'? On the other hand, if the upamāna is totally different from the upameya what is the purpose of an upamā such as 'A horse is like a cow'? . . . Where there is a degree of similarity and a degree of difference we have an upamāna and an upameya" [yadi yadevopamānam tadevopameyam ka ihopamārthaḥ gauriva gauḥ iti atha anyadevopamānam anyad upameyam ka ihopamārthaḥ gauriva aśvah iti | . . . yatra kiñcit sāmānyam kaśicca viśeṣah tatropamānopameye bhavataḥ |].⁴¹ He follows with his analysis of "upamāna" [under 2.1.55]: "For māna ["measure"]

is the means of discernment . . . for enabling another to discern what is not already known. . . . Upamāna is approximate to the māna [and determines an object not definitely but approximately]. . . ." [mānam hi nāmānir jñātajñānārtham upādiyate . . . tatsamipe yannātyantāya mimite tad upamānam |].

It is perhaps with a touch of frustration at material lost that we encounter the first extant and formal consideration of poetical language in a work devoted to multiple aspects of the theater. In Bharata's Nātyaśāstra (with segments perhaps variously dated from as early as the 2nd century b.c. to as late as the 5th century a.d.⁴²) we find in a single chapter -- as though spontaneously arising -- a quite developed catalog of the essential components of kāvya. Bharata enumerates and describes thirty-six lakṣanas/"essential characteristics" [17.1-42] (which Dāṇḍin indeed accepts as "alamkāras" [2.367]); four alamkāras [17.43-61]; ten yamakas/"sound repetitions" [17.62- 87ab] (KD [3.1-77]); ten dosas/"faults"

[17.87cd-95ab] (KD [3.125-85]); and ten gunas/"qualities"

[17.95cd-108ab] (KD [1.40-102]). Quite certainly these stem from an obviously active ambient tradition, one that is however sadly silent.

Thus upamā truly appears for the first time in its role as an alamkāra. Bharata provides a definition in [17.44]: "Among the compositions of kāvya, where anything is compared through similarity (sādrśya) upamā should be discerned -- its bases are similar attributes (gunas) or actions (kṛtis)" [yātkiñcit kāvyabandhesu sādrśyeno-pamīyate | upamā nāma vijñeyā gunā kṛti samāśrayā ||].

Four varieties follow that depend strictly on the structural manipulation of the number of objects compared. The presentation is entirely descriptive with no mention of the technical components (upameya and upamāna) that seem to be the focus of the grammarians.⁴³ Thus we have: (1) "Of one with one/ekasya ekena, where one upameya may be compared with one upamāna ("Your face is like the moon"/tulyam te śaśinā vaktram) [17.46]; (2) "Of more than

one with one"/anekasya ekena, where more than one upameya may be compared with a single upamāna ("The stars shine like the moon"/śaśāñkavat prakāśante jyotimṣi) [17.47]; (3) "Of one with many"/ekasya bahubhiḥ, where one upameya may be compared with more than one upamāna ("Whose eye is like that of the hawk, peacock, and vulture"/śyenabarhinabhāsānām tulyāksa [17.48]);⁴⁴ and (4) "Of many with many"/bahūnām bahubhiḥ, where more than one upameya may be compared with more than one upamāna ("Elephants like clouds"/ghanā iva gajāḥ) [17.49].

Seemingly in balance to the above, Bharata then cites five additional varieties that may be seen as "contextual," that is, it is primarily the modulation of context that distinguishes the comparison: "Five types of upamā are discerned by the wise: praśamsā ("praise"), nindā ("censure"), kalpitā ("imagined"), sadr̄ṣī ("(uniquely) similar"), and kiñcit sadr̄ṣī ("somewhat similar")"/praśamsā caiva nindā ca kalpitā sadr̄ṣī tathā | kiñcicca sadr̄ṣī jñeyā hyupamā pañcadhā budhaiḥ || [17.50]. In praśamsā upamā

[17.51] the context of comparison is elevated with praiseworthy elements: a king and a beautiful lady / sages and success. In nindā upamā [17.52], on the other hand, we have reproach and objects deserving of censure: a women and a man "devoid of all qualities" / a vine and a thorny tree.

The remaining three varieties focus on degrees of comparison. Thus in kalpitā upamā [17.53] we must "imagine" a component of the comparison: quite real "Elephants oozing ichor, moving with a graceful slowness"/*kṣaranto dānasa lilam līlāmanthara gāminah | mataṅgajā. . . . are compared to a conception of "mountains as though moving"/jaṅgamā iva parvatāḥ*⁴⁵ In sadr̄si upamā [17.54] the upameya and upamāna are uniquely comparable: "a deed done today"/previous "superhuman deeds". And in kiñcit sadr̄si upamā [17.55], where a series of upameyas -- the following all attributes of the first -- are comparable to varied and distinct upamānas, similarity is distributed and thus "partial": the face of a beautiful lady/the moon;

her eyes/lotus petals; her walk/the graceful elephant's gait.

Before moving on to the formal kāvya śāstra tradition, we may touch briefly upon one last important linguistic treatise, the Vākyapadīya ("Concerning Sentences and Words") of Bhartr̥hari,⁴⁶ which, if correctly dated to A.D. 450-510,⁴⁷ follows the Nātyaśāstra and precedes Dāṇḍin. Bhartr̥hari [3.359-427] accepts (and repeats) Patañjali's definition of upamāna, and extensively analyzes the relationships between upamā's fundamental components: upamāna, upameya, and sāmanya (sādhārana dharma). We see for the first time a technical consideration of the process of comparison itself within the specific context of upamā. Thus in [3.383]: "The attribute (dharma) held to exist in the upameya is inferred (anumiyate) to exist in the other. Or that held to exist in the upamāna is inferred to exist in the upameya" [upameye sthito dharmah śruto 'nyatrānumīyate | śruto 'thavopamānastha upameye 'numiyate ||].⁴⁸

And in the vṛtti following [3.426-27] the nature of

"similarity" itself is discussed: "The word 'sāmānya' in this case expresses a similarity (sādr̥ṣya) that exists in both [objects]. And similarity entails both difference and identity" [ubhayagatam sādr̥ṣya mātram sāmānyaśabdenātra vivakṣitam | sādr̥ṣyam ca bhedābhedābhyaśameva bhavati ||].⁴⁹ To which may be added, "What is called resemblance is nothing more than an attribute presented as existing in more than one thing" [tathā cānvayinā rūpenoccyamāno guṇa eva sādr̥ṣyam na tato 'rthāntaram |].⁵⁰

In this light we may further consider the earlier verse [1.63]: "When, whatever is considered as the common property between the standard [upamāna] and the object of comparison [upameya] itself figures in acts of comparison, some other common property, different from it, is adopted" [sāmānyamāśritam yadyad upamānopame-yayoh | tasya tasyopamāneṣu dharmo 'nyo vyatiricyate ||].⁵¹ That is, in the example, "The study of the ksattriya is similar to that of the brāhmaṇa" [brāhmaṇādhyayanena tulyam ksattriyādhyayanam iti], "study" (ādhyayana) as the apparent

common property is directly construed with both upameya and upamāna and thus figures in the act of comparison -- the actual common property, such as "excellence," is inferred.

In the *vṛtti* under [1.63] Bharṭṛhari explicitly marks three of the four fundamental components of upamā (he excludes vacaka) in their traditional form (in what should be no surprise at this rather advanced date): "Here, the upamāna, the upameya, and the sādhārana dharma between them -- these three are well-established" [*ihopamānamupameyam tayośca sādhārano dharma iti tritayametat siddham*].⁵²

And finally, in light of Yāska's remarks on the relative status of upameya and upamāna, we may cite [3.373]: "Due to its celebrated status, the upamāna is universally considered superior. Whether superior or equivalent the upameya is not denied its role" [*upamānam prasiddhatvāt sarvatra vyatiricyate | upameyatvamādhikya sāmya vā na nivartate ||*].⁵³ That is, "that which is superior in quality, really or known to be so, becomes the standard of comparison [upamāna]. The face of the beloved

is inferior in quality to the moon, but due to poetic tradition, poets [may] make it the standard of comparison for the moon. Only what is thought of as superior in quality becomes the upamāna. There is no such restriction as far as the upameya is concerned."⁵⁴

Standing with Dandin's Kāvyādarśa at the beginning of the extant textual tradition, Bhāmaha's Kāvyālaṅkāra⁵⁵ presents a somewhat restricted view of upamā's varieties [2.30-38], devoting rather a number of verses to potentially obviating "faults" (dosas) [2.39-65]. In his definition and varieties a number of features from our previous overview are evident (though of course not necessarily directly). Bhāmaha [2.30] thus defines upamā: "Where there is similarity between an upameya and upamāna even through a slight attribute -- though they differ with respect to place, time, or behavior -- This is upamā" [viruddheno-pamānena deśakālakriyādibhiḥ | upameyasya yatsāmyam
guṇaleśena sopamā ||]. As Bhartrhari noted, "Similarity

entails both difference and identity"/bhedābheda (*vṛtti* under [3.426-27].

Examples immediately follow [2.31] utilizing either of the two comparative markers (vacakas), iva (dūrvākāñḍamiva śyāmam/"Dark like a blade of Dūrva grass"), or yathā (tanvī śyāmā latā yathā/"The slender lady like a Śyāmā vine").

Alternately, similarity may be "hidden" in a compound (samāsa) with iva or yathā elided (kamalapatrāksī/"lotus-petaled-eyed" or śaśāṅkavadanā/"moon-faced") -- a feature discussed, for example, by Pāṇini. Similarity of action (kriyāsāmya) may be expressed through the suffix -vat [2.33]: dvijātivadadhīte 'sau guruvaccānuśāsti naḥ /"This one learns like a bhraman and commands like a guru." This variation is identical to one of the two alternatives in Yāska's siddha upamā [3.16], where the upamāna is "well-established and known to surpass every other object in a particular quality (guna) or action (kriya)" (see above). Bhāmaha follows with a variety termed prativastu upama [2.34-36] where, without the employment of either iva

or yathā, similarity is inferred between two parallel sentences or expressions (vastus/vākyas) through the presentation of similar attributes (gunas) in each. This variety appears with Dandin as well [2.46-47], and although seemingly quite distinct such balanced, analogical similarity between extended, parallel expressions certainly appeared as early as the Rg Veda.

Bhāmaha's concise presentation reflects a conscious, personal discrimination -- that he was aware of a number of other varieties is clear. Before proceeding to possible faults in upamā he remarks [2.37], "Certain great ones have declared the nature of upamā to be three-fold, given the presence of either "censure"/nindā, "praise"/praśamsā or "a wish to express"/ācikhyāsā. . . . [2.38] Through specifying [the necessity of] a common property [in [2.30]] certainly even these three are indicated. And all those such as māla upamā and so on, are of little consequence -- their elaboration is unnecessary" [yaduktam triprakāratvam tasyāḥ kaiścinmahātmabhiḥ | nindāpraśamsācikhyāsābhedādatrābhidhī-

ate ||] [2.37] [sāmānyaguṇanirdeśāttrayamapyuditam nanu |
mālopamādiḥ sarvo 'pi na jyāyānvistaro mudhā ||] [2.38].

It is certainly not the case that "Bhāmaha . . . specifically objects to the classification by praise and blame as irrelevant. . . ." (Glossary/144). Gerow would see Bhāmaha as initiating a structural tradition of classifying upamā, while dismissing the varieties based on "censure"/nindā, "praise"/praśamsā, and "a wish to express"/ācikhyāsā as "irrelevant," and depending "only on the grammatical device by which the similitude is expressed." Alternately, given that nindā and praśamsā upamās (as well as sadr̥ṣī, kiñcit sadr̥ṣī and kalpita) appear in the Nātyaśāstra, Gerow affirms that "the non-structural, or contextual tradition may be said to begin with Bharata himself. . . ." (Glossary/144). Leaving aside the point that there can be no finding of absolute "origins" in the extant material, there can be no question of accepting such a clear-cut dichotomy. Bharata precedes his "contextual" varieties with four varieties based

strictly upon the manipulation of "structural" components; and Bhāmaha certainly does not "specifically object" to contextual varieties but rather simply indicates that they are subsumed by his definition -- through "specifying [the necessity for] a common property."

That Bhāmaha cites these three varieties in the same order that Daṇḍin presents them [2.30-32], and that ācikhyāsā upamā appears to be unique to Daṇḍin, have often been taken as evidence of Daṇḍin's chronological priority to Bhāmaha. It is certainly of interest, though it is somewhat hazardous "to conclude that Bhāmaha must have meant Daṇḍin alone, seeing that a vast amount of literature known to Bhāmaha and even mentioned by him by name is no longer available to us" (Notes 2/93). We might add that Bhāmaha in [2.37] uses the plural ("A few great ones"/mahātmabhiḥ) in referring to those who have indicated ninda, praśamsā, and ācikhyāsā as varieties of upamā; and to consider ācikhyāsā upamā as unique to Daṇḍin, given the degree of lost material, is a rather dubious leap of faith.

Bhāmaha concludes his exposition with a detailed analysis of seven potential faults that upamā may display [2.39-65] (see under [2.51]).

The conciseness of Dandin's definition stands in sharp contrast to his elaborate exemplification to follow. Although concise it is sufficient -- it is not the case that "Dandin says only that upamā is sadrśyam ('similitude')" (Glossary/143). The inclusion of yathākathamcit / "in whatever way [similarity may appear]," "variously," allows for the refinement and subtlety of the types to follow. Udbhūtam provides balance and exclusion -- similarity must be "clearly," though not necessarily explicitly, seen. Yet I would agree that Dandin's "treatment of upamā is probably unequaled in the history of alamkāra sāstra for its length, perspecuity, and philosophical interest" (Glossary/145).

It is unfortunate but revealing of the degree of critical insight all too commonly apparent in the literature that we find such remarks as the following:

"Dandin's classification is primitive. . . . Dandin's whole conception of upamā and his attempted classification of it is very crude and uncritical. Nor is there any attempt to present a systematic grouping of the varieties given" (Notes 2/80, 83); "the formula of classification followed is not at all scientific and logical";⁵⁶ or "Dandin's treatment of Upamā is unscientific as compared with Bhāmaha's. . . ."⁵⁷ Leaving aside the rather questionable presuppositions such remarks display, I think we shall find upon patient analysis that there is very much more involved in Dandin's varieties than has been previously revealed.

Dandin's exhaustive analysis of upamā is primarily procedural, an involvement with the manipulation of both structure and context which would seem to reflect his exuberance and concern as a practicing poet. He presents thirty-two distinct varieties (one [2.43] having two subtypes generates a total of thirty-three variations). We may distinguish nine implicit, somewhat loose categories.

Immediately following the definition, the first grouping [2.15-21] displays a structural emphasis. The first variety, dharma upamā [2.15], stands as a paradigm for a "complete"/pūrnā upamā with all four fundamental components -- upameya, upamāna, sādhārana dharma, and vacaka -- present. Vastu upamā [2.16] drops an explicit common attribute, focusing attention on the "objects" compared. Viparyasa [2.17] and anyona [2.18] upamās play upon the element of "reversal." In the former the somewhat usual roles of given objects as upameya and upamāna are reversed; the latter similarly presents such a reversal, but these same objects also appear in their usual roles giving us the element of parallel "reciprocity." Niyama [2.19] and aniyama [2.20] upamās are similarly paired, displaying alternate extremes of "restriction." In niyama the upameya is restricted to one and only one upamāna; in aniyama the number of upamānas is potentially limitless. And finally, samuccaya upamā [2.21] echoes the initial

dharma upamā [2.15] in its "completeness," yet further "conjoins" an additional common attribute.

The following atiśaya upamā [2.22] incorporates and extends the structural component of the preceding samuccaya upamā, for now the number of attributes is so great -- the similarity so "intense" -- that only a single difference distinguishes the upameya from the upamāna. And further, with the vacaka or comparative word elided for the first time, we must now infer the similarity -- the element of "suggestion" that plays such a primary role in the realization of any number of alamkāras. This exaggerated condition is realized, however, within the "contextual" element of exaggerated poetic imagination, a feature that similarly marks the following two (and a later two) as well. Thus in utpreksita upamā [2.23] similarity is presented within an explicit imaginative context (as, for example, the moon boasting of his own beauty); and in the following adbhuta upamā [2.24], attributes of the upameya,

in themselves quite usual, are "wondrously" imagined to apply to the upamāna.

Where similarity is great, accurate identification of upameya and upamāna may fail. A context of varying degrees of doubt characterizes the following three varieties. In moha upamā [2.25] confusion is total; in samśaya upamā [2.26], although attributes correctly correspond, a degree of doubt prevails; and in nirnaya upamā [2.27] initial doubt is resolved.

The following ślesa [2.28] and samāna [2.29] upamās are paired, with each displaying variations of "word-play." Ślesa entails a given attribute either "embracing" multiple referents, upameya and upamāna, or a given term embracing multiple meanings correspondingly applicable to either the upameya or upamāna. In samāna upamā attributes are expressed -- to a degree -- through a "uniform" linguistic string that allows for multiple readings depending upon its constituent analysis.

A rather long series of eight varieties follows that

explores a concern evident in the earliest of upamās -- the relative status between upameya and upamāna. A regular structural feature of many is the presence of two upamānas. Thus in nindā upamā [2.30] an upameya is elevated due to the "depreciation" of two upamānas. Alternately, in praśamsā upamā [2.31] through the "praise" of each upamāna, the upameya -- as similar -- is correspondingly elevated. Status is intentionally irrelevant in ācikhyāsa upamā [2.32], where regardless of appearing in a context of either censure or praise similarity must be expressed. In viroddha upamā [2.33] an upameya and two upamānas appear as "mutual rivals," and thus implicitly as equals. Yet in pratisedha upamā the power of an otherwise usual upamāna to act as such is explicitly "negated," thus implicitly marking the upameya as superior. In catu upamā [2.35] through its "flattery" at the expense of the otherwise superior upamāna, the upameya again attains equivalent status. The position of tattvākhyāna upamā [2.36] is somewhat anomalous, given its element of inferred, potential

confusion over the correct identities of the upameya and upamāna. Essentially, however, we have the expression of the "actual" nature of things and thus an affirmation of the standard status of upameya and upamāna. And in asādhārana upamā [2.37] the upameya "transcends" two upamānas in a particular attribute, becoming essentially "comparable to itself alone," and is thus seen in a thoroughly superior light.

The following abhūta [2.38] and asambhāvita [2.39] upamās both include the element of poetic "imagination" that is prominently displayed by the previous atiśaya [2.22], utpreksitā [2.23], and adbhuta [2.24] upamās, yet further focus on and develop the upamāna in a distinctive manner. In abhūta upamā the upamāna is elevated through imagination to a point where it is -- strictly -- "non-existent." In asambhāvita upamā the positive nature of an upameya is revealed through the denial of a negative attribute -- an observation validated by analogical

comparison with two upamānas that themselves are "inconceivable."

The above two varieties lead into a brief series whose focus is now entirely on the structural or conceptual manipulation of the upamāna. In bahu upamā [2.40] a "multiple" sequence of upamānas appears; in vikriyā upamā [2.41] the upameya is conceived as though "transformed" into two upamānas; and in mālā upamā [2.42] a series of upamānas appears as an interwoven "garland," where the locus of a preceding upamāna provides the subject for the following upamāna.

A series of three follows that is fundamentally * distinct. Previously comparison has been presented essentially between nominals, a relationship developed and manipulated within a given embracing context. The scope of comparison now expands to the subsuming framework of the sentence or vākyā. Thus in vākyārtha upamā [2.43-45] similarity is presented between two parallel sentences. With one, or more than one vacaka utilized it displays two

subtypes. In prativastu upamā [2.46-47] similarity is inferred between "parallel objects" in completely distinct parallel vākyas. And in tulyayoga upamā [2.48-49], again drawing in the element of relative status, the upameya and upamāna are equalized "in the performance of the same action" -- an action that is shared by and thus completes comparable vākyas.

The final variety, hetu upamā [2.50], stands alone, integrating a number of previous elements as well as displaying its own distinctive feature. It "frames" the entire sequence, for as with the initial dharma upamā [2.15] we again have all four fundamental components. And again there is a repetition of upamānas, and an "expanded" context with a series of brief vākyas. As hetu, a given attribute serves as the "cause" for a given comparison.

Dandīn, as with Bhāmaha, follows his presentation of the varieties of upamā with a consideration of potential, obviating faults (dosas) [2.51-56]. Unlike Bhāmaha, his exposition is brief, limited to faults in gender (liṅga-

doṣa), number (vacanadoṣa), and in inferiority/superiority (hinādhikatādoṣa). Dāṇḍin concludes [2.57-65] with a lengthy list that includes (but is not limited to) bahuvrīhi compounds, thirty-nine words and particles, fourteen verbs, and eleven expressions that may all indicate similarity.

Dāṇḍin's approach to upamā alamkāra -- however incisive -- is of course hardly definitive. In the later period the analyses of Vāmana [8th-9th centuries] and Mammaṭa [11th to 12th centuries] are I feel of special interest.

The position of Vāmana in the Kāvyālaṅkārasūtrāṇi⁵⁸ is unique. All of the artha alamkāras cited are developed within the framework of upamā: "And upamā is the basis [of the artha alamkāras] /arthālaṅkārāṇām . . . | tanmūlam copameti. . . . (Preface to [4.2.1]).

Accepting the division of figures into those of sound and those of sense, he sought to comprehend all the latter group under the categories suitable to . . . [upamā]. The distortions involved in defining hyperbole, or a poetic version of the

cause and effect relationship, as . . . [upamā] can be imagined. . . . Whether Vāmana was induced to develop his notion of figure as . . . [upamā] because of his general redefinition of figure in relation to guna, is not clear.⁵⁹

Vāmana's definition (KAS [4.2.1]) of upamā is straight-forward: "Similarity between particular attributes of an upamāna and upameya -- This is upamā" [upamānenopameyasya guṇaleśataḥ sāmyamupamā ||]. And in the following vṛtti we find the corresponding definitions of upamāna: "The upamāna is that element with superior qualities with which another is compared through the indication of similarity." And of the upameya: "The upameya is that element with inferior qualities with which [the upamāna] is compared" [upamīyate sādrśyamānīyate yenotkrṣṭagunenānyat-tadupamānam | yadupamīyate nyūnaguṇam tadupameyam ||].

Vāmana's specific varieties consist of three sets of contrasting pairs and three contextual modes. Kalpita upamā is cited in [4.2.2] and explained in the following vṛtti: "Due to the element of "fanciful imagination" on the part

of poets this is a kalpita upamā. But the previous [standard case] involves conventional [similarity]" [*kavibhiḥ kalpitatvāt kalpitā pūrvā tu laukikī* ||]. In addition to the "imagined"/"conventional" (kalpita/laukiki) polarity, we may have similarity based upon either "word" or "sentence" meaning (padārtha/vākyā): "Due to a distinction between those based upon word-meaning and those based upon sentence-meaning, upamā is two-fold" [*tad-dvaividhyam padavākyārthavṛtti-bhedāt* || [4.2.3]]. And it may be further based upon the familiar and early "complete" /"elliptical" (pūrnā/luptā) distinction: "And it is either 'complete' or 'elliptical'" [*sā pūrnā luptā ca* ||] [4.2.4]. Where "It is 'complete' when there is a totality consisting of the words denoting guna, dyotaka [vacaka], upamāna, and upameya [*gunadyotakopamānopameyaśabdānām sāmagrye pūrnā* ||] [4.2.5]; and "It is 'elliptical' when there is elision" [*lope luptā* ||] [4.2.6].⁶⁰ And finally "Its usage involves 'praise,' 'censure,' and 'expressing things as they are'" [stutinindātattvākhyānesu || [4.2.7].

We note in Vāmana's varieties and "modes" the presence of a number of previous elements: kalpita mentioned explicitly by Bharata (KA [17.53]); Daṇḍin's series in [2.43-49] based upon "sentence meaning"/vākyārtha (Bhāmaha's prativastu upamā [2.34-36]); the pūrnā/luptā distinction evident in the Rg Veda, with luptā explicitly cited by Yāska [3.18] (though perhaps in a somewhat different sense); and "praise"/as praśamsā and "censure"/nindā similarly included by Bharata (NS [17.51-52], Daṇḍin [2.30-31], and mentioned by Bhāmaha [2.37-38].

And we might add that Vāmana replaces the variety that would seem to have been usually grouped with praśamsā and nindā, that of ācikhyāsa/"a wish to express" with tattvākhyāna, which appears to be more mundane than Daṇḍin's variety of the same name in [2.36]. Vāmana, as with Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, concludes with a discussion of faults in upamā [4.2.8-21] (following Bhāmaha, with the exception of dropping viparyayah /"excessive disparity" (of relative status between the upameya and upamāna).

Mammaṭa's presentation in the Kāvyaprakāśa [10.87-91]⁶¹

carries a structural analysis of upamā to an extreme. His definition [10.87a] is an abbreviated reflection of Bhāmaha's: "Upamā is similarity within difference"/ [sādharmyamupamābheda ||]. Twenty-five varieties follow, grouped under the two superordinate categories of pūrnā [10.87b] or luptā [10.87bcd]. Pūrnā may be either śrauti/"explicit," where the upamāna is explicitly marked by such particles as yathā, iva, and vā; or ārthī/"implicit," where the comparison is marked by free-floating words, such as tulya, leaving the identity of the (expressed) upamāna to be inferred from an awareness of similarity. Varieties falling within either of these two categories may in turn be based upon either a sentence (vākyā), a compound (samāsa), or a taddhita suffix (as we noted above, a number of Pāṇini's rules refer to the expression of upamā through compounds, and kṛt and taddhita suffixes).

The elaboration of the luptā category is complex, extending to nineteen varieties. The śrauti/ārthī

distinction is utilized where applicable, and there is a further extension of the particular suffixes upon which a given upamā may be based (kyac, kvip, kyāñ, namul). We may thus have, for example, the single elision (ekaluptā) of the common attribute (dharma) in a sentence (vākya) either explicitly (srautī) or implicitly (ārthī) expressed.⁶²

Notes: [2.14]

1. As for example: upamānām [8.61.2]; īdrśe [1.17.1], [4.57.1], [6.45.5], [6.60.5]; and sadrśih [1.123.8], [3.35.3], [3.52.8], [4.51.6], [6.47.21]. Rg Veda Samhitā with English Translation, translated by Swami Satya Prakash Sarasvati and Satyakam Vidyalankar, vol. 2 (New Delhi: Veda Pratishthana, 1977).
2. Rg Veda [1.31.15cd], translated by Swami Satya Prakash Sarasvati and Satyakam Vidyalankar, vcl. 2, pp. 96-97.
3. Rg Veda [1.113.15cd], translated by Swami Satya Prakash Sarasvati and Satyakam Vidyalankar, pp. 376-77.
4. See Abel H. J. Bergaigne, "Quelques Observations sur Les Figures de Rhétorique dans le rg-Veda," in Mémoires de la Société de Linguistique, tome 4, 2nd fasc. (Paris, 1880), pp. 96-137. Abel H. J. Bergaigne, "La Syntaxe des Comparaisons Védiques," in Mélanges Renier, Bibliothèque de L'École des Hautes Études (Paris: F. Vieweg, 1887), pp. 75-101. H. R. Diwekar, "La Notion D'Alaṅkāra dans le Rg Veda"; "Les Alaṅkāra dans Le Rg Veda," in Les Fleurs de Rhétorique dans L'Inde (Paris: Librairie d'Amérique et d'Orient, 1930), pp. 1-22. P. S. Sastri, "Figures of Speech in the Rg Veda," Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 28 (1947), pp. 34-64. H. D. Velankar, "Rgvedic Similes: I. Similes of the Vāmadevas (R. V. Mandala IV)," Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, New Series, 14 (1938), pp. 1-47. H. D. Velankar, "Rgvedic Similes: II. Similes of the Atris (R. V. Mandala V)," Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 16 (1940), pp. 1-42. H. D. Velankar, "Similes in the Atharvaveda," Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bombay, New Series, 38 (1963), pp. 19-43. A. Venkatasubbiah, "Syntax of Vedic Comparisons" (Translation of Abel Bergaigne, "La Syntaxe des Comparaisons Védiques"), "Annals

of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 16 (1934-35), pp. 232-61. A. Venkatasubbiah, "Some Observations on the Figures of Speech in the *ṛgveda*" (Translation of Abel Bergaigne, "Quelques Observations sur Les Figures de Rhétorique dans le *ṛgveda*"), Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 17 (1935-36), pp. 61-83, 259-88. Hermann Weller, "Über Vergleichungen im Rigveda," in Aus Indiens Kultur: Festgabe Richard von Garbe, edited by Julius von Negelein (Tübingen: Erlangen, Palm and Enke, 1927), pp. 54-64. Weller, Hermann, "Zu einigen Metaphern des Rigveda," Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik, 5 (1927), pp. 178-84.

And the related: Jan Gonda, Remarks on Similes in Sanskrit Literature (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1949). Maurice Bloomfield, Rig-Veda Repetitions, Harvard Oriental Series, vols. 20, 24 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1916). C. A. F. Rhys Davids, "Similes in the Nikaya: A Classified Index," Journal of the Pali Text Society (1906-7), pp. 52-151; (1908), pp. 180-88.

5. H. D. Velankar, "Rgvedic Similes: I. Similes of the Vāmadevas (R. V. Mandala IV.)," Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, New Series, 14 (1938), pp.

1-47. H. D. Velankar, "Rgvedic Similes: II. Similes of the Atris (R. V. Mandala V.)," Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 16 (1940), pp. 1-42. H. D.

Velankar, "Similes in the Atharvaveda," Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bombay, New Series, 38 (1963), pp. 19-43.

6. H. D. Velankar, "Rgvedic Similes: I.," p. 5.

7. H. D. Velankar, "Rgvedic Similes: I.," p. 7.

8. H. D. Velankar, "Rgvedic Similes: I.," p. 15.

9. H. D. Velankar, "Rgvedic Similes: I.," pp. 17-18.

10. H. D. Velankar, "Rgvedic Similes: I.," p. 23.
11. H. D. Velankar, "Rgvedic Similes: I.," p. 42.
12. Rg Veda [7.32.13ab], following the translations of Satya Prakash Sarasvati and Satyakam Vidyalankar, pp. 2444-45; and H. D. Velankar, "rg- vedic Similes: I.," p. 2.
13. Rg Veda [10.71.2], following P. V. Kane's translation History of Sanskrit Poetics, 3rd edition; Reprint (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971), p. 328.
 Yāska in the Nirukta [4.10] expands on such "men of wisdom" (dhirāḥ): "Wise, full of insight, able in contemplation"/dhirāḥ prajñānvanto dhyānavantah (Yāska, Nirukta, edited by Lakshman Sarup, text on p. 78, translation on pp. 59-60). And Patañjali in the introduction to the Mahābhāṣya remarks (with fitting bias), "Well, who are they? . . . Grammarians"/ke punaste | vaiyākaranāḥ (Patañjali, Mahābhāṣya, edited by F. Kielhorn, 3rd edition, vol. 1, p. 4).
14. H. R. Diwekar, Les Fleurs de Rhétorique dans L'Inde, p. 23. And similarly P. V. Kane, "In those very ancient times, though no theory of Poetics could be stated to have been evolved, the germs of it were there" (P. V. Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, p. 329).
15. S. K. De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, vol. 1, 2nd rev. ed. (Calcutta: K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1960), pp. 2-3.
16. Following the dating of Hartmut Scharfe, Grammatical Literature (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1977), p. 88. Pāṇini, The Astādhāyi of Pāṇini, edited and translated by Śrīśa Chandra Vasu, 2 vols. (1891-98); Reprint: (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1962).

17. Pāṇini, Aṣṭādhyāyī, edited by S. C. Vasu, vol. 1, p. 243.
18. Pāṇini, Aṣṭādhyāyī, edited by S. C. Vasu, vol. 1, p. 243.
19. Thus in regard to the later, standard four fundamental components of upamā, the remarks of Gerow, "This terminology goes back at least to Pāṇini. . . ." (Glossary/142), and those of P. V. Kane, "Long before Pāṇini these technical words had become fixed in the language" (P. V. Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, p. 338) are -- strictly speaking -- incorrect.
20. Pāṇini, Aṣṭādhyāyī, edited by S. C. Vasu , vol. 1, pp. 305-6, [2.3.72]: "The third or sixth case affix may optionally be employed when a word is joined with another word meaning 'similar to' (tulya) -- except tulā and upamā"/tulyārtha ratulopamābhyaṁ tr̥tiyā 'nyatarasyām ||.
21. Yāska, The Nighantu and the Nirukta, edited and translated by Lakshman Sarup (Delhi: Motilal Banarsi Dass, 1967).
22. Hartmut Scharfe, Grammatical Literature, pp. 118-19: "While we cannot be certain that Yāska knew Pāṇini, he must have known a grammar so close to the Aṣṭādhyāyī as to be almost identical with it. Considering that Pāṇini lacks familiarity with the White Yajurveda (studied in the more eastern parts of India) while Yāska quotes from all branches of the Yajurveda, it is not hard to assume that Pāṇini preceded Yāska and did not know his work" (p. 119).
23. Hartmut Scharfe, Grammatical Literature, p. 117, n. 2.
24. Nighann̄tu [3.13], edited by Lakshman Sarup, p. 18.

25. Yāska, Nirukta, edited by Lakshman Sarup, p. 67.
26. Pāṇini, Aṣṭādhyāyī [7.3.99]; [8.3.20]; and [8.4.66].

Sumitra Katre considers this the "name of several teachers" (he cites also [4.1.105], yet here "gārgya and so on" refers to "one descended from Gārgya," not Gārgya as such) (Sumitra M. Katre, Dictionary of Pāṇini, 2 vols., (Poona: Deccan College Post-Graduate and Research Institute, 1968), p. 212). In each case the occurrence refers to a specific Gārgya, a prior grammarian. Given the lack of any contradicting evidence, one would assume that Pāṇini is referring to one and the same person. Multiple citations hardly means multiple people. As Hartmut Scharfe points out, however, actual works later attributed to various "previous teachers"/pūrvācāryas are "spurious." And further -- "as a rule" -- alleged quotations appearing in the later commentaries are "highly suspect" (Hartmut Scharfe, Grammatical Literature, p. 86). That "their insights were assimilated by their followers, but their compositions were lost when the classical works of Pāṇini and Yāska rose above the previous literature" (p. 86). He qualifies this somewhat in noting that Patañjali and others usually simply attribute an anomalous term or expression to these "previous teachers," "that they never give specific references which they probably would have had such been available to them" (p. 86, n. 46; see F. Kielhorn, Indian Antiquary, 16 (1887), p. 101ff.). Yet most importantly, Scharfe would contend that the validity of Yāska's discussion of earlier grammatical studies (primarily in his introduction) is an exception to the above: "Almost all other information on pre-Pāṇinian grammarians in later literature is suspect" (p. 119).

27. P. V. Kane, "Outlines of the History of Alamkara Literature," The Indian Antiquary, 41 (1912), pp. 124-28; 204-8.

28. S. K. De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, vol. 1, p. 4.
29. Following the French of H. R. Diwekar, Les Fleurs de Rhétorique dans L'Inde, pp. 26-27.
30. The Aśvins: divine horse-headed twins -- as the sons of the sun and a mare -- healers and the charioteers who draw dawn (Uṣa) across the sky: "O Aśvins who work wonders, turn your chariot that brings cattle, that brings gold, and with one mind come back to us. You Aśvins who gave a shout from Heaven and made light for mankind, bring us strength" (Rg Veda [1.92.16-17]); Wendy D. O'Flaherty, trans., The Rig Veda: An Anthology (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1981), p. 181.
31. Yāska, Nirukta [3.16]: ā ityākāra upasargah purastādeva vyākhyātah athāpyupamārthe dr̥syate |.
32. Bhūta upamā: And also possibly where the upameya assumes the character of the upamāna [?] (S. K. De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, vol. 1, p. 3).
33. S. K. De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, vol. 1, p. 4. This "surpassing" is not, however, necessarily in a positive sense.
34. P. V. Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, p. 338. See especially Mammata's presentation of upamā, Kāvyaprakāśa [10.87-91].
35. See [2.66]-[2.96]. In considering upamā in the Nirukta, Gerow believes that "the term signifies generally metaphorical usage and comprehends what are later considered separate figures (rūpaka, samāsokti)" (Glossary/141). This would pertain only to luptā/arthā upamā and ignores Yāska's preceding varieties.

36. H. R. Diwekar, Les Fleurs de Rhétorique, p. 27.
37. H. R. Diwekar, Les Fleurs de Rhétorique, p. 29.
38. Patañjali, The Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali, edited by F. Kielhorn, vol. 1; third rev. ed. by K. V. Abhyankar (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1962).
39. Patañjali, Mahābhāṣya, edited by Śāstri Vedavrata, vol. 1, part 2 (Harayāṇa: Sāhitya Saṁsthāham, 1964), pp. 619-20, under [2.1.55]. For an English gloss of Patañjali's discussion see P. S. Sastri, Lectures on Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya, , vol. 5, āhnikas 15-22 (Tiruchirapalli: P. S. Sastri, 1957), pp. 281-86.
40. H. R. Diwekar, Fleurs de Rhétorique, p. 30.
41. S. K. De further comments on Patañjali's example, gauriva gavaya iti/"A gavaya is like a cow": "Strictly speaking, a writer on Poetics will not accept the example adduced by Patañjali as an instance of poetic upamā, inasmuch as the characteristic charmingness essential in a poetic figure is wanting in such a plain expression; but this grammatical analysis of the general idea of comparison is an early and near approach to the technical conception of Poetics" (S. K. De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, vol. 1, pp. 5-6). Again, the difference between the two has not been sufficiently stressed in the literature.
42. Bharata, Nāṭyaśāstra, edited by Baṭuka Nāṭha Sharmā and Baladeva Upādhyāya, The Kashi Sanskrit Series, no. 60, 2nd edition (Varanasi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Sanstham, 1980). "The widest possible divergence of opinion exists among scholars as to [Bharata's] actual date" (S. K. De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, vol. 1, p. 18; see note 1).
43. S. K. De is incorrect in asserting, "Bharata is

expressly making use of these technical terms" (S. K. De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, vol. 2, p. 6).

44. Nātyaśāstra [17.47]: accepting tulyāksa for tulyārtha (Bharata, The Nātyaśāstra ascribed to Bharata-Muni, edited by Manomohan Ghosh, vol. 1, (chaps. 1-27) (Calcutta: Manisha Granthalaya, 1967), p. 82.

45. Gerow's definition is confused: "Strictly speaking, no comparability at all is alleged . . . rather different descriptive properties are assigned to both which are, in fact, similar (the similarity is not literal, but analogical)" (Glossary/144).

I feel the focus is misplaced. Comparability in our example certainly is alleged: the verb "appear (as)"/virājante immediately precedes the upamāna; the expressed descriptive properties are neither different nor similar but identical (both are "moving"). It is not so much that we are asked to infer or imagine the comparison, as that we have a comparison between a "literal" element and one that we must imagine.

46. Bhartrhari, Vākyapadiya with the commentary Ambakartri by Raghunātha Sharma, Sarasvatī Bhavana Granthamālā, no. 91 (Varanasi: Varanaseya Sanskrit Vishwavidyalaya, 1963).

47. Hartmut Scharfe, Grammatical Literature, p. 170 (citing Erich Frauwallner, "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic," Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd und Ostasiens, 5 (1961), pp. 125-48).

We may mention a reference to upamā in a text that also falls within this intervening period, the Vedānta Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa, dated to A.D 200-400 (Herman Jacobi, "The Dates of the Philosophical Sūtras of the Brahmins," Journal of the American Oriental Society, 31 (1911), p. 29): "And for just this reason, there are upamās [comparing Brahman] to the sun, and so on"/ata eva ca upamā

sūryakādivat [3.2.18] (Bādarāyana, The Vedānta Sūtras, translated by Śrīsa Chandra Vasu (1912); Reprint (New York: AMS Press, 1974), p. 476).

48. Bhartr̥hari, Vākyapadīya, Chap. 3 (Padakānda), [3.383].
49. Bhartr̥hari, Vākyapadīya, Chap. 3 (Padakānda), vṛtti following [3.426-27].
50. K. A. S. Iyer, trans., The Vākyapadīya of Bhartr̥hari, Chap. 3, Part 2 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, p. 318). Bhartr̥hari, Vākyapadīya, Chap. 3 (Padakānda), vṛtti under [3.426-27].
51. K. A. S. Iyer, trans., The Vākyapadīya of Bhartr̥hari, Chap. 1, p. 66. Bhartr̥hari, Vākyapadīya, Chap. 1 (Brahmakānda), [1.63].
52. Bhartr̥hari, Vākyapadīya, Chap. 1 (Brahmakāṇḍa), vṛtti under [1.63].
53. Bhartr̥hari, Vākyapadīya, Chap. 3 (Padakānda), Part 2, [3.373].
54. K. A. S. Iyer, trans., The Vākyapadīya of Bhartr̥hari, Chap. 3, Part 2, p. 293.
55. Bhāmaha, Kāvyālaṅkāra, edited with English translation and notes by P. V. Naganatha Sastry, 2nd ed. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970).
56. D. K. Gupta, A Critical Study of Daṇḍin and his Works (Delhi: Meharchand Lachhmandas, 1970), p. 202.
57. P. V. Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, p. 111.
58. Vāmana, Kāvyālaṅkārasūtra of Āchārya Vāmana, edited

with Hindi translation by Bechana Jhā, Kashi Sanskrit Series, no. 209 (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1971).

59. Edwin Gerow, Indian Poetics (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1977), p. 238. Vāmana's position is succinctly given in (KAS [3.1.1]): "Gunas are those qualities that generate the beauty of kāvya"/
kāvyaśobhāyāḥ kartaro dharmā gunāḥ ||. And in [3.1.2]: "Where alamkāras are factors that enhance that [beauty]"/
tadatiśayahetavastvalaṅkārāḥ ||.

60. Gerow comments on Vāmaha's pūrnā / luptā distinction: "He suggests another distinction which soon becomes dominant, and which is clearly based on the method of Bhāmaha. This distinction is the first which clearly sets forth the four elements of simile [upamā] as criteria" (Glossary/146). That this distinction is "based on the method of Bhāmaha" is dubious given its antiquity, and again the "method" of Bhāmaha is not as clear-cut as Gerow would have it. And further, we have noted Bhartr̥hari's comment citing three of the four elements and noting that they "are well-established" (presumably the fourth -- the vacaka or comparative particle -- was considered too obvious to be specified (Bhartr̥hari, Vākyapadīya, (Chap. 1) vr̥tti under [1.63]).

61. Mammāṭa, The Poetic Light: Kāvyaprakāśa of Mammāṭa, translated by R. C. Dwivedi with Sanskrit Text, 2 vols. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1967 and 1970).

62. Mammāṭa's analysis of upamā is charted on (Notes 2/81).

2.15 The Upamā of Attribute

Innocent one!

The palm of your hand is reddish --

like a lotus --

Due to directly showing a common attribute

This is an Upamā of Attribute.

Dharma Upamā :

ambhoruhamivātāmram mugdhe karatalam tava
iti dharmopamā sāksāt tulyadharma pradarśanāt

mugdhe [< mugdha] : bāle / "Oh child!," "an
exclamation of affection" (RŚ/72); mundari (RR/122).

One of the countless and endlessly varied terms so
loosely caught in English by "beautiful." "From the

original meaning 'confused' (1) comes the sense 'silly, foolish' (2), then 'innocent' (3), 'charmingly innocent' (4), and then simply 'charming' or 'beautiful' (5) Finally a further meaning arises . . . 'fair, light of color'" (see [2.1], under sobhā).¹

Dharma upamā -- "ein Gleichniss in Bezug auf eine charakteristische Eigenschaft"/"a comparison in regard to a characteristic property/attribute" (Böhtlingk/24) -- is one of the most basic and pervasive of upamās. A common attribute or property (tulyadharma), "redness," is directly (sāksāt) shown, "is . . . like," between two things: the "palm of a hand," the upameya or element to be illustrated by the comparison; and a "lotus," the upamāna or element which serves as the illuminating standard with which the comparison is made. It is an example of a pūrnā or "complete" upamā, a category not explicitly described until Vāmana [8th to 9th centuries],² and one that became firmly integrated within the tradition with the elaborate structural schema of Mammata [11th to 12th centuries].³ Yet

its distinguishing elements, as we have noted, stem from the earliest stages of critical thinking devoted to kāvya. Again, four components may be overtly evident: (1) upameya; (2) upamāna; (3) sādhārana (tulya) dharma, the attribute(s) held in common between the upameya and upamāna; and (4) sādrśya vācaka, the word or particle directly signifying comparison. We may assume that Dandin implicitly recognized these distinctions, and that he was aware of the components involved.⁴

2.16 The Upamā of Objects

Your face is like a lotus

Your eyes like lilies --

Where the common attribute is just implied

This is the Upamā of Objects.

Vastu Upamā :

rājīvamiva te vaktram netre nīlotpale iva
 iyam pratīyamānaikadharmā vastūpamaiva sā

pratīyamāna [vartamāne kṛdanta in the karmani
prayoga < prati (+) *i].

ekadharma : ekah samāno dharmah /"a single or common
 property" (RŚ/72).

Dandīn presents two distinct examples of vastu upamā in the first two padas. Where in dharma upamā [2.15] the focus is on the sādhārana dharma, the particular attribute held in common between the upameya and upamāna, in vastu upamā the emphasis is on the two objects or things (vastus) being compared. The upameyas ("face"/"eyes") are directly related to the upamānas ("lotus"/"lilies") through the sādr̥ṣya vācaka ("like") -- the sādhārana dharma ("beauty") is left to be inferred. With the elision of one of the four fundamental components, vastu is the first of numerous

variations of upamās that fall into the broad category of lupta or "elliptical" -- as we have noted, one of the earliest formally enunciated classifications of upamā.

The common property should of course be rather obvious though, as demonstrated by our commentators, inference leaves room for rather a range of associations: kāntyādi / "brilliance and so on" (RS/72); manojñatvasaurabhatvādih / "beauty, fragrance, and so on" (RR/124). We may add that both distinct upamānas appear to be a shade of blue. If so, Dandin would seem to be drawing on this as a stylistic parallel -- his audience would absorb the "blueness" in passing without confusing it with the "beauty" to be inferred in common.

Our first two varieties of upamā have been conjoined in the Agnipurāna [343.10]: "Where the common attribute is either overtly expressed or implied -- due to the prominence of either the attribute or the objects -- we have both the upamās of Attribute and Objects" [yatra

sādhāraṇo dharmah kathyate gamyate 'pi vā | te dharma-
vastuprādhanyāddharmavastūpame ubhe ||].

2.17 The Upamā of Transposition

The blossomed lotus was

like your face --

Due to the transposition of the usual

This is considered the Upamā of Transposition.

Viparyāsa Upamā :

tvadānanamivonnidramaravindamabhūditi

sā prasiddhiviparyāsādviparyāsopamesyate

ud-nidram : vikasitam /"burst open," "blossomed" (RS/73);

prabuddham /"awoken," "blossomed" (RR/124).

vipariāsah [< vi (+) pari (+) *as].

Given the "usual" relationship between the two compared elements in an upamā, the "lotus" would appear as the upamāna and the "face" as the upameya. In viparyāsa upamā the usual situation is reversed, the elements transposed: the lotus becomes the upameya, the face the upamāna. Further, given the usual presumed superiority of the upamāna (a principle expressed as early as Yāska), this transposition connotes an elevation of the usual upameya at the expense of the usual upamāna. "Each of the two terms is expressed in the formal position naturally appropriate to the other, thus exaggerating the prominence of the in fact inferior subject" (Glossary/165).

As in vastu upamā [2.16], with the sādhāraṇa dharma elided, the common attribute is left to be inferred. Yet in viparyāsa upamā this elision is secondary to the reversal of the usual order (and to a degree, status) of the elements involved. This feature was felt by the majority of later writers to justify viparyāsa upamā's reclassification as a separate alamkāra termed pratipa (for

example, Sāhityadarpana [10.87]). The Agnipurāṇa, however, retains it as viparīta upamā [343.12]. We shall note the similarity of viparyāsa upamā with a series of varieties to come, nindā upamā [2.30] and following, which focus on variations of relative status between the upameya and upamāna.

2.18 The Upamā of Reciprocity

The lotus is like your face

Your face is like the lotus --

Invoking reciprocal excellence

This is an Upamā of Reciprocity.

Anyonya Upamā :

tavānanamivāmbhojamambhojamiva te mukham
ityanyonyopamā seyamanyonyotkarṣaśamsinī

anyonya [anya - anya]: paraspara (RŚ/73).

utkarsa [ud (+) *kṛṣ]: viśeṣam kātyādilaksanam /

"an excellence which is a distinguishing characteristic,
such as brilliance and so on. . . ." (RŚ/73).

śamsinī [-in (f.) < *śams]/ "recite," "praise,"
"invoke"; prakāśayati [nijannta < pra (+) *kāś] / "reveal,"
"proclaim" (RŚ/73).

As viparyāsa upamā [2.17] is initially an extension of the preceding vastu upamā [2.16], so anyonya upamā initially takes the form of the immediately preceding viparyāsa upamā -- a positional transposition of the elements with the common attribute left to be inferred. To be immediately balanced, however, with what is strictly a vastu upamā, incorporating the initial elements in their usual stations. The result is a reaffirmation of the beauty of the face and, reciprocally, an affirmation of the beauty of the lotus as well.

Bhāmaha, and writers following Daṇḍin, consider anyonya upamā a distinct figure. Bhāmaha (KA [3.37]) terms

this upameyopamā (as do Vāmana [4.3.15], Udbhaṭa (KASS [5.14]), and Mammaṭa (KP [10.91d]): "Where the upamāna and upameya should alternate in turn. . . . "/ [upamānopameya-
tvam yatra paryāyato bhavet |]. In the Agnipurāṇa [343.11], it appears as parasparopamā.

2.19 The Upamā of Restriction

Your face is similar only to a lotus --

Nothing else --

Due to the exclusion of similarity with others

This is an Upamā of Restriction.

Niyama Upamā :

tvanmukham kamalenaiva tulyam nānyena kenacit
ityanyasāmyavyāvṛtteriyam sā niyamopamā

vyāvṛtteḥ [-ih̥ (f.) < vi (+) ā (+) *vṛt̥]

/"exclusion," "restriction," "limitation".

In niyama upamā the upameya (a "face") is in a narrowly defined relationship with the upamāna (a "lotus"): the range of potential upamānas with which the upameya may be compared is uniquely restricted to but one and only one. Niyama upamā is cited as such in the Agnipurāṇa [343.12].

2.20 The Upamā of Non-Restriction

Certainly the lotus emulates your face

And if there is another similar thing

May it do the same! --

This is an Upamā of Non-Restriction.

Aniyama Upamā :

padmāṁ tāvat tavānveti mukhamanyacca tādrśam
 asti cedastu tatkārityasāvaniyamopamā

Aniyama upamā is the reverse of the preceding niyama upamā: where previously the range of potential upamānas permitted the upameya was specifically and uniquely restricted, now restriction is removed and the range of similarity is implied to be quite open-ended, potentially limitless (given of course upamānas which display the appropriate sādhārana dharmas).

The distinctive process of aniyama upamā is quite clear. The meaning of Dandin's example, however, is rather confused. Although we may speak of Sanskrit as an inflected language permitting an exactness within a free-floating word order, there is an unspoken assumption that though words may float, their inflection yet serves to ground them to meaning, to specify rather than to obscure.

Confusion in this case is due to a convoluted word order combined with ambiguous inflection -- all nominatives. and corresponding modifiers are in the napumsakaliṅga (neuter). Who is doing what to whom? Ratnaśrī informs us that "'your face' is the subject/agent (kartr̥)" and that "'lotus' is the direct object (karman)" (RS/74). Rangacharya Raddi reads it as it is written, taking "lotus" as the kartr̥ in initial position, "The lotus certainly emulates your face. . . ." (RR/126). Anyat ca tādrśam asti ced /literally, "If there is another such as that," marks this upamā as niyama. The potential for more than one upamāna opens the range of similarity: padmasamam /"similar to the lotus" (RS/74); sundaram vastu candrādi / "a beautiful object, such as the moon and so on" (RR/126). Tatkāri (again in the neuter) /"doing that," refers to the central action of the verse, anveti /"emulating," "imitating": if taken to modify anyat it would imply that the lotus is the kartr̥, yet we may also take it as referring to the action of "emulating" on the part of the

face. Vavilla Sastrulu would appear to have fallen prey to this confusion with, "The lotus, it imitates your face; if another similar face there be, it also does likewise" -- rather it is the "lotus," marking the upamāna, that is restricted.⁵ Edwin Gerow's rather literal translation, although effectively following these twists and turns, just as effectively catches the confusion for the translator: "Your face resembles the lotus, and whatever may be said to be similar to the lotus -- why your face resembles that as well" (Glossary/148).

Aniyama upamā re-appears, with niyama upamā, in Agnipurāṇa [343.12].

2.21 The Upamā of Conjunction

There is also the Upamā of Conjunction:

Your face

Not only in beauty

But in generating pleasure

Emulates the moon.

Samuccaya Upamā :

samuccayopamāpyasti na kāntyāiva mukham tava

hlādanākhyena cānveti karmanendumitīdrśi

na kāntyāiva . . . : na saumyatvena gunena kevalena

/"not only with the attribute of brilliance / beauty";

hlādanākhyena prīṇanena ca karmanā kriyayā /"but with the

karman or "action" which is pleasing/satisfying" (RS/74).

hlādana- : samtosajanana- /"causing satisfaction, delight" (RR/126).

In samuccaya upamā we have the conjunction of two sādhārana dharmas which the upameya and upamāna are perceived to hold in common, explicitly expressed, and embedded within the basic framework of a vastu upamā. Thus "beauty"/"brilliance" and "a pleasing/satisfying action" are conjoined within the meta-structure "Your face . . . Emulates the moon." Rangacharya Raddi further specifies, "Here there is the conjunction of an attribute (guna) and an action (kriyā) . . . in the conjunction of sādhārana dharmas, the conjunction of a single attribute and a single action is to be further understood" [atra gunakriyayoh samuccayah | īdrśityanena kevalagunakevalakriyāsamuccaye sadhāraṇadharma samuccayepi iyam jñeyā ||] (RR/126). Whether or not Dandin is actually specifying that an attribute and an action serving as an attribute must be conjoined is open to speculation. Samuccaya upamā is a

basic extension of dharma upamā [2.15] with two attributes, rather than one, explicitly expressed.

2.22 The Upamā of Intensity

Your face -- seen only on you

The moon -- seen only in the sky

This is the only difference -- there is no other --

This is an Upamā of Intensity.

Atiśaya Upamā :

tvayyeva tvanmukham drṣṭam drṣyate divi candramāḥ
iyatyeva bhidā nānyetyasāvatiśayopamā

atiśayah : übertrieben/"exaggerated," "excessive"

(Böhtlingk/23).

candramāḥ : [-ās (m.) (nom.) (sing.)].

As the preceding samuccaya upamā [2.21] logically extends the essential feature of dharma upamā [2.15], so atiśaya upamā may be seen in one sense as an extension of samuccaya upamā. The attributes which the upameya and upamāna hold in common are not confined to merely two in conjunction: they are so numerous, the similarity is so "intense," that only a single difference distinguishes them.

Yet unlike samuccaya upamā and all the previous varieties, in atiśaya upamā, "because words serving as sādharmyavācakas, iva and so on, are not employed, similarity is to be inferred through suggestion (vyañjanā)" alone [atra ivādisādharmyavācakaśabdāprayogāt sāmyam vyañjanāgamyameva] (RR/127). Not only the common attributes but similarity itself is left to be inferred. Further, in negating all differences with the upamāna (the "moon") but one, the status of the upameya (the "face") is accordingly elevated to -- nearly -- the same level.

Atiśaya upamā is the first example to reflect a

generative process which Dandin will ubiquitously employ throughout this central chapter: through incorporating elements of another distinct alamkāra within the framework of a given superordinate alamkāra a new variety of superordinate alamkāra is created. Atiśaya upamā shares the feature of "intensity" or "exaggeration" of distinctive attribute(s) with atiśayokti alamkāra [2.214-20], a feature that is, however, woven within a superordinate framework whose primary purpose is to illuminate similarity -- we are yet dealing with upamā. And, as Rangacharya Raddi points out, neither should we confuse this variety of upamā with rūpaka alamkāra [2.66-96], whose focus is the inference of similarity; or with vyatireka alamkāra [2.180-98], where similarity is negated (usually) at the expense of the upamāna. "This is not a case of rūpakadhvanīḥ ["suggestion involving rūpaka"] -- the lack of difference is recognized through the clear delineation of a [single] basis of difference [literally: "of the difference between the basis" (that is, "on you" and "in the sky")]. Neither is it

a case of vyatireka -- there is no indication of the superiority of the upameya over the upamāna. Therefore, this is certainly an upamā" [nātra rūpakadhvaniḥ | āśrayamedasya spaṣṭa pratipādanena abhedapratīter-abhāvāt | nāpi vyatirekah | upamānādūpameyagatādhikyasya anudbhavāt | tasmādūpamā eva iyam] (RR/127) .

2.23 The Upamā of Imagination

"I alone possess the beauty of her face!"

Enough of the moon's boasts!

Surely that beauty lies in the lotus as well --

This is an Upamā of Imagination.

Utpreksitā Upamā :

mayyevāsyā mukhaśrīrityalamindorvikatthanaiḥ
padmepi sā yadastyevetyasāvutpreksitopamā

As in atiśaya upamā [2.22], we again have qualities drawn from another distinct alamkāra. We walk a fine line here; being able to discern and separate the elements involved may provide the key to a particular verse and to an understanding of its rational. In utpreksā alamkāra [2.221-34] we have similarity, whether overtly marked through a vācakaśabha or implied, between components. This similarity, however, "is not lokaprasiddha ["established in the world," "conventional"] but purely a creation of the poet's imagination" (Notes 2/82) -- the stress is on the element of imagination, of "fancy," not on similarity as such.

In Dandin's example the element of imagination is subordinate to that of similarity: equating (whether left to be inferred as here, or not) the moon and the lotus with beauty and thus to, for example, a face, is conventional; yet within this framework, to personify the moon as an advocate of his own beauty is not -- a thread of utpreksā is added.

I would not hold with Böhtlingk that this example is based upon a "falschen Voraussetzung"/"false supposition" (Böhtlingk/23), for we are hardly dealing with logic; and certainly not with Gerow's convoluted definition which misses the mark: "In which similitude is expressed as a relative and subjective opinion about which of several objects of comparison is most likely or appropriate" (Glossary/152). Dandin appears to be unique in ascribing utpreksā/"imagined ascription," "conjecture," as an essential element in one variety of upamā.

2.24 The Upamā of the Wondrous

If there would be a lotus

with curved brows and darting eyes

it would display the beauty of your face --

This is an Upamā of the Wondrous.

Adbhuta Upamā :

yadi kimcidbhavet padmam̄ subhru vibhrāntalocanam
 tat te mukhaśriyam̄ dhattāmityasāvadbhutopamā

udbhru : In this instance we accept the reading udbhru/"curved brows" (RŚ/75) rather than that of our primary text, subhru (RR/127). We may note that Ratnaśrī's commentary (upon which the printed text was based) is one of the earliest and was presumably based upon a selective comparative reading of a number of available manuscripts.⁶ We may also consider the comments of Belvalkar and Raddi that "udbhru, as the more difficult reading and also the one intrinsically more poetic, seems to be the genuine reading which got ousted by the more familiar word subhru" (Notes 2/87). Nothing here of course is conclusive. Where the reading is subhru, it is taken as a vocative: "Beautiful one!"/"Beautiful-browed one!" We prefer to read udbhru as [(n.) (nom.) (sing.)] in parallel with "darting

eyes"/vibhrānta locanam adding a bit more weight to the element of "wonder."

dhattām [(ā.) (3rd) (sing.) (lot) < *dhā]: prāpnotu (RR/127).

Adbhuta upamā may be confused with the preceding utpreksita upamā [2.23]. Yet here all the expressed components -- upameya ("face"), upamāna ("lotus"), sādhārana dharma ("beauty") -- remain within conventionally real bounds. In adbhuta upamā, real attributes of the upameya, "curved brows" and "darting eyes," are "wondrously" attributed to the upamāna to develop a conception of something marvelous. We should note that on a more subtle level, given that similarity may be inferred only if certain marvelous, and ultimately unreal, conditions can be met, that the upameya is elevated in stature -- a women's face thus partakes of the wondrous in its unequalled beauty.

Adbhuta upamā appears in the Agnipurāṇa [343.16].

2.25 The Upamā of Confusion

Slender one!

Imagining your face to be the moon

Hoping for your face

I run after the moon --

This is considered an Upamā of Confusion.

Moha Upamā :

śaityutpreksya tanvaṅgi tvanmukham tvanmukhāśayā¹
indumapyanudhāvāmītyeṣā mohopamā smṛtā

In atiśaya upamā [2.22] the similarity between the upameya and upamāna was so great that only a single difference could be discerned. In moha upamā even that minimal distinction dissolves -- resulting in total

confusion. Which is the face? Which is the moon? Of course the confusion further underlines a conceived identity between the upameya and upamāna, whose common attributes are left to be inferred. And in confusion the relative status of upameya and upamāna blurs -- a face so beautiful that it cannot be distinguished from the moon.

Moha upamā reappears in the Agnipurāṇa [343.17].

2.26 The Upamā of Doubt

Is this a lotus with bees roaming within?

Is this your face with eyes darting?

My mind swings thus . . .

This is an Upamā of Doubt.

Samśaya Upamā :

kim padmamantarbhrāntāli kim te lolekṣanām mukham
 mama dolāyate cittamitīyam samśayopamā

With atiśaya upamā [2.22] a single difference; with moha upamā [2.25] a confused blurring; in samśaya upamā the degree of similarity between the upameya ("face") and upamāna ("lotus") prevents accurate identification -- doubt lingers. And where in adbhuta upamā [2.24] there is a hypothesized transfer of features, in samśaya upamā comparable features remain distinctive respectively to the upameya and upamāna ("eyes darting"/"bees roaming"). The presence of doubt but leads to the inference of similarity.

Daṇḍin would seem to stand nearly alone (with the compiler(s) of the Agni Purāna) in considering samśaya a variety of upamā. Samśaya, where it appears in other writers, is held to be a distinct alamkāra; whether as, for example, sasamdeha (Bhāmaha, (KA [3.43-44])), samdeha

(Vāmana, (KAS [4.3.11])), or samśaya (Rudraṭa, (KA [8.59-64])). It is interesting to note that Daṇḍin does mention samdeha alamkāra in passing [2.358], confirming its identity with samśaya upamā. He thus not only indicates its specific previous existence as a distinct alamkāra, but also, through implication, the existence of a sophisticated theoretical tradition of which it would be a part.

Samśaya indeed reappears as an upamā in the Agnipurāṇa [343.18].

2.27 The Upamā of Resolution

A brilliance shaming the moon . . .

The lotus

(Overcome by the moon)

Doesn't have it . . .

Yes, it's your face --

This is an Upamā of Resolution.

Nirnaya Upamā :

na padmasyendunigrāhyasyendulajjākari dyutih
 atastvanmukhamevedamityasau nirṇayopamā

nigrāhasya [tavyānta < ni (+) *grah] / "restrain,"
 "suppress": nigr̥hitasya/abhibhāvyasya / "to be conquered,"
 "to be humiliated" (RR/130). The "conquest" or

"humiliation" of the lotus by the moon refers to the conventional poetic conceit wherein lotus flowers are imagined to be closed by the moonlight. Böhtlingk obliquely catches this with "Tagwasserrose" for padma (Böhtlingk/24).

Nirṇaya upamā continues our series where similarity is stressed through variations on confusion. We have seen total confusion in moha upamā [2.25], mild confusion resulting in doubt in samśaya upamā [2.26], and now in nirṇaya upamā confusion firmly resolved. It is not quite the case that the "upamāna is perceived as the upamāna" (Notes 2/89), nor that "two comparable things are distinguished" (Glossary/159). Rather the upameya is elevated through reverberation between itself and two comparable upamānas: the perceived degree of intensity of the sādhāranādharma is greater than that of upamāna-Y which in turn is greater than that of upamāna-X -- it can only be upameya-Z.

Nirṇaya upamā appears as niścaya upamā in Agnipurāṇa

[343.18], for, as Rangacharya Raddi notes, "niścaya upamā and nirṇaya upamā are two alternatives" (RR/130).

2.28 The Upamā of Multiple Embrace

Your	face	is like a	lotus
the moon's			
rival	/	enemy	
brilliant	/	holding Śrī	
with perfumed lotion	/	fragrant	

This is an Upamā of Multiple Embrace.

Ślesa Upamā :

śiśirāṁśupratispardhi śrīmat surabhigandhi ca
ambhojamiva te vaktramiti ślesopamā smṛtā

śiśirāṁśuh [(m.)] /literally, "the cool-rayed," the moon.

pratispardhi : [(-in) (n.) (nom.) (sing.)] /"rival," "competitor," and also "enemey: pratidvandvi (RR/131); alternate reading for pratidvandvi : pratyānikam/"enemy" (RŚ/76).

surabhi-gandhi [(-in)] /literally, "possessing fragrant facial creme," and also "fragrant.

śleṣa [< *ślis] /"adhere," "embrace," coalesce"].

This is our first example of the ubiquitous śleṣa alamkāra [2.310-22], interwoven with and subordinate to another alamkāra to generating a distinct sub-type. And given śleṣa's specificity to the vocabulary and syntax of the Sanskrit language, it is here where translation, if otherwise stumbling, cannot but fall. At best I feel that a graphic transposition is possible where, at least, multiple parallel meanings may be grasped simultaneously, yet sacrificing the form, and sadly the essence, by which

they are captured. Our problems do not end here. As ślesa rests ultimately upon ambiguity it is perhaps not surprising that as its analysis as an alamkāra by the theorists and commentators is often confused and contradictory, so does confusion often inhere in the interpretation of specific instance. The verse at hand is an excellent example of the problems involved.

One interpretation of this verse is presented by the above transposition where the flow of meaning is as follows. The initial line reflects the primary, literal assertion of the ślesa -- "Your face is like a lotus" -- expressed in the basic form of a vastu upamā [2.16]. The reverberation through "multiple embrace" expands this basic structure, where the "common features present between the upamāna and upameya are illuminated through ślesa"

[śleṣena upamā upamānopameyagatasādharmyam dyotyate]

(RR/131). In ślesa upamā, ślesa thus operates within and is subordinate to embracing framework of upamā: "Although one realizes that this is a case of ślesa, it is not ślesa

alamkāra -- the distinctive charm (vaicitrya) of ślesa is subordinate to the primary distinctive charm based on similarity" [atra śleṣasya vidyamānatvopi na śleṣālamkārah | sādr̥syavaicitrye śleṣavaicitryasya nilinatvāt] (RR/131).

The ślesa in our example develops two parallel sets of meaning, one referring to the upameya, the "face," the other referring to the upamāna, the "lotus," through three consecutive ślesas in each case one word "embraces" two meanings. The initial compound, śiśirāṁśu-pratispardhi, may thus be taken with pratispardhi in a competitive sense when referring to the face, "the moon's rival"; and in a certainly related though more hostile sense when referring to the lotus, "the moon's enemy" (the familiar conceit of the moon's rays closing the lotus flowers, another instance of which we saw in the preceding nirṇaya upamā [2.27]). Similarly, śrīmat may be taken in the sense of "possessing beauty or brilliance" when referring to the face; and, reading Śrī as a proper noun, in the sense of "possessing the goddess Śrī" when referring to the lotus. For Śrī, the

consort of Viṣṇu, is also known as the "lotus-born" or the "lotus-dwelling goddess," epithets recalling legendary origins: "Out of the middle of this ocean of milk that was being churned by gods and demons. . . . the goddess Śrī of vibrant beauty arose . . . standing in a blossoming lotus with a lotus in her hand."⁸ And finally, the compound surabhi-gandhi as a karmadhārya (with the suffix -in) may mean "possessing a perfumed cream or lotion" when applied to the face, or alternately, it may be applied as a bahuvrīhi in the sense of "one whose smell is fragrant" in modifying the lotus.

In reading our transposition then, terms of single meaning applying to both the face and the lotus are centered, terms of double meaning are placed to either side immediately below their respective referents. We thus read: "Your face, the moon's rival, brilliant, with perfumed lotion, is like a lotus, the moon's enemy, holding Śrī, fragrant."

Edwin Gerow would see but the initial two ślesas, and

in the case of the first, substitutes "similar to" for "rival" as the meaning of pratispardhi when it is applied to the face (Glossary/166). A more distinct alternative would be to take the meanings of pratispardhi and surabhigandhi to be essentially uniform, as respectively "rival"/"competitor" and "fragrant." In this case, the initial compound śiśirāṁśu-pratispardhi would be read as a tatpurusa when referring to the face, "Your face, a competitor of the moon. . . ."; and, alternately, as a bahuvrihi application of a tatpurusa compound when referring to the lotus, "Your face is like a lotus that has the moon for a competitor. . . ." Śrimat alone would then display two reasonably marked meanings.

The more consistent, though not necessarily correct, alternative would be to accept the immediately preceding, yet to read śrimat in the sense of "beautiful" alone. Here there would be no "double-meaning" as such; rather a single meaning of a single term would apply to more than one referent. This is the (literal) interpretation of Otto

Böhtlingk: "Your face, with which the moon quarrels over precedence, is like a lotus flower, with which the moon quarrels over precedence. Both are brilliant and fragrant."⁹

At this point we may refer to our commentators and touch upon the question of artha and śabda ślesa. We must first emphasize that this distinction is not expressed by Dandin. As we shall see in his exposition of ślesa alamkāra, he considered ślesa to comprise two categories -- "abhinna" or the "unbroken," with one discrete word embracing two (or more) meanings; and "bhinna" or the "broken," where a given syllabic string may be variously broken to reveal corresponding and various meanings. The first is displayed in ślesa upama, the latter in the immediately following samāna upamā. And although speculation over the nature of ślesa continued, the term "artha" (ślesla) came later to be generally used in a sense similar to that of Dandin's "abhinna," and "śabda" (ślesa) in a sense similar to that of Dandin's "bhinna."

Rangacharya Raddi similarly sees a series of three ślesas as words of double meaning, although he only illustrates the first. As he remarks, "Three attributes are being associated with both places [the upameya and upamāna] through ślesa"/viśeṣanatrayam śleṣenobhatra sambandham labhate (RR/131). He considers this a case of artha ślesa, and indicates that sabda ślesa follows in sāmana upamā [2.29] (RR/131).

The interpretation of Ratnaśrī is somewhat confusing (RŚ/76). He considers the meaning of pratidvandvi/"enemy" (his reading) to evolve in two different contexts: "the moon's enemy in reference to the face, because its beauty is similar; and [an enemy] in reference to the lotus, because the lotus closes when the moon rises." Yet given these multiple contexts, Ratnaśrī would hold (apparently) that we have rather two sabdas, and thus sees this as an instance of sabda ślesa. He accepts the double meaning of śrimat and also considers this an instance of sabda ślesa: "śrimat means 'possessing beauty' (kāntiyuktam) in

reference to the face, and in reference to the lotus that 'the goddess Śrī dwells there.' This is also a sabda ślesa." However, he then adds, "On the other hand, since 'beauty' can be applied to both [the face and the lotus] it is artha ślesa . . . 'Fragrant' (surabhigandhi) also applies to both -- it is artha ślesa" [pratidvandvi pratyanikam mukhasya tatsamānakāntitvāt | ambhojasya ca tadudaye sākocabhajanāt | śabdaśleṣāḥ | śrimat kāntiyuktam mukhamambojam ca śrīrdevatā tatra vasatīti śruteḥ | ayamapi śabdaśleṣāḥ | ubhayorapi kāntiyogādarthaśleṣo vā | surabhiriṣṭo gandho 'syeti surabhigandhi dvayamapity- arthaśleṣāḥ] (RŚ/76).

With Ratnaśrī then, it would thus appear that we have a view varying from both our own and that of Rangacharya Raddi: where one word embraces more than one meaning we have śabda ślesa; where one meaning embraces more than one term we have artha ślesa.

2.29 The Upamā of the Uniform

Expressed through words interwoven in one form

This is the Upamā of the Uniform.

For example:

This garland of gardens is like a young girl

resplendent

with Śala trees / with curl-covered face

Samāna Upamā :

sarūpaśabdavācyatvāt sā samānopamā yathā
bālevodyānamāleyam̄ sālakānanaśobhini

Dāṇḍin follows slesa upamā [2.28] with what may be considered a variation. We again have a literal expressive statement taking the form of a vastu upamā [2.16], "This

garland of gardens is like a young girl. . . ." And again, similarity is expressed through a distinctive expansion of meaning, where both the upameya and upamāna are embraced simultaneously as referents by a discrete syntactical unit. In samāna upamā however, we do not have multiple meanings arising from a single word, nor a single meaning embracing more than one word; rather, meaning here varies depending upon how we construe a given syntactical sequence, a "uniform" sequence whose construction, based upon the varieties of compounding allowed in Sanskrit, incorporates distinct and separate words which permit multiple readings.

In the present example, the compound sālakānanaśobhī, may be mechanically divided to generate two distinct semantic strings. With śobhī/"shining," "resplendent" remaining constant in both cases, the first division is: sāla-/proper name of a tree (vatica robusta) (+) kānana/"forest"; the second is: sa-/"with" (+) alaka- /"curls" (+) ānana/"face."

As with ślesa upamā, we again are forced into mere

transposition, where the flow of meaning is as follows:

"This garland of gardens, resplendent with Śāla trees, is like a young girl, resplendent with a curl-covered face."

Both Rangacharya Raddi and Ratnaśrī agree in accepting samāna upamā as an instance of śabda ślesa. "In the reciprocating exchange of vrksa-kānana [sālakānana] [and sa-alaka-ānana] there is no [artha-] ślesa, thus this upamā is śabda ślesa"/atra vrksakānaneti parivrttau na ślesah atah śabdaśleṣeyamupamā (RR/132); "This is certainly ślesa upamā due to the śabda ślesa involving sālakānanaśobhini"/nanu śleṣopamaiveyam sālakānanaśobhiniti śabdaślesat (RS/76). Here it would seem that they are taking the unified compound, not the individual words, as their point of reference, and are thus focusing on the unified sound.

Samāna ślesa displays one of ślesas two essential categories according to Daṇḍin, that of "bhinna" -- where a unitary syllabic string may be variously "broken" to yield respectively corresponding meanings.

2.30 The Upamā of Depreciation

The lotus marred with pollen

The moon wanes --

Though similar to both

Your face supersedes --

This is considered an Upamā of Depreciation.

Nindā Upamā :

padmam bahurajaścandraḥ kṣayī tābhyaṁ tavānanam

samānamapi sotsekamiti nindopamā smṛtā

bahurajah [(-as) (n.)]: parāgadhūsaram/"greyish dust
or pollen" (RR/132).

tavānanam sotsekam : doṣaśūnyatvena utkarṣaśālīti/
"Your face [literally] flows over/supersedes, endowed with a

superiority stemming from the absence of blemish" (RR/132).

utsekam [< ut (+) *sic].

We have noted the convention pertaining to upamā where the common attribute or property is more intense, more pervasive, in the upamāna. This usual standard appears as early as Yāska's Niruktā [3.13], and is unequivocally stated in Bhartrhari's Vākyapadīya [3.373]: "Due to its celebrated status, the upamāna is universally considered superior" (see under [2.14]). Through reflection, the upameya partakes of this intensity or "superiority" and is thus elevated. This is hardly an absolute (again, as Yāska pointed out with examples from the Rg Veda), and through the manipulation of this relative relationship, with its connotations of relative superiority/inferiority, Dāṇḍin easily generates a number of further varieties (for example: praśamsā upamā [2.31]; virodha upamā [2.33]; prativedha upamā [2.34]; and vyatireka alamkāra [2.180]). Nindā upamā appears previously in Bharata's Nāṭya-

Sāstra [17.50, 52]). Yet, although often equated, we should accept a subtle distinction between that instance and Dandin's variety (Glossary/158). For Bharata, and indeed for Vāmana in the Kāvyālaṅkārasūtrāṇī [4.2.7], the entire tone of nindā upamā involves reproach, censure -- a perjorative upamāna reinforces the negative nature of the upameya. With Dandin, rather, we have an "ironic depreciation" of two upamānas -- two traditional paradigms of beauty, the lotus and the moon, are presented as blemished. The "face" is not necessarily reflected in this depreciation (as the final phrase will confirm), for it is "similar to the lotus and the moon [only] in brilliance and so on. . . ." [padmacandrābhyaṁ kāntyādinā samānam tulyamapi sattavānanam sotsekamutkarsayuktam prativiśistam vartate] (RŚ/77). Without evident flaw, the face can only be more beautiful -- the upameya "supersedes" the upamāna.

We may compare nindā upamā with viparyāsa upamā [2.17], where we have a reversal, not of the upameya and upamāna as such, but of terms which are otherwise

standardized as upameyas and upamānas. In its example, the beauty of the face is only further emphasized by its position as upamāna, an upamāna that yet retains its elevated position.

2.31 The Upamā of Appreciation

The lotus -- source even of Brahmā

The moon -- adorning the head of Śambhu

These resemble your face --

This is called an Upamā of Appreciation.

Praśamśa Upamā :

brahmaṇopyudbhavaḥ padmaścandraḥ śambhuśirodhṛtaḥ
tau tulyau tvanmukheneti sā praśamsopamocyate

brahmanah api udbhavah padmah /"The lotus -- source even of Brahma":

Kuśadhvaha entered the Lord's belly in turn. He, whose power is his truth, saw these worlds in the womb; roaming around inside the god, he saw no end or limit. All doors being shut by the great-souled Janārdana [Viṣṇu] , Brahmā found passage through the navel. Then the one born from a golden egg, the four-faced Brahmā had entered therein by the power of Yoga, displayed himself on the lotus. Lord Brahmā, self-existent, the Grandfather, womb of creation, lustrous as the inside of a flower, shone there radiantly, resting on the lotus.¹⁰

Śambhu /that is, Śiva, who wears "the crescent moon as a diadem" (see [2.12], under Vṛṣadhvajah).

Praśamsā upamā presents quite the opposite situation from that of ninda upamā, which it thus logically follows. And as with nindā upamā, we find praśamsā upamā previously mentioned by name in the Nātyaśāstra [17.50-51]; and similarly appearing at a later date in, for example, Vāmana's Kāvyālaṅkārasūtrāṇi [4.2.7] (though as "stuti"), and in the Agnipurāṇa [343.21]. Again we focus on the

relative balance of status between upameya and upamāna. In praśamsā upamā, however, we have an entirely elevated context where the positive qualities of (standard) upamānas "appreciate" further through praise. And thus, through reflective similarity, a (standard) upameya is correspondingly elevated.

Yet Dandin would seem to be adding an additional subtle touch. For in this instance it is not the case that a comparison is drawn, on the surface, with an "elevated object [upamāna]" (Glossary/161). Rather Dandin presents standard upamānas, "lotus" and "moon," as upameyas, and a standard upameya, a beautiful "face," as upamāna. As Rangacharya Raddi points outs, "Praśamsā upamā should be understood as being assisted by viparyāsa upamā [2.17], yet because in this case the principle factor [similarity is presented in the context] of appreciation. . . . it should not be understood as viparyāsa upamā" [iyam viparyāso-pamānuprāṇitā praśamsopamā jñeya | atra praśamsāyāḥ prādhanyāt. . . . tena na viparyāsopameti jñeyam ||]

(RR/133). In thus positioning the face as upamāna, its beauty appreciates even beyond that indicated by its association with proverbially beautiful objects, objects (now as upameyas) whose positive qualities are further reinforced through explicit praise.

Whether or not Daṇḍin considers this element of "transposition" essential to praśamsā upamā is of course open to speculation. For in transposing positions, the "deep structure" connotations of objects (especially with regard to those considered to possess particular qualities to a distinctive degree) remain. Whether or not their "surface level" position is that of upameya, such objects as "lotus" or "moon" would seem to retain a flavor of their usual status as upamānas. Similarly, the face retains traces of its usual status as upameya -- the surface level transposition and its resulting emphasis further reinforces the particular attributes of the "real" upameya that the poet wishes to stress.

2.32 The Upamā involving a Wish to Express

My heart wants to say

-- whether virtue or flaw --

Your face is like the moon --

This is considered an Upamā involving

a Wish to Express.

Ācikhyāsā Upamā :

candrena tvanmukham tulyamityācikhyāsu me manah

sa guṇo vāstu doṣo vetyācikhyāsopamāṁ viduh

ācikhyāsu [(n.) sannanta < ā (+) *khyā, agreeing
with manas (n.)].

Ācikhyāsā upamā revolves around a strong desire to
express the similarity between upameya and upamāna,

regardless of whether the comparison may be seen as illuminating the upameya in a positive light (one of "praise") or not (one of "depreciation"): "The assertion of similarity between the moon and the face; whether it be in a positive light, that is, correct . . . or in a negative light, that is, wrong . . . /ayam candramukhayostulyatā-vādah guṇo vāstu [ucito] . . . doṣo vāstu anucito (RŚ/77). It is neither a case of indecision ("I can't decide whether this is a virtue or a vice"), nor of doubt regarding the aptness of the comparison (Glossary/150-51). Such considerations are in fact irrelevant -- an irrelevancy underlining the assertion of the comparison, and thus "the superlative beauty of the upameya, the face, is suggested"/ tena ca mukhasya upameyasya cārutātiśayo vyāñjito bhavati (RR/133).

We have discussed Bhāmaha's mention of nindā, praśamsā, and ācikhyasā upamās in Kāvyālaṅkāra [2.37-38] (which is cited by Ratnaśrī on pages 77-78). Again, I do not hold the view that Bhāmaha is necessarily critical of these

three varieties, or that he considers ācikhyāsā upamā (and by implication, nindā and praśamsā) "otiose" as such.¹¹

Rather he seems to feel that as they are subsumed by his definition of upamā [2.30], further elaboration is unnecessary. It is varieties such as mālā upamā (KD [2.42]) -- where upamās are, usually, merely repeated -- that he considers superfluous.

2.33 The Upamā of Rivalry

The hundred-petaled lotus

The autumn moon

Your face --

Mutual rivals --

This is considered an Upamā of Rivalry.

Virodha Upamā :

śatapatram śaraccandrastvadānanamiti trayam

parasparavirodhīti sā virodhopamā matā

virodhin [(n.)]: pratidvandvi/"enemy" (RS/78);
spardhi/"rival," "competitor" (RR/133).

As in the example of slesa upamā [2.28], Daṇḍin invokes the conceit of the moon and lotus as rivals in brilliance and beauty (and we saw in the example of nirṇaya upamā [2.27] an alternate variation where the light of the moon is imagined to "conquer" (close) the lotus). In the present example, the face as upameya completes a triad with the two upamānas and is drawn into the established conceit -- all are mutual rivals -- leaving the similarity to be thus inferred.

In virodha upamā similarity is indirectly inferred through the presentation of the upameya and upamāna(s) as rivals or competitors. As mutual rivals, the upameya is

elevated to the level of the upamāna(s): all are seen as possessing the sādhārana dharma to an equal degree. Virodha upamā not only draws on the interplay between the relative status of the upameya and upamāna, as do the preceding nindā [2.30], praśamsā [2.31], and ācikhyasā [2.32] upamās for example, but also echoes both samuuccaya [2.21] and atiśaya [2.22] upamās where difference between upameya and upamāna is minimized. As we shall see, virodha alamkāra [2.333-40] is quite distinct, illuminating a subject through the expression of mutually contradictory attributes.

2.34 The Upamā of Negation

Never has the moon

-- blemished and cold --

the power to vie with your face --

This is an Upamā of Negation.

Pratisedha Upamā :

na jātu śaktirindoste mukhena pratigarjituṁ
kalañkino jaḍasyeti pratiṣedhopamaiva sā

pratigarjituṁ [tumanta < prati (+) *garj] /
literally, "to roar against"] : sparddhāṁ kartum / "to
compete," "emulate" (RŚ/78).

Pratisedha upamā continues the sequence that began with nindā upamā [2.30], focusing on the interplay of relative status between the upameya and upamāna. As in nindā upamā, flaws in the upamāna are mentioned -- "the moon blemished and cold" -- yet here, through the explicit negation of the power of the upamāna to compete with the upameya, the element of "ironic depreciation" shifts to that of similarity itself. For "through the negation of similarity, the superior quality of the upameya is indicated" [sādrśyapratiyapratiṣedhena upameya gunasyotkarṣo varṇito bhavati] (RR/134).

In pratisedha upamā the upameya is elevated through directly negating the possibility of the upamāna serving as such. The upameya draws all positive connotations from the upamāna through the inference of "ironic similitude," yet then proceeds to move to the fore through the negation of any absolute similarity ("the face is beautiful as the moon is beautiful yet even the moon's beauty cannot rival this beauty").

2.35 The Upamā of Flattery

Your Face

marked with the eyes of the doe

The Moon

marked with the deer itself

Even so

He's but an equal -- not superior.

This is an Upamā of Flattery.

Catū Upamā :

mṛgekṣaṇāñkam te vaktram mṛgenaivāñkitah śāśi

tathāpi sama evāsau notkarsīti catūpamā

In catū upamā we initially have a concise illustration
of the standard relationship between upameya and upamāna,

and the reason thereof. The upameya partakes of the sādharana dharma that the upamāna embodies to but a limited degree: "The face is beautiful with eyes like a doe, yet how much more beautiful must the moon be marked with the entire deer" (in the Indian tradition we have the "deer/rabbit-in-the-moon"). Yet the basis for the elevation of the upamāna is presented only to be countered: through explicit flattery the status of the upameya is raised to that of the upamāna, both meeting on equal ground.

2.36 The Upamā Expressing the Actual

It's not a lotus

certainly it's a face

These aren't bees

but eyes --.

Because similarity is clarified

This is an Upamā Expressing the Actual.

Tattvākhyāna Upamā :

na padmam̄ mukhamevedam̄ na bhr̄ngō cakṣusī ime

iti vispaṣṭasādr̄śyāt tattvākhyānopamaiva sā

tattvākhyāna [tattva- /"things as they are";

"reality," "truth" (+) ākhyāna [vartamāne kṛdanta < à (+)
*khyā] /"expressing," "describing"].

In tattvākhyāna upamā Dañdin presents double upameyas related to corresponding upamānas in parallel part-whole relationships: face/lotus; eyes/bees. Here similarity, so great that it borders on confusion, is clarified through expressly discriminating the upameya from the upamāna -- the "actual" state of affairs is resolved. In moha [2.25], samśaya [2.26], and nirṇaya [2.27] upamās, we have varieties based upon varying degrees of confusion and doubt. Tattvākhyāna upamā is distinct from this brief series, for we are not dealing with confusion (moha) or doubt (samśaya) as such, since "Here the similarity lies clearly before the eyes"/"Hier die Ähnlichkeit klar vor Augen liegt" (Böhtlingk/26). Nor do we have a "logical" resolution of such a state (nirṇaya). Rather, from the need in tattvākhyāna upamā to express the distinction between upameya and upamāna, to clarify their actual identities, we do infer a potential confusion, a potential that can only indicate and reinforce similarity.

2.37 The Upamā of the Unique

Your face

Transcending the beauty of the moon and lotus

Became comparable to itself alone --

This is an Upamā of the Unique.

Asādhārana Upamā :

candrāravindayoh kāntimatikramya mukham tava
 ātmanaivābhavat tulyamityasādhāranopamā

In niyama upamā [2.19] the upameya may be compared with one and only one upamāna. In pratisedha upamā [2.34] the capability of a given upamāna to act as such is directly negated with the consequent inferred elevation of the upameya. Asādhārana upamā reflects and combines the distinctive features of both, explicitly elevating the

upameya to an extreme degree: the capability of an otherwise usual upamāna to act as such is negated with the simultaneous specification of the upameya as its own unique ("one and only one") upamāna. The upameya is conceived as transcending all potential upamānas to the extreme where it can only be compared with itself, becoming, in effect, its own upamāna and thus "unique" in the degree that it displays a particular sādhārana dharma. Although the moon and lotus are extremely beautiful, the beauty of the face is beyond comparison.

Towards the close of our chapter in [2.358], Dandin mentions an alamkāra termed anavaya and equates it with asādhārana upamā. It is interesting to note that anavaya alamkāra rather than asādhārana upamā appears in Bhāmaha's Kāvyālaṅkārā [3.45-46]. Their equivalence is evident: "Where something may be compared to itself alone, given the wish to indicate the lack of similarity [between the upameya and anything else]. . . . [yatra tenaiva tasya

syādūpamānopameyatā | asādr̥syavivaksātastamity-
āhurananvayam || [3.45].

Asādhārana upamā reappears as such in the Agnipurāṇa
[343.19].

2.38 The Upamā of the Non-Existent

Your face shines

like a distillate of the brilliance of

every lotus gathered in one place --

This is known as an Upamā of the Non-Existent.

Abhūta Upamā :

sarvapadmaprabhāsārah samāhṛta iva kvacit
tvadānanam vibhātīti tāmabhūtopamām viduh

In what may be considered the basic format of upamā,

the upameya is elevated through the act of comparison with an upamāna presumed superior in the particular property or attribute held in common. In deviating from this "norm," we have seen how the manipulation of the relative status of upameya and upamāna allows the generation of a number of varieties. Thus far the focus has been on the elevation of the upameya, whether proportionately through association (as in prasamsā upamā [2.31]); substantially to a level of equivalence (as in virodha [2.33] and catu [2.35] upamās); or to one of transcendence (as in pratisedha [2.34] or asādhārana [2.37] upamās). And further, this elevation may be achieved either through a depreciation of the upamāna (as in catu or, more severely, in pratisedha upamās), or through a direct statement of the upameya's superiority (as in asādhārana upamā).

In abhitā upamā the focus shifts to the upamāna: the upamāna is elevated, through hyperbole, to a "non-existent" level, where the corresponding intensity of the sādhārana dharma is increased exponentially to the point where,

outside of the imagination, it could not possibly exist.

The relationship of the upameya to this non-existent upamāna takes the form of the basic vastu upamā [2.16], "Your face shines like. . . ." Yet given such an elevated upamāna, we should recognize that the act of comparison cannot but benefit the perceived status of the upameya.

Abhūta upamā further, and perhaps primarily, reflects the element of "imagination," of poetic conceptualization that is evident in the previous sequence of atiśaya [2.22], utpreksitā [2.23], and adbhuta [2.24] upamās. In adbhuta, for example, the element of "wonder" derives from horizontal interaction between upameya and upamāna, rather than vertical movements related to status: through attributing properties of the upameya to the upamāna, a wondrous, unreal, situation is conceived.

2.39 The Upamā of the Inconceivable

Like poison from the moon's disc

Like fire from sandalwood

Are harsh words from this mouth --

This is an Upamā of the Inconceivable.

Asambhāvita Upamā :

candrabimbādiva viṣṭam candanādiva pāvakah

paruṣā vāgito vaktrādityasambhāvitopamā

As with the preceding abhūta upamā, asambhāvita upamā highlights the upamāna(s) in a distinctive way. Yet where in the former, the emphasis is on the elevation of the upamāna to a "non-existent" extreme through imaginative conception, in asambhāvita upamā the realization that a negative attribute of the upameya is untenable is achieved

through analogical comparison with two upamānas that themselves -- in contradicting a reality assumed by (poetic) tradition -- are "inconceivable."

Comparison becomes inconceivable because its components are such -- now not through imaginative exaggeration but through logical contradiction. It is inconceivable that "poison could come from the moon's disc," for the moon overflows with lustrous, life-giving nectar (amṛtamayāt/"containing amṛta, nectar" (RŚ/79)); it is inconceivable that "fire could come from sandalwood," whose nature is soft and cool (ekāntaśiśirāt/"exclusively cool" (RŚ/79)). And thus, of course, it is correspondingly inconceivable that "harsh words could come from this mouth."

The greater the degree of inconceivability inherent in the upamānas, the greater the degree of inconceivability in positing a potential flaw in the upameya. And to this extent the true -- positive -- nature of the upameya is inferred with added emphasis.

In this example of asambhāvita upamā we note the presence of two (albeit "inconceivable") upamānas. The use of multiple upamānas, with variations thereon, will distinguish the immediately following varieties.

2.40 The Upamā of the Multiple

Your touch is cool --

like the sap of sandalwood

the rays of the moon

the moonstone

and so on --

Expressing intensity

This is an Upamā of the Multiple.

Bahu Upamā :

candanodakacandrāṁśucandrakāntādiśītalah

sparśastavetyatiśayam bodhayantī bahūpamā

candrakānta : "a fabulous gem formed of the congealed rays of the moon, glittering and exuding cool moisture in moonlight only."¹²

Although coming past the middle of Daṇḍin's presentation of upamā's varieties, bahu upamā's focus on the manipulation of structural components reflects primarily our initial series [2.15-21]. We have noted among Bharata's "structural" varieties (NŚ [17.45-49]) the instance where one upameya may be compared with more than one upamāna ("of one with many"/ekasya bahubhiḥ): "Whose eye is like that of the hawk, peacock, and vulture" [17.48]. And in Daṇḍin's initial, and ultimately "complete," dharma upamā [2.15], we have the explicit presentation of upamās four primary components.

In bahu upamā Dandin applies "one with many" to the fundamental format of dharma upamā: all four components are present (for the first time since dharma upamā itself), yet rather than one, we have a "multiple" number of upamānas enumerated to which a single sādhārana dharma applies. With multiple upamānas thus reinforcing the upameya's possession of the sādhārana dharma, the "intensity" (atiśaya) of the similarity is expressed.

We have seen a number of variations that integrate (as subordinate) this "multiple" mode: samuccaya upamā [2.21], two properties/one upamāna; atiśaya upamā [2.22], numerous properties implied/one upamāna; nirnaya upamā [2.27], doubt over the correct identification of the upameya resolved in the presence of two upamānas; nindā upamā [2.30], negative attributes of two upamānas presented; virodha upamā [2.33], upameya and two upamānas all mutual "rivals"; and the preceding asambhāvita upamā [2.39], displaying two "inconceivable" upamānas. We shall see a continuation of

this mode in the following vikriyā [2.41] and mālā [2.42] upamas.

Bahu upamā is again mentioned in the Agnipurāṇa [343.14].

2.41 The Upamā of Transformation

Slender one!

Your face --

as though carved from the disc of the moon

as though drawn from the womb of the lotus --

This is an Upamā of Transformation.

Vikriyā Upamā :

candrabimbādivotkīrṇam padmagarbhādivoddhṛtam
tava tanvañgi vadana mityasau vikriyopamā

utkīrnām [bhute kṛdanta < ut (+) *kīr].

uddhṛtam [bhute kṛdanta < ud (+) *hr̥].

In vikriyā upamā two upamānas and two corresponding vācakas ("as though") are directly expressed, with the corresponding sādhārana dharmas now left to be inferred. And rather than focusing on the multiple number of upamānas, the distinctive feature of vikriyā upamā is a conceived "transformation" of upamāna into upameya. "Here, the face is that which ultimately reflects the transformation (vikrtih); and the 'disc of the moon' and the 'womb of the lotus,' the upamānas, are the bases, the raw material of the transformation (prakrtih). The similarity is between the bases and their transformation" [atropamānabhūtau indubimbapadmagarbha prakṛtī vadanaṁ vikṛtiḥ | prakṛtivikṛtyoh sāmyamasti] (RR/137). (We have noted the usage of the "moon's disc" in asambhāvita upamā [2.39], and Śrī/"beauty" arising from the lotus in ślesa upamā [2.28].) We may note the further similarity of vikriyā upamā with

adbhuta upamā [2.24], where distinct features of the upameya are hypothetically imagined as transferred to the upamāna.

Vikriyā upamā is mentioned in the Agnipurāṇa [343.15], in the Alamkārasarvasva [verse 13] of Ruyyaka [12th century] as a distinct alamkāra termed parināmāḥ, and much later by Keśaramiśra in his Alamkāraśekhara [16th century] (Notes 2/96).

2.42 The Upamā of the Interwoven

Like light in the sun

the sun in the day

the day in the sky

Valor generated splendor in you --

This is considered the Upamā of the Interwoven.

Mālā Upamā :

pūṣṇyātapa ivāhnīvā pūṣā vyomnīva vāsarah

vikramastvayyadhällaks.mīmiti mālopamā matā

pūṣni [(loc.) < pūṣan (m.)].

ahni [(loc.) < ahan (n.)].

vyomni [(loc.) < vyoman (n.)].

Dāṇḍin, playing on the image of the garland (mālā), presents now three upamānas as blossoms strung on the thread of a common sādhāraṇa dharma: mālā upamā is "like a garland, woven with a succession of individual blossoms"/mālopamā mālāyāṁ yathā grathitasya ekasya kusumasya apareṇa tasyāpi apareṇa iti (RR/138). He provides a distinctive touch, however, for the upamānas are "interwoven" -- the locus of a preceding upamāna provides the subject for the following upamāna ("in the sun"/"sun"/"in the day"/"day").

It would seem that the later, usual conception of mālā upamā is more straightforward, with the upameya illuminated

through a series of upamānas, each expressive of and joined with a distinctive sādhārana dharma (for example, Agnipurāṇa [343.15], and in Rudraṭa's Kāvyālamkāra [8.25-26]). In this regard it is interesting to recall Bhāmaha's position, (KA [2.38]), where he affirms that to elaborate with such varieties as mālā upamā is "useless." Is he really objecting to what appears to be a distinctive variation unique to Daṇḍin (although talking of mālā upamā in general terms); or is he rather objecting to the mere stringing together of upamas, or of upamānas, within one upamā, which certainly becomes redundant, and which would seem to have been the usual practice?

Mammaṭa, in the discussion and examples following [10.90] of the Kāvyaprakāśa, touches on these points. Mālā upamā is described in a more basic format: "a number of upamānas are mentioned corresponding to a single upameya" [kasyaiva bahūpamānopādane mālopamā]. Of distinct interest is his immediately following description of what he terms raśana upamā / "the upamā of the [jeweled] girdle,"

a variety which is very similar to Dañdin's: "Where, in succession, a preceding upameya becomes a following upamāna." Yet, as with Bhāmaha, "raśana upamā (and mālā upamā) are not distinctly characterized because a thousand examples involving such distinctive charm are possible, and because they are not a meaningful addition to previously mentioned varieties [literally, 'because they do not transcend'] [raśanopamā ca na laksitā evamvidhavaicitrya-sahasrasambhavāduktabhedānatikramacca |].

2.43 The Upamā of Complete Expressions

If one complete expression is compared with another

Twofold with one or more words denoting comparison --

This is the Upamā of Complete Expressions.

Vākyārtha Upamā :

vākyārthenaiva vākyārthah kopi yadyupamīyate

ekānekevaśabdatvāt sā vākyārthopamā dvidhā

vākyā [(n.)] / vākyā may be variously translated as "clause" or "sentence" --it is essentially a group of words bound by a complete and organizing thought. Ratnaśrī points out that "its distinguishing characteristic is the relationship of the kriya to its kārakas"/vākyasyārthah kriyākārakasambandhaviś śeṣah (RS/81). Its focus is on kriya or "action," yet action expressed in relation to the six kārakas or "nominal modes as realized through the six cases" (kāraka literally means "the capacity in which a thing becomes instrumental in bringing about an action").¹³

ivaśabda : that is, vācakas /"words and particles of comparison."

Upamā primarily involves a comparison between two nominals (upameya and upamāna) through an attribute

perceived to be held in common (sādhārana dharma). In vākyārtha upamā the scope of comparison extends to embrace, and indeed revolves around, the verb. We have to be careful here for, upon examining the following two related examples, it would appear that Dandin does not necessarily mean comparison between distinct and complete vākyas. Rather, with more subtlety, a comparison seems to be developed between two associated sets, one serving to develop the upameya, the other the upamāna, with each sharing the same primary verb. Further, each set develops in parallel with the other, where aspects of the primary or encompassing upameyas and upamānas may in turn serve as sub-upameyas to corresponding sub-upamānas.

And it is not simply a question of the mechanical presence or absence of one, or more, vācakas ("ivaśabdās") that distinguishes the two varieties. As we shall see, the number of vācakas determines how the parallel structures develop, and serves in the second variety [2.45] to explicitly mark the sub-upameyas and sub-upamānas.

Vāmana, as we have seen in Kāvyālaṅkārasūtrāṇī [4.2.3], distinguishes between padārthavṛttih upamā, which revolves around the meaning of the phrase; and vākyārthavṛttih upamā, which revolves around the meaning of the extended clause or sentence. Vākyārtha upamā also appears in the Agnipurāṇa [343.19].

2.44 Example of the Upamā of Complete Expressions: I.

Your face like a lotus

shines

Eyes unsteady / Bees roaming

Lustre of the teeth visible / Filaments perceptible.

Vākyārtha Upamā Udāharanam I. :

tvadānanamadhīrākṣamāvirdaśanadīdhiti

bhramadbhr̥ngamivālakṣyakesaram bhāti pañkajam

Our first variety of vākyārtha upamā displays one vācaka, iva/"like," which directly relates a primary upameya ("face") with a primary upamāna ("lotus"). Each may further be seen as the subject of their own complete expression or clause, given that each shares the verb "shines"/bhāti: "Your face shines with eyes unsteady and the lustre of teeth visible like a lotus shines with bees roaming and filaments perceptible." And further, between each set of attributes we see parallel correspondences: "eyes unsteady" [like] "bees roaming"/"lustre of teeth visible" [like] "filaments perceptible" -- correspondences, left implicit, which serve to illustrate and emphasize the primary, encompassing similarity between the face and the lotus.

We may compare ślesa upamā [2.28] with vākyārtha upamā. Both have similarity illuminated through parallel development of the upameya and upamāna. In ślesa upamā the unique capability of ślesa creates this parallel reverberation out of a single form. In this first variety

of vākyārtha upamā parallel aspects are explicit; their integration into distinct yet comparable clauses, and the consequent reverberation, is, however, left to be inferred.

2.45 Example of the Upamā of Complete Expressions: II.

I	like	a Bee
enjoyed continuously kissing		
that face	like	that lotus
of she so slender	like	of a lotus vine.

Vākyārtha Upamā Udāharanam II. :

nalinyā iva tanvañgyāstasyāḥ padmamivānanam
 mayā madhuvrateneva pāyam pāyamaramyata
aramyata [lan (ā.) (3rd) (sing.) < *ram in the bhave
prayoga].

The second variety of vākyārtha upamā displays not one but three vācakas, in this case three instances of iva/"like". The basic structure follows the previous variety, yet the two additional vācakas not only serve to explicitly expose the parallel correspondences between the primary upameya ("I") and the primary upamāna ("bee"), but in so doing also serve to create sub-sets of upameyas and upamānas: "that face like a lotus"/"of she so slender like of a lotus vine." In being expressed they further serve to shift attention away from the central upamā between the primary components, toward the again shared verbal action and the parallel sentences that revolve around such action: "I enjoyed continuously kissing that face of she so slender like a bee enjoyed continuously kissing that lotus of a lotus vine."

2.46 The Upamā of Parallel Objects

Introducing a particular object in one expression

A comparable object follows in another

Generating the cognition of similarity --

This is an Upamā of Parallel Objects.

Prativastu Upamā :

vastu kiñcidupanyasya nyasanāttatsadharmanāḥ

sāmyapratītirastīti prativastūpamā yathā

vastu [(n.)] : prakṛtam/"the subject, topic illuminated" (RR/139); kiñcit vivakṣitam purusādi/"whatever one wishes to describe, people and so on" (RŚ/81). In this instance it has also been taken in the wider sense of "sentence." Rangacharya Raddi (RR/140) and P.V. Naganatha Sastry, in his comments on Bhāmaha's definition of

prativastūpamā in Kāvyalaṅkāra [2.34], mirror each other in their analysis of the compound "prativastūpamā," the latter being more explicit: "The word vastu means here a sentence. The derivation is prativastu (=prativākyārtham) upamā (=samānadharmaḥ) yasyām sā prativastūpamā."¹⁴ Both senses of vastu apply though Daṇḍin is most probably referring to those "objects" within the sentences, for it is not the sentences as such that display similarity.

upanyasya [lyabanta < upa (+) ni (+) *as (+) ya].

In vākyārtha upamā [2.43-45] we have an extension of scope, moving beyond the basic relationship of similitude between nominals to comparisons between vākyas, complete grammatical expressions of unified images. And with the proviso that the given kriya or verb does double duty: the vākyas develop in tandem, sharing a single verb with the similitude explicitly expressed through one or more words denoting comparison.

In prativastu upamā the situation is much clearer. We

again have an extension of scope, yet here an upameya is introduced and illustrated in an initial sentence, followed by a distinct second sentence that illustrates and embodies an upamāna. And in important contrast to vākyārtha upamā, "although such words as iva are not employed, the cognition of similarity is realized through suggestion (vyañjanayā)" / *ivādiśabdaprayogābhāvepi vyañjanayā sādrśyāvabodho bhavatīti* (RR/140). In effect, in prativastu upamā similarity is expressed between parallel objects embodied in parallel sentences.

Bhāmaha, for example, also accepted prativastu as a distinct variety of upamā. It is interesting to consider his definition (KA [2.34]): where the absence of "iva words" is explicitly noted, yathevānabhidhāne 'pi / "although yathā and iva are not expressed"; and where the subsequent and concluding pada -- guṇasāmyapratiṭitah -- mirrors the words of Dāṇḍin, "there is the cognition of similar qualities" [samānavastunyāsena prativastūpamocaye | yathevānabhidhāne 'pi guṇasāmyapratiṭitah ||]. And we may

note the definition of Mammaṭa (KP [10.101d-102ab]) -- who, along with Vāmana (KAS [4.3.1-2]) and Udbhaṭa (KASS [1.22-23] for example -- considered prativastūpamā a distinct alamkāra -- "Where one attribute held in common is presented in two ways in two sentences" [sāmānyasya dvirekasya yatra vākyadvaye sthitih |].

2.47 Example of the Upamā of Parallel Objects

Among kings arising

there's not yet one that resembles you

Indeed, there's not a tree

second to the Pārijāta.

Prativastu Upamodāharanam :

naikopi tvādrśodyāpi jāyamāneṣu rājasu
nanu dvitīyo nāstyeva pārijātasya pādapah

jāyamānesu [vartamāne kṛdanta < *jan].

pārijātah : One of the five trees of svarga, Indra's paradise, divine and miraculous in nature, capable of granting any wish. It is said to have arose at the "Churning of the Ocean": "Next from the whirling milk ocean came the Pārijāta tree, perfuming the world with its fragrance and delighting the wives of the gods."¹⁵

In our example of prativastu upamā we have two distinct vākyas or, here, sentences. In the first, the upameya is presented: a king above all others, without rival. In the second, paralleling the first, the upamāna is described: the Pārijāta tree, without equal. In their respective elevated uniqueness, the objects are "parallel," and we infer their similarity. Rangacharya Radzi summarizes: "Here, with 'not one resembles' and 'there's not a second,' a single common attribute is presented in two sentences in different words" [*atra sadṛśo nāsti dvitiyo nāsti iti eka eva samāno dharmah śabdāntareṇa*]

vākyadvaye nirdiṣṭa] (RR/140). Again, we have an inferred similarity between parallel objects in parallel sentences.

2.48 The Upamā of Equalization

Equating the inferior with the superior

in the performance of the same action --

This is considered the Upamā of Equalization.

Tulyayoga Upamā :

adhikena samīkṛtya hīnamekakriyāvidhau
yadbruvanti smṛtā seyam tulyayogopamā yathā

We have seen a number of previous varieties that play on the relative status of upameya and upamāna. Specifically we may note atiśaya upamā [2.22], where the upameya and upamāna are considered equals but for a single

difference; virodha upamā [2.33], where upameya and upamāna(s) appear as "rivals" and are thus of equivalent status; and catu upamā [2.35], where in depreciating the upamāna as a mere equal the upameya is "flattered."

In tulyayoga upamā the focus again revolves around status, but with two additional structural aspects. Here the upameya and upamāna are again "equalized": a normally inferior upameya is equated with a superior upamāna. Yet this correspondence is not explicit, for it must be inferred from the presentation of the upameya and upamāna as participating, respectively, in the "performance of the same action." And further, its form mirrors the "expansion of scope" that we have seen in the two previous varieties, vākyārtha [2.43-45] and prativastu [2.46-47] upamās. As in the former, we have two vākyas revolving around the same action, one marking to the upameya, the other the upamāna. And, with two such sets present, each equating the upameya and upamāna through the performance of the same action, we

also have the complete parallelism exemplified by the latter.

In [2.330-32] Dandin defines tulyayogitā alamkāra and illustrates two varieties, that of stuti/"praise," "appreciation" and that of nindā/"censure," "depreciation." In this alamkāra inferior is also equated with superior(s), yet its purpose is to describe or illuminate the inferior, whether in a positive or negative context, not to focus on conceived similarity. This is achieved through presenting the inferior and superior elements displaying the same attribute, not through their performance of the same action in their respective (and unequal) spheres.

2.49 Example of the Upamā of Equalization

Pulomāri watches in heaven's protection

You in the earth's

He destroys asuras

You arrogant kings.

Tulyayoga Upamā Udāharanam :

divo jāgarti rakṣayai pulomārīrbhuvo bhavān
 asurāstena hanyante sāvalepāstvayā nrpāḥ

Pulomāri : "the enemy of Puloman," that is, Indra.

Puloman is Indra's father-in-law, and a dānava (a son of Danu, wife of Kaśyapa), a variety of demon. He aided the dragon Vṛta and was slain along with him by Indra: "An act which also symbolizes the releasing of the waters or rains

which Vṛta held back, the conquest of the enemies of the Āryans, and the setting in order of heaven."¹⁶

A king (nṛpah /literally, "protector of men"), the upameya, is vigilant exactly as Indra, the upamāna, is vigilant. He destroys kings who presume to rival him exactly as Indra destroys the ever-troublesome Asuras. Through the performance of the same actions, "watching"/jāgarti and "killing"/hanyante, upameya and upamāna are equated. We note the parallel structure between two sets, each set comprised of two vākyas revolving around the same verb, illustrating the equalization.

2.50 The Upamā of Cause

Oh king!

Because of beauty you emulate the moon

Because of splendor the sun

Because of composure the ocean --

This is considered an Upamā of Cause.

Hetu Upamā :

kāntyā candramasam dhārmnā sūryam dhairyena cārnavam
rājānnanukaroṣīti saisā hetūpamā matā

In hetu upamā a series of sādhārana dharmas are specifically marked -- grammatically -- as the "causes" justifying a series of similarities. In this instance, "beauty," "splendor," and "composure," are all in the trtiyā

vibhakti or "instrumental" case. Each serves as the rationale, the "cause" for the specific and distinct comparison to follow.

Hetu upamā symmetrically frames Dandin's sequence, for as with our first variety, dharma upamā [2.15], it is a "complete"/pūrṇa upamā in displaying explicitly upameya, upamāna, sādhārana dharma, and vācaka. And, in incorporating a number of previous distinctive features, it appropriately stands in the final position.

As with the preceding series of vākyārtha [2.43-44], prativastu [2.46-47], and tulyayoga [2.48-49] upamās, hetu upamā displays a series of vākyas -- here complete but for a shared verb.

And again we have the repetition of upamānas, a motif whose variations we saw, for example, in asambhāvita [2.39], bahu [2.40], vikriya [2.41], and mālā [2.42] upamās. This repetition is a new variation, however, for it is a series of distinct sādhārana dharmas correlated with corresponding upamānas. In this hetu upamā resembles the

more usual, later form of mālā upamā as seen, for example, in Rudraṭa (KA [8.25-26]) and Mammaṭa (KP [10.90ff.]).

2.51 Exceptions to Faults in Upamās

Neither a difference in gender or number
 nor in inferiority or superiority
 are sufficient to spoil an upamā
 where there is no distaste among the discerning.

Upamādosāpavadah :

na liṅgavacane bhinne na hīnādhikatāpi vā
 upamādūṣanāyālam yatrodvego na dhīmatām

Dāṇḍin follows his varieties of upamā with a consideration of possible faults that they may exhibit [2.51-56], and exceptions to such faults. He is concise

and it is important to note that he stresses that dicta are inoperable in the realm of the creative imagination, a realm with boundaries yet drawn by the collective taste of those deeply versed in kāvya and its ancillary studies. Dāṇḍin is entirely aware that kāvya is generated by the unique abilities and talents of the poet, not by mechanical adherence to prescribed dogma.

With "difference" Dāṇḍin is referring to discrepancies between upameya and upamāna. Traditionally in Sanskrit, liṅga ("gender") generally reflects the conceived sexual status of the relevant object. When we find, as we frequently do, an object considered from our perspective "inanimate" marked in Sanskrit as either "male" (pumliṅga) or "female" (striliṅgā) it is very probably conceived to display the corresponding sexual gender. If "there is no distaste among the discerning" where objects of different genders are indeed compared fault is not necessarily evident. Similarly, although the correlation of grammatical and physical "number" is exact, where a given

upameya differs from a given corresponding upamāna in number (vacanabhinna) a fault need not arise. This should not be confused with variations on the "number of" either alamkāra or upamānas.

In the second case, a marked difference in inferiority/superiority, that is, a discrepancy in the relative status of the upameya and upamāna need not appear as a fault.

In Kāvyālañkāra [2.39-65], Bhāmaha considers at length "faults in upamās"/upamādosāḥ. It is interesting to speculate in light of the question of the relative priority of Dāṇḍin and Bhāmaha, whether Dāṇḍin, as later, critically considers only these three faults as worthy of mention, preferring to downplay the discussion at this point (especially considering his extensive examination of dosas in [3.125-185]); or whether Bhāmaha, as later, felt that an expansion of so concise a presentation was necessary.

Bhāmaha lists seven flaws in upamā (KA [2.39]), and notes that these seven were mentioned by a previous writer, Medhāvin [2.40] (see Introduction, under The Tradition and

Possible Predecessors). These are: (1) hīnatā/"deficiency" in the upamāna, the lack of explicitly listed attributes of the upamāna corresponding to those of the upameya (not in the sense of "inferior status"); (2) asambhava/"improbability," though there are exceptions where the meaning involves atiśaya (in the sense of "intensification"), or in the case of utprekṣa ("poetic imagination") [2.50]; (3) liṅgabhedah /"a difference in gender," with the example of an (implied) man being compared to a river (āpaqā (f.)) [2.53]; (4) vacobhedah /"a difference in number"; (5) viparyayah /"excessive contrast," with the examples of a king breaking an enemy army being compared to a dog's movements in the hunt [2.54], and a bird being compared to the god Brahmā [2.55] (comparable to the hina/adhikatā of Dāṇḍin); (6) upamāne adhikatram/ "excess in the upamāna," the excess of explicitly listed attributes of the upamāna corresponding to those of the upameya (not in the sense of "superior status"); and (7) asadrśatā/"lack of similarity."

