

Political Economy of Growth (PS 2543)

Michaël Aklin

E-mail: aklin@pitt.edu
Office Hours: Mo: 10-11am
Office: 4621

Web: michaelaklin.github.io
Class Hours: 12-2:30
Class Room: 4430 Posvar

Online stuff

This version of the syllabus is from: 2023-03-10.

Signup sheet for presentations: shorturl.at/bjkmt.

Homepage for the course: https://michaelaklin.github.io/2023_ps2543/

Updates are marked with “**New!**”

Course objectives

This graduate course is devoted to the study of the politics of economic growth. While this is nominally a course at the intersection of IPE and CPE, you will see that it borrows heavily from other subfields and disciplines (primarily economics, but also public policy, management, history, sociology, etc.).

The aim for this course is:

- to ensure that you have a strong overview of theoretical models of growth
- to show the richness of rigorous empirical work that has been conducted
- to stimulate new research ideas, new theories, and novel empirical designs

Note: the course is primarily one based on presentations and discussions. The readings consists in a mix of ‘classics’ and recent papers. The latter were selected because they are either interesting (if I read them) or they seem interesting (based on the abstract).

Requirements

Assignments.

- 50%: a research project/pre-analysis plan (including theory + empirical design; data analysis optional)
- 40%: in-class presentations and participation.
- 10%: a book review.

Grade scale: 0 < 60: F, 60 < 64: D-, 64 < 67: D, 67 < 70: D+, 70 < 73: C-, 74 < 77: C, 77 < 80: C+, 80 < 84: B-, 84 < 87: B, 87 < 90: B+, 90 < 94: A-, 93 or more: A. "Y < X" means: "from Y up to, but not including X." Grades are not rounded up.

Late submissions are penalized by a loss of 2 percentage points per day. If you have issues that prevent you from submitting an assignment on time, then please let me know immediately. If you inform me *after* a deadline has passed, I will need to be provided justification (e.g. doctor's note) to cancel the late submission penalty.

Important note: you can discuss ideas with your fellow students, but you must do your assignments individually. For pedagogical reasons, it is essential that you must try to understand the material on your own.

Organization

Every course is divided in three parts:

1. Lecture (if applicable)
2. Paper presentation (+ discussion)
3. Project presentation

Readings

There are no required textbooks for this class. Useful textbooks to study growth models include:

- Aghion P, Howitt PW (2008). *The Economics of Growth*. MIT Press.
- Acemoglu D (2009). *Introduction to Modern Economic Growth*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

Class Schedule

The schedule is subject to change.

Week 01, 01/09: Introduction

Hall RE, Jones CI (1999). "Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker Than Others?" *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 114(1), 83-116.

Galor O (2005). "From Stagnation to Growth: Unified Growth Theory." In Aghion P, Durlauf S (eds.), *Handbook of Economic Growth*, 171-293.

Week 02, 01/16: MLK Day

No class.

Week 03, 01/23: Growth and inequality: persistence and discontinuities

Comin D, Easterly W, Gong E (2010). "Was the Wealth of Nations Determined in 1000 BC?" *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 2, 65-97.

Dell M (2010). "The Persistent Effects of Peru's Mining Mita." *Econometrica*, 78(6), 1863-1903.

Miguel E, Roland G (2011). "The Long-Run Impact of Bombing Vietnam." *Journal of Development Economics*, 96(1), 1-15.

Hornbeck R (2012). "The Enduring Impact of the American Dust Bowl: Short- and Long-Run Adjustments to Environmental Catastrophe." *The American Economic Review*, 102(4), 1477-1507.

Voigtländer N, Voth H (2012). "Persecution perpetuated: the medieval origins of anti-Semitic violence in Nazi Germany." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 127(3), 1339-1392.

Guiso L, Sapienza P, Zingales L (2016). "Long-Term Persistence." *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 14(6), 1401-1436.

Dalgaard C, Kaarsen N, Olsson O, Selaya P (2018). "Roman roads to prosperity: Persistence and non-persistence of public goods provision." CEPR Discussion Paper DP12745.

Acemoglu D, Autor D, Hazell J, Restrepo P (2021). "AI and jobs: evidence from online vacancies." *Journal of Labor Economics*.

Acemoglu D, Restrepo P (2022). "Tasks, automation, and the rise in US wage inequality." *Econometrica*, 90(5), 1973-2016.

