

Economic Motivators and Traits of The European Social-Democratic Coalition

Introduction

In the post-WW2 era, social-democratic parties have been common and sizable presences in parliaments throughout Europe, frequently (as in the UK, Germany, Spain, Portugal, and, until recently, France,) claiming the majority of the center-left vote. This paper uses party affiliation data from various sources, including European Parliament membership and party messaging, to construct multinomial models for voter choice that include wealth and education variables, among many others, to predict likelihood of social-democratic support.

By using multinational datasets, including the 2019 European Elections survey; the 2018 European Social Survey; and the 2019 joint European Values Survey/ World Values Survey, and utilizing multinomial regressions to account for ideological diversity across parties, this paper identifies numerous factors that correlate with social-democratic vote likelihood. Many are in line with rational economic expectations, including positive correlations with union membership and public worker status, negative correlations with income and employment, and others. Further, by utilizing MARPOR analysis of electoral manifestos, this paper finds connections between the makeup of social-democratic party coalitions and which policies each nation's largest social-democratic party emphasizes. This paper finds evidence in support of economic voting patterns regarding union membership, income, employment status, and public worker status, among others. It also proposes a potential dynamic relationship between the composition of social-democratic party support bases and the issues they emphasize. Finally, it identifies characteristics of the below-prime-age voting bloc that hint at potential future gender and educational polarization.

Literature Review

The literature review includes three key areas:

1. Background information on social-democratic parties, including their recent history, their importance to contemporary European politics, their likely policy commonalities, and their current support makeup.
2. A survey of methods used to estimate likelihood of voter choice in multiparty elections, including information on the multinomial logit model; frequent controls used in voter choice regressions; potential necessary adjustments for the impact of strategic voting; and a discussion of international and national-level regressors to include.
3. Information on datasets to be utilized in this paper.

The Importance of Social Democratic Parties

In numerous countries across Europe, election cycle after election cycle, social-democratic parties consistently claim one of the largest vote shares among competing parties. This electoral strength, persistent both across time and across nations, makes the social-democratic project “one of the main electoral forces in European politics since 1945” (Benedetto et al 2020, 939.)

However, although social-democratic parties have remained electorally significant essentially since their inception, they have undergone substantial changes in their coalitions, their issue positions, and their support shares. Benedetto et al 2020 breaks this history into three waves. The first, prior to the Great Depression, is characterized by social-democratic parties that rose out of far-left revolutionary politics and pushed for “maximum working hours, paid annual leave, collective bargaining, and pension systems.” These parties catered largely to industrial workers. Although they split this constituency with supra-ideological Catholic parties, as well as the Communists, these first-wave social-democratic parties nonetheless found electoral success; the 1920’s and 1930’s saw social-democratic-led governments in Czechoslovakia, Germany, France, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the UK.

This first wave ended in the wake of democratic collapse across Europe following the Great Depression; when democracy returned after World War Two, social-democratic parties pursued votes beyond their traditional industrial worker constituency (Benedetto et al 2020.) In this second wave, social-democratic parties took up socially as well as economically liberal positions, and reached out to left-wing “public sector employees, urban professionals, and agricultural laborers.” (Benedetto et al 2020, 931.) Social-democratic parties reached new heights of voter support in this second wave, gaining between one third and one half of votes in many European nations. However, in many nations, social-democratic support fell under 1970’s oil-crisis-induced stagflation; this marked the beginning of a lengthy fall in voter share for social-democratic parties (Benedetto et al.)

Social-democratic parties’ response to this, a move rightward on fiscal issues, marked the beginning of the third wave; by the mid-1990’s, many European social-democratic parties had moved center-left economically, embracing supply-side economics even while retaining socially liberal issue stances and emphasizing environmentalism (Benedetto et al.) (Even before the start of the third wave, many social-democratic parties had also embraced European integrationism: “Social Democrats took on clear pro-European stances in the mid-80’s.” (Abou-Chadi and Wagner 2020, 249.)) Social-democratic strength was buttressed by the fall of Communism, as former Communists launched social-democratic parties across Eastern Europe to distance themselves from their old parties; the upshot of these shifts was a rise in social-democratic vote shares across the continent, as social-democratic support bases broadened to include middle-class professional public-sector workers (Benedetto et al.)

Across Europe, this rise was followed by a steep decline: “Between 2000 and 2017, most social-democratic parties secured the lowest levels of support that they had had since 1918.” (Benedetto et al 2020, 931.) In a regression on vote shares for 31 social-democratic parties, Benedetto et al concludes that this fall is caused largely by a reduction in the percentage of the population industrial workers, the traditional core base of social-democratic parties, represent, and by a reduction in the percentage of industrial workers that vote for social-democratic parties. Explanations of this reduction vary. Abou-Chadi and Hix 2021 notes that as social issues rise in primacy, radical right parties may make bids for the votes of socially conservative industrial workers. Polacko 2021 instead blames the move rightward on economic issues for pushing fiscally left-leaning voters to challenger parties. Irrespective of the cause of this decline, however, the result is a coalition that is changing in composition as well as in size. This has a direct policy impact; Abou-Chadi and Immergut 2019 finds that, as middle-class professionals become an ever more crucial part of the social-democratic coalition, left-leaning social-democratic governments facing strong electoral competition may opt to reduce spending on pensions, a crucial component of the welfare state for industrial workers, in favor of spending on daycares, a component of the welfare state that has disproportionate benefits for middle-class professional workers.

In sum, social-democratic parties are important parts of the political landscape for nations across Europe. In many of these nations, they have seen a recent reduction in voter support, particularly among their former core base of industrial workers. This has changed the size and composition of their coalition, reducing their parliamentary strength and moving their priorities toward the needs of middle-class professional workers, which form an ever-larger portion of their coalition. Because of its cross-continental direct and indirect policy impact, this shift in voter support is crucial to understand. As such, this paper will seek to utilize individual-level data from a number of European nations with social-democratic parties to better understand the motivations behind a social-democratic vote, economic and otherwise.

Current methods of voter-choice likelihood estimation

Multinomial models

Numerous prior studies have regressed individual-level vote choice on various economic, demographic, and ideological indicators. Many of these studies have taken place in nations with more than two major parties. In such cases, each of these parties’ voter bases may have highly distinct characteristics, making a binary indicator for party choice insufficient. Of the papers surveyed that used election data from democracies with more than two major parties, all used a multinomial model.

Four papers used a multinomial logistic regression. In Kwon 2019, UK voter party preferences from the 1997-2001 British Election Panel Study were regressed, using a multinomial logit model, on past

votes, union membership, age, gender, and various issue positions; only the top three parties, Labour, the Conservatives, and the Liberal Democrats, were studied.

In Cataife 2011, a survey by Argentinian polling organization Ibarometro of 1,229 Buenos Aires citizens was used to study individual-level voter choice in the 2009 Argentinian midterm elections; vote choice was regressed on numerous issue positions, financial status, personal opinion of leadership candidates, and various demographic indicators such as age, gender, and education. A mixed multinomial logit was used, allowing for heterogeneity in individual-level sensitivity to different factors; the paper stated that three variables displayed significant heterogeneity relating to their effect on vote choice. Here, too, only the top three tickets were surveyed: FPV, PRO, and CC. This curtailment excluded 12% of the data.

In Andre et al 2019, data taken from the Dutch Long Term Internet Study for the Social Sciences, covering three election periods, was used to regress individual-level voter choice on housing wealth, as well as controls including education, number of children, age, marital status, ideological left-right self-placement, a number of issue positions, and household-level finances. Due to the high degree of partisan fragmentation in the Netherlands, the eleven parties with elected parliamentary representation at the time of the paper were sorted into “pro-welfare,” “centre,” and “pro-ownership” categories, with respect to the authors’ stance on their housing policy. Votes for parties classed into the same category were analyzed as though identical.

In Koop and Poirier 1994, a poll of Canadian adults taken before the 1988 Canadian federal election by York University’s Institute for Social Research was filtered for values from Ontario, Canada’s largest province. Individual-level voter preference was then regressed on age, marital status, income, primary language (i.e., French or not French,) union membership, employment and employment type, and education. A rank-ordered approach was taken, where every possible ranking of the parties surveyed was treated as a category. As there were three leading parties- the Progressive Conservatives, the Liberals, and the New Democrats- this left $3!=6$ possible options for voter preference.

Although it appears to be the standard for individual-level voter choice regressions in nations with numerous major parties, there are potential weaknesses to the multinomial logit approach. As Cataife writes, the fit of multinomial models often grows weaker as the number of incorporated parties increases. Of the four papers surveyed, two used three categories; one used four; one used six. As such, the multinomial logit may require some artificial “merging” of ideologically similar parties, as in Andre et al 2019, for nations with numerous major parties.

Abou-Chadi and Hix 2020 notes that the rise of education as a non-ideological secondary dimension has cleaved the political landscape in many European parliamentary democracies into four broad categories: the mainstream left, of the less educated left-wing; the green parties and

left-libertarians, of the more educated left-wing; the mainstream right, of the more educated right-wing; and the radical right, of the less educated right-wing. The first of these categories, they note, is dominated in many European nations by the social-democrats. These categories notably omit Communist and hard-left parties, as well as parties that essentially lack conventional left-right political ideology, such as testimonial parties. We will therefore add these two categories to the four-party categorization used in Abou-Chadi and Hix, and cluster parties into those six groups for the purpose of multinomial modeling.

Common controls

Of the four papers that utilize multinomial logit models, various controls were frequently utilized; a table of every control used in more than one paper is listed below.

	Koop and Porrier 1994	Cataife 2011	Kwon 2019	Andre et al 2019
Education	x	x	x	x
Marital status	x			x
Age	x	x	x	x
Gender	x	x	x	x
Household income	x	x	x	x
LR self-placement			x	x
Union membership	x		x	
Employment status	x		x	
EU distrust			x	x

Left-right self-placement is endogenous, being highly correlated with other demographic and economic characteristics; additionally, party affiliation can causally affect left-right self-placement, making the selection of voter choice as a ‘dependent variable’ problematic (Garzia 2013.) As such, it will not be included as a regressor. However, the other covariates appear potentially impactful for individual-level social-democratic support. A study of individual-level vote choice across thirteen nations, using European Social Survey data, identified a positive correlation between EU support and

social-democratic vote likelihood (Abou-Chadi and Wagner 2020.) This effect may stem from the policy positions undertaken by these parties; social-democratic parties trend more integrationist, and more friendly toward immigration, than their conservative counterparts (Abou-Chadi 2016.)

Due to shifts in the social-democratic support base, union membership, education, income, and gender should likely also be included as covariates. On the individual level, union membership, and being a woman, both correlate positively with support for redistributive policy (Kitschelt and Rehm 2014,) traditionally a flagship policy of social-democratic parties, and one the electorate perceives them as promoting (Polacko 2021.) There is also a rich history of social-democratic support for labor movements (Manwaring and Holloway 2020,) making a union membership effect highly plausible. However, as the social-democratic coalition shifts, the impacts of union membership and gender on social-democratic vote likelihood may be diverging: “Cosmopolitan, middle-class voters in the social service sector – predominantly female – have become a core electoral group for centre-left parties, while culturally traditional working-class voters increasingly support centre-right parties” (Abou-Chadi and Immergut 2018.) Far-right parties have also made a bid for often socially conservative industrial workers, once a mainstay of the social-democratic coalition (Abou-Chadi and Hix 2021.) (This rise in cosmopolitan support also introduces education, and income, as cleavages within the social-democratic voter base. We will also include a binary variable for public employment, to reflect rising support within the social service sector.) Though a recent individual-level voter choice survey still found a significant positive trend between union membership and social-democratic support likelihood (Abou-Chadi and Wagner 2020,) there is nonetheless evidence that the overall support base is shifting. On the multinational level, a survey of 31 countries found a negative relationship between union density and nationwide social-democratic vote share (Benedetto et al 2017.)

There are also justifications for the inclusion of employment status, age, and marital status. Unemployment is associated, perhaps unsurprisingly, with increased support for redistributive policies (Kitschelt and Rehm 2014.) As social-democratic vote shares fall, “sticky” vote levels, with new voters more likely than current social-democrats to move to other parties, may result in the aging up of the social-democratic coalition. Meanwhile, married couples tend to be more conservative than single individuals in the United States (ANES 2018,) an effect that may partially arise from the additional economic stability associated with entering into a marriage (Greenstone and Looney 2012); if this reverse causation does not account for the entirety of effect size, and if this relationship holds true in Europe, there may be a linkage between marriage status and social-democratic vote likelihood. As such, all three will be included within my regression as possible covariates with social-democratic vote share likelihood.

Nation-specific factors

Beyond continent-wide impacts, a number of factors may be nation-specific, dependent on the political system of the particular democracy. Three possible such factors include the proportionality of the electoral system; the political stances of the social-democratic party; and whether the primary right-wing party in a given nation is populist far-right. Another clear factor is that voting is a functionally different act in authoritarian nations, where those votes may lack value and party systems may be underdeveloped. Each of these factors will be discussed in turn, as well as ways of accommodating these factors in our equation design.

Nation-specific factors: Electoral system proportionality

“First-past-the-post” electoral systems, in which the party with the most votes wins the seat, may lead to strategic voting- where supporters of smaller parties avoid splitting the vote by lending their support in a particular election to whichever major party comes closer to their political views. This can serve to increase the relative vote share of the top two parties, relative to a proportional-representation system. Singer (2013,) in a survey of single-member district outcomes from 53 national elections from 1994 to 2008, studied the distribution of vote shares across the largest parties, finding that “the top two candidates win at least 90 per cent of the vote in most countries, and there is little support for parties outside the top three except in the most ethnically divided societies.” Because the impact of this consolidation is likely to increase the vote share of social-democratic parties when they are one of the top two largest parties in a first-past-the-vote electoral system, as in the UK, it is necessary to account for the impact of strategic voting to allow one-to-one comparisons with other national social-democratic parties in proportional-representation systems.

In some cases, however, voters may not know what a strategic vote entails. There are two clear cases where confusion might arise- when a voter lacks information about the state of a given race, rendering them unable to identify the strategic vote; and when a voter unfamiliar with an electoral system is unsure how to navigate their ballot to select the most strategic outcome.

The former case was analyzed by Clough (2007,) who performed a game-theoretic model on a simulated electorate where voters voted strategically and only had access to information about the ideologies of a certain sector of the overall voting pool- i.e., their neighbors. She then tracked the level of electoral consolidation. Ultimately, she found that electoral consolidation requires a high degree of public information about the state of the race; when simulated voters had 8 neighbors out of a voting pool of 168, a model that began with 3 parties converged to 2 parties only 69% of the time. However, because all data is collected in nations where prior election results have broadcast universal signals regarding which parties have substantial public followings, the Clough model itself predicts that convergence is likely.

The latter case was analyzed by Bawn (1999,) who looked to German electoral results to identify whether complex voting systems were leading to inadvertent non-strategic voting. The voting system in Germany is notoriously complex- the first of two votes for the national parliament is used for a constituency-level first past the post election, then, after those votes are counted, the second vote is used to appoint a certain number of candidates from the party list to, overall, have a Bundestag breakdown identical to the popular vote breakdown as per the second vote. Bawn reported first/second vote gaps to identify whether voters are voting “rationally”- major party on the first vote to solidify their constituency-level representation, as close to their ideology as possible on the second. Bawn found that between two to eight times as many ballots obeyed this pattern than the converse, indicating that strategic voting is commonplace. Bawn explains these results by noting that information on electoral systems is frequently shared at the polling place itself, making a strategic vote in a complex electoral system simpler. (It is worth noting here that state-of-race information is likely more difficult to come by in these situations.) In light of these results, it is not likely that an adjustment for electoral system complexity is necessary.

Social-democratic parties are often the largest parties of the center-left, with the two largest parties in many European multiparty democracies often the social-democrats and their leading right-wing rival (Manwaring and Holloway 2021.) As such, it is likely that non-proportional electoral systems will lead to increases in vote share for social-democratic parties, as per Duverger’s Law. To accommodate for this, we will control for electoral disproportionality and for electoral fragmentation.

Nation-specific factors: Authoritarianism

Many authoritarian nations nonetheless hold elections; as of 2021, electoral autocracies formed the most common regime type (Neundorf and Northmore-Ball 2021, 7.) The literature is weak and divided on the effects of authoritarian elections, relative to democratic elections, on voter behavior (Neundorf and Northmore-Ball 2021, 8.) Because of the innate difficulties of modeling authoritarian elections, I will remove from the dataset all authoritarian nations, defined as those with a score of 4 or lower in that year’s, or the most recent, annual Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index report. Among European nations (defined in this paper as nations with membership in the Council of Europe or completely surrounded by nations with membership in the Council of Europe,) this restriction excludes Azerbaijan, Russia, and Belarus.

Nation-specific factors: Issue positions

There are a number of factors that vary across social-democratic parties. Some parties, of course, are more left-leaning overall than others, which may affect the makeup of their support base. Other particular issue stances may also affect the makeup of the party support base.

On a general level, Benedetto et al 2020 describes an existential change in social-democratic parties across Europe that has occurred since the 1990's- in Benedetto et al's telling, fifteen European nations have seen their largest social-democratic party move from a so-called "catch-all" left-wing party that favored welfare state construction, a social market, nationalization of natural monopolies, and liberal social policies, to a "new middle" party that has moved to the center-to-center-left on economic issues, prioritizes balanced budgets, and has moved left on environmental issues as they have risen in political prevalence. The magnitude of this change is distinct between nations. Some nations' social-democratic parties may not have undergone this shift, as Benedetto et al 2020 asserts happened in Switzerland. Some social-democratic parties may have undergone it to a lesser extent than others. Further, some parties may be in the midst of transition. Benedetto et al 2020 notes that where these ideological transitions have occurred, they often presage a fall in industrial worker support for social-democratic parties- and a move toward more highly educated, middle-class public employees as the new core of the social-democratic coalition. Polacko 2021 goes further by asserting causation, stating that social-democratic parties' move to the center has "led traditional supporters to increasingly embrace new challenger parties." To adequately account for this ideological transition, we will examine each party's support for labor unions and welfare state expansion, characteristic of social-democratic pre-shift areas of emphasis, and for environmentalism and emphasis of middle-class professional workers' issues, characteristic of potential post-shift areas of emphasis. To do this, we will use Manifesto Project-produced scoring of each party's most recent electoral manifesto with respect to these issues; the Manifesto Project is a dataset that analyzes policy preferences of 1,000 parties from 50 nations from 1945 to the present date based on readings of each political party's electoral manifesto.

Beyond the transition Benedetto et al describes, there are a number of potentially electorally potent issues that differ between social-democratic parties. Abou-Chadi 2016 finds that left-of-center parties are generally associated with liberalization of immigration policy, but that "facing a highly immigration-skeptic and latently xenophobic public... even left-wing governments will refrain from liberalization." This prospect of electoral blowback from an immigration-skeptical public for pursuing liberalization indicates that immigration is a potentially electorally potent issue. Abou-Chadi 2016 further notes that non-strictly-electoral factors, such as the number of veto points in the policymaking process, can shift the likelihood of a social-democratic party pursuing immigration liberalization; this indicates a differentiation in behavior between left-wing parties on the topic of immigration. Because immigration

stances are both potentially electorally impactful and variant across nations, we will include, where available, Manifesto Project data relating to individual parties' stances on immigration as a control.

Although their ideological range on the topic is limited, social-democratic parties nonetheless vary somewhat in their stance toward the topic of European integration: although “no social-democratic party takes even a moderately Eurosceptic stance,” social-democratic parties nonetheless range from “strong to moderate pro-EU stances on European integration.” (Abou-Chadi and Wagner 2020, 252.) Abou-Chadi and Wagner 2020 notes that, due in part to pro-EU sentiment among the middle-class professional workers that increasingly constitute much of the social-democratic base, there is a significant positive impact on vote share for social-democratic parties that espouse strongly pro-EU positions. As EU stances therefore are electorally impactful and vary between social-democratic parties, we will add EU integration to our list of by-party controls, utilizing, where available, Manifesto Project data relating to individual parties' stance on EU integration.

