Exponential Separations In Local Differential Privacy

Matthew Joseph



Jieming Mao



Aaron Roth

<u>Problem</u>

Problem



Problem



"How many Americans have used a schedule-I drug?

<u>Problem</u>



"How many Americans have used a schedule-I drug?

People are probably reluctant to tell the federal government honestly...


<u>Problem</u>





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
...so how can I get an accurate answer while guaranteeing plausible deniability for everyone?"








 $O(\sqrt{\# \text{ responses}})$ accuracy



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"Sounds good! Let's do that."



Surgeon General Jerome Adams



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"Sounds good! Let's do that."

"Or maybe we can do better if we ask many questions?

First ask person one q, then use the answer to ask person second q, and so on."



Dep. Surgeon General Erica Schwartz



Surgeon General Jerome Adams

"Sounds good! Let's do that."

"Or maybe we can do better if we ask many questions?

First ask person one q, then use the answer to ask person second q, and so on."

"Sounds cumbersome! We need **proof** that the extra effort is worth it first."



Dep. Surgeon General Erica Schwartz

This Talk

Prove adaptive questioning with plausible deniability is worth it.

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Prove adaptive questioning with plausible deniability is worth it.



Construct problem where we can prove fully interactive locally differentially private protocols get much better sample complexity than sequentially interactive ones.

<u>Outline</u>

1. Preliminaries

2. Tool: LDP ≈ Noisy Communication

3. Application: Exponential Separation

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Local Differential Privacy (LDP) [DMNS06]

Each user has their own private datum

Protocol A learns about the data through public communication with users

Users send messages through randomizers R

Randomness ensures privacy

LDP in Math

<u>Definition</u>: Protocol A is (ε, δ) -locally differentially private (LDP) if the transcript of communications it generates is an (ε, δ) -DP function of the user data.

For neighboring distributed databases X and X',

$$P[T(X) \text{ in } Y] \le e^{\varepsilon} P[T(X') \text{ in } Y] + \delta$$

LDP: Pros and Cons

Pros:

- ✓ Data never leaves user device, only DP outputs
- ✓ Don't have to store any private data

LDP: Pros and Cons

Pros:


- ✓ Data never leaves user device, only DP outputs
- ✓ Don't have to store any private data

Cons:

- X More noise → worse utility
- X Don't get to store any private data


<u>Definition</u>: Protocol *A* is noninteractive if all users speak once, simultaneously and independently.

Make all randomizer assignments beforehand.





<u>Definition</u>: Protocol ⚠ is sequentially interactive [DJW13] if all users speak once (possibly in multiple rounds).

Make randomizer assignments adaptively.



<u>Definition</u>: Protocol *A* is *fully interactive* if users may interact arbitrarily (possibly speak multiple times, in multiple rounds).






Noninteractive


 $\begin{bmatrix} x_1 \\ y_1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x_2 \\ y_2 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x_3 \\ y_3 \end{bmatrix} \cdots$

rounds = 1

Sequentially Interactive




rounds ≤# users Fully Interactive




rounds = ???

Local Differential Privacy


Noninteractive



Sequentially Interactive




Fully Interactive




[KLNRS08] [DF19]

Local Differential Privacy


Noninteractive



Sequentially Interactive



Fully Interactive



[KLNRS08] [DF18] This Work

Local Differential Privacy

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1. Preliminaries

2. Tool: LDP ≈ Noisy Communication

3. Application: Exponential Separation

General connection between two-party communication complexity (CC) and multi-party locally private sample complexity (SC).

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Two-party problem: Alice has input **a**, Bob has input **b**, want to compute some function of **a** and **b**.

General connection between two-party communication complexity (CC) and multi-party locally private sample complexity (SC).

Two-party problem: Alice has input **a**, Bob has input **b**, want to compute some function of **a** and **b**.

Multi-party problem: each user randomly gets \mathbf{a} or \mathbf{b} , want to compute some function of \mathbf{a} and \mathbf{b} .

Tool: LDP ≈ Noisy Communication


Theorem: Given two-party problem P_2 and multi-party analogue P_m , for $\varepsilon = O(1)$, $SC^{\varepsilon,S}(P_m) = \Theta(CC(P_2)/\varepsilon^2)$.

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Proof Sketch

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Three parts:

1. Connect CC of noiseless and CC of ε'-noisy two-party communication problems [BR14, BM15]

Proof Sketch

- 1. Connect CC of noiseless and CC of ε'-noisy two-party communication problems [BR14, BM15]
- 2. Connect CC of ε'-noisy two-party and SC of 1-bit-per-person sequentially interactive ε-locally private multi-party communication problems

```
2.: \rightarrow
* P_m^{\epsilon,S,1} \rightarrow P_s^{\epsilon',noisy}: Alice and Bob randomly partition users in P_m^{\epsilon,S,1} between them
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- * $P_m^{\epsilon,S,1} \rightarrow P_2^{\epsilon',\text{noisy}}$: Alice and Bob randomly partition users in $P_m^{\epsilon,S,1}$ between them
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```
uses SC^{\epsilon,S} = \# randomizer calls
  Proof Sketch
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Proof Sketch

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* P_m^{\epsilon,S,1} \leftarrow P_2^{\epsilon',\text{noisy}}: for each bit in P_2^{\epsilon',\text{noisy}}, draw a new user
```

* user sends bit through **£**-RR if correct of Alice and Bob otherwise uniform random


Proof Sketch

- 1. Connect CC of noiseless and CC of ε'-noisy two-party communication problems [BR14, BM15]
- 2. Connect CC of ε'-noisy two-party and SC of 1-bit-per-person sequentially interactive ε-locally private multi-party communication problems

Proof Sketch

- 1. Connect CC of noiseless and CC of ε'-noisy two-party communication problems [BR14, BM15]
- 2. Connect CC of ε'-noisy two-party and SC of 1-bit-per-person sequentially interactive ε-locally private multi-party communication problems
- 3. Connect SC of 1-bit-per-person and SC of generic sequentially interactive ε-locally private multi-party communication problems [BS15] Tool: LDP ≈ Noisy Communication

Proof Sketch



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Can now get multi-party $SC^{\epsilon,S}$ lower bounds straight from two-party CC lower bounds.


<u>Outline</u>


1. Prelims


2. Tool: LDP ≈ Noisy Communication


Useful because two-party CC lower bounds are well-studied.


<u>Lemma</u> [GKR16]: Solving the two-party *hidden layers* problem requires $CC = \Omega(2^k)$.

















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Corollary: For P_m = multi-party hidden layers problem, $SC^{\epsilon,S}(P_m) = \Omega(2^k/\epsilon^2)$. But $SC^{\epsilon,F}(P_m) = O(k/\epsilon^2)$. (At each node, for all 2^k possible next nodes, ask all users if correct. Can handle 2^k by union bound on RR accuracy.)



Surgeon General Jerome Adams

"The extra effort is worth it if we're trying to solve the hidden layers problem!



Dep. Surgeon General Erica Schwartz



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And we can prove it using a general connection between local differential privacy and communication complexity."



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"The extra effort is worth it if we're trying to solve the hidden layers problem!

And we can prove it using a general connection between local differential privacy and communication complexity."

"Great! We'll keep that in mind if we ever need to solve the hidden layers problem."



Dep. Surgeon General Erica Schwartz

How large can the gap between SI and FI be?

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arxiv.org/abs/1907.00813

<u>References</u>

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