Lindgren K, Oskarsoon S (2022). "The Perpetuity of the Past: Transmission of Political Inequality across Multiple Generations." *American Political Science Review*, 1-15.

Fouka V, Voth H (2022). "Collective Remembrance and Private Choice: German-Greek Conflict and Behavior in Times of Crisis." *American Political Science Review*, 1-20.

Cagé J, Dagorret A, Grosjean P, Jha S (2023). "Heroes and villains: The effects of combat heroism on autocratic values and Nazi collaboration in France." *American Economic Review*.

Background reading:

Moene KO, Wallerstein M (2001). "Inequality, Social Insurance, and Redistribution." *American Political Science Review*, 95(4), 859-874.

Kenworthy L, Pontusson J (2005). "Rising Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution in Affluent Countries." *Perspectives on Politics*, 3(3), 449-471.

Piketty T (2013). *Le Capital au XXI^e Siècle*. Le Seuil, Paris.

Kelly M (2019). "The standard errors of persistence." CEPR Discussion paper no. DP13783.

Blanchard O, Rodrik D (eds.) (2021). *Combating Inequality*. MIT Press.

New! Guinnane TW (2021). "We do not know the population of every country in the world for the past two thousand years." CESifo Working Paper.

New! Guinnane TW, Hoffman P (2022). "Medieval Anti-Semitism, Weimar Social Capital, and the Rise of the Nazi Party: A Reconsideration." CESifo Working Paper.

Week 04, 01/30: Labor, population, migration, and unions

Voigtländer N, Voth H (2013). "The three horsemen of riches: Plague, war, and urbanization in early modern Europe." *Review of Economic Studies*, 80(2), 774-811.

Jansen G, Sluiter R, Akkerman A (2016). "The Diffusion of Strikes: A Dyadic Analysis of Economic Sectors in the Netherlands, 1995-2007." *American Journal of Sociology*, 121(6), 1885-1918.

New! Dean A (2016). *From Conflict to Coalition*. Cambridge University Press.

Frymer P, Grumbach JM (2021). "Labor unions and white racial politics." *American Journal of Political Science*, 65(1), 225-240.

Bouscasse P, Nakamura E, Steinsson J (2021). "When did growth begin? New estimates of productivity growth in England from 1250 to 1870." NBER Working Paper 28623.

Erikson E, Shirado H (2021). "Networks, Property, and the Division of Labor." *American Sociological Review*, 86(4), 759-786.

New! Frymer P, Grumbach JM (2021). "Labor unions and white racial politics." *American Journal of Political Science*, 65(1), 225-240.

Lim J (2022). "The Electoral Consequences of International Migration in Sending Countries: Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe." *Comparative Political Studies*.

Jones CI (2022). "The end of economic growth? Unintended consequences of a declining population." *American Economic Review*, 112(11), 3489-3527.

New! Colonnelli E, Neto VP, Teso E (2022). "Politics at work." NBER Working Paper 30182.

Background reading:

Franzen A, Hangartner D (2006). "Social networks and labour market outcomes: The non-monetary benefits of social capital." *European Sociological Review*, 22(4), 353-368.

Hayashi F, Prescott EC (2008). "The depressing effect of agricultural institutions on the prewar Japanese economy." *Journal of Political Economy*, 116(4), 573-632.

Hainmueller J, Hiscox MJ (2010). "Attitudes toward Highly Skilled and Low-Skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment." *American Political Science Review*, 104(1), 61-84.

Guinnane TW (2011). "The historical fertility transition: A guide for economists." *Journal of Economic Literature*, 49(3), 589-614.

Hainmueller J, Hangartner D (2013). "Who gets a Swiss passport? A natural experiment in immigrant discrimination." *American Political Science Review*, 107(1), 159-187.

Jäger S, Noy S, Schoefer B (2022). "The German Model of Industrial Relations: Balancing Flexibility and Collective Action." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 36(4), 53-80.

Naidu S (2022). "Is There Any Future for a US Labor Movement?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 36(4), 3-28.

Week 05, 02/06: Technology and infrastructure

Hornung E (2014). "Immigration and the diffusion of technology: The Huguenot diaspora in Prussia." *American Economic Review*, 104(1), 84-122.

Juhász R (2018). "Temporary Protection and Technology Adoption: Evidence from the Napoleonic Blockade." *American Economic Review*, 108(11), 3339-76.

New! Bowles S, Choi J (2019). "The Neolithic agricultural revolution and the origins of private property." *Journal of Political Economy*, 127(5), 2186-2228.