Nation-specific factors: Far-right conservative primacy

As social-democratic parties and far-right parties often draw from relatively less educated constituencies compared to mainstream right and green/left-libertarian parties (Abou-Chadi and Hix 2021,) it is possible that social-democrats may be more ready to defect to the far right rather than to the mainstream right. Indeed, Abou-Chadi and Immergut 2019 found that a radical right party can increase the risk of voter defection among social-democratic parties, making moving to the center for the purposes of vote maximization a riskier strategy. Dissatisfied social-democrats, especially socially conservative and economically left-leaning social-democrats, may readily defect to the far-right: “Radical right parties have become established contenders for the working-class vote in a large share of industrialised democracies.” (Abou-Chadi and Hix 2021, 7.) As such, I hypothesize that the domination of the right wing by a radical right, or far right, party may serve to reduce relative social-democratic vote share. I will incorporate a binary variable on the national level for whether the largest right-wing party in that nation was far right at the time of the survey. The largest party will be the one with the highest categorized seat share in the previous election.

Datasets Utilized

The EVS, EES, and ESS

Respondent-level data was collected from three large multinational surveys: the 2018 European Social Survey (ESS), the 2019 European Elections Studies survey (EES), and the 2019 joint European Values Survey/ World Values Survey (EVS). All three included statistics for or closely related to voter

choice, household income, age, gender, union membership, public worker status, marital status, trust in the European Union or European Parliament, employment status, education, and urban/rural split. Inclusion in the model was restricted to nations in Europe (as determined by whether they were members of, or surrounded by members of, the Council of Europe;) with EIU Democracy Index scores above 4.0 in the year the data was collected, 4.0 being the cutoff for authoritarian regimes as per Economist methodology. A list of the non-authoritarian European countries that each dataset covers, and, consequently, the nations to be included in the model, is in Appendix C.

Factors from the EVS, EES, and ESS Datasets

Gender

Data on gender was compiled from each dataset and represented in factor form, with a three-factor model where 0 represented males, 1 represented females, and 2 represented nonbinary individuals. Though the EES and EVS included “other” as a category, the ESS did not. As nonbinary individuals accounted for only 0.035% of the overall population surveyed, the impact of this is assumed to be minimal.

Age

Data on age was compiled from each dataset. The EVS and ESS asked age directly, but the EES asked for birth year. All EES data for the included wave was collected in 2019, so age was estimated by subtracting the birth year from 2019; some off-by-one errors are almost certainly present as a result. As the magnitude of these errors is quite small and the assumed net bias is zero, in that the calculation is exactly as likely to undercount by a year as overcount by a year, the impact is assumed to be minimal. Another minor source of error is that EVS age data from those over 82 is censored, and these individuals are simply assigned an age of 82; ESS age data from those over 90 is similarly censored, and these individuals are similarly assigned an age of 90. (This is due to confidentiality concerns; as the raw number of individuals of a given age tapers at higher ages, smaller towns might have only a few people of a given age, making respondents potentially identifiable based on their responses.) Assuming that the true number of individuals who are 82, in EVS data, or 90, in ESS data, are about equal to the number of individuals who are 81 and 89, respectively, a survey of the “extra” 82-year-olds and 90-year-olds indicates that age-censoring affected approximately 0.26% of ESS data and 2.35% of EVS/WVS data. In light of the low proportion of observations affected, the impact of this censoring is assumed to be minimal.

Income

Data on perceived relative income was compiled from each dataset. EVS and ESS respondents were asked to identify which income decile their household belonged to on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 corresponding to being in their home country's bottom 10% of households with respect to net income, and 10 corresponding to being in the top 10%. EES respondents were asked to identify their family's standard of living on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 corresponding to a "poor family" and 7 corresponding to a "rich family."

There are two difficulties in reconciling the two measures described here. Firstly, the EES measure could conceivably relate to net annual expenditures rather than net income; secondly, the question of whether a family is "rich" is not explicitly linked to the average income of the respondents' home country, as the deciles utilized by the EVS/WVS and ESS are. However, because we can anticipate income and expenditures to be strongly correlated, and because respondents' expectations for what standard of living the term "rich" corresponds to can be anticipated to vary based on average national income, the error arising from these two difficulties is partially mitigated. Further mitigation of this error is not possible given available data.

To change the range of the EES question from 1-7 to 1-10, all income variable values in the EES were multiplied by the mean value of the income variable across the EVS/WVS and ESS datasets, divided by the prior mean of the EES income variable.

All income values were missing for Portugal's 2019 election. Estimated income values were imputed for each respondent using the following three-step process:

1. Data from Portugal's 2015 election, which included income values, were utilized to generate a linear model to predict income from regressors available in the data from Portugal's 2019 election. Income was regressed on employment status, gender, educational attainment, urban/rural status, former/current public worker status, age, and trust in the EU/European Parliament.
2. Coefficients for this linear regression were collected.
3. These coefficients were utilized to create a linear model to predict by-respondent income within data collected from Portugal's 2019 election.

Marital Status

All responses for which relevant data was available were coded with a binary variable *MarStat* indicating whether the respondent was currently married. The EES asked respondents whether they were *married or remarried*, *single living with a partner*, *single*, *divorced or separated*, or a *widow/er*. Individuals who selected *married or remarried* were coded as currently married. The ESS asked respondents whether they were *legally married*, *in a legally registered civil union*, *legally separated*,

legally divorced/civil union dissolved; widowed/civil partner died; or none of these; individuals who selected *legally married* were coded as currently married. The EVS/WVS asked respondents whether they were *married, living together as married, divorced, separated, widowed, or single/never married*; individuals who selected *married* were coded as currently married. For all three datasets, respondents who did not select from among the above options were given NA values for *MarStat*.

Public Worker Status (Current/Formers)

All responses for which relevant data was available were coded with a binary variable *PubWork* indicating whether the respondent was a public worker. The ESS asked respondents whether they worked or previously worked for *central or local government, other public sector, a state owned enterprise, a private firm, or were self-employed*; individuals who worked for *central or local government, other public sector, or a state owned enterprise* were coded as public workers. The EES asked all respondents who were retired, unemployed, or employed whether they worked or previously worked in *agriculture, state industry, private industry, public services, private services, or other*. Individuals who worked or previously worked in *state industry* or *public services* were coded as public workers. The EVS asked individuals whether they work or previously worked at a *public institution, a private business, or a private non-profit organization*. Individuals who worked or previously worked at a *public institution* were coded as public workers. For all three datasets, respondents who did not select from among the above options were given NA values for *PubWork*.

Trust in EU or European Parliament

Data on trust in the European Union or European Parliament was compiled from each dataset. ESS respondents were asked to rank their trust in the European Parliament on a scale from 0 to 10. EVS respondents were asked to rank their trust in the European Union on a scale from 1 to 4, with 1 referring to *a great deal*, 2 referring to *quite a lot*, 3 referring to *not very much*, and 4 referring to *none at all*. EES respondents were asked whether they trusted the European Parliament and chose from 5 answers, numbered 1-5, with 1 referring to *Yes, totally*, 2 referring to *Yes, somewhat*, 3 referring to *Neither trust nor distrust*, 4 referring to *No, not really*, and 5 referring to *No, not at all*. EVS and EES measures were flipped, so that trust increased, rather than decreased, with higher-numbered responses; all measures were then represented as individual levels of the continuous linear variable *EuroTrust*. To reconcile the three measures, each dataset's *EuroTrust* values were multiplied by 5 and divided by the prior mean of that dataset's *EuroTrust* values.

There are possible sources of error regarding this formulation. Some individuals' trust levels may vary between the European Union and European Parliament; although no dataset asked about both,

however, it seems reasonable to expect that trust levels between the European Union and its subsidiary institutions are highly correlated.

Respondents who did not indicate their level of trust in the European Parliament or, in the case of the EVS, level of trust in the European Union, were given NA values for *EuroTrust*.

Urban/Rural

All responses for which relevant data was available were coded with a binary variable indicating whether the respondent lived in an urban area. The EES gave respondents three choices, asking whether they lived in a *rural area*, a *small or medium town*, or a *large town*; all respondents who stated they lived in a *small or medium town* or a *large town* were coded as living in an urban area. The EVS/WVS coded respondents by the population of the municipality in which they lived, with five options: *less than 5,000*, *less than 20,000*, *less than 100,000*, *less than 500,000*, and *greater than or equal to 500,000*. All respondents who lived in a municipality with a population greater than 20,000 were coded as living in an urban area. The ESS gave respondents five choices, asking whether they lived in a *big city*, *suburbs*, a *small city*, a *country village*, or a *farm or home in the countryside*. All respondents who stated they lived in a *big city*, *suburbs*, or a *small city* were coded as living in an urban area.

There are possible sources of error innate in this approach. For one, there is a marked lack of granularity in the EES option. Further, regarding the EVS/WVS, the subset of municipalities with populations between 20,000 and 100,000 is quite large, and a reasonable definition of ‘urban’ could conceivably fall between the two. Finally, the definition of urbanization itself is slippery, and inevitably subjective; one individual might reasonably disagree with their neighbor over whether the municipality in which they live constitutes a *small or medium town* or a *rural area*, resulting in the unfortunate possibility that these two respondents in essentially identical living conditions might be coded differently on this question. The resultant uncertainty is potentially large but, given available data, appears irreducible.

Educational Attainment

All responses for which relevant data was available were coded with a multi-factor variable *Edu* indicating the highest educational attainment of the respondent. The ESS coded respondents by educational attainment on a seven-factor scale, with 1 corresponding to *less than lower secondary* (i.e., elementary school), 2 to *lower secondary* (similar to middle school), 3 to *lower tier upper secondary* (first half of high school), 4 to *upper tier upper secondary* (second half of high school), 5 to *advanced vocational, sub-degree* (i.e., an Associates’), 6 to *lower tertiary education, BA level*, and 7 to *higher tertiary education, >= MA level*. The EVS coded respondents by educational attainment on a nine-factor scale, with 0 corresponding to *less than primary*, 1 to *primary*, 2 to *lower secondary*, 3 to *upper*

secondary, 4 to *post-secondary non tertiary*, 5 to *short-cycle tertiary*, 6 to *Bachelor or equivalent*, 7 to *Master or equivalent*, and 8 to *Doctoral or equivalent*. The EES did not code respondents by educational attainment directly, but recorded whether respondents were still in school, and, if not, how old they were when they stopped full-time education.

To reconcile ESS and EVS measures, a six-factor scale was set up. ESS respondents who selected *less than lower secondary* and EVS respondents who selected *less than primary* or *primary* were given *Edu* values of 1. ESS and EVS respondents who selected *lower secondary* were given *Edu* values of 2. ESS respondents who selected *lower tier upper secondary* or *upper tier upper secondary* and EVS respondents who selected *upper secondary* were given *Edu* values of 3. ESS respondents who selected *advanced vocational, sub-degree* and EVS respondents who selected *post-secondary non-tertiary* and *short-cycle tertiary* were given *Edu* values of 4. ESS respondents who selected *lower tertiary education, BA level* and EVS respondents who selected *Bachelor of equivalent* were given *Edu* values of 5. ESS respondents who selected *higher tertiary education, >= MA level* and EVS respondents who selected *Master or equivalent* or *Doctoral or equivalent* were given *Edu* values of 6.

To reconcile EES age-of-stoppage data with the educational attainment data present in the EVS/WVS and ESS, age ranges were matched with specific educational attainment levels; i.e., individuals who left full-time education at 22 or 23 were assumed to have obtained Bachelors', while individuals who left at 8 were assumed not to have finished primary school, while those who left full-time education at 25 were presumed to have completed post-graduate education. Respondents who left school before the age of 13 were given *Edu* values of 1; those who left between 13 and 16 were given *Edu* values of 2; those who left between 17 and 19 were given *Edu* values of 3; those who left between 20 and 21 were given *Edu* values of 4; those who left between 22 and 24 were given *Edu* values of 5; and those who left at or above the age of 25 were given *Edu* values of 6. Finally, respondents who indicated that they were still in full-time schooling had *Edu* values imputed consistent with their age, as per the above schema.

As the correlation between age of stoppage and educational attainment is not perfect, there is innate error in this approach. Several attempts were made at predicting education levels utilizing other factors present in all datasets. However, after investigating correlations between these predicted *Edu* levels and other regressors, relative to actual *Edu* levels and those regressors, it became clear that the gap between other-factors-based *Edu* predictions and actual *Edu* data was far greater than that between age-of-stoppage-based *Edu* predictions and actual *Edu* data. Consequently, although some error is almost certainly present, it appears irreducible given available data.

Respondents who did not indicate educational attainment levels, or, in the case of EES, age of stoppage of full-time education, were given NA values for *Edu*.

Employment Status

All responses for which relevant data was available were coded with a binary variable *Empl* indicating whether the respondent was employed—specifically, employed full-time or self-employed. EVS respondents were asked to denote whether they were *full time (30h a week or more)*, *part time*, *self employed*, *retired/pensioned*, *a housewife*, *a student*, *unemployed*, or had some *other* employment status. Respondents who were *full time* or *self employed* were coded as employed. ESS respondents were asked whether, over the past seven days, the main activity they were engaged in was *paid work*, *education*, *unemployed (looking for job)*, *unemployed (not looking for job)*, *permanently sick or disabled*, *retired*, *undergoing community or military service*, *looking after children/housework/others*, or engaged in some *other* activity. Respondents engaged in *paid work* were coded as employed. EES respondents were asked their current work situation, and asked to describe themselves as *self-employed*, *employed*, *in school*, *working in the household*, *retired*, *unemployed*, or *other*. Respondents who described themselves as *self-employed* or *employed* were coded as employed.

One potential source of error here comes from part-time work; if some individuals with part-time employment surveyed in the EES nonetheless identify as employed, there is a mismatch in how employment is defined across datasets. However, as many other part-time workers would not identify as employed, the lack of granularity in the EES option set means this error is probably irreducible given available data.

Union Membership

All responses for which relevant data was available were coded with a binary variable *Union* indicating whether the respondent held current union membership. For all three datasets, respondents who did not indicate whether or not they were union members were given NA values for *Union*.

By-Factor Coverage

Variable	Description	Coverages			
		EVS	ESS	EES	Overall
<i>Gender</i>	Gender	1	1	1	1
<i>Age</i>	Age	0.996	0.997	1	0.997

<i>Income</i>	Income	0.890	0.867	0.989	0.910
<i>MarStat</i>	Marital status	0.996	0.986	1	0.993
<i>PubWork</i>	Current/former public worker status	0.754	1	0.884	0.871
<i>EuroTrust</i>	Trust in EU or European Parliament	0.963	0.946	0.980	0.962
<i>Urban</i>	Urban area residency	1	0.999	1	1
<i>Edu</i>	Educational attainment	0.993	0.996	0.973	0.989
<i>Empl</i>	Employment status	0.994	0.998	1	0.997
<i>Union</i>	Union membership	1	0.996	1	0.999

By-Factor Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Description	Overall mean	Mean of national means	SD of national means
<i>Gender</i>	Proportion female	0.4765	0.4723	0.0481
<i>Age</i>	Age	51.63	51.02	2.50
<i>Income</i>	Income	5.349	5.193	0.631
<i>MarStat</i>	Marital status	0.5296	0.5501	0.0744
<i>PubWork</i>	Current/former public worker status	0.3490	0.3635	0.0919
<i>EuroTrust</i>	Trust in EU or European Parliament	5.002	5.082	0.462
<i>Urban</i>	Urban area residency	0.5672	0.5791	0.1531

<i>Edu</i>	Educational attainment (if repr. numerically)	3.728	3.657	0.364
<i>Empl</i>	Employment status	0.5059	0.4978	0.0818
<i>Union</i>	Union membership	0.1856	0.1633	0.1617

Population Data

For all 39 surveyed countries, national population data was taken from World Bank Open Data. Each country was then imputed with a variable *Population* expressing that nation's population in thousands. To permit population weighting for the overall multinomial regression, all responses were coded with a *popweight* variable produced by dividing the *Population* value of the respondent's country by the number of responses from the respondent's country. All *popweight* variables were then divided by the prior mean of *popweight*.

Filtering of campaign-season data

In some cases, an election occurred while data was being collected; i.e., an election happened while a single organization (the EVS, ESS, or EES) was calling voters. Because campaigns from an upcoming election will influence voter choice, and are in fact designed to, political manifesto and electoral data from the previous election cannot be used to explain party choice in data collected close to an upcoming election. To ensure data was not collected arbitrarily close to an upcoming election, when an election occurred while data from a given source was being collected, all data collected in that country from that source was filtered out if it was collected prior to that election. This filter affected all three datasets and resulted in the exclusion of 3.6% of the data.

Party Category Data

Guidelines for party categorizations

Across all three datasets, respondents were asked what political party they supported. ESS and EES respondents, as well as EVS respondents from Greece and Cyprus, were asked what party they voted for in the most recent national election, while EVS respondents, excluding those from Greece and Cyprus, were asked which political party appealed to them the most.

All political parties that at least one respondent selected were sorted into six categories: *Social Democratic*, *Center-Right*, *Liberal/Green*, *Far-Right*, *Other/Non-Ideological*, and *Communist/Hard Left*.

Where in-depth information was available, the sorting of parties took into account numerous sources of information about each party. These sources of information include references to their ideological position (i.e., articles or papers that describe parties as ‘center-left,’ ‘center-right,’ ‘far-right,’ ‘environmentalist,’ etc.) information about their affiliation with EU-wide and international multiparty groups (i.e., the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, the Greens-European Free Alliance, the Socialist International, etc.) and internal statements, public statements, or interviews with prominent party politicians that hint at party ideology (i.e., a promise for a strong welfare state and economic redistribution, which may lead to a small party being classed as *Social Democratic*.)

Many political parties had traits associated with multiple categories, making the project of party sorting innately holistic. However, traits I chose to associate with distinct party categories are listed below. Citations from all sources utilized to generate party categorizations are included in Appendix 1.

Parties labeled *Social Democratic* often self-identified as social-democratic and were referred to in the literature or by national news sources as social-democratic, center-left, or left-wing. They were often members of center-left international organizations such as the Socialist International (Lansford et al 2021, 182,) and, within the EU, were often members of the S&D parliamentary group within the European Parliament (Lansford et al 2021, 1941.) They often supported redistributive economic policy, increased worker protections, and progressive social policy, and were often in favor of welfare state expansion. Few were strongly opposed to immigration, although stances varied.

Parties labeled *Center-Right* often self-identified as right-of-center, conservative, or Christian Democratic and were referred to in the literature or by national news sources as center-right, center to center-right, conservative, or right-wing. They were often members of conservative or Christian Democratic international organizations such as the Centrist Democrat International (CDI site,) and, within the EU, were often members of the EPP parliamentary group within the European Parliament (Lansford et al 2021, 1941.) They often were conservative on matters of social policy and favored reductions in social spending. Some were opposed to immigration, though typically less so than far-right parties.

Parties labeled *Liberal/Green* included Green parties, Pirate parties, centrist parties, and liberal parties, making *Liberal/Green* the most diverse party category. Parties that were identified by the literature or national news sources as liberal and not referred to as center-right, liberal-conservative, or otherwise right of center were labeled as *Liberal/Green*. These parties were often members of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats in Europe/ Renew Europe parliamentary group within the European Parliament (Lansford et al 2021, 1941,) and often favored welfare state reform and shrinkage, as well as libertarian social policy. Green parties were typically strongly pro-environmentalist, often self-identified as Green parties, were often members of the Greens-EFA parliamentary group within the European Parliament (Lansford et al 2021, 1942,) and, though exceptions existed, frequently held left-of-center views on both

social and fiscal policy even beyond environmentalism. Pirate parties, which seem to often favor strong reforms to the government system that include libertarian policy and more opportunities for direct democracy (Lansford et al 2021,) were labeled as *Liberal/Green* as well. Parties referred to as centrist in the literature or by national news sources were referred to as *Liberal/Green* as well; no parliamentary group specifically caters to centrist parties, so many were split across the EPP, ALDE, and S&D blocs (Lansford et al, 2021.) These four types of parties present in the *Liberal/Green* category share few similarities on fiscal policy, but all have a typically centrist or left-of-center approach to social policy.

