



# Hands-On





# Exercise Structure

- OTCEP25 folder on Windows VM desktop with the necessary exercise files
- PROMPT.txt
  - Contains the command to be copy-pasted into the **Chat Panel**
  - Commands to be pasted as plain text (Ctrl + Shift + v)
- COMMANDS.txt
  - Contains the command to be copy-pasted into the **terminal** after the generated code have been accepted
- ANSWER.txt
  - Contains an example of the code generated during preparation using the same prompt within PROMPT.txt





# Disclaimer

- GenAI produces non-deterministic output
  - Same prompt (with same context) may not produce the same output
- If the code produced by prompt does not work:
  - Revert changes and try again with the same prompt,
  - Copy-paste the error message(s) into LLM to debug, or
  - Use the code provided in ANSWER.txt



## Submit from a previous message?

Submitting from a previous message will revert file changes to before this message and clear the messages after this one.

☐

Don't ask again

Cancel (esc)

Continue without reverting

Continue and revert ↗




# Setting the Stage

- The following scenarios are a snapshot of the execution phase of a Purple Team Exercise
- Attacker Scenarios
  - Leveraging GenAI to generate payloads that bypass AV signature detection
  - Leveraging GenAI to generate payloads that blend into the background
- Defender Scenarios
  - Leverage GenAI to supplement detection rules from open-source repositories
  - Leverage GenAI to improve and refine detection rules

# Scenario 1: Payload Obfuscation

## Attacker





# AttackExercise1: Motivation

Recently, advancements in the code understanding capabilities of LLMs have raised concerns about criminals using LLMs to generate novel malware. Although LLMs struggle to create malware from scratch, criminals can easily use them to rewrite or obfuscate existing malware, making it harder to detect.

Adversaries have long used common obfuscation techniques and tools to avoid detection. We can easily fingerprint or detect off-the-shelf obfuscation tools because they are well known to defenders and produce changes in a predefined way. However, criminals can prompt LLMs to perform transformations that are much more natural-looking, which makes detecting this malware more challenging.

Furthermore, given enough layers of transformations, many

Source: <https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/using-llms-obfuscate-malicious-javascript/>

Date: Dec 2024



# AttackExercise1: Motivation

## Findings: Government-Backed Threat Actors Misusing Gemini

### At a Glance: Government-Backed Attackers

Government-backed attackers attempted to use Gemini for coding and scripting tasks, gathering information about potential targets, researching publicly known vulnerabilities, and enabling post-compromise activities, such as defense evasion in a target environment.


Source: <https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/adversarial-misuse-generative-ai>

Date: Jan 2025



# AttackExercise1: Preparation

- Listener that simulates attacker Command & Control (C2) infrastructure (listener.bat)
  - A batch script that simulates the attacker's command & control server
  - Uses `ncat.exe` to listen on port 1234 for incoming connections








# AttackExercise1: Thought Process

- PowerCat is a PowerShell script allows an attacker to connect a victim machine to their system
  - Able to execute code on victim machine remotely
- The script has been signatored and is being detected by Win Defender
- Attacker needs to obfuscate the code in order to execute it





# AttackExercise1: Obfuscation

- What is obfuscation?
  - A technique hackers use to disguise malicious code to bypass Antivirus software
  - Imagine writing a harmful message in a secret code (obfuscation) so security guards can't read it



# AttackExercise1: Obfuscation Examples

- String obfuscation

```
2
3  ✓ with open("HelloWorld.txt", "w") as file:
4      |     file.write("Hello World")
```



```
3  ascii_codes = [72, 101, 108, 108, 111, 87, 111, 114, 108, 100, 46, 116, 120, 116]
4  filename3 = ''.join(chr(code) for code in ascii_codes)
5  ✓ with open(filename3, "w") as file:
6      |     file.write("Hello World")
```



# AttackExercise1: Obfuscation Examples

- Renaming function and variable names

```
1 function OTCEPFunc() {  
2     var OTCEP = 'hello';  
3     console.log(OTCEP);  
4 }  
5 OTCEPFunc();
```




```
1 function a7k9x2m() {  
2     var b3n8w5 = 'hello';  
3     console.log(b3n8w5);  
4 }  
5 a7k9x2m();
```



# AttackExercise1: Execution

- **Task:** Use Cursor to modify and obfuscate the existing code, target file is **simplecat.ps1** in the AttackExercise1 folder





# AttackExercise1: Execution

- Copy the prompt in PROMPT1.txt to the agent chat window and hit enter
- The obfuscated code will be “added” to a new file named Exercise1.ps1
- Click ‘Accept file’ to save changes made in Exercise1.ps1

simplecat.ps1

Rename all parameters and function names to short random alphanumeric chars and save it to file Exercise1.ps1 in the same folder. Use xyz as the function name, a for client mode, b for port and c for execute.

