

Election-Denying Republican Candidates Underperformed in the 2022 Midterms*

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Abstract

We combine newly collected election data with records of public denials of the results of the 2020 election to estimate the degree to which election-denying Republican candidates for senator, governor, secretary of state, and attorney general over- or under-performed other Republicans in 2022. We find that the average vote share of election-denying Republicans in statewide races was approximately 2.3 percentage points lower than their co-partisans after accounting for state-level partisanship. Election-denying candidates received roughly 2 percentage-points more vote share than other Republican candidates in primaries, on average, although this estimate is quite uncertain. The general-election penalty is larger than the margin of victory in battleground states in recent close presidential elections, suggesting that nominating election-denying candidates in 2024 could be a damaging electoral strategy for Republicans. At the same time, it is small enough to suggest that only a relatively small group of voters changed their vote in response to having an election-denying candidate on the ballot.

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1 Introduction

In 2022, denying the 2020 election’s outcome became an explicit campaign strategy for many Republican candidates. In the end, a number of high-profile candidates who denied the 2020 election—including Arizona secretary of state candidate Mark Finchem, Arizona gubernatorial candidate Kari Lake, Nevada senatorial candidate Adam Laxalt, and Pennsylvania gubernatorial candidate Doug Mastriano—lost their races in 2022, leading some to argue that the American electorate had rejected election denialism. NPR, to choose one of many examples, ran a headline declaring “Midterm results show voters reject election denialism.”¹ Others disagree. For example, pointing to many election-denying candidates who won their races, a 538 article wrote that “election denial is alive and well.”² What can data tell us about the extent to which voters did or did not reject election-denying candidates in 2022?

To provide hard data on this important question, we gather new 2022 primary and general election data on key statewide offices—senate, governor, secretary of state, and attorney general—and combine it with systematic data on which candidates explicitly denied the 2020 election outcome publicly.³

Using several statistical approaches to account for partisan differences across states and offices, we estimate that election-denying candidates for statewide offices underperformed their fellow Republicans who did not deny the 2020 election by roughly 2.3 percentage points, on average. While this difference is small by some standards, it constitutes a large enough vote-share swing to have changed the electoral college outcome of recent close presidential elections like the 2020 election, where President Biden’s win margins in Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin were under 2 percentage points. As such, the estimated penalty seems relevant for the debate over the electability of Republican candidates in the 2024 primary cycle.

These results also help to advance the long-running debate over candidate positioning and electoral outcomes in American elections. On one side, empirical studies consistently estimate an advantage to more-moderate candidates (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; Broockman

¹<https://www.npr.org/2022/11/23/1138875937/midterm-results-show-voters-reject-election-denialism>

²<https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/election-denialism-lives-on-even-as-candidates-who-support-it-concede/>

³We also collected this data for U.S. House races. However, lacking a reliable measure of district partisanship because of the 2022 redistricting cycle, we do not use this data to estimate a penalty or reward to election-denying candidates.

and Kalla 2020; Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002; Hall 2015; Hall and Thompson 2018), and behavioral data suggests that swing voters remain important in determining election outcomes (Fowler et al. N.d.; Hill, Hopkins, and Huber 2021). On the other hand, an important vein of behavioral research argues that Americans are too uninformed and/or too partisan to care about other considerations like candidate positions (e.g., Achen and Bartels 2016; Campbell et al. 1960).

Our results are somewhere in between extreme claims on either side of this debate. The estimates indicate that, even in the hyper-polarized election of 2022, candidates who took unpopular positions on election denialism importantly underperformed—so something beyond pure partisanship is at work. At the same time, the observed underperformance is also small enough in magnitude to suggest that a substantial bloc of voters continued to vote the Republican party line for both election-denying candidates and non-election-denying candidates. Moreover, the penalty that we estimate is roughly similar in magnitude to survey-based estimates provided in Graham and Svobik (2020), which argues that relatively few Americans will trade off ideological or partisan considerations to support the democratic process itself. Our results using observational data reinforce the survey-based conclusion that this group is indeed small—though large enough, it appears, to swing important close elections including presidential ones.

