

Political Economy of Growth (PS 2543)

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Class Hours: 12-2:30

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Course Objectives

This graduate course is devoted to the study of the politics of economic growth. While this is nominally a course at the intersection of IPE and CPE, you will see that it borrows heavily from other subfields and disciplines (primarily economics, but also public policy, management, history, sociology, etc.).

The aim for this course is:

- to ensure that you have a strong overview of theoretical models of growth
- to show the richness of rigorous empirical work that has been conducted
- to stimulate new research ideas, new theories, and novel empirical designs

Note: the course is primarily one based on presentations and discussions. The readings consists in a mix of 'classics' and recent papers. The latter were selected because they are either interesting (if I read them) or they seem interesting (based on the abstract).

Requirements

Assignments.

- 50%: a research project/pre-analysis plan (including theory + empirical design; data analysis optional)
- 40%: in-class presentations and participation.
- 10%: a book review.

Grade scale: 0 < 60: F, 60 < 64: D-, 64 < 67: D, 67 < 70: D+, 70 < 73: C-, 74 < 77: C, 77 < 80: C+, 80 < 84: B-, 84 < 87: B, 87 < 90: B+, 90 < 94: A-, 93 or more: A. "Y < X" means: "from Y up to, but not including X." Grades are not rounded up.

Late submissions are penalized by a loss of 2 percentage points per day. If you have issues that prevent you from submitting an assignment on time, then please let me know immediately. If you inform me *after* a deadline has passed, I will need to be provided justification (e.g. doctor's note) to cancel the late submission penalty.

Important note: you can discuss ideas with your fellow students, but you must do your assignments individually. For pedagogical reasons, it is essential that you must try to understand the material on your own.

Organization

Every course is divided in three parts:

1. Lecture (if applicable)
2. Paper presentation (+ discussion)
3. Project presentation

Readings

There are no required textbooks for this class. Useful textbooks to study growth models include:

- Aghion P, Howitt PW (2008). *The Economics of Growth*. MIT Press.
- Acemoglu D (2009). *Introduction to Modern Economic Growth*. Princeton, University Press, Princeton, NJ.

Class Schedule

The schedule is subject to change.

Week 01, 01/09: Introduction

Hall RE, Jones CI (1999). "Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More, Output Per Worker Than Others?" *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 114(1), 83-116.

Galor O (2005). "Handbook of Economic Growth." In Aghion P, Durlauf S, (eds.), chapter From Stagnation to Growth: Unified Growth Theory,, 171-293. North-Holland.

Week 02, 01/16: MLK Day

No class.

Week 03, 01/23: Growth models and persistence

Comin D, Easterly W, Gong E (2010). "Was the Wealth of Nations, Determined in 1000 BC?" *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 2, 65-97.

Dell M (2010). "The Persistent Effects of Peru's Mining Mita.", *Econometrica*, 78(6), 1863-1903.

Miguel E, Roland G (2011). "The Long-Run Impact of Bombing Vietnam.", *Journal of Development Economics*, 96(1), 1-15.

Hornbeck R (2012). "The Enduring Impact of the American Dust Bowl: Short- and Long-Run Adjustments to Environmental Catastrophe." *The American Economic Review*, 102(4), 1477-1507.

Voigtländer N, Voth H (2012). "Persecution perpetuated: the medieval, origins of anti-Semitic violence in Nazi Germany." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 127(3), 1339-1392.

Guiso L, Sapienza P, Zingales L (2016). "Long-Term Persistence.", *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 14(6), 1401-1436.

Dalgaard C, Kaarsen N, Olsson O, Selaya P (2018). "Roman roads to, prosperity: Persistence and non-persistence of public goods provision.", CEPR Discussion Paper DP12745.

Background reading:

Kelly M (2019). "The standard errors of persistence." CEPR Discussion, paper no. DP13783.