Acemoglu D, Restrepo P (2020). "Robots and jobs: Evidence from US labor markets." *Journal of Political Economy*, 128(6), 2188-2244.

Owen E (2019). "Firms vs. Workers? The Politics of Openness in an Era of Global Production and Automation." Working Paper.

Bussemeyer MR, Tober T (2022). "Dealing with Technological Change: Social Policy Preferences and Institutional Context." *Comparative Political Studies*, 00104140221139381.

Lim J, Aklin M, Frank M (2022). "Quantifying Barriers to a Just Transition for US Fossil Fuel Workers." Working Paper.

Braun ST, Franke R (2022). "Railways, Growth, and Industrialization in a Developing German Economy, 1829-1910." *Journal of Economic History*, 82(4), 1183-1221.

Bogart D, You X, Alvarez-Palau EJ, Satchell M, Shaw-Taylor L (2022). "Railways, divergence, and structural change in 19th century England and Wales." *Journal of Urban Economics*, 128, 103390.

Voth H, Caprettini B, Trew A (2022). "Fighting for Growth: Labor scarcity and technological progress during the British industrial revolution." Working Paper Series 2022-15.

New! Akcigit U, Baslandze S, Lotti F (2023). "Connecting to Power: Political Connections, Innovation, and Firm Dynamics." *Econometrica*.

New! Kelly M, Mokyr J, Ó Gráda C (2023). "The Mechanics of the Industrial Revolution." *Journal of Political Economy*, 131(1), 59-94.

New! Braxton JC, Taska B (2023). "Technological Change and the Consequences of Job Loss." *American Economic Review*, 113(2), 279-316.

Background reading:

Schumpeter J (1934). *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*. Harper, New York.

Foster AD, Rosenzweig MR (1996). "Technical change and human-capital returns and investments: evidence from the green revolution." *American Economic Review*, 931-953.

Iversen T, Soskice D (2001). "An asset theory of social policy preferences." *American Political Science Review*, 95(4), 875-893.

Walter S (2021). "The backlash against globalization." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 24(1), 421-442.

Week 06, 02/13: Human capital

Harding R, Stasavage D (2013). "What Democracy Does (and Doesn't Do) for Basic Services: School Fees, School Inputs, and African Elections." *Journal of Politics*, 76(1), 229-245.

Ansell B, Lindvall J (2013). "The political origins of primary education systems: Ideology, institutions, and interdenominational conflict in an era of nation-building." *American Political Science Review*, 107(3), 505-522.

Cantoni D, Yuchtman N (2014). "Medieval Universities, Legal Institutions, and the Commercial Revolution." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 129(2), 823-887.

Squicciarini MP, Voigtländer N (2015). "Human capital and industrialization: Evidence from the age of enlightenment." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 130(4), 1825-1883.

Rauscher E (2016). "Does Educational Equality Increase Mobility? Exploiting Nineteenth-Century U.S. Compulsory Schooling Laws." *American Journal of Sociology*, 121(6), 1697-1761.

Croke K, Grossman G, Larreguy HA, Marshall J (2016). "Deliberate Disengagement: How Education Can Decrease Political Participation in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes." *American Political Science Review*, 110(3), 579-600.

De la Croix D, Doepke M, Mokyr J (2018). "Clans, guilds, and markets: Apprenticeship institutions and growth in the preindustrial economy." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 133(1), 1-70.

Valencia Caicedo F (2019). "The mission: Human capital transmission, economic persistence, and culture in South America." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 134(1), 507-556.

Squicciarini MP (2020). "Devotion and development: religiosity, education, and economic progress in nineteenth-century France." *American Economic Review*, 110(11), 3454-91.

Background reading:

Bourdieu P, Passeron J (1990). *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*. Sage Publications, London.

Weitzman ML (1998). "Recombinant growth." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 113(2), 331-360.

Barro RJ (2001). "Human Capital and Growth." *American Economic Review*, 91(2), 12-17.

Stijns J (2006). "Natural resource abundance and human capital accumulation." *World Development*, 34(6), 1060-1083.

Goldin C, Katz LF (2010). *The Race between Education and Technology*. Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA.

Week 07, 02/20: Social capital, networks, corruption

Satyanath S, Voigtlaender N, Voth H (2017). "Bowling for Fascism: Social Capital and the Rise of the Nazi Party." *Journal of Political Economy*, 125(2).