Parties labeled *Far Right* rarely self-identified as such, but many were described within the literature or by national news sources as far-right, hard-right, or nationalist right-wing. They were often Eurosceptic and, within the EU, were often members of the ECR or ID parliamentary group within the European Parliament (Lansford et al, 1942.) Often, fiscal policy varied, but social policy was frequently very right-wing, and hostility toward immigration was common. In addition, far-right parties were often more populist in tone than center-right parties, and more likely to express hostility towards the current political system.

Parties labeled *Other/Non-Ideological* were not structured around ideologies that fit comfortably onto a left-right scale. These included obscure single-issue parties, animal-rights parties, parties that represented national minorities and had few policy priorities save for funneling investments and resources toward those communities, and parties that were purely populist and lacked consistent ideological traits. It also included a small number of conspiracy-theorist parties, although parties of this kind that funneled conspiracy theories toward policy associated with far-right parties were labeled *Far Right*. The *Other/Non-Ideological* label was also utilized, in three cases, when no documentation could be found for an extremely minor party.

Parties labeled *Communist/Hard Left* often self-identified as Communist, anti-capitalist, or leftist, and were often referred to as Communist or far-left in the literature and by national news sources. These parties often expressed opposition to capitalism and were frequently members of international Communist organizations. Fiscal policy was typically far-left, favoring nationalization of large corporations and sharp increases in social spending. Social policy was often left-wing as well, although frequently less focal than fiscal policy. These parties were frequently strongly opposed to their nation's political and corporate system.


Parties By Party Category

A table of nations and parties included in the analysis, alongside the total vote shares of each party category in each nation, is included in Appendix D.

Party Categories By Nation

Included below is a chart of what percentage of those surveyed in each country expressed support for each party category listed. For most nations, social-democratic and center-right parties have substantial shares of the vote, with high variance in terms of far-right and liberal/green support shares. With the exception of Italy for the former and Cyprus for the latter, other/non-ideological and Communist parties rarely are among the largest party categories in any given nation. Because center-right parties have significant voting shares in every nation surveyed, the composition of each country's center-right voting bloc will be used as the baseline for multinomial regressions.

Party Category Vote Shares by Nation



Social-Democratic Party Ideological Data

The Manifesto Project Dataset, maintained by Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR), is an open-source dataset that measures the proportion of statements, referred to internally as *quasi-sentences*, in various parties' political manifestos that refer to given issues. The result is a dataset that, for a given party and a given election, tracks relative emphases of distinct issues in that party's manifesto. Where available, Manifesto Project data has been collected for the largest social-democratic party or electoral coalition in each nation, for each election measured within the nation. The resultant variables are utilized as instruments for the emphasis each social-democratic party or electoral coalition places on the issues each of the variables correspond to.

Data was collected for every election except for three: the 2019 parliamentary election in Ukraine, the 2017 parliamentary election in Albania, and the 2017 parliamentary election in Malta. No Manifesto Project data was available for these elections or for other recent national elections held in those nations.

For four other elections, no Manifesto Project data was available, but data was available for the prior election. All citations for party categorization for all social-democratic parties for which Manifesto Project data was collected are included in Appendix A; for each electoral cycle, the "largest" social-democratic party was the one who ultimately won the most seats in that election, as per electoral data from the Europe Elects database.

- For the 2017 parliamentary election in Armenia, no Manifesto Project data was available, but data for the 2012 parliamentary election was available and values generated from the 2012 political manifesto of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, then the largest social-democratic party in Armenia, were utilized instead.
- For the 2019 parliamentary election in Greece, no Manifesto Project data was available; however, Manifesto Project data for the 2015 parliamentary election was available and values generated from the 2015 political manifesto of Syriza, the largest social-democratic party in Greece in both the 2015 and 2019 elections, were utilized instead.
- For the 2018 parliamentary election in Luxembourg, no Manifesto Project data was available, but data for the 2013 parliamentary election was available and values generated from the 2013 political manifesto of the Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party, the largest social-democratic party in Luxembourg in both the 2013 and 2018 elections, were utilized instead.
- For the 2015 parliamentary election in Poland, no Manifesto Project data was available, but data for the 2011 parliamentary election was available and values generated from the 2011 political

manifesto of the Democratic Left Alliance, the largest social-democratic party in Poland, were utilized instead.

Except for the three elections listed above where data was unavailable, the following six variables were collected for each election:

- *EUPos*, the proportion of the manifesto consisting of favorable references to the European Union or European Community.
- *EnviPos*, the proportion of the manifesto consisting of expressions of support for environmental protection, preservation initiatives, green policy, and measures to reduce climate change.
- *WelfPos*, the proportion of the manifesto consisting of expressions of support for welfare state expansion.
- *ImmigPos*, the proportion of the manifesto consisting of favorable references to immigration and immigrants.
- *MCPPos*, the proportion of the manifesto consisting of favorable references to the middle class.
- *LaborPos*, the proportion of the manifesto consisting of favorable references to labor unions, unemployed workers, and the working class.

A table of which social-democratic party Manifesto Project data was collected for, by country and election, is included in Appendix E.

Disproportionality and Fragmentation Data

For each election included within the dataset, where such metrics were possible to calculate, information was collected on the extent to which the allocation of parliamentary seats across parties was disproportionate compared to the popular vote in the prior election, and the effective number of electoral parties, a measure of electoral fragmentation where a smaller number indicates an electoral system where more seats go to the largest handful of parties- i.e., with less fragmentation.

Disproportionality Data

Voters are unaware of the disproportionality of an election as they vote in it, as parliamentary seats are allocated only after the votes are cast. However, the results of the previous election *are* available; I hypothesize that signals about how disproportionate an election is likely to be, and, consequently, the extent to which a voter can increase the power of their vote by voting for a larger party, are sent by the

disproportionality of the election immediately previous. As such, data on the previous election's disproportionality was collected for each election, where possible.

To estimate disproportionality, I use the Gallagher Least-Squares Index (Gallagher 1991,) which is calculated using the following formula:

$$LSq = \sqrt{0.5 \sum_{i=1}^n (V_i - S_i)^2}; \quad V_i = \% \text{ votes for party } i; \quad S_i = \% \text{ seats for party } i$$

The range of the Gallagher Least-Squares Index is from 0 to 100, with 0 indicating complete proportionality and 100 indicating complete disproportionality (i.e., all parties that received votes received no seats, and vice versa.)

For elections where the previous election had a high share of independent candidates, the Gallagher Least-Squares Index of that previous election is not a one-to-one comparison, as independent candidacies are difficult to incorporate into the Gallagher equation. This, however, only affected Ukraine; the only election in which data was collected was the 2019 election, so the Gallagher Least-Squares Index would have been calculated for the 2014 election. However, independent candidates were such a large presence that a meaningful Gallagher Least-Squares Index calculation was impossible.

For each election, Gallagher Least-Squares Index values for the previous election were taken from calculations performed by Michael Gallagher, the developer of the original index.

Fragmentation Data

I hypothesize that polling data gives voters insight into which parties are likely to win substantial representation in an upcoming parliamentary election, while the signal polling data gives for likely disproportionality is much more indirect. As such, data on fragmentation was collected for each election.

To estimate consolidation, I use the Effective Number of Electoral Parties Index (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979,) which is calculated using the following formula:

$$ENEP = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^n p_i^2}, \quad p_i = \text{share of seats won by party } i, \quad n = \text{number of parties that won at least one seat}$$

The range of the ENEP index is from 1 to the number of seats in the parliament, with 1 indicating that one party won every single seat (i.e., no fragmentation) and an ENEP equal to the number of seats in the parliament indicating that no party won more than one seat (i.e., total fragmentation.)

For each election, Effective Number of Electoral Parties values for that election were taken from calculations performed by Michael Gallagher.

Largest Right-Wing Party Ideology

In order to study potential shifts in electoral dynamics that occur when a far-right party becomes the most powerful party on the right wing, every election was imputed with a binary variable *BigRPFR* measuring whether the largest right-wing party (i.e., the party that, between parties labeled *Center-Right* or *Far Right*, had won the most parliamentary seats in the previous election) was far-right (i.e., labeled *Far Right*.) Past election results from a database hosted by Europe Elects were used to determine which right-wing party had won the most seats at the previous election.

Methodology

After augmentation from the other data sources listed, filtering of responses that were close to upcoming national elections, and restrictions to the 39 countries and 49 elections for which party category data was collected, EVS, EES and ESS data were combined into a single merged dataset.

Overall Multinomial Regression

To assist with population weighting, each response was assigned a weight *popweight*, equivalent to the respondent's home nation's population variable *Population* divided by the number of responses in the dataset from the respondent's home nation. This ensured that each nation's total value of *popweight* was proportional to its population. All *popweight* values were then divided by the prior mean of *popweight* across the dataset in order to fix the *popweight* mean at 1.

Because the quality of fit of multinomial regressions often decreases when levels that correspond to a relatively small number of observations are added to the dependent variable (Cataife 2011,) respondents that supported smaller party categories were filtered out from the dataset used for the overall multinomial regression. This filter removed all party categories that were supported by fewer than 5% of respondents, weighted by population; this removed all respondents that supported parties coded as *Communist/Hard Left* or *Other/Non-Ideological*. This resulted in four remaining party categories: *Social Democratic*, *Center-Right*, *Liberal/Green*, and *Far Right*.

A multinomial regression was run on the post-filter merged dataset, utilizing *popweight* values as weights and party categories as levels. *Center-Right* was designated as the reference level. Party category was regressed on *Union*, *Gender*, *PubWork*, *Edu*, *Empl*, *MarStat*, *Urban*, *Income*, *EuroTrust*, *Age*, Gallagher Least Squares Index from the previous election, and effective number of elective parties from the relevant election, as well as national dummy variables.

The equations being fit are of the below form, with π_{ij} corresponding to the probability that a respondent i supports a party of party-category j (i.e., $\pi_{25, \text{Social-Democratic}}$ is the probability that respondent 25 supports a party coded *Social-Democratic*), and π_{ij} denoting the probability that respondent i supports a party of the reference level, that is, a party coded *Center-Right*. X_i and β_j denote, respectively, the values respondent i holds for each regressor (i.e., if the regressors of interest are *Union*, *PubWork*, and *Urban*, a rural public employee that is not a union-member would have an X_i vector of [0,1,0],) and the coefficient estimates for each regressor regarding the impact of their changes on the likelihood of a vote for a party of category j . In this case, the vector X_i includes respondent values for *Union*, *Gender*, *PubWork*, *Edu*, *Empl*, *MarStat*, *Urban*, *Income*, *EuroTrust*, *Age*, Gallagher Least Squares Index from the previous election, and effective number of elective parties from the relevant election, as well as national dummy variables, and the vector β_j includes coefficient estimates for each of those regressors, respectively.

$$\log_e \left[\frac{\pi_{ij}}{\pi_{ij}} \right] = X_i' \beta_{jj} \quad j = 1, 2 \dots J - 1$$

Removing the reference level and directly solving for the probability that a respondent supports a party of category j ; that is, π_{ij} :

$$\pi_{ij} = \frac{\exp(X_i' \beta_j)}{1 + \sum_{k=1}^{J-1} \exp(X_i' \beta_k)}, \quad j = 1, 2 \dots J - 1$$

Note that this value, denoting a probability, is bounded by 0 and 1. Sources for the form of the multinomial logistic regression were obtained from Sakaya Barasa and Muchwanju, 2015.

Education, Age, Employment, and Gender Interaction Specification

The overall multinomial regression was rerun, with *Gender*, *Edu*, *Empl*, and *Age* removed from the dataset and replaced with all interactions of the following four factor variables:

- *GenderFac*, with two levels: male or non-male.
- *AgeFac*, with three levels: below prime-age (<25,) prime-age (25-54,) or above prime-age (>54).
- *EduFac*, with two levels: holds a Bachelor's degree or equivalent, or does not hold a Bachelor's degree or equivalent.
- *EmplFac*, identical to *Empl*, with two levels: currently employed full-time or self-employed, and not employed full-time or self-employed.

To avoid multicollinearity, no interaction variable was generated for non-male respondents below prime age who do not hold a Bachelor's degree and are not employed. Consequently, 23 interaction variables were generated. All other regressors were unchanged, as was the general form of the equation.

By-Election Regression

The merged dataset was separated into 49 subsets, representing 39 countries, based on the most recent parliamentary election in the respondent's home nation at the time that each respondent was interviewed. For each election, the following variables were calculated:

- *UnionPrem*, the percentage of union-member respondents who supported a party coded *Social-Democratic*, minus the percentage of all respondents who supported such a party.
- *PubPrem*, the percentage of public-worker respondents who supported a party coded *Social-Democratic*, minus the percentage of all respondents who supported such a party.
- *UrbPrem*, the percentage of urban-dweller respondents who supported a party coded *Social-Democratic*, minus the percentage of all respondents who supported such a party.
- *IncomeAvg*, the average self-reported income decile of respondents who supported a party coded *Social-Democratic*.
- *EuroPrem*, the average value of *EuroTrust*, a variable corresponding to self-reported trust in the European Parliament or European Union, among respondents who supported a party coded *Social-Democratic*, minus the average value of *EuroTrust* across all respondents.

A new dataset was produced that recorded Manifesto Project variables, the binary variable *BigRPFR* indicating whether the largest right-wing party was far-right, the five variables *UnionPrem*, *PubPrem*, *UrbPrem*, *IncomeAvg*, and *EuroPrem* mentioned above, and the share of the electorate that had supported parties coded *Communist/Hard Left* for each election in the dataset. Each election was assigned a weight *Popval* equivalent to the population of the nation in which the election occurred, divided by the number of elections in the dataset that occurred in that nation.

Five linear regressions were subsequently performed on the new dataset, regressing *UnionPrem*, *PubPrem*, *UrbPrem*, *IncomeAvg*, and *EuroPrem*, respectively, on *BigRPFR*, Communist vote share, and Manifesto Project variables *EUPos*, *LaborPos*, *EnviPos*, *ImmigPos*, *WelfPos*, and *MCPPos*.

Each equation was of the form $(X^T W X)^{-1} X^T W y$, with W corresponding to the vector of population and electoral-frequency weights *Popval*, $\hat{\beta}$ corresponding to the vector of coefficient estimates for each regressor, and X corresponding to the matrix of values of each regressor for each respondent. For

each equation, y stood in alternately for the vector of by-election values for *UnionPrem*, *PubPrem*, *UrbPrem*, *IncomeAvg*, and *EuroPrem*.

Results

Overall Multinomial Regression

Below are the results from the overall multinomial regression; effect sizes for each variable are followed by the p-value in parentheses, with the p-value stated to the hundred-thousandth; p-values of less than one two-hundred-thousandth are listed as 0. Because of the number of variables, the table is split into multiple sections, but all sections correspond to a single regression. *Center-Right* is the designated reference level and therefore omitted.

For the multifactor variables *Edu*, *Gender*, and *Nation*, the reference values are, respectively, 1 (meaning that the respondent did not complete secondary education,) and 1 (meaning that the respondent is male,) and ‘Albania’ (meaning that the respondent, of course, is from Albania.) National dummy variables are omitted due to length; however, a table of results that includes national dummy variables is included in Appendix B.

Correlations significant at the $p < 0.05$ level are in bold.

Party Category	Intercept	<i>Union</i>	<i>Gender</i> (F)	<i>Gender</i> (NB)	<i>PubWork</i>
Liberal/Green	-5.4210670 (0)	0.2232688 (0)	0.05355516 (0.0521)	0.2244286 (0.28007)	0.10911931 (0.0003)
Far Right	-6.1942436 (0)	0.2338908 (0)	-0.24581837 (0)	-1.3605688 (0)	0.01759812 (0.61742)
Social Democratic	0.3406399 (0.2561)	0.5861805 (0)	-0.01859502 (0.41201)	0.3071535 (0.70860)	0.32313828 (0)

Party Category	<i>Empl</i>	<i>MarStat</i>	<i>Urban</i>	<i>Income</i>
Liberal/Green	-0.14848125 (0.0001)	-0.15298451 (0)	0.1046620 (0.0025)	-0.003908214 (0.53230)
Far Right	0.01917683 (0.61487)	0.00664149 (0.84068)	0.0171243 (0.59139)	-0.087283475 (0)
Social Democratic	-0.18195500 (0)	-0.02681206 (0.26938)	0.1108190 (0)	-0.089544768 (0)

Party Category	<i>EuroTrust</i>	<i>Age</i>	Previous Election Least-Squares	ENEP
Liberal/Green	0.08410798 (0)	-0.01500760 (0)	0.1190520 (0.0064)	0.21104285 (0.0013)
Far Right	-0.3108273 (0)	-0.02517592 (0)	0.1612342 (0)	1.17427411 (0)
Social Democratic	0.04849730 (0)	-0.01169078 (0)	0.1258217 (0.0049)	-0.04118521 (0.33984)

Party Category	<i>Edu2</i>	<i>Edu3</i>	<i>Edu4</i>	<i>Edu5</i>	<i>Edu6</i>
Liberal/Green	-0.005674326 (0.94719)	0.15847060 (0.0370)	0.42551920 (0)	0.5023162 (0)	0.715635881 (0)
Far Right	-0.014814310 (0.84327)	-0.18954164 (0.0070)	-0.31447446 (0.0008)	-0.6275364 (0)	-0.521691290 (0)
Social Democratic	-0.032499079 (0.54217)	-0.02219617 (0.65160)	-0.06894939 (0.20853)	-0.1336888 (0.01384)	-0.006643339 (0.90293)

Regarding social-democratic parties, there are statistically significant positive correlations between likelihood of social-democratic support and a number of factors, including union membership, public-worker status, living in an urban area, and having a high degree of trust in European political institutions. There are statistically significant negative correlations between likelihood of social-democratic support and employment status, income, and age. Unlike in the United States, there is no statistically significant correlation between likelihood of social-democratic support and marital status. (There is, however, a statistically significant negative correlation between likelihood of liberal/green support and marital status.)

There are also interesting correlations involving the disproportionality and fragmentation data; there is a significant positive correlation between electoral disproportionality and likelihood of social-democratic support. In addition, while electoral fragmentation is not statistically significant with likelihood of social-democratic support, the setting of *Center-Right* as the reference level means that this only indicates that electoral fragmentation does not increase social-democratic vote likelihood by more than it increases center-right vote likelihood; the significant positive correlation between liberal/green and far-right vote likelihood and electoral fragmentation indicates that nations with fewer effective electoral parties tend to see lower vote shares for both party categories, and, conversely, higher vote shares for both social-democratic and center-right parties.

Education, Age, Employment, and Gender Interaction Specification

Below are the results for the interaction specification of the overall multinomial regression. Effect sizes for each variable are followed by the p-value in parentheses, with the p-value stated to the ten-thousandth; p-values of less than one twenty-thousandth are listed as 0. *Center-Right* is the designated reference level and therefore omitted. As shown, outside of age, gender, education, and employment, no statistically significant correlations lost significance or changed direction. However, a statistically significant negative correlation between marital status and social-democratic vote likelihood developed. Values for national dummy variables are omitted due to length. To prevent multicollinearity, the interaction variable corresponding to unemployed below-prime-age non-males without bachelor degrees is omitted.