Week 04, 01/30: Capital, investments, and firms

Gray J (2013). *The company states keep: International economic, organizations and investor perceptions*. Cambridge University Press,, New York.

Jensen NM (2017). "Job creation and firm-specific location incentives.", *Journal of Public Policy*, 37(1), 85-112.

Samila S, Sorenson O (2017). "Community and Capital in Entrepreneurship, and Economic Growth." *American Sociological Review*, 82(4), 770-795.

Danzman SB (2019). *Merging interests: when domestic firms shape FDI, policy*. Cambridge University Press.

Jensen NM, Findley MG, Nielson DL (2020). "Electoral institutions and, electoral cycles in investment incentives: A field experiment on over, 3,000 US municipalities." *American Journal of Political Science*, 64(4), 807-822.

Background reading:

Coase RH (1937). "The Nature of the Firm." *Economica*, 4(16), 386-405.

Edwards S (1995). "Why are saving rates so different across countries?, An international comparative analysis." NBER Working Paper 5097.

Mellahi K, Frynas JG, Sun P, Siegel D (2016). "A review of the, nonmarket strategy literature: Toward a multi-theoretical integration.", *Journal of Management*, 42(1), 143-173.

Week 05, 02/06: Labor, migration, and unions

Franzen A, Hangartner D (2006). "Social networks and labour market, outcomes: The non-monetary benefits of social capital." *European, Sociological Review*, 22(4), 353-368.

Hayashi F, Prescott EC (2008). "The depressing effect of agricultural, institutions on the prewar Japanese economy." *Journal of Political, Economy*, 116(4), 573-632.

Hainmueller J, Hiscox MJ (2010). "Attitudes toward Highly Skilled and, Low-Skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment." *American, Political Science Review*, 104(1), 61-84.

Hainmueller J, Hangartner D (2013). "Who gets a Swiss passport? A, natural experiment in immigrant discrimination." *American Political, Science Review*, 107(1), 159-187.

Jansen G, Sluiter R, Akkerman A (2016). "The Diffusion of Strikes: A, Dyadic Analysis of Economic Sectors in the Netherlands, 1995-2007.", *American Journal of Sociology*, 121(6), 1885-1918.

Frymer P, Grumbach JM (2021). "Labor unions and white racial politics.", *American Journal of Political Science*, 65(1), 225-240.

Bouscasse P, Nakamura E, Steinsson J (2021). "When did growth begin?, New estimates of productivity growth in England from 1250 to 1870.", NBER Working Paper 28623.

Erikson E, Shirado H (2021). "Networks, Property, and the Division of, Labor." *American Sociological Review*, 86(4), 759-786.

Lim J (2022). "The Electoral Consequences of International Migration in, Sending Countries: Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe.", *Comparative Political Studies*.

Jones CI (2022). "The end of economic growth? Unintended consequences, of a declining population." *American Economic Review*, 112(11), 3489-3527.

Colonnelli E, Neto VP, Teso E (2022). "Politics at work." NBER Working, Paper 30182.

Background reading:

Jäger S, Noy S, Schoefer B (2022). "The German Model of Industrial, Relations: Balancing Flexibility and Collective Action." *Journal of, Economic Perspectives*, 36(4), 53-80.

Naidu S (2022). “Is There Any Future for a US Labor Movement?” *Journal, of Economic Perspectives*, 36(4), 3-28.

Week 06, 02/13: Land and agriculture

Heldring L, Robinson JA, Vollmer S (2021). “The long-run impact of the, dissolution of the English monasteries.” *Quarterly Journal of, Economics*, 136(4), 2093-2145.

Finley T (2021). “Free riding in the monastery: Club goods, the, cistercian order and agricultural investment in Ancien Regime France.”, *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 184, 318-336.

Chang Q (2022). “Career Incentives, Economic Competition, and Public, Land Prices.” Working Paper.

Background reading:

Johnston BF, Mellor JW (1961). “The role of agriculture in economic, development.” *American Economic Review*, 51(4), 566-593.