Beyond the general election, it is also important to understand the extent to which Republican primaries preferred election-denying candidates. Perhaps surprisingly, we estimate that election-denying Republicans outperformed primary opponents by only roughly 2 percentage points.⁴ Because the estimate does seem positive, however, it is at least roughly consistent with research exploring the perceived tradeoff primary voters face between voting for more-extreme candidates they prefer and voting for less-extreme candidates more likely to win the general election (e.g., Aranson and Ordeshook 1972; Brady, Han, and Pope 2007; Hill 2015; Owen and Grofman 2006)

There are two important limitations to our analysis. First, our analysis only measures the gap in electoral performance of statewide Republican candidates who denied or did not deny the 2020 election. Because it compares Republican candidates to one another, it differences out any penalty that may have accrued to the Republican party as a whole because of its association with the election-denying position of former President Trump and other candidates. While it

⁴It is also arguably small relative to the high degree of polarization between Democrats and Republicans in terms of their self-reported views concerning election integrity and vote-by-mail in the 2020 election (Lockhart et al. 2020).

would be useful to estimate that party-level penalty, too, the specific underperformance of election-denying candidates relative to other Republicans is particularly informative for thinking through the factional politics of the Republican party and the relative advantage or disadvantage that election-denying candidates may be perceived to hold within the party for 2024 and beyond, especially as questions about “electability” become relevant during the 2024 Republican primaries.

Second, our estimate does not only reflect the causal effect of a candidate switching her position on election denialism; rather, it summarizes how much worse election-denying candidates did than non-denying candidates. If election-denying candidates differ from their non-denying candidates in their same states—for example, if they are less experienced, more ideologically extreme, or otherwise less popular candidates—these other differences would contribute to our estimate as well. To the extent these other factors drive the difference we observe, our estimate would still be helpful in predicting how the types of people who have chosen to adopt election-denying views tend to perform, electorally, giving us predictive power on whether we should expect election-denying candidates to continue making it into office, but not directly telling us whether a particular candidate would gain or lose votes by changing her position on the 2020 election’s legitimacy.

2 Empirical Approaches to Account for State Partisanship

We collect certified statewide election returns for 2022 directly from official state websites.⁵ We combine this data with information on 2020 Republican presidential vote share collected from Dave Leip’s Election Atlas. Ultimately, we analyze data for 42 states, excluding 8 states that either did not have any two-party contested elections for senate, governor, secretary of state, and attorney general (6 states) or which use non-standard election rules that lead to more than one general-election candidate in one or both parties (2 states).⁶

Classifying Republican candidates as denying the 2020 election is partially a subjective exercise. While some candidates very explicitly and consistently rejected the results of the 2020 election in

⁵We were not able to find certified general-election results for Kentucky, though we do have certified primary results. In that case, we used ballotpedia data.

⁶Specifically, we exclude Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, West Virginia, and Virginia because they held no elections for these offices in 2022. We exclude Utah because the only relevant election held was for senate and there was no Democratic opponent. Finally, we exclude Alaska and Louisiana due to the presence of co-partisan opponents in the general election. While California uses a top-2 system that could also lead to these issues, in the 2022 elections for the offices we include, the general elections ended up being standard D vs. R races.

public statements, and are therefore easy to classify, many others have expressed varying levels of skepticism or have avoided answering questions about it directly, and may even change their answers over time. To avoid making our own judgment calls on these borderline cases, we rely on two external datasets of election-denying candidates. The first, from States United Democracy Center (SUDC), is a list of Republican candidates for governor, secretary of state, and state attorney general who made public statements expressing skepticism about the 2020 election. SUDC is a nonpartisan organization founded by three former government officials that focuses on issues around American democracy.⁷ SUDC identifies Republican as having denied the election if, in the evaluation of the organization’s experts, they claimed former President Trump was the rightful winner of the 2022 election instead of President Biden, spread lies regarding the election to the press or on social media, called for an audit of election results after they were certified, attended “Stop the Steal” rallies, or filed litigation to overturn election results (States United Democracy Center 2022). A key advantage to this dataset for the purpose of our study is that it includes primary-election candidates and not only nominees. A drawback for us is that it does not include senatorial candidates.