Restore checkpoint

AttackExercise1 > Exercise1.ps1

```
1 function xyz
2 {
3     param(
4         [alias("Client")][string] $a="",
5         [alias("Port")][Parameter(Position=-1)][string] $b="",
6         [alias("Execute")][string] $c=""
7     )
```



```
33 $f1 = $False
34 netstat -na | Select-String LISTENING | % {if($_.ToString().split(":")[1].split(" ")[0] -eq $b){Write-Output ("The selected port " + $b + " is already in use")
35 if($f1){break}
36 }
37 ##### VALIDATE ARGS #####
38
```


1 / 1 ~ Reject file Ctrl+Shift+Q Accept file Ctrl+Shift+A



# AttackExercise1: Execution

- Run listener.bat, if it is not running yet
- **Right click** Exercise1.ps1 and click “Open in Integrated Terminal”
  - Copy the text in COMMAND1.TXT into the Terminal and hit enter
- Observe a shell connection has been made to the attacker listener.bat









# AttackExercise1: Prompt Engineering

Rename all parameters and function names to short random alphanumeric chars and save it to file Exercise1.ps1 in the same folder.

Use xyz as the function name, a for client mode, b for port and c for execute.

Specific instruction to rename parameters and function names  
More consistent output than generic 'obfuscate' instruction

For consistency in this exercise  
Not necessary for actual engagements




# AttackExercise1: Conclusion

- New obfuscated code was successful in establishing a reverse shell
- Code is no longer detected by Windows Defender
  - Test out the evasion by copying the file to Desktop and see if it gets flagged
  - Renaming function and variable names worked, WinDef was detecting malicious code based on this
- **Takeaway:** GenAI is enabling threat actors to efficiently rework malware to bypass signature-based defences

# Scenario 2: Payload Conversion

## Attacker





# AttackExercise2: Motivation

## 3. FIN7 and LOLBins

FIN7, also known as Carbanak, is a financially motivated cybercriminal group known for its use of LotL techniques, particularly the abuse of LOLBins.

- **Mshta and HTML Applications:** FIN7 has been known to use Mshta to execute malicious HTA files that were delivered via phishing emails. These HTA files contained scripts that would download and execute additional malware.
- **Rundll32 and Custom DLLs:** The group has also used Rundll32 to execute malicious functions from custom DLLs. This allowed them to bypass security controls and maintain persistence within compromised systems.

FIN7's use of LOLBins highlights how cybercriminals can effectively leverage legitimate tools to carry out sophisticated attacks while evading detection.

Source: <https://www.netsecurity.com/what-is-living-off-the-land-lotl-technique-and-how-to-detect>




## AttackExercise2: Motivation

- Blending into the environment
  - Payloads executed through trusted and default programs often appear as regular activity
  - This makes it challenging for defenders to differentiate malicious behaviour from benign ones



## AttackExercise2: Thought Process

- Attacker has gotten a foothold onto the system in Exercise 1, now needs a way to maintain access even through system reboots (Persistence Technique)
- A common method is by using Windows Scheduled Tasks. A scheduled task has 3 main parts:
  - Trigger – When should it run? (e.g., at 11 PM, on startup)
  - Action – What should it do? (e.g., run a program or command)
  - Conditions/Settings – Optional rules (e.g., only if plugged in)


Name	Status	Triggers	Next Run Time
 MicrosoftEd...	Ready	Multiple triggers defined	19/7/2025 10:17:14 am

Action	Details
Start a program	C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeUpdate\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe /c



## AttackExercise2: Thought Process


- Attacker usually uses a PowerShell script to create the scheduled task
- Attacker enumerated the system and discovered Node.js installed, which could be leveraged to execute the script as well
  - Allow the task execution to blend into Node.js activity