Frank MR, Sun L, Cebrian M, Youn H, Rahwan I (2018). "Small cities face greater impact from automation." *Journal of the Royal Society Interface*, 15(139), 20170946.

Hong I, Frank MR, Rahwan I, Jung W, Youn H (2020). "The universal pathway to innovative urban economies." *Science Advances*, 6(34), eaba4934.

Battaglini M, Guiso L, Lacava C, Miller DL, Patacchini E (2022). "Refining Public Policies with Machine Learning: The Case of Tax Auditing." NBER Working Paper 30777.

Canen N, Jackson MO, Trebbi F (2022). "Social interactions and legislative activity." *Journal of the European Economic Association*.

New! Jackson MO, Nei SM, Snowberg E, Yariv L (2023). "The Dynamics of Networks and Homophily." NBER Working Paper 30815.

New! Gulino G, Masera F (2023). "Contagious dishonesty: Corruption scandals and supermarket theft." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*.

New! Browne O, Gazze L, Greenstone M, Rostapshova O (2023). "Man vs. Machine: Technological Promise and Political Limits of Automated Regulation Enforcement." NBER Working Paper 30816.

New! Korovkin V, Makarin A (2023). "Conflict and Intergroup Trade: Evidence from the 2014 Russia-Ukraine Crisis." *American Economic Review*, 113(1), 34-70.

Background reading:

Coleman JS (1988). "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital." *American Journal of Sociology*, 94, 95-120.

Montgomery JD (1991). "Social networks and labor-market outcomes: Toward an economic analysis." *American Economic Review*, 81(5), 1408-1418.

Knack S, Keefer P (1997). "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112(4), 1251-1288.

Putnam RD (2001). *Bowling Alone*. Simon & Schuster, New York.

Glaeser EL (2008). *Cities, agglomeration, and spatial equilibrium*. Oxford University Press.

Campante F, Durante R, Tesei A (2022). "Media and social capital." *Annual Review of Economics*, 14, 69-91.

Week 08, 02/27: Institutions (democracy vs autocracy)

Feyrer J, Sacerdote B (2009). "Colonialism and Modern Income: Islands as Natural Experiments." *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 91(2), 245-262.

Michalopoulos S, Papaioannou E (2013). "National Institutions and Subnational Development in Africa." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 129(1), 151-213.

Fernández R (2014). "Women's rights and development." *Journal of Economic Growth*, 19(1), 37-80.

Pepinsky TB (2016). "Colonial migration and the origins of governance: Theory and evidence from Java." *Comparative Political Studies*, 49(9), 1201-1237.

Lacroix J (2017). "Steam democracy up! Industrialization-led opposition in Napoleonic plebiscites." *European Review of Economic History*, 22(2), 135-160.

Acemoglu D, Naidu S, Restrepo P, Robinson JA (2019). "Democracy does cause growth." *Journal of Political Economy*, 127(1), 47-100.

Background reading:

Lipset SM (1959). "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." *American Political Science Review*, 53(1), 69-105.

O'Donnell G (1973). *Modernization and bureaucratic-authoritarianism: Studies in South American politics*. Institute of International Studies.

Dahl RA (1989). *Democracy and Its Critics*. Yale University Press, New Haven.

Przeworski A (1991). *Democracy and the market: Political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge University Press.

Acemoglu D, Johnson S, Robinson JA (2001). "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation." *American Economic Review*, 91(5), 1369-1401.

Baum MA, Lake DA (2003). "The Political Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human Capital." *American Journal of Political Science*, 47(2), 333-347.

Rodrik D, Subramanian A, Trebbi F (2004). "Institutions rule: the primacy of institutions over geography and integration in economic development." *Journal of Economic Growth*, 9(2), 131-165.

Glaeser EL, La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A (2004). "Do Institutions Cause Growth?" *Journal of Economic Growth*, 9(3), 271-303.

Cheibub JA, Gandhi J, Vreeland J (2010). "Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited." *Public Choice*, 143(1), 67-101.

Acemoglu D, Egorov G, Sonin K (2021). "Institutional change and institutional persistence." In *The Handbook of Historical Economics*, 365-389. Elsevier.

Week 09, 03/06: Spring Break

No class.

Week 10, 03/13: Institutions (autocracy)

Albertus M (2015). *Autocracy and Redistribution*. Cambridge University Press, New York.