Bhāmaha in citing examples of accepted poetic practice as exceptions to the above rules [2.56], recognizes a pervasive contra-diction: it is usual, for example, to compare the "hand"/pānih (m.) with the "lotus"/kamalam (n.), or the "lips"/adharah (m.) to "fruit"/phalam (n.). Yet more striking is his comment in the following verse [2.57], "The rule is not considered binding in cases involving differences in gender"/striпumsayorayam | vidhirnābhimato. . . . ||. Again, such a rule would only have real bearing if liṅga connoted ultimately sexual comparison, if male was compared to female, or the reverse, in an inappropriate way. That differences in grammatical gender of components compared is frequently observed should perhaps not be too surprising.

2.52 Examples of Exceptions to Faults in Gender and Number

This eunuch walks like a woman

This woman speaks like a man

This lover is like my life-breaths

The branches of knowledge are earned like money.

Liṅgavacanadosāpavadodāharanāni :

strīva gacchati ṣaṇḍhoyam vaktyeṣā strī pumāniva
prāṇā iva priyoyam me vidyā dhanamivārjitā¹⁷

In dealing with grammatically constrained issues specific to a given language of course translation stumbles. In the present series of examples, Dandin illustrates exceptions to the mechanical assumptions that where upameya and upamāna differ in gender or number (or both) there is fault.

The first two examples display cases where upameya and upamāna differ in sexual grammatical gender. In the first the upameya ("eunuch"/ssandhah) is male, the upamāna ("woman"/strī) is female; in the second example the situation is reversed, where the upameya ("woman") is female, the upamāna ("man"/pumān) is male. A man may walk like a women if there is no contradiction with context, and thus especially if he is a eunuch; a woman may certainly speak like a man in strength or in anger.

The following two examples display cases where upameya and upamāna differ in grammatical number. In this regard it is important to note that just as in English such a difference is logically and graphically jarring, it may be acceptable (as in the present cases) where one of the components compared, when grammatically plural, assumes a "collective," singular sense. Thus, in the first of the two examples, although an upameya in the singular ("lover"/priyah) is compared with an upamāna ("life-breaths"/prānāh) in the plural, the dominant sense of

prānā(h) is collectively singular, "principle of life"/"life."¹⁸ And similarly, in the second of the two examples, although an upameya in the plural ("branches of knowledge") is compared with an upamāna ("money") in the singular, the dominant sense of vidyā(h) is the collectively singular "knowledge."¹⁹

2.53 Examples of Exceptions to Faults in Inferiority/ Superiority

Protector of the earth!

The King of the gods shines like you.

A king through brilliance

is able to ascend to the status of the sun.

Hinādhikatādosāpavadodāharanāni :

bhavāniva mahīpāla devarājo virājate
 alamśumataḥ kaksāmāroḍhum tejasā nr̥pah

devarājah /literally, "King of the gods or devas," an epithet of Indra. I feel that Dāṇḍin chose this particular epithet not only because of the parallelism between "kings," but also to stress -- the point of the example -- Indra's elevated position, and thus have chosen its literal translation.

Dāṇḍin now presents examples that belie the assumption that a "difference in inferiority or superiority" is necessarily a fault in upamās. We are not dealing with either the hinatā or upamane adhikatram of Bhāmaha (KA [2.39ff.]), which are primarily structural and involve respectively a "deficiency" or "excess" of explicitly stated attributes of the upamāna in relation to those of the upameya. We are closer rather to his viparyayah, that

is, cases of "excessive contrast" between the upameya and upamāna. Dandin's examples are not so extreme, yet we are still concerned with relative contrast -- where either the upameya or upamāna is so inferior or superior to the other that the basis of similarity is undermined. Where this contrast is not excessive we do not necessarily have fault.

In the first half of the verse we have a superior upameya (Indra in his role as "King of the gods") compared to an inferior upamāna (an earthly king). In the second half, in a reversal pattern, we have an inferior upameya (an earthly king) compared to a superior upamāna (the sun).

We may note that this second exception is illustrated in the form of a hetu upamā [2.50], where the "brilliance" of the king is the cause, explicitly expressed, of his similarity with the sun.

2.54 Conclusion to Exceptions to Faults in Upamās/
Indicating Examples of Faults in Upamās

In such examples beauty is never abandoned.

Though certainly in some cases distaste arises
among those versed in literature.

For example:

Upamādosāpavadopasam̄hārah / Upamādosodāharanāsūcanam :

ityevamādau saubhāgyam na jahātyeva jātucit
astyeva kvacidudvegah prayogevāgvidām yathā

vāgvidām [(gen.) (pl.) < the upapada samāsa vāc-vid/literally, "knowers of speech, language"].

Where saubhāgyam, poetic grace or beauty, is dominant even otherwise obviating structures may be utilized. Where

absent and the flaw excessive, "distaste arises" and we no longer have an alamkāra.

2.55 Examples of Faults in Upamās

The Moon [m.] is white like a Hamsī [f.]

The sky is clear like lakes.

The servant is devoted to his master like a dog.

The firefly shines like the sun.

Upamādosopasamhārah :

hamsīva dhavalaścandraḥ sarāṁsivāmalam nabhaḥ
bhartr̥bhakto bhaṭaḥ śveva khadyoto bhāti bhānuvat

hamsī [(f.) of hamsah] / In poetical usage the hamsa is far more than what is perhaps its mundane

counterpart, the wild goose; especially the rājahamsa, which "wins its Indian name from the height at which it flies, from the dignity of its motion , and from the lightness of its plumage, actually white and brown although the Sanskrit poets always emphasize the white."²⁰ The hamsa serves as the mount of Bhramā, he signals the approach of the monsoon with his northern flight and thus the enjoyment or separation of lovers, and displays the power of separating milk from water. To "translate" hamsa (as "goose," much less the erroneous "swan" or the inane "flamingo") would thus be to cast aside an entire range of connotative meaning, to deflate it to the level of a creature whose English connotations are quite the reverse.

Dāṇḍin now illustrates actual faults in upamās, following exactly the order in which they and their respective examples were given in verses [2.51-54]. The first example illustrates a fault due to difference in gender. Again, it is important to note that although

upameya and upamāna are of "grammatically" distinct genders this may be secondary, and happen to reflect the fact that an object conceived of as male is being compared with an object conceived of as female. Candraḥ /"moon", as upameya, is conceived of as a male entity, elevated as a male deity, and personified as King Soma founder of the lunar dynasty. In later poetry he may appear, for example, as a lover undressing his mistress, the Night, with his rays;²¹ or as love's stage manager, his chaplain and priest.²² Hamsī, as upamāna, does not just happen to be in the feminine gender, but signifies a female hamsa. Although both are white, the sexual difference prevents the comparison.

In the second example we have a fault due to difference in number. The "sky"/nabhas as upameya, conceived of as a singular entity, is compared with "lakes"/saras, in the plural, as upamāna. There is no question of "lakes" being taken in a singular, collective sense (as prānāḥ or vidyāḥ in [2.52] above), and thus the comparison fails.

The third and fourth examples reflect faults due to excessive differences in the relative status of upameya and upamāna. We may note that, unlike the exceptions of [2.53], the stress here is on "excessive" and closely corresponds to the viparyayah of Bhāmaha [2.39ff.]. Although subservient, a "servant"/bhaṭah as upameya, cannot correctly be compared with a "dog"/śvā, an upamāna that is excessively inferior. With the reversal, a "firefly"/khadyotah as upameya, is distinctly inferior to the "sun"/bhānu, an excessively superior upamāna.

2.56 Conclusion to Faults in Upamās

Such cases are avoided by the talented --

Let the learned themselves consider the reasons

in order to discriminate between merit and fault.

Upamādosopasam̄hārah :

īdrśam varjyate sadbhīḥ kāraṇam tatra cintyatām
guṇadoṣaviciरāya svayameva manisibhiḥ

2.57 Particles, Words, and Expressions Indicating

-65 Similarity in Upamās

2.57

The words and particles:

iva vat vā yathā samāna nibhā samnibha
tulya samkāsa nīkāsa prakāsa pratirūpaka

Upamāsādrśya sūcinaḥ śabdāḥ :

ivadvāyathāśabdāḥ samānanibhasamnibhāḥ
tulyasamkāśanīkāśaprakāśapratiरūpakaḥ

iva / (ind.) "like"; -vat / (suffix) "like"; vā /
 (ind.) "like"; yathā / (ind.) "like"; samāna / (adj.)
 "similar"; nibhā / (adj.) "similar"; saṁnibha / (adj.)
 "similar"; tulya / (adj.) "similar"; saṁkāśa / (adj.)
 "similar"; nīkāśa / (adj.) "similar"; prakāśa / (adj.)
 "brilliant"; pratirūpaka / (adj.) " having a parallel
 form."

2.58

pratipakṣa pratidvandvi pratyānika virodhin

sadr̥g sadr̥ś saṁvādi sajātiya anuvadin

pratipaksapratidvandvipratyanikavirodhinah

sadr̥ksadr̥śasamvādisajātiyānuvādinah

pratipakṣa / (adj.) "on the opposite side," "enemy";
pratidvandvi / (adj.) "competitor," "rival"; pratyānika /
 (adj.) "of the opposite army," "enemy"; virodhin / (adj.)

"one who disputes," "opponent"; sadr̥q / (adj.) "that which looks the same," "similar"; sadr̥ś / (adj.) "that which looks the same," "similar"; samvādin / (adj.) "that which corresponds, agrees"; sajātiya / (adj.) "that which belongs to the same category"; anuvādin / (adj.) "that which repeats."

2.59

pratibimba praticchanda sarūpa sama saṃmita
 salakṣaṇa sadṛkṣa ābha sapakṣa upamita upamā
 pratibimbaparticchandasarūpasamasammitāḥ
 salakṣaṇasadṛkṣābhāsapakṣopamitopamāḥ

pratibimba / (m.) "reflection"; praticchanda / (m.) "reflection"; sarūpa / (adj.) "with the same form"; sama / (adj.) "with the same measure," "equal"; saṃmita / (adj.) "with the same measure," "equal"; salakṣaṇa / (adj.) "with

the same distinguishing characteristic"; sadrksa / (adj.) "similar"; ābha / (adj.) "that which shines the same," "similar"; sapakṣa / (adj.) "with the same side, position"; upamita / (bhute krdanta) "measured similarly"; upamā / (f.) "similarity."

2.60

and kalpa deśīya deśya and so on

also prakhya and pratinidhi

and the words savarṇa and tulita

and those whose meaning expresses "one not inferior."

kalpadeśīyadeśyādiḥ prakhyapratinidhī api

s̄varṇatulitau śabdaye cānyūnārthavādinah

-kalpa; -deśīya; -deśya / (adj. suffixes) "a little less than _____," "one who is like _____; prakhya / (adj.) "that which shines similarly," "similar"; pratinidhiḥ /

(m.) "replacement," "representative"; savarna / (adj.) "with the same color, caste"; tulita / (adj.) "with the same measure."

2.61

and bahuvrīhi applications in such cases as

"one who has a face like the moon," and so on

and the verbs:

spardhate jayati dvesti druhayati pratigarjati

samāsaśca bahuvrīhiḥ śaśāñkavadanādiṣu

spardhate jayati dvesti druhayati pratigarjati

śaśāñkavadana : śaśāñkah iva vadanaṁ yasyāḥ sā /

"one who has a face like the moon"; spardhate [< *spardh] / "compete"; jayati [< *ji] / "conquer"; dvesti [< *dviṣ] "hate"; druhyati [< *druh] / "plot against";

pratigarjati [< prati (+) *garj] / "roar against,"
"challenge."

2.62

ākrośati avajānāti kadarthayati nindati
viḍambayati saṁdhatte hasati īrsyati asūyati

ākrośatyavajānāti kadarthayati nindati

viḍambayati saṁdhatte hasatīrsyatyasūyati

ākrośato [< ā (+) *kruś] / "blame," "curse";
avajānāti [< ava (+) *jñā] / "insult"; kadarthayati
[nāmadhatu < kadartha] / "torment," "despise"; nindati
[< *nind] / "blame"; viḍambayati [nāmadhātu <
viḍamba] / "act like"; saṁdhatte [< sam (+) *dhā] /
"hold," "connect"; hasati [< *has] / "laugh"; īrsyati [
< *īrsy] / "envy"; asūyati [nāmadhātu < asūya] / "feel
mental burning, anger."

2.63

[and such expressions as:]

"He robs his beauty."

"He removes his brilliance."

"He quarrels with him."

"He climbs on the balance with him."

tasya muṣṇāti saubhāgyam tasya kāntim vilumpati

tena sārdham vigrhnāti tulām tenādhirohati

We may note the verbs employed: muṣṇāti [< *muṣ] /

"rob"; vilumpati [< vi (+) *lup] / "take away";

vigrhnati [< vi (+) *grah] / "quarrel"; adhirohati [< adhi (+) *ruh] / "climb up."

2.64

"He sets his foot on his position."

"He attains his level."

"He follows him."

"He associates with him."

"He has his character."

"He negates him."

tatpadavyāṁ padam̄ dhatte tasya kaksām̄ vigāhate

tamanvetyanubadhnāti tacchīlam̄ tannisedhati

Again the verbs are: dhatte [< *dhā] / "put," "place"; vigāhate [< vi (+) *gāh] / "enter," "reach"; anveti [< anu (+) *ī] / "follow"; anubadhnāti [< anu (+) *bandh] / "bind," "associate"; nisedhati [< ni (+) *sidh] / "negate."

2.65

and "He imitates him."

These words and expressions are indicators
of similarity in upamās.

Stating them provides comfort
to the minds of poets.

tasya cānukarotiti śabdāḥ sādrśyasūcakāḥ
upamāyāmīme proktāḥ kavīnām buddhisaukhyadāḥ

anukaroti [< anu (+) *kr̥] / "follow;" "imitate."

Notes [2.15] - [2.65]

1. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, "Words for Beauty in Classical Sanskrit Poetry," in Indological Studies in Honor of W. Norman Brown (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1962), p. 95.
2. Vāmana, Kavyālaṅkārasūtrāṇī [4.2.4-5].
3. Mammata, Kāvyaprakāśa [10.87-91].
4. Daṇḍin elsewhere explicitly refers to, for example: upameya [2.228]; upamāna [2.227, 228]; dharma [2.15, 16]; tulyadharma [2.228]; samaguna [2.231]; and iva [2.227].
5. Daṇḍin, Kāvyādarśa, edited with English translation by V. Narayana Iyer (Madras: Ramaswamy Sastrulu, 1952); Reprint: (Madras, 1964), p. 65
6. Daṇḍin, Kavyalaksana of Dandin (also known as Kāvyādarśa), edited by Anantalal Thakur and Upendra Jha, with the commentary entitled Ratnaśrī by Ratnaśrījñana (Dharbhanga: Mithila Institute of Post Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1957), Introduction, pp. 15-27.
7. Henry S. Heifetz, "Issues of Literary Translation from Sanskrit and Tamil," Ph.D. dissertation (University of California, Berkeley, 1983), p. 155.
8. Viṣṇu Purāṇa [1.9.2-116], "The Churning of the Ocean," in Classical Hindu Mythology, edited and translated by Cornelia Dimmitt and J. A. B. van Buitenen (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978), pp. 94-98. See also Viṣṇu Purāṇa [1.8.17-35], "Viṣṇu and Śrī," pp. 98-99.
9. Otto Böhtlingk, Dandin's Poetik (Kāvyādarśa), Sanskrit

text with German translation (Leipzig: Verlag von H. Haessel, 1890), p. 24: "Dein Gesicht, mit dem Monde um den Vorrang streitet, ist wie eine Lotusblute, mit der der Mond um den Vorrang streitet. Beide sind prachtvoll und wohlriechend. . . ."

10. Kūrma Purāṇa [1.9.6-29]: "Origin of Brahmā from the Lotus in Viṣṇu's Navel," in Classical Hindu Mythology, p. 31.

11. "The figure [ācikhyāsā upamā] is not defined by Bhāmaha, who considers the term otiose" (Glossary/151).

12. Arthur A. Macdonell, A Practical Sanskrit Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1923); Reprint (1976), p. 91.

13. Kashinath V. Abhyankar, A Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar (Baroda: University of Baroda Press, 1961), pp.109-110. The six kārakas and their corresponding cases are: kartr/prathamā (subject/1st case); karman/dvitīyā (direct object/2nd case); karaṇa/trtīyā (instrumental/3rd case); sampradāna/caturthī (indirect object/4th case); apādāna/pañcamī (ablative/5th case); and adhikarana/saptamī (locative/7th case).]

14. Bhāmaha, Kāvyālaṅkāra of Bhāmaha, edited by P.V. Naganatha Sastry, , p.33.

15. Viṣṇu Purāṇa [1.9.2-116], in Classical Hindu Mythology, p. 97.

16. Wendy O'Flaherty, Hindu Myths (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975), p. 74.

17. All the published Sanskrit editions examined have this as arjita, the feminine singular, and thus read the subject of this bhute kṛdanta, vidyā, as feminine singular.

I believe the emendation to arjitāḥ, the feminine plural, is valid, and thus read vidyā(h) as feminine plural. The absence of the final visarga on arjitā would reflect the mechanical transmission of an initial scribal error -- a transmission perfectly plausible given the lack of absolute authority of any received text (with a gap of perhaps one thousand years between the oldest available manuscript and the original text), and the cloning process by which "new" copies of a text would be generated.

Be that as it may, I feel the emendation is justified for two reasons. The first is con-textual. The verse represents examples of accepted differences in gender and number in a logical and symmetrical pattern. The first two lines are concerned with differences in gender with a reversal pattern: upameya/male - upamāna/female // upameya/female - upamāna/male. The third line is concerned with differences in number, initiating a symmetrical matching pattern: upameya/singular - upamāna/plural. With arjitāḥ (as plural) the fourth line logically and symmetrically completes the pattern: upameya (vidyā(h))/plural - upamāna/singular. With arjitā (as singular), both upameya and upamāna would be singular and the point would be lost; one would be forced into contradiction (as is Rangacharya Raddi (RR/143)) with the framework of the verse. That to little purpose we would again have an example of a discrepancy in what would be strictly grammatical gender, with upameya/female - upamāna/neuter.

The second reason is trans-textual. The initial Tibetan translation of the Kāvyādarśa, that of Lakṣmikāra in the latter half of the thirteenth century, reflects a text at least four hundred years prior to any received Sanskrit manuscript; and, importantly, one that upon its introduction into Tibet was transmitted independently. Granted that prior age of itself does not necessarily mean greater textual validity, we yet observe that the vast majority of Tibetan editions have rig pa rnams, the equivalent of the plural vidyāḥ, and the past participle

bsgrubs (with -ba/-pa deletion), the equivalent of the plural arjitāḥ. And further, Ratnaśrī, whose commentary may be dated to the tenth century, writes, vidyā vyākaraṇā-dayah arjitā dhanamiveti vacanabhedah / "The branches of knowledge, grammar and so on, are earned like money: this is a difference of number" (RŚ/83). The fact that we have arjita, not arjitāḥ, is due to the following dhanam, whose initial voicing causes the ellision of the visarga. Given that the text of the Kāvyādarśa in this edition has been "reconstructed" from Ratnaśrī's commentary, in giving arjita I would hold that the editors took the commentator's arjita at face value (and were no doubt consulting available printed texts), ignoring the sandhi and the grammatical coordination demanded by the plural subject and its participle. Ratnaśrī's reading carries weight not primarily because of its age, but most importantly because at that early date he "collated various manuscripts of the Kāvyalakṣana [Kāvyādarśa] and accepted the best readings" (Introduction to Kāvyalakṣanam, page 21).

18. prānāḥ / "the (five) life breaths": pra-āna / "the formed breath"; apa-āna / "the downward breath"; sam-āna / "the central breath"; ud-āna / "the outward breath"; and vy-āna / "the diffuse breath."

19. The number of vidyās listed vary, yet increase across time: the original four (knowledge of the three Vedas, logic, government, and agriculture); increased to five (including knowledge of the "true self"/ātman); to fourteen (the four Vedas, the six Vedāṅgs, the Purāṇas, the Mīmāṃsā, the Nyāya, and the Dharma); to eighteen (including the four upa-Vedas; medicine, music and dance, military studies, and architecture); to thirty-three; and to sixty-four (Margaret and James Stutley, Harper's Dictionary of Hinduism (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 332).

20. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Sanskrit Poetry from Vidyākara's

Treasury (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 106.

21. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Sanskrit Poetry, verse no. 920 by Pāṇini, p. 203.
22. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Sanskrit Poetry, verse no. 897 by Vasukalpa, p. 201.

2.66 Definition of Rūpaka Alambāra / Examples of the Compounded Rūpaka

Upamā itself

-- with difference obscured --

is called Rūpaka.

For example:

Arm-creeper Hand-lotus Foot-petal.

Rūpakālambāralakṣanam / samasta rūpakodāharanam

upamaivatirobhūtabhedā rūpakamucyate

yathā bāhulatā pāṇipadmam caraṇapallavah

tirobhūta [< tiras (+) bhūta / "become hidden,
concealed"] : aprakata / "not manifest, evident,"
"disguised" (RŚ/86).

bāhu-latā; pāni-padman; carana-pallavah : Three specific examples of Dāṇdin's initial variety of rūpaka, samasta or the "compounded."

Dāṇdin's first three varieties of rūpaka revolve around the distinctive and ubiquitous syntactical condensation in Sanskrit known as samasa/"compound." In the present verse we have three examples of samasta or "compounded" rūpakas (specified in [2.68]); in [2.67] we have examples of asamasta or "uncompounded" rūpakas (again specified as such in [2.68]) subsumed within an extended image; and in [2.68] we have an example of a samastavyasta or "compounded/uncompounded" rūpaka, a straightforward combination of the two preceding.

The condensation, the compact power, of the samasa is due to the loss of (nearly) all case endings of the elements conjoined (thus primarily nominals), with the exception of the final member which thus completes and relates the compound to its linguistic environment.

Although in theory any number of elements may be combined,

there are stylistic and semantic constraints. Regardless of length, the fundamental relationship involved is bipartite, whether displayed by the basic two-member compound standing alone, or moving backward, one juncture at a time, from the final member in more extended compounds.

The most pervasive and important modes of compounding are subsumed under the general rubric "tatpurusa," where the final element, whether adjective or substantive, and whether the final element of two or final in relation to initial in an extended sequence, is further defined by what precedes.¹ We may distinguish six varieties of tatpurusa compounds: the tatpurusa as such, where the relationship between elements, upon analysis (vigraha), is expressed by any case but the nominative (prathamā vibhakti); nan, involving a preceding negative; prādi and gati, the "prepositional" compounds; upapada or "reduced-word" compounds, where the final elements are reduced verbal roots; and, primary for our discussion, the karmadhāraya.² The karmadhāraya or "compound of agreement" (or

"descriptive determinative" as opposed to the "dependent determinative, the tatpurusa as such³) includes the dvigu or "two cow" compound, where the first member is a numeral; and is defined by Pāṇini [1.2.42] as tatpurusah samānādhikaranah karmadhārayah /"a karmadhārayah is a tatpurusa where the elements are in the same case relation."⁴ Yet as Michael Coulson points out, "The notion that it expresses nominative relationship between the two members should not be pressed too far. . . . The point is rather that in descriptives [karmadhārayas] the first element stands in an attributive relationship . . . to the second."⁵ Four varieties of karmadhāraya may thus be structurally distinguished: (1) adjective (+) substantive; (2) substantive (+) substantive; (3) adjective/adverb (+) adjective; and (4) substantive (+) adjective.⁶

We may now return to consider with greater precision Dandin's usage of samasta in rūpaka. In samasta rūpaka we are dealing with a specific variety of compound: substantive conjoined with substantive in a karmadhāraya relationship.

As karmadhāraya the relationship is attributive, thus "arm-creeper"/bāhulatā or "a creeper that is an arm"; "hand-lotus"/pānipadmam or "a lotus that is a hand"; "foot-petal"/caranapallavah or "a petal that is a foot," and so on.

As Dandin views rūpaka as an extension of upamā it will not be out of place to continue to use our previously employed structural terminology (the sādrśya vācaka, overtly marking similarity, will of course not apply). In samasta rūpaka, therefore, the upameya, the element to be illuminated, precedes the upamāna, the illuminating element. It is not strictly the case that "the first member has syntactical reality only through the second and therefore is subordinated to and is taken when possible as an equivalent of the second" (Glossary/256). Rather both elements conjoin to form a cohesive and figurative whole -- the unique expressive capability of a specific type of karmadhāraya is utilized to create a compact unit that further underlines a figurative identification.

We might add that just as the substantive-substantive karmadhāraya may be utilized in the creation of rūpaka, the substantive-adjective karmadhāraya may signify an upamā. For example, ghanaśyāmāḥ > ghana iva śyāmāḥ / "dark like a cloud." It is not a complete upamā, however, for the final adjectival element functions as a sādharanadharma, an attribute held in common with an upameya which resides outside of the compound. M. R. Kale terms this compound upamānapūrvapadakarmadhāraya or "a karmadhāraya where the prior word functions as an upamāna," with the stress on the final element.⁷ Where the karmadhāraya expresses a rūpaka, the underlying upamāna will follow as the final element, with the stress on the preceding underlying upameya (strictly, as the rūpaka relationship is equational, this distinction is submerged). This may accordingly be termed an upamānottarapadakarmadhāraya or "a karmadhāraya where the final word functions as an upamāna".⁸

We may conclude with a brief note on translation. Sanskrit permits a wide-ranging flexibility in the creation

of compounds that cannot possibly be matched in English. Where feasible, a parallel compound in English will catch the form and to a degree the sense of the original. Yet any such English compound, by its ad hoc nature, will strike a contingent note not found in the original. The Sanskrit compound may surprise and even startle, but the response is due to particular words in particular relation; in English the response may be marred by the act of compounding itself. Where the direct translation of a samasta rūpaka is not feasible, the "subjective genitive" of English may be utilized. Thus, for example, pānipadma/"hand-lotus" may be alternately translated by the "lotus of (her) hand." Obviously the loss of form is undesirable, but so frequently it is unavoidable.

Notes [2.66]

1. Michael Coulson, Sanskrit: An Introduction to the Classical Language (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1976), pp. 86-87.
2. M. R. Kale, A Higher Sanskrit Grammar (G. Narayen, 1918); Reprint (Delhi: Motilal Banarsi das, 1972), pp. 121-144.
3. Michael Coulson, Sanskrit, pp. 86ff.
4. Pāṇini, Aṣṭādhyāyī [1.2.42].
5. Michael Coulson, Sanskrit, pp. 90-91.
6. Michael Coulson, Sanskrit, pp. 91-93.
7. M. R. Kale, A Higher Sanskrit Grammar, pp. 133-134.
8. M. R. Kale, A Higher Sanskrit Grammar, pp. 133-134.

2.67 Example of the Uncompounded Rūpaka

Fingers are tender petals

Rays from the nails . . . flowers

Arms . . . creepers --

To us you are the visibly moving beauty of spring.

Asamasta Rūpakodāharanam :

aṅgulyah pallavānyāsan kusumāni nakhārcisah

bāhū late vasantaśrīstvam nah pratyaksacārinī

nakhārcisah [(pl.) < nakha (+) arcis (n.) (f.)] /

literally, "finger/toe nail rays, beams"; "rays of light

reflected from lustrous nails."

Asamasta rūpaka (again, specified as such in [2.68])

expressly reveals the relationship of figurative

identification between upameya and upamāna so succinctly marked by samasta rūpaka. With the members "uncompounded" we have the direct predication -- and thus the absolute identification -- of the upameya as upamāna. We note that asamasta rūpaka is negatively conceived from the point of view of samasta rūpaka. Although the more explicit, and thus to a degree the more basic, expression of the relationship rūpaka describes, asamasta rūpaka would appear to be somewhat secondary to the compounded form (a reflection perhaps of the utilization of "density" as a positive feature in classical Sanskrit style).

There are four examples of asamasta rūpaka in the present verse, with the initial three correlating aspects of a beautiful women to aspects of spring and these subsumed, in a part-whole relationship, to the fourth, which expresses and completes the total identification that the first three imply. Thus it is not a "foot-petal" (or the toes of the foot conceived as petals), rather "fingers are tender petals"; not "hand-lotus," rather "rays from the

nails are flowers"; and not "arm-creeper," rather "arms are creepers."

The examples of this verse are of further interest.

As Rangacharya Raddi points out -- and as we may recall from Dañdin's citing "Exceptions to Faults in Upamās" [2.51-54], "As among upamās, in rūpaka a difference in gender between the upamāna and upameya is not [necessarily] a fault. Thus here, in three expressions (vākyas) a difference in gender is indicated. And in some cases in rūpaka, even a difference in number is not [necessarily] a fault [upamāyāmiva rūpaka upamānopame-yayor bhinnaliṅgatve na doṣah | atotra vākyatraye bhinna-liṅgayor nirdeśah | vacanabhedopi rūpake kvacinna doṣāya | (RR/160) .

For in this verse we have the following discrepancies in grammatical gender: aṅgulayah [(f.) (pl.)] / pallavāni [(n.) (pl.)]; nakha-arcisah [(n.) yet also (f.) (pl.) < (-s) stem] / [kusumāni (n.) (pl.)]; and bāhū [(m.) (dual)] / late [(f.) (dual)].

2.68 Specification of the Compounded and Uncompounded

Rūpaka / The Compounded/Uncompounded Rūpaka

The latter is termed the Uncompounded Rūpaka;

The former is termed the Compounded Rūpaka.

Her smile is the moonlight of that face-moon.

This is a Compounded/Uncompounded Rūpaka.

Samastavyastayoh Rūpakayoh Nirdeśah / Samastavyasta

Rūpakam :

ityetadasamastākhyam samastam pūrvarūpakam

smitam mukhendorjyotsneti samastavyastarūpakam

vyasta /"separated," "distinct" = asamasta /"uncompounded" [< a (+) samasta].

Daṇḍin now specifies the two previous varieties of

rūpaka: "this," "the latter" (etat) refers to the example presented in [2.67], the asamasta/"uncompounded" rūpaka; "previous," "the former" (pūrva) refers to the example presented in [2.66], the samasta/"compounded" rūpaka.

Daṇḍin then gives his third variety of rūpaka, samastavyasta or "the compounded/uncompounded" rūpaka. Its focus and mode of expression is the substantive-substantive karmadhāraya compound and its absence (thus direct predication), combining the two previous varieties into one cohesive image. With the direct predication of a "smile" as "moonlight," there is an initial asamasta (vyasta) rūpaka; yet a smile and moonlight are but attributes of the respective totalities that display them, captured in figurative identity as "face-moon," a following samasta rūpaka.

Daṇḍin's three initial varieties of rūpaka were ignored by the theorists of kāvya with the exception of Bhoja [11th century]. In his Sarasvatīkānṭhābharana [4.27] both samasta and vyasta are cited as "distinctive," with the

example of vyasta rūpaka drawn verbatim from Kāvyādarśa [2.67].¹ And in the tenth section of his Śrṅgāraprakāśa, rūpaka is further distinguished as fourfold: the first three are Dāṇḍin's samasta, asamasta, and samastavyasta; the fourth is rūpakarūpaka (which Dāṇḍin presents in [2.93]). Again the example of (the now termed) asamasta rūpaka is drawn verbatim from Dāṇḍin, with the remaining examples a close parallel.²

Dāṇḍin's samastavyasta rūpaka may be reflected in the later paramparita/"successive," "continuous" rūpaka of Rudraṭa (KA [8.46-47]) and Mammaṭa (KP [10.95]). In paramparita rūpaka there are multiple rūpakas, where a "subordinate metaphor . . . is both a grammatical and conceptual element of an aspect (the object) of the principal metaphor. Instead of being founded upon a part, it is a part. . . ." (Glossary/250). It is perhaps too extreme to affirm that Dāṇḍin's variety "is paramparita rūpaka defined in a purely formal fashion [an example alone suffices as a formal definition?], without reference to the

kind of relation existing between two metaphors"
(Glossary/258) .

Dandin's samastavyasta rūpaka stresses the structural framework that captures the rūpakas involved, yet we should recognize that these rūpakas are not merely conjoined -- the members of the uncompounded rūpaka are parallel and respective attributes of the members of the compounded rūpaka.

2.69 Example of the Complete Rūpaka

Rows of red petals of toes

Filaments of rays from the nails . . .

The lotus of your foot

held on the head by kings.

Sakala rūpakodāharanam :

tāmrāñgulidalaśreṇi nakhadīdhitesaram

dhriyate mūrdhni bhūpālairbhavaccaranapañkajam

nakhadīdhiti [< nakha (+) dīdhiti (f.)] / literally,
"finger/toe nail-rays, beams."

Nakhadīdhiti in this instance is somewhat awkward in translation. This example contains three samasta rūpakas: añguli-dala/toes are conceived as petals, thus "toe-petals"; carana-pañkajam/the foot is conceived as a lotus, thus "foot-lotus"; and nakhadīdhī-kesaram / rays of light reflected from the (finger/toe) nails conceived as filaments (stamen and anther) of the lotus, but "nail-ray-filaments" is confused. The compound may be expanded to "filaments of nail-rays," but there is the danger of taking "nail-rays" itself as a rūpaka. Our last alternative is complete expansion, thus "filaments of rays from the nails." Given this, do we sacrifice the other two viable English compounds

to achieve structural symmetry? I have chosen this course, not only in view of symmetrical balance, but also to avoid the above confusion.

2.70 Explication of the Example of the Complete Rūpaka

Superimposing the status

of petals on toes

of filaments on nails

of the lotus on the foot

And placing the totality in an appropriate position

-- This is a Complete Rūpaka.

Sakala Rūpakodāharanāsvarūpaprakāśanam : :

aṅgulyādau dalāditvam pāde cāropya padmatām

tadyogysthānavinyāsādetat sakalarūpakam

āropyā [lyabanta < ā (+) *ruh/"ascend," "mount"]/"a placing upon," "superimposing," "equating."

sakala [sa-kala] /literally, "with parts"; "entire," "whole."

Dandīn's analysis and classification of rūpaka -- as with upamā -- is thorough, and it is with purpose that he initiates his schema with samasta, asamasta, and samastavyasta rūpakas. For, as we shall see, the compounded and uncompounded formats represent the essential and basic structures of rūpaka as such. All the varieties to follow will depend on either their varying arrangement, their presence or absence with regard to the elements involved, or their incorporation with other (now subordinate) alamkāras.

Sakala or the "complete" rūpaka is of fundamental importance, not only of itself, but also as a reference point for the immediate varieties to follow. In sakala rūpaka the primary upameya and upamāna are identified

through what becomes the primary rūpaka, an identification further reinforced by the inclusion of secondary rūpakas that equate in parallel and respective fashion attributes of the primary pair. These primary components are thus presented as "totalities" or "wholes," corresponding to distinctive attributes that are presented as "parts." This rūpaka is "complete", for both subsidiary parts, as attributes, and unified aggregates, as illuminated subjects, are present. And all are realized through a parallel sequence of appropriate rūpakas.

In the present example there are three samasta rūpakas, with the two initial as illuminating attributes of the final, which represents the superordinate and unifying equation. Petals of the lotus are equated with toes of the foot; filaments of the lotus are equated with rays of light reflected from lustrous nails; and the lotus is equated with the foot. The totality is further reinforced through an appropriate action or situation with which it may be involved. Thus vassal kings, bowing down in homage, will

place the "foot-lotus" of their ruling lord on their heads.

This verse is of further interest, for here Daṇḍin expands his initial definition of rūpaka [2.66], negatively realized as an extension of upamā, with a positive statement of the distinctive process involved. It is, for example, the "petal-ness," the status or essence that characterizes a petal (marked by the abstract generating suffixes [-tva] or [-tā]) that is "placed upon," "superimposed on" (āropya) the toes; and similarly for the abstract status of filaments and the lotus respectively superimposed on rays from the nails and the foot. In structure rūpaka is essentially upamā with any trace of difference between upameya and upamāna concealed -- it is through the process of superimposition that this concealment is achieved. And although connotative and developmental differences do not permit the translatable equation of rūpaka with "metaphor," the essential denotative process that marks them, whether of a "placing

"upon" or of a "carrying over," a "transfer," is essentially one and the same.

This further elaboration of Dāṇḍin has not been adequately noted. Gerow, for example, contrasts the "negative" definitions of rūpaka (of Dāṇḍin, Udbhaṭa and Rudraṭa, for example) with those that stress the positive process of identification (of Bhāmaha and Vāmana, for example) (Glossary/243). I would hold that Dāṇḍin's view of rūpaka embraced both concepts, and that his influence is very probably to be seen in both groups of writers who later chose one or the other approach; that just as there are those who took his definition as such (in [2.66]) as focal point, there are those who chose to stress the process of āropya or "superimposition" that he notes in [2.70].³

Although the process of complete superimposition may be distinctive of rūpaka, the framework Dāṇḍin employs in sakala rūpaka is mirrored elsewhere. In ślesa upamā [2.28], for example, we have seen attributes of the upameya and upamāna linked (though not necessarily comparable)

through ślesa; and, more exactly, in the example of vākyārtha upamā I. [2.44], where we have the description of comparable attributes as "parts" of comparable objects as "wholes."

Daṇḍin's sakala rūpaka may be equated with the samastavastuvisaya rūpaka of other writers (Bhāmaha (KA [2.23]), Udbhaṭa (KASS [1.12])), Mammata (KP [10.93]), that is, "The rūpaka that includes the full range of components" (that is, primary upameya and upamāna with their respective attributes). Bhāmaha [2.23], for example, equates clouds and elephants as upameya and upamāna (jalada-dantinah/ "cloud-elephants"), with an attribute of each additionally equated (śikarāmbhasmada/ "rain-rutting ichor") { śikarāmbhomasrasjastuṅgā jaladantinah | niryānto madayantime śakrakārmukakāraṇam ||.

2.71 Example of the Rūpaka of Attributes

Angry one!

Your face suddenly

-- petal of lower lip quivering --

Wears blossoms of sweat drops

lustrous as pearls.

Avayava Rūpakodāharanam :

akasmādeva te candi sphuritādharapallavam

mukham muktāruco dhatte gharmāmbhaḥkaṇamañjariḥ

sphurita : kopena kampitah /"trembling with anger"

(RR/162).

muktārucaḥ [muktā-rucaḥ < ruc (f.), here (acc.)
(pl.)] : coordinating with mañjariḥ as a basic dharma upamā

with the vācaka implied by the compound, "blossoms lustrous-[like]-pearls."

gharmāmbas [gharma-ambhas (n.)] /literally, "warm water"; "sweat," "perspiration."

2.72 Explication of the Example of the Rūpaka of Attributes

Equating the lower lip with a petal

Drops of sweat with blossoms

The face is not otherwise identified --

This is a Rūpaka of Attributes.

Avayava Rūpakodāharanasvarūpaprakāśanam :

mañjarikṛtyagharmāmbhah pallavikṛtya cādharam

nānyathā kṛtamatrāsyamatovayavarūpakam

mañjarīkrtya . . . pallavīkrtya . . . : the first line displays a balancing of two cvi pratyayas (with [-ī] replacing the final vowel in each case), followed by a form of the verbal root *kr (*bhū may be alternately employed in an intransitive, reflexive sense)/literally, "turned X into Y," "made X Y."

avayavah [(m.) < ava (+) *yu/"separate from"] /"part," "limb."

Avayava rūpaka is the first of a series whose point of reference is sakala rūpaka. For as sakala rūpaka is "complete," with both aggregates and respective attributes expressed through rūpakas, in avayava rūpaka it is the "parts" or, more properly, the attributes alone that are equated. It is not that both primary upameya and upamāna are thus descriptively mentioned, rather the primary upameya alone is expressed. It is through the subordinate parallels developed in the rūpakas, parallels that invoke attributes of the unexpressed upamāna, that the upamāna is inferred and the total integration of the image achieved.

In our example we have two samasta rūpakas: adhara-pallava/"petal of lower lip," and gharmāmbhahkaṇamañ-jarīḥ/"blossoms of sweat drops." Having "turned" the lower lip into a petal, and drops of sweat on the face into small clusters or blossoms, the face, as aggregate, is merely mentioned -- its identification with a flower, presumably the lotus, is left to be inferred.

Avayava rūpaka is the first of what we may consider to be "partial" rūpakas -- partial in view of sakala rūpaka as "complete" -- and it is Daṇḍin who provides their most extensive and detailed classification. We have noted Bhāmaha's limited division of rūpaka into either samastavastuisaya (KA [2.23]), or ekadeśavivarti [2.24] (a division similarly limited in Udbhāṭa (KASS [1.11-13])). In his example of ekadeśavivarti/"involving one aspect, part," "partial" rūpaka, Bhāmaha [2.24] equates attributes of thunderous clouds and elephants ("lightening-girths"/"balākā [a species of crane]-garlands") through two samasta rūpakas, expressly mentioning the clouds (as primary

upameya), leaving the elephants (as primary upamāna) to be inferred [taṭidva-layakakṣyāñām balākāmālabhārinām | payomucām dhvanirdhīro dunoti mama tām priyām ||.

Mammaṭa (KP [10.94], simplifying Rudraṭa) considers these basic classifications as the two varieties of sāṅga/"with parts, attributes" rūpaka (the equivalent of Rudraṭa's sāvayava rūpaka (KA [8.41-45])); this to be further distinguished from niraṅga/"without parts, attributes" rūpaka (the equivalent of Rudraṭa's śuddha niravayava rūpaka [8.46, 48]). That is, a fundamental distinction was drawn between rūpakas where attributes were equated (sāṅga) and where they were absent (niraṅga).

Danḍin expands the concept of ekadeśavivarti rūpaka in his own distinct way. His avayava rūpaka cannot be strictly equated with the later sāvayavarūpaka of Rudraṭa (KA [8.41-45]) (and thus with Mammaṭa's conception of ekadśavivarti) where the primary upameya and upamāna are explicit. As we have seen in Danḍin's variety, the primary upamāna is left to be inferred.

2.73 Example of the Rūpaka of the Aggregate

Brows dancing

Sweat dripping

Eyes a bit red . . .

This face-lotus reveals a state of intoxication.

Avayavi Rūpakodāharanam :

valgitabhu galadgharmajalamālohitēkṣanam

vivṛ̥noti madāvasthāmidam vadana pañkajam

2.74 Explication of the Example of the Rūpaka of the Aggregate

Without transforming the attributes of the face

The face itself is identified with

the status of the lotus --

This is the Rūpaka of the Aggregate.

Avayavi Rūpakodāharanāsvarūpaprakāśanam :

avikṛtya mukhāṅgāni mukhamevāravindatām

āśidgamitamatredamatovayavirūpakam

gamitam [nijanta bhūte krdanta < *gam] /literally,

"caused to go"; "made, turned into," "became."

avayavi [(-in)]/literally, "possessing parts";

"complete," "whole."

Without transforming its attributes -- "brows dancing, sweat dripping, eyes a bit red" -- the face as the relevant aggregate is transformed through rūpaka into a "face-lotus." Avayavi rūpaka may be considered the reverse of avayava rūpaka [2.71-72]. Here both primary upameya and upamāna, as aggregates, "wholes," are explicitly equated through rūpaka. Where in avayava rūpaka the upamāna was left to be inferred from the presentation of its attributes in parallel with those of the upameya, now attributes of the upameya alone are descriptively presented, and those of the upamāna, through appropriate correspondence, are left to be inferred.

Dandīn's variety is again unique in the literature, and one should not confuse avayavi rūpaka with Rudrata's niravayava classification (KA [8.41, 46-51]), where although primary upameya and primary upamāna alone are equated through rūpaka, there is no presentation of respective attributes.

2.75 Example of the Rūpaka of One-Attribute

Cheeks flushed from intoxication

Eye-lilies red . . .

Your face

fills an innocent man like this with passion.

Eka Aṅga Rūpakodāharanam :

madapāṭalagandena raktanetrotpalena te

mukhena mugdhaḥ sopyesa jano rāgamayah kṛtaḥ

mugdhaḥ [Here in the (m.)] / "an innocent man," "a foolish, confused man": mugdhe / "Innocent one!" (RŚ/89).

rāgamayah kṛtaḥ /literally, "made full of passion"; "passionate." Dāṇḍin includes an isolated ślesa here, for the word rāga embraces the meaning of "red" as well as "passion," "desire": as the cheeks and eyes of a beautiful

woman are red from intoxication, so a man becomes "flushed" from desire.

2.76 The Rūpaka of One-Attribute

This is the Rūpaka of One-Attribute.

Two or even more attributes

may be similarly transformed --

Here correspondence or its absence

marks a distinction.

Eka Aṅga Rūpakam :

ekāṅgarūpakam caitadevam dviprabhṛtīnyapi
aṅgāni rūpayantyatra yogāyogau bhidākarau

In avayava rūpaka [2.71-72] attributes alone are

sequentially superimposed through rūpaka, attributes of an expressed primary upameya and an implied upamāna. Moreover, all attributes present must be realized in this way. Ekāṅga rūpaka is a basic variant. In our example, two attributes of a face are presented, yet only one is realized through rūpaka: "cheeks are flushed," the eyes as "eye-lilies" are red.

It is perhaps redundant for Daṇḍin to point out that more than one attribute may be presented in this way given the preceding avayava rūpaka, yet some distinctions may be drawn. In ekāṅga (or dvyaṅga and so on) all attributes presented do not necessarily have to be realized through rūpakas. And further, especially in the case of ekāṅga rūpaka, it would seem that the primary mode of such verses is descriptive. Where in avayava rūpaka a total image is developed through parallel correspondences and one is led logically to the imputation of a superordinate upamāna, here the upameya-upamāna relationship appears restricted to the specific, otherwise subordinate, rūpaka. The rūpaka does

serve to illuminate a superordinate aggregate, yet there is no strong implication that the aggregate is to be identified with anything beyond itself.

Where we do have more than one attribute transformed through rūpaka, there may be a connection or correspondence between the specific upamānas of each or there may not -- this distinction generates our next two varieties.

2.77 The Rūpaka of Congruity

This face

bees of eyes darting

is luminous with

flowers of smiles --

Due to the congruity between flowers and bees

This is a Rūpaka of Congruity.

Yukta Rūpakam :

smitapuspojjvalam lolanetrabhrñgamidam mukham
 iti puṣpadvirephāñām saṃgatyā yuktarūpakam

dvirephāñam [(m.)] /literally, "having two r's in its name," that is, bhramara, a type of bee.

Yukta rūpaka is an extension of the preceding ekāṅga rūpaka. Here not one, but two attributes of an expressed aggregate are realized through rūpakas: "bees of eyes" and "flowers of smiles." In each case not only is the appropriateness of the identification marked by explicitly mentioning what are in effect sādhārana dharmas -- both bees and eyes display a "darting" movement; both flowers and smiles share in common the feature of being "luminous," "brilliant" -- but most importantly there is a close and direct congruity between the upamānas themselves, "bees" and "flowers."

The single rūpaka displayed by ekāṅga rūpaka appears

insufficient to generate a sense of parallel development within the verse. Yet yukta rūpaka, with its tightly woven structure developing correspondences horizontally within and vertically between rūpakas, is most effective in leading, logically and inevitably, to the realization of the primary upamāna, with which the expressed primary upameya and focus of the verse cannot but thus be equated.

2.78 The Rūpaka of Incongruity

This face . . .

Moonlight of soft smiles

Lilies of shining eyes . . .

Due to the lack of congruity

between moonlight and lilies

This is termed a Rūpaka of Incongruity.

Ayukta Rūpakam :

idamārdrasmitajyotsnam snigdhanetrotpalam mukham
 iti jyotsnotpalāyogādayuktam nāma rūpakam

Ayukta rūpaka is again an extension of ekāṅga rūpaka [2.76] with two attributes -- again, "smiles" and "eyes" -- of a primary aggregate -- again, a "face" -- realized through two rūpakas: "moonlight of smiles" and "lilies of eyes." And again the appropriateness of each identification is marked by an explicit sādhāraṇa dharma, for moonlight and smiles may be "soft," just as lilies and eyes may be "shining."

Ayukta rūpaka's structure to this point thus parallels the preceding yukta rūpaka, yet through the lack of congruity between the upamānas of each rūpaka, it remains fundamentally distinct. For although we have horizontal relationships of identity within each rūpaka, there is no direct correspondence or relevant connection between

"moonlight" and "lilies." And with this lack of vertical correspondence between what would otherwise be subsidiary upamānas we lose the ability to impute what would otherwise by the primary upamāna. There can be no question now of integrating two vertical sets of correspondences into a total image; the rūpakas exist as separate units illuminating attributes of an isolated and distinct aggregate.

2.79 The Rūpaka of the Uneven

Transforming the aggregate

Transforming but selectively the attributes --

An attractive rūpaka known as the Uneven arises.

For example:

Viṣama Rūpakam :

rūpañādañginoñgānāṁ rūpañārūpañāśrayāt
 rūpakāṁ viṣamāṁ nāma lalitām jāyate yathā

añgānam rūpanārūpanāśrayanāt /literally, "due to the transformation/non-transformation of the parts."

viṣama [< vi (+) sama] / "dissimilar," "uneven," "unbalanced."

2.80 Example of the Rūpaka of the Uneven

With your face-moon

cheeks flushed from intoxication

brow-creepers dancing --

Manmatha is capable of crushing the three-fold world.

Viṣama Rūpakodāharanam :

madaraktakapolena manmathastvanmukhendunā
nartitabhrūlatenālam marditum bhuvanatrayam

manmatha /the "Churner of Hearts," that is, Kāma, the god of love and desire. Kāma's epithets are colorful and numerous. When at ease he is smarah /"memory," "love"; when active madanah /"the Intoxicator"; with his bow of flowers he is puspacāpah /"He having a bow of flowers"; shooting his five flowered arrows he is known as pañcabāñah /"the Five-Arrowed One"; appearing in the hearts of men and women he is manasijah /"He who is born in the heart"; with a makara⁴ on his banner he is makaraketah /"He whose banner displays a makara; and with his destruction by Śiva's third eye he is anaṅgah /"the Bodiless."⁵

bhuvanatrayam /"the three-fold world," that is, the heavens, sky, and earth.

In viṣama rūpaka a primary aggregate or subject (a

"face") is illuminated through rūpaka (for it is a "face that is a moon" in its beauty). The image of the primary aggregate further expands through the presentation of two of its attributes or parts. Distinctively the presentation is "uneven": one is directly described ("cheeks flushed"), and one is realized through rūpaka ("brow-creepers").

Visama rūpaka may be considered a logical variation of the preceding "partial" varieties: similar to avayava rūpaka [2.71-72] with an attribute presented through rūpaka (yet dissimilar in that this does not apply to all attributes); similar to avayavi rūpaka [2.73-74] with the primary aggregate presented through rūpaka (yet dissimilar in that at least one attribute is also transformed); and similar to ekāṅga rūpaka [2.75] with one attribute transformed through rūpaka (yet dissimilar in that a primary rūpaka is present). Yukta [2.77] and ayukta [2.78] rūpakas, with two attributes both being transformed through rūpakas in each case, do not apply.

The quality of "unevenness" would appear to prevent

the parallel development through subsidiary attributes of the primary upamāna (as we have also seen with ekāṅga and ayukta rūpakas). There is no special relationship in our example between the "moon" and the upamāna of the subsidiary rūpaka, "creepers," nor with the quality of being "flushed" or "red." The emphasis here is entirely on the upameya of the primary rūpaka, for the subsidiary rūpaka and descriptive phrase serve to illuminate its attributes alone.

2.81 Example of the Rūpaka of Attribution

The leg of Hari

crowned with a cloth of Jahnukanyā's waters

banner of the Suras'

(now fearless of Asuras)

festival of bliss

reigns supreme.

Saviśeṣaṇa Rūpakodāharanam :

hari-pādah śiro-lagnajahnu-kanyā-jalāṁśukah

jaya-tya-suraniḥśaṅka-surānanda-sta-vad-hvajah

hari /Viṣṇu. : "It is probably because of its association with the solar Viṣṇu and with light that the

Purānic writers borrowed the epithet 'hari' and applied it to the post-Vedic Viṣṇu.⁶

asura/sura : In the Rg Veda, asura and deva sometimes appear as synonyms for generally beneficent divine beings. By the time of the later Vedic period the Asuras appear as the personification of negative forces or demons. The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa [9.5.1ff.] "relates that the Devas (gods) and Asuras, both of them sprung from the Creator Prajāpati, inherited speech -- both true and false --, but that finally the gods rejected untruth, whilst the Asuras spurned truth which led to their downfall."⁷ With the deletion of the initial negative marker, the Suras are the opposites of the Asuras or thus equivalent to Devas.

jahnukanyā /"Daughter of Jahnu": the Gaṅgā. Upon the river Gaṅgā's inundation of his sacrificial precincts, king Jahnu drank and retained its waters; appeased by gods and sages he released the river through his ears, henceforth it being considered his (figurative) daughter.⁸

The image of this verse is complex. It is reflects the myth(s) of Viṣṇu's "Three Steps," primarily drawn from the Purāṇas. Viṣṇu in the form of a dwarf (vāmana) tricks the demon Bali (who with his minions controls the Triple-World) into granting him all the territory he may cover in three steps. At this time Brahmā washes his feet in homage with water from the Gaṅgā. Viṣṇu proceeds to encompass the universe -- the heavens, sky, and earth -- wresting control from the demons.⁹ The water dripping from the leg of Viṣṇu -- a leg "crowned with a cloth of Jahnukanyā's waters" -- thus forms a victory banner or standard, with the leg itself conceived of as the staff, for the now joyous Suras.

2.82 Explication of the Example of the Rūpaka of Attribution

Applying the image of the banner to the leg

The banner complete with its own attribution --

The is a Rūpaka of Attribution.

Saviśeṣaṇa Rūpakodāharanāsvarūpaprakāśanam :

viśeṣaṇasamagrasya rūpam ketoryadidṛśam

pāde tadarpaṇādetat saviśeṣaṇarūpakam

saviśeṣaṇa [< sa (+) vi (+) *śis] / "distinguish," "characterize," "qualify"] / "with [the process of] distinguishing, qualifying"; [(n.)] / "with that which differentiates," that is, "attribute," "predicate," "adjective."

We now shift our focus from the preceding "complete"

and, in varying degrees, "partial" rūpakas, with their distinguishing "aggregate-attribute" relationship. In saviśesana rūpaka the particular rūpakas are exclusively involved in the process of "attribution," of serving not to illuminate attributes of aggregates or the aggregates themselves, but to descriptively expand through the attribution of distinguishing characteristics a given term, to serve as attributes as such.

Thus in our example we have the initial attribution, through an asamasta rūpaka, of a standard or banner as the leg of Viṣṇu; the "image of the standard is applied or transferred to the leg." Yet the standard itself is qualified "with its own attribution" through a samasta rūpaka -- it is "crowned" with a flag made of a "cloth of Jahnukanyā's waters."

2.83 Example of the Rūpaka of the Incongruous

Your face-moon

doesn't force lotuses to close

it doesn't even bathe in the sky . . .

It only acts to tear away my life.

Viruddha Rūpakodāharanam :

na mīlayati padmāni na nabhopyavagāhate

tvanmukhendurmamāsūnāṁ haraṇāyaiva kalpate

mīllayati [nijanta of *mīl/"close"].

asūvām /"life-breaths": prāṇah (RS/91) (RR/166). See under [2.52], where we consider that prāṇah, though grammatically plural, may yet have a "collectively singular" connotation. Asūvām as equivalent -- strictly plural, but connoting "life" -- would tend to reinforce this.

2.84 Explication of the Example of the Rūpaka of the Incongruous

The non-performance of the moon's usual actions

The performance of another unusual action --

This is a rūpaka known as the Incongruous.

Viruddha Rūpakodāharanāsvarūpaprakāśanam :

akriyā candra kāryā nām anya kāryasya ca kriyā
atra saṃdarśyate yasmād viruddham nāma rūpakam

viruddha [bhūte kṛdanta < vi (+) *rudh] / "opposed," "obstructed," "inconsistent." A previous reference to the common conceit of the moon's ability to close the lotus appears in nirṇaya upamā [2.27].

We have seen an upameya and two upamānas all presented as mutual rivals in virodha upamā [2.33] -- virodha in the sense of "rivalry." In viruddha rūpaka we have a single,

primary rūpaka whose upamāna, due to its conjunction with a particular upameya, is perceived as acting in an "incongruous" manner: the equated entity, embodied in the rūpaka, is yet dominated by the specific upameya. It is in this that another, more subtle, meaning of viruddha applies. The actions of the upamāna are "incongruous" because they are in effect "blocked" by those of the upameya.

In our example a face is equated with the moon in beauty, yet now the moon is incapable of its usual actions of moving through the sky, or of forcing the lotuses to close with its brilliance. It can only remind a lover of his beloved's face, and thus participates in the incongruous, negative act of destruction; the lover's life is taken away by the "intensity [of desire] arising in the separation of lovers"/vipralambhoddīpakaṭvād (RR/166).

Unlike virodha upamā [2.33], in viruddha rūpaka the distinctive feature displayed by virodha alamkāra [2.333-40] is not entirely distinct. In the former we have

mutually contradictory attributes applied to yet illuminating a given subject; here we have an action that "contradicts" usual behavior. An action that is, however, due to and thus contingent upon the given rūpaka.

2.85 Example of the Rūpaka of Cause

Because of depth you are an ocean

Because of magnificence -- a mountain

Because of fulfilling the world's wishes --

a Kalpa tree.

Hetu Rūpakodāharanam :

gāmbhīryeṇa samudrosi gauravenāsi parvataḥ

kāmadatvācca lokānāmasi tvam kalpapādaphah

kalpapādaphah /the Kalpa tree. As with the Pārijāta

tree , one of the five magical trees of Indra's heaven,
capable of fulfilling any wish (see pārijāta, under [2.47]).

2.86 The Explication of the Example of the Rūpaka of
Cause

Due to various causes

-- "depth" "magnificence" "fulfilling wishes" --

A great king is conceived of as

an ocean a mountain a Kalpa tree --

This is a Rūpaka of Cause.

Hetu Rūpakodāharanasvarūpaprakāśanam :

gāmbhiryapramukhairatra hetubhiḥ sāgaro giriḥ
kalpadrumaśca kriyate tadiḍam heturūpakam

As with hetu upamā [2.50], whose structure is parallel, hetu rūpaka incorporates hetu alamkāra in a subordinate role. Three causes are presented justifying, not mere similarity, but now the complete identification marked by rūpaka. Again, sādhārana dharmas as the causal factors are explicit, factors now sufficient to result in complete identification. We may note that all three individual rūpakas are in the expanded asamasta form [2.67-68].

2.87 The Rūpaka of Multiple Embrace

Lady! Your face - lotus

Worthy of enjoyment by

the best of kings / the rājahamṣa

Its fragrance desired by

lovers / bees --

This is a Rūpaka of Multiple Embrace.

Śliṣṭa Rūpakam :

rājahamṣopabhogaṛham bhramaraprārthyasaurabham

sakhi vaktrāmbujamidam taveti śliṣṭarūpakam

prārthya [tavyānta < pra (+) *arth] / "to be desired,
wished for."

rājahamsa /the "royal" hamsa (see hamsī, under 2.55]).

ślistā [bhūte krdanta < *ślis] /literally, "the rūpaka containing embraced, joined elements."

With ślistā rūpaka we have the inclusion of ślesa alamkāra [2.310-22] in a subordinate yet illuminating role.

As with ślesa upamā [2.28], ślesa serves to illustrate attributes of components subsumed by the primary alamkāra. One word may "embrace" two meanings, each of which specifically corresponds to either the upameya or the upamāna; or one word with one meaning may embrace both upameya and upamāna as appropriate referents.

In our present example two distinct ślesas illuminate an initial and primary rūpaka. Both consist of one word with multiple meanings. The first, rājahamsa, may alternately mean "the best of kings," or a particular species of the largely poetically conceived bird, the "hamsa." The second, bhramara, may alternately mean "lover," "one filled with desire"; or its more usual

meaning, "bee." In reading our transposition we thus have:

"Your face [as upameya equated with "lotus" as upamāna] is worthy of enjoyment by the best of kings, its fragrance desired by lovers; [Your face that is] a lotus worthy of enjoyment by rājahamsas, its fragrance desired by bees."

As we have noted above in our discussion of ślesa upamā, ślesa -- with ambiguity as its essence -- often permits multiple interpretations or easily generates confusion. Both of our primary commentators differ in their explications. Ratnaśrī would agree that rājahamsa may be taken in two senses, yet holds that the entire phrase bhramaraprārthyasaurabham has but one meaning that may be applied to both the "face-lotus" and the lotus itself. "As the lotus is worthy of enjoyment by rājahamsas (a particular species of bird) . . . so your face-lotus is worthy of enjoyment by rājahamsas (the best of kings) -- this is sabda ślesa. . . . And further, the fragrance or excellent smell of both [presumably, the lotus and the face-lotus] is desired . . . by bees -- thus 'a fragrance desired by

bees' /bhramaraprārthyasaurabham is artha ślesa" [padmam
 tāvat rājahamsaiḥ pakṣiviśeṣaiḥ upabhogam niṣevanam arhati.
 . . . tava vaktrāmbujam tu rājahamsaiḥ nr̥pavaraiḥ
 upabhogamarhatīti śabdaśleṣah | ubhayamapi bhramaraiḥ
 prārthyam abhilasaṇīyam saurabham gandhaviśeṣo 'syeti
 bhramaraprārthyasaurabhamityarthaśleṣah |] (RS/92).

We note that Ratnaśrī appears to take "face-lotus" as a unit, and further, that his attribution of the first ślesa (one word/two meanings) as śabda ślesa, and of the second ślesa (one word/one meaning embracing multiple referents) as artha ślesa confirms our prior, tentative explication of these terms as viewed by our commentators.

Rangacarya Raddi says simply, "[a face-lotus] worthy of enjoyment by the rājahamsa -- the best among kings, or a particular species of hamsa . . . whose fragrance is desired . . . by bhramaras -- lovers (kāmukas/'those desirous, enamoured of'), or bees (bhr̥ngas)" [rāja-hamsopabhogārham rājahamso nr̥paśrestho hamsaviśeṣaśca. . . . bhramaraprārthyasaurabham bhramaraiḥ kāmukairbhr̥ngaiśca]

(RR/167). There is no reference to these as śabda ślesas, which presumably Rangacarya Raddi would take them to be.

Mammata (KP [10.95cd]) considers ślesa or its absence the distinguishing marks of one of his fundamental varieties of rūpaka, paramparita. "Thus in paramparita [rūpaka] the vācakas may be expressed through ślesa, or each may be distinct (bheda)," where vācaka would appear to be taken in the more general sense of "illuminating words," the components of the rūpaka itself [tat paramparitam śliṣṭe vācake bhedabhāji vā ||.

2.88 The Rūpaka of Similarity and the Rūpaka of Disparity

Seeing similarity and disparity between

figurative and literal

Two rūpakas -- of Similarity and Disparity

are accepted.

For example:

Upamā Rūpakam Vyatireka Rūpaka ca :

istam sādharmyavaidharmyadarśanādgauṇamukhyayoh

upamāvyatirekākhyam rūpakadvitayam yathā

vaidharmya /"opposing attributes, qualities,"

"dissimilarity," "disparity."

gauna [vrddhi of "guna"] /literally, "relating to an attribute," "possessing attributes"; "secondary," "figurative."

mukhya /literally, "relating to the mouth or face,; "foremost"; "primary," "literal."

Continuing the series where otherwise distinct alamkāras are combined as subordinate within rūpaka, Daṇḍin now includes upamā [2.14-65] and vyatireka [2.180-98] alamkāras. Alamkāra śāstra is a difficult subject yet more often than not the difficulty arises from unnecessary obfuscation, whether in translation or analysis. These immediate verses have generated some confusion. Edwin Gerow appears to assume that Daṇḍin, in referring to "figurative" and "literal" is making a fundamental distinction between upamā and rūpaka ("The difference between simile and metaphor is here exemplified"); and launches into a rather opaque discussion whose relevance and validity are open to doubt ("simile is thus in principle a realistic figure, while metaphor is necessarily figurative"). No mention is made of vyatireka rūpaka (Glossary/246-47). Belvalkar and Raddi after some

hesitation do correctly interpret these terms (Notes 2/112-13). While Gero Jenner in his analytical catalogue, Die Poetischen Figuren Der Inder Von Bhāmaha Bis Mammata, curiously places upamā rūpaka "unter upamā."¹⁰ These verses are in fact quite straightforward: "Seeing similarity between the figurative" usage of a word "and the literal" usage of the same word, we have upamā rūpaka; "Seeing disparity between the figurative" usage of a word "and the literal" usage of the same word, we have vyatireka rūpaka.

We shall see a similar usage of gauṇa and mukhya in Dāṇdin's explication of śliṣṭa āksepa alamkāra [2.159-60], where it is clear that the "literal" (mukhya) moon is rejected in favor of the "figurative" (gauṇa) moon.

2.89 Example of the Rūpaka of Similarity

The moon of her face

color flushed from intoxication

challenges the moon

armored in red as it rises.

Upamā Rūpakodāharanam :

ayamālohitacchāyo madena mukhacandramāḥ

samnaddhodayarāgasya candraśya pratigarjati

samnaddha [< sam (+) *nah] / "prepared," "equipped";

"armed," "ready for battle."

In our example of upamā rūpaka we have the initial presentation of a word as figurative (gaṇa) expressed through rūpaka, followed by a statement of its similarity

with the same word presented as literal (mukhya). The figurative moon, equated through rūpaka with a face in "the moon of her face" (mukha-candramāḥ), challenges the literal moon (candrasya as object of pratigarjati).

"Challenges" (pratigarjati) as a vācaka marks the comparison; it is cited as such in [2.61], and is similarly employed in [2.34]. The rūpaka serves in effect as an upameya, the literal moon as an upamāna, and in each case an appropriate sādhārana dharma is expressed, forming the basis of the comparison (the property of "redness").

Rūpaka is yet primary, for the comparison, with the attendant sādhārana dharmas, serves to illuminate this identification: the first sādhārana dharma applies to the primary term of the rūpaka, the "face" (as upameya); the secondary term, the "moon" (as upamāna) also serves -- free-standing and thus literal -- as the superordinate upamāna of the comparison to which the second sādhārana dharma applies.

Again, the comparison is between a word presented in two different ways; it is entirely unwarranted to interpret

upamā and rūpaka as comparatively literal or figurative.

There can be no strictly "realistic" alamkāras, for either we have an alamkāra or we do not. And as we turn to our next example, vyatireka rūpaka, we see "figurative" and "literal" used in exactly the same way with no trace of upamā as such.

Daṇḍin chose to include upamā rūpaka as a variety of rūpaka, yet it is important to note that he was aware of its existence as a separate alamkāra. As we have previously remarked, it is mentioned as such in [2.358] along with sasamdeha and ananvaya, which themselves were included among Daṇḍin's varieties of upamās, as samśaya [2.26] and asādhārana [2.37] respectively.

Upamā rūpaka was accepted as an independent alamkāra by Bhāmaha [3.34-35], although his definition is nearly indistinguishable from that of rūpaka itself [2.21]. In rūpaka "the identity of the upameya with the upamāna is described"; in upamā rūpaka "similarity is described through the identification of the upameya with the upamāna"

[upamānena tadbhāvamupameyasya sādhayan | yām vadatyupamāmetadupamārūpakaṁ yathā ||] [3.34]. In practice, his equation of the "foot of Viṣṇu" with a "measuring stick" and a "new mirror" through direct predication in [3.35] would seem to be rather two instances of Dāṇḍin's asamasta rūpaka.

Dāṇḍin, if postulated as later, is perhaps positing such examples for what they logically appear to be, and reserving upamā rūpaka for what the title would again logically imply -- rūpaka illuminated through upamā. Upamā rūpaka is also presumed to appear as a distinct alamkāra in [10.61] of the Bhāttikāvyam, where mouths of rivers falling into the ocean are compared explicitly to a lover's fallen upper-garment, with both upameya and upamāna -- fallen from "breasts of mountains" -- further related through rūpaka. And finally, in [4.3.32] of Vāmana's Kāvyālaṅkārasūtrāṇi, upamā rūpaka appears as a variety of samsṛṣṭi alamkāra, with the combination of alamkāras in general (comparable to Dāṇḍin's samsṛṣṭi alamkāra [2.359-62]). Vāmana provides a

succinct and clear definition: "Rūpaka realized through upamā is upamārūpaka" [upamājanyam rūpakaupamārūpaka].

2.90 Example of the Rūpaka of Disparity

The moon is being drunk by Devas

Your face-moon by me --

That one at times incomplete

This one ever perfect in form.

Vyatireka Rūpakodāharanam :

candramāḥ pīyate devairmayā tvanmukhacandramāḥ

asamagropyasau śaśvadayamāpūrnāmaṇḍalah

āpūrnāmaṇḍalah /literally, "a full, complete circle."

We now turn to "disparity between the figurative"

usage of a word "and the literal" usage of the same word.

In vyatireka rūpaka the identification posited by rūpaka is again further illuminated through the incorporation of another distinct alamkāra; yet with vyatireka alamkāra now subordinate -- where "similarity is negated (at the expense of the upamāna)" -- we have the inverse of the preceding upamā rūpaka. Now disparity, not similarity, is displayed between the figurative usage of a word (gauna) -- conjoined in a rūpaka -- and its presentation as literal (mukhya).

Realized through vyatireka, our example presents an initial statement of similarity. Again, the moon as figurative in "face-moon" is compared to the literal moon, with a relevant sādhārana dharma -- revolving around a conceived property -- expressed. As the milk or nectar (amṛta) of the literal moon is drunk by Devas, so does a lover absorb the beauty of the figurative moon of the face. A similarity is presented only to be negated at the expense of the usually superior upamāna -- that literal moon wanes,

where the figurative moon of the face is always full,
"perfect in form."

2.91 The Rūpaka of Denial

Beautiful one!

The qualities of the moon

do not accord with

The moon of your face

torturing others in such a way --

This is a Rūpaka of Denial.

Ākṣepa Rūpakam :

mukhacandrasya candravatvamitthamanyopatāpinah
na te sundari samvādītyetadākṣeparūpakam

upatāpinah [(m.) (gen.) (sing.) agreeing with
mukhacandrasya < upa (+) tāpin] /"causing pain, unhappiness."

samvādi [(n.) (nom.) (sing.) agreeing with candratvam
< sam (+) vādin] /"correspond," "be in harmony with."

Rūpaka is now realized through the distinct alamkāra, ākṣepa [2.120-68], which involves the telling expression of negation or denial. In ākṣepa rūpaka the validity of the rūpaka itself is questioned through the "denial" of proper correspondence between the elements identified. In effect, drawing a parallel with our two preceding varieties -- upamā and vyatireka rūpakas -- the ability of the literal upamāna to function as a figurative upamāna is denied.

The literal moon, among whose qualities are the ability to please, to comfort (candraḥ as "one who gives pleasure," from the root *can; and we may compare the adjective candraka/"pleasing"), and coolness (the moon as śitalaḥ), cannot possibly accord with the figurative "moon

of your face," which, in generating unfulfilled desire only causes pain (extrapolating from the literal meaning of the root *tap, "generate heat").

Āksepa rūpaka may be considered in light of the preceding viruddha rūpaka [2.83-84], where the moon is incorporated into a figurative entity whose actions are "incongruous" -- without raising the question of validity -- with those of the literal moon.

2.92 The Rūpaka of Rationalization

Angry one!

Even the moon of your face

burns me mercilessly . . .

Surely its only my own bad luck --

This is a Rūpaka of Rationalization.

Samādhāna Rūpakam :

mukhendurapi te caṇḍi mām nirdahati nirdayam

bhāgyadosānmamaiveti tat samādhānarūpakam

samādhāna [< sa (+) ā (+) *dhā] /literally,

"placing, putting together," "adjusting"; "reconciling."

In viruddha rūpaka [2.83--84] we have the expression of incongruous actions, incongruity between actions usually associated with a mundane, literal object, and actions (or the lack thereof) of the figurative entity created through rūpaka that yet incorporates the literal object. And in the immediately preceding ākṣepa rūpaka we have seen incongruity brought to the point of expressly denying the validity of the identification embodied in a specific rūpaka.

In samādhāna rūpaka we again have the entity embodied in a specific rūpaka behaving in a fashion incongruous with that of its upamāna as literal object, an object in this case, however, not directly expressed. Yet rather than

leading to its denial, the validity of the rūpaka is implicitly recognized through the "rationalization" of the incongruity.

That "the moon [which is by nature cool] of your face" yet "burns" a lover in generating desire is certainly incongruous, yet it is an incongruity rationalized by the lover's recognition that it is due to his own "bad luck" (bhāgya dosā). Such a contingent rationalization of course undermines the perceived incongruity, thus allowing one, inversely, to assume that the conjunction of the particular elements in the rūpaka is valid.

2.93 The Rūpaka of Transference

That dancer of a brow-creeper

On the stage of your face-lotus

Performs a graceful dance --

This is the delightful Rūpaka of Transference.

Rūpaka Rūpakam :

mukhapañkajarañgesmin bhrūlatānartakī tava

līlānṛtyam karotīti ramyam rūpakarūpakam

Rūpaka rūpaka, though distinct in process, parallels our previous mālā upamā [2.42]. Yet as with Dāṇḍin's mālā upamā, Dāṇḍin's rūpaka rūpaka must be distinguished from later varieties of rūpaka that involve "multiple" effects. Three primary elements are now involved in the creation of two conjoined rūpakas: an initial rūpaka, where one element

is equated with another, forms a unit that is in turn equated with a third element to form a second rūpaka.

Our present verse provides two examples. Thus brū-latā-nartaki /literally, "brow-creeper-dancer," or a brow equated with a creeper, with the resulting "brow-creeper" in turn equated with a dancer. Similarly, mukha-paṅkaja-raṅga / literally, "face-lotus-stage," or a face equated with a lotus, with the resulting "face-lotus" in turn equated with a stage. "Initially there is the transformation of the face through the lotus; following this, the transformation of the face-lotus through the stage. . . ." [prathamam mukhasya paṅkajena rūpanam paścācca mukhapaṅkajasya raṅgena rūpanam] (RR/170) and so on.

I do not agree with Edwin Gerow that rūpaka rūpaka involves a "triple metaphor," where "the object of a simple metaphorical identification is itself taken as the subject of a further metaphor." This would be to read these compounds serially, item by item, thus generating in the

first instance, for example, "on the stage which is a lotus which is her face" (Glossary/252). I feel that Daṇḍin conceived of the initial rūpaka as a conceptual whole: [A = B] = C, rather than A = B = C.

In this light we may consider, for example, the later mālā rūpaka of Mammata (KP [10.94ff]). Mālā rūpaka is like the previous [mālā upamā [10.90ff.], where one upameya is illuminated by successive upamānas A = B, = C, = D. He does not include raśana rūpaka, feeling that it is without "distinctive charm," yet he does provide an example and we see that it parallels that of the similarly excluded raśana upamā in [10.90ff.]. Again, I do not agree with Edwin Gerow that Daṇḍin's rūpaka rūpaka is a "raśana rūpaka in which the term taken as both subject and object is expressed only once" (Glossary/253). Raśana rūpaka is completely distinct. Rather than a following object (upamāna) becoming a preceding subject (upameya) -- A is B is C -- in raśana rūpaka (as in raśana upamā) a preceding upameya

becomes a following upamāna in succession: A = B, C = A,
D = C.

2.94 Example of the Rūpaka Concealing the Actual

This is not a face . . .

it's a lotus --

These are not eyes . . .

but bees --

These cannot be the rays of your teeth . . .

surely they're filaments.

Tattvāpahnava Rūpakodāharanam :

naitanmukhamidam padmam na netre bhramarāvimau
etāni kesarānyeva naitā dantārciśastava

2.95 Explication of the Example of the Rūpaka Concealing
the Actual

Specifically negating the actuality of

the face, eyes, and rays of the teeth

Transforming them as though actually

a lotus, bees, and filaments

with excellent attributes nicely revealed --

This is the Rūpaka Concealing the Actual.

Tattvāpahnava Rūpakodāharanasvarūpaprakāśanam :

mukhāditvam nivartyaiva padmāditvena rūpanāt

udbhāvitaguṇotkarṣam tattvāpahnavarūpакam

rūpanāt : parikalpanāt / "due to conceiving, imagining"

(RS/94); āropāt/"due to the superimposition of" (RR/171).

udbhāvita [nijanta bhūte kṛdanta < ud (+) *bhū] / "manifest," "display," "reveal."

apahnavah [< apa (+) *hnu] / "conceal," "disguise."

In tattvākhyāna upamā [2.36], we have seen an initial, potential confusion -- due to similarity between upameya and upamāna -- explicitly resolved with the clarification of the "actual," or true state of affairs. The actuality of the upameya is affirmed, that of the upamāna is denied.

In tattvāpahnava rūpaka the situation is reversed: the actuality of an object serving as upameya is specifically denied; rather its conceived upamāna is explicitly affirmed. With the transformation of the upameya into upamāna, through direct predication, the true state of affairs is figuratively "concealed." Yet as in tattvākhyāna upamā, we again have the initial upameya and upamāna presented as "wholes" or aggregates, illuminated -- "with excellent attributes nicely revealed" -- by subsequent

upameyas and upamānas as corresponding, subsidiary "parts."

Our example in [2.94] is accordingly that of tattvākhyāna upamā [2.36] in reverse. Now it is the initial upameya that is negated, its true status concealed through its affirmation as or conceived transformation into the conceived upamāna: "the face is not a face but a lotus." And subsequently, "the eyes are not eyes but bees"; "these cannot be rays from the teeth, surely they're filaments."

We might add that where we have the positive resolution of objects as they realistically are (tattvākhyāna upamā), there is no direct transformation (the face is but a face) -- potential confusion stresses similarity and thus we have upamā. Where the true status of objects is concealed, at once negated and transformed into another (it is not a face but the face is a lotus), we have the superimposition and identification characteristic of rūpaka.

2.96 Conclusion to Upamā and Rūpaka Alamkāras

The varieties of Rūpaka and Upamā are without end

Thus but the general direction is shown.

Let those unstated be inferred by the wise.

Upamārūpakālamkāropasamḥārah :

na paryanto vikalpānām rūpakopamayorataḥ

diñmātram darśitam dhīrairanuktamanumiyatām

Again Daṇḍin's various varieties should be seen as templates, indicators of potentiality, that point to yet further possibilities that may "be inferred by the wise."

Notes [2.67] - [2.96]

1. Bhojarāja, Sarasvatīkanṭhabharāṇa, edited by Anurdoram Barooah (1883); Reprint (Gauhati, Assam: Publication Board, 1969), [4.27]: [caturdhā prakṛtam teṣu śabdabhūyiṣṭhamucyate | samastam vyastamubhayam saviśeṣaṇamityapi ||].
2. Bhojarāja, Śrṅgāraprakāśa, edited by G. R. Josyer, vol. 2, chap. 10 (Mysore: Coronation Press, 1955-197?), pp. 412-13.
3. Vāmana, for example, in choosing to focus on process is explicit: tattvāropo rūpakam/"rūpaka is the superimposition (āropah) of identity" (KAS [4.3.6]).
4. Makara: "A mythical aquatic animal which in early art appears to have been inspired by the crocodile. In Indian sculpture it originally had four and later two or four leonine or dog-like legs; a scaly body and crocodile tail. . . The makara figures in many legends and myths and is endowed with occult and magical powers, especially those relating to the fertility of rivers, lakes, and the sea. . . (Margaret and James Stutley, Harper's Dictionary of Hinduism (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), pp. 174-75).
5. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, trans., Sanskrit Poetry from Vidyākara's Treasury (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 118-19.
6. Margaret and James Stutley, Harper's Dictionary of Hinduism, p. 109.
7. Margaret and James Stutley, Harper's Dictionary of Hinduism, p. 23.
8. Vaman Shivaram Apte, The Practical Sanskrit-English

Dictionary (Poona, 1890); Rev. ed. (Poona: Prasad Prakashan, 1957); Reprint (Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co., 1978), p. 732.

9. The myth of Viṣṇu's "Three Steps" of course evolved across time. In the Rg Veda it is a creation myth where Viṣṇu delineates the "earthly realms" from the "upper dwelling place" (primarily Rg Veda [1.154.1-6]). In the Brāhmaṇas myths of gods and demons are included. In the Purāṇas there is extensive elaboration, and the development of a primary antagonist, the demon Bali.

See Wendy O'Flaherty, Hindu Myths, no. 47, "From the Rg Veda," p. 176 (Rg Veda [1.154.1-6]); no. 48, "From the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa," pp. 177-78 (Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa [1.2.5.1-9a]); no. 49, "From the Vāyu Purāṇa," pp. 178-79 (Vāyu Purāṇa [2.36.74-86]); and pp. 328-29 for extensive textual references. See also, C. Dommitt and J. A. B. van Buitenen, Classical Hindu Mythology, "Vāmana, the Dwarf, and Bali," pp. 80-82 (Vāmana Saromāhātmya [10.1-9, 10.33-66, 10.85-87, 10.91]).

10. Gero Jenner, Die Poetischen Figuren der Inder von Bhāmaha bis Mammata (Hamburg: Ludwig Appel Verlag, 1968), p. 289.

2.97 Definition of Dīpaka Alamkāra

If a single word or phrase in a given position

expressing either Genus Action Attribute or Individual

completes the senses of a series of expressions --

This is called Dīpaka.

For example:

Dīpakālamkāralakṣanam :

jātikriyāguṇadravyavācinaikatra vartinā

sarvavākyopakāraśet tamāhurdīpakam yathā

Dīpaka, from the verbal root *dīp/"flame," "blaze," "shine," may be aptly but literally translated as the "illuminator."¹ For "just as a lamp dissipates the darkness and permits us to see various objects, there are in dīpaka words that illuminate the sense of an entire expression."²

In dīpaka alamkāra the sense of a word or phrase extends to and thus completes, "illuminates," a series of otherwise incomplete parallel sentences or unitary expressions (vākyas). As we shall see, the varieties generated fundamentally revolve around the position of the illuminating element, and/or its grammatical type or characteristics. Daṇḍin was the first, not only to go beyond the very basic positional classifications, but also to develop varieties based upon the relations between the parallel sentences themselves.

Dīpaka alamkāra is certainly one of the most fundamental of figures, and was surely recognized and enumerated as such during the earliest stages of the tradition. It first appears in the extant literature as one of the four alamkāras cited in the Nāṭyaśāstra [17.43ff.] (along with upamā, rūpaka, and yamaka). Bharata [17.60] provides a concise and succinct definition that remains essentially valid across time, its completeness echoing yet earlier writers: "The coherence of words -- whose field of

meaning varies -- into one complete expression through their [mutual] illumination -- this is termed dīpaka" [nānādhikaraṇasthānāṁ śabdānāṁ sampradipataḥ | ekavākyena samyogo yastaddīpakamucyate ||].

He provides but a single, unspecified example [17.61]: "With hamsas on lakes, trees in flower, lotuses swarmed with drunken bees, parties among gardens and parks -- in this land repletion was continually insured" [sarāṁsi hamṣaiḥ kusumaiśca vṛkṣā mattairdvirephaiśca saroruhāṇi | goṣṭhibhirudyānavanāni caiva tasminnaśūnyāni sadā kriyante ||].

Bhāmaha, in Kāvyālaṅkāra [2.25-29], admits of and illustrates but three varieties based on position: ādi, where the illuminating element is initially presented (initial pada), the parallel elements to follow; madhya, where the illuminating element occurs medially (medial padas); and anta, where the illuminating element occurs in final position (final pada). We may note that in each case the word that consolidates the meaning of the expression is

a verb. There is no formal definition, Bhāmaha being content to remark in [2.26], "Due to the illumination of meaning . . . its name is appropriate" [anvarthamasyākhyām-arthadīpanāt]. Similarly, in Bhattī's Rāvanavadha (Bhattikāvyam) [10.23-25] we have three verses presumed to illustrate ādi, anta, and madhya dīpakas respectively.³

Dāṇḍin incorporates the distinction based upon location as a matter of course, and chooses in his definition to focus on a categorical schema that we have already seen employed in svabhāvokti alamkāra [2.8-13] (and which we shall see again in vyatireka [2.180-98] and viśesokti [2.323-29] alamkāras). Thus "if a word in one place (ekatra) expressing either genus (jāti), a representative of a specific class or type; an action (kriyā); an attribute or property (gunā); or an individual by name (dravya) assists or serves [completes the meanings of] a series of expressions (vākyas) -- this is called dīpaka."

Four examples follow, illustrating each of these types

in initial (ādi) position. Dāṇḍin does not explicitly mention position until [2.102], following in [2.103-6] with examples of the medial (madhya) and final (anta) positions (with words of the jāti and kriyā categories in each). Twelve potential varieties are thus generated: each of the four categories of "type" in each of the three positions.

At this juncture we have an excellent opportunity to consider Dāṇḍin's craft and methodology. Dipaka alamkāra's distinguishing process is a single word or phrase acting as capstone to otherwise unresolved meanings. Prior to Dāṇḍin it would appear that the illuminating element was strictly verbal in type, its position in the extended expression varying to generate three varieties. Dāṇḍin accepts the three positions in a manner that indicates their prior and common acceptance. They are unmentioned in his definition yet position is utilized in his first four examples [2.98-101], formal mention following in [2.102]. He chooses rather to focus on the illuminating element itself, the dipaka as such, in light of four potential categories

(categories that he has employed and that he will employ again). Yet Dandin goes further, displaying (I cannot help but feel) his distinctive and original approach, generating variations in light of process and context, relationship and structure, given the necessary, distinguishing element marking the specific alamkāra. And as he repeatedly insists, this approach is open-ended -- the "endless" number of potential varieties but limited by the critical selectivity of the author.

Four varieties follow, focusing on contextual relationship and process. Mālā dīpaka [2.107-8] is perhaps Dandin's most distinctive variety, commonly accepted by later writers. Parallel, sequential sentences are now "interwoven," with the karman (direct object) of a preceding sentence becoming the kartr (subject) of the immediately following sentence. As we have seen, contextual variation may be achieved with the subordinate incorporation of elements distinctive of otherwise independent alamkāras. Thus viroddha alamkāra [2.335-40], with its element of

"incongruity" or "opposition," is reflected in viruddha artha dīpaka [2.109-10], where the meanings of parallel sentences are incongruous. This variety is immediately balanced by eka artha dīpaka [2.111-12], where parallel sentences are correlates, each uniquely illustrating essentially the same action. And finally, with the incorporation of ślesa alamkāra [2.310-22], attributes of two distinct subjects "illuminated" by the same action are revealed through ślesa [2.113-14].

Later writers offer less varieties of dīpaka, eliminating Dandin's categories of jāti, guna, and dravya, and his latter varieties (with the exception of mālā). Thus Vāmana (KAS [4.3.18-19]) accepts but kriyā, again allowing its appearance in the three positions. Of interest is his introduction of explicit similitude as essential to the figure, a requirement largely incorporated by later writers, though one that is, as we shall see, perhaps quite beside the point. Thus a unifying word, of necessity a verb, illuminates phrases that appear as upameya and

upamāna. Rudraṭa (KA [7.64-71]) adds to the solitary category of kriyā that of kāraka (kartr̥), where a nominal in a given case illuminates a series of verbs. Again, the three positions are allowed. Mammata (KP [10.103-4ab]), ignoring the three positions, presents an abbreviated selection from earlier writers. We have but three varieties: an attribute or action, stated but once, that is common to both upameya and upamāna illuminates the entire expression (from Vāmana, though allowing for guna as well as kriyā); a single case (a nominal) governs several verbs (from Rudraṭa, the category of kāraka); and mālā dīpaka (from Dāṇḍin).

That Vāmana [4.3.18-19] chose to make similitude an essential feature of dīpaka (albeit expressed in a specific relationship) is perhaps more a reflection of his own theoretical predilections than an accurate assessment of the distinctive features of the alamkāra itself. And this raises an important issue. To what degree are the various theorists of kāvya actually involved with the critical

analysis of *kāvya* (literary) texts, providing insight into the actual practice of the kavi (or poet)? To what degree are they evolving primarily idiosyncratic systems from within the *alamkāra* tradition itself, at the very least a step removed from the direct consideration of the literary texts themselves?

Dandin also would seem to be generating sub-varieties based not necessarily on preexistent examples in the literature, but rather on potentialities of context and structure inherent in the *alamkāras* themselves. These "evolve," however, from a core group of *alamkāras* that yet appear to primarily reflect actual practice. Following Dandin, do *alamkāras* tend to float free, theoretical units unto themselves, structured and organized to reflect a given author's own theoretical predilections (where a later author is creatively theorizing at all, rather than creatively compiling)?

After Dandin do we move away from active, practical criticism whose point of departure is yet literary, into a

realm increasingly self-absorbed, philosophical, and remote? Those who espouse the search for and exposition of the "soul" or "essence" of kāvya as a culmination are perhaps revealing more about their own assumed values and beliefs, rather than pointing to anything of ultimate interest to the literary critic.

Notes [2.97]

1. Dipaka has occasionally been equated with the rhetorical figure "zeugma," ((Glossary/193-99); D. K. Gupta, A Critical Study of Dandin, pp. 207-8, and so on) a presumed technical equivalence that -- as with upamā as "simile," and rūpaka as "metaphor" -- I cannot help but view with suspicion. I would hold that technical terms referring to fundamentally conceptual procedures, commonly culturally specific and frequently vague at best, are highly resistant to anything other than obviously limited literal translations. That frequently the translator's ego cannot brook this resistance and the "translation" that ensues is based on superficial resemblance, where subtle yet obviating denotative differences and blatant connotative variations are ignored. And where, as in the Western rhetorical tradition, a term's life in the source language may embrace vast stretches of time and be itself highly resistant to proper interpretation, confusion may in fact reign on all sides -- as though the translator could chase clouds with a net.

Dipaka is not equivalent to zeugma. If we narrowly consider zeugma to strictly entail a discrepancy in meaning -- between applications of the "yoking" word to each of the words to which it refers -- we shall see that in every example of Dandin's varieties, the meaning of the word or phrase that is shared by parallel sentences never varies in its application. In viruddha artha dipaka (the Dipaka of Opposite Meaning) [2.109-10], for example, although parallel sentences may display opposite or disparate meaning ("augmenting"/"diminishing"), the sense of the mutually shared subject ("clouds") remains constant. In the following alamkāra, āvṛtti [2.116-19], we shall see a variety, pada āvṛtti, that approximates this conception of zeugma, yet here we have a word physically repeated in two different senses, not a single "yoking" word with varying applications.

Even granting a wider conception of zeugma -- a single word referring to two or more words in the same sentence -- dīpaka differs. In zeugma the scope of operation is restricted to the sentence, a single verb referring to two or more objects, for example. In dīpaka a single word does not "yoke" elements within and thus complete a single sentence, rather that single word although expressed but once is meant to apply to, to be inserted into, a number of distinct sentences -- its meaning "illuminating" and thus completing a more extended, complex image. Whether we consider the relevant Sanskrit expressions "clauses" or "sentences" the principle still holds: zeugma "yokes" and thus unifies elements within a single image; dīpaka "illuminates" and thus pervades a series of discrete images that are crafted into a more varied and layered whole.

2. H. R. Diwekar, Les Fleurs de Rhétorique dans L'Inde, (Paris: Librairie d'Amerique et d'Orient, 1930), p. 31: "De même qu'une lampe dissipe les ténèbres et nous permet de voir les objets, il y a dans le dīpaka des mots qui illuminent le sens de toute la phrase."

3. Bhāttikāvyam [10.25] may, however, be an instance of atiśayokti alamkāra rather than madhya dīpaka.

See C. Hooykaas, "On Some Arthālaṅkāras in the Bhāttikāvya X," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 20 (1957), p. 358.

2.98 Example of the Dīpaka of Genus (in Initial Position)

The Southern Breeze carries away

the decayed leaves of winding creepers

He alone acts to break

the pride of shapely women.

Jāti (Ādi) Dīpakodāharanam :

pavano daksināḥ parṇam jīrṇam harati vīrudhām

sa evāvanataṅgīnāṁ mānabhaṅgāya kalpate

pavanah dakssinah / "the southern breeze": malayānilah / "breezes off the Malaya mountains" (the western Ghāts) (RŚ/96).

vīrudhām [(f.) (gen.) (pl.) < vīrudh] / "a low creeping plant or shrub," "vine": latānām (RŚ/96).

avanata-aṅgīnām [(f.) (gen.) (pl.) < ava (+) *nam-

aṅgam] /literally, "of those women whose bodies are slightly bent down"; that is, "bent down from the weight of their breasts." Edwin Gerow's translation of avanatāṅginām as "modest," in ". . . calms the anger of modest women" (Glossary/197), results in the somewhat incongruous image of "modest" women asserting themselves through anger, an image distinctly jarring when mānah is taken in its more usual usage as "pride" ("calms the pride of modest women"). The translation misses the analogy between "breaking the pride of shapely, curving creepers in scattering their now decayed leaves"; and "breaking the pride of shapely women." Resonance is lost, the verse collapses, and translation fails. Women slightly bending from full breasts is a poetic conceit within the tradition, and one considered particularly appropos of southern women.

A later poem by Vasukalpa [10th century] echoes this association of the southern breeze with full-breasted southern women: "Their strength [that of the southern breezes] is lessened by their strenuous tumblings / on the

heavy breasts of Andhra girls. . . ."¹ As stature of body is associated with beauty, so there was an assumed pride in its possession. And curiously we again see a later poem evoking the relationship of the southern breeze with this other element of Dandin's image: "Garrulous with the cuckoo's cry, / [the southern breezes] have absolved the pride of maids of Murala and Andhra."²

In our first four varieties of dīpaka, Dandin specifically illustrates his definition with corresponding examples of an illuminating word denoting genus (jāti), action (kriyā), attribute (gunā), and an individual (dravya). In each case the term is placed in initial (ādi) position.

In the present verse, out of the family of "breezes," a particular genus of breeze is presented in initial position. We have two distinct sentences illustrating "his" attributes, yet the sense of the second is incomplete without the referent -- the southern breeze -- of the

pronoun sah ("he," "it"). The southern breeze flowing northward in spring evokes the erotic. Usually conceived as originating on the sandalwood slopes of Mount Malabar it is cool and pleasantly scented. Frequently personified as a lover caressing lips, disheveling hair, or fondling breasts (or an erring husband straying northward) -- "regularly the spring breezes are 'looseners of the knot of anger' [or pride] in maidens' breasts."³

2.99 Example of the Dīpaka of Action (in Initial Position)

Your tuskers wander

among gardens on the beaches of the four oceans

Your virtues splendid as Kunda flowers

among arbors on the Cakravāla mountains.

Kriyā (Ādi) Dīpakodāharanam :

caranti caturambhodhivelodyāneṣu dantinah

cakravālādrikuñjeṣu kundabhāso gunāśca te

catur-ambhodhi- [(-ih) (m.) < ambhas (+) dhi /

literally, "receptacle of the waters"] /"the four oceans"
surrounding the world, corresponding to the four cardinal
directions.

dantinah [(m.) (nom.) (pl.) < dantin / literally,
"possessing tusks"] /"elephants": jayakuñjarāḥ /"elephants
victorious [over all rivals]" (RŚ/96).

cakravāla-adri /"Cakravāla mountains": the nine
mythical mountain ranges, with Mount Meru at the center,
"encircling the orb of the earth and being the limit of
light and darkness."⁴

kundah [(m.)] /a variety of Jasmine. We note how an
upamā may be compactly embedded within a phrase through the
use of the substantive-adjective karmādhāraya compound (see

under. [2.66]: kunda-bhāsah /"[virtues] splendid like Kunda flowers."

An action (kriyā) placed in initial position now completes the sense of an extended expression or image. A victorious king's elephants "wander"/caranti the beaches at the ends of the world. Just as his elephants -- and by implication, his armies -- are universally victorious, so do his "virtues" wander the Cakravāla mountains, "the limit of light and darkness," and thus similarly extend throughout the known world. Another limit whose attainment implies universal control or recognition.

We should recognize that Dandin in his "categorical" dīpakas (involving jāti, kriyā, guna, or dravya), as well as in his latter varieties, more often than not balances his sentences not only through a shared illuminating word, but also through an implied similarity. Thus, for example, "the southern breeze carries away leaves just as it carries away the pride or anger of women"; or "elephants wander just

as virtues wander." That Dandin chose not to mark similarity as such as a formal feature of dipaka is fitting, given that with two expressions sharing either the same subject (in the case of jāti or dravya), the same attribute (guna), or especially the same verb (kriyā) the similarity could be easily inferred.

2.100 Example of the Dipaka of Attribute (in Initial Position)

Dark are the quarters

with rows of rainy season clouds

And the lands

with tender patches of young grass.

Guna (Ādi) Dipakodāharanam :

śyāmalāḥ prāvṛṣenyaḥbhirdiso jīmūtapañktibhiḥ¹
bhuvaśca sukuṁrābhiraṇavaśādvalarājibhiḥ

A word expressing a distinctive attribute or property (guna) applicable to (in this case, the subjects of) parallel expressions appears but once and again initially. The relationship is attributive with the verbal copula implied. Thus "the quarters or directions are dark or black/śyāmala with . . . and the lands are dark with. . . ." It is important to note that Dandin's conception of dipaka stresses semantic completion, rather than syntactical "yoking." It is this stress on a single word "completing the sense" of an expression that allows such categorical varieties as guna (and dravya) dipaka.

2.101 Example of the Dīpaka of an Individual (in Initial Position)

Viṣṇu stride taking

Carried off (to where?)

the riches of the Dānavas

Brought (from where?)

the treasures of the Devas.

Dravya (Ādi) Dīpakodāharanam :

viṣṇunā vikramasthena dānavānām vibhūtayah

kvāpi nītāḥ kutopyāsannānītā devatarddhayah

Viṣṇu's "Three Strides" encompassed the universe -- what mortal can know its extent? -- wresting control from the demons, winning control for the gods. Viṣṇu as an example of a word expressing a specific individual (dravya)

appears but once as the applicable subject of two parallel sentences. Incorporated strictly with the first, he yet illuminates the second in an identical capacity, though not necessarily with the same action.

Daṇḍin's varieties of dravya and jāti dīpaka (unlike guna) are later subsumed by Rudraṭa's more general kāraka (or kartr̥) dīpaka (KA ([7.64, 7.69-71])). A single nominal, a word capable of expressing a case relation (or capable of serving as the "actor") governs, in parallel expressions, more than one verb.

2.102 The Explicit Indication of the Initial, Medial, and Final Positions of Dipaka

Dipakas occurring

in initial position are thus displayed --

We shall show some

in medial and final position as well.

For example:

Ādimadyāntadipakasūcanam :

ityādīdīpakānyuktānyevam̄ madhyāntayorapi

vākyayordarśayisyaṁmah̄ kānicit tāni tadyathā

When the dipaka or illuminating word is a given verb or verbal phrase, manipulation of position appears as the primary variable. Daṇḍin views positional variation as strictly secondary to and contingent upon more integral

features and relationships. Four examples immediately follow, illustrating dīpakas -- of genus and action -- in medial and final positions.

2.103 Example of the Dīpaka of Genus (in Medial Position)

Dancing in the laps of Niculas

Peacocks singing

Fixing glances -- full of joyful tears

on the clouds.

Jāti (Madhya) Dīpakodāharanam :

nṛtyanti niculotsaṅge gāyanti ca kalāpinah

badhnanti ca payodesu drśo harṣāśrugarbhiṇih

nicula- [(m.)]/a variety of cane or reed growing near the water.

kalāpinah [(-in) (m.) (nom.) (pl.)]: mayūrāh / "peacocks" (RŚ/97).

garbhiniḥ [(f.) (acc.) (pl.) (adj.) < garbhini] coordinating with drśah /literally, "inside the womb"; "pregnant," "full of."

nṛtyanti; gāyanti; badhnanti /literally, "they are dancing," "they are singing," "they are binding." The Sanskrit verbs are finite, describing three progressive, simultaneous actions. In translation -- to avoid the awkwardness of the extended progressive construction and to stress simultaneity -- strictly participial forms appear; we may consider them progressive forms with the "to be" auxiliary deleted. This has to be noted for (in this case) it is not just that a single subject governs a number of participles: as dīpaka that single subject must be read as though actually appearing and thus completing the sense of what are actually distinct vākyas ("sentences").

As jāti dīpaka, with the dīpaka as such presented in

medial position, a distinctive genus of bird, the "peacock"/kalāpin appears medially as the actor or subject illuminating three parallel actions: "dancing," "singing," and "fixing glances." Peacocks are a symbol of the erotic and, in a traditional conceit, their dancing marks the monsoon and thus -- on the poetic calendar -- the seclusion and enjoyment of lovers (including their own, "full of joyful tears"). "The peacock calls gently to his mate who tarries, / and glances once again toward the sky; / / to the sound of thunder sweet as loud reverberations of a drum / he performs his joyful dance."⁵

There would occasionally appear to be a fine line between the four categorical varieties of dipaka and their counterparts in svabhāvokti alamkāra [2.8-13]. In our previous example of guna dipaka [2.100], we have an instance of dipaka employed in "naturalistic" description, evoking images of the rainy season; in our present example, a picture of the varied responses of peacocks to the onset of the monsoon. Yet the line between description and

svabhāvokti, however fine at times, is quite real. For svabhāvokti alamkāra "graphically reveals" or captures in brief strokes the essential, distinguishing features or effects of a reality envisioned through the four categories -- description merely describes.

We may also consider a usual difference in syntactical structure. In order to "capture" a specific object, attribute, or action svabhāvokti would appear to primarily employ a single vākya (sentence), developing a single, contained image that is built around a single subject-finite verb relationship. All ancillary actions are then marked as subordinate elements modifying the subject.⁶ In dīpaka we find primarily parallel vākyas, contributing to the descriptive effect, but fundamentally tending to extend or disperse the focal point of the verse. And with parallel vākyas we have parallel subject-finite verb relationships existing on a grammatically equivalent plane (although as dīpaka the illuminating object, attribute, or action will

physically appear but once; rather through inference it may serve double or triple duty).

2.104 Example of the Dīpaka of Action (in Medial Position)

The gentle breeze . . .

salt

The moon becomes . . .

fire

The smearing of sandalwood paste . . .

striking weapons --

For travellers away from home.

Kriyā (Madhyā) Dīpakodāharanam :

mando gandhavahaḥ kṣāro vahnirinduśca jāyate

carcācandanapātaśca śastrapātaḥ pravāsinām

pravāsinām [(m.) (gen.) (pl.) < pra (+) *vas (+)
(-in)] /literally, "those living beyond, away."

Our previous image -- peacocks, themselves considered symbols of the erotic, dancing in joy at the monsoon -- hints at one pole of kāvya's bipolar evocation of love, "love-in-enjoyment" (sambhoga). Dāṇḍin follows with an evocative picture of the effects of love's other, darker mode, "love-in-separation" (vipralambha).

For lovers away from their beloved, continually evoked in the literature by the merchant, the soldier, the traveller away from home, in the pain of separation objects that are paradigms of soothing coolness become quite the reverse. The single finite verb of our example, "becomes"/jāyate, occurs medially in the second of three parallel vākyas, extending to and thus completing the sense of the others.

2.105 Example of the Dipaka of Genus (in Final Position)

Water thrown down by clouds

A flock of pet peacocks

Darting string of lightning --

This is the army of Kusumadhanvana.

Jāti (Anta) Dipakodāharanam :

jalam jaladharodgirṇam kulam grhaśikhandinām

calam ca taḍitām dāma balam kusumadhanvanah

udgirṇam [< ud (+) *gr̥] / "vomit," "eject."

kusumadhanvanah /literally, "the Flower-Bowed One": one of the many epithets of Kāma, god of love (see [2.80], under manmatha, for an overview of Kāma's numerous names).

Among the many armies of the world, Dandin presents

elements of the specific "army" of Kāma, one designed to conquer hearts and win the reticent. "Army"/balam as the dipaka appearing in final position is necessarily preceded by distinguishing attributes. Again we have an evocation of the monsoon, whose various elements -- rain, lightning, peacocks -- contribute to retreat and repose, aspects of an army effectively utilized by the god of love and desire.

2.106 Example of the Dipaka of Action (in Final Position)

You . . . the blue-black lily by the ear

Smara . . . the arrow in the bow

I . . . the mind in death --

All three placed simultaneously.

Kriyā (Anta) Dīpakodāharanam :

tvayā nīlotpalam karne smarenāstram śarāsane
mayāpi marane cetastrayametat samam krtam

smarah /literally, "memory": epithet of Kāma, god of love (see [2.80], under manmatha).

śara-āsane /literally, "(in) the seat of the arrow"; "bow."

Three simultaneous, identical actions whose identity as such is unresolved (explicitly) until the bhūte krdanta krta/"placed" appears in final position. Dandin's example continues the brief series begun in [2.103] evoking the erotic/śrṅgara. Here a beautiful woman places a lily by her ear as the god of love, observing the lover, places an arrow of desire in his "flower-bow" as a lover, observing her, places his mind -- "as of those who have reached the tenth decade" -- in death, "smitten with the shock of

desire" [mayā ca rāgavegamūrcchitena marañe daśamyāṁ
daśayāṁ cetah . . . | (RS/98).

We note the use of the bhūte kṛdanta, a "past passive participle," as the single illuminating "verbal" in this verse.

2.107 Example of the Interwoven Dipaka

The white fortnight augments the Moon

He . . . the Five-Arrowed One

And He . . . Passion

And That . . . the Beauty

of youth's sexual festival.

Mālā Dipakodāharanam :

śuklah śvetārciṣo vr̥ddhyai pakṣah pañcaśarasya saḥ
sa ca rāgasya rāgopi yūnāṁ ratyutsavaśriyah

śveta-arcisah [(m.) (gen.) (sing.)] /literally, "the white-rayed": the moon.

vrddhyai [(n.) (dat.) (sing.) < vrddhyam < *vṛdh /"is for the augmentation of, the increase of."

pañca-śarasya /"the Five-Arrowed One": an epithet of Kāma, god of love (see [2.80], under manmatha).

śriyah [(f.) (gen.) (sing.) < śri /"splendor," "beauty"].

2.108 The Interwoven Dīpaka

Although there is a dīpaka in initial position

a garland of phrases is employed

all sequentially related --

This is considered the Interwoven Dīpaka.

Mālā Dīpakam :

ityādīdīpakaṭvepi pūrvapūrvavyapekṣinī¹
vākyamālā prayukteti tanmālādīpakaṁ matam

The various "interwoven" (usually termed mālā-) figures provide excellent examples of Dāṇḍin's distinctive ability to generate (or recognize) varieties based upon the manipulation and exploitation of context and process within a given metastructure. Again, I assume that a greater degree of "critical creativity" is displayed in the generation of the various sub-varieties of the given alamkāras than in the enumeration of the alamkāras themselves. It would appear that the primary alamkāras reflect a greater (though certainly not total) grounding in the previous theoretical literature.

In mālā dīpaka, as with mālā upamā [2.42] and to a lesser extent with rūpaka rūpaka [2.92], a series of phrases are "interwoven": a subordinate element of a preceding

phrase (marking location or the direct object, for example) carries over (whether directly or through a relevant pronominal), usually assuming a primary role (as subject), to the immediately following phrase. Given the necessity of nominal components successively echoing, dīpaka (primarily focusing on the verbal element) is easily incorporated into this framework.

Thus "the white fortnight" or waxing phase augments the moon; the moon, stirring lovers and lighting their way, [augments] the god of love; the god of love [augments] passion; and that passion cannot but [augment] the beauty of "youth's sexual festival" (rati-utsava).

As Dāṇḍin points out, that the shared or illuminating word happens to occur initially is completely secondary to mālā's distinguishing structure. And given that distinguishing structure, that the illuminating word itself is free to assume a form other than any of Dāṇḍin's previously expressed categories is perhaps not surprising. Vṛddhyai reflects neither jāti, guna, nor dravya, yet may be

presumed a phrasal component with the verb "to be" implied
-- "is for the purpose of augmenting."

Mālā dīpaka is an important variety, one commonly accepted by later writers. Although first appearing in Dāṇḍin, it is important to note that "Bhāmaha's example of ādidiḍipaka [2.27] corresponds structurally with Dāṇḍin's mālā dīpaka"; and to further consider, "the fact that Dāṇḍin created a distinct variety out of Bhāmaha's example speaks for the priority of the latter."⁷ Bhāmaha's example (KA [2.27]) is as follows: "Intoxi-cation generates pleasure / That . . . the god of love capable of breaking the pride [of beautiful women] / He . . . desire to join with the beloved / And that . . . unbearable mental anguish" [mado janayati prītim sānañgam mānabhañguram | sa priyāsañ gamotkanṭhām sāsahyām manasah śucam ||].

It would indeed appear that Dāṇḍin in this instance incorporates a preexisting framework into his own schema; that he also places the dīpaka in initial position and

matches the theme, would again appear to point to Bhāmaha as the source.

Mālā dīpaka reappears in Mammāṭa's Kāvyaprakāśa [10.104ab], and in the Alamkārasarvasva [55ff.] of Ruyyaka. It is renamed ekāvalī by Bhoja in the Śrṅgāraprakāśa [10],⁸ and ultimately elevated to the status of an independent alamkāra by Viśvanātha [14th century] in the Sāhityadarpana [10.76-77].

2.109 Example of the Dīpaka of Opposite Meaning

Augmenting the arrogance of Anaṅga

Clouds -- their drops hurled by the wind

Diminishing that of summer.

Viruddha Artha Dīpakodāharanam :

avalepamanaṅgasya vardhayanti balāhakāḥ
karśayanti tu gharmasya mārutoddhūtaśikarāḥ

anañgah /"the Bodiless": an epithet of Kāma, god of love (see [2.80], under manmatha).

vardhayanti/karśayanti [parallel nijantas < *vrdh and *krś]/denoting opposite actions, "cause to grow, increase" /"cause to decline, decrease."

2.110 The Dīpaka of Opposite Meaning

To the direct object "arrogance"

And the subject "clouds"

Two disparate actions are joined --

This is a Dīpaka of Opposite Meaning.

Viruddha Artha Dīpakam :

avalepapadenātra balāhakapadena ca

kriye viruddhe samyukte tadviruddhārthadīpakam

avalepa-padena: vyāpyabhūtena (RŚ/100); karmabhūtena (RR/179) /literally, "with the word avalepa/'arrogance' which is the direct object." Vyāpya refers to a direct object that is "pervaded/permeated" by the action of a transitive root. It may appear as synonymous with karman, as in the Śabdānuśāsana [2.2.3] of Hemacandra and in the Cāndra Vyākaranā [1.1.23].⁹

balāhaka-padena: kartrvācinā (RŚ/100); kartrbhūtena (RR/179) /"with the word balāhakāḥ /'clouds' which is the subject or agent."

Danḍin primarily considers the dīpaka itself (the "illuminating" word) in light of the four categories, with relative position a secondary variable. With mālā dīpaka [2.107-8] the focus shifts to infrastructure, to distinctive pattern. In viruddha artha dīpaka and the remaining varieties, this focus remains.

We have seen viruddha rūpaka [2.83-84] where a conjoined upamāna behaves in an "incongruous" manner, and

virodha upamā [2.33] where an upameya and two upamānas all appear as "rivals." In each case the sense of viruddha/virodha is somewhat different. In the present variety we have yet a third shade of meaning (translating the meaning rather than repeating the form of the word).

Conjoined with dipaka, viruddha may be translated as "opposite": a single subject or agent is shared by two opposite actions. There is no question of "incongruity," for each action is appropriate in context. Thus "monsoon clouds augment the arrogance of the god of love" (continuing the theme of the immediately preceding varieties), for this is a special time for lovers; simultaneously "they diminish the arrogance of summer," for summer is personified and imagining the Indian summer heat as "arrogant" is surely apt. This is an excellent example of Dandin's ability to maximize symmetry and balance on the structural level, while simultaneously "expanding" the conceptual range of the verse.¹⁰

Dandin presents a single direct object (karman) and a

single subject (kartr) to be shared by two opposite actions: "two opposite actions are joined to the direct object [literally, "the word 'arrogance'"], and to the subject [literally, "the word 'clouds'"]. Their grammatical roles, as pointed out by our commentators, are obvious.

In translation I have substituted the grammatical roles in each appropriate instance for the literal and nebulous "word"/pada. Gratuitous additions and fanciful elaborations are certainly to be avoided, but I do feel that a translation can be equally marred by strict adherence to the literal. This is especially so in Sanskrit where the dictates of meter or line space may govern the choice of a word (to the extent that its meaning fits), over another whose meaning might strictly be more apropos. That the translator should avoid the "intentional fallacy" in this case,¹¹ to presume to know what the writer intended if only the restrictions of line and meter permitted, is clear; yet where a verse is otherwise opaque in translation (the opaqueness clearly due to line and meter constrictions)

and the meaning is directly implied -- and would be assumed by the Indian reader -- judicious clarification may be justified. This is often the case with the usage of ādi/"and so on," for example. In the present instance, to translate pada literally as "word" would be to obscure the infrastructure that Dandin creates, leaving the reader puzzled by the words -- "arrogance" and "clouds" -- drawn directly from the example without further clarification. The role of "clouds" is clear, but that "arrogance" is also doing double duty -- pertaining to the "summer" as well as to the "god of love" -- and that Dandin in effect utilizes the direct object as well as the subject as dipakas, should be made clear.

2.111 Example of the Dīpaka of Uniform Meaning

Stealing the expanse of the quarters

Seizing the array of stars and planets

And today tearing away my life --

This range of clouds . . .

Eka Artha Dīpakodāharanam :

haratyābhogamāśānāṁ gr̥hnāti jyotiṣāṁ gaṇam

ādatte cādya me prāṇānasau jaladharāvalī

jyotiṣām [(n.) (gen.) (pl.) < jyotis] / (in plural)

literally, "luminous ones"; "stars and planets."

prāṇān [(m.) (acc.) (pl.)] / literally, "life-breaths"

(see under [2.52]).

2.112 The Dīpaka of Uniform Meaning

"Range of clouds" illuminates but a single action

variously expressed in different words --

This is a Dīpaka of Uniform Meaning.

Eka Artha Dīpakam :

anekaśabdopādānāt kriyaikaivātra dīpyate

yato jaladharāvalyā tasmādekārthadīpakam

Eka artha dīpaka balances the preceding yiruddha artha dīpaka. The meaning -- focusing on action -- of the various parallel sentences is now essentially the same, or perhaps more properly, coordinate. We have but one subject, "range of clouds"/jaladharāvalī, appearing (incidentally) in final position illuminating what is essentially the same action expressed in three parallel sentences. As opposite,

actions are expressed through a bipolar relationship between two sentences, and are further reinforced by making all other primary variables constant (subject and direct object the same for each). Action that is fundamentally uniform, to be expressed variously, must be displayed in serial phrases, and is further reinforced by varying -- given that the subject as dipaka appears once and is equally shared by all sentences -- the direct object. Thus "this range of clouds" "steals" and "seizes" through its massive extent the sky and any sight of stars and planets; it "tears away" a life -- a lover in anguish, separated from his beloved during the rainy season.