## AttackExercise2: Execution

- **Task:** Use Cursor to convert the existing PowerShell script to be executable in Node.js, target file is **scheduledtask.ps1** in the AttackExercise2 folder









## AttackExercise2: Execution



- Search for Task Scheduler from Start button and open it
- Observe that there isn't any Malicious tasks currently





## AttackExercise2: Execution

- Copy the prompt in **PROMPT2.txt** to the agent chat window and hit enter
- New code written in NodeJS will be saved to **Exercise2.js**
- Right click **Exercise2.js** and click “Open in Integrated Terminal”
  - Copy the text in **COMMAND2.TXT** into the Terminal and hit enter




```
PS C:\Users\vagrant\Desktop\OTCEP25\AttackExercise2> node .\Exercise2.js
Task created successfully:
SUCCESS: The scheduled task "BasicMalicious" has successfully been created.
```



## AttackExercise2: Execution

- Refresh the task scheduler and look for BasicMalicious task

Name	Status	Triggers	Next Run Time	Last Run Time
 BasicMalicious	Ready	At 11:59 PM on 6/30/2025	6/30/2025 11:59:00 PM	11/30/1999 12:00:00 AM

host [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBox

FileMachineViewInputDevicesHelp

FileEditSelectionViewGoRunTerminalHelp

OTCEP25

AttackExercise1

AttackExercise2

ANSWER2.txt

COMMAND2.txt

PROMPT2.txt

scheduledtask.ps1

DefendExercise3

DefendExercise4

ExtraExercise5

listener.bat

OUTLINE

TIMELINE

scheduledtask.ps1

AttackExercise2 > scheduledtask.ps1

1 schtasks /create /sc once /tn BasicMalicious /tr calc.exe /st 23:59

New Chat

@

Plan, search, build anything

Agent Ctrl+I gpt-4.1

Past Chats

View All

Modify TCP proxy for cmd.exe piping1d

Improve SPL query for scheduled task detection1d

Convert Sigma rule to Splunk query1d

Cursor TabLn 1, Col 68Spaces: 4UTF-8CRLFPowerShell1:39 PM7/23/2025



## AttackExercise2: Prompt Engineering

Convert this PowerShell script to a NodeJS script and save as Exercise2.js in this folder.

The script should not require any further installation and

should only consist of a single file.

Convert the PowerShell script into Node.js script

Ensure the script can run on any machine with Node.js, without additional setup

No splitting code into modules or using external files.  
This makes the script easy to run and deploy




## AttackExercise2: Conclusion

- Attacker was able to recreate the Persistence technique using living-off-the-land method
  - PowerShell logging will not be useful for detection
- **Takeaway: Attackers can leverage GenAI to quickly adapt their payloads to blend in with normal activity and evade detection**

# Scenario 3: Rule Conversion

## Defender





## DefendExercise3: Motivation

- Sigma is an open standard for writing detection rules in a generic, readable format
- There is an open-source repository of Sigma rules available
  - <https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma>
  - Hundreds of pre-built rules for Windows, Linux, cloud, and application logs.
- Browse and select from the available rules to match your needs

```
title: Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation via schtasks.exe
id: a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890
status: experimental
description: Detects creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/
author: Security Analyst
date: 2024/01/01
modified: 2024/01/01
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege_escalation
  - attack.t1053.005
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'schtasks'
      - '/create'
  filter_privs:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'NT AUTH'
      - ' SYSTEM'
      - 'HIGHEST'
  condition: all of selection and not filter_privs
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate administrative tasks
  - System maintenance scripts
  - Software installations
level: medium
```





# DefendExercise3: Thought Process


- The Sigma repository contains a rule related to suspicious scheduled task creation.
- The Defender system uses Splunk as the SIEM, so the search query needs to be written in Splunk Search Processing Language (SPL)
  - Conversion from Sigma to SPL is required for the rule to be utilized

```
title: Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation via schtasks.exe
id: a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890
status: experimental
description: Detects creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/
author: Security Analyst
date: 2024/01/01
modified: 2024/01/01
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege_escalation
  - attack.t1053.005
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: security
detection:
  selection:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'schtasks'
      - '/create'
  filter_privs:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'NT AUTH'
      - ' SYSTEM'
      - 'HIGHEST'
  condition: all of selection and not filter_privs
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate administrative tasks
  - System maintenance scripts
  - Software installations
level: medium
```



## DefendExercise3: Execution

- **Task:** Use Cursor to convert the selected Sigma rule to SPL, target file is **SIGMARULE.TXT** in the DefendExercise3 folder





## DefendExercise3: Execution

- Copy the prompt in **PROMPT3.txt** to the agent chat window and hit enter
- New SPL query will be saved to **Exercise3.txt**
- Access Splunk in the Host VM Edge favourites bar, click Search & Reporting
  - Username: admin, Pass: password123

SIGMARULE.txt

Convert the Sigma rule into an efficient Splunk Processing Language (SPL) query using main as the index.