Miller MK (2015). "Electoral Authoritarianism and Human Development." *Comparative Political Studies*, 48(12), 1526-1562.

New! Zhukov YM, Talibova R (2018). "Stalin's terror and the long-term political effects of mass repression." *Journal of Peace Research*, 55(2), 267-283.

Geddes B, Wright J, Wright JG, Frantz E (2018). *How dictatorships work: Power, personalization, and collapse*. Cambridge University Press, New York.

Dower PC, Finkel E, Gehlbach S, Nafziger S (2018). "Collective action and representation in autocracies: Evidence from Russia's great reforms." *American Political Science Review*, 112(1), 125-147.

Rozenas A, Zhukov YM (2019). "Mass Repression and Political Loyalty: Evidence from Stalin's 'Terror by Hunger'." *American Political Science Review*, 113(2), 569-583.

Rizio SM, Skali A (2019). "How often do dictators have positive economic effects? Global evidence, 1858-2010." *The Leadership Quarterly*.

Chang Q (2022). "Career Incentives, Economic Competition, and Public Land Prices." Working Paper.

Background reading:

Linz JJ (2000). *Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Olson M (1993). "Dictatorship, democracy, and development." *American political science review*, 87(3), 567-576.

Gandhi J (2008). *Political institutions under dictatorship*. Cambridge University Press, New York.

Svolik MW (2012). *The politics of authoritarian rule*. Cambridge University Press, New York.

Gehlbach S, Sonin K, Svolik MW (2016). "Formal Models of Nondemocratic Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 19(1), 565-584.

Week 11, 03/20: Institutions (informal, bureaucracy, state capacity, etc.)

Alesina A, Giuliano P, Nunn N (2013). "On the origins of gender roles: Women and the plough." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 128(2), 469-530.

Cantoni D (2015). "The economic effects of the Protestant Reformation: testing the Weber hypothesis in the German lands." *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 13(4), 561-598.

Acemoglu D, García-Jimeno C, Robinson JA (2015). "State capacity and economic development: A network approach." *American Economic Review*, 105(8), 2364-2409.

Nowak A, Gelfand MJ, Borkowski W, Cohen D, Hernandez I (2016). "The evolutionary basis of honor cultures." *Psychological science*, 27(1), 12-24.

Schulz J (2017). "The Churches' Bans on Consanguineous Marriages, Kin-Networks and Democracy." Working Paper.

Lowes S, Nunn N, Robinson JA, Weigel JL (2017). "The evolution of culture and institutions: Evidence from the Kuba kingdom." *Econometrica*, 85(4), 1065-1091.

Lehne J (2018). "An opium curse? The long-run economic consequences of narcotics cultivation in British India." Working Paper.

Vogler JP (2019). "Imperial rule, the imposition of bureaucratic institutions, and their long-term legacies." *World Politics*, 71(4), 806-863.

Colonnelli E, Prem M, Teso E (2020). "Patronage and selection in public sector organizations." *American Economic Review*, 110(10), 3071-99.

Rich JA (2022). "Outsourcing Bureaucracy to Evade Accountability: How Public Servants Build Shadow State Capacity." *American Political Science Review*, 1-16.

Slough T (2022). "Bureaucratic Quality and Electoral Accountability." Working Paper.

Background reading:

Bourdieu P, Passeron J (1990). *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*. Sage Publications, London.

Mauss M (2000). *The Gift*. W. W. Norton, New York.

Lauth H (2000). "Informal Institutions and Democracy." *Democratization*, 7(4), 21-50.

Guiso L, Sapienza P, Zingales L (2006). "Does culture affect economic outcomes?" *Journal of Economic perspectives*, 20(2), 23-48.

Tsai KS (2006). "Adaptive informal institutions and endogenous institutional change in China." *World Politics*, 59(1), 116-141.

Weber M (2019). *Economy and Society*. Harvard University Press.

Hendrix CS (2010). "Measuring state capacity: Theoretical and empirical implications for the study of civil conflict." *Journal of Peace Research*, 47(3), 273-285.

Alesina A, Giuliano P (2015). "Culture and institutions." *Journal of Economic Literature*, 53(4), 898-944.

Pomeranz D, Vila-Belda J (2019). "Taking state-capacity research to the field: Insights from collaborations with tax authorities." *Annual Review of Economics*, 11, 755-781.

Besley T, Burgess R, Khan A, Xu G (2022). "Bureaucracy and development." *Annual Review of Economics*, 14, 397-424.

