

Class 5: Parties


voters

Dr. Michael C. Zeller

Agenda for the day

- Opening notes
- Overview of voting for far-right parties
- Poll: motivations and tendencies in voting for far-right parties
- Voting explanations: values & attitudes
- far-right parties' electoral performance - discussion
- responses and counter-strategies (lead-in to next week)
- Any questions, concerns, feedback for this class?

Opening notes



Presentation groups

Topics to me as soon as possible

May June July

Presentations line-up

Date	Presenters	Method
15 May:	Idil M., Zeynep P., Liesl W., Selin K., Chiara W.	logistic regression
22 May:	Gabriel W., Lina M., Florian S., Julian B.	discourse analysis
29 May:	NO CLASS MEETING	

Overview of voting for far-right parties

- demographically
- issue-based
- further explanatory factors
 - place
 - deprivation

Voting for far-right parties: demographically

- generally, voting for far-right parties (univariate predictors, e.g., in 11 European countries, Lucassen and Lubbers 2012; also Bornschier et al. 2021; Schäfer 2022) ...
 - **gender**: *men more likely than women*
 - **age**: *younger people more likely*
 - **location**: *rural/residents more likely*
 - **education**: *less educated more likely*
 - **ethnicity**: *migration background less likely*
 - **others?**
- **BUT** it is more complicated in bivariate/multivariate perspectives

Voting for far-right parties: issue-based

Voting for far-right parties: further explanatory factors

rising local rental prices increase probability of support (*AfD*) among renters with lower household income (Abou-Chadi, Cohen, and Kurer 2024)




Figure 6. Conditional marginal effects of local market rents on the probability of AfD support as a function of logged equivalized household incomes for long-term resident renters (left) and homeowners (right). Point estimates with 95% confidence

Voting for far-right parties: further explanatory factors

- public service deprivation predicts more far-right support (Cremaschi et al. 2024)
- place resentment: spatial clustering perception of one's region as *excluded* produces similar clustering of populist radical right attitudes (Arzheimer and Bernemann 2023)
- immigrant presence predicts more populist radical right support—mediated by education levels (Arzheimer et al. 2024)
- presence of stronger dialect predicts more far-right (*AfD*) voting (Ziblatt, Hilbig, and Bischof 2024)

Voting for far-right parties: further explanatory factors



– contact & threat hypotheses

- (intercultural) contact hypothesis *versus* threat hypothesis

- likelihood of Front National increases in polling stations intermediate distances from mosques and then decreases (Dazey and Gay 2024) – halo theory




Figure 2. Front National vote share, Presidential Election 2007 (%). This figure




Figure 3. Spatial distribution of mosques. This figure displays in dark green the locations of the 1,053 mosques present in the matched 1997 and 2012 files.

Far-right voting among the youth

(video from just before 2024 EU elections)





Far-right voting among the youth

Observations:

- pluralities of young men voting far right
 - some major young women support too (e.g., AfD)
- youth more left wing in Anglophone countries
- young Europeans more ‘right-wing’ than US/UK youth on cultural issues like immigration and welfare

Theses:

- Demographic, attitudinal factors:
 - educational gender gap
 - declining religious salience for women voters
 - polarisation from ‘culture war’ issues
- two- vs. multi-party systems
- underlying anti-establishment attitudes

Poll: motivations and tendencies | LMU

LUDWIG-
MAXIMILIANS-
UNIVERSITÄT
MÜNCHEN

voting for far-right parties



Take the survey at


<https://forms.gle/im5PVyqQeGNw8FWg8>

- Rational choice? Misinformed, manipulated?
- protest vote or genuine support?
- economic insecurity or cultural/identity-based concerns?
- actual immigration vs. perception of immigration?


Voting for far-right parties - hunches

Poll results (Respondents: 2)

Rational choice?






Misinformed, manipulated?



Voting for far-right parties - hunches

Voting for far-right parties - hunches



Voting for far-right parties - hunches

Voting explanations: values & attitudes

- institutional contexts
- demand side
- supply side
- silent revolution?
 - cultural backlash theory?



It's all about...

Values

Attitudes



Values

- broad, deep-seated beliefs about what is important in life
- stable over time, typically long-term and more abstract
- influenced by socialisation (e.g., family, culture, education)
- e.g., societies of survival vs. self-expression

It's all about...

Values

Attitudes



Attitudes

- specific and short-term predispositions or opinions that individuals hold toward specific objects, issues, or policies
- situational, influenced by context (e.g., economic conditions, political events) and personal experiences

It's all about...

Values

Attitudes



values *shape* attitudes

Voter choice, electoral behaviour frameworks

- institutional contexts
 - especially electoral and party systems
 - how FR parties emerge in two-party vs. multi-party systems
- demand side: major values and attitudes among electorate
 - what do voting constituencies want?
 - *who* (groups? from where?) are ‘buying’ what parties ‘supply’
- supply side: elite competition and cooperation
 - what do parties offer?
 - ideology and policy (party platform)
 - leaders and representatives

An opening salvo from Pippa Norris

(a full-length lecture: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Qw8TtzjtL4>. strongly recommended for those interested in party politics and/or doing their data report on a far-right party)



values & attitudes in brief (Inglehart, Norris, Welzel)

- Inglehart magnifies Maslow's **hierarchy of needs** to societal (macro-) level of analysis → aligns with groups and their socio-political values and attitudes