2.113 Example of the Dīpaka of Multiple Embrace

These

clouds

elephants

of

pleasant breezes

perfumed fragrance

massive

majestic in black like the Tamāla

wander

sky

earth.

Śliṣṭa Artha Dīpakodāharanam :

hṛdyagandhavahāstunāgastamālaśyāmalatviṣah

divi bhramanti jīmūtā bhuvi caite mataṅgajāḥ

ganghavahāḥ [(m.) (nom.) (pl.) /marking a bahuvrīhi compound coordinating with both jīmutāḥ /"clouds" and mataṅgajāḥ /"elephants"] /literally, "(those) bearing fragrance (gangha-vahāḥ)"; alternately, "fragrance-bearers," "breezes"; (those) possessing breezes."

tamālah : the Tamāla tree, known for its dark bark.

tvisah [(f.) (nom.) (pl.) < tviṣ /"brilliance," "splendor"] /contingently (m.) in bahuvrīhi coordinating with both jīmutāḥ and mataṅgajāḥ .

2.114 The Dipaka of Multiple Embrace

"Clouds and "Elephants"

-- a common connection with "wandering"

with attributes undifferentiated in form --

This is a Dipaka of Multiple Embrace.

Ślīṣṭa Artha Dīpakam :

atra dharmairabhinnānāmabhrāṇām dantinām tathā
bhramanenaiva sambandha iti Ślīṣṭārthadīpakam

Dandīn concludes his varieties of dīpaka with the incorporation of a distinct alamkāra, a technique he employs in varying degrees for each particular alamkāra throughout his schema, yet always with the implication that the process is open-ended.

The conjunction of ślesa alamkāra [2.310-22] with dīpaka alamkāra is particularly apt. For as dīpaka links elements through a commonly shared word or phrase (albeit expressed once), ślesa links elements through the presentation of their respective attributes in a single "undifferentiated form" (previously, upameya and upamāna in the case of ślesa upamā [2.28]; conjoined upameya-upamāna in the case of rūpaka [2.87]). We have seen that this process includes both a single word with multiple

meanings, each meaning specifically corresponding to one of the elements involved (śabda ślesa); and one word with essentially a single meaning that applies to each of the elements (artha ślesa).

In our example [2.113], "clouds" explicitly "wander"/bhramanti in the sky," with this action completing the sense of the second element; thus "elephants [wander] on the earth -- the primary alamkāra is dipaka. The attributes of each, however, are illustrated through three instances of ślesa. The compound ganghavahāḥ, qualified by the preceding hrdaya-, may be taken either as a semantic entity, "(those) bearing (vaha) fragrance (gangha)", that is, "those with pleasant, delightful breezes"; or literally as "(those) bearing a delightful, 'perfumed' fragrance." Tuṅgāḥ as "high," "tall," "massive," displays essentially one meaning applicable to both clouds and elephants; as does the qualifying phrase (with embedded upamā) tamāla-śyāmala-tviṣah /"splendid, majestic in their black color like the Tamāla tree." Thus, "These clouds of pleasant

breezes, massive, majestic in black like the Tamāla, wander the sky"; as "These elephants of perfumed fragrance, massive, majestic in black like the Tamāla, wander the earth."

Our commentators are consistent and agree in considering the first instance of śleṣa, śabda śleṣa (though Ratnaśrī is somewhat ambivalent), and the following two instances, as examples of artha śleṣa (RŚ/100-1) (RR/181).

2.115 Conclusion to Dīpaka Alamkāra

Following this process

the discerning should envision

the remaining varieties of Dīpaka.

Dīpakālamkārasamhārah :

anenaiva prakārena śeṣānāmapi dīpake
vikalpānāmavagatirvidhātavyā vicakṣanaiḥ

avagatiḥ-vidhātavyā [tavyānta < vi (+) *dhā (+)
tavya] /literally, "understanding should be made."

I cannot agree with Belvalkar and Raddi that this verse necessarily "testifies to the existence before Dāṇdin's day of writers who gave a still larger number of Dīpaka varieties" (Notes 2/119). That there was a prior tradition, perhaps but dimly reflected in the extant literature, is assumed. The essential point in this regard is that Dāṇdin's method would appear to be primarily "generative" in the evolution of sub-varieties: "Following this process (prakāra) . . ." And as Dāṇdin remarks in conclusion to upamā and rūpaka [2.96]: "The varieties of rūpaka and upamā are without end / Thus but the general direction is shown. . . ."

Dandin develops essential or characteristic features given the framework of the (primarily) given, specific alamkāras -- his method is yet ultimately based upon a "descriptive foundation." In dīpaka we have seen his approach focusing on the "illuminating" word, the fulcrum of the alamkāra, involving the four distinctions of genus, attribute, action, or individual. Directly adopting the most probable prior basis of categorization, Dandin further manipulates these elements according to their position, generating twelve varieties. He then shifts from components to structure. Given the nature of dīpaka, parallel relationships ensue. These may be easily manipulated, "opposite" or "uniform" in meaning for example, and we have two more varieties.

If so inclined, we might choose to specify, for example, a dīpaka reflecting genus in a specific position to be shared by two parallel sentences of opposite meaning. (Though of course conceptual potential is hardly practical realization; there would be combinations more obviously

strained.) And where feasible, elements from any of the other alamkāras may be incorporated.

It is Dandin's distinctive genius to develop a schema based not strictly on what has gone before, nor on philosophical or metaphysical predilections, but primarily on a creative response to the implications inherent in the alamkāras themselves.

Notes [2.98] - [2.115]

1. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Sanskrit Poetry from Vidyākara's Treasury (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), no. 1126 by Vasudeva, pp. 229-30.
2. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Sanskrit Poetry, no. 1128 by Śrīkanṭha [10th century [?]], p. 230.
3. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Sanskrit Poetry, pp. 229-31.
4. Sir Monier Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1899); Reprint (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1974), p.381.
5. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Sanskrit Poetry, no. 222 [Anon.], p. 101.
6. Subordinate elements that may display a remarkable degree of grammatical variety. In the example of kriyā svabhāvokti [2.10], for example, we note ancillary actions marked by an instrumental of accompaniment, a bahuvrīhi application of a compound containing a bhūte kṛdanta, a lyabanta (or gerund in -ya), and a sannanta (desiderative in -uh).
7. Gero Jenner, Die Poetischen Figuren der Inder von Bhāmaha bis Mammata (Hamburg: Ludwig Appel Verlag, 1968), p. 212: "Bhāmaha's Beispiel zum Ādidīpaka entspricht strukturell Dāṇdin's Mālādīpaka. Die Tatsache, dass Dāṇdin aus Bhāmaha's Beispiel eine besondere Art macht, spricht für die Priorität des letzteren."
8. Bhoja, Śrṅgāraprakāśa, edited by G. R. Josyer, vol. 2 (Mysore: Coronation Press, 1955-197?), p. 424.

9. Kashinath V. Abhyankar, A Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar (Baroda: University of Baroda Press, 1961), pp. 351-52.

10. And an example pregnant with danger for the translator with a penchant for the literal. Edwin Gerow, for example, translates, "The rain clouds increase the arrogance of the Love God, but diminish the summer's heat" (Glossary/198): To see "heat" literally as a second direct object is to miss an important structural element, and to ignore (it is not included for the reader) the explicit clarification of the following verse [2.110].

11. W. K. Wimsatt, Jr., and Monroe C. Beardsley, "The Intentional Fallacy," Sewanee Review, 60 (1952), pp. 253-73. Although discussing the dangers of approaching literary analysis with a presumption of the author's "intention," their comments are certainly of value to the translator -- especially with regard to the question of "creative" (versus judicious) expansion upon the source text.

2.116 Definition of Āvṛtti Alāmkāra

Repetition of sense

Repetition of word

Repetition of both --

A three-fold alāmkāra

accepted in light of Dīpaka.

Āvṛtyalāmkāralakṣaṇam :

arthāvṛttih padāvṛttirubhayāvṛttireva ca
dīpakasthāna evesṭamalāmkāratrayam yathā

Āvṛtti or the alāmkāra of "repetition" may be considered fundamentally an appendage of dīpaka alāmkāra. Āvṛtti is "accepted in light of dīpaka"/dīpakasthāne evesṭam. . . . Sthāne literally means "in place of,

instead of," and Dāṇḍin's phrase has been variously glossed as accepted "only (eva) or not elsewhere (nānyatra) in the position (sthāne) or in the operational domain (viśaye) of dīpaka"/dīpakasya sthāne visaya eva nānyatra (RŚ/102); or "accepted in connection with or in the context of dīpaka"/dīpakaprasaṅge (RR/182). In essence dīpaka is taken as a template: where dīpaka presents a single word, the word and its sense illuminating more than one sentence, āvṛtti explicitly presents each case of shared "illumination" in the same position as it would otherwise appear (in dīpaka). Āvṛtti thus "repeats" not only the same word and its sense, but also may -- and in this it is distinct from dīpaka -- repeat only the sense through different words alone, or repeat the word itself yet in different senses. Thus we shall see in our examples "repetition of sense [only]," "repetition of word [only]," and "repetition of both."

As a distinct alamkāra, āvṛtti appears initially with and remains primarily restricted to Dāṇḍin. It does reappear as such in the Candrāloka [45] of Jayadeva [13th

century] (cited in Notes 2/119), yet is subsumed as a variety of dīpaka by Bhoja in both the Sarasvatīkantha-bharana [4.78] and the Śrṅgāraprakāśa.¹ And is considered in the Agni Purāna [342.18-20] from the point of view of sound repetition and thus included in the enumeration of śabda alamkāras.

2.117 Example of the Āvṛtti of Sense

The Kadamba buds flower

The Kuṭaja trees bloom

The Kandali sprouts open

And the Kakubha flowers blossom.

Artha Āvṛttyudāharanam :

vikasanti kadambāni sphuṭanti kuṭajadrumāḥ
unmīlanti ca kandalyo dalanti kakubhāni ca

vikasanti [< vi (+) *kas /"blossom," "flower"].

sphutanti [< *sput /"burst open"].

unmilanti [< ud (+) mil /"open"].

dalanti [< *dal /"open"].

In artha āvṛtti different words in parallel sentences "repeat" essentially the same sense. Our example presents four parallel sentences whose meanings all revolve around the idea of "flowering" or "opening." We note the similarity with eka artha dīpaka [2.111], where three different verbs in three parallel expressions appear, each meaning "seize" or "take away." Each shares, however, the same subject -- physically appearing but once in the verse, but to be read as appearing with each. This is the fundamental difference between dīpaka and āvṛtti alamkāras: āvṛtti displays completely independent, semantically and grammatically complete, expressions that yet share -- through explicit repetition -- the same sense (as in this variety), the same word, or both. Where the same word in

the same sense is repeated, dropping all but one instance of it will result in dīpaka.

In the present case, although the repeated verbs appear in positions otherwise left vacant -- but for one -- "in light of dīpaka", given the use of intransitive verbs, dropping of all but one would result in a disjunctive and awkward extended image. In kriyā dīpaka, although we similarly have distinct subjects, the transitive usage allows effective elision of each instance -- but for one -- of the otherwise expressed and identical verb. We are left with a series of direct objects in balance with a series of subjects.

That Dāṇḍin is walking along the borders of the realm of alamkāra with the present variety is certainly open to consideration. A degree of confusion remains from his initial verse [2.116] over the relationship between dīpaka and āvṛtti. That Dāṇḍin had reservations about the independent status of āvṛtti is clear, yet the degree of its subordination to or realization through dīpaka is not.

I would accept that Dandin primarily considered āvṛtti to be dīpaka with "the dots connected," and that it was this association that justified for him its inclusion as an alamkāra.

The repetitive feature of Dandin's āvṛtti alamkāra is perhaps seen echoed in the samuuccaya alamkāra of Rudrata (KA [7.19-29]), where a mood or tone is reinforced through repetitive descriptive or qualitative enumeration. Yet even here, with the repetitive expressions sharing a common focus, the similarity with dīpaka is mirrored. Repetition (of meaning) for its own sake was obviously held to be somewhat suspect.

2.118 Example of the Āvṛtti of Word

This garland of clouds

raises the necks of flocking peacocks

Makaradvaja

raises longing in the hearts of the young.

Pada Āvṛttyudāharanam :

utkan̄thayati meghānām mālā vr̄ndam kalāpinām

yūnām cotkan̄thayatyesā mānasam makaradvajah

utkan̄thayati [nijanta nāmadhātu < ut (+) kan̄tha] /

literally, "causing the neck to be raised"; figuratively,

"causing longing, desire."

makaradvajah / "He who has a makara for a banner":

Kāma, god of love (see [2.80], under manmatha, and Note 4,

under Notes [2.67]-[2.96] for makara).

Pada āvṛtti initially appears to be the reverse of the previous: the same word is repeated in parallel sentences, its sense different in each case. The word utkanthayati appears in each of the two complete though complementary expressions.

The theme of our example returns to Kāma and the erotic. Thus utkanthayati in its literal sense, "causing the neck to be uplifted, raised," appropriately applies to peacocks, symbols of the erotic, excitedly watching for the onset of the monsoon. In its figurative or extended sense, "causing longing, desire," it appropriately applies to Makaradvaja, the god who "raises longing in the hearts of the young."

Initially we do have the reverse of artha āvṛtti, yet in actuality we have something more -- a variety of āvṛtti that more clearly stands on its own as an alamkāra. Why? The answer is perhaps primarily fortuitous. Alamkāras are not absolutely distinct entities; they exist in the medium of a shared, specific language, and to varying degrees their

distinctive features intersect. That Dandin could logically develop āvrtti from dipaka and realize in the present case a variety that is closer to ślesa alamkāra is thus not too surprising. For if we attempt to evolve dipaka out of the present example by eliding one instance of the repeated word, the result is not dipaka -- the multiple senses of utkanthayati cannot be irrespectively shared. We would rather have ślesa: one word with more than one meaning, the specific meanings applicable to specific elements of the total image. And of course there is an element of the fortuitous in the availability of words with multiple senses that can synchronize so effectively in parallel images, though an element overshadowed by the skill of the poet in their selection.

Yet to what extent does a word generate the image or the image generate the word? This reverberation between multiple meanings and/or multiple structures, and multiple images lies at the center of the alamkāra. It is perhaps

this crafted texture that gives to kāvya so much of its distinctive appeal.

2.119 Example of the Āvrtti of Both Sense and Word

You conquering the earth

sport with women of the harem

Your host of enemies departing for heaven

sport with apsaras.

Arthapadobhayayoh Āvrtyudāharanam :

jitvā viśvam bhavānatra viharaty² avarodhanaiḥ

viharatyapsarobhiste ripuvargo divam gataḥ

apsaras [(f.)]: "Seductive celestial nymphs," lovers of the gandharvas, dancers of the gods, dwelling in heaven

yet, capable of assuming any form at will, often appearing on earth to seduce sages and the unwary.³

Dandīn's final variety of āvṛtti, the repetition of both a word and its (unitary) sense in parallel sentences, is the most exact and obvious extension of dipaka. With both expressions sharing exactly the same word in exactly the same sense, either instance of the repeated word could be elided and the result would be an example of (kriyā) dipaka.

In our example a great king after successful conquest may "sport"/viharati with the women of his harem, just as his enemies in death may "sport" with the "nymphs" of heaven. Although the repetition of a word and its sense would seemingly imply strictly complementary images, this does not preclude a poet of Dandīn's skill from adding a counter-balancing element of ironic contrast -- that a king's enemies may similarly sport in heaven is not to deny a secondary status to this imagined privilege, for death in defeat is the price of admission.

Notes [2.116] - [2.119]

1. Bhoja, Śrīgāraprakāśa, edited by G. R. Josyer, vol. 2 (Mysore: Coronation Press, 1955-197?), p. 423.
2. Rangacharya Raddi's printed text has viharatv- (p. 183): I consider this a clear misprint [i < a =/v] and have emended [i < a = y] our text accordingly.
3. Margaret and James Stutley, Harper's Dictionary of Hinduism (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 16.

2.120 Definition of Ākṣepa Alamkāra

Ākṣepa is the expression of denial:

In light of the three times its nature is three-fold

And due to the infinitude of discriminations

stemming from what may be denied

Its varieties are endless.

Ākṣepālamkāralakṣanam :

pratiṣedhoktirākṣepastraikālyāpekṣayā tridhā

athāsyā punarākṣepyabhedānāntyādanantatā

pratiṣedhah [< prati (+) *sidh] / "prevention,"
 "prohibition," "denial," "contradiction," (grammatical)
 negation."

ākṣepah [< ā (+) *ksip / "throw down, out";
 "challenge," "dispute"].

traikālyā- /"the three times": past, present, and future.

Ākṣepa alamkāra revolves around a distinctive and telling expression of "denial" in the widest sense. As we shall see, ākṣepa subsumes such concepts as "negation," "obstruction," "restraint," "prohibition," "prevention," and "removal."¹ As in dīpaka alamkāra [2.97-115], Dāṇḍin employs a freely applicable modality, now not of "position" but "of time." Although explicitly characterizing the first three varieties "in light of the three times," negation "when" may thus in theory be further applied to any variety. And although some twenty-three varieties of ākṣepa are distinguished, their number is potentially -- as Dāṇḍin repeatedly stresses for various alamkāras-- "endless," "due to the infinitude of discriminations stemming from what may be denied." Again, perhaps Dāṇḍin's most distinctive quality is an open and flexible awareness of the creative potential inherent in the alamkāras. Hardly dogmatic

prescriptions, his varieties rather should be seen as creative variations on a number of dominant themes.

Following our initial three varieties exemplifying "when" the goal of denial occurs -- in the past [2.121-22], present [2.123-24], or future [2.125-26] -- we have two sets of complementary pairs focusing on the "what" of negation. Thus we may have the negation of an attribute as distinctive part [2.127-28], as well as the negation of a complex entity as distinctive whole, one serving as the basis of attribution [2.129-30]. Similarly, as a cause as such may be denied [2.131-32], so may be an effect [2.133-34]. A unique series then follows [2.135-54]: ten varieties all thematically focused on the necessity of a woman in love "obstructing" the extended journey of her lover. The goal of negation is equivalent in each, and the procedural focus thus turns to "how" -- whether of manner or of means -- the lover's journey may be denied. Another complementary pair follows, yet now more tightly related and distinctive in their utilization of denial to create an

emotive mood -- the self turns pity outward in "compassion" [2.157-58], inward in "regret" [2.161-62]. Dāṇḍin's concluding varieties are based upon his prevalent and fruitful technique of incorporating as subordinate the distinctive features of otherwise independent alamkāras; here, those of ślesa [2.159-60], samsaya [2.161-62], arthāntaranyāsa [2.165-66], and hetu [2.167-68].

Dāṇḍin's presentation of ākṣepa is extensive and varied, exceeding in scope the treatment of other major writers on kāvya. Bhāmaha's definition (KA [2.68ab]) of ākṣepa is of interest, with its specific inclusion of indirect suggestion or inference as a distinctive element: "The apparent (iva) denial of something intended with the [actual] desire of expressing a relevant particularity (viśesa)" [pratiṣedha ivestasya yo viśeṣābhidhītsayā]. It is not the case that "Bhāmaha and Dāṇḍin define this figure as prativedhokti ('the enunciation of an interdiction') . . ." (Glossary/125). The "expression of

"denial" is specific to Dandin, whose definition is open and allows for both direct expression and subtle inference.

Bhāmaha presents but two varieties of ākṣepa, both of which are based on temporal considerations. Thus vakṣyamāna-visayah (KA [2.67, 2.69]) is the "(apparent) denial of something about to be said"; uktavisayah [2.67, 2.70] is the "(apparent) denial of something that has been said." His focus on "apparent denial" is clear in the relevant examples. Illustrating uktavisaya ākṣepa [2.70cd], for example, the negation of wonder at a great king's modesty or bearing is only to be inferred, for after all, "Where is the bridge that could trouble the ocean?"

This example is closely paralleled by Dandin's example of arthāntara ākṣepa [2.163], a variety based upon the subordinate incorporation of arthāntaranyāsa alamkāra (KD [2.169-79]). And given that Bhāmaha follows his example by arthāntaranyāsa alamkāra itself [2.71-74], one cannot help but wonder if Dandin may have drawn directly from

Bhāmaha's text, combining both verses to generate his own new variety.

As it would seem that Daṇḍin directly drew from and synthesized Bhāmaha's verse [2.70] and the immediately following alamkāra defined in [2.71], it is interesting to compare Bhāmaha's two examples with verses [10.38-39] of Bhaṭṭī's Rāvanavadha (Bhaṭṭikāvyam) [6th-7th centuries], verses presumed to exemplify ākṣepa alamkāra.² Each, respectively, could be taken as models -- albeit somewhat less refined -- for Bhāmaha's examples. For just as in Bhaṭṭī's example of [10.38], we have an initial element of wonder or strangeness, "It would be strange if an infatuated demon had not become an arrogant fellow, after having become rich" [ṛddhimān rākṣaso mūḍhaścitraṁ nā 'sau yaduddhataḥ |];³ so we read in the initial line of Bhāmaha's example of uktavisaya ākṣepa [2.70ab], "It is wonderful that a great king should have no conceit or pride" [svavikramākrānta-bhuvaścitraṁ yanna tavoddhatih |]. And as Bhaṭṭī then immediatley follows with a distinct

justification of the initial statement (thus negating this element of wonder), "Is there any reason why mean persons should abide by the way of the law?" [ko vā heturanāryānām dharmye vartmani vartitum ||];⁴ so Bhāmaha closes his example with, "Where is the bridge that could trouble the ocean?" [ko vā seturalam sindhorvikārakaraṇam prati ||].

Similarly, as Bhatṭī's example of [10.39] closes with the words (of Hanūman), "I report the essence of my mission only. What is the use of saying what is left, even if it is a matter of pride?" [kāryasya sāro 'yamudirito vah proktena śeṣena kimuddhatena ||;⁵ so we have the closing words (of a distressed lover) in Bhāmaha's example of vakṣyamānavisaya ākṣepa [2.69cd], "Let me not stop here. What is the use of telling unpleasant things to you?" [iyadevāstvato 'nyena kimuktenāpriyena ||].⁶

We have discussed the parallel treatment of the alamkāras in the Bhatṭikāvyam and Bhāmaha's Kāvyālaṅkāra. under svabhāvokti alamkāra. In accepting Bhatṭī as prior, I feel we may go further than S. K. De's certainly "safe"

conclusion positing parallel though similar sources for each each, that "Bhaṭṭī made use of a text unknown to Bhāmaha but not materially differing from Bhāmaha's own sources. . . ."⁷ We can always assume a common source (or parallel sources) when one text appears to mirror another in part. De bases his conclusion on the discrepancies between the two. I would grant Bhāmaha the ability to accept a given framework (the alamkāras as such) and then move off on his own (in the consideration of their individual varieties). Yet when the degree of structural reflection borders on the exact and there is clear reflection in specific example (and we have noted Bhāmaha's probable reference in (KA [2.20]) to Bhaṭṭī's verse [22.34]), I would assume a direct -- though of course not necessarily unique -- influence.

Udbhaṭa (KASS [2.1-3]) copies the first line of Bhāmaha's definition, and gives the same two varieties. Mammata (KP [10.106cd-7ab]) similarly follows Bhāmaha's varieties, and gives his definition verbatim with the

exception of an initial nisedho vaktum/"the denial of what one wishes to say" [10.106cd]. Mammata qualifies this, however, in his vṛtti [10.107ab ff.] to align with Bhāmaha, "that is, an 'apparent' denial"/nisedho nisedha iva.

Vāmana (KAS [4.27ff.]) defines ākṣepa as "the denial of the upamāna" [upamānākṣepaścākṣepah] , and follows with two rather vague variations where ākṣepa may reveal the uselessness of the upamāna in light of the (thus elevated) upameya, or merely hint at or suggest the upamāna. Rudraṭa (KA [8.89-91]) considers the object negated or denied strictly according to a bi-polar typology: whether it is conventionally acceptable (prasiddha) or totally incongruous (viruddha).

Although Dandin allows for and occasionally illustrates the direct expression of denial, his examples of ākṣepa are primarily studies in miniature of inference and suggestion realized in poetic form. We may consider as probable D. K. Gupta's speculation that "the view of the Dhvanikāra [according to one view, the anonymous author of

the kārika verses upon which the Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana [9th century] is based] seems to have been inspired by his [Dandin's] examples.⁸ According to the later author Jagannātha [17th century], the Dhvanikāra held that ākṣepa embraced all suggestive negation or denial.⁹

The probability of this view is reinforced when we consider the definition of ākṣepa in the Agni Purāṇa. As A. Sankaran points out, the initial definition of ākṣepa found in the Agni Purāṇa [344.14-15ab] was most probably drawn from verse [1.13] of the Dhvanyāloka (and that in accepting this we would of course be placing the Agni Purāṇa after the Dhvanyāloka):¹⁰ "And ākṣepa is dhvani since it is realized through word and meaning that is suggested, where the suggested meaning is inferred through the subordination of explicit meaning."¹¹ It is not surprising that the second (and final) definition of [344.15cd] is drawn verbatim from Bhāmaha, where we see the implicit association of ākṣepa -- "as though denying" -- with suggestion.

It is with Dandin, however, that we see the implications of this association explicitly illustrated in varied and numerous poetic examples. It would not be the brief definition that would come to influence later writers, including most probably the early dhvani theorists, as much as the extended exemplifications that, in retroactively conferring and validating that definition, would solidify the association of ākṣepa and suggestion. And more importantly, in working out the possibilities inherent in that association, Dandin would highlight and reinforce the role of "suggestion" itself.

Notes [2.120]

1. And Dandin will use as synonyms embracing such concepts of "denial" variations drawn from a number of verbs: [ā (+) *kṣip] ; [*rudh] ; [apa (+) *rudh] ; [ni (+) *sidh] ; [prati (+) *sidh] ; [ni (+) *vṛt] ; and [vi (+) ā (+) *vṛt].
2. Bhaṭṭi-kāvya, with the Jayamaṅgalā commentary (Bombay: Nirṇaya Sāgar Press, 1887); Reprint (1914), pp. 276-277; Bhaṭṭikāvyam, translated by G. G. Leonardi (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972), p. 103; C. Hooykaas, "On Some Arthālaṅkāras in the Bhaṭṭikāvya X," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 20 (1957), p. 357.
3. Bhaṭṭkāvyam [10.38]: Bhaṭṭkāvyam, translated by G. G. Leonardi, p. 103; Bhaṭṭi-kāvya, with the Jayamaṅgalā commentary, p. 276.
4. Bhaṭṭkāvyam [10.38]: Bhaṭṭkāvyam, translated by G. G. Leonardi, p. 103; Bhaṭṭi-kāvya, with the Jayamaṅgalā commentary, p. 276.
5. Bhaṭṭkāvyam [10.39]: Bhaṭṭkāvyam, translated by G. G. Leonardi, p. 104; Bhaṭṭi-kāvya, with the Jayamaṅgalā commentary, p. 276.
6. Bhāmaha, Kāvyālaṅkāra [2.69cd]: Kāvyālaṅkāra of Bhāmaha, translated by P. V. Naganatha Sastry, 2nd ed. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970), p. 44.
7. S. K. De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, vol. 1, 2nd rev. ed. (Calcutta: K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1960), p. 56.
8. D. K. Gupta, A Critical Study of Dandin and His Works (Delhi: Meharchand Lachhmandas, 1970), pp. 209-10.

9. Cited by S. K. De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, vol. 2, p. 71. Jagannātha, Rasagañgadhara (Bombay: Nirṇaya Sāgar Press, [?]), p. 421ff.
10. A. Sankaran, Some Aspects of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit or The Theories of Rasa and Dhvani (Madras: University of Madras, 1926); Reprint (New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, 1973), pp. 38-39.
11. Agni Purāṇa [344.14cd-15ab]: sa ākṣepo dhvaniḥ syācca dhvaninā vyajyate yataḥ | śabdenārthena yatrāthah kṛtvā svamupārjanam ||.

2.121 Example of the Ākṣepa of the Past

Anaṅga conquered the universe

with five flowery arrows!

This was impossible or else . . .

Wondrous are the potentialities of things.

Vṛtta Ākṣepodāharanam :

anaṅgah pañcabhiḥ puṣpairviśvam vyajayatesubhiḥ

ityasambhavyamathavā vicitrā vastuśaktayah

anaṅga /"the Bodiless": Kāma, god of love (see [2.80], under manmatha). Desire, personified as Kāma, was accepted as a pervasive, supremely powerful force:

When Kāma . . . knew that Śakra [Indra] had thought of him, he took up his flower-bow, went to the husband of Śaci, and said, "What duty is there for me to perform, O best of the thirty-three gods? Who threatens your position with his keen

asceticism? Or what woman does not wish to obey your command? I will make her full of desire, intent upon thoughts of you, this very day. There is no hero, no proud woman, no learned man too powerful for me. I pervade the whole universe, moving and still, beginning with Brahmā the Creator. But what need is there to say more? . . ."

"Lord of Rati," said Indra, "I know what you are capable of with your flower-bow. All things that are to be done are accomplished by you, and not otherwise."1

pañcabhiḥ puṣpaiḥ . . . iṣubhiḥ / "[Kāma's] five flowery arrows": "The aravinda, aśoka, cūta, navamālikā, and nīlotpala [flowers]" (RR/185).

visvam : "Includes the non-human realms, that is, that of Brahmā, Indra, and so on" (RR/185).

2.122 The Ākṣepa of the Past

A thought considered to have occurred
 -- that Anaṅga's victory was impossible --
 is denied through the strength of a reason --
 Such is an Ākṣepa of the Past.

Vṛtta Ākṣepah :

ityanaṅgajayāyogabuddhirhetubalādiha
 pravṛttaiva yadākṣiptā vṛttākṣepah sa īdrśah

vṛtta [bhūte kṛdanta < *vṛt_] / "has happened,"
 "occurred;" "past time."

Vṛtta ākṣepa is the first of three varieties that respectively exemplify ākṣepa alamkāra's three modalities of past, present, and future. In this case, that which is to

be denied or negated is conceived of as occurring in or referring to the past. It parallels the uktavisaya ākṣepa of Bhāmaha and later writers, though, as with Daṇdin's other varieties of ākṣepa, its range of application goes beyond the apparent denial of "things said" (or of "things about to be said"). We are not dealing necessarily with direct and thus literal negation or obstruction. As negation realized through an alamkāra where the element of vakrokti is primarily displayed, we must always be ready to seek the final resolution of meaning at a subtle remove from that which appears immediately on the page. And where immediately present, meaning may not be what we might otherwise initially assume.

Our initial example provides an excellent illustration of the translator's need to step beyond culturally determined assumptions. That "Anāṅga, the god of love, conquered the universe with his five flowery arrows was impossible." With our (Western) "rational" approach to things we might initially focus on the unreality of such a

feat, and thus suppose that the ākṣepa lies in the element of "impossibility"/a-sambhāvyam). Edwin Gerow does this and thus mistranslates: "The God of Love conquered the whole world with five flower-tipped arrows. This is quite impossible; amazing is the power of things!" (Glossary/125). To a classically educated Indian of Dandin's period (if I may be allowed the generalization) the borders between what we conceive of as myth, metaphor, and reality were rather vague. It was not Anaṅga's feat that must be appropriately denied -- for of course it occurred -- but rather the very thought of its impossibility. "Or else" athavā marks the denial and leads into its basis, for indeed, "Wondrous are the potentialities of things."

2.123 Example of the Āksepa of the Present

Sweet speaker!

Why are you adorning the ear with the Kuvalaya?

Do you suppose the corner of the eye
incapable of the task?

Vartamāna Āksepodāharanam :

kutah kuvalayam karne karosi kalabhasiṇi
kimapāñgamaparyāptamasmin karmāṇi manyase

apāñgam /literally, "corner(s) of the eye(s)":

netraprāntam (RR/185); though here picturing the corner of
the eye, being beautifully made up, as extending towards
the ear.

kuvalaya : a dark water lily that opens at night;
popular as an ear ornament.

karmani [(n.) (loc.) < karman /"action," "function," "task"] /specifically, "in the function of bestowing beauty to the ear"/karnaśobhāsampādanakarmani (RR/185) .

2.124 The Ākṣepa of the Present

This is an Ākṣepa of the Present:

A woman placing a black Utpala behind her ear
is thus restrained by a flattering lover.

Vartamāna Ākṣepah :

sa vartamānākṣepoyam kurvatyevāsitotpalam
karne kācit priyenaivam cātukāreṇa rudhyate

vartamāna [vartamāne kṛdanta < *vṛt /"happen," "occur"] /"present time."

Vartamāna ākṣepa, the denial or obstruction of an

ongoing event, appears to be unique to Daṇḍin, though certainly it appears to be a logical extension of Bhāmaha's uktavisaya (the apparent denial of something that has been said) and vakṣyamānavisaya (the apparent denial of something that is about to be said) varieties.

As Daṇḍin clearly explains, the act of "adorning" -- the focus of what is denied is "ongoing" -- the ear with a common ornament, the Kuvalaya flower, is impeded. We should recognize the lover's shrewdness in its implementation, for the obstruction of the act is achieved through inferred flattery: "Why bother with the Kuvalaya, when the beautiful extended corners of your eye are surely more than enough to adorn your ear."

Daṇḍin's example has literally "making," "doing"/karosi [< *kr̥] the Kuvalaya flower behind the ear, with the same verbal root echoed in the following "task" or "function" (karman). Given the context, to translate karosi as "adorning" I feel is apt, and to a degree necessary given the otherwise ambiguous referent of "task." For to

correctly recognize what the "task" is involves an awareness that "the corner of the eye" was extended through make-up and is thus -- when extremely beautiful as the lover here implies -- capable of "adorning" the ear.²

2.125 Example of the Ākṣepa of the Future

Lover! I speak truly

You'll not get to see me

With your eyes red with lac

Marked by another's kissing.

Bhavisyat Ākṣepodāharanam :

satyam bravīmi na tvam mām draṣṭum vallabha lapsyase
anyacumbanasamkrāntalāksāraktena cakṣuṣā

lāksā /usually interpreted as "lac": variously

considered the excretion of the cochineal insect utilized in the manufacture of "laquers," or as a red dye that is obtained from a particular tree, one that V. S. Apte avers was "largely used by women in ancient times as an article of decoration, especially for the soles of the feet and lips."³ We may add that the bark of this same tree is used in cleaning the teeth, staining the lips red.

2.126 The Ākṣepa of the Future

This is an Ākṣepa of the Future:

A very proud women

thus blocked in advance

a lover's potential future offense.

Bhavisyat Ākṣepah :

soyam bhavisyatākṣepah prāgevātimanasvinī¹
kadācidaparādhosya bhavītyevamarunddha yat

bhavisyat [bhavisyakāle krdanta (future participle)
< *bhū] /"what will be happening, occurring."

Concluding the three varieties based strictly on the "three times," bhavisyat ākṣepa illustrates the denial or obstruction of an event that may potentially occur in the future. It is not that the actual implementation of negation or prevention occurs in the future, rather an expression or event occurring in the present prevents a future act. A lover's potential additional amorous involvement -- an "offense" -- is thus blocked of necessity in advance by the beloved's threat of separation.

Whether an Ākṣepa of the Past, Present, or Future, the actual denial, however implemented, is primarily on ongoing event. It is in effect the occurrence of that which is to

be denied relative to the process of denial that
distinguishes our first three varieties of ākṣepa.

2.127 Example of the Ākṣepa of Attribute

O Slender one!

The reputed softness of your limbs

is surely illusionary . . .

If truly soft

why are they suddenly torturing me?

Dharma Ākṣepodāharanam :

tava tanvaṅgi mithyaiva rūḍhaman̄geṣu mārdavam

yadi satyam mṛdūnyeva kimakāṇde rujanti mām

2.128 The Ākṣepa of Attribute

This is an Ākṣepa of Attribute:

The softness of a beautiful woman's limbs

-- due to an incongruous effect --

is thus denied by a lover.

Dharma Ākṣepah :

dharmaśeṣopayamāksiptamañganāgātramārdavam

kāmukena yadatraivam̄ karmanā tadvirodhinā

añganā /"a (beautiful) woman."

kāmukena [< kāmukah] /literally, "one wishing for,
longing after"; "a (male) lover."

A consideration of "when" an event to be denied occurs
has generated our first three varieties. And just as with

the three structural variations of position in dīpaka alamkāra, ākṣepa's three variations of relative time may be considered "modalities" that could (in theory) be applied in an overlapping manner to following varieties. We now turn to a series based upon "what" is actually denied.

In dharma ākṣepa the validity of a distinctive attribute or feature (dharma) of an object is called into question. The negation is not absolute, however, but apparent, and thus ironically the intensity of the attribute is described. As in dharma upamā [2.15], the focus of dharma ākṣepa is an attribute; yet the means of its realization, an object generating an otherwise incongruous effect, reflects the process displayed by viruddha rūpaka [2.83-84]. The element of incongruity lies only on the surface and it is in this that the element of irony lies.

The obvious softness (mārdavam) of a beautiful woman's limbs must be illusionary. "If truly soft / Why are they suddenly torturing me?" As in bhavisyet ākṣepa [2.125-26],

a lover's flattery embodies the apparent negation -- limbs
 that are in fact so soft they cannot but "torture" her lover
 with desire.

2.129 Example of the Ākṣepa of the Basis of Attribution

"Is she beautiful or not?"

How can correct discrimination occur?

Only a shimmering brilliance is seen --

Not its basis.

Dharmin Ākṣepodāharanam :

sundarī sā na vetyesa vivekah kena jāyate
 prabhāmātram hi taralam dr̥syate na tadāśrayah

2.130 The Ākṣepa of the Basis of Attribution

This is an Ākṣepa of the Basis of Attribution:

Given the attribute "brilliance"

the basis of this attribution is denied

by one who wishes to illustrate a beauty

that is truly wondrous.

Dharmin Ākṣepah :

dharma^{yā}ākṣepoyamāksipto dharmī dharmam̄ prabhāhvayam̄

anujñāyaiva yadrūpamatyāścaryam̄ vivakṣatā

dharmi- [< dharma (+) in /literally, "that which possesses dharmas or attributes"; "a whole," "aggregate," "basis"] .

Both guna and dharma may mean "attribute" or

"property," yet guna may also carry the further connotation of "excellence" or "quality." Dharma in its frequent association with the complementary term dharmin, may lay perhaps greater stress on the attribute as "attribute of an aggregate." Thus as dharma āksepa focuses on the attribute as such, in dharmin āksepa the complex object that "possesses attributes," that is, the "basis of attribution" conceived of as a complex entity is denied.

In this case, however, the negation is quite real, and once again the result is the emphasis of a positive quality, and thus subtle yet emphatic flattery. For of course one perceives a beautiful woman whose beauty is so great that it appears as a "shimmering brilliance" (dharma), so intense that it eclipses and thus negates its very basis, the woman herself (dharmin).

2.131 Example of the Ākṣepa of Efficient Cause

Your eyes are turning red

That petal of a lower lip trembles

Your brows are furrowed --

Yet I -- faultless -- am without fear.

Kāraṇa Ākṣepodāharanam :

cakṣuśī tava rajyete sphuratyadharapallavah

bhruvau ca bhugne na tathāpyaduṣṭasyāsti me bhayam

2.132 The Ākṣepa of Efficient Cause

This is an Ākṣepa of Efficient Cause:

A shrewd lover has denied

the primary cause of fear --

His own offense.

Kāraṇa Ākṣepah :

sa eṣa kāraṇākṣepah pradhānam kāraṇam bhiyah

svāparādho niṣiddhotra yat priyēṇa paṭiyasā

kāraṇam [(n.)] / "(efficient) cause," "reason";
 "means," "instrument."

niṣiddhah [bhūte kṛdanta < ni (+) *sidh] /
 "prohibited," "suppressed," "negated."

We have but briefly considered Dāṇḍin's general

conception of "causality" (fully elaborated in hetu alamkāra [2.235-60]) in our previous examinations of its subordinate integration within two distinct alamkāras -- hetu upamā [2.50] and hetu rūpaka [2.85-86]. Thus hetu as a superordinate term referring to the general process of cause and effect or "causality." When integrated within another alamkāra as subordinate it may more specifically refer to one of its two fundamental subdivisions: that of jñāpaka hetu or "logical/conceptual cause," or that of kāraka hetu or "efficient/material cause."

Kārana ākṣepa may be considered to reflect the latter category, kāraka hetu. The Aristotelian categories tend to merge in kāraka/kārana: coming from the verbal root *kr /"do," "act," "make," it refers to the actual force or means by which an effect is produced and is thus "efficient," yet frequently this "means" is realized as an entity or object and is thus "material." With its integration into ākṣepa alamkāra we thus see kārana ākṣepa

illustrating the denial or negation of what may be somewhat broadly considered an "efficient cause."

Thus a "shrewd lover" denies the "primary cause" (pradhānam kāranam) of what in this case would otherwise be the primary effect -- his own fear. The lover's "offense" is thus otherwise conceived as the phenomenally objective means -- the kārana -- that would produce this effect.

Dandin focuses on the lover's offense as the primary cause of (potential) fear, for we do observe three secondary causes additionally illustrated in his example: the beloved's "eyes turning red," "lower lip trembling," and "brows furrowed." Reflecting extreme anger or distress, these are yet insufficient to generate fear in the shrewd lover who negates its motivating basis.

2.133 Example of the Ākṣepa of Effect

My dearest one's far away

The rainy season's here

I see the blossomed Niculas . . .

I'm not dead -- What is this?

Kārya Ākṣepodāharanam :

düre priyatamah soyamāgato jaladāgamah

dr̥ṣṭāśca phullā niculā na mṛtā cāsmi kim nvidam

jaladāgamah /literally, "clouds-coming": "the rainy season."

phullāh niculāh /"blossomed Niculas." We have seen joyful peacocks "dancing in the laps of Niculas" with glances fixed on the rainy season clouds [2.103]; peacocks and Niculas as markers of the erotic.

2.134 The Ākṣepa of Effect

This is an Ākṣepa of Effect:

Expressing the cause

-- the terrifying rainy season --

The effect -- death -- is negated.

Kārya Ākṣepah :

kāryākṣepah sa kāryasya maraṇasya nivartanāt

tatkāraṇamupanyasya dāruṇam jaladāgamam

kārya- [(n.) tavyānta < *kr] / "duty"; "conduct";
"purpose," "motive"; "effect," "result."

nivartanāt [(n.) (abl.) of nivartana [< ni (+)
*vṛt] / "turning back," "averting," "prohibiting,"
"negating"] : nisedhāt (RR/189).

As dharmin [2.129-30] followed dharma [2.127-28], so kārana ākṣepa is followed by a complementary variety. In kārya ākṣepa a cause is expressed, yet now its consequent effect -- kārya -- is denied.

The rainy season is perhaps the kāvi's favorite arena for playing out love's polar modes: love-in-enjoyment (sambhoga) and love-in-separation (vipralambha). It is a time when travel is difficult, if not impossible. For lovers fortunately together at its onset, it is a time of seclusion and enjoyment; for those separated, the duration of the rains marks a period of suffering and frustrated desire.

The blossoming Niculas (and joyfully dancing peacocks) mark the onset of the rainy season. For a woman intensely in love whose lover is far away, this cause can -- in kāvya's hyper-sensitized world -- have but one effect -- death. With its negation a lady cannot but express her amazement.

2.135 Example of the Ākṣepa through Permission

Your journey won't be distressful for long

If you must go . . . Please go

You needn't trouble yourself about it.

Anujñā Ākṣepodāharanam :

na ciram mama tāpaya tava yātrā bhaviṣyati

yadi yāsyasi yātavyamalamāśaṅkayātra te

2.136 The Ākṣepa through Permission

This is termed an Ākṣepa through Permission:

Through permission

-- by a woman yet implying her own death --

the journey of a lover is impeded.

Anujñā Āksepah :

ityanujñāmukhenaiva kāntasyāksipyate gatih

maraṇam sūcayantyaiva sonujñākṣepa ucyate

āksipyate [karmani prayoga < ā (+) *ksip].

Anujñā ākṣepa initiates a series of some ten varieties (through [2.154]) that in its length, and in its coherence of theme and method is unique among the subvarieties of Dāṇḍin's artha alamkāras. The preceding kārya ākṣepa provides an introductory note with the rainy season and its attendant dangers for lovers apart; yet a warning note, an illustration of the potential result of separation, that provides an implicit backdrop for the theme to follow. In each of the verses of our series, a woman addresses her lover with the ultimate -- for we shall see that her means are various and subtle -- goal of preventing his departure on a long journey, thus initiating a potentially fatal separation. As the theme of this series is constant

throughout, so is the primary framework of its realization. Ākṣepa has been distinguished according to the "when" of the three temporal modalities, and according to the "what" of that which is actually denied. We now turn to the "how" of negation, the manner and means of its achievement illustrated as multiple methods of obstructing a lover's departure.

In anujñā ākṣepa the journey of a lover is impeded through what is -- ironically -- a woman's permission for him to depart. A permission, however, heavily (and effectively) burdened with its potential consequences. Of course "If you must go . . . go. How can your journey be distressful to one that will soon be dead?"

The element of implication and "suggestion" is dominant in nearly all of the verses of this series and should be considered yet another integrating element. And most importantly we should consider that Dāṇḍin's no doubt conscious craft in the realization and display of suggestion in these verses was very probably to serve as an

influential source for the first (extant) writer to explicitly posit suggestion as the distinguishing feature of poetic language.

2.137 Example of the Āksepa through Authority

You'll probably run into lots of money

There's pleasure and safety on the road

And there should be no concern for my life --

Even so . . . Dear One! Don't go!

Prabhatva Āksepodāharanam :

dhanam ca bahu labhyam te sukham kṣemam ca vartmani

na ca me prāṇasamdehastathāpi priya mā sma gāḥ

mā . . . gāḥ [(2nd.) (sing.) negative injunctive < luñ (aorist) in short a].

2.138 The Ākṣepa through Authority

This is termed an Ākṣepa through Authority:

Through sheer authority

-- by a women giving otherwise conducive reasons --

the journey of a lover is obstructed.

Prabhuṭva Ākṣepah :

ityācaksāṇayā hetūn priyayātrānubandhinah

prabhuṭvenaiva ruddhastat prabhuṭvākṣepa ucyate

prabhuṭvam [(n.) < pra (+) *bhū] / "sovereignty,"

"power," "dominance," "authority."

Prabhuṭva ākṣepa would seem to embody immediate and direct presentation and would thus appear as a fundamental exception to our series' general tenor of implicit

suggestion. A woman counters conducive reasons for her lover's journey with a direct and explicit plea to remain. The journey is obstructed through what is in effect the polar opposite to suggestive persuasion -- "sheer authority." Yet this direct appeal follows what is actually a subtle preparatory attack on the lover's resolve. The "conducive" reasons for going are in reality refutations of some very real reasons for not going: losing one's money, danger, and her probable death at his departure. Their reality and preventive force would perhaps be only strengthened through what are rather contingent verbal refutations.

2.139 Example of the Ākṣepa through Indifference

My desire for life is strong

My greed for money weak --

Go or stay!

Beloved! I've stated my position.

Anādara Ākṣepodāharanam :

jīvitāśā balavatī dhanāśā durbalā mama

gaccha vā tiṣṭha vā kānta svāvasthā tu niveditā

2.140 The Ākṣepa through Indifference

This is an Ākṣepa through Indifference:

Words indicating indifference are employed

by a woman in love --

One obstructing the journey of her lover.

Anādara Ākṣepah :

asāvanādarākṣepo yadanādaravadvacah

priyaprayānam rundhatyā prayuktamiha raktayā

anādarah [< an (+) ādarah < ā (+) *dr̥] /

"dis-respect," "dis-regard"; "indifference."

"Go or stay!" -- words that seemingly indicate the cool indifference of a woman towards her lover's journey.

Yet once again the ironic nature of what seems to be the

case is revealed through our inference of the true situation. The initial statements of her "position" only belie her announced indifference. Her "desire for life is strong" -- she does not wish to die upon his departure. Her "greed for money is weak" -- she cannot be swayed by claims of potential wealth. In anādara āksepa what is suggested betrays the illusion of a literal indifference, and the journey of the lover is denied.

2.141 Example of the Āksepa through Benediction

Beloved! If you would go . . . Go!

May your roads be auspicious

May my next birth occur there

Where you have gone.

Āśīrvacana Ākṣepodāharanam :

gaccha gacchasi cet kānta panthānah santu te śivāḥ
 mamāpi janma tatraiva būyādyatra gato bhavān

2.142 The Ākṣepa through Benediction

This is an Ākṣepa through Benediction:

Through benediction

-- by a woman actually communicating her own plight --

the journey of a lover is obstructed.

Āśīrvacana Ākṣepah :

ityāśīrvacanākṣepo yadāśīrvādavartmanā
 svāvasthām sūcayantyaiva kāntayātrā niśidhyate

āśīrvacana- [< āśīs (f.)] /literally, "expressing a propitious wish"; "a blessing," "benediction."

A woman blesses her lover's journey, expressing herself in the propitious terms of benediction, "May your. . . ." Yet her true feelings, and thus the ironic intent of the initial statements, are "suggested" by the concluding line. Although in the literal form of a propitious wish -- "May my next birth occur there / Where you have gone" -- what her lover infers and thus actually hears is rather, "I will die with agony at your departure"/tvadvirahavedanayā marisyāmi (RR/191).

Āśīrvacana ākṣepa ironically cloaks a statement whose force is to deny or obstruct in the seemingly encouraging guise of propitious benediction.

2.143 Example of the Ākṣepa through Harshness

If this journey of yours is really happening

May you find another woman!

Today surely I'm held by death

taking advantage of weakness.

Parusa Ākṣepodāharanam :

yadi satyaiva yātrā te kāpyanyā mr̄gyatāṁ tvayā

ahamadyaiva ruddhāsmi randhrāpeksēṇa mr̄tyunā

randhrāpeksēṇa [randhra - apa (+) īkṣa] /literally,

"one keeping a sharp eye out for holes"; "one taking

advantage of weak points or weakness."

2.144 The Ākṣepa through Harshness

This is an Ākṣepa through Harshness:

Through harsh words

-- by a woman yet consumed by love --

the journey of a lover is impeded.

Parusa Āksepah :

ityesa parusakṣepah parusakṣarapūrvakam

kāntasyāksipyate yasmāt prasthānam premanighnayā

Parusa ākṣepa initially appears to be quite similar to the "authoritative" and thus explicit expression of denial that we have seen in prabhuta ākṣepa [2.137-38]. The "harshness" explicit in a woman's hope that her lover "find another woman" is obvious. On the surface we have anger and again indifference. And although the harshness of tone

carries on to the latter half of the verse, its focus turns inward as she voices her despair and reveals her inner feelings. For at her lover's departure she would be "held" by none other than death, he who "takes advantage of weakness." Yet this weakness can only in fact reflect "a woman yet subsumed by love" -- a weakness that cannot but obstruct the lover's journey.

As harshness of tone often reflects a sense of one's own vulnerability, so the harshness illustrated by parusa āksepa is rather an ironic revelation of a directly proportionate love.

2.145 Example of the Ākṣepa through Counsel

If you would go . . . go quickly!

Before the cries

flung from the mouths of grieving relations

-- sounds inimical to your journey --

reach your ears.

Sācivya Ākṣepodāharanam :

gantā cedgaccha tūrṇām te karnau yānti purā ravāḥ

ārtabandhumukhodgīrṇāḥ prayāṇaparipanthināḥ

paripanthināḥ [< pari (+) pathin] /literally,
"across one's path"; "enemy," "obstacle."

2.146 The Ākṣepa through Counsel

This is an Ākṣepa through Counsel:

As though offering counsel

a woman very much in love

impedes the journey of her lover.

Sācivya Ākṣepah :

sācivyākṣepa evaiṣa yadatra pratiṣidhyate

priyaprayāṇam sācivyam kurvatyevātiraktayā

As āśīrvacana ākṣepa [2.141-42] assumes the form of a benediction, so sācivya ākṣepa ironically "suggests" obstruction or denial through the form of positive counsel or advice. And as with āśīrvacana ākṣepa, an initial statement appears to convey the acquiescence of a woman to

her lover's journey, but again serves rather to accentuate the force of the inferred meaning to follow.

It is wise counsel for a woman's lover to leave in haste if indeed he must go, for the "cries flung from the mouths of grieving relations" may cause distress and possible second thoughts. Yet such second thoughts are assured with the lover's inferred realization that such grief would more probably stem from the death, consequent upon his departure, of his beloved.

2.147 Example of the Āksepa of Effort

Beloved! I want to say "Go!"

Wishing what is pleasing to you

From my mouth "Don't go!" comes forth --

What can I do?

Yatna Ākṣepodāharanam :

gaccheti vaktumicchāmi matpriya tvatpriyaiśinī
nirgacchati mukhādvāṇī mā gā iti karomi kim

2.148 The Ākṣepa through Effort

This is an Ākṣepa through Effort:

Showing the uselessness of effort

made for an undesired object

through the generation of an

otherwise opposite result.

Yatna Ākṣepah :

yatnākṣepah sa yatnasya kṛtasyāniṣṭavastuni
viparītaphalotpatterānartha khyopadarśanāt

A woman "Wishing what is pleasing" to her lover makes an attempt to acquiesce to his journey; she sincerely wants to say "Go!," yet "What can she do?" Through no fault of her own the opposite result ensues, and her true feelings are explicitly revealed.

In yatna ākṣepa the strength of a woman's plea to her lover to remain -- its obstructing power -- is reinforced through its presentation as an objective and inevitable result, one realized in spite of all possible contrary effort. The sincerity of her effort, for what is after all an "undesired object," may perhaps be questioned. Yet from this very questioning the validity of her actual intent, a plea to remain, is inferred.

2.149 Example of the Ākṣepa through Control of Another

Tell love of your journey!

He who's angry at blinking lashes

but brief obstacles to sight --

What's accepted by him is accepted by me.

Paravaśā Ākṣepodāharanam :

kṣanam darśanavighnāya pakṣmaspandāya kupyataḥ

premnāḥ prayānam tvam brūhi mayā tasyeṣṭamisya

premnāḥ [(m.) (gen.) (sing.) < preman] / "love,"

"affection."

tasyeṣṭam [tasya-iṣṭam]: where a bhūte kṛdanta (iṣṭa) expresses an action occurring in the present or immediate future, its agent will frequently take the genitive case (tasya).

2.150 The Ākṣepa through Control of Another

This is an Ākṣepa through Control of Another:

A woman under the control of another

-- "Love" --

through ironic implication

impedes the journey of her lover.

Paravaśa Ākṣepah :

soyam paravaśākṣepo yat premaparatantrayā

tayā niśidhyate yātrānyasyārthasyopasūcanāt

anyasya arthasya upasūcanāt /literally, "due to
indicating another meaning."

In the preceding yatra ākṣepa we have seen an
otherwise direct negation ("Don't go!") presented as an

objective and inevitable result, divorced to a degree from the woman involved. In paravaśa ākṣepa the question whether to obstruct or not is abstracted and objectively placed "under the control of another." Again, the objectivity is illusory, serving but to set the scene for the "ironic implication" to follow, assuring the inevitable denial.

A woman places the fate of her lover's journey in the hands of none other than "Love." Yet for one who is angry at the separation of lovers for the mere blink of an eye, what we infer of his feelings at protracted separation -- and thus what he will or will not "accept" -- is obvious.

2.151 Example of the Ākṣepa through an Impossible Expedient

Lord! I will endure separation . . .

Give me the mascara of invisibility!

With my eyes thus adorned

Kandarpaḥ -- the tormentor -- won't see me.

Upāya Ākṣepodāharanam :

sahiṣye viraham nātha dehyadr̥syāñjanam mama
 yadaktanetrām kandarpaḥ prahartā mām na paśyati

adr̥syāñjanam [a-dr̥sy-a-ñjanah] /literally, "an ointment/mascara for not being seen": an ointment applied around the eyes that confers invisibility.

kandarpaḥ [< kam (+) darpa /"inflamer of the gods"
 [?]] /epithet of Kāma, god of love (see [2.80], under manmatha).

2.152 The Ākṣepa through an Impossible Expedient

Stipulating an expedient for living

difficult to realize

the journey of the husband is impeded --

This is called an Ākṣepa

through an Impossible Expedient.

Upāya Ākṣepah :

duṣkaram jīvanopāyamupanyasyoparudhyate

patyuh prasthānamityāhurupāyākṣepamidrśam

Placing the fate of a lover's journey under the control of one such as "Love," a woman is assured of a favorable decision. Let her stipulate impossible grounds for separation and the result is equally inevitable. Denial

is assured in upāya āksepa where the grounds or means for what would otherwise be affirmation are impossible to realize.

Certainly a woman would endure separation if her husband could provide the (non-existent) "mascara of invisibility." Invisible, she would survive the otherwise fatal torments of the god of love. Without it, the husband cannot but infer the mortal consequences of his journey.

2.153 Example of the Āksepa through Anger

Beloved! "I'm going"

has certainly come from your mouth --

Although remaining just now

with your faded love

What are you to me?

Rosa Ākṣepodāharanam :

pravṛttaiva prayāmīti vāñī vallabha te mukhāt

ayatāpi tvayedānīm mandapremṇā mamāsti kim

2.154 The Ākṣepa through Anger

This is an Ākṣepa through Anger:

A furious woman

-- uncontrolled due to excessive love --

obstructs the imminent journey of her lover.

Rosa Ākṣepah :

roṣākṣepoyamudriktasnehaniryantritātmanā

samrabdhayā priyārabdham prayānam yanniśidhyate

Rosa ākṣepa shares with prabhutva ākṣepa [2.137-38]

the element of direct and explicit presentation, and is similar to parusa ākṣepa [2.143-44] in its strident tone.

Denial or obstruction is achieved not so much through the force of "anger" itself, but -- in a method analogous to parusa ākṣepa -- through what that anger (or harshness) "suggests" about a quite opposite emotion.

At the announcement of her lover's departure a woman becomes "furious" and voices her disdain. What can she not help but surmise about the depth of his love if he does indeed depart? Yet the lover cannot but infer that she is "uncontrolled due to excessive love," and thus abandon his journey.

Rosa ākṣepa marks the end of our integrated series thematically revolving around the obstruction of a lover's journey. We now turn to what are the finest examples of "suggestion" among ākṣepa's varieties, and conclude, as is Dandin's wont, with a brief series based upon the incorporation of distinct alamkāras.

[Note: I believe verses [2.155-56] of Rangacharya

Raddi's text are interpolations; the numbering of his text
is yet retained (see note 4 below).]

2.157 Example of the Āksepa of Compassion⁴

No longer smelled

No longer kept behind the ear by beautiful women

No longer placed in liquor --

The Utpala . . . decayed and wilted

in the wells of your enemies.

Anukrośa Āksepodāharanam :

nāghrātam na kṛtam karṇe strībhirmadhuni nārpitam
tvaddviṣām dīrghikāsveva viśīrṇam nilamutpalam

2.158 The Ākṣepa of Compassion

This is an Ākṣepa of Compassion:

Negating with apparent compassion

appropriate functions of the Utpala

in the description of a pathetic condition.

Anukrośa Ākṣepah :

asāvanukrośākṣepah sānukrośamivotpale

vyāvartya karma tadyogyam śocyāvasthopadarśanāt

anukrośa [< anu (+) *kruś / "shout," "cry out," "lament"].

With anukrośa ākṣepa (and the following anuśaya) we turn from "how" ākṣepa or denial is realized, to its presentation as an integral factor in the development of an

emotive mood. Thus a series of negations of usual and appropriate functions of the Utpala flower -- its fragrance, its beauty as ornament -- reinforces the description of its "pathetic condition," captured in the final line, where, its functions denied, it can only appear "decayed and wilted" in the wells of a great king's enemies.

Dandin's effective descriptions, nicely crafted with repeated negations of former actions fondly remembered abruptly crystalizing into a sharp, positive image of present decay, certainly reflect and succeed in evoking sympathetic compassion. The cumulative resonance of the verse further expands with the additional inference that we cannot help but draw -- the Utpala is but a symbol for all that a great king's enemies have lost and for what they have become.

[Note: The following three varieties of ākṣepa alamkāra are in what I believe to be the more accurate order; again, the numbering of Rangacharya Radhi's text is yet retained (see note 5 below).]

2.161 Example of the Āksepa of Regret⁵

No wealth accumulated

No branch of knowledge mastered

No austerities performed --

An entire lifetime gone . . .

Anuśaya Āksepodāharanam :

artho na saṁbhṛtaḥ kaścinna vidyā kācidarjitā

na tapah saṁcitatām kiṁcidgatām ca sakalam vayah

vidyā /" (branches of) knowledge" (see under vidyā,

[2.52]).

2.162 The Ākṣepa of Regret

This is an Ākṣepa of Regret:

Consequent to regret

the denial of accumulated wealth and so on

is expressed by one whose life has passed.

Anuśaya Ākṣepah :

asāvanuśayāksepo yasmādanuśayottaram

arthārjanādervyāvṛttidarsiteha gatāyuṣā

anuśayah [(m.) < anu (+) *śī / "lie along side of,"
 "adhere to"] / "close connection," "consequence,";
 "repentance," "regret."

We have seen Daṇḍin's predilection for generating
 complementary pairs in, for example, dharma [2.127-28]/

dharmin [2.129-30] and kārana [2.131-32]/kārya [2.133-34] āksepas. Anuśaya āksepa parallels the preceding anukrośa āksepa. Again a series of three negations sets the stage for a final integrating image. And again, all three negations involve the denial of positive actions. Yet now, with the verse expressed in the first person rather than through an omniscient observer, the effect of retrospective denial turns inward -- compassion for another is now an interior, personal "regret." "One whose life has passed" looks back on failures, whose results can only be expressed as a series of negations. Engendered by regret, the verse again succeeds in capturing and thus evoking a specific emotion.

2.163 Example of the Ākṣepa of Doubt

Is this an autumn cloud?

A flock of hamsas?

A sound as though of anklets is heard . . .

It's not a cloud.

Samśaya Ākṣepodāharanam :

kimayam śaradambodah kim vā hamsakadambakam
rutam nūpurasamvādi śrūyate tanna toyadah

hamsa : (see [2.55], under hamsī).

2.164 The Ākṣepa of Doubt

This is an Ākṣepa of Doubt:

Doubt is removed

through an attribute applicable to hamsas --

one inapplicable as such to clouds.

Samśaya Ākṣepah :

ityayam samśayākṣepah samśayo yannivartyate

dharmaṇa hamsasulabhenāspr̥ṣṭaghanajatinā

As we have noted in our discussion of samśaya upamā [2.26], Dandin was aware of samśaya (sasamdeha/samdeha) as an independent alamkāra. Again, this is expressly confirmed by its mention as such in [2.358], and indirectly by its inclusion within such a series where independent alamkāras are incorporated. Apparently Dandin did not think

the "distinctive charm" or resonance of samśaya sufficient to warrant its citation as a distinct alamkāra, but this did not prevent him from utilizing it with effect as a subordinate element within other alamkāras.

In samśaya upamā doubt must linger ("My mind swings thus. . . .!") in order to stress the marked degree of similarity between upameya and upamāna. With samśaya āksepa, however, doubt must be resolved in order to achieve the element of denial. Our example thus illustrates two alternatives generating doubt: "Is this a massive white autumn cloud or a massed flock of white hamsas?" For with autumn the rains have passed and clouds would no longer be dark and ominous, and with autumn comes the migratory flights of numerous birds (whether poetically conceived or not). Doubt arises from an initial confusion of color and shape. With the cries of the hamsas, "as though of anklets," doubt is resolved through sound -- preparing the way for the ultimate denial of the "autumn cloud."

2.159 Example of the Ākṣepa of Multiple Embrace

When there is your

face

-

moon

delightful

/

body of nectar

enemy of the lotus

with

loving eyes

/

shining stars

What use is that other moon?

Śliṣṭa Ākṣepodāharanam :

amṛtātmani padmānām dveṣṭari snigdhatārake

mukhendau tava satyasminnapareṇa kimindunā

2.160 The Ākṣepa of Multiple Embrace

Describing similar attributes

existing in a figurative moon

the literal moon is then rejected --

Such is an Ākṣepa of Multiple Embrace.

Ślistā Ākṣepah :

iti mukhyenurākṣipto gunān gaunenduvartinah

tatsamān darśayitveha ślistākṣepastathāvidhah

mukhya/gauna" : "primary"/"literal" ; "secondary"/
 "figurative" (see discussion under [2.88], upamā rūpaka and
vyatireka rūpaka, and their respective examples in [2.89]
 and [2.90]).

Ślistā [ślesā] ākṣepa begins a final series of four

varieties, all based upon the subordinate incorporation of an otherwise distinct alamkāra. We have previously seen ślesa alamkāra [2.310-22] combined with upamā [2.28], rūpaka [2.87], and dīpaka [2.113-14] alamkāras. In the present instance there is the further addition of rūpaka. It would appear that we thus have the balanced integration of distinctive elements of rūpaka, ślesa, and ākṣepa alamkāras within one verse: the image of a "figurative moon" with rūpaka ("face-moon"); the respective attributes of each component captured by ślesa; and the final denial of the "literal moon" with ākṣepa. Yet as a variety of ākṣepa alamkāra, the "face-moon" and its attributes must be seen in light of and thus subordinate to the final rejection of the moon itself.

There are three examples of ślesa in the example, each illuminating the "face-moon." Amṛta-ātmani [(loc.) (sing.) < atman] may be taken literally in its application to the moon, as "one whose body or essence consists of nectar"/candra-pakṣe amṛtameva ātmā svarūpam yasya (RR/196); and

"from the point of view of the face, may mean 'one causing unsurpassed delight or joy'"/paramāhlādake ityarthah
mukhapakṣe (RR/196). The meaning of padmānām dvestari [(loc.) (sing.) < dvestr̥] /"hater of lotuses" is essentially uniform, though applicable to both components. The hatred of the face and moon presumably reflects their status as jealous rivals in beauty with the lotus.

Snigdha-tārake

[(loc.) (sing.) < tāraka] plays upon the dual meaning of tāraka; thus we have, alternately, "shining or loving pupils" and "shining constellations or stars." As Ratnaśrī notes in reference to the moon, "rohinī and so on" (RŚ/114). That is, the stars comprising the constellations of the "lunar mansions," the 27 (28) divisions of the Indian lunar zodiac. The intimate relation between "pupils" and face is thus aptly balanced by the constellations as marking the path of the moon.

Expanding literally our verse we thus have: "When there is the face (of your face-moon), delightful, enemy of

the lotus, with loving eyes . . . / When there is the moon
 (of your face-moon), body of nectar, enemy of the lotus,
 with shining stars . . . What use is that other moon?"

The justification for the negation (āksepa) of a literal object is illustrated through the presentation of positive attributes (through slesa) of a figurative object (through rūpaka).

2.165 Example of the Āksepa through Analogous Corroboration

It is wondrous --

Although over-running the world

Your valor's still unsatisfied . . .

Yet when is a raging fire's satisfaction seen?

Artha Antara Ākṣepodāharanam :

citramākrāntaviśvopi vikramaste na ṭṛpyati

kadā vā dr̥ṣyate ṭṛptirudīrṇasya havirbhujah

havirbhujah [(m.) (gen.) (sing.) < havis-bhuj] /

literally, "eater of oblations"; "fire."

2.166 The Ākṣepa through Analogous Corroboration

This is an Ākṣepa through Analogous Corroboration

An initial wonder is negated

through seeing similar attributes

displayed in analogous situation.

Artha Antara Ākṣepah:

ayamarthāntarākṣepah prakrānto yannivāryate

vismayorthāntarasyeha darśanāt tatsadharmanah

Arthāntaranyāsa alamkāra [2.169-79] (literally, "stating another thing/object") immediately follows ākṣepa alamkāra. It revolves around variations of validation: an initial proposition is introduced, followed by a verification (the "other thing" stated). Incorporated within ākṣepa alamkāra as artha antara ākṣepa, we then have negation realized through the verification of an initial proposition. Though as we shall see in our example, negation in this case may be something quite other.

That "A great king's valor remains unsatisfied even after the conquest of the world" is indeed "wondrous." Wonder, however, stems from the initial, primary proposition, marking the rare and unusual event. To validate the primary statement with corroborating, analogous comparison, to eliminate its unique nature, is to negate -- from a strictly logical point of view -- the element of awe. In accepting that a "raging fire forever remains unsatisfied," and in accepting that the comparison is valid, we substantiate a great king's insatiable thirst

for conquest while simultaneously appearing to deny its wondrous aspect.

Once again it would seem that Dandin is playing with levels of inference and thus resonance. With the acceptance of the comparison as valid, we infer -- initially -- that wonder is to be denied. Moving one step further, however, given that the comparison involves being compared with something that in itself is great and wondrous, we cannot but return full circle with interest -- ironic negation serves but to reinforce affirmation.

2.167 Example of the Ākṣepa with Cause

Lord of men!

Never are you praised: "You are one who gives!"

Since supplicants assume your wealth

considering it their own.

Hetu Ākṣepodāharanam :

na stūyase narendra tvam dadāsiti kadācana
 svameva matvā gr̥hṇanti yatastvaddhanamarthinah

2.168 The Ākṣepa with Cause / Conclusion to Ākṣepa Alambikāra

Such an ākṣepa is considered

an Ākṣepa with Cause --

Along these lines other varieties of ākṣepa
 can certainly be imagined.

Hetu Ākṣepalambikāropasamhārah :

ityevamādirākṣepo hetvākṣepa iti smṛtaḥ
 anayaiva diśānyepi vikalpāḥ śakyamūhitum

In kārana ākṣepa [2.131-32] a primary, "efficient" cause -- cause as the actual force or means by which an effect is produced -- was the focus of denial. In hetu ākṣepa, our concluding variety, cause appears as the "reason for" a distinct negation, thus reflecting hetu's other main subdivision, jñāpaka hetu or "logical/conceptual" cause. That a king is explicitly praised by those in need is directly denied. An apparent fault becomes in effect praise ith the reason for the negation expressed: "Why should they praise you? Your generosity is so great that supplicants consider your wealth their own."

Dāṇḍin's example of hetu ākṣepa echoes his conception of vyājastuti alamkāra [2.343-47], where praise appears in the guise of censure. In the present case, negation appears as censure to be followed by its cause, a cause that reveals all as praise (though this transition need hardly be a requirement for this variety). In the varieties of vyājastuti alamkāra, the entire context is one of apparent censure and praise must thus be inferred.

Notes [2.121] - [2.168]

1. Wendy D. O'Flaherty, Hindu Myths (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975), No. 41, From the Saura Purāṇa [53.21-65a, 69-73; 54.1-8, 16-22], p. 156.
2. Again, a lack of cultural awareness often leads to mistranslation: "Why do you fix a lotus at your ear, my soft-voiced one? Do you think your sidelong glance unable to attract me?" (Glossary/127). There is no "sidelong glance" in the verse, and the task that both flower and corner of the eye fulfill is one of adornment. The relationship between adornment and attraction is obvious, but this is just the point. Mistranslation arises not only from invalid semantic correspondence, from misrepresentation of tone and content, but just as surely from "collapsing" a verse in substituting as though explicit what is in fact left to be inferred.
3. V. S. Apte, The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary, rev. enlarged ed. (Poona: Prasad Prakashan, 1957); Reprint (Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co., 1978), p. 1362.
4. The following two verses appear as [2.155] and [2.156] in Rangacharya Raddi's text (p. 195). I feel that they are later interpolations and have thus elided them from the body of the text:

2.155 Example of the Ākṣepa through Fainting

A young woman fainting

upon hearing of her lover's journey --

regaining consciousness, seeing her beloved,

says, "Why did it take you so long to return?"

Mūrchā Ākṣepodāharāṇam :

mugdhā kāntasya yātrotktiśravaṇādeva mūrchitā

buddhvā vakti priyam dr̥ṣṭvā kim cireṇāgate bhavān

2.156 The Āksepa through Fainting

Through suddenly fainting

a woman with frightened eyes

obstructs the journey of her lover --

Such is an Āksepa through Fainting.

Mūrcha Āksepah :

iti tatkālasambhūtamūrchayāksipyate gatiḥ

kāntasya kātarākṣyā yanmūrchākṣepah sa īdrśah

S. K. Belvalkar and Rangacharya Raddi in their Notes to Chapter Two of the Kāvyādarśa consider that "the two stanzas about mūrchāksepa (2.155, 156) are probably interpolations. Our oldest MSS. J [?] and N [?] omit them, and the fact that the Madras edition [presumably that of M. Raṅgācarya, Madras, 1910, with the commentary by Taruṇavācaspati and the anonymous Hṛdayaṅgama commentary] takes them before the two stanzas dealing with rosāksepa points to the same conclusion" (Notes 2/125). Of course it is not the specific position that is important in this case, rather that the variation itself points to the lack of firm integration within the text. They conclude, "We

had to retain them in the text so as not to disturb the numbering of the *editio princeps*" (*Notes* 2/125). S. K. Belvalkar in his 1924 edition of the *Kāvyādarśa* refers to these verses as "spurious" (Preface, p.vii), yet again, taking Premachandra's 1863 edition as *editio princeps*, includes them. Rangacharya Raddi in his 1938 edition merely notes that these stanzas do not appear in the Malayālam palm leaf manuscript he consulted (volume "a") (RR/195). Otto Böhtlingk also includes them but notes under the first stanza, "Dieser und der folgende vers fehlen in vielen Hdschrrr"/"This and the following verse are missing in many manuscripts" (Böhtlingk/46).

The elision of these stanzas stems from two primary considerations. We have noted the general references to their absence in various copies of the text, and their variant position in at least one edition. More specifically and importantly, these are not referred to in Ratnaśrī's commentary and thus do not appear in his reconstructed text; nor do they appear in either of the Tibetan translations, the earliest of which, that of Shong ston rdo rje rgyal mtshan and Lakṣmikāra [13th to 14th centuries], predates any of the available Sanskrit manuscripts.

Beyond these inter-textual considerations, we may examine the verses themselves. First, they appear as the last of Daṇdin's varieties of ākṣepa that revolve around a woman obstructing the imminent departure of her lover -- the logical position of interpolated appendages. Second, there are stylistic discrepancies. Reflecting Daṇdin's love of pattern, all of the examples in this series appear in the first person voice of a woman addressing her lover. This example, however, is presented through the eyes of an omniscient narrator, relating the woman's actions and what she eventually does say. Further, there is an uncharacteristic and jarring choppiness to this example, marked by a series of disjunctive actions: a woman "hears," then "faints," "regains consciousness," "sees," and then "says . . ." And we must add that to base a variety on such a specific and obvious action (for a woman intent on

influencing her lover) as "fainting," rather than say "action" as such, accords with the strained and pedestrian nature of its style.

5. I have transposed Raddi's order: anuśaya follows anukrośa, and then śliṣṭa appears.

S. K. Belvalkar and Rangacharya B. Raddi comment, "Our Ms. N [?] put stanzas ii.159, 160 [śliṣṭa ākṣepa] after stanza ii. 162 [anuśaya ākṣepa] and this fact we believe is not a pure accident. Probably this was Dandin's sequence" (Notes 2/126). Remaining faithful to their *editio princeps*, they retain śliṣṭa before anuśaya. In his later edition of 1924, S. K. Belvalkar compromises, transposing them on the page yet retaining the numbering of his *editio princeps*, Premachandra's edition of 1863.

The reasons for the transposition of śliṣṭa and anuśaya, of assuming that this does indeed reflect Dandin's original order, are again both inter- and infra-textual. The primary evidence for our accepted order lies within the text itself. As we shall see, anuśaya/The Ākṣepa of Regret complements anurośa/The Ākṣepa of Compassion -- titles, structure, terminology, the evocation of an emotive mood are similar and parallel. Śliṣṭa ākṣepa properly belongs within the final series of varieties based upon the incorporation of otherwise independent alamkāras, thus: samśaya (+) ākṣepa; śliṣṭa (śleṣa) (+) ākṣepa; arthāntara-nyāsa (+) ākṣepa; and hetu (+) ākṣepa.

Comparison with the Tibetan editions tends to confirm the grouping of anukrośa and anuśaya, and raises another possibility. That anuśaya should follow anukrośa I feel is most probable; that śliṣṭa should then immediately follow is open to some doubt. The Tibetan translations and their various editions similarly group anukrośa and anuśaya, but place samśaya immediately after anuśaya, with śliṣṭa following samśaya -- the ordering that I believe to be the more probable. It is interesting that they vary on this point from the order reflected in Ratnaśrī's commentary. Ratnaśrī (RŚ/114) (and manuscript "N" cited by Belvalkar and

Raddi) group anuśaya with anukrośa, following anuśaya immediately with śliṣṭa.

The order of the Tibetan translations reflects the logical connection between anukrośa and anuśaya, yet also the degree of verbal harmony between titles. There are really no other determining considerations other than the fact that just as anuśaya follows anukrośa, samśaya might more properly appear following anuśaya; that samśaya, rather than śliṣṭa, might be harmonically called to the writer's mind following anuśaya.

We cannot dismiss entirely, however, the rather remote possibility that indeed Dāṇḍin may have placed śliṣṭa between anukrośa and anuśaya. Confronted with this somewhat anomalous situation the first Tibetan translator and early editors may have pulled śliṣṭa out and seeing the obvious sound harmony between anuśaya and samśaya, dropped it back in two steps removed from its otherwise original position. Alternately, confronted with śliṣṭa following anuśaya they may have simply switched śliṣṭa and samśaya based on the degree of sound harmony between anuśaya and samśaya alone. Granting the high degree of fidelity of the Tibetan translations, however, this would be doubtful, though the possibility of manipulation cannot be ruled out.

2.169 Definition of Arthāntaranyāsa Alamkāra

Introducing a particular proposition

Presenting another statement

capable of its corroboration --

This is known as arthāntaranyāsa.

Arthāntaranyāsālamkāralakṣaṇam :

jñeyah sorthāntaranyāso vastu prastutya kiṃcit

tatsādhanasamarthasya nyāso yonyasya vastunah

artha-antara-nyāsaḥ [< ni (+) *ās] /literally,
 "placing, putting forth another thing/object."
vastu /"object," "thing"; "subject": prakṛta (RR/199).
 "Vastu has been here taken to mean a theme or a complete
 statement. . . ." (Notes 2/127).
sādhana- [< *sādh] /"establishing," "verifying,"

"corroborating": Bestätigung /also "acknowledgement,"

"ratification," "sanction."¹

Arthāntaranyāsa alamkārā revolves around a process of verification or "corroboration": a situation, usually in the form of a positive statement or proposition, is introduced, followed by "another subject or situation," a statement that serves to corroborate (literally, to "establish," "fulfill"/sādhana) what was initially presented. We should not be surprised to see that corroboration may entail something more than strict logical validation, that such "proofs" that appear may derive their legitimacy just as surely from the poetical as from the empirical world. And as Gero Jenner notes, "Diese Figur in der Bestätigung eines Satzes durch einen anderen besteht," where "Bestätigung" connotes not only "validation," but additionally such concepts as "acknowledgement" and "sanction."²

The structure of arthāntaranyāsa is regular, with the corroborating statement in each variety always following,

and frequently being marked by a distinctive word (such as hi/"for" or nanu/"surely," "indeed"). The verses are, usually, evenly divided between the two statements (at two padas each). It is not the case that the initial statement is "justified or substantiated by the adjunction of a relevant moral or rationale" (Glossary/118). To the extent that the validating statement expresses a universally accepted truth it, in a sense, might be considered a "moral." But this is not quite the point. Justification itself is the focus and its varying means of realization provide our varieties.

Given this basically fixed structural format, Dandin generates eight varieties in essentially related pairs, through varying the "type" of corroborating statement involved. As we shall see, both statements within each variety will, however, frequently mirror and balance each other.

Thus we have an initial pair where the corroborating statement expresses a truth valid universally (viśvavyāpi)

[2.172], or one applicable only to a specific group (viśesstah) [2.173]. Two varieties then follow marked by the inclusion of elements otherwise attributable to distinct alamkārās. The first incorporates ślesa within the validating statement (ślesāviddhah) [2.174]; the second includes virodha, though here the element of "apparent contradiction" is evident in both statements (virodhavān) [2.175]. The remaining four varieties all revolve around a bi-polar distinction between statements that either "appropriately correspond" (yukta), where an effect appropriately, logically and consistently, follows from a basis or cause; or "inappropriately correspond" (ayukta), where an effect -- although valid -- follows paradoxically, and thus to a degree "unnaturally," "improperly" from a given basis. Through manipulating the distribution of these two types, four varieties are generated: the lack of appropriate correspondence, or paradox evident in an initial statement may be validated as such by the evident paradoxical truth displayed by the following statement

(ayuktakārī) [2.176]; alternately, the validity of an initial (often seemingly paradoxical) situation may be corroborated by a following statement that reveals all correspondence between elements as, in fact, appropriate (yuktātmā) [2.177]; the situation to be validated may itself be divided into appropriate and inappropriate expressions, with the following corroborating section similarly and correspondingly divided (yuktāyuktaḥ) [2.178]; and finally, the immediately preceding order of situational types may be reversed within each section (viparyaya) [2.179].

Given the fixed verse structure employed, two halves of two pādas each, it is certainly not surprising that figures or subvarieties would evolve that play upon such symmetry. We have been previously introduced to arthāntaranyāsa with its subsidiary incorporation within artha antara ākṣepa [2.165-66], where "negation" is realized through the verification of an initial statement. The relation of arthāntaranyāsa to prativastu upamā

[2.46-47] is similarly extremely close. Ratnaśrī appropriately raises the issue: "And what is the difference between this [alamkārā] and prativastu upamā, since both juxtapose varying statements? There is a great difference" [prativastūpamā[yā] asya ca ko bhedah ubhayatrāpyarthāntaropanyāsāt mahān bhedah | (RS/117). Although each figure employs parallel statements, in prativastu upamā the "other thing stated" is presented -- we have a subvariety of upamā -- to establish similarity; in arthāntaranyāsa, although similarity may or may not be evident between the two statements, the primary purpose of the second is to establish or sanction the validity of the first.

Prior to Daṇḍin, arthāntaranyāsa alamkārā is presumed to appear in the Bhāttikāvyam. Critics are in general agreement that it is illustrated by verse [10.37].³ Hanūman speaks of Rāvaṇa's corruption upon the attainment of ill-gotten gains, and closes with a universal rationale: "Well, is there in this world anybody who has not been unsettled and driven from the right path by success?"

[vyathayati satpathādadhidigatā 'thaveha sampanna kam ||].⁴

In In our discussion of ākṣepa alamkārā we have noted the possibility that Daṇḍin may have drawn upon Bhāmaha's example of uktavisaya ākṣepa (KA [2.70]), and his immediately following definition of arthāntaranyāsa alamkārā [2.71] to create his own distinct subvariety, arthāntara ākṣepa (KD [2.163]). In his definition of arthāntaranyāsa [2.71], Bhāmaha writes: "The expression of a situation other than that [primarily and initially] presented, illuminating [literally, "assisting"] that initial situation -- this is known as arthāntaranyāsa" [upanyasanama yasya yadarthasyo-ditādrte | pūrvārthānugato yathā ||].

He follows with a single example [2.72] where, as in Bhāttikāvyam [10.37], the ancillary, validating statement embodies what could be considered a generally accepted truth. Bhāmaha does, however, elaborate further on his conception of arthāntaranyāsa in verse [2.73]: "This arthāntaranyāsa is clearly indicated where the word 'hi'

("for," "surely") is utilized, marking a cause (hetu) in order to validate (siddhaye) the primary subject put forth"

[hiśabdenāpi hetvarthaprathanāduktasiddhaye |
ayamarthāntaranyāsaḥ sutarām vyajyate yathā ||]. Again, a single example follows [2.74], now incorporating "hi" to mark the transition between statements. We note that the usage of hi is not mandatory, as well as Bhāmaha's utilization of siddha in [2.73], connoting the important concept of "validation" or "corroboration" (literally, "establishment," "fulfillment") -- a word echoed in Dāṇḍin's definition with sādhana.

Later writers generally mimic the formulation of arthāntaranyāsa alamkārā that we see in Bhāmaha and Dāṇḍin, though there are slight variations in the number and bases of the subvarieties. Vāmana (KAS [4.3.21]) would seem to have drawn elements verbatim from both Bhāmaha and Dāṇḍin in his definition (uktasiddhaya/vastunah), and provides only a single example with no subvarieties. Udbhāta (KASS [2.4]) presents four subvarieties based upon the position

of the "samarthaka", the corroborating statement. It may be either initial or following, and may or may not be signaled by the presence of the word "hi." Rudraṭa (KA [8.79-84]), and later Mammata (KP [10.109]), similarly distinguishes four subvarieties, yet now based upon the type and order of each statement: whether a general, universal (sāmānya) statement is validated by a particular, specific (viśesa) statement; or the reverse. And on the relationship between statements, whether of similarity (sādharmya) or dissimilarity (vaidharmya).

2.170 The Varieties of Arthāntaranyāsa

Involving:

Universal Corroboration / Specific Corroboration

Śleṣa / Apparent Contradiction

Inappropriate-/Appropriate- Correspondence

Appropriate-Inappropriate Correspondence

and the Reverse --

Arthāntaranyāsabhedāḥ :

viśvavyāpi viśeṣasthaḥ slesāviddho virodhavān
ayuktakārī yuktātmā yuktāyukto viparyayaḥ

viśvavyāpi [(m.) < viśvyāpin].

virodhavān [(m.) < virodhavant].

ayuktakārī [(m.) < ayuktakārin].

yuktātmā [(m.) < yuktātman].

2.171 Illuminating the Varieties of Arthāntaranyāsa

Varieties such as these and others

are observed in the usage of arthāntaranyāsa.

A garland of examples will be shown

in order to reveal their forms.

Arthāntaranyāsabhedaprakāśanam :

ityevamādayo bhedāḥ prayogesvasya laksitāḥ

udāharanāmālaisām rūpavyaktyai nidarsyate

2.172 Example of the Arthāntaranyāsa involving
Universal Corroboration

The sun and moon

The divine ones

The eyes of the universe --

See! Even they must set . . .

Who indeed overcomes the nature of things?

Viśvavyāpi Arthāntaranyāsodāharanam :

bhagavantau jagannetre sūryācandramasāvapi

paśya gacchata evāstam niyatih kena lañghyate

viśva-vyāpi /literally, "pervading or applicable to all."

niyatih [(f.) < ni (+) *yam /"restrain," "control"] /

"fate," "destiny"; "the fixed nature of things": daivam (RR/201).

In viśvavyāpi arthāntaranyāsa the corroborating statement expresses a truth universally applicable. "And this is viśvavyāpi because it is thus applicable everywhere to [all] existing things" [ayam ca viśvavyāpi tathābhāvasya sarvatragatvāditi] (RŚ/118).

If even the divine lords of the heavens, the sun and moon, must set or wane, "Who indeed may overcome the fixed nature of things?" We may add that Dandin reinforces the note of universality through referring to the sun and moon as the "eyes of the universe" -- an apropos designation "as through them all things are revealed"/sarvapadārthaprakāśakatvāt (RR/201).

2.173 The Arthāntaranyāsa involving Specific Corroboration

Surely clouds alleviate

burning heat for all beings --

Surely the birth of the Great relieves
suffering for others.

Viśesasthah Arthāntaranyāsodāharanam :

payomucaḥ parītāpam harantyeva śarīrinām
nanvātmalābho mahatām paraduhkhopasāntaye

viśesa-sthah /literally, "present in a specific,
particular thing."

payomucaḥ [(m.) (pl.) < payas (+) muc] /literally,
"releasers of water": "clouds."

śarīrinām [< śarīrin] /literally, "possessing a

body"; "living creatures": sthāvara jaṅgamānām/"[both] animate and inanimate" (RŚ/118); prāṇinām (RR/201).

Viśeṣasthah arthāntaranyāsa effectively balances the preceding variety. Our initial structure is validated by a following statement expressing a corroborating truth, but now one strictly applicable to a "specific" group. Massive clouds may block the harsh rays of the sun, for surely those possessed of that distinctive and restricted attribute, "greatness," may relieve the suffering of others. Although the distinctive focus is a specifically applicable corroboration, we should note that the inferred mutually valid and specific attribute really involves a play on two different shades of meaning. Mahatām/"of the Great" primarily refers to those who possess the intangible quality of "greatness", yet in its additional sense of "physical greatness" it thus encompasses the initial image of "[massive] clouds."

Belvalkar and Raddi incorrectly affirm that "Daṇḍin's

distinction between viśvavyāpi and viśesastha is not strictly logical" (though again, "strict logic" is hardly at issue). This belief derives from equating "the proposition -- All obey Fate" (viśvavyāpi), with their misreading of the present example, "the proposition -- All great men relieve suffering" (Notes 2/131). Dandin's element of the particular does not derive incongruously from the general assumption that great men do indeed relieve suffering, but rather from the fact that "greatness" as such -- its "birth" -- is a specific and restricted attribute.⁵

2.174 The Arthāntaranyāsa involving Multiple Embrace

The breeze off the Malaya mountains

pleases the world

Surely one

from the South / considerate

is pleasing to everyone.

Ślesāviddhah Arthāntaranyāsodāharanam :

utpādayati lokasya prītim malayamārutah

nanu dāksin̄yasampannah sarvasya bhavati priyah

ślesa-viddhah /literally, "studded, strewn with ślesas;
instances of "Multiple Embrace."

malaya-mārutah : the cool and refreshing breezes off
the Malaya mountains, the southern Western Ghāts, whose

slopes abound in similarly soothing Sandlewood, where the "southern breeze . . . alone acts to break the pride of shapely women" (see [2.98]).

dāksinya-sampannah /"southern," "from the South"; yet also, "possessing consideration, tact"; "considerate," "polite."

Ślesāviddhah is one of two varieties of arthāntara-nyāsa incorporating the distinctive elements of an otherwise independent alamkārā -- a technique that we should by now recognize as a standard procedure. The basis of the corroborating statement now revolves on a single (hardly "strewn") instance of ślesa, which with its expanded meanings "embraces" both statements.

The ślesa in the following statement is marked by the compound dāksinya-sampannah, which may mean either "one from the South," or "one considerate or polite." We thus have a literal reference to "The breeze off the [southern] Malaya mountains," where "one from the South is pleasing to everyone." And yet a further parallel reference -- given

the established poetic conceit of the Malaya breezes,
flowing off slopes of soothing Sandlewood trees, as cool and
refreshing -- that links the initial statement to an
attribute that more immediately forms the basis for the
corroboration. For "Surely one as considerate as this
soothing breeze is pleasing to everyone."

Again we should stress that although the truth of the
initial statement -- whether accepted as empirical
knowledge or poetic conceit -- may be rather self-evident,
this immediacy does not invalidate the essential method of
this alamkārā. Embodied in an alamkārā, strict logical
validation must be subsumed by and serve the primary goal
of resonating and "striking" presentation. No one would
seriously question the truth of either the initial or
following statements in Dandin's examples of arthāntaranyāsa
-- for there is the implicit acceptance that validation is
but a ruse in the service of generating illuminating
resonance between two given situations.

2.175 Example of the Arthāntaranyāsa involving
Contradiction

The Moon although marked

pleases the world --

For a Lord among brahmins although blemished
benefits others.

Virodhavān Arthāntaranyāsodāharanam :

jagadānandayatyeṣa malinopi niśākarah
anugṛhnāti hi parān sadoṣopi dvijeśvarah

ānandayati [nijanta nāmadhātu < ānanda] / "causing
pleasure."

dvija-īśvarah /literally, "Lord of the twice-born, of
brahmins," and also, the "moon."

As with ślesa, the connotations associated with the element of virodha, subsumed broadly by virodha alamkārā [2.333-40], appear ubiquitously as incorporated features within a number of otherwise distinct alamkārās. We have previously seen virodha connote "rivalry" -- and thus inferred similarity -- between an upameya and multiple upamānas in virodha upamā [2.33]; or "incongruity" between the actions of a primary rūpaka ("face-moon") and its incorporated upamāna (the "moon" itself) in viruddha rūpaka [2.83-84]; and in viruddha artha dīpaka [2.109-10] distinctly "opposite" -- though respectively appropriate -- effects stemming from a single, "illuminating" subject.

In virodhavān arthāntaranyāsa we have yet another subtle variation. Both initial and corroborating statements express a "contradiction": an object generates an effect that apparently contradicts, due to a seemingly obviating attribute, what we might otherwise expect. In validation, the following statement mirrors both the form and meaning of the initial, expressing a readily evident truth.

Thus just as "a Lord among brahmins, although deficient in some respects, will yet benefit others," so we may accept that "the Moon, although "marked" and blemished, yet pleases the world with its light and beauty."

As we have seen in viśesasthāḥ [2.173] and certainly in ślesā [2.174], the following statement may validate not only directly through parallel meanings, but also indirectly through utilizing a word whose multiple meanings allow multiple references. A single term directly stands as the subject of the validating statement, while indirectly referring to the subject of the initial proposition. Dandin again utilizes this technique in the present example. Dvija-iśvarah as "a Lord among brahmins" serves primarily as the subject of the validating statement; yet in a secondary sense, this term also refers to the "moon" -- validity is further reinforced. We must add that in varieties other than ślesā arthāntaranyāśa, these instances of what are after all examples of ślesā are secondary to the essential mode and procedure that the particular

variety may display. As Ratnaśrī notes, dviyeśvarah may be taken as an instance of śleṣa, but adds, "Here it is not intended to be expressly or explicitly noticed, as primarily contradiction is meant to be expressed" [sa tvihā tu na vivakṣitah virodhasyaivābhi-dhītsitatvāt] (RS/119).

2.176 Example of the Arthāntaranyāsa involving
Inappropriate Correspondence

Although sprung from throats

sweet from drinking honey

The sound of bees

falls harshly on the ear --

Such is discord among lovers.

Ayuktakārī Arthāntaranyāsodāharanam :

madhupānakalāt kan̄thānnirgatopyalinām dhvaniḥ
kāturbhavati karṇasya kāminām pāpamīdrśam

ayukta-kārī /literally, "maker of the inappropriate, the improper."

Ayuktakārī arthāntaranyāsa is the first of four varieties based upon the varying distribution of statements where an effect or result either does (yukta) or does not (ayukta) "appropriately correspond" to its given cause or basis. In yukta rūpaka [2.77] we have seen two attributes of a given aggregate (a "face") realized through two rūpakas, where there is not only appropriate correspondence within ("bees [darting] eyes"/"flowers [blossoming] smiles"), but further between elements ("bees"/"flowers"). Alternately, although ayukta rūpaka [2.78] displays the same structure, and similarly displays an internal correspondence within each of the two attributive rūpakas

("moonlight [soft] smiles"/"lilies [shining] eyes"), there is no immediate correspondence between them ("moonlight"/"lilies").

In ayuktakārī arthāntaranyāsa both statements will symmetrically "demonstrate an inappropriate correspondence" between what we might expect as a result from the given basis, with the following analogously validating the initial. There is now no question, however, of contradiction being cast aside through positive resolution, as in the preceding virodhavān. For with the lack of any affirming resolution, the element of contradiction, of an "unnatural impropriety" remains, and the ensuing result can hardly be seen in a positive light.

It is "inappropriate" that sounds arising from a source as sweet as the honey covered throats of bees should fall harshly in the ear. Yet however anomalous the correspondence, the validity of such a situation cannot really be questioned for "Such is discord or sin (pāpam) among lovers" -- "a condition that [should] give pleasure,

in fact generates suffering"/sukhadavastunopi duhkhadatvam
 (RR/202).⁶

2.177 Example of the Arthāntaranyāsa involving Appropriate Correspondence

This bed of scarlet lotus petals

scorches my body --

Surely it's appropriate that a symbol of fire

has a burning nature.

Yuktātmā Arthāntaranyāsodāharanam :

ayam mama dahatyañgamambhojadalaśamstarah

hutāśanapratinidhirdāhātmā nanu yujyate

ambhoja- [(n.)] /literally, "water-born"; a lotus
 vividly red in color.

huta-aśana- [(n.)] /literally, "he to whom food is offered"; "fire."

prati-nidhiḥ [(m.)] /"representative," "deputy"; "image."

Yuktātmā arthāntaranyāsa, balancing the preceding variety, corroborates that an effect does indeed flow "appropriately" from a given basis or cause. The initial situation may appear to be negatively paradoxical and thus seemingly inappropriate, yet the following validation affirms -- however pleasant or unpleasant that effect may be -- that all is in fact quite correct.

That a bed of soft and gentle lotus petals burns and scorches might initially appear improper,⁷ yet "surely it's appropriate and valid, for should not a symbol fire -- an expanse of flame-red color -- itself be capable of burning."

2.178 Example of the Arthāntaranyāsa involving
Appropriate-Inappropriate Correspondence

Let the Moon torment me at will!

Why does Spring hurt me?

Such action performed by the Disagreeable

Surely is inappropriate for the Pleasing.

Yuktāyukta Arthāntaranyāsodāharanam :

kṣinotu kāmam śitāṁśuh kim vasanto dunoti mām
 malinācaritam karma surabhernanvasāṁpratam

śīta-amśuh /literally, "the Cool-rayed"; the "moon."

vasantah [< *vas /"shine"] /"the brilliant season";
 "springtime."

malina- [(m.) < malina /"dirty," "impure"; "foul"] /
 "the Tainted or Blemished"; the "moon."

surabheh [(m.) (gen.) (sing.) < surabhi / "pleasing," "lovely"; "fragrant" [< su (+) *rabh / "affecting pleasantly"]] / "the Fragrant or Pleasing"; "springtime."

Yuktāyukta arthāntaranyāsa is a logical, structural extension of the two preceding varieties. It is more than a straightforward combination, however, for "appropriate" and "inappropriate" situations symmetrically alternate in a bi-partite now extended initial sequence, followed by a balancing bi-partite, respectively validating sequence.

Once again the play of words and meanings is integral in Dandin's specific example, although this important element must be looked upon as secondary to the actual import and structural sequence of the situations themselves. Thus malina in the latter half of the verse fundamentally means "impure," "tainted," "unpleasant," and as such has also become a name for the moon ("the Blemished One"); surabhi fundamentally means "lovely," "fragrant," "pleasing," and through a similar extension has become a

name for the spring season ("the Pleasing or Fragrant One"). These semantic associations allow the corroboration of the initial sequence as expressing events -- a basis and its effect -- that either appropriately or inappropriately correspond.

That the Moon should "torment" is perfectly appropriate given his "blemished" nature. Yet such action cannot but be inappropriate for Spring, whose nature -- on the contrary -- is "fragrant" and "pleasing."⁸

2.179 Example of the Arthāntaranyāsa involving
Inappropriate-Appropriate Correspondence

Where even lilies of the night burn

What about this multitude of daylight lotuses?

When the minions of the Moon are wrathful

Surely the supplicants of the Sun would not be tender.

Viparyaya Arthāntaranyāsodāharanam :

kumudānyapi dāhāya kimayam kamalākarah
 na hindugṛhyeṣūgṛesu sūryagrhyo mr̥durbhavet

kumudāni [(n.) (pl.)]: lilies or lotuses blooming at night and thus conceived as followers of the moon.

kamala- [(n.)]: lotuses blooming during the day and thus conceived as followers of the sun.

Viparyaya arthāntaranyāsa is a "reversal" of the preceding variety: the initial situation presents an "inappropriate"--"appropriate" sequence, symmetrically balanced by the following corroborating statements.

Dandin again draws on poetic conceit to effect his presentation (conceits that I have chosen to bring out somewhat in translation). The well-versed "connoisseur" would recognize the kumuda flowers, blooming at night, as "minions" of the Moon, with natures -- as followers of the "Cool-rayed One" -- similarly cool and soothing; and the

kamalas, blossoming during the day, as "supplicants" of the Sun, with natures thus heated and potentially abrasive.

That the "minions of the Moon are wrathful" can only corroborate their otherwise unnatural or inappropriate "burning" actions. And where even these otherwise soothing "lilies of the night" torment, surely such action is more than appropriate for the "supplicants of the Sun," this "multitude of daylight lotuses," whose natures are, as it is, heated.

We might add that "reversal," in this instance, is not confined to strictly an alternation of the previous sequence. Previously, the moon as the "Blemished" may appropriately torment; now, such behavior by his followers -- reflecting the moon as the "Cool-rayed" -- can only be seen, on the contrary, as inappropriate.

Notes [2.169] - [2.179]

1. Gero Jenner, Die Poetischen Figuren der Inder von Bhāmaha bis Mammata (Hamburg: Ludwig Appel Verlag, 1968), p. 239.
2. Gero Jenner, Die Poetischen Figuren, p. 239.
3. Bhaṭṭī, Bhaṭṭikāvya, with the Jayamaṅgalā commentary (Bombay: Nirṇaya Sāgar Press, 1887); Reprint (1914), p. 276; C. Hooykaas, "On Some Arthālaṅkāras in the Bhaṭṭī kāvya X," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 20 (1957), p. 357; Bhaṭṭkāvyam, translated by G. G. Leonardi (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972), p. 103.
4. Bhaṭṭkāvyam [10.37]: Bhaṭṭikāvya, with the Jayamaṅgalā commentary, p. 276; Bhaṭṭikāvyam, translated by G. G. Leonardi, p. 103.
5. Daṇḍin strikes a balance between elements that each share a specific attribute. Gerow, with his affinity for logical constructs, misrepresents the degree of integration in his translation: "The great rain clouds relieve the scorching heat of summer for the wandering ascetics, for it is the office of the great to alleviate the suffering of others" (Glossary/121). There are no "wandering ascetics" in the verse -- śarīrin refers to all "embodied beings." An artificial element of "specificity" and distorted resonance is thus added. The presence of "ascetics," who also obviously relieve suffering, allows a confused misreading: "rain clouds relieve heat as ascetics relieve suffering,
for it is the office of the great (rain clouds? ascetics?)
. . . ."
6. All available translations of verse [2.176], with one very important exception, presume that "of lovers" (kāminām)

construes with "on the ear" (karnasya) rather than with "discord" or "sin" (pāpam). Gerow, for example, translates: "The sounding of the bees, though it issues from throats thick with honey, is harsh to the ear of lovers. What a shame this is!" (Glossary/118). He would appear to have had a direct eye on Böhtlingk's parallel, initial phrase, "Welch ein Unglück. . . ." (Otto Böhtlingk, Kāvyādarśa [2.176], p. 50).

I cannot bend to the majority in this case (although in a field where prior interpretation is frequently unquestioned, a majority opinion of itself is not necessarily of great weight), and feel that these translations do not reflect the variety at hand.

Ayuktakārī presents essentially unresolved paradox within the framework of arthāntaranyāsa -- one paradoxical situation balancing and validating another -- not paradox for its own sake, followed by an appended value judgement. Our commentators would appear to have it both ways, each somewhat absurdly noting that this sound is "harsh to the ears of separated (varahin) lovers" (RŚ/119) (RR/202), as though the buzzing of bees is otherwise melodious. And yet, as Ratnaśrī adds, "For such is discord/sin among lovers or those overcome with desire"/yataḥ pāpamīdrśam kāminām rāginām (RŚ/120).

In Gerow's case it is difficult to determine if mistranslation stems from misinterpretation or the reverse. He affirms that in ayuktakārī "the situation referred to in proposition and substantiation is condemned by the speaker," where in the following yuktātmā [2.177] it is "approved" (Glossary/118-19). Presumably then, the appended "What a shame this is!" would qualify as a "substantiation," for that the "sounding of the bees . . . is harsh to the ears of lovers" hardly balances or validates the fact that "it issues from throats thick with honey."

I would agree rather with the Tibetan translators -- with an eye on logical consistency and near absolute (literal) fidelity -- who consider that just as discord

surely may stem from what would appear to be an entirely inappropriate source -- people in love -- so may harsh sounds arise from the throats of bees. The initial situation is thus balanced with a following validation: 'dod ldan rnam kyi sdig 'di 'dra / "Such is sin/evil among lovers" (literally, "those possessing desire").

Whatever the inferred attitude of the speaker, the focus of these four final varieties, as examples of arthāntaranyāsa, is on the corroboration of an initial situation.

7. A situation the Gerow would have us believe is "approved by the speaker." Yuktātmā: ". . . in which the situation referred to in proposition and substantiation is approved by the speaker" (Glossary/119).

8. Gerow's strained evaluation of this (and the next) variety reflects the weakness of his assumption that ayukta-yukta primarily expresses "disapproval"/"approval": "In which the situation referred to in proposition and substantiation is generally or conditionally approved by the speaker but for some reason is, in this case, considered irregular" (Glossary/119). That he misses completely the structural balance and integration is revealed in his translation: "Such a black deed is surely unsuited to the sweet season" (Glossary/119). In taking malina incorrectly in its purely adjectival sense, as "black" qualifying "deed" (karma), rather than as a word here displaying multiple overtones ("blemished"/"the Moon") the balanced corroboration of the verse is lost.

2.180 Definition of Vyatireka Alamkāra

Where similarity exists between two objects

-- either stated in words or implied --

expressing a distinction therein --

This is called Vyatireka.

Vyatirekālamkāralakṣaṇam :

śabdopatte pratīte vā sādr̥syे vastunordvayoh

tatra yadbhedakathanam vyatirekah sa kathyate

vyatirekah [< vi (+) ati (+) *ric / "surpass,"
 "excel"; "differ"] / "contrast," "difference," "disparity."
pratīte [(loc.) (sing.) bhūte kṛdanta < prati (+)
 *i] / "understood," "implied."

The word vyatireka embraces the concepts of

"difference" and "distinction," with the further possible implication of "superiority." Both concepts blend into vyatireka alamkāra, giving this figure its essential feature. Yet this "distinction" must be drawn between two primary objects, or even between (in one instance) two concepts, whose similarity -- whether "stated in words" (sabdopādāna) or "implied" (pratīyamāna) -- is initially evident. "Vyatireka consists of two parts -- sādharmyakathana ["expressing similarity"] and bhedakathana ["expressing difference"] -- both of which are essential to the nature of the figure" (Notes 2/133).

In the extensive elaboration of upamā alamkāra [2.14-65] we have seen numerous varieties that involve either explicit or implicit similarity. Thus "similarity (sādrśya) between two things or objects, that is, between an upamāna and an upameya, may be expressed through words -- either through employing particles explicitly marking the common attribute(s) (sādhāranadharmavācaka), such as iva [("like")] and so on, or through words such as tulya

[("equal")], sama [("same")] and so on. . . ." [dvayor-vastunoḥ arthāt upamānopameyayoh sādṛṣye śabdopatte sādhāraṇadharmaवाकेवादिप्रयोगेना . . . kimvātulya-samādiśabdaprayoge] (RR/204). Yet as we shall see in our varieties of vyatireka alamkāra, "explicit" similarity may be signaled not only by such specific linguistic markers, but also through the singular presentation of the common attributes -- other "words" -- themselves.

We thus have evident similarity followed by difference, a difference that in nearly every case connotes a "distinction" based upon relative status. In upamā alamkāra the superiority of the upamāna, that it possesses the common attribute(s) to a greater degree, is generally assumed -- if not, there would generally be little point in drawing the comparison. In vyatireka alamkāra, however, difference is being illustrated to mark the elevation of the upameya, through a distinctive attribute, over the upamāna [kenaciddharmaविशेषेना upamānādūpameyasyotkarsāya bhedapratipādanam] (RR/204). The upamāna or means of the

comparison may yet possess to a greater degree whatever attribute(s) mark the similarity, but its ultimate inferiority to the upameya is revealed through an obviating distinction.

Dāṇḍin generates ten varieties of vyatireka alamkāra through, primarily, manipulating the figure's basic components of similarity and difference; in specific cases, through highlighting or not the relative status between upameya and upamāna; or focusing on the type of relationship rather than the attributes themselves. And of course varieties are generated through incorporating the distinctive features of other alamkāras. It is not the case that "Dāṇḍin distinguishes vyatireka into two broad classes -- . . . [pratiyamāna (implicit)] and śabdopādāna (explicit) -- and then subdivides each type further" (Glossary/281). Rather we see either a number of complementary pairs within which explicit or implicit similarity may be a factor, though a factor invariably secondary to the element that in fact marks the variety as distinctive; or we find individual

varieties that are similarly distinguished by quite other criteria.

The first two varieties are a complementary pair where, with an initial similarity expressed in each, the grounds for distinction pertain to either one [2.181-82] or to both [2.183-84] of the primary elements. Three varieties follow, again with similarity between upameya and upamāna overtly evident in all, that incorporate within the expression of difference the essential features of, respectively, ślesa [2.185] ākṣepa [2.186], and hetu [2.188] alamkāras. We then have a pair, now with similarity implicit in each, displaying differentiating attributes for both primary elements where -- overtly -- either an equality of status between upameya and upamāna is described [2.190], or the superiority of the upameya is stressed [2.191]. The following pair of varieties are the only instances where the mode of similarity's presentation is the determining variable. In each case the differentiating features that are described for both

upameya and upamāna are themselves similar, where the initial similarity may be either explicit [2.193] or implicit [2.194]. Our last variety differs from all that come before, for explicit similarity and difference appear now not between objects as such, but between a species and its embracing genus [2.197-98].

Vyatireka alamkāra appears essentially unchanged throughout the tradition, although as D. K. Gupta notes, "In post-Daṇḍin writers [among which he includes Bhāmaha] the scope of the two objects has specifically been confined to the object of comparison [upameya] and the standard thereof [upamāna]."¹

Bhāmaha's definition (KA [2.75ab]) is concise, with no mention of the mode of similarity's presentation: "Presenting a distinction between objects that are similar. . ." [upamānavato 'rthasya yadvīśeṣanidarśanam |]. He follows [2.76] with a single example where differentiating features alternately deprecate the upamā na(s) ("white lotus"/"blue lily"), or elevate the upameya ("eyes and

lashes"); an example most closely mirrored by Dandin's variety of ādhikya vyatireka [2.193]. With the fundamental form of the figure firmly established, Vāmana (KAS [4.3.22]) could explicitly focus on the element of relative status: "Vyatireka -- where the superiority of the qualities of the upameya [are expressed]" [upameyasya gunā tirekitvam vyatirekah].

In Mammaṭa's Kāvyaprakāśa (KP [10.105-106ab]) we find, as in Dandin's work, one of the most extensive elaborations of vyatireka. Although his definition [10.105ab] is essentially the same as Vāmana's, his schema is unique and somewhat complex. Some twenty-five varieties may be generated from four given situations: where both the cause of the upameya's superiority and the cause of the upamāna's inferiority appear; where both are absent; or where one or the other alternately appears. The relationship of similarity between upameya and upamāna in each of these four cases may itself be marked explicitly by either a word (śabda) or the sense (artha). In both modes a word, such as

iva, signaling the comparison appears. Yet "in śabda vyatireka, the comparative particle expresses a nominal similitude, that is, a similitude of two things through a common property"; in artha vyatireka "the comparative particle (iva, 'like') is [similarly] present, [though now] expressing a similitude of action or behavior" (Glossary/277). The similarity between upameya and upamāna in any of the four cases may also be, however, implicit (āksipta), with the comparative marker absent. And finally, within any of these twelve, ślesa may be incorporated, allowing a total of twenty-four varieties.

2.181 Example of the Vyatireka involving a Single Object

With such attributes as

resolve beauty depth

You are similar to the ocean --

Yet surely a distinction lies

in this wondrous form of yours.

Eka Vyatirekodāharanam :

dhairyalāvanyagāmbhīryapramukhaistvamudanvataḥ

guṇaistulyosi bhedastu vapusāivedr̥śena te

dhairyam / "courage/resolve and implacability": dhṛtiḥ
acāñcalyam ca (RR/205).

lāvanyam / "beauty and salinity": saundaryam
lavanamayatvam ca (RR/205).

gāmbhīryam / "reserve/tact and depth": gūdhāśayatvam
gabhiratvam ca (RR/205).

vapusa [(n.) (inst.) (sing.) < vapus / "wondrous
 appearance," "form"; "body"].

2.182 The Vyatireka involving a Single Object

This is a Vyatireka involving a Single Object:

Drawing within the range of understanding

a difference between two objects

through marking an attribute evident in one.

Eka Vyatirekah :

ityekavyatirekoyam dharmenaikatravartinā
 pratitivisayaprāpterbhedasyobhayavartinah

pratiti-visaya-prāteh [(m.) (abl.) (sing.) < pra (+)

*āp] /literally, "pulling, drawing within the scope or range of understanding/cognition."

Eka vyatireka is the first of a series where the similarity between two objects or primary elements -- an upameya and an upamāna -- is "stated in words," that is, explicitly expressed. Yet given its incorporation within vyatireka alamkārā, similarity, whether explicit or otherwise, serves to highlight a distinction. And again, as opposed to upamā in its standard form, we have a distinction that in the majority of cases is drawn at the expense of the upamāna or means of comparison. In eka vyatireka the grounds for this distinction thus explicitly pertain to but one of two elements, the upameya or subject of comparison to the detriment of the upamāna. We shall note in a number of examples of vyatireka that Daṇḍin reinforces and illuminates the aspect of similarity with attributes captured in ślesas -- two distinct meanings respectively applicable to each primary object, or a single

meaning (or closely similar shades of meaning) simultaneously applicable to each.

A great king is similar (tulyah asi) to the ocean in courage and "resolve" (dhairyā), matching its inexorable power; "profound" in a wisdom as unfathomable as the oceans's depths (gāmbhīrya); and marked by the distinguishing attribute of "beauty," as integral to his being as "salinity" is to the ocean (lāvanya). Yet "through marking a [positive] attribute evident in one alone," the superior status of the king as upameya is expressed. For where the ocean is fluid, lacking definite shape and demeanor, the king is marked by a "wondrous form" -- "the difference is in such a form or body of yours, with exceedingly beautiful hands, feet, and face" [te īdr̥ṣena atisundarakaracarana-vadanavatā vapusā śarireṇaivāsti] (RR/205).

2.183 Example of the Vyatireka involving Two Objects

The Ocean and You

deep / profound

with unbroken

shores / principles

But He similar to black mascara

You to the splendor of gold.

Ubhaya Vyatirekodāharanam :

abhinnavelau gambhīrāvamburāśirbhavānapi

asāvañjanasamkāśastvam tu cāmīkaradyutih

velau [(nom.) (dual) < velā (f.)] / "shore," "beach"

or "limit," "boundary"; "principle."

gambhirau [(nom.) (dual) < gambhira] /"deep" or "profound."

ambu-rāśih [(m.)] /literally, "heap of water": the ocean.

2.184 The Vyatireka involving Two Objects

This is a Vyatireka involving Two Objects:

The differentiating attributes of both

-- "blackness" and "goldness" --

are presented distinctly.

Ubhaya Vyatirekah :

ubhayavyatirekoyamubhayorbhedakau gunau

kārṣṇyam piśāṅgatā cobhau yat pṛthagdarśitāviha

Ubhaya vyatireka is a logical structural extension of

the preceding. Again the similarity between upameya and upamāna is explicit, with similar attributes once again expressed through ślesas, yet now the grounds for distinction pertain to "both" primary objects. As in eka vyatireka, the distinguishing attribute applicable to the upameya marks its superiority, yet now a deprecatory attribute applies to the upamāna confirming its inferiority.