Party Category	Intercept	<i>Union</i>	<i>PubWork</i>	<i>Urban</i>	<i>Income</i>
Liberal/Green	-5.19041752 (0)	0.2111930 (0)	0.1415680 (0)	0.12182559 (0)	0.009566626 (0.1197)
Far Right	-7.03405036 (0)	0.2266393 (0)	-0.0280227 (0.4227)	-0.02905882 (0.3574)	-0.098908698 (0)
Social Democratic	0.06711874 (0.8330)	0.5787975 (0)	0.3010634 (0)	0.10438707 (0)	-0.092033108 (0)

Party Category	<i>EuroTrust</i>	Previous Election Least-Squares	ENEP	<i>MarStat</i>
Liberal/Green	0.08911143 (0)	0.1209520 (0.0013)	0.23200319 (0.0058)	-0.17419908 (0)
Far Right	-0.31233010 (0)	0.1594586 (0)	1.13967090 (0)	-0.04435960 (0.1810)
Social Democratic	0.04916200 (0)	0.1267946 (0.0005)	-0.04644808 (0.3692)	-0.05888107 (0.0161)

Party Category	Unemployed non-college below-prime-age male	Unemployed non-college prime-age male	Unemployed non-college prime-age non-male	Unemployed non-college above-prime-age male

Liberal/Green	-0.20004110 (0.2816)	-0.8450194 (0)	-0.8932104 (0)	-1.3462969 (0)
Far Right	0.43816742 (0.0718)	0.1852253 (0.3691)	0.1722090 (0.3783)	-0.5257471 (0.0053)
Social Democratic	-0.06177837 (0.7211)	-0.1828194 (0.1993)	-0.1692046 (0.1981)	-0.4215101 (0.0008)

Party Category	Unemployed non-college above-prime-age non-male	Unemployed college-graduate below-prime-age male	Unemployed college-graduate below-prime-age non-male	Unemployed college-graduate prime-age male
Liberal/Green	-1.3598037 (0)	-1.4058170 (0.2315)	-2.0723411 (0.0108)	-0.2080927 (0.3790)
Far Right	-0.7291695 (0.0001)	-3.7484858 (0)	-2.6193411 (0.3040)	-0.3565311 (0.2646)
Social Democratic	-0.5749298 (0)	0.2758769 (0.6415)	-0.7731075 (0.1837)	-0.2224178 (0.3011)

Party Category	Unemployed college-graduate prime-age non-male	Unemployed college-graduate above-prime-age male	Unemployed college-graduate above-prime-age non-male	Employed non-college below-prime-age male
Liberal/Green	-0.005504898 (0.9754)	-0.9520958 (0)	-0.9287000 (0)	-0.8075348 (0)
Far Right	0.133598477 (0.5938)	-0.5375020 (0.0177)	-0.8965047 (0.0001)	0.7169153 (0.0009)
Social Democratic	-0.071235789 (0.6785)	-0.3566868 (0.0122)	-0.3257065 (0.0253)	-0.1324307 (0.3967)

Party Category	Employed non-college below-prime-age non-male	Employed non-college prime-age male	Employed non-college prime-age non-male	Employed non-college above-prime-age male
Liberal/Green	-0.96362837 (0)	-1.0347271 (0)	-0.97333152 (0)	-1.2287596 (0)

Far Right	-0.07883768 (0.7369)	0.2122743 (0.2569)	-0.05192139 (0.7828)	-0.1939770 (0.3184)
Social Democratic	-0.49791183 (0.0022)	-0.3734435 (0.0029)	-0.33524351 (0.0077)	-0.4871903 (0.0002)

Party Category	Employed non-college above-prime-age non-male	Employed college-graduate below-prime-age male	Employed college-graduate below-prime-age non-male	Employed college-graduate prime-age male
Liberal/Green	-1.0052975 (0)	0.3126682 (0.6642)	-2.2297491 (0.0182)	-0.6363174 (0)
Far Right	-0.6311049 (0.0015)	-4.0932674 (0)	-0.4881724 (0.5694)	-0.1748475 (0.3728)
Social Democratic	-0.5435070 (0)	1.1278354 (0.0986)	-0.3365447 (0.5942)	-0.4955520 (0.0002)

Party Category	Employed college-graduate prime-age non-male	Employed college-graduate above-prime-age male	Employed college-graduate above-prime-age non-male
Liberal/Green	-0.5923540 (0)	-0.9020256 (0)	-0.4460867 (0.0103)
Far Right	-0.3866698 (0.0542)	-0.3088612 (0.1665)	-0.7343129 (0.0050)
Social Democratic	-0.1458685 (0.2759)	-0.6576327 (0)	-0.4060485 (0.0130)

Because the decision on which interaction variable to admit has a powerful influence on what appears significant, the differences in effect size across groups has more relevance than the absolute effect size estimates. Focusing on the differences in effect size, a few intriguing trends become apparent that were not perceptible in the overall multinomial regression before interaction specifications were added.

The first is a difference across genders in the behavior of below-prime-age males and non-males. In all cases, across all divides, movement from prime-age to above-prime-age decreased the likelihood of a social-democratic vote (that is, unemployed degree-holding males of prime age were more likely than those above prime age, and so on for all possible gender, employment, and educational divides.) The movement from below prime age to prime age was much different. Among males, across all educational

and employment divides, those below prime age had a higher likelihood of voting for a social-democratic party than those of prime age; among non-males, the precise opposite occurred, with those below prime age less likely to vote for a social-democratic party than those of prime age.

Below-prime-age college graduates also appear to ‘break the rule’ regarding employment and voter choice. In all cases except three, employment decreases the likelihood of a social-democratic vote; except in the case of non-college-graduate non-males above prime age, where employment appears to slightly reduce the likelihood of a social-democratic vote, employment generally decreases social-democratic vote likelihood across age, education, and gender. However, in the case of below-prime-age college graduates of both genders, the trend reverses; employment actually substantially increases the likelihood of a social-democratic vote.

The effects of education also seem to vary based on age and gender. Across gender and employment, a bachelor’s degree appears to increase the likelihood of a social-democratic vote for below-prime-age individuals. The outlook is mixed for above-prime-age individuals; a bachelor’s degree appears to increase the likelihood of a social-democratic vote for unemployed above-prime-age individuals and employed above-prime-age non-males, but decreases it for employed above-prime-age males. For prime-age individuals, a neat gender divide appears: bachelor’s degrees increase the likelihood of a social-democratic vote for prime-age non-males and decrease it for prime-age males, irrespective of employment status.

By-Election Regression

Below are the results from all five linear regressions performed on the dataset generated from the by-election regression; effect sizes for each variable are followed by the p-value in parentheses, with the p-value stated to the ten-thousandth where available.

Some correlations that were significant at the $p < 0.05$ level when elections were weighted by population and frequency were not significant at the $p < 0.05$ level when all elections were weighted equally; these correlations are italicized. Correlations significant at the $p < 0.05$ level for both the population-weighting and equal-weighting systems are bolded.

	<i>UnionPrem</i>	<i>PubPrem</i>	<i>UrbPrem</i>	<i>IncomeAvg</i>	<i>EuroPrem</i>
Intercept	0.0101805 (0.8228)	0.0364386 (0.0545)	-0.0149617 (0.3302)	4.667872 (0)	-0.197506 (0.2882)
<i>BigRPFR</i>	-0.0137999 (0.7262)	-0.0132830 (0.4089)	0.0140513 (0.2916)	0.440508 (0.0554)	<i>0.516053 (0.0024)</i>

<i>EUPos</i>	0.0281563 (0.0006)	-0.0001054 (0.9727)	0.0023523 (0.3578)	0.057865 (0.1851)	0.097415 (0.0029)
<i>EnviPos</i>	-0.0006786 (0.9085)	0.0037974 (0.1195)	0.0012327 (0.5351)	0.022698 (0.5010)	0.038313 (0.1158)
<i>LaborPos</i>	-0.0025250 (0.5838)	0.0028457 (0.1340)	0.0003531 (0.8193)	0.029583 (0.2631)	0.002065 (0.9120)
<i>WelfPos</i>	0.0009797 (0.7296)	-0.0013875 (0.2326)	0.0002799 (0.7686)	-0.015846 (0.3291)	0.004444 (0.6994)
<i>ImmigPos</i>	0.0761187 (0.0057)	-0.0240540 (0.0286)	0.0266313 (0.0042)	0.500617 (0.0017)	0.003284 (0.9753)
<i>MCPPos</i>	-0.0380199 (0.0214)	0.0144905 (0.0304)	-0.0080996 (0.1363)	-0.096670 (0.2910)	-0.075554 (0.2476)
<i>Comm</i>	-0.1207240 (0.0007)	-0.0074543 (0.5786)	-0.0160194 (0.1531)	0.006742 (0.9713)	-0.191534 (0.1576)

We utilize *UnionPrem* as a measure of disproportionate union-member support for social-democratic parties, *PubPrem* and *UrbPrem* as the same for public workers and urban-dwellers, *EuroPrem* as a measure of support for social-democratic parties among individuals with high degrees of trust in the EU or European Parliament, and *IncomeAvg* as a measure of the relative wealth of the social-democratic party base. Correlations shown here can be interpreted as linkages between social-democratic party platform emphases and the composition of the social-democratic voter base.

Using this formulation, and discarding relationships that failed equal-weighting robustness checks, we find the following statistically significant relationships:

- The extent of union-member support for social-democratic parties is positively correlated with the extent to which social-democratic parties talk about the EU, and negatively correlated with the extent to which they talk about the middle class. It is also negatively correlated with the share of the national vote that went to Communist or hard-left parties.
- The extent of urban support for social-democratic parties is positively correlated with the extent to which social-democratic parties talk about immigration.
- The trust gap between social-democrats and the electorate with respect to the EU or European Parliament is positively correlated with the extent to which social-democratic parties talk about European integration.

Robustness Checks

To ensure that the behavior of regressors was relatively uniform across the three datasets (EVS, EES, and ESS) surveyed, the overall multinomial regression was rerun three times on data consisting only of the EVS, ESS, and EES, respectively. All significant relationships remain significant, and no new relationships become significant, with two exceptions: in the ESS, if surveyed alone, there is no statistically significant correlation between disproportionality and likelihood of social-democratic support, and, if surveyed alone, every dataset shows a significant negative trend between the effective number of electoral parties and the likelihood of social-democratic support.

A straightforward logit regression of a social-democratic party vote upon all regressors included in the overall multinomial regression was also run. No relationships lost or gained significance, except for disproportionality, which lost significance, and ENEP, which gained significance; in both these cases, this is likely attributable to the setting of *Center-Right* as the reference level in the overall multinomial regression. As mentioned, it appears that electoral consolidation benefits both social-democratic and center-right parties to an about equal extent, meaning that a multinomial regression where *Center-Right* is the reference level will show little effect from consolidation but that a simple logit regression will show a quite large one. Interpretation for disproportionality is more difficult; it appears that center-right parties are simply less able to gain from disproportionate electoral systems.

Further, to investigate the effect of population weighting, the overall multinomial regression was rerun using equal weighting across all countries. Weighting was calculated not based on population but only based on the number of responses from a given country, such that all countries had equal influence irrespective of their populations. When this regression was run, the statistical significance of the correlation between trust in the European Union/European Community and social-democratic vote likelihood disappeared, a statistically significant negative correlation between ENEP and social-democratic vote likelihood was found, and gender became significant, with women more likely than men to support social-democratic parties. All other statistically significant relationships remained significant, and no additional relationships became significant.

The by-election regression was also rerun without any weighting, resulting in equal influence for all elections irrespective of the population of the country that took place or the number of elections in the dataset from that country. No new statistically significant correlations developed, and statistical significance disappeared for a number of correlations, including between *UnionPrem* and *ImmigPos*; *PubPrem* and *ImmigPos*; *PubPrem* and *MCPPos*; *IncomeAvg* and *ImmigPos*; and *EUPrem* and *BigRPFR*. To avoid extrapolating off of potentially spurious correlations, those findings that failed robustness checks are not expounded on in the Conclusions section.

In sum, the overall regression performed well against robustness checks, but several findings of the by-election model changed substantially when the weighting was changed. Constructing a larger

dataset, with data from more elections per nation, could help generate more robust findings about the relationships between party ideologies and political polarization. This will also help determine whether the erasure of significance following the change in weighting indicates that these findings are truly fragile, or whether the loss of significance was simply a result of differences in party systems between larger and smaller-population countries.

Conclusions

Economic Motivators of Social-Democratic Support

Social democratic parties often favor welfare state expansion, rising social spending, and progressive tax policy (Kastning 2013.) As such, a model that presumes rational, economically-motivated voter behavior would likely predict disproportionate support for social-democratic parties among those who lack economic stability and, therefore, would benefit most from redistributive policy. The strong negative correlations between income and social-democratic party support likelihood, and employment status and social-democratic party support likelihood, are consistent with these predictions.

Further, social-democratic parties' strong support for labor unions (Benedetto et al 2020) and general association with increases in the size of the public sector (Abou-Chadi and Hix 2020) suggest that union members and public workers might perceive additional and particular economic incentives to support social-democratic parties. This is also borne out by the data; union members and public workers are significantly more likely to support social-democratic parties.

Perceptions of economic benefits associated with social-democratic support may also differ between voters. Social democratic parties are often associated with greater advocacy for European integration (Benedetto et al 2020;) individuals who have greater trust in the European Union and European Parliament may predict economic benefits as a result of greater rates of integration, while individuals with less trust in these institutions may be less likely to predict economic benefits. As such, individuals with greater trust in the EU and European Parliament may have perceptions of an economic benefit associated with social-democratic support that are not shared by voters with lower trust in these institutions. Consequently, higher-trust voters may be more likely to back social-democratic parties. The data, which indicates a strong positive correlation between trust in the European Union or European Parliament and likelihood of social-democratic party support, is consistent with this prediction.

To be sure, there are numerous clearly non-economic drivers of social-democratic party support. For one, there is a very strong positive correlation between living in an urban area and supporting a social-democratic party. Inhabitants of urban areas are both more likely to be members of ethnic minorities and more likely to be socially to the left (Luca et al 2022,) both factors that are not strictly economic in nature and would be expected to correlate positively with social-democratic party support. In

addition, there is no statistically significant correlation between the effect size of living in an urban area on social-democratic party support likelihood and the extent to which social-democratic parties talk about welfare state expansion or the working class, but there is a significantly positive correlation between the effect size of living in an urban area on social-democratic party support likelihood and the extent to which social-democratic parties favor immigration. The example of urban support for social democrats, which appears to go beyond raw economic interest, shows that economic motivators cannot account for the entirety of voter choice. This is even true for the two groups described above that might draw particular economic benefits from social-democratic leadership. Public workers may be drawn to public work out of a love for public service (Abou-Chadi and Hix 2020,) meaning that some may disproportionately support an increase in state services irrespective of their own economic benefit. Many unions also have long-standing links with social-democratic parties (Benedetto et al 2020,) which may lead their members to disproportionately support such parties irrespective of their own economic benefit. As such, there are reasons why union members and public workers might disproportionately support social-democratic parties that go beyond pure economic considerations.

The strong linkage between unions and social-democratic parties may account for the 75% greater magnitude of effect on social-democratic vote likelihood for union membership than for public-worker status, and the fivefold greater magnitude of effect for union membership relative to living in an urban area. Both the magnitude of effect for union membership and public worker status is far larger than both the effect for living in an urban area and being unemployed. Remarkably, this effect holds for income as well; the magnitude of effect for union membership is about as great as the projected effect from falling from the 75th to 15th percentile in income. It is far from clear whether this accurately corresponds to the anticipated economic benefit accorded to each group from a social-democratic administration; a state that favors wealth redistribution would indeed appear more inherently favorable for the unemployed and for low-income individuals than for union memberships. There is ultimately a substantial gap in magnitude between the effect of membership in communities that benefit from social-democratic policy— that is, participation in a union or in a public workplace— and the effect of simply being in a position to benefit on an individual basis, through being low-income or unemployed. Though some of this is likely a result of the self-selection dynamics described above, this also suggests a community effect regarding voter choice. In such circumstances, economic voting is not simply an individual but also a communal act; these individuals may become more likely to vote in their own economic interest, buttressed by a desire to advance the economic interest of their communities. Because the data suggests that economic voting is stronger on a communal than on an individual level— that is, individuals in a group that can expect to accrue economic benefits are more likely to vote in their economic interest than individuals who simply

happen to be in a position to accrue such benefits— it may be difficult to disentangle individual-level economic voting from voting as an expression of community identification.

That said, although economic interest is by no means the sole driver of social-democratic party support, there is strong evidence that it is a powerful motivator. As shown, individuals who are lower-income or unemployed and would benefit from redistributive policy, who belong to economic groups that are favored by social-democratic policy, or who perceive economic benefit in social-democratic policy, are all disproportionately likely to vote in line with what their economic motivations would seem to lean toward.

Voter Responses to Disproportionality and Fragmentation

Because disproportionate electoral systems give disproportionate advantages to the largest few parties, and because social-democratic parties are among the largest parties in most of the nations in the dataset, switching to a social-democratic party from a smaller, non-social-democratic party tends, on average, to increase the impact of a respondent's vote in disproportionate electoral systems. As a result, on average, the more disproportionate an electoral system is, the stronger an individual voter is incentivized to 'vote strategically' and back the major party closest to their ideological position, rather than a minor party; for voters on the left, this often entails backing a social-democratic party, perhaps instead of a green party, a hard-left party, or some other non-social-democratic party that may enjoy less voter support. Voters on the left appear to respond rationally to the added incentives for strategic voting that a disproportionate electoral system provides; there is a statistically significant correlation between the disproportionality of the previous parliamentary election and the likelihood a respondent supports a social-democratic party.

Even in proportional systems, voters may be incentivized to vote for larger parties; larger parties often claim more valuable ministries and have a higher probability of supplying the head of government (Brams and Kaplan 2004.) In this case, even outside of considerations relative to the translation of votes into seats, voters may still increase their real impact by voting for larger parties. In less fragmented systems, the incentives for backing larger parties increases, as these parties hold more seats between them and, consequently, greater political power. There is a statistically significant positive correlation between support for liberal/green parties and the effective number of electoral parties, as well as a statistically significant positive correlation between support for far right parties and the effective number of electoral parties. This indicates that, in more fragmented political systems, these parties enjoy a larger share of voter support; and, conversely, that in less fragmented political systems, social-democratic and center-right parties, often the largest parties, enjoy greater voter support. This is consistent with a model

in which voters respond rationally to electoral consolidation by being more likely to increase their voting impact through backing the large party closest to their ideological position.

Other Findings Regarding Voter Choice

Effects of Age

I initially predicted that the overall fall in social-democratic support would involve younger voters departing social-democratic parties in greater relative numbers than “stickier” older voters, resulting in the aging up of the social-democratic coalition. There is a statistically significant negative correlation between age and likelihood of support for social-democratic parties, but this negative sign owes much to the setting of center-right parties as the reference level; the negative correlation between age and likelihood of support was stronger in magnitude for both far right and liberal/green parties than it was for social democrats. This indicates that, despite any aging up that may have occurred, the linkage between age and likelihood of support for center-right parties is still stronger than for social-democratic parties; however, both far right and liberal/green parties gain disproportionate support from younger voters relative to social-democratic parties.

One side effect of far right parties skewing younger than center-right parties is that, in nations where far right parties are the largest parties of the right wing, the right tends to skew younger. As the far right-led right wing amasses younger supporters and turns off older voters, the effect is reduced youth support, and increased support among older voters, for the social democrats. Consequently, in these nations, the magnitude of the negative correlation between age and likelihood of social-democratic support decreases significantly.

Effects of Marital Status

Unlike in the United States, where marital status is negatively correlated with support for the center-left Democratic Party (ANES 2018,) there is no statistically significant correlation between marital status and likelihood of support for a social-democratic party. One justification in the literature for the negative correlation that exists in the United States is that marriage is associated with economic stability, and individuals confident in their economic position are less likely to support parties on the left (Greenstone and Looney 2012). The latter part of this assertion is confirmed in the data; being employed and having a high income, both factors associated with economic stability, are both strongly negatively correlated with likelihood of support for social-democratic parties.

There are a number of possible interpretations here. The first is that the partisan effects of marriage in Europe and in the United States are similar but largely due to economic factors, which are adjusted for in this regression. The second is that the partisan effects of marriage in Europe go beyond

economic factors, but, whether due to a greater emphasis on fiscal rather than social policy in Europe or due to genuinely different characteristics of the married and unmarried population, the partisan effects of marriage in Europe are far weaker than in the United States.