Moore B (1966). *Social origins of dictatorship and democracy: Lord and, peasant in the making of the modern world*. Beacon Press.

Byerlee D, De Janvry A, Sadoulet E (2009). “Agriculture for, development: Toward a new paradigm.” *Annual Review of Resource, Economics*, 1(1), 15-31.

Week 07, 02/20: Technology and infrastructure

Acemoglu D, Restrepo P (2020). “Robots and jobs: Evidence from US labor, markets.” *Journal of Political Economy*, 128(6), 2188-2244.

Owen E (2019). “Firms vs. Workers? The Politics of Openness in an Era, of Global Production and Automation.” Working Paper.

Busemeyer MR, Tober T (2022). “Dealing with Technological Change:, Social Policy Preferences and Institutional Context.” *Comparative, Political Studies*, 00104140221139381.

Lim J, Aklin M, Frank M (2022). “Quantifying Barriers to a Just, Transition for US Fossil Fuel Workers.” Working Paper.

Braun ST, Franke R (2022). “Railways, Growth, and Industrialization in, a Developing German Economy, 1829-1910.” *The Journal of Economic, History*, 82(4), 1183-1221.

Voth H, Caprettini B, Trew A (2022). “Fighting for Growth: Labor, scarcity and technological progress during the British industrial, revolution.” Working Paper Series 2022-15.

Background reading:

Schumpeter J (1934). *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*. Harper,, New York.

Iversen T, Soskice D (2001). “An asset theory of social policy, preferences.” *American Political Science Review*, 95(4), 875-893.

Walter S (2021). “The backlash against globalization.” *Annual Review, of Political Science*, 24(1), 421-442.

Week 08, 02/27: Human capital

Stijns J (2006). "Natural resource abundance and human capital, accumulation." *World Development*, 34(6), 1060-1083.

Harding R, Stasavage D (2013). "What Democracy Does (and Doesn't Do), for Basic Services: School Fees, School Inputs, and African Elections." *Journal of Politics*, 76(1), 229-245.

Ansell B, Lindvall J (2013). "The political origins of primary, education systems: Ideology, institutions, and interdenominational, conflict in an era of nation-building." *American Political Science Review*, 107(3), 505-522.

Cantoni D, Yuchtman N (2014). "Medieval Universities, Legal, Institutions, and the Commercial Revolution." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 129(2), 823-887.

Squicciarini MP, Voigtländer N (2015). "Human capital and, industrialization: Evidence from the age of enlightenment." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 130(4), 1825-1883.

Rauscher E (2016). "Does Educational Equality Increase Mobility?, Exploiting Nineteenth-Century U.S. Compulsory Schooling Laws." *American Journal of Sociology*, 121(6), 1697-1761.

Croke K, Grossman G, Larreguy HA, Marshall J (2016). "Deliberate, Disengagement: How Education Can Decrease Political Participation in, Electoral Authoritarian Regimes." *American Political Science Review*, 110(3), 579-600.

De la Croix D, Doepke M, Mokyr J (2018). "Clans, guilds, and markets: Apprenticeship institutions and growth in the preindustrial economy." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 133(1), 1-70.

Squicciarini MP (2020). "Devotion and development: religiosity, education, and economic progress in nineteenth-century France." *American Economic Review*, 110(11), 3454-91.

Background reading:

Weitzman ML (1998). "Recombinant growth." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 113(2), 331-360.

Barro RJ (2001). "Human Capital and Growth." *American Economic Review*, 91(2), 12-17.

Goldin C, Katz LF (2010). *The Race between Education and Technology*, Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA.

Week 08, 02/27: Social capital and networks

Satyanath S, Voigtlaender N, Voth H (2017). "Bowling for Fascism: Social Capital and the Rise of the Nazi Party." *Journal of Political Economy*, 125(2).