The ocean and a great king are again comparable in "depth" (gambhirau), and as the ocean respects the limits imposed by the shoreline, so does the king maintain his "principles unbroken" (abhinna velau). In this case however, the differentiating attributes of both -- "blackness" and "goldness" -- are presented distinctly. The ocean (as upamāna) is yet tainted and dark, "similar to black mascara (añjana)," and is thus surely inferior to this king (as upameya) who, on the contrary, is "similar to the splendor of gold."

2.185 Example of the Vyatireka of Multiple Embrace

You and the Ocean

difficult to

defeat / drink

of powerful

character / creatures

majestic / molten

But this is the difference between you:

His nature is fluid / foolish

You are hard / shrewd.

Saślesa Vyatirekodāharanam :

tvam samudraśca durvārau mahāsattvau satejasau

ayam tu yuvayorbhedah sa jadātmā paṭurbhavān

dur-vārau [(nom.) (dual) < vār (f.)] /literally, "having bad water [to drink]," and also "difficult to control, subdue."

mahā-sattvau /"having great creatures, beings," and also "having great capacity, power, character."

tejasau /"having fire," "fiery," "molten" or "splendid," "brilliant." The ocean as "fiery" or "molten" refers to the "mare's fire" (vadabāgni), a raging submarine fire seen as emerging from a physical cavity called the "mare's mouth"/vadabāmukha; or alternately seen as one that has assumed the form of a mare: "The fiery mare is placed in a delicate balance deep within the ocean, where her flames harmlessly devour the waters, holding in check both their floods and her own destructive flame, until, at doomsday, she is released. . . ."²

Myths concerning the origin of the submarine fire are varied. In the Śiva Purāna, for example, it arises as the deadly fire from Śiva's third eye:

Then Brahmā took that fire of [Śiva's] anger which wished to burn the triple universe, and he put it inside a mare with ambrosial (or "gentle") flames in her mouth. And then . . . Brahmā, the lord of universes, took that fire in the body of a mare to the ocean. . . .

"This anger of the great lord in the form of a mare with flames in her mouth must be held by you until the final flood. . . . Your water will be its constant food, and you must control it with great care. . . ."

The ocean made a firm promise to Brahmā to hold the fierce mare-fire which could not be held by anyone else. Then the fire with the body of a mare entered the ocean, shining with its halo of flames, thoroughly burning the floods of water.³

jada-ātmā /"whose nature is water" or "foolish."

patuh /"hard" or "clever, shrewd."

2.186 The Vyatireka of Multiple Embrace / Introduction to
The Vyatirekas of Denial and Cause

This should be considered a Vyatireka of Multiple Embrace

due to its form embedded with śleṣas.

There are also the Vyatirekas of Denial and Cause --

This pair will be immediately shown.

Saśleṣa Vyatirekah / Sākṣepasahetu

Vyatirekopakramah :

sa eṣa śleṣarūpatvāt saśleṣa iti gr̥hyatām

sākṣepaśca sahetuśca darśyate tadapi dvayam

Within the broader category of vyatireka where we see explicit similarity, Daṇḍin includes three varieties that respectively incorporate the distinctive features of otherwise independent alamkāras. Saśleṣa vyatireka or the

vyatireka of "multiple embrace" --- "its form embedded with ślesas" -- incorporates as subordinate ślesa alamkāra [2.310-22]. It is not the case that this is "a type of vyatireka in which the similitude on which the distinction is founded is punned upon" (Glossary/282). As Gero Jenner notes, given the frequent occurrence of ślesa to express attributes in other examples we might consider that as a variety of vyatireka, saślesa is, "strictly speaking, superfluous."⁵ Yet the distinctive feature of vyatireka is the expression of difference (within similarity) and it is the additional appearance of ślesas (though apparently Jenner considers only jadātmā) to mark that difference that validates this variety.

As ubhaya vyatireka logically follows eka vyatireka, so saślesa appears as an extension of ubhaya. Again the similarity between a king and the ocean is explicitly expressed through a series of attributes presented through ślesas. And again difference is presented from the perspective of both primary objects, with positive and

negative features respectively characterizing the upameya and upamāna. Yet now the integration provided by ślesa extends to the differentiating features themselves.

Just as a great king is "difficult to defeat," so the ocean is "difficult to drink" (durvārau); as the capacity or "character of the king is powerful," so is the capacity of the ocean in containing a variety of "powerful creatures" (mahāsattvau); and as the king is "majestic" and splendid, so is the ocean with the brilliance of its "molten," interior fire (tejasau). Yet the ocean must be considered inferior for, after all, his nature is both "fluid and foolish" (both meanings captured by jada-ātmā), where the king's can only seen as "hard and shrewd" (both meanings captured by patuh).

2.187 Example of the Vyatireka of Denial

Although observing prescribed boundaries
 even implacable a mine of jewels --
 That dark-stained abode of makaras
 cannot attain your stature.

Sākṣepa Vyatirekodāharānam :

sthitimānapi dhīropi ratnānāmākaropi san
 tava kaksām na yātyeva malino makarālayah

sthitimān : maryādāvān /literally, "one who keeps
 within the boundaries"; "within the moral limits,"
 "virtuous"; yet also, immediately applicable to the ocean,
 "one who limits himself, does not transgress the shoreline"
 (RŚ/123).

kaksām na yāti /literally, "does not go to or reach (your) chamber," that is, "level" or "status."

makara-ālayah /literally, "the abode of makaras": the "ocean" (see Note 4, under Notes [2.67] - [2.96]). In this instance I have chosen in translation to express the literal meaning of the epithet. Dāṇḍin draws on this meaning to reinforce the ultimate "denial" of the ocean when compared to a great king -- it appears as more than a semantically neutral "name."

Sākṣepa vyatireka incorporates the element of "denial" or "negation," whose variations in poetic possibilities we have seen elaborated at length in ākṣepa alamkāra [2.120-68]. Again, with the "similarity stated in words," there is the initial presentation of attributes held clearly in common by two primary objects. And we should note that it is not necessarily the explicit usage of a vācakaśabda (a word such as iva/"like") that is meant by "stated similarity." This phrase also subsumes the

presentation -- as in the present variety -- of the relevant "similar attributes" or sādharaṇdharmas alone. Their applicability to the given objects might be inferred, but they thus express "in words" the basis and ground for the similarity. The element of denial must of course be incorporated within sāksepa vyatireka's distinctive component. The difference -- following a series of common attributes -- between upameya and upamāna is thus expressed in the form of a denial of or negative failing in the upamāna that yet pertains.

A great king and the ocean both remain within their prescribed limits: the one, within the moral constraints of dharma; the other, within the very real physical boundaries set by land's end (sthitimān). Both are "implacable" (dhīrah); and a generous king surely is a "mine of jewels" or gifts to his subjects, where the ocean is considered a quite literal source of wealth (ratnānām ākarah). Yet the ocean, one of whose names Daṇḍin utilizes to add an additional negative flavor, the "abode of makaras" or rather

unsavory mythological creatures, with its "dark-stained" and thus tainted appearance, although similar, cannot possibly attain the stature of the king.

2.188 Example of the Vyatireka of Cause

Although bearing all the earth
 with mountains, islands and oceans --
 Because he's the lord of serpents / libertines
 Śeṣa is dragged beneath you.

Sahetu Vyatirekodāharanam :

vahannapi mahīm kṛtsnām saśailadvīpasāgarām
 bharṭṛbhāvādbhujaṁgānām śeṣastvatto nikṛṣyate

bhujaṁgānām [< bhujaṁgah] /literally, "curved-goer": "snake," and also "a dissolute libertine," "a rake":

"bhujaṅgāḥ , that is, either serpents or licentious rogues (vīṭas) -- through a trick of words defects are expressed"/
bhujaṅgā nāgā vīṭāśceti śabdacchalena doṣoktiḥ (RŚ/124).

Śesah : Lord of serpents, whose head supports the earth. "As a theriomorphic form of Viṣṇu, Śeṣa is a kind of demiurge whose fiery breath at the end of every age destroys the world, whose ashes sink into the primordial waters . . . , leaving only Viṣṇu and Śeṣa to continue the work of creation. Viṣṇu reclines on the coiled form of Śeṣa, the coils symbolizing the endless revolutions of Time."⁶

Sahetu vyatireka mirrors the preceding, yet now incorporates the distinctive feature of hetu alamkāra [2.235-60]. Thus again we have the ground of similarity between two primary objects expressed, yet now the "cause" or reason for the ultimate differentiation, for the ultimate inferiority of the upamāna, appears.

A great king and Śeṣa "bear all the earth," the former

figuratively and the latter (as conceived) quite literally. Yet Śeṣa, as lord of serpents and libertines (or licentious rogues), must ultimately be "dragged beneath." That Śeṣa is both "lord of serpents" and "libertines" is expressed through an adventitious ślesa (bhujamgānām). This element must be seen, however, as a subordinate component within the distinctive and primary expression of the cause of ultimate difference.

2.189 Conclusion to the Varieties of Vyatireka where Similarity is Explicit / Introduction to the Varieties of Vyatireka where Similarity is Implicit

Such is the vyatireka where

similarity is stated in words.

There is also a vyatireka where

similarity is implicit --

it will now be described.

Śabdopādānasādr̥syā Vyatirekopasam̄hārah /

Pratiyamānasādr̥syā Vyatirekopakramah :

śabdopādānasādr̥syavyatirekoyamīdr̥sah

pratiyamānasādr̥syopyasti sopyabhidhīyate

In all of the preceding varieties of vyatireka a similarity between two objects has been stated or elaborated in words (śabdopādānasādr̥syā). Dandin now turns to the alternate variation noted in his definition: cases where similarity may be merely "implied" (pratiyamāna-sādr̥syā).⁷

2.190 Example of the Vyatireka involving Difference Alone

Your face and the lotus --

The difference between the two:

The lotus growing in water

Your face with you for a basis.

Bhedamātra Vyatirekodāharanam :

tvanmukham kamalam ceti dvayorapyanayorbhidā
kamalam jalasamrohi tvanmukham tvadupāśrayam

In bhedamātra vyatireka there is no question of initially presenting attributes held in common, much less the explicit avowal of similarity. Two primary objects are given, objects whose similarity may be, however, immediately inferred. The grounds for distinction, as in ubhaya vyatireka [2.183-84], are described from the perspective of each. With the lack of explicit similarity we have, in effect, the expression of "difference alone."

For a women's face and the lotus -- where of course a similar beauty is inferred -- only the difference between them is explicitly described: "The lotus growing in water / Your face with you for a basis."

We may compare bhedamātra vyatireka with both atiśaya [2.22] and catu [2.35] upamās. Its similarity to the

former approaches equivalence.⁸ A subtle difference yet remains: "In [atiśaya upamā] iyatyeva bhidā nānyā ["This is the only difference -- there is no other"] emphatically declares the sādharmya ["similarity"]. In [bhedamātra vyatireka] only the bheda ["difference"] is stated and the sādharmya is left to be inferred" (Notes 2/136). We infer, rather, in bhedamātra that this is the only difference, and thus the existence of a truly "intense" similarity between both primary objects. In catu upamā we have the presentation of what we infer to be a single difference, and one which otherwise marks the superiority of the upamāna (as befits upamā). This difference is, however, dismissed in "flattering" the upameya.⁹

In bhedamātra vyatireka it would appear that the expressed difference is similarly depreciated; that in this case upameya and upamāna are in fact considered equals. Yet we should note a subtle reversal here of the presumed bases of superiority. Where in catu upamā the "moon" as upamāna (and thus assumed to be superior) is "marked with the deer

itself," and the upameya is marked with but the "eyes of the doe"; here it is the "face" as upameya that has a beautiful women for its basis, as opposed to the "lotus" as upamāna, whose source is external and rather neutral in value. We shall consider this point further in discussing the complementary variety to follow.

2.191 Example of the Vyatireka involving Superiority

The eyes of the deer

-- devoid of the play of brows

untouched by the flush of intoxication --

But these two eyes of yours

adorned with those qualities . . .

Ādhikya Vyatirekodāharanam :

abhrūvilāsamasprṣṭamadarāgam mrgekṣanam

idam tu nayanadvandvam tava tadguṇabhūsitam

Ādhikya vyatireka complements and extends the preceding. Again two primary objects are merely stated, with their similarity and its bases left to be inferred. And thus again it would appear that "difference alone" is explicit. Yet here, in differentiation, attractive and thus positive attributes that are denied to the upamāna are attributed to the upameya, effectively presenting its "superiority" (ādhikya).

That the "eyes of the deer" and the "eyes of a women" are similar in beauty we again infer, yet how superior must hers be "adorned with those very qualities" that the deer's lack -- a seductive "play of brows" and the "flush of intoxication."

Both bhedamātra and ādhikya vyatirekas thus display

essentially the same structure. We should not assume, however, that in the former "the differentiation is entirely circumstantial, eschewing such judgments" that we might find in the latter (Glossary/281). In ādhikya, following an inferred similarity however obvious, we yet infer the superiority of the upameya over the upamāna. In bhedamātra it is not that we have just the mere statement of difference -- for it is really "difference alone" as opposed to explicit similarity and difference -- but at a more subtle remove, a similarity that is more overtly drawn in ādhikya.

2.192 The Vyatirekas involving Difference Alone

And Superiority / Introduction to the Vyatireka
Involving Similarity in Difference

In the former the statement of Difference Alone

In the latter Superiority is shown.

Yet another vyatireka involving

Similarity in Difference

will presently be described.

Bhedamātra Ādhikya Vyatirekau / Sadrśa

Vyatirekopakramah :

pūrvasmin bhedamātroktirasminnādhikyadarśanam
 sadrśavyatirekaśca punaranyah pradarśyate

2.193 Example of the Vyatireka of Similarity in DifferenceWith Similarity Expressed

Your face and the lotus

blooming with fragrant scent --

But the lotus has its roaming bees

Your face its darting eyes.

Śabdopādānasādrśya Sadrśavyatirekodāharanam :

tvanmukham puñdarīkam ca phulle surabhigandhini

bhramadbhramaramambhojam lolanetram mukham tu te

Dandin presents yet another complementary pair, one that draws upon all the preceding structural elements. As vyatireka alamkara fundamentally describes difference within similarity, so now sadrśa vyatireka essentially describes similarity within a difference that exists within

an over-arching similarity. Given the constancy of similar attributes within differentiating features, the mode of expressing the basic similarity between the two primary objects allows two alternatives.

Thus in our first instance we again return to a similarity that is expressed in words. Yet now we find the explicit expression of similarity not only between the primary objects, but between the differentiating attributes as well. Both a beautiful face and a lotus are certainly similar, "blooming with a fresh and fragrant scent," yet where "the lotus has its roaming bees," the face displays "its darting eyes." But surely these features, although differentiating, in their explicitly presented actions of "roaming"/"darting" are themselves clearly similar. We may add that given this condition, with differentiation based upon similarity rather than inferiority/superiority, the status of the upameya and that of the upamāna are essentially equal.

2.194 Example of the Vyatireka of Similarity in DifferenceWith Similarity Implicit

This moon the tiara of the sky

The hamsa the ornament of water

The sky with its garland of stars

The water with its blossomed lilies.

Pratiyamānasādrya Sadrśavyatirekodāharanam :

candroymambarottamso hamsoyam toyabhūṣanam

nabho nakṣatramālīdamutphullakumudam payah

hamsa : (See [2.55], under hamsī.)

2.195 Explication of the Example of the Vyatireka of
Similarity in Difference with Similarity Implicit

Here where similarity between sky and water

based upon "clarity" and so on is being implied --

And between moon and hamsa

based upon "whiteness" --

A distinction is made.

Pratiyamānasādrśya Sadrśavyatirekodāharanāsva-

rūpaprakāśanam :

pratiyamānaśauklyādisāmyayorviyadambhasoh

kṛtaḥ pratītaśuddhyośca¹⁰ bhedosmimścandrahamsayoh

śauklya /"whiteness"; "purity" : Ratnaśrī is
presumably reading rather śauksmya/"subtleness" (RŚ/126).

viyadambhasoh [< (gen.) (dual) viyat (n.) /"sky" (+) ambhas (n.) /"water"].

suddhyoh [(gen.) (dual) < suddhih (f.) /"purity"; "whiteness"].

Given the structural condensation allowed by the present variety, Dāṇḍin departs somewhat from the usual format. Our example displays two essentially distinct vyatirekas, structurally joined -- we might say "interwoven" -- with the differentiating features of the initial primary pair of objects becoming themselves the primary objects for the second and following vyatireka. Yet it is essential to the correct translation and interpretation of Dāṇḍin's explanation to realize that this verse explicitly pertains only to the initial vyatireka presented in the first two pādas of the example. The process revealed is, however, obviously applicable to the following instance.

As a further variety of the vyatireka displaying

"similarity in difference" we again see two primary objects distinguished by features that themselves are similar. In the present case, two pairs of features differentiate two pairs of primary objects. Yet now in complementing the preceding subvariety with "similarity expressed" [2.193], the similarity between both primary objects and between their respective differentiating features is but implied, left to be inferred from the conjunction of the elements themselves.

We infer the similarity between the initial pair of primary objects, "moon" and "hamsa," "based upon 'whiteness'." And between the corresponding differentiating features, "sky" and "water," we infer a degree of similarity "based upon 'clarity'." Yet given this context, "a distinction is made"; for the moon is the "tiara of the sky," where the hamsa is the "ornament of water."

A parallel situation pertains in the second-half of the example, although now with an exchange between the structural elements of the attributes inferred in the

first-half. Again the attribute of "clarity" is inferred between sky and water, yet these now stand as primary objects. And again we infer the attribute of "whiteness," yet now between a new pair of objects serving as differentiating features, "stars" and "lilies." And although similarity is inferred between each pair, the primary objects are yet distinct: for the sky is marked "with its garland of stars," where the water is adorned "with its blossomed lilies." We might add that however felicitous the structural element of integration for the extended verse, it is neither distinctive of or essential to the variety of vyatireka at hand.

From this rather elaborate interwoven example, the abstracted structure of pratiyamānasādrśya sadrśavyatireka is clear: a pair of similar objects, differentiated by a pair of similar features, with the common attribute in each case implicit.

2.196 Conclusion and Explication of the Vyatireka of
Similarity in Difference

In the former similarity is expressed in words

Yet in both varieties the differentiating features

-- bees, eyes, and so on -- are similar.

Thus we have instances of vyatireka expressing

Similarity in Difference.

Sadrśa Vyatirekaprakāśanodāharanam :

pūrvatra śabdavat sāmyamubhayatrāpi bhedakam

bhr̥nganetrādi tulyam tat sadrśavyatirekatā

2.197 Example of the Vyatireka of Species

Undestroyed by the radiance of jewels

Unremoved by the rays of the sun

The obstructor of vision --

The darkness born of youth.

Svajāti¹¹ Vyatirekodāharanam :

aratnālokaśamhāryamahāryam sūryaraśmibhiḥ

dṛṣṭirodhakaram yūnām yauvanaprabhavam tamah¹²

2.198 The Vyatireka of Species

This is a Vyatireka of Species:

A species of darkness

-- an "obstructor of vision" --

and thus similar to all within the genus of Darkness

is yet shown as distinct through unique attributes.

Svajāti Vyatirekah :

sajātivyatirekoyam tamojāteridam tamah

dr̥ṣṭirodhitayā tulyam bhinnamanyairadarśi yat

adarsi [(lun) (3rd.) (sing.) < *dr̥ś (+) i].

Svajāti vyatireka is our final variety, and itself is somewhat unique. We return to a similarity "expressed in words," though now one established not between two objects as such, but one that exists between a "species" (svajāti)

and its superordinate genus (*jāti*). The differentiating features or "unique attributes" of that species are presented, marking its distinct status.

As an "obstructor of vision," this particular darkness qualifies for inclusion within the superordinate genus of "Darkness," and is thus similar to all other included species. Yet this powerful darkness stemming from youth's ignorance is distinct, and thus may be considered a species -- a mental darkness that inheres, "undestroyed by the radiance of jewels," "unremoved by rays of the sun."

Notes [2.180] - [2.198]

1. D. K. Gupta, A Critical Study of Dandin, p. 212.
2. Wendy O'Flaherty, Hindu Myths, pp. 159-60.
3. Wendy O'Flaherty, Hindu Myths, "Śiva Engenders the Submarine Mare," No. 42 from the Śiva Purāna [2.3.20.2-23], pp. 160-61. See also p. 327 for extensive textual references.
4. Gerow's translation reflects a lack of traditional knowledge, yet now a lack unfortunately combined with linguistic failure: "You and the ocean, O king, are indomitable (uncrossable), of great character (containing many substances), violent (stormy); this, however, is the difference between you: the ocean is cold (stupid) souled; you, however, are acrid (keen witted)" (Glossary/282).

Aside from the question of style, we note the addition of the vocative; the failure to catch durvārau also as "bad water," that is, "difficult to drink," echoing the "salinity" (lāvanya) of the ocean expressed in [2.179]; that sattva in this case reflects its materialistic, categorical usage, "many substances," is dubious; and most obviously, tejasau as "violent (stormy)" not only posits a questionable attribute to the king, but also misses the traditional awareness of the ocean as "molten," stemming from the "submarine fire" within its depths (see [2.183], under tejasau).
5. Gero Jenner, Die Poetischen Figuren, p. 216 : "Der Saśleṣavyatireka ist eigentlich überflüssig, da sämtliche vorangehenden Beispiele schon śliṣṭa waren. Es wird hier der zusätzliche śleṣa: 'jadātmā' gemeint sein."
6. Margaret and James Stutley, Harper's Dictionary of Hinduism, p. 276.

7. Again, Gerow would see all the remaining varieties as instances of pratiyamānasādrśya, where similarity is only implied. This view is, as we shall see, incorrect (Glossary/280-81).

8. [2.22] Atiśaya upamā: "Your face seen only on you / The moon seen only in the sky / This is the only difference -- there is no other. . . ."

9. [2.35] Catu upamā: "Your face / marked with the eyes of the doe / The moon / marked with the deer itself / Even so -- / He's but an equal -- not superior."

10. I am emending what I feel is an error of transposition in Rangacharya Raddi's text (RR/210): accepting śuddhyoh for śudhdyoh.

11. The reading svajāti of Ratnaśrī's commentary (RŚ/127) is accepted here, rather than the reading sajāti of Rangacharya Raddi's text (RR/211): I feel svajāti better captures the sense of "species" (as opposed to "genus"/jāti), where sajāti might be confused with jāti itself.

12. We may note the close similarity between this verse and the following lines found in Bāṇa's Kādambarī:
 nisargata evābhānubhedyam aratnālokokchedyam apradīpa-prabhāpaneyam atigahanam tamo yauvanaprabhavam (Bombay Sanskrit edition, p. 102). And which are nicely translated by H. R. Diwekar: "Impénétrables au soleil, ne pouvant être fendues par l'éclat des joyaux, ni dissipées par la lueur des lampes, très profondes par leur nature même, sont les ténèbres qui ont pour origine la jeunesse (H. R. Diwekar, Les Fleurs de Rhétorique dans L'Inde (Paris: Librairie d'Amerique et d'Orient, 1930), pp. 115-16).

As Belvalkar and Raddi point out, Maheścandra Nyāyaratna ("On the Authorship of the Mṛchchhakaṭikā," Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1887, pp. 196-97) and Peterson (Daśakumāracarita, Preface, p. ii) consider that Dandin

incorporated these lines into verse [2.197], thus signifying Bāṇa's chronological priority. They later affirm, however, that "more probably the two are quite independent of each other" (Notes 2/138).

Similarly, and at greater length, A. B. Keith writes: "The assumption that the Kādambarī was the source of the verse in Dāṇḍin seems without possible ground. . . . In the world of Kavis long before 600 A.D. we may assume that many tried their hands on so obvious and tempting a theme as that enshrined in the verse and in the Kādambarī" (A. B. Keith, "Dāṇḍin and Bhāmaha," In Indian Studies in Honor of Charles Rockwell Lanman, pp. 167-85 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1929, p. 169)).

Alternately and once again, H. R. Diwekar holds that the strong resemblance points to Dāṇḍin's borrowing from Bāṇa. Yet to further maintain that "la stance [of 2.198] ne laisse subsister aucun doute sur ce point" (p. 116) is unwarranted. There is nothing to suggest that "Le pluriel anyair signifie soit 'par d'autres poètes,' soit 'par les trois qualités distinctes' mentionnées par Bāṇa et dont Dāṇḍin n'a emprunté que deux" (p. 116).

Beyond noting the evident resemblance, we may really only speculate.

2.199 Definition of Vibhāvanā Alamkāra

Where excluding the usual cause

another cause or characteristic condition

can be discerned --

This is Vibhāvanā.

Vibhāvanālamkāralakṣaṇam :

prasiddhahetu^{yā}vṛtyā yatkīmcit kāraṇāntaram

yatra svābhāvikatvam vā vibhāvyam sā vibhāvanā

vibhāvanā [< vi (+) *bhū] / "causing to appear,"
"manifesting"; "discerning," "imagining."

vibhāvyam : avagamyate / "is understood" (RŚ/128);
cintanīyam / "can be realized" (RR/212).

svābhāvikatvam : naisargikam [< nisarga] /

"pertaining to an object's natural state or condition"
 (RŚ/128).

Vibhāvana alamkāra is brief, limited to two essential varieties displayed in three examples. A series of events or conditions are presented with their "usual or commonly accepted cause" (prasiddha hetu) explicitly and respectively denied. These negations thus lead to the "manifestation" (the literal meaning of vibhāvanā), or inference of either of two alternatives: the effects may be due to "another cause" (kārana antara) [2.200], or may in fact themselves be more properly seen as attributes organically reflecting a "characteristic condition" (svābhāvika) [2.201]. And further, that characteristic or natural condition may be explicitly marked through a specific word (such as nisargena/"naturally") [2.203-4].

Vibhāvanā alamkāra integrates and reflects the distinctive features of a number of independent alamkāras. "Cause" (hetu) as a central feature is fully developed in

hetu alamkāra [2.235-60], and is pervasively incorporated throughout Dāṇdin's varieties. Thus far we have seen cause interwoven as a subordinate feature in hetu upamā [2.50], hetu rūpaka [2.85-86], in both kārana [2.131-32] and hetu [2.167-68] āksepas, and in the immediately preceding hetu vyatireka [2.188]. Of special note is kārana āksepa where both principal cause (pradhāna kārana) and effect are negated. In vibhāvana "there is a negation of the [principal] cause but an assertion of the effect" (Notes 2/123).

And of course the consistent element of "denial" reflects to a degree the distinctive feature of āksepa alamkāra itself, although here denial merely sets the stage -- we go beyond denial to "the vibhāvanā or imagining of the new cause (or svābhāvika) ["characteristic condition"] to explain the effect" (Notes 2/139). Perhaps more properly, denial but leads to a further distinctive feature -- contradiction -- drawn from virodha alamkāra [2.333-40]. Given the denial of the expected, one is faced

with an initial contradiction, a discrepancy which leads to the resolving "manifestation" that is the focus of vibhāvanā.

The concept of vibhāvanā alamkāra remains essentially uniform across time. As in the Kāvyadarśa, vibhāvanā appears immediately after vyatireka alamkāra in both the Bhaṭṭikāvyam [10.41]¹ and in Bhāmaha's Kāvyālaṅkāra [2.77-78]. Bhāmaha [2.77] succinctly states: "The manifestation of an effect (phalam) where the cause (kriyā) is negated-- the explanation being apparent -- is known as vibhāvanā" [kriyāyāḥ pratiṣedhe tatphalasya vibhāvanā | jñeyā vibhāvanaivāsau samādhau sulabhe sati ||].

We note that there is no mention of what form this "explanation" might take, although that it should be apparent is clear. "To say that an effect is produced without its appropriate cause is a case of contradiction and here will come under the description of the dosa ["fault"] called vyartham. To obviate this . . . Bhāmaha adds the restriction "samādhau sulabhe sati."² Bhāmaha's solitary

example [2.78] is, however, similar to Dāṇḍin's example of kārana antara vibhāvanā [2.200] (the "Vibhāvanā involving Another Cause"), yet here we "discern" the rainy season as the ultimate cause of a number of effects (the first pāda matching Dāṇḍin's in sense: "Peacocks intoxicated without drinking. . . ."/apītamattāḥ śikhināḥ).

Vāmana (KAS [4.3.13]) would appear to have considered both Bhāmaha and Dāṇḍin, with a definition that follows primarily Bhāmaha, but with a single example that resembles Dāṇḍin's svābhāvika variety. Udbhaṭa (KASS [2.9]) repeats Bhāmaha's definition verbatim, and with Mammata (KP [10.107cd]) we find a close echo: "Although there is the exclusion of a cause, an effect is apparent -- this is vibhāvanā" [kriyāyāḥ pratisedhe 'pi phalavyaktirvi- bhāvanā ||. Balancing Bhāmaha's influence we find Dāṇḍin's definition similarly appearing verbatim in the Agni Purāṇa [343.27cd-28ab], and in Bhoja's Sarasvatīkānthabharana [3.9] and Śrṅgāraprakāśa [10].³

2.200 Example of the Vibhāvanā involving Another Cause

Kādambas intoxicated without drinking

Sky spotless without sweeping

Water pure without clarifying --

The world became captivating.

Kāranāntara Vibhāvanodāharanam :

apitaksibakādambamasammṛṣṭāmalāmbaram

aprasāditaśuddhāmbu jagadāśinmanoharam

kādamba : hamsaviśesa / "a particular type of hamsa"

(RR/212), which Ratnaśrī sees as the kalahamsa / "black

hamsa" (RŚ/128) (see [2.55], under hamsī).

The usual causes of presented effects, effects that are themselves attributes, are excluded. The situation yet

allows the inference of another further integrating cause (kāraṇāntara). All the effects of our example in fact reflect the "autumn season," where "The flights of geese make a semblance of white clouds / And, by reflections in the water, of a hundred lotuses: / as if the fall had not enamored us already with its river waves ringing sweet and sharp / like women's jeweled anklets."⁴

Rangacharya Raddi nicely glosses this verse: "Here the usual causes of being intoxicated, spotless, or pure are drinking, sweeping, clarifying, and so on. Although these are not evident, the relevant effects that should occur are described . . . another cause -- the autumn season -- is discerned" [atra kṣībatvāmalatvaśuddhatvānām pānasammārjanaprasādanādīni prasiddhāni kāraṇāni | teṣāmabhāvepi tādr̥śa phalotpattirvarnyamānā . . . śaratkāla rūpam kāraṇāntaram vibhāvayati ||] (RR/212).

2.201 Example of the Vibhāvanā involving Characteristic Condition

Beautiful one!

Your eyes black without being made-up

Your brows furrowed without being drawn

And this lower lip red without being colored . . .

Svābhāvika Vibhāvanodāharānam :

anañjitāsitā dr̥ṣṭirbhūranāvarjitā natā

arajjitoruṇāścāyamadharastava sundari

Once again various results -- eyes being black, brows furrowed, a lower lip red -- are seen without any evidence of their usual causes: the application of mascara to the eyes, of red make-up to the lips, or brows furrowed or drawn down perhaps in anger or displeasure. Yet here

"there is no evidence of some 'other cause' (kāraṇāntara), rather these [various attributes] are discerned [as reflections] of a 'characteristic condition' (svābhāvika-tvam) alone" [tāni ca . . . kāraṇāntaramapratipadyamānāni svābhāvikatvameva vibhāvayanti] (RR/213).

We fail to infer the implicit presence of any other causes for effects that seem to anomalously appear. Yet "other causes" really means external forces acting from without. Alternately, a "natural" or characteristic condition may present itself as an originating basis. Where what otherwise might be seen as effects, now are surely attributes of an integrating whole, marking an organic relationship that cannot quite be seen in the light of cause and effect. A series of beautiful facial features appear as though of themselves, organic to and inseparable from the characteristic condition of "beauty."⁵

2.202 Explication of the Vibhāvanās involving AnotherCause and Characteristic Condition

In these varieties one wishes to present results

-- intoxication and so on --

that do not arise from drinking and so on --

But that originate from other causes

or are in fact without cause --

Thus there is no incongruity.

Kāraṇāntara Svābhāvika Vibhāvanodāharanāsvarūpa-
prakāśanam :

yadapitādijanyam syāt kṣībatvādyanyahetujam
 ahetukam ca tasyeha vivakṣetyaviruddhatā

In each case results follow without any evidence of

their usual causes -- apparent incongruities. In the first case "another cause" -- the autumn season -- is discerned; in the second, the cause is in fact innate, where the "characteristic condition or nature" of a beautiful women may display attributes on its own without the aid of any further manipulation. And in each case the apparent incongruity is resolved.

2.203 Example of the Vibhāvanā involving Explicit

Characteristic Condition

The mouth fragrant naturally

The body beautiful without decoration

The moon an enemy for no reason

The god of love a foe without cause.

Śabda Svābhāvika Vibhāvanodāharanam :

vaktram nisargasurabhi vapuravyājasundaram
 akāraṇaripuścandro nirnimittāsuhṛt smarah

nisarga- /"by nature," "naturally": nisargena svabhād-
eva surabhi sugandhi /"surabhi or 'fragrant' nisargena 'by
 its essential nature alone'" (RŚ/130).

smarah /that is, Kāma, the god of love and desire (see
 [2.80], under manmatha).

2.204 The Vibhāvanā involving Explicit CharacteristicCondition

Here with the words "naturally" and so on

Cause is explicitly denied

But effects -- marked by "fragrance" and so on

are stated --

Thus we have Vibhāvanā.

Śabda Svābhāvika Vibhāvanā :

nisargādipadairatra hetuh sāksānnivartitah

uktam ca surabhītvādi phalam tat sā vibhāvanā

hetuh : hetuh jātyaikavacanam | hetavah / "Hetu in the singular refers to 'cause' as genus (jāti), that is, [consisting of a number of distinct] causes" (RR/214).

For a beautiful woman the mouth is "fragrant and sweet naturally" -- there is no other cause. What need of external decoration on a "body that is innately beautiful"?

Towards her the brilliant, shining moon "by nature" will be at jealous odds. And of course the god of love, Kāma, will .pa be a "foe," constantly generating disruptive desire in and towards one so beautiful.

Again a series of attributes appears in the guise of seemingly unaccountable effects, attributes that in fact reflect a given "characteristic condition." In the present and final variety of vibhāvanā alamkāra, a word such as "naturally"/nisarg(ena) explicitly marks the relationship between attributes and their bases as organic and innate. It thus simultaneously denies the existence of "cause" as such.

Notes [2.199] - [2.204]

1. Jayamaṅgalā [10.41], [850], pp. 277-78.
2. Bhāmaha, Kāvyālaṅkāra of Bhāmaha, edited and translated by P. V. Nāganātha Sastry, p. 47.
3. Bhoja, Śrīgāraprakāśa [10], edited by G. R. Josyer, vol. 2, p. 395.
4. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Sanskrit Poetry, No. 270, attributed to Manovinoda (c. 900-110), p. 107.
5. It is not the case, as Gerow affirms, that "her anger is the 'cause' of her paradoxical appearance; she doesn't love him. . . ." (Glossary/265). There is no external cause as such, no "cause" beyond the natural condition of innate beauty.

2.205 Definition of Samāsokti Alamkāra

Implying one thing

Expressing another thing --

Due to its concise form

This is considered Samāsokti.

Samāsoktyalamkāralakṣaṇam :

vastu kiṁcidabhipretya tattulyasyānyavastunah

uktih samkṣeparūpatvāt sā samāsoktirisyate

samāsoktiḥ [(f.) < samāsa-uktih] /literally,
 "speech thrown, put together [< sam (+) *ās] ;"concise,
 condensed speech."

abhipretya [lyabanta (gerund in -(t)ya) < abhi (+)
pra (+) *i] /literally, "having intended. . . ."

Samāsokti alamkāra extends the process of inference utilized in the immediately preceding vibhāvanā alamkāra [2.199-204]. In vibhāvanā one must go beyond the given verse to infer the actual cause of otherwise anomalous effects. In samāsokti the scope and degree of inference is widened: we are simultaneously "implying one thing" (an upameya) "in expressing another similar thing" (an upamāna -- an object with various attributes. "The descriptive qualifications of an explicit subject suggest an implicitly comparable object to which they likewise apply" (Glossary/316). Through inference we effectively "condense" (samāsa/"throw together") two parallel and similar images into one given verse.

It is not surprising that Ratnaśrī should comment, "This very [process] others have termed 'dhvani,'" and that he should then proceed to quote the definition of dhvani given in the Dhvanyāloka [1.13]: "The learned designate that type of kāvya as 'dhvani' where the words and [explicit] meanings are subordinated and suggest an

[implicit] meaning" [yatrārthaḥ śabdo vā tamarthamupa-sarjanīkṛtasvārthau | vyañktah kāvyaviśeṣah sa dhvaniriti sūribhiḥ kathitah ||].¹ Yet the element of dhvani, or rather of varying degrees of inference, appears throughout Daṇdin's schema, and we should hardly consider it confined to the present instance.

Previously we have seen prativastu upamā [2.46-47], where comparable images appear in parallel sentences; and tulyayoga upamā [2.48-49], where "in the performance of the same action" otherwise distinct objects are considered comparable. In each case, however, both upameya and upamāna are expressed "in words" (śabdopātta). It is in the forthcoming aprastutapraśamsā alamkāra [2.340-42], the "praising" of the aprastuta or upamāna at the expense of an implied prastuta or upameya, that we find the greatest degree of similarity. The upamāna alone is not merely described but praised in a way that allows us to infer not merely the upameya, but that it is an upameya thus disparaged.²

Dandin's first three varieties of samāsokti alamkāra are essentially variations on a structural theme. The first is left unqualified [2.206-7], yet may be considered "samāsokti as such" -- a general instance of the figure, although one, in displaying the greatest degree of "suggestion", that portrays most completely samāsokti's distinctive approach. Thus, as opposed to the following two varieties, there are no attributes that explicitly and simultaneously apply to the inferred upameya -- there is no direct contact between the two parallel images.

In tulyākāraviśeṣana samāsokti [2.208-9, 2.211] a series of ślesas embrace multiple meanings that respectively apply to the explicit upamāna and the implicit upameya. The "form" or word that expresses either attribute simultaneously is thus one and the same, or "equivalent." Alternately, in bhinnābhinnaviśeṣanā samāsokti [2.208, 2.10-11] we have a balance where one pair of attributes applies specifically to the explicit upamāna, another pair -- as in the preceding and again utilizing

ślesas -- where one of two multiple meanings respectively applies to either the explicit or the implicit object. The final variety, apūrva samāsokti [2.12-13] is somewhat distinct. It presents an "unusual" situation where, although attributes appear through ślesas, those applicable are "disjunctively conjoined" to the expressed upamāna, and yet appropriately refer to the implicit upameya.

Samāsokti alamkāra would most certainly appear to be reflected in the Bhāttikāvyam [10.42] where from the drying of an artificial reservoir we infer Rāma's distress.³ Bhāmaha's sequence is again identical to Dāṇḍin's, with samāsokti (KA [2.79-80]) immediately following vibhāvanā [2.77-78]. His definition [2.79] is quite similar: "Where in a given expression another meaning -- displaying similar attributes -- is implied. Due to the condensation of meaning -- This is considered samāsokti" [yat rokte gamyate 'nyo 'rthastatsamānaviśeṣaṇah | sā samāsoktiruddistiṣṭā samkṣiptārthayā yathā ||]. The single example that follows [2.80], takes a "tree" as its explicit upamāna, as do two

examples of Dāṇḍin's, yet now one fallen -- "a good man struck down by misfortune."⁴ Bhāmaha's definition reappears in the Agni Purāṇa [344.17].⁵

Vāmana's definition (KAS [4.3.3]) is concise, and considers -- as we would expect -- samāsokti essentially in light of upamā: [anuktau samāokti] / [Literally] "In not stating -- This is samāsokti." Yet this abbreviated definition coordinates with the preceding verse [4.3.2] that defines prativastu alamkāra: [upameyāsyoktau samānavastunyāsaḥ prativastud] / "Presenting parallel sentences in stating the upameya -- This is prativastu."⁶ We may thus consider Vāmana's gloss [4.3.3ff.] to his definition of samāsokti and expand: "Presenting parallel sentences in not stating the upameya -- This is samāsokti"/ upameyasyānuktau samā navastunyāsaḥ ||.

And finally we may note in Mammata's definition (KP [10.97ab]) a shift of emphasis, with the explicit inclusion of a prevalent (though not essential) element of Dāṇḍin's varieties. For Mammata samāsokti appears as "The expression

of another [object] through attributes [appearing in]
ślesas" [paroktirbhedakaiḥ śliṣṭaiḥ samāsoktiḥ ||].

2.206 Example of Samāsokti as Such

See!

The bee drinking honey at will

from the blossomed lotus

kisses the virgin bud of nascent fragrance.

Samāoskti Svarūpodāharanam :

pibān madhu yathākāmāṁ bhramaraḥ phullapañkaje
 apyasaṁnaddhasaurabhyāṁ paśya cumbati kuḍmalam

2.207 Explication of the Samāsokti as Such

Here the presence of desire towards
 a young girl is implied
 in a passionate man
 whose love-play is confined to mature woman.

Samāsokti Svarūpodāharanāsvarūpaprakāśanam :

iti praudhāñganābaddharatililasya rāgiṇah
 kasyāmcidiha bālāyāmicchāvṛttirvibhāvyate

praudha-añganā / "a mature woman," both in the sense of
 "youth at its peak," as well as in the sense of
 "experienced," "adept in all the amorous arts."
vibhāvyate [nijannta karmani prayoga < vi (+) *bhū]
 /literally, "is being caused to manifest (itself)":
pratiyate (RŚ/132). We note the use of the identical

verbal root utilized to mark the preceding (vibhāvanā)
alamkāra.

Daṇḍin's first example of samāsokti, although not explicitly qualified, is yet distinct. It may be considered to reflect samāsokti "as such," that is, samāsokti in its most essential form. In this case there is no question of presented attributes in varying degrees referring simultaneously and explicitly -- through ślesa -- to both the primary object expressed (upamāna) and the primary object implied (upameya). There are no explicit clues beyond the given description of subject, actions, and attributes. The element of "suggestion" permeates our example completely -- the reliance on inference is total.

As a "bee drinks honey at will / from the blossomed lotus," so a "passionate man" takes his pleasure with a mature companion as he wishes. And as the bee may be tempted by a "virgin bud" whose fragrance is yet nascent, so such a man might simultaneously be desirous of a young yet inexperienced woman.

2.208 Introduction to the Samāsoktis of Equivalent Application and Equivalent and Differential Application

There is a variety where the qualified objects alone are differentiated whose attributes are of equivalent application -- And another with attributes of either differential or equivalent application.

Tulyākāraviśeṣaṇā Bhinnābhinnaviśeṣaṇā

Samāsoktiprakāśanam :

viśeṣyamātrabhinnāpi tulyākāraviśeṣaṇā
astyasāvaparāpyasti bhinnābhinnaviśeṣaṇā

tulya-ākāra-viśeṣaṇā /literally, "attributes that have or present an equivalent form or aspect."

bhinnābhinnaviśesanā /literally, "different and equivalent attributes."

Two complementary varieties of samāsokti are introduced. Of necessity the object expressed and the object it implies, however similar, are ultimately distinct. Yet what is expressed is expressed through attributes (viśesana), and when these are presented through ślesas a single term through multiple meanings may in fact refer, respectively, not only to the explicit object but directly to the hidden, implicit object as well. The degree to which this technique is employed, and thus the degree of what is really overt reference within a context of implication, distinguishes these two varieties.

2.209 Example of the Samāsokti of Equivalent Application

With firm

roots / retainers

Continually nourishing beggars with an abundance of

fruits / favors

With extensive

shade / splendor --

I found refuge under this great tree.

Tulyākāraviśesana Samāsoktyudāharanam :

rūḍhamūlah phalabharaiḥ puṣṇannaniśamarthinah

sāndracchāyo mahāvṛksaḥ soyamāsādito mayā

rūḍha-mūlah / "of firm, fixed 'roots,' and also
'supporter(s),' 'retainer(s).' "

phala-bharaiḥ /"with a weight/load of 'fruit(s),' and also 'benefit(s),' 'favor(s).' "

sāndra-chayah /"thick, extensive 'shade,' and also 'splendor.' "

In tulya ākāra viśeṣanā samāsokti "all attributes are equally applicable" (RR/214) to both the object overtly expressed (upamāna), and to the object implied and with which the comparison is drawn (upameya). It is not that the meaning of each attribute is unitary and mutually applies, rather that the attributes -- through ślesa -- are presented as respectively applicable shades of meaning "embraced" by a series of single words -- "attributes that have an equivalent form or aspect" (tulya ākāra). Given that all attributes embrace two applicable shades of meaning within one form, and in this sense are of "equivalent application," it is the "qualified objects alone" -- explicit upamāna and implicit upameya -- that are differentiated."

Explicitly a man finds "refuge under this great tree," a tree qualified by a series of s̄lesas that all simultaneously apply to, and thus indicate and illuminate the inferred object -- a "great king." As the tree's "roots are firm," so are the king's faithful "retainers" (rūdha-mūlah); just as the great tree is "continually nourishing beggars with an abundance of fruits," so the king nourishes his supplicants with "favors"; and as the array of branches provides "extensive shade," so the king displays "extensive splendor."

2.210 Example of the Samāsokti of Equivalent and Differential Application

Vast with innumerable branches

Abundant with fruits and flowers

Lofty / Exalted

Stable / Steadfast --

Through luck I found this tree.

Bhinnābhinnaviśeṣaṇa Samāsoktyudāharanam :

analpavīṭapābhogaḥ phalapuṣpasamṛddhimān

socchrāyah sthairyavān daivādesa labdho mayā drumaḥ

sa-ucchrāyah / "with great height, elevation" or
"exalted," "superior."

sthairyavān / "possessing stability," "stable" or
"steadfast," "resolute."

Bhinnābhinnaviśesana samāsokti, where we have

"equivalent and differential application," complements the preceding, balancing the applicability of a series of expressed attributes. Rather than all attributes being simultaneously apropos to both the expressed upamāna and the implicit upameya, now some refer strictly to the expressed object, and some continue -- again through ślesas -- to refer to both primary objects.

A fortunate man finds a comfort-giving tree that is "vast with innumerable branches" and "abundant with fruits and flowers," a tree that cannot but mirror a beneficient king or generous benefactor. For as the tree is "lofty," so he is "exalted" (sa-ucchrāyah); and as it is "stable," so he is "steadfast" (sthairyavān). Thus one pair of attributes refers to the tree alone, the expressed object; where another pair simultaneously and expressly applies to both the explicit "tree" and the implicit object, a beneficient "patron."

2.211 The Samāsoktis of Equivalent Application and
Equivalent and Differential Application

In these a man is described

through the image of a tree --

In the earlier all attributes

are equally applicable --

In the latter only two.

Tulyākāraviśeṣana Bhinnābhinnaviśeṣana Samāsokti ca :

ubhayatra pumān kaścit vṛkṣatvenopavarnitah

sarve sādhāraṇā dharmāḥ pūrvatrānyatra tu dvayam

2.212 Example of the Samāsokti of the Unusual

This ocean

where contact with serpents has ceased

whose nature is naturally sweet

Alas! Dries in the course of time.

Apūrva Samāsoktyudāharanam :

nivṛttavyālaśamsargo nisargamadhurāśayah

ayamambhonidhiḥ kastam kālena pariśusyati

vyāla- /"serpents" or "wicked, vicious [people]" (see under [2.188], where bhujamgānām similarly captures the two meanings of "serpents" and "libertines."

madhura- /"sweet" or "charming," "affectionate."

2.213 The Samāsokti of the Unusual

This is a Samāsokti of the Unusual:

Implying the dying of a man

who is similar to the ocean

through dissociation from its usual attributes.

Apūrva Samāsoktiḥ :

ityapūrvasamāsoktiḥ pūrvadharmanivartanāt

samudreṇa samānasya pumso vyāpattisūcanāt

Apūrva samāsokti, the third and final specified variety, is distinct and somewhat complex. It presents an "unusual" or "novel" (apūrva) situation, where quite contradictory attributes are associated with the expressed primary object. Yet these attributes are once again expressed through ślesas, and where in one sense they are

disjunctively conjoined with the explicit upamāna, in another sense they appropriately refer to the implicit upameya. Essentially, apūrva's novelty reflects a contradiction based upon attributes which themselves provide the keys to its resolution. Their alternate meanings point to the implicit object, drawing it into the context of the entire verse where we infer its similarity to the given object, and thus the analogical appropriateness of a given -- inevitable -- result.

The "unusual" in our example stems from the "dissociation of the ocean's usual attributes": "This ocean" -- truly the abode of numerous serpents -- "where contact with serpents has ceased"; whose nature is salty, certainly not "naturally sweet." Yet vyāla not only means "serpents," but also "wicked, vicious [people]"; and madhura not only means "sweet," yet also "charming" or "affectionate." This initial disjunction alerts us to the possibility of an alternate, implied object, "explicitly" pointed to through attributes of multiple meanings. We infer a good man

"whose contact with the wicked has ceased," and "whose nature is naturally affectionate." In being drawn into the verse, he is then "similar to the ocean," and thus we draw the inevitable conclusion: as even this great body of water "will dry in the course of time," so we ultimately infer that this good man is in fact "dying."

Notes [2.205] - [2.213]

1. Ānandavardhana, Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana, edited and translated by K. Krishnamoorthy, p. 18.
2. The relationship between and the interpretation of samāsokti and aprastutapraśamsā alamkāras in later writers frequently varys and is often confused. See (Glossary/316-18) and (Notes 2/143-44).
3. Jayamañgalā [851] on [10.42], p. 278.
4. Bhāmaha, Kāvyālaṅkāra, edited and translated by P. V. Naganatha Sastry, , p. 48
5. Agni Purāṇa [344.17]: [yat roktam̄ gamyate nārthas-tatsamānaviśeṣanam̄ | sā samāsoktiruditā saṅkṣepārthatayā budhaiḥ ||].
6. Vāmana, Kāvyālaṅkārasūtrāni [4.3.2ff.]: In light of our translation and discussion of Daṇḍin's prativastu upamā [2.46-47], we should note that Vāmana glosses vastu / literally, "thing," "object," as vākyārtha/"sentence."

2.214 Definition of Atiśayokti [Atiśaya] Alamkāra

A desire to describe

through transcending conventional limits

a distinctive attribute --

This is Atiśayokti -- foremost of alamkāras.

For example:

Atiśayoktyalamkāralaksanam :

vivakṣā yā viśeṣasya lokasimātivartinī

asāvatiśayokti syādalamkārottamā yathā

atiśaya-uktih [(f.) < ati (+) *śī / "surpass,"
"excel"] / "the expression of superiority," "of exaggerated
degree, excess."

loka-sīma-ativartinī [< ati (+) vartin] / literally,
"going beyond the boundaries of the world."

Atisayokti alamkāra, although displaying few varieties, is of great importance. It is the essential embodiment of a feature or process that is considered primary in kāvya. Atisayokti is the "expression of an excess, of an exaggeration, of an intensity" (atisaya) that "transcends conventional limits" (lokasimātivartini). The focus is a "distinctive attribute" and one that "should be naturally inherent in the given subject" (Glossary/98) -- not fantastically ascribed. It is thus closely related to (for some, indistinguishable from) that artistic and creative "twisting" of language, vakrokti, that for Daṇḍin and others is so vital in achieving that striking resonance of total effect that distinguishes the alamkāra. We have considered vakrokti at length in our discussion of svabhāvokti alamkāra [2.8-13], and once again we should note Daṇḍin's illuminating statement [2.363]: "Literary or poetic language has a two-fold division: svabhāvokti and vakrokti."

Daṇḍin distinguishes atisayokti as "the best or

foremost of alamkāras" (alamkārottamā). Ratnaśrī perhaps misses the point when he comments, "This is the 'best' or foremost (pradhānā) among the other alamkāras due to its excessive beauty" [sā ca iyamalaṅkārāṇām anyeṣām uttamā pradhānā atyantamanoharatvāt] (RŚ/135). Rangacharya Raddi recognizes rather that it is primarily due to atiśayokti's status as embodying atiśaya that merits Daṇḍin's attribution: "This is the 'best of alamkāras' since an alamkāra depends on captivating charm (vaicitrya) and this captivating charm depends on a presentation abundantly marked by atiśaya [asau atiśayoktiralamkāreṣu uttamā | yataḥ alamkāro vaicitryādhīnah | tacca vaicitryam prāyotiśaya varṇanādhīnam] (RR/221-22).

It is in Bhāmaha's Kāvyālaṅkāra [2.84], following his definition and examples [2.81-83], that the importance of atiśayokti in kāvya is most forcefully stated: "Through the integration of the exaggeration of qualities all such expressions which display atiśayokti arise. One should identify these according to the definition" [ityevamādir-

uditā gunātiśayayogataḥ | sarvaivātiśayoktistu tarkayettāṁ yathāgamam ||]. Bhāmaha continues in the following verse [2.85] in a manner that allows one to infer that (for him) atiśayokti and vakrokti are nearly indistinguishable: "This very atiśayokti surely pervades vakrokti in its entirety. Through it meaning is enhanced. Kavis should strive for it. Where is the alamkāra without it? [saīśā sarvaiva vakroktiranayārtho vibhāvyate | yatno 'syām kavinā kāryah ko 'laṅkāro 'nayā vinā ||].

This importance is again stressed by Ānandavardhana [9th century] in his highly influential Dhvanyāloka [3.36ff.]. "One may assume a degree of atiśayokti in all alamkāras. The great kavis have certainly utilized it with an eye towards augmenting the beauty of kāvya. Indeed, when the element of atiśaya is employed in kāvya according to its own principles of propriety, how can it fail to generate excellence?" [tāvadatiśayoktigarbhatā sarvālañ- kāeṣu śakyakriyā | kṛtaiva ca sā mahākavibhiḥ kāmapi

kāvyacchavim puṣyati katham hyatiśayayogitā svaviṣayau-cityena kriyamānā satī kāvye notkarṣamāvahet |].

We should keep Bhāmaha's words in mind when we turn to Dandin's illuminating conclusion to atiśayokti alamkāra [2.218]: "They say that this mode of expression / whose name is atiśaya / honored by men of letters / is the primary basis of yet other alamkāras." Whether or not Dandin himself had Bhāmaha's words specifically in mind is an interesting but ultimately open question. It would seem, however, that Dandin's statement allows us to conclude that the importance of atiśaya as a primary element in kāvya was accepted by earlier writers.

Recognition of atiśaya does appear to go back to an early date. Significantly it appears as one of the thirty-six lakṣanas in Bharata's Nātyaśāstra [17.2]. That atiśayokti alamkāra appears in the Bhaṭṭikāvyam we may assume, although, as we have previously noted exactly where appears impossible to confirm. The Jayamaṅgalā [852] sees atiśayokti in verse [10.43], where Mallinātha sees svabhā

vokti alamkāra. Alternately, Mallinātha sees atiśayokti in verse [10.46], where the Jayamaṅgalā would see (the spurious) vārtā.

Among the critics, the essential conception of atiśayokti alamkāra remains relatively unchanged across time. Shifts in emphasis do result, however, in variations among the subvarieties. Bhāmaha (KA [2.81]), for example, considers atiśayokti "An expression generated by [the desire] to transcend conventional limits" [nimittato vaco yattu lokātikrāntagocaram | manyante 'tiśayoktiṁ tām- alamkāratayā yathā ||]. A definition certainly similar to Dāṇḍin's (with a quite identical phrase), and indeed in the first of Bhāmaha's two following examples [2.82-83] we find a Saptacchada tree blooming in white becoming invisible in the moonlight, mirroring Dāṇḍin's initial example.

Dāṇḍin limits atiśayokti to but four varieties. As in the preceding samāsokti alamkāra, the first [2.215-16] is untitled and may be taken as "atiśayokti as such," a representative example that displays the essential process

of this alamkāra. A complementary pair follows: the exaggerated diminution of an attribute may be marked either by "doubt"/samśaya [2.217], or by the "resolution"/ nirnaya [2.218] of doubt. Dandin's final variety has again, as with the first and third, been left unnamed, although in this case we shall see no certainty of determination. I have considered it an atiśayokti of "inclusive relationship"/ ādeya-ādhāra [2.219].

Following Dandin we may note once again Rudraṭa's elevation and isolation of the element of atiśaya as marking one of his four major categories of artha alamkāras (KA [7.9]) (along with vastava, aupamya, and ślesa). Chapter nine of his Kavyālaṅkāra is completely devoted to various varieties of atiśaya, of which he enumerates twelve.¹ Within this category "Rudraṭa groups those assertions which in some may defy the canonical or assumed relation of a predicate or quality to its subject. . . ." (Glossary/37).

Although the definition of atiśayokti alamkāra

appearing in the Agni Purāṇa [343.25cd-26a] does not vary from the norm, it anomalously presents a two-fold division of sambhava/"possible" and asambhava/"impossible" varieties [343.26b].

Finally we may consider the four developed categories of Mammaṭa (KP [10.100-101abc]). The first, adhyavasāna, acknowledges what is perhaps the fundamental procedure of atiśayokti -- the identification of the upameya with the upamāna due to the exaggeration of an attribute held in common. This reflects Dāṇḍin's initial variety [2.215], as well as, for example, those found in Bhāmaha (KA [2.82]) and Vāmana (KAS [4.3.10]). In prastutasya yadanyatva, foreshadowed by Udbhaṭa in [2.12] (whose definition [2.11] is drawn from that of Bhāmaha), the upameya (prastuta) is identified as something "other" than what it actually is. Again explicitly categorizing a feature found in earlier examples, as in Bhāmaha [2.83] and Vāmana [4.3.10], yadyarthoktau ca kalpanam refers to an imagined situation explicitly marked by a word meaning "if" (yadi) -- a usage

which does not appear in Dandin. The last category Mammaṭa draws directly from Udbhaṭa [2.13]. In kāryakāraṇayor-
yaśca paurvāparyaviparyayah we find find a reversal of the usual sequence of cause and effect.

2.214 Example of Atiśayokti as Such

Wearing garlands of Jasmine

Sandalwood lotion pervading the limbs

Dressed in silk garments --

Women furtively meeting their lovers

pass unnoticed in the moonlight.

Atiśayokti Svarūpodāharanam :

mallikāmālabhārīnyah sarvāṅgīnārdracandanāḥ

kṣaumavatyo na lakṣyante jyotsnāyāmabhisārikāḥ

mallikā : the white Jasmine flower, noted for its pungent evening scent; woven into garlands frequently considered an erotic adornment.

abhisārikāḥ : the abhisārikā, the woman "going forth" to a secret assignation with her lover, is a popular figure with the kavi. Ingalls notes that she "moves in circles of nobility. Among the peasantry it was the man who visited his mistress."² Silence is essential and alternately, with the moon on the wane, she will dress in dark garments to facilitate her passage: "Clad in garments dark as was the hue / of smoke that rose from Kāma's fire, / abhisarikās set forth on their paths / with silent ornaments to meet their lovers."³

2.216 Explication of the Example of Atiśayokti as Such /Introduction to Further Varieties

The excessive intensity of moonlight

is described in exaggerated degree.

For the sake of illustrating

the Atiśayotki of Doubt and others

a few further examples will be shown.

Atiśayokti Svarūpodāharanāsvarūpaprakāśanam /Atiśayokti Prabhedaprakāśanam :

candrātapaśya bāhulyāmuktamutkarsavattayā

samśayātiśayādīnām vyaktyai kīmcinnidarśyate

As with the initial variety of the immediately preceding samāsokti alamkāra [2.206-7], "atiśayokti as such" illustrates this alamkāra's general yet essential

form. "A distinctive attribute" is described in a manner that "transcends conventional limits" -- its evident presence is marked in exaggerated degree. Abhisārikās "furtively meeting their lovers" must pass unnoticed. Wearing pure white "garlands of Jasmine," anointing their limbs with the pale and cooling "sandalwood lotion," and adorned in "garments of white silk," they seek to attain an intensity of "whiteness" that might match the evident brilliance of blinding and betraying moonlight. The "excessive intensity of moonlight," its degree of whiteness, is thus described in reflection -- a series of elements that themselves markedly display this same attribute are cumulatively arrayed. The "exaggerated degree" of the moonlight's whiteness is effectively inferred from the necessity of this multiple array, reflecting the efforts of the women to achieve a comparable intensity.⁴

2.217 Example of the Atisayokti of Doubt

Dear one!

Between your breasts and hips

is there a waist or not . . . ?

My doubt doesn't cease . . . even now.

Samśaya Atisayokyudāharanam :

stanayorjaghanasyāpi madhye madhyam̄ priye tava
asti nāstīti samdeho na medyapi nivartate

Samśaya atisayokti (that of "doubt") is balanced by the immediately following nirnaya atisayokti (that of "resolution"). Dandin has previously utilized these complementary elements in upamā alamkāra: in samśaya upamā [2.26] "the presence of doubt leads to the inference of similarity"; in nirnaya upamā [2.27] initial doubt is

resolved with the identification (and elevation) of the upameya. Samśaya ākṣepa [2.163-64], however, embraces both elements. An initial doubt is "negated" through its resolution. In samśaya atisayokti the presence of doubt serves to underline the degree of intensity of a distinctive attribute.

From a lover's incredulous query, "Is there a waist or not . . . ? -- doubting the existence of a "middle" -- we cannot but infer that the degree of "slenderness" displayed is truly incredible.

2.218 Example of the Atisayokti of Resolution

Beautiful buns!

It is possible to conclude

that your waist is there . . .

The presence of those massive breasts

would otherwise be inexplicable.

Nirnaya Atisayoktyudāharanam :

nirnetum śakyamasti madhyam tava nitambini
anyathānupapattyiva payodharabharasthiteḥ

nitambini [(f.) (voc.) < nitambinī]. Nitambinī refers to a woman of beautiful "buttocks"/"ass." Neither of these two extremes -- the one of awkward anatomy, the other perhaps excessively vulgar -- works in translation. The tone of the verse is one of playful familiarity, and I would ask forgiveness for the excursion into the remoter regions of slang in the attempt to come up with a term playful yet not excessively crass. I am not satisfied but I refuse to use the usual euphemistic and inaccurate "hips."

In nirnaya atisayokti, complementing the preceding, the intensity of a given attribute is stressed through the "resolution" of what was obviously an initial doubt. Again we have the attribute of "slenderness" portrayed to an

excessive degree. A lover playfully and emotionally addressing a beloved resolves that her waist, however slender, does indeed exist. For, utilizing logic to proper effect, how could "those massive breasts" exist without a modicum of support.

2.219 Example of the Atisayokti of Inclusive Relationship

Oh king!

How extensive the womb of the three-fold world!

For the extent of your fame

-- otherwise impossible to measure --

fits therein.

Ādeya-Ādhāra Atisayokyudāharanam :

aho viśālam bhūpāla bhuvanatritayodaram
māti mātumaśakyopi yaśorāśiryadatra te

Dandīn in leaving the distinctive feature or process of this last example of atiśayokti unspecified has left the door open for variable interpretation. As opposed to the first example [2.215], similarly unspecified yet which is held to illustrate in a general yet essential way the distinctive aspect of this alamkāra, we assume that this verse embodies an element sufficiently distinctive that would allow it to qualify as an integral subvariety.

Our example presents a king being praised by a subject "transcending conventional limits" in expressing the amazing extent of his lord's fame. Ratnaśrī focuses on the specific attribute and declares, "Where one wishes to portray the great extent of fame . . . -- Such is the clever Atiśayokti of Fame (yaśas) [viśālam yaśo vivakṣitam yat . . . iti yaśo 'tiśayoktirevamvidhā vidagdheti] (RŚ/137). The Tibetan commentator Bod-mkhas-pa (17th century) would agree, terming it "grags pa phul byung."⁵

I feel that it is safe to reject this interpretation. Dandīn, thus far, has invariably and skillfully character-

ized his varieties either structurally or procedurally, never on the basis of a highly restricted and specific component. It is significant that the only conceivable exception would otherwise be mūrcha ākṣepa (the "Ākṣepa through fainting"), which has been dismissed from our text as an interpolation (see Note 4, under Notes [2.121] - [2.168]).

Alternately, Rangacharya Raddi affirms that "due to portraying excessive extension (ādhikya), through illustrating the extensiveness of the 'womb of the three-fold world,' conceived as an encompassing receptacle within which even the extent of [a king's] fame fits, this is ādhikya atiśayokti" [āśrayībhūtasya tribhuvanodarasya viśālatāpratipādena tatsthasya yaśorāśerapi ādhikya-dyotanādādhikyātiśayoktiriyam |] (RR/224).

Edwin Gerow would also see this verse as ādhikya atiśayokti, and defines it as "a type of atiśayokti in which a quality or attribute is quantitatively exaggerated out of all proportion" (Glossary/99). Although arriving at

the same conclusion as Rangacharya Raddi, Gerow's path is somewhat circuitous. He mistranslates: "The extent of your fame, itself measureless, comprehends, O King, the prosperity of the three worlds" (Glossary/99). Aside from the appearance of "prosperity," it is the "womb of the three-fold world" that comprehends the "fame," not the other way around. Thus unlike Rangacharya Raddi, Gerow considers the verse to exclusively portray an exaggerated fame, yet agrees in accepting ādhikya as the distinguishing feature.

A further twist is provided by Mammata, who considers that Dandin's verse -- which he quotes -- reflects a completely independent alamkara termed adhika (KP [10.128]).

I hesitate to accept any of these views. I am not sure that Dandin, as opposed to Gerow, would draw a distinction between "quantitative" and presumably "qualitative" exaggeration. Either case aside, the usage of the term ādhikya in conjunction with atiśayokti easily

slides towards the tautological. Ādhikya and atiśayokti both connote "excess," "extra-abundance" -- to specify an atiśayokti as one of "excess" or "extension" really adds nothing.

And although we may agree with Gerow that "Dandin recognizes the exaggeration of size to the point of ultimate smallness [reflected in] (samśaya) [2.217], as well as ultimate greatness (ādhikya)" [in this case] (Glossary/98), we are not bound to accept that this polar approach reflects the determining factor. The exaggerated degree of slenderness in the first variety is subsumed within the distinguishing context. Thus just as it is not "smallness" that is reflected in Dandin's title of [2.217], but "doubt" (samśaya), so I feel we would do better, in balance, to consider a term other than ādhikya/"greatness" to characterize the present variety. That is, to attempt to reflect the tact that our writer seems to take in this situation, rather than to focus on an aspect simply because it is there or accords with a presumed logical design.

I would rather classify this example as reflecting primarily ādeya/ādhāra (literally, the "container"/the "contained"), that is, an exaggerated "inclusive relationship." The element of atiśaya reciprocally touches both a superordinate "container" -- "the womb of the three-fold world" -- and that "contained," the attribute or object which it includes -- a "king's fame." The focus is neither strictly on the fact of "extension" (Raddi), nor on an "attribute quantitatively exaggerated" (Gerow). The ultimate result is to stress a particular attribute, yet this emphasis is, again, subsumed within a distinguishing context. For the presentation of the incredible extent of a king's fame is contingent upon the inclusive relation it bears to an encompassing entity whose great expanse is to a degree understood.

And it should not be surprising to note in this context the additional element of "wonder" or adbhuta (a feature that may itself be primary, as we have previously seen in adbhuta upamā [2.24]). This dominant tone of the

speaker stems from the conceived extension or projection of components, and surely is a primary and apropos response to a situation that "transcends conventional limits."

2.220 Conclusion to Atisayokti Alamkara

They say that this mode of expression
 whose name is atisaya
 honored by men of letters
 is the primary basis of yet other alamkaras.

Atisayoktyalamkāropasamḥārah :

alamkārāntarāñāmapyekamāhuḥ parāyaṇam
 vāgiśamahitāmuktimimāmatiśayāhvayām

vāk-iśa : vācaspati /"Lord of speech" (RR/224), that
 is, the ancient god Brhaspati, "Lord of prayer or speech"

(also known as Brahmanaspati): "The celestial priest or purohita of the gods. Unlike most Vedic deities, who personify only the forces and phenomena of nature Br̥haspati represents moral ideas, or is regarded as the divine brāhmaṇa who sanctifies the sacrificial rites of his earthly counterpart."⁶

Yet also, "lords or masters of speech," that is, kavis, "men of letters": "[atiśayokti is] honored among kavis or lords of speech due to its preeminence"/vāgiśānām kavīnāmutkarsa-yogāt | mahitām (RŚ/137).

This verse, discussed in our introduction to atiśayokti [2.214], is an important and illuminating statement. Again, atiśayokti alamkāra as the essential reflection of the feature of "exaggerated" language (atiśaya) so intimately related to one of Dandin's two primary elements of poetic discourse -- vakrokti.

Notes [2.214] - [2.220]

1. Rudrata, in Kāvyālaṅkāra [Chapter 12], presents twelve varieties of atiśaya: pūrva, viśesa, utpreksā, vibhāvanā, tadguna, adhika, virodha, visama, asamgati, pihita, vyaghāta, and ahetu.
2. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Sanskrit Poetry, p. 100.
3. Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Sanskrit Poetry, attributed to Bhaṭṭa Śivasvāmin (latter 9th century), p. 190.
4. Gerow would appear to have ignored the explication of [2.216] given in [2.217], and to have misread the example itself: "The whiteness of the girls' dresses is exaggerated to the point of making them invisible in the moonlight" (Glossary/97-98).
5. Bod mkhas pa Mi pham dge legs rnam rgyal, Snyan ngag gi bstan bcos chen po me long la 'jug pa'i bshad sbyar dandi'i dgongs rgyan (Dharamsala: Tibetan Cultural Printing Press, 1980), p. 247.
6. Margaret and James Stutley, Harper's Dictionary of Hinduism, p. 54.

2.221 Definition of Utpr̥ekṣā Alamkāra

Where the state of a sentient or insentient subject

existing in a usual way

is imaginatively conceived otherwise --

This is known as Utpr̥ekṣā

For example:

Utp̥reksālamkāralakṣaṇam :

anyathaiva sthitā vṛttiścetanasyetarasya vā

anyathotprekṣyate yatra tāmutprekṣām viduryathā

utprekṣā [< ud (+) pra (+) *iks / "regard"; "fancy,"
"imagine"].

cetanasya . . . vṛttih [< cetana] : "The state
(vṛttih) of an object either 'sentient' (cetana), that is,

'with life,' or insentient (*acetana*), that is, 'without life'"/*cetanasya sajīvasya acetanasya nirjīvasya vastunah vṛttih* (RŚ/138).

utpreksyate : parikalpyate/"is contrived," "supposed" (RŚ/138); sambhāvyate/"is supposed," "assumed" (RR/225).

"It is well-known that great poets like Kālidāsa, Māgha and Bāṇa, in their flights of imagination, revel in utpreksā,"¹ and appropriately so. Utprekṣa alamkāra is the direct expression of the kavis' "imagination," of their powers of poetic conceptualization. As with the immediately preceding atiśayokti alamkāra [2.214-220] we again "transcend conventional limits," yet we are now concerned not with the creative "exaggeration" of elements that are after all conventionally evident, but with the "striking" effect, the creative distortion that results from novel association. We have seen the basic and varied relationships of similarity between two objects examined in upamā [2.14-65]; those of identity developed in rūpaka [2.66-96]; and in samāsokti [2.205-13] we have noted how an

explicitly described object may parallel and balance one that is quite implicit.

In utpreksā alamkāra a number of writers have chosen to similarly view the imaginative association presented as one ultimately revealing and based upon similarity. It is important to note, however, that Dāṇdin's definition and conception focuses strictly on the element of "imagination." Utpreksā thus presents an essentially novel situation, where the usual and conventional mode of existence of a given object, an object either "sentient" or "insentient" (or "either living or non-living" (RŚ/138)) is now "imaginatively conceived" (utpreksyate) -- through the attribution of strictly inapplicable features -- in a new light. However novel, the imaginative mode of existence must yet plausibly stem from the given context. And in Dāṇdin's examples the contexts themselves reflect the world, not of the everyday, but of poetic convention. Essentially then, the element of imagination substantiates the elevation of the mundane.

Dandīn limits his presentation to two varieties that, although unspecified, reflect the bipartite distinction drawn in his definition. Thus we have the utpreksā involving a "sentient subject" [2.222-23], and alternately, the utpreksā involving an "insentient subject" [2.224-25]. He follows these varieties with an appended discussion [2.226-34] that most probably reflects a contemporary point of contention. The word iva ("like," "as") is the principle vācaka or explicit indicator of upamā, yet it may serve as well to mark the imagined context ("as though") captured by utpreksā. If so, do we really have a distinct alamkāra, or simply another instance of upamā? Dandīn's clarification of the usage of iva in utpreksā is of importance given its regular appearance in this role.

In the Bhāttikāvyam [10.45]² we have an illustration where Mount Mahendra "seems as though it were standing" (sthitamiva) as a bulwark against the waters of the ocean. Similarly, in Bhāmaha's single example of utpreksā (KA [2.92]) we find, "Climbing to the tops of the trees in the

guise of Kimśuka flowers, it seems as though the fire surveys (paśyatīva) the scorched and as yet unscorched forest" [kimśukavyapadeśena tarumāruhya sarvataḥ | dagdhādagdha maranyānyāḥ paśyatīva vibhāvasuh ||].

Bhāmaha's own definition of utpreksā [2.91] emphasizes the conceived element of similarity, viewing utpreksā essentially in light of upamā: "Utpreksā is marked with excellence: Without the desire to explicitly express a common attribute, due to the conjunction of objects through either a secondary attribute or action, similarity is yet evident" [avivakṣitasāmānyā kiṁciccopamayā saha | atadguṇakriyāyogādutpreksātiśayānvitā ||].

We have noted that Dandin chooses rather to strictly emphasize the element of "imaginative conception" as the distinctive feature of utpreksā. Later writers tended to incorporate both views. Rudraṭa (KA [8.32-37]), for example, in an exhaustive series of six alternative definitions, develops "the mode of interpreting the ascription which constitutes the utpreksā; that is,

relating that ascription to the simile or similes which it assumes" (Glossary/134). Mammaṭa (KP [10.92ab]) says simply, "Utpreksā consists in imaginatively conceiving of the primary object [upameya] as similar with another object [upamāna]" [sambhāvanam athotpreksā prakṛtasya samena yat ||].

The actual categories of utpreksā were initially quite limited. The earlier critics are generally content with an example or two of the alamkāra as such. Dandin considered but two categories, expressed in his definition and illustrated with corresponding examples. Udbhaṭa (KASS [3.3-4]), for example, although drawing his definition of utpreksā primarily from Bhāmaha, perhaps was influenced by Dandin in distinguishing two general types: the situation presented may be either "possible"/bhāva or "impossible"/abhāva. Yet the two examples given incorporate further features of his definition, and as Gero Jenner points out, we may actually infer two more varieties.³ Thus just as Udbhaṭa illustrates both a "possible" situation with

similarity inferred through a secondary attribute/
atadguṇayogād bhāvābhimānena, and an "impossible" situation
with similarity inferred through a secondary action/
atadkriyāyodād abhāvābhimānena, we may reasonably infer the
reversal of bhāva/abhāva in each case producing
additionally, atadguṇayogād abhāvābhimānena and atadkriyā-
yogād bhāvābhimānena.

This relative dearth of varieties, during the most
vital period of critical activity, was to radically change.
Gerow is clearly in error in stating: "It is curious that
the figure utpreksā . . . should never have been made the
subject of an elaborate subdivision or classification so
typical of the ālamkārika writers" (Glossary/132-33).
Quite the contrary, utpreksā is an excellent example of the
later tendency, in this case beginning with Ruyyaka [12th
century], toward "elaborate subdivision." For as Kumari S.
S. Janaki notes in his introduction to Ruyyaka's
Alamkārasarvasva: "The elaborate classification of Utpreksā
is another noteworthy feature in the Sarvasva. . . .

Ruyyaka has taken much trouble to analyze the innumerable instances of this figure found in literature. Almost all the later ālamkārikas have followed Ruyyaka in this aspect."⁴ Indeed we may well ponder the elaborate schema developed by S. K. Belvalkar and Rangacharya Raddi, drawn primarily from the Ālamkārasarvasva [21ff.] and the later Rasagaṅgādhara of Jagannātha [17th century],⁵ where no less than 120 varieties of utpreksā are enumerated (Notes 2/150-52).

2.222 Example of the Utprēksā involving a Sentient Subject

An elephant scorched by the mid-day sun

is entering the lake --

I suppose he has decided

to uproot those lotuses --

the sun's retainers.

Cetana Utpr̥ekṣodāharanam :

madhyam̥dinārkasam̥taptah sarasim̥ gāhate gajah

manye mārtandagr̥hyāni padmānyuddhartumudyatah

2.223 Explication of the Example of the Utpr̥ekṣā involving
a Sentient Subject

The kavi describes

the entrance of the elephant into water

-- to bathe, drink, and eat lotus stalks --

Imagining this is for the purpose of

repaying the enmity of the sun.

Cetana Utpr̥ekṣodāharanāsvarūpaprakāśanam :

snātum pātum bisānyattum karino jalagāhanam

tadvairaniśkrayāyeti kavinotprekṣya varṇyate

The usual behavior of a given sentient (sacetana) subject is initially presented. Yet it is not for the usual reasons -- "to bathe, drink, and eat lotus stalks" -- that an elephant enters the soothing waters. An observer can only "suppose" (manye) that, "scorched by the mid-day sun," the elephant with seemingly human intent seeks to vent his anger in striking back against if not the master at least his servants: "to uproot those lotuses -- the sun's retainers."

That lotuses, blooming in the daylight, are in fact "retainers of the sun" we have previously noted in the example of viparyaya arthāntaranyāsa [2.179]. The rationale for elevating a mundane action through imagination in this case thus ultimately rests upon and comes to balance an accepted poetic conceit.

2.224 Example of the Utpr̥ekṣā involving an InsentientSubject

"This ornament of the ear

is the obstacle to my expansion" --

It's probably with this thought

that your glance leaps over

the utpala behind the ear.

Acetana Utpr̥ekṣodāharanam :

karnasya bhūṣaṇam idam māmāyatīvirodhinah

iti karnotpalam prāyastava dr̥ṣṭyā vilāṅghyate

prāyas /"probably," "likely"; "usually": "The word prāyas is an indicator of utpr̥ekṣā"/prāyahpadam utpr̥ekṣā-vācakam (RR/228).

vilañghyate [< vi (+) *lañgh /"jump over," "pass over"; "surpass," "excel"]: "That is, [the ear ornament] is surpassed by [the eye's] inherent brilliance"/svatejasā atisayyate (RR/227).

2.225 Explication of the Example of the Utpreksā involving an Insentient Subject

The brilliant rays of the eye

-- whether or not they touch the utpala --

are falling beyond its corner --

Being thus imagined it is described by the kavi.

Acetana Utprekṣodāharanāsvarūpaprakāśanam :

āpāñgabhañgapātīnyā dr̥steramśubhirutpalam
spr̥syate vā na vetyevam kavinotprekṣya varnyate

There is nothing out of the usual in a women with beautiful eyes being adorned with an utpala flower behind an ear. Yet in the realm of kāvya the two cannot help but be in competition, a contest in which the flower, a decorative accessory, cannot hope to win. This image of imagined conflict has previously appeared in vartamāna ākṣepa [2.123-24], where a women is restrained by a "flattering lover" from placing a kuvalaya flower behind her ear -- "Why are you adorning the ear with the Kuvalaya? / Do you suppose the corner of the eye / incapable of the task?"

Presented now within the context of utpreksā, the kavi "imaginatively conceives" of a possible reason for the "brilliant rays of the eye" -- whether or not they actually touch the utpala is irrelevant -- "falling beyond" or surpassing the utpala in beauty. An observer now imagines an insentient (acetana) subject, the eye, to be capable of quite human intention: "This ornament of the ear / is the obstacle to my expansion." And recognizing this obstacle,

her glance cannot then fail to "leap over that utpala
behind the ear."

2.226 Establishing the Distinction between Utpreksā and

-234 Upamā

2.226

"It is as though darkness is smearing the limbs

It is as though the sky is raining mascara" --

These lines as well are thoroughly imbued

with the characteristics of utpreksā.

Utpreksopamābhedaśādhanam :

limpatīva tamoṅgāni varṣatīvāñjanam nabhaḥ
itīdamapi bhūyiṣṭhamutpreksālakṣaṇānvitam

We have previously noted the important usage of iva/

"like," "as" as the principle vācaka or "explicit indicator" of similarity in upamā alamkāra [2.14-65]. That it should also be capable of marking utpreksā alamkāra -- a usage which the principle critics accept -- would yet appear to be an issue of contention.

In the following technical discussion, Daṇḍin addresses and clarifies this issue. Essentially, in upamā two objects (upameya and upamāna) are related through an attribute held in common. When iva is employed it explicitly marks the upamāna or "vehicle" of the comparison (ambhojamiva te mukham/"Your face is like the lotus").

When iva is employed in utpreksā, however, it correlates with the verb and thus shifts slightly in meaning. In English this shift may be conveniently marked in translation: iva in upamā reflected by "like" or "as"; iva in utpreksā by "as though" or "as if." Thus rather than marking a specific element within a superordinate relationship, iva in utpreksā, through correlating with the verb, gives the integrating action a flavor of supposition,

signaling that the entire context is something other than the norm. Indeed, it is perfectly possible for utpreksā to be incorporated within upamā, as we have seen in utpreksā upamā [2.23] (and presumably the reverse). Yet, perhaps to avoid the confusion, Dañdin in that case left the primary focus -- similarity -- to be inferred.

Dañdin initiates his discussion with two examples, the first two padas of a stanza found both in Bhāsa's Chārudatta [1.19] and in Śūdraka's Mṛcchakatīka [1.34].⁶ The entire stanza appears later in the Kāvyādarśa as a variety of samsṛṣṭi alamkāra [2.359-63] (although its authenticity as such may be questioned): "It is as though darkness is smearing the limbs" / "It is as though the sky is raining mascara" / "Sight became useless / like service rendered by an evil man" [limpati iva tamah aṅgāni varati iva añjanam nabhah | asatpurusaseveva dr̥ṣṭirnisphalatām gatā ||]. Whether or not Dañdin did indeed choose to incorporate the entire verse at a later point in the Kāvyādarśa, it is

obviously a fruitful example -- with iva again appearing in the second half -- for discussion.

A number of later critics have commented upon this issue. Mammaṭa for example (KP [10.92ab]), merely cites these two initial phrases as instances of utpreksā and adds, "In these two cases, 'pervading' (vyāpana) [the "pervasion" of the action] and so on is imaginatively conceived through 'smearing' and so on" [ityādau vyāpanādi lepanādirūpatayā sambhāvitam i]. Ruyyaka (KA [21ff.]) considers the entire stanza, and maintains that the first two padas illustrate utpreksas, where the latter two illustrate upamā.

Vidyācakravartin [14th century (?)] in the Sañjīvani commentary on Ruyyaka's Alamkārasarvasva, accepts Ruyyaka's analysis of the complete stanza and adds an important clarification: the relationships displayed in the first two padas (utpreksas) are generated by the kavi's imagination (kavikalpitah), where the following relationship (upamā) derives from conventional knowledge. Appayya Dikṣita [16th

century] in turn, in his Citramīmāṃsā (under utpreksā
nirūpanam) quotes and acknowledges Dāṇḍin as well as
Vidyācakravartin.⁷

2.227

Some upon hearing "as though"

-- disregarding the dictum of the authorities:

"A verb cannot serve as an upamāna" --

generate the illusion of an upamā.

keśāmcidupamābhṛāntirivaśrutyeha jāyate

nopamānam tiñantenetyatikramyāptabhbāsitam

That iva construes with the upamāna in upamā is
commonly accepted. In the present examples it is clear
that in each case it construes with the verb. Given the
"dictum of the authorities" -- a rule drawn most probably

from Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya [3.1.7] -- that "a verb cannot serve as an upamāna" / na tiñantena upamānamasti, how could one continue to "generate the illusion of an upamā"?

2.228

The relationship between upamāna and upameya

is contingent upon a common attribute.

What common attribute is perceived

between "is smearing" and "darkness"?

upamānopameyatvam tulyadharmavyapekṣayā
limpatestamasaścāsau dharmah katra samikṣyate

Aside from this, if one yet assumes, as pūrvapakṣa, that the word limpati / "is smearing" is the upamāna with tamas / "darkness" as the upameya, "What common attribute

(sādhāraṇadharma) is perceived between 'is smearing' and 'darkness'?"

Again, an upamā rests upon a perceived attribute held in common between upameya and upamāna. Without it there is no basis for similarity and thus no upamā. Given the four basic components of an upamā, Dāṇḍin's hypothetical opponent in this argument, presenting the pūrvapakṣa, would be assuming the following: upamāna : limpati ; upameya : tamas ; vācaka : iva ; and sādhāraṇadharma : [?].

2.229

If "smearing" is accepted as the common attribute

What import could the verb "is smearing" otherwise have?

A sane man does not admit that the same thing

is both an attribute and the focus of attribution.

yadi lepanam evesṭam limpatirnāma koparah
sa eva dharmo dharmī cetyanunmatto na bhāṣate

lepanam / The action of "smearing," "anointing."

limpatih / The nominalization through the addition of the -ti suffix signifies the highlighting of the word as such, that is, that we are concerned with "the verb 'limpati'."

dharma/dharmin / The attribute itself (dharma) and that which displays ("possesses") the attribute (dharmin) (see [2.15] dharma upamā, and the parallel connotations in [2.71-72] avayava rūpaka and [2.73-74] avayavi rūpaka).

Daṇḍin now refutes this initial pūrvapakṣa in presenting his own view, as uttarapakṣa. A Sanskrit verb (tiñanta /literally, "one ending the -ti suffix) is considered by the grammarians to primarily convey "pervasive action" (kriyā), yet it also marks the agent(s) (kartr̥), the element of time (kāla), and in the karmani prayoga ("passive") the direct object (karman). If one abstracts the "action of smearing"/lepanam and postulates this as the common attribute, given its absence in the

preceding, "What import could the verb itself -- 'is smearing' (limpati) -- otherwise have?" One would be positing that the primary feature of the verb would be to serve as an attribute (dharma), and that the verb itself would be serving as the "focus of attribution" (dharmin), that is, as the upamāna -- "A sane man does not admit that the same thing" can simultaneously display these two mutually exclusive features.

2.230

If the agent is considered the upamāna -- being itself subsumed by the verb and thus absorbed in its own action -- It would not be capable of construing with anything else.

kartā yadyupamānam syānnyaqbhūtosau kriyāpade
svakriyāsādhanavyagro nālamanyadapeksitum

An opponent might reply that even if one assumes that the "pervasive action" of the verb is taken as the common attribute as before, the verb itself need not be the upamāna. Why not abstract the "agent element" (kartr) and consider this the upamāna? Yet this would not do. The agent is "subsumed by the verb," and is thus incapable of being independently construed with any other element in the sentence.

2.231

In the case of positing

"Darkness is as one who is smearing"

"limbs" would be disconnected --

And further, the common attribute

would yet remain to be found.

yo limpatyamunā tulyam tama ityapi śamsataḥ
 aṅgānīti na sambaddham̄ sopi mr̄gyah̄ samo gunah̄

Dandin now slightly changes tack. An opponent might rather hold with the "logicians" (naiyayikas) that the agent is not in fact "subsumed by the verb." If so, he might posit as upamāna this independent agent, "one who is smearing." An agent who would then be able to construe with both "as"/iva and "darkness"/tamas. Even granting this, the result would be, "Darkness is as one who is smearing," and we are yet left with problems. What of the direct object "limbs"/aṅgāri; and further, what common attribute exists between "darkness" (upameya) and "one who is smearing" (upamāna)?

2.232

For example:

In "Your face is like the moon"

"beauty" is understood.

Similarly, in the case of the verb "is smearing"

nothing other than the action

of "smearing" is understood.

yathenduriva te vaktramiti kāntih pratīyate

na tathā limpaterlepādanyadatra pratīyate

In an upamā the attribute held in common by the upameya and the upamāna need not be explicitly presented, but it should certainly be evident. Granting that "a face is like the moon," we immediately understand that "beauty" is the attribute that validates the relationship.

Similarly, "in the case of the verb 'is smearing' / limpati we immediately infer the "action of 'smearing'" -- yet nothing else. Without the ability to serve as a focus of attribution, the verb cannot possibly function as an upamāna, and the attempt to posit an upamā again fails.

2.233

Therefore we should accept that "is smearing" -- that it has the meaning of "spreading over" -- that it has "darkness" for an agent and "limbs" for an object is thus imaginatively conceived by the kavi.

tadupaśleṣaṇārthoyam limpatirdhvāntakartṛkah
aṅgakarmā ca pumsaivamutpreksyata itīṣyatām

upaślesana- [< upa (+) *ślis /"cling to," "spread over"].

kartrkah /literally, "one having X for an agent" (the -ka suffix marking the bahuvrīhi application).

Thus Dandin concludes his effective argument.

Although these phrases include iva, it is clear that it does indeed correlate with the verb. And as he has shown, given that the verb cannot function as an upamāna, we cannot have the bipolar relationship based upon similarity that distinguishes upamā. In each of these phrases, the various components in fact function in a strictly conventional way -- verbs displaying actions that are carried out by agents towards some further objects. Iva when tagging the verb subsumes the entire context, signaling that we are rather faced with imaginative supposition.

2.234

Utpreksā is indicated through such words as:

manyे śaṅke dhruvam prāyas nūnam --

And such is the word "iva."

manyे śaṅke dhruvam̄ prāyo nūnamityevamādibhiḥ¹
utpreksā vyajyate śabdairivaśabdopi tādrśah

manyे [*man] /"I suppose."

śaṅke [< *śaṅk] /"I doubt."

dhruvam /"surely."

prāyas /"probably," "most likely."

nūnam /"perhaps."

iva /"as though," "like," "as."

And as upamā may be explicitly marked by a rather wide range of vācakas or words and phrases explicitly connoting

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similarity, so utprekṣa alamkāra may be indicated through a number of words which signal that a given situation is something other than mundane reality.

Notes [2.221] - [2.234]

1. S. S. Janaki, Introduction to the Alamkāra-Sarvasva of Ruyyaka, edited by V. Raghavan (Delhi: Meharchand Lachh-mandas, 1955), p. 109.
2. Bhaṭṭi, Bhaṭṭikāvyam [10.45] : cited as such by the Jayamaṅgalā [854], p. 279.
3. Gero Jenner, Die Poetischen Figuren, pp. 172-73.
4. S. S. Janaki, Introduction to the Alamkāra-Sarvasva of Ruyyaka, pp. 109-110.
5. Jagannātha, Rasagaṅgādhara, edited by Kedāranātha Ojhā, part 2 (Varanasi: Sampūrṇānanda Saṃskṛta Viśvavidyā laya, 1981), pp. 278-318.
6. I would not agree with Gero Jenner's presentation of these two examples as illustrating an additional category in Dāṇḍin's schema (Gero Jenner, Die Poetischen Figuren, pp. 171-72). As we shall presently see [2.232], iva is but one of a number of words that may explicitly indicate utpreksā. This does not mean that we have a corresponding number of additional categories. Dāṇḍin broadly and loosely differentiates utpreksā only according to the status -- sentient/non-sentient -- of the given subject. The essential process displayed, which may or may not be marked by a word such as iva, is the same for each.
7. Appaya Dīksita, Citramimāṃsā, edited by Jagadīśa Chandra Miśra (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1971), pp. 315, 325, 340.

2.235 Introduction to Hetu / Sūksma / and LeśaAlamkāras // Definition of Hetu Alamkāra

Hetu Sūksma and Leśa

are superior ornaments of kāvyas.

Hetu subsumes the categories of Kāraka and Jñāpaka

and of these there are many varieties.

For example:

Hetusūksmaleśopakramah / Hetvalamkāralakṣanam :

hetuśca sūksmaleśau ca vācāmuttamabhūṣanam

kārakojñāpakau hetū tau cānekavidhau yathā

Hetu alamkāra revolves around the element of "causality," and is of importance not only for its wide-ranging appearance as an integral element in a number of

other distinct alamkāras, but also, given its rejection by various critics, for what light it might shed on the nature of alamkāra itself.

Causality may be integrated as a primary feature within the essential structure of various alamkāras. We have seen arthāntaranyāsa alamkāra [2.169-79], for example, where a following statement serves to corroborate -- as validating analogy or cause -- an initial proposition. In vibhāvanā alamkāra [2.199-204], "Excluding the usual cause / Another cause or characteristic condition can be discerned." Causality will play a similar primary role in the forthcoming samāhita [2.298-99], viśesokti [2.323-29], and nidarśana [2.348-40] alamkāras.

The incorporation of hetu alamkāra -- its central element of "cause" -- within other distinct alamkāras to generate new subvarieties is an ubiquitous process. In hetu upamā [2.50] an attribute held in common by upameya and upamāna is marked as the "cause" of similarity; just as in hetu rūpaka [2.85-86] cause marks their identification.

It is in ākṣepa alamkāra, however, that we find a foreshadowing of Dāṇḍin's principal categories of hetu alamkāra. In kārana ākṣepa [2.131-32] a "shrewd lover" denies the primary cause -- his own offense -- of a primary effect -- his own fear in the presence of an angry beloved. We thus have a reflection of cause as kāraka, "the actual force or means by which an effect is produced" and thus "efficient"; frequently this "means" is realized as an entity or object and may thus be considered "material." Alternately, in hetu ākṣepa [2.167-69] cause "indicates" the reason for a particular negation, and thus reflects the second primary category of hetu, that of jñāpaka. And further, in hetu vyatireka [2.186, 188] we observe cause indicating the reason for distinction within similarity.

Dāṇḍin conceives of hetu, fundamentally, as either kāraka or jñāpaka. "Kāraka is the 'producer' (janaka) of the effect" -- thus cause as efficient or material -- "an effect that may either reflect an 'existent' ('positive') / bhāva, or 'non-existent' ('negative') / abhāva entity or

situation"/*kārako bhāvābhāvarūpasya kāryasya janakah* (RŚ/145). Jñāpaka, literally, "maker of knowledge," is "conceptual or logical cause," a cause that indicates or suggests the result. Dāṇḍin presents two varieties, where the "thing to be realized or indicated" (jñāpyavastu) may be either "implicit" (sūcya) [2.244], or "explicit" (vācya) [2.245].

Although distinctively presented, Dāṇḍin's two remaining categories are essentially subcategories reflecting cause as kāraka.¹ In the varieties of abhāva hetu [2.246-52], the modality of "non-existence" is extended now to the cause itself. An effect may thus arise from a "previously non-existent" (prāgabhāva) cause [2.247], or from the "destruction" (pradhvamsa) [2.248] of a previously existent cause. The "non-existence of one thing as another" (anyonyābhāva) [2.249] may generate an effect, as might a cause that "absolutely will never exist" (atyantābhāva) [2.250]. And logically extending the initial prāgabhāva, we may have cause as the "non-existence

of something itself previously non-existent" (prāgabhāva abhāva) [2.251] (which is to say, actually existent).

In the "innumerable" varieties of citra hetu [2.253-59] the emphasis is on an "unusual" or "marvelous" relationship between cause and effect. Thus an effect may be "at a distance" (dūra) from its cause [2.255]; it may be "simultaneous with" (sahaja) [2.256], or even "subsequent to" (anantaraja) [2.257] its cause. Alternately, the relationship may be either "incongruous" (ayukta) [2.258] or "congruous" (yukta) [2.259].

Although hetu appears as a laksana in Bharata's Nātyaśāstra [17.1, 10], we have noted in our discussion of svabhāvokti alamkāra [2.8-13] that Bhāmaha (KA [2.86]) specifically rejects hetu (as well as sūksma and leśa) as alamkāras: "Hetu, sūksma, and leśa are not considered alamkāras -- there is no integration of vakrokti within their composite meanings" [hetuśca sūkṣmo leśo 'tha nālamkāratayā mataḥ | samudāyābhidheyasya vakroktyanabhi-dhānataḥ ||].

Bhāmaha follows with a single (supposed) example [2.87ab] that is identical to Dāṇḍin's illustration of an "implicit" jñāpaka hetu (KD [2.242]) (although both may ultimately reflect a verse appearing in Bhāsa's Svapnavāsavadattam; see Note 7, under Notes [2.235] - [2.259]), rejecting these lines with the words 2.87cd], "Are such lines kāvyas? These are termed vārta" [ityevamādi kim kāvyam vārttāmenām pracaksate ||]. It would appear that one writer is responding to the other, though of course we must allow for the possibility that both are responding to an ongoing argument. The somewhat striking emphasis that Dāṇḍin places on hetu, sūksma and leśa as "superior ornaments of kāvyas," should perhaps be seen as an extra touch of affirmation in light of their rejection by others. Yet who was responding to whom is unfortunately impossible to determine.

Bhāmaha thus rejects hetu due to the absence of that creative "twisting" of language (vakrokti) that he considers essential to an alamkāra. Yet it would seem that

Bhāmaha's conception of hetu is somewhat narrowly conceived. Such lines as: "The sun has departed for Asta Mountain / The moon is shining / The birds are returning home," considered in isolation may indeed appear to be instances of vārtā or mundane linguistic usage, but this misses the point. These lines are not presented in isolation in Dandin's example [2.244], but rather as causes that "indicate" a further component -- the inference of a specific period of time, the sunset, as effect. As Gerow points out, "Those authors who accept hetu are far from thinking it mere literalism. . . . All [examples] invoke some striking, though not necessarily deformed or unnatural instance of the cause-effect relation" (Glossary/327). And as we shall see, "None of Dandin's examples . . . satisfy the literal prerequisites of the conclusive cause-effect relation, as defined in the nyāya -- the invariable concomitance of the effect with the cause (vyāpti)². . . . Dandin's examples . . . are thoroughly poetic in the sense

that the logical form is misapplied for effect"
(Glossary/45).

It is perhaps this discrepancy between Bhāmaha's absolute rejection, and the evident employment of vakrokti in Dāṇḍin's numerous examples that accounts for the rather varied and often ambiguous response to hetu alamkāra by later writers. Among the critics who accept hetu (as well as sūksma and leśa) are the author(s) of the Agni Purāṇa [343.29cd-30ab], Rudraṭa (KA [7.82-83]), and Bhoja in the Sarasvatikānthābharaṇālaṅkārah [3.12-20]. Rudraṭa's conception of hetu [7.82] is, however, quite specific and limited: "The expression of cause as identical with effect" [hetumatā saha hetorabhidhānamabhedato hetuh ||]. Alternately, Vāmana would appear to concur with Bhāmaha, for hetu (and its close variants) is excluded from his Kāvyālamkārasūtrāni. Yet both Udbhaṭa and Mammaṭa, who appear to similarly reject hetu, seem to waiver in that they present alamkāras that are in fact close variants. Thus Udbhaṭa (KASS [6.7]) includes an alamkāra termed

kāvyahetu (or kāvyaliṅga), which is repeated by Mammāṭa (KP [10.132abc]) as smarana alamkāra: "The remembrance of something just as it was experienced upon seeing something similar -- This is smarana" [yathānubhavamarthasya drṣṭe tatsadrṣe smṛtiḥ | smaranam ||]. Gerow would see this as "a jñāpaka hetu whose purpose is comparison" (Glossary/175). And indeed in Udbhaṭa's initial definition [6.7] we find that such remembrance of experience involves "the perceiving or understanding of causality" [śrutamekam yadanyatra smṛteranubhavasya vā | hetutāṁ pratipadyeta kāvyaliṅgam taducya te ||].

In addition to smarana, Mammāṭa includes his own kāvyaliṅga alamkāra [10.114cd], where "Cause (hetu) is expressed as the meaning of either the sentence or the word(s) [kāvyaliṅgam hetorvākyapadārthatā ||]. Yet in practice this marks "a metaphorical relation of cause and effect," and thus "there is little ground for distinguishing this rather obscure figure from the ordinary hetu. The main structural argument for the distinction is that the

cause is here specified as poetic [kāvya-liṅga] for hetu, such a determination has always been implicit" (Glossary/174).

And where Mammata specifically rejects hetu, we must note that he does indeed refer to the limited conception of hetu presented by Rudrata. Following the inclusion of Rudrata's definition [7.82], Mammata writes [10.120ff.]: "This hetu alamkara is not considered here. For such forms as 'Ghee [clarified butter] is life' and so on are never worthy of serving as an ornament due to their lack of striking charm (vaicitrya)" [iti hetvalaṅkāro 'tra na lakṣitah | āyurghṛtamityādirūpo hyesa na bhūṣanatām kadācidarhati vaicitryābhāvāt |]. He then proceeds to affirm that "Hetu is in fact kāvya-liṅga" [kāvya-liṅgameva hetuh].

Mammata thus draws from yet modifies Bhāmaha's position in rejecting specific instances of hetu where a lack of vakrokti (vaicitrya) is evident. Yet he simultaneously accepts Daṇdin's position that this

stipulation hardly need exclude hetu as such, for when properly conceived and presented it goes without saying that vakrokti will be evident. Ultimately both Udbhaṭa and Mammata are hedging, and their resulting alamkāras are limited and obscure rather than displaying any degree of integrative development. It is in Dāṇḍin's presentation of positive examples that we find the clear identification of hetu as an alamkāra.

2.236 Example of the Hetu of Production involving A Directly Generated Positive Effect

The Malaya breeze

shaking the tender leaves

from the full Sandal trees

generates pleasure in everyone.

Nirvartyabhāvakārya Kārakahetūdāharanam :

ayamāndolitapraudhacandanadrumpallavah

utpādayati sarvasya prītim malayamārutah

malaya-mārutah /the soothing "Malaya breeze" (see [2.174], under malaya-mārutah, and under [2.98]).

2.237 The Hetu of Production involving a Directly Generated Positive Effect

Here the elaboration of character

-- of one capable of generating pleasure --

is to be taken as the alamkāra --

This applies even where the effect is negative.

Nirvartyabhāvakārya Kārakahetuḥ :

prītyutpādanayogyasya rūpasyatropabṛṁhaṇam

alamkāratayoddīṣṭam nivṛttāvapi tat samam

upabṛṁhaṇam [< *br̥m̥h / "enlarge," "develop,"
"elaborate," "expatiate upon"].

Danḍin's first two varieties of kāraka hetu alamkāra are complementary. As instances of nirvartya, both involve "immediate and direct production," yet vary in the modality of the ensuing effect. In the present case, a cause generates a directly immediate effect that is "existent," that is, "positive" (bhāva). The soothing, soft Malaya breeze, as cause, thus "generates pleasure," an immediate and existent effect.

That Danḍin was aware of the rather gratuitous charge against hetu as being excessively mundane -- that causality is routinely expressed in mundane usage hardly precludes it from serving poetic ends -- would certainly seem to be

implied by this example. For here it is "the elaboration of character / -- of one capable of generating pleasure --" that "is to be taken as the alamkāra" (or literally, "is meant to be taken as the 'alamkāra-ness'"). That is, it is the elaboration and development of the properties and attributes of the given cause that allow it to produce the given effect within the context of causality. It is not just the "Malaya breeze" that generates pleasure, but an entity that is "shaking the tender leaves / from the full Sandal trees."

Dandin is clearly aware that the presentation of immediate cause and effect alone would not qualify as an alamkāra -- the poetic quality lies in the integrated image of cause, effect, and "elaborated" justification.

2.238 Example of the Hetu of Production involving ADirectly Generated Negative Effect

This breeze

swaying the forest of Sandal trees

caressing the streams of Malaya Mountain

has arrived for the annihilation of travellers.

Nirvartyābhāvakārya Kārakahetūdāharanam :

candanāranyamādhūya sprṣṭvā malayanirjharān

pathikānāmabhāvāya pavanoyamupasthitah

2.239 Explication of the Example of the Hetu of Production
involving a Directly Generated Negative Effect

A breeze such as this
is capable of effecting annihilation
for one who has an aversion
-- arising from the fever of separation --
towards attractive things.

Nirvartyābhāvakārya Kārakahetūdāharanasvarūpa-

prakāśanam:

abhāvasādhanāyālamevambhūto hi mārutah
virahajvarasambhūtamanojñārocake jane

Complementing the preceding variety, we again have a
hetu of production (kāraka) involving a direct and

immediate effect (nirvartya), yet now an effect that is "non-existent," that is, "negative" (ābhāva). Again Dandin utilizes the "Malaya breeze" as efficient cause, yet its effect is now quite the opposite. Far from "generating pleasure," it now effects the "annihilation" or "non-existence" of travellers. For one away from their beloved, "One who has an aversion / -- arising from the fever of separation -- / towards attractive things," the soft and gentle Malaya breeze can only generate evocative memories, memories that intensify the pain of separation to the point of personal annihilation. And certainly those left at home were equally aware of the destructive potential of the otherwise pleasing Malaya breeze: "Tell him not my present state / nor say that he has overstayed the promised time. / Make him no reproaches, artless friend, / but ask his welfare, saying only this: / 'I pray the winds of Malabar [Malaya] / have not blown your way; / I pray the mango has not blossomed'."³ These varying effects thus reflect two

of kāvyas most prevalent motifs: love-in-enjoyment (sambhoga) and love-in-separation (vipralambha).

Again, it is the integrated "elaboration" of the character or nature of the cause that essentially justifies this alamkāra. For it is not just that "this breeze causes the annihilation of travellers," but that this effect appears due to a cause "swaying the forest of Sandal trees / caressing the streams of Malaya Mountain."⁴

2.240 Causality with Reference to the Three Categories

Of Direct Object

In the case of objects to be produced or transformed

Causality is concerned with those objects themselves --

But in the case of objects to be contacted

Causality is generally concerned with the action alone.

Karmatrayavisayakahetutā :

nirvartye ca vikārye ca hetutvam̄ tadapekṣayā

prāpye tu karmanī prāyah̄ kriyāpeksaiva hetutā

nirvartye [(loc.) tavyānta < ni (+) *vṛt] / "turn back"; "cease"; "to bring to an end," that is, "effect," "produce," "perform"] / "to be produced."

vikārye [(loc.) tavyānta < vi (+) *kr̄] / "to be modified," "transformed."

prāpye [(loc.) tavyānta < pra (+) *āp] / literally, "to be attained," "reached"; "to be contacted, touched."

Danḍin draws directly from the formal grammatical tradition in distinguishing his three primary varieties of kāraka hetu. In the Karmādhikāra of Bharṭṛhari's Vākyapadīya [3.7.45-88], for example, we find that in analyzing karman, "nirvartya, vikārya, and prāpya are considered its three categories" [nirvartyam̄ ca vikāryam̄ ca prāpyam̄ ca trividham̄ matam ||] [3.7.45ab]. Within the

grammatical tradition these three categories may be distinguished as follows: with nirvartya "the object is brought into being under a specific name (ghatam karoti ["He/she makes a pot"]); with vikarya "a transformation or change is noticed in the object as a result of the . . . [verbal] activity (ghatam bhinatti ["He/she breaks the pot"]); and with prapya no change is seen to result from the action, the object only coming into contact with the subject (gramam gacchati ["He/she goes to the village"])."⁵

Thus Dandin specifies, "In the case of objects [effects] to be produced [nirvartye] or transformed [vikarye] / Causality [or the causal activity] is concerned with those objects themselves / But in the case of objects to be contacted [prapye]," where no true change occurs and the object is essentially independent, "Causality is generally concerned with the action alone."

In the first two instances the verbal activity marks the relationship between a cause and an object or state as effect that is thus either "directly produced" or

"transformed." In the last case the action itself will assume the role of "cause."

2.241 On the Preceding Variety of Hetu and the Varieties

That are to Immediately Follow

Hetu involving an object to be Directly Generated

has been illustrated --

After presenting a pair of examples

for the remaining two categories

The Hetu of Indication will be described.

Uktānuktahetuprabhedavivecanam :

heturnirvartanīyasya darśitah śeṣayordvayoh
dattvodāharanadvandvam jñāpako varṇayisyate

We have initially seen two complementary examples of hetu alamkāra involving a directly generated object or state (nirvartya) with either a "existent" ("positive") / bhāva [2.236-37] or "non-existent" ("negative") / abhāva [2.238-39] effect. Dandīn now presents examples for the remaining two categories, where causality either effects a "transformation" (vikārya) [2.242], or is involved with "contact" (prāpya) [2.243]. Two varieties of jñāpaka hetu, the alternate primary category of hetu alamkāra, will then follow [2.244-45].

2.242 Example of the Hetu of Production involving
Transformation

Forests with budding leaves

Wells adorned with lotuses fully blossomed

The full moon --

By Kāma transformed into poison

in the eyes of travellers.

Vikārya Kārakahetūdāharanam :

utpravālānyarānyāni vāpyah saṁphullapañkajāḥ
candraḥ pūrṇaśca kāmena pānthatrṣṭerviśam kṛtam

Daṇḍin's second variety of kāraka hetu thus reflects the second of the three categories into which direct objects (karmans) may be analyzed. In vikārya the cause

not only materially generates an effect, but further achieves its "transformation." We continue with the theme of "love-in-separation," yet now it is not just that an otherwise pleasing breeze causes the "annihilation" of those away from home, but that an array of otherwise pleasing and beautiful things -- "Forests with budding leaves / Wells adorned with lotuses fully blossomed / The full moon" -- are themselves transformed by a cause -- the ubiquitous god of love, Kāma -- into "poison in the eyes of travellers." An ultimate effect that may prove fatal for separated lovers.

As in the preceding case of nirvartya kāraka hetu, the causal activity acts upon -- now transforming -- a given object or series of objects that embody the effect.

2.243 Example of the Hetu of Production involving Contact

"I shall practice anger" --

A young woman

-- eyes squinting with knitted brows

lower lip throbbing --

regards a friend in place of a lover.

Prāpya Kārakahetūdāharanam :

mānayogyām karomīti priyasthānasthitām sakhīm

bālā bhrūbhāngajihmākṣī paśyati sphuritādharaā

In prāpya/literally, "to be attained," "reached," we have the third and final of Dāṇḍin's three primary categories of kāraka hetu. Unlike the preceding nirvartya and vikārya, where the object or recipient of the causal

force is either directly effected or transformed, now "no change is seen to result from the action." And with the object thus being marked strictly by "contact," we find that "Causality is generally concerned with the action alone."

Thus in Dandin's example, where the object, a female "friend" (sakhi), is neither produced nor transformed, causality resides in the action alone: "A young woman seeing or regarding" (paśyati). And again we find that cause is not merely stated, but further elaborated. For it is not strictly "regarding," but "regarding as though angry," and this in the developed context of "eyes squinting with knitted brows / lower lip throbbing."⁶

2.244 Example of the Implicit Hetu of Indication

The sun has departed for Asta Mountain . . .

The moon is shining . . .

The birds are returning home --

Even these are quite nice

when indicating a point in time.

Sūcyajñāpya Jñāpakahetudāharanam :

gatostamarko bhātīnduryānti vāsāya paksiṇah

itidamapi sādhveva kālāvasthānivedane⁷

Jñāpaka/literally, "the maker of knowledge," is the second of Dāṇḍin's two primary categories of hetu alamkāra. Where kāraka involves a cause that leads to a tangible effect, whether reflected by an object or action, jñāpaka

involves a cause that leads to knowledge or awareness. It is in this sense that the Naiyayikas ("logicians") speak of, for example, "smoke" as hetu, for it leads to an awareness of "fire" as sādhya or jñāpya (that is, "that which is to be inferred or known").

Dāṇḍin's first example, which I consider illustrates an "implicit" or sūcya jñāpaka, essentially reflects the logician's paradigm of hetu and sādhya. A series of jñāpaka hetus -- "The sun has departed for Asta Mountain . . . / The moon is shining . . . / The birds are returning home" -- leads us to infer the sādhya, "a point in time," that is, "dusk."

It is vital to realize, however, that as we are dealing with an alamkāra, "a poetic jñāpaka need not always have that rigorous validity in its vyāpti [or "pervasion" of cause and effect] which logic requires. . . ." For "it is only if the jñāpaka is the kārya [or actual effect] of the jñāpya [or sādhya] that the vyāpti is invariably valid" (Notes 2/157). That is, "smoke" is the jñāpaka or hetu that

indicates "fire," which is, from another perspective, the kāraka that leads to the kārya or tangible effect. Simply, when we have a jñāpaka hetu we do not have a strict cause and effect (kārya) relationship, rather we have one of hetu/"cause" and sādhya/"that which is indicated." It is where, as with smoke and fire, the jñāpaka is simultaneously an "effect" that the logicians consider the vyāpti between the two elements as valid. As sūcya hetu alamkāra, jñāpaka may display this validity, but then again, it may and need not.

In our introduction to hetu alamkāra we have noted Bhāmaha's (KA [2.87]) specific reference to and rejection of this same series of jñāpaka hetus, dismissing them as mere vārtā or instances of mundane linguistic usage. If one considers these lines in and of themselves, Bhāmaha's point is perhaps well taken. Yet clearly Dāṇḍin views them as but part of a wider integrated whole. The validity of jñāpaka as an alamkāra would seem for Dāṇḍin to be derived

from the poetic possibilities offered by the association of jñāpakas and that to be "indicated" or "known" (jñāpya).

2.245 Example of the Explicit Hetu of Indication

From the heat of your body

incapable of being vanquished by moonbeams

nor quenched with Sandalwood water --

It's easy to see, friend

that your heart is sick with love.

Vācyajñāpya Jñāpakahetūdāharanam :

avadhyairindupādārāmasādhyaiścandanāmbhasām

dehośmabhiḥ subodham te sakhi kāmāturaṁ manah

Danḍin's alternate variety of jñāpaka hetu is an

extension of the primarily "logical" paradigm of the preceding. That which the jñāpaka indicates (the jñāpya) is now "explicit"/vācyā, rather than left to be inferred. This structure has been previously mirrored in hetu ākṣepa [2.167-68], where through a particular cause we become aware of the validity of a particular negation. Thus from the "heat"/ūṣman of a woman's body as jñāpaka, one becomes aware that her "heart is sick with love."

It is interesting to note that with the element of inference now removed, Dāṇḍin chooses -- as in the primary varieties of kāraka hetu -- to "elaborate" the character or nature of the particular cause. The intensity of the cause, and thus of that which it indicates, is marked as well through the lack of effect these "moonbeams" and this "Sandalwood water" -- (poetically) proverbial in their exceptionally cool natures -- display.

2.246 Conclusion to the Hetus of Indication / Introduction
To the Hetus involving Non-Existence

Charming Hetus of Indication

are thus seen in actual practice --

A few captivating Hetus involving Non-Existence

will be immediately described.

Jñāpakahetūpasamhārah / Abhāvahetūpakramah :

iti laksyāḥ prayogesu ramyā jñāpakahetavah

abhāvahetavah kecidvyāhriyante manoharāḥ

In Dandin's two variations of nirvartya kāraka hetu [2.236-37] we have seen the alternate modalities of "existence"/"non-existence" respectively reflected in the effect. With abhāva hetu the modality of "non-existence" shifts to the cause itself, expressed through five

variations. Effect may yet, as in the previous instance, reflect either existence or non-existence. And again, given that in every case we have a cause that "produces" an effect, abhāva may be considered in addition a sub-category of kāraka hetu.

