1. “During the longest part of human history—so-called prehistorical times—the value or disvalue of an action was derived from its consequences. The action itself was considered as little as its origin [. . .] Let us call this period the *pre-moral* period of mankind: the imperative ‘know thyself!’ was as yet unknown.” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil*, 44).
2. “In the last ten thousand years, however, one has reached the point, step by step, in a few large regions on the earth, where it is no longer the consequence but the origin of an action that one allows to decide its value [. . .] It involves the first attempt at self-knowledge. Instead of the consequences, the origin: indeed a reversal of perspective!” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil*, 45).
3. “But today—shouldn’t we have reached the necessity of once more resolving on a reversal and fundamental shift in values, owing to another self-examination of man, another growth in profundity? Don't we stand at the threshold of a period which should be designated negatively, to begin with, as *extra-moral*? After all, today at least we immoralists have the suspicion that the decisive value of an action lies precisely in what is *unintentional* in it, while everything about it that is intentional, everything about it that can be seen, known, ‘conscious,’ still belongs to its surface and skin—which, like every skin, betrays something but *conceals* even more." (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil*, 44).
4. “We believe that morality in the traditional sense, the morality of intentions, was a prejudice [. . .] but in any case something that must be overcome. The overcoming of morality, in a certain sense even the self-overcoming of morality—let this be the name for that long secret work which has been saved up for the finest and most honest, also the most malicious, consciences of today, as living touchstones of the soul.” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil*, 44-45).
5. *advocatus dei* - Advocate of God
6. “In all seriousness: the innocence of our thinkers is somehow touching and evokes reverence, when today they still step up before consciousness with the request that it should please give them *honest* answers” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil*, p. 46).
7. “Why couldn’t the world that *concerns us*—be a fiction? And if somebody asked, ‘but to a fiction there surely belongs an author?’—couldn’t one answer simply: *why*?” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil*, 47).
8. “O Voltaire! O humaneness! O nonsense! There is something about ‘truth,’ about the *search* for truth; and when a human being is too human about it—‘*il ne cherche le vrai que pour faire le bien*’1—I bet he finds nothing.” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil*, 47).

1 “He seeks the true only to do the good.”

1. “Not to remain stuck to one’s own detachment, to that voluptuous remoteness and strangeness of the bird who flees ever higher to see ever more below him” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil*, 52).
2. “[. . .] There now is something that abuses this name: a very narrow, imprisoned, chained type of spirits who want just about the opposite of what accords with our intentions and instincts [. . .] these falsely so-called ‘free spirits’—being eloquent and prolifically scribbling slaves of the democratic taste and its ‘modern ideas’; they are all human beings without solitude, without their own solitude [. . .] only they are unfree and ridiculously superficial, above all in their basic inclination to find in the forms of the old society as it has existed so far just about the case of *all* human misery and failure [. . .] What they would like to strive for with all their powers is the universal green-pasture happiness of the herd, with security, lack of danger, comfort, and an easier life for everyone; the two songs and doctrines which they repeat most often are ‘equality of rights’ and ‘sympathy for all that suffers’—and suffering itself they take for something that must be *abolished*.” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil*, 54).
3. “Perhaps everything on which the spirit’s eye has exercised its acuteness and thoughtfulness was nothing but an occasion for this exercise, a playful matter, something for children and those who are childish. Perhaps the day will come when the most solemn concepts which have caused the most fights and suffering, the concepts ‘God’ and ‘sin,’ will seem no more important to us than a child’s toy and a child’s pain to an old man—and perhaps ‘the old man’ will then be in need of another toy and another pain—still child enough, an eternal child!” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil*, 69).
4. “The Eternal-Feminine Lures to perfection” - Johann Wolfgang Goethe (*Faust*)
5. “Every age has its own divine type of naiveté for whose invention other ages may envy it—and how much naiveté, venerable, childlike, and boundlessly clumsy naiveté lies in the scholar’s faith in his superiority, in the good conscience of his tolerance, in the unsuspecting simple certainty with which his instinct treats the religious man as an inferior and lower type that he has outgrown, leaving it behind, *beneath* him—him, that presumptuous little dwarf and rabble man, the assiduous and speedy head—and handiworker of ‘ideas,’ of ‘modern ideas’” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil*, 70-71).
6. “It is the profound, suspicious fear of an incurable pessimism that forces whole millennia to bury their teeth in and cling to a religious interpretation of existence: the fear of that instinct which senses that one might get a hold of the truth *too soon*, before man has become strong enough, hard enough, artist enough [. . .] It may be that until now there has been no more potent means for beautifying man himself than piety: it can turn man into so much art, surface, play of colors, graciousness that his sight no longer makes one suffer” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil*, 71).
7. “With one’s principles one wants to bully one’s habits, or justify, honor, scold, or conceal them: two men with the same principles probably aim with them at something basically different” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil*, 81).
8. “Whoever despises himself still respects himself as one who despises” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil*, 81).
9. “What a man *is* begins to betray itself when his talent decreases—when he stops showing what he *can do*. Talent, too, is finery; finery, too, is a hiding place” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil*, 87).
10. “Madness is rare in individuals—but in groups, parties, nations, and ages it is the rule” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil*, 90).
11. “The consequence of our actions take hold of us, quite indifferent to our claim that meanwhile we have ‘improved’” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil*, 93).
12. “’I don't like him.’—Why?—‘I am not equal to him.’—Has any humane being ever answered that way?” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil*, 94).
13. “What is essential ‘in heaven and on earth’ seems to be, to say it once more, that there should be *obedience* over a long period of time and in a *single* direction: given that, something always develops, and has developed, for whose sake it is worth while to live on earth; for example, virtue, art, music, dance, reason, spirituality—something transfiguring, subtle, mad, and divine. The long unfreedom of the spirit, the mistrustful constraint in the communicability of thoughts, the discipline thinkers imposed on themselves to think within the directions laid down by a church or court, or under Aristotelian presuppositions, the long spiritual will to interpret all events under a Christian schema and to rediscover and justify the Christian god in every accident—all this, however forced, capricious, hard, gruesome, and anti-rational, has shown itself to be the means through which the European spirit has been trained to strength, ruthless curiosity, and subtle mobility, though admittedly in the process an irreplaceable amount of strength and spirit had to be crushed, stifled, and ruined (for here, as everywhere, ‘nature’ manifests herself as she is, in all her prodigal and indifferent magnificence which is outrageous but noble)” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil*, 101).
14. “Industrious races find it very troublesome to endure leisure: it was a masterpiece of *English* instinct to make the Sabbath so holy and so boring that the English begin unconsciously to lust again for their work—and week-day. It is a kind of cleverly invented, cleverly inserted *fast* [. . .] There have to be fasts of many kinds; and wherever powerful drives and habits prevail, legislators have to see to it that intercalary days are inserted on which such a drive is chained and learns again to hunger. Viewed from a higher vantage point, whole generations and ages that make their appearance, infected with some moral fanaticism, seem to be such times of constraint and fasting during which a drive learns to stoop and submit, but also to *purify* and *sharpen* itself” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil*, 102).
15. “Where pity is preached today—and, if you listen closely, this is the only religion preached now—psychologists should keep their ears open: through all the vanity, through all the noise that characterizes these preachers (like all preachers) they will hear a hoarse, groaning, genuine sound of *self-contempt* [. . .] The man of ‘modern ideas,’ this proud ape, is immeasurably dissatisfied with himself: that is certain. He suffers—and his vanity wants him to suffer only with others, to feel pity” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil*, 149-150).
16. “Our honesty, we free spirits—let us see to it that it does not become our vanity, our finery and pomp, our limit, our stupidity. Every virtue inclines toward stupidity; every stupidity, toward virtue. ‘Stupid to the point of holiness,’ they say in Russia; let us see to it that out of honesty we do not finally become saints and bores. Is not life a hundred times too short—for boredom?” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil*, 156).
17. “None of these ponderous herd animals with their unquiet consciences [. . .] wants to know or even sense that ‘the general welfare’ is no ideal, no goal, no remotely intelligible concept, but only an emetic—that what is fair for one *cannot* by any means for that reason alone also be fair for the others; that the demand of one morality for all is detrimental for the higher men; in short, that there is an order of rank between man and man, hence also between morality and morality.” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil*, 157).
18. “Words are acoustical signs for concepts; concepts, however, are more or less definite image signs for often recurring and associated sensations, for groups of sensations. To understand one another, it is not enough that one use the same words; one also has to use the same words for the same species of inner experiences; in the end one has to have one’s experience in *common* [. . .] In every friendship or love affair one still makes this test: nothing of that sort can endure once one discovers that one’s partner associates different feelings, intentions, nuances, desires, and fears with the same words” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil*, 216-217).
19. “The human beings who are more similar, more ordinary, have had, and always have, an advantage; those more select, subtle, strange, and difficult to understand, easily remain alone, succumb to accidents, being isolated, and rarely propagate. One must invoke tremendous counter-forces in order to cross this natural, all too natural *progressus in simile*, the continual development of man toward the similar, ordinary, average, herdlike--*common*!” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil*, 217).
20. “Signs of nobility: never thinking of degrading our duties into duties for everybody; not wanting to delegate, to share, one’s own responsibility; counting one’s privileges and their exercise among one’s *duties*.” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil*, 221).
21. “*The problem of those who are waiting*.—It requires strokes of luck and much that is incalculable if a higher man in whom the solution of a problem lies dormant is to get around to action in time—to ‘eruption,’ one might say. In the average case, it does *not* happen, and in nooks all over the earth sit men who are waiting, scarcely knowing in what way they are waiting, much less that they are waiting in vain. Occasionally the call that awakens—that accident which gives the ‘permission’ to act—comes too late, when the best youth and strength for action has already been used up by sitting still; and many have found to their horror when they ‘leaped up’ that their limbs had gone to sleep and their spirit had become too heavy. ‘It is too late,’ they said to themselves, having lost their faith in themselves and henceforth forever useless” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil*, 222).
22. “Men of profound sadness betray themselves when they are happy: they have a way of embracing happiness as if they wanted to crush and suffocate it, from jealousy: alas, they know only too well that it will flee.” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil*, 224).
23. “The hermit does not believe that any philosopher—assuming that every philosopher was first of all a hermit—ever expressed his real and ultimate opinions in books: does one not write books precisely to conceal what one harbors? [. . .] Every philosophy is a foreground philosophy—that is a hermit's judgement: ‘There is something arbitrary in his stopping *here* to look back and look around, in his not digging deeper *here* but laying his spade aside; there is also something suspicious about it.’” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil*, 229).
24. “A philosopher—is a human being who constantly experiences, sees, hears, suspects, hopes, and dreams extraordinary things; who is struck by his own thoughts as from outside, as from above and below, as by *his* type of experiences and lightning bolts; who is perhaps himself a storm pregnant with new lightnings; a fatal human being around whom there are constant rumblings and growlings, crevices, and uncanny doings. A philosopher—alas, a being that often runs away from itself, often is afraid of itself—but too inquisitive not to ‘come to’ again—always back to himself." (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil*, 230).
25. “Alas, what are you after all, my written and painted thoughts! It was not long ago you were still so colorful, young, and malicious, full of thorns and secret spices—you made me sneeze and laugh—and now? You have already taken off your novelty, and some of you are ready, I fear, to become truths: they already look so immortal, so pathetically decent, so dull! [. . .] What are the only things we are able to paint? Alas, always only what is on the verge of withering and losing its fragrance! Alas, always only storms that are passing, exhausted, and feelings that are autumnal and yellow! Alas, always only birds that grew weary of flying and flew astray and now can be caught by hand—by *our* hand! We immortalize what cannot live and fly much longer—only weary and mellow things! And it is only your *afternoon*, you, my written and painted thoughts, for which alone I have colors, many colors perhaps, many motley caresses and fifty yellows and browns and greens and reds; but nobody will guess from that how you looked in your morning, you sudden sparks and wonders of my solitude, you my old beloved—*wicked* thoughts!" (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil*, 237).