Frank MR, Sun L, Cebrian M, Youn H, Rahwan I (2018). "Small cities face, greater impact from automation." *Journal of the Royal Society, Interface*, 15(139), 20170946.

Hong I, Frank MR, Rahwan I, Jung W, Youn H (2020). "The universal, pathway to innovative urban economies." *Science Advances*, 6(34), eaba4934.

Background reading:

Montgomery JD (1991). "Social networks and labor-market outcomes: Toward an economic analysis." *American economic review*, 81(5), 1408-1418.

Putnam RD (2001). *Bowling Alone*. Simon & Schuster, New York.

Glaeser EL (2008). *Cities, agglomeration, and spatial equilibrium*., Oxford University Press.

Week 09, 03/06: Spring Break

No class.

Week 10, 03/13: Institutions (democracy vs autocracy)

Feyrer J, Sacerdote B (2009). "Colonialism and Modern Income: Islands, as Natural Experiments." *The Review of Economics and Statistics*., 91(2), 245-262.

Michalopoulos S, Papaioannou E (2013). "National Institutions and, Subnational Development in Africa." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*., 129(1), 151-213.

Fernández R (2014). "Women's rights and development." *Journal of, Economic Growth*, 19(1), 37-80.

Pepinsky TB (2016). "Colonial migration and the origins of governance:, Theory and evidence from Java." *Comparative Political Studies*., 49(9), 1201-1237.

Lacroix J (2017). "Steam democracy up! Industrialization-led opposition, in Napoleonic plebiscites." *European Review of Economic History*., 22(2), 135-160.

Acemoglu D, Naidu S, Restrepo P, Robinson JA (2019). "Democracy does, cause growth." *Journal of Political Economy*, 127(1), 47-100.

Background reading:

Lipset SM (1959). "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic, Development and Political Legitimacy." *American Political Science, Review*, 53(1), 69-105.

O'Donnell G (1973). *Modernization and bureaucratic-authoritarianism:, Studies in South American politics*. Institute of International, Studies.

Dahl RA (1989). *Democracy and Its Critics*. Yale University Press, New, Haven.

Przeworski A (1991). *Democracy and the market: Political and economic, reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge University, Press.

Acemoglu D, Johnson S, Robinson JA (2001). "The Colonial Origins of, Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation." *American, Economic Review*, 91(5), 1369-1401.

Baum MA, Lake DA (2003). "The Political Economy of Growth: Democracy, and Human Capital." *American Journal of Political Science*, 47(2), 333-347.

Rodrik D, Subramanian A, Trebbi F (2004). "Institutions rule: the, primacy of institutions over geography and integration in economic, development." *Journal of Economic Growth*, 9(2), 131-165.

Glaeser EL, La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A (2004). "Do, Institutions Cause Growth?" *Journal of Economic Growth*, 9(3), 271-303.

Cheibub JA, Gandhi J, Vreeland J (2010). "Democracy and Dictatorship, Revisited." *Public Choice*, 143(1), 67-101.

Acemoglu D, Egorov G, Sonin K (2021). "Institutional change and, institutional persistence." In *The Handbook of Historical Economics*, 365-389. Elsevier.

Week 11, 03/20: Institutions (autocracy)

Albertus M (2015). *Autocracy and Redistribution*. Cambridge University, Press, New York.

Miller MK (2015). "Electoral Authoritarianism and Human Development.", *Comparative Political Studies*, 48(12), 1526-1562.

Geddes B, Wright J, Wright JG, Frantz E (2018). *How dictatorships work: Power, personalization, and collapse*. Cambridge University, Press, New York.

Dower PC, Finkel E, Gehlbach S, Nafziger S (2018). "Collective action, and representation in autocracies: Evidence from Russia's great reforms." *American Political Science Review*, 112(1), 125-147.

Rozenas A, Zhukov YM (2019). "Mass Repression and Political Loyalty: Evidence from Stalin's 'Terror by Hunger'." *American Political Science Review*, 113(2), 569-583.