2.247 Example of the Hetu of Prior Non-Existence

Due to lack of practice in the branches of knowledge

Due to lack of association with the wise

Due to lack of control of the senses --

Disaster arises among the people.

Prāgabhāva Hetūdaharanam :

anabhyāsenā vidyānāmasamsargena dhīmatām
anigraheṇā cāksāṇām jāyate vyasanām nr̥ṇām

vidyānām [< vidyā / "(branches of) knowledge"] (see Note 19, under Notes [2.15] - [2.65]).

Our initial variety of abhāva hetu displays a distinct existent effect that arises by default: due to the lack of a given quality or the non-occurrence of a given action the effect occurs. Each cause is thus "previously non-existent"/prāgabhāva, that is, the effect is generated by a series of elements that have never existed. Where neither "practice in the branches of knowledge," "association with the wise," nor "control of the senses" have never existed, surely "disaster arises among the people."

In composing this example of prāgabhāva hetu, Dandin would seem to have been directly aware of two prior illustrations. Thus the example of hetu rūpaka [2.86] displays a similar parallel series of causes, yet each reflecting rather an "existent" feature: "Due to depth . . . / Due to magnificence . . . / Due to fulfilling the world's wishes. . . ." Considered in its entirety, however, this

example is closer categorically to jñāpaka hetu, for each cause "indicates" an identification appropriate to a great king. And in the illustration of anuśaya ākṣepa [2.161] the negation of accomplishment in a series of features "signals" regret: "No wealth accumulated / No branch of knowledge mastered / No austerities performed. . . ." Our present example nearly mirrors the combination of these respective features.

2.248 Example of the Hetu of Non-Existence involving Destruction

Gone . . . the madness of love's tale

Waned . . . the fever of youth

Destroyed . . . delusion

Vanished . . . greed --

The mind set on the sacred hermitage.

Pradhvamsa Abhāvahetūdāharanam :

gataḥ kāmakathonmādo galito yauvanajvarah

kṣato mohaścyutā tṛṣṇā kṛtam punyāśrame manah

Pradhvamsa abhāva hetu balances the preceding variety.

Again a series of elements that are "non-"existent" contribute to the generation of a single, existent effect. Yet the status of each now reflects not what has been after all a constant state, but rather the "destruction" of a prior existence. In each case, what once was -- ". . . the madness of love's tale / . . . the fever of youth / . . . delusion / . . . greed" -- has been destroyed, thus generating as effect a "mind set on the sacred hermitage."

2.249 Example of the Hetu of Reciprocal Non-Existence

These are forests . . . not stately houses

Rivers . . . not shimmering ladies

Wild creatures . . . not quarreling heirs --

Thus my mind rejoices.

Anyonya Abhāvahetūdāharanam :

vanānyamūni na grhānyetā nadyo na yośitah

mrgā ime na dāyādāstanme nandati mānasam

In anyonya upamā [2.18] we have an instance of "reciprocal" similarity "invoking reciprocal excellence." Integrated within abhāva hetu alamkāra, "reciprocal non-existence," or the non-existence of one thing as another, generates a specific, existent effect. Causal force stems from positive contrast.

For a king, taking his ease amidst the natural world away from the tribulations of the court, the realization that he is indeed surrounded by "Forests . . . not stately houses / Rivers . . . not shimmering ladies / Wild creatures . . . not quarreling heirs," cannot help but generate rejoicing.

2.250 Example of the Hetu of Absolute Non-Existence

Among the worthy
unconsidered action never occurs
Thus all their wealth
continually prospers.

Atyanta Abhāvahetūdāharanam :

atyantamasadāryāñāmanālocitaceṣṭitam
atasteṣāṁ vivardhante satatam sarvasampadah

In atyanta abhāva hetu, Dandin merely extends the temporal range of causal non-existence "absolutely." Where in prāgabhāva [2.247] we have a state of "prior non-existence," or in pradhvamsa [2.248] the transition from existence to non-existence, in atyanta causal elements never have and never will exist.

Given that "Among the worthy unconsidered action presumably never has and never will occur," it would seem reasonable, as positive and existent effect, that "all their wealth should continually prosper."

2.251 Example of the Hetu of Non-Existence involving

A Double Negative

Cluster of garden mango flowers

not unblossomed --

Cupped hands of water with sesame

should be offered to the women of travellers.

Prāgabhāva Abhāvahetūdāharanam :

udyānasahakārāñāmanudbhinnā na mañjari
deyah pathikanārīnām satilah salilāñjaliḥ

Daṇḍin's final variety of abhāva hetu carries the modality of non-existence to its logical extreme, to where cause may reflect the non-existence of (prior) non-existence itself. That prāgabhāva abhāva thus displays a cause that is ultimately existent appears to be quite secondary to the actual form of its presentation -- through a "double negative" -- within the context of non-existence. And yet, as if in compensation for its illusionary appearance as an element of the cause, and in contrast to all previous variations of abhāva, non-existence now characterizes the effect.

Daṇḍin provides us with an excellent example of "twisted speech" in portraying indirectly the ultimately devastating effect of this "Cluster of garden mango flowers

/ not unblossomed." For an offering of "cupped hands of water with sesame seeds" is an offering for the dead.

Echoing the previous example of nirvartya hetu involving a similarly non-existent or negative effect [2.238-39], these in fact "blossomed" mango flowers are quite "capable of effecting annihilation / in the case of one who has an aversion / -- arising from the fever of separation -- / for attractive things."

Either of these examples thus portrays the destructive effect, reflecting non-existence, of beautiful or soothing things -- epitomized in the world of kāvya by, for example, the Malaya breeze or the blossomed Mango⁸ -- on travellers separated from their lovers. And further, we note the parallel balance between the former indirect presentation of effect, and the present indirect portrayal of an in fact existent cause through the technique of the double negative.

2.252 Conclusion to the Hetus of Non-Existence

In these the causality of a feature

-- displaying "Prior Non-Existence" and so on --

is described with reference to an effect

that itself is either existent or non-existent.

Abhāva Hetūpasamhārah :

prāgabhāvādirūpasya hetutvamiha vastunah

bhāvābhāvasvarūpasya kāryasyotpādanam̄ prati

Again, the primary and fixed element of abhāva hetu is cause conceived as "non-existent." The effect, however, is free to vary. Yet as we have seen, in every variety but the last, the effect reflects an "existent" entity or situation.

2.253 The Varieties of the Hetus of the Marvelous

A cause whose effect is at a distance

Those whose effect is simultaneous or preceding

And those whose effect is either

Incongruous or congruous --

Innumerable are the Hetus of the Marvelous.

Citra Hetuprabhedāḥ :

dūrakāryastatsahajah kāryānantarajastathā

ayuktayuktakāryau cetyasamkhyāścitrahetavah

dūra-kāryah / "[cause] whose effect is at a distance"

[2.255].

kārya-sahajah / "[cause] that occurs simultaneously
with its effect" [2.256].

kārya-anantarajah / "[cause] that occurs subsequent to its effect" [2.257].

ayukta-kāryah / "[cause] whose effect is inappropriate," that is, "incongruous" [2.258].

yukta-kāryah / "[cause] whose effect is appropriate," that is, "congruous" [2.259].

citra- / "brilliant," "variegated (in color)"; "unusual," "strange."

2.254 The Hetu of the Marvelous

Among the paths of usage

these varieties -- based upon the figurative mode

are considered exceedingly beautiful --

Their examples are as follows:

Citra Hetuh

temī prayogamārgeṣu gaunavṛttivyapāśrayāḥ

atyantasundarā dr̥ṣṭāstadudāhṛtayo yathā

gauna- vṛtti-vyapāśrayāḥ [< - vi (+) apa (+) ā (+) śrayāḥ] /literally, "whose bases are the figurative mode."

As we have previously seen, the distinction between upamā and vyatireka rūpakas [2.88-90] is respectively marked by either similarity or disparity between the "figurative"/gauna and "literal," "factual"/mukhya usage of a given word. In śliṣṭa ākṣepa [2.159-60] we have noted the rejection of the "literal" moon in favor of a "figurative" ("face"-) moon. The "innumerable" varieties of citra hetu, however, are based exclusively upon the "figurative mode" (gaunavṛtti). The element of figuration in these cases lies primarily in a perceived distortion of the usual (or literal) cause/effect relationship, or in the presentation of a situation that appears to "twist" reality

evoking a sense of the "marvelous." And certainly within the world of the kavi logical truth is not at issue, for the presentation itself is its own validation given that it ultimately serves the ends of "beauty" (śobhā).

2.255 Example of the Hetu of the Marvelous involving
An Effect at a Distance

Beautiful one!

That conquering spear of Anaṅga

-- whose name is "Your Eye-Corner" --

was cast elsewhere --

Yet even I was struck in the heart.

Dūrakārya Citrahetudāharanam :

tvadapāṅgāhvayam jaitramanaṅgāstram yadaṅgane
muktam tadanyatastena sopyaham manasi kṣataḥ

anañgah /"the Bodiless," that is, Kāma, god of love and desire (see [2.80], under manmatha, and specifically [2.121], under anañgah).

In our first variety of citra hetu the presumed effect is conceived to be quite literally "at a distance" (dūra) from its cause. This quite physical separation allows for the possibility of figurative ramification. Obviously to equate a woman's side-glances with the "conquering spear of Anañga," the god of desire, is to emphasize their beauty (and their potent effect). Yet to assume strictly that "this superimposition marks the figurative element"/anena atra sāropa gaunī laksanā darśitā (RR/247) is to overlook the primary focus -- the imaginative distortion of cause and effect.

A beautiful women's glances -- equated with the spear of Anañga -- are "cast." As cause, given this equivalence, we can only presume their effect would be to generate intense desire in whomever would serve as target. That they

would be so intense as to further strike an innocent bystander well-removed from their directed path, can only be seen as "marvelous," thus further and primarily emphasizing the degree of beauty involved.

2.256 Example of the Hetu of the Marvelous involving
A Simultaneous Effect

That age of women
childhood cast aside
vividly appears right along with
the varied delusions of love's madness among men.

Kāryasahaja Citrahetūdāharanam :

āvirbhavati nārīṇāṁ vayah paryastaśaiśavam
sahaiva vividhaiḥ pumsāmañgajonmādavibhramaiḥ

From an initial physical distortion of cause and effect, in kāryasahaja citra hetu we shift to one of temporal sequence. Here a given cause may be so intense that its effect appears to be "simultaneous" (sahaja) in occurrence.

As cause we have the beauty of women in their youth -- "That age of women / childhood cast aside" -- that in its intensity generates an effect that indeed seems to appear without interval -- "the varied delusions of love's madness among men."

2.257 Example of the Hetu of the Marvelous involving

A Preceding Effect

After -- the orb of the moon arose

scattering beams all around

Before -- the ocean of desire swelled

among the doe-eyed.

Kāryānantaraja Citrahetūdāharanam :

paścāt paryasya kiraṇānudīrṇam candramandalam
 prāgeva harinākṣīṇāmudīrṇo rāgasāgarah

As an effect may appear simultaneously with its cause,
 so in kāryānantaraja citra hetu we find a "logical"
 extension of such temporal distortion -- a cause in its
 intensity appears to be "born after" (anantaraja) its
 effect.

It is not "after" but "before" the "orb of the moon
 arose," as cause, that the "ocean of desire swelled / among
 doe-eyed" ladies. An effect that occurs so rapidly and in
 such intensity that it seems to precede its cause.

2.258 Example of the Hetu of the Marvelous involving
An Incongruous Effect

Lord! Why does the morning light
the redness of your two feet
touching the hand-lotuses of vassal kings
transform them into closing buds?

Ayuktakārya Citrahetūdāharanam :

rājñām hastāravindāni kudmalīkurute kutah
deva tvaccaraṇadvandvarāgabālātapaḥ sprśan

kudmalīkurute [cvi pratyaya < kudmala (+)

*kr] /literally, "turn, transform X into 'closing buds'."

In yukta/ayukta rūpakas [2.77-78] we have seen the complementary elements of congruity/incongruity as

respectively distinctive. In the former, primary elements of two attributes ("bees" and "flowers") of an expressed aggregate (a "face") are clearly congruous. In the latter, the primary elements of a pair of attributes ("moonlight" and "lilies") distinguishing an aggregate (again, a "face") are incongruous. Dāṇḍin again draws upon the complementary balance of congruity/incongruity to distinguish his last two varieties of (citra) hetu alamkāra.

As a variety of citra hetu, the element of "incongruity" displayed in ayukta kārya should revolve around the interplay of cause and effect. This incongruity would appear to be generally central to citra hetu as such (though as we shall see with the final variety, one not absolutely necessary). As explicitly marking a particular variety, not only would we expect the focus to be on this disjunction, but given its prevalent appearance at any event, we might expect a further "figurative" elaboration of the components and context presented and such is what we do indeed find.

Dan̄din repeatedly plays upon, as a standard conceit of kāvya, the sun's opening of the lotus flower to present an image of faithful alliance. A king's retainer cannot help then but be amazed at the evident incongruity of the "morning light" transforming lotuses into "closing buds." Yet this central incongruity is embedded within a developed figurative image. It is not just "morning light" -- as cause -- but sunlight equated through rūpaka with the "redness" (rāga-) of the king's feet. Correspondingly, it is not just "closing buds" -- as effect -- but buds equated through rūpaka with the closing hands (hasta-aravindāni) of vassal kings touching the feet of their lord in homage (añjaliḥ). And we should recognize that the focus of the sense of wonder generated by this perceived anomaly of nature is ultimately transferred -- appropriately reinforced -- to the evident majesty and power that such a king commands.

2.259 Example of the Hetu of the Marvelous involving
A Congruous Effect

The beams from your toenail-moons

-- white as the Kunda flower --

are capable of closing

the hand-lotuses of vassal kings.

Yuktakārya Citrahetūdāharanam :

pāṇipadmāni bhūpānāṁ saṃkocayitumīśate
 tvatpādanakhacandrāṇāmarciṣah kundanirmalāḥ

Yuktakārya citra hetu, marking "congruity" between cause and effect, thus complements the preceding. Yet with the element of disjunction removed we have an exception to all preceding varieties of citra hetu. The generation of a sense of the "marvelous" must then stem from the imagined

context, an intensified presentation and unusual association of those objects appearing in the roles of cause and effect.

The image of our example similarly and appropriately balances that of the preceding. Within the world of kāvya there is nothing unusual in the moon's closure of the lotus, grounds for a conceived mutual enmity. The cause and effect relationship here is thus entirely congruous or appropriate. Yet again each component is developed through rūpakas. It is not simply the "moon," but the "beams from "toenail-moons" (nakha-candrānām) of a great king that appear as cause; not simply "lotuses," but again the "hand-lotuses" (pāni-padmāni) of vassal kings closing in homage that appear as effect. We find an additional touch of elaboration of the cause through upamā, for it is not just "toenail-moons," but toenail-moons "white as the Kunda flower" -- themselves but the size of a toenail. And once again, the sense of wonder generated ultimately comes to focus on the majesty and power of the king.

Notes [2.235] - [2.259]

1. The degree of categorical independence granted to the varieties of abhāva hetu [2.246-52] and citra hetu [2.253-59] varys with various critics. Thus D. K. Gupta (A Critical Study of Dandin, pp. 216-17) considers abhāva and citra as distinct classifications (and incorrectly notes that fifteen, rather than sixteen, varieties of hetu are illustrated). Ratnaśrī (RŚ/149-55) marks the varieties of abhāva as further instances of kāraka, but appears to consider those of citra as essentially distinct. And S. K. Belvalkar and Rangacharya Raddi (Notes 2/156-60) view all of Dandin's varieties, with the exception of jñāpaka's two examples, as essentially instances of kāraka hetu (a view which I accept).
2. Vyāpti/"pervasion" in the context of the Nyāya system is more correctly seen as the inferential relationship between indicatory (jñāpaka) "cause" or hetu, and the "thing to be inferred" or sādhya. Thus jñāpaka hetu is the "logical mark or liṅga (for example, dhūma ["/smoke"]) which in its most valid form is actually the kārya ["/effect"] of the jñāpyavastu sādhya or "thing to be inferred or known" (for example, vahni ["/fire"]." And most importantly, "A poetic jñāpaka need not always have that rigorous validity in its vyāpti which logic requires. . . . It is only if the jñāpaka is the kārya of the jñāpya that the vyāpti is invariably valid" (Notes 2/157).
3. Subhāsitaratnakosa [22.26], attributed to Vākkūṭa [?]; in Sanskrit Poetry, translated by Daniel H. H. Ingalls, p. 177.
4. Gerow incorrectly interprets the distinction between Dandin's first two varieties of (kāraka) hetu alamkāra. The former [2.236-37] he would see as an instance of

"augmentation"/upabṛṁhana: "A type of hetu wherein the modality of the cause is increase or augmentation" (Glossary/328). The latter reflects "cessation"/nivṛtti: "A type of hetu wherein the modality of the cause is diminution or cessation" (Glossary/330).

As Dandin remarks in [2.237] following his first example, "The elaboration of character [of the cause] . . . applies even where the effect is negative [or non-existent]." That is, upabṛṁhana/"elaboration" of the cause is frequently a component necessary to elevate hetu above the mundane -- it applies as a common feature, not as a distinctive element of the first to be opposed to the element of "cessation" in the second.

An error in interpretation that either contributes to or stems from an error in translation: "The wind out of the South, touching springs and sandal forests in the Southern mountains, is destined to relieve the weary wanderer"

(Glossary/330). Again, a translator's lack of awareness of traditional poetic conceits may lead to distortion. The Malaya breeze hardly "is destined to relieve the weary wanderer." As Dandin writes pathikānām abhāvāya/literally, "it is for the non-existence of travellers," its effect is indeed quite the reverse.

5. K. V. Abhyankar, A Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar, p. 103.

6. Gerow misses the point of this variety completely in considering this "A type of kāraka hetu in which the cause and effect are simulated. . . . in which simulation takes the place of action" (Glossary/330-31).

The element of "simulation" is entirely contingent. Reflecting prāpya karman there is no stipulation that the action appear to be feigned, rather it should merely "touch" or "contact" the object. Yet even so, the finite verbal action here, "seeing," is quite authentic, regardless of the manner in which it is carried out.

7. It is evident that this verse [2.244] is a point of contention, whether one immediately between Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha themselves, or (if we assume such) between their respective traditions. These lines may be a distillation of verse 16 (act 1) of Bhāsa's Svapnavāsavadattam : "The birds have returned to their nests. The hermits have plunged into the stream. Fires have been lit and are burning brightly, smoke is spreading in the penance-grove. The sun has dropped a long way down, gathering his rays together he turns his chariot and slowly descends on the summit of the western mountain" (translated by A. C. Woolner and Lakshman Sarup, Thirteen Trivandrum Plays Attributed to Bhāsa (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), p. 47) [khagā vāsopetāḥ salilamavagādho munijanah / pradipto 'gnirbhāti pravicarati dhūmo munivanam | paribhraṣṭo dūrādravirapi ca saṃkṣiptakirāṇo / ratham vyāvartyāsau praviśati śanairastaśikharam ||] (text cited from the Svapnavāsavadatta of Bhāsa, edited by M. R. Kale, 7th edition (Bombay: Bookseller's Publishing Co., 1969 (1929)).

8. Both of which appear together in the illustrative verse attributed to Vākkūṭa included above: "I pray the winds of Malabar / have not blown your way; / I pray the mango has not blossomed."

2.260 Conclusion to Hetu Alamkāra / Definition of Sūksma
Alamkāra

The nature of Hetu's varieties is thus shown.

Where an intention may be discerned

through gesture or appearance

-- due to its subtlety --

This is considered Sūksma.

Hetvalamkāropasamhārah / Sūksmālamkāralakṣanam :

iti hetuvikalpānām darśitā gatirīdrśī

iṅgitākāralakṣyorthah sauksmyāt sūksma iti smṛtaḥ

iṅgita- [< *iṅg / "move," "agitate"] / "sign,"
 "gesture."

ākāra / "form," "appearance."

sūksmah [< *sūc / "point out, "indicate"; "indicate by gestures or signs"] / "subtle."

The distinctive focus of sūksma alamkāra rests primarily on situational content. It is not that a primary -- "subtle" -- meaning or intention is implicitly conveyed or suggested through the interplay of words, but rather now through the depiction of suggestive action as "gesture" (iṅgita), or suggestive "appearance" (ākāra). The reader observes this subtle transfer of meaning between two players within the frame of the alamkāra, yet, as is clear from Dāṇdin's examples, this meaning may or may not be announced for the reader's benefit. And if not, then the proper inference -- as with the recipient within the verse itself -- must be drawn from the sign provided.

It is perhaps the stress on content -- although only a mode of inference is really being specified -- that accounts for the ambivalent response to this alamkāra in various writers. Bhāmaha, for example, specifically

rejects sūksma (along with hetu and leśa alamkāras) in KA [2.86], where Vāmana and Udbhaṭa decline any mention of it.

Whether it is illustrated in the Battiikāvyam is doubtful.¹

Yet both Bhoja² and Mammata, for example, accept Dandin's view. Mammata in KP [10.122cd-123ab] offers the following definition: "Where something although subtle is noticed and revealed to another" [kuto 'pi laksitah sūksmo 'pyartho 'nyasmai prakāsyate | dharmena kenacid yatra tat sūksmam paricakṣate ||].

2.261 Example of the Sūksma of Gesture

"When will our union be?"

Realizing her beloved was unable

to speak such in public

the lady closed her playful-lotus.

Iṅgita Sūksodāharanam :

kadā nau samgamo bhāvityākīrṇe vaktumakṣamam
 avetya kāntamabalā līlāpadmam nyamīlayat

līlā-padmam : a lotus playfully held in the hand in
 sport.

2.262 Explication of the Example of the Sūksma of Gesture

Here a union in the night is indicated

with the closure of the lotus

By a woman wishing to assuage

a lover tormented by desire.

Iṅgita Sūksmodāharansvarūpaprakāśanam :

padmasammilanādatra sūcito niśi samgamah
 āśvāsayitumicchantyā priyamañgajapīditam

Daṇḍin offers two varieties of sūksma alamkāra which follow from his definition, each with example and explication. In the sūksma of "gesture" (iṅgita) someone wishing to convey a strictly personal message to another is constrained from explicit channels due to inopportune circumstance. He or she must make do with but a gesture or sign, one which even open to view, would have true meaning only for the parties specifically involved.

As the moon closes the lotus flowers -- in the familiar kāvya conceit -- so closure by the lover's hand indicates the time of assignation.³

2.263 Example of the Sūksma of Appearance

Her glance fixed on me

at the song recital --

Color -- lustrous from uncontrolled desire --

spread over her face-lotus.

Ākāra Sūksmodāharanam :

madarpitadrśastasyā gītagosthyāmavardhata

uddāmarāgataralā chāyā kāpi mukhāmbuje

gīta-gosthī : a song or music recital. A gosthī ("meeting," "assembly") also marks a gathering of poets and connoisseurs, where kāvya may be recited and discussed, or a variety of literate word-games enjoyed.

ud-dāma /literally, "one that has the string broken," that is, "uncontrolled."

2.264 Explication of the Example of the Sūksma of

Appearance

Here a desire for sexual enjoyment

is conveyed --

Without transgressing the bounds of subtlety

since its actuality is unexplicit.

Ākāra Sūksmodāharanasvarūpaprakāśanam :

ityanudbhinnarūpatvādratyutsavamanorathah

anullaṅghyaiva sūksmatvamabhūdatra vyavasthitah

Now "appearance" (ākāra) alone conveys the intended, subtle meaning. From our example it would appear that volitional control is not a necessary element. The appearance -- with color "lustrous from uncontrolled desire" -- of a woman's face is sufficient when conjoined with intent and fixed glance to convey within "the bounds of subtlety" not only her true feelings, but presumably her intentions as well.

2.265 Definition of Leśa Alamkāra

Leśa involves the concealment

of the true nature of a partially exposed situation

Its form will be clarified

through the examples themselves.

Leśālamkāralakṣaṇam :

leśo leśena nirbhinnavasturūpanigūhanam

udāharanā evāsyā rūpamāvirbhaviṣyati

leśah [< *liś / "become small," "decrease"] / "a slight part or amount of," "a trace."

Leśa alamkāra appears to present us with one of the most evident cases of Dāṇḍin's direct incorporation of prior yet unresolved figurative modes or procedures. Two

quite distinct types are presented, with the second consisting of two mirroring categories. As we shall see, all three modes were -- most probably -- considered distinct well before Dandin., and their clear distinction will appear to be resolved not only in later writers, but to a degree within the Kāvyādarśa itself.

As with sūksma alamkāra, the first variety of leśa [2.265-67] involves "concealment," yet with a twist. Now the true meaning itself must be hidden, whether from others in one case, or from oneself in another. Its recognition would result in embarrassment or worse; and given this, it must be deflected or disguised rather than truly conveyed or acknowledged. Dandin offers two examples which provide illumination.

Leśa appears as a lakṣaṇa in Bharata's Nātyaśāstra [17.4] and is defined in [17.37ab]: "Where (speech) is expressed by those adept in argument. . . ." [yadvākyam vādakuśalairupāyenābhidhīyate |]. And we would seem to find evidence for both subvarieties of the second type of

leśa alamkāra in Bharata's lakṣaṇas termed gunātipāta [17.2, 19], where censure appears as praise: [17.19] "Various expressions of qualities, inapropos in a given situation, reflect gunātipāta -- sweet yet harsh in purport. . . ." [gunābhidhānairvividhairviparitārthayojitaiḥ | gunātipāto madhuro niṣṭurārtho bhavedatha ||]; and in garhaṇa [17.3, 31], where praise appears as censure: [17.31] "Where verbally stating a fault, one in actuality expresses a quality. . . ." [yatra samkīrtayan doṣam gunamarthena darśayet | . . . garhaṇam nāma tadbhavet ||].

Bhāmaha again rejects leśa as an alamkāra (as he does hetu and sūksma) in KA [2.86]: "Thus hetu, sūksma, and leśa are not considered alamkāras, since vakrokti of the entire expression is not displayed" [hetuśca sūkṣmo leśo 'tha nālamkāratayā mataḥ | samudāya bhidhānasya vakroktyanabhidhānataḥ ||]. Neither does it appear in Vāmana, Udbhāta, nor (apparently) in the Bhāttikāvyam.⁴

Yet with Rudraṭa (KA [7.100-2]), for example, only the second type of leśa presented by Dāṇḍin appears as leśa

alamkārā: (KA [7.100]) "Where a virtue is expressed as though a fault, or a fault is expressed as though a virtue . . ." [doṣibhāvo yasminguṇasya doṣasya vā guṇibhāvah | abhidhīyate tathāvidhakarmanimittah sa leśah syāt ||].

And Mammata, perhaps more logically, divides Daṇdin's two types of leśa into two distinct alamkāras. (1) vyājokti alamkāra (KP [10.118cd]) subsumes Daṇdin's first type: "Vyājokti -- concealing the evident nature of something through contrivance" [vyājoktiśchadmanodbhinnavasturūpanigūhanam ||]. (2) vyājastuti alamkāra (KP [10.112ab]) subsumes both subvarieties of Daṇdin's second type: "Vyājastuti -- where either censure or praise on the face of it is in fact otherwise" [vyājastutirmukhe nindā stutirvā rūḍhiranyathā |].⁵

2.266 Example of Leśa Alamkāra

With these goosebumps

the guards would see through me --

desirous of the king's daughter . . .

Ah! I've got it!

"Oh, what a cold wind that forest has!"

Leśalamkārodāharanam :

rājakanyānuraktam māṁ romodbhedena raksakāḥ

avagaccheyurājñātamaho śitanilam vanam

roma-udbhedenā /literally, "with the hair(s) breaking out"; horripilation, "goosebumps."

The presence of goosebumps on the flesh of a lover "desirous of the king's daughter" would surely reveal the

intent of his passage to keen-eyed guards. There is no denying that they are there. The true nature of the situation -- the lover's desire for a potentially forbidden object -- is thus partially exposed. But the realization of this evident meaning by the king's guards would result in frustration or worse. This hazard must be deflected. An adventitious cold wind allows an open comment on its chill -- made evidently before the guards -- which though seemingly unrelated would account for his manifest "horripilation."

2.267 Another Example of Leśa Alamkāra

How can it be?

Upon seeing that girl

tears of joy arise . . .

My eyes smart from pollen

kicked up by the wind.

Aparam Leśodāharanam :

ānandāśru pravṛttam me katham drṣṭvaiva kanyakām

akṣi me puṣparajasā vātoddhūtena dūsitam

And now a lover -- for whatever reason -- must conceal
 or deny his affection not only from the object of his
 desire, but from himself. The true purport of the
 appearance of "tears of joy" at the sight of this lady is

known. Pollinating flowers and a breeze provide a convenient rationalization.

2.268 Another Definition of Leśa Alankāra

This alamkāra truly shines
is such situations.

Some consider Leśa as
censure or praise subtly construed.

Aparam Leśālamkāralaksanam :

ityevamādisthāneyamalamkārotiśobhate
leśameke vidurnindām stutim vā leśataḥ kṛtām

leśataḥ /literally, "slightly"; "seemingly";
"subtly."

Daṇdin's second type of leśa alamkāra -- clearly indicated as held by "some" apart from the first -- appears to be quite distinct, but is again a variation on "subtle concealment." The two varieties reflect mirror images. In the first [2.269-70], what appears as praise in reality subtly conveys censure. In the second [2.271-72], apparent censure in fact subtly offers praise.

2.269 Example of Leśa involving Censure through Praise

He's a youth, virtuous, a king, magnificent

a husband worthy of you --

Whose heart is attached more to the festival of battle
than to the festival of love.

Stutynindāyāḥ_Leśodāharanam :

yuvaiṣa guṇavān rājā yogyaste patirūrjitah
 ranotsave manah saktam yasya kāmotsavādapi

2.270 Explication of the Example of Leśa involving
Censure through Praise

Here praise of the greatness of valor

is in actuality censure --

It leads to the annulment of attachment

in a woman wishing to continuously enjoy
 sensual pleasures.

Stutynindāyāḥ_Leśodāharanāśvarūpaprakāśanam :

vīryotkarṣastutirnindaivāśmin bhāvanivṛttaye
 kanyāyāḥ kalpate bhogaṁ nirvivikṣornirantaram

nirvivikṣoh [(gen.) sannata < nir (+) *viś

/literally, "one desirous of entering"].

For a woman "wishing to continuously enjoy sensual pleasures" the desirability of a young man's enumerated and praiseworthy qualities (presumably stated by a concerned friend) -- youth, virtue, kingship, magnificence -- is clear. Yet censure is subtly conveyed, for however praiseworthy martial ardour might be to some, to such a woman this revelation of ultimate attachement to "the festival of battle" can only lead to "the annulment of attachment" and any hope for marital bliss.

2.271 Example of Leśa involving Praise through Censure

Dear friend!

this man is fickle . . . merciless --

What use is he to me?

One who learns sweet words

merely to wash away offense.

Nindāstutyāḥ Leśodāharanam :

capalo nirdayaścāsau janah kim tena me sakhi

āgahpramārjanāyaiva cātavo yena śiksitāḥ

2.272 Explication of the Example of Leśa involving
Praise through Censure

A virtue -- speaking sweet words --

is presented as an apparent flaw

by a woman incapable of generating

the anger advised by a friend.

Nindāstutyāḥ Leśodāharanasvarūpaprakāśanam :

doṣābhāso gunāḥ kopi darśitaścātukāritā

mānam sakhijanoddīṣṭam kartum rāgādaśaktayā

We now have the reverse of the preceding. In response to admonishment over the behavior of her lover, a lady attempts to concur in apparent censure. It is in reality but a pose, and her words in subtly conveying praise for

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his "sweet words" or flattery (catu), reflect her inability to generate appropriate anger and thus hint at the true state of emotional affairs.

2.273 Definition of Yathāsamkhyā [Saṃkhyāna / Krama]Alamkāra

Respective correlation

to objects previously stated

is termed Yathāsamkhyā --

It is also known as Saṃkhyāna and Krama.

Yathāsamkhyālamkāralakṣaṇam :

uddiṣṭānām padārthānāmanūddeśo yathākramam

yathāsamkhyamiti proktam saṃkhyānam krama ityapi

Yathāsamkhyā or the alamkāra of "respective enumeration" focuses on precise structural organization.

An initial series of objects must be followed by a parallel series, whose individual members are respectively correlated with the former. And further, extrapolating

from the single example following, each series reflects a coherent group, its members related in a given way. We thus have parallel horizontal cohesion across the group, as well as respective vertical cohesion between members of each group. Dandin has chosen a relationship of similarity to mark the correlation between the groups -- one item as upameya, the other as upamāna -- yet whether or not this arrangement is mandatory is uncertain.

This alamkāra is clearly known by a number of names, and indeed Dandin in his initial list of the artha alamkāras utilizes the term "kramah" [2.5].

In considering yathāsamkhya alamkāra across time, we may accept D. K. Gupta's opinion that "The general conception of the figure remains the same throughout" only if stress is placed upon the word "general." Although Bhāmaha, for example, in KA [2.88-90] accepts the framework of "respective correlation," he yet differs in internal detail. Yathāsamkhya is defined as: (KA [2.89]) "The respective reference to a number of dissimilar objects

previously stated. . . ." [bhūyasāmupadistānāmarthā-nāmasadharmanām | karamaśo yo 'nunirdeśo yathāsamkhyam taducyate ||].

His single example in KA [2.90] lays out the lotus, moon, bee, elephant, male kokila (cuckoo), and peacock as the initial series; followed by attributes of a beautiful woman in respective correlate order: her face, brilliance, glance, walk, voice, and hair. We note then that there is similarity only between respective pairs ("lotus"/"face" and so on), not between the items themselves of each series, or more properly, sequence.

Dandīn's arrangement then might be represented by two parallel series (A and B), each item in each similar or related (A, A, A / B, B, B), yet with an evident relationship between respective pairs of each series as well (A¹, A², A³ / B¹, B², B³). Where Bhāmaha presents two sequences whose individual members are unrelated (A, B, C / D, E, F), yet again with a correlation between respective pairs (A¹, B², C³ / D¹, E², F³).⁶

Vāmana (KAS [4.3.17]) terms this alamkāra "kramah," and explicitly states what appears to be implicit with Dāṇḍin: "The respective correlation of upameyas and upamānas -- This is kramah." [upameyopamānām kramasambandhah kramah ||]. Yet Rudraṭa (KA [7.34-37]) and Mammata (KP [10.108cd]) use the term "yathāsamkhya"; and Mammata, for example, echos Dāṇḍin: "Yathāsamkhya involves respective correlation among things expressed in a particular order" [yathāsamkhyam kramenaiva kramikānām samanvayah ||]. And we might mention the appearance of "yathāsamkhya" in the Agnipurāna [345.21], as one of the six guṇas it classifies pertaining to both sound and sense (ubhayaguna): "It is the extended and universal (sāmanya) application (atideśa) of an undefined statement (anuddeśa)" [yathāsañkhyamanuddeśah sāmānyamatidiṣyate ||].⁷

2.274 Example of Yathāsamkhya Alamkāra

Slender one! Entering the water to bathe
 the brilliance of your
 Smile, Eyes and Face
 is surely stolen by the
 Kumuda, Utpala and Pañkaja.

Yathāsamkhyodāharanam :

dhruvam te coritā tanvi smiteksaṇamukhadyutih
 snātumambhapraviṣṭāyāḥ kumudotpalapañkajaiḥ

kumuda / utpala / pañkaja : Varieties of lotus, where
 "the Kumudas should be considered white, the Utpalas black,
 and the Pañkajas red" / atra kumudānām śvetatvam utpalānām
 nilatvam pañkajānām ca āraktatvam jñeyam | (RR/256) .

An initial series of three is presented, each item related as features of a beautiful lady -- "smile, eyes and face." A series of three follows, with each a beautiful flower again all are related -- "the [white] Kumuda, the [black] Utpala and the [red] Pañkaja."

Yet further, each following item is respectively correlated to those "objects previously mentioned." In the present case each correlate pair is in a comparative relationship. Thus a lady's smile with teeth revealed is similar to the white Kumuda; her eyes black with collyrium are like the black Utpala; and the tone of her face in the blush of health (or perhaps of intoxication) appears as red as the red Pañkaja -- three pairs of upameyas and upamānas structurally aligned in order.⁸

Notes [2.260] - [2.274]

1. C. Hooykaas considers that Bhāttikāvyam [10.43] might refer to sūksma alamkāra ("On Some arthālañkāras in the Bhāttikāvya X," (1957), p. 359), yet Mallinatha believes this verse reflects rather svabhāvokti, where Jayamañgalā would see atiśayokti.
2. Bhoja, Śrīgāraprakāśah, vol. 2, (1963), p. 393.
3. Gerow's translation misses the point : "Putting a lotus on, she indicated a rendez-vous that night. . . ." (Glossary/323). It is the act of closure, not mere adornment, that indicates the lady's intention.
4. S. K. De overstates the case in regard to hetū, sūksma, and leśa alamkāras: "These figures, however, are illustrated (as interpreted by commentators) by Bhātti, and were probably recognized before Bhāmaha's time" (History of Sanskrit Poetics, vol. 2, (1960), p. 28, n. 61). There is mention of but hetu alamkāra in the Bhāttikāvyam [10.73] by the Jayamañgalā commentary [882].
5. Gerow is incorrect in equating both of these varieties (citing KD [2.268-72]) with vyājastuti alamkāra (Glossary/260). Vyājastuti as presented by Dandin [2.343-47] involves strictly praise in the guise of censure, and thus reflects the latter subvariety [2.271-72] alone.
6. The term "samkhyāna" also appears in the Kāvyālañkāra [2.88], the usual reading of which is quite possibly corrupt. Bhāmaha introduces yathāsamkhyā and utpreksā alamkāras together and comments in [2.88cd]: "In some places Medhāvin (see Introduction, under The Tradition and Possible Predecessors) terms utpreksā 'samkhyāna'" [saṁkhyānamiti medhāvinotpreksābhīhitā kvacit ||]. P. V. Kane, however, points out that "this does not

make good sense," and offers the emendation "samkhyā-namiti medhāvī notpreksābhīhitā kvacit." That is, "Medhāvin calls yathāsamkhya by the name samkhyāna and in some places (in some works on alaṅkāra) utpreksā has not been spoken of as an Alaṅkāra" (P. V. Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, (1961), p. 63).

Yet S. K. De considers Kane's emendation problematical given the elaborate treatment of utpreksā by Dāṇḍin (History of Sanskrit Poetics, vol. 2, (1960), p. 29). If we assume, however, a somewhat gradual cataloging of the alamkāras and a relatively early date for Medhāvin why should this be a problem? We might add that D. K. Gupta incorrectly notes, "according to Bhāmaha (II.88), this name was given to the figure by Medhāvin" (A Critical Study of Dāṇḍin, (1970), p. 219, n. 6) -- presumably he is accepting Kane's emendation without citing his reading as such.

7. Prakas Chandra Lahiri, "The Theory of Rīti and Guṇa in the Agnipurāṇa," Indian Historical Quarterly, 9 (1933), p. 458.

8. Gerow mistranslates: "As you entered the water to bathe, you certainly stole the beauty of your smile, eyes, and face from the red lotus, the blue lotus, and the white lotus" (Glossary/222).

The failure here stems both from inaccurate construal of grammar (the flowers are doing the "stealing" not the woman), and cultural disjunction (the inaccurate attribution of the flowers' colors appears to stem from a distinctly Western and thus inappropriately conceived female image: red lips; blue eyes, and white face).

2.275 Definitions of Preyas / Rasavat / Ūrjasvin Alamkāras

Preyas -- the expression of something exceedingly pleasing

Rasavat -- Captivating embued with rasas

Ūrjasvin -- Displaying deep-rooted pride

These three display an excellent intensity.

Preyorasavadūrjasvyalamkāralaksāni :

preyah priyatarākhyānam rasavad rasapeśalam

ūrjasvi rūḍhām̄kāram yuktotkarsam ca

ut-karsa / "excellence," "eminence"; yet here conjoined with "intensity."

Danḍin presents a trinity of alamkāras -- all of which "display an excellent intensity." Essentially all three focus on the intensification of what we may rather loosely consider an "emotion" or psychological state. Upon

examining each and considering their respective examples we shall be in a better position to reflect on why Dandin chose to present these as a group.

Preyas alamkāra is "the expression of something exceedingly pleasing (priya-tara)," a display of intense pleasure or happiness. And in the following [2.281] (the "Elucidation of the Example of Rasavat [Alamkāra] involving Śrṅgāra Rasa") we read, "Previously [in preyas alamkāra] joy (prīti) was presented. . . ." D. K. Gupta considers prīti or "affection" "in a way the dominant emotion of preyas (where rati (love) is the enduring emotion of the erotic sentiment" [rasa]), and notes that the commentator Taruṇavācaspati "defines prīti as affection with reference to gods, preceptors, and elders [on KD [2.275, 280-1]]."¹ This view is echoed in Gerow's definition: "The expression of affection in an extraordinary way" (Glossary/217).

It would certainly appear that Dandin develops preyas alamkāra in an analogous way to the various examples of rasavat alamkāra to follow. We shall discuss the rasa

schema, but for now may point out that just as, for example, (again from KD [2.281]), "love (rati) -- through intensification of its nature / becomes [the rasa] śṛṅgāra," so preyas would appear to be conceived as an "intensification" of prīti or "joy" as the dominant "emotion" (sthāyibhāva).

Preyas alamkāra may possibly reflect the lakṣaṇa priyavacana or priyokti found in Bharata's Nātyaśāstra [17.5, 41]: (NŚ [17.41]) "When words are uttered in a pleasant mood to honour an honourable person and to express joy. . . ." [yatprasannena manasā pūjyam pūjayitum vacah | harṣaprakāśanārtham tu sā priyoktirudāhṛtā ||].

Preyas, rasavat, and ūrjasvin appear grouped in Dandin's order in Bhāmaha's listing of alamkāras (KA [3.1]), and in his brief presentation of each (KA [3.5-7]). He offers a single example of preyas in [3.5], which mirrors that of Dandin's to follow (Vidura expressing his joy at Kṛṣṇa's arrival). Similarly, the Jayamaṅgalā commentary [856] would see the Bhāttikāvyam illustrating all three of

these alamkāras in matching order, with preyas appearing in [10.47].

Udbhaṭa's position in his Kāvyālaṅkārasāraśāṅgraha is interesting, and foreshadows future development. He expands the views of Dandin and Bhāmaha (in which he appears to implicitly accept that a "bhāva" or "emotion" is involved), and incorporates formal elements of the rasa schema as presented in the Nātyaśāstra. Now termed "preyasvat," this alamkāra comes in balance with the following rasavat. Where the latter presents the rasas, preyasvat rather than presenting one emotion may incorporate any of the primary bhāvas from which the rasas are derived: "Where kāvya is composed with indications of the bhāvas such as rati and so on, through the anubhāvas ["visible consequents" of the inner emotions] and so on -- This is termed preyasvat"² [ratyādikānāṁ bhāvānāmanu-
bhāvādisūcanaiḥ | yatkāvyam badhyate sadbhīstatpreyasvat-
udāhṛtam ||] [(KASS [4.2])].

Gerow's definition of Udbhaṭa's preyasvat overstates

the case: "That quality of a work of art by which descriptive situations elicit and sustain in every way appropriately the basic mood (rasa) of the work" (Glossary/218). Again, the point here is not necessarily to "elicit" rasa -- this task is reserved for the following rasavat -- but to present the bhāvas. And certainly Gero Jenner is incorrect in positing Udbhaṭa's conception as equally applicable to those of Dandin and Bhāmaha, where "Rati oder andere Bhāva treten auf" -- again, this is not applicable to either Dandin's or Bhāmaha's view.³

With Rudraṭa "preyān" appears as a tenth rasa (KA [12.3], [15.17-19]), yet his new bhāva alamkāra (KA [7.38-39]) would seem to reflect Udbhaṭa: (KA [7.38]) "Wherein the visible effect of an emotional state, together with its apparently unrelated cause, suggests the nature of that emotional state, which, in turn, explains the relevance of the cause" (Glossary/218-19) [yasya vikārah prabhavannapratibaddhena hetunā yena | gamayati tadabhi-
prāyam tatpratibandham ca bhāvo 'sau ||]. Yet the

explanation that Gerow provides (with which I would agree, although I am not sure that we may speak of rasa in this context as "a general characteristic of the work itself"), is perhaps equally applicable to Udbhaṭa's conception: "Bhāva is more limited in scope than rasavat alamkāra, aiming only at suggesting a specific, temporally limited emotion, rather than a mood (rasa) which would be a general characteristic of the work itself" (Glossary/218-19).

2.276 Example of Preyas Alamkāra

Govinda! When today you entered my house

What I joy I felt!

It could occur again

only upon your next arrival.

Preyas Udāharanam :

adya yā mama govinda jātā tvayi gr̄hāgate
 kālenaisā bhavet prītistavaivāgamanāt punah

Govinda /"finder of cows" : Kṛṣṇa.

Saṅjaya said:

Indeed I have heard the propitious explanation of God's names -- as far as I can know; for Keśava is beyond the measure of knowledge.

He is Vāsudeva, because he clothes the creatures, because he is wealth, because he is the womb of the Gods. Inasmuch as he is known for his masculinity, he is called Viṣṇu. Know, Bhārata, that he is Mādhava because of his hermithood, meditation, and Yoga. . . . Inasmuch as he has not been born from a mother, he is the Unborn (Aja), the vanquisher of armies. They know him as Dāmodara, because he tames the Gods with his self-luminousness. . . . As he carries heaven and earth in his arms, he is known as the Great-armed One (Mahābāhu), . . . and as Nārāyaṇa, because he is the course of men. . . . They call him All (Sarva), because he is the source and dissolution of all that is existent and nonexistent, and because he always knows all. Kṛṣṇa stands firm on truth and truth stands firm on him, and Govinda is truth beyond truth -- therefore he has the name of True (Satya). . . . He makes the unreal real, and thereby confuses the creatures.⁴

The lines of Dandin's verse are drawn from an episode of the "Book of Effort" (Udyoga Parvan) [5.54.87ff.] in the Mahābhārata. Yudhiṣṭhīra, eldest and nominal head of the Pāṇḍava brothers, sends Kṛṣṇa to Hāstinapura in an attempt to negotiate before the outbreak of hostilities. He visits the sagacious Vidura, half-brother to both the father of the Pāṇḍavas, Pāṇḍu, and the blind regent Dhṛitarāṣṭra (the epithets that follow again refer to Kṛṣṇa):

After meeting in proper fashion the Kurus in their assembly, the Mādhava made his way to the dwelling of Vidura. Vidura received Janārdana with all the blessings, and he saluted the Dāśārha and waited on him with all he desired. After receiving Govinda as a proper host, Vidura, who knew all the Laws, asked Madhusūdana about the health of Pāṇḍu's sons. To his dear and sagacious friend the Steward, constant in the Law and without flaws, the most wise Dāśārha, who saw all before him, then told in full the vicissitudes of the Pāṇḍavas.⁵

2.277 Explication of an Example of Preyas Alamkāra

Vidura spoke appropriately --

For such joy there can be no other source.

Thus Hari -- satisfied only through devotion --

was greatly pleased.

Preyasah Udāharanāsvarūpaprakāśanam :

ityāha yuktaḥ viduro nānyatastādrśī dhṛtiḥ
bhaktimātrasamārādhyaḥ suprītaśca tato hariḥ

Dāṇḍin's first example of preyas alamkāra pictures the joy of Vidura at Hari's (Kṛṣṇa's) arrival at his home (and reciprocally, as we see in the explication, the joy of Kṛṣṇa in response). We note that the intensity of Vidura's joy or pleasure is specifically marked -- it is a joy so rare that it could be repeated only upon a repetition of

the given circumstance (an intensity echoed with Kṛṣṇa's joy that after all, appears only at such devotion).

2.278 Another Example of Preyas Alamkāra

Transcending the forms

Moon Sun Wind Earth

Sky Sacrificer Fire Water --

Oh Lord! Who are we to see you?

Aparam Preyasa Udāharanam :

somah sūryo marudbhūmirvyoma hotānalo jalam

iti rūpānyatikramya tvām draṣṭum deva ke vayam

hotā [< (m) hotr̥] : one of the four officiating priests at the vedic sacrifice (with the adhvaryu, brahman, and udgātr̥), chanting verses from the Rg Veda.

The eight material forms of Śiva are nicely expressed by Kālidāsa in the Benediction to the Abhijñānaśākuntala: "Eight forms has Shiva, lord of all and king: / And these are water, first created thing; / And fire, which speeds the sacrifice begun; / The priest; and time's dividers, moon and sun; / The all-embracing ether, path of sound; / The earth, wherein all seeds of life are found; / And air, the breath of life: May he draw near, / Revealed in these, and bless those gathered here."⁶

2.279 Explication of an Example of Preyas Alamkāra

This demonstration
of King's Rātavarman's pleasure
upon the manifestation of the Lord
should be understood as Preyas.

Preyas Udāharanāsvarūpaprakāśanam :

iti sāksātkṛte deve rājño yadrātavarmanah

prītiprakāśanam tacca preya ityavagamyatām

deve [(loc.) (sing.)] /Śiva : samkare (RS/162);
mahaśvare (RR/263).

rātavarman : Yet we also find the alternate reading, "Rājavarman," which is a possible reference to the Pallava Rājasimhavarman or Narasimhavarman II. [c. 690/91-c.728/29].

Again we have the depiction and expression of extreme joy. Transcending his eight material forms, Śiva appears before a humble devotee, who cannot but exclaim his wonder and pleasure. And again the intensity of the occasion is marked, albeit perhaps now a touch more subtly than before.

For upon our awareness that the speaker is a king (and if indeed this a reference to Pallava Narasimhavarman II., a great king), comes the realization of the disjunction

between status and the evident humility of his remark -- "Who are we to see you?." A disjunction which thus serves to emphasize the king's appreciation of the event.

With rasavat (literally, "possessing rasa") -- an alamkāra "Captivating (peśala) embued with rasas" -- Dāṇḍin draws the rasas into the Kāvyādarśa. His definition, or more properly "gloss," of rasavat clearly assumes a degree of familiarity with the rasas, their generation, characteristics, and associated elements. That Dāṇḍin himself was thoroughly familiar with this knowledge -- as exemplified in the foundational presentation of Bharata's Nātyaśāstra -- I would certainly accept.

The Nātyaśāstra is an extensive copendium focusing of the theatre, and including any number of skills and disciplines deemed relevant (dramatic structure, theory, types of plays, characters and roles, dance, music, gesture, costume, language and kāvya, and so on). Its date is uncertain, being broadly placed from the 2nd to the 5th

centuries, though with elements possibly as early as the 2nd century b.c.⁷

Bharata's work is the oldest extant to consider rasa, and indeed is usually taken as the seminal text for the study of kāvya, but that rasa was a concern of yet previous writers is extremely probable.⁸ The Nātyaśāstra lists and discusses eight rasas [6.15, 38-83], and develops an elaborate and somewhat confused enveloping schema stressing their central role in dramatic or theatrical production.

Although the practice of kāvya predates the Nātyaśāstra, it is assumed given this text that the rasa schemata (I hardly think the word "theory" is appropriate) initially arose within the context of dramatic speculation. Rasa "is introduced, in terms

borrowed from Indian logic, as the laksana of drama: an invariably concomitant attribute which serves to mark drama apart from all else. Rasa does not begin its career either as a psychological principle or as an aesthetic principle -- if by this we mean a universal principle -- but as a critical principle. . . . Rasa should be understood then, in its earliest form, not only as an integrative principle, but as

a distinctive feature of the dramatic genre. That it occurred first in the context of the drama is a crucial, rather than an incidental, factor in its definition.⁹

Or again, "La théorie du Rasa . . . est demeurée conditionnée par le drame bien plus que par le poème."¹⁰ And as S. K. De points out, "Dramaturgy . . . appears at first to have formed a study by itself. . . . Both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, no doubt, speak of nāṭaka as a species of kāvya, but refer to specialized treatises for its detailed treatment" (as in [KA [1.24] and KD [1.31]]).¹¹

Regardless of their origins, it is clear from Daṇḍin's presentation that the rasas themselves were seen by the kavis of the classical period as yet another element capable of beautifying kāvya. It is important to realize that the elevated theoretical bias of some later writers, and the ensuing distortion and revisionism of many contemporary scholars (we shall touch on this later), neither reflects the actual attitude of the practicing kavis (as so inferred), nor in any way confirms their lack

of awareness for not conforming to this later quite presumptuous bias. The literature on the rasa schema, its development and place in Indian literature is ponderous in extent, yet much is of questionable value. We may, however, attempt a brief sketch grounded in the Nātyaśāstra and touching on considered comment and analysis.¹²

Bharata (NS [6.15]) lists eight rasas:

- (1) śrṅgāra (the "erotic")
- (2) hāsyā (the "comic")
- (3) karuna (the "compassionate")
- (4) raudra (the "furious")
- (5) vīra (the "heroic")
- (6) bhayānaka (the "terrifying")
- (7) bibhatsa (the "hideous")
- (8) adbhuta (the "marvelous")

And he expatiates, "Without rasa meaning cannot arise.

Rasa is produced from a combination of the vibhāvas

["determinants"], the anubhāvas ["consequents"], and the

vyabhicāribhāvas ["transitory emotional states"] [na hi
 rasādrte kaścidarthah pravartate | tatra vibhāvānubhāva
 vyabhicārisamyogādrasanispattiḥ |] (NŚ [6.31ff.]).¹³

On which Renou expands: "Comme le pose déjà Bharata,

le rasa est fondé sur le bhāva, c'est-à-dire sur l'émotion (proprement "l'état" psychique), en tant qu'elle assume un caractère stable, qu'elle est un sthāyibhāva. Un état émotionnel se fixe en sthāyibhāva lorsqu'il est consolidé par les vibhāva ou "déterminants" (dont on distingue deux catégories, les "essentials" et les simples "excitants"), par les anubhāva "conséquents", manifestations extérieures (parmi lesquelles il y a les huit sattvaja ou sāttvika, signes physiques de l'emotion, sveda "sueur", etc.), enfin par les vyabhicāri-bhāva ou saṃcāribhāva "états complémentaires" au nombre de 33. . . . 14

We also read in the following chapter of the Nātyaśāstra [7.6ff.], "One should understand that there are forty-nine bhāvas ["emotional states," "emotions"] which may [contribute to] the manifestation of rasa in kāvya [. . . kāvyarasābhivyaktihetava ekonapañcāśadbhāvāḥ pratyavagantavyāḥ |]; and further that "The rasas are produced from these through being imbued with the quality

(guna) of universality (sāmānya)" [ebhyaśca sāmānyaguṇa-yogena rasā niṣpadyante].

The fundamental "structural" components which in varying combinations may lead to the generation of rasa are the forty-nine bhāvas. These are divided into three categories:

(1) the eight sthāyibhāvas ("permanent," "dominant," "durable"): rati ("love"), hāsa ("mirth"), soka ("sorrow"); krodha ("anger"), utsāha ("resolve"), bhaya ("fear"), jugupsā ("disgust"), and vismaya ("wonder") (NS [6.16,17]).

(2) the thirty-three vyabhicāribhāvas ("transitory," "complementary"), such as, for example: asūyā ("envy"), cintā ("worry"), moha ("confusion"), harsa ("joy") (NS [6.16, 18-21]).

(3) the eight sāttvika- or sattvaja- bhāvas ("indicatory," "involuntary"): stambha ("paralysis"), sveda ("perspiration"), romañca ("horripilation"), svarabhañga ("breaking voice"), vepathu ("trembling"), vaivarnya

("changing color"), aśru ("crying"), and pralaya ("fainting") (NS [6.16, 22]).

Bharata's schema involves then three levels of generation, with two primary groupings whose elements are conceived to be essential. We should immediately note that the thirty-three "transitory states" (vyabhicāribhāvas) are common to both of these groups. Remaining in the first group are the "determinants" (vibhāvas) and the "consequents" (anubhāvas). These latter two elements are not bhāvas as such, but rather associated factors. The vibhāvas involve the conditions of the emotion . . . "The background, the scene, the characterizatons themselves -- those aspects of the drama that are necessary preconditions, but not sufficient casuse, of the coherent emotional tone [sthāyibhāva]."¹⁵ Where the anubhāvas are "tokens of an emotion. [() The emotion itself, of course, is never real; it can only be suggested. Paradoxically, any irruption of real emotion, which is by its nature grounded in individual awareness, would terminate the process of suggestion and

therefore terminate the drama as well. . . .[]]."¹⁶ These are the external signs which suggest to the audience or the to the reader a character's internal emotional or physical state.

And again we have overlap between the two groups, for the eight sāttvika bhāvas are considered anubhāvas. "In a play, what the actor acts is not the central mood of love or grief. He acts out the conditions that excite the mood and the responses that follow from it. . . . The Indian theorists spelled this out in great detail, prescribing for each of the rasas the correlative consequents, the kinds of dramatic personae, the gestures and scenery and kinds of diction, thus analyzing content into forms."¹⁷

The remaining category of the second group is vitally important and we must add a caveat. When one turns to Bharata's analysis of the individual rasas, we see that they immediately arise not from the combination of all the various categories, but from the eight "durable" or "dominant" sthāyibhāvas -- "These dominant moods, which all

factors combine to suggest and express. . . . It is the *sthāyi-bhāva* that the audience perceives, and in this emphatic perception is the *rasa* of the play [or of the *kāvya*]."¹⁸

We have then these three levels of generation:

- (1) vibhāva, anubhāvas (which include the sāttvikabhāvas),
and vyabhicāribhāvas >
- (2) the sthāyibhāvas > (3) the rasas

<u>rati</u>	<u>śr̥ngāra</u>
<u>hāsa</u>	<u>hāsyā</u>
<u>soka</u>	<u>karuna</u>
<u>krodha</u>	<u>raudra</u>
<u>utsāha</u>	<u>vīra</u>
<u>bhaya</u>	<u>bhayānaka</u>
<u>jugupsā</u>	<u>bībhatsa</u>
<u>vismaya</u>	<u>adbhuta</u>

And what may be said of "rasa" itself. Rasa ("flavor," "taste," "essence") "signifie au sens propre

'saveur' et les représentations gustatives prévaudront toujours autour du rasa. On le traduira [a futile endeavor] approximativement par 'sentiment'; le terme le plus adéquat serait *Stimmung*."¹⁹

As Bharata writes: "Just as flavor (rasa) comes from a combination of many spices, herbs and other substances (dravya), so rasa . . . comes from the combination of many bhāvas. . . . How is rasa savored? As gourmets (sumanas) are able to savor the flavor of food prepared with many spices, and attain pleasure etc., so sensitive spectators [or readers] savor the primary emotions [sthāyibhāvas] suggested by the acting out of the various bhāvas and presented with the appropriate modulation of the voice, movements of the body and display of involuntary reactions [sāttvikas], and attain pleasure etc." [yathā hi nānāvyañjanauṣadhidravyasamyoगādrasanis-
pattiḥ tathā nānābhāvopagamādrasanispattiḥ | |
kathamāsvādyate rasah | yathā hi nānāvyañjanasamskṛtamannam
bhuñjāna rasānāsvādayanti sumanasah purusā harṣādīmścādhi-

gacchanti tathā nānābhāvābhinayavyāñjitān vāgañgasattvopetān
 sthāyibhāvānāsvādayanti sumanasah prekṣakāḥ harsādimścādhi-
 gacchanti |] (NŚ [6.31ff.]).²⁰

Louis Renou would see rasa as

un état subjectif du lecteur ou de l'auditeur (c'est tout un) par lequel les émotions dormantes qu'il est en état d'éprouver sont réveillées au contact de l'oeuvre littéraire et donnent la sensation d'un plaisir, d'une volupté. A la base du rasa, il y a une sorte de transfert: le lecteur recrée pour son compte et reçoit en lui l'expérience originale du poète, mais cette expérience ne devient rasa que si elle revêt la forme d'un sentiment universel, impersonnel, pour ainsi dire abstrait.²¹

As Bharata has stated, this quality of "universality," "abstraction" (sāmanya) is vital.

The feelings of an individual man are based on personal, accidental, incommunicable experience. Only when they are ordered, depersonalized, and rendered communicable by prescriptions do they participate in rasa, which is created by them and in turn suffuses them. By this ordering, one's own history is reactivated in an impersonal context. Rasa is a depersonalized condition of the self, an imaginative system of relations.²²

Rasa and the various elements from which it arises are thus conceived as distinct. And again as Daniel Ingalls writes:

Emotion (bhāva) and mood (rasa) differ in several respects. An emotion is seldom pure or sustained and the emotions which contaminate it, since they depend on circumstances beyond our control, are seldom aesthetically harmonious. Our bursts of energy are mixed with anger and fear; our sexual excitement is interrupted, frustrated, forgotten, and then resumed. A mood, on the other hand, since it is created by an artist, may be purified and sustained and can be combined with other moods in an artistic fashion. Again, the emotion is personal whereas the mood is universal.²³

Now this sounds quite meaningful, but -- if I may be allowed to step back a bit -- these last words of Daniel Ingalls expose what I feel is a serious weakness with the rasa schema, both in substance and presentation. One should be aware that the "rasa theory" (as with the "dhvani theory") has been grasped upon by those, whether later writers of kāvya śāstra or contemporary interpreters, who have felt the need to "explain" (and presumably believe

that this is possible) the creative act, and has been elevated into an imagined position of revelatory dominance. The concomitant of course of the presumed realization of this need is not only distorted evaluation, but -- and this on the part of the majority of contemporary writers -- serious distortion of the tradition itself.

The position of S. K. De provides an excellent example: "As there existed side by side the rival theories of the more influential *Alamkāra* and *Riti* Schools, who never realized its aesthetic importance, the Rasa-theory and its exponents never seem to have come into prominence, until the idea was taken up by the Dhvani School and worked into its system."²⁴ And elsewhere, "The bearings of this doctrine on poetry were seldom discussed, and the importance of Rasa as one of the essential factors of poetry was indeed naively understood but was not theoretically established."²⁵

Leaving aside the evident (I would hope) critical vacuousness of such presumption, I feel strongly that the

presentation of rasa in the Kāvyādarśa, by a writer and poet working within the midst of the most creative and productive period of classical Sanskrit literature, is a far more accurate reflection of the position and estimation of rasa for the working poets themselves. Gerow's perspective is far more revealing:

Both in its field of application (poetry in the broadest sense) and in its theoretical justification (śāstra), the notion of rasa shows a marked imperialistic tendency. From its beginnings in the discussions of Sanskrit drama, its partisans have sought on the one hand to bring under its explanatory aegis many other genres of literary and artistic production, and on the other, have claimed for the rasa greater and greater psychological or ontological validity.²⁶

This distortion thus unfortunately extends beyond the aggrandizement of one's personal view, to the revision of conceived practice as well -- projecting backwards upon the kavis themselves the assumption that rasa for them as well is the be and end-all, the invariable focus of effort, and to be sought at every turn.

As A. K. Ramanujan, for example, remarks, "It is the sentence that interprets the word, not the words that make up the sentence. A sentence does not exist without words, but it is beyond words. This is also the significance of the relationship of the poem to its various parts: the whole transcends the parts, incorporates them, and defines them after being created by them. This relationship is called the rasa, the 'mood' of the poem; it is what is experienced through the poem's parts."²⁷

And in a similar vein, V. Raghavan writes, "While what [ancient critics] . . . took Rasa to be was something inherent in the over-all situation regarding poetry as distinct from drama, they indicated their appreciation of the distinct beauty due to Rasa by mentioning the Rasavat, Preyas and Ūrjasvi in a separate class . . . one of them, Dandin, going to the extent of stating in express terms that the three stood on a higher footing, yuktotkarsam ca tat trayam."²⁸

As we have discussed, rather than seeming to prove

this preconceived view, this last phrase (taken from [2.275]) does not indicate a "higher footing," but that the three are conjoined with or display "excellence," or more specifically in this case, "intensity." And we have and shall note that Dañdin continually marks a number of alamkāras throughout the Second Chapter as "best," "foremost," or "excellent," without necessarily indicating a preferential footing.

Yet failure lies not only in elevating the rasa schema to something beyond what the kavis themselves accepted in practice, but in its presentation by various contemporary writers as "theory." This stems primarily from the error of presuming a valid ontological or referential correspondence between words and in this case "mental" activities, and is reflected not only in terminological confusion, but correspondingly, in presuming that a "theory" can be constructed from such passing linguistic shades. I would urge one to question the validity of a proposed theory of creative literature based upon a typology of "emotions" or

"psychological states", whose proponents suppose (as does Ingalls above) that "a mood . . . since it is created by an artist, may be purified and sustained and can be considered with other moods in an artistic fashion" -- as though in truth such terms as "mood" or "sentiment" correspond with internal realities that can be precisely categorized and contained; as though, in truth the poet may shuffle "them" about, like so many colors at the touch of a brush.

The fundamental nature of rasavat, as an alamkāra where a rasa provides the focus, was generally accepted unchanged. Bhāmaha offers a brief definition of rasavat in (KA [3.6]): "Rasavat -- Where śrṅgāra [rasa] and so on are strikingly shown" [rasavaddarśitaspaṣṭaśrṅgārādir . . .]. And again the Jayamañgalā commentary [857] would see rasavat following preyas alamkāra in Bhāt̄tikāvyam [10.48].

Udbhaṭa (KASS [4.3-4]), however, as with his conception of preyas, chooses to incorporate a number of the formal features associated with rasa, drawn from the

Nātyaśāstra (or its tradition). Thus where the first-half of his definition repeats that of Bhāmaha, the second-half attempts the explicit transfer of those features whose presentation (to the extent that they were incorporated) in the non-theatrical mode of kāvya would appear to have been heretofore implicit: "Rasavat -- Where the rasas, śrṅgāra and so on, are strikingly shown; and which includes a verbal expression [of the rasa], the sthāyi [-bhāva, the samcāris, the vibhāvas and the abhinayas" [rasavaddarśita-spaṣṭaśrṅgārādirasādayam | svaśabdasthāyisamcārivibhāvābhinayāspadam ||]. And in the following verse [4.4], we find what is perhaps the earliest extant citation of the rasas as numbering nine, now including sānta or the "peaceful" rasa.

Yet it is with Rudraṭa's Kāvyālaṅkāra [Chapters 12-15] that we have the first extended discussion of the rasa schema in a kāvya śāstra (again, apart from the preceding and much earlier Nātyaśāstra). Although, as S. K. De qualifies, "It is not clear, however, what theoretical

significance he attaches to Rasa, for although at the beginning of his work he praises poets who have won eternal fame by composing poetry enlivened by Rasa, he devotes a comparatively small part of his work to its treatment and is entirely silent with regard to the theoretical aspect of the question."²⁹

We may close with noting the important role and problem -- with its anomaly -- that rasavat was to pose for the later dhvani theorists. For with the focus turning from "showing" to "explaining" kāvya, to the search for ultimate aesthetic principles, rasa -- in a return really to its central position in the drama -- is again elevated, and conjoined with dhvani to realize the positions of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. Thus rasavat alamkāra

becomes crucial for the tenants of the dhvani theory, who want to establish the autonomous expression of rasa vis-à-vis the figures of speech. Should there be a figure which itself is the expression of a rasa, the contrary would a fortiori be proven, and the rasa would be subordinated to the general notion of the figure. The outcome of the argument allows rasavat as the general term for those figures which contain a

touch of rasa, but where the rasa is not the major end of the poet employing that figure. Rasa as the proper end is pure dhvani and not related to any figure (Dhvanyāloka 2.5). (Glossary/ 239).

2.280 Example of the Rasavat involving Śrṅgāra Rasa

Yes, she is dead.

To meet her in the next world

I considered death . . .

How unbelievable that I found Avanti

Here, in this very life.

Śrṅgārarasa Rasavadudāharanam :

mṛteti³⁰ pretya samgantum yayā me marañam matam
saivāvantī mayā labdhā kathamatraiva janmani

Avanti : "Daughter of the King of Avanti" (RŚ/163); or
 Vāsavadattā (RR/264).

In his example of śrṅgāra rasavat, Dāṇḍin but needs to touch a single tone, the mention of Avanti (or Vāsavadattā), to evoke in the well-versed reader one of the strongest paradigms of love. The tales of Vāsavadattā and Udayana focusing on the strength of their mutual love appear throughout the literary tradition. Their story very probably appeared for example in the early (lost) Br̥hatkathā of Gunādhya (4th century a.d. (?), although in all probability earlier); it is reflected in the 12th century version of this text by Somadeva, the Kathāsaritsāgara; and it forms the basis of at least two plays attributed to Bhāsa, the Svapnavāsavadatta and the Pratijñāyaugandharāyana. As Somadeva writes, "Their mutual love, having blossomed after a long time of expectation, was so great, owing to the strength of their passion, that their hearts continually resembled those of the sorrowing

Chakravākas [birds] when the night, during which they are separated comes to an end."³¹

Yet Daṇḍin's verse also reflects a crucial episode in their story (and Daṇḍin here would be drawing directly from (or a source very close to) the Brhatkathā itself). Again from Somadeva's work, the crux is related by King Udayana's prime minister, Yaugandharāyaṇa, to his general Rumamvat., fearing that Udayana is ignoring his kingly dharma of world conquest: "For he certainly remains devoted to women, wine and hunting, and he has delegated to us all the duty of thinking about his kingdom. So we by our own intelligence must take such steps as that he shall obtain the empire of the whole earth. . . ." Yaugandharāyaṇa then relates the "Story of the Clever Physician" -- a physician cures his ailing king through the shock generated by announcing (falsely) the death of the queen.

With this tale as the seed of their plan, they seek an alliance through marriage with "a foe in the rear that is always attacking us behind," the powerful King of Magadha,

Pradyota. Knowing of Udayana's devotion to Vāsavadattā, they realize that Pradyota would never consent to give his daughter Padmāvatī. Vāsavadattā's death must be feigned, and the king tricked into the marriage and thus alliance: "And by our cleverness we will conceal Vāsavadattā somewhere, and setting fire to her house, we will give out everywhere that the queen is burnt." Vāsavadattā is apprised of the plan, and although hesitant because of the momentary separation agrees, for "What, indeed, is there which women of good family, who are attached to their husbands, will not endure?" And so it came to pass.

The king returns from hunting in the groves outside of Lāvānaka, and "saw the women's apartments reduced to ashes by fire, and heard from his ministers that the queen was burnt. . . . And when he heard it, he fell on the ground, and he was robbed of his senses by unconsciousness, that seemed to desire to remove the painful sense of grief. But in a moment he came to himself, and was burnt with sorrow

in his heart, as if penetrated with the fire that strove to consume the image of the queen imprinted there."³²

2.281 Explication of the Example of Rasavat involving

Śrṅgāra Rasa

Previously joy was presented.

Here love -- through an intensification of its nature becomes śrṅgāra --

These words demonstrate Rasavat.

Śrṅgārarasa Rasavadudāharanāsvarūpaprakāśanam :

prāk prītirdarśitā seyam ratih śrṅgāratām gatā
rūpabāhulyayogena tadidam rasavadvacah

prītiḥ [(f.)] / "joy," "happiness," "pleasure."

Where in the previous examples of preyas alamkāra [2.276, 278], prīti or "joy" was "intensified" and thus transformed into preyas, in the following examples of rasavat we shall have a given sthāyibhāva ("dominant, durable emotion" or "mental state") intensified and thus transformed into its corresponding rasa. Here the sthāyibhāva rati or "love" -- "through an intensification (bāhulya-) or its nature (rūpa)" -- becomes śrṅgāra or the "erotic" rasa. As we read in the Nātyasāstra: "[The rasa] termed śrṅgāra arises from rati as the sthāyibhāva" [śrṅgāro nāma ratisthāyibhāvaprabhavaḥ] (NŚ [6.45ff.]).³³

"Whatever in the ordinary world is bright, pure . . . , shining or beautiful, is associated with love. . . . It has two major divisions: love in union, and love in separation"³⁴ [ujjvalavesātmakah | yatkīñcilloke śuci medyamujjvalam darśanīyam vā tacchrṅgāreṇopamīyate | tasya dve adhiṣṭhāne sambhogo vipralambhaśca ||]. Representations of which we find throughout the Kāvyādarśa.

2.282 Example of the Rasavat involving Raudra Rasa

That wretched Duḥśāsana
 who dragged Kṛṣṇā before me
 seized by the hair
 is cornered . . .

Does he live for a moment?

Raudrarasa Rasavadudāharanam :

nigrhya keśevākṛṣṭā kṛṣṇā yenāgrato mama
 soyam duḥśāsanaḥ pāpo labdhah kim jīvati kṣanam

Dāṇḍin now draws from the Mahābhārata. Kṛṣṇā or Draupadī, wife of the Pāṇḍava brothers, seemingly lost to the Kurus by Yudhiṣṭhira's fateful game of dice, is dragged into the assembly hall by Duḥśāsana, a son of Dhṛtarāṣṭra:

"And quickly the angry Duḥśāsana came rushing to her with a thunderous roar; / By the long-tressed black and flowing hair / Duḥśāsana grabbed the wife of a king. . . .

Duḥśāsana, stroking her, led her and brought her, / That Kṛṣṇā of deep black hair, to the hall, / As though unprotected amidst her protectors, / And tossed her as wind tosses a plantain tree."³⁵

2.283 Explication of the Example of Rasavat involving Raudra Rasa

Upon seeing the enemy

Bhīma's anger

-- reaching the breaking point --

becomes raudra --

Thus these words display Rasavat.

Raudrarasa Rasavadudāharanāsvarūpaprakāśanam :

ityāruhya parām kotīm krodho raudrātmatām gataḥ
bhīmasya paśyataḥ śatrumityetadrasavadvacah

Bhīma's anger or krodha as the sthāyibhāva "reaching the breaking point" in intensification, becomes raudra or the "furious" rasa. "Now [the rasa] termed raudra has anger for its permanent emotion [sthāyibhāva]. Demons, monsters and violent men are its characters. It is caused by battles" [atha raudro nāma krodhasthāyibhāvātmako rakṣodānavoddhatamanusyaprakṛtiḥ samgrāma hetukah |] (NŚ [6.63ff.]).³⁶

2.284 Example of Rasavat involving Vira Rasa

Not conquering

the earth surrounded by oceans

Not worshipping

with various sacrifices

Not granting wealth

to those who ask --

How would I become king?

Vīrarasa Rasavadudāharanam :

ajitvā sārṇavāmūrvīmaniṣṭvā vividhairmakhaiḥ
adattvā cārthamarthibhyo bhaveyam pārthivah katham

2.285 Explication of the Example of Rasavat involving
Vira Rasa

Here firm resolution intensified
existing in the form of vīra rasa
is capable of maintaining
a state of Rasavat among expressions.

Vīrarasa Rasavadudāharanāsvarūpaprakāśanam :

ityutsāhah prakṛṣṭātmā tiṣṭhan vīrarasātmanā
rasavattvam girāmāsām samarthayitumīśvarah

utsāhah /"will," "resolution"; "effort."
samarthayitum : sampādayitum (RR/267) /literally,
"cause to arise"; "produce," "generate."
"Here firm resolution" or utsāha is presented as the

sthāyibhāva "intensified" ((prakṛṣṭa), thus "existing in the form of vīra or the 'heroic' rasa."

Clearly there is a touch of irony in Dāṇḍin's example of vīra rasavat. Faced with seemingly insurmountable obstacles -- the necessity of conquering the vast earth, worshipping with all the required and various sacrifices, freeing oneself of grasping to personal possessions in granting wealth to any and all -- a man appears to despair.

But his question should I feel be seen as rhetorical, for the implication is clearly that despite what lies ahead his path is chosen with firm resolve.

"Now [the rasa] called vīra has (only) noble people for its characters and consists in dynamic energy. . . . It should be acted out by such anubhāvas ["visible consequents"] as firmness, patience, heroism, generosity and shrewdness"³⁷ [atha vīro nāmottamaprakṛtirutsāhātmakah | . . . tasya sthairyadhairyaśauryatyāgavaiśāradadyādibhiranubhāvairabhinayah prayoktavyah |] (NS [6.66ff.]).

2.286 Example cf the Rasavat involving Karuna Rasa

This slender one of tender limbs

for whom even a bed of flowers caused pain --

How is she lying upon

this pyre of blazing fire?

Karunarasa Rasavadudāharanam :

yasyāḥ kusumaśayyāpi komalāṅgyā rujākari

sādhīsete kathāṁ tanvī hutāśanavatīm citām

Dandin appears to reflect Kālidāsa in his example of rasavat involving karuna rasa. We read in the Raghuvamśa [8.57]: "The body of yours, so soft, placed even upon a bed of fresh tender buds, feels pain. Oh one of attractive thighs! How would this body endure, lying upon the pyre!"

2.287 Explication of the Example of the Rasavat involving
Karuṇa Rasa / Indicating the Form of Rasavat
Alamkāra involving the Remaining Rasas

Here grief enhanced

is considered the alamkāra.

The process is the same for the other rasas:

bībhatsa / hāsyā / adbhuta / and bhayānaka.

Karuṇarasa Rasavadudāharanāsvarūpaprakāśanam /

Apararasarasavadalamkārasvarūpasūcanam :

iti kārunyamudriktamalamkāratayā smṛtam

tathāparepi bībhatsahāsyādbhutabhayānakāḥ

kārunyam /literally, "the state reflecting kāruṇa or
'compassion'" : śokah /"grief" (RŚ/165).

Now "grief" -- as the dominant psychological condition -- "enhanced" (udrikta) becomes karuṇa or the "compassionate" rasa, and this is considered the alamkāra. One's grief at the burning death of a woman on the funeral pyre can only be enhanced knowing the intensity of the agony she must endure, one so slender that "even a bed of flowers caused pain."

"Now [the rasa] termed karuṇa arises from the śoka sthāyibhāva. . . . It should be acted out by tears, laments, drying up of the mouth, change of color, languour in the limbs, sighs, loss of memory, and so on"³⁸ [atha karuṇo nāma śokasthāyibhāvaprabhavaḥ | tasyāśrupātāparidevanamukhaśoṣaṇavaivarnyasarastagātratāniśsvāsasmṛtilopādibhiranubhāvairabhinayah prayoktavyah |] (NŚ [6.61ff.]).

Daṇḍin lists the four remaining rasas (and shall follow with their examples in [2.88-91]), and indicates that their respective incorporation as rasavat alamkāras is analogous to the preceding four -- the depiction of the

given rasa through the intensification of the corresponding
sthāyibhāva.

2.288 Example of the Rasavat involving Bibhatsa Rasā

Continuously drinking with cupped hands

the blood of your enemies

Kauṇapas -- wearing ribs for ornaments

dance with the headless ones.

Bibhatsarasa Rasavadudāharanam :

pāyam pāyam tavārīnām śonitam pāṇisamputaiḥ
 kauṇapāḥ saha nr̥tyanti kabandhairantrabhūṣaṇāḥ

kaunapāḥ : rāksasāḥ / "demons" (RS/165).

Bibatsa or the "hideous" rasa is generated by the

enhancement of jugupsā or "disgust" as the dominant psychological state. Dandin's example -- the nauseating Kauṇapa demons dancing and drinking with cupped hands dripping fresh blood, clothed in clattering and putrifying human ribs, with decapitated corpses for macabre companions -- in brief span nicely captures the required "taste."

The Kashmiri kavi Kṣemendra in the Brhatkathāmañjari [9.2.40-58] provides us with a wonderfully hideous description of a cemetery that is embued with bībatsa rasa:

Then fearlessly he entered the cemetery which was full of demons. It was like an assemblage of all deaths, the abode of hundreds of troubles. Full of heaps of white bones smeared with brains, it seemed like Death's pleasure-garden where blood was the drink and skulls were the cups. . . . The wind swiftly whistled through the holes in long, decayed bones; the place resounded as if with the noise of the anklets of a rushing troop of witches. . . . The bellies of wolves were filled there with streams of fresh blood; the tumult that was raised caused pain to the ears. . . . It was an abode of all distress, which caused the troops of demons to rejoice; it had many holes, but the multitude of closely- pressed corpses showed no gaps. . . . The assemblies of demons and goblins who danced lasciviously there seemed to encircle the place with garlands. . . . The place caused fear itself to be afraid, confused even confusion,

was the black darkness even of darkness, cut off
even death.³⁹

"Now [the rasa] termed bibhatsa has disgust (jugupsa)
as its dominant emotion. It arises from such vibhāvanas
["determinants"] as discussing, hearing, or seeing what is
ugly, unpleasant, unclean and undesired"⁴⁰ [atha bībhato
nāma jugupsāsthāyibhāvātmakah | sacāhṛdyāpriyācosyāniṣṭa-
śravaṇadarśanakīrtanādibhirvibhāvairutpadyate | (NS
[6.72ff.]).

2.289 Example of the Rasavat involving Hāsyā Rasa

Friend! Let this fresh nail wound

marked on the upper breast

be hidden by your upper garment --

And you with unfaded anger.

Hāsyarasa Rasavadudāharanam :

idamamlānamālāyā⁴¹ lagnam stanataṭe tava
 chādyatāmuttarīyenā navam nakhapadam sakhi

The dominant emotion of "mirth" (hāsa) intensified and transformed results in hāsyā or the "comic" rasa. A lady gently chides her friend, fully aware of the comic implications arising from the discrepancy between evident physical proof and presumed attitude. For the pose of "unfaded anger" toward a lover cannot but be amusing in light of "this fresh nail wound marked on the upper breast" -- a clear sign of recent sexual activity, an intimacy indicative of truer feelings.

"Now [the rasa] termed hāsyā has mirth (hāsa) as its dominant emotion. It arises from such vibhāvas ["determinants"] as wearing clothes and ornaments that belong to someone else or do not fit, shamelessness, greed, tickling certain sensitive parts of the body, telling

fantastic tales, seeing some (comic) deformity, and
describing faults"⁴² [atha hāsyo nāma hāsasthāyibhāvātmakah
| sa ca vikṛtaparavesālañkāradhārṣṭyalaukyakuhakāsatpralāpa-
vyañgadarśanadosodāharanādibhirvibhāvairutpadyate |] (NS
[6.48ff.]).

2.290 Example of the Rasavat involving Adbhuta Rasa

Tender leaves -- silk garments

Flowers -- necklaces and other ornaments

Branches -- palaces

These trees of Nandana garden . . . Marvelous!

Adbhutarasa Rasavadudāharanam :

amśukāni pravālāni puṣpam hārādibhūṣanam

śākhāśca mandirānyeṣām citram nandanaśākhinām

nandana : the divine garden of Indra. "Here the good dwell in ethereal form, the reward of their meritorious actions when on earth."⁴³ Of the wondrous trees of Nandana garden we have previously seen mentioned the Pārijāta (see [2.47]), and the Kalpa (see [2.85]).

With its "Tender leaves -- silk garments," its "Flowers -- necklaces and other ornaments," and its arching "Branches -- palaces," the response to Indra's miraculous Nandana garden cannot help but be dumbstruck wonder (vismaya) -- the dominant emotion contributing to the permeating flavor of adbhuta or the "marvelous" rasa.

"Now [the rasa] termed adbhuta has for its dominant emotion vismaya. And it arises from such vibhāvas as seeing heavenly beings, gaining one's desired object, going to a temple, a garden or a meeting place, or (seeing) a flying chariot, a magic show (māyā), or a juggler's show"⁴⁴ [athādbhuto nāma vismayasthāyibhāvātmakah | sa ca divyajanadarśanepsitamanorathāvāptyupavanadevakulādigamana-

sabhāvīmānamāyendrajālasambhāvanādibhirvibhāvairutpadyate |]
(NS [6.74ff.]).

2.291 Example of the Rasavat involving Bhayānaka Rasa

This is the thunderbolt of Maghavan

with fire running along the edges

Whose memory leads to the premature fall

of the Daitya women's embryos.

Bhayānakarasa Rasavadudāharanam :

idam maghonah kuliśam dhārāsamnihilālam
 smaranam yasya daityastrīgarbhapātāya kalpate

maghonah [(gen.) (sing.) < maghavan (m.)] / an
 epithet for the god Indra: śakrasya (RS/166); mahendrasya
 (RR/269).

kuliśam /the thunderbolt weapon of Indra.

"Perhaps the primary meaning of Indra is that given in the Rg Veda which defines his chief characteristic as 'power' or 'strength' [śatakratu /"Lord of a Hundred Powers" (Rg Veda [8.32.11]; putrāḥ śavasah /"Son of strength" (Rg Veda [4.24.1], for example]. This is represented by his vajra (the thunderbolt or lightning) which destroys the demons of drought or eclipse, or metaphorically strikes the enemies of āryans. . . ."⁴⁵

An episode from the Rg Veda reveals Indra's power:

"[The dragon] Vṛta challenged the great hero who had overcome the mighty and who drank Soma to the dregs.

Unable to withstand the onslaught of his deadly weapons, he who found Indra an overpowering enemy was shattered, his nose crushed. Without feet or hands he fought against Indra, who struck him upon the back with his thunderbolt.

The castrated steer who wished to become the equal of the virile bull, Vṛta lay shattered in many places."⁴⁶

daitya- /the descendants of Diti; originally conceived

as anti-gods in opposition to the devas, yet later and more usually seen as but another variety of "demon."

Bhayānaka or the "terrifying" rasa arises from "fear" (bhaya) as the sthāyibhāva or dominant emotion. The terrifying flavor of Dandin's example evolves through its depiction of the thunderbolt (kuliśam) of Indra -- terrifying not only aspect -- "with fire running along the edges" -- but in its very aura, whose memory alone is sufficient to cause "the premature fall of Daitya women's embryos."

"Now [the rasa] termed bhayānaka has fear [bhaya] as its dominant emotion. It arises from such vibhāvas ["determinants"] as ghastly noises, seeing supernatural beings, fear and panic due to the (cries) of owls (or the howling of) jackals, going to an empty house or to a forest, hearing or speaking about, or seeing the imprisonment or murder of one's relatives"⁴⁷ [atha bhayānako nāma bhaya sthāyibhāvātmakah | sa ca

vikṛtaravasattvadarśanaśivolūkatrāsodvegaśūnyāgārāraṇyagaman
 asvajanavadvahabandhadarśanaśrutikathādibhirvibhāvairut-
 padyate |] (NŚ [6.68ff.]).

2.292 The Distinction between Rasa in Mādhurya Guna and
Rasa in Rasavat Alamkāra

Rasa was presented in the context of mādhurya guna

as the absence of vulgarity in expression --

Yet here the fact that words display Rasavat
 stems from the eight rasas themselves.

Mādhuryagune Rasasya Rasavadalamkāre Rasasya ca

Bhedah

vākyasyāgrāmyatāyonirmādhurye darśito rasah
 iha tvastarasāyattā rasavattā smṛtā girām

vākyasya : vācyasya kāvyādheyavastunah / "vākya refers to the meaning conveyed by the kāvya" (RŚ/167).

Dandin appears to use the term "rasa" in two senses. We have discussed at some length the first appearance of rasa in the presentation of mādhurya guna in Chapter One [1.51-68]: "Madhura reflects the possession of rasa / and rasa exists in both sound and sense / Rasa through which the connoisseur becomes drunk / like the bee through honey" [1.51]. In this case rasa is associated with the absence of vulgarity or jarring crudeness, a sense which the present verse confirms. In the context of rasavat alamkāra -- as is certainly evident -- rasa assumes its more usual, somewhat technical sense.

2.293 Example of Ūrjasvin Alāmkāra

Have no fear in your heart

thinking I'll harm you --

My sword never wishes to strike

those whose backs are turned.

Ūrjasvin Alāmkārodāharanam :

apakartāhamasmīti hr̥di te mā sma bhūdibhayam

vimukhesu na me khadgah prahartum jātu vāñchati

2.294 Ūrjasvin Alamkāra

Thus an enemy cornered in battle

is released by a man shining with pride.

Such expressions should be known

as Ūrjasvin.

Ūrjasvin Alamkāra :

iti muktah̄ paro yuddhe niruddho darpaśālinā

pumsā kenāpi tajjñeyamūrjasvītyevamādikam

darpa- /"pride," "vanity"; "self-esteem":

ahamkāravatā /"arrogance" (RR/272).

śālinā /literally, one who "shines"; one who
"boasts."

The final member of our group of three is ūrjasvin
alamkāra ([< urjas (n.)] /literally, "possessing

strength or power"). "Due to the presentation of ürjas or power (balam) the name 'ürjasvi' is designated" / ürjah
balam tatprakāśanādūrjasvi iti nāmnātra vyavahriyate
(RR/272). From Daṇḍin's brief definition [2.275] we see that it displays "deep-rooted pride," "self-esteem," or "confidence" (ahamkāra, or from the above verse "darpa").

The word ahamkāra lends itself easily in translation to "ego" or "egotism." Thus Gerow defines ürjasvin as, "The expression of extraordinary self-assurance or arrogance" (Glossary/171). Yet we should be wary, for the concept here certainly is not a negative feature, which the English "arrogance" implies. As with the preceding preyas and rasavat, the distinguishing feature of ürjasvin alamkāra is "intensification," yet now of one's sense of strength or capability (not necessarily a false exaggeration), presented through the expression of extreme self-confidence or self-control.

Daṇḍin's example displays the nobility and magnanimity of a warrior in battle "shining" with pride or self-

confidence (darpaśalinā). His control and assurance are such that his "sword never wishes to strike / those whose backs are turned."

Bhāmaha's single example of ūrjasvin alamkāra (KA [3.7]) reflects a conception similar to Daṇḍin's: "'Śalya! Would Karṇa take aim a second time. . . ." [dvi sandadhāti kim karṇah śalye. . . . ||]. Thus the great pride or self-assurance of the warrior Karṇa is displayed. The Jayamaṅgalā commentary [858] would see ūrjasvin illustrated in Bhṛtikāvyam [10.49], similarly following preyas and rasavat. And again Udbhaṭa offers an expansion in scope (KASS [4.5]): "The composition of bhāvas and rasas improperly displayed due to desire, anger, and so on, is termed ūrjasvi" [anaucityapravṛttānāṁ kāmakrodhādi kāraṇāt | bhāvānāṁ ca rasānāṁ ca bandha ūrjasvi kathyate ||]. We have then not only the inclusion of the primary bhāvas, as with his conception of preyas, but that of the rasas, as with rasavat, as well. And further, now the element of "impropriety" is conceived as distinctive -- we have "Rasa

or Bhāva manifesting themselves in an unbecoming way (in ungeziemender Weise)."⁴⁸

There is no basis for Gerow's hypothesis that Udbhaṭa's view reflects the original meaning of ūrjasvin, and the fallacious reasoning in his gloss -- affirming a consequent to prove an antecedent rather than the reverse -- does nothing to further his supposition: "As the third in the trio preyas, rasavat, ūrjasvi, this figure may originally have meant 'excess in the portrayal of a rasa', and this explanation is in fact adopted by Udbhaṭa, though his example in no way differs from the one given [by Dandin in KD [2.294]]" (Glossary/172).

And we may note the distortion introduced by various writers in seeking to explicate preyas, rasavat, and ūrjasvin considered as a group. Belvalkar and Raddi, for example, fallaciously project what are essentially Udbhaṭa's views across the board:

The distinction between preyas, rasavat, and ūrjasvin can be thus formulated. If the 50 bhāvas described above [comprising the anubhāvas,

sthāyibhāvas, and vyabhicāribhāvas] are any of them produced by certain vibhāvas the nature of which prevents the manifestation of a corresponding full-fledged rasa in the audience or the reader . . . we have an incomplete rasa . . . which gives rise to preyolamkāra. . . . A rasavat alamkāra of course exhibits the vibhāvas, anubhāvas, and vyabhicārins in regular sequence. . . . Finally an ūrjasvin exhibits an inchoate Rasa (as in Preyas) or a full-fledged Rasa (as in Rasavat), but the manner of exteriorisation adopted is . . . in flagrant opposition to the normal or the conventional, purposely with a view to stamp one's own individuality upon it (Notes 2/174).

Where both Gerow's and S. Ramachandra Rao's views reflect an imprecision stemming from presuming quite nebulous psychological terms have substantial referential validity. Thus Gerow posits a dubious distinction, seeing preyas and ūrjasvin based upon the "ego," as opposed to rasavat which rests upon the "emotions": "The two figures closely allied to rasavat, namely ūrjasvi and preyas, which originally meant only 'arrogance' and 'compliance' . . . [are] contrasted with rasavat (as reposing upon the ego and not upon bhāvas common to all). . . ." (Glossary/218).

Where in Rao's case we find a meaningless distinction based upon the imagined solidity of "mood," "sentiment," and "semblance of sentiment": "[Rasavat] differs from its own brothers, the Preyas and Ūrjasvi. Though the presence of a subordinate element is common to the three, it becomes Rasavat only when a sentiment is reduced to a subordinate condition. While in Preyas it is a mood and in Ūrjasvi, a semblance of sentiment."⁴⁹

We may conclude our discussion of this group of three alamkāras with briefly mentioning the later position of Bhoja. As presented in both his Sarasvatīkanṭhabharana [5.166ff.] and Śrṅgāraprakāśa [11],⁵⁰ we have I feel the realization of what is implicit in the Kāvyādarśa's portrayal of both preyas and ūrjasvin. Now both are conceived as rasas (as preyas and uddhata or udātta), along with rasavat. Given Daṇḍin's defining condition of all three in [2.275] -- the display of "excellence" or "intensity" (yuktotkarsa) -- V. Raghavan believes "that Bhoja simply converted Daṇḍin's Ūrjasvi into his Uddhata

Rasa."⁵¹ And this rasa of Bhoja's is indeed illustrated with Dandin's example of ūrjasvin alamkāra from KD [2.293] (with an extremely minor variation). Where this intensity is absent in any of the three rasas, they become gunas or "qualities," and respectively appear as "preyas," "bhāvika," and "aurjitya."

Notes [2.275] - [2.294]

1. D. K. Gupta, A Critical Study of Dandin, (1970), p. 220.
2. Under "Notes," in Udbhaṭa, Kāvyālaṅkāra-Sāra-Saṅgraha of Udbhaṭa, edited with introduction and notes by Narayana Daso Banhatti, second edition (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1982), p. 95.
3. Gero Jenner, Die Poetischen Figuren (Hamburg: Ludwig Appel Verlag, 1968), p. 119.
4. The Mahābhārata, "The Book of Effort" (Udyoga Parvan) [5.53.68] translated by J. A. B. van Buitenen, vol. 3 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 338.
5. The Mahābhārata, "The Book of Effort" (Udyoga Parvan) [5.54.87ff.], translated by J. A. B. van Buitenen, vol. 3, p. 367.
6. Kālidāsa, Kalidasa: Translations of Shakuntala and Other Works, translated by Arthur Ryder (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1920), p. 3.
7. Edwin Gerow, Indian Poetics, (1977), p. 245; and P. V. Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, (1961), pp. 40-63.
8. That earlier writers discussed rasa is probable. As S. K. De notes, "That the Rasa-theory was older than Bharata is apparent from the fact that Bharata himself cites in chs. vi. and vii. several ślokas in the Ārya as well as in the Anuṣṭubh metres in support of his own statements; and in one place, he distinctly quotes two āryā-ślokas from a chapter of an unknown work relating to the discussion of Rasa" ("The Theory of Rasa in Sanskrit

- Poetics" (1922), in Some Problems of Sanskrit Poetics, Reprint (Calcutta: Firma KLM, 1981 (1959), p. 179).
9. Edwin Gerow, "Rasa as a Category of Literary Criticism -- What are the Limits of its Application?", in Sanskrit Drama in Performance, edited by Rachel Van M. Baumer and James R. Brandon (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1981), p. 228, p. 229.
10. Louis Renou, "La Réflexion sur la Poésie dans l'Inde Ancienne," in Sanskrit et Culture: L'Apport de l'Inde à la Civilisation Humaine (Paris: Payot, 1950), p. 138.
11. S. K. De, "The Theory of Rasa," (1922), p. 178.
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28. V. Raghavan, "The Rasavadalamkāra," in Professor M. Hiriyana Birth Centenary Volume, (1972), p. 234.
29. S. K. De, "The Theory of Rasa," (1922), p. 187.

30. Rangacharya Raddi's reading of mrtoti (RR/263) is considered a misprint, and has been emended to mrteti.
31. Somadeva, The Ocean of Story: C. H. Tawney's Translation of Somadeva's Kathā Sarit Sāgara, edited with extensive notes by N. M. Penzer, vol. 1, book 2, chap. 9 (London: Chas. J. Sawyer, 1924), p. 187.
32. Somadeva, The Ocean of Story, vol. 2, book 3, (1924), pp. 1-25.
33. The Sanskrit text of the Nātyaśāstra followed in the exemplification of Dāṇḍin's various verses on rasavat alamkāra is the edition of M. Rama Krishna Kavi, 2nd rev. edition by K. S. Ramaswami Shastri, vol. 1 (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1956).
34. J. L. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan, Aesthetic Rapture, vol. 1, (1970), p. 49.
35. Mahābhārata, Sabhāparvan (The Book of the Assembly Hall) [2.27.60.22,24], translated by J. A. B. van Buitenen, vol. 2, p. 141.
36. The dramatic confrontation between Bhīma and Duḥsāsana amidst the apocalyptic climactic battle, as strikingly retold by Jean-Claude Carrière, illuminates Dāṇḍin's words:
- Bhīma: I haven't stopped fighting for three days. Now I'm ready to drop. Vyasa, I'd like to plunge into a river and let the clear current wash my blood. . . . Who's coming toward me? My eyes are full of blood. I can only see a moving shape.
- Duhsasana: It's me.
- Bhīma: Who, you? Bring your body over here.

Duhsasana: Try to see who I am. It's Duhsasana!

Bhima: Duhsasana! They've told you I've been wounded and you're coming on tiptoe to kill me. Duhsasana knocks down Bhima's shelter and pushes away his club. . . .

Duhsasana: You're slow and heavy. I'm not afraid of you.

Bhima: I'm heavy with dead men's blood. Duhsasana seizes his axe and strikes. Bhima avoids the blows as best he can. Spare me, I'm defenseless. . . .

Duhsasana: I'm going to save myself and save my brothers! Duhsasana dances lightly around Bhima. He hits and wounds him. Bhima clutches his wounded arm. . . .

You sweat like an old elephant and you can't move anymore. Think of your life which ends here!

Bhima: Duhsasana . . . Suddenly, as Duhsasana is about to deliver a mortal blow, Bhima relaxes. His hand shoots out and grabs his opponent's ankle. Duhsasana falls. Bhima pounces and overcomes him. Miserable abortion, who do you want to kill? Duhsasana struggles, thrashes about wildly in all directions.

Duhsasana: Help!

Bhima: Stop crying! Your black hour has come, Duhsasana. This is where it all ends! Now! He raises his voice and calls: Draupadi! Can you hear me? Come! Draupadi appears. Look! I will drink his blood, just as I promised. Its your turn, Duhsasana. You've a gasp or two still left. Think back over your wretched life and remember Draupadi drawn by the hair. Look at her. Let her be the last thing you see. He forces Duhsasana to face Draupadi.

Duhsasana: My brothers! Save me! Where is Karna? Karna!

Bhima: Karna can't hear you. There's no one to help you. And I rip out your life. Go. Enough. Die. He plunges his hands into Duhsasana's belly and kills him. Then he crouches down to drink his blood and eat his entrails, fulfilling his promise. . . .³⁶

(Jean-Claude Carrière, The Mahabharata: A Play Based Upon the Indian Classic Epic, translated from the French by Peter Brook (New York: Harper and Row, 1987, pp. 210-12).

37. J. L. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan, Aesthetic Rapture, vol. 1, p. 54.
38. J. L. Masson, and M. V. Patwardhan, Aesthetic Rapture, vol. 1, p. 52.
39. M. B. Emeneau, "Kṣemendra as kavi," Journal of American Oriental Society, 53 (1933), pp. 129-31.
40. J. L. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan, Aesthetic Rapture, vol. 1, p. 55.
41. Accepting Ratnaśrī's reading of mālāyā ("[one] of [unfaded] anger") (RŚ/166) for Rangacharya Raddi's mānāyā ("[one] of [unfaded] garlands") (RR/268).
42. J. L. Masson, and M. V. Patwardhan, Aesthetic Rapture, vol. 1, p. 50.
43. Margaret and James Stutley, Harper's Dictionary of Hinduism (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 203.]
44. J. L. Masson, and M. V. Patwardhan, Aesthetic Rapture, vol. 1, p. 56.
45. Margaret and James Stutley, Harper's Dictionary of Hinduism, (1977), pp. 116-18.

46. Wendy D. O'Flaherty, Hindu Myths (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975), p. 75. From Rg Veda [1.32.1-15]: "Indra Slays Vṛta and Releases the Waters."
47. J. L. Masson, and M. V. Patwardhan, Aesthetic Rapture, vol. 1, p. 54.
48. Gero Jenner, Die Poetischen Figuren, (1968), p. 119.
49. S. Ramachandra Rao, "Nature and Development of Rasavadalāṅkāra," in Professor M. Hiriyanna Birth Centenary Commemoration Volume (1871-1971), edited by V. Raghavan and G. Marulasiddaiah (Mysore: University of Mysore, 1972), pp. 65-66.
50. Bhoja, Śrṅgāraprakāśa, edited by G. R. Josyer, vol. 2, pp. 436-37.
51. V. Raghavan, Bhoja's Śrṅgāraprakāśa, p. 413.

2.295 Definition of Paryāyokta Alamkāra

Communicating through indirect means

in order to capture

an intended meaning not directly stated --

This is considered Paryāyokta.

Paryāyoktālamkāralakṣaṇam :

arthamīśṭamanākhyāya sāksāt tasyaiva siddhaye

yat prakārāntarākhyānam paryāyoktam tadiṣyate

paryāyokta [paryāya [< pari (+) *i] /"revolving";
 "moving around," "digression" (+) uktam] /thus "that which
 is stated in an indirect way."

In paryāyokta alamkāra an intended, desired meaning is
 yet conveyed, but "through indirect means." Its similarity

to sūksma [2.260cd-64] and leśa [2.265-72] alamkāras is evident, yet in these cases there is an explicit albeit subtle hint of the true meaning or nature of a situation offered within the verse -- in sūksma through "gesture" or "appearance"; in leśa the true meaning is "partially exposed" and must be hidden. Paryāyokta, however, "depends upon nothing but context and connotation for its comprehension" (Glossary/206). It is not really a case of "nothing but," for the connotation derived, given the context, through the indirect means employed is one and the same with the intended meaning. Thus where in sūksma meaning is inferred from a physical gesture or appearance, and in leśa the true meaning is partially evident but must be twisted, in paryāyokta one wishes to correctly yet indirectly suggest a meaning through direct expression.

Thus it is essential to note that the "other means" (prakārāntara) employed, the indirect means of expression in paryāyokta alamkāra, relates directly to the "intended meaning." For although paryāyokta focuses on the element of

"suggestion," we do not have a case of dhvani as such.

Narayana Banhatti explains: "In real [within the context of dhvani] vyañjanā ["suggestion"] the sense which is implied is quite different from the vācyā ["direct"] sense. But in the case of paryāyokti the meaning conveyed by vyañjanā is in substance the same as the vācyārtha (the sense directly expressed)."¹

Where Belvalkar and Raddi offer the following gloss: "The sense intended to be conveyed and the sense actually expressed by the words used . . . are both of them prastuta [a "principle subject"]; but they are not therefore of coordinate or equal importance; and there is not between the two any relation of sādrśya ["similarity"] etc., as there is in Samāsokti [alamkāra, KD [2.205-13]]" (Notes 2/183).

Paryāyokta alamkāra is accepted, with the exception of Vāmana, throughout the tradition. Occasionally it appears under a slightly different name (as with the "paryāya" of Rudraṭa (KA [7.42]) and Bhoja (SKB [4.80])), or with a

slightly greater degree of specification (as by Ruyyaka (AS [pp. 111-12]).

Bhāmaha's definition (KA [3.8]) is concise and mirrors that of Dandin: "Paryāyokta -- where [something] is expressed through indirect means (anyena prakāreṇa) [paryāyoktam yadanyena prakāreṇābhidhīyate]; and is followed by a single example in [3.9].

Udbhaṭa follows Bhāmaha verbatim in the first-half of his definition (KASS [4.6]), yet expands in the second-half: "Displaying implication (avagamātmanā), devoid of the functions of vācya and vācaka" [vācyavācakavr̥ttibhyām śūryenāvagamātmanā ||]. Narayana Banhatti, glossing the Laghuvṛtti commentary of Indurāja on this section, states, "Vācakavr̥tti is the function of an expressive word, that is, the function of denoting the direct sense (vacyārtha) of a word. Vācyavr̥tti is the process of the vacyārtha (direct sense) combining itself with other vācya senses (of words) for the purpose of forming a consistent meaning."²

2.296 Example of Paryāyokya Alamkāra

This Parabhṛta bird is nibbling

that cluster of sweet mango flowers . . .

I will drive it away --

You two stay freely.

Paryāyoktālamkārodāharanam :

daśatyasau parabhṛtah sahakārasya mañjarīm

tamaham vārayiṣyāmi yuvābhyaṁ svairamāsyatām

parabhṛtah /literally, "supported, carried by another," that is, another name for the Kokila (Cuckoo), which is believed to be hatched and raised by the crow. As the king in Kālidāsa's Abhijñānaśakuntalam [5.23cd] declaims, "Parabhṛta's, so they say, have their own young reared by other birds before they venture forth."

2.297 Explication of the Example of Paryāyokta Alamkāra

A woman

-- Bringing together at a rendezvous

a friend with a lover

Wishing to bring about

their festival of love --

takes herself away.

Paryāyoktodāharanasvarūpaprakāśanam :

saṁgamayya sakhīm yūnā saṁkete tadratotsavam

nirvartayitumicchantyā kayāpyapasṛtam tataḥ

In Dandin's single example of paryāyokta alamkāra a woman seeks the welfare of a friend in arranging a "rendezvous" with a lover. "Wishing to bring about / their

festival of love," yet not wishing to be indiscreet she must employ indirect means. A Parabhr̥ta bird nibbling a cluster of sweet mango flowers is opportune to allow a graceful exit. For in drawing attention to the "nibbling" of the Parabhr̥ta she not only suggests love-play, but under the pretense of driving the bird away, she allows opportunity for its fulfillment.

2.298 Definition of Samāhita Alamkāra

For one undertaking a particular activity

When there is the appearance of additional means

Due to fortuitous circumstance --

This is termed Samāhita.

Samāhitālamkāralakṣanam :

kimcidārabhamāṇasya kāryam daivavaśat punah

tatsādhanasamāpattiiryā tadāhuḥ samāhitam

daiva-vaśat /literally, "due to the power or control
of fortune, fate"; "fortuitously."

samāhitam [< sam (+) ā (+) hita [< *dhā] /
literally, "properly made, accomplished"].

Samāhita alamkāra involves the felicitous display of

"fortuitous circumstance." Someone seeks to accomplish a particular goal, the initial attainment of which is by no means assured. Yet coincidentally an "additional means" appears and success seems inevitable. The two events appear unrelated only apart from the given context. Thus where Gerow defines samāhita as, "A figure in which a desired effect is accomplished by the coincidental intervention of another and quite irrelevant cause" (Glossary/315), we might emend and note that although the intervention appears coincidental, it is supremely relevant to the context expressed.

Bhāmaha provides but a single example of samāhita alamkāra (KA [3.10]), illustrating "fortuitous circumstance" (drawn apparently from a work entitled "Rājamitra" (?)). The sage Nārada fortuitously appears before kṣatriya (warrior caste) ladies going to appeal to (Paraśu) Rāma to desist from the killing of their husbands.

Udbhāta (KASS [4.7]) however, includes samāhita within the group comprising preyas, rasavat, and ūrjasvin, seeing

its distinctive feature as a further extension of the various processes these display: "A description of the cessation of rasas, bhāvas, and their ābhāsas, devoid of the anubhāvas of other [rasas and bhāvas]" [rasabhāvatad-ābhāsavṛtteḥ praśamabandhanam | anyānubhāvaniḥśūnyarūpam yattat samāhitam ||].

Vāmana's conception of samāhita alamkāra (KAS [4.3.29ff.]) also varies from Daṇḍin's (and from Udbhaṭa's as well): "Where the upamāna becomes the upameya" (or literally, "What is similar, that something becomes") [yatsādr̥syam tatsampattiḥ samāhitam ||]. On which Gerow comments, "The identification of the two things here differs from rūpaka, since the mode of the identification is volitional [that is, "in the mind of a particular person"], not conventional; a stratum of explicit consciousness is overlaid on the identification" (Glossary/320). Yet Mammaṭa (KP [10.125ab]), who terms this alamkāra "samādhi," and Bhoja (SKB [3.33] and ŚP

[10]), who cites Dandin's single example from KD [2.299], accept Dandin's conception of samāhita alamkāra.

2.299 Example of Samāhita Alamkāra

Falling at her feet

to appease her anger . . .

Fortuitously the thunder of the clouds

broke forth to assist me.

Samāhitālamkārodāharanam :

mānamasyā nirākartum pādayorme patiṣyataḥ

upakārāya diṣṭyaitadudirṇam ghanagarjitam

...

dvistyā /"fortunately," "luckily"; "fortuitously."

In Dandin's single example of samāhita alamkāra we are

presented with a man -- "undertaking a particular activity" -- falling at the feet of his lover seeking "to appease her anger." Yet coincidently with his action he is provided with additional means to accomplish his goal -- "the thunder of the clouds." "Here the appeasement of anger is the activity undertaken; and where -- due to fortuitous circumstance -- there is the appearance of additional means, the 'thunder of the clouds'" [iha mānanirākaranam kāryamārabdhām tatra vidhivaśād ghanagarjitamaparam sādhanam ca samāpannamiti. . . . ||] (RS/170).

For thunder would not only perhaps startle his lover into his arms, but -- following an established conceit of kāvya -- generate desire. With the doubled force of abject supplication and this fortuitous natural assistance we might expect his lady's anger to be dissipated.

2.300 Definition of Udātta Alāmkāra

An unsurpassed greatness

of character or wealth --

The learned term Udātta alāmkāra.

Udāttālāmkāralakṣaṇam :

āśayasya vibhūtervā yanmahattvamanuttamam

udāttam nāma tam prāhuralāmkāram maniśinah

āśayasya [< ā (+) *sī] / "bed," "seat," but also, "mind," "heart": "intention [which means] any specifically [directed] mental activity" / abhiprāyasya manovyāpāra-viśeṣasyeti yāvat (RR/276).

Udātta alāmkāra captures an "unsurpassed greatness" (mahatvam anuttamam) through the depiction of exalted "character" (āśaya), nobility of mind and heart; or of

exorbitant "wealth" (vibhūti). These two areas of focus provide two subvarieties, whose individual examples follow.

When we touch on other writers' views of udātta, we shall see that in all probability Dāṇḍin's subvarieties were originally distinct conceptions of this alamkāra.

Udātta, as with for example preyas, rasavat, and ūrjasvin, again lays greater stress on content. As Gerow notes, "The present figure is one of the group of figures [preyas, rasavat, ūrjasvin] which seem to depend more on their subject matter than on form. . . . They do show that in the earlier literature the tendency was to include the notion of 'mood' [rasa] within that of 'figure' [alamkāra], and not the reverse, as happened later" (Glossary/140).

Although it is important to recognize that in this case we do not have the evocation of rasa, nor do we have "description" as such. And it is incorrect to posit that "The element of exaggeration is not necessarily present" (Glossary/140). On the contrary, it is this element of intensity, here "an unsurpassed greatness," that is distinctive.

Ruyyaka felt that if this factor was not stressed there would be a danger of confusing udātta with either svabhāvokti (KD [2.8-13]) or bhāvika (KD [2.364-66]) alamkāras: "In svabhāvokti and bhāvika there is the description of things as they are [yathāadvastuvarnanam] (AS [pp.183-84]).

In contrast to these there is the scope of udātta, which involves a projected subject; and the description of a subject that displays a wealth (vibhūti) that is inconceivable -- This description presents a greatness that is created by the creative inspiration of the kavi (kavipratibhā) [svabhāvoktau bhāvike ca yathāadvastu-varṇanam | tadvipakṣatvenāropitavastvātmana udāttasyāvasarah | tatrāsambhāvyamānavibhūtiyuktasya vastuno varṇanam | kavipratibhotthāpitamaiśvaryalakṣaṇamudāttam |].

And although we should recognize that Ruyyaka's view of svabhāvokti and bhāvika as "the description of things as they are" is not exactly that of Dandin's, that "greatness"

creatively conceived is held to be the distinguishing mark of udātta alamkāra does correspond to Dāṇḍin's conception and is a point well taken.

Udātta alamkāra may possibly be reflected in the lakṣana "prasiddhi" found in Bharata's Nātyaśāstra [17.4, 33]: "With numerous expressions that display abundance [of a feature], which embellish the total picture, and which are well-known in the world" [vākyārthasya prasādhakaiḥ | lokaprasiddhairbahubhiḥ prasiddhiriti kīrtitā ||] (NS [17.33]).

Bhāmaha mirrors Dāṇḍin's conception of udātta with its two motifs in KA [3.11-13]. His initial example [3.11] displays "greatness of character," and, as with Dāṇḍin, through the theme of Rāma abandoning his kingdom at the command of his father. Yet his following verse -- in which he points out that this particular view of udātta is held by some as opposed to the preceding -- may possibly indicate that Dāṇḍin's two varieties of the one alamkāra were initially distinct. "This [alamkāra] others know

otherwise through another interpretation. Where it displays such things as various gems this they say is termed udātta" [etadevāpare 'nyena vyākhyānenānyathā viduh | nānāratnādiyuktam yattatkilodāttamucyate ||] (KA [3.12]). Bhāmaha follows with a single example in [3.13]. The Jayamaṅgalā would see verses [10.52-54] of the Bhāttikāvyam illustrating what it terms "udāram"; where udātta is excluded by Vāmana.

Udbhaṭa in the first-half of his definition (KASS [4.8]) also specifies two topics upon which udātta alamkāra may focus. One is again "wealth," but the second is now "the behavior of the great" (caritam ca mahātmanām) rather than the nobility of heart or mind as such: "Udātta displays an object that has greatness, and reflects the behavior of the great as subordinate, that is, it is not the thematic focus (itivṛtta)" [udāttamṛddhimadvastu caritam ca mahātmanām | upalakṣaṇatām prāptam netivṛttatvatvāgatam ||] (KASS [4.8]).

Indurāja, the 10th century commentator on Udbhaṭa, adds

that if this exalted behavior were not "subordinated," rasa might come to the fore.³ And upon which Gerow comments, "Udbhaṭa is careful to distinguish this figure from rasavad alamkāra, for here the evocation of the rasa [citing vīra rasa in Bhāmaha's example of KA [3.11]] . . . is subordinated to other considerations. . . ." (Glossary/140).

