

Class 10: Movements


Demobilisation

Dr. Michael C. Zeller

Agenda for the day

- Opening notes
- Demobilisation and disengagement conceptually
- Individual demobilisation/disengagement
- Campaign demobilisation
- Organisational demobilisation (and proscription)
- Any questions, concerns, feedback for this class?

Opening notes



Presentation groups

June July May

Date	Presenters	Method
5 June:	Rasmus B., Andre D., Josefine E., Ioanna L., Santiago C.	surveys
12 June:	Omar B., Lela E., Niclas W.	network analysis
19 June:	NO CLASS MEETING	
26 June:	Colombe I., Konstantin S., Jakob W., Veronika L.	ethnography
26 June:	Maksim K., Felix S., Jon L.D., Damir S., Korbinian M.	case study

Demobilisation and disengagement conceptually

- definitions:
 - process and outcome
- causes:
 - internal
 - individual, organisational
 - external
 - state, private



Demobilisation and disengagement defined

Demobilisation (Zeller under contract; cf. Davenport 2015)

the **process** whereby **collective action**, whether in the form of campaigns, organisations, or even whole movements, **decreases** and ultimately **ends**

Disengagement (cf. Gaudette, Scrivens, and Venkatesh 2022; Fillieule 2009, 2015)

the **process** by which an **individual** leaves their associated extremist group or movement

Note that these definitions cover *decline* and *cessation* of activity

Demobilisation causes (Zeller under contract)

Internal		External	
Lost Participation (individual level)	Organisational Failure (group level)	Social control (two dimensions)	
<i>Burnout/exhaustion</i> (inability to continue participation)	<i>Membership loss</i> (failure to recruit/retain members)	<i>(1) Identity of repressive agent</i> State agents (actors representing state institutions)	<i>repressive agent</i> Private agents (actors not representing state institutions)
<i>Lost commitment</i> (unwillingness to continue participation)	<i>Factionalisation</i> (internal splitting of organisations or coalitions)	<i>(2) Character of repressive action</i> Coercion (direct repression; the threat or use of force)	<i>repressive action</i> Channelling (indirect repression, such as resource deprivation, problem depletion)
	<i>Rigidity</i> (failure to adapt according to new circumstances)		

Demobilisation causes (Zeller under contract)

causes overlap and interact in different demobilisation processes

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Individual demobilisation/disengagement

Individual disengagement - core concepts

- **radicalisation** (*change in belief*): process of connecting with and adopting radical or extremist ideology—does not necessarily result in violence or ‘engaging’ in extremist activity
- **engagement** (*change in behaviour*): (in this context) process or act of performing radical or extremist activity, especially violence
- **deradicalisation** (*change in belief*): (p1) “process by which an individual is diverted from an extremist ideology, eventually rejecting an extremist ideology and moderating their beliefs”
- **disengagement** (*change in behaviour*): (p1) “process by which an individual decides to leave their associated extremist group or movement in order to reintegrate into society”

Individual disengagement - a few reasons

Burnout/exhaustion or Lost commitment might be driven by ...
among several possibilities:

Individual disengagement - a few reasons

Burnout/exhaustion or Lost commitment might be driven by ...
among several possibilities:

- intervention programmes

Individual disengagement - a few reasons

Burnout/exhaustion or Lost commitment might be driven by ... among several possibilities:

- criminal justice responses (high variability: from 'read Jane Austen' ([Taylor and Suliman 2021](#)); to counter-terrorism responses ([Koehler 2019](#)))
- intervention programmes

Individual disengagement - a few reasons

Burnout/exhaustion or Lost commitment might be driven by ... among several possibilities:

- changes to biographical availability
- criminal justice responses (high variability: from 'read Jane Austen' ([Taylor and Suliman 2021](#)); to counter-terrorism responses ([Koehler 2019](#)))
- intervention programmes


Individual disengagement - Gaudette et al. (2022)

- interviews with Canadian former right-wing extremists (RWEs):
- ethical implications? (more on related issues in our last class)

prior to conducting the interviews with formers, we consulted with key stakeholders, namely Canadian law enforcement officials and local community activists, and they developed a list of interview questions that they would ask formers and those questions were incorporated into the interview guide. The purpose of this approach was simple: rather than developing an interview guide that was derived from an academic perspective only, we included interview questions from key stakeholders for the purposes of developing a multidimensional, multi-perspective interview guide.

Individual disengagement - Gaudette et al. (2022)

- data: 10 former RWEs, recruited using **snowball sampling**



Disengagement reasons - Gaudette et al. (2022)

	-	n
Birth of a child	4	
Reunite with family	1	
Emotional burnout	3	
Physical burnout	1	
Disillusionment	6	

- note multiplicity of reasons

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- ‘hard-wired beliefs’: disengaged but not deradicalised
 - retention of radicalism → strong predictor of reengagement (Altier, MB, Boyle, EL, & Horgan, J., 2021)

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- note multiplicity of reasons
- generalisability? might we find the same with other places, periods, movements?