Rizio SM, Skali A (2019). "How often do dictators have positive, economic effects? Global evidence, 1858-2010." *The Leadership, Quarterly*.

Chang Q (2022). "Career Incentives, Economic Competition, and Public, Land Prices." Working Paper.

Background reading:

Linz JJ (2000). *Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes*. Lynne Rienner, Publishers.

Olson M (1993). "Dictatorship, democracy, and development." *American, political science review*, 87(3), 567-576.

Gandhi J (2008). *Political institutions under dictatorship*. Cambridge, University Press, New York.

Svolik MW (2012). *The politics of authoritarian rule*. Cambridge, University Press, New York.

Gehlbach S, Sonin K, Svolik MW (2016). "Formal Models of Nondemocratic, Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 19(1), 565-584.

Week 12, 03/27: Institutions (bureaucracy, state capacity)

Acemoglu D, García-Jimeno C, Robinson JA (2015). "State capacity and, economic development: A network approach." *American Economic Review*, 105(8), 2364-2409.

Vogler JP (2019). "Imperial rule, the imposition of bureaucratic, institutions, and their long-term legacies." *World Politics*, 71(4), 806-863.

Colonnelli E, Prem M, Teso E (2020). "Patronage and selection in public, sector organizations." *American Economic Review*, 110(10), 3071-99.

Rich JA (2022). "Outsourcing Bureaucracy to Evade Accountability: How, Public Servants Build Shadow State Capacity." *American Political, Science Review*, 1-16.

Slough T (2022). "Bureaucratic Quality and Electoral Accountability.", Working Paper.

Background reading:

Weber M (2019). *Economy and Society*. Harvard University Press. ' Hendrix CS (2010). "Measuring state capacity: Theoretical and empirical, implications for the study of civil conflict." *Journal of Peace, Research*, 47(3), 273-285.

Pomeranz D, Vila-Belda J (2019). "Taking state-capacity research to the field: Insights from collaborations with tax authorities." *Annual, Review of Economics*, 11, 755-781.

Besley T, Burgess R, Khan A, Xu G (2022). "Bureaucracy and, development." *Annual Review of Economics*, 14, 397-424.

Week 13, 04/03: Institutions (informal)

Tsai KS (2006). "Adaptive informal institutions and endogenous, institutional change in China." *World Politics*, 59(1), 116-141.

Alesina A, Giuliano P, Nunn N (2013). "On the origins of gender roles: Women and the plough." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 128(2), 469-530.

Cantoni D (2015). "The economic effects of the Protestant Reformation: testing the Weber hypothesis in the German lands." *Journal of the, European Economic Association*, 13(4), 561-598.

Nowak A, Gelfand MJ, Borkowski W, Cohen D, Hernandez I (2016). "The, evolutionary basis of honor cultures." *Psychological science*, 27(1), 12-24.

Schulz J (2017). "The Churches' Bans on Consanguineous Marriages,, Kin-Networks and Democracy." Working Paper.

Lowes S, Nunn N, Robinson JA, Weigel JL (2017). "The evolution of, culture and institutions: Evidence from the Kuba kingdom.", *Econometrica*, 85(4), 1065-1091.

Lehne J (2018). "An opium curse? The long-run economic consequences of, narcotics cultivation in British India." Working Paper.

Background reading:

Bourdieu P, Passeron J (1990). *Reproduction in Education, Society and, Culture*. Sage Publications, London.

Mauss M (2000). *The Gift*. W. W. Norton, New York.

Lauth H (2000). "Informal Institutions and Democracy.", *Democratization*, 7(4), 21-50.

Guiso L, Sapienza P, Zingales L (2006). "Does culture affect economic, outcomes?" *Journal of Economic perspectives*, 20(2), 23-48.