Convert 'CommandLine' -> 'Message'.

Translate the 'detection' logic from the Sigma rule into an optimized SPL query using the inferred context and the required field mapping.c" .

Do not add comments.

Save the output to Exercise3.txt in this folder folder.

Do not refer to any other files.





# DefendExercise3: Splunk

- Search box to enter your query
  - Searches through various log sources
- Results consist of the events returned based on the search query
  - Fields in the left column can be added to the search query to fine-tune it
- Look through the events to confirm if the event is a legitimate attack

**New Search**

`source="WinEventLog:Security"`

✓ 3,644 events (8/5/24 3:00:00.000 PM to 8/6/24 3:00:24.000 PM) No Event Sampling ▼

Events (3,644) Patterns Statistics Visualization

Format Timeline ▼ — Zoom Out + Zoom to Selection × Deselect

List ▼ ✓ Format 20 Per Page ▼

< Hide Fields All Fields

**SELECTED FIELDS**

- a host 2
- a source 1
- a sourcetype 1

**INTERESTING FIELDS**

- a Account\_Domain 8

i	Time	Event
>	8/6/24 3:00:22.000 PM	08/06/2024 03:00:22 PM LogName=Security EventCode=4688 EventType=0 ComputerName=host Show all 41 lines host = HOST   source = WinEventLog:Security



# DefendExercise3: Threat Hunting

- Copy in the SPL query from Exercise3.txt to the search bar
- Set limit to past hour

## New Search

```
index=* EventCode=4688 Message="*\\schtasks.exe*" Message="*schtasks*" Message="*/create*" NOT (Message="*NT AUT*" OR Message="* SYSTEM*" OR Message="*HIGHEST*")
```

tasks.exe\*" Message="\*schtasks\*" Message="\*/create\*" NOT (Message="\*NT AUT\*" OR Message="\* SYSTEM\*" OR Message="\*HIGHEST\*")

Today ▼

Presets

REAL-TIME	RELATIVE	OTHER
30 second window	Today	Last 15 minutes
1 minute window	Week to date	Last 60 minutes
5 minute window	Business week to date	Last 4 hours
30 minute window	Month to date	Last 24 hours
1 hour window	Year to date	Last 7 days



# DefendExercise3: Threat Hunting

- Look in the results for BasicMalicious Task

```
> 6/30/25 06/30/2025 10:27:30 AM
10:27:30.000 AM LogName=Security
EventCode=4688
EventType=0
ComputerName=host

Process Information:
New Process ID: 0xcdc
New Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe
Token Elevation Type: %%1936
Mandatory Label: S-1-16-12288
Creator Process ID: 0x1584
Creator Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
Process Command Line: "C:\Windows\system32\schtasks.exe" /create /sc once /tn BasicMalicious /tr calc.exe /st 23:59

Process Information:
New Process ID: 0xcdc
New Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe
Token Elevation Type: %%1936
Mandatory Label: S-1-16-12288
Creator Process ID: 0x1584
Creator Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
Process Command Line: "C:\Windows\system32\schtasks.exe" /create /sc once /tn BasicMalicious /tr calc.exe /st 23:59
```

host [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBox

FileMachineViewInputDevicesHelp

FileEditSelectionViewGoRunTerminalHelp

OTCEP25

AttackExercise1AttackExercise2DefendExercise3ANSWER3.txtPROMPT3.txtSIGMARULE.txtDefendExercise4ExtraExercise5listener.bat