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Individual disengagement intervention programmes



- non-criminal justice responses increasingly common in many European states
- social work programmes to steer individuals away from radical/extreme milieu
- For example: Exit Norway, UK's Prevent strategy and Channel programme, EXIT Deutschland

Disengagement intervention programmes - EXIT



DonateTheHate

Trojan T-Shirt


Involuntary walkathon

Haut, Stein



Campaign demobilisation

- unit of analysis: campaign
- patterns overall (Zeller 2021; Zeller under contract)
- example of EDL (UK) (Morrow and Meadowcroft 2018)




Social movement campaigns

- Campaigns consist of four elements (della Porta and Rucht 2002; Staggenborg and Lecomte 2009)
 1. a consistent organising actor (an activist[s], an organisation[s]),
 2. temporal boundedness,
 3. strategically linked actions, and
 4. the intention to advance goals

Far-right demonstration campaigns (AT, DE, UK)





What might cause these campaigns to (negatively) demobilise?

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- concentrated private channelling (*PCH*)
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- concentrated private coercion (*PCO*)
- concentrated private channelling (*PCH*)
- concentrated state coercion (*SCO*)
- concentrated state channelling (*SCH*)

What might cause these campaigns to (negatively) demobilise?

- long duration (*LD*) (on temporality, see Grzymala-Busse 2011)
- concentrated private coercion (*PCO*)
- concentrated private channelling (*PCH*)
- concentrated state coercion (*SCO*)
- concentrated state channelling (*SCH*)

Far-right demobilisation patterns (Zeller under construction)

		incls	PRI	covS	covU	cases
closing opportunity	SCH	0.977	0.977	0.408	0.097	HoGeSa, Pressefest der Deutsche Stimme, Eichsfelder Heimattag; AN Antikriegstag; 2. Hess Gedenkmarsch; 1. Hess Gedenkmarsch; 2. Waffen-SS commemoration, Heidenau hört zu; Ulrichsbergfeier; Freital steht auf, 2018 Pro Chemnitz; Tag der deutschen Zukunft; Trauermarsch Bad Nenndorf
state repression	~LD* ~PCH	1	1	0.136	0.087	Freigeist; Sachsentag; 1. Waffen-SS commemoration; 1. Hess Gedenkmarsch
civil counter-mobilisation	~PCO* PCH	0.925	0.923	0.475	0.243	Lichtelläufen Schneeberg, Free Tommy Robinson, FLA against extremism, Justice for Women and Children; HoGeSa, Pressefest der Deutsche Stimme, Eichsfelder Heimattag; 2. Hess Gedenkmarsch; Deutsche Volksunion Congress, PEGIDA Dresden, Legida, EDL rally, Migrationspakt stoppen, S/TH-ÜGIDA; Freital steht auf, 2018 Pro Chemnitz
anti-far-right militancy	LD* ~SCO* PCO	1	1	0.214	0.146	2. Wehrmachtsausstellung; Trauermarsch Magdeburg, BNP Red, White and Blue festival, Wiener Korporations Ball, 1. Trauermarsch Dresden; Tag der deutschen Zukunft; Trauermarsch Bad Nenndorf
Solution		0.949	0.948	0.893		


Far-right demobilisation patterns (Zeller under contr



non-demobilisation

mixed outcomes

no cases



Example of the EDL (Morrow and Meadowcroft 2018)



English Defence League (EDL)



- important case: return to street politics, lots of successors (FLA, DFLA, Free Tommy Robinson, Justice for Women and Children)

Example of the EDL (Morrow and Meadowcroft 2018)



rejection of pluralism and minority rights means [EDL] can properly be considered 'far right' (p545) (cf. Mudde 2019)

EDL (Morrow and Meadowcroft 2018; cf. Busher et al.



- RQ: What determines the success or failure of FR organisations?
- theory: “We concur with Norris (2005) that a satisfactory explanation of far-right... activism must understand the *interaction of supply and demand*.
- data: ethnographic interviews at protests in London, Manchester, Newcastle and Rotherham
 - “nonprobabilistic and purposive” sample
 - respondents ages 16 to 54 years, 15 men and 5 women




EDL (Morrow and Meadowcroft 2018)

- methods note:
 - explanations for the rapid collapse of the EDL (**explaining outcome, single case study**) (p544)
- EDL measured its success by protest attendance (unclear how then to achieve goals)
- benefits to members: access to violence, increased self-worth and group solidarity
- participatory crowding → many marginal members



EDL (Morrow and Meadowcroft 2018)



From 2012, the police more effectively kept EDL and counter-demonstrations apart, and routed protests away from potential flashpoints such as Islamic centres

EDL (Morrow and Meadowcroft 2018)

At interview, Robinson explained that the numbers at EDL demonstrations declined from 2011 because: *The police were successful in what they were doing, the days become quite boring, intentionallywise [sic]... Tower Hamlets they held everyone in the road for six hours – it's boring as fuck. Do you think I've just travelled down from Newcastle to stand in the road for six hours without having beer?*


on protest policing, see (e.g.,) della Porta and Reiter (1998)

Organisational demobilisation (and proscription)

- states and civil society responding to far-right *organisations*
- overview of proscription/banning of far-right organisations
- proscription patterns in Germany




Banned & monitored (nationally) FR orgs in Germany




- Organisations monitored by Bundesverfassungsschutz (VfS)
 - ○: monitored by VfS, but not banned
 - ✕: banned by BRD interior ministry

Banned & monitored (nationally) FR orgs in Germany



- Organisations monitored by Bundesverfassungsschutz (VfS)
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- many groups/orgs. exist that are in violation of the law; they are monitored; but they are not banned.
Why?