Where Mammata's definition (KP [10.115cd]) reflects a condensation of Udbhaṭa's (and is perhaps an echo of Bharata's laksana as well): "Udātta [expresses] the abundance of something, and includes the subordination of the great" [udāttam vastunah sampat mahatām copa-lakṣaṇam ||].

2.301 Example of the Udātta of Character

Rāghava undaunted even in the weighty work

of chopping the heads of Rāvaṇa --

Could not transgress

the command of his father.

Āśaya Udāttodāharanam :

guroḥ śāsanamatyetum na śāśāka sa rāghavah

yo rāvaṇaśiraśchedakāryabhāropyaviklavah

rāghava /"Descendent of Raghu," that is, Rāma. Raghu, grandson of Khaṭvāṅga and great-grandfather of Rāma, ruler of Ayodhyā and king of the solar (ikṣvāku) lineage -- the epitome of the ideal king.⁴

rāvana /"Lord of Laṅkā," half-brother to Kubera, the god of Wealth, and "most formidable" of demons. With ten

heads, marking his extensive knowledge, he is also known as Daśānana.⁵

He was tall as a tree. He had ten dark faces and twenty dark arms, and twenty red eyes red-rimmed like fire. He had yellow up-pointing fangs. He licked his lips with sharp tongues. He wore golden armor, long heavy gold earrings swaying, gold bracelets, gold arm-bands, ten golden crowns set with golden pearls, gold belt-chains crashing and gold rings all over his fingers. Fragrant white flower-garlands went over his shoulders and around his ten necks.⁶

An unsurpassed "greatness of character" (āśaya-māhātmyam) is illustrated in Dāṇḍin's first example of udāttā alamkāra (specifically cited in the following [2.303]). Rāghava or Rāma the eldest son of King Daśaratha was first in royal succession. Yet the king could not refuse the two wishes of Kaikeyī, mother of Rāma's step-brother Bharata, that her own son should assume the throne and that Rāma be exiled for a period of fourteen years. True to his word, and at the insistence of Rāma himself, King Daśaratha commanded Rāma to forsake the

kingdom. Thus with Sītā and his third step-brother Lakṣmaṇa at his side, Rāma went forth to his renowned adventures.

Rāma's adherence to the dharmic code in his willing acceptance of his father's command is one of the most exemplary examples of elevated character and heart in the Indic literary tradition. Yet Dandin further underscores the "unsurpassed" degree of Rāma's nobility in noting his extreme courage in fighting to the last the hideous and powerful demon king Rāvaṇa, most formidable of opponents.

2.302 Example of the Udātta of Wealth

Surrounded by hundreds of reflections
off walls of gems

The Lord of Laṅkā

was identified with difficulty by Āñjaneya.

Vibhūti Udāttodāharanam :

ratnabhittiṣu samkrāntaiḥ pratibimbaśatairvṛtaḥ
jñāto lañkeśvaraḥ kṛcchrādāñjaneyena tattvataḥ

lañkā-iśvarah /"Lord of Lañkā," that is, Rāvaṇa (see [2.301], under rāvana).

āñjaneya /"Son of Añjanā, that is, Hanumat; king of monkies and indispensable ally of Rāma in the search for Sītā and in the war against Rāvaṇa. The son of Vāyu (the Wind) and the apsaras Añjanā, Hanumat is "described as having a short thick neck, a round red face, sharp white fangs, a mane like aśoka flowers, a tail like Indra's banner, and able to expand until he was as large as a mountain."⁷

A "largesse of wealth" (abhyudayagauravam) is pleasantly indicated in the second variety of udātta alamkāra (again specifically cited to be the case in the concluding [2.303]). Daṇḍin again draws from the Rāmāyaṇa

in illustration. The noble and faithful monkey Hanuman in his desperate search for the imprisoned Sītā throughout the Lañkā palace is eventually caught and dragged before Rāvaṇa. Yet so unsurpassed is the display of wealth and riches, the image of Rāvaṇa is infinitely multiplied, reflected in walls that themselves are made of flashing gems, crystals, and precious metals. William Buck provides a captivating glimpse of the palace afforded Hanumat prior to his capture:

Hanuman went into the palace. He went bounding and sniffing past a thousand enduring pillars and columns, through stately chambers and long rambling halls lit by hanging war-shields and the gleam of magic bows stacked close together. The corridor walls were made of deep blue tiles and bands of bricks glazed crimson, and set high above were large windows covered by networks of gold and crystal, or of soft ivories and silver, or curtained over with silks. There were rooms of precious stones and serving dishes and full metal wine jars. . . . 8

2.303 Explication of the Examples of Udātta Alamkāra

In the former greatness of character

In the latter a largesse of wealth

are pleasantly indicated --

Thus a pair of udāttas are expressed.

Udāttodāharanadvayasvarūpaprakāśanam :

pūrvatrāśayamāhātmyamatrābhuyudayagauravam

suvyañjitamiti proktamudāttadvayamapyadaḥ

2.304 Definition of Apahnuti Alamkāra / Example of
Apahnuti as Such

Suppressing something

Asserting something else --

This is Apahnuti.

As in: Smara isn't five-arrowed

He has a thousand arrows.

Apahnutyalamkāralakṣaṇam / Apahnuti

Svarūpodāharanam :

apahnutirapahnutya kiṁcidanyārthadarśanam

na pañcesuh smarastasya sahastram patrināmiti

apahnutih [(f.) < apa (+) *hnu / "conceal," "hide";
 "deny"] / "concealment"; "suppression."

apahnutya : nirākṛtya /"repudiating"; "contradicting"
(RŚ/171).

Apahnuti alamkāra involves the "suppression" or "concealment" -- which may not be total -- of something that is conventionally assumed to be the case with regard to a given subject, and the simultaneous assertion with regard to that subject of something quite other.

Daṇḍin illustrates this procedural schema with a brief example: That "Smara," that is Kāma the god of love, in fact wields his five flowered-arrows is suppressed or denied. Rather it is asserted by one thoroughly tormented by desire, that he is struck by not five but "a thousand arrows." The commentator Ratnaśrī (RŚ/171), among others, would see this example marking a specific subvariety, in addition to the two that follow, termed "dharma" -- signifying that a specific "attribute" or "feature" is suppressed, where another is asserted.

Daṇḍin does not further qualify this example and I

feel that -- although a dharma is indeed denied and another asserted in this specific case -- he is rather briefly sketching the essential procedure of this alamkāra as such. Our other primary commentator Rangacharya Raddi, for example, glosses this example as it is, deigning to designate it as a specific variety: "Negating the 'five-arrowedness' of Smara, due to the attribution of another attribute, a 'thousand arrows,' this is apahnutih [atra smarasya pañcesutvadharmaṁ pratiśidhya sahasreśurūpa-dharmāntarāropād apahnutih]" (RR/279).

Apahnuti appears somewhat varied in other writers, due primarily to the explicit inclusion of the element of "similarity." Bhāmaha (KA [3.21-22]), for example, not only specifies this inclusion, but also explicitly qualifies what is to be actually suppressed as the "true nature of an object": (KA [3.21]) "That which includes a degree of similarity is accepted as apahnuti. The name of this is construed because of the suppression of the true nature of an object" [apahnutirabhīṣṭā ca kiṃcidantar-

gatopamā | bhūtarthāpahnavañdasyāḥ kriyate cābhidhā
 yathā ||]. In Bhāmaha's single example [3.22] the actual buzzing of bees is denied; rather this sound as the twanging of Kandarpa's (Kāma's) bowstring is asserted.

Udbhaṭa (KASS [5.3]) essentially repeats Bhāmaha, where Vāmana (KAS [4.3.5]) offers a succinct definition: "Concealment [of one thing] by another similar thing -- This is apahnuti" [samena vastunā 'nyāpalāpo 'pah-nutih ||]. Vāmana further specifies in the following vr̥tti that not only are the relevant objects in separate sentences, but that the sentence containing the predication or the assertion must be superimposed (aropana) on the other containing the "concealment." This somewhat unusual requirement of two separate sentences is apparently evoked to provide grounds for distinction from his conception of rūpaka alamkāra: "Since similarity (tādrūpya) [arises] from the meaning of two sentences, this is not rūpaka" [vākyā-rthayostātparyāt tādrūpyamiti na rūpakam ||].

And finally we may note that Mammata's definition of

apahnuti (KP [10.96ab]) is similar to that of Dandin's: "Negating the primary subject, another [object] is established -- This is apahnuti" [prakṛtam yanniṣidyānyat sādhyate sā tvapahnutih]. Yet in the following vṛtti he not only further includes the element of similarity, but explicitly specifies the primary, formal components of a comparison: "Having made the upameya unreal (asatya), the upamāna is established as real. . . ." [upameyamasatyam kṛtvopamānam satyatayā yat sthāpyate. . .].

2.305 Example of the Apahnuti of Restricted Scope

Sandlewood Moonlight

The gentle Southern Breeze --

Creations of fire for me

Cool towards others.

Viṣaya Apahnutyudāharanam :

candanam candrikā mando gandhavāhaśca daksināḥ
 seyamagnimayi sr̥ṣṭirmayi śītā parān prati

2.306 Explication of the Apahnuti of Restricted Scope

Since a lover indicates heat

with regard to himself

Granting coolness in the case of others --

This is an Apahnuti of Restricted Scope.

Viṣaya Apahnutyudāharanasvarūpaprakāśanam :

śaiśiryamabhyupetyaiva paresvātmani kāminā
 ausṇyaprakāśanāt tasya seyam viṣayanihnutih

In viṣaya apahnuti alamkāra the "scope" of suppression

or concealment is restricted and thus incomplete. For a lover in the heat of desire the proverbially cool and soothing properties of "sandlewood, moonlight, and the gentle southern breeze" are suppressed -- they are quite anomalously seen as "creations of fire." Yet with the assertion that they are "cool towards others" we recognize not only that this lover is fully aware of the true nature of these objects, but that this unfortunate situation pertains to himself alone.

In a context of restricted application the act of suppressing or denying what is commonly accepted thus allows an emphatic focus and serves to reinforce a given condition or attribute. For where the exception truly denies the rule, how much more exceptional must that exception be.

2.307 Example of the Apahnuti of Specific Nature

Indeed we understand the moon

to be one with rays dripping nectar.

This thing with rays dripping poison

is surely something else.

Svarūpa Apahnutyudāharanam :

amṛtasyandikirāṇāścandramā nāmato mataḥ

anya evāyamarthātmā viṣanisyandidīdhitiḥ

candramāḥ [candramas (m.) < candra [< *cand
 /"please"] (+) mas [< *mas /"change," "modify"]] /"one
 who gives pleasure."

2.308 Explication of the Example of the Apahnuti of
Specific Nature

Suppressing its specific moon-ness

one tormented by Smara

presents the moon as something quite other --

This is considered an Apahnuti of Specific Nature.

Svarūpa Apahnutyudāharanāsvarūpaprakāśanam :

iti candra tvamevendau nivartyārthāntarātmatā

uktā smarārtenetyesā svarūpāpahnutirmatā

In Dandin's first generic example of apahnuti a specific object is accepted as valid, where a usual attribute is completely suppressed. In the second example, illustrating viṣaya apahnuti, a series of primary objects are accepted as valid, yet their common attribute is denied

only with respect to a specific individual. Now, in what may be considered svarūpa apahnuti, we not only have the complete suppression of the "specific nature" of an object, but in the consequent assertion, the denial of the object itself.

Dandin continues the theme of the first two examples -- a lover afflicted with unbearable desire. As opposed to the first case, he now correctly associates the cool and soothing rays of the moon with "dripping nectar." The correct association of object and distinctive attribute as such is not denied. Yet as in the second case, for an individual so afflicted the attribute becomes something quite other -- nectar now felt as "poison." Although we again have an individual suppressing a usual attribute, with the focus now specifically shifted to the total denial of this attribute, the individual projects the validity of his perception to all. Thus given the correct association of object and attribute, with the suppression of the "specific nature" of the object, the lover can only

conclude and assert that "This thing with rays dripping poison / is surely something else."

2.309 Conclusion to Apahnuti Alamkāra

Apahnuti within upamā was previously shown among the upamās themselves.

An expansion of apahnuti's varieties may be seen among actual compositions.

Apahnutyalamkāropasamhārah :

upamāpahnutih pūrvamupamāsveva darśitā¹
ityapahnutibhedānām laksyo laksyeṣu vistarah

We have seen that "similarity" between whatever is suppressed and whatever is asserted is taken as a distinctive feature of apahnuti alamkāra by a number of writers other than Dandin. Yet it is clear from the

present verse that Dandin was aware of this association.

Among the upamās we have pratisedha upamā [2.34], where although attributes of an object as upamāna are correctly recognized ("the moon -- blemished and cold"), its ability to compete with the upameya is specifically denied ("Never has the moon . . . the power to vie with your face"). We might add that both Ratnaśrī (RŚ/173) and Rangacharya Raddi (RR/280) agree that pratisedha is the upamā referred to. Yet given that Dandin considers rūpaka alamkāra within the broader category of upamā ("Upamā itself / -- with difference obscured -- / is called rūpaka" [2.66]), I feel that he is more pointedly referring to [2.94] tattvāpahnava rūpaka, the rūpaka "Concealing the Actual." "Apahnava" clearly marks the association, as does the form of this subvariety: the "actual" or true status of objects serving as upameyas is denied, where their conceived and imagined status as upamānas is specifically asserted ("This is not a face . . . / it's a lotus --").

As I feel that Dandin himself is primarily responsible

for the generation of the various subvarieties associated with the alamkāras -- themselves drawn primarily from existent tradition -- it is probable, granting this assumption, that the element of similarity within apahnuti was quite usual for the tradition from which Dāṇdin drew, but that he felt it sufficiently marked to justify its inclusion within the category which takes this feature for its focus. Even with this inclusion, the manipulation of apahnuti's features of suppression and assertion yet allows the development of any number of varieties.

Dāṇdin's concluding lines allow us to once again stress two very important points. That "An expansion of apahnuti's varieties / may be seen among actual compositions" belies the position of those who assume the numerous variations of the alamkāras reflects prescriptive dogma; but these lines also explicitly indicate that the potential generation of the varieties was to an indeterminate degree grounded in the literature itself.

Notes [2.295] - [2.309]

1. Udbhaṭa, Kāvyālaṅkāra-Sāra-Saṅgraha, edited by Narayana Daso Banhatti, 2nd edition, (1982), p. 105.
2. Udbhaṭa, Kāvyālaṅkāra-Sāra-Saṅgraha, edited by Narayana Daso Banhatti, 2nd edition, (1982), p. 104.
3. Udbhaṭa, Kāvyālaṅkārasārasaṅgraha of Udbhaṭa, edited by Narayana Daso Banhatti, 2nd edition, (1982), (text) pp. 57-58.
4. See Benjamin Walker, Hindu World, vol. 2 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1968), pp. 270-72.
5. See Benjamin Walker, Hindu World, vol. 2, pp. 290-92.
6. William Buck, Ramayana (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 170.
7. Margaret and James Stutley, Harper's Dictionary of Hinduism, p. 109.
8. William Buck, Ramayana, pp. 234-35.

2.310 Definition of Ślesa [Śliṣṭa] Alambāra and the
Illumination of Its Fundamental Categories

Multiple meanings united in a single form

is accepted as Śliṣṭa --

It is twofold:

Invoking integral words

Invoking for the most part divisible words.

Ślesālamkāralaksanam Tadbhedaprakāśanamca :

śliṣṭamīṣṭamanekārthamekarūpānvitam vacah

tadabhinnapadam bhinnapadaprāyamiti dvidhā

Ślesa [Śliṣṭa] alambāra displays to the fullest one of the most vital and ubiquitous elements of kāvya. Ślesa [< *ślis /"combine," "conjoin"] refers to the derivation of multiple meanings from a given discrete pada or phonemic

"string" (whether "word" as such, or compound) -- the given unit thus "embraces" more than one meaning.

As we have seen in Chapter One, Dandin also employs the term "ślesa" or "śliṣṭa" in a quite different sense to refer to one of the ten gunas [1.41, 43-44]. It is neither the case that Dandin utilizes the term "śliṣṭa" in his definition above of the alamkāra to mark this distinction, for in [1.43] he uses it as well as "ślesa" to refer to the guna; nor that he "prefers" it (Glossary/289). Not only is the alamkāra termed "ślesa" in Dandin's introductory list of the artha alamkāras [2.6], but ślesa is also used throughout the Kavyādarśa to signify "ślesa as such." Except where śliṣṭa explicitly appears in the text, "ślesa" has been consistently employed.

Ślesa -- as specific linguistic feature and as alamkāra -- is certainly one of the most difficult of kāvya's elements to approach and clearly explicate. Founded on an inextricable relationship of word as phonemic form and meaning we have noted that it is beyond the reach of

translation. With "ambiguity" integral to its nature, a degree of uncertainty is inevitable in the specific instance, yet much unnecessary difficulty stems from the haze of distortion generated in the secondary literature. Dāṇḍin's presentation of ślesa is, however, quite clear. As always then we shall remain grounded in our text, but before proceeding I would make two points as initial steps toward clarification.

The first stumbling block one encounters in approaching this material in translation -- as we have repeatedly seen in cases of various other alamkāras -- is one of terminology. "Ślesa" is nothing other than itself, and with attempted translation we are immediately off the conceptual mark. As Gerow states:

A number of English words have been used to translate the Sanskrit ślesa; none, however, conveys the intended significance of that word and all have connotations which are unfortunate. 'Pun,' which covers much of the concept is also used, and perhaps primarily understood as word play of the type that Ogden Nash has made famous. . . . Similarly 'double-entendre,' often preferable to pun, errs in the other extreme,

including a number of figures which involve two meanings, but have no explicit grammatical basis of expression, such as irony. . . . Lastly the learned 'paronomasia' includes cases which are not puns, but only adjunctions of words similar in form but different in meaning. . . . (Glossary/63, n. 151).

Yet Gerow himself is unfortunately a practitioner of the surprisingly common "Yes, but. . . ." approach to translation. Throughout his Glossary, ślesa, notwithstanding the above, appears haphazardly as "pun," "double-entendre," or "paronomasia."

"Pun" as the most commonly used term fails in translation not only because of the catch-all nature and vagueness of the word, where for Dandin ślesa is precisely conceived; but also and primarily because in usage the connotations of pun revolve around the comic (Noah Webster's "low species of wit") and the trivial ("What of Whims and Shams, Punns and Flams, Stultiloquious Dialogs?").¹

The humor often inherent in ambiguity is occasionally

exploited in the classical Sanskritic tradition (primarily in the drama), but the usage of slesa as such was not primarily to amuse but rather -- through reverberation of sound and expansion of meaning -- to add further dimension and impact. That the "pun" does not approach in either range or formal development the slesa is not of course to disparage the creative ability of the English poet. These alternate roles are a reflection of the distinctive features and resources of the languages themselves.

Semantic and syntactic constraints in English consign the pun to a rather limited appearance, and as the comic is primarily distinguished by disjunction, so the pun far more usually generates a light amusement stemming from unusual association. Where the extreme formal development of slesa -- as with the seemingly innumerable metres of kāvya -- rests upon the facility of its generation, and the variety of potential applications stemming from a number of resources specifically available in Sanskrit:

Several factors combine to produce a far greater inventory of homonyms: the wealth of vocabulary, the lack of a thoroughgoing distinction between concrete and abstract applications of a given word, the great variety of contextual variations permissible for each morpheme, the wide range of derivational affixes in use, and the freedom with which descriptive epithets are formed. Further, the relatively free word order of Sanskrit, and the ability to compound stems and thus to leave aside even the grammatical terminations of words, lends even greater opportunity. . . . (Glossary/39).

The views of the *kāvya* sāstra writers themselves on ślesa grew increasingly complex and varied, and are by no means in every case easily grasped. The second source of potential distortion is the hodge-podge presentation of ślesa found in a number of recent writers, who tend to jumble a number of these varying and sometimes quite alternate views, mixing terminology, presenting one position through the partial framework of another. In this brief introduction we shall touch but lightly upon other views, but in every case (and certainly with that of Dandin's) the respectively distinctive presentations where applicable shall be carefully retained.

Danđin's conception of ślesa is clearly stated, "Multiple meanings united in a single form / is accepted as śliṣṭa." Yet granting that this "form" may be viewed in two relevant ways, it may be considered twofold. Where the form (or phonemic string) generates two (or more) meanings as it is, without manipulation, it is termed abhinna or an "unbroken" ślesa. Meaning and form are essentially "integral" -- where what in English would be considered a "word" displays more than one meaning. This is the usual type, and in Danđin's examples of ślesa alamkāra it is exclusively employed. The second type of ślesa lends itself to confusion due to the mismatch between "word" and pada." For this category involves padas that are bhинна, that is, for the most part capable of being "broken" or phonemically analysed in more than one way, with each of the distinct readings yielding a different meaning. Pada in this case may mark a word as such, or what might alternately be considered a "compound."

We have previously encountered both of these types

separately integrated within Dāṇḍin's upamā alamkāra.

Ślesa upamā [2.28] strictly involves the first type; the following samāna upamā [2.29] -- where in the example the compound sālakānanaśobhini may be "broken" in two different ways -- reflects the second type.

It is important to note that Dāṇḍin does not use the terms "artha" and "śabda" in this context (although I feel he was aware of such usage as, for example, [1.51] would indicate). The adoption or reflection of abhinna and bhinnna as artha and śabdha ślesas by later writers and commentators was not followed by uniformity of conception and application. Dāṇḍin's choice of terminology offers a clarity based upon the actual procedures involved. I feel that he saw the potential confusion arising from the employment of terms that themselves are abstract, whose own meanings are wide-ranging, and whose application to these two types of ślesa is hardly so neatly distinct.

And further, we should be aware that Dāṇḍin in the present verse is delineating ślesa "as such" -- that "ślesa

alamkāra" is something else again. It is as specific and discriminate process -- "multiple meanings united in a single form" -- that śleṣa appears as a feature capable of subordinate integration into any number of other alamkāras. As Dāṇḍin points out in an extremely important closing verse of this chapter [2.363], "Śleṣa in general enhances the beauty of all expressions displaying vakrokti. . . ." Where again, vakrokti as the "twisting" of language is perceived by Dāṇḍin as one of kāvya's two essential expressive modes -- along with the direct intensity of svabhāvokti. For ślesa, so abundantly and inherently available in Sanskrit, in itself is perhaps the epitome of the semantic "curvature" that was to be so profusely developed through the creative work of the kavis.

Śleṣa as alamkāra is built upon the inclusion of a number of individual ślesas, not in random array, but as units whose multiple meanings are precisely utilized and balanced in various ways to expand the scope of the given verse. As we work through Dāṇḍin's varieties, which are by

no means closed, we shall see that this procedure is symmetrically integrated, that the fundamental structure of this alamkāra reflects parallel development of individual expression which may be distinctly marked by the nature of the ślesas themselves (abhinna/bhinna śleṣa alamkāras [2.311-12]); by the way in which they are or are not conjoined, the relationship existing between the developed expressions as a whole (abhinnakriyā/aviruddhakriyā/viruddhakarman śleṣa alamkāras [2.316-18]); by whether or not the meanings so developed are or are not "restricted" in any way, which further involves the degree of applicability of one series of meanings over the other (niyamavat/niyamākṣepa śleṣa alamkāras [2.319-20]); or by the nature of the relationship between the expanded meanings themselves (avirodha/virodha śleṣa alamkāras [2.321-22]).

In touching on the conceptions of śleṣa alamkāra presented by various other writers one is immediately struck by the degree of disparity. Bhāmaha (KA [3.14-20]),

for example, considers "śliṣṭa" closely related to rūpaka alamkāra: "Where the identity of the upameya and upamaṇa is expressed through guṇa ("attribute"), kriyā ("action") and nāman ("name") -- This is termed śliṣṭa" [upamānena yattattvamupameyasya sādhyate | guṇakriyābhyaṁ nāmnā ca śliṣṭam tadabhidhiyate ||] (KA [3.14]). The first line of his definition of rūpaka in [2.21] (upamānena yattattvam-upameyasya rūpyate) mirrors the first line of the above, where the second line draws a distinction: "through seeing similar attributes. . . ." (guṇānām samatām drṣṭvā).

Bhāmaha continues, "This definition certainly characterizes rūpaka as well. Yet here the simultaneous presentation of the upamāna and upameya is desired"

[lakṣanām rūpake 'pi dām laksyate kāmamatra tu | iṣṭah prayogo yugapadupamānopameyayoph ||] (KA [3.15]). What does he mean? Noting a prior example of rūpaka drawn in [3.16cd], "cloud-elephants," he writes, "In this case clouds and elephants are presented as equivalent (samatā) [ityatra meghakariṇām nirdeśah kriyate samam ||]. Which

he appears to explain in [3.17], "The distinction [of ślesa] is produced from the conjunction of word (vacas) and meaning (artha). This is threefold due to the presentation of simultaneity (sahokti), similarity (upamā), and causality (hetu)" [ślesādevārthavacasorasya ca kriyate bhidā | tatsahoktyupamāhetunirdeśāttrividham yathā ||].

Which is to say (I believe) that although in rūpaka two objects are equated, they are each represented by separate words. In ślesa the identification occurs through their simultaneous presentation through word (vacas) and meaning (artha). Although I am unsure of the purport of Bhāmaha's presentation, this verse may be the basis for the later distinction between śabda and artha ślesas.

Thus in Bhāmaha's schema, apparently the "identity" presented by ślesa may reflect either "attribute," "action," or "individual" (from [3.14]), and may involve simultaneity, similarity, and causality. How these features interact is not clarified. The three following examples [3.18-20], would appear to be illustrating,

respectively, the combination of attributes; comparison between objects, including an identical action; and the expression of identical attributes as the bases or reasons for drawing a comparison between an individual and an object.

It is not surprising that Vāmana with his emphasis on "comparison" throughout the alamkāras, echos Bhāmaha. His definition of śleṣa (KAS [4.3.7]) immediately follows that of rūpaka ("Where there is superimposition of the upameya with the upamāna due to similar attributes" [upamānenopameyasya gunasāmyāt tattvāropo rūpakam] [4.3.6]): "That [superimposition (the pronoun refers back to the "tattvāropa" of the preceding verse)] with regard to attributes when there is the usage of a single statement with at least two meanings (tantra)" [sa dharmeṣu tantraprayoge śleṣah ||]. Yet it would seem that subsuming śleṣa within the greater category of comparison is unnecessarily restrictive. I would accept Gerow's comment on the positions of both Bhāmaha and Vāmana: "This view seems to

imply that ślesa, too, is at bottom a comparison (upamā) or can . . . be described in the same context. . . . But it is simply not true that every ślesa rests on an implicit comparison. . . ." (Glossary/291).

It is in Rudraṭa's Kāvyālamkāra that we find the first elaborate classification of ślesa alamkāra based upon the two broad categories of śabda [all of Chapter Four] and artha [all of Chapter Ten]. The first distinction within Rudraṭa's schema to be noted is that śabda ślesa is considered to be a śabda alamkāra (along with vakrokti ("twisted speech"), anuprāsa ("sound manipulation"), and yamaka ("sound repetition")). Some eight varieties of śabda ślesa are distinguished: (1) varna ("letter") [4.3]; (2) pada ("word") [4.5]; (3) liṅga ("gender") [4.8]; (4) bhāṣā ("language," one reading is in Sanskrit, the other in some other language) [4.10]; (5) prakṛti (involving a verbal root or nominal stem) [4.24]; (6) pratyaya ("suffix") [4.26]; (7) vibhakti (involving "case" or "person" markers) [4.28abc]; and (8) vacana ("number")

[4.28d]. This category is extremely similar to Dandin's "bhinnna" ślesa. Essentially a given string may be broken to yield two meanings, that is, "difference can be specified in terms of the kinds of morphemes (form classes) which are thus confused" (Glossary/294).

Artha ślesa, on the other hand, is one of Rudraṭa's four major categories of artha alamkāra (along with vāstava ("description"), aupamya ("comparison"), and atiśaya ("exaggeration")), and reflects Dandin's "abhinnna" ślesa. His ten varieties revolve around the relationship between the two meanings a given word may display. We have (1) aviśesa (the meanings are "without distinction") [10.3]; (2) virodha (the meanings are "contradictory") [10.5]; (3) adhika (the "superiority" of one subject is marked) [10.7]; (4) vakra (another rasa may be inferred) [10.9]; (5) vyāja (one meaning indicates censure, the other praise) [10.11]; (6) ukti (one meaning reflects especially mundane usage) [10.14]; (7) asambhava (the meanings involve "improbability") [10.16]; (8) avayava (one meaning reinforces the

attributes indicated by the other) [10.18]; (9) tattva (one meaning reinforces or emphasizes the subject of the other) [10.20]; and (10) virodhābhāsa (where incongruity is only apparent) [10.22].

Although Mammāṭa follows Rudraṭa in classifying śabda ślesa as a śabda alamkāra, it is not the case that he "considers ślesa as a verbal [śabda] figure only"² -- "ślesa" also appears among his artha alamkāras in Chapter Ten of the Kāvyaprakāśa. Mammāṭa repeats Rudraṭa's eight varieties of śabda ślesa (KP [9.84ff.]); but in [9.85ab] adds a ninth, abhaṅga ślesa, where "there is no distinction based upon 'prakṛti' and so on" [bhedābhāvāt prakṛtyāder-bhedo navamo 'pi bhavet ||].

Mammāṭa's definition of ślesa among the artha alamkāras [10.96cd] (followed by a single example) is of interest, for "multiple meaning" is now held to be displayed at the sentence (vākyā) rather than the word (pada) level: "It is ślesa where, in a single sentence there is more than one meaning" [śleṣah sa vākyā ekasmin yatrānekārthatā bhavet ||].

2.311 Example of the Ślesa of Integral Words

This

King / Moon

achieving

prosperity / Udaya mountain

attractive / lustrous

with

devoted subjects / scarlet disc

and

light / gentle

taxes / rays --

Captivates the heart of the world.

Abhinnapada Ślesodāharanam :

asāvudayamārūḍhah kāntimān raktamandalah
 rājā harati lokasya hr̥dayam mr̥dubhih karaih

Daṇdin's first example of ślesa alamkāra illustrates the first of its two fundamental types. In abhinnapada ślesa the words are "unbroken," that is, one and the same integral form "embrces" more than one meaning. But we should further note that we have something more than a string of ślesas scattered across the verse. Rather, through ślesa, two sets of attributes are developed, whose individual members are related within their given set in illuminating the same subject. With the individual ślesa we have horizontal expansion (if you will); with the series of ślesas, vertical and integrated development.

Daṇdin's example displays a series of six ślesas -- six words whose form remains unbroken, each embracing essentially two meanings. The first ślesa then lays out the

subjects, where (1) rājan may mean both "king" and "moon."

The multiple meanings of the remaining five respectively

serve as illuminating attributes: (2) udayam-ārūḍha /"one achieving, attaining prosperity (udaya)"; and also

"climbing Udaya (mountain)," over which the moon is

conceived to rise; (3) kāntimat /"attractive"; and also

"lustrous," "brilliant"; (4) rakta-mandala /"one with

devoted, loving subjects"; and also "one with a scarlet

circle or disc"; and (5) kara /"taxes"; and also "rays,"

"beams."

Within the single verse we have then two parallel veins of meaning: "This king, achieving prosperity, attractive, with devoted subjects and light taxes -- Captivates the heart of the world" / "This moon, achieving Udaya mountain, lustrous with scarlet disc and gentle rays -- Captivates the heart of the world."

2.312 Example of the Śleṣā of Divisible Words

Why doesn't this

vicious one / dusk

associate of the

king / moon

that

mine of faults / night-maker

not moving / moving

along the path of

warriors / stars

Hurt me? -- One

disliked by him / without his beloved.

Bhinnapada Ślesodāharanam :

dosākareṇa saṃbadhnannakṣatrapathavartinā
rājñā pradoṣo māmitthamapriyam kīm na bādhate

Dandīn now turns to the alternate fundamental type.

With bhinnapada ślesa a "word" -- and again as in Sanskrit pada here marks a "word" as such, as well as a "compound," we are more properly dealing with words as "semantic strings" -- is capable of being "broken" or analysed in more than one way, generating multiple meanings. Yet again, as ślesa alamkāra, a series of ślesas is presented whose alternate meanings develop parallel or vertical, semantically integral expressions.

In Dandīn's example I would see four bhinnapada ślesas (with a single instance of abhinna ślesa), that is, five strings capable of being read in two ways: (1) pradosah : [pradosah] /"dusk"; and also [pra (+) dosah] /"one who has many faults." (2) rājñā [< rājan] (as abhinna ślesa)

/"king"; and also "moon." (3) *dosākarena* : [*dosā* /"night"
 (+) *karena* /"maker"]; and also [*dosa* /"fault" (+) *ākarena*
 /"mine"]. (4) *nakṣatrapathavartinā* : [*nakṣatra* (+) *patha*
 (+) *vartinā*] /"one moving along the path of stars"; and
 also [*na* (+) *ksatra* (+) *patha* (+) *vartinā*] /"one not moving
 along the path of *ksatras* or warriors." (5) *apriyam* : ā
 (+) *priyā* > *apriyam* (*bahuvrīhi*) /"one without his beloved";
 and also *apriyam* (*tatparusa*) /"one disliked."

The verse thus provides two simultaneous readings:
 "Why doesn't this vicious one, associate of the king, that
 mine of faults, not moving along the path of warriors, hurt
 me? -- One disliked by him" / "Why doesn't this dusk,
 associate of the moon, that night-maker moving along the
 path of stars, hurt me? -- One without his beloved."

2.313 Indicating the Varieties of Ślesa PreviouslyMentioned

Ślesas were previously presented

within the scope of Upamā Rūpaka

Ākṣepa Vyatireka and so on --

A few others will now be shown.

Uktaslesabhedasūcanam :

upamārūpakākṣepavyatirekādigocarāḥ

prāgeva darśitāḥ ślesā darśyante kecanāpare

The individual ślesa pervasively appears as a subordinate component throughout the second chapter. We have seen, ślesa upama [2.28]; ślistā rūpaka [2.87]; ślistā artha dīpaka [2.113-14]; ślistā ākṣepa [2.159-60]; ślesā-

viddhah arthāntaranyāsa [2.174]; and saślesa vyatireka [2.185-86].

Seven more varieties of ślesa alamkāra -- itemized in the following two verses -- will be immediately shown. We may note as well the incorporation of ślesa within two alamkāras yet to come: ślesa virodha [2.339] and ślesa vyājastuti [2.345-46].

2.314 Indicating the Varieties of Ślesa yet Unmentioned

There is one ślesa that involves Integral Action

Another that involves Congruous Action

Another that involves Incongruous Action

And one that involves Restriction

Anuktaślesabhedasūcanam :

astyabhinnakriyah kaścidaviruddhakriyoparah
 viruddhakarmā cāstyanyah śleṣo niyamavānapi

2.315 Indicating the Varieties of Ślesa yet Unmentioned

There is one that involves the Negation of Restriction

One that involves Congruous Meanings

And also one that involves Incongruous Meanings --

Their form will become evident

through the examples themselves.

Anuktaślesabhedasūcanam :

niyamākṣeparūpoktiravirodhī virodhyapi
 teṣāṁ nidarśaneśveva rūpamāvirbhaviṣyati

2.316 Example of the Ślesa involving Integral Action

Sidelong / Subtle

Glances Messengers

naturally

attractive / friendly

cast / sent

indicating / proclaiming

extensive love --

capture the beloved.

Abhinnakriyā Ślesodāharanam :

vakrāḥ svabhāvamadhurāḥ śamsantyo rāgamulbanam

dṛśo dūtyaśca karsanti kāntābhiḥ presitāḥ priyān

Abhinna kriyā ślesa focuses on the relationship between the primary (finite) verbal action (kriyā) and the parallel expressions developed by a brief series of individual ślesas. As "abhinna" this action is "unbroken" or integral, that is, it is equally applicable to each of the two generated expressions.

In Dandin's example I would see a series of four (abhinna) ślesas: (1) vakra /"crooked," "sidelong"; and also "subtle"; (2) madhura /"attractive," "sweet"; and also, "friendly"; (3) presita /"cast," "thrown out"; and also "sent"; and (4) śamsantyah [(nom.) (pl.) vartamāne kṛdanta] /"indicating," "pointing out"; and also "proclaiming."

As I feel these ślesas indicate (or more accurately what I infer from our interpretation), we may frequently have not multiple, distinct "meanings," so much as words that are perceived as displaying a range of associated, shaded meanings. Thus in the present case, presita, for example, focuses on the (participial) action of having sent

or casting something outwards. "Cast" and "sent" in English certainly are closer semantically than not, yet I feel that Dāṇḍin does accept some such shading (obviously realized in Sanskrit) associated with presita where each shade is precisely attuned to the separate albeit parallel contexts that he is developing in the verse. This inference is also based upon or dictated by the essential structural framework of ślesa as alm̄kāra -- parallel development or expansion. If one assumes that artha ślesa entails only radically different meanings one might, as in the present verse, search in vain for such distinction and fail to map this developed structure to the full.

The expanded form of this verse then may be read as follows: "Sidelong Glances, naturally attractive, cast by lovers indicating extensive love --" / "Subtle Messengers, naturally friendly, sent by lovers proclaiming extensive love --" With the primary verbal action "unbroken," the finite verb karsanti [(1st per.) (pl.) < *kṛṣ] applies equally to and completes each of these

expressions. Both "sidelong glances" and "subtle messengers," with their contributing attributes, thus "captivate the beloved."

2.317 Example of the Ślesa involving Congruous Action

Songs of the Kokilās Black-eyed Women

sweet / attractive

augmenting passion

soft / tender

melodious / amorous

in their

pleasure / intoxication

are

heard embraced.

Aviruddhakriyā Ślesodāharanam :

madhurā rāgavardhinyah komalāh kokilāgirah

ākarnyante madakalāh śliṣyante cāsitekṣaṇāh

Aviruddha ślesa is a logical extension of the preceding. Now not one but two primary verbal actions are incorporated, individually and respectively coordinating with one of the two parallel expressions generated by the ślesas involved. Yet the distinctive feature of this variety stems from the "congruous" or harmonious (aviruddha) relationship between these two expressions that arise from their respective actions.

In our example I find again a series of four (abhinna) ślesas: (1) madhura /"sweet"; and also "attractive"; (2) komala /"soft"; and also "tender"; (3) kala /"sweet," "melodious"; and also "amorous"; and (4) mada /"one feeling pleasure"; and also "intoxicated." And we have two finite (passive) verbal forms: ākarnyante [nāmadhātu < ā (+)

karna] /"being heard"; and ślisyante [< *ślis] /"being embraced."

The developed verse would thus appear as: "Songs of the Kokilās, sweet, augmenting passion, soft, melodious in their pleasure, are heard" / "Black-eyed women, attractive, augmenting passion, tender, amorous in their intoxication, are embraced." Within this given context then we have two developed actions that may be considered congruous; not only are they simultaneous, but also quite intertwined. For it is to the conducive background of the melodious songs of the Kokilās that these attractive black-eyed women are being embraced by their lovers.

2.318 Example of the śleṣā involving Incongruous Action

The Sun Love
 displaying
 /
 scarlet passion
 swelled from contact with
 the western quarter / wine
 declines increases.

Viruddhakarman Śleṣodāharanam :

rāgamādarśayanneśa vārunīyogavardhitam
 tirobhavati gharmāṁśuraṅgajastu vijṛmbhate

And again Daṇḍin logically manipulates a given feature to generate another variety. Viruddha karman śleṣā structurally mirrors the preceding aviruddha kriyā, yet now

the two actions are "incongruous and thus, upon realizing the meanings of the slesa involved, we are presented with two quite diametrically opposed events.

In Dandin's example we have but two (abhinna) slesas, now with distinct meanings: (1) rāga /"scarlet," "red"; and also "passion," "desire"; and (2) vārunī /"the western quarter"; and also "wine," "spirits." And we have two opposite actions: tirobhavati [< tiras (+) *bhū] /"decline"; and vijrmbhate [< vi (+) jrmbh] /"increase."

We may thus read the expanded verse as, "The Sun, displaying scarlet, swelled from contact with the western quarter, declines" / "Love, displaying passion, swelled from contact with wine, increases."

2.319 Example of the Ślesa involving Restriction

For this Lord of Men

1

finger breadths

applies but to the sword

Curvature / Deviousness

but to the bow

Head shaft feathers / Indigence

but to the arrows.

Niyamavat Ślesodāharanam :

nistrimśatvamasāveva dhanusyevāsyā vakratā

śaresveva narendrasya mārganatvam ca vartate

With niyamavat ślesa Dandin changes tack somewhat, and marks this variety with the incorporation of a specific process, now "restriction" or "limitation" -- a feature that regularly appears throughout his schema. Again we have a series of ślesas, but now the focus shifts from two integral, parallel "vertical" expressions to the explicit restriction (niyama) of the applicability of the double meanings embraced by each of the ślesas themselves. We thus have a series of "horizontal" expressions which could semantically stand alone; yet given that the two groups of alternate meanings of each ślesa each pertain to the same theme, we have a degree of "vertical" integration -- in reinforcing repetition -- as well.

And it would appear that Dandin has added a further degree of depth in the mode of realization of each of the ślesas. For given the context of each, one meaning appears to be literally applicable; yet given the total context of the verse, such meaning appears to fail. With this we are led to the alternate sense of each ślesa, and thus to the

full realization of the meaning of the verse as such (it is important to keep in mind, however, that out of this specific context, the meanings of each ślesa are equally evident). Gerow's definition of niyamavat (beyond the questionable terminology) is thus confused: "A type of paronomasia in which a double-entendre is explicitly limited to its further or irregular sense" (Glossary/298). There is on the one hand no question of one sense as such being more "regular" than another in an individual ślesa, nor does the "explicit limitation" in this variety apply to what I would rather see as the "figurative" sense of each ślesa -- granting that we can make such a distinction in this specific case. For the element of restriction applies to both meanings, and much of the "alamkāraness" of this variety lies in the fact that although the context leads us to choose what thus appears as a literal meaning -- specifically because of the applicability of this restriction -- we come to infer the ultimate relevance of a

series of alternate meanings and their restriction in view of the verse as a whole.

This example of niyamavat contains three (abhinna) ślesas: (1) nistrimśatva / "[a size] beyond thirty [finger breadths (aṅgulas)]," and also "cruelty"; (2) vakratā / "curvature," and also "deviousness"; and (3) mārganatva / "the state or distinctive nature of being an arrow," "arrow-ness," and also "indigence," "supplication." In each śleṣa one meaning corresponds literally to the context of its restriction: "For this Lord of Men, size beyond thirty finger-breadths applies but to the sword; curvature but to the bow; head, shaft, and feathers but to the arrows." Yet clearly coherent sense is lacking, and one is led to the alternate meanings of each of the ślesas to fulfill the integrated and complete purport of the verse. Each of these meanings as a negative attribute (albeit hardly unusual in those wielding royal power) with its corresponding restriction are really offered in praise of a noble king: "For this Lord of Men, cruelty applies but to

the sword; deviousness but to the bow; indigence but to the arrows."

2.320 Example of the Ślesa involving the Negation of
Restriction

When you are ruling there are kāntakas [criminals]
but these kāntakas [thorns] appear only on lotus stalks
But wait! Kāntakas [goosebumps] are also seen
in the embraces of passionate couples.

Niyamākṣepa Ślesodāharanam :

padmānāmeva dāṇḍeṣu kāntakastvayi rakṣati
athavā dr̥syate rāgimithunāliṅganeśvapi

With niyama ākṣepa ślesa we again have logical extension -- where two meanings embraced by a ślesa may be

specifically restricted, so may restriction itself be denied through yet a third meaning that proves to be an exception.

In his example Dandin plays upon three meanings of the word "kantaka" -- "criminals" / "thorns" / "goosebumps" -- and indeed this tripartite capability would appear to be essential to this variety if a single ślesa is to be the focus. For we have with one meaning, assertion; with another, restriction; and with the third, the negation (āksepa) of this restriction (niyama).

Thus when a great king is ruling, yes there are kantakas as "criminals," but in reality these kantakas as "thorns" (literally, yet drawing along the "criminals" as well) "appear only on lotus stalks" -- an initial potential meaning is restricted or denied. "But wait!" -- the restriction itself is negated by yet a third sense of the same word. For kantakas are indeed found elsewhere, as "goosebumps" they "are also seen in the embraces of passionate couples."

2.321 Example of the Ślesa involving Congruous Meanings

That one was a

King / Mountain

with an extensive

capital / plateau

Powerful / A Sun

destined to

prosper / rise

Skillful / Dakṣa

lord / creator

of people

Master / Svāmin

wielder of

power / the śakti weapon.

Avirodhin Ślesodāharanam :

maḥibhrdbhūrikaṭakastejasvī niyatodayah

dakṣah prajāpatiścāśit svāmī ṣaktidharaśca sah

dakṣa : "He was one of the ten sons of Brahman, being born from his right thumb, and was the chief of the patriarchs of mankind."¹¹

svāmin / that is, Kārttikeya, Kumāra, or Skanda, Śiva's son (there are varying depictions of his generation), god of war and leader of the divine armies, he rides the peacock Paravāṇi and wields the śakti or spear.

Daṇḍin's two final varieties echo and logically vary the preceding aviruddha/viruddha ślesas [2.317-18]. Where in aviruddha a single primary action applied equally and congruously to the two parallel structures generated through the series of ślesas; in avirodhin the focus shifts to the congruity of the multiple meanings of each of the individual ślesas as applicable to a given topic.

Our example of avirodhin ślesa presents the most extensively developed of Dandin's varieties, with eight (abhinna) ślesas: (1) mahibṛt / (literally, "bearer of the earth) "king," and also "mountain"; (2) katakah / "capital city," and also "plateau"; (3) tejasvin / (literally, "possessing splendor") "powerful," "brilliant," and also "sun"; (4) udaya / "prosperous," and also "one rising"; (5) dakṣa / "clever," "skillful," and also Dakṣa, one of the ten sons of Brahmā; (6) (prajā-) patih / "lord," "master" (of people), and also "creator" (of people); (7) svāmin / "master," "lord," and also Svāmin, the son of Śiva; and (8) śakti / "power," and also the "śakti weapon."

We have four essentially complete units, each incorporating two ślesas and thus developing two brief, parallel expressions. In each unit the initial ślesa marks two topics; the following ślesa in expansion presenting respectively appropriate attributes. As "avirodhin" the relationship between topic and attribute in every case is entirely "congruous."

The verse as a whole offers a series of positive attributes in praise of a great king that has presumably died. In each of the four units, one of the parallel expressions is clearly applicable to this king. Yet we also simultaneously infer the comparative applicability of each of the alternate expressions -- each displaying an elevated subject that thus mirrors the king's renown.

We may thus read (taking each unit one at a time): "That One was a king, with an extensive capital"/"A mountain with an extensive plateau"; "One Powerful, destined to prosper"/"A Sun destined to rise"; "One Skillful, lord of people"/"Dakṣa, creator of people"; "A Master, wielder of power"/"Svāmin, wielder of the Sakti weapon."

2.322 Example of the Śleṣā involving Incongruous Meanings

He was known to be

Kṛṣṇa / righteous

a non-destroyer of

Vṛṣa / dharma

The Moon / A King

without experiencing

decline / adversity

A Deva / A Lord not

without

divinity / wise councilors

Śamkara / Munificent

without

serpents / sychophants.

Virodhin Ślesodāharanam :

acyutopyavirṣacchedī rājāpyaviditakṣayah
devopyavibudho jajñe śamkaropyabhujaṅgavān

Śamkara /the "Beneficient"; one of Śiva's numerous epithets (see under [2.12]). His association with serpents is close: "Hara [Śiva] was radiant, crowned with skulls, wearing a handsome saffron-colored tilaka, clothed in a lion-skin, decked out in earings made of snakes that were black as bees, his bracelets bejeweled with cobras. . . ."¹²

Where in the preceding viruddhakarman [2.318] the two actions characterizing the two parallel expressions are "incongruous"; in virodhin Ślesa the focus is on the incongruity evident in one of the two possible readings of a series of attributive units developed through Ślesas.

As in the immediately preceding avirodhin, the development in Dāṇḍin's example is extensive, again with eight Ślesas: (1) acyuta /an epithet of Kṛṣṇa, and also

"one not fallen down," "righteous"; (2) vṛṣa /name of a
demonic bull, and also "dharma"; (3) rājan /"moon," and
also "king"; (4) ksaya /"decline," and also "adversity";
(5) deva /"deva" or god, and also a noble lord or ruler;
(6) vibudha /"divinity," and also "those possessing
wisdom, knowledge"; (7) śamkara /Śiva, and also
(literally) "a doer of good"; and (8) bhujāṅga /
"serpent," and also "rogue," "libertine," "sychophant."

The structural framework mirrors the preceding variety
as well. Again we have four essentially independent units
-- albeit again each points in praise to a deceased king.
Parallel topics with following attributes are presented in
each case through a pair of ślesas. Yet now, as virodhin
ślesa, we have evident "incongruity" between topic and
attribute in one of the alternate readings in each of the
four units. In effect, the incongruity leads to the
confirmation of the alternate reading. Yet it is important
to realize that the element of contradiction resides only
within the individual unit -- it does not negate the

applicability of the expression itself as attribute of the primary subject of the verse as a whole.

Thus the contradictions involved in a moon that never wanes, or a deva (god) without divinity are evident. And equally incongruous is Viṣṇu posited as the "non-destroyer" of the demon bull Vṛṣṭa, or Śiva without his adorning serpents. Yet in each case we note that the expression as a whole is a quite positive attribution. Again taking each unit in sequence, the verse may be read as follows: "He was known to be Kṛṣṇa (although) a non-destroyer of Vṛṣṭa"/ "Righteous, a non-destroyer of dharma"; "The Moon (although) without experiencing decline"/"A King without experiencing adversity"; "A Deva (although) without divinity"/"A Lord not without wise councilors"; "Śamkāra without serpents"/"Munificent without sychophants."

2.323 Definition of Viśesokti [Viśesa] Alamkāra

Displaying a deficiency

of either Attribute Genus Action and so on

Strictly for the sake of presenting an excellence --

This is considered Viśesokti.

Viśesoktyalamkāralakṣanam :

gunajātikriyādīnām yattu vaikalyadarśanam

viśeṣadarśanāyaiva sā viśeṣoktiriṣyate

vaikalya- /"deficiency," "defect"; "non-existence."

viśesokti [< viśesa (+) uktih] /literally, "the expression of excellence," "distinction."

Viśesokti alamkāra presents either the absence or "deficiency" (vaikalya) of a subject's usually distinctive

feature or series of attributes conceived through the familiar fourfold categorization as either "attribute" (guna) [2.324], "genus" (jāti) [2.325], "action" (kriyā) [2.326], or individual or material object (dravya) [2.327]; or given this deficiency, an explicit indication of the cause (hetu) [2.328] which allows the subject to proceed regardless. Yet such deficiency is not displayed for its own sake, but "strictly for the sake of presenting an excellence" of the given subject. That is, despite what one would take to be obviating lack, the subject is yet able to carry out an exceptional act -- a feat which of course can only emphasize the subject's exceptional nature.

The fundamental structural paradigm for each of viśesokti's varieties is similar, with hetu viśesokti providing a slight variation in explicitly marking a positive attribute of the subject as cause, where the others leave one to infer the excellence of the subject. Viśesokti then clearly plays upon the element of "causality" -- the primary cause of a notable effect is

either explicitly mentioned as an attribute of the subject, or left to be inferred as the thus exceptional and excellent nature of the subject itself. Deficiencies are presented only to emphasize the "power of a given cause which realizes its effect in a normal way" (Glossary/270).

We may briefly note various other varieties that similarly manipulate cause and effect. Within ākṣepa alamkāra, for example, kārana ākṣepa [2.131-32] displays the absence of primary cause and effect, although secondary causes are present. Alternately, in kārya ākṣepa [2.133-34], although the primary cause is present, its usual effect is absent. Where in vibhāvanā alamkāra [2.199-204] with the primary cause absent an effect yet occurs and we are led to infer either another cause, or to attribute this result to a "characteristic condition" of the subject itself. "We wonder in vibhāvanā, that the effect should come at all, but here [in viśeṣokti] we wonder at how it has come about. . . ." (Glossary/271). Yet some would consider the distinction between viśeṣokti and vibhāvanā

alamkāras to be rather blurred. Gero Jenner, for example, remarks, "Die Višeṣokti der frühen Autoren von Bhaṭṭī bis Dāṇḍin ist eine nicht sonderlich klare Figur. Vor allem wird ihr Unterschied zur Vibhāvanā nicht deutlich."⁵

And of course we have the detailed exposition of cause developed in hetu alamkāra itself [2.235-60].

Dāṇḍin's conception of višeṣokti alamkāra is echoed in the Agni Purāṇa [343.26cd-27ab], and by Bhoja in his Sarasvatīkaṇṭhabharanālaṅkārah [4.72-73]. Bhāmaha's view (KA [3.23-24]) is certainly similar, yet there is no developed differentiation: "When there is the lack of a single part and the existence of other complementary attributes but for the sake of presenting something special. . . ." [eka-deśasya vigame yā gunāntararasamsthitiḥ | višeṣaprathanāyāsau višeṣoktirmatā yathā ||] (KA [3.23]). He follows with a single example in [3.24], where we see that Kāma (Anaṅga) is yet capable of destroying the three worlds although Śiva has rendered him "bodiless."

Udbhaṭa (KASS [5.4-5]) appears to incorporate Dāṇḍin's

ultimate focus -- "presenting an excellence" -- although he shifts his structural emphasis to a specific mode of displaying causality: "Presenting the absence of effect, although its efficacious causes are evident, with the intention of expressing a distinctive excellence (viśesa) -- This is termed Viśeṣokti" [yatsāmagryepi śaktinām phalānutpattibandhanam | viśeṣasyābhidhitsātastadviśeṣoktir-ucyate ||] (KASS [5.4]). Udbhaṭa's conception of viśeṣokti is thus explicitly closer to vibhāvana alamkāra, and for the most part becomes the later standard view.

Vāmana (KAS [4.3.23]), through modeling the earlier conception to fit his own schema, offers a distinctive view. The element of "deficiency" is retained, yet the end is the emphasis of "similarity" rather than "excellence." "Upon the perception of the absence of a particular attribute, there is the firm corroboration of similarity -- This is viśeṣokti" [ekaguṇahānikalpanāyām sāmyadārdhyām viśeṣoktiḥ ||].

And finally we may note Mammatā's position (KP

[10.108ab]) which is quite the reverse of Dandin's:

"Viśesokti -- Where although the causes are effective, the effect is not expressed" [viśeṣoktirakhaṇdeśu kāraṇeśu palāvacah |]. As Gerow points out, "This figure is just the inverse of [Dandin's variety] where the effect is present, the contributing cause absent" (Glossary/273).

Mammata presents three varieties, two of which are drawn from Udbhatā. We find (1) anuktanimitta, where "the cause is unexpressed" (compare with Udbhatā's nimitta adarśana (KASS [5.5])); (2) uktanimitta, where "the cause is expressed" (compare with Udbhatā's nimitta darśita (KASS [5.5])); and (3) acintyanimitta, where "cause is inconceivable."

2.324 Example of the Viśesokti involving a Deficiency of Attribute

Neither hard nor sharp

Even so --

That weapon of Puṣpadhanvan

Surely conquered the threefold world.

Gunavaikalya Viśesoktyudāharanam :

na kaṭhoram na vā tīkṣṇamāyudham puṣpadhanvanah

tathāpi jitamevāśidamunā bhuvanatrayam

puspa-dhanvanah [(m.) (gen.) (sing.) < puspa-
dhanvan] / "the Flower-bowed One," that is, Kāma, god of
love and desire.

Daṇḍin's first example of viśesokti alamkāra presents

a deficiency of attributes (gunas). What would appear to be otherwise necessary attributes in a given material cause are absent, yet it achieves a wondrous and quite exaggerated effect. Given this, we cannot but infer the extreme efficacy and thus "excellence" of the object itself.

Kāma's bow -- with bees for a drawstring and flowers for arrows -- is "Neither hard nor sharp." Yet truly how excellent it must be, for even so, it "Surely conquered the threefold world" in filling the hearts of their respective inhabitants with love and desire.

2.325 Example of the Viśeṣokti involving a Deficiency of Genus

Neither a daughter of Devas

Nor one born in the family of Gandharvas

Even so ---

This one is capable of destroying

the austerities even of Vedhas.

Jātivaikalya Viśeṣoktyudāharanam :

na devakanyakā nāpi gandharvakulasambhavā

tathāpyeṣā tapobhaṅgam vidhātum vedhasopyalam

vedhasah [< (m.) vedhas] /an epithet of the god
Bhramā.

In jāti viśeṣokti the lack of inclusion within a

specific "genus" or group noted for its capability to produce a specific effect again could initially appear ultimately restrictive. The cause yet occurs and we are thus led to reflect upon the subject's exceptional nature.

Where the spiritual austerities and ensuing power or tapas of sages depends upon disciplined continence, one might usually assume that only a women born into a "celestial jāti" as "a daughter of Devas" or in "the family of Gandharvas" could generate a desire sufficient to break down the ascetic vow. That a woman merely human-born is capable of this feat, truly bespeakes her surpassing beauty.

2.326 Example of the Viśesokti involving a Deficiency of

Action

Brows not knitted

Lips not quivering

Eyes not flushed --

Yet the enemy host was conquered.

Kriyāvaikalya Viśesoktyudāharanam :

na baddhā bhrukuṭirnāpi sphurito daśanacchadah

na ca raktābhavaddr̥ṣṭirjitam ca dviṣatām kulam

Kriyā viśesokti explicitly notes the occurrence of an exceptional event despite the notable absence of a number of associated "actions." Where a king or warrior conquers the enemy host with "Brows not knitted / Lips not quivering / Eyes not flushed" -- all actions indicative of the strain and effort of combat -- we can only infer ease and facility, and thus a truly exceptional degree of skill and valor.

2.327 Example of the Viśesokti involving A Deficiency of
Objects

Without

Chariots Elephants Horses Infantry --

Through just a side-glance

Women conquer the threefold world.

Dravyavaikalya Viśesoktyudāharanam :

na rathā na ca mātaṅgā na hayā na ca pattayah

strīnāmapāṅgadrṣṭyaiva jiyate jagatāṁ trayam

rathāḥ / mātaṅgāḥ / hayāḥ / pattayah : The four limbs of the classical Indian army (chatur- or sena- aṅga). This army was "ideally" conceived to be based upon a "platoon" consisting of one elephant, one chariot, three cavalry troopers, and five infantry men. Repetitive multiplication

by nine yields the various organizational levels: nine platoons = a gulna or "company," led by a nāyaka; nine gulnas = a vāhin or "battalion," led by a vāhinpati; nine vāhins = a senā or "regiment," led by a senāpati; nine senās = a chamū or "division," led by a chamūnātha. Yet the largest unit, the aksauhini or "army corps" led by the mahāsenāpati (usually the king), was conceived to consist of 21,870 elephants; 21,830 chariots; 65,610 cavalry; and 109,350 infantry men.

We have seen "dravya" in the sense of "specific individual" marking a specific variety of svabhāvokti alamkāra [2.12]. Yet dravya in the present dravya viśesokti takes on its alternate meanings of "material," "object," "that which is necessary." Thus specific objects usually associated with a specific effect are explicitly noted as deficient in an expressed primary cause -- yet the effect occurs. That such a cause is efficacious given this lack is an evident indication of its power.

Clearly the wondrous power of women is revealed in their ability to conquer the hearts of those dwelling throughout the threefold world. Yet how much more is this power emphasized when we realize such a feat of "arms" is accomplished without the fearsome strength of the four military limbs -- "chariots," "elephants," "horses," "infantry" -- but rather "Through just a side-glance."

2.328 Example of the Viśeṣokti of Cause

The chariot's one-wheeled

The driver handicapped

The horses uneven

Even so --

The mighty sun

overruns the expanse of the sky.

Hetu Viśeṣoktyudāharanam :

saiśā hetuviśeṣoktistejasvīti viśeṣanāt
 ayameva kramonyeṣāṁ bhedānāmapi kalpane

2.329 The Viśeṣokti involving Cause / Conclusion to
Viśeṣokti Alamkāra

This is a Viśeṣokti involving Cause

due to the modifier "mighty."

When postulating even other varieties

surely this is the method.

Hetu Viśeṣokti / Viśeṣoktyalamkāropasamhārah

saiśā hetuviśeṣoktistejasvīti viśeṣanāt
 ayameva kramonyeṣāṁ bhedānāmapi kalpane

Hetu viśesokti provides a slight variation on the preceding. It displays a "qualified" rather than absolute deficiency in that "the deficient attribute is present but in an unusual or improbable form" (Glossary/272). In spite of this handicap the given subject is able to overcome and to effect an impressive result. And further, we have the explicit mention of a distinctive attribute of the subject -- as an indication of its "excellence" this "viśesa" may be considered the actual "cause" (hetu) of the subject's feat.

Thus the various attributes of the sun imaginatively conceived appear as partial deficiencies: his chariot pictured as the blazing disc is thus but "one-wheeled"; the driver known as Anūru, the "Thighless One," is without a lower body and thus appears "handicapped"; and even further, the horses are unbalanced in their traces, numbering seven in reflecting the seven days of the week. Yet despite these seeming drawbacks the mighty sun indeed "overruns the expanse of the sky."

With the inclusion of the viśesa or modifier "mighty" (tejasvin) we have the explicit indication of the cause or basis of the sun's exceptional capability. Admittedly this "cause" appears to be somewhat indirect. As Rangacharya Raddi notes in glossing this variety, "It is called hetu viśesokti due to the modifier 'tejasvī', which is a concealed cause" [tejasvīti viśesanād hetugarbha-viśesanāditi bhāvah] (RR/292).

Dāṇḍin closes viśesokti alamkāra, as we have mentioned, with yet another indication of the "open-endedness" of his schema.

2.330 Definition of Tulyayogitā Alambikāra

When presenting a subject

equating it with something excessive

in the given attribute one wishes to portray

-- with an eye towards praise or censure --

This is considered Tulyayogitā.

Tulyayogitālamkāralakṣanam :

vivakṣitagūnotkr̄ṣṭairyat samīkṛtya kasya cit

kīrtanam stutinindartham sā matā tulyayogitā

tulya-yogitā /literally, "equal-connection,"
"association."

Tulyayogitā alambikāra displays an "equal-connection" or
association between two things, through their being

perceived to equally possess a distinctive "attribute one wishes to portray." A subject's imagined possession or display of this given attribute is the point to be emphasized -- it is thus equated with "something excessive," something universally accepted to possess or display to an excessive degree this chosen feature. Yet this attribute need not reflect a positive quality; it may be presented "with an eye towards praise" certainly, but towards "censure" as well, generating our two varieties.

Tulyayogitā is clearly similar to both upamā and rūpaka alamkāras, and may also be compared, with its incorporation of either praise or censure, to Dāṇḍin's second type of leśa alamkāra, aprastutapraśamsā alamkāra, vyājastuti alamkāra, and to a number of subvarieties.

In tulyayoga upamā [2.48-49], for example, there is the equation of "the inferior with the superior / in the performance of the same action." Yet this "equation" strictly pertains to participation in the same action. We do indeed infer a comparison between the two objects, but

each remains in its respective sphere -- spheres essentially unequal. In tulyayogitā alamkāra, however, the element of equalization is complete and explicit. In rūpaka alamkāra we go to an extreme, where two objects are "superimposed," each conjoined (grammatically and/or syntactically) in explicit identification with the other. Here each object retains its individual identity, yet both are presented as though of equivalent status.

Of further variations on "praise or censure" one may compare, for example, praśamśa upamā [2.31], where positive qualities of upamānas "appreciate" further through praise -- "And thus, through reflective similarity, an upameya is correspondingly elevated." Alternately, in ninda upamā [2.30] we find "ironic depreciation" of two upamānas allowing the upameya to "supersede." Praise may be offered in the guise of censure, or censure as praise in the second type of leśa alamkāra [2.268-72]. In the forthcoming aprastutapraśamsā alamkāra [2.340-42] we shall simultaneously infer an unexpressed "contingent subject" and

its censure. And in the following vyājastuti alamkāra [2.343-47] we shall see the subtle expression of an inferior/superior relationship within the context of censure and inferred praise.

Both Bhāmaha's and Vāmana's conception of tulyayogitā alamkāra is indeed closer to Dāṇḍin's tulyayoga upamā [2.48-49]. Thus Bhāmaha's focus comes to rest ultimately on the presentation of similarity: "A desire to convey similarity of attributes -- due to their association with the same action -- of an inferior with a superior" [nyu-nasyāpi viśiṣṭena gunasāmyavivakṣayā | tulyakāryakriyā-yogādityuktā tulyayogitā ||] (KA [3.27]). Yet his single example in [3.28] appears to be closer to those of Dāṇḍin's for the alamkāra itself.

The similarity of Vāmana's definition is evident: "The conjunction of simultaneous action for the sake of equating [inferior] with superior. . . ." [viśiṣṭena sāmyārthamekakālakriyāyogastulyayogitā ||] (KAS [4.3.26]). Udbhaṭa, although stressing similarity, chooses a somewhat

different perspective: "An expression that presents similarity between [either] aprastuta [the means of illuminating the subject] or prastāvabhāj [(prastuta) the subject or topic] without describing them as upamāna and upameya [literally, "devoid of the upamāna/upameya relationship"]" [upamānopameyoktiśūnyairaprastutair-vacah | sāmyābhidhāyi prastāvabhāg�hirvā tulyayogitā ||] (KASS [5.7]). Gerow offers the following definition of "aprastuta" [upamāna], where "the concatenated terms are obliquely related to the intentional subject of the utterance"; and of "prastāvabhāj [(prastuta) upameya], where "the concatenated terms function as the intentional subject of the utterance" (Glossary/192).

And Mammata differs yet again, viewing tulyayogitā as the presentation of "an attribute held in common by a number of specific objects" [niyatānām sakṛddharmaḥ sā punastulyayogitā ||] (KP [10.104cd]). Where we find in the following vṛtti that "specific objects" refers to either those that are "prākaranika" (or prastuta), or to those

that are aprākaranika (or aprastuta), each forming the basis for a single example.

2.331 Example of the Tulyayogitā of Praise

Yama Kubera Varuna Sahastrākṣa

and You --

Bear the name "world protector"

inapplicable to others.

Stuti Tulyayogitodāharanam :

yamah kubero¹⁴ varunah sahasrākṣo bhavānapi
bibhratyananyaviṣayām lokapāla iti śrutim

śrutim : khyātim /"name," "assertion," "idea"; "fame," "celebrity" (RR/294).

yama /the "Restrainer" [< *yam]: An ancient deity,

lord and judge of the dead, and ruler or the southern quarter. The first of mortals to die, he found the way to the regions of the "fathers" (pitr̄s) and was deified. The son of Vivasvat (the "Brilliant"), that is, the Sun, Yama rides a black buffalo with a mace for punishment and a noose (the kālasūtra) for capture in hand.⁷

kubera / (or kuvera) "One of Ugly Body"; the lord of the northern quarter, and of all precious minerals and gems and he is thus also known as "Lord of Riches" (dhanapati). In the oldest myths he appears as "Lord of Yaksas," "spirits" or "elemental beings" who guard treasures hidden in the earth and under trees. Kubera (known in the Rāmāyaṇa as Vaiśravaṇa) was the original ruler of Laṅkā; having been usurped by his half-brother Rāvana he came to dwell in a fabulous palace on Mount Kailāsa. Upon practicing tapas for one-thousand years, Brahmā granted Kubera immortality and regency of the northern quarter. He appears as a misshapen dwarf with three legs, one eye, and eight teeth.⁸

varuna : An ancient and primary (and indeed Indo-

European) god associated with celestial order. He came to be seen as the guardian of rta, and thus as the protector of moral and ethical order. Varuṇa's powers were gradually transferred to the priestly and ruling classes. He was eclipsed by Indra, eventually becoming known as the "Lord of Oceans" (ambhurāja) or "Lord of the Waters" (jalapati), with the makara for his vehicle, and the designated ruler of the western quarter.

sahastrāksa /that is, Indra, considered the most powerful god of the Vedas. "His worship probably represents a phase of the Aryan invasion more active in opposing and subduing the aboriginal tribes of India than the era of the serene and metaphysical Varuṇa."⁹ With his gradual loss of powers, Indra comes to rule the eastern quarter. He dwells in Svarga heaven, attended upon by Apsarās and Gandharvas, with the elephant Airāvata for his mount.

In stuti tulyayogitā the end is "praise" of a given

subject through its portrayal in equivalent association with objects universally held to be "excessive" in a positive quality.

In presenting a great king as one and the same with the four "Lokapalas," the guardians and masters of the Four Quarters -- "Yama Kubera Varuna Sahastrākṣa / and You" -- and in noting the truly exceptional attribute that each shares, where all "Bear the name 'World Protector'," clearly this lord's power and extensive sway is duly praised.

2.332 Example of the Tulyayogitā of Censure

Relationships with

Doe-eyed women Lightening flashes

although begun with

fervor / thunderclouds

Do not last even for two seconds.

Nindā Tulyayogitodāharanam :

saṃgatāni mṛgākṣinām taḍidvilasitāni ca
kṣaṇadvayam na tiṣṭhanti ghanārabdhānyapi svayam

ghana- /"dense," "thick"; "big," "great"; "intense";
and also "(thunder) cloud." Dandin thus presents the source
of his primary objects in this case through a single word
as a abhinna ślesa.

In nindā tulyayogitā we have the opposite of the
preceding. A posited equivalence is drawn between a given
subject and something manifestly displaying an attribute
which -- in context -- can only shed a dubious light.

"Lightening flashes" indeed have for their source
great and massive, seemingly all-powerful "thunder clouds,"
yet "do not last for even two seconds." Just so, where
relationships with beautiful, "doe-eyed women" are cast as
clearly equivalent -- beginning in passionate "fervor" but

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failing to endure beyond the fleeting moment -- we cannot
help but question their ultimate value.

2.333 Definition of Virodha Alamkāra

Presenting the conjunction

of contradictory elements

for the sake of showing something special --

This is considered Virodha.

Virodhālamkāralakṣanam :

viruddhānām padārthānām yatra samsargadarśanam

viśeṣadarśanāyaiva sa virodhah smṛto yathā

Virodha alamkāra displays as its distinctive feature the "conjunction of contradictory elements." It is not the case that these "contradictory properties are expressed of the same subject" (Glossary/265). Rather actions or attributes are predicated of distinct subjects and are respectively quite apropos -- it is from their "conjunc-

tion" (samsarga) that contradiction arises. And further, we do not have contradiction for its own sake, but specifically for showing in a striking way "something special" or especially distinctive.

Dāṇḍin does not explicitly name the varieties of virodha that follow, but I feel that his various bases for their respective distinction are clear. Far from being "based on no definite principles" (Notes 2/199), or "without any specific classification,"¹⁰ Dāṇḍin draws from the familiar four categories kriyā ("action"), guna ("attribute"), and dravya ("object" or "individual") to mark four of his six varieties; with "causality," and the ubiquitous ślesa integrated respectively within the two remaining.

Virodha alamkāra is widely accepted throughout the tradition, and although a degree of variation is noted, the element of "contradiction" remains central. Bhāmaha (KA [3.25-26]), for example, mirrors Dāṇḍin in having virodha present a particular excellence or distinction, yet he is

more specific in explicitly mentioning what the invoked contradiction is between: "Where for the sake of expressing distinction there is the presentation of an attribute or action in contradiction with another attribute or action. . . ." [*gunasya vā kriyāyā vā viruddhānyakriyā-bhidhā | yā viśeṣābhidhānāya virodham tam vidurbudhāḥ ||* (KA [3.25]). The Jayamāṅgalā commentary [873] sees virodha illustrated in Bhāttikāvyam [10.64], and although Udbhaṭa's definition (KASS [5.6]) follows that of Bhāmaha, his examples may logically extend the elements of "action" and "attribute" -- and thus possibly reflecting Dāṇḍin -- to include "object" and "genus" as well.¹¹

With Vāmana (KAS [4.3.12]) we find a distinctive variation with the addition of the "apparent" or "unreal." Thus "Where contradiction is but apparent -- This is Virodha" [*viruddhābhāsatvam virodhah ||*].

Rudrāṭa (KA [9.30-44]) explicitly includes all four of the categories and their possible combinations (with the exception of jātidravya) in his expansion of virodha's

varieties. We thus find, for example, contradiction between two dravyas [9.34]; two gunas [9.35]; two kriyās [9.36]; two jātis [9.37]; dravya and guna [9.38]; dravya and kriyā [9.38]; guna and kriyā [9.39]; guna and jāti [9.39]; and jāti and kriyā [9.40].

And finally we may note in Mammata's presentation a synthesis of previous features. Thus in his definition (KP [10.110ab]) there is an obvious debt to Vāmana: "It is virodha where something is expressed through contradiction although there is no contradiction as such" [avirodhah so 'virodhe 'pi viruddhatvena yad vacah]. Yet his first nine of ten potential varieties enumerated in [10.110cd-111ab] are drawn from Rudraṭa, with the tenth (excluded by Rudraṭa) now reflecting (apparent) contradiction between jāti and dravya.

2.334 Example of the Virodha of Actions

The Rājahamsas' call

-- captivating through intoxication --

swells. . .

The Peacocks' cry

-- its richness faded --

dies. . .

Kriyā Virodhodāharanam :

kūjitam rājahamsānām vardhate madamañjulam

kṣīyate ca mayūrāṇām rutamutkrāntasauṣṭhavam

Dāṇdin's first example of virodha alamkāra displays what I feel may justifiably be termed "kriyā virodha" -- the conjunction of now contradictory actions (and it is not

the case that these are necessarily "two actions of the same subject" (Glossary/266)). Thus where the beautiful snowy-white Rājahamsas' call "swells" -- "captivating" in reflecting an intoxicated joy -- the cry of the brilliantly variegated Peacocks' cry "dies" -- its usual "richness faded."

Two contradictory actions are presented, with each completely appropriate to the context. For where the Peacocks' cry fades we infer a period other than the rainy season, when their happiness is proverbially evident. And given this and that the Rājahamsas' call swells in joy, we are led to further infer that the verse depicts their own preferred autumn season. As Rangacharya Raddi notes, "The extraordinary greatness of the autumn season is indicated" [Śaratkālasya māhātmyam sphuṭam pratīyate |] (RR/296).

2.335 Example of the Virodha of Attributes

The sky becomes black

with rainy season clouds

Yet the heart of the world

becomes filled with scarlet / passion.

Guna Virodhodāharanam :

prāvṛṣenyairjaladharairambarām durdināyate

rāgenā punarākrāntam jāyate jagatām manah

rāga /"scarlet,' and also "passion." Dandin employs this slesa to mark not only one of the contradictory attributes, but also to complete the sense of the verse -- both meanings are equally evident.

As with actions, contradiction may be correspondingly

displayed between the distinctive "attributes" (gunas) of two conjoined subjects. Thus for the sake of showing "the distinction of the rainy season" / varṣāsamayasya viśeṣah (RR/296). Dandin offers us two associated features displaying quite contradictory attributes. Surely the "sky becomes black" with the dark thunderclouds of the rainy season, yet just as surely it is the time for lovers, of opportune confinement, and thus, "fills the heart of the world" with a bright and "scarlet passion" -- one and the same subject simultaneously displays two contradictory colors as attributes conjoined within the same verse.¹²

2.336 Example of the Virodha of Objects

Slender waist -- Wide hips

Red lips -- Black eyes

Low navel -- High breasts

This female body. . .

Whom does it not slay?

Dravya Virodhodāharanam :

tanumadhyam prthuśroni raktauṣṭhamasitekṣanam

natanābhi vapuh strīnām kam na hantyunnatastanam

Continuing Dandin's series, I would see the present variety of virodha alamkara displaying contradiction between "specific objects or materials" (dravyas). Admittedly, there is room for interpretation. Rangacharya

Raddi, for example, believes the contradiction in this case lies between "attributes present in different parts [of the same object]" / *avayavagataguna* (RR/296). Yet I would aver that the distinction is not between attributes as such (as in the preceding example), but between the objects that the attributes thus mark. Gerow's evaluation of this verse stems from misreading and a perceived semantic distinction in English falsely attributed to the Sanskrit: "Though based on guna, [this verse] does not show virodha in any accepted sense. . . . [It shows] only a situation of contrasts, not contradiction" (Glossary/267).

"This female body" truly is "something special," for although displaying contradiction between a number of objects -- waist/hips, lips/eyes, navel/breasts -- who can stand against its beauty? "Whom does it not slay?"

2.337 Example of the Virodha involving Attributes and

Action

Slender one!

Though your body has arms of lotus stalks

Thighs of tapering plantain trees

A lotus for a face and lilies for eyes --

It ends in scorching us.

Gunakriyā Virodhodāharanam :

mṛṇālabāhu rambhoru padmotpalamukhekṣanam

api te rūpamasmākam tanvi tāpāya kalpate

The previous varieties have demonstrated that virodha may exist between the "categories" as such -- between kriyā and kriyā [2.334], guna and guna [2.335], dravya and dravya [2.336], for example -- yet now Dāṇḍin shows that

contradiction is perfectly possible between one category and another. Thus I have termed the present variety "guna-kriyā" virodha, and would see contradiction between the presumed attributes of various objects and a quite inapposite action for which they are responsible.

Danḍin incorporates three rūpakas to display the various attributes of the body of a beautiful woman. A body which has "arms that are in fact lotus stalks" in their slender form; thighs which are "tapering plantain trees" in their pleasing shape; a "face that is a lotus" in its beauty; and "eyes that are lilies" in their shining brilliance. We note that there is no contradiction involved -- each attribute is entirely appropriate given the beauty of the woman concerned. Yet where we would expect these features to generate a soothing pleasure, we find to the contrary that this body "ends in scorching us" with its generation of heated desire.

We have seen Rudraṭa's explicit presentation of the possible combinations of all four categories implicit in

Dandin's somewhat brief layout. Again Dandin frequently provides but a template or points to further possibilities of process and combination.¹³

2.338 Example of the Virodha of Cause and Effect

The pollen of the Mango and Campaka

kicked-up by garden breezes

Yet without touching

brings tears to the eyes of travellers.

Kāraṇakārya Virodhodāharanam :

udyānamāruttoddhutāścūtacampakareṇavah

udaśrayanti pānthānāmasprśantopi locane

cūtah /the Mango tree.

campakah /a tree bearing fragrant, yellow flowers.

In his previous layout of the varieties of viśeṣokti alamkāra [2.323-29], Dandin invoked our categories and the element of "cause" (hetu). Similarly, we now have a variety of virodha alamkāra where "contradiction" is displayed between a given cause (kārana) and ensuing effect (kārya). In a sense of course the preceding gunakriyā virodha could be similarly viewed. Yet there we saw the presentation of attributes as such and an action as such -- we infer the causal relationship. Now not only are cause and effect explicitly presented as such, but the grounds for the contradiction between them is marked as well.

The irritating "pollen" of the Mango trees and Campaka flowers "kicked-up by garden breezes" is a perfectly plausible cause of "tears" appearing in "the eyes of travellers." Yet when we are told that this result occurs "without touching" the element of contradiction -- how would pollen generate tears without contact? -- is introduced.

And again contradiction leads us to infer a more

subtle reality. For the presence of pollen indicates the blooming of the Mango and Campaka flowers in all their beauty and the erotic season of spring. For travellers at this time, distant from their lovers, such beauty can only remind them in comparative reflection of their separation and bring tears to their eyes in sadness.

2.339 Example of the Virodha of Multiple Embrace

Sweet speaker! Your glance
though affectionate / red
 / black and white
 dwells on exends to
 Karna / the ears --
 Who would trust it?

Ślesa Virodhodāharanam :

kṛṣṇārjunānuraktāpi dr̥ṣṭih karnāvalambini
yāti viśvasanīyatvam kasya te kalabhāṣinī

kṛṣṇa /the god Kṛṣṇa, faithful ally of the Pāṇḍavas (the five Pāṇḍu brothers) in their struggle against the Kauravas.

arjuna /Arjuna, fathered by Indra -- and thus displaying great prowess as a warrior -- one of the five sons of Pāṇḍu, along with Yudhiṣṭhira, Bhīmasena, Nakula, and Sahadeva.

karna /Karna, abandoned and illegitimate son of Kuntī and Sūrya, the Sun, brought up by Adhinatha and Rādhā -- a powerful and skilled warrior, allied with the Kauravas.

And as we have seen in so many cases, a variety may be generated through the incorporation of a distinctive feature -- now subordinate -- of another alamkāra, here the ever-available ślesa. Yet as a variety of virodha alamkāra

the element of contradiction comes to the fore. That is, not only does it exist beyond the ślesas themselves, albeit incorporating the particular meanings of the expanded ślesas within it, but contradiction is the basis upon which the ultimate meaning of the verse rests.

Dāṇḍin draws on four abhinna ślesas to develop two parallel and simultaneous images: (1) rakta /"affectionate," and also "red"; (2) kṛṣṇa /Kṛṣṇa, the clever and powerful god, and also "black"; (3) arjuna /Arjuna, one of the Pāñdava brothers,; and also "white"; and (4) karna / mighty ally of the Kauravas, and also "ear(s)."

The expanded verse may thus be read as follows: "Sweet speaker! Your glance though affectionate towards Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna, dwells on Karna" / "Your glance -- red (with a touch of enticing intoxication), black (with shades of collyrium), and white (with flashing eyes) -- extends to the ear (in its sweeping brilliance) -- Who would trust it?"

A lover thus addresses his beloved, praising the

extreme beauty of her glance. Two images of the "glance" are created with the aid of these śleṣas -- in one appropriate and distinctive attributes are displayed, in the other we are offered action entailing an element of contradiction. For although her glance is "affectionate towards" Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna, friends and allies, it also "dwells on Karṇa," their avowed enemy. How could the same woman hold similar feelings for members of two opposed camps?

Yet after all the lover is speaking in affectionate play, and this contradiction is thoroughly imagined. Through it he stresses the powerful force of a glance that steps beyond normal bounds, affecting all without distinction -- "Who would trust it?" By which expression this lover subtly implies that before such beautiful eyes it is his own behavior which one might more appropriately distrust.

Notes [2.310] - [2.339]

1. The Reverend E. Hooker, 1683, cited in The Oxford-English Dictionary, vol. 8 , Reprint (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961 (1933)), p. 1594.
2. D. K. Gupta, A Critical Study, p. 225, n. 4.
3. V. S. Apte, The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary, rev. and enlarged edition, Reprint (Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co., 1978 (1957)), p. 796.
4. Cornelia Dimmitt and J. A. B. van Buitenen, "The Wedding of Śiva and Pārvatī" [from the Vāmana Purāṇa [27.1-62], in Classical Hindu Mythology (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978), p. 168.
5. Gero Jenner, Die Poetischen Figuren (Hamburg: Ludwig Appel Verlag, 1968), p. 231.
6. Rangacharya Raddi's reading of "kubaro" is considered a misprint, and has been emended to "kubero."
7. Margaret and James Stutley, Harper's Dictionary of Hinduism, p. 346; Benjamin Walker, Hindu World, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1968) pp. 614-15.
8. Margaret and James Stutley, Harper's Dictionary of Hinduism, (1977), p. 154; Hindu World, p. 154.
9. Benjamin Walker, Hindu World, p. 480.
10. D. K. Gupta, A Critical Study, (1970), p. 227.
11. Udbhaṭa, Kāvyālaṅkārasāraśaṅgraha of Udbhaṭa, edited by Narayana Daso Banhatti, 2nd edition, (1982), (Notes) p. 123.
12. And thus again I feel that Gerow errs. He would see

this variety as "jāti virodha," "A type of virodha where generic incompatibility is shown in the same subject" (Glossary/267).

13. I would disagree with Gerow's evaluation of this example. He considers this an instance of "dravya virodha," "where the incompatibility is that of particular individual things or ideas" (Glossary/267).

2.340 Conclusion to Virodha Alāmkāra / Definition of
Aprastutapraśamsā [Aprastutastotra] Alāmkāra

In this way this alāmkāra
is known to display numerous varieties.

Where praise pertains to
a contingent topic --

This is Aprastutapraśamsā.

Virodhālāmkāropasamhārah / Aprastutapraśamsā
Lakṣanām

ityanekaprakāroyamalamkārah pratīyate
aprastutapraśamsā syādaprakrāntesu yā stutiḥ

aprastuta- / "secondary"; "extraneous," "irrelevant";
"contingent."

aprakrāntesu [(loc.) (pl.) < a (+) pra (+) *kram] / "not begun"; "not pertaining to the principle point or topic."

Once again Dāṇḍin indicates that the methods and procedures of his presented varieties point the way to yet further possibilities. That the element of "contradiction" or "disjunction" as such may be creatively employed as an incorporated feature in a number of other alamkāras Dāṇḍin has aptly shown throughout the Second Chapter: virodha upamā [2.33]; viruddha rūpaka [2.83-84]; viruddha artha dīpaka [2.109-10]; virodhavān arthāntaranyāsa [2.175]; aviruddhakriyā ślesā [2.317]; viruddhakarman ślesā [2.318]; avirodhin ślesā [2.321]; and virodhin ślesā [2.322].

Aprastutapraśamsā and the immediately following vyājastuti alamkāra focus on a feature that we have seen Dāṇḍin touch on repeatedly -- the manipulation of praise and censure. In aprastutapraśamsā alamkāra "praise" (praśamsā) pertains to a subject or topic that is actually

"contingent" or secondary (aprastuta). Yet Dāṇdin declines to mention the further and subtle dimension of this alamkāra. For through this contingent topic which is explicitly presented, we infer the primary subject or topic (prastuta); and through the praise of what is in fact secondary, we cannot but infer the implied censure of the primary topic as the ultimate purport.

As Belvalkar and Raddi point out, "Dāṇdin understands aprastutapraśamsā in the literal sense of aprastutasya [prastutanindartha] praśamsā ["praise of a secondary topic, where the intent is censure of the primary topic"], and so strictly limits the application of this figure to this case alone" (Notes 2/200).

Aprastutapraśamsā is the explicit realization as alamkāra of one of the two varieties subsumed by the "other definition" of leśa alamkāra which Dāṇdin notes is posited "by some" -- leśa involving "Censure through Praise" [2.268-70]. It is possible that in both of these cases we have a reflection of Bharata's lakṣaṇa "gunātipāta" (NS

[17.2, 19]), where (to repeat) "various expressions of qualities, inappropriately in a given situation, reflect gunātipāta -- sweet yet harsh in purport" (NŚ [17.19]).

Bhāmaha's definition (KA [3.299]) varies but slightly from that of Dandin's in terminology and in explicitly mentioning the primary subject (adhikāra): "Where there is praise of a object that is removed from the primary subject. . . ." [adhikārādāpetas ya vastuno 'nyasya yā stutih ||]. He offers a single example in [3.30]. Where Udbhaṭa (KASS [5.8]) follows Bhāmaha, but in the last pada of his definition he explicitly indicates that this praise of a "removed" object indeed "conveys the purport of the primary subject" (prastuta) [prastutārthānubandhini ||].

Vāmana (KAS [4.3.4]) initially appears to focus strictly upon the mode of indication of the prastuta, which he not surprisingly equates with the upameya: "In slight reference there is aprastutapraśamsā" [kiñciduktāvaprastutapraśamsā ||]. That is, as we read in the *vr̥tti* following, "Expressing similar objects while slightly

referring to the upameya through merely a sign" [*upameyasya kiñcilliñgamātrenoktau samānavastunyāse aprastutaprasamsā*]. Yet as he continues we find that he indeed includes Dāṇḍin's view, "It is aprastutapraśamsā praising the contingent object" [*aprastutasyārthasya praśamsanam-aprastutapraśamsā* ||].

With later writers, however, "praise" as an explicit element of aprastutapraśamsā is usually dropped. For these authors, "aprastutavarnanena prastutavarnanapratītiḥ is aprastutapraśamsā" ["A description of the prastuta is indicated through describing the aprastuta"]; where for Dāṇḍin (again), "aprastutapraśamsanena prastutanindāpratītiḥ is aprastutapraśamsā" ["Censure of the prastuta is indicated through praise of the aprastuta"] (Notes 2/201).

Thus Mammaṭa (KP [10.98cd-99], for example, considers that aprastutapraśamsā involves strictly the interplay between an expressed secondary topic and an implicit primary subject. His definition is brief, "That which is aprastutapraśamsā has for its basis the primary subject"

[aprastutapraśamsā yā sā saiva prastutāśrayā || (KP [10.98cd]). Yet in the following vṛtti he elaborates, "Hinting at the meaning of the principle subject when expressing the meaning of a contingent topic -- This is aprastutapraśamsā" [aprākaraṇikasyārthasyābhidhānena prākaraṇikasyārthasyākṣepo 'prastutapraśamsā |].

Mammāta's seven varieties thus play upon varying roles the primary subject may assume and the varying means of expressing it. We have: (1) expressing the cause (kārana), with the primary subject as the effect; (2) expressing the effect, with the primary subject as the cause; (3) expressing a "particular" (viśeṣa), with the primary subject as a "universal" (sāmanya); (4) expressing a universal, with the primary subject a particular; and (5) expressing something similar to the unexpressed primary subject. This last in turn has three variations: similarity may be expressed through (6) śleṣa, (7) samāsokti ("concise speech"), or (8) sādrśyamātra ("similarity alone").

2.341 Example of Aprastutapraśamsā Alamkāra

With foods easily obtained without effort

-- grass and darbha and sprouts and so on --

The deer live happily in the forests

without serving others.

Aprastutapraśamsālamkārodāharanam :

sukham jīvanti harinā vaneśvaparasevinah

annairayatnasulabhaistr̥ṇadarbhāñkurādibhiḥ

2.342 Explication of the Example of AprastutapraśamsāAlamkāra

Here a proud man

-- despondent from the stress of serving a king --

praises the life of the deer --

the contingent subject.

Aprastutapraśamsālamkārodāharanāsvarūpaprakāsanam :

seyamaprastutaivātra mrgavṛttih praśasyate

rājānuvartanakleśanirviṇṇena manasvinā

As Dandin clearly explains, "A proud man . . . praises the life of the deer" -- living happily in the forests, their wants easily supplied, and perhaps most indicative, without the demands of serving others. Praise explicitly pertains to what is in fact the contingent topic. For we

infer that he is casting more than a wistful eye toward life in the forest, and are led beyond the immediate verse to a realization of what in reality is the "primary" subject or topic of concern -- his own situation in life.

And given this context of praise, we simultaneously infer that this primary concern is held in a quite opposite light; that he is in fact appositely censuring his own circumstances and is indeed a man "despondent from the stress of serving a (perhaps overly demanding) king."¹

2.343 Definition of Vyājastuti Alamkāra

If one praises as though censuring

This is considered Vyājastuti --

For here only qualities in the guise of faults
come to the fore.

Vyājastutyalamkāralakṣanam :

yadi nindanniva stauti vyājastutirasau smṛtā
dosābhāsā gunā eva labhante hyatra samnidhim

Vyājastuti alamkāra balances the immediately preceding aprastutapraśamsā. Now with the realization as a distinct alamkāra of the alternate variety of the second type of leśa ascribed to by "some" [2.268, 271-72], we have a situation where "one praises as though censuring" -- for

what are explicitly presented as faults are but in reality qualities in disguise.

Again, we have very possibly an early reflection of vyājastuti in Bharata's lakṣana "garhāṇa" (NS [17.3, 31], "Where verbally stating a fault, one in actuality expresses a quality. . . ." Bhāmaha's definition (KA [3.31-32]) not only specifies the types of attributes involved, but also explicitly incorporates "similarity" as a primary component: "With a desire to express similarity -- through the representation of attributes superior and difficult to attain -- there is censure. . . ." [dūrādhikaguṇastotra-vyapadeśena tulyatām | kiṁcidvidhītsoryā nindā vyājastutir-asau yathā ||] (KA [3.31]).

Yet this view is not so different from that of Dāṇḍin's as it might first appear, as once again Bhāmaha seems to lose focus in attempting to express a number of features that may in fact be inherent in a more concise and pointed definition. In Dāṇḍin's presentation of vyājastuti, as opposed to that of aprastut-apraśamsā, both primary

subject and secondary topic are explicitly mentioned, and we indeed find the subtle inclusion of the superior/inferior relationship. For what appears as censure we may very well infer to be praise due to an ironic depreciation that involves a comparison between two things of quite distinct status.

Among the early approaches, Udbhaṭa's definition (KASS [5.9]) is perhaps the clearest: "Where censure is expressed through the denotative power of words, but where in reality praise is the primary intent" [śabdaśaktisvabhāvena² yatra nindeva gamyate | vastutastu stutih śresthā vyājastutirasau matā ||].

Later writers hold to a wider view, one reflecting the second type of leśa alamkāra with both its variants [2.268-72], and thus one comprising both the aprastutapraśamsā and vyājastuti alamkāras of Dāṇḍin. Bhoja, for example, specifically equates (this type of) leśa with vyājastuti, "Leśa is also considered to be none other than vyājastuti" [sa leśah syāttato nānyā vyājastutirapiśyate ||] (SKA

[4.58cd]); and again, "Leśa is also vyājastuti" [vyāja-stutirapi leśa eva |] (ŚP [10], vol. 2, p. 420). Where Mammaṭa (KP [10.112ab]) offers a usual definition:

"Vyājastuti -- where censure or praise appears on the surface, but where the actual meaning is the reverse"

[vyājastutirmukha nindā stutirvā rūḍharanyathā |].

As Belvalkar and Raddi note, "All writers except Daṇḍin, Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa, and Vāmana consider both nindayā stutih ["praise through censure"] and stutyā nindā ["censure through praise"] as the legitimate spheres of this figure" (Notes 2/203).

2.344 Example of Vyājastuti as Such

This earth was conquered by Rāma

a mere practitioner of austerities

The very same was conquered by You

being a king --

Restrain your pride!

Vyājastutisvarūpodāharanam :

tāpasenāpi rāmena jiteyam bhūtadhārinī

tvayā rājñāpi saiveyam jitā mā bhūnmadastava

rāma /that is, Praśurāma ("Rāma with the battle-axe"),
the sixth avatāra of Viṣṇu:

Lamenting thus and having laid out his father in
the presence of his brothers, Rāma took up his
battle-axe, determined to put an end to the
kṣatriyas [the warrior caste].

Rāma then went to Mahiśmatī, whose prosperity had been ruined by the brahmin-killers, O king, and raised in the middle of the city a huge mountain of their heads. Making the river run red with their blood, terrifying those brahmin-haters, he used his father's murder as motivation for wreaking havoc on the kṣatriyas. Expunging the kṣatriyas from the earth twenty-one times, the lord filled nine lakes in Samantapañcaka with their blood.³

Daṇḍin's first variety of vyājastuti is a presentation of the alamkāra "as such," a display of its essential nature (svarūpa) -- praise appearing in the guise of censure. One of high authority or perhaps a lover admonishes a king, censuring him for an evident display of self-aggrandizement upon extensive conquest -- "Restrain your pride!" It being pointed out in seeming deflation that after all this earth was also conquered by Parasūrāma, who was only "a mere practitioner of austerities" (tapas); and that after all he is a king, with all the great power that station entails and that no less could have been expected.

Yet this pose of censure is only apparent, for to

picture in ironic depreciation the great and fearsome Paraśurāma, slayer of kings and ksatriyas without end, as a "mere practitioner of austerities" in a context of comparison is to clearly imply the superiority of this king, and to offer the deepest praise over his extensive and glorious victory.

2.345 Example of the Vyājastuti of Multiple Embrace

Tearing

a young woman . / Sri

away from

an old man / Viṣṇu

You enjoy --

Oh King! Is this proper for you

Scion of the Ikṣvākus?

Ślesa Vyājastut�udāharanam :

pumṣah purāṇādācchidya śrīstvayā paribhuujyate
rājannikṣvākuvamśyasya kimidam tava yujyate

ikṣvāku-vamśyasya /"one of the Ikṣvāku clan or tribe," that is, one of the "solar dynasty" -- founded by Ikṣvāku, grandson of the Sun and eldest son of Manu Vaivasvat.

In ślesa vyājastuti we have the incorporation of ślesas -- words or compounds capable of "embracing" more than one meaning -- as integral elements. As we shall see in this example, the multiple meanings of the ślesas are utilized to generate two parallel expressions. With one, the more literally apparent in this case, censure appears to be offered; yet with the other, on the contrary we find praise expressed.

In Dandin's example two ślesas are present: (1) pumsa purāṇa /literally, "old man", and also the "Old Man," an epithet of Viṣṇu; and (2) śrī /a "young woman"; and also

"Śrī, wife of Viṣṇu; and "wealth," "prosperity." Thus with what might be one's initial reading (although both expressions are strictly simultaneously evident), a king is remonstrated for a thoroughly unworthy act, "Tearing a young woman away from an old man / You enjoy -- / Oh King! Is this proper for you / Scion of the Ikṣvākus?"

Yet with the alternate reading generated by the ślesas the result is quite otherwise, "Tearing Śrī away from Viṣṇu / You enjoy -- / Oh King. . . ." For not only could such a feat be attributed only to the mightiest of kings, but the further meaning of "Śrī", "wealth," "prosperity", is also carried along (albeit perhaps a step behind "Śrī"), and thus we further infer the possession of great wealth and a kingdom blessed with prosperity -- in each case abundant praise is offered. The concluding question is thus rhetorical, for such a demonstration of power and attainment is surely proper for a "scion of the Ikṣvākus."

2.346 Another Example of the Vyājastuti of Multiple
Embrace

Your wife is

a low caste woman / the Earth

attached to the

enjoyment / hood

of

libertines / the Serpent. . .

Why does your arrogance climb to such heights?

Ślesa Vyājastutya parodāharanam :

bhujaṅgabhogasamsaktā kalatram tava medinī¹
ahamkārah parām koṭimārohati kutastava

medinī : Viṣṇu destroyed the demons Kaitabha and Madhu, who sprung from his ear in an attempt to kill Brahmā -- "According to the Harivamśa, the bodies of the two asuras ["demons"] produced so much fat or marrow (medas), that Viṣṇu in the form of Nārāyaṇa formed the earth from it, and hence its appellation Medinī."⁴

Dandin offers another example of ślesa vyājastuti, whose essential process and structure mirrors the preceding. With now three ślesas employed we do have, however, a slightly greater degree of expansion: (1) medhinī / a "low caste woman," and also a name for the "Earth" (as Ratnaśrī glosses this word, prthivī jaghanya-jātiya ca strī / "the Earth and a woman of the lowest caste" (RŚ/187)); (2) bhoga / "enjoyment," and also a "(serpent's) hood"; and (3) bhujaṅga / "libertine," "rogue," and also "serpent" (here a reference to the great serpent Śeṣa, upon which the earth rests).

And again, one evident meaning appears as censure of a

king, now over the disrepute of his wife, "Your wife is a low caste woman, attached to the enjoyment of libertines -- Why does your arrogance climb to such heights?" Yet from the alternate reading generated by the ślesas we infer that again praise is the ultimate end, "Your wife is the Earth attached to the hood of the Serpent (Śeṣa). . . ."

We should note that we again infer the true nature of the praise that is being offered from the evident and direct meaning of this alternate reading. Whoever is praising the king is not saying literally that his "wife is the Earth," but rather in picturing the earth as the king's "wife" he or she is praising this king for his extreme power and dominion who is able to enjoy all the earth at will as he would his wife.

2.347 Conclusion to Vyājastuti Alamkāra

Thus studded with śleṣas

or other alamkāras

The expansion of the varieties of Vyājastuti
may be surmised to be endless.

Vyājastutyalamkāropasamḥārah

iti śleṣānuviddhānāmanyeshām copalakṣyatām
vyājastutiprakārāṇāmaparyantastu vistaraḥ

anyeshām : anyeshām anyālamkārasambaddhānām / "'of
others,' that is, in combination with other alamkāras"
(RR/302).

We should not assume that either the varieties of
vyājastuti alamkāra that incorporate as subordinate the

distinct feature of slesa alamkāra, or those varieties of other alamkāras that similarly and variously incorporate such distinctive features, are necessarily restricted to those that actually appear. Given of course success in the generation of "beauty," Dandin would thus see the potential scope of expansion of such varieties as open and indeed "endless."

2.348 Definition of Nidarśana Alambikāra

If an effect should be demonstrated

-- whether positive or negative --

similar to that of a specific situation

by one engaged in a parallel activity --

This would be Nirdarśana.

Nidarśanālamkāralakṣanam :

arthāntaraprapravṛttena kiṃcit tatsadrśam phalam

sadasadvā nidarśyeta yadi tat syānnidarśanam

nidarśanam [ni (+) *drś / "point out"] / "demonstration," "exemplification."

Nidarśana alambikāra "demonstrates" or "exemplifies" a generally applicable truth, moral or maxim -- two

situations are presented as similar through a perceived similarity of effect, "whether positive or negative." The truth of an initial situation as self-evident is superimposed upon and thus substantiates a following situation, whose universal validity is more of an ideal than an absolute reality. Gerow considers nidarśana "A figure in which a particular situation is translated into a general truth, and a moral is drawn. . . ."; and further notes that it differs from the related arthāntaranyāsa alamkāra [2.169-79] "in that the general truth is here expressed as the very meaning of the particular situation, not as another and more valid formulation of it" (Glossary/201).

Dāṇḍin offers two varieties directly stemming from his definition: a result and the situation it involves may be "positive" or beneficial (satphala) [2.349], or alternately, they may be "negative" or detrimental (asatphala) [2.350].

A "nidarśana" appears as a lakṣaṇa in Bharata's Nāṭyaśāstra [17.2,15]: "Where well-known things are stated

for the purpose of supporting a given position. . . ."

[yatrārthānam prasiddhānām kriyate parikīrtanam |
parāpeksāpyudāsārtham tannidarśanamucyate ||] (NŚ [17.15]).

Bhāmaha's view (KA [3.33-34]) is similar to that of Dāṇḍin's, although he specifically precludes the usage of such explicit comparative markers as "yathā," "iva," or "vat" (Dāṇḍin would appear to take this exclusion as self-evident, for with their appearance we would have upamā alamkāra). "Through only a specific action, illustrating a result as a well-known principle, without employing yathā, iva, or vat -- This is nidarśana" [kriyayaiva viśiṣṭasya tadarthasyopadarśanāt | jñeyā nidarśanā nāma yathevavatibhirvinā ||] (KA [3.33]). Bhāmaha follows in [3.34] with a single example that illustrates a "negative result": "This sun with dull lustre wants to go towards Asta Mountain / Thus instructing the wealthy -- 'Rising is for falling'" [ayam mandadyutirabhāsvānastam prati yiyāsati | udayah patanāyeti śrīmato bodhayannarān ||].

Udbhaṭa (KASS [5.10]) terms this alamkāra "vidarśanā,"

and introduces a new element that was to reappear in yet later writers. "Where either an improbable or probable connection between things generates an awareness of the upamāna/upameya relationship. . . ." [abhavanvastusambandho bhavanvā yatra kalpayet | upamānopameyatvam kathyate sā vidarśanā ||]. Gerow would see this as "a figure in which a similitude is suggested by attributing to one subject a property which is characterized as really belonging to another" (Glossary/263). Yet there is also a second aspect to Udbhaṭa's definition where vidarśana may appear in essentially the same guise that we have previously seen. And although he does not provide an example for this alternate type, one of his principal commentators Indurāja interestingly offers verse [3.34] of Bhāmaha's Kāvyālamkāra as an illustration.⁵

And although Vāmana's definition (KAS [4.3.20]) varies somewhat, his conception of nidarsana is similar to that of his predecessors: "For a specific action, revealing a connection between it and its cause. . . ." [kriyayaiva

svatadarthānvayakhyāpanam *nidarśanam* ||]. In his following example we see that the "connection" is not only between a specific cause and effect, but also between this situation and those for whom it is evidently relevant. Thus the attainment of "high" position is seen as the cause of the effect of "falling," where the further connection is marked by "the wealthy." That is, "A falling leaf indicates to the wealthy that high position results in eventual decline."

And finally we may note the synthesis of Mammata (KP [10.97bcd-98ab]) (who again uses the term "nidarśana"). He offers two types, the first clearly drawn from Udbhaṭa with its element of "improbable" relationship: "Nidarśana is an improbable connection between things which generates an awareness of similarity" [*nidarśanā* | *abhavan* *vastu-sambandha* *upamāparikalpakah* ||] (KP [10.97bcd]). Yet the second seems to reflect Vāmana's influence: "For a specific action, the expression of a connection between itself and

its cause is another [type of nidarśana]" [svasvahetv-anvayasyoktiḥ kriyayaiva ca sāpamā |] (KP [10.98ab]).

2.349 Example of the Nidarśana of Positive Effect

This rising sun

dispenses beauty among lotuses

to demonstrate that the fruit of one's riches

is for gracing one's friends.

Satphala Nidarśanodāharanam :

udayanneśa savitā padmeśvarpayati śriyam

vibhāvayitumṛddhīnāṁ phalam suhṛdanugraham

Daṇḍin's first example illustrates satphala
nidarśana -- one situation or circumstance "demonstrates"
the validity of another similar situation conceived as

"positive" and realized as a generally applicable maxim or precept.

It is self-evident that "This rising sun / dispenses beauty among lotuses," yet surely this demonstrates that the ultimate end of "one's riches / is for gracing one's friends" in an equally beneficial dispensation.

2.350 Example of the Nidarśana of Negative Effect

This massed darkness is instantly dispelled

touched by the beams of the moon --

Indicating the harsh end

of those opposed to the king / moon.

Asatphala Nidarśanodāharanam :

yāti candrāṁśubhiḥ sprṣṭā dhvāntarājī parābhavan
sadyo rājaviruddhānāṁ sūcayantī durantatām

rāja /"moon," and also "king."

With asatphala nidarśana structure and process remain the same as the preceding, yet now the "demonstrated" effect is woven within a situation that is distinctly unpleasant or "negative."

"The beams of the moon" dispelling "massed darkness" clearly indicate the inevitability of a similar effect in a parallel situation -- a noble king would surely, "dispel those who oppose him," reducing them in defeat to an entirely "harsh" and ignominious end.

2.351 Definition of Sahokti and Parivrtti Alamkāras

Sahokti involves describing conjunction

through attribute or action.

Yet an exchange of elements

is considered Parivṛtti.

Sahoktiparivṛttyalamkāralaksane

sahoktiḥ sahabhāvena kathanam guṇakarmanām

arthānām yo vinimayah parivṛttistu sā smṛtā

saha-uktih /literally, "expression with [the word]
'saha'" ("with"); "simultaneous expression."

sahabhāvasya [sahabhāvena] : sambandhinaḥ sahabhāvasya
yugapat /"simultaneous connection or conjunction" (RS/189).

Sahokti alamkāra presents the "conjunction" or

association of two distinct subjects through their mutual albeit respectively appropriate display of either the same attribute or the same action. As alamkāra these sahoktis "as such" are combined -- maintaining conjunctive attribute with conjunctive attribute, conjunctive action with conjunctive action (although presumably a combination of guna and kriyā sahoktis might be possible) -- with the attributes and actions varying in each case. Yet whatever these attributes or actions may be or the relationship between them, each distinct sahokti appropriately marks or "suggests" the deeper situation or reality that the kavi wishes to convey.

Among various other writers the conception of sahokti alamkāra remains generally unchanged. Bhāmaha (KA [3.39-40]), for example, is somewhat more specific than Dāṇḍin -- we have "two simultaneous actions" -- yet there is no mention of "attributes" as such. "Where two simultaneous actions relating to two objects are expressed through a single expression -- This is considered sahokti" [tulya-

kāle kriye yatra vastudvayasyamāśraye | padenaikena kathyete
sahoktiḥ sā matā yathā ||] (KA [3.39]).

Both Udbhaṭa (KASS [5.15]) and Vāmana (KAS [4.3.28]) follow Bhāmaha in their definitions, but Vāmana does add in his vṛtti, "Due to the usage of words which mean 'with' (saha) this is sahokti" [sahā 'rthaśabdasaṁarthyāt sahoktiḥ ||].

With Mammata (KP [10.112cd]) this stress on the actual words employed is formally incorporated: "It is sahokti where through the force [of words] meaning 'with,' a single [expression] indicates two [meanings]" [sā sahoktiḥ sahārthasya balādekaṁ dvivācakaṁ ||].

And we may note the somewhat distinct expression of sahokti in the Agni Purāṇa [343.23cd] (and later followed by Ruyyaka (KA [p. 81]) with its explicit inclusion of the element of "similarity": "Sahokti -- The presentation of similar objects appearing together" [sahoktiḥ sahabhāvena kathanam tulyadharminām ||].

2.352 Example of the Sahokti of Attribute

Now these nights are long

together with my sighs

And ornamented with the moon are white

together with my limbs.

Guna Sahoktyudāharanam :

saha dīrghā mama śvāsairimāḥ samprati rātrayah

pāṇḍurāśca mamaivāṅgaiḥ saha tāścandrabhūṣanāḥ

Guna sahokti presents the felicitous conjunction of a single attribute in two objects. And as an alamkāra we may possibly expect this conjunction to point to a further, unexpressed dimension. Dandin's example displays strictly two sahoktis -- their repetition serves to emphasize the ultimate purport of the verse. Thus both "nights" and a

woman's "sighs" are marked by the attribute "long"; and "ornamented with the moon," these same nights and this woman's "limbs" are both marked by the attribute "white."

As Ratnaśrī glosses this example, "Here the [distinct] connection or conjunction of both 'length' and 'whiteness' is expressed. And the long length of the sighs and the night, and the white limbs and nights appear simultaneously" [atra dairghyasya pāṇḍuratvasya cobhayasambandhinah sahabhāva uktaḥ | niśvāsa rātrayaśca dīrghā aṅgāni rātrayaśca pāṇḍurā yugapadbhavantīti ||] (RŚ/190).

As Ratnaśrī indicates, and Bhāmaha explicitly mentions, as an integrated whole we may accept the "simultaneity" of the features so conjoined. And just as Bhāmaha explicitly specifies that conjunction involves "two" things, we shall find this implicit in Daṇḍin's examples. We shall also note the usage of terms specifically marking conjunction. Daṇḍin may have felt that to explicitly specify their inclusion in a definition of sahokti -- as does Mammata -- was rather superfluous.

Thus for a woman separated from her beloved, the length of her sighs is only matched by the seemingly interminable nights; and just as the moon fills the night with whiteness, so her limbs cannot but appear pale and white reflecting the weakness of her condition stemming from this separation.

2.353 Example of the Sahokti of Action

The cluster of Mango flowers grows
along with the fainting of travellers
And the Malaya breezes are coming down
along with their lives.

Kriyā Sahoktyudāharanam :

vardhate saha pānthānām mūrchayā cūtamañjari
patanti ca samām tesāmasubhirmalayānilāḥ

Alternately in kriyā sahokti we have the simultaneous conjunction of two objects or situations through their display -- albeit distinctly appropriate -- of the same "action." Daṇḍin's example, as in the preceding, employs two distinct sahoktis, each effectively contributing to the ultimate purport of the verse. Thus both "Mango flowers" and the "fainting of travellers" simultaneously display the action or action of "increase" or "growth" (vardhate) ; "Malaya breezes" coming down off the slopes of the southern mountains, and the "lives" of these same travellers both "fall down" or "decline" (patanti).

Yet these conjoined actions and the subjects involved point towards or suggest the actual reality. For both the blossoming of Mango flowers and the northward movement of the southern Malaya breezes are signs of spring, and with the appearance of "travellers" we may justly assume that Daṇḍin once again touches on "love-in-separation."

The beauty of the growing Mango flowers can only remind those travellers of the beauty of their distant

lovers and thus can only "intensify" their fainting in despair; and similarly, the "fall" of the Malaya breezes as a marker of this most erotic of seasons strikes home the unfortunate reality of their situation, and thus cannot but contribute to the "decline" of their lives.

We note certainly that the actions of each of the sahoktis are strictly contradictory, and one might be led to elevate this feature as distinctive. I feel that the focus is one the sahokti itself, and thus in this case on action as such (as compared with, say, attribute), and thus consider the incorporation of contradiction between these primary, distinct elements entirely subordinate.

2.354 Another Example of the Sahokti of Action

Charming with the cries of the Kokilās

Fragrant with forest breezes

The days of spring increase

along with the joys of the people.

Kriyā Sahoktyaparodāharanam :

kokilālāpasubhagā sugandhivanavāyavaḥ

yānti sārdham janānandairvṛddhim surabhivāsarāḥ

Dāṇḍin provides what I feel is another example of kriyā sahokti yet with further variation. We have now strictly a single sahokti -- the same action simultaneously realized by two subjects -- subsumed within the verse.

Thus as "the days of spring increase" or lengthen (yānti . . . vṛddhi / literally, "go to growing"), so

appropriately do the "joys of the people." And the action of the sahokti is balanced by the presentation of two descriptive (and static) attributes -- unconjoined. As the spring days and joys increase, so is spring itself "charming (with the cries of the Kokilās)," and "fragrant (with forest breezes)."

2.355 Conclusion to Sahokti Alamkāra / Introduction to Parivṛtti Alamkāra

A few examples of Sahokti

are thus offered.

A brief illustration of the form of Parivṛtti will now be presented.

Sahoktyalamkāropasamhārah / Parivrttyalamkāropakramah

ityudāhṛtayo dattāḥ sahokteratra kāścana
kriyate parivṛtteśca kimcidrūpanidarśanam

2.356 Example of Parivṛtti Alamkāra

Giving weapon blows

Your arm received

the long-earned fame of kings --

white as the Kumuda flower.

Parivṛttyalamkārodāharanam :

śastraprahāram dadatā bhujena tava bhūbhujām
cirārjitam hr̥tam tesām yaśah kumudapāñduram

Parivṛtti alamkāra centers on an "exchange (vinimayah)

of elements (arthas)" [2.351]. Dāṇḍin's presentation is concise, with this single example offered. Ratnaśrī would see in potential elaboration these elements reflecting the familiar four categories: "An 'exchange' or transposition of elements involving attributes, actions and so on [that is, involving genus (jāti) and object/individual (dravya) as well]" / arthānām guṇakriyādīnām vinimayo vyatyayah (RŚ/189). Where other writers tend to focus on the relative status of the things exchanged.

Thus although the element of "exchange" remains central to parivṛtti alamkāra, individual conceptions are in this case I feel especially revealing. Bhāmaha (KA [3.41-42]) lays out specific requirements that are left implicit in Dāṇḍin: "When one receives a superior thing through turning over another [inferior thing], and with arthāntaranyāsa included -- This is parivṛtti" [viśiṣṭasya yadādānamanyāpohena vastunah | arthāntaranyāsavati parivṛttirasau yathā ||] (KA [3.41]). In his following

example [3.42] we see wealth exchanged for a "superior thing", that is, "fame."