Alesina A, Giuliano P (2015). "Culture and institutions." *Journal of, Economic Literature*, 53(4), 898-944.

Week 14, 04/10: Law, crime, and property rights

Kostelnik J, Skarbek D (2013). "The governance institutions of a drug, trafficking organization." *Public Choice*, 156(1-2), 95-103.

Dube O, García-Ponce O, Thom K (2016). "From Maize to Haze: Agricultural Shocks and the Growth of the Mexican Drug Sector.", *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 14(5), 1181-1224.

Dimico A, Isopi A, Olsson O (2017). "Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: The Market for Lemons." *The Journal of Economic History*, 77(4), 1083-1115.

Daniele G, Dipoppa G (2022). "Fighting Organized Crime by Targeting their Revenue: Screening, Mafias, and Public Funds." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*.

Ash E, Chen DL, Naidu S (2022). "Ideas have consequences: The impact of law and economics on american justice." NBER Working Paper 29788.

Background reading:

Anderson RT (1965). "From Mafia to Cosa Nostra." *American Journal of Sociology*, 71(3), 302-310.

Krueger AO (1974). "The political economy of the rent-seeking society.", *American Economic Review*, 64(3), 291-303.

North DC, Weingast BR (1989). "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England." *The Journal of Economic History*, 49(4), 803-832.

Gottfredson M, Hirschi T (1990). *A General Theory of Crime*. Stanford, University Press, Stanford.

Fiorentini G, Peltzman S (1997). *The economics of organised crime.*, Cambridge University Press, New York.

Porta RL, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A (2008). "The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins." *Journal of Economic Literature*, 46(2), 285-332.

Venkatesh S (2008). *Gang Leader for a Day*. Penguin, New York.

Week 15, 04/17: Violence and war

Nunn N, Wantchekon L (2011). "The slave trade and the origins of mistrust in Africa." *American Economic Review*, 101(7), 3221-52.

Berger D, Easterly W, Nunn N, Satyanath S (2013). "Commercial imperialism? Political influence and trade during the Cold War.", *American Economic Review*, 103(2), 863-96.

Oatley T (2015). *A Political Economy of American Hegemony*. Cambridge, University Press, New York.

Braun R (2016). "Religious minorities and resistance to genocide: The collective rescue of Jews in the Netherlands during the Holocaust.", *American Political Science Review*, 110(1), 127-147.

Klor EF, Saiegh SM, Satyanath S (2017). "Cronyism in State Violence: Evidence from Labor Repression During Argentina's Last Dictatorship.", Working Paper.

Dell M, Querubin P (2017). "Nation Building Through Foreign, Intervention: Evidence from Discontinuities in Military Strategies.", *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 133*(2), 701-764.

Leeson PT, Russ JW (2017). "Witch trials." *The Economic Journal*, 128(613), 2066-2105.

Feigenbaum JJ, Lee J, Mezzanotti F (2018). "Capital Destruction and, Economic Growth: The Effects of Sherman's March, 1850-1920." NBER, Working Paper 25392.

Cox GW, Dincecco M (2019). "The Budgetary Origins of Fiscal-Military, Prowess." Working Paper.

Hager A, Krakowski K (2022). "Does state repression spark protests?, evidence from secret police surveillance in communist poland.", *American Political Science Review*, 116(2), 564-579.

Bachmann R, Baqaee D, Bayer C, Kuhn M, Löschel A, Moll B, Peichl A,, Pittel K, Schukarick M (2022). "What if? The Economic Effects for, Germany of a Stop of Energy Imports from Russia." Econ Tribute Policy, Brief No. 028.

Background reading:

Tilly C (2017). "War making and state making as organized crime." In, *Collective Violence, Contentious Politics, and Social Change*, 121-139. Routledge.

Week 16, 04/24: Agency and leadership

Li H, Zhou L (2005). "Political turnover and economic performance: the, incentive role of personnel control in China." *Journal of public, economics*, 89(9-10), 1743-1762.