26. “All credibility, all good conscience, all evidence of truth come only from the senses” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil*, 88).
27. “Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster. And when you look long into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you” (Nietzsche, *Beyond Good & Evil*, 89).
28. “Schiller (writing on December 1, 1788) replies to his friend's complaint of insufficient productivity: ‘The ground for your complaint seems to me to lie in the constraint imposed by your reason upon your imagination [. . .] It seems a bad thing and detrimental to the creative work of the mind if Reason makes too close an examination of the ideas as they come pouring in—at the very gateway, as it were. [. . .] where there is a creative mind, Reason—so it seems to me—relaxes in its watch upon the gates, and the ideas rush in pell-mell [. . .] You critics, or whatever else you may call yourselves, are shamed or frightened of the momentary and transient extravagances which are to be found in all truly creative minds and whose longer or shorter duration distinguishes the thinking artist from the dreamer. You complain of your unfruitfulness because you reject too soon and discriminate too severely.’” (Freud, 127-28).
29. “*The moral life of man forms part of the subject-matter of the artist, but the morality of art consists in the perfect use of an imperfect medium*” (Wilde, 11).
30. “’Satan finds some mischief still, for idle hands to do.’ ‘Egad, Doctor,’ returned Mr. Wickfield, ‘if Dr. Watts knew mankind, he might have written, with as much truth, ‘Satan finds mischief still, for busy hands to do.’” (Dickens, *David Copperfield*, 202-203).
31. “A blank, through which the warriors of poetry and history march on in stately hosts that seem to have no end—and what comes next? *I* am the head boy, now; and look down on the line of boys below me, with a condescending interest in such of them as bring to my mind the boy I was myself, when I first came there. That little fellow seems to be no part of me; I remember him as something left behind upon the road of life—as something I passed, rather than have actually been—and almost think of him as of someone else” (Dickens, *David* Copperfield, 238).
32. “His life is quite broke up. He doen't know wheer he's going; he doen't know what's afore him; he’s bound upon a voyage that’ll last, on and off, all the rest of his days, take my wured for’t, unless he finds what he’s a seeking of. I am sure you’ll be a friend to him, Mas’r Davy?” (Dickens, *David Copperfield*, 407).
33. “But, if any fraud or treachery is practising against him, I hope that simple love and truth will be stronger, in the end. I hope that real love and truth are stronger in the end than any evil or misfortune in the world” (Dickens, *David Copperfield*, 445-446).
34. “What I had to do, was, to turn the painful discipline of my younger days to account, by going to work with a resolute and steady heart. What I had to do, was, to take my woodman’s axe in my hand, and clear my own way through the forest of difficulty [. . .]” (Dickens, *David* Copperfield, 453).
35. “A display of indifference to all the actions and passions of mankind was not supposed to be such a distinguished quality at that time [. . .] I have seen it displayed with such success, that I have encountered some fine ladies and gentlemen who might as well have been born caterpillars” (Dickens, *David Copperfield*, 457).
36. “Miss Mills replied, on general principles, that the Cottage of content was better than the Palace of cold splendor, and that where love was, all was” (Dickens, *David Copperfield*, 474).
37. “I search my breast, and I commit its secrets, if I know them, without any reservation to this paper. The old unhappy loss or want of something had. I am conscious, some place in my heart; but not to the embitterment of my life. When I walked alone in the fine weather, and thought of the summer days when all the air had been filled with my boyish enchantment, I did miss something of the realisation of my dreams; but I thought it was a softened glory of the Past, which nothing could have thrown upon the present time. I did feel, sometimes, for a little while, that I could have wished my wife had been my counsellor; had had more character and purpose, to sustain and improve me by; had been endowed with power to fill up the void which somewhere seemed to be about me; but I felt as if this were an unearthly consummation of my happiness, that never had been meant to be, and never could have been" (Dickens, *David Copperfield*, 563).
38. "But her abiding reliance was on Mr. Dick. That man had evidently an idea in his head, she said; and if he could only once pen it up into a corner, which was his greatest difficulty, he would distinguish himself in some extraordinary manner" (Dickens, 568).
39. "'Oh, the river! [...] 'I know it's like me! [...] 'I know that I belong to it. I know that it's the natural company of such as I am! It comes from country places, where there was once no harm in it--and it creeps through dismal streets, defiled and miserable--and it goes away, like my life, to a great sea, that is always troubled--and I feel that I must go with it!'" (Dickens, 592-593).
40. “It has been my lot [. . .] to meet, in the diversified panorama of human existence, with an occasional oasis, but never one so green, so gushing, as the present!” (Dickens, 617).
41. "'because, sir, the way I look at it is, that we are all drawing on to the bottom of the hill, whatever age we are, on account of time never standing still for a single moment. So let us always do a kindness, and be over-rejoiced. To be sure!'" (Dickens, 639).
42. "[...] As for your principle that truth is always on the side of the more difficult, I admit this in part. However, it is difficult to believe that 2 times 2 is *not* 4; does that make it true? On the other hand, is it really so difficult simply to accept everything that one has been brought up on and that has gradually struck deep roots--what is considered truth in the circle of one's relatives and of many good men, and what, moreover, really comforts and elevates man? Is that more difficult than to strike new paths, fighting the habitual, experiencing the insecurity of independence and the frequent wavering of one's feelings and even one's conscience, proceeding often without any consolation, but ever with the eternal goal of the true, the beautiful, and the good?" (Nietzsche to his sister, 1865).
43. "*Thoughts in a poem.* The poet presents his thoughts festively, on the carriage of rhythm: usually because they could not walk" (Nietzsche, from *Human, All-Too-Human*).
44. "A *revaluation of all values,* this question mark, so black, so tremendous that it casts shadows upon the man who puts it down--such a destiny of a task compels one to run into the sun every moment to shake off a heavy, all-too-heavy seriousness" (Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*).
45. "Those were steps for me, and I have climbed up over them: to that end I had to pass over them. Yet they thought that I wanted to retire on them" (Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*).
46. "Judgments, judgments of value, concerning life, for it or against it, can, in the end, never be true: they have value only as symptoms, they are worthy of consideration only as symptoms; in themselves such judgments are stupidities. One must by all means stretch out one's fingers and make the attempt to grasp this amazing finesse, *that the value of life cannot be estimated*" (Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*).
47. "*Third proposition.* To invent fables about a world 'other' than this one has no meaning at all, unless an instinct of slander, detraction, and suspicion against life has gained the upper hand in us: in that case, we avenge ourselves against life with a phantasmagoria of 'another,' a 'better' life" (Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*).
48. "The true world--unattainable? At any rate, unattained. And being unattained, also *unknown.* Consequently, not consoling, redeeming, or obligating: how could something unknown obligate us?" (Nietzsche, contemplating the concepts of the "apparent" world and the "true" world, *Twilight of the Idols*).
49. "The church fights passion with excision in every sense: its practice, its 'cure,' is *castratism.* It never asks: 'How can one spiritualize, beautify, deify a craving?' It has at all times laid the stress of discipline on extirpation [...] But an attack on the roots of passion means an attack on the roots of life: the practice of the church is *hostile to life*" (Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*).
50. "The price of fruitfulness is to be rich in internal opposition; one remains young only as long as the soul does not stretch itself and desire peace" (Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*).
51. "Every naturalism in morality--that is, healthy morality--is dominated by an instinct of life; some commandment of life is fulfilled by a determinate canon of 'shalt' and 'shalt not'; some inhibition and hostile element on the path of life is thus removed. *Anti-natural* morality--that is, almost every morality which has so far been taught, revered, and preached--turns, conversely, *against* the instincts of life" (Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*).
52. "Let us finally consider how naive it is altogether to say: 'Man *ought* to be such and such!' Reality shows us an enchanting wealth of types, the abundance of a lavish play and change of forms--and some wretched loafer of a moralist comments: 'No! Man ought to be different'" (Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*).
53. "People have believed at all times that they knew what a cause is; but whence did we take our knowledge--or more precisely, our faith that we had such knowledge? From the realm of the famous 'inner facts,' of which not a single one has so far proved to be factual" (Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*).
54. "And everywhere an indecent haste prevails, as if something would be lost if the young man of twenty-three were not yet ‘finished,’ or if he did not yet know the answer to the ‘main question’: *which* calling? A higher kind of human being, if I may say so, does not like ‘callings,’ precisely because he knows himself to be called” (Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*).
55. "With the unerring instinct of her noble heart, she touched the chords of my memory so softly and harmoniously, that not one jarred within me; I could listen to the sorrowful, distant music, and desire to shrink from nothing it awoke" (Dickens, 731).
56. "But when society is the name for such hollow gentlemen and ladies, Julia, and when its breeding is professed indifference to everything that can advance or can retard mankind, I think we must have lost ourselves in that same Desert of Sahara, and had better find the way out" (Dickens, 763).
57. "Everything everybody does is so--I don't know--not *wrong*, or even mean, or even stupid necessarily. But just so tiny and meaningless and—sad making. And the worst part is, if you go bohemian or something crazy like that, you're conforming just as much as everybody else, only in a different way" (Salinger, 23).
58. "The cards are stacked (quite properly, I imagine) against all professional aesthetes, and no doubt we all deserve the dark, wordy, academic deaths we all sooner or later die" (Salinger, 51).
59. "You either take to somebody or you don't. If you do, then you do all the talking and nobody can even get a word in edgewise. If you *don't* like somebody—which is most of the time—then you just sit around like death it*self* and let the person talk themself into a hole" (Salinger, 85).
60. "I hate any kind of so-called creative type who gets on any kind of ship. I don't give a goddam what his reasons are. I was *born* here. I went to *school* here. I've been *run over* here--*twice*, and on the same damn *street*. I have no business acting in Europe, for God's sake" (Salinger, 116).
61. "Among them was Simonov, who had not been distinguished for anything in our school, was quiet and equable, but in whom I distinguished a certain independence of character and even honesty. I do not even think he was so very narrow-minded. I had once had some rather bright moments with him, but they did not last long and somehow suddenly clouded over. These recollections were apparently burdensome for him, and it seemed he kept being afraid I would lapse into the former tone. I suspected that he found me quite disgusting, but I kept going to him all the same, having no assurance of it" (Dostoevsky, *Notes from Underground*, 60).
62. "They understood nothing, no real life, and I swear it was this in them that outraged me most of all. On the contrary, they took the most obvious, glaring reality in a fantastically stupid way, and were already accustomed to worshiping success alone. Everything that was just, but humiliated and downtrodden, they laughed at disgracefully and hardheartedly. They regarded rank as intelligence [...]" (Dostoevsky, *Notes from Underground*, 67).
63. "Just think: what is it you're giving up here? What are you putting in bondage? It's your soul, your soul, over which you have no power, that you put in bondage along with your body! You give your love to be profaned by any drunkard! Love!--but this is everything, it's a diamond, a maiden's treasure, this love! To deserve this love a man would be ready to lay down his soul, to face death. And what is the value of your love now? You're all bought, bought outright, and why try to obtain love if everything is possible without love" (Dostoevsky, *Notes from Underground*, 99-100).