With Vāmana (KAS [4.3.16]) the exchange of the inferior for the superior is dropped in favor of his characteristic focus. Now parivṛtti is seen as "The exchange of either similar or dissimilar things" [*sama-visadrśābhyaṁ parivartanam parivṛttih* ||].

Where Udbhaṭa (KASS [5.16]) extends the logical implications of earlier approaches, with yet further complication: "The exchange of something for [something either] equal, inferior, or superior; and which may be either advantageous or disadvantageous. . . ." [*samyūnaviśiṣṭairtu kasyacitparivartanam | arthānarthaḥasvabhāvam yatparivṛttirabhāṇi sā* ||].

Three possibilities of exchange and relative advantage are proposed: (1) equal exchanged for equal, reflecting arthatvaya abhāvah / "the absence of advantage"; (2) an exchange for something inferior, reflecting arthasya pratipakṣah / "the opposite of advantage," that is, a

situation positively disadvantageous; and (3) an exchange for something superior, reflecting arthasvabhāva, an "advantageous situation."

And Mammata's view essentially reflects a concise, synthetic repetition of the preceding: "Parivṛtti is the exchange of elements for things either equal or unequal" [parivṛttirvinimayo yo 'rthānām syāt samāsamaiḥ ||].

Where he repeats Udbhaṭa's threefold categorization of parivṛtti in his examples.

In Daṇḍin's example we find the "arm" of a powerful warrior "giving weapon blows" in exchange for the "long-earned fame of kings." And although Rangacharya Radhi correctly ascertains that, "Here one should realize that the exchange takes the form of receiving something superior for something inferior" / atra nyūnenādhikasya grahaṇarūpo vinimayo jñeyah (RR/306), there is no assurance from his brief definition or from this single example that Daṇḍin would restrict the status of the elements exchanged to this relationship.

2.357 Definition and Example of Āśis Alāmkāra

Āśis expresses a wish for something desired --

For example:

May the highest light

-- beyond speech and thought --

protect you.

Āśiralamkāralakṣaṇodāharanamca :

āśīrnāmābhilaśite vastunyāśaṁsanam yathā

pātu vah paramam jyotiravāñmanasagocaram

āśis [(f.)] /"a wish," "prayer," "benediction."

Dandīn includes āśis alāmkāra almost it seems in passing, noting merely that it is "expresses a wish for something desired," and including but this brief example.

Bharata's laksana "priyoktiḥ" (NS [17.5, 41]) is somewhat similar: "Words expressed for the sake of joy, to honor one worthy of honor in a friendly spirit -- This is termed Priyokti" [*yatprasannena manasā pūjyam pūjayitum vacah | harṣaprakāśanārtham tu sā priyoktirudāhṛtā |*] (NS [17.41]). Yet with the exception of Bhāmaha, and possibly of Bhatṭi, āśis was rejected as an alamkāra by the central tradition.

Bhāmaha's presentation (KA [3.55-57]) is somewhat more extensive than Dāṇḍin's with two complete examples. It is clear that even at this early date its acceptance as an alamkāra was not universal. "Some consider āśis as well an alamkāra. It is utilized in expression where there is no conflict with good feelings" [*āśirapi ca keśāmcidalañkāratayā matā | sauhṛdayyāvirodhoktau prayogo 'syāscā tadyathā ||*] (KA [3.55]).

One of his following examples [3.57] pictures the benediction offered a king on his way to war: "May all the kings see the cities of your enemies with their trees broken

down by elephants blind with rut, their warriors killed,
 their frightened citizens dispersed, and all their beauty
 burned by the fire of your valor" [madāndhamātañgavibhinna-
 sālā hatapravirā drutabhītapaurāḥ | tvattejasā dagdha-
 samastaśobhā dviśāṁ purāḥ paśyatu rājalokāḥ ||]. And if one
 accepts the Jayamaṅgalā commentary [881], Bhatṭi also
 illustrates āśis alamkāra in Bhatṭikāvyam [10.72].

Gerow comments on the later general rejection of āśis,
 "This figure, appropriately enough, occurs at the end of
 Bhāmaha's and Dāṇḍin's lists. Like general earlier figures
(preyas, ūrjasvi, rasavat), it was thought too closely
 allied to the content of its expression . . . and hence was
 discarded by later writers" (Glossary/129). No evidence is
 offered that this indeed was what later writers "thought,"
 but we have noted that "content" as the distinguishing
 factor in Dāṇḍin's subvarieties plays a minor role -- the
 focus again is on relational process and structural
 procedure.

Āśis was not, however, entirely discarded by later

writers. It is found in Vāgbhaṭa's Kāvyānuśāsana as an alamkāra (Notes 2/209). And it reappears as a "nātya alamkāra" in the Sāhityadarpaṇa [471] of Viśvanātha, indeed with an echo of Dāṇḍin's words -- "Āśiṣ is a propitious wish on behalf of a friend" [āśīriṣṭajanāśamsā |].

2.358 Indicating that Anavaya and Sasamdeha were Presented among the Upamās and that Upamārūpaka was Presented among the Rūpakas

Anavaya and Sasamdeha

were shown among the Upamās

And Upamā-rūpaka was shown

among the Rūpakas.

Upamāsvananvayasasamdehayoh Rūpakesūpamārūpakyasya

Darśitatvasya Sūcanam :

ananvayasasamdehāvupamāsveva darśitau

upamārūpakam cāpi rūpakeśveva darśitam

In the present (and the first-half of the following) verse Daṇḍin indicates specific independent alamkāras that he has chosen to include rather as subvarieties. Of course

it may well be that Dāṇḍin is simply accepting a preordained and variant view, yet again I feel that although this may be generally true with respect to the alamkāras themselves, Dāṇḍin is primarily responsible for the generation and development of their numerous variations. Now subsumed within other alamkāras, these cases reflect then yet another possibility of method in the elaboration of Dāṇḍin's schema.

"Ananvaya" appears as asādhāraṇa upamā in (KD [2.37]), where "the upameya is conceived as transcending all potential upamānas to the extreme where it can only be compared with itself, becoming, in effect, its own upamāna and thus 'unique'... Yet it is considered an independent alamkāra by, for example, Bhāmaha (KA [3.45-46]), Udbhaṭa (KASS [6.4]) (who repeats Bhāmaha's definition), Vāmana (KAS [4.3.14]), and Mammaṭa (KP [10.91abc]). Rudraṭa, however, apparently accepts Dāṇḍin's view, for although he retains the name "ananvaya" in his

Kāvyālaṅkāra [8.11], it appears as a subvariety of upamā alamkāra.

"Sasamdeha" (literally, "with doubt") appears as samśaya upamā in (KD [2.26]), where "the presence of doubt leads to the inference of similarity." As an independent alamkāra we find, for example, Bhāmaha's (KA [3.43-44]) and Udbhaṭa's (KASS [6.2]) sasamdeha; Vāmana's (KAS [4.3.11]) samdeha, Rudraṭa's (KA [8.59-65]) samśaya; and Mammata's (KP [10.92cd]) sandeha.

The element of "praise" is distinctive in Bhāmaha's conception: "A statement involving doubt, which expresses the [upameya's] identity with then [its] difference from the upamāna for the sake of [its] praise is known as Sasamdeha" [upamānenā tattvam ca bhedam ca vadataḥ punah | sasamdeham vacaḥ stutyai sasamdeham viduryathā ||] (KA [3.43]).

Dāṇḍin subsumes "supamā-rūpaka" within his presentation of rūpaka alamkāra [2.88-89], where one sees "similarity between the figurative usage of a word and the

factual or literal usage of the same word." Gerow considers that "the metaphorical identification is completed by a mention of the common property which justifies it" (Glossary/170).

As an independent alamkāra upamārūpaka appears only in Bhāmaha's Kāvyālaṅkāra [3.35-36]. Here an upamā appears as validation for the identification of the upameya and upamāna (the actual rūpaka). Yet Belvalkar and Raddi believe that "Dāṇḍin's definition of the figure is so differently worded from that of Bhāmaha that it would be hazardous to imagine that there is somekind of a connection between the two. . . . It is likely . . . that the two writers are following independent traditions in regard to their explanation[s] of this figure" (Notes 2/113). This is, however, far from certain.

We might note that Vāmana does include upamārūpaka (KAS [4.3.30]), yet he considers it one of two subvarieties of samsṛṣṭi alamkāra (along with utpreksāvayava), and says simply, "Upamārūpaka is rūpaka produced through upamā [upamājanyam rūpakamupamārūpakam ||] (KAS [4.3.32]).

2.359 Indicating that Utpr̥ekṣāvayava is a Variety of Utpr̥ekṣā / Definition of Samsṛṣṭi [Samkīrṇa] Alamkāra

Utpr̥ekṣā-vayava

is but a variety of Utpr̥ekṣā.

Yet the combination of various alamkāras

is termed Samsṛṣṭi.

Utpr̥ekṣāvayavasya Utpr̥ekṣābheda vasūcanam /

Samsṛṣṭyalamkāralakṣanam :

utpr̥ekṣābheda evāśāvutpr̥ekṣāvayavopi ca

nānālamkārasamsṛṣṭih samsṛṣṭistu nigadyate

Although Dāṇḍin would subsume utpr̥ekṣā-vayava within utpr̥ekṣā alamkāra [2.221-34] it does not appear. Bhāmaha (KA [3.47-48]) is the only writer to accept it as an

independent alamkāra, and considers it a mixture of distinctive features (all presumably subordinate to that of utpreksā): "Utpreksā-avayava involves an element of śleṣa, utpreksā, and rūpaka. . . ." [śliṣṭasyārthena samyuktah kimcidutprekṣayānvitah | rūpakārthena ca punarutpreksāvayavo yathā ||] (KA [3.47]). Where Gerow comments, "It differs from simple utpreksā only in being associated with other and subordinate figures in a 'mixed' metaphor. . . . Later writers consider this figure nothing but one of the many kinds of multiple alamkāra (samsṛṣṭi), and its early enumeration as a separate figure probably involves no other issues than the extreme frequency with which this particular metaphorical complex is encountered" (Glossary/138-39).

Thus Vāmana, for example, sees utpreksāvayava (along with upamārūpaka) as a category of samsṛṣṭi alamkāra (KAS [4.3.30-31, 33]): "Utpreksāvayava is the motivating basis of an utpreksā [utpreksāheturutpreksāvayavah] -- "in the sense that the subordinate metaphors or similes define the

broader context in which the main utpreksā becomes alive"
(Glossary/139).

2.360 Indicating the Two Varieties of Samsṛṣṭi

A primary/secondary relationship

Equal status among all --

This twofold approach

is observed in the combination of alamkāras.

Samsṛṣṭeh Dvayaprabhedasūcanam :

aṅgāṅgibhāvāvasthānam sarvesām samakakṣatā

ityalamkārasamsṛṣṭerlakṣaṇīyā dvayī gatiḥ

aṅga-aṅgi [< aṅgam / aṅgin] / "part," "limb"; and
 (literally) "the possessor of parts"; "whole."

Throughout the Second Chapter we have seen the generation of innumerable varieties through the incorporation as subordinate of a specific, distinctive feature drawn from an otherwise independent alamkāra. And in the immediately preceding we have seen Dandin subsume within independent alamkāras four varieties, two of which -- upamā rūpaka and utpreksāvayava -- clearly involve the distinctive employment of features drawn from more than one alamkāra.

Samsṛṣṭi (or samkīrna [2.7]) alamkāra is unique and quite logically comes at the close of Dandin's schema. Now alamkāras as such are brought together -- they are not "combined" for each retains its distinctive and recognizable nature, nor is but a specific albeit distinctive feature of one subordinated to another which thoroughly dominates. Samsṛṣṭi or the "'association'" of figures, is the coherence of the unique figures in the poem. The figures used must not cancel each other out but must constitute the unity that is the stanza. . . ."⁶

Dandīn envisions two basic possibilities. The alamkāras may be in a "aṅga-aṅgi" relationship, that is (literally), as "part(s)" and one as subsuming "whole" -- or, perhaps more accurately, one alamkāra (and presumably there is the possibility of more) "assists" in the full realization of another. Alternately, all the alamkāras involved may display "equal status" (sama-kakṣatā), each contributing equally to the full realization of the verse or the extended image.

It is interesting to note that Bhāmaha unlike Dandīn does not list subvarieties of a given alamkāra that reflect the incorporation of distinct features of other alamkāras. In the few cases where such combination is evident these are raised to the status of independent alamkāras, as we have seen with upamārūpaka and utpreksāvayava. His conception of samsṛsti (KA [3.49-52]) then -- which he certainly accepts and indeed holds in high regard -- may possibly be wider than that of Dandīn's, and might tend to include some of the combinations Dandīn presents rather as

subvarieties. "Samsṛṣṭi is an excellent ornament and is made up of various alamkāras, like a garland of jewels. . ." [varā vibhūṣā samsṛṣṭirbahvalaṅkārayogataḥ | racitā ratnamāleva sā caivamuditā yathā ||] (KA [3.49]). Bhāmaha follows with two examples.

Gerow believes Bhāmaha (and Vāmana) consider samsṛṣṭi as "the genus of multiple alamkāras" (Glossary/307), without any further distinction. It is possible, however, that these two examples mirror Dandin's division. Gero Jenner, for example, would see Bhāmaha's verse [3.50] as an "angāngibhāva zwischen śleṣa und vyatireka," and [3.51] as equally displaying vibhāvana (analaṅkrta kāntam / "beautiful though unadorned") and upamā (vanajadyuti / "splendid like the lotus") alamkāras.⁷

That Bhaṭṭi (Bhaṭṭikāvyam [10.71]) illustrates samsṛṣṭi (as termed by the commentators) is accepted by both Jayamaṅgalā [880] and Mallinātha,⁸ yet there is confusion over which alamkāras are in fact present. Where

the former would see slesa, virodha, and tulyayogitā; the latter would see virodha and upamā.

Udbhaṭa formally extends Dāṇḍin's schema. Samsṛṣṭi (KASS [6.5]) now refers only to the conjunction of independent alamkāras as equals (Dāṇḍin's samakaksatā): "Many or even two mutually independent alamkāras based together in a single place. . . ." [alamkṛtīnāṁ bahvīnāṁ dvayorvāpi samāśrayah | ekatra nirapeksānāṁ mithah samsṛṣṭirucyate ||]. A single example follows in his vṛtti displaying both upamā and rūpaka alamkāras.

Udbhaṭa's "samkara," however, with four variations (KASS [5.11-13]), reflects a "blending" of alamkāras. Thus in [5.11] we have samkara (as such), where alamkāras are so interdependent that no individual identification is possible; in [5.12abc] we have śabdārthavartyalamkāra, with "Alamkāras pertaining to sound and sense appearing in one sentence" [śabdārthavartyalamkārā vākyā ekatra bhāsinah | samkarah]; in [5.12cd] ekaśabdābhidhāna (unique to Udbhaṭa), "And samkara is [also] expressed due to the

penetration of [more than one alamkāra] in a single portion of a sentence" [ekavākyāmśapraveśādvābhidhīyate], that is, "where the two constituent figures overlap as to the words which express them" (Glossary/310); and finally in [5.13] we find anugrähyānugrähaka (a direct reflection of Dandin's aṅgāngi), "Where the alamkāras are established through mutual assistance, and where they do not attain their existence independently. . . ." [paraspnopakārena yatrālamkṛtayah sthitāḥ | svātantryenātmalābhām no labhante sopi samkarah ||].

Vāmana's definition of samsṛṣṭi (KAS [4.3.30-33]) appears quite general -- "Where one alamkāra is based upon [another] alamkāra" [alaṅkārasyālaṅkārayonitvam sam-sṛṣṭih] -- yet in fact is rather narrowly conceived (and if Gerow errs with regard to Bhāmaha, he certainly does in believing that Vāmana also considers samsṛṣṭi "the genus of multiple alamkāras" (Glossary/307)). For "bei Vāmana sind nur solche Figuren als Bestandteile der samsṛṣṭi zugelassen, die irgendwie einen Vergleich enthalten"⁹ --

the presence of "similarity" is essential. In practice, as we have touched upon above, two varieties are accepted: upamārūpaka [4.3.31-32], and utpreksāvayava [4.3.31, 33].

Mammaṭa's position with respect to the mixture of alamkāras is on the one hand generally similar to that of Bhāmaha's, for the various varieties are quite distinct ("unmixed"), yet his presentation of "mixture" on the other hand reflects that of Udbhaṭa. Again samsṛsti (KP [10.139cd]) involves only the conjunction of alamkāras kept distinct -- "Where these [alamkāras] are established distinctly. . . ." [sestā samsṛṣṭireteśāṁ bhedena yadiha sthitih ||]. Yet now such conjunction is categorized in a threefold way: it may involve (1) śabda alamkāras, (2) artha alamkāras, or (3) śabda and artha alamkāras.

And as with Udbhaṭa, Mammaṭa presents rather samkara (KP [10.140-41]) as the interdependent combination of alamkāras, now with three varieties: (1) samkara "as such," which now appears, however, to specifically reflect Dāṇḍin's aṅgāngi, "Yet where there is a primary/secondary

relationship, where these [alamkāras] do not enjoy dependence strictly on themselves. . . ." [aviśrānti-jusāmātmanyāngāṅgitvam tu sañkarah |] (KP [10.140ab]); (2) anisaya which is equivalent to Udbhaṭa's samdeha samkara (KP [10.140cd]); and (3) ekatraśabdārtha which is equivalent to Udbhaṭa's śabdārthavartyalamkāra (KP [10.141abc], "Where in a single region two alamkāras, of sound and sense, are clearly evident. . . ." [sphuṭam-ekatra viśaye śabdārthālaṅkṛtidvayam | vyavasthitam. ca].

2.361 Example of the Samsṛṣṭi involving a Primary/
Secondary Relationship

Innocent one! White lotuses capture

the beauty of your

face / wealth --

For those endowed with

buds / treasures

stems / armies

What is difficult to achieve?

Aṅgāṅgibhāva Samsṛstyudāharanam :

ākṣipantyaravindāni mugdhe tava mukhaśriyam
 kośadaṇḍasamagrāṇām kimeśāmasti duṣkaram

In aṅgāṅgibhāva samsṛṣṭi distinct alamkāras are brought together in a "primary"/"secondary" relationship. One will stand out as primary, providing overall direction; one (or more) will appear to "assist," albeit retaining its distinctive nature. Thus "a subordination of implication only is to be understood by this term [aṅgāṅgi]; the two figures concerned are formally distinguishable . . . and occupy different places in the total phrase. . . ." (Glossary/308).

Daṇḍin's example is not entirely clear, and is variously interpreted. We should first recognize that we have initially upamā, marked by [ā (+) *ksip /literally, "to cast away"], in the sense of "capture" (as an "upamā vācaka this usage is similar to that of [prati (+) *garj /"roar against," "challenge" (KD [2.61]))). Thus "White lotuses capture . . . your face," which is to say, "Your face is like the white lotus."

Further, arthāntaranyāsa alamkāra [2.169-79] is also evident. We have an initial positive statement or

proposition, followed by another statement that corroborates or validates what was initially presented. That "White lotuses" are capable of capturing "beauty" from a beautiful woman's face, as well as "wealth," is indeed probable given that they are endowed with charming "buds" and "stems," as well as copious "treasures" and powerful "armies."

And finally Dāṇḍin has also incorporated three ślesas within this verse: (1) śriyam /"beauty," and also "wealth"; (2) koṣa /"bud," and also "riches," "treasures"; and (3) danda /"stem," and also "army." What is, however, important to realize I feel is that Dāṇḍin considers "śleṣa" an ubiquitous element -- examples of which we have amply seen -- capable of "enhancing" any number of expressions, and that when it appears in this role we have "śleṣa as such" rather than "śleṣa alamkāra."

In the present instance then the ślesas are thoroughly incorporated as subordinate elements within the upamā and arthāntaranyāsa. I would thus agree with Ratnaśrī, "Upamā and arthāntaranyāsa are the two alamkāras . . . śleṣa is

present as a constituent of arthāntaranyāsa and is not counted [as an alamkāra]" [upamā arthāntaranyāsa ityalaṅkāradvayam vā | śleṣastvarthāntaranyāsātmanaiva avasthitah na pṛthak saṃkhyāyata iti] (RŚ/195) -- and further posit a ślesa within the upamā as well.

Thus I feel that Belvalkar and Raddi err in seeing the primary/secondary relationship in this case as one of arthāntaranyāsa alamkāra based upon ślesa alamkāra (Notes 2/214). And similarly, I would discount Gerow's analysis, for he not only excludes arthāntaranyāsa, believing the two alamkāras to be upamā and ślesa, but demonstrates confusion over the nature of ślesa itself -- "The ślesa of the second half verse depends on the upamā of the first: if the lotuses were not 'disputing' the beauty of her face, then their 'buds' and 'stalks' would not be taken as weapons: 'treasury' and 'army'... ." (Glossary/308). It is not that one meaning of a ślesa is "taken for" the other -- each if employed skillfully by the kavi will be respectively appropriate to the context.

I would tend to assume that arthāntaranyāsa is the primary alamkāra in this example, for it provides the "whole" or integrated format for the entire verse. Upamā alamkāra would then be secondary albeit necessary in forming the initial proposition that is arthāntaranyāsa's first component.

2.362 Example of the Samsṛṣṭi involving an Equal Relationship

It is as though darkness is smearing the limbs

It is as though the sky is raining mascara --

Sight became useless

like service rendered be an evil man.

Samakaksatā Samṣrṣṭyudāharanam :

līmpatīva tamoṅgāni varṣatīvāñjanam nabhah
asatpuruṣaseveva dr̥ṣṭirniśphalatām gatā

Although this verse -- an example illustrating the conjunction of alamkāras, two instances of utpreksā and one of upamā, where each displays "equal status" (samakaksatā) -- is included in Rangacharya Raddi's text I consider it most probably to be a later interpolation.

This verse does not appear in Ratnaśri's early commentary, nor in the Tibetan translations (and not we might add in the Malayalam palm leaf manuscript consulted by Rangacharya Raddi). Gero Jenner is quite specific, noting that "there is no example [of this variety of samsṛṣṭi]. The Hṛdayangama commentator inserts the verse līmpatīva. . . ."¹⁰ S. K. Belvalkar in his 1924 edition of the Kāvyādarśa marks this verse in the English translation as an "interpolated stanza."¹¹ Where both Belvalkar and

Raddi write, "Dāṇḍin has not apparently given an illustration for . . . samakakṣatā [samsṛṣṭi]. . . . It is omitted by most MSS. . . . Surely it would have been possible for Dāṇḍin, without repeating himself [the first half of this verse is cited in [2.226ab]], to give another instance for samakakṣatāsamsṛṣṭi if he had thought it necessary" (Notes 2/214).

That Dāṇḍin is not the author of this verse is certain. Dāṇḍin has previously cited the first half [2.226ab] in initiating his extended discussion [2.226-34] on the distinction between utpreksā and upamā -- clearly the verse was already well-known as exemplifying a point of contention. Indeed the entire verse appears in Bhāsa's Cārudatta [1.19] (and in the Bālacarita), and in the later Mṛcchakatika of Śūdraka (?) [1.34] -- both of whom were prior to Dāṇḍin.

The question then is whether or not Dāṇḍin chose to include this readily available example. On the one hand he may have done so to reinforce his earlier point -- that as

an example of samsṛṣṭi of the second type, both upamā and utpreksā appear here as distinct and independent alamkāras. And too it would be somewhat unusual for Dāṇḍin not to include an example for a specific variety. Yet on the other hand, if it were originally included it would be (I believe) the only example drawn verbatim from another writer. And too the realization of this type of samsṛṣṭi may have been thought to have been self-evident and an example thus superfluous.

One could perhaps thus argue either way, but given its absence in Ratnaśrī's commentary (and where he would have been aware of even earlier recensions of the text through the Sinhalese version), and Dāṇḍin's creative generation of examples throughout the text, I would tend to exclude this verse.

2.363 Indicating that Śleṣa Adds Beauty and the Twofold Division of Vāñmaya

Śleṣa in general enhances the beauty

of all expressions displaying vakrokti.

Creative expression has a twofold basis:

Svabhāvokti and Vakrokti.

Ślesasya Alamkāraśobhādhāyakatāyā ca Vāñmayasya

Dviprakārakatāyā Sūcanam :

śleṣah sarvāsu puṣṇati prāyo vakroktisu śriyam
bhinnam dvidhā svabhāvoktirvakroktiśceti vāñmayam

śriyam : sobhām (RŚ/196) (RR/311).

vāñmayam [< vāc (+) maya /literally, "possessing speech"] /in this context, "literary or creative expression" : kāvyam (RR/311).

Dāṇḍin now explicitly marks -- almost as an appendage to the preceding presentation of samsṛṣṭi alamkāra -- the ubiquitous ability and power of ślesa "to enhance the beauty" when incorporated as a subordinate feature of all expressions or alamkāras "displaying vakrokti."

This statement leads into one of the only direct expressions or indications in the text of Dāṇḍin's formal conception of "creative expression" (vānmaya) -- a conception we have considered at length in our discussion of svabhāvokti alamkāra (under [2.8]). Here we may simply reiterate that ślesa -- with its ability to "embrace" multiple meanings, to suggest multiple images -- is perhaps the most evident display of the "twisting" of speech that is termed "vakrokti." Yet no less important for the kavi in his or her quest for creative expression, realized through kāvya, is the alternate and to a degree balancing mode known as "svabhāvokti" (though we should recognize that in any given instance both modes are mutually exclusive) -- direct and vital presentation that steps beyond "description" in its intensity.

Notes [2.340] - [2.363]

1. Gerow misreads *vaneśvapanasevinah* [2.341] and thus alters and misinterprets the example: "This is to be understood as a complaint addressed to an illiberal benefactor: 'The gentle deer in the forest think only of serving others. . . .'" (Glossary/116).
2. "*śaktih* = *arthapratyāyanauṇmukhyam* = the tendency to express the meaning. *Svabhāvah* = *niyatārthanīṣṭhatvam* = the natural disposition (of the *śakti*) to indicate a settled meaning. *Śabdaśaktisvabhāva* is the natural tendency of a word to express a settled meaning, that is, the abhidhā process of a word" (Udbhaṭa, Kāvyālaṅkārasārañgraha of Udbhaṭa, edited by Narayana Daso Banhatti, 2nd edition, (1982), (Notes) p. 129).
3. From Bhāgavata Purāṇa [9.15.16-20, 23-41; 16.1-27], in Classical Hindu Mythology, edited and translated by Cornelia Dimmitt and J. A. B. van Buitenen (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978), p. 85.
4. Margaret and James Stutley, Harper's Dictionary of Hinduism, (1977), p. 134.
5. Udbhaṭa, Kāvyālaṅkārasārañgraha of Udbhaṭa, edited by Narayana Daso Banhatti, (1982), (Text) p. 67.
6. Edwin Gerow, in The Literatures of India, p. 127.
7. Gero Jenner, Die Poetischen Figuren, p. 278.
8. Bhaṭṭi, Bhāttikāvyam or Rāvanavadha composed by Śrī bhaṭṭi, with the commentary of Mallinātha and with critical and explanatory notes by K. P. Trivedi, vol. 2 (Bombay: Bombay Sanskrit Series, 1898), p. 34.

9. Gero Jenner, Die Poetischen Figuren, p. 279: "With Vāmana only such figures are allowed as constituents of samsṛṣṭi that in some manner contain similarity."
10. Gero Jenner, Die Poetischen Figuren, p. 279.
11. Dandin, Kavyādarśa of Dandin, edited with Sanskrit text and English translation by S. K. Belvalkar (Poona: The Oriental Book-Supplying Agency, 1924), p. 50.

2.364- Definition and Explication of Bhāvika Alamkāra

2.366

2.364

That quality whose range is the extended composition
is termed Bhāvika.

"Bhāva" is the creative plan of the kavi
that inheres throughout kāvyas.

Bhāvikālamkāralakṣaṇapratyākāśanaca :

tadbhāvikamiti prāhuḥ prabandhaviṣayam gunam
bhāvah kaverabhiprāyah kāvyeṣvāsiddhi samsthitah

2.365

Mutual support between all elements

of the subject at hand

Non-utilization of useless modifiers

Description on appropriate occasions

Bhāvikālamkāraprakāśanam :

parasparopakāritvam sarvesām vastuparvanām

viśeṣanānām vyarthānāmakriyā sthānavarṇanā

2.366

And the illumination of the theme

-- however involved --

through the force of successive expressions --

All of these are based upon bhāva

and thus comprise Bhāvika.

Bhāvikālamkāraprakāśanam :

vyaktiruktikramabalādgambhīrasyāpi vastunah

bhāvāyattamidam sarvamiti tadbhāvikam viduh

Bhāvika alamkāra stands apart and given its unique nature it is entirely appropriate that it brings to a close Dāṇdin's presentation of the artha alamkāras. Bhāvika as an alamkāra of course takes as its touchstone and ultimate focus the generation of sobhā or "beauty," yet as "bhāvika"

its nature is distinct from the thirty-four alamkāras that have preceded. Bhāvika is a "quality (guna) whose range is the extended composition" or text.

Dāṇḍin we note employs the term "guna" and I feel that he takes it in its usual, non-technical, sense of "positive quality." The ten gunas are specifically and pointedly discussed in a defined context in the First Chapter, and are quite "technical" in their application. S. K. De, for example, stumbles here, and his comments betray his own confusion rather than any "uneasiness" Dāṇḍin might have felt -- "Both Bhāmaha and Dāṇḍin betray an uneasiness over the character of the figure Bhāvika, and do not know whether to classify it as a Guṇa or Alamkāra."¹

Bhāvika is the coherent, integrative harmony and balance which, as Dāṇḍin's verses indicate, inheres or pervades an extended composition on all levels. At the level of the word it involves, "the non-utilization of useless modifiers"; and at the level of extended expression it is revealed in "Description on appropriate occasions,"

and "the illumination of the theme (vastu) -- however involved -- through the force of successive expressions."

And ultimately and perhaps most characteristically bhāvika entails a balanced "mutual support between all elements of the subject at hand."

As we shall see in the following verse [2.367], Daṇdin -- drawing from the nātya or drama -- accepts such extended and integrating "structural" features as the "sandhis," the "aṅgas," and the "vrttis" as alamkāras. It would appear that bhāvika reflects an extension of the principles that these elements display. For just as Bharata could write, "There is no doubt that a kāvya, although inferior in meaning, when endowed with the proper aṅgas ("segments"), because of the ensuing brilliance of presentation, will possess śobhā" (NŚ [21.55]), so certainly Daṇdin could accept and include bhāvika as an alamkāra whose primary function was to insure the generation of this śobhā in light of what is essentially structural balance throughout the work.

Failure to see this correspondence has again led to confusion over the validity of bhāvika as an alamkāra. Thus Gerow, for example, "would like to think . . . that bhāvika was not considered an arthālamkāra at all, since it does not formulate the possibility of any concrete poetic expression or idea" (Glossary/69, n. 158).

And we may note that misrepresentation may also stem from falsely equating "bhāva" -- "the creative plan of the kavi," a reflection of his or her imagination and ability -- with bhāvika itself. Thus S. K. De, for example, affirms "It is clear that the conception of Bhāvika belongs properly to Aesthetic";² or more severly in the case of Gerow, "The imagination as a quality of the whole is an alamkāra. . . ." (Glossary/69), and further:

In the Indian tradition, then, imagination (bhāvika) is generally described as the ability to make the several images of the individual poetic statements coherent in terms demanded by the work as a larger whole. It is manifested in such things as the plot (the story stringing together the individual statements), by the lack of shocking contrast in its development, by the

general appropriateness of one image to its neighbors, and the like (Glossary/68).

Rather bhāvika is an alamkāra that stems from the creativity of the kavi, that according to Dāṇḍin refers to structural coherence, not a rather nebulous psychological feature. Yet the above also severly distorts the actual representation of bhāvika "in the Indian tradition," for what Gerow is actually describing in the latter part of his statement is in fact Dāṇḍin's conception of bhāvika alamkāra (falsely equated with the "imagination"), and we should realize that this concept was indeed to undergo radical change.

It is this failure to be aware of what bhāvika was for various writers that explains A. B. Keith's similarly misconceived comment, "This quality . . . would if Dāṇḍin had any idea of order, have been conjoined with Svabhā-vokti"³ (and at the close of our study we may I would hope have arrived at a better appreciation of Dāṇḍin's "idea of order" than Keith's superfluous awareness of the issues

would indicate). Not only does Keith betray a lack of understanding of Dāṇḍin's position, but takes a later individualistic conception of bhāvika as a somehow more valid standard. For the conception that Dāṇḍin presents -- so closely aligned I would maintain with that of Bharata or his his tradition -- is in fact unique.

Bhāmaha similarly places what he terms "bhāvikatva" at the end of his list of the alamkāras (KA [3.53-54]), and although initially his position mirrors that of Dāṇḍin we see a radical difference: "They term that quality whose range is the extended composition bhāvikatvam -- where the events of the past and future are shown as though immediately present" [bhāvikatvamiti prāhuḥ prabandhaviṣayam
gunam | pratyakṣā iva dr̥ṣyante yatrārthā bhūtabhāvinah ||] (KA [3.53]). "It bases are considered stories striking, elevated, marvelous, well-enacted, and with clear language" [citrodāttādbhutārthatvam kathāyāḥ svabhītataḥ | śabdā-
nākulataḥ ceti tasya hetum pracakṣate ||] (KA [3.54]) (where V. Raghavan glosses "kathāyāḥ svabhītataḥ" as : "It simply

means that the story should progress very smoothly and with gripping interest, there being no hitch, no vagueness and nothing mystifying"⁴).

And where Udbhaṭa in his definition (KASS [6.6]) drops Bhāmaha's first line (adding Bhāmaha's second line as his first and condensing Bhāmaha's second verse as his second line) bhāvika's restriction is complete: "Where extremely marvelous events of the past or future are shown as though immediately present through clarity of language. . . ."

[*pratyakṣā iva yatrārthā dṛśyante bhūtabhāvinah | atyadbhutāḥ syāttadvācāmanākulyena bhāvikam ||*]. Narayana Banhatti comments on the commentator Indurāja's *vṛtti* on this verse, "Indurāja lays stress on this point. . . . When there is (anākulatā) force and vividness in the style, the bhāva or the feelings of the poet are experienced by the appreciative readers as the reflection produced by that poetry, and are felt by them as forcibly as by the poet himself."⁵

Mammaṭa (KP [10.114abc]) merely says, "Where objects

of the past and future are construed as though immediately present, this is *bhāvika*" [*pratyaksā iva yad bhāvāḥ kriyante bhūtabhāvinah | tad bhāvikam*]. It is interesting to note, however, that in *Mammaṭa*'s following *vṛtti* we find a limited paraphrase of *Dāṇḍin* pulled from context and applied to this quite different view: "There is here *bhāva* or the creative plan of the kavi -- thus it is *bhāvika*" [*bhāvāḥ kaverabhiprāyo 'trāstīti bhāvikam |*].

Leaving aside the question of "aesthetics" and "rhetoric," we may consider V. Raghavan's evaluation of the change that *Dāṇḍin*'s view of *bhāvika* underwent:

It is however not the mention in so many ideas and words of the past and future that is meant by *Bhāmaha*. . . . But through *Udbhaṭa*, and *Mammaṭa* also, a great concept of aesthetics fell to the place of a narrow rhetorical figure of a *vākyā* ["sentence"].

When *bhāvika* was reduced to this state, trouble arose and writers had to show that it did not overlap two others, that is, *Svabhāvokti* on one side, and *Rasokti* [reflecting the earlier "rasavat"] on the other.⁶

Eventually then we find in *Ruyyaka* [12th century] (AS

[pp. 178ff.]), for example, a differentiation between on the one hand bhāvika, and svabhāvokti and rasavat on the other. Bhāvika now appears as the objective realization of svabhāvokti and rasavat, where "not only is there a generalized or universalized experience (sādhāranī-kṛta) . . . but there is also . . . a loss or forgetting of the individuality of the reader or spectator."⁷ Where svabhāvokti pertains rather to the "description of subtle attributes present in conventional objects" [laukikavastu-gatasūkṣmadharmavarṇana].

2.367 The Acceptance of the Samdhyāṅgas, Vṛttyāṅgas,
Lakṣaṇas and so on as Alamkāras

The Samdhyāṅgas, Vṛttyāṅgas, Lakṣaṇas

and so on

described in another discipline

We accept as alamkāras.

Samdhyāṅgavṛttyāṅgalakṣaṇādīnām Alamkāratayā

Iṣṭatvam :

yacca samdhyāṅgavṛttyāṅgalakṣaṇādyāgamāntare

vyāvarṇitamidam cestamalamkāratayaiva nah

āgama / "tradition," "discipline"; here "in the [nātya]
śāstras of Bharata and so on / asmin śāstre bharatādau
(RS/199).

Daṇḍin's open and generous approach to kāvya cannot be overly stressed. In our initial section we have discussed Daṇḍin's presentation of the ten gunas -- those features that may be variously employed to generate a particular "mārga" -- as alamkāras. And we have touched on the varied assortment of alamkāras that Daṇḍin presents in his Third Chapter -- those of "sound" (śabda) and those especially "difficult to construe" (duskara). Daṇḍin now explicitly indicates that he also accepts as alamkāras special features characteristic of the drama or nātya (the "other discipline"), and elucidated so definitely in Bharata's Nātyaśāstra.

We have mentioned as possible early reflections of some of Daṇḍin's artha alamkāras some of the various "lakṣaṇas" found in Bharata's text [17.1-42]. That Daṇḍin would have absorbed certain of these lakṣaṇas into his alamkāra schema A. B. Keith considers "a clear sign of archaism, and is significant as indicating the process of

emancipation of the [kāvya] sāstra from connection with the drama."⁸

And as S. K. De notes:

The list [of Bharata's lakṣanas] includes several items which later were accepted as alamkāras (atiśaya, 'hyperbole'; hetu 'etiology'; drṣṭānta 'illustration'), but for the most part the concepts involved are aspects of the story or qualities of the dramatis personae. The list [as such] played no role in the subsequent history of poetic speculation. Bharata says that the lakṣanas are to be considered elements of the emotional structure of the drama (bhāvārthagatāni) and are to be used as the principal rasa dictates (samyakprayojyāni yathārasam tu) (NŚ [16.4], GOS edition (?)).⁹

Where Gerow would consider the lakṣanas "an effort at ad hoc characterization, randomly focusing on content, goal, and method; seemingly an empirical list of the characteristics a play may have."¹⁰

Yet Bharata's own words are highly revealing, and I feel of the utmost importance for not only do they reveal an intimate connection between the lakṣanas and the alamkāras, but may possibly mark a conception that was

directly absorbed by Dāṇḍin as his own view of "alamkāra": "These thirty-six lakṣaṇas of kāvya -- conducive to the end in view -- create beauty in compositions and are correctly employed according to the [relevant] rasas" [etāni ca kāvyasya lakṣaṇāni satvīśaduddeśyanidarśanāni | prabandha śobhākarāṇi tajjñaiḥ samyak prayojyāni yathārasāni || (NS [17.42]).

And of extreme interest here is that Dāṇḍin also borrows directly from the nātya tradition and accepts as alamkāras features that may be considered primarily structural, or specific modes of expression or content that further the nātya's progressive development -- elements thus capable of generating śobhā. We thus may have a prelude to and a possible basis for the inclusion of the primarily structural bhāvika as an alamkāra -- which considered in isolation has struck a confused note for many.

"Samdhyaṅgas" refers specifically to the sandhis, the five "junctures" or stages of the primary plot or "vastu"

("body") of a drama, and their sixty-four aṅgas or "components." "The Junctures [sandhis] are the structural divisions of the drama, which correspond with the elements of the plot and the stages in the hero's realization of his purpose."¹¹ And as Sylvain Levi explains, "The junctures of the action indicate the development of each of the phases of the theme up to the moment where it attains its own particular end. . . ."¹²

The five sandhis are :

(1) mukha / The opening of the play "where the seed (bīja) arises as the source of various elements and rasas" [yatra bījasamutpattirnānārtharasasambhavā] (NŚ [21.38ab]) -- with twelve aṅgas.

(2) pratimukha / "The bija ["seed"] seems to bear its first fruits, but these disappear as soon as they have been shown";¹³ sporadic indications of and progress towards the final goal (NŚ [21.39]) with thirteen aṅgas.

(3) garbha / "Where there is the development of the bīja, the possibility of its attainment, and the searching

or seeking after it. . . ." [udbhedastasya bijasya prāptiraprāptireva vā | punaścānvesanām yatra sa garbha iti samjñitah ||] (NŚ [21.40]). "The bija deposited in the mukha had grown to be somewhat perceptible in the pratimukha. The garbha shows the ultimate success (phala-yoga) . . . It corresponds in the mind of the principle protagonists to the possibility of success"¹⁴ -- with twelve aṅgas.

(4) vimarṣa (avamarṣa) / A deliberate pause or interruption of the bija which has broken open in the preceding garbha, due to temptation, anger, disaster, and so on (NŚ [21.41]) -- with thirteen aṅgas.

(5) nirvahanā / The dénouement or unravelling of the various plot elements: "A resolution of the elements, mukha and so on, along with the bija, which have attained their realization" [samānayanamarthānām mukhādyānām sabijinām | phalopasaṅgatānāñca jñeyam nirvahanām tu tat ||] (NŚ [21.42]) -- with fourteen aṅgas.

And when Bharata writes on the importance of the

sixty-four aṅgas (a verse we have seen above), we have an explicit indication of the basis for their inclusion -- and indeed all such structural features -- by Dāṇḍin as alamkāras: "There is no doubt that a kāvya, although inferior in meaning, when endowed with the proper aṅgas, because of the [ensuing] brilliance of presentation will possess śobhā" [kāvyam yadapi hīnārtham samyagaṅgaiḥ samanvitam | dīptatvāttu prayogasya śobhāmeti na samśayah ||] (NS [21.55]).

Bharata presents four "vṛttis" or expressional modes: "They are considered the mother of all the kāvyas" [sarveṣāmeva kāvyānām mātrikā vṛttayah smṛtāḥ] (NS [20.4ab]); "And the name 'vṛtti' is construed as the refuge of the various bhāvas and rasas" [vṛttisamjñā kṛtā hyeṣā nānābhāvarasāśrayā] (NS [22.21ab]).

(1) bhārati / the "verbal" employs the voice, the spoken word of male characters only, and that only in Sanskrit -- with four principle aṅgas. (NS [22.26-37]).

(2) sāttvatī / the "grand" involves both words and

gestures; the expression of joy, heroism, compassion, righteousness -- with four principle añgas. "It employs all the virtues that make the 'man of heart'." (NŚ [22.38-46]).¹⁵

(3) kaiśiki / the "graceful" displays singing and dancing with male and female characters in striking costumes; it presents love, pleasures, "galanteries et de coquetteries" -- with four principle añgas. (NŚ [22.47-54]).

(4) ārabhatī / the "violent" presents the acts of men whose "heart is hard," with arguments, fights, lies, deceptions, and magical conjurations -- with four principle añgas. (NŚ [22.55-61]).

2.368 Conclusion to the Second Chapter

The path of alamkāras is thus displayed
 condensing within limits its endless expansion --
 Practice alone can reveal the fine points
 transcending the range of words.

Dvitiya Paricchedopasamhārah :

panthāḥ sa eṣa vivṛtah parimāṇavṛttyā
 samṛtya vistaramanantamalamkriyāṇām |
 vācāmatītya viśayam parivartamānān-
 anabhyāsa eva vivaritumalam viśeṣān ||

Notes [2.364] - [2.368]

1. S. K. De, "The Problem of Poetic Expression," in Some Problems of Sanskrit Poetics (Calcutta: Firma KLM, 1981), p. 9, n. 1.
2. S. K. De, "Bhāmaha's Views on Guṇa," in Some Problems of Sanskrit Poetics, p. 55.
3. A. B. Keith, History of Sanskrit Literature, pp. 380-81.
4. V. Raghavan, "The History of Bhāvika in Sanskrit Poetics," The Indian Historical Quarterly, 14 (1938), p. 789.
5. Udbhata, Kavyālaṅkāra-Sāra-Saṅgraha of Udbhata, edited with notes by Narayana Daso Banhatti, p. 151.
6. V. Raghavan, "The History of Bhāvika in Sanskrit Poetics," The Indian Historical Quarterly, 14 (1938), p. 794.
7. V. Raghavan, "The History of Bhāvika in Sanskrit Poetics," p. 797.
8. A. B. Keith, "Dandin and Bhāmaha," in Indian Studies in Honor of Charles Rockwell Lanman (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1929), p. 180.
9. S. K. De, Sanskrit Poetics as a Study of Aesthetic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), p. 94.
10. Edwin Gerow, Indian Poetics, p. 227, n. 38.

11. Dhanamjaya, The Daśarūpa, translated by George C. O. Haas; Reprint (Delhi: Motilal Banarsiās, 1962 (1912)), p. 11.
12. From the French of Sylvain Levi, Le Théâtre Indien, vol. 1; Reprint (Paris: College de France, 1963 (1890)), p. 35.
13. Sylvain Levi, Le Théâtre Indien, vol. 1, pp. 40.
14. Sylvain Levi, Le Théâtre Indien, vol. 1, p. 44.
15. Sylvain Levi, Le Théâtre Indien, vol. 1, p. 91.

Textual Transmission

The influence of the Kāvyādarśa -- as an authoritative and accepted guide extensively illuminating practice with a creative and open approach to the writing of kāvya -- radiating we presume from the city of Kāñcī in the latter years of the 7th or the earlier years of the 8th centuries -- was profound and throughout the Dekkan and the regions to the south was quite nearly absolute. "That in his time and later, Dandin dominated the literary horizon in the Dekkan, South India and Ceylon is clear from the Kanarese, Tamil and Sinhalese use of his poetics."¹

One might immediately (and naively) be tempted to attribute this dominance exclusively to regional convenience -- that this was possibly initially a factor I would grant. I would hold, however, that the ease of its adoption was primarily facilitated by characteristics and qualities of the text itself. Admittedly an irrecoverable interplay of factors was involved and this proposition is offered as nothing more than considered opinion. Yet in what is surely one of the most extensive cases of trans-cultural

textual adoption, reflection, and dissimilation, the greatest cultural and intellectual impact of the Kāvyādarśa was not to be seen throughout Central and Southern India, and Śri Laṅkā, but thousands of miles to the north -- in Tibet. And it is here that I would go beyond speculation and affirm that, during the mid-12th century, with an awareness of the major kāvya sāstras, it was the Kāvyādarśa that was consciously selected by the Tibetans (in circum-stances that shall examine) as the text of choice to initiate the study of kāvya in Tibet.

Kannada

The earliest extant evidence of the Kāvyādarśa's influence as textual exemplar appears across the Dekkan peninsula to the west, in the Dravidian language of Kannada or Kanarese. The Kavirājamārga ("The Royal Road of Kavis") is a foundational work of kāvya śāstra in Kannada that not only explicates and describes a number of indigenous literary features, but which translates, absorbs and adapts elements drawn from the Kāvyādarśa -- the text which clearly served as its touchstone and primary example.²

The Kavirājamārga is traditionally attributed to a Rāṣṭrakūṭa king who is known only by his birudas (elevated names of praise), most usually as Nr̥patuṅga ("Prominent among Kings") or Amoghavarṣa ("The One Who Beneficially Rains"), the son of Govinda III., and dated to 814/15 - 877/78.³ Although there appears to be agreement over the temporal period of the text, relatively recent scholars have disputed the identity of the writer and it would indeed appear to be someone other than "Nr̥patuṅga."

John F. Fleet in an extended article dismisses this traditional attribution, as presented for example by K. B. Pathak in his 1898 edition ("A more feeble way of asserting a result, without any attempt at explanation or argument could hardly be conceived"), and affirms that Nr̥patuṅga was rather the patron of the author; that the author "represented himself as simply putting forward views concurred in by Nr̥patuṅga"; that the author is known to us as Kaviśvara ("a secondary appellation which he must have adopted in imitation of an earlier Kaviśvara who has been mentioned by him"); and that Kaviśvara based the Kavirājamārga on an earlier work by one Śrīvijaya entitled Kavimārga ("who was very probably the earlier Kaviśvara himself, in imitation of whom the author adopted the appellation by which he has made himself known to us").⁴ Fleet's view is echoed by Rau and Aiyangar in their 1930 edition of the Kavirājamārga. (It is interesting to note that they believe that Śrīvijaya wrote a campu kāvya (thus c. 8th century) called the

Candraprapha Purāna; mentioned however in only one verse by a Doddayya of Piriyapatṭanā⁵.)

A somewhat dubious variant is provided by Edward P. Rice in A History of Kanarese Literature, who would see the author as the earlier Śrīvijaya.⁶ And this view is echoed by R. S. Mugali, who affirms, "A close examination of the internal evidence warrants the conclusion that the author of the Kavirājamārga was not Nrpatuṅga but a Jaina scholar-poet, who had high regard for Nrpatuṅga and composed the work under his inspiration and approval."⁷ We might add that "Śrīvijaya" occurs among a list of previous writers which the Kavirājamārga mentions; and further, that in the last stanza of each chapter -- embedded in a ślesa alamkāra -- there is praise to Śrīvijaya. In a nonsensical argument in support of his view Mugali notes, "About 200 years later, [D]Thugasimha, author of the Pancatantra in Kannada, eulogizes [the] Kavimārga [not the Kavirājamārga] of Śrīvijaya explicitly. . . ."⁸

The Kavirājamārga is divided into three paricchedas or

chapters, glossed, for example, by William Taylor in his Catalogue Raisonné of 1862 from a palm-leaf manuscript as, [Chapter 1:] "Discrimination as to faults, and on freedom from faults"; [Chapter 2:] "On figures or tropes, contained in a single word"; [and Chapter 3:] "Arthālancāram on tropes, Metaphors, in the meaning; or ornament of style generally."⁹ More accurately, in the first chapter we find, "The true nature of poetry, its purpose, its gradation, the preparations on the part of the writer and the balance between Sanskrit and Kannada diction. . . ."¹⁰

It opens with two invocatory verses explicitly in praise of Viṣṇu yet implicitly in praise of the author's patron, Nṛpatuṅga. Sarasvati is invoked and homage offered to earlier kavis. The importance of kāvya and its use, and the factors conducive to its composition are noted.

Following the source [the Kāvyādarśa] . . . [the author] lists such essential gifts of a poet as genius and ingenuity [Kāvyādarśa 1.103-5]. But he has his own reflections on the ways and the effect of poetry. He says, [Kavirājamārga 1.12] 'The poetic idea that takes shape in the mind of the poet will attract men of taste if it is presented

in a new form. Otherwise who is charmed by it? That composition, which like a wreath of diamonds worn in the heart delights by constant remembrance and rumination, gains fame. Its greatness is very easy to grasp'.¹¹

Or on degrees of poetic excellence we find, "' He who knows how to unlock another's heart as he intends, is one who understands speech. He who can convey much meaning in a small compass is abler than the first. He who can weave his utterance into a rhythmic pattern is even more skillful. He who can compose a classic spontaneously without a pause is the greatest of all'" [Kavirāja-mārga 1.13].¹²

The characteristics of kāvya and its varieties are itemized, including forms specific to the Kanarese, such as the bedande and chattāna.¹³ A number of "prose" kāvyas in both Sanskrit and Kannada are mentioned, as well as material that specifically pertains to the Kannada region (from the Kāveri River in the south to the Godāvari River in the north; bounded by the four towns, Kisuvolal, Koppana, Puligere, and Okkuntha), its people and language.

Chapter one concludes with a presentation of the various faults in kāvya with examples. Here we find, for example (an adaptation of Kāvyādarśa [1.7]), that "Even a small blemish will spoil the entire beauty of the work, just as a black spot [of collyrium] will spoil the entire beauty of the eye";¹⁴ in Kavirājamārga [1.52] that the mixture of Sanskrit with Kannada words may produce "a cacophony like the harsh sound of a two-faced drum";¹⁵ or in Kavirājamārga [1.57] that the mixture of Kannada and Sanskrit in compounds "will be like adding drops of butter-milk to hot milk."¹⁶ Rau and Aiyangar note that the influence of Bhāmaha's presentation of dosas in the Kāvyālaṅkāra is to be seen in this section as well.¹⁷

In the second chapter of the Kavirājamārga we find material from the first chapter of the Kāvyādarśa with, for example, two mārgas cited, now referred to only as "that of the South" (dakṣina) and "that of the North" (uttara); and Daṇdin's ten gunas presented in detail (although with any mention of anuprasa ("sound manipulation") excluded). A

great deal then follows that is drawn from the third chapter of the Kāvyādarśa: niyama ("restriction"), yamaka ("sound repetition"), and prahelikas ("riddles"), all with examples.

Dāṇdin's presentation in Chapter One of the mahākāvya with its eighteen primary elements, and all of his thirty-five artha alamkāras with examples from Chapter Two appears in the third chapter of the Kavirājamārga. As K. B. Pathak affirms in the introduction to his 1889 edition of the text, "Most of the verses in the Third Parichchheda of the Kavirāja-Mārga are either translations or adaptations from the Kavirājamārga."¹⁸ And he notes at least six verses on the alamkāras that are "literal translations" from the Kāvyādarśa: (1) asādharana upamā (KRM [3.77]/KD [2.37]); (2) asambhava upamā (KRM [3.79]/KD [2.39]); (3) anuśaya akṣepa (KRM [3.101]/KD [2.161]); (4) viśesokti alamkāra (KRM [3.122]/KD [2.326]); (5) hetu alamkāra (KRM [3.165]/KD [2.247]); and (6) atiśayokti alamkāra (KRM [3.194]/KD [2.219]).¹⁹

Although most of the varieties of upamā alamkāra are included,²⁰ a number of subvarieties have been dropped. The examples are varied, with some being translations of those found in the Kāvyādarśa, but many are the author's own appearing as praises King Nr̥patuṅga.²¹ It is extremely interesting to note that the Kavirājamārga alludes to dhvani in its technical sense and recognizes it as an additional alamkāra in [3.209].²² We might speculate as to whether this reflects the influence of the Dhvanyaloka, or whether the material crystallized by this text was in fact previously rather widely dispersed. Regardless, it is clear that the author conceived of dhvani -- in a text devoted to the actual writing and presentation of kāvya -- as an alamkāra rather than an absolute principle.

Notes: Kannada

1. V. Raghavan, "Review: Avantisundari by Acharya Dandin, edited by K. S. Mahadeva Sastri (Trivandrum: Suranad Kunjan Pillai, 1954), Journal of the Travancore University Oriental Manuscripts Library, vol. 8, no. 2 (1955), pp. 101-105.

2. Kavirājamārga, Nṛipatūṅga's Kavirājamārga, edited by K. B. Pathak (Bangalore, 1898).

Kāvyādarśa, Karnataka Kavirājamārgam, edited by A. Venkata Rau and H. Sesha Aiyangar (Madras: University of Madras, 1930; Reprint, 1973).

3. John F. Fleet, "The Rashtrakutas of Malkhed," in The Dynasties of the Kanarese Districts of the Bombay Presidency from the Earliest Historical Times to the Musalman Conquest of A.D. 1318, p. 401 (Bombay: The Government Central Press, 1896). See pp. 401-7.

The evident influence of the Kāvyādarśa on the Kavirājamārga and the acceptance of its date to the 9th century, has been noted as a later chronological bracket for the Kāvyādarśa itself: "It follows that the Kāvyādarśa cannot be placed in any case later than 750 A.D., since considerable time must have elapsed before it became famous and could be translated into Canarese" (P. V. Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, 3rd edition (Delhi: Motilal Banarsi das, 1961 (1923); Reprint, 1971), p. 99).

4. John F. Fleet, "Notes on Indian History and Geography: Kaviśvara's Kavirājamārga," The Indian Antiquary, 1904, pp. 267, 260, and 278.

K. B. Pathak goes to unnecessary lengths, incorporating a great deal of irrelevant material, in an attempt to counter John Fleet and to prove that King Nṛpatūṅga was rather the author of the Kavirājamārga (in K. B. Pathak, "Nṛpatūṅga and the Authorship of the Kavirājamārga (A Reply to Dr. Fleet)," The Journal of the Bombay Branch of the

Royal Asiatic Society, 22 (1908), pp. 81-115). His arguments, such as they are, are unconvincing.

In the first two verses, for example, the author of the Kavirājamārga plays upon the word "Nr̥patuñga" as an epithet of Viṣṇu and a biruda of the king to simultaneously request them to grant power. I hardly think the author would be addressing himself. And further a number of the examples in the verses involve the same king in a context of praise. I think it far more likely that the author is addressing his patron, whom it is probably safe to assume was the king known as Nr̥patuñga or Amoghavarṣa. Of course I am restricted in not knowing Kannada, and may only evaluate the logic of the arguments put forth by those who do.

5. Kavirājamārga (Madras, 1930), p. ii.
6. Edward P. Rice, A History of Kanarese Literature, 2nd rev. edition (Calcutta: Association Press, 1921), p. 25.
7. R. S. Mugali, History of Kannada Literature (New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 1975. See pp. 12-18.
8. R. S. Mugali, History of kannada Literature, (1975), p. 15.
9. William Taylor, A Catalogue Raisonné of Oriental Manuscripts in the Government Library, vol. 3 (Madras: Fort Saint George Gazette Press, 1862), p. 262.
10. R. S. Mugali, History of Kannada Literature, p. 16.
11. R. S. Mugali, History of Kannada Literature, p. 16.
12. R. S. Mugali, History of Kannada Literature, p. 16.
13. R. Narasimhacharya, History of Kannada Literature (Mysore: The Wesley Press and Publishing House, 1940), p. 12: "The former [bedande] is defined as a composition

consisting of alternate kandas and vrittas, and the latter [chattāna] as one consisting of many kandas along with vrittas, akkara, chaupadi, gītika and tivadi" [various metres?].

14. R. S. Mugali, History of Kannada Literature, p. 17.
15. R. S. Mugali, History of Kannada Literature, p. 17.
16. R. S. Mugali, History of Kannada Literature, p. 17.
17. Kavirājamārga (Madras, 1930), p. iii.
18. Cited by G. J. Agashe in Daśakumāracharita of Dandin, 2nd edition (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1919), p. xxxvi.
19. Cited by G. J. Agashe in Daśakumāracharita of Dandin, (1919), p. xxxv.
20. P. V. Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, (1961), p. 99.
21. Kavirājamārga (Madras, 1930), p. iii.
22. K. Krishnamoorthy, "Germs of the Theory of Dhvani," Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 28 (1947), p. 196.

Sinhalese

As with the Kannada country to the west, the island of Ceylon to the south was in constant interaction with the lands along the southwestern coast. Politically, and thus militarily, players in the complex weave of South Indian alliance and conflict, the early kings of Ceylon would frequently aid attempted conquest or suffer invasion themselves.

In the years immediately preceding the period of the Kāvyādarśa there is clear evidence of the focal role of Kāñcī in this complex. We read in historical inscriptions that a king Mānavamma fled from Ceylon to Kāñcī during the reign of Dāthopatissa II [c. 640 a.d.], taking refuge with the great Pallava monarch Narasimhavarman [630-68 a.d.]. Mānavamma assisted Narasimha in his war against the powerful Western Chālukya king Pulakeśin II [c. 610-42 a.d.], who was defeated with the city of Vātāpi destroyed in 642. With Pallava help he invaded Ceylon, being

successful on the second attempt and ascending the throne in 668 (ruling until 703).¹

This episode is of specific interest for there is a very real probability that Dandan may have been active at the Kāñcī court during the later years of Mānavamma's rule. We presume cultural and economic contact were coincident with close political alliance, and the implications for the transmission of the Kāvyādarśa are obvious.

Whether or not Dandan's Sanskrit text was available and utilized in Ceylon from this time on is an open question. It is clear, however, that the influence of Sanskrit was great. From an early period "the study of Sanskrit progressed in Ceylon, and even adherents of the orthodox [Buddhist] schools pursued the knowledge of Sanskrit grammar, metrics, poetics, lexicography, and literature such as poetry and drama. . . ."² Indeed, predating the earliest extant Sinhalese mahākāvyas is the Jānakīharana in Sanskrit, written by the Ceylonese kavi Kumāradāsa (traditionally identified with Kumāradhātusena,

King of Ceylon [523-22 a.d.]) in twenty chapters based on a theme drawn from the Rāmāyaṇa.³ I would think it reasonable to assume that Sinhalese scholars were familiar with the Kāvyādarśa for a time prior to its formal adaptation.

What we do find is evidence of the direct and extensive influence of the Kāvyādarśa approximately a century and a half later on the seminal text for kāvya śāstra in Sinhalese -- the Siyabaslakara (usually dated to the mid-9th century).⁴ And striking a curious note of coincidence with the Kāvyādarśa's adaptation into Kannada, the Siyabaslakara is the earliest extant text in the language.

We may briefly note, however, that Sinhalese literature certainly predated the advent of this text. "Sinhalese as a distinct language and script developed rapidly under the joint stimuli of Pāli and Buddhism. . . . By the second century A.D. Sinhalese was being used for literary purposes, and thereafter a body of religious

writing explaining the Pāli canon was accumulated, primarily for the purpose of conveying its ideas to those not conversant with Pāli.⁵ Numerous citations from the Siyabaslakara itself point to an active prior poetical tradition.⁶ Yet the "oldest datable" Sinhalese mahākāvya would appear to be the Sasadāvata or "Kāvyatilakaya" composed during the reign of Queen Līlāvatī [1197-1200],⁷ running to 293 verses arranged in the gī metre. It is based upon the Sasajākata (or the story of the Buddha's incarnation as a hare), where "the author's knowledge of Sanskrit poetry and his indebtedness to it are quite evident from the figures used. . . ."⁸

The traditional view on the writer and dating of the Siyabaslakara is stated by Martino de Zilva Wickremasinghe, "King Sena I. or Silamegha Sena, called also Matvala Sen (A.D. 846-66), wrote the Siyabaslakara at the request of his brother and minister, Amaragiri Kāśyapa."⁹ This position is generally accepted by later scholars such as L. D. Barnett, who notes that the dates 846-66 are drawn

from the Mahāvamsa for King Sena I., and adds (the exceptional) opinion of a colleague, Hugh Nevill, that "the writer was more probably Akbo VI. (son of Kasup III.), who ascended the throne in A.D. 741;¹⁰ P. V. Kane, who paraphrases Barnett;¹¹ Robert Sewell, who cites the additional name Silāmeghavarṇa V. for Sena I. and offers the possibility of the earlier dates 823-43 as well;¹² Garrett Mendis, who considers the text "an adaptation of the Kāvyādarśa" and places it broadly to the 9th century;¹³ and K. M. de Silva (reflecting a more realistic possibility of confusion) considers that the "author was probably Sena IV. (954-56)."¹⁴

It is possible that the Siyabaslakara may have been written at a later date. C. E. Godakumbura more specifically notes that "The concluding verses of the Siyabaslakara say that it was composed by a King called Salamevan (Śilāmeghavarṇa). . . ."; yet considers the identification of the writer as "King Sena I. (A.D. 831-851) . . . improbable," and adds, "Several monarchs of

Ceylon between the ninth and thirteenth centuries . . .

have borne the title of Śilāmeghavarna, and the author may be any one of these.¹⁵ He writes in a later work, "The text in its present form may be dated to about the twelfth century A.D."¹⁶

The Siyabaslakara, the "'Ornaments of the Indigenous Language' or 'the Poetics of Sinhalese' is the Sinhalese gī ["verse"] version of Daṇḍin's Kāvyādarśa.¹⁷ Following the Kāvyādarśa it is divided into three chapters (sagas). The first covers types of kāvya; the second, the artha alamkāras; and the third, various śabda alamkāras although in abbreviated fashion (yamakas only ?). P. V. Kane notes that "almost all of the verses of the [first] two paricchedas of the Kāvyādarśa are taken up in the Sinhalese work. . . ."¹⁸

The text itself "is, for the most part, a very close Sinhalese version of the Sanskrit original; even the first verse, which is an invocation of Sarasvatī, is retained, without substituting for it a verse in worship of the

Buddha."¹⁹ The second verse is of interest -- although the 1892 edition in translation reads "'Offering homage to great Brahma, Indra, the gods' teacher (Br̥haspati), the sage Kāśyapa, the excellent Vāmana, Dāṇḍī, and other masters of the poetical art' [yet] the two excellent manuscripts of the book which are in the British Museum read bāmaha instead of vāmana."²⁰

In the third verse the author indicates that he has synthesized earlier works (as does Dāṇḍin) and will proceed to compose the work in his own language. As with the Kannada Kavirājamārga there is thus a degree of adaptation (although it would appear to be less) to the indigenous literary milieu -- "There are a few places where one notices that the author knew the works of previous writers on Sinhalese prosody, and had the needs of the Sinhalese poet in mind."²¹ We may note, for example, an enumeration of the various types of Sinhalese compositions in verse in Chapter One; the influence of Buddhism (in verse 20 of Chapter One), "'The life and virtues of the Buddha are

written in verse, works on rules of conduct in prose, and drama in a mixture of both";²² and that although most of the examples are Sinhalese translations of those of the Kāvyādarśa some are not, such as verse 355 of Chapter Two -- the example of ślesa alamkāra -- which involves the Jātaka story of King Kusa and Prabhāvatī, a theme evidently popular with earlier Sinhalese poets.

Closely associated with the Siyabaslakara is the Siyabaslakara Sannaya and the Dandyālankārasanne. There is some confusion in the literature as to what exactly these are. C. E. Godakumbura in his earlier work indicates that the Dandyālankārasanne is an actual translation of the Kāvyādarśa, and that it was composed about the same time as the Siyabaslakara (which he believes was in the 12th century).²³ In his later Catalogue, citing a manuscript under the heading "Kāvyādarśa," Godakumbura writes, "The present MS contains the Sannaya or interverbal translation of the Kāvyādarśa, which is generally known in Ceylon as Dandyālaṅkārasanne. This Sanne, which may be dated about

the twelfth century, contains illustrative examples which are not met with in the well-known Sanskrit commentaries of the Kāvyādarśa, and some of these citations are from Buddhist writers."²⁴

The Siyabaslakara Sanne appears to be distinct. In his Catalogue Godakumbura cites a palm leaf manuscript under this title, and states that it is "the word for word translation of the Elu [Sinhalese] treatise on poetics."²⁵ He also affirms that it is "the work of a scholar by the name of Ruvanmiaduru or Ratnamadhvācarya, and it appears to have been written soon after the composition of the text itself."²⁶ Martino de Zilva Wickremasinghe, in his yet earlier Catalogue of the Sinhalese Manuscripts in the British Museum, considers this Sanne rather an "interverbal paraphrase," and would date it "probably a century or two later [than the Siyabaslakara itself], judging from its language."²⁷ This gap would allow for the earlier date of the Siyabaslakara. Wickremasinghe also notes that this work is attributed to a thera [Buddhist monk] named

"Ratnamadhu or Ruvanmī," and adds an interesting speculation:

There was, however, a Thera by the name of Ratnaśrījñāna, called also Ratnamatiपāda, who was the author of the Cāndragomi-vyākarana-pañjikā and the Śabdārthacintā, and who must have lived before the 12th century. It has still to be determined if these two priests were really one person, and were identical with Pañdita Ratnaśrījñāna Bhikshu of Ceylon, mentioned in the Sanskrit inscription of about the 10th century at Buddhagayā.²⁸

It would indeed seem plausible that the Ceylonese Buddhist monk Ratnaśrījñāna, who provides one of the earliest commentaries on the Kāvyādarśa itself (and one to which we shall refer), and which was to find its way into Tibet as one of the two primary Sanskrit commentaries utilized, would be responsible for the explicative work in his native tongue on the Sinhalese adaptation of the Kāvyādarśa.

Notes: Sinhalese

1. Robert Sewell, Historical Inscriptions of Southern India (Madras: University of Madras, 1932), p. 331.
E. Hultzsch, "Contributions to Singhalese Chronology," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1913, pp. 517-31.
2. C. E. Godakumbura, Catalogue of Ceylonese Manuscripts (Copenhagen: The Royal Library, 1980), p. xxiv.
3. C. E. Godakumbura, Catalogue, p. xxv. See Kumāradāsa, The Jānakiharana of Kumāradāsa, edited by S. Paranavitana and C. E. Godakumbura (Colombo: Ceylon Academy of Letters, 1967).
4. (1) Śilāmeghavarna Sena (King of Ceylon), Siyabas Lakara or Sinhalese Rhetoric (founded on Dandin's Kāvyādarśa) by King Silāmēghavarna, paraphrased by Ratnamadhvā chārya Mahā Thēra, revised and edited by Hendrick Jayatilaka (Colombo, 1892).
(2) Siyabaslakara, with the Sannaya, edited by Hendrick Jayatilaka (Colombo, 1901). (3) Śilāmeghavarna (Salamevan), Siyabaslakara Vistaravarnanāva, edited by Hēnpiṭagedara Nāṇasiha (Colombo, 1964).
5. K. M. De Silva, A History of Sri Lanka (London: C. Hurst and Co., 1981), p. 58.
6. C. E. Godakumbura, Sinhalese Literature (Colombo: The Colombo Apothecaries' Co., 1955), p. 138.
7. C. E. Godakumbura, Catalogue, p. xxviii.
8. C. E. Godakumbura, Sinhalese Literature, p. 147.
The Muvadevdāvata, a Sinhalese mahākāvya based upon the Makhādeva Jātaka, is also dated to this period and may possibly be earlier than the Sasadāvata (see pp. 144-46).

9. Martino de Zilva Wickremasinghe, Catalogue of the Sinhalese Manuscripts in the British Museum (London: The British Museum, 1900), p. xiii.
10. L. D. Barnett, "The Date of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍī," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1905, p. 841.
11. P. V. Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, 3rd edition, Reprint (Delhi: Motilal Banarsiādass, 1971 (1961)), p. 100.
12. Robert Sewell, Inscriptions of Southern India, p. 332.
13. Garrett Mendis, The Early History of Ceylon (Calcutta: Y. M. C. A. Publishing House, 1940), p. 77.
14. K. M. de Silva, A History of Sri Lanka (London: C. Hurst and Co., 1981), p. 58.
15. C. E. Godakumbura, Sinhalese Literature, p. 329.
16. C. E. Godakumbura, Catalogue, p. 252.
17. C. E. Godakumbura, Catalogue, p. 252.
18. P. V. Kane, History of Sanskrit Poetics, p. 100.
19. C. E. Godakumbura, Sinhalese Literature, p. 328.
20. L. D. Barnett, "The Date of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍī," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1905, p. 841.
21. C. E. Godakumbura, Sinhalese Literature, p. 328.
22. C. E. Godakumbura, Sinhalese Literature, p. 328.
23. C. E. Godakumbura, Sinhalese Literature, p. 328.

24. C. E. Godakumbura, Catalogue, p. 140.
25. C. E. Godakumbura, Catalogue, p. 252.
26. C. E. Godakumbura, Sinhalese Literature, pp. 329-30.
27. Martin de Zilva Wickremasinghe, Catalogue, p. xiii.
28. Martino de Zilva Wickremasinghe, Catalogue, p. xiii.
See Rajendralala Mitra, Buddha Gaya; Reprint (Delhi: Indological Book House, 1972 (1878)), p. 194.

Pāli

The impact of the Kāvyādarśa in Ceylon goes beyond the Sinhalese however, and in the 12th century we have the appearance of an original and comprehensive kāvya śāstra, based primarily on the Kāvyādarśa, composed in the "classical" language of Ceylonese Buddhism and culture, Pāli. The Subodhālañkāra was written by the Buddhist monk Saṅgharakkhita, a disciple of Sāriputta who led a large school at the monastery of Jetavana, a focal point for literary renewal. Both figures are associated with the reign of Parākramabāhu I. [1153-86].¹

The 9th and 10th centuries in Śrī Lañkā were a period of invasion and conquest, with the Tamil Cōlas pushing south. Coinciding with the decline of Buddhism throughout southern India, "The inevitable result of the Cōla conquest was that Hindu-Brāhmaṇical and Saiva religious practices, Dravidian art and architecture, and the Tamil language itself became overwhelmingly powerful in their intrusive

impact on the religion and culture of Sri Lanka."² Yet with the expulsion of the Cōlas by Vijayabāhu I. [1055-1110] (completed by 1070), and the restoration of the Sinhalese dynasty, a period of cultural and religious resurgence and renewal ensued. This effort was further reinforced and consolidated in the following century with King Parākramabāhu I. [1153-86]. "The resuscitative zeal of these two monarchs in particular demonstrated afresh the remarkable resilience of Sri Lankan Buddhism. Sinhalese bikkhus maintained contacts with distant centres of Buddhism like Nepal and Tibet; they also made vigorous but unsuccessful attempts to spread their teachings in Bengal. . ."³ It is then during this period and with this impetus that Ratnaśrijñāna -- with his profound knowledge of the Kāvyādarśa and associated texts -- was to journey north.

Associated with the resurgence of Buddhism, yet spreading further afield, was an intensity of literary activity in Pāli. "One of the distinctive features of the literature of the Polonnaruva period [named for the Capital

City] was the continued vitality of Pāli as the language of Sinhalese Buddhism. The tradition was still very much in favor of writing in Pāli rather than Sinhalese."⁴

Saṅgharakkhita was clearly a master of the contemporary linguistic arts. Apart from the Subodhālaṅkāra he is also credited with such associated texts as the Sambandhacintā ("Thoughts on Syntax or Composition"), and the Vuttodaya, a work in prose and verse in six chapters on Pāli prosody.⁵

And as with the Siyabaslakara and its associated "Sanne," there appears a Subodhālaṅkāra Sanne (of unknown author and date). This is written in Sinhalese however, and "shows a good deal of indebtedness to Daṇdin's treatise. Where the writer of the Sanne thought that the author of the original had not given sufficient detail, he supplied it with material from the Kavyādarśa."⁶

In considering the Subodhālaṅkāra of Saṅgharakkhita we are extremely fortunate to have the quite thorough analysis of G. E. Fryer (with the complete text).⁷ The text itself consists of 370 verses divided into five chapters.

Chapters One and Two primarily present the composition of kāvya and its potential faults or "dosas." After an invocation to the goddess of speech, here "Vāṇi," it is interesting to find in the second verse mention of an unknown earlier writer, "Although there are excellent treatises on Rhetoric by Rāmasamma (Rāmaśarma) and others, yet they are not adapted for the Māgadha people" [verse 2] (Fryer/93).⁸

The definition of composition (bandha) reflects the influence of Bhāmaha or later writers rather than Dandin however, "That a combination of words and meanings faultless with merits [gunas] or verbal ornaments [alamkāras] is composition" [verse 8] (Fryer/93). Where the cited divisions of kāvya stems from the Kāvyādarśa, "[It] is threefold, being metrical (pajja), in prose (gajja), and in a mixture of both" [verse 8] (Fryer/93). Yet its further division again appears to reflect Bhāmaha's Kāvyālaṅkāra, "It is further divided into continuous

composition (nibandha), and non-continuous composition (anibandha)" [verse 9] (Fryer/93).

Faults (dosas) are threefold, whether of word, sentence, or meaning. Their presentation would appear to have been drawn from a number of sources, although the influence of Dāṇḍin's list is evident (or indeed of Bhāmaha given that one of his lists is identical with that of Dāṇḍin's). Faults pertaining to the word are, for example, viruddhatthantara [verses 22, 71-72], "When a word is employed which suggests a meaning different from what is intended" [verse 22] (Fryer/94); virodhi [verses 35, 76-81], that is, of "contradiction," which (as in the Kāvyādarśa) may be of place (desa), time (kāla), skills (kalā), accepted worldly knowledge (loka), reasoning (ñāya), or of scripture (āgama); or hīnaltha [verses 39, 85], where there is too great a discrepancy in either inferiority or superiority in comparison (one of the faults in upamās appearing in Chapter Two of the Kāvyādarśa).

It is interesting that yamaka and prahelikā (pahelī)

are mentioned under the fault kilittha ("inconsistency," "ambiguity"), "Any word of far-fetched meaning employed in the varieties of . . . yamaka, or . . . paheli, is included in this fault" [verse 25] (Fryer/94). The presentation of yamaka's varieties is brief, but its delineation is identical with the primary divisions found in the third chapter of the Kāvyādarśa. Yamaka "formed by a repetition of syllables is threefold: non-separated (avyapeta); separated (vyapeta); and both sorts combined. These divisions may appear either in the beginning, middle, or end of a quarter verse (pāda)" [verse 27] (Fryer/94). Yet the author ultimately dismisses yamaka and rejects prahelikā completely. In [verse 34] we read, "But as yamaka and paheli are not altogether pleasing, they are not dwelt upon here" (Fryer/94) -- and there appears to be no mention of anuprāsa. Indeed, with Chapter Four entirely devoted to artha alamkāras, and Chapter Five to rasa, with the exception of these few verses on yamaka, śabda and duskaṛa alamkāras are not presented.

Faults potentially occurring at the sentence level are, for example: ekattha (ekārtha) [verses 41-41, 88], unnecessary repetition; yatihīna (yatibhraṣṭa) [verse 48], a defective "word break" in metre; or ativotta (vyartha ?) [verses 57, 96, 147], and contradiction between sentence elements.

Faults of meaning within a sentence may be, for example: apakkama (apakrama) [verses 61, 101], incorrect correlation of parallel elements; or samsaya (samśaya) [verses 65, 111], ambiguity of meaning which allows more than one interpretation of a sentence.

Chapter Three of the Subodhālañkāra presents the identical ten gunas found in Chapter One of the Kāvyādarśa. The order varies yet it is interesting to note that the first three, pasāda (prasāda), oja (ojas), and madhuratā (mādhurya), are the triad of gunas frequently accepted by writers later than Dandin. Their definitions are similar to those of Dandin, but we do find an elaboration of the last guna, samādhi ("transference"). It is considered the

"cream of composition" (bandhaśaro) [verse 150], and "is manifested when the imagination clothes objects with qualities or functions foreign to them" [verses 150-51] (Fryer/98). Where "1. Life is ascribed to inanimate objects; 2. Form to objects without form; 3. Flavour to objects unassociated with flavour; 4. Liquidity to objects not displaying this feature; 5. Agency to an object that is not an agent; and 6. Solidity to an object that is without solid form" [verses 152-53] (Fryer/98).

Chapter Four presents thirty-six artha alamkāras, and there is little doubt that Saṅgharakkhita drew heavily from Daṇḍin's presentation of the thirty-five alamkāras in Chapter Two of the Kāvyādarśa. The order is close, and with the exception of three alamkāras dropped and replaced, and one transformed apparently into two, the individual alamkāras are the same. There is certainly a streamlining of Daṇḍin's subvarieties, yet those that do appear -- as in upamā, dīpaka, and hetu for example -- seem to reflect distilled echos of the Kāvyādarśa. The definitions,

however, seem to vary in some cases, and appear to be in Saṅgharakkhita's own words.

Of immediate interest is his division of the artha alamkāras into two categories, where the meaning is "expressed in words," or where the meaning is "suggested" [verse 166ab]. Into the first category falls what is termed sabhāvavutti (or svabhāvokti); the second includes the thirty-five (in his schema) remaining alamkāras. I have little doubt that Saṅgharakkhita had Daṇḍin's extensive elaboration of the subvarieties in mind when he remarks in [verse 168], "As the varieties of the suggestive figures are endless, only the basic alamkāras will be described" (Fryer/98).

Taking the alamkāras out of the order presented (although retaining their numbered sequence) when considering Saṅgharakkhita's terminology in light of Daṇḍin's we find three groups:

(T.) Those alamkāras directly borrowed: (2) upamā; (3)

rūpaka; (5) dīpaka; (9) vibhāvanā; (10) hetu; (15) samāhita; and (21) tulyayogitā.

(II.) Those "transferred" into Pāli: (1) sabhāvavutti (svabhāvokti), the only alamkāra of the first major division; (1) atisayavutti (atiśayokti); (4) āvutti (āvṛtti); (6) ākkhepo (ākṣepa); (7) attantaranyāsa (arthāntaranyāsa); (8) vyatireko (vyatireka); (11) kamo (krama or yathāsamkhya); (13) samāsavutti (samāsokti); (16) pariyāya (paryāyokta); (17) vyājavanñana (vyājastuti); (20) sileso (ślesa); (22) nidassanam (nidarśana); (23) mahantattham (udātta); (24) appakatathuti (aprastuta-praśamsā); (28) sahavutti (sahokti); (29) virodhitā (virodha); (30) parivutti (parivṛtti); and (34) āsi (āśis).

(III.) Those "translated" into Pāli: (12) piyataram (preyas); (14) parikappanna (utpreksā); (19) rūlhāhankāra (ūrjasvin); (24) vañcanā (apahnuti); and (33) missam (samsṛṣṭi).

Saṅgharakkhita has dropped (as does nearly every writer after Dandin) sūksma and leśa alamkāras, as well as

bhāvika alamkāra. He has added (26) ekāvali / "When what is mentioned first, is qualified by what follows, and this again by what comes next, and so on" [verse 317] (Fryer/102); (27) aññamaññam / "When two things do the same things to each other" [verses 320-21] (Fryer/103); and (31) bhamo / "The thinking, from resemblance, of an object to be what it is not" [verse 329] (Fryer/103).

We should note, however, that the essential processes that mark these alamkāras -- successive or reciprocal relationships, error or doubt -- are well-represented in a number of Dāṇḍin's subvarieties. The remaining alamkāras I view as essentially reflecting Dāṇḍin's rasavat: (32) bhāvo (bhāva) / "The awakening of rasa in the minds of kavis" [verse 331], where "This alamkāra is considered the life of kāvya" [verse 173] (Fryer/103; and (35) rasī / "Where the style is full of feeling and wit" [verses 337-38] (Fryer/103).

A number of points may be noted from Saṅgharakkhita's presentation of the alamkāras. The śabda alamkāras play a

minimal role. Although missam (samsrsti) is defined [verse 333] as the blending of śabda and artha alamkāras, beyond the brief mention of yamaka, little else is said. And although Saṅgharakkhita was certainly cognizant of the dus्कāra (those "difficult to compose") alamkāras and the prahelikas, he chose to exclude them. The fundamental categories of svabhāvokti and vakrokti that Daṇḍin indicated in (KD [3.363]) yet never explicitly clarified, are made explicit and used as the fundamental differentia for the schema of the alamkāras. Svabhāvokti as "sabhā vavutti" marks the first category whenever meaning is directly expressed (again, there is no need to assume a false contradiction, for as an alamkāra it would go without saying that whether "direct" or not, the primary effect is the generation of beauty). Vakrokti as "suggested" meaning appears as "vañgavutti," and Saṅgharakkhita would see this as marking all the remaining alamkāras.

I find it especially interesting in light of those recent writers who view the dhvani theory as a culmination,

and rather blithely assume that it was so recognized by all who came after the Dhvanyaloka, that we find no mention of it in the Subodhalañkāra.

We note that the importance of atiśayokti (atiśaya) -- marked by both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin -- is emphasized by Saṅgharakkhita in bringing it forward to the first position of the second category. Hetu alamkāra, specifically excluded by Bhāmaha, is retained and divided into two basic categories that reflect Daṇḍin's schema -- janakahetu (karakahetu) and nāpakahetu (jñānakahetu). And finally, we may note that the four oldest explicitly named alamkāras (based on of course the extant material) -- yamaka, upamā, rūpaka, and dīpaka -- were all incorporated directly as Sanskrit terms without modification into the Subodhalañkāra.

The fifth and last chapter of the Subodhalañkāra is dedicated to a precise exposition of rasa and its associated elements. Saṅgharakkhita was clearly aware of treatments following Daṇḍin, as we find nine rather than eight rasas with "śanta" now included. The corresponding nine "dominant" or "stable" emotional states, the thāyi-

bhāvas (sthāyibhāvas) are listed in [verse 344]: (1) rati (rati) / "love"; (2) haso (hāsa) / "mirth"; (3) soko (śoka) / "sorrow"; (4) kodho (krodha) / "anger"; (5) ussaka (utsāha) / "resolve"; (6) bhayam (bhaya) / "fear"; (7) jigucchā (jugupsā) / "disgust"; (8) vimhaya (vismaya) / "wonder"; and (9) samo (nirveda) / "tranquility."

The thirty-three vyabhicāribhāvas -- the "transitory" or "subordinate" states -- are listed in [verse 345], the eight satta (sāttvika) bhāvas -- the "physiological" or "natural" states -- follow in [verse 348], and the nine rasas themselves are enumerated in [verse 356]: (1) singāra (śrṅgāra) / the "erotic"; (2) hassa (hāsyā) / the "comic"; (3) karunā (karuna) / the "compassionate"; (4) ruddha (raudra) / the "furious"; (5) vira (vīra) / the "heroic"; (6) bhayanañkā (bhayānaka) / the "terrifying"; (7) bibhaccha (bibhatsa) / the "hideous"; (8) abbhuta (adbhuta) / the "marvelous"; and (9) santa (śānta) / the "peaceful."

The closing verses of the Subodhālañkāra explicate the rasas individually, delineating their characteristics, divisions if any, and their associated features.

Notes: Pāli

1. See George P. Malasekera, "Sāriputta's Circle," in The Pāli Literature of Ceylon (Colombo: M. D. Gunasena and Co., 1958), pp. 196-219. K. M. De Silva, "The Polonnaruva Kingdom," in A History of Sri Lanka (London: C. Hurst and Co., 1981), pp. 60-78.
2. K. M. De Silva, A History of Sri Lanka, p. 73.
3. K. M. De Silva, A History of Sri Lanka, p. 73.
4. K. M. De Silva, A History of Sri Lanka, p. 74.
5. Sañgharakkhita, Vuttodaya (Exposition of Metre) by Sañgharakkhita Thera, edited and translated by G. E. Fryer (Calcutta: The Baptist Mission Press, 1877).

Samgharakkhita's Vuttodaya, translated by R. Siddharatha (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1981).

In the Gandha Vamsa, a list of Pāli authors and texts (date ?), the Subodhālaṅkāra and the Vuttodaya appear as the two works associated with Sañgharakkhita: "Subodhālamkāro nāma gandho vuttodayo nāma gandho attano matiyā samgharakkhitācariyena kato" (Gandha Vamsa, edited by (?) Minayeff, Journal of the Pāli Text Society, 1886, p. 70).

Bimala C. Law in this regard provides an excellent example of an author engaged in historical textual overview failing to be familiar with the texts themselves: Pāli literature is conspicuous by the absence of any noteworthy work on Poetics. If there be any such work, we may safely take it to be based on some Sanskrit authority. There are a few Pāli works on metre notably the Vuttodaya and the Subodhālaṅkāra [which in fact is the Pāli work on "poetics"]. With regard to all these works on prosody, it may suffice to say that they are far from being original productions" (Bimala C. Law, A History of Pāli Literature,

vol. 2; Reprint (Varanasi: Bhartiya Publishing House, 1974), p. 634).

6. C. E. Godakumbura, Sinhalese Literature, p. 330.
See Subodhālankāra-sanne, edited by Dhammarakkhita-tissa (Colombo ?, 1910).

7. G. E. Fryer, "On the Ceylon Grammarians Sangharakkhita Thera and his Treatise on Rhetoric," Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, vol. 44, part 1 ((1875), pp. 91-125.
See also Sañgharakkhita, Subodhālañkāra, with Sinhalese notes and paraphrase, revised by Dhammarakkhita Tissa, 2 vols. (Colombo, 1909-10).

8. All of the following translations of the Pāli verses of the Subodhālañkāra are drawn from G. E. Fryer's presentation cited immediately above, and will be marked in the running text with "(Fryer/)."

Tibetan

It is with the "earlier spread" (snga dar) of Buddhism into Tibet, initiated in the latter half of the 8th century by King Khri srong lde'u bstan, that we find the first wave of Indian textual transmission and incorporation. The translation of the various sūtras (bka'a), āgamas and sāstras (bstan bcos) dating to this period were fortunately itemized in an extant catalogue of more than seven-hundred works classified under thirty titles, composed by Dpal brtsegs and Nam mkha'i snying po at the Palace of Ldan kar in Stod thang. Its heading reads Pho brang stod thang ldan dkar gyi bka'a dang bcos 'gyur ro cog gi dkar chag dpal brtsegs dang nam mkha'a snying pos mdzad do.¹ Under the category "Various mahāyāna sāstras" (theg pa chen po'i bstan bcos sna chogs la) appears a text that was to become a touchstone for the practice of kāvya in Tibet, the Jātakamālā (Skyes pa'i rabs kyi rgyud) of Āryaśūra [3rd to 4th centuries]. Stories of the Buddha during his various

incarnations, the Jātakamālā was to serve as a basic exemplar and thematic source.²

That the Jātakamālā was widely circulated is shown by the discovery of a fragment to the north, in the sands of Central Asia.³ There is similarly evidence that the Saundarananda of Aśvaghoṣa [1st/2nd centuries a.d.] -- perhaps the earliest extant extended kāvya -- was known to this region at a comparatively early date. Fragments found appear to be "not older than the 6th c. after Christ," written in Prākṛta with the Brāhmaṇī form of the old Turkish script.⁴

Yet more tangible evidence of the extent of the early dissemination of Indic material was provided with the discovery of a monastic library preserved in the caves at Tun-huang (Chien-to-fung), which may be dated from the 8th to 9th centuries. Aside from the purely religious material, we find popular tales, legends, chronicles, songs, and of immediate interest, some six (incomplete) manuscripts -- reflecting at least two recensions⁵ --

relating the Rāmāyaṇa.⁶ As Frederick W. Thomas remarks, "The Indian literary works hitherto recovered from Chinese Turkestan, whether Sanskrit or Prākrit originals or versions in other languages, are almost exclusively of a Buddhist character. But here we have manuscripts exhibiting the story of the chief Brahmanical epic, the ādi-kāvya, with no infusion of Buddhism. From the extreme east of the region, the very border of China proper, comes a Tibetan version of the story of Rāma."⁷

Distance, culture and authorial circumstance have left their marks, however, for we have a tale quite distinct from the Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmīki. King Daśaratha, for example, now has but two sons, Ramana and Lakṣana; Sītā appears as the daughter of Daśagrīva (Rāvana); and Hanuman upon being captures begs to be killed.⁸ The form differs as well, not only from that of the Sanskrit original, but from earlier Tibetan verse, prose, and song -- "marked by . . . brisk rhythm, great vitality and use of onomatopoeia,"⁹ The Tibetan version of the Rāmāyaṇa appears in both prose and

verse, with the prose relating the story line, and the verse reserved for speech and for letters exchanged between Ramana (Rāma) and Sītā. And with a developed prosody now coming to the fore.¹⁰ Thomas doubts that this version stems directly from an Indian original:

"The story, as told, is in form and substance wholly Indian, and the interspersed verses are unmistakably Indian in style and sentiment. But we should seek in vain for an Indian version of the Rāmāyana to which the text closely corresponds. It follows the general lines of the narrative in the Mahā-Bharata (Vana-Parvan, chapters 274-290); but the incidents and the nomenclature differ widely, and indeed surprisingly. . . . We have therefore a highly peculiar Rāmāyana story. Whence and how did it come to the Chinese frontier of Turkestan?"¹¹

He would consider Nepal as a possible intermediary.

J. W. de Jong, however, considers it "probable that the text of the verses closely follows an Indian original." Where "the Indian original of the Tibetan version seems to have taken elements from Vālmīki's Rāmāyana and to have combined them with stories taken from other Rāmāyana recensions."¹²

From the 9th to 11th centuries we should note the translation into Tibetan of a large number of subhāṣitas -- "sayings, epigrams, aphorisms, sententious verses and didactic teaching," and "beautifully turned quotations drawn from literary sources."¹³ Their format was most usually the regular four pāda śloka; they sought to capture a striking image, convey useful information or a conventional truth.

Eight such works were later included in the Bstan 'gyur of the Tibetan canon (from the Sde dge edition): (1) Shes rab brgya pa zhes bya ba'i rab tu byed pa (Prajñāśatakanāmaprakarana), attributed to Nāgarjuna (Klu sgrub), translated by Dpal brtsegs (one of the compilers of the previously mentioned Ldan kar catalogue) and Sarvajñadeva [8th-9th centuries]; (2) Lugs kyi bstan bcos shes rab sdong bu (Nītiśāstraprājñādanda), attributed to Nāgarjuna, translated by Ye shes sde and Śilendrabodhi (?) [9th century]; (3) Lugs kyi bstan bcos skye bo gso ba'i thigs pa (Nītiśāstrajanaposaṇabindu), attributed to Nāgarjuna,

translated by Ye shes sde and Śilendrabodhi [9th century];

(4) Tshig su bcad pa'i mdzod (Gāthā [or Ārya] kosa),

attributed to Ravigupta, translated by Dpal gyi lhun po and

Jñānaśānti [9th century]; (5) Tshigs su bcad brgya pa

(Śatagāthā), attributed to Vararuci, translated by Chos kyi

shes rab and Vinayacandra [11-12th centuries]; (6) Dri ma

med pa'i dris lan rin po che'i phreng ba (Vimalapraśnot-

tararatnamālā), attributed to Amoghavarsa, translated by

Rin chen bzang po and Kamalagupta [11th century]; (7) Tsa

na ka'i rgyal po'i lugs kyi rgyal bcos (Cāṇakyarājanīti-

śāstra), attributed to Cāṇakya, translated by Rin chen

bzang po and Prabhākaraśrīmitra [11th century]; and (8) Ma

sū rā kṣa'i lugs kyi bstan bcos (Masūrākṣaṇītiśāstra),

attributed to Masūrākṣa, translated by Śākyablogros and

Dharmaśribhadra [11th century].¹⁴

We should not assume, however, that the assimilation of Indian texts was smooth and continual. The centralization of Tibetan power that began in the 6th to 7th centuries, focused on the Yar klungs and Skyid chu valleys,

and the assumption of Buddhism by the dynastic rulers -- leading to its elevation as the state religion in 779 a.d. when Tibetan imperial rule was at its height under King Khri srong lde brtsan (ruled 755-97) -- was a continuing source of secular and religious friction. Numerous Tibetans, especially among the nobility, yet held to an assortment of for the most part indigenous spiritual practices and beliefs (mi chos/"the religion of the people"), that were largely incorporated into the Bon po religion (lha chos/"the religions of the gods," a term which was only later applied to Buddhism).¹⁵ This tension came to a head with the assassination of King Khri gtsug lde brtsan Ral pa can in 836.¹⁶ This act led to the eventual installment of the King's brother Khri u dum brtsan Glang dar ma [ruled 838-42] as a puppet of the noble clans, and thus to the severe repression of Buddhism and the termination of significant textual transmission. Yet Glang dar ma was himself murdered by a tantric Buddhist monk, Dpal gyi rdo rje. A period of nearly a century and a

half of turmoil and chaos ensued [mid 9th to the latter part of the 10th centuries]. (This interruption is seen, for example, in the above dating for the Tibetan incorporation of the Indian nīti literature: the first four works were translated in the 8th or 9th centuries; the latter four in the 11th or 12th centuries.)

Buddhism first revived in the western kingdom of Gu ge, and with the prodigious and pioneering work of Rin chen bzang po (958-1055) (who along with colleagues, translated and revised some 158 texts¹⁷), and the teachings of the Indian pandita Atiśa [entering Tibet in 1042] the "later spread" (phyi dar) of Buddhism and concomitant textual absorption began.

The study of kāvya in Tibet was initiated by the great scholar and teacher, Kun dga'a rgyal mtshan [1182-1251] of Sa skya monastery (founded in 1073 by 'Khon dkon mchog rgyal po). By this period the fundamental translations of scriptures and śāstras were nearly complete. For Sa skya Pandita (a title recognizing his skill in Sanskrit and by

which he is usually mentioned) then the "main tasks were to consolidate the doctrinal and philosophical advances of his predecessors and to enrich further the scholarly and literary resources of Tibetan Buddhism."¹⁸

Sa skya Paṇḍita's study of kāvya began in earnest in approximately 1205 with a Buddhist scholar from western India, Sugataśrī, who was working in Tibet with the renowned Kashmiri paṇḍita [Kha che paṇ chen] Śākyasrī. The years from 1205 to 1207 were spent primarily at Sa skya with Sugataśrī immersed in the study of Sanskrit texts. A program that included kāvya and kāvya śāstra (snyan ngag), Sanskrit grammar (śabdhavidyā /sgra rig pa), lexicography (abhidhāna/mngon brjod), prosody (chandas/sdeb sbyor), and drama (nāṭaka/zlos gar).¹⁹ He also studied with the Newar paṇḍita Samghaśrī (a disciple of Śākyasrī), "famed for his great learning in the Candra tradition of Sanskrit grammar."²⁰

Sa skya Paṇḍita's studies proved fruitful. The formal study of Sanskrit-Tibetan lexicography begins with his

partial translation of the Amarakosa of Amarasiṁha, the Tshig gi gter [c. 1210-20].²¹ The formal study of Sanskrit prosody first appears with Sa skya Pandita's Sdeb sbyor sna tshogs me tog gi chun po (c. 1220-30).²² And of extreme importance, in the Mkhas pa rnams 'jug pa'i sgo, "An Introduction to the Principles and Concepts of Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism" [c. 1220-30], we have the introduction into Tibet of kāvya śāstra (snyan ngag bstan bcos) -- a major section of which is drawn from Dandin's Kāvyādarśa.²³

The Mkhas 'Jug was one of Sa skya Pandita's "main means for introducing the methods of traditional Tibetan Buddhist scholarship into Tibet and thus putting Tibetan scholarship on a sound methodological footing."²⁴ The text is divided into three sections: composition (rtsom pa), teaching (bshad pa), and debate (rtsod pa). It is the first section which is of concern to this study, but before proceeding to its analysis it is of interest to note the relevant texts Sa skya Pandita studied, listed in the

introductory section (each brief group concludes with sogs pa / "and so on," implying one presumes the awareness of yet further works).²⁵

On grammar (sgra'i bstan bcos) we find the Ka lā pa, one of "the four great grammatical systems to spread in Tibet."²⁶ The Kalāpa was first translated into Tibetan in the early 14th century by Dpang blo gros brtan pa (a name to keep in mind), following the Durga-Simha commentary. The second grammatical text mentioned by Sa skya Pandita is the Tsandra pa or Cāndravyākaraṇa by Candragomin [c. 450 a.d.] (a work greatly influenced by Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya).

The basic text was first translated by Shong ston rdo rje rgyal mtshan (another primary Tibetan figure in our study), and revised by Dpang blo gros brtan pa.²⁷ (The other two of the "four great grammatical systems" are the Sārasvata-vyākaraṇa (Dbyangs can pa), with the first extant translation by Jo nang Tārānātha [16th-17th centuries]. And the Pāṇinivyākaraṇa, first translated by 'Dar lo tsā ba

[17th century] with the patronage of the Fifth Dalai Lama. It is traditionally believed to have been recited by Kumāra (Gzhon nu Gdong drug), the son of Mahādeva, to the ācārya Śarvavarman (or Īśvaravarman/Slob dpon Dbang phyug go cha).)²⁸

Under kāvya texts (snyan ngag gi bstan bcos), Sa skyā Pāṇḍita mentions the Skyes pa'i rabs (Jātakamālā) of Ārdyaśūra (a text whose early Tibetan translation and importance we have previously noted); and the "Three Great Ones" (chen po gsum) [?] and the "Three Small Ones" (chung ngu gsum) [?]. Studies on prosody (sdeb sbyor gyi bstan bcos) follow, with the important Rin chen 'byung gnas (Chandoratnākara) of Ratnākaraśānti mentioned. For Tibetan scholars this was the fundamental text on Sanskrit prosody. It was first translated into Tibetan by Byan chub rtse mo [1303-80] (a linguistic scholar within the tradition initiated by Shong ston). He later collaborated on a revision with Nam mkha'a bzang po [13th-14th centuries]. The text was subsequently corrected by Zhwa lu lo tsā ba

Chos skyong bzang po [1441-1527/8].²⁹ The second text cited on metre is the Sdeb sbyor gyi tshoms (Chandovicchiti [?]).

For alamkāra śāstra (tshig gi rgyan gyi bstan bcos) Sa skyā Pandita includes "Dandī" (that is, the Kāvyādarśa), and, most interestingly, the Dbyangs can gyi mgul rgyan or the Sarasvatikānthābarana of Bhoja [11th century].

Lexicographical texts follow (ming gi nges brjod), citing not surprisingly the A ma ra ko sā, and the Sna tshogs gsal ba (Viśvalocana). The Amarakosā or Nāmalingānuśāsana of Amarasimha [6th century (?)] was translated by Yar klungs lo tsā ba Grags pa rgyal mtshan [c. 1300] and Pandita Kīrticandra. It was corrected probably by Dpang Blo gros brtan pa, and was completely revised by Zhwa lu lo tsā ba Chos skyong bzang po [1441-1528].³⁰ The Viśvalocana (or Muktāvalī) of Śrīdharaṇasena was translated by Zhwa lu lo tsā ba.

And finally we may note two nāṭakas or plays cited under nāṭaka śāstra (zlos gar gyi bstan bcos). These are the Glu rnams rab tu dga'a ba, that is, the Nāgānandanāṭaka

of Harṣadeva, translated by Shong ston rdo rje rgyal mtshan and the Nepalese pandita Lakṣmikara;³¹ and the Gzugs kyi snye ma [?].

The motives for Sa skya Pandita's writing what remains one of the finest (if not unique) study of its kind in Tibetan are no doubt complex. He was on the one hand one of the leading religious and political figures of his time. Clearly extremely well-read and learned, he sought to place Tibetan scholarship on firm ground. Running throughout one assumes are Buddhist concerns. Yet too -- and this is evident in the subsequent tradition -- one cannot help but feel that there was a genuine pleasure in the play of words. David Jackson -- a scholar well-versed in the work of Sa skya Pandita and the Sa skya tradition -- writes:

His teaching of the methods of composition was the outgrowth of his own pioneering studies of Sanskrit grammar and the Sanskrit literary arts such as poetics, metrics, and lexicography. . . .

Sa-pāṇī's immediate motive for explaining these topics was either to fill a real gap in current knowledge (as in the case of grammar and poetics) or to rectify already established traditions (as

in the case of some aspects of exposition and debate). . . . There was also a deeper, religious motive for the work. By teaching the methods of scholarship, Sa-p'an hoped to lead others ultimately to enlightened wisdom, the highest goal of Buddhist practice.³²

The section of the Mkhas 'Jug on composition itself is divided into three parts: (1) an initial discussion on the appropriate opening or beginning of texts; (2) various aspects of language, grammar and meaning, and their components on the "phonological (yi ge), morphological (ming), and grammatical (tshig) levels of analysis";³³ and (3) an examination of the composition of syan ngag or kāvya.

Sa skyā Pandita opens his explication of kāvya:
 "Having thus realized the application of linguistic study (sgra), I shall now explain the embellishment of words (tshig rgyan) so that one may proceed with the composition of kāvya" [de ltar sgra'i sbyor ba shes nas snyan ngag rtsom pa la 'jug pa'i phyir tshig rgyan bhad do]. He continues in verse with words that appear to echo yet effectively

expand Dāṇḍin's view of svabhāvokti and vakrokti as the fundamental elements of creative expression (where "||" in the Tibetan transliteration shall mark the end of a verse line; "|" the end of a prose sentence or phrase): "The embellishment of language lies in the manner of expressing characteristic natures, attributes, and actions through the description of the nature of something in its actual state, or through praising its virtues or censoring its faults through literal (drang po) or figurative (zur mig) expression, which involves the explicit and implicit understanding of words (tshig) and meaning (don). I shall begin, presenting the rasas (ro) of the nine bhāvas (nyams) that are formed by embellishment through upamās (dpes) and other poetical devices [rang bzhin yon tan las rnams la || ngo bo bstod smad brjod pa'i tshul || drang po zur mig tshig dang don || dngos shugs dpe yi sgo nas de || sgro btags nas ni tshig gi rgyan || nyams dgu'i ro dang sbyar te spel ||].³⁴

Sa skyā Pāṇḍita then proceeds to lay out the nine (not eight) rasas:

- (1) sgeg pa / śrṅgāra
- (2) dpa'a ba / vīra
- (3) mi sdug pa / bibhatsa
- (4) dgod pa / hāsyā
- (5) drag shul / raudra
- (6) 'jigs rung / bhayānaka
- (7) snying rje / karuṇā
- (8) ngam pa / adbhuta
- (9) zhi ba / sānta³⁵

These are followed by their explication and a consideration of which ones may or may not combine. For example, "The ornament of the erotic (sgeg pa'i rgyan) may not combine with either the horrific, the furious, or the marvelous ornaments" [sgeg pa'i rgyan la mi sdug dang || drag shul ngam pa'i rgyan mi sbyar ||].³⁶ Where "The erotic ornament may combine with the compassionate, the

marvelous, and the tranquil" [sgeg pa'i rgyan la snying rje dang || ngam dang zhi ba 'jug pa srid ||].³⁷ We might note that this extensive explication of rasa is clearly not drawn from Bharata, rather from a comparatively late text (Bhoja's Sarasvatikantthābhāraṇa ?) -- not from the Kāvyaśāra. Yet Sa skya Pandita uses the phrase, as here for example, sgeg pa'i rgyan; that is, "the alamkāra which is the erotic [rasa]." Rasas as alamkāras reflect Dāṇḍin's view, and one might wonder whether his influence is to be seen here.

And textual examples are cited: "Illustrative examples (dpe(r) brjod) of these [ornaments displaying the comic rasa] should be understood from such texts as the Nāgānandanāma nāṭaka [of Harsadeva]" ['di dag gi dpe brjod pa ni klu rnams rab tu dga'a bar byed pa'i zlos gar la sog s par shes par bya'o].³⁸ Or "Illustrative examples of the compassionate [rasa] should be understood from such texts as the Viśvantara Jātaka; and of the tranquil [rasa] from such texts as the Jātaka of 'The One Born in the House of

Iron'" [snying rje'i dpe brjod pa thams cad sgrol dang |
 zhi ba'i dpe brjod pa lcags kyi khyim du skyes pa'i rabs la
 sogs pa ltar shes par bya'o].³⁹

And as Sa skya Pandita moves into the discussion of kāvya as such -- its forms, components, characteristics -- we begin to see the direct reflection of the Kāvyādarśa, whether in paraphrase or translation. For example, from Kāvyādarśa [1.11]: "For those composing texts there are three [forms]: tshigs bcad (padya/"verse"); rkyang pa (gadya/"prose"); and spel ba (miśra/"mixed") [bstan bcos byed pas tshigs bcad dang || rkyang pa dang ni spel ba gsum ||].⁴⁰ And again from Kāvyādarśa [1.11]: "Stanzas according to the study of prosody (sdeb sbyor) consist of four rkang pas (pādas). And due to the distinction of being either 'jug pa (vrtti) or rigs pa (jāti) are of two types" [sdeb sbyor tshigs bcad rkang bzhi pa || 'jug dang rigs kyis dbye bas gnyis ||].⁴¹ From Kāvyādarśa [1.10]: "Kāvya has been analysed and described as displaying two aspects: A framework (or body/lus) and its embellishment

(rgyan)" [snyan ngag la ni lus dang rgyan || rnam pa gnyis su bsdus te bshad ||].⁴² And translating Dāṇḍin's fundamental position on creative freedom as stated in [1.20]: "A kāvya although short of some of these positive features will not be considered defective where the excellence of those employed generates pleasure in the wise" [gang tshe nye bar phun sum tshogs || de nyid rig pa mgu byed na || 'dir ni gang 'ga'a ma tshang yang || snyan ngag skyon can min shes bya ||].⁴³

The mārgas are thoroughly discussed. Reflecting Kāvyādarśa [1.40]: "In the discrimination of kāvya [literally, "words"] there are the two tshul rnam pas (mārgas/"paths") -- the Vai dharbha and the Gau ḍa ba -- famed among the wise of the land of the āryas" [vai dharbha dang gau ḍa ba'i || tshig gi sbyor tshul rnam pa gnyis || 'phags pa'i yul gyi mkhas la grags ||]. Where Sa skyā Pāṇḍita glosses "'phags pa'i yul" ("land of the āryas") as "sangs rgyas bzhugs pa'i gnas ma ga dhā la sogs pa'o" ("the place of the Buddha's birth, Magadhā, and so on").⁴⁴

The ten gunas are listed following Dāṇḍin's order in
Kāvyādarśa [1.41]:

- (1) 'brel / ślesa
- (2) rab gsal / prasāda
- (3) mnyam pa nyid / samatā
- (4) snyan / mādhuryam
- (5) rab tu bzhon pa / sukumāratā
- (6) don gsal / arthavyakti
- (7) go bde ba / udāratva
- (8) brjid / ojas
- (9) mdzes / kānti
- (10) ting nge 'dzin / samādhaya⁴⁵

Sa skya Pandita reserves the greater portion of the Mkhas 'jug's section on composition, however, for an extended translation that covers somewhat over half of the Kāvyādarśa's second chapter. Although he varies between verse and prose, occasionally paraphrasing, adding here and there his own gloss (albeit rarely), he stays extremely

close to Dandin's text with nearly all of the material directly translated. This section is extremely important for it represents the earliest extant, extended translation from the Kāvyāsarśa (aside from the fact that it has remained a closed book beyond any but the Tibetans themselves, as indeed has all of Tibetan kāvya śāstra).

This was the core that grounded the Kāvyādarśa in Tibet, initiating the complete translation(s) to follow; and through this, the incredible growth of Tibetan commentary and speculation on kāvya -- as focused by the Kāvyādarśa -- that continued across the centuries. For the present, let us examine Sa skya Pan.d.ita's layout of the alamkāras, their subvarieties, and the corresponding verses from the Kāvyādarśa that they reflect (the numbering of the Sanskrit verses will follow Rangacharya Raddhi's text).⁴⁶

We begin with a partial translation of Kāvyādarśa [2.8] on svabhāvokti alamkāra or rang bzhing brjod pa rgyan: [ngo bos dngos su bsngags pa ni || rang bzhin brjod dang rigs yin te || de sogs de yi rgyan bshad bya ||]

("Graphically revealing objects/This is rang bzhin brjod and rigs. . . .").⁴⁷ It is interesting to note that Sa skya Pañdita, in a brief added gloss, considers svabhāvokti and jāti (rigs) as two aspects or elements rather than two names for the same thing (tshigs su bcad pa rtshom pa'i tshul la gnyis te | rang bzhin bsngags pa dang | rigs bsngags pa'o |). Where "rang bzhin" refers to the expression of the true nature of something directly, without fault" [dang po ni dngos po'i gnas lugs skyon med par brjod pa yin la]; and "rigs refers to the presentation of the object as such, as realized through its intimate relationship with this nature" [gnyis pa ni de dang rjes su 'brel ba'i chos brjod pa yin |]. The four examples of svabhāvokti follow: (1) rigs tsam (jāti "as such") [2.9]; (2) bya ba (kriyā), [2.10]; (3) yon tan (guṇa), [2.11]; and (4) rdzes (dravya), [2.12].

Upamā alamkāra or dpe rgyan and its numerous varieties are thoroughly laid out.⁴⁸ From Dañdin's definition of [2.14]: [de lta'i dpe yi rab dbye ba | sngon gyi mkhas pas

'di ltar bshad] ("Dpe [upamā] -- Where similarity is thoroughly distinguished / Previous masters have taught it accordingly"). The Tibetan varieties following Dañdin's sequence are:

- (1) chos / dharma [2.15]
- (2) dngos / vastu [2.16]
- (3) bzlog pa / viparyāsa [2.17]
- (4) phan tshun / anyonya [2.18]
- (5) nges pa / niyama [2.19]
- (6) ma nges pa / aniyama [2.20]
- (7) sdud pa / samuccaya [2.21]
- (8) khyad par / atiśaya [2.22]
- (9) brtag bya / utpreksitā [2.23]
- (10) mtshan can / adbhuta [2.24]
- (11) rmongs pa / moha [2.25]
- (12) the tshom / samśaya [2.26]
- (13) 'bebs pa / nirnaya [2.27]
- (14) 'dres pa / ślesa [2.28]
- (15) mtshungs pa / samāna [2.29]

- (16) smad pa / nindā [2.30]
- (17) bsngags pa / praśamsā [2.31]
- (18) brjod 'dod / ācikhyāsa [2.32]
- (19) 'gal ba / virodha [2.33]
- (20) sun 'byin pa / pratiseda [2.34]
- (21) mdzes pa / catu [2.35]
- (22) gnas lugs bhad pa / tattvākhyāna [2.36]
- (23) thun mong ma yin pa / asādhāraṇa [2.37]
- (24) ma byung ba / abhūta [2.38]
- (25) mi srid pa / asambhāvita [2.39]
- (26) mang po / bahu [2.40]
- (27) rnam par 'gyur ba / vikriyā [2.41]
- (28) phreng ba / mālā [2.42]
- (29) ngag don / vākyārtha [2.43-45]
- (30) mthun dngos po / prativastu [2.46-47]
- (31) sbyor ba / tulyayoga [2.48-49]
- (32) gtan tshigs / hetu [2.50]

Exceptions to faults in upamās and examples of actual

faults follow [2.51-52, 54-56]. The section concludes with a translation of the Sanskrit particles, words and expressions indicative of similarity presented in Kāvyādarśa [2.57-65].

From [2.66] we have the definition of rūpaka alamkāra or rū pa ka rgyan: [dpe yi dbye ba mi mn̄gon pa'i || nyid ni rū pa ka zhes 'dod ||] ("Where the discrimination of similarity is not explicit --This is accepted as rū pa ka"). Note that Sa skyā Pañdita leaves "rūpaka" as is.⁴⁹

And we have the following Tibetan varieties:

- (1) bsdu ba ma yin / asamasta [2.67-68]
- (2) bsdu ba / samasta [2.68]
- (3) tshig bsdu dbye ba / samastavyasta [2.68]
- (4) mtha'a dag / sakala [2.69-70]
- (5) cha shas / avayava [2.71-72]
- (6) yan lag can / avayavi [2.73-74]
- (7) yan lag gcig / eka aṅga [2.75-76]
- (8) sbyar ba / yukta [2.77]
- (9) ma sbyar (dpog) / ayukta [2.78]

- (10) mi mnyam / visama [2.79-80]
- (11) khyad can / saviśesana [2.81-82]
- (12) mi 'gal ldog pa / viruddha [2.83-84]
- (13) gtan tshigs / hetu [2.85-86]
- (14) 'dres pa / śliṣṭa [2.87]
- (15) dpe / upamā [2.88, 89]
- (16) ldog pa / vyatireka [2.88, 90]
- (17) sun 'byin / ākṣepa [2.91]
- (18) mnyam 'jog / samādhāna [2.92]
- (19) rū pa ka / rūpaka [2.93]
- (20) dpag pa bzlog pa / tattvāpahnava [2.94-95]

The conclusion to upamā and rūpaka alamkāras from [2.96] follows.