Other findings surrounding marital status, however, cast doubt on the idea that the partisan effects of marriage in Europe can be adequately explained by economic factors. If the partisan effects of marriage were purely products of greater economic stability, one would anticipate that party categories favored by higher-income individuals would also be favored by married individuals. However, there is a strongly negative correlation between support for liberal/green parties and marital status; conversely, there is essentially no correlation between support for liberal/green parties and income. This demonstrates that, even in Europe, marital status has effects that go beyond simple economic considerations. Consequently, the second interpretation— that partisan effects of marriage go beyond economic factors in Europe and are substantially different from the partisan effects of marriage in the US— appears most consistent with the data.

Nonbinary Voter Choice

Although the sample size of nonbinary individuals in the dataset was too small to draw significant conclusions about the effect of nonbinary gender identity on likelihood of support for social-democratic, center-right, or liberal/green parties, there is a strongly negative correlation between nonbinary gender identity and support for far right parties. Though this finding is obvious, it does not appear that any past multinational surveys have been taken regarding the voting preferences of nonbinary individuals, making this finding nonetheless worthy of note. Further research is needed to gain greater insight on the voting preferences of nonbinary individuals.

Evidence for Dynamic Relationships Between Party Positions and Voter Choice

In the by-election regression, several statistically significant correlations were found between the makeup of social-democratic voter bases and the relative emphasis placed on distinct issues in social-democratic party platforms. Many of these results lose significance when population weights are removed— that is, using a weighting system that gives disproportionate consideration to small nations, many of these results prove fragile. However, four such correlations proved robust. There were positive correlations between urban support for social-democratic parties and the extent to which social-democratic parties discuss immigration; between the size of the EU/ European Parliament trust gap between the social-democratic base and the electorate and the extent to which social-democratic parties discuss European integration; and between union support for social-democratic parties and the extent to which social-democratic parties discuss European integration. There was a negative correlation between

union support for social-democratic parties and the extent to which social-democratic parties discuss the middle class.

Of the linkages found, many make intuitive sense. For one, the robust negative linkage between union support and middle-class emphasis accords well with past research that indicates an internal schism between middle-class social liberals and working-class union members (Abou-Chadi and Hix, 2021.) Parties that focus on the former do indeed appear to lose support among the latter. Another example of this is the linkage between urban support and discussions of immigration. This could indicate that rural voters have strongly negative attitudes towards immigrants relative to urban voters, and are less likely to vote for social-democratic parties that express positive stances toward immigrants. It could also indicate that social-democratic parties more dependent on urban voters are more likely to embrace policies favored by them, such as friendly immigration policy, while social-democratic parties with support spread across the country may steer clear of pro-immigrant argumentation. Both of these narratives probably account for at least some of this effect. The data is then consistent with a dynamic model between party leadership and the party voting bloc, in which voters change party support as responses to policy emphases, presumably communicated on the campaign trail, while party leadership responds to changes in voting bloc makeup by adjusting policy emphases accordingly. Of course, few voters read manifestos; this dynamic model only presumes that a party's manifesto correlates with the speeches, advertisements, and actual policy actions undertaken by members of that party, permitting manifestos, across elections, to serve as changing ledgers of the choices of the party leadership.

This dynamic model can be expanded to other correlations found in the data. One example of this was the rather unsurprising finding that the EU/ European Parliament trust gap between social-democrats and the electorate is positively correlated with the extent to which social-democratic parties talk about European integration. Social democratic parties in given countries may embrace European integration, and, in so doing, attract the votes of individuals who are in favor of such integration; parties may also respond to a pro-integration voter base by emphasizing integration in their platform.

All of this presumes that the arrow of causality in these correlations flows in both directions. One major weakness in this analysis, however, is that the data is not sufficient to conclusively establish any form of causality. In fact, though these narratives of a blind party or public appear less plausible, this data would be perfectly consistent with the assertion that the overwhelming majority of these effects are due to party leadership responding to the electorate, with little impact from the electorate responding to party leadership, or vice versa. This would remove the dynamic nature of the model altogether. Establishing the direction or directions of causality will likely require broadening the horizon to far more electoral cycles, and utilizing time series analysis to investigate how party ideological positions respond to the voting base, and vice versa, over time.

Changing Patterns of Support Among Young Voters

Exceptions to Typical Age Trends

The data indicates that voters above the age of 55, irrespective of employment, education, and gender, are less likely to vote for social-democratic parties than voters between the ages of 25 and 54 with the same educational attainment, gender, and employment status. This is in line with the findings of the overall multinomial regression, which found a negative relationship between social-democratic vote likelihood and age, a correlation augmented by older voters' affinity for center-right parties. However, voters below 25 exhibit a much different trend. Below-prime-age males appear to be more likely to back social-democratic parties relative to both prime-age and above-prime-age males, meaning that the correlation between age and social-democratic vote likelihood holds across the entire age range. For non-males, however, across all categories, below-prime-age voters are less, not more, likely to support social-democratic parties than prime-age voters of the same educational attainment and employment status. This gender divide suggests that social-democratic parties may grow more male with time. *Liberal/Green* parties and *Center-Right* parties appear to be disproportionately nonmale relative to *Social-Democratic* and certainly *Far-Right* parties; as young-voter patterns suggest that these gaps are increasing over time, rather than declining, gender differences across party categories may prove an essentially permanent feature of European politics.

Educational Polarization Among Youth Voters

The effects of education are also distinct for young voters. In most cases, across prime-age and above-prime-age voters, obtaining a Bachelor's degree increases the likelihood of a social-democratic vote for nonmales and decreases it for males. For younger voters, this gap disappears; all groups of below-prime-age voters, irrespective of employment or gender, have a greater likelihood of social-democratic party support among those with Bachelor's degrees. This ties in well with the prediction of rising educational polarization in Europe, as in the United States, put forward in Abou-Chadi and Hix 2021.

The Educated and Unemployed

A 2016 Brookings report identified unemployment among the educational youth in Egypt as a crucial source of strength for anti-establishment activism (Ghani 2016.) While the situation in dictatorial Egypt is obviously quite different from that faced by young voters in Europe, it does appear that anti-establishment feeling among educated and unemployed youth voters is reversing otherwise quite robust trends regarding the effects of employment on likelihood of social-democratic support. For

uneducated below-prime-age voters of both genders, and practically all segments of prime-age and above-prime-age voters, unemployment increases the likelihood of a social-democratic vote. However, for below-prime-age voters who hold Bachelor's degrees, across both genders, unemployment reduces the likelihood of a social-democratic vote— and increases the likelihood of a far-right vote.

Code

All code, and links to all data utilized, are available at the following link:

https://github.com/mglickman/Thesis_Code

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Appendix A: Citations for Party Categorization

Albania

- Democratic Party; listed as center-right.
 - N.A. (2022, January). *Albania*. European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity. Retrieved March 10, 2022, from <https://www.europeanforum.net/countries/albania>
- Socialist Party; listed as social-democratic.
 - N.A. (2022, January). *Albania*. European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity. Retrieved March 10, 2022, from <https://www.europeanforum.net/countries/albania>
- Socialist Movement for Integration; listed as center-left.
 - N.A. (2022, January). *Albania*. European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity. Retrieved March 10, 2022, from <https://www.europeanforum.net/countries/albania>
- The Human Rights Union Party; listed as liberal/green.
 - Sotiropoulos, D., Armakolos, I., Gemi, E., Valvis, A., Feta, B., Agolli, S., Gianna, E. & Lambro, M. (2013, April). *Albanian Elections Observatory Brief*. Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy South East European Programme. Retrieved March 20, 2022, from <https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/bn1.pdf>
- Christian Democrats; listed as center-right.
 - Nordsieck, W. (2021). Albania. In *Parties and Elections in Europe* (p. 12). Books on Demand GmbH.
- Republican Party; listed as center-right.
 - Sotiropoulos, D., Armakolos, I., Gemi, E., Valvis, A., Feta, B., Agolli, S., Gianna, E. & Lambro, M. (2013, April). *Albanian Elections Observatory Brief*. Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy South East European Programme. Retrieved March 20, 2022, from <https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/bn1.pdf>
- Social Democracy Party; listed as social-democratic.
 - Nordsieck, W. (2021). Albania. In *Parties and Elections in Europe* (p. 12). Books on Demand GmbH.
- Movement of Legality Party; listed as far-right.
 - Nordsieck, W. (2021). Albania. In *Parties and Elections in Europe* (p. 12). Books on Demand GmbH.
- National Front Party; listed as far-right.
 - Nordsieck, W. (2021). Albania. In *Parties and Elections in Europe* (p. 13). Books on Demand GmbH.
- New Democrat Party; listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Albania. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 24). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Justice Integration and Unity Party; listed as center-right.
 - Sotiropoulos, D., Armakolos, I., Gemi, E., Valvis, A., Feta, B., Agolli, S., Gianna, E. & Lambro, M. (2013, April). *Albanian Elections Observatory Brief*. Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy South East European Programme. Retrieved March 20, 2022, from <https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/bn1.pdf>
- Challenge for Albania; listed as liberal/green.

- Krasniqi, A. & Recj, A. (2017). *Internal Democracy in Political Parties in Albania Annual Report - 2016*. Albanian Institute of Political Studies and Freidrich Ebert Stiftung. Retrieved March 20, 2022, from <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/albanien/13810.pdf>
- Social Democratic Party; listed as center-left.
 - N.A. (2022, January). *Albania*. European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity. Retrieved March 10, 2022, from <https://www.europeanforum.net/countries/albania>
- Environmental Party / Agrarian Environmentalist Party; listed as liberal/green.
 - Nordsieck, W. (2021). Albania. In *Parties and Elections in Europe* (p. 13). Books on Demand GmbH.
- Communist Party of Albania; listed as Communist.
 - This determination arises from the party's membership in the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties.
 - N.A. (2022). *Communist and Workers' Parties*. International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties. Retrieved March 20, 2022, from <http://www.solidnet.org/links/communist-and-workers-parties/>
- People's Alliance Party; listed as non-ideological.
 - No ideological information about this minor party could be found.
- Equal List; listed as liberal/green.
 - Krasniqi, A. & Recj, A. (2017). *Internal Democracy in Political Parties in Albania Annual Report - 2016*. Albanian Institute of Political Studies and Freidrich Ebert Stiftung. Retrieved March 20, 2022, from <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/albanien/13810.pdf>
- Green Party; listed as liberal/green.
 - This determination arises from the party's membership in the European Green Party.
 - N.A. (2021, December). *Statutes of the European Green Party European Political Party (PPEU)*. European Green Party. Retrieved March 20, 2022, from <https://europeangreens.eu/sites/europeangreens.eu/files/EGP%20Statutes%20-%20%20updated%20annex%20B%20-%202034th%20EGP%20Council.pdf>

Armenia

- Armenian Revolutionary Federation, listed as social-democratic.
 - Barseghyan, A. and Manougian, H. (2020). *Armenian Political Parties' Affiliations With Their European Counterparts*. EVN Report. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://evnreport.com/politics/armenian-political-parties-affiliations-with-their-european-counterparts/>
- Armenian Communist Party, listed as Communist
 - Barseghyan, A. and Manougian, H. (2020). *Armenian Political Parties' Affiliations With Their European Counterparts*. EVN Report. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://evnreport.com/politics/armenian-political-parties-affiliations-with-their-european-counterparts/>
- Way Out Union, listed as liberal/green
 - N.A. (2017, March). *Armenia 2017: An Introduction to the Party-Political Landscape*. European Friends of Armenia. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from https://eufoa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Armenia2017PartypoliticalLandscapeGuide_28March-2017.pdf. p. 17.

- Free Democrats Party, listed as liberal/green
 - N.A. (2017, March). *Armenia 2017: An Introduction to the Party-Political Landscape*. European Friends of Armenia. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from https://eufoa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Armenia2017PartypoliticalLandscapeGuide_28March-2017.pdf.
- Democratic Party of Armenia, listed as social-democratic
 - Mkhitarian, S., et al. (2007). Armenian Democratic Party. In *Political Parties of the Republic of Armenia Participating in the National Assembly Elections 2007* (p. 57). Foundation for Civil and Social Development. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/e/3/24970.pdf>
- Heritage Party, listed as center-right
 - Barseghyan, A. and Manougian, H. (2020). *Armenian Political Parties' Affiliations With Their European Counterparts*. EVN Report. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://evnreport.com/politics/armenian-political-parties-affiliations-with-their-european-counterparts/>
- Armenian National Congress, listed as liberal/green
 - Barseghyan, A. and Manougian, H. (2020). *Armenian Political Parties' Affiliations With Their European Counterparts*. EVN Report. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://evnreport.com/politics/armenian-political-parties-affiliations-with-their-european-counterparts/>
- People's Party of Armenia, listed as social-democratic
 - Mkhitarian, S., et al. (2007). People's Party of Armenia. In *Political Parties of the Republic of Armenia Participating in the National Assembly Elections 2007* (p. 64). Foundation for Civil and Social Development. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/e/3/24970.pdf>
- Tsarukyan Block/ Prosperous Armenia, listed as center-right
 - Barseghyan, A. and Manougian, H. (2020). *Armenian Political Parties' Affiliations With Their European Counterparts*. EVN Report. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://evnreport.com/politics/armenian-political-parties-affiliations-with-their-european-counterparts/>
- Republican Party, listed as center-right
 - Barseghyan, A. and Manougian, H. (2020). *Armenian Political Parties' Affiliations With Their European Counterparts*. EVN Report. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://evnreport.com/politics/armenian-political-parties-affiliations-with-their-european-counterparts/>
- Yerkir Tsirani / Apricot Country Party, listed as liberal/green
 - N.A. (2018, September). *In Case "Yerkir Tsirani" Wins Elections, It Promises To Recover Eliminated Green Zones in Yerevan*. ECOLUR. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://www.ecolur.org/en/news/electionspoliticsecology/in-case-yerkir-tsirani-wins-elections-it-promises-to-recover-eliminated-green-zones-in-yerevan/10418/>
- Country of Laws/ Armenian Renaissance Party, listed as center-right
 - N.A. (2017, March). *Armenia 2017: An Introduction to the Party-Political Landscape*. European Friends of Armenia. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from

Austria

- Die Weißen, listed as far-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Austria. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (pp. 105-106). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- FLÖ (Liste Dr. Schnell), listed as far-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Austria. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 105). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Liste Roland Düringer, listed as non-ideological.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Austria. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 105). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- All other party identification was done based on information from the ESS Codebook.

Belgium

- All party identification was done based on information from the ESS Codebook.

Bosnia

- Bosnian Party, listed as social-democratic.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Bosnia and Herzegovina. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 199). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Democratic Front, listed as social-democratic.
 - Nordsieck, W. (2021). Bosnia-Herzegovina. In *Parties and Elections in Europe* (p. 61). Books on Demand GmbH.
- CDU 1990, listed as center-right.
 - This determination arises from the party's membership in the center-right European People's Party.
 - N.A. (2022). *Member Parties*. European People's Party. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://www.epp.eu/pdf/parties-partners.pdf?t=1647841318>
- Croatian Democratic Union, listed as center-right.
 - This determination arises from the party's membership in the center-right European People's Party.
 - N.A. (2022). *Member Parties*. European People's Party. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://www.epp.eu/pdf/parties-partners.pdf?t=1647841318>
- Croatian Republican Party, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Bosnia and Herzegovina. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 196). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Croatian Party of Rights, listed as far-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Bosnia and Herzegovina. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 196). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- People and Justice, listed as center-right.
 - Nordsieck, W. (2021). Bosnia-Herzegovina. In *Parties and Elections in Europe* (p. 68). Books on Demand GmbH.

- Our Party, listed as liberal/green.
 - Nordsieck, W. (2021). Bosnia-Herzegovina. In *Parties and Elections in Europe* (p. 62). Books on Demand GmbH.
- Party of Democratic Progress, listed as center-right.
 - Nordsieck, W. (2021). Bosnia-Herzegovina. In *Parties and Elections in Europe* (p. 61). Books on Demand GmbH.
- Movement of Democratic Action, listed as center-right.
 - Nordsieck, W. (2021). Bosnia-Herzegovina. In *Parties and Elections in Europe* (p. 62). Books on Demand GmbH.
- Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, listed as far-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Bosnia and Herzegovina. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 193). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- SBB BiH, listed as center-right.
 - Nordsieck, W. (2021). Bosnia-Herzegovina. In *Parties and Elections in Europe* (p. 61). Books on Demand GmbH.
- Social-Democratic Party, listed as social-democratic.
 - Nordsieck, W. (2021). Bosnia-Herzegovina. In *Parties and Elections in Europe* (p. 59). Books on Demand GmbH.
- Serbian Democratic Party, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Bosnia and Herzegovina. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (pp. 195-196). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Democratic People's Alliance, listed as far-right.
 - Nordsieck, W. (2021). Bosnia-Herzegovina. In *Parties and Elections in Europe* (p. 62). Books on Demand GmbH.
- Party of Democratic Action, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Bosnia and Herzegovina. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 193). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Independent Bloc, listed as center-right.
 - Nordsieck, W. (2021). Bosnia-Herzegovina. In *Parties and Elections in Europe* (p. 63). Books on Demand GmbH.

Bulgaria

- Democratic Bulgaria, listed as liberal/green.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Bulgaria. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 226). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- MRF, listed as liberal/green.
 - Nordsieck, W. (2021). Bulgaria. In *Parties and Elections in Europe* (p. 76). Books on Demand GmbH.
- Attack, listed as far-right.
 - Nordsieck, W. (2021). Bulgaria. In *Parties and Elections in Europe* (p. 76). Books on Demand GmbH.
- Union of Democratic Forces, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Bulgaria. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 225). SAGE Publications Ltd.

- Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria, listed as center-right.
 - Nordsieck, W. (2021). Bulgaria. In *Parties and Elections in Europe* (p. 77). Books on Demand GmbH.
- VMRO, listed as far-right.
 - Nordsieck, W. (2021). Bulgaria. In *Parties and Elections in Europe* (p. 75). Books on Demand GmbH.
- Alternative for Bulgarian Revival, listed as social-democratic.
 - Nordsieck, W. (2021). Bulgaria. In *Parties and Elections in Europe* (p. 77). Books on Demand GmbH.
- M21, listed as social-democratic.
 - N.A. (2022). *Bulgaria*. Europe Elects. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://europeelects.eu/bulgaria/>
- Movement Bulgaria of the Citizens, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Bulgaria. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 226). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- The Greens, listed as liberal/green.
 - This determination arises from the party's membership in the European Green Party.
 - N.A. (2021, December). *Statutes of the European Green Party European Political Party (PPEU)*. European Green Party. Retrieved March 20, 2022, from <https://europeangreens.eu/sites/europeangreens.eu/files/EGP%20Statutes%20-%20%20updated%20annex%20B%20-%2034th%20EGP%20Council.pdf>
- Yes Bulgaria, listed as liberal/green.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Bulgaria. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 226). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- All other party identification was done based on information from the ESS Codebook.

Croatia

- NHR-HSP, listed as far-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Croatia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 198). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Croatian Party of Rights, listed as far-right.
 - Nordsieck, W. (2021). Croatia. In *Parties and Elections in Europe* (p. 98). Books on Demand GmbH.
- Croatian Party of Pensioners, listed as social-democratic.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Croatia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 408). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Smart, listed as liberal/green.
 - N.A. (2020, November). *Pametno and SIP join to form new party called Centre*. N1. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://hr.n1info.com/english/news/a576117-pametno-and-sip-join-to-form-new-party-called-centre/>
- Gorski Kotar Alliance, listed as liberal/green.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2015). *Political Handbook of the World 2015*. SAGE Publications Ltd.

- All other party identification was done based on information from the ESS Codebook.

Cyprus

- Party for the Animals of Cyprus; listed as non-ideological.
 - This decision was based on a holistic review of their website.
 - N.A. (2021, May 31). *Home Page*. Party for the Animals of Cyprus. Retrieved March 10, 2022, from <https://animalpartycyprus.com/>
- All other party identification was done based on information from the ESS Codebook.