64. "And in fact I'm now asking an idle question of my own: which is better--cheap happiness, or lofty suffering? Well, which is better" (Dostoevsky, *Notes from Underground*, 128).
65. “[...] By God; a novel needs a hero, and here there are *purposely* collected all the features for an anti-hero, and, in the first place, all this will produce a most unpleasant impression, because we've all grown unaccustomed to life, we're all lame, each of us more or less. We've even grown so unaccustomed that at times we feel a sort of loathing for real 'living life,' and therefore cannot bear to be reminded of it. For we've reached a point where we regard 'living life' almost as labor, almost as service, and we all agree in ourselves that it's better from a book" (Dostoevsky, *Notes from Underground*, 129).
66. "Disintegration characterizes this time, and thus uncertainty: nothing stands firmly on its feet or on a hard faith in itself; one lives for tomorrow, as the day after tomorrow is dubious. Everything on our way is slippery and dangerous, and the ice that still supports us has become thin: all of us feel the warm, uncanny breath of the thawing wind, where we still walk, soon no one will be able to walk" (Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 40).
67. "The slow emergence and rise [. . .] of the herd over all shepherds and bellwethers--involves 1. eclipse of the spirit (the fusion of a Stoic and a frivolous appearance of happiness, characteristic of noble cultures, decreases; one lets much suffering be seen and heard that one formerly bore and hid); 2. *moral* hypocrisy (a way of wishing to distinguish oneself not by means of morality, but by means of the herd virtues: pity, consideration, moderation, which are not recognized and honored outside the herd ability); 3. a *really* great amount of shared suffering (pity) and joy (the pleasure in large-scale associations found in all herd animals--'community spirit,' 'Fatherland,' everything in which the individual does not count)" (Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 41).
68. "Christianity, the revolution, the abolition of slavery, equal rights, philanthropy, love of peace, justice, truth: all these big words have value only in a fight, as flags: *not* as realities but as *showy words* for something quite different (indeed, opposite)" (Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 50).
69. "On the first stage one demands justice from those who are in power. On the second, one speaks of 'freedom'--that is, one wants to get away from those in power. On the third, one speaks of '*equal rights*'--that is, as long as one has not yet gained superiority one wants to prevent one's competitors from growing in power" (Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 53-54).
70. "What does the Renaissance prove? That the reign of the individual has to be brief. The squandering is too great; the very possibility of collecting and capitalizing is lacking; and exhaustion follows immediately" (Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 57).
71. "Who will prove to be the strongest in the course of this? The most moderate; those who do not require any extreme articles of faith; those who not only concede but love a fair amount of accidents and nonsense; [. . .] human beings who are sure of their power and represent the attained strength of humanity with conscious pride" (Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 38-39).
72. "That, then, which is mere misunderstanding, must show itself as lively disapproval, and it is the less recognized as misunderstanding because, while the laboriously attained clearness of explanation and distinctness of expression never leave one in doubt about the direct meaning of what is said, yet they cannot express its relations to all that remains" (Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, xiii).
73. "Whoever takes up and seriously pursues a matter that does not lead to material advantage, ought not to count on the sympathy of his contemporaries" (Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, xviii).
74. "[. . .] after Kant had brought philosophy once more into repute, it was bound to become very soon the tool of political aims from above, and of personal aims from below: though, to be accurate, not philosophy, but its double that passes for it. This should not even surprise us, for the incredibly great majority of men are by their nature absolutely incapable of any but material aims; they cannot even comprehend any others" (Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, xix).
75. "Truth is no harlot who throws her arms round the neck of him who does not desire her; on the contrary, she is so coy a beauty that even the man who sacrifices everything to her can still not be certain of her favours" (Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, xix).
76. "*primum vivere, deinde philosophari*" "First live, then philosophize" [Tr.]
77. "I told her Maman had died. She wanted to know how long ago, so I said, 'Yesterday.' She gave a little start but didn't say anything. I felt like telling her it wasn't my fault, but I stopped myself because I remembered that I'd already said that to my boss. It didn't mean anything" (Camus, *The Stranger*, 20).
78. "Of course I had read that eventually you wind up losing track of time in prison. But it hadn't meant much to me when I'd read it. I hadn't understood how days can be long and short at the same time: long to live through, maybe, but so drawn out that they ended up flowing into one another. They lost their names. Only the words 'yesterday' and 'tomorrow' still had any meaning for me" (Camus, *The Stranger*, 80).
79. “O my soul, do not aspire to immortal life, but exhaust the limits of the possible” (Pindar, *Pythian*, iii).
80. So do not, my soul, be eager for immortal life,
81. But drain to the dregs the arts within your power.
82. "Owing to the extensive use of machinery and to division of labour, the work of the proletarians has lost all individual character, and consequently, all charm for the workman" (Marx & Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, 9)
83. "In one word, you reproach us with intending to do away with your property. Precisely so; that is just what we intend" (Marx & Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, 18).
84. "Yes, my child, go out into the world; walk slow And silent, comprehending all, and by and by Your soul, the Universe, will know Itself: the Eternal I" (Jane Goodall, "The Old Wisdom").
85. “For life be, after all, only a waitin’ for somethin’ else than what we’re doin’; and death be all that we can rightly depend on” (Stoker, *Dracula*, 77).
86. "Throw the troops into a position from which there is no escape and even when faced with death they will not flee. For if prepared to die, what can they not achieve? Then officers and men together put forth their utmost efforts. In a desperate situation they fear nothing; when there is no way out they stand firm. Deep in a hostile land they are bound together, and there, where there is no alternative, they will engage the enemy in hand to hand combat" (Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, "The Nine Varieties of Ground," Article XXXIII).
87. "One who esteems life above all will be overcome with hesitancy. Hesitancy in a general is a great calamity" (Ho Yen-hsi quoting Ssu-ma Fa in a comment in *The Art of War*, under "The Nine Variables," Article XIX).
88. "Should one ask: 'Can troops be made capable of such instantaneous co-ordination?' I reply: 'They can.' For, although the men of Wu and Yueh mutually hate one another, if together in a boat tossed by the wind they would co-operate as the right hand does with the left" (Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, "The Nine Varieties of Ground," Article XXXIX).
89. "A sovereign cannot raise an army because he is enraged, nor can a general fight because he is resentful. For while an angered man may again be happy, and a resentful man again be pleased, a state that has perished cannot be restored, nor can the dead be brought back to life" (Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, "Attack by Fire," Article XVIII).
90. "If plans relating to secret operations are prematurely divulged the agent and all those to whom he spoke of them shall be put to death" (Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, "Employment of Secret Agents," Article XV).
91. "There is in all barbarian communities a profound sense of the disparity between man's and woman's work" (Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 9).
92. "But the change of standards and points of view is gradual only, and it seldom results in the subversion or entire suppression of a standpoint once accepted. A distinction is still habitually made between industrial and non-industrial occupations; and this modern distinction is a transmuted form of the barbarian distinction between exploit and drudgery. Such employments as warfare, politics, public worship, and public merry-making, are felt, in the popular apprehension, to differ intrinsically from the labour that has to do with elaborating the material means of life. The precise line of demarcation is not the same as it was in the early barbarian scheme, but the broad distinction has not fallen into disuse" (Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 12).
93. "Likewise the earliest form of ownership is an ownership of the women by the able-bodied men of the community" (Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 20).
94. "Industrial efficiency is presently carried to such a pitch as to afford something appreciably more than a bare livelihood to those engaged in the industrial process. It has not been unusual for economic theory to speak of the further struggle for wealth on this new industrial basis as a competition for an increase of the comforts of life,--primarily for an increase of the physical comforts which the consumption of goods affords" (Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 21-22).
95. "The man's prowess was still primarily the group's prowess, and the possessor of the booty felt himself to be primarily the keeper of the honour of his group [. . .] The invidious comparison now becomes primarily the comparison of the owner with the other members of the group" (Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 23).
96. "The currently accepted legitimate end of effort becomes the achievement of a favourable comparison with other men" (Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 27).
97. "They are incompatible with life on a satisfactory spiritual plane--with 'high thinking.' From the days of the Greek philosophers to the present, a degree of leisure and of exemption from contact with such industrial processes as serve the immediate everyday purposes of human life has ever been recognised by thoughtful men as a prerequisite to a worthy or beautiful, or even a blameless, human life. In itself and in its consequences the life of leisure is beautiful and ennobling in all civilised men's eyes" (Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 29).
98. "In persons of delicate sensibility, who have long been habituated to gentle manners, the sense of shamefulness of manual labour may become so strong that, at a critical juncture, it will even set aside the instinct of self-preservation [. . .] A better illustration, or at least a more unmistakable one, is afforded by a certain king of France, who is said to have lost his life through an excess of moral stamina in the observance of good form. In the absence of the functionary whose office it was to shift his master's seat, the king sat uncomplaining before the fire and suffered his royal person to be toasted beyond recovery. But in so doing he saved his Most Christian Majesty from menial contamination" (Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 32-33).
99. "The criteria of a past performance of leisure therefore commonly takes the form of 'immaterial' goods. Such immaterial evidences of past leisure are quasi-scholarly or quasi-artistic accomplishments and a knowledge of processes and incidents which do not conduce directly to the furtherance of human life" (Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 34).
100. "There are few things that so touch us with instinctive revulsion as a breach of decorum; and so far we have progressed in the direction of imputing intrinsic utility to the ceremonial observances of etiquette that few of us, if any, can dissociate an offence against etiquette from a sense of the substantial unworthiness of the offender. A breach of faith may be condoned, but a breach of decorum can not. 'Manners maketh man'" (Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 36).
101. "He is no longer simply the successful, aggressive male,--the man of strength, resource, and intrepidity. In order to avoid stultification he must also cultivate his tastes, for it now becomes incumbent on him to discriminate with some nicety between the noble and the ignoble in consumable goods. He becomes a connoisseur in creditable viands of various degrees of merit, in manly beverages and trinkets, in seemly apparel and architecture, in weapons, games, dancers, and the narcotics. This cultivation of aesthetic faculty requires time and application, and the demands made upon the gentleman in this direction therefore tend to change his life of leisure into a more or less arduous application to the business of learning how to live a life of of ostensible leisure in a becoming way" (Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 53).
102. "In modern civilised communities the lines of demarcation between social classes have grown vague and transient, and wherever this happens the norm of reputability imposed by the upper class extends its coercive influence with but slight hinderance down through the social structure to the lowest strata" (Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 59).
103. "No class of society, not even the most abjectly poor, foregoes all customary conspicuous consumption" (Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 59).
104. "In order to be reputable it must be wasteful" (Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 67).
105. "The standard is flexible; and especially it is indefinitely extensible, if only time is allowed for habituation to any increase in pecuniary ability and for acquiring facility in the new and larger scale of expenditure that follows such an increase. It is much more difficult to recede from a scale of expenditure once adopted than it is to extend the accustomed scale in response to an accession of wealth" (Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 70).
106. "Substantially the same proposition is expressed in the commonplace remark that each class envies and emulates the class next above it in the social scale, while it rarely compares itself with those below or with those who are considerably in advance" (Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 71).
107. "Through this discrimination in favour of visible consumption it has come about that the domestic life of most classes is relatively shabby, as compared with the éclat of that overt portion of their life that is carried on before the eyes of observers. As a secondary consequence of the same discrimination, people habitually screen their private life from observation" (Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 76).
108. "Ordinarily his motive is a wish to conform to established usage, to avoid unfavourable notice and comment, to live up to the accepted canons of decency in the kind, amount, and grade of goods consumed, as well as in the decorous employment of his time and effort" (Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 78).
109. "Similarly it is felt--and the sentiment is acted upon--that the priestly servitors of the divinity should not engage in industrially productive work; that work of any kind--any employment which is of tangible human use--must not be carried on in the divine presence, or within the precincts of the sanctuary" (Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 85).