The second is a dataset from FiveThirtyEight (538) that the news organization created by contacting every Republican nominee and asking them about the 2020 election (FiveThirtyEight 2022). A key advantage to this dataset is that they include senatorial candidates; however, a key drawback is that this data does not cover primary elections. Rather than classifying candidates as denying the 2020 election, 538 lists six possible kinds of stances each candidate could take. These stances are: “Fully accepted;” “Accepted with reservations;” “Avoided answering;” “No comment;” “Raised questions;” and “Fully denied.” We classify candidates in this data as denying the 2020 election only if they “fully denied” the 2020 election, though in the Appendix we show that results are robust to expanding this definition.

In addition to using the two classifications separately, we also combine them by generating a variable that classifies any Republican candidate as denying the 2020 election if (a) they are classified as doing so by States United, OR (b) they are classified as doing so in the 538 data.

⁷See <https://statesuniteddemocracy.org/>.

Focusing only on Republican statewide candidates, we run regressions of the form

$$\text{Repub Vote Share}_{is} = \beta \text{Deny 2020}_i + X_{is} + \epsilon_{is}, \quad (1)$$

where the outcome is the vote share for Republican statewide candidate i in state s in the 2022 election. The variable Deny 2020_i is a binary variable indicating whether candidate i officially denied the results of the 2020 election. The variable X_{is} represents an optional control vector. In some specifications, we control for state-level presidential vote share to account for possible confounding where states with more election-denying candidates in 2022 are states where Republican vote shares are generally higher. In other specifications, we instead use state fixed effects for this. Finally, ϵ_{is} is the error term which we expect to feature autocorrelation within states.

Public accounts of the 2022 election have noted that incumbents tended to be more reluctant to deny the results of the 2020 election and were more likely to win reelection, while challengers were more likely to deny the election and less likely to win.⁸ To the extent we find a negative estimate for β , it could therefore be partially intertwined with other kinds of incumbency advantages. However, as we discussed in the introduction, the purpose of our study is to assess whether candidates who denied the 2020 election performed worse or better—including all the possible differences between them, including incumbency. This basic difference provides our best takeaway of how the electorate reacted to election-denying candidates, and our best prediction of what might happen in future election cycles.

3 Underperformance of Election-Denying Candidates in 2022

Table 1 presents the estimates. The first three columns present our more-precise statistical estimates when we pool the data while controlling for state-level 2020 presidential vote share. The second set of three columns present estimates where we instead use state fixed effects, focusing on comparisons between Republican candidates running in the same state who vary in their election denialism. This latter specification can address potential changes in state partisanship between 2020 and 2022, but at the cost of using less of the data and therefore lowering our statistical precision.

⁸For example, see <https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/denying-the-2020-election-wasnt-a-winning-strategy-for-political-newcomers/>.

Table 1 – Underperformance of Election Deniers in 2022 Races for Governor, Senator, Secretary of State, and Attorney General.

	General-Election Vote Share					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	States United	538	Combined	States United	538	Combined
Election Denier	-0.033 (0.014)	-0.027 (0.009)	-0.023 (0.010)	-0.045 (0.027)	-0.018 (0.012)	-0.025 (0.014)
N	85	118	118	85	118	118
# States	38	42	42	38	42	42
Pres Vote Share	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
State FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes

Sample is Republican statewide candidates. Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. Columns labeled States United use election-denier classifications from SUDC, which does not include Senate races. Columns labeled 538 use 538 classifications which do include Senate races. Columns 1-3 control linearly for 2020 presidential vote share. Columns 4-6 use state fixed effects which absorb 2020 presidential vote share.


Columns 1 and 4 use the States United classification of election-denying candidates (which do not include senate races), while columns 2 and 5 use the 538 classification. Columns 3 and 6 use the combined measure we created, described above.