Jones BF, Olken BA (2005). "Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and, Growth since World War II." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 120(3), 835-864.

Khwaja AI, Mian A (2005). "Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected, Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market." *The Quarterly, Journal of Economics*, 120(4), 1371-1411.

Faccio M (2006). "Politically connected firms." *American economic, review*, 96(1), 369-386.

Ferguson T, Voth H (2008). "Betting on Hitler - The Value of Political, Connections in Nazi Germany." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(1), 101-137.

Querubin P, Snyder Jr JM (2013). "The Control of Politicians in Normal, Times and Times of Crisis: Wealth Accumulation by US Congressmen,, 1850-1880." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 8, 409-450.

Dal Bó E, Finan F, Folke O, Persson T, Rickne J (2017). "Who Becomes A, Politician?" *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 132(4), 1877-1914.

Girardi D, Bowles S (2018). "Institution Shocks and Economic Outcomes:, Allende's Election, Pinochet's Coup and the Santiago Stock Market.", *Journal of Development Economics*, 134, 16-27.

Chen T, Kung JK (2018). "Busting the "Princelings": The Campaign, Against Corruption in China's Primary Land Market." *Quarterly Journal, of Economics*, 134(1), 185-226.

Thompson DM, Feigenbaum JJ, Hall AB, Yoder J (2019). "Who Becomes a, Member of Congress? Evidence From De-Anonymized Census Data." NBER, Working Paper 26156.

Easterly W, Pennings S (2020). "Leader value added: assessing the, growth contribution of individual national leaders." World Bank Policy, Research Working Paper 9215.

Carreri M (2021). "Can good politicians compensate for bad, institutions? Evidence from an original survey of Italian mayors.", *Journal of Politics*, 83(4), 1229-1245.

Mehmood S, Naseer S, Chen DL (2021). "Training policymakers in, econometrics." Working Paper.

Week 17, 05/01: Trade

Rho S, Tomz M (2017). "Why don't trade preferences reflect economic, self-interest?" *International Organization*, 71.

Juhász R (2018). "Temporary Protection and Technology Adoption:, Evidence from the Napoleonic Blockade." *American Economic Review*, 108(11), 3339-76.

Barjamovic G, Chaney T, Coşar K, Hortaçsu A (2019). "Trade, merchants,, and the lost cities of the bronze age." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 134(3), 1455-1503.

Background reading:

Greif A (1993). "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in, Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition." *American Economic Review*, 83(3), 525-548.

Milner HV, Kubota K (2005). "Why the move to free trade? Democracy and, trade policy in the developing countries." *International Organization*, 59(1), 107-143.

Spolaore E, Wacziarg R (2009). "The Diffusion of Development.", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 124(2), 469-529.

Harrison A, Rodriguez-Clare A (2009). "Trade, Foreign Investment, and, Industrial Policy for Developing Countries." NBER Working Paper 15261.

Hays J (2009). *Globalization and the New Politics of Embedded, Liberalism*. Oxford University Press, New York.

Week 18, 05/08: Fiscal policy

Dincecco M (2010). "The Political Economy of Fiscal Prudence in, Historical Perspective." *Economics & Politics*, 22(1), 1-36.

Pickering A, Rockey J (2011). "Ideology and the growth of government.", *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 93(3), 907-919.

Raess D, Pontusson J (2015). "The politics of fiscal policy during, economic downturns, 1981-2010." *European Journal of Political Research*, 54(1), 1-22.

Scheve K, Stasavage D (2016). *Taxing the Rich A History of Fiscal, Fairness in the United States and Europe*. Princeton University Press,, Princeton, NJ.

de Benedictis-Kessner J, Warshaw C (2016). "Mayoral partisanship and, municipal fiscal policy." *Journal of Politics*, 78(4), 1124-1138.