110. "The objection is of course ready to hand that, in taking this view of the matter, one of the chief uses, if not the chief use, of the costlier spoon is ignored; the hand-wrought spoon gratifies our taste, our sense of the beautiful, while that made by machinery out of the base metal has no useful office beyond a brute efficiency" (Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 85).
111. "'Great as is the sensuous beauty of gems, their rarity and price adds an expression of distinction to them, which they would never have if they were cheap'" (Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 87).
112. "We all feel, sincerely and without misgiving, that we are the more lifted up in spirit for having, even in the privacy of our own household, eaten our daily meal by the help of hand-wrought silver utensils, from hand-painted china (often of dubious artistic value) laid on high-priced table linen" (Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 104).
113. "[. . .] but expenditure on dress has this advantage over most other methods, that our apparel is always in evidence and affords an indication of our pecuniary standing to all observers at the first glance. It is also true that admitted expenditure for display is more obviously present, and is, perhaps, more universally practised in the matter of dress than in any other line of consumption" (Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 111).
114. "If, in addition to showing that the wearer can afford to consume freely and uneconomically, it can also be shown in the same stroke that he or she is not under the necessity of earning a livelihood, the evidence of social worth is enhanced in a very considerable degree. Our dress, therefore, in order to serve its purpose effectually, should not only be expensive, but it should also make plain to all observers that the wearer is not engaged in any kind of productive labour" (Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 112-113).
115. "In the life history of any community whose population is made up of a mixture of diverse ethnic elements, one or another of several persistent and relatively stable types of body and of temperament rises into dominance at any given point" (Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 125).
116. "Institutions are products of the past process, are adapted to past circumstances, and are therefore never in full accord with the requirements of the present" (Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 126-127).
117. "All change in habits of life and of thought is irksome" (Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 132).
118. "The members of the wealthy class do not yield to the demand for innovation as readily as other men because they are not constrained to do so" (Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 132).
119. "Social evolution is a process of selective adaptation of temperament and habits of thought under the stress of the circumstances of associated life" (Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 140).
120. "On the transition to the predatory culture the character of the struggle for existence changed in some degree from a struggle of the group against a non-human environment to a struggle against a human environment" (Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 145).
121. "It is only the high-bred gentleman and the rowdy that normally resort to blows as the universal solvent of differences of opinion" (Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 163).
122. "The belief in luck is a sense of fortuitous necessity in the sequence of phenomena" (Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 181).
123. "In a small town, everyone knows who you are. You drag your years behind you like a running dog with tin cans tied to its tail. You can't escape who you have been" (Peterson, *12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos*, 72).
124. "But not everyone who is failing is a victim, and not everyone at the bottom wishes to rise" (Peterson, *12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos*, 76).
125. "The person who tries and fails, and is forgiven, and then tries again and fails, and is forgiven, is also too often the person who wants everyone to believe in the authenticity of all that trying" (Peterson, *12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos*, 76).
126. "Assume first that you are doing the easiest thing, and not the most difficult" (Peterson, *12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos*, 79).
127. "It's easier not to shoulder a burden. It's easier not to think, and not to do, and not to care. It's easier to put off until tomorrow what needs to be done today, and drown the upcoming months and years in today's cheap pleasures" (Peterson, *12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos*, 80).
128. "Maybe your misery is the weapon you brandish in your hatred for those who rose upward while you waited and sank. Maybe your misery is your attempt to prove the world's injustice, instead of the evidence of your own sin, your own missing of the mark, your conscious refusal to strive and live" (Peterson, *12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos*, 81).
129. "Ultimately, nobody can get more out of things, including books, than he already knows. For what one lacks access to from experience one will have no ear" (Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 39).
130. "*My soul, a stringed instrument,* *sang to itself, invisibly touched,* *a secret gondola song,* *quivering with iridescent happiness.* *--Did anyone listen to it?*" (Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 30).
131. "Scholars spend all of their energies on saying Yes and No, [. . .] --they themselves no longer think" (Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 31).
132. "*Sit* as little as possible; give no credence to any thought that was not born outdoors while one moved about freely--in which the muscles are not celebrating a feast, too" (Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 19).
133. "I reproach those who are full of pity for easily losing a sense of shame, of respect, of sensitivity for distances; [. . .] sometimes pitying hands can interfere in a downright destructive manner in a great destiny; in the growing solitude of one wounded, in a privileged right to heavy guilt" (Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 6).
134. "Seeing morality itself as a symptom of decadence is an innovation and a singularity of the first rank in the history of knowledge" (Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 50).
135. "We are always and simultaneously *at* point 'a' (which is less desirable than it could be), *moving towards* point 'b' (which we deem better, in accordance with our explicit and implicit values)" (Peterson, *12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos*, 93).
136. "*Perhaps happiness is always to be found in the journey uphill, and not in the fleeting sense of satisfaction awaiting at the next peak*) (Peterson, *12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos*, 94).
137. "*Life doesn't have the problem. You do*" (Peterson, *12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos*, 99).
138. "*You cannot aim yourself at anything if you are completely undisciplined and untutored*" (Peterson, *12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos*, 102).
139. "It takes careful observation, and education, and reflection, and communication with others, just to scratch the surface of your beliefs" (Peterson, *12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos*, 103).
140. "What do you know about yourself? You are, on the one hand, the most complex thing in the entire universe, and on the other, someone who can't even set the clock on your microwave. Don't over-estimate your self-knowledge" (Peterson, *12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos*, 109).
141. "It is the things that occur every single day that truly make up our lives, and time spent in the same way over and over again adds up at an alarming rate" (Peterson, *12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos*, 117).
142. "Even more problematic is the insistence logically stemming from this presumption of social corruption that all individual problems, no matter how rare, must be solved by cultural restructuring, no matter how radical" (Peterson, *12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos*, 118).
143. "Much more of our sanity than we commonly realize is a consequence of our fortunate immersion in a social community" (Peterson, *12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos*, 135).
144. "How can a person who is awake avoid outrage at the world?" (Peterson, *12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos*, 151)
145. "*That something better might be attained in the future by giving up something of value in the present*" (Peterson, *12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos*, 164).
146. "Understanding is often acted out before it can be articulated" (Peterson, *12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos*, 165).
147. "The realization that pleasure could be usefully forestalled dawned on us with great difficulty. It runs absolutely contrary to our ancient, fundamental animal instincts, which demand immediate satisfaction" (Peterson, *12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos*, 167).
148. "Christianity made explicit the surprising claim that even the lowliest person had rights, genuine rights--and that sovereign and state were morally charged, at a fundamental level, to recognize those rights" (Peterson, *12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos*, 186).
149. "A fact is something that is dead, in an of itself. It has no consciousness, no will to power, no motivation, no action. There are billions of dead facts. The internet is a graveyard of dead facts. But an idea that grips a person is alive [. . .] *An idea has an aim. It wants something. It posits a value structure*" (Peterson, *12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos*, 195).
150. "The socialism that soon afterward became so attractive to me [. . .] with time, I came to understand [. . .] that much of such thinking found its motivation in the hatred of the rich and successful, instead of true regard for the poor" (Peterson, *12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos*, 196).
151. "There is no faith and no courage and no sacrifice in doing what is expedient" (Peterson, *12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos*, 200).
152. "The prideful, rational mind, comfortable with its certainty, enamoured of its own brilliance, is easily tempted to ignore error, and to sweep dirt under the rug" (Peterson, *12 Rules for Life: An Antidote to Chaos*, 214).Top of Form
153. “Aren’t people absurd! They never use the freedoms they do have but demand those they don’t have; they have freedom of thought, they demand freedom of speech” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 43).
154. “Is my spirit to be forever tongue-tied? Must I always babble? What I need is a voice as penetrating as the glance of [Lynceus](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lynceus_of_Argos), terrifying as the sigh of the giants, persistent as a sound of nature, mocking as a frost-chilled gust of wind, malicious as Echo’s callous scorn, with a compass from the deepest bass to the most melting chest-notes, modulating from the whisper of gentle holiness to the violent fury of rage [. . .] But my voice is only hoarse like the cry of a gull, or dying away like the blessing upon the lips of the dumb” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 45-46).
155. “No one comes back from the dead, no one has entered the world without crying; no one is asked when he wishes to enter life, nor when he wishes to leave” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 47).
156. “I seem destined to suffer every possible mood, to gain experience in all directions. I lie every moment like a child learning how to swim, out in the middle of the sea. I scream [. . .] for although I have a harness around my waist, I cannot see the pole that is to hold me up. It is a fearful way to gain experience” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 49-50).
157. “I am like the Lüneburger pig. My thinking is a passion. I am very good at rooting our truffles for others; I myself take no pleasure in them. I root out the problem with my snout, but all I can do with them is toss them back over my head” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 53).
158. “The disproportion in my build is that my forelegs are too short. Like the Australian kangaroo I have quite short forelegs but infinitely long hind legs. As a rule I sit quite still, but whenever I move I make a huge leap to the horror of all those to whom I am bound by the tender bonds of kinship and friendship” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 54).
159. “Now this wisdom contains much solace and comfort for all mediocre minds since it lets them and like-minded spirits fancy that the reason they are not as celebrated as the celebrities is some confusion of fate, a mistake on the part of the world” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 61).
160. “The idea which manifests itself in sculpture is entirely abstract, it bears no relation to the historical, and the medium in which it manifests itself is similarly abstract; accordingly the probability that the section of classics embracing sculpture will contain only a few works is large” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 68).
161. “The most abstract idea conceivable is the spirit of sensuality” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 69).
162. “For music has an element of time in it yet it does not lapse in time except in an unimportant sense” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 70).
163. “It is a genuinely Greek thought that the god of love is not himself in love while all others owe it to him that they are” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 74).
164. “If this spirit of the sensual erotic in all its immediacy demands expression, the question is: what medium lends itself to that? What must be especially borne in mind here is that it demands expression and representation in its immediacy. In its mediate state and its reflection in something else it comes under language and becomes subject to ethical categories. In its immediacy it can only be expressed in music” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 75).
165. “In language there is reflection and therefore language cannot express the immediate. Reflection kills the immediate and that is why it is impossible to express the musical in language” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 80).
166. “Music cannot give the reason, that is beyond its power. Words are unable to express the mood itself, it is too heavy, too ponderous, for words to carry; only music can express it” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 87).
167. “Desire awakens, and as one always first realizes one has been dreaming at the moment of waking, so here too the dream is over” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 89).
168. “If we remember that desire is present in all three stages, we can say that in the first stage it is specified as *dreaming*, in the second as *seeking*, in the third as *desiring*” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 90).
169. “Love from the soul is a continuation in time, sensual love a disappearance in time, but the medium which expresses this is precisely music. This is something music is excellently fitted to accomplish, since it is far more abstract than language and therefore does not express the particular but the general in all its generality, and yet it expresses the general, not in reflective abstraction, but in the concreteness of immediacy” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 101).
170. “It is appropriate, therefore, that the overture be composed last, so that the artist himself can be properly permeated with the music” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 127).
171. “While clearly the content of the overture should not be the same as the opera’s, neither, of course, should it be anything absolutely different. Its content should be the same but in some other way. It should contain what is central to the piece so that this can seize the listener with all its might” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 128).
172. “As when one skims a stone over the surface of the water, it skips lightly for a time, but as soon as it stops skipping, instantly it sinks down into the depths, that is how Don Giovanni dances over the abyss, jubilant in his brief respite” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 131).
173. “So while everyone wants to rule, no one wants the responsibility” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 141).