As the results show, we find a relatively consistent underperformance for election-denying Republicans compared to other Republicans, ranging from as large as -4.5 percentage points (column 4) to -1.8 percentage points (column 5). Our most precise estimate (in terms of lowest standard error) is in column 2, where we estimate a 2.7 percentage-point penalty using the 538 classification. Column 3 remains our ex ante preferred specification, where we use the combined measure and control for presidential vote share and estimate an underperformance of -2.3 percentage points relative to other Republicans.

Figure 1 explains which states featured the most underperformance by election-denying candidates, focusing on states that featured Republican candidates who did and did not deny the 2020 election. The plot shows the election-denying candidates' average vote share in the state on the horizontal axis, and the non-election-denying candidates' average vote share in the state on the vertical axis. Points above the 45-degree line are states where the non-denying candidates outperformed the denying candidates.

As the figure shows, many states are quite close to the 45-degree line, but with a number of substantial positive outliers indicating major underperformance of election-denying candidates rel-

Figure 1 – Comparing 2022 vote shares of statewide Republican candidates who denied vs. did not deny the results of the 2020 election and ran in the same state.



ative to other Republicans. The largest is Kansas. Here, Kris Kobach—classified by both States United and 538 as denying the 2020 election—garnered slightly more than 50% of the two-party vote share in the general election in the race for state Attorney General. Derek Schmidt, classified as denying the 2020 election by States United, got roughly 49% of the two-party vote in his race for governor, and lost. Scott Schwab and Jerry Moran fully accepted the results of the 2020 election, and each won their races (for secretary of state and senate, respectively) with more than 60% of the two-party vote. This pattern is similar in Ohio, where JD Vance, classified as denying the 2020 election by 538, underperformed the other three Republican statewide candidates by 7 to 9 percentage points. Pennsylvania features a similar pattern though at slightly smaller magnitude, with election-denying candidate Doug Mastriano underperforming Mehmet Oz by roughly 5 percentage points.

Some other states do not follow this pattern. In Arizona, Blake Masters was the only of the four statewide Republican candidates to partially accept the results of the 2020 election, yet he garnered roughly 2 percentage points less of the two-party vote share than both Kari Lake and Abraham Hamadeh, both candidates who denied the 2020 election. He ran roughly even with Mark Finchem, who also denied the 2020 election. Why some states featured more underperformance than others

is an important question for future research; nevertheless, looking across all the states, there are more positive outliers than negative, and the overall average indicates important underperformance for election-denying candidates.


4 Possible Advantage of Election-Denying Candidates in Primary Elections

While election-denying candidates may be disadvantaged in the general election, many observers have concluded that they enjoyed a considerable advantage in primary elections.

Our data is not entirely consistent with this view. We begin with simple descriptives. As Figure 2 shows, of all the candidates running in governor, attorney general, and secretary of state races that we study, roughly 32% are classified as election-denying candidates by States United (the only data source that covers primary elections, and which does not include senate races). This reflects a substantial but minority portion of the candidate pool, suggesting that a good number of candidates perceived a favorable environment for these positions in the primaries. Roughly 34% of all state offices in our sample have at least one election-denying candidate seeking office. In contested primaries in our sample, roughly 38% produce an election-denying nominee. Finally, among primaries with at least one election-denying candidate, election-denying candidates are nominated in roughly 52% of cases. Together, these patterns suggest a somewhat favorable electoral climate for election-denying candidates, but nowhere near guaranteed victory for them.

Examples reinforce this nuanced picture. We can point to many high-profile election-denying candidates who won their primaries—including people like Doug Mastriano, Kari Lake, and others we mentioned in the introduction—but we can also point to other races that went the opposite way. In Georgia, Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger and Governor Brian Kemp won their primaries over election-denying candidates. In Nebraska, Jim Pillen won his primary over Charles Herbster (the second highest vote-getting candidate), an election-denying candidate. Brad Little in Idaho and Mike Dewine provide further examples like these.

Figure 2 – Election-Denying Candidates in Statewide Republican Primaries.