- basic material needs satisfied enables seeking non-material needs

- materialist values
 - economic growth (maintaining stability and order)
 - security and material needs safeguarded
 - traditional morality
- post-materialist values
 - freedoms, liberties, rights – autonomy and expression
 - gender and racial equality
 - environmental protection
- societal groups (existing cleavages) show tendencies towards these values groups: generationally, regionally, class-based, religiously

values & attitudes in brief (Inglehart, Norris, Welzel)



- silent revolution:
a values shift from
materialist to
post-materialist
 - new cleavage
silent counter-revolution



cultural backlash theory (Inglehart, Norris, Welzel, D




cultural backlash theory (Inglehart, Norris)

Stage 1: Values

Stage 2: Votes

Stage 3: Impacts



cultural backlash theory conclusions

1. age, education, urbanisation, cultural values **predict** voting for authoritarian-populist parties in Europe
2. older, non-college educated, rural areas with most authoritarian values drive voting for authoritarian-populist parties
 - *youth votes 'authoritarian-populist parties'* (cleavage forming?)
3. Tipping point thesis: increasing social liberalism threatens socially conservative authoritarian voters (faith, family, nation identities)
4. Effects of economic conditions and social diversity reinforces these threat perceptions

Critiquing cultural backlash theory - Schäfer (2022)



1. Different age groups have very similar cultural attitudes
of polarisation among old and young cohorts



2. On most topics, different cohorts agree in principle, even though they might differ in degree
3. No positive link between authoritarian values and populist attitudes (measured as political trust); if using a populism scale, cohorts hardly differ
4. Older *slightly* more likely to vote for authoritarian parties, less likely to vote for populists
5. Younger more likely to vote for authoritarian-populist parties defined in a more concise way
6. Interwar generation is the cohort least likely to vote for authoritarian-populist parties

far-right parties' electoral performance - discussion

under what conditions
do far-right parties

Electoral system and party competition

- electoral system: proportional representation, low thresholds → easier to gain seats
- party competition dynamics (e.g., Carter 2005): generally, far-right parties can benefit from ...
 - ideological distance from nearest right-wing/centre-right competitor ('political space')
 - being or at least appearing more moderate (contra: AfD, Trump Republicans)
 - ideological convergence between mainstream parties
 - hotly debated: accommodation, adopting far-right rhetoric/frames, exclusion of far right

Natural ceiling of support? Situational opportunities

- far-right parties rely on voters with nativist, perhaps populist attitudes
- ↳ surveys suggest these attitudes hover around 20%
 - is this a **natural ceiling** on far-right party electoral strength?

Opportunities:

- **crisis** (security/terrorism, economy, immigration) often triggers (*psychological phenomenon*) ‘authoritarian response’
- similarly, high **issue salience** of far-right ‘*owned*’ issues
- **frustration with mainstream** can boost protest votes

factors/combinations enable far-right parties to surpass 20% ceiling

responses and counter-strategies

(lead-in to next week)

- responses and counter-strategies
 - what types of responses?
 - by which actors?
 - what possible/likely effects?

Any questions, concerns, feedback for this class?

Anonymous feedback here:

<https://forms.gle/pisUmtmWdE13zMD58>

Alternatively, send me an email: m.zeller@lmu.de

References

- Abou-Chadi, Tarik, Denis Cohen, and Thomas Kurer. 2024. "Rental Market Risk and Radical Right Support." *Comparative Political Studies*, December, 00104140241306963. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140241306963>.
- Arzheimer, Kai, and Theresa Bernemann. 2023. "'Place' Does Matter for Populist Radical Right Sentiment, but How? Evidence from Germany." *European Political Science Review*, September, 1–20. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773923000279>.
- Arzheimer, Kai, Carl Berning, Sarah De Lange, Jerome Dutozia, Jocelyn Evans, Myles Gould, Eelco Harteveld, et al. 2024. "How Local Context Affects Populist Radical Right Support: A Cross-National Investigation Into Mediated and Moderated Relationships." *British Journal of Political Science* 54 (4): 1133–58. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123424000085>.
- Bornschier, Simon, Silja Häusermann, Delia Zollinger, and Céline Colombo. 2021. "How 'Us' and 'Them' Relates to Voting Behavior—Social Structure, Social Identities, and Electoral Choice." *Comparative Political Studies* 0 (0): 1–36. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414021997504>.
- Carter, Elisabeth. 2005. "Party Competition." In *The Extreme Right in Western Europe: Success or Failure?*, 102–45. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Cremaschi, Simone, Paula Rettl, Marco Cappelluti, and Catherine E. De Vries. 2024. "Geographies of Discontent: Public Service Deprivation and the Rise of the Far Right in Italy." *American Journal of Political Science*, December, ajps.12936. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12936>.

Dazey, Margot, and Victor Gay. 2024. "The Mosque Nearby: Visible Minorities and Far-Right Support in France." *Comparative Political Studies*, October, 0010414024128. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140241283015>.



Lucassen, Geertje, and Marcel Lubbers. 2012. "Who Fears What? Explaining Far-Right Voting Preference in Europe by Distinguishing Perceived Cultural and Economic Ethnic Threats." *Comparative Political Studies* 45 (5): 547–74. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414011427851>.

Schäfer, Armin. 2022. "Cultural Backlash? How (Not) to Explain the Rise of Authoritarian Populism." *British Journal of Political Science* 52 (4): 1977–93. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123421000363>.

Ziblatt, Daniel, Hanno Hilbig, and Daniel Bischof. 2024. "Wealth of Tongues: Why Peripheral Regions Vote for the Radical Right in Germany." *American Political Science Review* 118 (3): 1480–96. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055423000862>.