174. “All isolated individuals always become comic by asserting their own accidental individuality in the face of evolutionary necessity” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 142).
175. “Every individual, however original, is still a child of God, of his age, of his nation, of his family, of his friends” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 144).
176. “But then what is human life when we take these two things away? What is the human race? Either the sadness of the tragic, or the profound sorrow and profound joy of religion” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 145).
177. “In ancient tragedy the sorrow is deeper, the pain less; in modern tragedy, the pain is greater, the sorrow less” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 146).
178. “Remorse has a holiness which obscures the aesthetic” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 147).
179. “This is part of the confusion evident in so many ways in our age: we look for a thing where we ought not to look for it; and worse, we find it where we ought not to find it” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 148).
180. “True tragic sorrow accordingly requires an element of guilt, true tragic pain an element of innocence” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 150).
181. “Seeing that we [. . .] recognize the fragmentary as a characteristic of all human striving in its truth and realize that it is precisely this that distinguishes it from the infinite coherence of Nature, that an individual’s wealth consists precisely in his power of fragmentary extravagance” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 150).
182. “Perhaps nothing ennobles a human being so much as keeping a secret. It gives a man’s whole life a meaning, though one that it has only for him” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 155).
183. “The difference lies in the fact that art belongs in the category of space and poetry in that of time, that art represents repose, poetry movement” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 168).
184. “It is the essence of joy to reveal itself, but sorrow wants to hide, yes, sometimes even to deceive. Joy is communicative, sociable, open-hearted, and wants to express itself; sorrow is reserved, silent, solitary, and seeks to retire into itself” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 169).
185. “Similarly the picture I want to show here is an inner picture which can also only be detected by looking through the exterior. There may be nothing striking about the exterior, it is only when I look through it that I discover the inner picture, which is what I want to show, an inner picture too refined to be visible on the outside, woven as it is of the softest moods of the soul” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 172).
186. “Let others be proud that no girl near or far can withstand the power of their love, we do not envy them; we would be proud if no secret sorrow escaped our attention, no private sorrow were too coy and too proud for us to succeed in probing triumphantly into its innermost hiding-places” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 173).
187. “So the outer is the object of our observation, but not of our interest. Thus the fisherman sits and directs his attention unwaveringly on the float, yet the float does not interest him at all, only the movements down on the sea-bed” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 173).
188. “If one is in a hurry it would only delay matters to dwell further on these things, since one can learn no more than one already knows, which is the whole story” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 176).
189. “The point in reflective sorrow is that the sorrow is constantly in search of its object; the searching is the unrest of sorrow and its life” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 177).
190. “If someone were now to ask her what it was she sorrowed over, she could give no answer, or she would answer in the same way as that wise man who, when asked what religion was, kept on demanding time to think it over and so was perpetually at a loss for an answer” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 181).
191. “If love has no endurance, what then can endure” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 185).
192. “Perhaps the trees have found out something—and yet the trees are better than men, for the trees sigh and keep silent; men whisper” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 191).
193. “[. . .] and though she does not glide with the lightness of childlike innocence, she steps forward with the energetic firmness of womanly passion” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 193).
194. “The religious is, altogether, a dangerous power to have anything to do with; it is jealous of itself and will not be ridiculed” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 195).
195. “For people’s lives consist not of food and drink alone, the soul too needs nourishment” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 196).
196. “As the shades of the underworld, when they got hold of someone living, sucked the blood from him and lived as long as this blood warmed and nourished them, so Faust seeks an immediate life that can renew and strengthen him” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 200).
197. “When you read a name on an epitaph you are easily led to wonder how it went with this life in the world; one would like to climb down into the grave to converse with him” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 211).
198. “He enjoys, for everyday purposes, the reputation of being in his right mind, yet he knows that were he to explain to a single person just how things were with him, he would be declared mad” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 216).
199. “And what is life but madness, and faith but folly, and hope but reprieve, and love but salt in the wound” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 221).
200. “Strange that boredom, so still and static, should have such power to set things in motion. The effect that boredom exercises is altogether magical, except that it is not one of attraction but of repulsion” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 227).
201. “There is a kind of restless activity that keeps a person out of the world of spirit and puts him in a class with the animals, which from instinct must always be on the go” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 231).
202. “A prisoner in solitary confinement for life is most resourceful, a spider can cause him much amusement” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 233).
203. “It is a peculiar feeling when, in the midst of enjoyment, one looks at it in order to remember” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 234).
204. “The reason for nature’s greatness is that it has forgotten that it was once chaos, but this latter thought can recur whenever need be” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 235).
205. “Besides, in marriage one falls into extremely fateful line with practice and custom, and, like wind and weather, practice and custom are very hard to pin down” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 238).
206. “Friendship is already dangerous, marriage still more so, for the woman is and will remain the husband’s ruin as soon as he enters into a permanent relation with her. Take a young man, ardent as an Arabian horse, let him marry, he is lost” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 238).
207. “Enjoyment was what his whole life was organized around. In the first case he savoured the aesthetic element personally; in the second he savoured his own person aesthetically” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 249).
208. “At times his desire was for something altogether arbitrary—a greeting, for instance—and under no circumstance would he accept more, because in the person in question this was what was most beautiful” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 250).
209. “Ah, yes, when one is seventeen, when one goes shopping at that happy age, when the thought of every large or small object one lays one’s hand on gives an inexpressible joy, one forgets easily” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 258).
210. “And what weapon so sharp, so sudden in its movement, and hence so deceptive, as the eye” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 261).
211. “One has to restrict oneself, that is a main condition of all enjoyment” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 267).
212. “How enjoyable thus to splash up and down on a stormy lake—how enjoyable to be stirred in oneself” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 268).
213. “I would give a hundred dollars for a smile from a young girl in a street situation, but not even ten for a handclasp at a party; these are currencies of quite different kinds” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 268).
214. “She was at her most beautiful age. A young girl does not develop in the sense that a boy does; she does not grow, she is born” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 273).
215. “Most men enjoy a young girl as they do a glass of champagne, in a single frothing moment; oh, yes! That’s really nice, and with many young girls it’s no doubt the most one can make of it” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 282).
216. “He simply doesn’t know how to tackle his love. When he knows she is there in the evening he dresses up just for her, puts on his new dark suit just for her, cuff-links just for her, and cuts an almost ridiculous figure among the otherwise commonplace company in the drawing-room” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 287).
217. “When a small number of people often come together in the same room, a kind of tradition soon develops in which each one has his own place, his station; it becomes a picture one can unfold at will, a chart of the terrain” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 289).
218. “What rejuvenating power a young girl has! Not the freshness of the morning air, not the soughing of the wind, not the coolness of the ocean, not the fragrance of wine and its delicious bouquet—nothing else in the world has this rejuvenating power” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 291).
219. “A person who speaks like a book is exceedingly boring to listen to; sometimes, however, it is not inappropriate to talk in that way” (Kierkegaard, *Either/Or,* 312).
220. “[. . .] the miseries numberless, grief on grief, no end--  
     too much to bear, we are all dying  
     O my people…  
     Thebes like a great army dying  
     and there is no sword of thought to save us, no  
     and the fruits of our famous earth, they will not ripen  
     no and the women cannot scream their pangs to birth--  
     screams for the Healer, children dead in the womb  
     and life on life goes down  
     you can watch them go” (Sophocles, *Oedipus The King*).
221. “Now what the night spares he comes by day and kills--  
     the god of death” (Sophocles, *Oedipus The King*).
222. “God of the headdress gleaming gold, I cry to you--  
     your name and ours are one, Dionysus--  
     come with your face aflame with wine  
     and raving women’s cries  
     your army on the march! Come with the lightning  
     come with your torches blazing, eyes ablaze with glory!  
     Burn that god of death that all gods hate!” (Sophocles, *Oedipus The King*).
223. “Look, if you think crude, senseless stubbornness  
     such a gift, you’ve lost your sense of balance” (Sophocles, *Oedipus The King*).
224. “He solved the famous riddle with his brilliance,  
     he rose to power, a man beyond all power.  
     Who could behold his greatness without envy?  
     Now what a black sea of terror has overwhelmed him.  
     Now as we keep our watch and wait the final day,  
     count no man happy till he dies, free of pain at last” (Sophocles, *Oedipus The King*).
225. “They have realized that no single approach is likely to unravel the workings of the mind: it will not give up its secrets to psychology alone; nor is any other isolated discipline –artificial intelligence, linguistics, anthropology, neurophysiology, philosophy –going to have any greater success” (Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 7).
226. “A machine can be controlled by a ‘program’ of symbolic instructions, and there is nothing ghostly about a computer program. Perhaps the mind stands to the brain in much the same way that the program stands to the computer. There can be a science of the mind” (Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 8).
227. “To what extent can people know the reasons for their behaviour?” (Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 13).
228. “Dualism [. . .] is so potent that the history of psychology is, broadly speaking, little more than a series of reactions to it” (Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 14).
229. “Animals studied by Americans rush about frantically, with an incredible display of hustle and pep, and at least achieve the desired solution by chance. Animals observed by Germans sit still and think, and at last evolve the solution out of their inner consciousness” (Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 19).
230. “A theory may be so rich in descriptive possibilities that it can be made to fit any data” (Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 21).
231. “Numerals are potent because they are each distinct from one another, and there is a simple structural recipe for constructing an unlimited supply of them” (Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 31).
232. “Bertrand Russell once remarked that in mathematics one never knows what one is talking about or whether what one is saying is true or false” (Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 34).
233. “An effective procedure, like a recipe or a knitting pattern, must reach the desired goal in a finite number of steps, using only a finite amount of knowledge” (Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 38).
234. “A grammar is a set of rules for a domain of symbols (or language) that characterizes all the properly formed constructions, and provides a description of their structure” (Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 45).
235. “*Theories* of the mind, however, should not be confused with the mind itself, any more than theories of the weather should be confused with rain or sunshine” (Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 51).
236. “Students of the mind do not always know that they do not know what they are talking about” (Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 52).
237. “Cognition is therefore not wholly a matter of computations that transform mental symbols: symbols can be created by physical interactions with the world” (Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 59).
238. “Nature has mastered small-scale wiring in three dimensions and the parallel execution of myriad computations. Each cell in the nervous system has thousands of connections to other cells and carries out its own computations. Electronic components such as the micro-chip, however, are restricted to an essentially two-dimensional wiring of components, with far fewer interconnections than occur between nerve cells” (Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 79).
239. “It is a profoundly erroneous truism… that we should cultivate the habit of thinking what we are doing. The precise opposite is the case. Civilization advances by extending the number of important operations which we can perform without thinking about them” (Alfred North, quoted in Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 130).
240. “A newly hatched gosling learns to follow the first large moving object that it sees. It treats this object as the mother goose—even if it happens to be the ethologist, Konrad Lorenz” (Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 131).
241. “You may go through life complaining about the fallibility of your memory, but take comfort from the thought that no one knows whether the normal tendency to forget is an unfortunate flaw in the design of human memory, or a feature that improves its overall efficiency” (Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 143).
242. “Since long- and short-term memory can each be independently disrupted by brain damage, there is a ‘double dissociation’ between them, which suggests that they depend on separate modules within the brain” (Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 151).
243. “William James likened the stream of consciousness to the trajectory of a bird—a sequence of alternating flights and perchings” (Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 217).
244. “A concept should be general enough to include all positive instances but specific enough to exclude all negative instances” (Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 237).
245. “When people try to induce a novel concept or hypothesis, they concentrate on its positive exemplars” (Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 239).
246. “Other theories, such as that creativity depends on unusual associations, are too simplistic to yield genuine works of the imagination” (Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 254).