Week 12, 03/27: Law, crime, and property rights

Kostelnik J, Skarbek D (2013). "The governance institutions of a drug trafficking organization." *Public Choice*, 156(1-2), 95-103.

Buonanno P, Durante R, Prarolo G, Vanin P (2015). "Poor institutions, rich mines: Resource curse in the origins of the sicilian mafia." *The Economic Journal*, 125(586), F175-F202.

Dube O, García-Ponce O, Thom K (2016). "From Maize to Haze: Agricultural Shocks and the Growth of the Mexican Drug Sector." *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 14(5), 1181-1224.

Dimico A, Isopi A, Olsson O (2017). "Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: The Market for Lemons." *The Journal of Economic History*, 77(4), 1083-1115.

Daniele G, Dipoppa G (2022). "Fighting Organized Crime by Targeting their Revenue: Screening, Mafias, and Public Funds." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*.

Ash E, Chen DL, Naidu S (2022). "Ideas have consequences: The impact of law and economics on american justice." NBER Working Paper 29788.

Background reading:

Anderson RT (1965). "From Mafia to Cosa Nostra." *American Journal of Sociology*, 71(3), 302-310.

Krueger AO (1974). "The political economy of the rent-seeking society." *American Economic Review*, 64(3), 291-303.

North DC, Weingast BR (1989). "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England." *The Journal of Economic History*, 49(4), 803-832.

Gottfredson M, Hirschi T (1990). *A General Theory of Crime*. Stanford University Press, Stanford.

Fiorentini G, Peltzman S (1997). *The economics of organised crime*. Cambridge University Press, New York.

Porta RL, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A (2008). "The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins." *Journal of Economic Literature*, 46(2), 285-332.

Venkatesh S (2008). *Gang Leader for a Day*. Penguin, New York.

Week 13, 04/03: Violence and war

Nunn N, Wantchekon L (2011). "The slave trade and the origins of mistrust in Africa." *American Economic Review*, 101(7), 3221-52.

Berger D, Easterly W, Nunn N, Satyanath S (2013). "Commercial imperialism? Political influence and trade during the Cold War." *American Economic Review*, 103(2), 863-96.

Oatley T (2015). *A Political Economy of American Hegemony*. Cambridge University Press, New York.

Adena M, Enikolopov R, Petrova M, Santarosa V, Zhuravskaya E (2015). "Radio and the Rise of the Nazis in Prewar Germany." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 130(4), 1885-1939.

Braun R (2016). "Religious minorities and resistance to genocide: The collective rescue of Jews in the Netherlands during the Holocaust." *American Political Science Review*, 110(1), 127-147.

Klor EF, Saiegh SM, Satyanath S (2017). "Cronyism in State Violence: Evidence from Labor Repression During Argentina's Last Dictatorship." Working Paper.

Dell M, Querubin P (2017). "Nation Building Through Foreign Intervention: Evidence from Discontinuities in Military Strategies." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 133(2), 701-764.

Leeson PT, Russ JW (2017). "Witch trials." *The Economic Journal*, 128(613), 2066-2105.

Feigenbaum JJ, Lee J, Mezzanotti F (2018). "Capital Destruction and Economic Growth: The Effects of Sherman's March, 1850-1920." NBER Working Paper 25392.

Cox GW, Dincecco M (2019). "The Budgetary Origins of Fiscal-Military Prowess." Working Paper.

Wang T (2021). "Media, pulpit, and populist persuasion: evidence from father Coughlin." *American Economic Review*, 111(9), 3064-3092.

Hager A, Krakowski K (2022). "Does state repression spark protests? evidence from secret police surveillance in communist poland." *American Political Science Review*, 116(2), 564-579.

Bachmann R, Baqaee D, Bayer C, Kuhn M, Löschel A, Moll B, Peichl A, Pittel K, Schukarick M (2022). "What if? The Economic Effects for Germany of a Stop of Energy Imports from Russia." Econ Tribute Policy Brief No. 028.

New! Buggle J, Mayer T, Sakalli SO, Thoenig M (2023). "The Refugee's Dilemma: Evidence from Jewish Migration out of Nazi Germany*." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*.

Background reading:

Tilly C (2017). "War making and state making as organized crime." In *Collective Violence, Contentious Politics, and Social Change*, 121-139. Routledge.