Czechia

- Úsvit-NK, listed as far-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Czech Republic. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 442). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Svobodní, listed as center-right.
 - Nordsieck, W. (2021). Czechia. In *Parties and Elections in Europe* (p. 123). Books on Demand GmbH.
- SPO, listed as social-democratic.
 - Nordsieck, W. (2021). Czechia. In *Parties and Elections in Europe* (p. 123). Books on Demand GmbH.
- Realisté, listed as center-right.
 - Richterova, B. (2017). *Realisté představili posilu. Jako lídr Parubického kraje přišel Alexander Tomský*. ParlamentniListy.cz. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://www.parlamentnilisty.cz/arena/monitor/Realiste-predstavili-posilu-Jako-lidr-Parubickeho-kraje-prisel-Alexander-Tomsky-499102>
- DSSS, listed as far-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Czech Republic. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 445). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- All other party identification was done based on information from the ESS Codebook.

Denmark

- Social Liberal Party, listed as liberal/green.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Denmark. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 451). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- New Right, listed as far-right
 - N.A. (2016, September 22). *Meet Denmark's New Anti-Immigration Party*. The Local. Retrieved March 22, 2022 from <https://www.thelocal.dk/20160922/meet-denmarks-new-anti-immigration-party/>
- All other party identification was done based on information from the ESS Codebook.

Estonia

- Estonia 200, listed as liberal/green.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Estonia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 530). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Richness of Life, listed as liberal/green.

- Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Estonia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 530). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Estonia United, listed as liberal/green.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Estonia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 530). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- All other party identification was done based on information from the ESS Codebook.

Finland

- Seven Star Movement, listed as center-right
 - N.A. (2018, July 27). *Ex-Centre elder Paavo Väyrynen sets up yet another party*. YLE News. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://yle.fi/news/3-10326386>
- Citizen's Party / People's Party, listed as liberal/green
 - Tiusanen, L. (2017, July 17). *Kansalaispuolueessa on vain noin 30 päätösvaltaista jäsentä – tuore puheenjohtaja Sami Kilpeläinen aikoo jättää keskustan luottamustehtävät*. Suomenmaa. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://www.suomenmaa.fi/uutiset/kansalaispuolueessa-on-vain-noin-30-paatosisvaltaista-jasenta-tuore-puheenjohtaja-sami-kilpelainen-aikoo-jattaa-keskustan-luottamustehtavat/>
- The Independence Party, listed as non-ideological
 - Rautanen, P. (2016, November 30). *Itsenäisyyspuolueella jälleen kannattajat koossa*. YLE News. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-9324645>
- Finnish People First / Finnish People's Party, listed as far-right
 - Paakkanen, M. (2018, December 11). *Suomeen rekisteröitiin uusi maahanmuuttovastainen puolue*. Helsingin Sanomat. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://www.hs.fi/politiikka/art-2000005928715.html>
- All other party identification was done based on information from the ESS Codebook.

France

- Left Radical Party, listed as Communist / p.573 Handbook
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). France. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 573). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Miscellaneous Left (not a party,) listed as social-democratic.
- Miscellaneous Right (not a party,) listed as center-right.
- Regionalists (not a party,) listed as non-ideological.
- Non-EELV environmentalists (not a party,) listed as liberal/green.
- Left extremists (not a party,) listed as Communist.
- Right extremists (not a party,) listed as far-right.
- UDI, listed as center-right.
 - N.A. (2017, March 26). *L'UDI écartelée entre Macron et Fillon*. Le Point. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from https://www.lepoint.fr/presidentielle/l-udi-ecartele-entre-macron-et-fillon-26-03-2017-2114799_3121.php
- Agir, listed as center-right.

- Chazan, D. (2017, November 26). *New Centre-Right Party Launches in France*. The Telegraph. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/11/26/new-centre-right-party-launches-france/>
- All other party identification was done based on information from the ESS Codebook.

Georgia

- United National Movement, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Georgia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 607). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Georgian Labor Party, listed as social-democratic.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Georgia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 608). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- New Rightists, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Georgia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 608). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Republican Party, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Georgia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 608). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Industry Will Save Georgia, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Georgia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 606). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- United Democratic Movement, listed as social-democratic.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Georgia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 609). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Alliance of Patriots, listed as far-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Georgia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 607). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- European Georgia, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Georgia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 606). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Free Democrats, listed as liberal/green.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Georgia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 608). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Georgian Dream, listed as social-democratic.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Georgia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 606). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- National Forum, listed as liberal/green.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Georgia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 608). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- State for the People, listed as center-right.
 - პაატა ბურჭულაძე - სახელმწიფო ხალხისთვის / Paata Burchuladze. (n.d.) *Home* [Facebook page]. Facebook. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://www.facebook.com/stateforpeople/>
- New Political Center Girchi, listed as center-right.

- N.A. (2020, July 13). *What is Girchi?* New Political Center Girchi. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://www.girchi.com/en/node/3804>.
- Strategy Builder / New Georgia, listed as liberal/green.
 - This determination arises from the party's membership in the liberal centrist Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe.
 - N.A. (2022). *ALDE Member Parties*. Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from https://www.aldeparty.eu/alde_member_parties
- Development Party, listed as liberal/green.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Georgia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 608). SAGE Publications Ltd.

Germany

- The Republicans, listed as far-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Germany. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 623). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- All other party identification was done based on information from the ESS Codebook.

Greece

- Panhellenic Socialist Movement/ Movement for Change, listed as social-democratic.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Greece. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (pp. 642-643). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- New Democracy, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Greece. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (pp. 640-641). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Communist Party, listed as Communist.
 - This determination arises from the party's membership in the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties.
 - N.A. (2022). *Communist and Workers' Parties*. International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties. Retrieved March 20, 2022, from <http://www.solidnet.org/links/communist-and-workers-parties/>
- Independent Greeks, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Greece. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 644). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Antarsya / Front of the Greek Anticapitalist Left, listed as Communist.
 - Baboulias, Y. & Seth-Smith, N. (2015, July 3). *Letter from Athens: Greece divided over exit as anarchists and neo-Nazis wait in the wings*. International Business Times. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/letter-athens-greece-divided-over-exit-anarchists-neo-nazis-wait-wings-1508844>
- Democratic Alignment, listed as social-democratic.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Greece. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 643). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Union of Centrists, listed as liberal/green.

- Nordsieck, W. (2019). *Greece*. Parties and Elections in Europe. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <http://parties-and-elections.eu/greece.html>
- Popular Unity, listed as social-democratic.
 - N.A. (2015, August 21). *Greece crisis: Syriza rebels form new party*. BBC. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34014083>
- Course of Freedom, listed as social-democratic.
 - Choros, E. (2016, April 15). *Zoe Konstantopoulou to Present New Party 'Course of Freedom.'* Greek Reporter. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://greekreporter.com/2016/04/15/zoe-konstantopoulou-to-present-new-party-course-of-freedom/>
- The River, listed as social-democratic.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Greece. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 643). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Syriza, listed as social-democratic.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Greece. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (pp. 641-642). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Golden Dawn, listed as far-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Greece. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (pp. 644-645). SAGE Publications Ltd.

Hungary

- Hungarian Liberal Party, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Hungary. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 717). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- All other party identification was done based on information from the ESS Codebook.

Iceland

- People's Front of Iceland, listed as Communist.
 - Valgarðsson, V. (2013, February 19). *Almenn stjórnmálaályktun framhaldsstofnfundar. Alþýðufylkingarinnar*. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://web.archive.org/web/20150118124820/http://www.althydufylkingin.blogspot.com/2013/02/almenn-stjornmalaalyktun.html>
- Icelandic National Front, listed as far-right.
 - N.A. (2017, October 18). *Populist right-wing party charged with election fraud, withdraws all its party slates*. Iceland Magazine. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://icelandmag.is/article/populist-right-wing-party-charged-election-fraud-withdraws-all-its-party-slates>
- All other party identification was done based on information from the ESS Codebook.

Ireland

- Independents 4 Change, listed as Communist.
 - Nordsieck, W. (2019). *Ireland*. Parties and Elections in Europe. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <http://parties-and-elections.eu/ireland.html>
- Independents, listed as non-ideological.

- Independent Alliance, listed as non-ideological.
 - Bardon, S. (2015, June 29). *Independent Alliance to field up to 20 candidates in general election*. The Irish Times. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/independent-alliance-to-field-up-to-20-candidates-in-general-election-1.22666687>
- All other party identification was done based on information from the ESS Codebook.

Italy

- Italian Left, listed as social-democratic.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Italy. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 830). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- South Tyrol People's Party, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Italy. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (pp. 830-831). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Communist Party, listed as Communist.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Italy. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 832). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Power to the People, listed as Communist.
 - N.A. (2017, December 15). *L'associazionismo si fa partito: nasce la lista "Potere al popolo."* Citynews. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://www.today.it/politica/elezioni/politiche-2018/potere-al-popolo.html>
- Free and Equal, listed as social-democratic.
 - Nordsieck, W. (2019). *Italy*. Parties and Elections in Europe. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <http://parties-and-elections.eu/italy.html>
- Popular Civic Lorenzin, listed as liberal/green.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Italy. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 829). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Us with Italy, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Italy. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 830). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- People of the Family, listed as center-right.
 - N.A. (n.d.) *Presentato il simbolo AP per le elezioni europee 2019*. Alternativa Popolare. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://www.alternativapopolare.it/presentato-simbolo-ap-le-elezioni-europee-2019/>
- Italy to the Italians, listed as far-right.
 - N.A. (2018, January 30). *Speciale Elezioni 2018, un'altra formazione di destra nella scheda: L'Italia agli Italiani*. Perugia Today. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://www.perugiatoday.it/politica/umbria-camera-senato-lista-italia-agli-italiani-fn-fiamma-tricolore.html>
- All other party identification was done based on information from the ESS Codebook.

Latvia

- Development/For!, listed as social-democratic.

- Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Latvia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 945). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Social Democratic Party "Harmony", listed as social-democratic.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Latvia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 946). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Unity, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Latvia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 944). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Latvian Russian Union, listed as liberal/green.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Latvia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 947). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- All for Latvia! / Latvian Nationalists, listed as far-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Latvia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 945). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Latvian Association of Regions, listed as **liberal/green**.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Latvia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 947). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Action Party, listed as far-right.
 - Due to a lack of reporting and online presence for this minor and seemingly defunct party, their ideology was determined by a holistic review of their Instagram profile.
 - Rīcības Partija. [@riciba]. (n.d.). *Posts* [Instagram profile]. Instagram. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://www.instagram.com/riciba/?hl=en>
- Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party, listed as social-democratic.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Latvia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 947). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Latvian Centrist Party, listed as far-right.
 - N.A. (2019, December 16). *Centra partijas vērtības*. Latvian Centrist Party. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://web.archive.org/web/20200727102242/http://centrapartija.lv/centra-partijas-vertibas/>
- All other party identification was done based on information from the ESS Codebook.

Lithuania

- Election Action of Lithuania's Poles, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Lithuania. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 995). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Lithuanian Centre Party, listed as center-right.
 - N.A. (2022). *Lithuania*. Europe Elects. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://europeelects.eu/lithuania/>
- Lithuanian Freedom Union, listed as center-right.
 - N.A. (2022). *Lithuania*. Europe Elects. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://europeelects.eu/lithuania/>
- Anti-Corruption Coalition, listed as non-ideological.

- N.A. (2016, October 3). *ELECTIONS. New Populists Admire Demise of the Old Populists*. Lithuania Tribune. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://lithuaniatribune.com/elections-new-populists-admire-demise-of-the-old-populists/>
- Liberal Union, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Lithuania. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 997). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- All other party identification was done based on information from the ESS Codebook.

Luxembourg

- Christian Social People's Party, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Luxembourg. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1001). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Socialist Workers' Party, listed as social-democratic.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Luxembourg. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1001). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Democratic Party, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Luxembourg. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (pp. 1000-1001). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- The Greens, listed as liberal/green.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Luxembourg. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1001). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- The Left, listed as Communist.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Luxembourg. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1001). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Alternative Democratic Reform Party, listed as far-right.
 - Van Kessel, S.T. (2011, July). *Supply and Demand: Identifying Populist Parties in Europe and Explaining Their Electoral Performance*. [Doctoral thesis, University of Sussex]. Sussex Research Online. Retrieved March 22, 2022 from http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/7521/1/Van_Kessel,_Stijn_Theodoor.pdf
- Pirate Party of Luxembourg, listed as liberal/green.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Luxembourg. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1002). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Communist Party, listed as Communist.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Luxembourg. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1002). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- DEMOKRATIE, listed as non-ideological.
 - Little data was available on the ideology of this minor party.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Luxembourg. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1002). SAGE Publications Ltd.

Macedonia

- VMRO-DPMNE, listed as far-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). North Macedonia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1247). SAGE Publications Ltd.

- GROM / Civil Option, listed as liberal/green.
 - N.A. (2022). *North Macedonia*. Europe Elects. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://europeelects.eu/northmacedonia/>
- Movement Besa, listed as center-right.
 - N.A. (2022). *North Macedonia*. Europe Elects. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://europeelects.eu/northmacedonia/>
- Democratic Renewal, listed as liberal/green.
 - This determination arises from the party's membership in the European Green Party.
 - N.A. (2021, December). *Statutes of the European Green Party European Political Party (PPEU)*. European Green Party. Retrieved March 20, 2022, from <https://europeangreens.eu/sites/europeangreens.eu/files/EGP%20Statutes%20-%20%20updated%20annex%20B%20-%2034th%20EGP%20Council.pdf>
- DPA, listed as far-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). North Macedonia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (pp. 1246-1247). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- DPSM, listed as center-right.
 - N.A. (2022). *North Macedonia*. Europe Elects. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://europeelects.eu/northmacedonia/>
- DPTM, listed as non-ideological.
 - N.A. (2022). *North Macedonia*. Europe Elects. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://europeelects.eu/northmacedonia/>
- DUI, listed as social-democratic.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). North Macedonia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1246). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Alliance of Albanians, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). North Macedonia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1248). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- LDP, listed as liberal/green.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). North Macedonia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (pp. 1245-1246). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- NSDP, listed as social-democratic.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). North Macedonia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1245). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- PDT, listed as non-ideological.
 - <https://www.politicon.co/en/interviews/18/turks-in-macedonia-current-situation>
- PEF, listed as liberal/green.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). North Macedonia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1245). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- POPGM, listed as liberal/green.
 - N.A. (2017, April 8). *ИПОГПАМА (Program)*. Party of United Pensioners and Citizens of Macedonia. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from https://web.archive.org/web/20170408051833/http://obedinetipenzioneri.mk/sites/default/files/dokumenti/programa_na_popgm.doc
- RAM, listed as non-ideological.

- Sudetic, C. (2013, September 10). *Roma in Political Life: Macedonia - Pride and Prejudice*. Open Society Foundations. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/roma-political-life-macedonia-pride-and-prejudice>
- SDAM, listed as social-democratic.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). North Macedonia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (pp. 1244-1245). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Socialistic Party, listed as social-democratic.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). North Macedonia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1248). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Serbian Party, listed as social-democratic.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). North Macedonia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (pp. 1244-1245). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Levica, listed as Communist.
 - N.A. (2022). *North Macedonia*. Europe Elects. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://europeelects.eu/northmacedonia/>

Malta

- Labour Party, listed as social-democratic.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Malta. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1050). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Nationalist Party, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Malta. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1050). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Democratic Alternative, listed as liberal/green.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Malta. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1050). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Maltese Patriots' Movement, listed as far-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Malta. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (pp. 1050-1051). SAGE Publications Ltd.

Montenegro

- Democratic Party of Socialists, listed as social-democratic.
 - Nordsieck, W. (2020). *Montenegro*. Parties and Elections in Europe. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <http://parties-and-elections.eu/montenegro.html>
- Social Democratic Party, listed as social-democratic.
 - Nordsieck, W. (2020). *Montenegro*. Parties and Elections in Europe. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <http://parties-and-elections.eu/montenegro.html>
- Social Democrats of Montenegro, listed as social-democratic.
 - Nordsieck, W. (2020). *Montenegro*. Parties and Elections in Europe. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <http://parties-and-elections.eu/montenegro.html>
- Socialist Peoples' Party, listed as social-democratic.
 - Nordsieck, W. (2020). *Montenegro*. Parties and Elections in Europe. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <http://parties-and-elections.eu/montenegro.html>

- Positive Montenegro, listed as liberal/green.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Montenegro. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1115). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Liberal Party of Montenegro, listed as liberal/green.
 - N.A. (2022). *Montenegro*. Europe Elects. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://europeelects.eu/montenegro/>
- DEMOS / Democratic Alliance in Montenegro, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Montenegro. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1115). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- United Montenegro, listed as center-right.
 - N.A. (2022, February). *Montenegro*. European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://www.europeanforum.net/countries/montenegro>
- Democratic Montenegro, listed as liberal/green.
 - Nordsieck, W. (2020). *Montenegro*. Parties and Elections in Europe. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <http://parties-and-elections.eu/montenegro.html>
- United Reform Action, listed as liberal/green.
 - This determination arises from the party's candidacy for membership in the European Green Party.
 - N.A. (2021, December). *Statutes of the European Green Party European Political Party (PPEU)*. European Green Party. Retrieved March 20, 2022, from [https://europeangreens.eu/sites/europeangreens.eu/files/EGP%20Statutes%20-%20%20%20updated%20annex%20B%20-%2034th%20EGP%20Council.pdf](https://europeangreens.eu/sites/europeangreens.eu/files/EGP%20Statutes%20-%20%20updated%20annex%20B%20-%2034th%20EGP%20Council.pdf)
- Montenegrin Party, listed as center-right.
 - N.A. (2020). *O Nama*. Montenegrin Party. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <http://crnogorska.me/o-nama/>
- Democratic Union of Albanians, listed as center-right
 - N.A. (2022). *Montenegro*. Europe Elects. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://europeelects.eu/montenegro/>
- Albanian Alternative, listed as center-right.
 - N.A. (2022). *Montenegro*. Europe Elects. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://europeelects.eu/montenegro/>
- FORCA, listed as non-ideological.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Montenegro. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1113). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- True Montenegro, listed as center-right.
 - N.A. (2022, February). *Montenegro*. European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://www.europeanforum.net/countries/montenegro>
- FORCA-DUA-AA alliance, listed as non-ideological.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Montenegro. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1113). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- For One Goal, listed as non-ideological.
 - Small party; no records could be found.
- Alternative, listed as non-ideological.
 - Small party; no records could be found.

- HGI, listed as center-right.
 - N.A. (2022). *Montenegro*. Europe Elects. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://europeelects.eu/montenegro/>
- KEY, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Montenegro. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1115). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Democratic Serb Party / Serbian Party, listed as center-right.
 - Pejovic, I. (2016, August 31). *DSS pristupio DF-u*. Radio i Televizija Crne Gore. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://rtcg.me/vijesti/politika/139769/dss-pristupio-df-u.html>
- Pensioners, listed as non-ideological.
 - N.A. (2015, September 5). *PUPI: Ponuda DF Korisna i Odgovorna*. Portal Analitika. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://www.portalanalitika.me/clanak/200352--pupi-ponuda-df-korisna-i-odgovorna>
- Democratic Front, listed as center-right.
 - N.A. (2022, February). *Montenegro*. European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://www.europeanforum.net/countries/montenegro>
- Bosniak Party, listed as center-right.
 - N.A. (2022). *Montenegro*. Europe Elects. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://europeelects.eu/montenegro/>
- Justice and Reconciliation Party / Bosniak Community Party, listed as non-ideological.
 - Rozajama, U. (2017, December 2). *SPP Programska Nacela*. Justice and Reconciliation Party. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://www.sppcg.me/programska-nacela/>
- Serbian Radicals, listed as far-right.
 - Pantovic, M. and Tomovic, D. (2016, July 26). *Seselj's Radicals to Run in Montenegrin Elections*. Balkan Transitional Justice and BIRN. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://balkaninsight.com/2016/07/26/seselj-s-party-plans-to-run-for-montenegrin-parliament-07-25-2016/>

Netherlands

- All party identification was done based on information from the ESS Codebook.