247. “*A creative process yields an outcome that is novel for the individual, not merely remembered or perceived, and not constructed by rote or by a simple deterministic procedure*” (Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 255).
248. “The single mental model is provisional, and it can be revised in the light of subsequent information” (Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 339).
249. “Normally, communication has purpose, because it is governed by an intention” (Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 346).
250. “No one knows what consciousness is or whether is serves any purpose” (Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 353).
251. “As several cognitive scientists have observed, the brain could hardly have evolved without splitting into separate modules” (Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 355).
252. “This ‘operating system’ at the top of the hierarchy sets goals for lower level processors and monitors their performance” (Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 356).
253. “The experience of reality it a triumph of the architecture of the mind: the operating system has no access to the processes on which it is based” (Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 356).
254. “Human emotions are complicated and dependent on personal, historical and cultural experience. They have transcended their evolutionary origins” (Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 372).
255. “Since basic feelings are symbols that have no symbolic structure, there cannot be analytical concepts of them. There can be concepts only of the scenarios into which they typically enter” (Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 382).
256. “Moreover, the quest to understand the mind should be distinct from the question of how to treat human beings and from any attempt to supplant them by computers” (Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 387).
257. “The compatibility of free will with computational explanation reveals the crassness of the assumption that psychology is a means for the prediction and control of individual behavior” (Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 390).
258. “Researchers will never be certain about the true nature of the human mind: their understanding, like that of any scientists, will always be provisional” (Johnson-Laird, *The Computer and the Mind*, 390).
259. “Lord Jesus seemed to me in some ways a god of death, helpful, it is true, in that he scared away the terrors of the night, but himself uncanny, a crucified and bloody corpse” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 13).
260. “Ah, these good, efficient, healthy-minded people, they always remind me of those optimistic tadpoles who bask in a puddle in the sun, in the shallowest of waters, crowding together and amiably wriggling their tails, totally unaware that the next morning the puddle will have dried up and left them stranded” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 14).
261. “School came to bore me. It took up far too much time which I would rather have spent drawing battles and playing with fire” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 27).
262. “I was equally outraged when the teacher stated in the teeth of his own definition of parallel lines that they met at infinity. This seemed to me no better than a stupid trick to catch peasants with, and I could not and would not have anything to do with it” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 28).
263. “Previously I have been willed to do this and that; now *I* willed. This experience seemed to me tremendously important and new: there was ‘authority’ in me” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 33).
264. “Thus the pattern of my relationship to the world was already prefigured: today as then I am a solitary, because I know things and must hint at things which other people do not know, and usually do not even want to know” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 42).
265. “In fact it seemed to me that the high mountains, the rivers, lakes, trees, flowers, and animals far better exemplified the essence of God than men with their ridiculous clothes, their meanness, vanity, mendacity, and abhorrent egotism” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 45).
266. “My ‘religion’ recognized no human relationship to God, for how could anyone relate to something so little known as God” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 57).
267. “What, indeed, was God’s character? What would we say of a human personality who behaved in this manner? I did not dare to think this question out to its conclusion” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 58).
268. “As I saw it, it was not at all unreasonable to suppose that God, for all that He probably did not feel any such cruel satisfaction in the unmerited sufferings of man and beast, had nevertheless intended to create a world of contradictions in which one creature devoured another and life meant simply being born to die” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 59).
269. “Why do these philosophers pretend that God is an idea, a kind of arbitrary assumption which they can engender or not, when it is perfectly plain that He exists, as plain as a brick that falls on your head" (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 62).
270. “For everywhere in the realm of religious questions I encountered only locked doors, and if ever one door should chance to open I was disappointed in what lay behind it” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 63).
271. “It was as though a breath of the great world of stars and endless space had touched me, or as if a spirit had invisibly entered the room—the spirit of one who had long been dead and yet was perpetually present in timelessness until far into the future. Denouements of this sort were wreathed with the halo of a numen” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 66).
272. “People were like the animals, and seemed as unconscious as they. They looked down upon the ground or up into the trees in order to see what could be put to use, and for what purpose; like animals they herded, paired, and fought, but did not see that they dwelt in a unified cosmos, in God’s world, in an eternity where everything is already born and everything has already died” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 67).
273. “Because they are so closely akin to us and share our unknowingness, I loved all warm-blooded animals who have souls like ourselves and with whom, so I thought, we have an instinctive understanding. We experience joy and sorrow, love and hate, hunger and thirst, fear and trust in common—all the essential features of existence with the exception of speech, sharpened consciousness, and science” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 67).
274. “At the time I was still in that childlike state where life consists of single, unrelated experiences” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 80).
275. “Although we human beings have our own personal life, we are yet in large measure the representatives, the victims and the promoters of a collective spirit whose years are counted in the centuries. We can well think all our lives long that we are following our own noses, and may never discover that we are, for the most part, supernumeraries on the stage of the world theater. There are factors which, although we do not know them, nevertheless influence our lives, the more so if they are unconscious. Thus at least a part of our being lives in the centuries—that part which, for my private use, I have designated ‘No. 2’” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 91).
276. “What were men, anyway? ‘They are born dumb and blind as puppies,’ I thought, ‘and like all God’s creatures are furnished with the dimmest light, never enough to illuminate the darkness in which they grope’” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 93).
277. “The arch sin of faith, it seemed to me, was that it forestalled experience” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 94).
278. “I wanted to know how the human mind reacted to the sight of its own destruction, for psychiatry seemed to me an articulate expression of that biological reaction which seizes upon the so-called healthy mind in the presence of mental illness” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 112).
279. “In my practice I was constantly impressed by the way the human psyche reacts to a crime committed unconsciously” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 122).
280. “Clinical diagnoses are important, since the give the doctor a certain orientation; but they do not help the patient” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 124).
281. “The psyche is distinctly more complicated and inaccessible than the body. It is, so to speak, the half of the world which comes into existence only when we become conscious of it” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 132).
282. “Wherever there is a reaching down into innermost experience, into the nucleus of personality, most people are overcome by fright, and many run away” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 141).
283. “As I saw it, a scientific truth was a hypothesis which might be adequate for the moment but was not the preserved as an article of faith for all time” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 151).
284. “I regarded the unconscious, and dreams, which are its direct exponents, as natural processes to which no arbitrariness can be attributed, and above all no legerdemain. I knew no reasons for the assumption that the tricks of the consciousness can be extended to the natural processes of the unconscious” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 162).
285. “But the anima has a positive aspect as well. It is she who communicates the images of the unconscious to the conscious mind, and that is what I chiefly valued her for” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 187).
286. “Nietzsche had lost the ground under his feet because he possessed nothing more than the inner world of his thoughts—which incidentally possessed him more than he it” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 189).
287. “It was then that I dedicated myself to service of the psyche. I loved it and hated it; but it was my greatest wealth. My delivering myself over to it, as it were, was the only way by which I could endure my existence and live it as fully as possible” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 192).
288. “I was by no means free from the bigotry and hubris of consciousness which wants to believe that any halfway decent inspiration is due to one’s own merit, whereas inferior reactions come merely by chance, or even derive from alien sources” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 195).
289. “As a young man my goal had been to accomplish something in my science. But then, I hit upon this stream of lava, and the heat of its fires reshaped my life” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 199).
290. “In physics, too, we speak of energy and its various manifestations, such as electricity, light, heat, etc. The situation in psychology is precisely the same” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 208).
291. “Man always has some mental reservation, even in the face of divine decrees” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 220).
292. “The work is the expression of my inner development; for commitment to the contents of the unconscious forms the man and produces his transformations. My works can be regarded as stations along my life’s way” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 222).
293. “That is because most people find it quite beyond them to live on close terms with the unconscious. Again and again I have had to learn how hard this is for people” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 228).
294. “On the other hand, a characteristic of childhood is that, thanks to its naivete and unconsciousness, it sketches a more complete picture of the self, of the whole man in his pure individuality, than adulthood. Consequently, the sight of a child or a primitive will arouse certain longings in adult, civilized persons—longings which relate to the unfulfilled desires and needs of those parts of the personality which have been blotted out of the total picture in favor of the adapted persona” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 244).
295. “The predominantly rationalistic European finds much that is human alien to him, and he prides himself on this without realizing that his rationality is won at the expense of his vitality. And that the primitive part of his personality is consequently condemned to a more or less underground existence” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 245).
296. “Just as childhood memory can suddenly take possession of consciousness with so lively an emotion that we feel wholly transported back to the original situation, so these seemingly alien and wholly different Arab surroundings awake an archetypal memory of an only too well known pre-historic past which apparently we have entirely forgotten” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 246).
297. “That man is indispensable for the completion of creation; that, in fact, he himself is the second creator of the world, who alone has given to the world its objective existence—without which, unheard, unseen, silently eating, giving birth, dying, heads nodding through hundreds of millions of years, it would have gone in the profoundest night of non-being down to its unknown end” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 256).
298. “Human consciousness created objective existence and meaning, and man found his indispensable place in the great process of being” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 256).
299. “I asked myself whether the growing masculinization of the white woman is not connected with the loss of her natural wholeness (*shamba*, children, livestock, house of her own, hearth fire); whether it is not a compensation for her impoverishment; and whether the feminizing of the white man is not a further consequence” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 263-264).
300. “I, on the other hand, wish to persist in the state of lively contemplation of nature and of the psychic images. I want to be freed neither from human beings, nor from myself, nor from nature; for all these appear to me the greatest of miracles” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 276).
301. “What happens within oneself when one integrates previously unconscious contents with the consciousness is something which can scarcely be described in words” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 287).
302. “But when one follows the path of individuation, when own lives one’s own life, one must take mistakes into the bargain; life would not be complete without them. There is no guarantee—not for a single moment—that we will not fall into error or stumble into deadly peril” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 297).
303. “Rationalism and doctrinairism are the disease of our time; they pretend to have all the answers” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 300).
304. “We cannot visualize another world ruled by quite other laws, the reason being that we live in a specific world which has helped to shape our minds and establish our basic psychic conditions” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 300).
305. “There are many humans beings who throughout their lives and at the moment of death lag behind their own potentialities and—even more important—behind the knowledge which has been brought to consciousness by other human beings during their own lifetimes” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 309).
306. “When I die, my deeds will follow along with me—that is how I imagine it. I will bring with me what I have done. In the meantime it is important to ensure that I do not stand at the end with empty hands” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 318).
307. “A belief to me only proves the phenomenon of belief, not the content of the belief” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 319).
308. “The decisive question for man is: Is he related to something infinite or not? That is the telling question of his life” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 325).
309. “The more a man lays stress on false possessions, and the less sensitivity he has for what is essential, the less satisfying is his life. He feels limited because he has limited aims, and the result is envy and jealousy” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 325).
310. “Our age has shifted all emphasis to the here and now, and thus brought about a daemonization of man and his world" (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 326).
311. “But man’s tasks is [. . .] to become conscious of the contents that press upward from the unconscious” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 326).
312. “As far as we can discern, the sole purpose of human existence is to kindle a light in the darkness of mere being. It may even be assumed that just as the unconscious affects us, so the increase of our consciousness affects the unconscious” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 326).
313. “From then on, the symptoms of unrest and doubt increased, until at the end of the second millennium the outlines of a universal catastrophe became apparent, at first in the form of a threat to consciousness. This threat consists in giantism—in other words, a hubris of consciousness—in the assertion: ‘Nothing is greater than man and his deeds.’ The otherworldliness, the transcendence of the Christian myth was lost, and with it the view that wholeness is achieved in another world” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 328).