SIGMARULE.txt

DefendExercise3 > SIGMARULE.txt

```
1 title: Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation via schtasks.exe
2 id: a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890
3 status: experimental
4 description: Detects creation of scheduled tasks using schtasks.exe command line utility
5 references:
6   - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/
7 author: Security Analyst
8 date: 2024/01/01
9 modified: 2024/01/01
10 tags:
11   - attack.persistence
12   - attack.privilege_escalation
13   - attack.t1053.005
14 logsource:
15   product: windows
16   service: security
17 detection:
18   selection:
19     CommandLine|contains|all:
20     - 'schtasks'
21     - '/create'
22   filter_privs:
23     CommandLine|contains:
24     - 'NT AUTH'
25     - 'SYSTEM'
26     - 'HIGHEST'
27   condition: all of selection and not filter_privs
28 falsepositives:
29   - Legitimate administrative tasks
30   - System maintenance scripts
31   - Software installations
32 level: medium
```

New Chat

@ SIGMARULE.txt

Plan, search, build anything

Agent Chat claude-3.5-sonnet

Past Chats

Convert Sigma rule to Splunk query

Convert PowerShell script to Node.js

Modify TCP proxy for cmd.exe piping

View All

Just now

7m

1d

Do you want to install the recommended 'PowerShell' extension from ms-vscode for the PowerShell language?

Show RecommendationsInstall

Type here to search

Cursor-TabLn 19, Col 34Spaces: 4UTF-8CRLFPlain Text1:47 PM7/23/2025



## DefendExercise3: Prompt Engineering

Convert the Sigma rule into an efficient Splunk Processing Language (SPL) query using main as the index.

Convert `CommandLine` -> `Message`.

Translate the `detection` logic from the Sigma rule into an optimized SPL query using the inferred context and the required field mapping".

Task cursor to do the conversion, specifying main as our index (based on our config)

We know that the CommandLine in Sigma rules maps to Message in SPL

Get Cursor to read through the Sigma rule and try to map to SPL correctly






## DefendExercise3: Conclusion

- Defender was able to detect the creation of a new scheduled task
- An open-source Sigma rule was used, rather than creating a rule from scratch
- The sigma rule could be translated to other query languages besides SPL
- **Takeaway: GenAI can accelerate detection engineering by adapting community-sourced detection logic into actionable rules, enabling quicker identification of attacker techniques**


# Scenario 4: Improve Rule Defender





## DefendExercise4: Motivation


- The Pyramid of Pain shows how hard it is for attackers to adapt when you detect different things
  - It is 'trivial' for attackers to get around detection mechanisms the lower it is on the pyramid
  - The higher you go on the pyramid, the more pain you cause attackers – and the more durable your detection becomes
- We will look at how we can leverage GenAI to 'level up' our detection strategy





# DefendExercise4: Thought Process


- Currently detecting the use of schtasks.exe
- Attackers can evade detection by using other tools
  - Such as PowerShell cmdlet Register-ScheduledTask
- Is there a way to broadly detect any task creation regardless of medium?
  - Answer: Windows Event ID**
- Detecting by Task Creation Windows Event ID forces attackers to use other methods of persistence
  - Detection is now higher up in the Pyramid of Pain






## DefendExercise4: Preparation

- In DefendExercise4 folder, right-click **advancedtask.ps1** and click “Run with PowerShell”
- Refresh the Task Scheduler and observe that there are 2 tasks now



	AdvancedMalicious	Ready	At 6:00 AM on 6/30/2025
	BasicMalicious	Ready	At 11:59 PM on 6/30/2025





## DefendExercise4: Preparation

- Re-run the detection rule in Splunk to look for any additional results
  - Observe that there isn't any result for AdvancedMalicious
- Defender observes that while there are 2 new tasks created in the system, the SPL rule is only able to detect 1
- Defender needs to produce a better rule that can detect both types of attack



## DefendExercise4: Execution

- **Task:** Use Cursor to generate a better SPL query, target file is **Exercise3.txt** in the DefendExercise3 folder

OTCEP25

AttackExercise1

AttackExercise2

DefendExercise3

ANSWER3.txt

**Exercise3.txt**

PROMPT3.txt

SIGMARULE.txt

DefendExercise4

advancedtask.ps1

ANSWER4.txt

Exercise4.txt

PROMPT4.txt

DefendExercise3 > Exercise3.txt

1 index=main Message="\*schtasks\*" Message="\*/create\*" NOT (Mess

Exercise3.txt

Refer to Exercise3.txt in DefendExercise3 folder and improve the SPL query to detect a new scheduled task creation using main as the index.