Week 14, 04/10: Agency and leadership

Querubin P, Snyder Jr JM (2013). "The Control of Politicians in Normal Times and Times of Crisis: Wealth Accumulation by US Congressmen, 1850-1880." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 8, 409-450.

Dal Bó E, Finan F, Folke O, Persson T, Rickne J (2017). "Who Becomes A Politician?" *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 132(4), 1877-1914.

Girardi D, Bowles S (2018). "Institution Shocks and Economic Outcomes: Allende's Election, Pinochet's Coup and the Santiago Stock Market." *Journal of Development Economics*, 134, 16-27.

Chen T, Kung JK (2018). "Busting the "Princelings": The Campaign Against Corruption in China's Primary Land Market." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 134(1), 185-226.

Thompson DM, Feigenbaum JJ, Hall AB, Yoder J (2019). "Who Becomes a Member of Congress? Evidence From De-Anonymized Census Data." NBER Working Paper 26156.

Durante R, Pinotti P, Tesei A (2019). "The political legacy of entertainment TV." *American Economic Review*, 109(7), 2497-2530.

New! Lacroix J, Méon P, Oosterlinck K (2019). "A Positive Effect of Political Dynasties: The Case of France's 1940 Enabling Act." CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13871.

Easterly W, Pennings S (2020). "Leader value added: assessing the growth contribution of individual national leaders." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 9215.

Carreri M (2021). "Can good politicians compensate for bad institutions? Evidence from an original survey of Italian mayors." *Journal of Politics*, 83(4), 1229-1245.

Mehmood S, Naseer S, Chen DL (2021). "Training policymakers in econometrics." Working Paper.

Background reading:

Li H, Zhou L (2005). "Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China." *Journal of public economics*, 89(9-10), 1743-1762.

Jones BF, Olken BA (2005). "Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth since World War II." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 120(3), 835-864.

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Week 15, 04/17: Culture

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Guiso L, Sapienza P, Zingales L (2006). "Does culture affect economic outcomes?" *Journal of Economic perspectives*, 20(2), 23-48.

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Extra topics

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Danzman SB (2019). *Merging interests: when domestic firms shape FDI policy*. Cambridge University Press.

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Chang Q (2022). “Career Incentives, Economic Competition, and Public Land Prices.” Working Paper.

New! Fernández-Villaverde J, Koyama M, Lin Y, Sng T (2023). “The Fractured-Land Hypothesis.” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*.

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Johnston BF, Mellor JW (1961). “The role of agriculture in economic development.” *American Economic Review*, 51(4), 566-593.

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Greif A (1993). "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition." *American Economic Review*, 83(3), 525-548.

Milner HV, Kubota K (2005). "Why the move to free trade? Democracy and trade policy in the developing countries." *International Organization*, 59(1), 107-143.

Spolaore E, Wacziarg R (2009). "The Diffusion of Development." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 124(2), 469-529.

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Pickering A, Rockey J (2011). "Ideology and the growth of government." *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 93(3), 907-919.

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de Benedictis-Kessner J, Warshaw C (2016). "Mayoral partisanship and municipal fiscal policy." *Journal of Politics*, 78(4), 1124-1138.

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Background reading:

Levi M (1988). *Of Rule and Revenue*. University of California Press.

Alt JE, Lowry RC (1994). “Divided government, fiscal institutions, and budget deficits: Evidence from the states.” *American Political Science Review*, 88(4), 811-828.

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Fahlenbrach R, Prilmeier R, Stulz RM (2012). “This Time Is the Same: Using Bank Performance in 1998 to Explain Bank Performance during the Recent Financial Crisis.” *The Journal of Finance*, 67(6), 2139-2185.

Schularick M, Taylor AM (2012). “Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles, and Financial Crises, 1870-2008.” *American Economic Review*, 102(2), 1029-1061.

McCarty N, Poole KT, Rosenthal H (2013). *Political Bubbles: Financial Crises and the Failure of American Democrac*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

Calomiris CW, Haber SH (2014). *Fragile by Design*. Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Reinhart CM, Rogoff KS (2014). “Recovery from Financial Crises: Evidence from 100 Episodes.” NBER Working Paper 19823.

McDowell D (2017). *Brother, can you spare a billion? The United States, the IMF, and the International Lender of Last Resort*. Oxford University Press.

Lipsy PY (2018). “Democracy and Financial Crisis.” *International Organization*, 72(4), 937-968.

Copelovitch M, Singer DA (2020). *Banks on the Brink: Global Capital, Securities Markets, and the Political Roots of Financial Crises*. Cambridge University Press, New York.