Banned & monitored (nationally) FR orgs in Germany



- Organisations monitored by Bundesverfassungsschutz (VfS)
 - ○: monitored by VfS, but not banned
 - ✕: banned by BRD interior ministry
- many groups/orgs. exist that are in violation of the law; they are monitored; but they are not banned.
Why?
- a mixture of situational (and contextual, but that's for cross-country comparison) and proximate conditions that lead to bans

Banning FR orgs in Germany - necessity

- **high far-right visibility** is necessary for banning decisions

German governments banned far-right organisations only in years when far-right activity, in the form of violence or agitation, was highly visible. Conspicuous incidents of violence in particular were often a prod to proscriptive action. Organisational unlawfulness alone is not enough to explain banning decisions. Without public or political awareness, authorities appear unlikely to act, even if a group is technically illegal.

Banning FR orgs in Germany - sufficient patterns

1. Neo-Nazi movement groups – organisations promote National Socialist ideology – legally sufficient for banning in Germany and several other countries – as well as racial hatred and violence.
2. Longstanding hubs – long existing organisations, serving as centres of far-right activism and networking (network disruption strategy in banning decisions?)
3. Militant organisations – organisations embody particularly aggressive, confrontational far-right activism
4. Neo-Nazi sham parties – organisations presented as parties (hoping for status's protection) but still spread neo-Nazi ideology

Case 1: Nationale Offensive (NO)

- typical of neo-Nazi sham parties pattern
- founded 1990 (by split from FAP) → linked to previously banned group
- not serious electoral contestation:
 - 0.2 per cent at local elections in Singen-Konstanz
 - 1992 BW Landtag elections: 183 votes out of five million cast
- BAN: by Rudolf Seiters (CDU): the NO ‘created and fuelled a xenophobic mood.’
- NO *appealed...* → Federal Administrative Court *quashed* appeal

mechanism: *social and political pressure* on minister ← indignation about high levels of far-right violence (HVIO) situation

Case 2: Collegium Humanum (CH)

- typical of longstanding hubs pattern
- founded 1963 by Haverbeck (d. 1999) and Haverbeck-Wetzel
 - had charitable status (*Gemeinnützigkeit*)
 - meeting point (Vlotho, NRW) for far-right activists from all over
 - *are there any banned orgs. to which the CH was not linked?!*
 - publication: *Stimme des Gewissens*
- BAN: by Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU): the CH was directed against Germany's constitutional order and repeatedly violated laws against Holocaust denial

Case 2: Collegium Humanum (CH)



informative epilogue to these cases

Response to parliamentary inquiry (Deutscher Bundestag 1994).
Asked about effects of banning, government asserted

the bans had achieved ‘widespread uncertainty and a lack of prospects in the right-wing extremist scene, far-reaching suppression of group activity by breaking up organisational structures and confiscating organisations’ assets, and the seizure of weapons’

Moreover: government claimed a sort of **chilling effect**, that other groups ‘*have at least restricted their agitation activities in order to prevent bans*’.

informative epilogue to these cases

Conversely, gov. acknowledged that ...

- BfV intelligence-gathering perhaps disrupted by banning action,
- activists might use banning as an opportunity to propagandise,
- bans could radicalise members (i.e., conspiratorial, aggressive),
- members might acquire more solidarity by enduring banning

Response concludes, negative effects are uncertain, visible only after time; positive effects are achieved directly through the enforcement of bans. **instrumental logic**

- inconsistency in German governments' banning practices:
 - org. characteristics alone are not enough to explain bans
 - situational factors are causally significant and cannot be ignored
- the use of banning is sometimes a tool of politics rather than a targeted response to systemic threats
- *high far-right visibility* (HVIO+HPRO) necessary situation for ban
 - but that **visibility is specific** rather than generalised
 - builds social/political pressure to ban

bans do not just follow the law—they follow pressure. Public visibility, political will, and social mobilisation all shape outcomes. This means that organisational bans and perhaps other militant democracy decisions are not solely in the hands of governments. Societal actors inform and influence how states and governments respond to extremism.

Any questions, concerns, feedback for this class?

Anonymous feedback here:

<https://forms.gle/pisUmtmWdE13zMD58>

Alternatively, send me an email: m.zeller@lmu.de

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