From [2.97] we have the definition of dīpaka alamkāra or gsal byed rgyan: [rigs dang bya ba yon tan rdzes || brjod pa gcig la zhugs nas ni || gal te ngag rnamz la phan na || gsal byed ces ni brjod pa yin ||] ("If a single word [or phrase] / expressing Genus Action Attribute or Individual /

completes [the senses of a series of] expressions -- This is called gsal byed [dīpaka]).⁵⁰ And with the following Tibetan varieties:

- (1) rigs/thog ma | jāti/ādi [2.98]
- (2) bya ba/thog ma | kriyā/ādi [2.99]
- (3) yon tan/thog ma | guṇa/ādi [2.100]
- (4) rdzes/thog ma | dravya/ādi [2.101]
- (5) rigs/bar | jāti/madhya [2.103]
- (6) bya ba/bar | kriyā/madhya [2.104]

[Examples of [2.105], jāti anta dīpaka, and [2.106], kriyā anta dīpaka are dropped.]

- (7) phreng ba / mālā [2.107-8]
- (8) 'gal ba / viruddha [2.109-110]
- (9) don gcig / eka artha [2.111-12]
- (10) sbyar don / śliṣṭa artha [2.113-14]

The conclusion of dīpaka alamkāra follows from [2.115].

The definition of āvṛtti alamkāra (in prose) is

drawn from [2.116]: [don skor tshig skor gnyis ka bskor ba
gsum gsal bar byed pa'i gnas su rgyan gsum 'dod de |]

("Repetition of sense / Repetition of word / Repetition of both -- / A three-fold rgyan accepted in light of [literally, "in place of"] gsal byed pa [dīpaka]).⁵¹ And we have the three Tibetan varieties:

- (1) don / artha [2.117]
- (2) tshig / pada [2.118]
- (3) gnyis ka bskor ba / arthapadobhayayoh
[2.119].

The definition of ākṣepa alamkāra, either akṣe pa or 'gog pa rgyan is drawn from [2.120]: ['gog pa'i tshig ni akṣe pa || dus gsum la ltos rnam pa gsum || 'on kyang smod pa 'di la yang || dbye ba mtha'a yas phyir mtha'a yas ||] ("Akṣe pa is the expression of denial: / In light of the three times [its nature] is three-fold / And further -- due to the infinitude of the varieties / of

things that may be negated -- it is endless").⁵² And we have the following Tibetan varieties:

- (1) 'das pa / vr̥tta [2.121]
- (2) da ltar ba / vartamāna [2.123]
- (3) ma 'ongs pa / bhavisyat [2.125]
- (4) chos / dharma [2.127]
- (5) chos can / dharmin [2.129]
- (6) r̥gyu / kārana [2.131-32]
- (7) 'bras bu / kārya [2.133-34]
- (8) r̥jes gnang / anujñā [2.135-36]
- (9) dbang 'gyur / prabhetva [2.137-38]
- (10) ma gus / anādara [2.139-40]
- (11) shis brjod / āśīrvacana [2.141-42]
- (12) tshig rtsub / parusa [2.143-44]
- (13) mthun rk̥yen / sācivya [2.145-46]
- (14) r̥tsol ba / yatna [2.147-48]
- (15) gzhan dbang / paravaśa [2.149-50]
- (16) thabs / upāya [2.151-52]
- (17) khro ba / rosa [2.153-54]

[Note that [2.155-56] mūrcha āksepa (the "āksepa through fainting") does not appear; and the variation here from the later (?) texts.]

- (18) snying rje / anukrośa [2.157-58]
- (19) phyis 'gyod / anuśaya [2.161-62]
- (20) the tshom / saṃśaya [2.163-64]
- (21) sbyar ba / śliṣṭa [2.159-60]
- (22) don gzhan / artha antara [2.165-66]
- (23) rgyu mtshan / hetu [2.167-68]

From [2.169] we have the definition of arthāntaranyāsa alamkāra or don gzhan 'god pa rgyan':⁵³ [dngos po cung zad brjod nas ni || de yi sgrub par nus pa yi || gang zhig dngos po gzhan 'god pa || don gzhan 'god par de shes bya ||] ("Introducing a particular subject ('thing') / Presenting another statement / capable of its corroboration -- / This is known as don gzhan 'god pa'").⁵⁴

Immediately following the definition of don gzhan 'god pa rgyan, Sa skya Pañdita drops Kāvyādarśa [2.170-71]

on the varieties of arthāntaranyāsa alamkāra. Rather he comments in a few lines on the difficulty of translating sbyar ba rgyan or ślesa ("multiple embrace"): That although among Sanskrit expressions, examples of ślesa (sbyar ba) may be very beautiful, they are not applicable to Tibetan in exactly the same way -- yet one should make the attempt (legs par sbyar ba'i sgra las shin tu mdzes pa yod mod | ji lta ba bzhin du bod kyi skad la mi 'byor yang de dang cha mthun pa rang gis brtags te sbyar bar bya'o |).⁵⁵

He then lists the following varieties (other than sbyar ba) for arthāntaranyāsa alamkāra or don gzhan 'god pa rgyan (sbyar ba'i dpe gzhan rgyan las):

- (1) kun khyab / viśvavyāpi [2.172]
 - (2) khyad par la gnas / viśeṣastha [2.173]
- [Verse [2.174] on śesa arthāntaranyāsa is dropped]
- (3) 'gal ba' / virodhavān [2.175]
 - (4) mi 'os pa / ayuktakārī [2.176]
 - (5) 'os pa / yuktātmā [2.177]

(6) 'os shing mi 'os pa / yuktāyukta [2.178]

(7) mi 'os shing 'os pa / viparyaya [2.179]

The definition of vyatireka alamkāra or ldog pa can rgyan follows from [2.180]: [sgra yis ldog gam go 'gyur ba'i || 'dra ba 'di ni dngos po gnyis || de la ji lta'i dbye ba ston || de la ldog pa can zhes bshad pa ltar ro |] ("Where similarity exists between two objects / -- either stated in words or implied -- / one expresses a distinction therein. This is accordingly termed ldog pa can").⁵⁶

The following varieties for ldog pa can are then listed:

(1) gcig las / eka [2.181-82]

(2) gnyis las / ubhaya [2.183-84]

(3) sbyar ba can / saślesa [2.185-86]

(4) ā kṣe pa / ākṣepa [2.186-87]

(5) gtan tshigs can / sahetu [2.186, 188]

Conclusion to the varieties of vyatireka where
Similarity is Explicit / Introduction to the

varieties of vyatireka where Similarity is

Implicit [drawn from [2.189]]

(6) dbye ba 'ba'a / bhedamātra [2.190]

(7) lhag ma bstan pa / ādhikya [2.191]

On the vyatirekas involving Difference Alone and

Superiority / Introduction to the vyatireka

involving Similarity in Difference [drawn from

[2.192]]

(8) sgra ldan mtshungs ("similarity expressed

through words") [or mtshungs chos 'byed byed

gnyis ka pa'i ldog pa can] / (śabdopādānasā-

drśya sadrśa / Example and Conclusion of the

vyatireka of Similarity in Difference with the

Similarity Expressed) [drawn from [2.193, 196]]

(9) dag par chos mthun ("similarity implied

through objects") [or mtshungs chos shugs dang

'byed byed sgras zin pa'i ldog pa can] / (prati-

yamānasādrśya sasrśa / Example, Explication

and Conclusion of the vyatireka of Similarity in

Difference with the Similarity Implicit) [drawn
from [2.194-95, 196]]

(10) rigs mthun las / svajāti [2.197-98]

The definition of vibhāvana alamkāra or srid pa can
rgyan, the last alamkāra covered, is drawn from [2.199]:
[grags pa'i gtan tshigs las bzlog nas || gang rung pa yi
gtan tshigs gzhan || yang na rang gi ngo bo nyid || ston
pa de ni srid pa can ||] ("Negating the well-known cause /
some other cause / or characteristic condition / is shown
-- This is srid pa can").⁵⁷ And with but a single example:

(1) srid pa can pa'i dpe / kāraṇāntara [2.200]

[rab grags kyi rgyu bzlog pa la yang | phyi'i rgyu
gzhan cung zad ston pa'i srid pa can |.]

Sa skyā Pandita breaks off from the Kāvyādarśa at this
point. He concludes: "Even though kāvya as exemplified
through the preceding expressions is highly esteemed in
India, since Tibetans have not applied their minds to the

path of kāvya, I am not going to elaborate more than this"
 [zhes bya ba la sogs pa 'di lta bu'i snyan ngag rgya gar la
 gtsigs che. . . . yang | bod snyan ngag gi tshul la blo mi
 'jug pas | spros pa de tsam zhig las re zhig bzhag go |].⁵⁸

The son of Sa skya Pandita's younger brother Zangs tsha
 bsod nams rgyal mtshan, 'Phags pa 'gro dgon chos rgyal blo
 gros rgyal mtshan [1235-80] followed the path of his
 renowned uncle.⁵⁹ Upon the death of Sa skya Pandita in
 1251/52, 'Phags pa became the spiritual guru to the Mongol
 Prince Kublai Khan (Se chen), as well as abbot and head of
 Sa skya monastery. Having resided at the Mongol court at
 Lan-chou since his arrival in 1244, he was amply rewarded
 by the Prince for various religious initiations, eventually
 being granted secular control of the primary regions of
 greater Tibet.⁶⁰

Kublai in a formal letter of investiture writes:

"As a true believer in the Great Lord Buddha,
 the all-merciful and invincible ruler of the
 world, whose presence, like the sun, lights up
 every dark place, I have always shown special

favor to the monks and monasteries of your country. . . .

After studying under you, I have been encouraged to continue helping your monks and monasteries, and in return for what I have learned from your teaching, I must make you a gift.

This letter, then, is my present. It grants you authority over all Tibet, enabling you to protect the religious institutions and faith of your people and to propagate Lord Buddha's teachings.⁶¹

Kublai was enthroned as Khan in 1260 and 'Phags pa remained at his court, not returning to Tibet until 1265. We read in the Blue Annals of the Tibetan chronicler 'Gos lo tsā ba Gzhon nu dpal [1392-1481]: "After the grant by the Emperor [Kublai] Se-chen of the three provinces of Tibet, as reward for the Initiation, to the dpon-po 'Phags-pa Rin-po-che, the bLa-ma became the spiritual head (of the country), whereas officials (dpon-chen) appointed in turn, conducted the secular affairs (of the country). The first among the Regents (dpon-chen-la-snga-ba) Śākyā bzang-po [regent 1244?-75] was given a seal of office to rule over dbUs and gTsang by command of Se-chen."⁶²

It was through the authority of 'Phags pa and his regent Dpon chen Sa skya Bzang po that Sa skya Pandita's pioneering linguistic studies and his presentation of kāvya śāstra -- primarily through the prism of the Kāvyādarśa -- were to generate extensive and profound results. The principle agent of this next stage of transmission was the monk, scholar, traveler and translator, Shong ston rdo rje gyal mtshan. Again we turn to the Blue Annals for insight into Shong ston and the next stage of our story:

When the bLa-ma 'Phags-pa returned to Tibet . . . [Shong ston] presented him with a well-composed śloka of praise. Having said that he intended going to study the work of a translator, he begged 'Phags-pa to send him on (to India), and the latter said: "It is a good idea! But it is difficult to acquire the ability of translating new texts. Study well and interrogate panditas. Because of the shortness of my study with the Dharmasvāmin, I do not know properly the sDebs-sbyor me-tog-gi chung-po (a treatise on prosody) composed by the Lord himself (Sa-skyā pañ-chen), the Tshig-gi gter (a grammatical work by Sa-skyā pañ-chen), and other texts. Therefore you should at any rate master them!" Saying so, he gave him the above mentioned books, five golden srangs, and ten pieces of silk. Having reached Nepāl, he attended for five years on the pandita Mahendrabhadra and mastered the five lesser

sciences (mngon-brjod [lexicography; elegant synonyms], snyan-ngag [kāvya], sdebs-sbyor [prosody], zlos-gar [nātya], and rtsis [astrology]). He especially studied the science of grammar.⁶³

It was upon his return to Sa skya that Shong ston rdo rje gyal mtshan ("the grand lo tsā ba Vajradhvaja"), with the assistance of the Nepalese pandita Laksmikara⁶⁴ -- under the patronage of 'Phags pa and Sa skya Bzang po -- translated the Kāvyādarśa, appearing in Tibetan as the Snyan ngag gi me long, in its entirety. Perhaps we may trace the chronology of events.

The Blue Annals would have 'Phags pa, sometime after his return to Tibet in 1265, sending Shong ston to Nepal; and records that he stayed for five years. A modern Tibetan listing of Indian and Tibetan scholars who journeyed between the two countries from the 7th to the 17th centuries, says of Lakṣmikāra, "He was invited from Nepal by Shong lo rdo rje rgyal mtshan, at the time of Sa skya'i dpon chen śākya bzang po. He translated the snyan ngag me

long [Kāvyadarśa], the Dpag 'khri, the Bstod pa brgya pa, and so on."⁶⁵ Given that Sa skya Bzang po died in 1275, that Shong ston spent five years in Nepal, and assuming that he left Tibet soon after 'Phags pa's return in 1265, we would have a five-year block [1270-75] during which Shong ston and Lakṣmikāra may have been active at Sa skya.

Yet we also find an interesting letter written by 'Phags pa -- from apparently outside of Tibet -- to Lakṣmikāra. It appears that Lakṣmikāra was finding Tibet somewhat arduous, and that further "encouragement" was required. The letter begins by praising "The brahmin pāṇḍita Lakṣmikāra," and continues:

"You are a master of śabda and pramāṇa, a master of kāvya and chandas. . . . I've learned about your standing [literally, "rīgs" or caste], your behavior and good qualities from a letter by Shong ston rdo rje rgyal mtshan. These days in the [Sa skya] Gstug lha khang [part of the Sa skya monastery complex] I've heard that we've collected the necessities for pāṇḍitas and lo tsā bas [translators] in order to further the Doctrine. I'm very pleased as I've heard also that the students are doing well. I would like to meet with you, but for the time being it's not

possible. Yet why isn't it suitable to meet through this letter?

Tibet is cold and there's no suitable food and thus conditions are difficult. However, Bodhisattvas who are concerned with the aims of others -- even if they perceive sufferings for themselves -- strive for the benefit of others. And scholars endure various sufferings in order to achieve scholarly aims.

I request that you still remain for a long time on this side from Nepal, and benefit others through your scholarly activities. As a basis for this request I have dispatched a full measure of gold dust. . . ."66

The letter is dated to the "horse year" which would in this context be either 1258 or 1270.⁶⁷ Given that Shong ston did not go to Nepal until after 'Phags pa return in 1265, I would opt for the latter date. It would appear that we have a discrepancy as presumably 'Phags pa at this date would be in Tibet. Yet indeed we do find that two years after his initial arrival in Tibet 'Phags pa returned to the Great Khan for a brief period, thus leaving in perhaps 1267, returning in 1274 (he was to die in 1280, possibly poisoned by a close attendant).⁶⁸ As 'Phags pa writes that he has not met with Lakṣmikāra, and given the

above parameters, Shong ston and Lakṣmikāra would have been active at Sa skya in the years 1270-74. This is not to deny that the Tibetan translation of the Kāvyādarśa could not have begun in Nepal. By nature I tend to the skeptical, but if one accepts the various initial dates posited, I believe that the result stems from acceptable reasoning.

Shong ston and Lakṣmikāra -- similarly under the patronage of 'Phags pa and Sa skya Bzang po -- were also responsible for such associated Tibetan translations as the Nāgānandanāmanāṭaka (Klu kun tu dga'a ba zhes bya ba'i zlos gar) of Harṣadeva (Dpal dga'a ba'i lha);⁶⁹ and of the Bodhisattvāvadānakalpalatā (Byang chub sems pa'i dpag bsam gyi 'khri shing) by Kṣemendra.⁷⁰

Shong ston was also responsible for the first albeit brief (and rare if not lost) Tibetan commentary on the Snyan ngag gi me long (Kāvyādarśa), the Snyan ngag me long gi 'gral pa dbyangs can ma gul rgyan;⁷¹ and was further associated with the translation of a number of linguistic texts.⁷²

Other important Tibetan translators of this period include, Shong ston's younger brother, Shong blo gros brtan pa,⁷³ Thar pa lo tsā ba Nyi ma rgyal mtshan (the teacher of Bu ston), and Chag lo tsā ba Chos rje dpal (Dharmasvāmin) [1197-1264].⁷⁴

The extremely vital role played in this productive burst of linguistic activity by Sa skya Pañdita's nephew, 'Phags pa blo gros rgyal mtshan, through encouragement and support, is clear. One of his primary goals, as Guiseppe Tucci points out, was to insure that the Tibetans were provided with the teachings necessary to the writing of kāvya -- thus consolidating and extending the foundational work of his great uncle:

Most of these poems, dramas or treatises on rhetoric were translated at the express command of 'Phags pa or of his court dignitaries. The reasons of his interest are plain: he wanted to introduce into Tibet, on a sound basis and with the help of the best-known hand-books and of the most authoritative works containing examples of their teachings, the art of composing poetry (alaṅkāra) These translations then must be kept in mind, because they represent an event

which will not remain without consequences on the further development of Tibetan style."

That where earlier poems were generally quite direct, with "no pretentious imitation of the Kāvya's elaborate subtleties. . . . When the Tibetans, even without knowing Sanskrit, became accustomed to the rules and intricacies of the alaṅkāra through the translations . . . their writings were immediately affected."⁷⁵

To trace in detail the characteristics, influence, and course of such writings is no doubt a project for the future. Let us now attempt but a survey of the immense impact of the Kāvyādarśa in Tibet through tracing the development of the response; both through commentatorial and exegetical works, and through some of the more notable examples, whether formal "illustrative expressions" (dper brjod) which seek to display the various alamkāras presented in the Kāvyādarśa, or individual compositions that seek to embody the kāvya style. Although, as Gene Smith aptly remarks, "The number of Tibetan commentaries

and dper brjod surpasses the imagination,"⁷⁶ beyond the Tibetans themselves this wealth of material -- based on the Kāvyādarśa -- remains unknown. The interest in the Kāvyādarśa runs throughout Tibetan history, from its introduction to the present where it serves as a textbook in the Tibetan schools (in India). Some of the most renowned names in Tibetan literary and religious endeavor shall follow -- in a very real sense it is in Tibet that the full force of the Kāvyādarśa was and is evolving.

It perhaps is not too surprising to find that one of the earliest examples to reflect the work of Shong ston is a later work of 'Phags pa himself, the brief Rgyal po yab sras kyis mchod rten bzhengs pa la bsngags pa'i sdeb sbyor dand ka.⁷⁷ This is perhaps one of the only such works to have been written between the time of Shong ston's translation of the Kāvyādarśa and the subsequent initial revision. For Shong ston, and his brother Shong Blo gros brtan pa, were to teach their skills to Dpang lo tsā ba Blo gros brtan pa [1276-1342], one of the finest scholars of

the following generation. As the Blue Annals relate:

He studied with the lo-tsā-ba Mchog-l丹 the Kālā-pa and Candra-pa [grammars]. He also studied the Snyan-sngags-me-long (the Kāvyādarśa). He learned the Prākrta language from an Ā-tsa-ras (ācārya) whom he chanced to meet. [After] a time he became a great translator. On seven occasions he visited Nepal. He translated and revised the translations of numerous texts of the Tantra and Sūtra classes. He also composed numerous commentaries on logic (Pramāṇa), Abhidharma, and (other) branches of knowledge. In short, during his life-time there was no better scholar than he.⁷⁸

Dpang lo tsā ba proceeded to revise the initial translation of the Kāvyādarśa into Tibetan, working under it would seem Shong ston's watchful eye. And of great interest, it is accepted that he utilized the Sanskrit commentary of Ratnaśrī, perhaps the oldest available Sanskrit commentary and one which we have referred to in the preceding translation of the Second Chapter.⁷⁹ The greatest contemporary Tibetan snyan ngag scholar, Bar shi phun tshogs dbang rgyal, for example affirmed that Dpang lo tsā ba consulted Sanskrit commentaries by Blo dpon ra ta na

Śrī and Blo dpon ngag gi dbang phyug, that is Vāgiśvara (whose text is unknown, yet perhaps the author of the anonymous Hṛdayangama commentary which is similarly considered one of the earliest?); as does Gene Smith, whose breadth and depth of knowledge of Tibetan literature is indeed encyclopedic, who notes of Dpan lo tsā ba that he "compared it with a commentary by one Ratnaśrī."⁸⁰ As P. Cordier nicely summarizes, this was a "révision faites sous les auspices du Shong-ston, et conformément au hgrel-pa [commentary] de Slob-dpon chen-po Ratnaśrī, par le Lo-tsā-ba de Dpang, Dpal-l丹 Blo-gros brtan-pa (Śrīmat Sthiramati), expert en grammaire Sanskrite." With the place of the revision, "Le grand Vihāra de Dpal-l丹 Sa-skyā (Śripāṇḍubhūmi)."⁸¹ Dpang lo tsā ba also wrote the first complete Tibetan commentary on the Kāvyādarśa, considered one of the most authoritative, the Snyan ngags me long gi rgya cher 'grel pa gzhung don gsal ba (or as commonly known, the Dpang tik).⁸²

This great scholar in turn was the teacher of Lo chen

Byang chub rtse mo [1303-80], who translated Kālidāsa's

Meghadūta with the assistance of the Kashmiri pāṇḍita

Sumanaśrī (to be later revised by Nam mkha'a bzang po).⁸³

He also translated the Chandoratnākara of Ratnākarasānti,

which appears as the Sdeb sbyor rin chen 'byung gnas.⁸⁴

From the earlier half of the 14th century we also find the Sems skyed sdom pa rang gis blang ba'i cho ga 'di [the title is drawn from the colophon], a discourse on the usage of alamkāras (rgyans) by Rgyal sras Thogs med [1295-1369].⁸⁵

A fine example of Tibetan kāvya or snyan ngag from this period is a brief piece by the renowned Bu ston Rin chen grub [1290-1364]. Where in "the metrical introduction (mañgalācārana) to his history of Buddhism [Bde bar gshegs pa'i bstan pa'i gsal byed chos kyi 'byung gnas gsung rab rin po che'i mdzod], he uses intricate rhetorical figures, which later became a formal observance in eulogies. . . .

[Where subsequently] many rnam thar ["biographies"] adopted this style, which finally moulded and ornamented the fifth Dalai Lama's prose" [17th century].⁸⁶

Also of note in the 14th century are a number of stories where the influence of snyan ngag is seen by one of the most celebrated Nying ma pa teachers and yogins, **Klong chen Rab 'byams pa Dri med 'od zer** [1308-63]. We have, for example, the Ri bong gi rtoqs ba brjod pa legs par 'doms pa lha'i rnga bo che lta bu'i gtam; the Po ta la kun tu dga'a ba'i gtam; the Nags tshal kun tu dga'a ba'i gtam; and the Chos kyi sdom bzhi ston pa dri ma med pa'i gtam. He also wrote a brief piece illustrating the principles of Tibetan snyan ngag, the Tshigs su bcad pa'i bstan bcos me tog gi rgyan.⁸⁷

Moving into the latter half of the 14th century, among the voluminous works of the inimitable **Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa'i dpal** [1357-1419], we find a small work discussing the third chapter of the Kāvyādarśa, the Rdze thams cad mkhyen pas mdzad pa'i bya dka'a snyan ngag a'i dbyangs nges.⁸⁸ Tsong kha pa also wrote an illustrative piece, the Tshig sbyor phun sum tshogs pa'i snyan ngag gi lam nas drangs pa'i blo sbyong, on blo sbyong practice.⁸⁹

Lo chen Byang chub rtse mo [1303-80] was teacher of the linguistic arts to Lo chen Grags pa rgyal mtshan (a nephew), Chos kyi rgyal mtshan dpal bzang po, and Lo chen Nam mka'a bzang po.⁹⁰ This last writer we have briefly noted revised his teacher's translation of Kālidāsa's Meghadūta, and went on himself to teach Lo tsā ba Thugs rje dpal who carried the tradition forward to the First Dalai Lama Dge 'dun grub [1391-1475], and various other 15th century figures who would be vital in translation and revision. The First Dalai Lama, for example, wrote a stotra in elegant verse praising the Buddha, the Bcom ldan 'das thub pa'i dbang po'i rnam par thar pa la bstod pa bdud dpung phye mar 'thags pa.⁹¹

Other writers of importance in the 14th to 15th centuries include Stag tshang lo tsā ba Shes rab rin chen, Yar klungs lo tsā ba Grags pa rgyal mtshan, Sa bzang ma ti pan chen Blo gros rgyal mtshan (who wrote an extensive commentary on the Kalāpa grammar, the Sgra'i bstan bcos ka lā pa'i mdo'i rnam bshad legs sbyar rab gsal snang ba).⁹²

and 'Gros lo tsā ba Gzhon nu dpal [1392-1481], the author of the Blue Annals. In this period we also find an important, complete commentary on the Kāvyādarśa, the Snyan ngag me long gi rgya char 'grel pa by Snar thang lo tsā ba Dge ldun dpal (Saṅghaśrī), as well as his shorter Snyan ngag me long gi kri kha, a commentary on but the first chapter of the Kāvyādarśa.⁹³

It was also at this time that Snye thang lo tsā ba Blo gros brtan ba bzhi pa produced the second revision of Shong ston's translation of the Kāvyādarśa. Where Dpang lo tsā ba's edition is found in the Narthang edition of the Bstan 'gyur, that of Snye thang lo tsā ba's appears in the Sde dge edition -- between them a number of differences are evident, including variations in the names of some of the alamkāras.⁹⁴ Among other works, Snye thang lo tsā ba also wrote an extensive commentary on Sa skya Pañdita's Tshig gi gter (an abhidhana or lexicographical work based on the Amarakosa of Amarasimha), the Mngon brjod kyi bstan bcos

tshig gi gter zhes bya ba'i 'grel pa rgya cher don gsal ba bzhugs pa'i dbu mchog.⁹⁵

One of the principle and most prolific writers of the 15th century was Bo dong Pan chen Phyog las rnam rgyal (whose collected works are published as the Encyclopedia Tibetica running to 137 volumes).⁹⁶ An excellent example of the continuity of the Kāvyādarśa's transmission across Tibetan time is reflected in a vision that Bo dong is reported to have experienced: "Once while studying in a place called Sman Grong near Kyidung he visualized Lama Shong ston Rdo rje rgyal mtshan adorned in the robe of a Pandita, with religious texts loaded on several Elephants. The Lama seated on the throne read all the texts to the author one by one. . . ."⁹⁷

Bo dong wrote a complete commentary on the Kāvyādarśa, the Snyan ngags me long gi 'grel pa de nyid gsal ba; as well as a treatise on the principles of kāvya and their application to Tibetan, the Grub pa'i slob dpon dpal dbyangs can dga'a ba'i zhabs kyis mdzad pa'i snyan ngag gi bstan

bcoṣ yid kyi shing rtsa.⁹⁸ And we may point to a number of pieces written to demonstrate these principles in practice:

A dper brjod on Dāṇḍin's thirty-five artha alamkāras, the Snyan ngags kyi don rgyan rab tu gsal ba'i me long;⁹⁹ and a somewhat shorter work on the same subject simply titled Don brgyan [rgyan] sum bcu so lnga.¹⁰⁰ And we have short pieces, such as the Dngul dkar gyi me long (although this has been attributed to Bo dong, the authorship is ultimately uncertain);¹⁰¹ and a brief kāvya eulogizing Ta'i Si tu Rab brtan kun bzang 'phags [1389- 1442], the Shar kha pa ruler of Rgyal rtse, the Phun tshogs bcwo brgyad (rta'i si tu chen po rabs bstan kun bzang 'phags kyi phyag tu slangs pa'i mdzad pa ya mtshan can | khyad par du 'phags pa phun sum tshogs pa'i bkod pa cwa rgyad kyi rnam par thar pa rin po che'i phreng ba skye dgu mdzes par byed pa'i 'gul rgyan).¹⁰²

In appraisal Gene Smith writes:

Even in his own time, Phyogs-las-rnam-rgyal enjoyed the reputation of a leading writer of kāvya. It should not be forgotten that this was

an era of great poets like Zhang-zhung Chos-dbang-grags-pa (1404-1469). As the years have passed and copies of his writing have become increasingly rarer, the fame of Bo-dong pañ-chen has dimmed. Nevertheless, the name of his Snyan ngag de nyid gsal ba, his exegesis of the Kāvyādarśa, is still occasionally cited by older scholars and is to be found mentioned in a few gsan-yig and lists of rare and useful works, over five centuries after his death.¹⁰³

In the writing of Zhang zhung pa Chos dbang grags pa [1404-69] (a disciple of Tsong kha pa and Mkhās grub dge legs) we have some of the finest examples of Tibetan snyan ngag, The Rgyal po rā ma na'i gtam rgyud las brtsams pa'i snyan ngag gi bstan bcos dri za'i bu mo'i rgyud mang gi sgra dbyangs relates a version of the Rāmāyaṇa.¹⁰⁴ In mixed form, approximating the Sanskrit campu, we have "The Story of Sudāsa's Son," drawn from Āryaśūra's Jātakamāla, entitled Byang sems zla ba gzhon nu'i rtogs brjod las brtsams pa'i snyan ngag zla ba gsar pa'i phon po.¹⁰⁵ And we find a kāvya version of Gu ge khri tang pa Jñānaśrī's biography of his teacher, the famous translator Rin chen bzang po [10th century], the Gangs can gyi skad gnyis smra

ba thams cad kyi gtsug qi rgyan lo chen thams cad mkhyen pa
rin chen bzang po'i rnam thar snyan dngags punda ri ka'i
phreng ba.¹⁰⁶

Moving into the 16th century we note the brief though highly esteemed dper brjod by the Second Dalai Lama Dge 'dun rgya mtsho [1475-1542], the Snyan ngag skor la so gsum, and the Snyan ngag don rgyan la bcu gcig.¹⁰⁷ And similarly, we have dper brjod by Zhwa lu lo tsā ba Rin chen chos skyong bzang po (Dharmapālabhadra) [1441-1527], the Snyan ngag me long gzhung gi bstan pa'i dper brjod legs par bshad pa sgra dbyangs rgya mthso'i 'jug ngogs.¹⁰⁸ This famed linguistic scholar also wrote an abhidhana text, the Dag yig za ma tog bkod pa,¹⁰⁹ and revised the earlier translation of Ratnākaraśānti's Chandoratnākara by Byang chub rtse mo.

In the 16th century proper we have a number of extensive and important commentaries. The Snyan ngag gi 'grel pa is attributed to Zur mkhar Blo gros rgyal po.¹¹⁰ The justly famous Bka'a brgyud pa yogin, poet and scholar,

Padma dkar po [1527-92] has written a commentary on the Kāvyādarśa's first chapter titled Snyan dngags me long las rnam par dbye ba'i rnam par bcad pa dang po'i 'grel pa; as well as an elegant story in verse, the Rab btags kyi rtogs brjod rna ba'i rgyan.¹¹¹ "Pad ma dkar po's figure eclipsed those of his predecessors . . . both for the bulk and importance of his works and for the efficiency of his teachings; even today he soars over the 'Brug pa [bka'a brgyud pa]'s entire literary and dogmatical movement. . . .

Pad ma dkar po's style, outside his technical and liturgical works, is dignified and elaborate, and his language abounds in new words, taken even from the dialects of Khams and Bhutan and received into his pages with a broad tolerance. . . ."¹¹²

Yet perhaps even more famed as a master of kāvya from this era (and indeed one of the primary figures within the Tibetan tradition) is the Sa skyā pa, **Rin spungs pa** **Ngag dbang 'jigs brten dbang phyug grags pa**, the third and last of the Rin spungs pa rulers. He has written three

distinct, somewhat brief, commentaries on each of the three chapters of the Kāvyādarśa, the Snyan ngag gi skabs dang po. . . .; the Skabs gnyis pa. . . .; and the Skabs gsum pa snyan ngag me long. . . .¹¹³ And we have a complete commentary, the Snyan ngag me long gi rgya cher 'grel pa mi 'jigs pa seng ge'i rgyud kyi nga ro'i dbyangs.¹¹⁴

Rin spungs pa also wrote a number of kāvya pieces displaying his erudition. The Rtoqs brjod dpag bsam 'khri shing summarizes the Bodhisattvāvadāna of Kṣemendra in 108 verses; where the Skyes rabs so bzhi pa'i don bsdu'i tshigs so bcad pa summarizes thirty-four chapters of Āryaśūras Jātakamālā in thirty-four verses.¹¹⁵

Letters certainly were an opportunity for elegant verse, and an excellent example is the Rin spungs pa's Rang gi yab rje rigs ldan chos kyi rgyal po ngag dbang rnam par rgyal ba la zhu 'phrin du bya ba rig pa 'dzin pa'i pho nya, a letter to his father describing a mystical journey to Shambala.¹¹⁶

Continuing the linguistic tradition of the Sa skyas

pas, Sa skyā pa Ngag dbang chos grags [1572-1641] has written a series of verses illustrating the artha alamkāras, the Snyan ngag me long gi don rgyan skabs las 'phros pa'i dri ba dbyangs can mgrin brgya'i nga ro.¹¹⁷

Also in the earlier years of the 17th century we find one of the most extensive Tibetan kāvya works, the Bcom ldan 'das thub pa'i dbang po'i mdzad pa mdo tsam brjod pa mthong bas don ldan rab tu dga'a ba dang bcas pas dad pa'i nyin byed phyogs brgyar 'char ba, a narrative of the life of the Buddha in 125 sections by Jo nag Tārānātha Kun dga'a snying po [b. 1575].¹¹⁸

The 17th century is highlighted by Bod mkhas pa Mi pham dge legs rnam rgyal, certainly one of the outstanding figures of Tibetan snyan ngag.¹¹⁹ Bod mkhas pa's complete commentary on the Kāvyādarśa is perhaps the most popular, entitled Snyan ngag gi bstan bcos chen po me long la 'jug pa'i bshad sbyar dandi'i dgongs rgyan.¹²⁰ Briefer segments covering only the first and third chapter of the Kāvyādarśa have been published, the latter separately titled as the

Snyan ngag gi bstan bcos chen po me long gi bya dka'a ba'i
rnam par bcad pa gsum pa'i bshad sbyar.¹²¹

We also have an extended series of dper brjod in the Snyan ngag me long gzhung gis bstan pa'i dper brjod legs par
bshad pa sgra dbyangs rgya mtsho'i 'jug ngog,¹²² as well as a brief piece focusing on dpe rgyan, that is, upamā alamkāra from the second chapter of the Kāvyādarśa, the Snyan ngag me long ma'i le'u gnyis pa'i dpe rgyan gyi rnam
grangs mtshungs gsal gyi sgra drug cu rtsa lnga'i dper brjod
rang byung dbyangs kyi rgyal mo'i mgrin sgra.¹²³ The Pha grub pa'i dbang phyug ngag dbang don grub zhabs la mdo tsam
bstod pa nges gsang rgya mtsho'i 'jug ngogs is a very brief piece in praise of the author's teacher, Grub dbang ngag dbang don grub.¹²⁴ And of great interest are a series of relatively brief, open letters that reflect an ongoing debate over the problems and principles of and the criteria for Tibetan kāvya. In 1642 Bod mkhas pa wrote the Snyan ngag smra ba rnams la dri tshig cung zab gtam du bya ba
tshangs pa'i mgrin rgyan, an open letter to various masters

and teachers involved with snyan ngag.¹²⁵ He replied to this letter himself in a piece entitled Dri tshig tshangs pa'i mgrün rgyan gyi rang lan dbyangs can ngag rol mtsho.¹²⁶ The Snyan ngag la dpyad pa utpa la'i 'phreng ba'i lan snang ba mchog gi dus ston is a reply to what appears to be an opponent's position.¹²⁷ The Snyan ngag gi yang lan rab dga'i rgyud mang is yet another exchange on questions and problems.¹²⁸ And dated to 1668 is a longer treatise on critical principles involved in the judgement and analysis of the artha alamkāras, the Snyan ngag me long gi don gyi rgyan la dogs pa dpyod pa'i 'bel gtam legs par bshad pa'i rol mtsho.¹²⁹

A prominent contemporary and colleague of Bhod mkhas pa was Mkhas dbang sang rgyas rdo rje (both were 'Brug ps dkar brgyud pas). In his Snyan ngag gi bstan bcos me long las dngos su bstan pa'i dper brjod rdul mang brtsegs pa'i lhun po we have an extensive series of illustrative examples.¹³⁰

In previous years the work of those scholars, poets

and yogins who took an interest in and developed a taste for kāvya cut across religious sectarian lines. Although initially focused on Sa skya this interest soon spread, and was readily developed especially by the Dkar brgyud pa, and was not entirely ignored neither by the Rnying ma pa pa nor the Dge lugs pa. Yet by the 16th century sectarian friction had broken out into open warfare. The quest for political power was primarily responsible, yet moving into the 17th century religious and doctrinal strife was evident. It was not until the accession of the Fifth Dalai Lama (the "Great Fifth") Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho [1617-82], and the ensuing consolidation of secular power -- albeit hardly absolute -- under the Dge lugs pa sect that a degree of stability was achieved.

The Fifth Dalai Lama was capable and accomplished in a number of areas. Among his works, he has left us one of the best known Tibetan commentaries on the Kāvyādarśa, the Snyan ngag me long yi dka'a 'grel dbyangs can dgyes ba'i klu dbyangs.¹³¹ It should not be too surprising then that we

find echoes of this strife in the snyan ngag literature -- admittedly on a somewhat more refined plane. It appears in the often polemical tone of Ngag dbang rgya mtsho's commentary, and in the circumstances of its birth.

Guisepppe Tucci, glossing over the deeper currents at work, offers a standard view:

It is natural that a writer like Blo bzang rgya mtsho should study with particular attention the most authoritative handbook on rhetoric [again, a fallacious comparison] known to India, Daṇḍin's Kāvyādarśa. The Tibetans had become acquainted with it since the times of the lotsāva of Shong, who was the founder of Tibetan rhetorics; from his times on the booklet became a standard textbook and produced a series of commentaries. . . .

After establishing the importance of rhetoric in the hierarchy of those sciences which a scholar must be acquainted with, he gives a survey of the development of alāṅkāra in Tibet. He then begins to expound the meaning of the booklet, often quoting the opinions of preceding commentators and refuting them whenever he thinks they are mistaken.¹³²

Yet it is from the deep knowledge of Gene Smith that we are presented with tracings closer to reality:

The Fifth Dalai Lama was deeply interested in Tibetan poetry, a subject which the great Dge-lugs-pa scholiasts, with a few exceptions like Zhang-zhung Chos-dbang-grags-pa, had tended to neglect. On the other hand, the 'Brug-pa Dkar-brgyud-pa could boast of a number of skilled poets and wits, e. g. Bod-mkhas-pa Mi-pham-dge-legs-rnam-rgyal and Mkhas-dbang Sangs-rgyas-rdo-rje, during this period. Several of the Dkar-brgyud-pa masters of kāvya had written mocking verses to tease the Sa-sky-a-pa and Dge-lugs-pa for the rigid scholasticism in which they engaged. A number of important Dge-lugs-pa churchmen became extremely annoyed through such constant provocation. The Great Fifth was under considerable pressure to take some form of action or retaliation against the offenders.

The Fifth Dalai Lama's wise solution was to institute the study of poetics among his own followers. As an introduction to the subject he composed his famed Snyan ngag dbyangs can dgyes glu, which begins with a frontal attack on the arrogance of unnamed Dkar-brgyud-pa critics. . . .

It would seem that Bod-mkhas-pa or Sangs-rgyas-rdo-rje had annoyed the Dalai Lama considerably.¹³³

And in the later autobiography of Si tu Pañ chen Chos kyi 'byung gnas [1700-75] we find that:

He relates an account of the circumstances involved in the campaign against the Jo-nang-pa [a subsect considered "heretical" by some members of the Dge lugs pa] carried out by the Fifth Dalai

Lama. The villain according to Si-tu was [the blind] Smon-'gro-pa, the teacher of kāvya to the Fifth Dalai Lama. Smon-'gro-pa apparently had received certain Jo-nong-pa teachings, but he was the victim of some irrational jealousy against his former teachers. He methodically slandered the Jo-nang-pa to the Fifth Dalai Lama and urged him to confiscate their estates and convents and to destroy the great silver reliquary that contained the remains of Tārānātha.¹³⁴

Although begun in 1647, Ngag dbang rgya mtsho's commentary was not completed until 1656, undergoing extensive revision and correction at the hands of the "famous Tibetan kāvya scholar, Smon-'gro pan-chen and his nephew [or son], who should perhaps be considered co-authors."¹³⁵ Smon 'gro's knowledge of kāvya and thus the Fifth Dalai Lama's, may in all probability be traced back directly to the earlier Dge lugs pa linguistic scholar, Zhwa lu lo chen Chos skyong bzang po: "Smon-'gro seems to have been the student of Sgang-rgad 'Od-zer-rgyal-mtshan and Grangs-can 'Jam-pa'i-rdo-rje, who were the disciples of Zhwa-lu lo-chen Chos Skyong-bzang po."¹³⁶

Among the Fifth Dalai Lama's works, illustrations of

his knowledge of snyan ngag are also to be seen. In the Rgya bod hor sog gi mchog dman bar pa rnames la 'phrin yig snyan ngag tu bkod pa rab snang rgyud mang, for example, we have a collection of letters written to various dignitaries; and in the Sku gsung thugs rten gsar bzhengs rin po che'i mchod rdzas khang bzang gi dkar chag dang tham phud deb khrims yig gi 'go rgyans sde bzhi'i skal bzang, a series of inscriptions commemorating various occasions.¹³⁷

Ruling Tibet as regent (sde srid) for some twenty-five years, Sang rgyas rgya mtsho [1653-1705] assumed control of Central Tibet upon the Fifth Dalai Lama's death in 1682. From among his writings we may note a series of sixty-eight kāvya verses introducing the fourth section of the third volume of his biography of Ngag dbang rgya mtsho, the Drin can rtsa ba'i bla ma ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho'i thun mong phyi'i rnam thar du kū la'i gos bzang glegs bam gsum pa'i 'phros bzhi pa.¹³⁸

It is usual to find the Vaidūrya dkar po, an extensive work on astrology (rtsis), attributed to Sang rgyas rgya

mtsho. Yet with regard to this writer as well as to the Fifth Dalai Lama, I would defer to the opinion of Gene Smith, "A number of the Tibetan treatises attributed to these two princes owe little to their purported authors."¹³⁹ The Vaidūrya dkar po contains at the end a section on the "Subjects of Knowledge" (Rigs gnas lnga sogs kyi le'u) and thus a brief discourse on snyan ngag.¹⁴⁰ This then should actually be attributed to Ldum bu Don grub dbang rgyal: "Ldum-bu-nas was the greatest scholar in astrology, astronomy and calendrical calculations to appear in Tibet during the 17th century. . . . There is absolutely no doubt that he was the actual author of the Vaidūrya dkar po and probably of several of the other astrological works which have been assigned to the authorship of the Sde-srid Sangs-rgyas-rgya-mtsho."¹⁴¹

We may also mention a student of the Fifth Dalai Lama, Lo Chen Smin gro l gling Dharmāśrī [Chos dpal] [1654-1718/19]. "One of the greatest Tibetan scholars in grammatical sciences and metrics."¹⁴² His Snyan ngag gi

mtshan nyid bsdus pa rtsom dpe dang bcas pa sna tshogs
utpala'i chun po discusses essential points and offers
examples of Tibetan kāvya.¹⁴³

Similarly influenced by the great activity and discussion of the 17th century, and also laying the foundations for the productive work to come, we have 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje (alias Ngag dbang brton 'grus) [The First 'Jam bzhad pa] [1648-1721]. The Snyan ngag gsal bar byed pa'i bstan bcos dbyangs can zhal lung nyi ma 'bum gyi 'od can (dated to 1684) is a treatise on the practice of snyan ngag, appearing in his Collected Works.¹⁴⁴ Therein we also find a brief series of elegant examples, Snyan dngags kyi tshigs bcad 'ga'a zhig; and a collection of letters illustrating the author's mastery of kāvya, entitled Rje btsun 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje'i gsung 'bum khrig chags su bsdebs pa las chab shog snyan dngags kyi skor.¹⁴⁵ And we have an extremely interesting brief piece, a letter written in reply to the First Lcang skyā rin po che Ngag dbang chos ldan.¹⁴⁶ The form of the Bya ka lan

ta ka'i rjes lan legs par bshad pa is similar to the niyama or "restricted" śabda alamkāras Dāṇḍin presented in Chapter three. Termed "ka bshad," the form requires thirty lines, the beginnings of which match in proper order the letters of the Tibetan alphabet:

He tells his correspondent . . . that while sitting alone and pondering how best to begin this letter, there appeared before him a beautiful bird, the likes of which he had never seen, who spoke to him in elegant ka-bshad verse. He records his own surprised reply, also written in ka-bshad, and their conversation, each continuing, in alternation, his ka-bhad. So as not to forget their conversation, he immediately wrote it down and decided to send it as a letter to Lcang-skyā rin-po-che because of his appreciation of elegant verse.¹⁴⁷

And finally within this period we may cite the work of The Second Pan chen Lama, Blo bzang ye shes dpal bzang po [1663-1737]. He has written an extensive collection of dper brjod illustrating the artha alamkāras, the Snyan ngag me long las le'u gnyis pa'i dper brjod mtsho byung dgyes pa'i me tog.¹⁴⁸

By the 15th century much of the Tibetan absorption of Indian material through translation was over. In the ensuing centuries study focused primarily on existing translations and the adjunct commentatorial literature. "Tibetans seemed to have lost the motivation and persistence to master Sanskrit and its taxing scholastic discipline. By the beginning of the 15th century, the Tibetans were already in possession of an enormous corpus of translated scholarship and magic. . . . The systematic study of Sanskrit as a language had been replaced by drudging memorization of Tibetan commentaries of Tibetan commentaries."¹⁴⁹ We should note, however, that a partial exception to this evaluation would be the continual and active concern with snyan ngag.

With the 18th century we have a potent revival of interest not only in Sanskrit as such, but in all related linguistic subjects. Much of this effort was to revolve around the work of the great Si tu sprul sku The Eighth Karma bstan pa'i nyin byed gtsug lag Chos kyi snang ba

[alias Si tu Pan chen Chos kyi 'byung gnas] [1700-75].

After editing and correcting the sheets for the Sde dge Bstan 'gyur in 1731-33, "Si-tu turned to a project that was to occupy him for the rest of his life: the reexamination and revision of all existing translations of the Sanskrit grammatical, lexicographical and poetical śāstras that constitute the basis for Tibetan philological studies. . . .¹⁵⁰

From among his linguistic works we may note the extensive commentary on the early Tibetan grammatical works attributed to Thon mi Sambhotā, the Yul gangs can pa'i brda yang dag par sbyor ba'i bstan bcos kyi bye brag sum cu pa dang rtags kyi 'jug pa'i gzhung gi rnam par bzhad pa mkhas pa'i mgul rgyan mu tig phreng mdzes;¹⁵¹ and his revision of Amarasiṁha's Amarakosa in 1764 (first translated into Tibetan by Yar klungs lo tsā ba Grags pa rgyal mtshan and Kirticandra, and thoroughly revised by Zhwa lu lo tsā ba Chos skyong bzang po), the 'Chi med mdzod kyi gzhung la brten nas legs par sbyar ba'i skad kyi ming dang rtags kyi

'jug pa gsal bar byed pa'i bstan bcos legs bshad sgo brgya
'byed pa'i lde mig [Mdzod 'grel].¹⁵² And of the greatest
 importance for Tibetan snyan ngag, Si tu retranslated the
Kāvyādarśa: "Kar ma Si tu Bstan pa'i nyin byed, comparing
 both the Indian texts and Indian commentaries composed by
 the Buddhist pāṇḍita Ratnaśrī -- born on the isle of Sing
 ga la [Śrī Laṅkā] -- and by the Buddhist mahāpāṇḍita
 Ngag dbang grags pa [Vagindrakīrti] duly made
 revisions. . . ."¹⁵³

Si tu's bilingual edition of the Kāvyādarśa appears
 under the title Slob dpon dbyug pa can gyis mdzad pa'i snyan
ngag me long na zhes bya ba skad gnyis shan sbyar in volume
cha of his Collected Works.¹⁵⁴

Immediately influenced by the work of Si tu, the
 Fourth Khams sprul Bstan 'dzin chos kyi nyi ma [1730-79]
 wrote one of the finest Tibetan commentaries on the Kāvyā-
darśa, the Snyan ngag me long gi 'grel pa dbyangs can ngag
gi rol mtsho.¹⁵⁵ Exemplifying in practice the principles
 of Tibetan snyan ngag, Khams sprul also wrote the Lha chen

po khyab 'jug gi 'jug pa bcu'i gtam rgya bal mkhas pa'i zhal rgyun, an elegant version of the ten reincarnations of Viṣṇu.¹⁵⁶

Another famed contemporary of Si tu paṇ chen was the Sa skyā pa Zhu chen Tshul khriṃs rin chen [1698-1774]. A scholar from eastern Tibet, Zhu chen was renowned as a master of the linguistic arts (and of tantric learning as well), and was selected by the ruler of Sde dge to edit the Sde dge redaction of the Bstan 'gyur. From among his collected writings are a number of pieces -- letters, stotras, biographies and so on -- illustrating his knowledge of kāvya: (1) the Sangs rgyas kyi rtogs pa brjod pa'i thsigs su bcad pa rin chen don 'dus, a hagiography of the Buddha partially drawn from the Avadānakalpalatā of Kṣemendra; (2) the Sgra dbyangs lha mo dbyangs can ma la bsngags pa don rgyan padma dkar po bzhad pa'i rdzing bu, a stotra praising Sarasvatī illustrating the artha alamkāras; (3) the Bsngags 'os dam pa rnams la legs dbul stob pa'i gong brjod kyi thsigs su bcad pa rnam par dpyod ldan kun dga'i

dbyangs snyan, thirty-two literary letters sent to various spiritual leaders of Tibet and Mongolia; (4) the Thams cad mkhyen pa chen po nyi ma'i gnyen gyi rtogs pa brjod pa ma li kā'i phreng ba, a life of the Buddha in verse; and three letters displaying the kāvya style, (5) the Zhing khyad par 'phags pa'i skyabs yul kun 'dus bdag nyid rnams la phul ba'i bkur yig snyan dngags padma dkar po'i phreng ba, (6) the Sangs rgyas bstan pa'i rtsa lag tu gyur pa'i chos ldan sa 'dzin soqs bsngags 'os rnams la phul ba'i zhu yig rnams, and (7) the Srid zhi'i yon tan dang stobs 'byor mchog dman bar pas bsdus pa'i yul rnams la bsngags pa las brtsams pa'i zhu yig stob pa'i dper brjod snyan dngags ngag gi 'dod 'jo.¹⁵⁷

From the Nying ma pa scholar and friend of Si tu pan chen, Kah thog rig 'dzin chen po Tshe dbang nor bu [1698-1755] we find within an extensive collection of reverential petitions to various teachers, entitled Rdzogs pa chen po mka'a 'gro snying thig qi brgyud pa bla ma'i gsol 'debs nged

don snying po'i bcud len, a brief series of prayers to the lineage of snyan ngag masters.¹⁵⁸

This productive period also saw a number of important, extended literary works. Sum pa mkhan po Ye shes dpal 'byor [1704-88], apart from a brief piece on the alamkāras themselves, the Tsig rgyan nyung 'dus Snyan ngag 'jug sgo, also wrote a series of dper brjod (in conjunction with a presentation of elegant synonyms or mngon brjod), the Snyan ngag me long las bshad pa'i rgyan rnams kyi dper brjod rgyu skar phreng mdzes dang ming mngon brjod nyung 'dus tsin ta ma ni'i do shal.¹⁵⁹ Bstan 'dzin chos rgyal, the Tenth Rgyal mkhan of Bhutan, wrote a large number of literary biographies, which include not only eminent lamas, but also of the Buddha and the sixteen Buddhist sthaviras (or "Elders").¹⁶⁰ Gene Smith considers that "these [latter] two works guarantee him a place among the best Tibetan stylists."¹⁶¹ From the Third Karma pa Rang byung rdo rje 'Jigs med gling pa mkhyen brtse'i 'od zer [1728-99] we have sixty-seven Jātaka tales supplementing the original

Jātakamālā of Āryaśūra.¹⁶² And finally we may cite a work that is perhaps unique in Tibetan Literature -- although drawing themes from Indic sources, essentially an original kathā or ākhyāyikā (again, Dandin does not accept a distinction) -- the Gzhon nu zla med kyi gtam rgyud by Mdo mkhar zhabs drung tshe ring dbang rgyal [1697-1763].¹⁶³ Mdo mkhar Tshe ring dbang rgyal was not only extremely well-versed in the literary arts, but also played an important political role, serving on the first Tibetan Council (kashag) that was convened in 1751.

The exegetical tradition continues into the 19th century with the Bstan bcos snyan ngag me long gi 'grel bshad sngon med bu ram shing gi ljon pa of Karma tshe dbang dpal 'bar, dated to 1826.¹⁶⁴ The Fifth Pan chen Lama Chos kyi grags pa bstan pa'i dbang phyug [1854-82] has provided what is certainly one of the most thorough dper brjod collections with his Rgyal rigs kyi bandhe dpal ldan dandī'i gzhung lugs sarga gsum la sbyangs pa'i ngal be cung zad tsam bsten pa'i tshe gzhung don dper brjod du bkod pa

tshangs sras dgyes pa'i rol mo.¹⁶⁵ And from Lha smon dza sag Ye shes tshul khriṃs we find a brief although interesting Tibetan khandakāvya on the five Pāṇḍava brothers drawn from the Mahābhārata, the Skya seng bu lṅga'i byung ba brjod pa blo ldan yid dbang 'dren byed rmad byung 'phrul gyi shing rta.¹⁶⁶

In the lineage of Si tu Paṇ chen and Khams sprul Bstan 'dzin chos kyi nyi ma, we come to the major figure of Tibetan snyan ngag in the 19th century, 'Jam mgon 'Ju mi pham rgya mtsho [1846-1912]. Among his Collected Works we find his extremely important commentary on the Kāvyādarśa, the Snyan dngags me long gi 'grel ba dbyangs can dgyes pa'i rol mtsho.¹⁶⁷ "Mi-pham was one of the most imaginative and versatile minds to appear in the Tibetan tradition. . . . His commentary on the Kāvyādarśa is perhaps the finest source for understanding the development of Tibetan poetics during the 18th and first half of the 19th century. In this work he quotes extensively from the stories of the Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata. . . . Mi-pham's greatest

significance for the cultural history of Tibet lies in his brilliant and strikingly original commentaries on the important Indic shastras."¹⁶⁸

Another writer of importance whose work similarly extended from the 19th into the 20th century was A kyā yongs 'dzin Dbyangs can dga'a ba'i blo gros. He discusses and explicates principles of snyan ngag in his Snyan dngags kyi bstan bcos mu tig phreng ba; focuses on the ten gunas in the first chapter of the Kāvyādarśa in the Snyan ngag me long gi le'u dang po nas byung ba'i sbyar ba sogs yon tan bcu'i gnad don gsal bar ston pa legs bshad punda ri ka'i phreng mdzes; and considers the various doṣas or potential "faults" from the third chapter of the Kāvyādarśa in the Snyan ngag gi lus rgyan skyon sel gsum gyi sdom tshig rab gsal me long.¹⁶⁹ And with the Snyan ngag me long gi rgyan rnams kyi dper brjod kyi dpyid kyi rgyal mo glu dbyangs we have an illustrative series of dper brjod.¹⁷⁰ Dper brjod illustrating the alamkāras of the second chapter are also

provided by Skyabs dbyings pandita Sman ri ba Blo bzang rnam rgyal in his Sras dgyes pa'i glu dbyangs.¹⁷¹

And with Blo bzang rnam rgyal's 'Phags mchog thugs rje chen po'i sprul pa chos rgyal dri med kun ldan legs pa'i blo gros kyi rtoqs brjod bsngags 'os bsngags pa we also have an original extended kāvya based upon the theme of Dri med kun ldan drawn from the Vessantara Jātaka.¹⁷² Similarly, in the Ston mchog thams cad mkhyen pa thub pa'i dbang po'i skyes rabs gsal bar brjod pa brgya lnga bcu pa nor bu'i phreng ba of 'Jam dbyang blo gter dbang po [1847-1914] we find a kāvya piece relating now a number of Jātaka tales.¹⁷³

The Thirteenth Dalai Lama Ngag dbang blo bzang thub bstan rgya mtsho [1876-1933] continued the tradition of his illustrious predecessors. In the Gnas lnga rig pa'i pandi ta chen po skyabs rje dpa'a ri ba blo gros rab gsal mchog gi zhal snga nas snyan ngag gi bstan bcos me long ma'i steng nas bka'a khrid nod skabs le'u bar pa'i dka'a gnad brjed byang du bkod pa we have a collection of "notes

written on difficult points in the second chapter of the Kāvyādarśa.¹⁷⁴ In the title we should note that Thub bstan rgya mtsho refers to a commentary by his own kāvya teacher, Dpa'a ri ba blo gros rab gsal, the Snyan ngag bstan bcos me long ma.¹⁷⁵ And in the Dbyangs can zhal lung snyan dngags le'u gsum gyi dper brjod vai dür ra dkar po'i phreng ba la grangs he provides a series of dper brjod illuminating alamkāras from all three chapters of the Kāvyādarśa.¹⁷⁶

Moving into the 20th century and yet further reflecting the profound influence of Si tu Pan chen and those following in his path, we have the work of 'Bras ljongs Bsam 'grub khang gsar ba U rgyan kun bzang bstan 'dzin rdo rje, "a well-known teacher of Tibetan poetics, popular in Lhasa at the turn of the century."¹⁷⁷ His Dbyangs can ngag gi rol mtsho las don rgyan so lnga'i snying po bsdus pa blo gsar bung ba rol pa, dated to 1908, explicates Daṇḍin's thirty-five artha alamkāras.¹⁷⁸ Gene Smith comments on this text: "Probably the most popular modern commentary on the Kāvyādarśa of Daṇḍin, this work of

the Sikkimese **Bstan-'dzin-rdo-rje** is based upon the tradition of interpretation that stems from the 8th Si-tu sprul-sku Chos-kyi-'byung-gnas (1700-1775) and his school. Indeed, the author's intention in writing this work seems to have been to produce a smaller and less complicated textbook from the famous large commentary of Khams-sprul **Bstan-'dzin-chos-kyi-nyi-ma**, the Dbyangs can rol mtsho."¹⁷⁹

And illustrating these thirty-five artha alamkāras, U rgyan bstan 'dzin wrote the following year (1909) the Dandi'i me long gi 'grel tik chen mo dbyangs can ngag gi rol mtsho las don rgyan so lnga'i snying po bsdus pa blo gsar bung ba rol pa'i dga'a tshal du 'jug pa nye bar mkho ba mkhas pa'i gsung las legs pa'i 'ga'a zhig bsdebs pa kun phan nyi ma'i snang ba.¹⁸⁰ And in the Rgyan gyi bstan bcos me long gi 'grel chen dbyangs can ngag gi rol mtsho'i snying po bsdus pa blo gsar bung ba rol pa'i dga'a tshal we have further commentary, now explicating the first chapter of the Kāvyādarśa.¹⁸¹

In our own time the tradition of Tibetan explication of

and composition in snyan ngag remains very much alive. Reflecting the breadth of kāvya's appeal, we now find studies appearing in the writings of such Tibetan Bon po masters as Dpal ldan tshul khrims. His Bstan bcos yi bzhin gter mdzod las rtsom pa'i rgyan 'gyur snyan ngag rgyan gsum gyi rnam bshad nor bu'i me long provides commentary and discussion, where his series of literary stotras or hymns of praise to various Bon po divinities, the Lhag pa'i lha mchog tshogs la mchod bstod u dum wa ra'i dga'a tshal, offers numerous examples in practice.¹⁸²

Such contemporary instances of dper brjod may be cited as the Snyan ngag le'u gnyis pa'i dper brjod of Norbu Wangchhuk;¹⁸³ and the Don rgyan so Inga'i dper brjod mkhas pa dgyes pa'i ljon bzang of Mkhan po Sang rgyas bstan 'dzin¹⁸⁴ -- both works illustrating the artha alamkāras.

We have commentary with the Snyan ngag me long gi spyi don sdeb legs rig pa'i 'char sgo of Tshe tan Zhabs drung 'Jigs med rigs pa'i blo gros,¹⁸⁵ and indeed one of the most

extensive commentaries to date with the Snyan ngag gi rnam bshad gsal sgron of Rdo rje rgyal po.¹⁸⁶

Perhaps it is fitting that we conclude our survey with a translation of the preface of Phag ri lha 'og blo bzang, drawn from his dper brjod on the second chapter of the Kāvyādarśa, the Tshangs sras dgyes pa'i glu dbyangs:
Snyan ngag me long las le'u gnyis pa'i dper brjod:

Due to the presentation of my contemporary, Mkhās pa'i dbang po skyabs rje dga'a ldan shar rtse dze smad sprul sku Blo gter dgyes pa'i lang tsho, striving under his great kindness in the oral teachings on the middle chapter of the Snyan ngag me long (Kāvyādarśa) I composed various dper brjod. As, during a recent educational conference, everyone was firmly commended to make progress, to aid in the recovery from decline of our culture . . . I, a humble teacher of Tibetan Phag ri lha 'og blo bzang rnam rgyal, although my knowledge is very poor, with positive sincerity composed this text entitled Tshangs sras dgyes pa'i glu dbyangs on an auspicious day, the 22nd in the 11th month of the general year 1977, or on the 12th day in the 10th month of the fire-monkey year, at my home which is a part of the day school of Lugs zung bsam 'grub gling, the Tibetan refugee settlement in Bhe lā ko pi, a town in Kar na ṭa ka state in southern India.¹⁸⁷

Notes: Tibetan

1. See Marcelle Lalou, "Contribution à la Bibliographie du Kanjur et du Tanjur: Les Textes Bouddhiques au Temps du Roi Khri-sroñ-lde-bcan." Journal Asiatique, 241 (1953), pp. 313-53.

2. The initial Tibetan translation of the Jātakamālā was lost. It was re-translated at the beginning of the prolific "later spread" (phyi dar) of Buddhism by Vidyākarasimha and Lo tsā ba 'Jam dpal go cha.

For recent publications of the Jātakamālā see: Skyes pa'i Rabs kyi Rgyud: The Tibetan Jātakamālā of Āryasūra, reproduced from a Rare Manuscript from the Temple of Spagro Rdzong-brag-kha by Kunsang Tobgay (Thimphu: Kunsang Tobgay, 1975); and The Tibetan Rendering of the Jātakamālā of Āryasūra, supplemented with 67 additional Jātaka Stories by the Third Karma-pa Rang-byung-rdo-rje, 2 vols. (Darjeeling: Kargyud Sungrab Nyamso Khang, 1974).

3. Friedrich Weller, "Die Fragmente der Jātakamālā in der Turfansammlung der Berliner Akademie." In Friedrich Weller, Kleine Schriften, herausgegeben von Wilhelm Rau, vol. 1 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GMBH, 1987), pp. 395-449.

4. Friedrich Weller, "Ein zentralasiatisches Fragment des Saundaranandakāvya." In Friedrich Weller, Kleine Schriften, herausgegeben von Wilhelm Rau, vol 1 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GMBH, 1987), p. 401.

5. J. W. de Jong, "The Tun-Huang Manuscripts of the Tibetan Rāmāyaṇa Story," Indo-Iranian Journal, 19 (1977), p. 37.

6. Four manuscripts of the Tun-huang Rāmāyaṇa were originally examined by Frederick W. Thomas ("A Rāmāyaṇa

Story in Tibetan from Chinese Turkestan," in Indian Studies in Honor of Charles Rockwell Lanman (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1929), pp. 193-212 . And two were later brought to light in the Bibliothèque Nationale by Marcelle Lalou (Journal Asiatique, 228 (1936), pp. 560-62).

7. Frederick W. Thomas, "A Rāmāyaṇa Story in Tibetan," (1929), p. 193.
8. Frederick W. Thomas, "A Rāmāyaṇa Story in Tibetan," (1929), pp. 194-95; J. W. de Jong, "An Old Tibetan Version of the Rāmāyaṇa," T'oung Pao, 58 (1972), pp. 193-97.
9. R. A. Stein, "Ancient Poetry," in Tibetan Civilization, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972 (1962)), pp. 252-59.
10. J. W. de Jong, "An Old Tibetan Version of the Rāmāyaṇa," (1972), p. 198.
11. Frederick W. Thomas, "A Rāmāyaṇa Story in Tibetan," (1929), p. 194 and p. 195.
12. J. W. de Jong, "An Old Tibetan Version of the Rāmāyaṇa," (1972), p. 198 and p. 200.
See also Jaghans K. Balbir, L'Histoire de Rāma en Tibétain: D'après des Manuscrits de Touen-Houang (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1963). A. N. Jani, "Different Versions of Valmiki's Rāmāyaṇa in Sanskrit," in Asian Variations in Ramayana, edited by K. R. Srinivasa Iyengar (New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 1983), pp. 29-56. J. W. de Jong, "Un Fragment de L'Histoire de Rāma en Tibétain," in Études Tibétaines dédiées à la Mémoire de Marcelle Lalou (Paris: Librairie d'Amerique et d'Orient, 1971); "The Story of Rāma in Tibet," in Asian Variations in Rāmāyaṇa, pp. 163-82, edited by K. R. Srinivasa Iyengar (New Delhi: Sahitya

Akademie, 1983). Marcelle Lalou, "L'Histoire de Rāma en Tibétain," Journal Asiatique, 228 (1936), pp. 560-62.

13. Ludwik Sternbach, "Indian Wisdom and Its Spread Beyond India," Journal of the American Oriental Society, 101 (1981), p. 98.

14. [Tōhoku Catalogue] A Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons, edited by Hakuju Ui, et al. (Sendai: Tōhoku Imperial University, 1934), nos. 4328-4335.

See Suniti K. Pathak, "An Account of the Indian Nītiśāstras in Tibetan Translations," in The Indian Nītiśāstras in Tibet, pp. 25-45 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1974).

15. See R. A. Stein, "Tradition: The Nameless Religion," and "The Bon Religion," in Tibetan Civilization, (1972) pp. 191-229 and pp. 229-47.

16. "One day in 836, Ralpachen was drinking beer and sunning himself in the garden of the Shampa Palace [about 40 miles east of Lhasa], when the ministers Be [Dbas] and Chogro [Cog ro] crept up behind him. Grabbing him by the neck, they twisted his head around until his neck was broken" (Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 51).

17. Giuseppe Tucci, The Religions of Tibet (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980 (1970), p. 21.

18. David P. Jackson, "Sa-skya Pandita on Indian and Tibetan Traditions of Philosophical Debate: The Mkhās pa rṇams 'jug pa'i sgo, Section III," Ph.D. dissertation (University of Washington, Seattle, 1985), p. 2.

19. David P. Jackson, "Sa-skya Pandita" (1985), p. 17, n. 18; and p. 34.

20. David P. Jackson, "Sa skya Pandita (1985), p. 137.
21. Sa skya Pandita, Tshig gi gter, in The Complete Works of the Great Masters of the Sa skya Sect of the Tibetan Buddhism, vol. 5: The Complete Works of Pandita Kun Dga'a Rgyal Mtshan, compiled by Bsod Nams Rgya Mtsho (Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 1968), p. 125, folio 3, line 1 - p. 131, folio 4, line 6.

The dating of Sa skya Pandita's works is conjectural, and is drawn from David P. Jackson, "Sa skya Pandita" (1985), p. 83.

22. Sa skya Pandita, Sdeb sbyor sna tshogs me tog gi chun po, in The Complete Works (1968), p. 131, folio 4, line 6 - p. 141, folio 3, line 6.

23. Sa skya Pandita, Mkhas pa rnam 'jug pa'i sgo, in The Complete Works (1968), p. 81, folio 1, line 1 - p. 111, folio 3, line 6.

The edition which we shall follow is Sa skya Paṇḍīta Kun-dga'-rgyal-mtshan, Mkhas Pa 'Jug Pa'i Sgo: An Introduction to the Principles and Concepts of Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism (Dehra Dun: Sakya Centre, 1983).

The Mkhas 'Jug was one of the five major texts written by Sa skya Pandita. The others include: (1) the Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter (the longest work, summarizing the Indian logical traditions of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, and influenced as well by the work of Tibetan scholars) (David P. Jackson, "Sa-skyā Pandita" (1985), p. 73; (2) the Sdom pa gsum gyi rab tu dbye ba (a discussion of the three classes of Buddhist vows); (3) the Thub pa'i dgongs gsal (a detailed discussion of the various stages of the Bodhisattva's Path); and (4) the Legs par bshad pa rin po che'i gter (See David P. Jackson, "Chapter Three: Writing of Sa-Pañ : Major Works, Chronology and Transmission, in "Sa-skyā Pandita" (1985), pp. 71ff).

The Legs bshad is an extension of the nīti śāstra

literature that we have previously touched upon. "This text is significant because two trends of literature merge within it. The style of writing is directly related to the work of the early Kadampa Geshe Po to pa [1031-1105] [On Po to pa [1031-1105] see: Giuseppe Tucci, Tibetan Painted Scrolls, vol. 1 (Rome: La Libreria Dello Stato, 1949), pp. 98-99)]. As in his predecessors' work, Sakya Pandita's verses are pithy expositions of ethical issues, with an auto-commentary explaining the allusions in the verses. The tales referred to are both indigenous Tibetan and imported Indian stories" (Beth E. Soloman, "The Tale of the Incomparable Prince by Mdo Mkhār Zhabs Drung Tshe Ring Dbang Rgyal (1697-1763)," Ph.D. dissertation (University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1986), p. 19).

We find in it a number of allusions to the Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata, and the commentary of Dmar ston Chos rgyal on the Legs bshad presents one of the most extended Tibetan versions of various events associated with the latter work (Sa-skya Pandita, Legs par bśad pa rin po che'i gter dañ de'i grel pa: The Subhāśitaratna nidhi of Sa-skya Pandita with its Commentary by Dmar-ston Chos-rgyal (Gangtok: Sherab Gyaltsen, 1983) (see, for example, pp. 168-79).

For an English translation see: Sa-skya Pandita, A Treasury of Aphoristic Jewels: The Subhāśita ratna nidhi of Sa-skya Pandita in Tibetan and Mongolian, edited and translated by James E. Bosson (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1969).

24. David P. Jackson, "Sa-skya Pandita" (1985), p. 2.
25. These texts appear in Mkhas 'Jug, (1983), p. 4.
26. Gene Smith, "Historical Sketch of Linguistic Science in Tibet," in Encyclopedia Tibetica: The Collected Works of Bo-Doñ Pan-Chen Phyogs-Las-Rnam-Rgyal, edited by Sonam T. Kazi, vol. 3 (New Delhi: Tibet House, 1969), p. 6.
27. The earliest Tibetan translation, however, of a

Sanskrit work on grammar was that of the Kalāpala-
ghuvṛttiśiyahitā by Tareśvara (Sgrol ba'i dbang phyug) in
the early 11th century. It was translated by Lha bla ma
Pho brang zhi ba 'od (the brother of 'Od lde and Byang chub
'od of the royal dynasty of Mnga'a ris). (Gene Smith,
"Historical Sketch of Linguistic Science in Tibet" (1969),
p. 5).

28. This grammatical survey is drawn from Gene Smith,
"Historical Sketch of Linguistic in Tibet" (1969), pp. 3-9.

29. Gene Smith, "Introduction" to Encyclopedie Tibetica,
vol. 6 (1969), p. 2, n. 3. The more important commentaries
on the Rin chen 'byung gnas include: (1) Sdeb sbyor bsdus
don by Zhwa lu lo chen Chos skyong bzang po [1441-1527/8];
(2) Sdeb sbyor gyi rnam bzhag by The Eight Karma pa Mi
bskyod rdo rje [1507-54]; (3) Sdeb sbyor rin 'byung gi
'grel pa don gsal me long by Smin gling lo chen Dharmasri
[1654-1717].

See also Karma tshe dbang dpal 'bar, Sdeb sbyor rin
chen 'byung gnas kyi don 'grel nyung ngu rnam gsal
[Exegesis of the Chandoratnākara, based on the
autocommentary of Ratnākaraśānti and the detailed
commentary of the Eight Karma pa, Mi bskyod rdo rje], in
The Literary Arts in Ladakh, vol. 2 (Darjeeling: Kargyud
Sungrab Nyamso Khang, 1972), ff. 115-50.

Bo dong pan chen Phyogs las rnam rgyal, Sdeb sbyor
rtsa 'grel, in Encyclopedie Tibetica (1969), vol. 6,
pp. 1-85.

30. Claus Vogel (Indian Lexicography (Wiesbaden: Otto
Harrassowitz, 1979), p. 312, n. 38) incorrectly notes that
this latter revision of Zhwa lu lo tsā ba is found in the
Chone, Derge, Narthang and Peking editions of the Bstan
'gyur. It is found rather only in the Derge redactions.
The Peking and Narthang editions contain the original
translation "presumably as revised by Dpaṅg lo-tsāba" (Gene

Smith, "Introduction" to Encyclopedie Tibetica, vol. 6 (1969), p. 4).

31. See Harṣa, Nāgānanda [Klu kun tu dga'a ba zhes bya ba'i zlos gas] by Harṣadeva (King of Thanesar). A Play in Sanskrit and the Tibetan of Shong-ston rdo-rje rgyal-mtshan and Lakṣmikara, edited by Vidhushekha Bhattacharya (Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1957).
32. David P. Jackson, "Sa-skyā Pāṇḍita," (1985) pp. 2-3.
33. David P. Jackson, "Sa skyā Pāṇḍita," (1985) p. 242.
34. Sa skyā Pāṇḍita, Mkhas pa 'jug pa'i sgo, (1983), p. 27.
35. Sa skyā Pāṇḍita, Mkhas pa 'jug pa'i sgo, (1983), p. 28.
36. Sa skyā Pāṇḍita, Mkhas pa 'jug pa'i sgo, (1983), p. 32.
37. Sa skyā Pāṇḍita, Mkhas pa 'jug pa'i sgo, (1983), pp. 34-35.
38. Sa skyā Pāṇḍita, Mkhas pa 'jug pa'i sgo, (1983), p. 38.
39. Sa skyā Pāṇḍita, Mkhas pa 'jug pa'i sgo, (1983), p. 39.
40. Sa skyā Pāṇḍita, Mkhas pa 'jug pa'i sgo, (1983), p. 43.
41. Sa skyā Pāṇḍita, Mkhas pa 'jug pa'i sgo, (1983), p. 43.

42. Sa skyā Pandita, Mkhas pa 'jug pa'i sgo, (1983),
p. 44.
43. Sa skyā Pandita, Mkhas pa 'jug pa'i sgo, (1983),
p. 45.
44. Sa skyā Pandita, Mkhas pa 'jug pa'i sgo, (1983),
p. 46.
45. Sa skyā Pandita, Mkhas pa 'jug pa'i sgo, (1983),
p. 47.
46. Dañdin, Kāvyādarśa of Dañdin, edited with an original
commentary by Rangacharya Raddi Shastri, 2nd. ed. (Poona:
Bhandarkar Oriental Institute, 1970 (1938)).
47. Sa skyā Pandita, Mkhas pa 'jug pa'i sgo, (1983),
pp. 50 -52.
48. Sa skyā Pandita, Mkhas pa 'jug pa'i sgo, (1983),
pp. 52-57.
49. Sa skyā Pandita, Mkhas pa 'jug pa'i sgo, (1983),
pp. 57-61.
50. Sa skyā Pandita, Mkhas pa 'jug pa'i sgo, (1983),
pp. 62-64.
51. Sa skyā Pandita, Mkhas pa 'jug pa'i sgo, (1983),
pp. 64.
52. Sa skyā Pandita, Mkhas pa 'jug pa'i sgo, (1983),
pp. 64-69.
53. I am emending what I feel is a misprint in the
published 1983 edition of the Mkhas 'Jug: don gzhan 'gog pa

> don gzhan 'god pa (immediately preceding, our text has 'god pa, and it appears as such in the definition below).

54. Sa skya Pandita, Mkhas pa 'jug pa'i sgo, (1983), pp. 69-71.

55. Sa skya Pandita, Mkhas pa 'jug pa'i sgo, (1983), p. 69.

56. Sa skya Pandita, Mkhas pa 'jug pa'i sgo, (1983), pp. 171-74.

57. Sa skya Pandita, Mkhas pa 'jug pa'i sdo, (1983), p. 74.

58. Sa skya Pandita, Mkhas pa 'jug pa'i sgo, (1983), p. 74.

59. See "Sa skya pa chos rgyal 'Phags pa blo gros rgyal mtshan," in Biographical Dictionary of Tibetan Buddhism, compiled by Khetsun Sangpo, vol. 10: The Sa-skyapa Tradition (Part One) (Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1979), pp. 155-241.

60. See C. W. Cassinelli and Robert B. Ekvall, A Tibetan Principality: The Political System of Sa skya (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), pp. 13-17. Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, "Lamas and Patrons," in Tibet: A Political History, pp. 61-72 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967 (Reprint, 1973)).

61. Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political History, (1973), p. 65; citing the Sa skya'i gdung rabs rin chen bang mdzod by Bsod nams grags pa rgyal mtshan (A history of Sa Skya).

Tsepon Shakabpa dates this letter to 1254, the Wood-Tiger year. R. A. Stein (Tibetan Civilization, (1972), p. 78) would date it to either 1253 or 1260, the latter

being the year that Kublai became Emperor. It is certainly not the year 1275 as posited by Helmut Hoffman (Tibet: A Handbook (Bloomington: Indiana University, (?)), pp. 53-54).

62. [The Blue Annals] 'Gos lo tsā ba Gzhon nu dpal [1392-1481], Bod kyi yul du chos dang chos smra ba ji ltar byung ba'i rim pa deb ther sngon po ("The Blue Annals, the Stages of the Appearance of the Doctrine and Preachers in the Land of Tibet"), The Blue Annals, translated by George N. Roerich, Part 1 (Calcutta: Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1949), p. 216.

63. The Blue Annals, Part 2, (1949), pp. 784-85.

64. On Lakṣmikāra see: "(Gu ru) Lakṣmikāra'i lo rgyus," in Biographical Dictionary of Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism, compiled by Khetson Sangpo, vol. 1: The Arhats, Siddhas, and Panditas of India (Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1973), pp. 764-67.

65. In Indian and Tibetan Scholars who Visited Tibet and Indian from the 7th to the 17th Century A.D. [dus rabs bdun pa nas | dus rabs bcu bdun pa'i bar rgya gar gyi pandi ta bod du rim byon dang | bod kyi mkhas pa rgya gar du rim par byon pa'i mtshan tho dang | lo dus mdzad brjod rag bsdus bcas phyogs bsdebs rin chen nor bu'i do shal], compiled by the Cultural and Religious Affairs Office of H. H. The Dalai Lama (Dharamsala: The Cultural and Religious Affairs Office of H. H. The Dalai Lama, 1968), p. 13.

66. 'Phags pa chos rgyal blo gros rgyal mtshan, "Pāṇḍī ta lakṣmi ka ra la spring ba" ["A Letter to Pāṇḍita Lakṣmikāra"], in The Complete Works of the Great Masters of the Sa skya Sect of the Tibetan Buddhism, compiled by Bsod Nams Rgya Mtsho, vol. 7: The Complete Works of Chos Rgyal 'Phags Pa, Part 2 (Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 1968), p. 239, folio 3, line 5 - folio 4, line 6. I would like to

acknowledge the generous assistance of Dr. John Newman in the analysis of this letter.

67. Based on the year chart given by A. I. Vostrikov, Tibetan Historical Literature, translated from the Russian by Harish Chandra Gupta (Calcutta: R. K. Maitral, 1970).

68. Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political History, (1973), pp. 67-69.

69. The Nāgānanda appears in the Bstan 'gyur in, for example, the mdo 'grel section of the Peking edition as the third work of vol. khe (Catalogue du Fonds Tibétain, Part 3, no. 3 of section 92, p. 419). See Nāgānanda by Harsadeva (King of Thanesar), A Play in Sanskrit and the Tibetan translation of Shong-ston rdo-rje rgyal-mtshan and Lakṣmikāra, edited by Vidhushekhar Bhattacharya (Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1957).

70. The Bodhisattvāvadānakalpalatā is found in the Bstan 'gyur in, for example, the mdo 'grel section of the Peking edition as the first work of vol. ge (Catalogue du Fonds Tibétain, Part 3, no. 1 of section 93, pp. 419-20).

71. Shong ston's commentary on the Kāvyādarśa is cited in a number of later commentaries; and is listed in the Thob yig ("Bibliography") of A khu ching rin po che shes rab rgya mtsho [1803-75] (In Lokesh Chandra, Materials for a History of Tibetan Literature, vol. 3 (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1963), p. 580).

72. Shong ston is associated with such texts in the Bstan 'gyur as:

(1) In the mdo 'grel section of the Peking edition:

(a) Brel pa mdor bstan pa (Sambandhoddeśa) by Kāyastha Cañgadāsa. Translated by Dpal ldan blo gros brtan

pa. "Traduction exécutée d'après les principes exposés par le meilleur des interprètes . . . le Maitre de Shong (Shong-ston) . . . et conformément à la grammaire sanskrite." The 8th text in vol. le (Catalogue du Fonds Tibétain, Part 3, no. 8 in section 116, p. 460).

(b) Ka lā pa'i mdo (Kalāpasūtra), attributed to Sarvavarman. Translated by Blo gros brtan pa gsum pa [the Third Sthiramati] Grags pa rgyal mtshan "exécutée . . . d'après les principes exposés par le meilleur des interprètes, le Maitre de Shong (Shong ston), Rdo-rje rgyal-mtshan (Vajradhvaja)." The 9th text in vol. le (Catalogue du Fonds Tibétain, Part 3, no. 9 in section 116, pp. 460-61).

(c) Sdeb sbyor gyi phreng ba'i stod pa (Vṛtta-mālāstuti) by Jñānaśrīmitra. "Traduction commencée par le Maitre de Shong (Shong-ston) . . . et terminée par son élève et descendant (spirituel), Lo-tsā-ba Dge-slong Dpal-l丹 Blo-gros brtan-pa . . ." The 6th text of vol. she (following the translation of the Kāvyādarśa, which appears as the 3rd work) (Catalogue du Fonds Tibétain, Part 3, no. 6 in section 117, p. 467).

(2) In the Sgra mdo section of the Sde dge edition (the sgra mdo appears as a distinct section only in the Sde dge edition and those redactions stemming from it (the Cho ni and the incomplete Wa ra); all editions of the Bstan 'gyur, however, group such texts on language and associated topics together):

(a) Lung ston pa candra pa'i mdo (Candravyā-karanaśūtra) by Candragomin. Translated by Shong ston. The 1st text of vol. re (Tōhoku Catalogue, no. 4269, p. 653).

(b) Ting la sogs pa'i mtha'i bya ba rnam par dpyad pa (Tyādyantaprakriyāvicārita) by Sarvadhara. Translated by Shong ston. The 3rd text of vol. she (Tōhoku Catalogue, no. 4289, p. 656).

(c) Sdeb sbyor gyi phreng ba'i bstod pa (Vṛtta-mālāstuti) by Jñānaśrīmitra. Translated by Shon ston and Dpal l丹 blo gros brtan pa. The 9th and last text in vol.

se (where the Tibetan translation of the Kāvyādarśa appears as the 5th text) (Tōhoku Catalogue, no. 4305, p. 658).

73. One Tibetan source, the Ngor chos 'byung, refers to Shong blo gros brtan pa as the nephew of Shong ston (Cited by Gene Smith, "Historical Sketch of Linguistic Science in Tibet," in Encyclopedia Tibetica, vol. 3 (1969), p. 5, n. 20).

74. Gene Smith, "Historical Sketch of Linguistic Science in Tibet," in Encyclopedia Tibetica, vol. 3 (1969), p. 5.

75. Giuseppe Tucci, Tibetan Painted Scrolls, vol. 1 (Rome: La Libreria Dello Stato, 1949), p. 104.

76. Gene Smith, "Introduction" to Encyclopedia Tibetica, vol. 6 (1969), p. 11.

77. 'Phags pa blo gros rgyal mtshan, Rgyal po yab sras kyis mchod rten bzhengs pa la bsngags pa'i sdeb sbyor danda ka, in The Complete Works of the Great Masters of the Sa Skya Sect of the Tibetan Buddhism, vol. 7: The Complete Works of Chos Rgyal 'Phags pa, compiled by Bsod Nams Rgya Mtsho (Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 1968), p 284, folio 1, line 1 - p. 285, folio 2, line 2.

78. The Blue Annals, Part 2, (1953), p. 786.

79. Dandin, Kāvyałakṣana of Dandin, edited by Anantalal Thakur and Upendra Jha with the commentary called Ratnaśrī of Ratnaśrijñāna (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1957).

80. Bar shi phun tshogs dbang rgyal in a personal communication, Dharamsala, 1983; Gene Smith, "Introduction" to Encyclopedia Tibetica, vol. 6 (1969), p. 9.

In a somewhat bizarre article, Leonard W. J. van der

Kuijp ("Bhāmaha in Tibet," Indo-Iranian Journal, 29 (1986), pp. 31-39), endeavors to prove what is self-evident to those scholars that have previously worked through Dpang lo tsā ba's commentary -- that he in fact utilized Ratnaśri's commentary in its composition. His comparisons of points drawn in various Tibetan commentaries is, however, of interest.

The bizarreness of the article lies primarily in the author's seeming awareness of the invalidity of certain assertions which are nonetheless made. For example, although in a footnote he recognizes that the question of relative priority of Dāṇḍin and Bhāmaha is "far from settled," he nonetheless asserts in the body of the article and at the outset that "The view that has found widespread acceptance ever since it was first proposed in the first decade of this century is that the Kāvyālamkāra is chronologically prior to Dāṇḍin's Kāvyādarśa" (p. 31). This is false and I fear indicates but the most superficial acquaintance with the Sanskrit secondary literature (that he cites the "translation" of the Kāvyādarśa offered by S. K. Belvalkar further indicates but a passing knowledge of the Sanskrit text). Or again, in the body of the article we read that "Dpang Lo-tsā-ba makes an explicit mention of this work" (p. 31), but in the corresponding footnote find that "The GZHUNG-GSAL [Dpang lo tsā ba's commentary] does not refer to the RATNAŚRĪ by name, but rather by 'commentary'. . . ." And too it would appear to me that van der Kuipj is generating an "issue" where none in fact exists. That Dpang lo tsā ba echoes Ratnaśri's passing mention of Bhāmaha's varying view from that of Kāvyādarśa [1.21], or of [1.23-25], hardly indicates that Bhāmaha was in any real sense "in" Tibet.

I touch on this for although I would hardly question Professor van der Kuipj's ability in Tibetan and hardly pretend to absolute authority, I do feel that the article points to a very real danger for whoever who would pursue the study of Tibetan snyan ngag. That without a firm grounding in the Kāvyādarśa itself and the fundamental

issues involved, any presentation of the Tibetan material will lack authoritative substance.

81. P. Cordier, Catalogue du Fonds Tibétain de La Bibliothèque Nationale (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1909), p. 466.

82. Dpang lo tsā ba Blo gros brtan pa [1276-1342], Snyan ngags me long gi rgya cher 'grel pa gzhung don gsal ba, in Rig Gnas Phyogs Bsdebs: A Collection of Miscellaneous Works on Tibetan Minor Sciences, (Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1981), pp. 281-502.

83. Kālidāsa (Nag mo'i khōl), Meghadūtanāma (Sprin gyi pho nya shes bya ba), translated by Sumanāśrī and Byang chub rtse mo [1303-80], revised by Nam mkha'a bzang po.

Found in the Bstan 'gyur in, for example, the Mdo 'grel section of the Peking edition as the 8th text in vol. she (Catalogue du Fonds Tibétain, Part 3, the 8th text in section no. 117, p. 470); in the Sde dge edition as the 6th text of vol. se (Tōhoku Catalogue, no. 4302, p. 658). And also in Sgra mdo'i skor (From the Sde-dge bstan 'gyur), vol. 4 (Delhi: Gyalwae Sungrab Partun Khang, 1985), ff. 682-701; Sprin-gyi-pho-ña / Meghadūta, with Chinese translation (Peking: Nationalities Press, 1957).

84. This Tibetan translation of the Chandoratnākara is found in the Bstan 'gyur, for example, in the Sde dge editon as the 7th text in vol. se (Tōhoku Catalogue, no. 4303, p. 658).

85. Cited by Gene Smith, University of Washington Tibetan Catalogue, Part 2 (Seattle: University of Washington, 1969), p. 173.

86. Bu ston Rin chen grub [1290-1364], Introductory verses to the Bde bar gshegs pa'i bstan pa'i gsal byed chos kyi 'byung gnas gsung rab rin po che'i mdzod, in The Collected Works of Bu-ston, edited by Lokesh Chandra, vol. 24 (ya)

(New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1971), ff. 634-36.

See also [Bu ston] History of Buddhism (Chos-hbyung) by Bu-ston, Part 1: The Jewelry of Scripture, translated by E. Obermiller (Heidelberg: O. Harrassowitz, 1931), pp. 5-7. Giuseppe Tucci, Tibetan Painted Scrolls, vol. 1 (1949), p. 104.

87. In Miscellaneous Writings (Gsung thor bu) of Kun-mkhyen Klon-chen-pa Dri-med-'od-zer, reproduced from Xylographic Prints from the A-'dzom 'Brug-pa Chos-sgar Blocks by Sanje Dorje, (Delhi: Sanje Dorje, 1973), vol. 1 ff. 8-95; 95-137; 137-49; 149-67; vol. 2: ff. 609-22.

88. In Rje Tsong kha pa gsung 'bum, (Lhasa edition) vol. 2: Rje thams cad mkhyen pa tsong kha pa chen po'i bka'a 'bum thor bu (Dharamsala: Cultural Printing Press, [?]), ff. 724.1-730.6.

89. The Collected Works (Gsung 'Bum) of Rje Tsong-Kha-Pa Blo-Bzang Grags-pa, vol. 22: (Khams gsum chos kyi rgyal po tshong kha pa chen po'i gsung 'bum, vol. ba) (New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1978), ff. 406-411.

90. The outline of teacher/students in linguistic study from Shong ston into the 15th century follows Gene Smith, "Historical Sketch of Linguistic Science in Tibet," In Encyclopedie Tibetica, vol. 3 (1969), pp. 5-6.

91. Dge 'dun grub [The First Dalai Lama], Bcom ldan 'das thub pa'i dbang po'i rnam par thar pa la bstod pa bdud dpung phye mar 'thags pa, edited by Lama Jamspal (Varanasi: K. Lhundup, 1972).

92. In The Complete Works of the Great Masters of the Sa skya Sect of the Tibetan Buddhism, vol. 8: Works on Grammar, Rhetoric and Versification by Sa Bzang Ma Ti Pan

Chen and Others, compiled by Bsod Nams Rgya Mtsho (Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 1968).

93. Snar-thang lo-tsā-ba Dge-'dun-dpal, Snyan ngag me long gi rgya char 'grel pa, 2 vols. (Thimphu: Kunzang Topgey, 1976).

Snyan ngag me long gi kri kha, in The Literary Arts in Ladakh, vol. 1 (Darjeeling: Kargyud Sungrab Nyamso Khang, 1972), ff. 227-362.

94. See Gene Smith, "Introduction" to Encyclopedia Tibetica, vol. 6 (1969), pp. 9-10.

95. Snye thang lo tsā ba Blo gros brtan pa bzhi pa, Mngon brjod kyi bstan bcos tshig gi gter zhes bya ba'i 'grel pa rgya cher don gsal ba bzhugs pa'i dbu mchog (Gangtok: Gonpo Tseten, 1977).

96. [Bo-dong Pan-chen Phyogs-Las-Rnam-Rgyal] The Collected Works of Bo-dong Pan-chen Phyogs-Las-Rnam-Rgyal, 137 vols., edited by Sonam T. Kazi (New Delhi: The Tibet House, 1969).

97. J. K. Rechung, "Bodong Phyogs las Rnam Rgyal," Bulletin of Tibetology, New Series, no. 2 (1984), p. 26.

98. In Encyclopedia Tibetica, vol. 6 (1969), ff. 243-563; in Kāvya Texts from Bhutan (Thimpu: Kunzang Tobghey, 1976), ff. 597-687.

99. In Encyclopedia Tibetica, vol. 6 (1969), ff. 565-612.

Although on occasion some of these verses are "excellent," on the whole "As a dper brjod this little booklet impresses one as being second-rate. Similar works by the second Dalai Lama and Bod-mkhas-pa seem to have much more to offer" (Gene Smith, "Introduction" to Encyclopedia Tibetica, vol. 6 (1969), p. 14).

100. In The Literary Arts in Ladakh, vol. 1 (Darjeeling: Kargyud Sungrab Nyamso Khang, 1972), ff. 57-71.
101. In The Literary Arts in Ladakh, vol. 1 (1972), ff. 41-56.
102. In The Literary Arts in Ladakh, vol. 1 (1972), ff, 91-106.
103. Gene Smith, "Introduction" to Encyclopedia Tibetica, vol. 6 (1969), p. 11.
104. In Three Poems by Zhang zhung pa chos dbang grags pa (Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1976), pp. 87-128. Also in Kāvya Texts from Bhutan (Thimphu: Kunzang Topgey, 1976), ff. 569-96.
105. In Three Poems by Zhang zhung pa chos dbang grags pa, (1976), pp. 1-69.
106. In Three Poems by Zhang zhung pa chos dbang grags pa, (1976), pp. 70-87; also in Collected Biographical Material About Lo-chen Rin-chen-bzang-po and His Subsequent Reembodiments: A Reproduction of a Collection of Manuscripts from the Library of Dkyil Monastery in Spiti (Delhi: Rdo-rje-Brtan, 1977).
107. Cited in "Rgyal ba dge 'dun rgya mtsho'i gsung 'bum mtshan tho ni," in Material for a History of Tibetan Literature, compiled by Lokesh Chandra, Part 3 (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1963), pp. 624-35, nos. 14188 and 14195.
108. In The Literary Arts in Ladakh, vol. 4 (1982), ff. 467-75.
109. In Tibeto-Sanskrit Lexicographical Materials, edited by Sonam Angdu (Leh: Rinchen Tondup Tongspon, 1973).

110. Cited in "A-khu-ching Shes-rab-rgya-mthso's Thob-yig," in Materials for a History of Tibetan Literature, Part 3 (1963), p. 580, no. 12963.
111. In Collected Works (gsung-'bum) of Kun-mkhyen Padma-dhar-po, vol. 1 (Darjeeling: Kargyud Sungrab Nyamso Khang, 1973), ff. 67-212; and ff. 213-21.
112. Giuseppe Tucci, Tibetan Painted Scrolls, vol. 1 (1949), p. 125 and p. 128.
113. In The Complete Works of the Great Masters of the Sa Skya Sect of the Tibetan Buddhism, vol. 8: Works on Grammar, Rhetoric and Versification by Sa Bzang Ma Ti Panchen and Others, compiled by Bsod Nams Rgya Mtsho (Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 1968), pp. 217-39; 239-91; and 291-320.
114. Rin spungs pa Ngag dbang 'jigs brten dbang phyug grags pa, Snyan ngag me long gi rgya cher 'grel pa. . . . (New Delhi: Ngawang Sopa, 1975).
115. Rin spungs ngag dbang 'jigs grags, Rtogs brjod dpag bsam 'khri shing dang skyes rabs so bzhi pa'i don bsdu'i tshigs so bcad pa (Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1976).
116. Rin spungs pa ngag dbang 'jigs rten dbang phyug grags pa, Rang gi yab rje rigs ldan chos kyi rgyal po ngag dbang rnam par gyal ba la. . . . (Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1974).
117. In Bzo rig kha shas kyi pa tra lag len ma and other Texts on the Minor Sciences of the Tibetan Scholastic Tradition (Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1981), ff. 153-79.
 See "Sa skya pa Ngag dbang chos grags," in Biographical Dictionary of Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism, compiled by Khetsun Sangpo, vol. 11 (Dharamsala: Library of

Tibetan Works and Archives, 1979), p. 503.

118. In Sang rgyas kyi bstan pa la rim gyis 'jug pa'i tshul (Sangs rgyas bstan rim) by Rdo rje rgyal po / Bcom ldan 'das. . . . by Jo nang Rje btsun Tāraṇātha (Bir, H.P., 1977), ff. 105-488.

119. "Bod mkhas pa": "Literally, 'Learned scholar of Tibet,' would appear to be a delightful spelling of a place name which was not written. This form was the object of a good deal of amusement and jesting to his contemporaries. One of his literary opponents took to shortening the tail of the final -d in the first syllable, an alternation that produced Bong-mkhas-pa, that is, Wise Jackass." (Gene Smith, "Introduction" to Kongtrul's Encyclopaedia of Indo-Tibetan Culture, Parts 1-3, edited by Lokesh Chandra (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1970), p. 19, n. 39.

120. Bod mkhas pa Mi pham dge legs rnam rgyal, Snyan ngag gi bstan bcos chen po me long la 'jug pa'i bshad sbyar dand'i dgongs rgyan: (1) Rum btegs, 1972; (2) in Snyan ngag gi dper bjod tshangs sras dgyes pa'i rol mo: A Collection of Examples of Elegant Tibetan Poetry by the Fifth Panchen Lama Bstan-pa'i dbang phyug. . . . (New Delhi: Chos-'phel-legs-ldan, 1972), ff. 281-613; (3) Dharamsala: Tibetan Cultural Printing Press, 1980.

121. Bod mkhas pa Mi pham dge legs rnam rgyal, Snyan ngag gi bstan bcos chen po me long la 'jug pa'i bshad sbyar Dandi'i dgongs rgyan [1st chapter only ?], in Kāvya Texts from Bhutan (Thimphu: Kunzang Topgey, 1976), pp. 281-401; and in The Literary Arts in Ladakh, vol. 5 (Darjeeling: Kargyud Sungrab Nyamso Khang, 1982), ff. 63-196.

Snyan ngag gi bstan bcos chen po me long gi bya dka'a ba'i rnam par bcad pa gsum pa'i bshad sbyar, in Kāvya Texts from Bhutan (1976), pp. 403-83.

122. In Snyan ngag gi dper brjod tshangs sras dgyes pa'i

- rol mo: A Collection of Examples of Elegant Tibetan Poetry by the Fifth Panchen Lama Bstan pa'i dbang phyug. . . .
(New Delhi: Chos-'phel-legs-ldan, 1972), ff. 616-88.
123. In Snyan ngag phyogs bsgrigs (Hsi-ning: Ch'ing-hai People's Press, 1957), pp. 474-80.
124. In The Literary Arts in Ladakh, vol. 5 (1982), ff. 359-61.
125. In Kāvya Texts from Bhutan (1976), ff. 485-93.
126. In Kāvya Texts from Bhutan (1976), ff. 495-528.
127. In Kāvya Texts from Bhutan (1976), ff. 529-49.
128. In Kāvya Texts from Bhutan (1976), ff. 551-67.
129. In Kāvya Texts from Bhutan (1976), ff. 99-196.
130. In Literary Arts in Ladakh, vol. 5 (1982), ff. 1-62.
131. Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho [the Fifth Dalai Lama], Snyan ngag me long gi dka'a 'grel dbyangs can dgyes ba'i klu dbyangs, edited by Khenpo Thupten Tshondu (Varanasi, 1966).
132. Giuseppe Tucci, Tibetan Painted Scrolls, vol. 1 (1949), p. 135.
133. Gene Smith, "Introduction to Kongtrul's Encyclopaedia of Indo-Tibetan Culture, Parts 1-3 (1970), pp. 19-21.
134. Gene Smith, "Introduction" to The Autobiography and Diaries of Si-tu Pan-chen, edited by Lokesh Chandra (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1968), pp. 16-17.

135. Gene Smith, University of Washington Tibetan Catalogue, Part 1 (1969), p. 111.

136. Gene Smith, "Introduction to Kongtrul's Encyclopaedia of Indo-Tibetan Culture, Parts 1-3 (1970), p. 20, n. 40.

137. Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho, Rgya bod hor sog gi mchog dman bar pa rnams la. . . . (Thimphu: Kunsang Tobgay, 1975).

Sku gsung thugs rten gsar bzhengs rin po che'i mchod. . . . , in Collected Works (Gsung 'bum) of Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho, vol. ma-tsha.

138. ("The Fourth (Volume) continuing the Third Volume of the ordinary, outer Biography, (entitled) 'The Fine Silken Dress,' of my own gracious lama, Ngag-dbang blo-bzang rgya-mtsho" [The Fifth Dalai Lama]) Zahiruddin Ahmad, "The Introductory Verses of Sangs-Rgyas Rgya-Mtsho's 'Fourth Volume,' in Studies in Indo-Asian Art and Culture, vol. 6 (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1980), pp. 1-32.

139. Gene Smith, "Introduction" to Kongtrul's Encyclopaedia of Indo-Tibetan Culture, Part 1-3 (1970), p. 19.

140. The Vaidūrya Dkar Po [by Ldum bu Don grub dbang rgyal], The Vaidūrya dkar po of Sde-srid Sans-rgyas-rgya-mtsho: The Fundamental treatise on Tibetan Astrology and Calendrical Calculations, vol. 2 (New Delhi: T. Tsepal Taikhang, 1972), f. 579 and following.

141. Gene Smith, "Introduction" to Kongtrul's Encyclopaedia of Indo-Tibetan Culture, Parts 1-3 (1970), p. 18, n. 36.

Guiseppe Tucci has taken the Fifth Dalai Lama to task for an apparent ignorance of Sanskrit: "The fifth Dalai Lama first composed his Tibetan verses and then tried to

translate the beginning into Sanskrit, without any real grammatical knowledge of the language. . . . So these compositions, which have been much admired by his contemporaries, in fact show that Blo bzang[*g*] rgya mtsho did not hesitate to busy himself with things he knew only superficially" ("The Fifth Dalai Lama as a Sanskrit Scholar," in Liebenthal Festschrift: Sino-Indian Studies, edited by Kshitish Roy, vol. 5, parts 3 and 4 (Santiniketan: Visvabharati, 1957), p. 240).

In this regard, Gene Smith's comments are especially interesting: "The Lo-tsā-ba of 'Dar ['Dar ba Lo tsā ba Ngag dbang phun tshogs lhun grub] is the Sanskritist responsible for the translation of the Anubhūti Sarasvatāvyākaraṇa and of the Pāṇinivyākaraṇa. It would seem that he was the Sanskrit scholar who did not know versification and metres well enough and who has earned for the Fifth Dalai Lama the reputation of being a bogus Sanskritist" ("Introduction to Kongtrul's Encyclopaedia of Indo-Tibetan Culture, Parts 1-3 (1970), p. 18, n. 37).

142. Gene Smith, University of Washington Tibetan Catalogue, Part 2 (1969), p. 215.

143. [Lo chen] Smin grol gling Dharmāśrī [Chos dpal], Snyan ngag gi mtshan nyid bsdus pa rtsom dpe dang bcas pa sna tshogs utpala'i chun po (Darjeeling: Tibetan Freedom Press, 1966).

144. In The Collected Works of 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje (alias Ngag dbang brton 'grus) [The First 'Jam bzhad pa], vol. 1 (Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1974), ff. 242-300.

145. In The Collected Works of 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje, vol. 1 (1974), ff. 237-41; ff. 217-36.

146. 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje, Bya ka lan ta ka'i rjes lan legs par bshad pa. Cited in Gene Smith,

University of Washington Tibetan Catalogue, Part 1 (1969),
pp. 61-62.

147. Gene Smith, University of Washington Tibetan Catalogue, Part 1 (1969), pp. 61-62.

148. Blo bzang ye shes dpal bzang po [The Second Pan chen Lama], Snyan ngag me long las le'u gnyis pa'i dper brjod mtsho byung dgyes pa'i me tog (Dharamsala: Tibetan Cultural Printing Press, 1975).

149. Gene Smith, "Introduction" to The Autobiography and Diaries of Si-tu Pan-chen, (1968), p. 5.

150. Gene Smith, "Introduction" to The Autobiography and Diaries of Si-tu Pan-chen, (1968), p. 10.

151. Si tu Pan chen Chos kyi 'byung gnas, Yul gangs can pa'i brda (Dharamsala: Shes rig pa khang, 196?).

152. Si tu Pan chen Chos kyi 'byung gnas, The Amarakosa in Tibet: Being a New Tibetan Version by the Great Grammarian Si-tu, edited by Lokesh Chandra. (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1965).

153. Tshe tan zhabs drung 'Jigs me rigs pa'i blo gros [based upon the oral teachings of Lo tsā ba Dge 'dun chos 'phel], Snyan ngag me long gi spyi don sdeb legs rig pa'i 'char sgo, rev. ed. (Kan su Province: Mi rigs slob gra chen mo, 1979 (1952)), p. 8.

154. Si tu's translation of the Kāvyādarśa remains unpublished. Through the kindness of the Tibetan Library of Works and Archives, Dharamsala, I was able to examine and copy a reprint from the private collection of the Sikkimese scholar Rai Bahadur T. D. Densapa (Burmiok Athing). The original xylograph came from the Collected Works (Gsung 'bum) of Si tu Pan chen (volume cha), carved

and kept at the Dpal Spungs monastery in Derge -- the seat of Si tu rin po che.

155. Khams sprul Bstan 'dzin chos kyi nyi ma, Snyan ngag me long gi 'grel pa dbyangs can ngag gi rol mtsho (Tashijong, Palampur: The Sungrab Nyamso Junphel Parkhang Tibetan Craft Community, 1969).

156. In nyan ngag me long gi 'grel pa dbyangs can ngag gi rol mtsho (Tashijong, Palampur: The Sungrab Nyamso Junphel Parkhang Tibetan Craft Community, 1969).

157. Zhu chen Tshul khirms rin chen, Collected Writings on Buddhist Philosophy, Liturgy, and Ritual of Zhu-chen Tshul-khirms-rin-chen (New Delhi: B. Jamyang Norbu, 1973-74, (1) vol. 1 (ga) (1973), ff. 1-21; (2) vol. 1 (ga) (1973), ff. 173-81; (3) vol. 4 (cha) (1974), ff. 357-464; (4) vol. 7 (a) (1974), ff. 1-65; (5) vol. 7 (a) (1974), ff. 415-511; (6) vol. 7 (a) (1974), ff. 513-59; and (7) vol. 7 (a) (1974), ff. 561-97.

158. In The Collected Works (Gsung 'Bum) of Kah-thog Rig-'dzin Chen-po Tshe-dbang-nor-bu, vol. 2 (Dalhousie: Damchoe Sangpo, 1976), ff. 483-97. See Hugh E. Richardson, "A Tibetan Antiquarian in the XVIIIth Century," Bulletin of Tibetology, vol. 4, no. 3 (1967), pp. 5-8.

159. In Collected Works of Sum-pa-mkhan-po, reproduced by Lokesh Chandra, vol. 7 (ja) (Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1975), ff. 707-16; ff. 725-815.

160. See, for example, Bstan 'dzin chos rgyal, Rgyal kun khyab bdag 'gro ba'i bla ma Bstan 'dzin rin po che Legs pa'i don grub zhabs kyi rnam par thar pa ngo mtshar nor bu'i mchod sdong: The Life of Sgang-sten Sprul sku Bstan-'dzin-legs-pa'i-don-grub. . . . Rgyal kun brtse ba'i spyi gzugs Sems dpa'a chen po Gsung dbang sprin dbyangs kyi rtogs pa brjod pa rig 'dzin kun tu dga'a ba'i zlos gar: The Life

of Skyabs-phra Mtshams-brag Bla-ma Ngag-dbang-'brug-pa, in Biographies of Two Bhutanese Lamas of the Padma-gling-pa Tradition (Thimphu: Kunsang Tobgay, 1975).

The Biography of Chos-rje Šes-rab-'byung-gnas by the 10th Rje Mkhan-chen Bstan-'dzin-chos-rgyal. . . . In The Biographies of Šes-rab-'byung-gnas and Others (Thimphu: Kunsang Tsepgey, 1976).

161. Gene Smith, "Introduction" to The Autobiography and Diaries of Si-tu Pan-chen (1968), p. 7, n. 9.

162. Rang byung rdo rje, The Tibetan Rendering of the Jātakamālā of Āryaśūra, supplemented with 67 Additional Jātaka Stories by the Third Karma-pa Rang-'byung-rdo-rje, vol. 2 (Darjeeling: Kargyud Sungrab Nyamso Khang, 1974), ff. 459-613.

163. Mdo mkhar zhabs drung tshe ring dbang rgyal, Gzhon nu zla med kyi gtam rgyud (Dharamsala: Shes rig par khang, 1964).

See Beth E. Solomon, "The Tale of the Incomparable Prince: A Study and Translation of the Tibetan Novel Gzhon nu zla med kyi gtam rgyud by Mdo Mkhar Zhabs Drung (1697-1763), Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1987.

164. In The Literary Arts in Ladakh, vol. 2 (1972), ff. 151-336.

165. In Snyan ngag gi dper brjod tshangs sras dgyes pa'i rol mo: A Collection of Examples of Elegant Tibetan Poetry by the Fifth Panchen Lama Bstan-pa'i-dbang-phyug. . . . (New Delhi: Chos-'phel-legs-ldan, 1972), ff. 1-279.

166. In Rare Tibetan Historical and Literary Texts from the Library of Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, edited by T. Tsepal Taikhang (New Delhi: T. Tsepal Taikhang, 1974), ff. 209-27.

167. In Collected Works of 'Jam-mgon 'Ju Mi-pham rgya-mtsho, edited by Sonam Topgay Kazi, vol. 8 (Gangtok: Sonam Topgay Kazi, 1976), ff. 187-641; also Snyan ngag me long gi 'grel pa dbyangs can rol mtsho (Delhi: Getse-Tulku, 1969).
168. "Introduction" to the Gzhan gyis brtsad pa'i lan mdor bsdus pa rigs lam rab qsal de nyid snang byed by 'Jam-mgon mi-pham-rgya-mtsho of 'Ju (Gangtok: Sonam T. Kazi, 1969), pp. 6-7.
- Mi-pham discoursed extensively on the Rāmāyaṇa in his commentary on the Kāvyādarśa; in the Getse Tulku edition, (1969) for example, under Bsam pa rgya che ba'i rgyan, pp. 251-55; 257-130. These excerpts have been reprinted with an English translation by B. Ghosh, "Mipham on Rāmāyaṇa," Bulletin of Tibetology, no. 1 (1977), pp. 13-23; no. 2 (1977), pp. 36-39.
169. In The Collected Works of A-Kya Yongs-hdzin, vol. 2 (New Delhi: Lama Guru Deva, 1971), ff. 504-64; ff. 565-613; and ff. 689-700.
170. In The Collected Works of A-Kya Yongs-hdzin, vol. 2 (1971), ff. 614-88.
171. [Skyabs dbyings Pañdita Sman ri ba] Blo bzang rnam rgyal, Snyan ngag me long ri ba las le'u gnyis pa'i dper brjod tshangs sras dgyes pa'i glu dbyangs (Dharamsala: Bod gzhung shes rig par khang, 1977).
172. [Skyabs dbyings Pañdita Sman ri ba Blo bzang rnam rgyal, 'Phags mchog thugs rje chen po'i sprul pa chos rgyal dri med kun ldan . . . : An Ornate Extended Poem on the theme of Dri-med-kun-ldan or the Vessantara Jātaka (New Delhi: Ngawang Sopa, 1979).
173. 'Jam dbyangs blo gter dbang po, Ston mchog thams cad mkhyen pa thub pa'i dbang po'i skyes rabs gsal bar brjod pa

brqya lnga bcu pa nor bu'i phreng ba (Dharamsala: Tibetan Library of Works and Archives, 1980).

174. In The Collected Works of Dalai Lama XIII, vol. 3 (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1981), ff. 85-130.

175. In The Collected Works of Dalai Lama XIII, vol. 3 (1981), f. 85.

176. In The Collected Works of Dalai Lama XIII, vol. 3 (1981), ff. 5-83.

177. Gene Smith, University of Washington Tibetan Catalogue, Part 1 (1969), p. 106.

178. 'Bras ljongs Bsam 'grub khang gsar ba U rgyan kun bzang bstan 'dzin rdo rje, Dbyangs can ngag gi rol mtsho las don rgyan so lnga'i snying po bsdus pa blo gsar bung ba rol pa (Sarnath: Mongolian Lama Guru Deva, 1966).

179. The Catalogue cites a xylograph edition of 144 ff. and notes, "The blocks for this edition were carved at the order of the young Lhasa aristocrat, Rdo-rje-bkra-shis (b. ca. 1882) of the house of the Yab-bzhis Phun-tshogs-khang-gsar. The Yab-bzhis Phun-khang were the family of the 11th Dalai Lama. The edition was prepared shortly after the work was written [1908]" (Gene Smith, University of Washington Tibetan Catalogue, Part 1, p. 106).

180. Cited in Gene Smith, University of Washington Tibetan Catalogue, Part 1 (1969), pp. 137-38.

181. 'Bras ljongs pa Bsam 'grub khang gsar ba U rgyan kun bzang bstan 'dzin rdo rje, Rgyan gyi bstan bcos me long gi 'grel chen. . . . (Gangtok: Namgyal Institute of Tibetology, 1968).

182. In Bonpo Texts on the Laying Out of Mandalas, Mantras, Poetics, Scripts, and Puja by Khyung-sprul 'Jigs-med-nam-mkha'i-rdo-rje Dpal-ldan-thsul-khrims, and Sangs-rgyas-gling-pa Byang-chub-rdo-rje-rtsal, compiled by Sonam Drakpa (New Thobgyal, Himachal Pradesh: Tibetan Bonpo Monastic Centre, 1973).
183. Norbu Wangchhuk, Snyan ngag le'u gnyis pa'i dper brjod (Delhi: Mani Dorji, 1978).
184. [Mkhan po] Sang rgyas bstan 'dzin, Don rgyan so lnga'i dper brjod mkhas pa dgyes pa'i ljon bzang (Darjeeling: Khenpo Sangey Tenzin, 1981); also in The Literary Arts in Ladakh, vol. 5 (1982), ff. 1-62.
185. Tshe tan Zhabs drung 'Jigs med rigs pa'i blo gros alias Njag dbang dbyangs ldan rig pa'i 'dod 'jo, Snyan ngag me long gi spyi don sdeb legs rig pa'i 'char sgo, revised ed. (Kansu Province: Mi rigs slob gra chen mo, 1979 (1952)).
186. Rdo rje rgyal po, Snyan ngag gi rnam bshad gsal sgron (Peking: People's Printing Press, 1983).
187. Phag ri lha 'og blo bzang rnam rgyal, Tshangs sras dgyes pa'i glu dbyangs: Snyan ngag me long las le'u gnyis pa'i dper brjod (Dharamsala: Tibetan Cultural Printing Press, 1977).

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COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES: YEARS ATTENDED AND DEGREES

Kenyon College 1967-1971 B.A.

University of Wisconsin - Madison 1977-1980/1987-1989 Ph.D.

MEMBERSHIPS IN LEARNED OR HONORARY SOCIETIES

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