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Satyanath S (2005). *Globalization, Politics, and Financial Turmoil: Asia’s Banking Crisi*. Cambridge University Press, New York.

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Reinhart CM, Rogoff KS (2009). *This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

Stasavage D (2011). *States of credit: Size, power, and the development of European polities*. Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Information and media

Jensen R (2007). “The digital divide: Information (technology), market performance, and welfare in the South Indian fisheries sector.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 122(3), 879-924.

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Durante R, Pinotti P, Tesei A (2019). “The political legacy of entertainment TV.” *American Economic Review*, 109(7), 2497-2530.

Wang T (2021). “Media, pulpit, and populist persuasion: evidence from father Coughlin.” *American Economic Review*, 111(9), 3064-3092.

Tyler M, Grimmer J, Iyengar S (2022). “Partisan enclaves and information bazaars: Mapping selective exposure to online news.” *Journal of Politics*, 84(2), 1057-1073.

Background reading:

Tucker JA, Guess A, Barberá P, Vaccari C, Siegel A, Sanovich S, Stukal D, Nyhan B (2018). “Social media, political polarization, and political disinformation: A review of the scientific literature.” Hewlett Foundation.

Course policies

Pandemic/COVID

During this pandemic, it is extremely important that you abide by the public health regulations, the University of Pittsburgh's health standards and guidelines, and Pitt's Health Rules. These rules have been developed to protect the health and safety of all of us. Universal face covering is required in all classrooms and in every building on campus, without exceptions, regardless of vaccination status. This means you must wear a face covering that properly covers your nose and mouth when you are in the classroom. If you do not comply, you will be asked to leave class. It is your responsibility have the required face covering when entering a university building or classroom. For the most up-to-date information and guidance, please visit <https://coronavirus.pitt.edu> and check your Pitt email for updates before each class.

If you are required to isolate or quarantine, become sick, or are unable to come to class, contact me as soon as possible to discuss arrangements.

Disability Resource Services

If you have a disability for which you are or may be requesting an accommodation, you are encouraged to contact both your instructor and the Office of Disability Resources and Services, 140 William Pitt Union, 412-648-7890, as early as possible in the term. Disability Resources and Services will verify your disability and determine reasonable accommodations for this course.

Academic Integrity Policy

Cheating/plagiarism will not be tolerated. Students suspected of violating the University of Pittsburgh Policy on Academic Integrity, noted below, will be required to participate in the outlined procedural process as initiated by the instructor. A minimum sanction of a zero score for the quiz, exam or paper will be imposed. (For the full Academic Integrity policy, go to www.provost.pitt.edu/info/ai1.html.)

E-mail Communication Policy

Each student is issued a University e-mail address (username@pitt.edu) upon admittance. This e-mail address may be used by the University for official communication with students. Students are expected to read e-mail sent to this account on a regular basis. Failure to read and react to University communications in a timely manner does not absolve the student from knowing and complying with the content of the communications. The University provides an e-mail forwarding service that allows students to read their e-mail via other service providers (e.g., Hotmail, AOL, Yahoo). Students that choose to forward their e-mail from their pitt.edu address to another address do so at their own risk. If e-mail is lost as a result of forwarding, it does not absolve the student from responding to official communications sent to their University e-mail address. To forward e-mail sent to your University account, go to <http://accounts.pitt.edu>, log into your account, click on Edit Forwarding Addresses, and follow the instructions on the page. Be sure to log out of your account when you have finished. (For the full E-mail Communication Policy, go to www.bc.pitt.edu/policies/policy/09/09-10-01.html.)

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The University of Pittsburgh does not tolerate any form of discrimination, harassment, or retaliation based on disability, race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, genetic information, marital

status, familial status, sex, age, sexual orientation, veteran status or gender identity or other factors as stated in the University's Title IX policy. The University is committed to taking prompt action to end a hostile environment that interferes with the University's mission. For more information about policies, procedures, and practices, see: <https://www.diversity.pitt.edu/about>. I ask that everyone in the class strive to help ensure that other members of this class can learn in a supportive and respectful environment. If there are instances of the aforementioned issues, please contact the Title IX Coordinator, by calling 412-648-7860, or e-mailing titleixcoordinator@pitt.edu. Reports can also be filed online: <https://www.diversity.pitt.edu/civil-rights-title-ix-compliance/make-report>.