314. “As a rule, however, the individual is so unconscious that he altogether fails to see his own potentialities for decision. Instead he is constantly and anxiously looking around for external rules and regulations which can guide him in his perplexity” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 330).
315. “Hence deepened self-knowledge also requires science, that is, psychology. No one builds a telescope or microscope with one turn of the wrist, out of good will alone, without a knowledge of optics” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 331).
316. “There is a general feeling, to be sure, that we have reached a significant turning point in the ages, but people imagine that the great change has to do with nuclear fission and fusion, or with space rockets. What is concurrently taking place in the human psyche is usually overlooked” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 334).
317. “By virtue of his reflective faculties, man is raised out of the animal world, and by his mind he demonstrates that nature has put a high premium precisely upon the development of consciousness” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 338).
318. “There is no better means of intensifying the treasured feeling of individuality than the possession of a secret which the individual is pledged to guard” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 342).
319. “Like the initiate of a secret society who has broken free from the undifferentiated collectivity, the individual on his lonely path needs a secret which for various reasons he may not or cannot reveal. Such a secret reinforces him in the isolation of his individual aims” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 343).
320. “Loneliness does not come from having no people about one, but from being unable to communicate the things that seem important to oneself, or from holding certain views which others find inadmissible” (Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 356).
321. “Alfred Adler once said, referring to the children’s school he had founded in Vienne, ‘The pupils teach the teachers.’ It is always thus in psychotherapy” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 8).
322. “In other words, the most common problem now is not social taboos on sexual activity or guilt feeling about sex in itself, but the fact that sex for so many people is an empty, mechanical and vacuous experience” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 16).
323. “Certain attitudes in a society tend to crystallize rigidly just before they collapse. It is easy to see how a period of emptiness would have to follow the breakdown of the period of the ‘iron men’” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 20).
324. “The human being cannot live in a condition of emptiness for very long; if he is not growing *toward* something, he does not merely stagnate; the pent-up potentialities turn into morbidity and despair, and eventually into destructive activities” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 24).
325. “One of the two central beliefs in the modern period since the Renaissance has been in the value of individual competition” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 46).
326. “The individual’s striving for his own gain, in fine, without an equal emphasis on social welfare, no longer automatically brings good to the community” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 48).
327. “The second central belief in our modern age has been the faith in individual reason” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 49).
328. “’Reason’ operates while one goes to class, ‘emotion’ when one visits one’s lover, ‘will power’ when one studies for an exam, and religious duty at funerals and on Easter Sunday. This compartmentalization of values and goals leads very quickly to an undermining of the unity of the personality, and the person, in ‘pieces’ within as well as without, does not know which way to go” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 52).
329. “Though the 1920’s seemed to be a time when men had great confidence in the power of the person, it was actually the opposite: they had confidence in techniques and gadgets, not in the human being” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 57).
330. “Most people now, therefore, are able to find good external ‘reasons’ for their belief that as selves they are insignificant and powerless. For how can one act, they well ask, in the face of the giant economic, political and social movements of the time” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 58).
331. “The loss of the self and the rise of collectivist movements [. . .] are both the result of the same underlying historical changes in our society” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 58).
332. “The humor occurs because of a new appreciation of one’s self as a subject acting in an objective world” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 62).
333. “I believe it could be shown in researches [. . .] that when a culture in its historical phase of growing toward unity, its language reflects the unity and power; whereas when a culture is in the process of change, dispersal and disintegration, the language likewise loses its power” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 65).
334. “By the nineteenth century the interest in nature had become increasingly technical; man’s concern now was chiefly to *master and manipulate* nature” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 70).
335. “For the tragic view indicates that we take seriously man’s freedom and his need to realize himself; it demonstrates our belief in the ‘indestructible will of man to achieve his humanity’” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 78).
336. “Almost every adult is, in greater or lesser degree, still struggling on the long journey to achieve selfhood on the basis of the patterns which were set in his early experiences in the family” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 87).
337. “The self is the organizing function within the individual and the function by means of which one human being can relate to another. It is prior to, not an object of, our science; it is presupposed in the fact that one can be a scientist” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 91).
338. “And [. . .] if man does not fulfill his potentialities as a person, he becomes to that extent constricted and ill” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 95).
339. “Indeed, it is very easy to get an audience these days if one preaches against conceit and pride in one’s self, for most people feel so empty and convinced of their lack of worth anyway that they readily agree that the one who is condemning them must be right” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 98).
340. “The self-condemning person is very often trying to show how important he is that God is so concerned with punishing him” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 99).
341. “To be merely an ‘observer’ of one’s self, to treat one’s self as an object, is to be a stranger to one’s self” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 104).
342. “Not only do people separate the body from the self in using it as an instrument for work, but they likewise separate it from the self in their pursuit of pleasure. The body is treated as a vehicle of sensation, from which one can get certain gastronomical pleasures and sexual sensations is skillfully handled, just as though one were tuning a television set” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 108).
343. “It is only neurotic behavior which is rigidly repetitive” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 114).
344. “Though the tendencies and intuitions in the unconscious are blocked off from our conscious awareness, they are still part of the self and accessible in various degrees to being made conscious” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 115).
345. “For when there are no set standards to rebel against, one gets no power from rebelling” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 157).
346. “Since the rebel gets his sense of direction and vitality from attacking the existing standards and mores, he does not have to develop standards of his own” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 157).
347. “Freedom is never the opposite of responsibility” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 157).
348. “The belief in the ‘divine right to be taken care of’ often brings with it the feeling that one has a right to exercise power over others” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 200).
349. “We tend to assume that everything must be proven by the methods which properly fit mechanics and physical science” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 210).
350. “One never receives his convictions about values through intellectual debates” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 217).
351. “’To the best of my lights at the moment this is what I choose to do, even though I may know more and choose differently tomorrow’” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 219).
352. “Thus an ethical man does not act on the conscious level as though he loves someone when on unconscious levels he hates him” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 220).
353. “For it requires greater courage to preserve inner freedom, to move on in one’s inward journey into new realms, than to stand defiantly for outer freedom” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 230).
354. “It is not so bad to be defeated because the enemy is stronger, or even to be defeated because one didn’t fight; but to know one was a coward because one chose to sell out his strength to get along with the victor—this betrayal of one’s self is the bitterest pill of all” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 235).
355. “It is the courage to be and trust one’s self despite the fact that one is finite; it means acting, loving, thinking, creating, even though one knows he does not have the final answers, and he may well be wrong” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 238).
356. “To be capable of giving and receiving mature love is as sound a criterion as we have for the fulfilled personality” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 238).
357. “It not infrequently happens that two persons, feeling solitary and empty by themselves, relate to each other in a kind of unspoken bargain to keep each other from suffering loneliness” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 242).
358. “If you recall the last dozen questions which troubled you—on which, that is, you have to ponder and ‘chew’ to find out what you could believe was true—you will discover that very few if any of them had to do with matters that could be proven by scientific facts” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 247).
359. “The question of time—just how late is it?—is thus the focus for the most pressing anxiety of many modern persons” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 255).
360. “One can’t do much about the past, and very little about the distant future—how pleasant, then, to dream about them! How free from bother, how relieved from troublesome thoughts about what one has to do with one’s life!” (May, *Man’s Search for Himself*, 268).
361. “Philosophy, beginning in wonder, as Plato and Aristotle said, is able to fancy everything different from what it is. It sees the familiar as if it were strange, and the strange as if it were familiar” (James, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, 7).
362. “A man with no philosophy in him is the most inauspicious and unprofitable of all possible social mates” (James, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, 8).
363. “Philosophy in the full sense is only *man* *thinking*, thinking about generalities rather than particulars” (James, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, 15).
364. “’Down with philosophy!’ is the cry pf innumerable scientific minds. ‘Give us measurable facts only, phenomena, without the mind’s additions, without entities or principles that pretend to explain.’ It is largely from this kind of mind that the objection that philosophy has made no progress, proceeds” (James, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, 22).
366. “Feeling must have been originally self-sufficing; and thought appears as a superadded functions, adapting us to a wider environment than that of which brutes take account” (James, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, 48).
367. “With concepts we go in quest of the absent, meet the remote, actively turn this way or that, bend our experience, and make it tell us whither it is bound” (James, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, 64).
368. “So strongly do objects that come as universal and eternal arouse our sensibilities, so greatly do life’s values deepen when we translate percepts into ideas” (James, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, 73).
369. “Many of the troubles of philosophy come from assuming that to be understood (or ‘known’ in the only worthy sense of the word) out flowing life must be cut into discrete bits and pinned upon a fixed relational scheme” (James, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, 85).
370. “Use concepts when they help, and drop them when they hinder understanding; and take reality bodily and integrally up into philosophy in exactly the perceptual shape in which it comes” (James, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, 95).
371. “Perception prompts our thought, and thought in turn enriches our perception” (James, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, 108).
372. “Scholasticism is only common sense grown quite articulate” (James, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, 191).
373. “The life of a human being does not exist merely in the sphere of goal-directed verbs. It does not consist merely of activities that have something for their object” (Buber, *I and Thou*, 54).
374. “Those who experience do not participate in the world. For the experience is ‘in them’ and not between them and the world” (Buber, *I and Thou*, 56).
375. “All actual life is encounter” (Buber, *I and Thou*, 62).
376. “Primal man’s experiences of encounter were scarcely a matter of tame delight; but even violence against a being one really confronts is better than ghostly solicitude for faceless digits” (Buber, *I and Thou*, 75).
377. “And in all seriousness of truth, listen: without It a human being cannot live. But whoever lives only with that is not human” (Buber, *I and Thou*, 85).
378. “The improvement of the ability to experience and use generally involves a decrease in man’s power to relate” (Buber, *I and Thou*, 92).
379. “Man’s will to profit and will to power are natural and legitimate as long as they are tied to the will to human relations and carried by it” (Buber, *I and Thou*, 97).
380. “When a culture is no longer centered in a living an continually renewed relational process, it freezes into the It-world which is broken only intermittently by the eruptive, glowing deeds of solitary spirits” (Buber, *I and Thou*, 103).
381. “How is anyone to behold his freedom if caprice is his dwellingplace” (Buber, *I and Thou*, 108).
382. “The capricious man does not believe and encounter. He does not know association; he only knows the feverish world out there and his feverish desire to use it” (Buber, *I and Thou*, 109).
383. “The person beholds his self; the ego occupies himself with his My: my manner, my race, my works, my genius” (Buber, *I and Thou*, 114).
384. “Some would deny any legitimate use of the word God because it has been misused so much. Certainly it is the most burdened of all human words. Precisely for that reason it is the most imperishable and unavoidable” (Buber, *I and Thou*, 123).
385. “Above all, every feeling has its place in a polar tension; it derives its color and meaning not from itself alone but also from its polar opposite; every feeling is conditioned by its opposite” (Buber, *I and Thou*, 129).
386. “All doctrines of immersion are based on the gigantic delusion of a human spirit bent back into itself—the delusion that spirit occurs in man. In truth it occurs from man—between man and what he is not” (Buber, *I and Thou*, 141).
387. “Let us love the actual world that never wishes to be annulled, but love it in all its terror, but dare to embrace it with our spirit’s arms—and our hands encounter the hands that hold it” (Buber, *I and Thou*, 143).
388. “Whoever knows the world as something to be utilized knows God in the same way” (Buber, *I and Thou*, 156).
389. “The clinician and the physiologist frequently have direct access to data of first importance for psychology, sometimes without recognizing the fact” (Hebb, *The Organization of Behavior*, vii).