Digging deeper, we can also compute the average vote-share advantage or disadvantage for election-denying candidates. We run regressions of the form

$$Primary\ Vote\ Share_{ios} = Deny\ 2020_i + X_{ios} + \epsilon_{ios}, \quad (2)$$

where the outcome variable is candidate i 's primary-election vote share for office o in state s . The main explanatory variable is the same as before. Here, optional controls will include presidential vote share, state fixed effects, or state-by-office fixed effects.

Table 2 presents the results for these three specifications. Across the specifications, we see a relatively stable but very noisy estimate ranging from 1.9 percentage points in column 1 to 2.4 percentage points in column 3. In all three specifications, standard errors are large, and we cannot rule out somewhat large effects. For example, in column 1, the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval would be roughly a 7.7 percentage-point advantage. This important limitation notwithstanding, the estimated advantage seems surprisingly small relative to some prominent claims.

Table 2 – Possible Advantage of Election Deniers in 2022 Republican Primary Races for Governor, Senator, Secretary of State, and Attorney General.

	Primary-Election Vote Share		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Election Denier	0.023 (0.027)	0.026 (0.031)	0.024 (0.035)
N	293	291	277
# States	36	34	33
Pres Vote Share	Yes	No	No
# Cand FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE	No	Yes	No
State by Office FE	No	No	Yes

Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.
All columns use States United classification for election deniers, which is the only classification that includes all primary candidates.

5 Conclusion

Understanding the degree to which voters in 2022 rejected election-denying candidates is important for understanding the future of American democracy and for predicting what will happen in 2024. Although we know that many election-denying candidates lost key state-level races in 2022, we have not had any precise empirical sense of how strongly the American electorate punished candidates who espoused these views. The purpose of this study is to put together the data necessary to quantify this penalty systematically. We find that election-denying candidates underperformed in 2022 by a margin substantial enough to suggest that it could tip close elections in the future, including the 2024 presidential race. On the other hand, the penalty we document is also small enough to suggest that many voters were willing to continue supported Republican candidates even if they denied the results of the 2020 election.

In addition to its immediate policy relevance, our study also advances our understanding of the possible links between candidate positions and electoral outcomes. Historically, candidates who adopt more ideologically moderate candidates have performed better electorally, on average. Since 2016, as politics has become more focused on divisive national and cultural issues, the ideological structure underlying American elections has frayed. It is harder to assess which candidates are moderate, or even to define what it means to be moderate—for example, Trump-aligned candidates

like Elise Stefanik offer quite centrist positions on many classic policy issues concerning the size of government, yet profess radical views on election policy and a host of cultural issues. In this rapidly changing equilibrium, our main approaches to studying candidate ideology and its links to election outcomes are breaking down: we simultaneously worry that campaign-finance based approaches to scaling candidates on a unidimensional scale are not revealing ideology (Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2017), and, as party-line votes in Congress become increasingly common, that roll-call based measures are also not revealing ideology (Duck-Mayr and Montgomery 2022). Our study provides a helpful update to the literature on candidate positions in this new political era by focusing not on candidates' ideological portfolio but on their stance on one extremely salient issue—the outcome of the 2020 election. As we have shown, a small but pivotal group of American voters have meaningfully punished the candidates who have supported it.

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Supporting Information

Intended for online publication only.

A States United vs. 538 Confusion Matrix

Table SI.1 – Classification of Election Denier Classification for Republican General Election Candidates for Attorney General, Secretary of State, and Governor from States United and 538.

		States United	
		Accepts	Denies
538	Accept	55	17
	Denies	1	20

Frequencies are for all Republican candidates for attorney general, secretary of state, and governor elections in 2022.

B Alternative 538 Classification

In this section, we re-estimate our main results with a different classification of election-denying candidates. Here, using the 538 data, we define election-denying candidates as anyone who either “fully denied” the election results or “raised questions” about it.

Table SI.2 – Underperformance of Election Deniers in 2022 Races for Governor, Senator, Secretary of State, and Attorney General.