Craft the rule based on event id for task creation rather than LOLBINs.

Search for the use of 'exec' with the Message body.

Filter out Message with \Microsoft.



Do not add comments or refer to any other files.

Save the output to Exercise4.txt in DefendExercise4 folder.



## DefendExercise4: Execution

- Copy the prompt in **PROMPT4.txt** to the agent chat window
- Ensure context is set to **Exercise3.txt** and hit enter
- New SPL query will be saved to **Exercise4.txt**







# DefendExercise4: Execution

- Copy the SPL query from **Exercise4.txt** to the search bar, set limit to past hour

### New Search

```
source="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4698
| search "*exec*"
| eval detection_name="New Scheduled Task Creation with Exec Detection"
| eval severity="High"
| eval description="Detected creation of a new scheduled task containing 'exec' keyword using Windows Security Event ID 4698"
| table _time, Computer, User, EventCode, Task_Name, Command, CommandLine, ProcessName, keywords, detection_name, severity, description
| sort -_time
```

✓ 27 events (6/30/25 12:00:00.000 AM to 6/30/25 3:54:46.000 PM) No Event Sampling ▾

Events (27) Patterns **Statistics (27)** Visualization

20 Per Page ▾ Preview ▾

_time ↕	Computer ↕	User ↕	EventCode ↕	Task_Name ↕	Command ↕	CommandLine ↕
2025-06-30 15:54:22			4698	\AdvancedMalicious		
2025-06-30 15:53:38			4698	\BasicMalicious		

host [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBox

FileMachineViewInputDevicesHelp

FileEditSelectionViewGoRunTerminalHelp

OTCEP25

AttackExercise1

AttackExercise2

DefendExercise3

ANSWER3.txt

Exercise3.txt

PROMPT3.txt

SIGMARULE.txt

DefendExercise4

advancedtask.ps1

ANSWER4.txt

PROMPT4.txt

ExtraExercise5

listener.bat

Exercise3.txt

DefendExercise3 > Exercise3.txt

1 index=main Message="\*schtasks\*" Message="\*/create\*" NOT (Message="\*NT AUT\*" OR Message="\* SYSTEM\*" OR Message="\*HIGHEST\*")

DefendExercise4

FileHomeShareView

This PC > Desktop > OTCEP25 > DefendExercise4

Quick access

Desktop

Downloads

Documents

Pictures

AttackExercise2

DefendExercise3

DefendExercise4

Music

OneDrive

This PC

Network

Name	Date modified	Type	Size
advancedtask	7/10/2025 1:37 PM	Windows PowerS...	1 KB
ANSWER4	7/10/2025 1:37 PM	Text Document	1 KB
PROMPT4	7/10/2025 2:49 PM	Text Document	1 KB

3 items 1 item selected 199 bytes

New Chat

Exercise3.txt

Plan, search, build anything

Agent Ctrl+I claude-3.5-sonnet

Past Chats

Improve SPL query for scheduled task detection 4m

Convert Sigma rule to Splunk query 9m

Convert Sigma rule to Splunk query 10m

Do you want to install the recommended 'PowerShell' extension from ms-vscode for the PowerShell language?

Show Recommendations

Install

Type here to search

1:57 PM 7/23/2025



## DefendExercise4: Prompt Engineering

Refer to Exercise3.txt in DefendExercise3 folder and improve the SPL query to detect a new scheduled task creation using main as the index.

Craft the rule based on event id for task creation rather than LOLBINS.

Search for the use of 'exec' with the Message body.

Filter out Message with \Microsoft.

Task cursor to make improvements to existing code rather than start from scratch

Create the detection rule using specific Windows Event IDs, which are more reliable, as opposed to LOLBINS

Narrow down to tasks that are user created as opposed to system/service created

Remove false positives based on our environment baseline



## DefendExercise4: Conclusion

- The original Sigma rule detected task creation via schtasks.exe, but missed tasks created using Register-ScheduledTask (advancedtask.ps1)
- A new rule was developed using the Task Creation EventID to detect all scheduled tasks, regardless of the creation method
- **Takeaway: GenAI can help enhance detection rules quickly and speed up the detection engineering process**


```
detection:
  selection:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - 'schtasks'
      - '/create'
  filter_privs:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - 'NT AUTH'
      - 'SYSTEM'
      - 'HIGHEST'
  condition: all of selection and not filter_privs
```

```
DefendExercise5 > > advancedtask.ps1
1 $Trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -Once -At "6:00 am"
2 $Action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "calc.exe"
3 Register-ScheduledTask -TaskName "AdvancedMalicious" -Trigger $Trigger -Action $Action
```