Norway

- Democrats / Democrats in Norway, listed as far-right.
 - N.A. (2022). *Norway*. Europe Elects. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://europeelects.eu/norway/>
- The Christians, listed as center-right.
 - Garvik, O. (2021, September 15). *Partiet de Kristne*. Store Norske Leksikon. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from https://snl.no/Partiet_De_Kristne
- Pensioners' Party, listed as non-ideological.
 - Carlsen, C.C. (2013, March 29). *Vi kan bli landets største parti*. Nettavisen Nyheter. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://www.nettavisen.no/vi-kan-bli-landets-storste-parti/s/12-95-3583956>
- All other party identification was done based on information from the ESS Codebook.

Poland

- Polish People's Party, listed as center-right.
 - Nardelli, A. (2015, October 22). *Polish Elections 2015: A Guide to the Parties, Polls, and Electoral System*. The Guardian. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/22/polish-elections-2015-a-guide-to-the-parties-polls-and-electoral-system>
- All other party identification was done based on information from the ESS Codebook.

Portugal

- Unified Democratic Coalition, listed as Communist.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Portugal. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (pp. 1351-1352). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Alternative Socialist Movement, listed as Communist.
 - N.A. (2022, February 1). *O Que Nos Move?* Alternative Socialist Movement. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <http://mas.org.pt/index.php/2022/02/01/o-que-nos-move/>
- Portuguese Communist Party, listed as Communist.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Portugal. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1352). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- FREE, listed as liberal/green.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Portugal. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1353). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Communist Party, listed as Communist.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Portugal. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1353). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Social Democratic Party, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Portugal. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (pp. 1352-1353). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Social Democratic Centre, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Portugal. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1353). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Enough, listed as far-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Portugal. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1353). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Liberal Initiative, listed as center-right.
 - Crespo, A. (2019, August 31). *PS mais absoluto, PSD em queda livre. Aliança e Iniciativa Liberal podem eleger*. TSF Radio Noticias. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://www.tsf.pt/portugal/politica/ps-mais-absoluto-psd-em-queda-livre-alianca-e-iniciativa-liberal-podem-eleger-11252330.html>
- Workers Party, listed as Communist.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Portugal. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1353). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Liberal Democratic Party, listed as liberal/green.

- N.A. (2022). *Political Parties in Portugal*. The Translation Company Group LLC. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://thetranslationcompany.com/news/blog/language-news/portuguese/political-parties-portugal/>
- Alliance, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Portugal. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1353). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Labor Party / PTP, listed as social-democratic.
 - Nordsieck, W. (2015). *Madeira / P*. Parties and Elections in Europe. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://web.archive.org/web/20180507040614/http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/madeira.html>
- Earth Party, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Portugal. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1353). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- All other party identification was done based on information from the ESS Codebook.

Romania

- National Union for Romania, listed as social-democratic.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Romania. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (pp. 1370-1372). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Greater Romania Party, listed as far-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Romania. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1372). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- United Romania Party, listed as far-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Romania. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1373). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Demos, listed as Communist.
 - N.A. (2019). *Cine Suntem*. Demos. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://demos.org.ro/cine-suntem/>
- Social Democratic Party, listed as social-democratic.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Romania. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (pp. 1368-1369). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- National Liberal Party, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Romania. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (pp. 1366-1367). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Save Romania Union, listed as liberal/green.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Romania. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1370). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Democratic Union of Hungarians from Romania, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Romania. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1370). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Alliance of Liberals and Democrats, listed as center-right.

- Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Romania. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (pp. 1369-1370). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Popular Movement Party, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Romania. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (pp. 1370-1371). SAGE Publications Ltd.

Serbia

- SNS, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Serbia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1454). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Free Citizens Movement / PSG, listed as liberal/green.
 - N.A. (2022). *Serbia*. Europe Elects. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://europeelects.eu/serbia/>
- New Serbia / NS, listed as far-right.
 - N.A. (2012, May 7). *Serbia Prepares for Close 'Three-in-one' Super-Election*. EURACTIV. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://www.euractiv.com/section/elections/news/serbia-prepares-for-close-three-in-one-super-election/>
- SDS, listed as social-democratic.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Serbia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1458). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- LDP, listed as liberal/green.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Serbia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1457). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- SPS, listed as social-democratic.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Serbia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1455). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Enough is Enough / DJB, listed as far-right.
 - N.A. (2022). *Serbia*. Europe Elects. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://europeelects.eu/serbia/>
- PUPS, listed as social-democratic.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Serbia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1455). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- JS / United Serbia, listed as center-right.
 - N.A. (2022). *Serbia*. Europe Elects. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://europeelects.eu/serbia/>
- LSV, listed as liberal/green.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Serbia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1459). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Roma Party, listed as social-democratic.
 - N.A. (2022, February 9). *Roma Party Will Take Part in Serbia's April 3 Elections*. N1. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://rs.n1info.com/english/news/roma-party-will-take-part-in-serbias-april-3-elections/>
- SDA, listed as center-right.

- N.A. (2022). *Serbia*. Europe Elects. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://europeelects.eu/serbia/>
- SDPS, listed as social-democratic.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Serbia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1454). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- All other party identification was done based on information from the ESS Codebook.

Slovakia

- Christian Democratic Movement, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Slovakia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1491). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Party of the Hungarian Community, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Slovakia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1492). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Communist Party, listed as Communist.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Slovakia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1493). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Slovak Green Party, listed as liberal/green.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2015). *Political Handbook of the World 2015*. SAGE Publications Ltd.
- All other party identification was done based on information from the ESS Codebook.

Slovenia

- Slovenian Pirate Party, listed as liberal/green.
 - N.A. (2022). *Slovenia*. Europe Elects. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://europeelects.eu/slovenia/>
- Patriotic League, listed as far-right.
 - Klaric, M. (2019, April 24). *Slovenia: A Lot of Unknowns Before This Year's European Elections*. Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://www.rosalux.eu/en/article/1404.slovenia-a-lot-of-unknowns-before-this-year's-european-elections.html>
- Good Country, listed as non-ideological.
 - N.A. (2022). *Slovenia*. Europe Elects. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://europeelects.eu/slovenia/>
- ZL, listed as Communist.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Slovenia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1500). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- ZAAB, listed as liberal/green.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Slovenia. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1500). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- All other party identification was done based on information from the ESS Codebook.

Spain

- Together for Catalonia, listed as social-democratic.

- Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Spain. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (pp. 1557-1558). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Initiative for Catalonia, listed as liberal/green.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Spain. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1558). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- In Tide, listed as social-democratic.
 - N.A. (2016, July 31). *En Marea se constituye como partido y llama a Podemos a unirse para las autonómicas*. Fare de Vigo. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <https://www.farodevigo.es/galicia/2016/07/31/marea-constituye-partido-llama-unirse-16550403.html>
- Compromise, listed as social-democratic.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Spain. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1559). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Republican Party of Catalonia / Republican Left of Catalonia, listed as social-democratic
 - Nordsieck, W. (2019). *Spain*. Parties and Elections in Europe. Retrieved March 21, 2022 from <http://parties-and-elections.eu/spain.html>
- Union of Navarrese People, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Spain. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1559). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Basque Nationalist Party / Yes to the Future, listed as social-democratic.
 - Yes to the Future is not strictly the same party as the Basque Nationalist Party; however, it is a merger of multiple parties, of which the Basque Nationalist Party is the largest.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Spain. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1555). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- New Canary Islands, listed as social-democratic.
 - N.A. (2022). *Spain*. Europe Elects. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://europeelects.eu/spain/>
- Aragonese Party, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Spain. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1554). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Asturias Forum, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Spain. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1559). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- All other party identification was done based on information from the ESS Codebook.

Sweden

- All party identification was done based on information from the ESS Codebook.

Switzerland

- All party identification was done based on information from the ESS Codebook.

UK

- BNP, listed as far-right.

- Lansford, T., et al. (2021). United Kingdom. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1760). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- All other party identification was done based on information from the ESS Codebook.

Ukraine

- Sluha Narodu, listed as liberal/green.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Ukraine. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1732). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Opozytsiina Platforma, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Ukraine. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1734). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- All Ukrainian Association, listed as social-democratic.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Ukraine. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1737). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Yevropeiska Solidarnist, listed as center-right.
 - N.A. (2022). *Ukraine*. Europe Elects. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://europeelects.eu/ukraine/>
- Holos, listed as liberal/green.
 - N.A. (2022). *Ukraine*. Europe Elects. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://europeelects.eu/ukraine/>
- Radical Party, listed as far-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Ukraine. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1735). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Syl'a i Chest, listed as center-right.
 - N.A. (2022). *Ukraine*. Europe Elects. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://europeelects.eu/ukraine/>
- Opposition Bloc, listed as center-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Ukraine. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1734). SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Ukrainian Strategy, listed as social-democratic.
 - N.A. (2022). *Ukraine*. Europe Elects. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://europeelects.eu/ukraine/>
- Shariy's Party, listed as far-right.
 - N.A. (2022). *Ukraine*. Europe Elects. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://europeelects.eu/ukraine/>
- Svoboda, listed as far-right.
 - Lansford, T., et al. (2021). Ukraine. In *Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021* (p. 1726). SAGE Publications Ltd.

Appendix B: Full Results of Overall Multinomial Regression

Party Category	Intercept	<i>Union</i>	<i>Gender</i> (F)	<i>Gender</i> (NB)	<i>PubWork</i>
Liberal/Green	-5.4210670 (0)	0.2232688 (0)	0.05355516 (0.0521)	0.2244286 (0.28007)	0.10911931 (0.0003)
Far Right	-6.1942436 (0)	0.2338908 (0)	-0.24581837 (0)	-1.3605688 (0)	0.01759812 (0.61742)
Social Democratic	0.3406399 (0.2561)	0.5861805 (0)	-0.01859502 (0.41201)	0.3071535 (0.70860)	0.32313828 (0)

Party Category	<i>Empl</i>	<i>MarStat</i>	<i>Urban</i>	<i>Income</i>
Liberal/Green	-0.14848125 (0.0001)	-0.15298451 (0)	0.1046620 (0.0025)	-0.003908214 (0.53230)
Far Right	0.01917683 (0.61487)	0.00664149 (0.84068)	0.0171243 (0.59139)	-0.087283475 (0)
Social Democratic	-0.18195500 (0)	-0.02681206 (0.26938)	0.1108190 (0)	-0.089544768 (0)

Party Category	<i>EuroTrust</i>	<i>Age</i>	Previous Election Least-Squares	ENEP
Liberal/Green	0.08410798 (0)	-0.01500760 (0)	0.1190520 (0.0064)	0.21104285 (0.0013)
Far Right	-0.3108273 (0)	-0.02517592 (0)	0.1612342 (0)	1.17427411 (0)
Social Democratic	0.04849730 (0)	-0.01169078 (0)	0.1258217 (0.0049)	-0.04118521 (0.33984)

Party Category	<i>Edu2</i>	<i>Edu3</i>	<i>Edu4</i>	<i>Edu5</i>	<i>Edu6</i>
Liberal/Green	-0.005674326 (0.94719)	0.15847060 (0.0370)	0.42551920 (0)	0.5023162 (0)	0.715635881 (0)
Far Right	-0.014814310 (0.84327)	-0.18954164 (0.0070)	-0.31447446 (0.0008)	-0.6275364 (0)	-0.521691290 (0)

Social Democratic	-0.032499079 (0.54217)	-0.02219617 (0.65160)	-0.06894939 (0.20853)	-0.1336888 (0.01384)	-0.006643339 (0.90293)
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Party Category	<i>Nation: Armenia</i>	<i>Nation: Austria</i>	<i>Nation: Belgium</i>	<i>Nation: Bosnia</i>
Liberal/Green	2.879273 (0)	3.4400585 (0)	1.3912500 (0.0003)	0.2188005 (0.63203)
Far Right	-5.791777 (0)	3.8939012 (0)	-5.1021775 (0)	-5.0582573 (0)
Social Democratic	-2.331161 (0)	0.1823908 (0.30873)	-0.5066804 (0.11653)	-0.4029806 (0.27524)

Party Category	<i>Nation: Bulgaria</i>	<i>Nation: Croatia</i>	<i>Nation: Cyprus</i>	<i>Nation: Czechia</i>	<i>Nation: Denmark</i>
Liberal/Green	2.8022486 (0)	2.1161933 (0)	0.8478000 (0.20035)	3.7821216 (0)	3.0572632 (0)
Far Right	2.1820644 (0)	1.1673402 (0.00051)	0.9533709 (0.03896)	-1.1250620 (0)	1.9027225 (0)
Social Democratic	-0.4185653 (0.03962)	-0.2420746 (0.19939)	-0.4804849 (0.11306)	-0.9249175 (0.00006)	0.7068441 (0.00585)

Party Category	<i>Nation: Estonia</i>	<i>Nation: Finland</i>	<i>Nation: France</i>	<i>Nation: Georgia</i>	<i>Nation: Germany</i>
Liberal/Green	3.5362085 (0)	3.8198863 (0)	2.727322 (0)	1.125469 (0.23396)	3.0526288 (0)
Far Right	1.8322672 (0)	0.8681535 (0.00001)	-1.178044 (0.00557)	3.875090 (0)	-0.1130388 (0.26133)
Social Democratic	-0.9975215 (0.00082)	0.1748506 (0.46803)	-1.326561 (0.00743)	1.066230 (0.00020)	-0.5714725 (0.00573)

Party Category	<i>Nation:</i>	<i>Nation: Hungary</i>	<i>Nation: Iceland</i>	<i>Nation: Ireland</i>
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	<i>Greece</i>			
Liberal/Green	0.7676488 (0.00220)	2.324520 (0)	2.532279 (0)	0.08790646 (0.74662)
Far Right	0.8865108 (0)	3.151578 (0)	-2.020646 (0.04990)	-10.21799601 (0)
Social Democratic	-0.6284841 (0.00624)	-2.255234 (0)	-1.009337 (0.03066)	-1.49679168 (0)

Party Category	<i>Nation: Italy</i>	<i>Nation: Latvia</i>	<i>Nation: Lithuania</i>	<i>Nation: Luxembourg</i>
Liberal/Green	0.7414500 (0.10164)	1.8977557 (0)	2.9073882 (0)	2.75095957 (0)
Far Right	3.9256604 (0)	-0.7512303 (0.01551)	-2.0005742 (0)	-0.04907571 (0.93209)
Social Democratic	-0.5937692 (0.19046)	-0.2225899 (0.52407)	-0.9314678 (0.00201)	-1.40100763 (0.00032)

Party Category	<i>Nation: N. Macedonia</i>	<i>Nation: Malta</i>	<i>Nation: Montenegro</i>	<i>Nation: Netherlands</i>
Liberal/Green	4.166349 (0)	1.758949 (0.12962)	2.7839223 (0.00001)	3.1040932 (0)
Far Right	7.246676 (0)	2.879433 (0)	-0.2979016 (0)	-1.3400019 (0)
Social Democratic	1.931787 (0)	1.007118 (0.00523)	1.2662518 (0.00041)	0.0861698 (0.76723)

Party Category	<i>Nation: Norway</i>	<i>Nation: Poland</i>	<i>Nation: Portugal</i>	<i>Nation: Romania</i>
Liberal/Green	3.2707010 (0)	2.220306 (0)	0.5654313 (0.10164)	0.7814352 (0.00001)
Far Right	1.5598263 (0)	4.200314 (0)	2.4528619 (0)	0.7064997 (0.00131)

Social Democratic	0.2367826 (0.27430)	-1.891922 (0)	0.6784835 (0.00002)	-0.8995360 (0)
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Party Category	<i>Nation: Serbia</i>	<i>Nation: Slovakia</i>	<i>Nation: Slovenia</i>	<i>Nation: Spain</i>
Liberal/Green	2.612446 (0)	1.0040581 (0.0005)	4.8913543 (0)	-0.7029854 (0.00091)
Far Right	2.630702 (0)	-1.2004725 (0)	0.7763351 (0.02268)	0.3224810 (0.00015)
Social Democratic	-2.592148 (0)	-0.8668679 (0.00293)	0.8213506 (0.01301)	0.5492175 (0.00177)

Party Category	<i>Nation: Sweden</i>	<i>Nation: Switzerland</i>	<i>Nation: UK</i>
Liberal/Green	3.3380572 (0)	2.3408460 (0)	2.088601 (0)
Far Right	2.1017140 (0)	-1.5701180 (0)	1.249427 (0.00027)
Social Democratic	0.4964933 (0.0201)	-0.6396335 (0.00117)	-1.213148 (0.00112)

Appendix C: Nations Present in the ESS, EVS, and EES Datasets

Nation	EVS	ESS	EES
Albania	x	*	
Armenia	x		
Austria	x	x	x
Belgium		x	x
Bosnia and Herzegovina	x		
Bulgaria	x	x	x
Croatia	x	x	x
Cyprus	x	x	x
Czech Republic	x	x	x
Denmark	x	x	x
Estonia	x	x	x
Finland	x	x	x
France	x	x	x
Georgia	x		
Germany	x	x	x
Greece	x		x
Hungary	x	x	x
Iceland	x	x	
Ireland		x	x
Italy	x	x	x
Latvia		x	x
Lithuania	x	x	x
Luxembourg			x
Malta			x

Montenegro	x	x	
Netherlands	x	x	x
North Macedonia	x		
Norway	x	x	
Poland	x	x	x
Portugal	x	x	x
Romania	x	x	x
Serbia	x	x	
Slovakia	x	x	x
Slovenia	x	x	x
Spain	x	x	x
Sweden	x	x	x
Switzerland	x	x	
Ukraine	x		
UK	x	x	x

Appendix D: Parties By Party Category

A table of nations and parties included in the analysis is below; the percent-surveyed column indicates the share of individuals surveyed in a given country, across all elections, who indicated support for a party within that particular party category. That is, a row that reads “Nation A; Social-Democratic; SDPA, Socialist Party; 0.2500” would indicate that Nation A has two social-democratic parties, the SDPA and the Socialist Party, and that 25% of those surveyed who expressed support for a party, expressed support for the SDPA or the Socialist Party. All party support shares are stated to the ten thousandth, or hundredth of a percent. Party categories in a given nation with less than 5% support are italicized.

It is worth noting that the dataset covers multiple elections for several countries, and includes several multi-party coalitions. Some voters may choose to denote party choice by stating the name of an individual party within a coalition, and some prefer to state the name of the multiparty alliance that said party belongs to. Further, some parties may be defunct, and others may have merged into other parties on the list. Some party lists are therefore anachronisms; these parties would never have all appeared together on a ballot. Repetition of this sort (individual parties and coalitions, defunct parties and the ones they merged into) is unavoidable, but parties that were simply renamed or go by multiple names are only listed once (i.e., the Polish party KORWiN, which has previously gone by the name of Wolnosc and is sometimes referred to, in its full unabbreviated form, as the Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic - Liberty and Hope, is only listed once as KORWiN.)