Bodea C, Higashijima M (2017). "Central Bank Independence and Fiscal, Policy: Can the Central Bank Restrain Deficit Spending?" *British, Journal of Political Science*, 47(1), 47-70.

Hübscher E, Sattler T (2017). "Fiscal Consolidation under Electoral, Risk." *European Journal of Political Research*, 56(1), 151-168.

Rickard SJ (2018). *Spending to win: Political institutions, economic, geography, and government subsidies*. Cambridge University Press, New, York.

Andersson PF (2022). "Fiscal capacity in non-democratic states: the, origins and expansion of the income tax." *Journal of Institutional, Economics*, 1-15.

Background reading:

Levi M (1988). *Of Rule and Revenue*. University of California Press.

Alt JE, Lowry RC (1994). "Divided government, fiscal institutions, and, budget deficits: Evidence from the states." *American Political Science, Review*, 88(4), 811-828.

Week 19, 05/15: Models of inequality

Acemoglu D, Autor D, Hazell J, Restrepo P (2021). "AI and jobs:, evidence from online vacancies." *Journal of Labor Economics*.

Acemoglu D, Restrepo P (2022). "Tasks, automation, and the rise in US, wage inequality." *Econometrica*, 90(5), 1973-2016.

Lindgren K, Oskarsoon S (2022). "The Perpetuity of the Past:, Transmission of Political Inequality across Multiple Generations.", *American Political Science Review*, 1-15.

Background reading:

Moene KO, Wallerstein M (2001). "Inequality, Social Insurance, and, Redistribution." *American Political Science Review*, 95(4), 859-874.

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Course policies

Pandemic/COVID

During this pandemic, it is extremely important that you abide by the public health regulations, the University of Pittsburgh's health standards and guidelines, and Pitt's Health Rules. These rules have been developed to protect the health and safety of all of us. Universal face covering is required in all classrooms and in every building on campus, without exceptions, regardless of vaccination status. This means you must wear a face covering that properly covers your nose and mouth when you are in the classroom. If you do not comply, you will be asked to leave class. It is your responsibility have the required face covering when entering a university building or classroom. For the most up-to-date information and guidance, please visit <https://coronavirus.pitt.edu> and check your Pitt email for updates before each class.

If you are required to isolate or quarantine, become sick, or are unable to come to class, contact me as soon as possible to discuss arrangements.

Disability Resource Services

If you have a disability for which you are or may be requesting an accommodation, you are encouraged to contact both your instructor and the Office of Disability Resources and Services, 140 William Pitt Union, 412-648-7890, as early as possible in the term. Disability Resources and Services will verify your disability and determine reasonable accommodations for this course.

Academic Integrity Policy

Cheating/plagiarism will not be tolerated. Students suspected of violating the University of Pittsburgh Policy on Academic Integrity, noted below, will be required to participate in the outlined procedural process as initiated by the instructor. A minimum sanction of a zero score for the quiz, exam or paper will be imposed. (For the full Academic Integrity policy, go to www.provost.pitt.edu/info/ai1.html.)

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Each student is issued a University e-mail address (username@pitt.edu) upon admittance. This e-mail address may be used by the University for official communication with students. Students are expected to read e-mail sent to this account on a regular basis. Failure to read and react to University communications in a timely manner does not absolve the student from knowing and complying with the content of the communications. The University provides an e-mail forwarding service that allows students to read their e-mail via other service providers (e.g., Hotmail, AOL, Yahoo). Students that choose to forward their e-mail from their pitt.edu address to another address do so at their own risk. If e-mail is lost as a result of forwarding, it does not absolve the student from responding to official communications sent to their University e-mail address. To forward e-mail sent to your University account, go to <http://accounts.pitt.edu>, log into your account, click on Edit Forwarding Addresses, and follow the instructions on the page. Be sure to log out of your account when you have finished. (For the full E-mail Communication Policy, go to www.bc.pitt.edu/policies/policy/09/09-10-01.html.)

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