390. “It might be argued that the task of the psychologist, the task of understanding behavior and reducing the vagaries of human thought to a mechanical process of cause and effect, is a more difficult one than that of any other scientist” (Hebb, *The Organization of Behavior*, xi).
391. “There is a long way to go before we can speak of understanding the principles of behavior to the degree that we understand the principles of chemical reaction” (Hebb, *The Organization of Behavior*, xi).
392. “It is only too easy, no matter what formal theory of behavior one espouses, to entertain a concealed mysticism in one’s thinking about the large segment of behavior which theory does not handle adequately” (Hebb, *The Organization of Behavior*, xiii).
393. “The general idea is an old one, that any two cells or systems of cells that are repeatedly active at the same time will tend to become “associated,” so that activity in one facilitates activity in the other” (Hebb, *The Organization of Behavior*, 70).
394. “It is, likewise, a basic factor in originality, the original and creative person having, among other things, unusual sensitivity to the applicability of the already known to new problem situations” (Hebb, *The Organization of Behavior*, 110).
395. “As we go up the phylogenetic scale, then, we find in mature animals an increasing ability to learn complex relationships, but also, surprisingly, a slower and slower rate of learning in infancy” (Hebb, *The Organization of Behavior*, 113).
396. “Given a really new and unfamiliar set of sensations to be associated with motor responses, selectively, the first definite and clearcut association appears sooner in rat than in man, and apparently sooner in the insect than the rat” (Hebb, *The Organization of Behavior*, 114).
397. “The learning ability of higher species at maturity is not merely the capacity for a greater number of associations or for associations that involve finer sensory discriminations. The behavior also shows a less direct control by the stimulus of the moment, from the immediate environment” (Hebb, *The Organization of Behavior*, 126).
398. “And, finally, the variability of action that still remains selective is also greater in higher species: an aggressive attitude, for example, has a much more variable expression in the chimpanzee than in the dog” (Hebb, *The Organization of Behavior*, 141).
399. “Periods of spontaneous play are shorter in the rat than in the dog, and still shorter than in man; the period of emotional disturbance following momentary stimulation seems progressively shorter as one goes down the phylogenetic scale” (Hebb, *The Organization of Behavior*, 141).
400. “Ultimately, our aim must be to find out how the same fundamental neural principles determine all behavior” (Hebb, *The Organization of Behavior*, 166).
401. “The chimpanzee […] has an emotional repertoire that is very like man’s” (Hebb, *The Organization of Behavior*, 242).
402. “The trouble of course is that man is a suspicious, sensitive, and uncooperative animal who objects to having his intelligence tested and is not usually interested in helping a scientific investigation at such a price” (Hebb, *The Organization of Behavior*, 280).
403. “It is highly probable that such questions (concerning what peculiar contribution each part of the cortex makes to behavior) will remain unanswered until we can find out how to ask better questions” (Hebb, *The Organization of Behavior*, 285).
404. “An innate potential for development is not logically a guarantee that the development will occur” (Hebb, *The Organization of Behavior*, 295).
405. “It may be truly asserted that the rapid progress of the physical sciences during the last three centuries has not been accompanied by a corresponding advance in the theory of reasoning” (Jevons, *Principles of Science*, vii).
406. “The application of Scientific Method cannot be restricted to the sphere of lifeless objects. We must sooner or later have strict sciences of those mental and social phenomena, which, if comparison be possible, are of more interest to us than purely material phenomena” (Jevons, *Principles of Science*, vii).
407. “It is doubtful whether an entirely isolated phenomenon could present itself to our notice, since there must always be some points of similarity between object and object” (Jevons, *Principles of Science*, 1).
408. “Nature is a spectacle continually exhibited to our senses, in which phenomena are mingled in combinations of endless variety and novelty” (Jevons, *Principles of Science*, 1).
409. “There is an obvious danger that a concept that is used to explain everything will turn out to explain nothing” (Eysenck, *A Handbook of Cognitive Psychology*, p. 49).
410. “One of the most intriguing features of theorizing by philosophers and psychologists about human memory is the strong reliance placed on the spatial metaphor” (Eysenck, *A Handbook of Cognitive Psychology*, p. 80).
411. “We are fairly successful in deciding whether or not we possess certain information that cannot be recalled […] people can estimate fairly accurately what information is potentially accessible” (Eysenck, *A Handbook of Cognitive Psychology*, p. 167).
412. “Words are also meaningful units of information stored in long-term memory, and there is almost complete agreement that they are stored in a highly organized way that facilitates retrieval” (Eysenck, *A Handbook of Cognitive Psychology*, p. 175).
413. “Young children often attribute consciousness to those things that can move, and then to things which appear to be spontaneously active (e.g., clouds)” (Eysenck, *A Handbook of Cognitive Psychology*, p. 237).
414. “Most laboratory studies are also artificial in another important way: In everyday life, cognitive processes usually occur in the service of some higher purpose or goal, whereas they function as ends in themselves in the laboratory” (Eysenck, *A Handbook of Cognitive Psychology*, p. 364).
415. “What we are talking about is a wedding of insufficiencies: When the realistic but relatively contaminated data of everyday life are consistent with the somewhat artificial but pure data of the laboratory, then we may be reasonably confident that progress is being made” (Eysenck, *A Handbook of Cognitive Psychology*, p. 375).
416. “What is obvious, however, is that the uniform assessment of the intelligence of animal species is made difficult by the different specializations that the various species have evolved” (Delius & Delius, *Comparative Cognition* [Ch. 28], p. 559).
417. “Of the million or so species that exist on earth, only a very small proportion is capable of showing any behavior, an even smaller proportion capable of any learning, and only exceedingly few qualify as possibly intelligent” (Delius & Delius, *Comparative Cognition* [Ch. 28], p. 563).
418. “Still, much of cleverness of social insects is more the product of the cooperative functioning of their colonies than the cognitive capacities of individuals” (Delius & Delius, *Comparative Cognition* [Ch. 28], p. 563).
419. “It is important to realize that it is the selection pressure for more varied behavior, improved learning, and expanded intelligence that brings about the evolution of more voluminous and more sophisticated brains. It is not, as some have suggested, due to some intrinsic drive that makes brains ever larger and more intricate and then allows them to produce increasingly complex and refined behaviors” (Delius & Delius, *Comparative Cognition* [Ch. 28], p. 563).
420. “Who cares what I do? To whom will I confide the joy that my small discovery has given me, someone who will not smile sarcastically or enter the realm of annoying compassion? If I triumph, who will applaud? And if I am uncertain, who will correct me and provide the encouragement to go on?” (Cajal, *Advice for a Young Investigator*, p. xv).
421. “Science can never understand the foundation hidden below the appearance of phenomena in the universe” (Cajal, *Advice for a Young Investigator*, p. 2).
422. “Our brain is an organ of action that is directed toward practical tasks; it does not appear to have been built for discovering the ultimate causes of things, but rather for determining their immediate causes and invariant relationships” (Cajal, *Advice for a Young Investigator*, p. 3).
423. “I believe that excessive admiration for the work of great minds is one of the most unfortunate preoccupations of intellectual youth—along with a conviction that certain problems cannot be attacked, let alone solved, because of one’s relatively limited abilities” (Cajal, *Advice for a Young Investigator*, p. 9).
424. “Great men are at times geniuses, occasionally children, and always incomplete” (Cajal, *Advice for a Young Investigator*, p. 9-10).
425. “It is fair to say that, in general, no problems have been exhausted; instead, men have been exhausted by the problems” (Cajal, *Advice for a Young Investigator*, p. 14).
426. “Hapless is he who remains silent and absorbed in a book. Extreme admiration drains the personality and clouds understanding, which comes to accept hypothesis for proof and shadow for obvious truth” (Cajal, *Advice for a Young Investigator*, p. 30).
427. “Most people who lack self-confidence are unaware of the marvelous power of prolonged concentration. This type of cerebral polarization (which involves a special ordering of perceptions) refines judgement, enriches analytical powers, spurs constructive imagination, and—by focusing all light of reason on the darkness of a problem—allows unforeseen and subtle relationships to be discovered” (Cajal, *Advice for a Young Investigator*, p. 34).
428. “During the so-called intellectual incubation period, the investigator should ignore everything unrelated to the problem of interest, like a somnambulist attending only to the voice of the hypnotist. In the lecture room, on walks, in the theater, in conversation, and even in reading for pleasure, seek opportunities for insight, comparisons, and hypotheses that add at least some clarity to the problem one is obsessed with” (Cajal, *Advice for a Young Investigator*, p. 34).
429. “Of course we don’t recommend the elimination of all distractions. However, those of the investigator should always be light and promote the association of new ideas” (Cajal, *Advice for a Young Investigator*, p. 38).
430. “It has often been said that men of science, like great religious and other social reformers, exhibit mental traits frequently associated with the inept. They dwell on the high ground of humanity, unconcerned with the pettiness and trifles of everyday life” (Cajal, *Advice for a Young Investigator*, p. 40).
431. “The regard that the world has for power, aristocracy, and money is not a prime aspiration for him because he feels within himself a nobility greater than that granted capriciously by blind fortune or the good humor of a ruler” (Cajal, *Advice for a Young Investigator*, p. 49).
432. “’Are you acquainted with Such-and such’s surprising theory?’ And without listening to the reply, the erudite one expounds with warm eloquence some wild and audacious proposal with no basis in reality and endurable only in the context of a chat about spiritual matters” (Cajal, *Advice for a Young Investigator*, p. 77-78).
433. “All of the bibliophiles fondest hopes are concentrated on projecting an image of genius infused with culture” (Cajal, *Advice for a Young Investigator*, p. 78).
434. “Our neurons must be used for more substantial things. Not only to know but also to transform knowledge; not only to experience but also to construct—this is the standard for the genuine man of science to follow” (Cajal, *Advice for a Young Investigator*, p. 78).
435. “Oh comforting solitude, how favorable thou art to original thought!” (Cajal, *Advice for a Young Investigator*, p. 93).
436. “In evaluating our merit, only original contributions to science will be considered, not debating skill and nobility” (Cajal, *Advice for a Young Investigator*, p. 129).
437. “*True vocation always consists of a special activity for which the young man sacrifices time and money, scorning the distractions of our age*” (Cajal, *Advice for a Young Investigator*, p. 145).
438. “Nature has been merciful to the aged; granting the brain the sublime privilege of resisting more than any other organ the inexorable process of degeneration” (Cajal, *Advice for a Young Investigator*, p. 150).
439. “Our early youth is like a flower at dawn with a lovely dewdrop in its cup, harmoniously and pensively reflecting everything that surrounds it. But soon the sun rises over the horizon, and the dewdrop evaporates; with it vanish the fantasies of life, and now it becomes a question (to use a flower metaphor once more) whether or not man is able to produce—by his own efforts as does the *nereum*—a drop that may represent the fruit of his life” (Kierkegaard, in a letter to P.W. Lund [June 1, 1835]).
440. “Naturally every man desires to work according to his abilities in this world, but it follows from this that he wishes to develop his abilities in a particular direction, namely, in that which is best suited to him as an individual. But which is that? Here I am confronted with a big question mark. Here I stand like Hercules—not at a crossroads—no, but at a multitude of roads, and therefore it is all the harder to choose the right one. Perhaps it is my misfortune in life that I am interested in far too many things rather than definitely in any one thing” (Kierkegaard, in a letter to P.W. Lund [June 1, 1835]).
441. “It’s important to have a ‘growth mindset’ about programming—in other words, understand that people develop programming skills through practice. They aren’t just born as programmers, and being unskilled at programming now is not an indication that you that you can never become an expert” (Sweigart, *Automate the Boring Stuff with Python*)