Nation	Party Categories	Component Parties	% surveyed
Albania	Social Democratic	Socialist Party, Socialist Movement for Integration, Social Democracy Party, Social Democratic Party	.5600
	Center Right	Democratic Party, Christian Democrats, Republican Party, New Democrat Party, Justice Integration and Unity Party	.4251
	<i>Liberal/Green</i>	<i>Human Rights Union Party, Challenge for Albania, Agrarian Environmentalist Party, Equal List,</i>	<i>.0086</i>

		<i>Green Party</i>	
	<i>Far Right</i>	<i>Movement of Legality Party, National Front Party</i>	<i>.0021</i>
	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>	<i>People's Alliance Party</i>	<i>.0011</i>
	<i>Communist/ Far Left</i>	<i>Communist Party of Albania</i>	<i>.0032</i>
Armenia	Social Democratic	Armenian Revolutionary Federation, Democratic Party of Armenia, People's Party of Armenia	.0975
	Center Right	Heritage Party, Prosperous Armenia, Republican Party, Armenian Renaissance Party	.6407
	Liberal/Green	Way Out Union, Free Democrats Party, Armenian National Congress, Apricot Country Party	.2293
	<i>Far Right</i>		<i>0</i>
	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>		<i>0</i>
	<i>Communist/ Far Left</i>	<i>Armenian Communist Party</i>	<i>.0325</i>
Austria	Social Democratic	SPÖ	.3157
	Center Right	ÖVP	.3275
	Liberal/Green	PILZ, Grüne, NEOS	.1392
	Far Right	FPÖ, Die Weißen, FLÖ (Liste Dr. Schnell)	.2097
	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>	<i>GILT, Liste Roland Düringer</i>	<i>.0021</i>
	<i>Communist/ Far Left</i>	<i>KPÖ</i>	<i>.0058</i>

Belgium	Social Democratic	SP.A, CDH, PS	.2325
	Center Right	CD&V, N-VA, List Dedecker, Open VLD, MR, PP, DeFI	.4987
	Liberal/Green	Groen, Ecolo	.1296
	Far Right	VB	.0725
	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>		0
	Communist/ Far Left	PVDA+, PTB	.0667
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Social Democratic	Bosnian Party, Democratic Front, Social-Democratic Party	.2431
	Center Right	CDU 1990, Croatian Democratic Union, Croatian Republican Party, People and Justice, Party of Democratic Progress, Movement of Democratic Action, SBB BiH, Serbian Democratic Party, Party of Democratic Action, Independent Bloc	.5933
	<i>Liberal/Green</i>	<i>Our Party</i>	.0407
	Far Right	Croatian Party of Rights, Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, Democratic People's Alliance	.1230
	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>		0
	<i>Communist/ Far Left</i>		0
Bulgaria	Social Democratic	BSP, Coalition ABV-M21, Alternative for Bulgarian Revival, M21	.2698

	Center Right	GERB, Reformist Bloc, New Republic, Union of Democratic Forces, Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria, Movement Bulgaria of the Citizens	.4723
	Liberal/Green	DPS, KDDDB, DOST, Democratic Bulgaria, MRF, The Greens, Yes Bulgaria	.1423
	Far Right	NFSB, Volya, Revival, Attack, VMRO	.1156
	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>		0
	<i>Communist/ Far Left</i>		0
Croatia	Social Democratic	SDP, HSS, Bandic Milan 365, SDSS, Croatian Party of Pensioners	.3772
	Center Right	HDZ, HSLS, NHR, HKS	.3718
	Liberal/Green	HNS, IDS, START, GLAS, Smart, Gorski Kotar Alliance	.0644
	<i>Far Right</i>	<i>HDSSB, Hrast, NHR-HSP, Croatian Party of Rights</i>	.0274
	Other/ Non-Ideological	BIL, Human Shield, LMK	.1593
	<i>Communist/ Far Left</i>		0
Cyprus	Social Democratic	DIKO, KS EDEK, Citizens Alliance	.2025
	Center Right	DISY, Solidarity Movement	.4512
	<i>Liberal/Green</i>	<i>Cyprus Green Party</i>	.0142
	<i>Far Right</i>	<i>ELAM</i>	.0373

	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>	<i>Party for the Animals of Cyprus</i>	.0053
	Communist/ Far Left	AKEL	.2895
Czechia	Social Democratic	ČSSD, SPO	.1110
	Center Right	TOP 09, ODS, KDU-ČSL, Realisté, Svobodní	.3101
	Liberal/Green	Pirate Party, ANO 2011, Mayors and Independents	.4272
	Far Right	SPD, Úsvit-NK, DSSS	.0674
	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>		0
	Communist/ Far Left	KSČM	.0829
Denmark	Social Democratic	Social Democrats, Socialist People's Party	.4050
	Center Right	Conservative People's Party, Christian Democrats, Liberal Party, Liberal Alliance	.3101
	Liberal/Green	Radical Liberals, Alternative, Social Liberal Party	.1189
	Far Right	Danish People's Party, New Right	.1482
	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>		0
	<i>Communist/ Far Left</i>	<i>Red-Green Alliance</i>	.0179
Estonia	Social Democratic	Social Democratic Party	.1354
	Center Right	Estonian Reform Party, Pro Patria, Estonian Free Party	.4143
	Liberal/Green	Estonian Centre Party, Estonian	.3287

		Greens, Estonia 200, Richness of Life, Estonia United	
	Far Right	Conservative People's Party, Estonian Independence, Party of People's Unity	.1216
	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>		0
	<i>Communist/ Far Left</i>		0
Finland	Social Democratic	Social Democratic Party, Left Alliance	.2487
	Center Right	National Coalition Party, Christian Democrats, Seven Star Movement	.2444
	Liberal/Green	Swedish People's Party of Finland, Centre Party, Finland's Future, Pirate Party, Green League, Citizen Party, Feminist Party, Citizen's Party/People's Party	.3520
	Far Right	Finns Party, Independence Party, Blue Reform, Finnish People First	.1515
	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>	<i>For the Poor, Liberal Party, Animal Justice Party, Independence Party</i>	.0017
	<i>Communist/ Far Left</i>	<i>Communist Party, Communist Workers' Party, Workers' Party</i>	.0017
France	Social Democratic	PS, Miscellaneous Left	.1850
	Center Right	LR, Miscellaneous Right, UDI, Agir	.1678
	Liberal/Green	EELV, LREM, MODEM, non-EELV environmentalists	.3476

	Far Right	FN, RN, Debout La France, right-extremists	.1517
	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>	<i>Regionalists</i>	.0011
	Communist/ Far Left	PCF, FI, LO, NPA, Left Radical Party, left-extremists	.1468
Georgia	Social Democratic	Georgian Dream, Georgian Labor Party, United Democratic Movement	.5863
	Center Right	United National Movement, New Rightists, Republican Party, Industry Will Save Georgia, European Georgia, State for the People, New Political Center Girchi	.3252
	<i>Liberal/Green</i>	<i>Free Democrats, National Forum, Strategy Builder, Development Party</i>	.0288
	Far Right	Alliance of Patriots	.0597
	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>		0
	<i>Communist/ Far Left</i>		0
Germany	Social Democratic	SPD	.2238
	Center Right	CDU/CSU	.3351
	Liberal/Green	Green Party, FDP, Pirates	.2665
	Far Right	AfD, NPD, The Republicans	.0868
	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>		0
	Communist/ Far Left	Die Linke	.0878
Greece	Social Democratic	Syriza, Panhellenic Socialist	.3838

		Movement, Democratic Alignment, Popular Unity, The River, Course of Freedom	
	Center Right	New Democracy, Independent Greeks	.3949
	<i>Liberal/Green</i>	<i>Union of Centrists</i>	.0255
	Far Right	Golden Dawn	.0637
	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>		0
	Communist/ Far Left	Communist Party, Antarsya	.1322
Hungary	Social Democratic	MSZP, Together	.1508
	Center Right	Fidesz, KDNP, Hungarian Liberal Party	.3671
	Liberal/Green	LMP, DK, Momentum, Dialogue	.1891
	Far Right	Jobbik	.2556
	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>	<i>Two-Tailed Dog</i>	.0344
	<i>Communist/ Far Left</i>	<i>Workers' Party</i>	.0029
Iceland	Social Democratic	Social Democratic Party, Socialist Party	.2179
	Center Right	Independence Party, Progressive Party, Reform Party, Center Party	.4890
	Liberal/Green	Left Green, Bright Future, Pirate Party, Dawn, Humanist Party	.2317
	<i>Far Right</i>	<i>Icelandic Nationalist Party, Icelandic National Front</i>	.0247
	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>	<i>Party of the People</i>	.0348

	<i>Communist/ Far Left</i>	<i>Alþýðufylkinguna, People's Front of Iceland</i>	.0018
Ireland	Social Democratic	Labour, Sinn Fein, Social Democrats	.2292
	Center Right	Fianna Fail, Fine Gael	.6509
	<i>Liberal/Green</i>	<i>Green Party</i>	.0315
	<i>Far Right</i>		0
	Other/ Non-Ideological	Independents, Independent Alliance	.0629
	<i>Communist/ Far Left</i>	<i>People Before Profit, Socialist Party, Independents 4 Change</i>	.0237
Italy	Social Democratic	PD, Liberi e Uguali, Italy Europe Together, Italian Left	.2637
	Center Right	Forza Italia, CPL, UDC, South Tyrol People's Party, Us with Italy, People of the Family	.1060
	<i>Liberal/Green</i>	<i>More Europe, SVP-PATT, Popular Civic Lorenzin</i>	.0180
	Far Right	Lega Nord, Brothers of Italy, Casapound Italia, Italy to the Italians	.2508
	Other/ Non-Ideological	Five Star Movement	.3378
	<i>Communist/ Far Left</i>	<i>Power to the People, Communist Party</i>	.0237
Latvia	Social Democratic	Social Democratic Party "Harmony", The Progressives, LSDSP/KDS/GKL, For Latvia from the Heart, SPDS, Development/For!, Latvia Social	.2195

		Democratic Workers' Party	
	Center Right	Unity, JKP, LRA, New Unity, ZZS	.4423
	Liberal/Green	LKS, LA, Latvian Russian Union, Latvian Association of Regions	.0967
	Far Right	KPV IV, Action, LNNK, LCP, LN, All for Latvia!, Action Party, Latvian Centrist Party	.2382
	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>		0
	<i>Communist/ Far Left</i>	<i>For an Alternative</i>	.0033
Lithuania	Social Democratic	LSDP	.2098
	Center Right	TS-LKD, PKS-JL, LLRA-KSS, APKK-LCP, Electoral Action of Lithuania's Poles, Lithuanian Centre Party, Lithuanian Freedom Union, Liberal Union	.3619
	Liberal/Green	LLSL, LVZS, LRLS, DP, LZP	.3702
	Far Right	TT, TS	.0523
	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>	<i>DK, LLP, LS, LPP, Anti-Corruption Coalition</i>	.0054
	<i>Communist/ Far Left</i>		0
Luxembourg	Social Democratic	Socialist Workers' Party	.1425
	Center Right	Christian Social People's Party, Democratic Party	.4829
	Liberal/Green	The Greens, Pirate Party of Luxembourg	.2480

	<i>Far Right</i>	<i>Alternative Democratic Reform Party</i>	.0422
	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>	<i>DEMOKRATIE</i>	.0079
	Communist/ Far Left	The Left, Communist Party	.0765
Malta	Social Democratic	Labour Party	.6667
	Center Right	Nationalist Party	.3165
	<i>Liberal/Green</i>	<i>Democratic Alternative</i>	.0135
	<i>Far Right</i>	<i>Maltese Patriots' Movement</i>	.0034
	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>		0
	<i>Communist/ Far Left</i>		0
Montenegro	Social Democratic	Democratic Party of Socialists, Social Democratic Party, Social Democrats of Montenegro, Socialist People's Party	.6690
	Center Right	DEMOS, United Montenegro, Montenegrin Party, Democratic Union of Albanians, Albanian Alternative, True Montenegro, HGI, KEY, Democratic Serb Party, Democratic Front, Bosniak Party	.2458
	Liberal/Green	Positive Montenegro, Liberal Party of Montenegro, Democratic Montenegro, United Reform Action	.0630
	<i>Far Right</i>	<i>Serbian Radicals</i>	.0027
	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>	<i>FORCA, FORCA-DUA-AA, For One Goal, Alternative, Pensioners, Justice</i>	.0195

		<i>and Reconciliation Party</i>	
	<i>Communist/ Far Left</i>		0
Netherlands	Social Democratic	PvdA, SP, DENK	.1933
	Center Right	VVD, CDA, CU, 50PLUS	.3726
	Liberal/Green	D66, GroenLinks, Artikel1	.2422
	Far Right	PVV, FvD, SGP	.1527
	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>	<i>PvdD</i>	.0392
	<i>Communist/ Far Left</i>		0
North Macedonia	Social Democratic	DUI, NSDP, SDAM, Socialistic Party, Serbian Party	.4151
	Center Right	Movement Besa, DPSM, Alliance of Albanians	.0720
	Liberal/Green	GROM, Democratic Renewal, LDP, PEF, POPGM	.065
	Far Right	VMRO-DPMNE, DPA	.3893
	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>	<i>DPTM, PDT, RAM</i>	.0314
	<i>Communist/ Far Left</i>	<i>Levica</i>	.0277
Norway	Social Democratic	Socialist Left, Norwegian Labour	.3618
	Center Right	Christian Democratic Party, Conservative Party, Coast Party, The Christians	.3200
	Liberal/Green	Liberal Party, Centre Party, Green Party	.1923

	Far Right	Progress Party, Democrats in Norway	.0935
	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>	<i>Pensioners' Party</i>	.0028
	<i>Communist/ Far Left</i>	<i>Rodt</i>	.0294
Poland	Social Democratic	United Left, Democratic Left Alliance	.0519
	Center Right	Civic Platform, Polish Peasants' Party, Polish People's Party	.3211
	Liberal/Green	Modern Poland, Together	.0784
	Far Right	Law and Justice, KORWiN, Kukiz' 15	.5486
	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>		0
	<i>Communist/ Far Left</i>		0
Portugal	Social Democratic	PS, Left Block, PTP-MAS, NC, Labor Party	.5296
	Center Right	PPD-PSD/CDS-PP, Social Democratic Party, Social Democratic Centre, Liberal Initiative, Alliance, Earth Party	.2484
	<i>Liberal/Green</i>	<i>L/TDA, MPT, PDR, FREE, Liberal Democratic Party</i>	.0073
	<i>Far Right</i>	<i>PNR, PPV/CDC, Enough</i>	.0416
	Other/ Non-Ideological	PAN, JPP, PPM, PURP	.0979
	Communist/ Far Left	PCTP/MRPP, PCP-PEV-CDU, Unified Democratic Coalition, Alternative Socialist Movement,	.0752

		Portuguese Communist Party, Communist Party, Workers' Party	
Romania	Social Democratic	National Union for Romania, Social Democratic Party	.3697
	Center Right	National Liberal Party, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats, Democratic Union of Hungarians from Romania, Popular Movement Party	.5814
	<i>Liberal/Green</i>	<i>Save Romania Union</i>	.0332
	<i>Far Right</i>	<i>Greater Romania Party, United Romania Party</i>	.0156
	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>		0
	<i>Communist/ Far Left</i>	<i>Demos</i>	0
Serbia	Social Democratic	LDP LSV SDS, Serbia for All of Us, Restart, Doors, Democratic Party, SDS, LDP, PUPS, SPS, Roma Party, SDPS	.0701
	Center Right	Serbia Wins, SPS JS, Party for Democratic Action, Alliance of Vojvodina's Hungarians, SNS, United Serbia, SDA	.6408
	Liberal/Green	Party for Democratic Action of Sandzak, Green Party, Free Citizens Movement, LSV	.1378
	Far Right	Serbian Radical Party, Bosniak Democratic Community of Sandzak, New Serbia, Enough is Enough	.1513

	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>		0
	<i>Communist/ Far Left</i>		0
Slovakia	Social Democratic	Smer-SD	.2978
	Center Right	OL'aNO, SNS, SaS, Siet', Christian Democratic Movement, Party of the Hungarian Community	.4142
	Liberal/Green	Most-Hid, Slovak Green Party	.0765
	Far Right	L'SNS, We Are Family	.2030
	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>		0
	<i>Communist/ Far Left</i>	<i>Communist Party</i>	.0087
Slovenia	Social Democratic	PS, SD	.1816
	Center Right	NSI, SLS	.0944
	Liberal/Green	DeSUS, LMS, SAB, SMC, Slovenian Pirate Party, ZAAB	.3468
	Far Right	SNS, SDS, Patriotic League	.2766
	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>	<i>Good Country</i>	.0062
	<i>Communist/ Far Left</i>	L, ZL	.0944
Spain	Social Democratic	PSOE, Unidas Podemos, Podemos, IU, Together We Can, More Country, Commitment, ERC, Bloque Nacionalista Galego, EH Bildu, Together for Catalonia, In Tide, Compromise, Republican Left of Catalonia, Yes to the Future, New Canary Islands	.5634

	Center Right	PP, Citizens, PDeCAT, Basque Nationalist Party, CC-PNC, Navarre Sums, PRC, Union of Navarrese People, Aragonese Party, Asturias Forum	.3499
	<i>Liberal/Green</i>	<i>Initiative for Catalonia</i>	.0036
	Far Right	VOX	.0678
	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>	<i>PACMA</i>	.0128
	<i>Communist/ Far Left</i>	<i>CUP</i>	.0024
Sweden	Social Democratic	Social Democrats	.3526
	Center Right	Christian Democrats, Conservatives	.2634
	Liberal/Green	Centre Party, Liberals, Green Party, Feminist Initiative	.1736
	Far Right	Sweden Democrats	.1452
	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>		0
	Communist/ Far Left	Left Party	.0652
Switzerland	Social Democratic	Social Democratic Party, Alternative Left	.2420
	Center Right	Swiss People's Party, The Liberals, Christian Democratic Party, Conservative Democratic Party, Evangelical People's Party	.5910
	Liberal/Green	Green Party, Green Liberal Party, Pirate Party	.1420
	<i>Far Right</i>	<i>Federal Democratic Union, Ticino</i>	.0162

		<i>League, MCR</i>	
	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>		<i>0</i>
	<i>Communist/ Far Left</i>	<i>Swiss Labour</i>	<i>.0089</i>
Ukraine	Social Democratic	All Ukrainian Association, Ukrainian Strategy	.1430
	Center Right	Opozytsiina Platforma, Yevropeiska Solidarnist, Syl'a i Chest. Opposition Bloc	.4242
	Liberal/Green	Sluha Narodu, Holos	.3079
	Far Right	Radical Party, Shariy's Party, Svoboda	.1249
	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>		<i>0</i>
	<i>Communist/ Far Left</i>		<i>0</i>
United Kingdom	Social Democratic	Labour, SNP, Plaid Cymru, Sinn Fein, SDLP	.4235
	Center Right	Conservatives, UUP, DUP	.3977
	Liberal/Green	Liberal Democrats, Green Party, Alliance, Green Party of Northern Ireland	.1351
	<i>Far Right</i>	<i>UKIP, TUV, BNP</i>	<i>.0430</i>
	<i>Other/ Non-Ideological</i>		<i>0</i>
	<i>Communist/ Far Left</i>	<i>PBP Alliance</i>	<i>.0008</i>

Appendix E: Social-Democratic Parties Manifesto Project Data Was Generated For, By Nation

Nation	Party (Election year)
Albania	Not available
Armenia	Armenian Revolutionary Federation, 2012 manifesto (2017)
Austria	SPÖ (2017)
Belgium	SP.A (2014, 2019)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	SDP BiH (2018)
Bulgaria	BSP for Bulgaria (2017)
Croatia	People's Coalition (2016)
Cyprus	Social Democrats' Movement (2016)
Czech Republic	Czech Social Democratic Party (2017)
Denmark	Social Democratic Party (2015, 2019)
Estonia	Social Democratic Party (2015)
Finland	Finnish Social Democrats (2015, 2019)
France	Socialist Party (2017)
Georgia	Georgian Dream (2016)
Germany	SPD (2017)
Greece	Syriza, September 2015 manifesto (September 2015, 2019)

Hungary	Hungarian Socialist Party (2018)
Iceland	The Alliance- Social Democratic Party of Iceland (2017)
Ireland	Sinn Fein (2016)
Italy	Democratic Party (2018)
Latvia	Social Democratic Party “Harmony” (2018)
Lithuania	Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (2016)
Luxembourg	Socialist Workers’ Party of Luxembourg, 2013 manifesto (2018)
North Macedonia	Social-Democratic League of Macedonia (2016)
Malta	Not available
Montenegro	Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro (2016)
Netherlands	Socialist Party (2017)
Norway	Labour Party (2017)
Poland	Democratic Left Alliance, 2011 manifesto (2015)
Portugal	Socialist Party (2015, 2019)
Romania	Social Democratic Party (2016)
Serbia	Socialist Party of Serbia / United Serbia (2016)
Slovakia	Smer-SD (2016)
Slovenia	Social Democratic Party (2018)
Spain	Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (2016, April

	2019, November 2019)
Sweden	Social Democratic Labour Party (2014, 2018)
Switzerland	Social Democratic Party of Switzerland (2015)
Ukraine	Not available
United Kingdom	Labour Party (2017)