	General-Election Vote Share	
	(1)	(2)
Election Denier	-0.026 (0.009)	-0.023 (0.012)
N	118	118
Pres Vote Share	Yes	No
State FE	No	Yes

Sample is all Republican statewide candidates. Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. Columns labeled States United use election-denier classifications from States United, which does not include Senate races. Columns labeled 538 use 538 classifications which do include Senate races. Columns 1-3 control linearly for 2020 presidential vote share. Columns 4-6 use state fixed effects which absorb 2020 presidential vote share.

C List of Election-Denying Candidates

Table SI.3 – Republican Candidates for Attorney General Classified as Deniers

State	Candidate	General Election	538 Denier	States United Denier
AL	MARSHALL, STEVE	Won		✓
AZ	GLASSMAN, RODNEY		-	✓
AZ	HAMADEH, ABRAHAM	Lost	✓	✓
CA	EARLY, ERIC		-	✓
FL	MOODY, ASHLEY	Won	✓	✓
GA	GORDON, JOHN		-	✓
ID	LABRADOR, RAÚL R.	Won	✓	✓
ID	MACOMBER, ARTHUR		-	✓
KS	KOBACH, KRIS	Won	✓	✓
MD	PEROUTKA, MICHAEL ANTHONY	Lost		✓
MI	DEPERNO, MATTHEW	Lost	✓	✓
MN	ANDERSON, SHARON		-	✓
MN	WARDLOW, DOUG		-	✓
NV	CHATTAH, SIGAL	Lost		✓
SC	WILSON, ALAN	Won	✓	✓
TX	GOHMERT, LOUIE		-	✓
TX	PAXTON, KEN	Won	✓	✓
VT	PAIGE, H. BROOKE		-	✓
WI	MUELLER, KAREN		-	✓

A ✓ indicates that the candidate was classified as denying the results of 2020 election by either 538 or States United. A blank indicates the candidate was classified as not having rejected the election. A - indicates that the candidate was not considered by the source.

Table SI.5 – Republican Candidates for Governor Classified as Deniers

State	Candidate	General Election	538 Denier	States United Denier
AK	DUNLEAVY, MIKE	Won		✓
AK	KURKA, CHRISTOPHER		-	✓
AK	PIERCE, CHARLIE	Lost		✓
AL	BLANCHARD, LINDY		-	✓
AL	IVEY, KAY	Won	✓	✓
AL	ODLE, DEAN		-	✓
AR	WASHBURN, FRANCIS		-	✓
AZ	LAKE, KARI	Lost	✓	✓
AZ	NEELY, SCOTT DAVID		-	✓
AZ	SALMON, MATT		-	✓
AZ	ZEN, PAOLA TULLIANI		-	✓
CA	MERCURI, DANIEL R.		-	✓
CA	WILLIAMS, MAJOR		-	✓
CA	ZACKY, LEO S.		-	✓
FL	DESANTIS, RON	Won		✓
GA	PERDUE, DAVID A.		-	✓
GA	TAYLOR, KANDISS		-	✓
IA	REYNOLDS, KIM	Won		✓
ID	HUMPHREYS, EDWARD R.		-	✓
ID	LITTLE, BRAD	Won	✓	
ID	MCGEACHIN, JANICE		-	✓
IL	SOLOMON, MAX		-	✓
KS	SCHMIDT, DEREK	Lost		✓
MA	DIEHL, GEOFF	Lost	✓	✓
MD	COX, DAN	Lost	✓	✓
ME	LEPAGE, PAUL R.	Lost		✓
MI	DIXON, TUDOR M.	Lost	✓	✓
MI	KELLEY, RYAN D.		-	✓
MI	REBANDT, RALPH		-	✓
MI	SOLDANO, GARRETT		-	✓
NE	CONNELY, MICHAEL		-	✓
NE	HERBSTER, CHARLES W.		-	✓
NE	RIDENOUR, BRELAND		-	✓

A ✓ indicates that the candidate was classified as denying the results of 2020 election by either 538 or States United. A blank indicates the candidate was classified as not having rejected the election. A - indicates that the candidate was not considered by the source.