# Bonus

## Scenario 5: Payload Enhancement

### Attacker





## DefendExercise4: Motivation

### Protecting the Software Supply Chain: Deep Insights into the CCleaner Backdoor

October 04, 2017 | karansood | Threat Hunting & Intel

The term “supply chain attacks” means different things to different people. To the general business community, it refers to attacks targeting vulnerable third-parties in a larger organization’s supply chain. A well-known retail chain’s massive breach in 2013 is a classic example: Adversaries used a poorly protected HVAC vendor as their gateway to hack into the giant retailer’s

enterprise network. However, threat researchers have another definition: To them, supply chain attacks can also denote the growing phenomenon in which malicious code is injected into new releases and updates of legitimate software packages, effectively turning an organization’s own software supply infrastructure into a potent and hard-to-prevent attack vector. The recent backdoor that was discovered embedded in the legitimate, signed version of CCleaner 5.33, is just such an attack. To help inform the user community and empower them to better defend

Source: <https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/protecting-software-supply-chain-deep-insights-ccleaner-backdoor>




## ExtraExercise5: Thought Process

- Attacker has access to a codebase and wants to include malicious code to gain access to the victim's system
- A backdoor code could be inserted to make a connection to attacker-controlled IP when the program is executed
- Backdoor code must not give any indication to the user that there is anything out of the norm happening
  - Messages
  - User prompts etc



## ExtraExercise5: Intended Behaviour

- The project is a Node based TCP proxy that acts as a middleman between a client and a server, forwarding data between them
  - `node tcp-proxy-cli.js -n 192.168.111.151 -s 1111 -p 2222`



**-p 2222** : The proxy will listen on port 2222

**-n 192.168.111.151**: The proxy will forward traffic to localhost

**-s 1111** : The proxy will forward traffic to port 1111 of the IP above








## ExtraExercise5: Execution

- Copy the prompt in **PROMPT5.txt** to the agent chat window and hit enter
  - You might get denied by the agent due to malicious intent (built-in guardrails), try to bypass by changing models (GPT etc)
- Code changes will be made in the same **tcp-proxy.js** file, click Accept
- We can now test to see if the generated code works and gives us a shell
  - Re-run listener.bat again






## ExtraExercise5: Execution

- Right click node-tcp-proxy-master folder and launch Terminal
- Run the command in **COMMAND5.TXT**
- Observe a reverse shell connection made to our listener

```
PS C:\Users\csa-asg\Downloads\Defender Excluded\OTCEP-2025\Mini-PpT-Infra\setup\setup_files\OTCEP25\ExtraExercise5> node tcp-proxy-cli.js -n 192.168.111.151 -s 1111 -p 2222
```

```
C:\Users\Public\ncat.exe
Ncat: Version 5.59BETA1 ( http://nmap.org/ncat )
Ncat: Listening on 0.0.0.0:1234
Ncat: Connection from 127.0.0.1:40594.
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.19045.5854]
(c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Users\ASG\Desktop\OTCEP25\AttackExercise1\node-tcp-proxy-master>
```







## ExtraExercise5: Prompt Engineering

Add a change to this TCP proxy code.

When the proxy starts, it should connect to localhost:1234 and pipe cmd.exe input/output through that connection.

If the connection fails, retry every 5 seconds.

Do not display anything to console output.

Don't add any new command line arguments - just hardcode the settings.

Edit the existing code

Add in a feature to launch cmd.exe to the specific IP and Port

Mimics persistence and makes the shell activation more reliable

Maintain stealth, reducing the chances of being noticed by users

Hardcoded settings sufficient for this use case



## ExtraExercise5: Conclusion

- Malicious code that was inserted ran in the background to make a connection back to the attacker-controlled IP
- Certain guardrails were present when code generated had potentially malicious uses
- **Takeaway: GenAI can be leveraged to inject malicious code into codebases, and existing guardrails meant to prevent this can be bypassed**