Table SI.7 – Republican Candidates for Governor Classified as Deniers

State	Candidate	General Election	538 Denier	States United Denier
NV	GILBERT, JOEY		-	✓
NV	HAMILTON, EDDIE		-	✓
NV	LEE, JOHN J.		-	✓
NY	GIULIANI, ANDREW		-	✓
NY	ZELDIN, LEE	Lost		✓
OH	BLYSTONE, JOE		-	✓
OH	HOOD, RON		-	✓
OH	RENACCI, JIM		-	✓
OK	SHERWOOD, MARK		-	✓
OR	CHRISTENSEN, REED		-	✓
OR	RICHARDSON, AMBER R.		-	✓
PA	BARLETTA, LOUIS		-	✓
PA	GALE, JOSEPH CHARLES		-	✓
PA	GEROW, CHARLES R.		-	✓
PA	MASTRIANO, DOUGLAS V.	Lost	✓	✓
TN	LEE, BILL	Won		✓
TX	ABBOTT, GREG	Won		✓
TX	HARRISON, DANNY		-	✓
TX	HUFFINES, DON		-	✓
TX	PRATHER, CHAD		-	✓
TX	WEST, ALLEN B.		-	✓
WI	FISCHER, ADAM J.		-	✓
WI	KLEEFISCH, REBECCA		-	✓
WI	MICHELS, TIM	Lost		✓
WI	RAMTHUN, TIMOTHY		-	✓

A ✓ indicates that the candidate was classified as denying the results of 2020 election by either 538 or States United. A blank indicates the candidate was classified as not having rejected the election. A - indicates that the candidate was not considered by the source.

Table SI.9 – Republican Candidates for U.S. Senator Classified as Deniers

State	Candidate	General Election	538 Denier	States United Denier
AL	BRITT, KATIE	Won	✓	-
MD	CHAFFEE, CHRIS	Lost	✓	-
MO	SCHMITT, ERIC	Won	✓	-
NV	LAXALT, ADAM PAUL	Lost	✓	-
OH	VANCE, J. D.	Won	✓	-
OK	MULLIN, MARKWAYNE	Won	✓	-
OR	PERKINS, JO RAE	Lost	✓	-
WI	JOHNSON, RON	Won	✓	-

A ✓ indicates that the candidate was classified as denying the results of 2020 election by either 538 or States United. A blank indicates the candidate was classified as not having rejected the election. A - indicates that the candidate was not considered by the source.

Table SI.11 – Republican Candidates for Secretary of State Classified as Deniers

State	Candidate	General Election	538 Denier	States United Denier
AL	ALLEN, WES	Won		✓
AR	WILLIAMS, EDDIE JOE		-	✓
AZ	BOLICK, SHAWNNA		-	✓
AZ	FINCHEM, MARK	Lost	✓	✓
CA	HAMM, RACHEL		-	✓
CA	PAINE, JAMES		-	✓
CO	PETERS, TINA		-	✓
CT	RAPINI, DOMINIC	Lost		✓
GA	BELLE ISLE, DAVID C.		-	✓
GA	HICE, JODY		-	✓
ID	MOON, DOROTHY		-	✓
ID	SOUZA, MARY		-	✓
IN	MORALES, DIEGO	Won		✓
KS	BROWN, MIKE		-	✓
MA	CAMPBELL, RAYLA	Lost		✓
MI	KARAMO, KRISTINA ELAINE	Lost	✓	✓
MN	CROCKETT, KIM	Lost	✓	✓
NM	TRUJILLO, AUDREY	Lost	✓	✓
NV	GERHARDT, JOHN CARDIFF		-	✓
NV	MARCHANT, JIM	Lost	✓	✓
OH	ADAMS, JOHN		-	✓
SC	BLANDFORD, KEITH		-	✓
VT	PAIGE, H. BROOKE	Lost	✓	✓
WI	SCHMIDTKA, JUSTIN D.		-	✓
WI	SCHROEDER, JAY		-	✓
WY	GRAY, CHUCK	Won	✓	✓

A ✓ indicates that the candidate was classified as denying the results of 2020 election by either 538 or States United. A blank indicates the candidate was classified as not having rejected the election. A - indicates that the candidate was not considered by the source.